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==History==
==History==
The plan, for an invasion in the spring of 1943, drawn up by [[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Dwight David "Ike" Eisenhower]], reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe.<ref name = "este">Carlo d'Este, ''Decision in Normandy'', Penguin, 2004, pp. 24-35.</ref> Senior British commanders and politicians were reluctant to commit themselves to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the [[Battle of the Somme]] (where, on the [[first day on the Somme|first day of the battle]], the [[British Army]] lost almost 60,000 men) and the [[Battle of Passchendaele]] in the [[World War I|First World War]], they preferred to avoid a direct assault on a powerful enemy. [[Winston Churchill]], the [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|British Prime Minister]], preferred a strategy of attacking [[Wehrmacht|German forces]] in the Mediterranean instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly"), while other [[British Armed Forces|British military]] leaders hoped to defer an invasion until the Germans had been worn down by fighting on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] against the [[Red Army|Russian Army]].<ref name="morison">[[Samuel Eliot Morison]], ''The Invasion of France and Germany'', ISBN 0-316-58311-1, pp 7-17</ref> Churchill's plan would allow relatively inexperienced American forces to gain experience in a less risky [[Theater (warfare)|theatre]] while gradually building up overwhelming force before engaging Germany head on.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiNp_GU4vXLAhUBWxQKHd9CDkQQ6AEIPTAG#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=1317864719|page=54-55|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55&&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwicw4jk4PXLAhVBlhQKHepMDJUQ6AEINzAF#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref>
The plan, for an invasion in the spring of 1943, drawn up by [[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Dwight David "Ike" Eisenhower]], reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe.<ref name = "este">Carlo d'Este, ''Decision in Normandy'', Penguin, 2004, pp. 24-35.</ref> Senior British commanders and politicians were reluctant to commit themselves to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the [[Battle of the Somme]] (where, on the [[first day on the Somme|first day of the battle]], the [[British Army]] lost almost 60,000 men) and the [[Battle of Passchendaele]] in the [[World War I|First World War]], they preferred to avoid a direct assault on a powerful enemy. [[Winston Churchill]], the [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|British Prime Minister]], preferred a strategy of attacking [[Wehrmacht|German forces]] in the Mediterranean instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly"), while other [[British Armed Forces|British military]] leaders hoped to defer an invasion until the Germans had been worn down by fighting on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] against the [[Red Army|Russian Army]].<ref name="morison">[[Samuel Eliot Morison]], ''The Invasion of France and Germany'', ISBN 0-316-58311-1, pp 7-17</ref> Churchill's plan would allow relatively inexperienced [[United States Armed Forces|American forces]] to gain experience in a less risky [[Theater (warfare)|theatre of war]] while gradually building up overwhelming force before engaging Germany head on.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiNp_GU4vXLAhUBWxQKHd9CDkQQ6AEIPTAG#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=1317864719|page=54-55|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55&&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwicw4jk4PXLAhVBlhQKHepMDJUQ6AEINzAF#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref>


Given shortages of merchant shipping, [[landing craft]], and other resources, the Roundup plan was considered to be unrealistic; it called for a force consisting of 48 [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] [[Division (military)|divisions]] and 5,800 aircraft, with a landing on broad [[beachhead]]s between the [[France|French]] ports of [[Boulogne-sur-Mer|Boulogne]] and [[Le Havre]].<ref name="morison"/> By comparison, the eventual [[Normandy landings]], which occurred over a year later in June 1944, featured only 39 divisions.
Given shortages of merchant shipping, [[landing craft]], and other resources, the Roundup plan was considered to be unrealistic; it called for a force consisting of 48 [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] [[Division (military)|divisions]] and 5,800 aircraft, with a landing on broad [[beachhead]]s between the [[France|French]] ports of [[Boulogne-sur-Mer|Boulogne]] and [[Le Havre]].<ref name="morison"/> By comparison, the eventual [[Normandy landings]], which occurred over a year later in June 1944, featured only 39 Allied divisions.


