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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Laella (talk | contribs) at 21:11, 12 June 2020 (→‎OAS reports and rebuttals (2019 election controversy and resignation - 2019 election)). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Good articleEvo Morales has been listed as one of the Social sciences and society good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do so. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can reassess it.
In the newsOn this day... Article milestones
DateProcessResult
November 20, 2007Good article nomineeNot listed
June 23, 2015Good article nomineeListed
In the news A news item involving this article was featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the "In the news" column on November 11, 2019.
On this day... Facts from this article were featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the "On this day..." column on January 22, 2011, January 22, 2013, January 22, 2016, and January 22, 2020.
Current status: Good article

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"Dictator" of Bolivia

Calls Morales "dictator of Bolivia" which links to "President of Bolivia." Sounds like mischief to me. One of you fine editors want to look into that? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 194.55.30.7 (talk) 08:48, 23 October 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Unfortunately, Wikipedia often suffers from WP:Vandalism, but we try to catch it quickly when it occurs. Midnightblueowl (talk) 09:36, 23 October 2019 (UTC)[reply]

I came here to say the same. Could that please be removed? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.99.218.101 (talk) 22:56, 10 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Semi-protected edit request on 7 November 2019

Juan Evo Morales Ayma (Spanish pronunciation: [ˈeβo moˈɾales]; born October 26, 1959) is the dictator of Bolivia. A former cocalero activist serving as the 80th President of Bolivia since 2006. Article 168 of the 2009 constitution allows the President and Vice-President to put themselves forward for re-election only once, limiting the number of terms to two.

A constitutional referendum was held in Bolivia on Sunday, 21 February 2016.[1] The proposed constitutional amendments would have allowed the president and vice president to run for a third consecutive term under the 2009 Constitution.[2] The referendum was voted down by a 51.3% majority. Net1pro (talk) 19:49, 7 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done for now: please establish a consensus for this alteration before using the {{edit semi-protected}} template. —KuyaBriBriTalk 21:15, 7 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Bolivia Sets Date For Referendum On Evo Morales Re-election Telesurv, 15 October 2015
  2. ^ "Bolivia's Re-election Referendum: The case for Yes and No". Latin Correspondent. Archived from the original on 19 February 2016. Retrieved 18 February 2016.

"Military coup" Phrasing

I'd say referring to the current situation as a coup is too POV, but at the very least this needs to be settled before it turns into an edit war. Carlitos9595 (talk) 04:27, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

A coup d'etat is an "overthrow of an existing government by non-democratic means." Resignation in cooperation with a military ultimatum easily and objectively fits that definition. --Hatman92 (talk) 04:54, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Do you have any source regarding this "ultimatum"? Asking him to resign is not an ultimatum. An ultimatum is "do X or else we will do Y" 199.247.44.10 (talk) 05:57, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]
In this case, asking him to resign did represent an ultimatum, being as the party "asking" was the military. It would be an extreme (and certainly not neutral) stretch to suggest that this may have represented anything other than an ultimatum. --Hatman92 (talk) 06:46, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]
I would say the opposite would be the extreme stretch. Luckily we're on Wikipedia, where the only relevant factor is what reliable sources say. So again, do any refer to an "ultimatum" by the military? 199.247.44.10 (talk) 07:24, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]
NYT says Military suggested that he resign to restore public order. I cited and quoted this verbatim in the article. Alcibiades979 (talk) 08:06, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]
According to the Oxford English Dictionary a coup is: A sudden, violent, and illegal seizure of power from a government. According to Merriam Webster's a coup is "a sudden decisive exercise of force in politics especially : the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government by a small group." Reliable sources are not using the word coup, thus we should not. As a reminder this does fall under BLP. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/coup https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%20d'état Alcibiades979 (talk) 08:13, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]
The circumstances concerning Morales' resignation fit both the OED and Merriam Webster definition of a coup. How are you defining "reliable sources"? There is no such thing as objective reporting, every source in journalism represents its own particular point of view. In this case, establishment Western media, e.g. the NYT, is less likely to refer to what is definitionally a coup as such, because it is not in their interest to do so. Wikipedia should do better than to to nakedly parrot Western sources. --Hatman92 (talk) 18:57, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Reliable_sources#News_organizations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Biographies_of_living_persons#Reliable_sources Wiki articles on living people have the highest standards of any articles when it comes to sources. Alcibiades979 (talk) 04:59, 12 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

