Battle of Mogadishu (1993)

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Operation Gothic Serpent: ‘Irene’
Part of the Somalian Civil War
Mike Durant's helicopter "Super Six-Four" heading out over Mogadishu on 3 October 1993.
Date October 3 - October 4, 1993 Location Mogadishu, Somalia Result Capture of intended Targets
Belligerents
U.S. Special Operations Forces	Mogadishu Local Militia, Citizens
Commanders and leaders
Major General William F. Garrison, Joint Task Force Command Center	Mohamed Farrah Aidid
Strength
160	2,000+
Casualties and losses
18 Killed 73 Wounded	1,000+

The Battle of Mogadishu was fought on October 3 and 4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, between forces of the United States (by order of U.S. President Bill Clinton) and Somali guerrilla fighters (loyal to warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid).

A Division of Delta Force, and Army Ranger teams executed an operation which involved traveling from their compound on the outskirts of the city to capture leaders of Aidid's militia. The assault force was composed of nineteen aircraft, twelve vehicles and 160 men. During the operation, two U.S. UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by rocket propelled grenades, and three others were damaged. Some of the soldiers were able to evacuate wounded back to the compound, but others were trapped at the crash sites and cut off. An urban battle ensued throughout the night. Early the next morning, a joint task force was sent to rescue the trapped troops. It contained soldiers from Pakistan, Malaysia, and U.S. soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division. They assembled some 100 vehicles, including Pakistani tanks, Malaysian Condor armored personnel carriers, and were supported by US A/MH-6 Little Bird and MH-60 helicopters. This task force reached the first crash site and led the trapped soldiers out. The second crash site was overrun; the lone surviving American was taken prisoner, but later released.

Figures are unknown, but American estimates are that between 1000 and 1,500 Somali militiamen and civilians lost their lives in the battle, with injuries to another 3000-4000. Estimates from the book Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War estimated more than 700 Somali militiamen dead, and more than one thousand wounded. More definitely, 18 American soldiers died, and 73 were wounded (another American soldier was killed in a mortar attack a day later). One Malaysian soldier died, and seven were wounded; two Pakistanis were also wounded.

Background to the battle

In January 1991, the leader of Somalia, Mohammed Siad Barre, was overthrown by a coalition of opposing clans, called the United Somalia Congress. After this revolution, the coalition divided into two groups. One was led by Ali Mahdi, who became president; and the other, by Mohammed Farah Aidid. In total, there were four opposing groups: the United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), which continued to fight over the domination of Somalia. In June, 1991, a ceasefire was agreed, which these groups however, failed to hold. A fifth group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), had already in June, seceded from the northwest portion of Somalia, re-naming it the Somaliland Republic, with the leader of the SNM, Abdel-Rahman Ahmed Ali as president.

In September, 1991, severe fighting broke out in Mogadishu, which continued in the following months and spread throughout the country, with over 20,000 people killed or injured by the end of the year. These wars led to the destruction of the agriculture of Somalia, which in turn led to starvation in large parts of Somalia. The international community began to send food supplies to halt the starvation, but vast amounts of food were hijacked and brought to local clan leaders, who routinely exchanged it with other countries for weapons. An estimated 80 percent of the food was stolen. These factors led to even more starvation, from which an estimated 300,000 people died, and another 1.5 million people suffered, between 1991 and 1992. In July, 1992, after a ceasefire between the opposing clan factions, the United Nations (UN) sent 50 military observers to watch the distribution of the food.

Operation Provide Relief began in August, 1992, when the Bush White House announced that U.S. military transports would support the multinational UN relief effort in Somalia. Ten C-130s and 400 people were deployed to Mombasa, Kenya during Operation Provide Relief, airlifting aid to remote areas in Somalia, to reduce reliance on truck convoys. One member of the 86th Supply Squadron was deployed with the ground support contingent, USAFE's only contribution to the operation. The Air Force C-130s delivered 48,000 tons of food and medical supplies in six months to international humanitarian organizations trying to help the over three million starving people in the country. When this proved inadequate to stop the massive death and displacement of the Somali people (500,000 dead and 1.5 million refugees or displaced), the U.S. in December, 1992, launched a major coalition operation, Operation Restore Hope, to assist and protect humanitarian activities, under which the United States would assume the unified command of the new operation, in accordance with resolution 794 (1992).

Chalk Four Ranger returns to base after a mission in Somalia, 1993.

Mission shift to nation-building

A key moment in the operation was when the mission shifted from delivering food supplies to nation-building.

