Mayaguez incident

Mayaguez incident
Part of the Vietnam War
Aerial surveillance photo showing two Khmer Rouge gunboats during the initial seizing of the SS Mayaguez
Date May 12–15, 1975 Standort Koh Tang, Democratic Kampuchea Result Successful release of SS Mayaguez and crew
Belligerents
Vereinigte Staaten	Democratic Kampuchea
Commanders and leaders
Randall W. Austin	unknown
Strength
~200	Estimated 300+
Casualties and losses
15 killed 41 wounded 3 missing (later killed) Three CH-53 helicopters destroyed	60 killed

Template:Fix bunching The Mayaguez incident between the Khmer Rouge and the United States from May 12–15, 1975, was the last official battle of the Vietnam War. The names of the Americans killed, as well as those of three Marines who were left behind on the island of Koh Tang after the battle and who were subsequently executed by the Khmer Rouge are the last names on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The merchant ship's crew, whose seizure at sea had prompted the U.S. attack, had been released in good health, unknown to the U.S. Marines or the U.S. command of the operation, before the Marines attacked. It was the only known engagement between U.S. ground forces and the Khmer Rouge.

Khmer Rouge seize the Mayaguez

The crisis began on the afternoon of May 12, 1975, as the American container ship SS Mayaguez passed near Poulo Wai island en route to Sattahip, Thailand in recognized international sea lanes claimed as territorial waters by Cambodia. Ar 2:18 pm, a Khmer Rouge naval forces "Swift Boat" was sighted approaching the Mayaguez. The Khmer Rouges fired across the bow of the Mayaguez and when Captain Charles T Miller ordered the engine room to slow down to manoevuring speed to avoid the machine-gun fire the Khmers Rouges then fired a Rocket-propelled grenade at the ship. Captain Miller ordered the transmission of an SOS and then stopped the ship. Seven Khmer Rouges boarded the Mayaguez and their leader, Battalion Commander Sa Mean pointed at a map indicating that the ship should proceed to the east of Poulo Wai. One of the crewmembers broadcast a Mayday which was picked up by an Australian vessel. The Mayaguez arrived off Poulo Wai at approximately 4pm and a further 20 Khmers Rouges boarded the vessel. Sa Mean indicated that the Mayaguez should proceed to Ream on the Cambodian mainland, but Captain Miller showed that the ship's radar wasn't working and pantomimed the ship hitting rocks and sinking. Sa Mean radioed his superiors and was apparently instructed to stay at Poulo Wai, dropping anchor at 4:55pm.

President Ford reacts

The Mayaguezs SOS and Mayday signals were picked up by a number of listeners including an employee of Delta Exploration Company in Jakarta, Indonesia who notified the US Embassy in Jakarta. By 5:12am Eastern Standard Time (EST) the first news of the incident reached the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in Washington D.C..

U.S. President Gerald Ford was informed of the seizure of the Mayaguez at his morning briefing with his deputy assistant for national security affairs, Brent Scowcroft. At 12:05 EST (21:05 Cambodia), a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) was convened to discuss the situation. Meanwhile the NMCC ordered Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command (CINCPAC), to launch reconnaissance aircraft to locate the Mayaguez. The members of the NSC were determined to end the crisis decisively, believing that the fall of South Vietnam less than two weeks before and the forced withdrawal of the United States from Cambodia, (Operation Eagle Pull) and South Vietnam (Operation Frequent Wind) had severely damaged the U.S.'s reputation. They also wished to avoid comparisons to the Pueblo incident of 1968, where the failure to promptly use military force to halt the hijacking of a US intelligence ship by North Korea led to an eleven-month hostage situation. It was determined that keeping the Mayaguez and its crew away from the Cambodian mainland was essential. As the United States had no diplomatic contact with the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, President Ford instructed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to urge the People's Republic of China to persuade the Khmer Rouge to release the Mayaguez and its crew.

The container ship SS Mayaguez.

Following the NSC meeting the White House issued a press release stating that President Ford considered the seizure an act of "piracy". Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger ordered the military to locate the Mayaguez and prevent its movement to the Cambodian mainland, employing munitions (including Tear gas and sea mines) if necessary. Secretary of State Kissinger sent a message to the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington demanding the immediate release of the Mayaguez and its crew, but the chief of the Liaison Office refused to accept the note. Kissinger then instructed George H. W. Bush then head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing to deliver the note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and to pass on an oral message that "The Government of the United States demands the immediate release of the vessel and of the full crew. If that release does not immediately take place, the authorities in Phnom Penh will be responsible for the consequences."

