Jump to content

Operation Hastings: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Content deleted Content added
Line 49: Line 49:
==17-18 July==
==17-18 July==
Based on the sightings from the Rockpile, 2/1 Marines were redeployed from LZ Robin to the river valley near the Rockpile by helicopters of MAG-16 on the morning of 17 July. In Helicopter Valley there was little contact with the NVA, but 3/4 Marines gave up trying to push south and anticipating further night attacks they established a common perimeter with 2/4 Marines. General English ordered the two Battalions to withdraw to the northeast the following day, 2/4 was to establish blocking positions below the DMZ while 3/4 would move to the south of 2/4 and then attack south and take Hill 208<ref name="Shulimson168-9">Shulimson, p. 168-9.</ref>.
Based on the sightings from the Rockpile, 2/1 Marines were redeployed from LZ Robin to the river valley near the Rockpile by helicopters of MAG-16 on the morning of 17 July. In Helicopter Valley there was little contact with the NVA, but 3/4 Marines gave up trying to push south and anticipating further night attacks they established a common perimeter with 2/4 Marines. General English ordered the two Battalions to withdraw to the northeast the following day, 2/4 was to establish blocking positions below the DMZ while 3/4 would move to the south of 2/4 and then attack south and take Hill 208<ref name="Shulimson168-9">Shulimson, p. 168-9.</ref>.

On the morning of 18 July 2/4 Marines swept north towards their new positions which they reached without incident by mid-afternoon. At 14:00 3/4 Marines began to move out leaving Company K as a rearguard to provide security for the Battalion CP and the engineers who were tasked with destroying captured ammunition and the three crashed CH-46s. At 14:30 the NVA began mortaring the position and then attacked with infantry<ref name="Shulimson169">Shulimson, p. 169.</ref>. As the Marines had filled in their fighting holes they quickly had to dig them out again as an estimated 1000 NVA attacked. Company K's 1st Platoon bore the brunt of the assault and its squads were separated from each other as small groups of NVA moved between them. Airstrikes were called in as close as 45m from the Marines and Lt Col Vale called for Company L to return to the LZ and for 2/4 Marines to provide support. By 17:00 Company L had arrived at the LZ and a Company from 2/4 Marines occupied high ground overlooking the LZ and 1st Platoon of Company K was able to withdraw but had to leave their dead behind.


==In popular culture==
==In popular culture==

Revision as of 13:30, 14 July 2010

Operation Hastings
Part of the Vietnam War

Marines of Company H, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment take to the water as they move to join up with other elements of their battalion.
DateJuly 15 –Aug 3, 1966
Standort
Result South Vietnamese and U.S. victory
Belligerents
South Vietnam
Vereinigte Staaten
North Vietnam
Commanders and leaders
Lew Walt
Lowell English
Nguyen Van
Strength
8,500
(2/4, 3/4, 2/1, 1/3 and 3/5 Marine Battalions)
3,000
(1st ARVN Division)
8,000 to 10,000
(324B NVA Division)
Casualties and losses
128 killed, 162 wounded 824 killed, 14 captured

Operation Hastings was an American military operation in the Vietnam War. The operation was a qualified success in that it pushed the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces back across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). As the NVA clearly did not feel constrained by the "demilitarized" nature of the DMZ, US military leadership ordered a steady build-up of U.S. Marines near the DMZ from 1966 to 1968.

NVA Infiltration

During late June and early July of 1966, Marine reconnaissance units operating south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) had observed and engaged increased numbers of uniformed regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops[1]. on 6 July, troops of the ARVN 1st Division captured an NVA soldier near The Rockpile, he identified himself as being from the 812th Regiment of the 324B NVA Division and advised that the other Regiments of the Division had also moved into South Vietnam[2]. On 9 July a lieutenant from the 812th Regiment surrendered in the same area and advised that the 324B Division's mission was to liberate Quang Tri Province[2].

Planning

Convinced that the NVA had moved across the DMZ in force, Major-General Wood B Kyle, Commanding General of the 3rd Marine Division recommended to General Lew Walt of the need to launch an operation to drive back the NVA, General Walt passed on this recommendation COMUSMACV, General Westmoreland who gave his approval[2]. On 11 July Brigadier General Lowell English, Assistant Division Commander of the 3rd Marine Division met with General Truong, commanding General of the ARVN 1st Division and Colonel Sherman, commander of the 4th Marines at the 1st Division HQ in Huế to plan the operation. It was decided that a Marine task force would move into the area south of the DMZ to participate in Operation Hastings (the name given to Marine DMZ reconnaissance operations on 7 July), while ARVN forces would launch Operation Lam Son 289 south of the Marines[3].