On 1993-03-03, the U.N. Secretary-General submitted to the U.N. Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He indicated that since the adoption of Council resolution 794 (1992) in December 1992, the presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance (UNITAF deployed some 37,000 personnel over forty percent of southern and central Somalia). However, there was still no effective government, police, or national army with the result of serious security threats to UN personnel. To that end, the U.N. Security Council authorized UNOSOM II to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia, to achieve national reconciliation so as to create a democratic state.

At the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, held on 1993-03-15 in Addis Ababa, all fifteen Somali parties agreed to the terms set out to restore peace and democracy. Yet by May it became clear that, although signatory to the March Agreement, General Mohammed Farrah Aidid's faction would not cooperate in the Agreement's implementation.

UNOSOM II's attempts to implement disarmament led to violence. On June 5 1993, twenty-four Pakistani troops in the UN force were killed in heavy fighting in an area of Mogadishu controlled by Aidid. It was widely reported that the bodies of the UN peacekeepers had been mutilated. Some were skinned. Any hope of a peaceful resolution of the conflict quickly vanished. The next day, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 837 calling for the arrest and trial of those responsible for the ambush.

One of the most unfortunate results of this occurred on July 12, 1993 when a United States-led operation was launched on what was believed to be a safe house in Mogadishu where members of Aidid's Habr Gedir clan were supposedly meeting to plan more violence against U.S. and U.N. forces. In reality, elders of the clan, not gunmen, were meeting in the house. According to U.N. officials, the agenda (which was advertised in the local newspaper) was to discuss ways to peacefully resolve the conflict between Aidid and the multinational task force in Somalia, and perhaps even to remove Aidid as leader of the clan.

What eventually took place that day was a 17-minute combat operation in which U.S. Cobra attack helicopters fired 16 TOW missiles and thousands of 20-millimeter cannon rounds into the compound. When the operation was over and the smoke had cleared, more than 50 of the clan elders, the oldest and most respected in their community, were dead. Many in Mogadishu state that this was the turning point in unifying Somalians against the U.S. and U.N. efforts here. It would also lead to the deaths of four journalists, Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, Hansi Kraus and Anthony Macharia, who were killed by angry Somali mobs when they arrived to cover the incident. A fifth journalist, Scott Peterson, was injured but was rescued by his driver.

Operation Gothic Serpent

See Timeline of the Battle of Mogadishu for a detailed synopsis.

Map of key sites in Mogadishu during the battle.

On October 3 1993, Task Force Ranger, a U.S. Special Operations Forces composed mainly of Rangers, Delta Force (1st SFOD-D) operators, and aviation support from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Night Stalkers), attempted to capture Aidid's foreign minister, Omar Salad, and his top political advisor, Mohamed Hassan Awale. The plan was to fast rope from hovering MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, capture the targets, and load them onto a ground convoy for transport back to the U.S. compound. Four Ranger chalks, also inserted by helicopter, were to provide a secure square perimeter on the four corners of the operation's target building.

The ground extraction convoy was supposed to reach the captive targets a few minutes after the beginning of the operation. However, it ran into delays. Somali citizens and local militia formed barricades along the streets of Mogadishu with rocks and burning tires, blocking the convoy from reaching the Rangers and their captives. A five-ton truck, part of the convoy, was struck by a rocket propelled grenade.

Other complications arose. A U.S. Army Ranger was seriously injured during the insertion. PFC Todd Blackburn fell while fast roping from a helicopter hovering 70 feet above the streets. Minutes later, a MH-60 Black Hawk helicopter was shot down by a rocket propelled grenade. There was confusion between the ground convoy and the assault team. The assault team and the ground convoy waited for twenty minutes just out of sight of each other, ready to move, but each under the impression that they were to be first contacted by the other. During the wait, a second Black Hawk helicopter was downed. Most of the assault team went to the first crash site for a rescue operation. Upon reaching the site, about 90 Rangers found themselves under siege from heavy militia fire. Despite air support, the Rangers were effectively trapped for the night.

At the second crash site, two Delta Force snipers, Sgt. First Class Randy Shughart and Master Sgt. Gary Gordon, were inserted by helicopter (at their own request; permission was denied twice by Command but granted when they persisted and made a third request) to protect the injured crew from the approaching mob. Both snipers and three of the Black Hawk crewmen were later killed when the site was overrun by Somali militiamen. The Black Hawk's pilot, CW3 Mike Durant, who was seriously injured in the crash, was taken hostage. For their actions, Shughart and Gordon were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Repeated attempts by the Somalis to mass forces and overrun the American positions were neutralized by strafing and rocket attacks from U.S. aircraft. Reinforcements from the U.S. 10th Mountain Division, aided by Malaysian and Pakistani U.N. forces, arrived in the early morning. No contingency planning or coordination with U.N. forces had been arranged prior to the operation. This lack of planning significantly complicated and delayed the recovery of the surrounded U.S. soldiers.