U.S. rescue preparations

Following Secretary Schlesinger's instructions, P-3 Orion aircraft stationed at Naval Air Station Cubi Point in the Philippines and at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield in Thailand took off to locate the Mayaguez and the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea (CV-43), then en route to Australia was ordered into the area. The destroyer escort USS Harold E. Holt (FF-1074) and the guided missile destroyer USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) were both ordered to proceed at high speed from the Philippine Sea towards the Mayaguezs last known location.

An alert order was sent to 1st Battalion 4th Marines (1/4 Marines) at Subic Bay and to the 9th Marine Regiment on Okinawa. A reinforced company from 1/4 Marines was ordered to assemble at Naval Air Station Cubi Point for airlift to Thailand, while an 1100 man Battalion Landing Team (BLT) assembled in Okinawa.

Locating and stopping the Mayaguez

On the early morning of May 13, the P-3 Orions identified large radar returns near Poulo Wai and dropped flares on the suspected location of the Mayaguez provoking Khmer Rouge gunfire. Low on fuel the two Orions returned to base and were replaced with another Orion from Patrol Squadron 17. At 08:16 local time the Orion made a low pass over Poulo Wai positively identifying the Mayaguez and again drawing Khmer Rouge gunfire.

Shortly after the Orion made its low pass the Khmer Rouge leader, Sa Mean, ordered Captain Miller to get the ship under way. At 08:45 the Mayaguez set off towards the northeast following one of the Swift Boats. The Orion continued to track the Mayaguez as it left Poulo Wai. Once the location of the Mayaguez was identified, Admiral Gayler ordered the commander of the Seventh Air Force, Lt General John J. Burns at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base to move combat aircraft to the area.. At 13:00 two unarmed F-111 fighter-bombers diverted from a training mission began making low-level high-speed passes by the Mayaguez. Once the F-111s had left Sa Mean ordered Captain Miller to follow the Swift Boats around Koh Tang and drop anchor approximately 1.5km north of the island. Two F-4 Phantoms soon arrived over the Mayaguez and began firing their 20mm cannon into the water in front of the ship. The F-4s were followed by A-7Ds and more F-111s which continued to fire into the sea in front of and behind the ship indicating that no further movement should be attempted.

At 16:15 the Khmer Rouge ordered the Mayaguez crew onto two fishing boats which then took them closer to the shore of Koh Tang.

The rescue forces assemble

The Coral Sea, the Holt and the Wilson were all scheduled to arrive on station by 15 May, but none of these ships carried any troops. The USS Hancock (CV-19) carried a Marine contingent but could not arrive on station until 16 May, while the USS Okinawa (LPH-3) also carried Marines but could not arrive until 18 May.

III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) assigned Task Force 79.9 with recovering the Mayaguez and designated D Company 1/4 Marines in the Philippines as the unit that would actually retake the Mayaguez, but General Burns wanted additional force and orders were sent to the III Marine Division on Okinawa. 1st Battalion, 9th Marines (BLT 1/9) was then on alert as the primary "air contingency" reaction force, but most of BLT 1/9, were ending their tours of duty and were not subject to further extension of their tours except in the case of emergency. III MAF requested the extension of BLT 1/9's tour but this was refused. 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (BLT 2/9) (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Randall W. Austin), was then in a training exercise on Okinawa and it received orders on the night of 13 May to return to camp and prepare for departure by air at dawn on 14 May. On the morning of 14 May BLT 2/9 boarded Air Force C-141s at Kadena Air Base to fly to Thailand. The 9th Marine Regiment had been the first U.S. ground combat force committed to the Vietnam War in 1965, but in May 1975 only a few of the officers and NCOs from BLT 2/9 had seen combat in Vietnam.

Nine USAF HH-53 Jolly Greens of the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron and 10 CH-53 Knifes of the 21st Special Operations Squadron were available at Nakhon Phanom in Thailand for the rescue operation. There were differences between the two types which would become relevant during the battle: the HH-53 is air refuelable, has 450 gallon foam-filled tip tanks, a tail Minigun with armor plating, and two waist Miniguns. The CH-53 is not air refuelable, but has 650-gallon non-foam-filled tip tanks and two Miniguns, although no tail gun. Thus the HH-53's fuel tanks were less vulnerable to ground fire and with its refueling capability, could remain in the battle area indefinitely as long as it had access to a tanker.