After Churchill pressed for a landing in [[French North Africa]] in 1942, [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall|George C. Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], suggested instead to [[President of the United States|U.S. President]] [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] that the United States abandon the [[Europe first|Germany-first strategy]] and take the offensive in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]]. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal, saying it would do nothing to help the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=0385353065|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=SA6-PA69-IA6#v=onepage&q&f=false|chapter=The Common Cause: 1939-1944}}</ref> Instead, with Roosevelt's support and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, the decision was made at the [[Second Claridge Conference]] in late July 1942 to carry out [[Operation Torch]], the Allied invasion of French North Africa.<ref>{{cite book|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date=2013|publisher=Taylor and Francis|location=Hoboken|isbn=9781135071028|page=135|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwip0Jbc4vXLAhXIuBoKHXC4DYgQ6AEIQzAH#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref> Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch and preparations for Roundup were given lower priority due to the uncertainties of Allied strategy.<ref name = "este"/> The British were as reluctant to fully abandon Roundup as they had been to support it but in November 1942 Eisenhower, now a [[Lieutenant general (United States)|lieutenant general]], told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.<ref name="morison"/>
After Churchill pressed for a landing in [[French North Africa]] in 1942, [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall|George C. Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], suggested instead to [[President of the United States|U.S. President]] [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] that the United States abandon the [[Europe first|Germany-first strategy]] and take the offensive in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]]. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal, saying it would do nothing to help the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=0385353065|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=SA6-PA69-IA6#v=onepage&q&f=false|chapter=The Common Cause: 1939-1944}}</ref> Instead, with Roosevelt's support and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, the decision was made at the [[Second Claridge Conference]] in late July 1942 to carry out [[Operation Torch]], the Allied invasion of French North Africa.<ref>{{cite book|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date=2013|publisher=Taylor and Francis|location=Hoboken|isbn=9781135071028|page=135|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwip0Jbc4vXLAhXIuBoKHXC4DYgQ6AEIQzAH#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref> Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch and preparations for Roundup were given lower priority due to the uncertainties of Allied strategy.<ref name = "este"/> The British were as reluctant to fully abandon Roundup as they had been to support it but in November 1942 Eisenhower, now a [[Lieutenant general (United States)|lieutenant general]], told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.<ref name="morison"/>

Revision as of 17:02, 27 November 2016

Operation Roundup was the codename for a 1942 plan for an invasion of Northern France by Allied forces during World War II.

History

The plan, for an invasion in the spring of 1943, drawn up by Brigadier General Dwight David "Ike" Eisenhower, reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe.[1] Senior British commanders and politicians were reluctant to commit themselves to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the Battle of the Somme (where, on the first day of the battle, the British Army lost almost 60,000 men) and the Battle of Passchendaele in the First World War, they preferred to avoid a direct assault on a powerful enemy. Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, preferred a strategy of attacking German forces in the Mediterranean instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly"), while other British military leaders hoped to defer an invasion until the Germans had been worn down by fighting on the Eastern Front against the Russian Army.[2] Churchill's plan would allow relatively inexperienced American forces to gain experience in a less risky theatre of war while gradually building up overwhelming force before engaging Germany head on.[3][4]

Given shortages of merchant shipping, landing craft, and other resources, the Roundup plan was considered to be unrealistic; it called for a force consisting of 48 Allied divisions and 5,800 aircraft, with a landing on broad beachheads between the French ports of Boulogne and Le Havre.[2] By comparison, the eventual Normandy landings, which occurred over a year later in June 1944, featured only 39 Allied divisions.

After Churchill pressed for a landing in French North Africa in 1942, General George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, suggested instead to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the United States abandon the Germany-first strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal, saying it would do nothing to help the Soviet Union.[5] Instead, with Roosevelt's support and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, the decision was made at the Second Claridge Conference in late July 1942 to carry out Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa.[6] Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch and preparations for Roundup were given lower priority due to the uncertainties of Allied strategy.[1] The British were as reluctant to fully abandon Roundup as they had been to support it but in November 1942 Eisenhower, now a lieutenant general, told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.[2]

Briefings concerning this plan brought Eisenhower’s organizational and diplomatic skills to the attention of senior civil and military leaders in the United States and Europe, launching his meteoric rise to Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Operation Roundup included Operation Sledgehammer and the later variant Operation Roundhammer. British Lieutenant General incorporated aspects of the plan into the earliest version of the plan that became Operation Overlord.

Notes

  1. ^ a b Carlo d'Este, Decision in Normandy, Penguin, 2004, pp. 24-35.
  2. ^ a b c Samuel Eliot Morison, The Invasion of France and Germany, ISBN 0-316-58311-1, pp 7-17
  3. ^ Husen, editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van (1999). World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia. Garland Pub. p. 1270. ISBN 9780824070298. {{cite book}}: |first1= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ^ Mackenzie, S.P. (2014). The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition. Routledge. p. 54-55. ISBN 1317864719.
  5. ^ Ward, Geoffrey C.; Burns, Ken (2014). "The Common Cause: 1939-1944". The Roosevelts: An Intimate History. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. ISBN 0385353065.
  6. ^ Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. 2013. p. 135. ISBN 9781135071028.