The battle was over by October 4 at 6:30 AM. American forces were finally evacuated to the U.N. Pakistani base. In all, 18 US soldiers died of wounds from the battle and another 79 were injured. The Malaysian forces lost one soldier and had seven injured, while the Pakistanis suffered two injuries. Casualties on the Somali side were heavy, with estimates on fatalities from 500 to over 2000 people. The Somali casualties were a mixture of militiamen and local civilians, who were used as human shields. Two days later, a mortar round fell on the US compound, killing one U.S. soldier, SFC Matt Rierson, and injuring another twelve.

Killed on Oct. 3 and 4, 1993

US personnel

With posthumous awards listed.

• Sgt. First Class Randy Shughart, a Delta Sniper killed defending the crew of Super 64, the Medal of Honor.
• Master Sgt. Gary Gordon, a Delta Sniper killed defending the crew of Super 64, the Medal of Honor.
• CWO Cliff Wolcott, pilot of Super 61, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal, and the Air Medal with Valor Device , Night Stalkers
• CWO Donovan Briley, copilot of Super 61, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star and Air Medal with Valor Device, Night Stalkers
• Staff Sgt. William Cleveland, a crew chief on Super 64, Silver Star, Bronze Star and Air Medal with Valor Device, 75th Rangers
• Staff Sgt. Thomas Field, a crew chief on Super 64, Silver Star, Bronze Star and Air Medal with Valor Device, 75th Ranger
• CWO Raymond Frank, copilot of Super 64, Silver Star, Air Medal with Valor Device, Night Stalkers
• Staff Sgt. Daniel Busch, who crashed on Super 61 and was killed defending the downed crew, the Silver Star
• Sgt. Cornell Houston, who was killed fighting on the rescue convoy, the Bronze Star with Valor Device, De Fleury medal, 10th Mountain Division
• Sgt. Casey Joyce, who was killed on the Lost Convoy, the Bronze Star with Valor Device, 75th Rangers
• Spec. James Cavaco, who was killed on the Lost Convoy, the Bronze Star with Valor Device, 75th Rangers
• Cpl. Jamie Smith, who bled to death with the pinned-down force around crash site one, the Bronze Star with Valor Device, 75th Rangers
• Sgt. Dominick Pilla, who was killed on the convoy rescuing Pfc. Todd Blackburn, the Bronze Star with Valor Device, 75th Rangers. First KIA.
• Pfc. Richard Kowalewski, who was killed on the Lost Convoy, the Bronze Star with Valor Device, 75th Rangers
• Sgt. Lorenzo Ruiz, who was killed on the Lost Convoy, the Bronze Star with Valor Device, 75th Rangers
• Sgt. First Class Earl Fillmore, Delta soldier killed moving to the first crash site, Delta Force
• Pfc. James Martin, who was killed on the rescue convoy, 10th Mountain Division
• Master Sgt. Tim "Griz" Martin, a Delta soldier killed on the Lost Convoy, Delta Force

Malaysian personnel

• Pvt Mat Aznan Awang (posthumously promoted to Sgt) driver of a Malaysian Condor APC hit by a RPG. Awarded Seri Pahlawan Gagah Perkasa.

Somali personnel and civilians

• Unknown due to lack of record keeping. Often estimated around 1,000 killed, with a few thousand more wounded or missing and presumed dead. There are numerous accounts of local hospitals and clinics completely overwhelmed and flooded with wounded and dead for weeks after the battle had ended. But due to the almost complete lack of any official tally or records, the numbers will almost certainly remain unknown.

Order of battle

American units involved in the battle:

• U.S. 10th Mountain Division
• Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment
• Air Force Pararescue
• Special Forces Detachment Delta, a.k.a.: Delta Force
• Navy SEALs
• Night Stalkers

Consequences of the operation

Bravo Company, 3rd Batallion of the 75th Ranger Regiment in Somalia, 1993.