CIA backed, Fascist Military Coup

Dark Days ahead in Bolivia as Evo Morales is ousted in a CIA backed, Fascist Military Coup. Coup leaders are already arresting senior members of Morales' government. After Bolivian opposition supporters burned headquarters of the electoral authority in Sucre, Chuquisaca as votes continued to be counted, and as Carlos Mesa conspires, claiming fraud. The mass arrests are already starting. Fun fact: Morales opponent Carlos Mesa is a member of the group "Inter-American Dialogue" - the Washington D.C.-based think tank headed by a guy who used to work for ″National Endowment for Democracy″. The CIA's fingerprints are all over this. Years of brutal oppression, mass arrests & mass murder expected. Next come the show trials & death squads, presided over by CIA backed Fascists. Once again. CIA has a 60 year plus record of Coups & Regime Changes in Latin America. --87.170.200.47 (talk) 08:05, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]


Im glad not everyone is as dumb as you are. --Hkfreedomfighter (talk) 12:48, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Ad personam argumets are always the best ;-) Dan Cohen will explain to you how it happened: The Bolivian opposition, OAS, US government and mainstream media manufactured a phony narrative of election fraud, setting the stage for the fascist coup against @evoespueblo. The self-declared president of Bolivia ("Áñez, racista fuera del Palacio"), who has said "the city is not for Indians", appointed a new cabinet without a single member of the country's indigenous majority. This coup is clearly aimed at restoring Bolivia’s old racist, classist oligarchy. Do US liberals support this? Trump this week, with Erdogan next to him, on Syria: "We are keeping the oil. We have the oil. The oil is secure. We left troops behind only for the oil." The US have been fighting wars to hijack oil, now we're fighting green wars to hijack lithium.

80th?

Why does the article say that he is the 80th president but on the list he is the 67th, and the interim president is the 68th? Nusent 14:13, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

List of presidents of Bolivia gives 67 presidents, but it does not count the interim presidents that served in between the counted presidents, that is my interpretation of it Lochglasgowstrathyre (talk) 20:59, 11 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]
in template infobx successor : Why Adriana Salvatierra and not Jeanine Áñez ? Salvatierra resigned before being able to act as president. 92.154.41.65 (talk) 14:30, 12 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]
I removed Jeanine Anez because, currently, noone is able to know what happens next : there is no succession yet till a valid president of the senate is defined or a new election (with which laws ????) occured. 92.154.41.65 (talk) 17:31, 12 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Per Mewulwe's lead at Jeanine Anez. I've removed the numbering, as it can't be sourced & thus verified. The numberings should be removed from all bios of Bolivian presidents & vice presidents. GoodDay (talk) 22:55, 12 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Date format

According to Date format by country and other sources[1], Bolivia uses the DD/MM/YY date format instead of MM/DD/YY presented on this article and several other articles on Bolivia Lochglasgowstrathyre (talk) 09:57, 12 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Semi-protected edit request on 12 November 2019

Please change "Adrianna Salvatierra" as acting president to "Jeanine Áñez". I don't understand why this keeps getting reverted. Coming from a Bolivian user myself who literally just made an account to edit this - Adrianna Salvatierra resigned on November 10th, thus discluding her from the presidential line of succession. Since the vice-president, president of the Senate (Salvatierra), and the first vice-president of the Senate have resigned too, Jean Áñez (the second vice-president the Senate of Bolivia) is next in line. SpicyCheese (talk) 16:12, 12 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

 Already done No mention of Adrianna Salvatierra anywhere in the article at present. Thanks, NiciVampireHeart 03:46, 16 November 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Third presidential term: 2014–2019

