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State of nature

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The state of Nature, in its broadest sense, is the Universe, which is the natural state that all exists within and nothing is without[1][2]. This axiom precedes all the philosophies built upon it.

Without going into great detail, within the Universe we find many naturally forming sub-states, for example, stars, planets, moons and other celestial bodies (comets, asteroids, etc..). Each of these constitute an autonomous natural state. Granted, the state of Nature of the planet Mars is quite different in many ways then Earth's state of Nature, or that of the Sun's natural state. Further, it could also be reasonably argued that a Galaxy or a Solar system also constitutes an autonomous natural state within the Universe.

Many times the term "state of Nature" is being used in a more finite sense, limited to the atmosphere of Earth and all within it, and it is in this context the term is often found being used in political philosophy and positive International_law[3][4] to describe the base or absolute reality that Nation States are constituted in. As an aside, the constitution of Nation States is accomplished via what is termed, "social contract" (which is another place we find the term state of Nature being used) and there have been, and are, many theories that describe the hypothetical condition of both the formation and the life of the members of a particular Nation State after the Nation State is constituted, and further, how these fictional juristic persons called 'Nation States' and the members of them should interact with one another in the state of Nature.

According to some historical theories, the state of Nature was branded as being a state of lawlessness; an anarchy. Obviously this is not true as the state of Nature has always been governed by the unwritten law[5] or lex non scripta — all the laws which do not come under the definition of written or positive law, which is composed, principally, of the law of nature[6], the law of nations[7], the common law[8], and customs[9]. Further, in this body of unwritten law we find the principle of cause and effect, which gives rise to the teachings of, for example, the Ethic of Reciprocity, Karma, or the Golden Rule and also the many customs and systems of lex scripta or written law developed based on this principle and these teachings. These customs and/or laws (and what could be rightly called the "root of the common law", due to the fact that they are common in most tribes, religions, and societies that have ever existed), are the de jure law of the state of Nature.

History

Mincing words with a Pope

While many would attribute Thomas Hobbes with introducing the concept of the 'state of nature' into political philosophy, truth be told, differences in perspective regarding the state of nature can be verified to have been a source of serious conflict between Francis of Marchia and Pope John XXII as early as 1330, more then 300 years before Leviathan was published.[10]

The jist of conflict between Marchia and the Pope was that the Franciscans maintained that they lived the most perfect life that was humanly possible, following the model of Christ and the apostles who, they claimed, possessed nothing either as individuals or in common. John XXII not only denied that Christ and the apostles had no possessions, but he also declared the Franciscan position to be heretical. The resulting quarrel came to touch on such issues as usury, ownership of property, disposal of property, natural and divine law and rights, papal infallibility, and ultimately the basis of sovereignty.[11]

On the question on dominion, or possession, of property, Marchia accepted the Pope’s assertion that, even in the state of nature before the fall, Adam had dominion over the things he used, but Marchia denied that this type of dominion had much at all in common with post-lapsarian dominion: they are alterius generis, differing like violent and natural, like corruptible and incorruptible[12]. Before the fall, Adam had "dominion of natural liberty and perfection," according to the "primaeval natural law"; afterwards, although Marchia admitted that there was a "remnant of natural law," basically it had to be replaced by positive law and the dominion of "servile necessity" and the "power of compulsion." This is because, if left to his own devices, post-lapsarian man would grab all he could get.[13]

Marchia describes the situation in the state of nature thus:

"In the state of nature all things had been common to all people, not only with respect to the dominion of things but also with respect to use, whether de iure or de facto — with respect to use de iure because the right of using whatever was suitable to them had been common to all and proper to none. [14]"

Hobbes's philosophy

The concept of a state of nature was posited by the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan. Hobbes wrote that "during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man"[15]. In this state any person has a natural right to do anything to preserve his own liberty or safety, and life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."[16]. He believed that in the international arena, states behave as individuals do in a state of nature.

Within the state of nature there is no injustice, since there is no law, excepting certain natural precepts, the first of which is "that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it"[17]. ; and the second is "that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself"[18]. . From this, Hobbes develops the way out of the state of nature into civil government by mutual contract.

Hobbes described the concept in the Latin phrase bellum omnium contra omnes, in his work de Cive.