In a national security policy review session held in the White House on October 6, 1993, President Clinton directed the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, to stop all actions by U.S. forces against Aidid except those required in self-defense. He also reappointed Ambassador Robert B. Oakley as special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker a peace settlement and then announced that all U.S. Forces would withdraw from Somalia no later than March 31, 1994. On December 15, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stepped down, taking much of the blame for what was deemed a failed policy. For all intents and purposes, the United States was now determined to militarily disengage from Somalia as quickly as possible. Most of the American troops were out of Somalia by March 25, 1994. A few hundred Marines remained offshore to assist with any noncombatant evacuation mission that might occur regarding the 1,000-plus U.S. civilians and military advisers remaining as part of the U.S. liaison mission. All U.S. personnel were finally withdrawn by March 1995.

The Battle of Mogadishu led to a profound shift in American foreign policy, as American politicians became increasingly reluctant to use military intervention in Third World conflicts, failing to assist in the halt of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and affected America's actions in the Balkans during the later half of the 1990's. President Clinton preferred to use the "air power alone" tactic and hesitated to use U.S. ground troops in fighting Serbian military and para-military ground forces in Bosnia in 1995 and in Kosovo in 1999, out of fear of losing American soldiers in combat, as well as fear of repeating what happened in Mogadishu in 1993.

"Black Hawk Down"

In 1999, writer Mark Bowden published the book Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War which chronicles the events that surrounded the battle.

The book was adapted into the 2001 film Black Hawk Down, directed by Ridley Scott. The film describes the events surrounding the operation and some of the acts of bravery seen on that day. There are obvious differences between the book and the movie, which left out central sections and themes of the book, such as the involvement of civilians in the battle, and de-emphasized the key decision to stay in the area after the initial operation was completed, among others.

When the film premiered in Somalia in 2002, thousands went to see it. Many people in Mogadishu were angered by the film, calling it propaganda that focused on the 18 Americans killed and 73 wounded in the 18-hour battle, when an estimated 500 to 2,000 Somalis were also killed. When it was learned that the battle has been turned into a game for PC, Xbox, and PlayStation2, Somalis said it made a mockery of a real-life tragedy.

Mike Durant told his own story in his 2003 book In the Company of Heroes.

Rangers under fire in a Somali street near Irene's target building on October 3, 1993. The only photograph taken from the ground during the battle.

Links with Al-Qaeda

There have been allegations that Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda movement was involved in training and funding of Aidid's men. Bin Laden himself denied accusations of giving military aid and training to Aidid's men but openly praised the attack and the killing of 19 American soldiers. According to CNN, however, Al-Qaeda claimed to have supplied a large number of RPGs (Soviet-designed rocket-propelled grenade launchers) to Aidid's fighters and instructed them on a way to modify the RPGs to make them more effective against helicopters.

See also

• CNN effect
• Second Battle of Mogadishu

See para on rpg and indirect fire, i am the author and give you permission.

Home About Us Research Programs Publications Events Education Programs Contribute Books Orbis Bulletins Published Articles Transcripts E-Notes Iraq: We Have Seen This Movie Before by Garrett Jones

December 15, 2003

Garrett Jones is a 1993 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He served as a case officer with the CIA in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. He retired from the CIA in 1997 and now lives in the Northwestern United States.

Identify the following country: a mid-sized non-European country with a history going back to Biblical events. An ancient trading center, it figured in the works of ancient historians. It has an almost exclusively Muslim population, a troubled colonial history, and until recently was governed by an absolute dictator. The dictator, who ran a corrupt regime and aggressively attacked his neighbor, was ousted by force. The country, whose economy has since collapsed, is occupied by a multinational-armed force that is the frequent target of violent attacks— a mix of locally inspired efforts and actions planned or inspired by the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. It is believed to possess significant untapped oil reserves.

No, it is not Iraq. It is Somalia in 1993. [1] While one would not want to overreach in drawing a comparison between Somalia in 1993 and the current situation in Iraq, our experience in Somalia may be instructive in important respects. When I was serving in Somalia in 1993 as chief of CIA operations, some of the attacks against both multinational and U.S. forces were inspired or at least assisted, by elements of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. At the time, we did not know that. We did know that “foreigners” who had served in the Afghanis’ jihad against Soviet forces were assisting the Somalis in their attacks. In fact, we believed we knew the names of some of the individuals. However, in 1993, Al Qaeda was an unknown organization and Osama bin Laden was simply a “person of interest” in the terrorist world. Subsequently, we discovered that bin Laden had sent members of his organization to Somalia from Sudan to assist local Somali warlord Muhammad Farrah Aidid. According to statements allegedly made by bin Laden, he is doing the same thing in Iraq today.