On May 13, General Burns and his Seventh Air Force staff developed a contingency plan to retake the Mayaguez using an assault force composed of men of the 656th Air Force Security Squadron. 75 volunteers from the 656th would be dropped onto the containers on the decks of the Mayaguez on the morning of 14 May. In preparation for this assault 5 HH-53s and 7 CH-53s were ordered to proceed to U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield for staging. At approximately 21:30, one of the 21st SOS CH-53s (68-10933, call sign Knife 13) crashed, killing 18 security police and the five man crew.

File:Marines Downed Mayaguez.jpg

These 23 airmen perished when their helicopter crashed due to mechanical error.

President Ford chaired an NSC meeting at 10:22 EST, where the Air Force rescue plan was cancelled due to the accident and the fact that the containers on the Mayaguez could not bear the weight of the helicopters and that rappelling men down would expose them to gunfire. It was decided that it was necessary to wait for the Navy ships to arrive off Koh Tang and for the Marines to assemble in Thailand before a rescue attempt would be mounted. President Ford ordered the Air Force to stop any Cambodian boats moving between Koh Tang and the mainland.

Early on the morning of May 14, the Mayaguez crew was loaded onto one of the fishing boats and they left Koh Tang following two of the Swift boats on a heading for Kampong Som. Two F-111s swept past the fishing boat followed by a pair of F-4s and a pair of A-7s which began firing in front of the Swift boats and then directly at the Swift boats causing one of them to turn back to Koh Tang. The jets were then joined by an AC-130H Spectre gunship from the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing which proceeded to engage the second Swift boat with its cannons. An A7D then sprayed the Swift boat with its 20mm cannon, sinking it. The fighters then came at the fishing boat dropping bombs and firing their cannon into the water in front of it and spraying the boat with shrapnel. The fighter crews then reported back that 30 to 40 Caucasians were seen onboard the fishing boat.

In Washington President Ford convened another NSC meeting at 22:30 EST (09:30 Cambodia). A communication link had been established between the White House, Seventh Air Force at Nakhon Phanom, CINCPAC in Hawaii and the aircraft orbiting above Koh Tang allowing for near real-time communications. The orbiting fighters reported that they could try to shoot the rudder off the fishing boat to stop its progress to Kampong Som, but the NSC decided that the risk of killing the Mayaguez crew was too great. At 23:00 EST (10:00 Cambodia) President Ford ordered that only riot-control agent should be dropped on or near the fishing boat, while all patrols boats should be sunk.

The NSC meeting continued to consider the appropriate course to resolve the crisis. It was reported that the was informed that the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Beijing had refused to pass on the American note intended for the Khmer Rouge, but George Bush reported that they had read the note and that it may have been relayed to the Khmer Rouge. General David Jones, acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented the NSC with a range of military options and it was decided to proceed with a simultaneous attack by Marines to retake the Mayaguez and attack Koh Tang where it was suspected some of the crew were still being held ogether with attacking Cambodian shipping and bombing mainland targets.

The rescue plan

Upon its arrival at U Tapao, the commander of BLT 2/9 and his staff undertook a surveillance of Koh Tang by helicopter during that same afternoon. They were prevented from closely approaching the island in order not to compromise the secrecy of the mission, but determined that the island was so covered in jungle growth that the only two viable landing zones available were beaches on the west and east shores of the northern portion of Koh Tang.

USAF reconnaissance photo of Koh Tang, showing East Beach (left) and West Beach (right)

The rescue mission was organized into several groups. A unit of 57 Marines from Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines was to be transferred by three HH-53 Jolly Greens to the destroyer escort USS Harold E. Holt (DE-1074) for boarding the Mayaguez. A larger force of 600 Marines from BLT 2/9 — composed of Golf and Echo Companies — were assigned to conduct a combat assault in 5 CH-53 Knifes and 3 HH-53 Jolly Greens to seize and hold Koh Tang. Two additional CH-53s (because of their superior firepower, all the HH-53s were used for troop lift) were tasked as Search and Rescue helicopters, supported by an HC-130 "King" command-and-control aircraft. The flight from U Tapao to Koh Tang was a four-hour round trip.