On 13 July Task Force Delta became operational under the command of General English with Colonel Sherman as Chief of Staff. The Task Force consisted of four infantry Battalions, 2nd Battalion 1st Marines, 1st Battalion 3rd Marines, 2nd Battalion 4th Marines and 3rd Battalion 4th Marines, one artillery Battalion 3rd Battalion 12th Marines and various supporting forces. General English established his command post at Cam Lộ[3].

Intelligence determined that the 90th NVA Regiment with an estimated strength of 1500 men was using the Song Ngan River Valley some 10km northwest of Cam Lo as an infiltration route and that the command post of the 324B Division was located on Hill 208 overlooking the southwest of the Valley. The plans for the operation were for 3/4 Marines to be helilifted into the southwestern part of the Valley to establish blocking positions, while 2/4 Marines would land at the mouth of the valley and move southwest along the high ground towards Hill 208 and 3/4's positions. 2/1 Marines would secure Dong Ha while 1/3 Marines would protect Cam Lộ and 3/12 Marines' artillery. SLF 3rd Battalion 5th Marines would launch Operation Deckhouse II, 13km northeast of Dong Ha on 16 July and after establishing positions ashore Deckhouse would be terminated and 3/5 Marines would join Task Force Delta. The 1st ARVN Division and an airborne task force would launch Operation Lam Son 289 to the west of Route 1, with the 1st Division operating north of Dong Ha and the airborne operating south of Route 9[4].

D-Day in Helicopter Valley

On the morning of 15 July, A-4 Skyhawks from MAG-12 and F-4B Phantoms from MAG-11 began bombing and napalming the two landing zones, LZ Crow, 8km northeast of the Rockpile and LZ Dove at the mouth of the Valley, 5km northeast of Crow. At 07:25 3/12 artillery took over the bombardment of LZ Crow and at 07:45 20 CH-46s of HMM-164 and HMM-165 began landing 3/4 Marines on LZ Crow. While the Marines met no initial resistance, LZ Crow proved to be too small for the operation, two CH-46s collided and crashed while a third CH-46 hit a tree while trying to avoid the other two. As a result of these collisions, 2 Marines were killed and 7 injured. All 3 CH-46s were too badly damaged to be recovered and would have to be destroyed[5]. Later that day another CH-46 carrying men from 2/1 Marines was hit by NVA fire and crashed killing 13 Marines. Marines promptly renamed the Song Ngan as "Helicopter Valley"[6].

Companies K and L began establishing blocking positions around LZ Crow while Company I stayed in reserve. Company K took fire and soon located a 200 bed hospital and some 1200 pounds of ammunition. Company K continued on to their objective of 1.8km south of LZ Crow, but they were repulsed by NVA fire as they tried to cross the Ngan River with the loss of 3 Marines killed and five wounded. Company K decided to set up night positions on a hill 180m from the river. The NVA were now aware of the arrival of 3/4 Marines and the Battalion started to come under sustained small arms, machine gun and mortar fire. By 19:30, the Battalion CO Lt Col Vale reported that his Battalion was surrounded but 30 minutes latter under artillery and tactical air fire the NVA withdrew. At 20:15 a reinforced NVA Company attacked Company K's position and only withdrew after 3 hours of fighting, the following morning 25 NVA bodies were found in front of the position[7].

At 09:35 HMM-164 and HMM-165's CH-46s began lifting three Companies of 2/4 Marines into LZ Dove. Once landed, 2/4 Marines began moving west towards 3/4 Marines but their progress was hindered by high elephant grass and oppressive heat and humidity. 2/4 Marines were unable to move to assist 3/4 Marines and set up night positions with orders to abandon the move towards Hill 208 and proceed directly to join 3/4 Marines in the morning[8].