Examining what happened in Somalia in 1993 may provide us with clues to how Al Qaeda is operating today in Iraq: its structure, personnel, and targeting criteria. For the capture of Saddam Hussein does not end the threats to our troops there. It also may, by exclusion, permit us to distinguish between Al Qaeda-inspired attacks and cases of local Iraqis’ “venting” through armed actions. Much as we did not know exactly what we were up against in Somalia in 1993, in Iraq today we have been trying to “drain the Babylonian swamp” without always knowing the enemy.

Improvised explosive devices I believe that all of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used against multinational forces in Somalia were command detonated. I also believe these attacks were done under the guidance of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda did not appear to use or encourage the use of pressure mines or booby traps. This may have been to conserve resources or (a very distant second) to prevent casualties to locals. It seemed that a very few highly trained Al Qaeda members were operating in a sea of willing local “trigger pullers.” The locals had a wide range of motivations, from a hatred of the multinational forces to a desire to enhance their own reputations, or most often, we believed, because they were well paid for their efforts. The IEDs were evidently fabricated by one or two Al Qaeda bomb makers and then passed to other Al Qaeda operatives, who would select and train locals to actually carry out the operation. Al Qaeda operatives would select and help place the IEDs, but no Al Qaeda operatives would be present when the devices were employed in ambushes.

The placement of the IEDs and the escape routes for the locals who set them off were competently planned and well thought out. Targeting of specific vehicles was striking. While there were only a few IED ambushes in Somalia, they were all against a Humvee traveling in a convoy of Humvees and other vehicles. This seemed to be the case even when, militarily, there were higher-value targets in the same convoy. This may be because a Humvee usually means U.S. passengers. Alternatively, the bomb makers may have fabricated the explosive charge in the IED to be most effective against a target the size and armor level of a Humvee. One is also drawn to conclude that Al Qaeda had very low confidence in the local collaborators. It may have figured that the Humvee, with its distinctive appearance, could be recognized the locals. It may well be worth comparing the “forensic signature” of the IEDs currently in use in Iraq with those used in Somalia, to determine whether the bomb makers active in Iraq were trained by the same instructors or in the same facilities as those involved in Somalia, or even if they are the same bomb makers.

In 1993, we also received numerous reports that weapons and explosives were being smuggled into the Mogadishu area hidden beneath large shipments of scrap metal. The Somalis, perhaps at the direction of their Al Qaeda advisors, tended to make one large shipment hidden under scrap metal in a single truck, as opposed to small shipments scattered among many trucks. Apparently, the theory was that good security on one truck was easier to maintain than merely adequate security for many trucks.

RPG-7s and Indirect Fire Weapons RPG-7s were widely used against the multinational forces in Somalia in 1993, including in an anti-helicopter role. While local warlords were actively seeking man-portable surface- to-air missiles (SAMs) to use against the coalition, no SAMs were actually used against the coalition forces. The use of RPG-7s in an anti-helicopter role probably resulted from training by Al Qaeda operatives, who would have picked up the concept during their battles with Soviet forces in Afghanistan. This Al Qaeda training led to three distinct and identifiable “signatures” that should be watched for should this tactic be employed against the U.S.-led forces in Iraq.

Volley fire: While we do not know whether RPG-7s were used because of the unavailability of SAMs or because the Al Qaeda operatives believed the poorly trained local forces would do better with the RPG-7, we do know that the volley fire of large numbers of RPG-7s against low-flying helicopters was effective. It downed three helicopters and seriously damaged several others.

Fuse cutting of RPG-7 warheads: We received numerous reports on this modification, and I believe I personally witnessed the tactic in action against one of the early Task Force Ranger raids. More than half a dozen RPG-7s were fired at low-flying helicopters in this instance, all of which appeared to have detonated early and while the projectile was still on an upward trajectory. As we understood the procedure, the fuse leading from the rocket body to the warhead was shortened. In normal use, when the RPG-7 rocket exhausts it fuel, it also ignites a length-of-time fuse that burns down and then detonates the rocket warhead. This prevents a warhead that misses its target and fails to detonate from being recovered by opposing forces and its explosives employed against the original user. The Al Qaeda technique was to shorten the warhead’s time fuse, resulting in the warhead’s detonating much earlier. This in effect made the RPG-7 an air-bursting weapon. This may be a unique signature of Al Qaeda training.

