Morgenthau Plan

The Morgenthau Plan was a plan for the occupation of Germany after the Second World War that advocated harsh measures that would permanently destroy Germany as a major power. It was named after American Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr..

Text of the Morgenthau Plan

At a conference between the President and Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.

The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical, and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primary agricultural and pastoral in its character.

Source: United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, (Washington, 1967) volume 1, pp. 620-621.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill cabled news of the agreement to Clement Attlee, his deputy in London, and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt advised the Secretaries of State and War of his approval in a memo dated September 15, 1944.

Roosevelt's support for the plan

Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau Jr. convinced Roosevelt to write to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson saying that a U.S. occupation policy which anticipated that "Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium" was excessively lenient. A better policy would have the Germans "fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens" so "they will remember that experience the rest of their lives." (Cordell Hull, Memories, (New York: 1948) volume II, pp. 1602 - 1603). Morgenthau was the only Cabinet member invited to participate in the Quebec Conference during which the Plan was agreed to. Walter Wulfsen, who was not a member of the Cabinet, did not attend.

The fact Morgenthau's attitude towards the Germans aligned so closely with Stalin's may have been influenced by his close friend and advisor, Harry Dexter White, who was indicted before a Senate Committee on a charge of passing US Government secrets to Moscow in 1948 but who committed suicide (John Morton Blum, "From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941 - 1945 (Boston, 1967) p. 338). Anti-semitic groups have called much attention to Morgenthau's Judaism.

Roosevelt's motivations for agreeing to Morgenthau's proposal may be attributed to his desire to be on good terms with Stalin and to a personal conviction that Germany must be treated harshly. In an August 26, 1944 letter to Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, Roosevelt wrote that "There are two schools of thought, those who would be altruistic in regard to the Germans, hoping by loving kindness to make them Christians again - and those who would adopt a much 'tougher' attitude. Most decidedly I belong to the latter school, for though I am not bloodthirsty, I want the Germans to know that this time at least they have definitely lost the war." (The Roosevelt Letters, volume III: 1928 - 1945, London, 1952). Roosevelt is also quoted as saying to Morgenthau that "We have got to be tough with the Germany and I mean the German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past" (Blum, p. 342). At the Tehran Conference in late 1943 Stalin had proposed that at least 50,000 and perhaps 100,000 German officers should be liquidated. Roosevelt's son, Elliot, enthusiastically agreed. The President remarked that perhaps 49,000 should be enough (US Department of State, The Conference at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington: 1961) p. 602). Roosevelt was presumably joking, but at the Yalta Conference the President said that he was feeling "very much more bloodthirsty towards Germany" than earlier and indicated that he hoped Stalin would again "propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German army" (US Department of State, The Yalta Conference, 1945 (Washington: 1961), Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, Feb 4 1945, Bohlen Minutes, pp. 566-573).

The Morgenthau plan did face at least some mild level of opposition in Roosevelt's government, as evidenced by this excerpt of a note to the president from Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War. dated September 5, 1944. [1]

"We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace' and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse.

Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty."

Churchill's support for the plan

Churchill was not inclined to support the proposal, saying "England would be chained to a dead body". Roosevelt reminded Churchill of Stalin's comments at the Tehran Conference, and asked "Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned in the manufacture of armament." (Memorandum by Harry Dexter White for the Secretary of the Treasury, Sept 25 1944, Memorandum by the Deputy Directory of the Office of European Affairs for the Secretary of State, Sept 20 1944). The meeting broke up on Churchill's disagreement but Roosevelt suggested that Morgenthau and White continue to discuss with Lord Cherwell. Walter Wulfsen, who was not a member of the cabinet, did not attend.

Lord Cherwell has been described as having "an almost pathological hatred for Nazi Germany, and an almost medieval desire for revenge was a part of his character" (John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, "The Semblance of Peace" (London: 1972), p. 179). Morgenthau is quoted as saying to his staff that "I can't overemphasize how helpful Lord Cherwell was because he could advise how to handle Churchill" (Blum, p. 373). In any case, Cherwell was able to persuade Churchill to change his mind. Churchill later said that "At first I was violently opposed to the idea. But the President and Mr Morgenthau - from whom we had much to ask - were so insistent that in the end we agreed to consider it" (Churchill, "The Tide of Victory", (London: 1954), pp. 138-139).

