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At the Marine Guards' living quarters 5 blocks from the Embassy, Captain Robert J O'Brien organised the remaining marines into quick reactionteams and headed to the Embassy. As they approached the side gate on ''Mac Dinh Chi'' Street they found it locked and could see Vietcong inside the grounds, calling out to the MPs they were answered with fire from the Vietcong and withdrew to firing positions further down the street<ref name="Oberdorfer14">Oberdorfer, p.14.</ref>.
At the Marine Guards' living quarters 5 blocks from the Embassy, Captain Robert J O'Brien organised the remaining marines into quick reactionteams and headed to the Embassy. As they approached the side gate on ''Mac Dinh Chi'' Street they found it locked and could see Vietcong inside the grounds, calling out to the MPs they were answered with fire from the Vietcong and withdrew to firing positions further down the street<ref name="Oberdorfer14">Oberdorfer, p.14.</ref>.

At 04:00 Ambassador [[Ellsworth Bunker]] through an aide contacted the head of Saigon police, Lieutenant Nguyen Van Luan to ask for police reinforcements for the Embassy. The First Precinct police commanding officer refused to move his men in the dark and instead asked the Americans to escort his men to the Embassy<ref name="Oberdorfer2223">Oberdorfer, p.22-23.</ref>. The Vietnamese police proved to have been worthless in defending the Embassy with all policemen abandoning their posts when the firing began<ref name="Oberdorfer910">Oberdorfer, p.9-10.</ref>


At 04:20 [[General Westmoreland]] ordered the 716th MP Battalion to clear the Embassy as their first priority, lacking armoured vehicles and helicopters, the MPs moved in more troops to cordon off the Embassy <ref name="Oberdorfer23">Oberdorfer, p.23.</ref>. The tactical situation was confused by the poor communications within the Chancery and between the Chancery and the MPs and Marines outside the Embassy compound. Sergeant Harper and the other Americans inside the Chancery could communicate with the outside by telephone, while Sergeant Soto on the roof only had a radio. <ref name="Oberdorfer24">Oberdorfer, p.24.</ref>.
At 04:20 [[General Westmoreland]] ordered the 716th MP Battalion to clear the Embassy as their first priority, lacking armoured vehicles and helicopters, the MPs moved in more troops to cordon off the Embassy <ref name="Oberdorfer23">Oberdorfer, p.23.</ref>. The tactical situation was confused by the poor communications within the Chancery and between the Chancery and the MPs and Marines outside the Embassy compound. Sergeant Harper and the other Americans inside the Chancery could communicate with the outside by telephone, while Sergeant Soto on the roof only had a radio. <ref name="Oberdorfer24">Oberdorfer, p.24.</ref>.
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By 08:00 the Embassy was declared secure.
By 08:00 the Embassy was declared secure.


The first news reports of the Embassy attack were sent by the [[Associated Press]] at 03:15 based on fragmentary information<ref name="Oberdorfer16">Oberdorfer, p.16.</ref>. The news reports from the Embassy reflected the confused tacticla situation.
The first news reports of the Embassy attack were sent by the [[Associated Press]] at 03:15 based on fragmentary information, a later report stated that 3 Vietcong had entered the Embassy ground<ref name="Oberdorfer16">Oberdorfer, p.16.</ref>. The news reports from the Embassy reflected the confused tactical situation. At 07:25 the associated press carried a story stating that the Vietcong had seized part of the first floor of the Embassy building and that US forces were being held back by fire from the Embassy building. This report was picked up by [[NBC]] news who in their 6:30pm EST news broadcast that the Vietcong occuppied the first floor of the Embassy building and that US forces were in the Embassy grounds exchanging fire with them.


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Revision as of 05:43, 11 January 2010

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The US Embassy, Saigon was first established in Saigon, South Vietnam in 1950. It was the scene of a number of significant events of the Vietnam War, most notably the Vietcong attack during the Tet Offensive which helped turn US public opinion against the war and the helicopter evacuation during the Fall of Saigon.

1950-1965

The United States granted recognition to the State of Vietnam led by the Bao Dai Government in 1950 and a U.S. Embassy was established in Saigon that year.