The order of mentioning thinks is not at all unimportant. When I first read the article, I only read the beginning of each paragraph and I got the impression, that a so to say "friend" of Morales was against his reelection. In the way I wrote it now, you cannot avoid reading both the information (so, also that he later changed his mind). There is some more information that is actually based on facts and not just on allegations or opinions of people. I am also not so sure, that someone cannot appeal against the decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. I mean, right after Anéz got the "presidency", the Court changed the law again. So, either the decisions can change, or Anéz pressed the Court to make a new decision... But I don't have any source about this, so I left it like that. Yomomo (talk) 16:31, 26 December 2019 (UTC)[reply]

There seems to be a lot of confusion around this, I hope this helps:
The Supreme Tribunal of Justice had nothing to do with any of this.
The Supreme Tribunal of the Constitution has the task to interpret Bolivian laws, to verify that they are constitutional. They can simply say if something is constitutional or not. They do not have the power to alter the constitution.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights is an international court that "rules on whether a State has violated an individual's human rights" They are part of the OAS. "The Organization of American States established the Court in 1979 to enforce and interpret the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights" Inter-American_Court_of_Human_Rights
All member countries of the American Convention on Human Rights have agreed that the treaty will override the country's own laws. Most of the countries in the Americas (including USA) are members. Court rulings apply to all member countries, not just the country specified, unless otherwise indicated.
- So the The Supreme Tribunal of the Constitution was presented with the argument that the OAS treaty made term limits a human rights violation. The The Supreme Tribunal of the Constitution decided that they would allow the argument, pending a decision by the OAS. In the meantime, The Supreme Electoral Tribunal approved Evo's reelection application without waiting for a decision by the OAS.
The Supreme Tribunal of the Constitution did not make any changes to Bolivian law, rather accepted that if the Treaty made term limits a human rights violation, then Bolivia could not have term limits. - This would have applied to every elected position, not just president. And it would have applied to every member state, not just Bolivia. (incl the USA)
Colombia immediately registered a case against term limits as a human rights violation with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Eventually, the court decided that terms limits are a not human rights violation.
Once the interpretation was struck down, automatically the Bolivian constitution was no longer overridden on the point of term limits, which reinstated the Bolivian constitutional law - limiting the president to 2 terms.
As for Áñez: The Supreme Tribunal of the Constitution, as part of its regular function, certified that Áñez met the Constitutional requirements for succession.
I hope this clarifies the situation. Laella (talk) 11:00, 4 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks Laella for your thorough explanation. I still have two questions on this matter:

  • "Eventually, the court decided that terms limits are a not human rights violation." Do we have a source on this issue? I'm just wondering why Luis Almagro changed his opinion and supported the participation of Morales, when the court of the organization of which he is a president decided for the opposite.
  • I thought that the decision of the Supreme Tribunal of the Constitution over Áñez is a disputed issue among law experts. In the way you are writing about it, I become the impression, that there is no dispute on this issue. What is the case now? Yomomo (talk) 17:08, 4 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]


I am having trouble finding good resources in English (most are in Spanish). Here are a few links to the OAS statements on term limits as a human rights violation (please note dates)
If I find more, I will add them.
As for why Almagro decided to support Morales' reelection - That is a topic of some suspicion. Miami Herald opinion: OAS chief gives a boost to Bolivia’s dictatorship. What does he stand to gain?
Technically, at the time Bolivia's Constitutional Tribunal made their ruling, the OAS Court had not made an all-encompassing ruling about term limits. They had only issued a limited document, specific to a few countries in Central America. Even so, it was a strong indicator of how the OAS Court would rule in such a case. This grey area is what allowed Bolivia to proceed. By the time the OAS court made official statements (2018), Morales was already registered for the next election. Another grey area - technically he should have been disqualified then, but he was allowed to remain on the ballot.
The decision of the Supreme Tribunal of the Constitution over Áñez is not controversial legally, it is controversial politically. The Tribunal (consisting of the same members who presided over the decision to allow Morales to run for reelection) has the ultimate authority. They published their decision on Nov 12, 2019. 2 days after Morales' resignation. There was one member of the court who abstained in dissent. They laid out the basis for the succession, including that because the President resigned and left the country, rather than emitting an act of resignation in writing to congress, the constitution does not require congress accept the resignation (it's like resignation by abdication). Specifically it says, the vice-president immediately assumes the role. It then specifies the applicable law of order of succession that leads to Áñez.
Sorry, this one is only in Spanish TCPB Comunicado
--Laella (talk) 04:19, 5 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Camacho as activist