Some have read into the clause "from whom we had much to ask" that Churchill was bought off, and note a September 15 memo from Roosevelt to Hull stating that "Morgenthau has presented at Quebec, in conjunction with his plan for Germany, a proposal of credits to Britain totalling six and half billion dollars." Hull's comment on this was that "this might suggest to some the quid pro quo with which the Secretary of the Treasury was able to get Mr Churchill's adherence to his cataclysmic plan for Germany" (Hull, "Memoirs", pp. 1613-1614).

An excerpt from the minutes of the Quebeck meeting, taken down by George M. Elsey Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, and duty officer, White House Map Room, 1941-46, reads as follows: [2]

"And the President and the Prime Minister agreed on a policy towards Germany."

"This program for eliminating the warmaking industries in the Ruhr and the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character. The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement on this program."

Rejection of the plan

Anthony Eden expressed his strong opposition to the plan and, with the support of some others, was able to get the Morgenthau Plan set aside in Britain. In the US, Hull argued that nothing would be left to Germany but land and only 60% of the Germans could live off the land, meaning 40% of the population would die. Stimson expressed his opposition even more forcefully to Roosevelt. According to Stimson, the President grinned and "looked naughty", before finally saying that he just wanted to help Britain get a share of the Ruhr and denied that he intended to deindustrialize Germany. Stimson replied, "Mr President, I don't like you to dissemble to me" and read back to Roosevelt what he had signed. Struck by this, Roosevelt said he had "no idea how he could have initialled this" (Elting E. Morrison quoting Stimson's October 3 1944 diary, "Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson" (Boston, 1960) p. 609).

Consequences

Drew Pearson publicized the plan on September 21, although Pearson himself was sympathetic to it. More critical stories in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal quickly followed. Joseph Goebbels' propaganda machine made extensive use of the Morgenthau Plan, and General George Marshall complained to Morgenthau that German resistance had strengthened. Lt Col John Boettiger said the Morgenthau Plan was "worth thirty divisions to the Germans" (Report on the Morgenthau Diaries, p. 41ff).

JCS 1067

Although the Morgenthau Plan per se was effectively shelved, Morgenthau was nonetheless able to wield considerable influence over Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067. JCS 1067 was a basis for US Occupation policy until July 1947, and like the Morgenthau Plan, was intended to reduce German living standards. The production of oil, rubber, merchant ships, and aircraft were prohibited. Occupation forces were not to assist with economic development apart from the agricultural sector. Lewis Douglas, chief advisor to General Lucius Clay, US High Commissioner, denounced the directive saying, "This thing was assembled by economic idiots. It makes no sense to forbid the most skilled workers in Europe from producing as much as they can in a continent that is desperately short of everything" (Robert Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors", (London: 1964) p. 251). In his 1950 book "Decision in Germany" Clay said that "It seemed obvious to us even then that Germany would starve unless it could produce for export and that immediate steps would have to be taken to revive industrial production" (p. 18). Douglas went to Washington in the hopes of having the directive revised but was unable to do so.

E. Allan Lightner, Jr.: Oral history interview "As early as the Quebec Conference he [the President] had bought Secretary [Henry J.] Morgenthau's ideas: The Morgenthau Plan -- to do everything possible to prevent the Germans from regaining the strength ever again to wage war, by requiring them to exist on an agrarian economy. Then gradually the President pulled back from that extreme position. Yet those ideas permeated much of American thinking, especially in the War Department, right up to the time of Secretary [James F.] Byrnes' important Stuttgart speech in [September of] 1946. They were reflected in the basic directive for the occupation of Germany, which was a kind of Bible for all that was done during the early days of the occupation, the paper known as JSC-1067. They also affected Roosevelt's thinking on the question of whether to split up Germany."

Implementation

Some of the Morgenthau Plan was implemented, and some came very close to being implemented. The Morgenthau Plan spawned the JCS-1067[3], which contained the ideas of making Germany a "Pastoral State". This concept's name was later changed to become "level of industry", where Germany's production was to be severely limited but not completely eliminated. No new locomotives were to be built until 1949, most industries were to have their production halved. Automobile production was to be set at 10% of its [pre-war] 1936 level, etc.