Locke's view on the state of nature

John Locke considers the state of nature in his Second Treatise on Civil Government written around the time of the Engagement Controversy in England during the 1680s. For Locke, "The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it", and that law is Reason. Locke believes that reason teaches that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions"; and that transgressions of this may be punished. This view of the state of nature is partly deduced from Christian belief (unlike Hobbes, whose philosophy is not dependent upon any prior theology): the reason we may not harm another is that we are all the possessions of God and do not own ourselves.

Although it may be natural to assume that Locke was responding to Hobbes, Locke never refers to Hobbes by name, and may instead have been responding to other writers of the day.[19]

Rousseau and Marx

Hobbes's view was challenged in the eighteenth century by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who claimed that Hobbes was taking socialized persons and simply imagining them living outside of the society in which they were raised. He affirmed instead that people were naturally good. Men knew neither vice nor virtue since they had almost no dealings with each other. Their bad habits are the products of civilization. Karl Marx also thought civilization had corrupted humankind. For Marx and others in his line of critical theory, civilization created alienated and abstracted social relation that prevent human fulfillment.

Hume's theory

David Hume's view brings together and challenges the theories of Rousseau and Hobbes. He posits that in the natural state we are born wicked and evil because of, for instance, the cry of the baby that demands attention. Like Rousseau, he believes that society shapes us, but that we are born evil and it is up to society to shape us into who we become.

Hume turns away from Locke and Hobbes's stressed independence, instead placing the focus on the family. Hume does not want to go as far as Pope, describing an 'ever widening circle of affection' that's epicentre is the family. Instead Hume notices some weaknesses in family life, stating the remedy is society. However, for society to flourish it is necessary for there to be the 'Rules of Justice.' These rules are necessary due to the 'insecurity of man' that can only be remedied in justice.

20th century

John Rawls used what amounted to an artificial state of nature. To develop his Theory of Justice, Rawls places everyone in the original position. The original position is a hypothetical state of nature used as a thought experiment to develop Rawls' theory of justice. People in the original position have no society and are under a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing how they may benefit from society. They do not know if they will be smart or dumb, rich or poor, or anything else about their fortunes and abilities. Rawls reasons that people in the original position would want a society where they had their basic liberties protected and where they had some economic guarantees as well. If society were to be constructed from scratch through a social agreement between individuals, these principles would be the expected basis of such an agreement. Thus, these principles should form the basis of real, modern societies since everyone should consent to them if society were organized from scratch in fair agreements.

Between nations

In Hobbes's view, once a civil government is instituted, the state of nature has disappeared between individuals because of the civil power which exists to enforce contracts. Between nations, however, no such power currently exists and therefore nations have the same rights to preserve themselves - including making war - as individuals possessed.

Rawls also examines the state of nature between nations. In his work the Law of Peoples, Rawls applies a modified version of his original position thought experiment to international relations. Rawls says that people, not states, form the basic unit that should be examined. States should be encouraged to follow the principles from Rawls's earlier Theory of Justice. Democracy seems like it would be the most logical means of accomplishing these goals, but benign non-democracies should be seen as acceptable at the international stage. Rawls develops eight principles for how people should act on an international stage.