Scorch-and-debris wounds: There were several anecdotal reports that the individuals who attempted to use the RPG-7 against helicopters frequently suffered from scorch and debris wounds on their lower bodies as a result of the back blast from the tube striking the ground behind them. The RPG-7 was of course never intended for use against targets much above the horizontal, and even in normal use, great care must be exercised to avoid injury from its substantial back blast. The U.S.-led forces now in Iraq should use their access to local hospitals in the wake of any RPG-7 attacks to identify possible suspects.

Indirect fire weapons: These were frequently used against the multinational compounds in Somalia, mostly in the form of less than half a dozen rounds of nighttime harassing fire from a single mortar tube. All indications suggested that local Somalis operating in small groups, whose make-up changed from incident to incident, carried out these attacks. The individuals were well paid for their efforts and operated on the general plan of dropping a few rounds into a tube and then running. The only criterion for success seemed to be that the mortar rounds needed to impact somewhere on a multinational force compound.

In contrast to these harassing attacks, one very different mortar attack was carried out against Task Force Ranger shortly after its arrival in the country. This attack involved multiple mortar tubes in sustained fire, with direct observation of the target and fire correction, along with a radio communication net to tie together the forward observer and mortar crews. The mortar tubes rotated their turns firing to avoid pinpointing by counter-battery radar and helicopter patrols. The planning and disposition of forces was professional (though the effectiveness of the attack suffered from poorly maintained ammunition and lousy Somali shooting skills). We believed at the time and remain convinced now, based on the professionalism of the attack, that Al Qaeda planned it.

Charities, NGOs, and the UN It was my unfortunate experience to observe the local Somali warlords and their Al Qaeda advisors effectively and thoroughly penetrate and co-opt most of the charities, nongovernmental organizations, and the civilian sectors of the UN operating in Somalia a decade ago. These organizations were at best incredibly naive, and at worst ignored activities around them out of fear. This cooption and penetration ran from using charity-owned vehicles to move weapons through the city to using NGOs’ radios and radio frequencies for communications (no telephone network existed in Somalia in 1993), to using UN compounds for safe houses and hiding places and extorting funds from these organizations in return for refraining from staging violent attacks on their facilities and personnel.

None of these organizations was then in any way prepared to meet the challenges of operating in an environment containing a well-organized terrorist organization. I doubt this has changed. The sophistication of these activities was probably beyond the local Somalis. Even if it were not, Al Qaeda must have learned the lesson that these organizations can be a valuable resource in confronting a multinational force. By the time the U.S. pulled out of Somalia, any charitable organization or UN compound not being shot at by the warlords was considered by us to be exempt because it represented too valuable a resource to the warlords to threaten. Multinational forces in Iraq today should make it a priority to investigate the circumstances of all these organizations to determine to what extent Al Qaeda operatives are exploiting them.

Searching for “Elvis” After the August 1993 arrival of Task Force Ranger in Somalia, the main tasking for the CIA presence in Mogadishu was to find Somali warlord Muhammad Farrah Aidid. (Elvis was the nickname used by U.S. forces in Mogadishu for Somali warlord Muhammad Farrah Aidid.) While we believe we located Aidid on several occasions, we were never able to pinpoint him with enough confidence and for a sufficiently long enough periods for Task Force Ranger to launch a raid. Despite our lack of success, we did note several sophisticated MO’s being used by the Somali forces protecting Aidid. It is likely that least some of these procedures were because of recommendations given to Aidid’s forces by al-Qaeda operatives advising them.

While the capture of Saddam Hussein takes the Iraqi “ace of spades” off the wanted list, there are undoubtedly other individuals still in Iraq who are leading the “insurgency” and will be targets for capture by the multinational forces. If media reports are to be believed, the circumstances of Hussein’s capture strongly indicated that he had little or nothing to do with the insurgency. There was not even a pretense of a command-and-control apparatus around Hussein, and his reported mental condition suggests he was in no condition to track, much less direct, a nationwide resistance movement. This strongly suggests the clearly coordinated attacks against multinational forces are being directed and coordinated by an outside organization, such as Al Qaeda. Multinational forces now in Iraq and tasked with the capture of the “Babylonian Elvis” may benefit from looking for traces of the MO’s used in Mogadishu.