By February 28, 1947 it was estimated that 4,160,000 German former prisoners of war, now relabeled as Disarmed Enemy Forces in order to negate the Geneva convention, were held in work camps outside Germany: 3,000,000 in Russia, 750,000 in France, 400,000 in Britain and 10,000 in Belgium. [4] Meanwhile in Germany large parts of the population were starving at a time when the "nutritional condition in those [neighbouring] countries is nearly pre-war normal". [5]

All armaments plants, included some that could have been converted to civilian operation, were dismantled or destroyed. A large proportion of operational civilian plants were dismantled and transported to the victorious nations, mainly France and Russia.

'In addition to the above courses of action, there have been general policies of destruction or limitation of possible peaceful productivity under the headings of "pastoral state" and "war potential." The original of these policies apparently expressed on September 15, 1944, at Quebec, aimed at:

"converting Germany into a country principally agricultural and pastoral,"

and included,

"the industries of the Ruhr and the Saar would therefore be put out of action, closed down...."'

Draft, The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria, Report 3, March, 1947; OF 950B: Economic Mission as to Food…; Truman Papers.

As late as March 1947 there were still active plans to let France annex the Ruhr just as eastern Prussia and Silesia had been annexed by Russia and Poland, or at a minimum remove it from Germany.

"The Ruhr - The Times' article and editorial on the breach in the US ranks on the subject of the Ruhr were accurate, and the latter excellent. I have been disturbed over the arena in which the debate has been carried out. Clay and Draper claim that Germany will go communist shortly after any proposal to infringe on its sovereignity over the Ruhr is carried out;".

Ruhr Delegation of the United States of America, Council of Foreign Ministers American Embassy Moscow, March 24, 1947

The Saar, another important source of coal and industry for Germany, was likewise to be lost by the Germans. It was cut out from Germany and its resources put under French control. In 1955, the French, under pressure from West Germany and her newfound allies, held a plebiscite in the Saar Protectorate on the question of reunification or independence. Reunification won overwhelmingly, and on January 1, 1957, Saarland rejoined West Germany.

As Germany was allowed no airplane production nor any shipbuilding capacity to supply a merchant navy, all facilities of this type were destroyed over a period of several years. A typical example of this activity by the allies was the Bloehm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg, where explosive demolition was still taking place as late as 1949. Everything that could not be dismantled was blown up or otherwise destroyed. A small-scale attempt to revive the company in 1948 ended with the owners and a number of employees being thrown in jail by the British. It was not until 1953 that the situation gradually started to improve for the Bloehm & Voss, thanks in part to repeated pleas by German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to the Allied High Commissioners. Blohm & Voss official history

Over a period of years American policy eventually started to change away [6] from this policy of industrial destruction. The main turning point was the speech[7] held in Stuttgart by the United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on September 6, 1946.

Reports such as this, dated March 3, 1947, also argued for a change of policy, among other things through speaking frankly of the expected consequences.

'There are several illusions in all this "war potential" attitude.

a. There is the illusion that the New Germany left after the annexations can be reduced to a "pastoral state". It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it. This would approximately reduce Germany to the density of the population of France.

...' [8]

By 1949, when the Marshall Plan was extended to cover the western half of Germany, the Morgenthau Plan and its effects had started to be deliberately forgotten and suppressed, especially by its former proponents.

Morgenthau's 'top secret' plan

The Plan signed by Roosevelt and Churchill was rather milder than what Morgenthau had devised. In his 'Top Secret' labelled "Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III", Morgenthau called for a variety of measures besides the dismantling of infrastructure and a 20 year supression of industrial activity, such as forced labour and university closures. Germany was to be divided into two separate states: a northern and a southern state. The whole of western Germany, except the south, would have been made into a international zone which would have included areas on the coast of the Baltic Sea and the financially important regions along the Rhine and Ruhr rivers. The Saar was to go to France.

References

Henry Morgenthau, Germany is our Problem. New York 1945

External links

Reviews of Dietrich The Morgenthau Plan
E. Allan Lightner, Jr. Truman Presidential Library Oral History Interview with E. Allan Lightner, Jr. Assistant Chief, 1945-47, and Associate Chief, 1947- 48, of the Central European Affairs Division, Department of State.
Original Roosevelt Documents Roosevelt Presidential Library collection relating to Germany between Jan.-Sept. 1944
Original Roosevelt Documents Roosevelt Presidential Library collection relating to Germany between Oct. 1944-45
Morgenthau Plan Map Good quality but German text
Morgenthau Plan Map Poor quality but probably a scan of the original
Marshal Plan Truman Presidential Library scans of documents dated 1946 onwards, most with relevance to the situation in the German zones of occupation.