Following the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the subsequent partitioning into North Vietnam and South Vietnam, the United States did not extend diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam]].

The first US Embassy was located at 39 Ham Nghi Boulevard and the original remains there today.

1965-1966

On 30 March 1965, the Viet Cong detonated a car-bomb outside the Embassy, killing one female Embassy employee, another American, 19 Vietnamese and 1 Filipino and injuring 183 other people.

1967-1968

Due to security concerns following the 1965 bombing it was decided that a new Embassy with greater protection would be constructed. The site selected was at No 4 Thong Nhut (now Le Duan) Boulevard at the corner of Thong Nhut and Mac Dinh Chi Street (Embassy, Saigon 10°46′58.12″N 106°42′3.66″E / 10.7828111°N 106.7010167°E / 10.7828111; 106.7010167Invalid arguments have been passed to the {{#coordinates:}} function). The Embassy was next door to the French Embassy, opposite the British Embassy and located near to the Presidential Palace (now the Reunification Palace.

The Embassy comprised two separate compounds, a consular compound sealed off by a separate wall and steel gate and the Embassy compound with the Embassy Chancery building, behind it was a parking lot, a 2 storey villa used as a residence by the Mission Coordinator (a civilian assistant to the US Ambassador), a motor pool and other facilities[1].

The new Embassy Chancery was a distinctive 6 story white concrete building, with a facade that served to both cool the building and deflect projectiles. A small helipad was located on the roof. The Chancery was one of the tallest buildings in Saigon at the time of its construction. The Embassy was opened in September 1967.

The old Embassy remained in use as an annex.

Tet Offensive

On 15 December 1967 as a sign of their confidence in the Vietnamese military, US forces turned over responsibility for the defence of Saigon to the ARVN, henceforth US forces would only be responsible for defending themselves and their facilities in the city. On the night of 30 January 1968 4 Vietnamese police posts provided an outer line of defence for the Embassy. 2 Military policemen from the 716th MP Battalion guarded the vehicle entrance on Mac Dinh Chi Street, inside the Chancery building 2 US Marines occupied a guard post and, due to the heightened security situation, another Marine was stationed on the roof of the Chancery building[2].

Shortly after midnight on 31 January 1968, 19 Vietcong sappers from the C-10 Sapper Battalion gathered at a Vietcong safe house in a car repair shop at 59 Phan Thanh Gian Street to distribute weapons and conduct final preparations for the attack. The unit set off in a small truck and a taxi towards central Saigon. As the vehicles came down Mac Dinh Chi Street with their lights off after curfew they were spotted by a Vietnamese Police guard post north of the Embassy, but rather than trying to stop the vehicles the police instead took cover.

As the taxi turned from Mac Dinh Chi Street onto Thong Nhut Boulevard, the occupants opened fired on the two MPs guarding the night gate. The MPs, SFC4 Charles L Daniel and PFC William E Sebast returned fire, closed and locked the steel gate and radioed that the were under attack.

Hearing the firing on the side gate, Marine Sergeant Ronald W Harper who was in the rea of the Embassy compound ran back into the rear door of the Chancery acoss the lobby past Marine Corporal George B Zahuranic who was calling for help. Harper pulled a Vietnamese night watchman into the building and closed and bolted the heavy teak doors to the Chancery[3].

The Vietcong blew a small hole in the perimeter wall on Thong Nhut Boulevard and gained access to the Embassy grounds. The first 2 Vietcong into the grounds were shot and killed by SFC Daniel and PFC Sebast in their guard post at the Mac Dinh Chi Street entrance. Daniel radioed "They're coming in! They're coming in! Help me! Help me!" before the radio went silent. Daniel[4] and Sebast[5] were themselves shot and killed by the Vietcong.

On the Chancery roof, Marine Sergeant Rudy A Soto Jr saw the Vietcong sappers coming through the wall and tried to fire on them with his 12 gauge shotgun which jammed, he then emptied his .38 caliber revolver at the hole, but such fire was unlikely to be effective at that height and range. Inside the Embassy the Vietcong opened fire on the Chancery building with AK-47s and RPGs. Several RPGS penetrated the walls of the Chancery wounding Corporal Zahuranic and destroying the 2 radio sets in the guard post. Sergeant Soto tried unsuccessfully to contact the lobby guard post and assuming that Harper and Zahuranic were dead he called for assistance and waited for the Vietcong to reach him[6].