The guided missile destroyer USS Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) was assigned to support the Koh Tang operation, and the Harold E. Holt was deployed in a blocking position between U.S. forces and the Cambodian mainland with the mission of intercepting and engaging any Khmer reaction forces. Navy aircraft from the Coral Sea were given the mission of striking targets on the Cambodian mainland to prevent interference with the rescue.

Rescue operation

At 06:00 on May 15, the first phase of the operation began with the transfer of D/1/4th Marines to the Holt. As the destroyer escort slowly came alongside, USAF A-7 aircraft "saturated" the Mayaguez with tear gas munitions. Equipped with gas masks, the Marines at 07:20 hours then conducted the first hostile ship-to-ship boarding by the U.S. Navy since 1826, securing the vessel after an hour-long assault, finding it empty.

Simultaneously, the eight helicopters (five CH-53 Knifes and three HH-53 Jolly Greens) of the Koh Tang assault force approached the two LZs on Koh Tang. At 06:00, the CH-53s approaching the eastern LZ encountered intense automatic weapons and RPG fire from entrenched Khmer Rouge. Knife 23 crash-landed on the east beach, but successfully offloaded its 20 Marines and crew of five. They set up a defensive perimeter but remained cut off from both reinforcements and rescue for twelve hours. The second CH-53, Knife 31 was hit by two RPGs, exploding and crashing fifty meters offshore. A pilot, five Marines, and two Navy corpsmen were killed in the crash, another Marine drowned swimming from the wreck, and three Marines were killed by gunfire trying to reach the beach. A tenth Marine died of his wounds while clinging to the burning wreckage. The surviving ten Marines and three Air Force crewmen were forced to swim for four hours before being picked up by the gig of the arriving Henry B. Wilson. Among the Marine survivors was the battalion's Forward Air Controller, who used an Air Force survival radio while swimming to direct air strikes against the island.

On the western beach of the island, the first section of two CH-53 helicopters came in at 06:30 hours. The first helicopter; Knife 21, landed safely but while offloading its Marines came under heavy automatic weapons fire, destroying an engine. It managed to take off, protected by suppressive fire from the second CH-53, Knife 22, and ditched a mile offshore where all but one of its crew was picked up by Knife 32. Knife 22 was damaged so severely that it turned back with its Marines (including the Golf Company commander) still aboard, and crash-landed on the Thai coast, where its passengers were picked up and returned to U Tapao.

Two other sections of the first wave, consisting of the remaining four helicopters, eventually landed all of their Marines between 06:30 and 09:30 hours, although the final insertion by Jolly Green 41 required support from an AC-130 Spectre gunship in order to penetrate the Khmer Rouge fire on its fifth attempt. Knife 32, Jolly Green 41 and Jolly Green 42 eventually landed 81 Marines on the west beach under the command of the company Executive Officer, and Jolly Green 43 landed 29 Marines of the battalion command post and mortar platoon a kilometer to the southwest. 130 Marines had reached Koh Tang, but in three isolated beach areas and in close contact with Khmer Rouge troops. Unknown to U.S. commanders, the Khmer Rouge were well entrenched in anticipation of a Vietnamese attack over an ongoing territorial dispute. While isolated, the Marines were able to use their 81 mm mortars as fire support for their contingents and devised a makeshift communications network for controlling supporting air strikes by USAF A-7 and F-4 aircraft.

Of the eight helicopters assaulting Koh Tang, three had been destroyed (Knife 21, Knife 23 and Knife 31) and four others damaged too severely to continue operations (Knife 22, Knife 32, Jolly Green 41 and Jolly Green 42). One of the three helicopters used on the Holt portion of the operation, Jolly Green 13 had also been severely damaged attempting to pick up the platoon isolated on the east beach at 08:15 and had made an emergency landing in Rayong, Thailand. This left only three helicopters (all HH-53s - Jolly Greens 11, 12 and 43) of the original eleven available to bring in the followup forces of BLT 2/9, so the 2 CH-53s (Knife 51 and 52) whose mission had been search and rescue — the last available helicopters — were reassigned to carry troops. The five helicopters picked up 127 Marines of the second wave at U Tapao between 09:00 and 10:00 hours.