16 July

The NVA launched mortars into 3/4 Marines CP in the morning and the Marines responded with airstrikes and artillery. Company K was still unable to cross the Song Ngan, but the other two Companies were able to patrol unmolested to the north and northwest. 2/4 Marines set off at dawn towards 3/4's position and engaged the NVA several times calling in close air strikes before linking up with 3/4 at 14:45. At 19:30 the NVA again attacked Company K's position making three attacks over three and a half hours, the Marines suffered 1 dead, 5 seriously wounded and over 40 wounded from grenades thrown at short range. The NVA dragged away some of their dead but the Marines counted 79 bodies the following morning[9].

General English decided to deploy 2/1 Marines and they were lifted into LZ Robin 3km northeast of LZ Crow by 30 helicopters of HMM-161, HMM-163, HMM-164 and HMM-265. At 16:00 a platoon of Marines from the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company rapelled from a MAG-16 helicopter onto the summit of the Rockpile, three hours later they spotted an NVA force to their east and called in artillery fire from 3/12 killing 21 NVA and later that night they called in further fire on suspected NVA positions south of the Rockpile.[10].

17-18 July

Based on the sightings from the Rockpile, 2/1 Marines were redeployed from LZ Robin to the river valley near the Rockpile by helicopters of MAG-16 on the morning of 17 July. In Helicopter Valley there was little contact with the NVA, but 3/4 Marines gave up trying to push south and anticipating further night attacks they established a common perimeter with 2/4 Marines. General English ordered the two Battalions to withdraw to the northeast the following day, 2/4 was to establish blocking positions below the DMZ while 3/4 would move to the south of 2/4 and then attack south and take Hill 208[11].

On the morning of 18 July 2/4 Marines swept north towards their new positions which they reached without incident by mid-afternoon. At 14:00 3/4 Marines began to move out leaving Company K as a rearguard to provide security for the Battalion CP and the engineers who were tasked with destroying captured ammunition and the three crashed CH-46s. At 14:30 the NVA began mortaring the position and then attacked with infantry[12]. As the Marines had filled in their fighting holes they quickly had to dig them out again as an estimated 1000 NVA attacked. Company K's 1st Platoon bore the brunt of the assault and its squads were separated from each other as small groups of NVA moved between them. Airstrikes were called in as close as 45m from the Marines and Lt Col Vale called for Company L to return to the LZ and for 2/4 Marines to provide support. By 17:00 Company L had arrived at the LZ and a Company from 2/4 Marines occupied high ground overlooking the LZ and 1st Platoon of Company K was able to withdraw but had to leave their dead behind.

This operation is mentioned in the film Full Metal Jacket.

In Battlefield Vietnam, Operation Hastings is featured as a playable map.

Contemporary news reporting

  • "U.S. Accused of Zone Violation". NY Times. 1966-07-20. p. 3. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Tuohy, William (1966-07-24). "N. Viet Division Fails in Aim to Seize 2 Cities". LA Times. pp. E1. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • "A Prisoner's Tip Sparks A Battle". NY Times. 1966-07-25. p. 2. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • "Division from the North". Time. 1966-07-29. Retrieved 2007-04-08. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • "B-52s Attack 3 Red Positions In S. Vietnam". Washington Post/Times Herald. 1966-07-29. pp. A1. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • "Hanoi's Humanitarianism". Time. 1966-08-05. Retrieved 2007-04-08. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Norris, John G. (1966-08-07). "Rout of North Viet Division Indicates Big Change in War". Washington Post/Times Herald. pp. A18. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • "Quiet No More". Time. 1966-08-12. Retrieved 2007-04-08. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

References

  • Pearson, Lieutenant General Willard, The War in the Northern Provinces: 1966-1968, Washington D. C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975
  1. ^ Shulimson, Jack (1982). U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966 (Marine Corps Vietnam Operational Historical Series). Marine Corps Association. ASIN B000L34A0C. {{cite book}}: Text "p. 159" ignored (help)
  2. ^ a b c Shulimson, p. 160.
  3. ^ a b Shulimson, p. 161.
  4. ^ Shulimson, p. 163.
  5. ^ Shulimson, p. 164.
  6. ^ Shulimson, p. 165.
  7. ^ Shulimson, p. 166.
  8. ^ Shulimson, p. 166-7.
  9. ^ Shulimson, p. 167.
  10. ^ Shulimson, p. 168.
  11. ^ Shulimson, p. 168-9.
  12. ^ Shulimson, p. 169.