When the word activist over Camacho's actions in this context and article should be part of this article, then it should at least define the form of the activism. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Yomomo (talkcontribs) 10:22, 4 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

This is agreeable to me. Note that my most recent edit is merely adding a dash to your addition ("right wing" to "right-wing"). Jaydavidmartin (talk) 11:03, 4 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks. I'm actually no native speaking english, so sorry for the mistake :-) Yomomo (talk) 12:02, 4 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

NPOV issues

Sorry for not putting references here, but I'm a private person and full time working, so, you can look in the respective articles to proof the claims mentioned here. I would very much appreciate, when anyone could help me clear these issues in a more appropriate way, conforming to the Wikipedia rules.

I see in the whole description of Morales request to become president (for the 4. time) some issues, where I think NPOV is being violated. I would like some more information about these issues, but I cannot read Spanish.

  • It is often mentioned, that Morales himself asked for a limit in the presidency (2 times) and then changed his mind.
    • On the first place: The government under Morales seems to have changed its mind quite often, sometimes for the shake of its supporters and sometimes for the shake of its opponents. One example for the latter, is the autonomy given to regions. Saying "he had promised, but then did something else" without saying that changing opinion is part of a democratic process and of any discourse is an "accusation" that reflects a certain bias against him. Do we have more information on this issue and is there a way to make the argument more objective and according to the Wikipedia rules?
    • Further on: As far as I know, Morales is an elected leader of his party. I see quite often remarks, that say that he is sticking on the president position but I see no reports regarding his being elected there from a large majority of his party, even in the current very difficult situation. He is actually also a kind of elected king for his people, whereby the title is no title for life and no title for a fix period, it is more a title of respect that the person becomes from its people, so long this is the case (if the people don't want him, he loses the title). Do we have more information on this issue and is there a way to make the argument more objective and according to the Wikipedia rules?
  • It is also mentioned, that his reputation was damaged after a mud campaign over allegation about a liaison to a woman and so on. Although it is quite possible that his reputation was actually damaged, I don't see any sources that have really counted the effect of this campaign on the outcome of the referendum. Do we have more information on this issue and is there a way to make the argument more objective and according to the Wikipedia rules?
  • Over the decision of the supreme court, it is often mentioned, that it was under his control. Not only didn't I find adequate sources supporting this supposition, I didn't also find any mentioning of the impossibility of such an argumentation. By every decision of the supreme court that supports the government, this would be an argument against the decision and by every decision that is against the government, this argument wouldn't make any point. But this is no legal argument, it is only a way to push decisions against the government. I see many opinions about the court's decision, but the actual legal argument of the court is ruffly mentioned. Do we have more information on this issue and is there a way to make the argument more objective and according to the Wikipedia rules? Yomomo (talk) 12:10, 4 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]