• 
  USS Harold E. Holt pulls alongside the SS Mayaguez to allow the boarding party to board
• 
  1/4 Marines board the Mayaguez
• 
  USS Harold E. Holt tows the SS Mayaguez away from Koh Tang
• 
  Marines land on Koh Tang under heavy fire.
• 
  The Eastern LZ with Knife 23 at left, Knife 31 at right and a destroyed Khmer Rouge Swift Boat
• 
  Knife 22 after emergency landing near Rayong, Thailand
• 
  BLT 2/9 Command group disembarks Jolly Green 43
• 
  Former Knife 22 no 68-10928 upgraded to MH-53M Pave Low on display at Memorial Air Park, Hurlburt Field, Florida

Rescue of the Mayaguez crew

The Mayaguez crew had been removed to the mainland two days before the rescue, and were released during the combat. The Khmer Rouge had been publicly indicating, though not in direct communication with the U.S. government, that the crew would be released. The men — all alive and in good health — were found on a fishing boat and subsequently transferred to the Holt.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that, with the ship recaptured and the crew released, further reinforcement of Koh Tang was unnecessary and recalled the second wave. The helicopters with the second wave reversed course until the recall was canceled when Lt. Col. Austin, on the ground on Koh Tang, convinced the commander of the Seventh Air Force that the reinforcements were necessary to prevent his units from being overrun.

The second wave carrying the Marines from Knife 22 and a platoon from Company E had originally taken off at staggered times between 09:00 and 10:00, but with the reversal of course its arrival on Koh Tang was seriously delayed. Eventually Jolly Greens 11, 12 and 43 and Knife 51 successfully landed 100 additional Marines and evacuated 9 wounded on the west beach, making a total of 222 Marines - 202 on the west beach and 20 Marines and 5 Airmen on the east beach. Knife 52 which attempted to land its Marines on the east beach came under heavy fire and was forced to make an emergency landing in Thailand. At midday the command post planned a linkup of its small contingent with the bulk of Golf Company on the west beach LZ. Using mortar fire and A-7 airstrikes to clear the jungle between the two forces, it reached the west beach perimeter at 12:45.

Extraction of Marine elements

Another attempt to extricate the Marines on the east beach was made Jolly Greens 11 and 43 at 14:15 hours, but was repulsed by heavy fire. Jolly Green 43 had a fuel line damaged, but made an emergency landing on the Coral Sea at 14:36, where it was repaired and returned to service by 17:00 hours. At 16:00 hours, Nail 68, an Air Force OV-10 Forward air control (FAC) aircraft, arrived and took over the direction of air support. This change in controllers marked a turning point in the quality of airborne firepower available to the Marines, because for the first time that day they had an airborne observer exclusively dedicated to providing accurate and timely close air support. Between 17:30 and 18:00 hours, a third attempt to rescue the east beach force was successful, using Jolly Green 11 as the rescue ship and with gunfire support from Jolly Green 12, Knife 51 and the gig from the Henry B. Wilson mounting 4 M-60s. JG11 did not actually set down because the hulk of Knife 23 was sitting on the beach; instead, the pilot (1LT Donald Backlund) skilfully hovered the helicopter several feet off the ground just north of the original beach LZ. The extraction was difficult because the helicopter would see-saw up and down. Only a few Marines at a time could board the helicopter's rear ramp in this fashion by timing their jumps to coincide with the downward motion of the aircraft. JG11 was hit numerous times, but managed to transport its cargo of 20 Marines and 5 Airmen to the Coral Sea. Jolly Green 12 also suffered extensive battle damage while searching for a Marine reported to be clinging to the wreckage of Knife 31, no Marine was recovered and JG12 flew to the Coral Sea.

The remaining three helicopters (Jolly Greens 43 and 44 and Knife 51) were then joined by Jolly Green 44 that had been out of service at its Nakhon Phanom base but had been repaired and flown to the area. This force immediately began to withdraw the remaining 202 Marines from Koh Tang, protected by AC-130 fire and naval gunfire support from the Henry B. Wilson and its gig. The first load of 41 Marines was lifted out at 18:30 hours by Knife 51 and flown to the Coral Sea, followed by 53 taken aboard Jolly Green 43. As Jolly Green 44 picked up a load of 34 Marines, the remaining Marines on Koh Tang came under intense attack and were in danger of being overrun. The trip to the Coral Sea was a thirty minute round trip, so the pilot (1LT Bob Blough) decided to deliver his Marines to the Harold E. Holt, the nearest ship to Koh Tang, made in complete darkness while hovering over the ship with only its front wheels touching down. Within 5 minutes JG44 returned and picked up 40 more Marines, leaving 32 still on the island.