In the villa at the rear of the Embassy compound, Colonel Jacobson, the Mission Coordinator, was woken by the firing; searching for a weapon he found a single M26 grenade[7].

An MP jeep patrol responded to the calls for help from Daniel and Sebast but as they approached the Embassy they were met by automatic weapons fire killing Sergeant Johnie B Thomas[8] and SFC Owen E Mebust[9].

In addition to the 3 Marines, there were 2 Vietnamese and 6 Americans inside the Chancery building at the time of the attack. The Americans armed themselves with .38 revolvers, Beretta M12s and a shotgun and waited for the Vietcong to come inside[10].

Outside in the Embassy grounds, the Vietcong were unsure of their next move as the sapper team's leaders, Bay Tuyen and Ut Nho, had both been killed early in the attack possibly by Daniel and Sebast. The Vietcong were armed with more than 40 lbs of C4 (explosive) and could easily have blasted their way into the Chancery had they been ordered to do so. Instead they took positions in or near the circular planters around the Chancery and returned fire at the growing numbers of Americans shooting at them[11].

At the Marine Guards' living quarters 5 blocks from the Embassy, Captain Robert J O'Brien organised the remaining marines into quick reactionteams and headed to the Embassy. As they approached the side gate on Mac Dinh Chi Street they found it locked and could see Vietcong inside the grounds, calling out to the MPs they were answered with fire from the Vietcong and withdrew to firing positions further down the street[12].

At 04:00 Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker through an aide contacted the head of Saigon police, Lieutenant Nguyen Van Luan to ask for police reinforcements for the Embassy. The First Precinct police commanding officer refused to move his men in the dark and instead asked the Americans to escort his men to the Embassy[13]. The Vietnamese police proved to have been worthless in defending the Embassy with all policemen abandoning their posts when the firing began[14]

At 04:20 General Westmoreland ordered the 716th MP Battalion to clear the Embassy as their first priority, lacking armoured vehicles and helicopters, the MPs moved in more troops to cordon off the Embassy [15]. The tactical situation was confused by the poor communications within the Chancery and between the Chancery and the MPs and Marines outside the Embassy compound. Sergeant Harper and the other Americans inside the Chancery could communicate with the outside by telephone, while Sergeant Soto on the roof only had a radio. [16].

Marine Corporal James C Marshall climbed the roof of a small building in the Consular compound and was firing on Vietcong in the Embassy compound, hit by a rocket fragment he remained in place firing on the Vietcong until he was shot and killed[17], he would be the last American killed at the Embassy that day[15].

At 05:00 a helicopter carrying troops from the 101st Airborne Division attempted to land on the rootop helipad but was driven off by fire from Vietcong in the Embassy grounds. At 06:15 a medevac helicopter landed on the roof picked up Corporal Zahuranic and dropped off 3 cases of M16 ammunition, however none of the Americans in the Chancery had an M16 and so this resupply was useless[18].

As dawn broke on the morning of 31 January, the spider-hole that the Vietcong had blown in the wall to gain access to the Embassy compound was located at the same time MPs had finally managed to shoot off the locks of the front gate on Thong Nhut Boulevard and rammed the gates open with a jeep. The MPs found that most of the Vietcong were dead or dying in the Embassy garden. At the same time a helicopter carrying troops from the 101st Airborne Division landed on the roof and proceeded to sweep the Chancery building, finding no Vietcong inside[19].

In his villa Colonel Jacobson heard movement downstairs, he threw down his grenade and called out to the MPs in the grounds to throw him up a weapon. The MPs threw up a Colt .45 to Jacobson and poured fire through the ground floor windows and Jacobson proceeded to shoot a wounded Vietcong as he came upstairs.

By 08:00 the Embassy was declared secure.