I am having trouble following your writing, but I will try. Maybe it would help if you mentioned specifically what sentence from the article you have issue with?
Morales didn't ask for a term limit. He oversaw a completely new constitution. The 2 term-limit was part of the new constitution he oversaw (previously, it was limited to one consecutive term)
He did change his mind, and wanted another term - which is why he held a referendum (21F) - he said he would abide by the outcome, and he lost.
That is not bias - he said he would not, then he obviously did run again.
I explained the "supreme court" issue above, in response to your previous post.
He is not an elected king of his people, and I really dont understand your issue that he is elected by his party?
The Zapata controversy has referenced links - what about it is an issue?
Laella (talk) 12:23, 4 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]
I don't have time to reply in detail, but I think the references as of 6th Jan 2020 seem solid with regard to several of the issues you raise. Morales could have appointed a successor and MAS would have likely stormed the election without any problem or the corruption that went on. There is a lot of corruption in Bolivia in general, however, and it is fair that a lot of those involved face up to their crimes. Look up some reports on corruption in Bolivia. There are several in English. With regard to the most current allegations, there are holes and misappropriated funds in publicly owned companies - one (Entel) to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. I know you cannot read Spanish, but using translate in Google translate is extremely helpful if only for your own personal interest. Morales own personal involvement is not clear at all, but I would say he either knew about it or turned a blind eye to the activities of his associates. As far as I know, there is nothing implicating him directly other than things he financed for his role as President and that was never extravagant in the bigger picture. The Zapata stuff matches all that I know about it that I have heard from Bolivia and seems well researched. Being an elected king... well I doubt that he was ever really elected. It's an honorary title given by a committee of elders as far as I understand it. Like an honorary degree given to a person prominent in the community. There are a lot of them I think. I could be wrong on that, but it is not a king as we would understand it. I am not sure how being leader of the party works, but you need to understand that MAS really came together as a coalition of pre-existing parties and he was the one to bring them together. A lot of the factions that joined up with him to achieve victory are doubting his role now. A new generation of Masistas, like Eva Copa, seem to be fine without him. I know Bolivians who view him as a traitor to the Process of Change. They don't support him, but they support the Process. With regard to the legal argument for Morales changing the rules of his own constitution, I think that a lot of countries don't have terms limits so it is up to them, but the fact that Morales is changing his own rules is what people are very unhappy about, but also in the wider context of discontent with the immunity and corruption of the 14 year government it just made people angry. I invite you to check out the Bolivian press in these matters, even through the lense of Google translate. The rest of the world is way behind.Crmoorhead (talk) 02:37, 6 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • I will add a note here to say that Yomomo exclusively edits Bolivian politics articles, and has shown clear favor towards Morales. Directed at Yomomo: please note that this is a Good Article and as such has been assessed by Wikipedia as neutral. You can't just declare it POV and start making changes in poor English. Kingsif (talk) 05:07, 6 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

first indigenous president

There are explanations of this in 2 different places in the article, should they be merged?

From Personal Life:

Morales is ethnically Aymara, and has been widely described as Bolivia's first democratically-elected President from the indigenous majority.[10][6] Although Morales has sometimes been described as the first indigenous president to be democratically elected in Latin America, Benito Juárez, a Mexican of the Zapotec ethnic group, was elected President of Mexico in 1858.[7]

In a special note at the end:

Morales is described as the first indigenous president of Bolivia in academic studies of his presidency, such as those of Muñoz-Pogossian,[2] Webber,[3] Philip and Panizza,[4] and Farthing and Kohl,[5] as well as in press reports, such as those of BBC News,[6] However, there have been challenges to this claim by critics who have asserted that Morales probably has some European ancestry, and thus on genetic grounds is technically mestizo rather than solely indigenous.[7] Harten asserted that this argument was "misguided[,] wrong[... and] above all irrelevant" because regardless of his genetic makeup, the majority of Bolivians perceive Morales as being the first indigenous president.[7] In Bolivian society, indigeneity is a fluid concept rooted in cultural identity;[7] for instance, many indigenous individuals that have settled in urban areas and abandoned their traditional rural customs have come to identify as mestizo.[8]

The controversy is not that Morales has some European ancestry. The controversy is that he is not Bolivia's first indigenous/mestizo president. (Ignoring indigenous presidents from other LATAM countries for the moment) The first indigenous/mestizo president of Bolivia would have been either Andrés Santa Cruz Calahumana or Bautista Saavedra Mallea, depending on how you calculate. There are other Bolivian presidents who were likely mestizo, but their ancestries not known definitively, so it is impossible to prove. There were also at least a couple of mestizo presidents who were not democratically elected. Laella (talk) 12:09, 4 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Gaiagenesis edits

There were a lot of edits made by this user on several pages that have been reverted elsewhere. This includes a reference to this source [1]. Quite asides from the fact that this is not how it is been reported by any other Bolivian media, I am not sure how reputable or even real the website is. There were also a bunch of other references to the CEPR analysis of the election containing opinion on their analysis and NPOV elements concerning responses to their analysis. This information and further analyses of the election carried out by others is dealt with on other pages and is more up to date there. Crmoorhead (talk) 03:42, 12 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