All multinational force locations were carefully monitored for activity. Whenever significant activity was observed that could possibly be preparations for a raid, this activity was reported on a radio net monitored by Aidid’s security force. (The radio frequencies used by Aidid’s security forces were those set up by charities and other NGO’s. Aidid’s forces pirated the frequencies and used the NGO’s transmissions as cover.) Aidid’s security force never came up on this radio net, but coordinated itself using point-to-point transmissions with walkie-talkies. Whenever multinational force activity was reported, Aidid immediately moved from his location and remained in transit until the multinational force activity subsided. Aidid never left a location in the same vehicle in which he arrived. Aidid’s subordinates would prearrange times and places for meetings, but they would never know if Aidid would be at these meetings until he walked through the door. All contact with Aidid was person-to-person: he never used a radio or satellite telephone once Task Force Ranger began searching for him. Aidid always remained in an urban area. At night, he would always sleep at a multi-resident compound containing many innocent bystanders, such as a hospital, mosque or orphanage, which would present any raiding force with a significant “collateral damage” problem.

While there may have been procedures which we did not identify in use in Mogadishu, multinational forces in Iraq may wish to consider at minimum: launching capture raids from out of area bases, examining all NGO communication networks for co-option, being prepared to target any vehicle leaving a raid location, planning to deal with large numbers of innocent bystanders at any raid site and in urban locations, being prepared for the target to flee the location on foot.

Things We Tried or Wanted to Try Do not fort up: Taking the fight to the enemy not only disrupts his plans and achieves attrition of his forces, it is vital to maintaining a Humint program. If intelligence officers cannot get out on the streets, meet their sources, and search for new sources, Humint suffers. Humint more than anything else identifies the enemy’s plans and intentions and, in the end, gets a combatant to the “tipping point” that will destroy the enemy. In this vein, value walk-ins. Invaluable sources have often simply walked into the strangest places at the strangest times and volunteered their services. Too often they have been turned away or had to try numerous times before someone realized their value and listened to them. Every one of the troops, civilians and contractors in Iraq should be aware and active as a Humint operator. They should know what a walk-in is, how to handle one, and that they may have to talk to many unworthwhile walk-ins for every one good one.

If the troops do not speak Arabic, they should have “walk-in cards.” These are as old as the hills and can be kept and carried by anyone. They are simply pertinent questions, in English on one side and the local language on the other. If troops can handle “yes” and “no” in the local language, with a dozen or so index cards they can begin debriefing a walk- in anywhere, anytime. Multinational troops should have the same cards in their native languages.

Look for welding and cutting torches: In Mogadishu, we worried about the bad guys putting together “technicals” (a civilian four-wheel drive truck to the back of which a crew- served or heavy automatic weapon has been lashed, used in the role of a heavy weapons squad) in their backyards and local garages. As a result, after dark, we had airborne platforms looking for the unusual light signature that welding rods and cutting torches produce. These light signatures are difficult to suppress, especially after dark, even when the work is done indoors.

While technicals do not seem to be a problem in Iraq, improvised rocket launchers and car bombs are being used with good effect. Cutting torches and welding rods are almost certainly used in fabricating these weapons. Much of the work is probably performed after dark, out of the view of the local neighborhood. Airborne platforms will be at their most effective in detecting the unique light signatures put out by welding rods and cutting torches. Anyone using a welding rod or cutting torch in Baghdad at 3am probably warrants a visit from a ground patrol or gunship.

Money: As in Somalia, in Iraq a significant amount of “rent- an-insurgency” is apparently being undertaken. This means cash and a lot of it. Cash has to be stored, protected, moved around, and accounted for. This is one more set of targets for intelligence program. While we were never able to achieve progress on this in 1993, we were very interested in how Aideed financed his operation and moved his money around. In retrospect, a much more interesting question would have been to what degree Al Qaeda was involved and how it structured its financing.

In 1993, we wanted to get Humint reporting into the money- changing/jewelry section of Mogadishu, where what passes for consumer banking there is conducted. It would be surprising if this were not the case now in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. Money has to be changed from dollars to dinars, large- denomination bills must be converted to small denominations, and funds need to be moved in and out of the country and from city to city. Humint penetration of the money- changing/jewelry market should give a good insight into who the players are and how active they are.

Meeting Engagement: While “preparing” for a meeting engagement (a combat action that occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for action, engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place, usually with high casualties on both sides) may seem like a contradiction in terms, we could have done a better job of it in Somalia and it needs to be done in Iraq. The multinational force military leadership will deal with the battle itself; but both the civilian and military multinational forces need to prepare for handling the aftermath. While the U.S. and multinational political leadership seem prepared to stay the course in Iraq (unlike Somalia in 1993), the civilian and military leadership in Iraq need to be ready to react when, not if, this occurs. A U.S.-led multinational military force can win a meeting engagement, but the military leadership needs to view this as an opportunity and follow on immediately across the board with aggressive activity to exploit the disarray such a battle always brings to the opponent. The civilian authorities should be prepared to deal with the local population’s understandable concern and apprehension as well as the international media’s inevitable inflamed reporting of this kind of battle. In Mogadishu, U.S., forces won the battle and lost the media war. Well-thought-out guidance, with accurate and timely briefings and an aggressive and broad-based military response, will go along way in countering the “CNN effect” that carried the day in Mogadishu.