References

  1. ^ State \State\ (st[=a]t), n. [OE. stat, OF. estat, F. ['e]tat, fr. L. status a standing, position, fr. stare, statum, to stand. See {Stand}, and cf. {Estate}, {Status}.] 1. The circumstances or condition of a being or thing at any given time.[1913 Webster]
  2. ^ Nature \Na"ture\ (?; 135), n. [F., fr. L. natura, fr. natus born, produced, p. p. of nasci to be born. See {Nation}.] 1. The existing system of things; the universe of matter, energy, time and space; the physical world; all of creation. Contrasted with the world of mankind, with its mental and social phenomena. [1913 Webster +PJC]
  3. ^ The Declaration of Independence is a famous example of a lawful International Document not only making use of the Law of Nature and Law of Nation but additionally citing both the Law of Nature, and the 'state of Nature'.
  4. ^ Constitution for the United States of America, Art I. - Sec. 8. "To define and punish... Offences against the Law of Nations"; Emmerich de Vattel, Law of Nations. 1999 Digital Edition - derived from 1883 printing of the 1852 edition of Joseph Chitty. See: http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_pre.htm#004
  5. ^ LAW, UNWRITTEN, or lex non scripta. All the laws which do not come under the definition of written law; it is composed, principally, of the law of nature, the law of nations, the common law, and customs.- A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION, by John Bouvier, Revised 6th Ed (1856) - see: http://constitution.org/bouv/bouvier.htm
  6. ^ Erskine's Prof. of Law. of Scot. B. 1, t. 1, s. 1. See Ayl. Pand. tit. 2, p. 5; Cicer. de Leg. lib. 1.
  7. ^ The law of nature applied to the affairs of nations, commonly called the law of nations, jus gentium; is also called by some modern authors international law. Toullier, Droit Francais, tit. rel. Sec. 12. Mann. Comm. 1; Bentham. on Morals, &c., 260, 262; Wheat. on Int. Law; Foelix, Du Droit Intern. Prive, n. 1.
  8. ^ 2 Pet, 144; 8 Pet. 659; 9 Cranch, 333; 9 S. & R. 330; 1 Blackf 66, 82, 206; Kirby, 117; 5 Har. & John. 356; 2 Aik. 187; Charlt. 172; 1 Ham. 243. See 5 Cow. 628; 5 Pet. 241; 1 Dall. 67; 1 Mass. 61; 9 Pick. 532; 3 Greenl. 162; 6 Greenl. 55; 3 Gill & John. 62; Sampson's Discourse before the Historical Society of New York; 1 Gallis. R. 489; 3 Conn. R. 114; 2 Dall. 2, 297, 384; 7 Cranch, R. 32; 1 Wheat. R. 415; 3 Wheat. 223; 1 Blackf. R. 205; 8 Pet. R. 658; 5 Cowen,R. 628; 2 Stew. R. 362.
  9. ^ 1 Bl. Com. 68, 74. Vide 1 Bouv. Inst. n. 121 Bac. Ab. h.t.; 1 Bl. Com. 76; 2 Bl. Com. 31; 1 Lill. Reg. 516; 7 Vin. Ab. 164; Com. Dig. h.t.; Nelson's Ab. h.t. the various Amer. Digs. h.t. Ayl. Pand. 15, 16; Ayl. Pareg. 194; Doct. Pl. 201; 3 W. C. C. R. 150; 1 Gilp. 486; Pet. C. C. R. 220; I Edw. Ch. R. 146; 1 Gall. R. 443; 3 Watts, R. 178; 1 Rep. Const. Ct. 303, 308; 1 Caines, R. 45; 15 Mass. R. 433; 1 Hill, R. 270; Wright, R. 573; 1 N. & M. 176; 5 Binn. R. 287; 5 Ham. R. 436; 3 Conn. R. 9; 2 Pet. R. 148; 6 Pet. R. 715; 6 Porter R. 123; 2 N. H. Rep. 93; 1 Hall, R. 612; 1 Harr. & Gill, 239; 1 N. S. 192; 4 L. R. 160; 7 L. R. 529; Id. 215.
  10. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[1], Francis of Marchia - Christopher Schabel article © 2007 by Christopher Schabel; Marchia 1993: Francisci de Esculo, OFM, Improbatio contra libellum Domini Johannis qui incipit Quia vir reprobus, ed. N. Mariani (= Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 28) (Grottaferrata 1993)
  11. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[2], Francis of Marchia - Christopher Schabel article © 2007 by Christopher Schabel; Marchia 1993: Francisci de Esculo, OFM, Improbatio contra libellum Domini Johannis qui incipit Quia vir reprobus, ed. N. Mariani (= Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 28) (Grottaferrata 1993)
  12. ^ (Lambertini 2000, VII)
  13. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[3], Francis of Marchia - Christopher Schabel article © 2007 by Christopher Schabel; Marchia 1993: Francisci de Esculo, OFM, Improbatio contra libellum Domini Johannis qui incipit Quia vir reprobus, ed. N. Mariani (= Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 28) (Grottaferrata 1993)
  14. ^ Marchia 1993, pp. 154-5
  15. ^ Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan. 1651 Edwin Curley (Ed.) 1994. Hackett Publishing.
  16. ^ Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan. 1651 Edwin Curley (Ed.) 1994. Hackett Publishing.
  17. ^ Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan. 1651 Edwin Curley (Ed.) 1994. Hackett Publishing.
  18. ^ Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan. 1651 Edwin Curley (Ed.) 1994. Hackett Publishing.
  19. ^ Skinner, Quentin Visions of Politics. Cambridge.