The website is known to be part of the first large-scale social media influencer campaign of the MAS / Evo Morales presidential campaign. (citations in spanish, if I find english explanations, I will add them) [2] [3] - Laella (talk) 04:37, 12 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Gracias por eso! Certainly there is a lot that didn't seem right about it. Thanks for the background. The same information is being used on the President of Bolivia page but I did not edit that yet as there were a dozen edits made throughout yesterday and it is hard to untangle what should be removed and what not. Crmoorhead (talk) 13:38, 12 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Cult of Personality

(edit to say: I am re-deleting the comment from the article now that there are sources to say otherwise)

The article currently states "Unlike his ally Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, the MAS does not revolve around his personality." I deleted that opinion, and had the edit reverted with the following comment "reverting removal of sourced content. It is possible that Harten's claims are incorrect, but we would need sourced Reliable Sources to contest his statement."

My list below includes some smaller, left-biased, media source to show that even more left-leaning media considers Morales to be a Cult of Personality, and it is not an "opposition" opinion. I hope this is what was needed. So here I am posting reliable sources to contest the idea that "Evo Morales is not a Cult of Personality".

It’s true he was no longer as popular as he had been. It’s true his rule had lately taken on an authoritarian tinge. There were signs of democratic “backsliding” and of an unattractive, Castro-esque personality cult.[4]

The bonuses and other social programs keep the majority happy, and the result is that Morales enjoys a cult of personality very similar to that of former president Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.[5]

In the past years, Morales has had a conciliatory policy toward agribusiness, while governing on the basis of authoritarianism and a cult of personality.[6]

We build an ever more important cult of personality around the figure of Evo Morales. This allowed him to win the second election overwhelmingly...[7]

In recent years Evo, as he is widely known, showed increasing signs of believing his own cult of personality, which MAS has promoted in part because of its failure to cultivate a politically viable successor.[8]

Bolivia TV’s informative style is typical. Reporters usually appear on screen with the following introduction: “Now we are going to interview residents of this town so that they can express their satisfaction with the new public works carried out by the government of President Morales.” The cult of personality is ubiquitous in government-controlled media.[9]

A staunch ally of Venezuela, Cuba and Iran, Morales can best be described as a “narcissist-Leninist.” Following the steps of late Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez, he has built a strong personality cult and uses radical leftist rhetoric. Critics in Bolivia jokingly refer to him as “Ego” Morales. He has built a $7.1 million museum — the biggest in the country — to glorify his life story in his home village of Orinoca, about six hours by car from the capital. He named it “Museum of the Democratic and Cultural Revolution,” but everybody in Bolivia knows it as “Evo’s Museum.”[10]

Old complications might compound the economic difficulties that Bolivia will face if a proper political transition is not made. Morales’ party, the Movement for Socialism (MAS), has not sought an alternative to Evo, a reflection of the cult of personality that developed around him which, in the opinion of many experts, is another reason for his fall.[11]

Laella (talk) 18:48, 13 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Same source used twice

Sources 315 and 319 (from The Guardian, titled "Bolivian president Evo Morales resigns after election result dispute") are the same. Could someone please erase one? Thanks in advance! --177.230.47.65 (talk) 06:10, 22 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

thanks for that. Now corrected.
Burrobert (talk) 06:57, 22 January 2020 (UTC)[reply]

MIT / CEPR study discussion

This has been an issue in several articles that want to include the secondary CEPR study. People seem to be doing verbal gymnastics to mention MIT, in order to lend legitimacy to CEPR's rehash study (From CEPR's description of the researchers' study: "Disclosure: In December 2019, the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) contracted with the authors to see if the numerical and statistical results of CEPR’s November 2019 study could be independently verified."[1]. " - So not an independent study.)