Conclusion Somalia ten years ago and Iraq today are not the same places. If, however, Al Qaeda and its operatives are active in Iraq, it is likely and logical that the multinational forces in Iraq will see traces of MOs and signatures that were used with success in Somalia. While these will have been updated and modified to the local environment, with careful analysis, they should still be identifiable. Being able to distinguish Al Qaeda-inspired efforts from local Iraqi “venting,” or even from the actions of other terrorist organizations, would be valuable in prioritizing multinational force efforts to curtail the current violence in Iraq.

Notes [1] Somalia, about the size of Texas, was called the “Land of Punt” by ancient Egyptian writers. The frankincense referred to in Biblical narratives probably originated in the land that is now Somalia, which was visited and written about by Arab historian Ibn Battuta in 1331. Chinese historians record visits of Chinese fleets beginning in the eleventh century and continuing intermittently until the 1400s. The 2003 CIA World Factbook lists Somalia as almost exclusively Sunni Muslim. It was colonized into separate protectorates by the British in 1886-1960 and the Italians in 1889-1960. The dictator Muhammad Said Barre began a series of border wars starting in 1974 with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region. Barre was ousted in a 1991 coup. The attacks on the multinational forces of Operation Restore Hope include the infamous October 3, 1993 attack on Task Force Rangers in Mogadishu that was the subject of Mark Bowden’s book Black Hawk Down (New York. Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), the best general account of the event. As of 2003, oil exploration rights to Somalia were still carried as an asset by ConocoPhillips in SEC filings; exploration operations had been suspended due to “force majeure.”

THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY THE CIA. THAT REVIEW NEITHER CONSTITUTES CIA AUTHENTICATION OF INFORMATION NOR IMPLIES CIA ENDORSEMENT OF THE AUTHOR’S VIEWS.

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External links

• Raw Video Footage shot by the somalis on the ground
• Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War - Featuring the text of the original articles, photos, and interviews with former soldiers involved in the battle.
• Cactus and Bitterness Grow Where American Chopper Was Downed - An American journalist visits Mogadishu, 12 years after the battle.
• United Nations Operation in Somalia I A "Mission Backgrounder' prepared by the Department of Public Information, United Nations
• Somalia: Strategic Failures and Operational Successes A 1995 thesis submitted to the faculty of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College
• Task Force Ranger Memorial. - Memorial to the fallen US Army Personnel
• PDF document
• Funeral held for battle of Mogadishu pilot

Former combatants' websites

• Black Hawk Down '93 - including an image gallery with pictures taken during the operation. (Requires free registration)
• NightStalkers.com: Operation Gothic Serpent - with a memorial of American casualties (including a bio for each of them) and an article written by a former Ranger that served on the operation.
• SpecialOperations.com: Operation Restore Hope - featuring a detailed explanation of the operation and the events of October 3 1993.
• SuaSponte.com - Ranger History: Somalia - featuring a 41 page summary of the Battle of Mogadishu, the events that lead to it, and what could have contributed to the missions disaster.
• U.S. Army Ranger Association - History: Somalia (Task Force Ranger) - featuring the account by USARA and former NightStalkers that served in combat during the battle.
• EccentricAmerica.net/Somalia - Photos taken by former medic and Battle of Mogadishu veteran Mark Jackson while stationed in Mogadishu, Somalia with the 10th Mountain Division from Aug - Dec 1993.

References

1. Bowden, Mark, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, Atlantic Monthly Press (1999)
2. Clarke, Walter, and Herbst, Jeffrey, editors, Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Westview Press (1997)
3. Gardner, Judith and el Bushra, Judy, editors, Somalia - The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women, Pluto Press (2004)
4. Prestowitz, Clyde, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions, Basic Books (2003)
5. Sangvic, Roger, Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (1998)
6. Stevenson, Jonathan, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia, Naval Institute Press (1995)
7. Stewart, Richard W., The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, US Army Center for Military History (2003)
8. Somalia: Good Intentions, Deadly Results, VHS, produced by KR Video and The Philadelphia Inquirer (1998)