The first news reports of the Embassy attack were sent by the Associated Press at 03:15 based on fragmentary information, a later report stated that 3 Vietcong had entered the Embassy ground[20]. The news reports from the Embassy reflected the confused tactical situation. At 07:25 the associated press carried a story stating that the Vietcong had seized part of the first floor of the Embassy building and that US forces were being held back by fire from the Embassy building. This report was picked up by NBC news who in their 6:30pm EST news broadcast that the Vietcong occuppied the first floor of the Embassy building and that US forces were in the Embassy grounds exchanging fire with them.

1968-1975

A fire-bomb attack on the Embassy took place on 18 February 1971.

Fall of Saigon and Operation Frequent Wind

See Fall of Saigon and Operation Frequent Wind.

1975-1995

North Vietnames intelligence officials scoured the Embassy shortly after taking Saigon, they apparently were able to piece together classified documents that had been shredded but not burnt and used these to track down South Vietnamese employees of the CIA.

The Embassy was used as the offices of Petro-Vietnam throughout the 1980s.

1995 to present

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United State and Vietnam a new US Embassy was opened in Hanoi in 1995 and the site of the former US Embassy in Saigon was handed back to the US government.

It was decided that the former US Embassy building was unusable after more than 20 years of neglect in Vietnam's tropical climate[21], but it also seems likely that the history of the building itself carried such negative connotations that it did not fit with the new US-Vietnam relationship. The fomer US Embassy was demolished in May-July of 1998 and the new Consulate-General of the United States in Ho Chi Minh City was built adjacent to the old Embassy site[22].

During the demolition of the Embassy the ladder leading from the Embassy rooftop to the helipad was removed and sent back to the United States, where it is now on display at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum[23] [24].

Some visible remnants of the old Embassy remain, most notably the large round concrete planters which sat in front of the Embassy and were used as firing positions by the Vietcong during the Tet Offensive attack. The footprint of the old Embassy building can still be seen from above, the site is now a park for Consulate staff.

On 14 November 2002, a dedication ceremony was held for the replacement plaque commemorating the US Marine guard and the 4 MPs who were killed defending the Embassy[25]. The original plaque was left at the Embassy during the Fall of Saigon and was subsequently on display at the War Remnants Museum (Ho Chi Minh City) before disappearing[26]

See Also

References

  1. ^ Oberdorfer, Don (1971). Tet!: The Turning Point in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-6703-7. {{cite book}}: Text "p. 10" ignored (help)
  2. ^ Oberdorfer, p. 9-10.
  3. ^ Oberdorfer, p.11.
  4. ^ "SP4 Charles L Daniel". The Virtual Wall.
  5. ^ "CPL William M Sebast". The Virtual Wall.
  6. ^ Oberdorfer, p.11-12.
  7. ^ Oberdorfer, p.13.
  8. ^ "SGT Johnie B Thomas". The Virtual Wall.
  9. ^ "SP4 Owen E Mebust". The Virtual Wall.
  10. ^ Oberdorfer, p.12-13.
  11. ^ Oberdorfer, p.23-24.
  12. ^ Oberdorfer, p.14.
  13. ^ Oberdorfer, p.22-23.
  14. ^ Oberdorfer, p.9-10.
  15. ^ a b Oberdorfer, p.23.
  16. ^ Oberdorfer, p.24.
  17. ^ "CPL James C Marshall". The Virtual Wall.
  18. ^ Oberdorfer, p.25-26.
  19. ^ Oberdorfer, p.29-30.
  20. ^ Oberdorfer, p.16.
  21. ^ Norman Kempster (1999-09-08). "Albright Opens Consulate Near Infamous Saigon Spot".
  22. ^ Jane Perlez (1999-09-08). "A U.S. Office Opens, Stirring Saigon Memories". Retrieved 2008-03-19.
  23. ^ Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum Leadership in Diplomacy exhibit
  24. ^ Gerald R. Ford's Remarks at the Opening of the Ford Museum's Saigon Staircase Exhibit April 1999
  25. ^ "Dedication Ceremony". 2002-11-14.
  26. ^ John Rossie (1999–2002). "Plaque Page".{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: date format (link)