MIT has unequivocally stated they don't want their name attached to this study. Per letter from MIT: "... this study was conducted independently of MIT... it should be referred to as a CEPR study..."[2] MIT has also stated that the authors should be cited as "independent contractors to the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)" and not as employees of MIT. Laella (talk) 19:53, 9 April 2020 (UTC)[reply]

There are a few things to note about this study and there is an interesting article written by an expert in election modelling that compares the OAS and two CEPR (the original and the one by John Cushiel and Jack R Williams) and discusses the merits and failings of each. [12]. Cushiel and Williams are quoted often as MIT election experts, but when one examines their credentials they are not as impressive as one might believe. The MIT Politics department has an impressive list of scholars [13], none of which appear to be willing to be connected with this study. The Election and Data lab has 5 members and a lot more affiliated graduate and undergraduate students. [14] Cushiel completed his PhD less than a year ago and his areas of expertise are in public health dentristry and rezoning of voting districts. [15] Williams, as far as can be determined, does not have a Masters or Phd and obtained a BA in 2017. [16] Quite aside from that, Williams signed a public document denouncing the interim govenment as a coup with supporting evidence from the original CEPR report before the full OAS report was ever released. The work he is meant to be "independently" verifying. Compare their qualifications as experts with the head of the OAS study, Irfan Nooruddin, who is a Professor at Georgetown University and has written a book on electoral democracy [17], Walter Mebane, who is a professor of both statistics and politics at University of Michigan [18] and who said that fraud existed (although he debated whether or not it would change the result of the election) and Diego Escobari, Associate Professor at University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, and Gary A. Hoover, Head of Economics at the University of Oklahoma who concluded even more forcefully that the election was fraudulent.[19]. The article I mention was also written by a professor-researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, Rodrigo Salazar Elena, and what he has to say is important because it actually does a comparison of the studies.
Firstly, when comparing the two CEPR studies, he says "I invite readers to compare the documents and judge for themselves that it is, except in a few details, a replica of the same analysis." They are not claiming anything particularly new. Secondly, that "the prestige of MIT and the Washington Post was enough for many commentators to take for granted the conclusion that CEPR had reached earlier" and that "statistics is a subject that requires training that most of us do not have, so when taking sides in disputes on these issues many will be guided by issues such as reputation and prestige." CEPR have a lot of motivation in getting the MIT name in this. Salazar also says "It must be remembered that the OAS audit presents evidence of different irregularities. Statistical study is only part of the analysis. In this sense, by concentrating the discussion on this aspect, this shows the propagnadistic effect of the relaunch of the CEPR analysis." Thirdly, he says that the CEPR reports don't confront head on the lack of continuity around an arbitrary point in time, which is the basis of the conclusions of the OAS. "A rebuttal of the OAS analysis would have to mention which feature clearly distinguishes voters on either side of the threshold, to account for the jump of about 10%", he says. CEPR avoid this evidence entirely and use other means to attempt to prove the opposite. Fourthly, with regard the the Curiel/Williams and earlier CEPR report, he does not criticise their methods, but points out that they also rely on an assumption of geographic continuity in the results. He also points out that what flaws there are in that assumption. In summing up, he says "If you read a headline like "Simulations from MIT specialists show that Evo won in the first round," it sounds like they're launching rockets into space. Not so, not even close. On the one hand, the OAS analysis has not been properly refuted. On the other hand, the CEPR-MIT analysis is valid only if one is willing to believe in an assumption that is at least as difficult to sustain as that of the OAS audit." Furthermore, there is also a lot of OTHER evidence of fraud or attempted fraud in the OAS report that the CEPR study just ignores as if it is irrelevant and do not answer the question of whether or not the elections should be anulled. CEPR in response to one of these rebuttals of their work state "neither the report by C&W nor their piece in the Monkey Cage proves there was no fraud. C&W did not set out to prove there was no fraud — merely to investigate whether the data supported a specific claim by the OAS. There is no amount of analysis that can suffice to prove there was no fraud." [20] They make similar statements on another piece that states "This analysis is not meant to serve as a validation of the electoral results themselves. Rather, it is an analysis of the OAS’s actual findings and of the neutrality and rigor of the audit itself. This is not about supporting one political party or candidate over another. Nor is it solely about Bolivia. This is about the need for independent electoral observation in the hemisphere, and about accountability for an organization that has abandoned any semblance of neutrality under the leadership of Secretary General Luis Almagro."
So, in contrast to saying "there is no statistical evidence of fraud" CEPR are saying that whether the elections were valid or not is secondary to their criticism of the OAS.

Crmoorhead (talk) 15:35, 11 April 2020 (UTC)[reply]

OAS reports and rebuttals (2019 election controversy and resignation - 2019 election)

This section is absurdly large. It is the largest section on this page right now - 5 paragraphs (over 1200 words). There is a note on this section to go to 2019 Bolivian political crisis for more information. The rest of this section should be reduced to a short summary. The OAS report and rebuttals are NOT actually about Evo Morales directly. They do not contribute to an understanding of Evo Morales. Also, it falls into the problem on many of Bolivia's pages where basically the exact same information is over-described on many different pages, which means that information has to be updated in too many places when there are updates. If no one objects, and no one else wants to do it, I am going to cut this down to one paragraph. The details can be added to "2019 Bolivian political crisis" if they are not there already. --Laella (talk) 00:11, 12 June 2020 (UTC)[reply]

I am inclined to agree, and there will doubtless be more studies both for and against the conclusions of the OAS. We cannot keep adding arguments for and against every study. There is a place for that, as you say. If there are similar presidents with content on wikipedia with precedent, it may be arguable, but seems like this is becoming a battleground to clear or damn Evo's name. These studies don't speak about his personal involvement in the alleged fraud, which would be more pertinent. Seperating into groups of those that say no evidence of fraud, those that say there was evidence of fraud, but it had a negligible or unknown effect on the result, and those that say both there was evidence of fraud and it had an effect on the results could be an idea. Crmoorhead (talk) 01:15, 12 June 2020 (UTC)[reply]
can you post your proposed paragraph on the talk page first so that other editors can provide comments before the article is updated? Burrobert (talk) 08:13, 12 June 2020 (UTC)[reply]
I don't have a proposed paragraph. I propose to delete the 5 paragraphs about the OAS report and rebuttals. It can be replaced with "reports and rebuttals have been issued, see 2019 Bolivian political crisis for more information, if needed (or something along those lines). Then, polish the remaining information if needed (adding transitions, etc). Laella (talk) 21:11, 12 June 2020 (UTC)[reply]

.

  1. ^ https://www.primeralinea.info/ingeniero-altera-resultados-para-justificar-supuesto-fraude-y-generar-un-show-mediatico/
  2. ^ https://www.chequeabolivia.bo/primera-linea-noticias-portal-enganoso
  3. ^ https://eldeber.com.bo/141954_guerreros-digitales-operan-medios-digitales-y-cambian-su-estrategia-operativa
  4. ^ editorial, Observer (17 November 2019). "The Observer view on Evo Morales and Bolivia | Observer editorial". The Guardian. The Guardian. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  5. ^ Mendez Cabrera, Julio. "Bolivia's Perennial President | Harvard Political Review". Harvard Political Review. harvardpolitics.com. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  6. ^ "Down With the Right-Wing Coup in Bolivia!". Left Voice. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  7. ^ Webber, Jeffrey. "Bolivian Horizons: An Interview with Pablo Solón". Solidarity. solidarity-us.org. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  8. ^ Hennigan, Tom. "Bolivia: End came swiftly for Evo Morales but crisis has deep roots". The Irish Times. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  9. ^ Gumucio Dagron, Alfonso. "Media and Democracy in Bolivia". NACLA. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  10. ^ Oppenheimer, Andres. "Bolivia's election could lead to a ruthless 'elected dictatorship.' But no one's paying attention". Miami Herald. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  11. ^ Sanz, Juan Antonio. "Bolivia on a razor's edge". Equal Times. Retrieved 13 January 2020.
  12. ^ https://vozyvoto.com.mx/LeerBlog/32El-analisis-estadistico-de-las-elecciones-de-Bolivia-Una-orientacion-al-debate
  13. ^ https://polisci.mit.edu/people/faculty
  14. ^ https://electionlab.mit.edu/about
  15. ^ https://jcuriel.mit.edu/research
  16. ^ https://jackrw.mit.edu/
  17. ^ https://gufaculty360.georgetown.edu/s/contact/00336000014TIakAAG/irfan-nooruddin
  18. ^ https://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/people_faculty_wmebane.pdf
  19. ^ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3492928
  20. ^ https://www.cepr.net/guilty-until-proven-innocent-the-diego-escobari-approach-to-bolivias-elections/