Finally Knife 51 landed and began loading in the dark and under fire. Having loaded everyone save for themselves, Captain Davis, Gunnery Sergeant McNemar, and K51 Pararescueman TSGT Wayne Fisk, combed the beach one last time for stragglers, finding none, they leaped onto the hovering CH-53 and at 20:10 left Koh Tang for the Coral Sea.

The final action on Koh Tang included the dropping of a BLU-82 bomb—a 15,000-pound device and the largest conventional explosive weapon in the U.S. arsenal at the time—from a C-130.

• 
  A USAF pararescueman from the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron guides Marines to an HH-53
• 
  View of Western LZ from an HH-53
• 
  Marines of 3d Platoon, Company G board Jolly Green 11 to evacuate the Eastern LZ

Marines left behind and subsequent controversy

Because of intense direct and indirect fire during the operation, the bodies of Marines who were killed were left where they died. Such is the case of LCpl Ashton Loney, who had been killed by enemy fire early in the battle. As a result, extraction of the forces was also extremely chaotic.

With each withdrawal, the Marines contracted their perimeter on the west beach of Koh Tang. Lance Corporal John S. Standfast, squad leader, 3d Squad, 3d Platoon, Company E and his squad covered Company G's withdrawal during the reduction of the perimeter, and he then singlehandedly directed the pullback of his own squad. Before withdrawing to the safety of the new perimeter, Standfast and his platoon guide, Sergeant Andersen would move forward to the old perimeter to ensure that no member of the company inadvertently had been left behind, each time checking every foxhole. However despite such precautions, three Marines of an M60 machine gun team were mistakenly left behind.

Hours after the evacuation was completed, with the Koh Tang Marines dispersed among three Navy ships, the Company E commander, Captain Mykle K. Stahl, discovered that three of his Marines were missing. The Marines checked all of the Navy ships, but could not locate LCpl Joseph N. Hargrove , PFC Gary L. Hall, and Pvt Danny G. Marshall, members of a three man machine gun team which had been assigned to protect the right flank of the constantly shrinking perimeter during the final evacuation. Sergeant Andersen was the last member of the Marine force to see Hall, Hargrove, and Marshall alive at about 20:00 when he ordered them to move back to a new position which was located to the left of the position occupied by Captain James H. Davis.

A rescue operation was proposed, but was turned down because it was considered too dangerous, and there was a lack of evidence that the men were still alive. The Holt continued to patrol the shore of Koh Tang for the next 2 days in case any of the missing men emerged from the jungle and tried to swim from the island, but Hargrove, Hall, and Marshall were subsequently declared Missing in Action and presumed dead.

In 1995, eyewitness reports reported that the three Marines survived for several weeks on the island without food, water, or supplies, and were out of ammunition before they were captured, tortured and executed. One of the Marines (believed but not confirmed to be Hargrove) allegedly put up a fight before being captured, and under the order of Khmer Rouge commander on the island Em Son, the Marine was said to have been executed on the spot. The other two Marines were allegedly ambushed and captured while scavenging for supplies, and were transported to the port of Kompong Som for interrogation where they were stripped naked, brutally tortured, and eventually executed.

Recovery efforts between 1995 and 2001 by Joint Task Force-Full Accounting later found bone fragments that might have belonged to the three abandoned Marines, but DNA tests have proven inconclusive due to the small size of the fragments. Hargrove, Hall, and Marshall all received obligatory Purple Hearts from the Marine Corps. However, Hargrove's family did not receive the award until 1999, after investigative journalist and author Ralph Wetterhahn published several articles in popular magazines about his findings.

In 2007, Duplin County Commissioner Cary Turner decided to take on the task to search for the Marines, and in 2009, in collaboration with JPAC, reported to have found four of the remains around where one of the missing Marines were reportedly executed and buried. One of the remains was said to be Caucasian in nature.

Aftermath

TSgt Wayne Fisk, a pararescueman on Knife 51 was awarded a Bronze Oak leaf cluster in lieu of a second award of the Silver Star.

1st Lt Bob Blough, pilot of Jolly Green 44 was awarded the Silver Star

Four Airmen were awarded the Air Force Cross:

• Capt Rowland Purser, pilot of Jolly Green 43
• 1st Lt Donald Backlund, pilot of Jolly Green 11
• 1st Lt Richard C Brims, pilot of Knife 51
• SSgt Jon Harston, flight mechanic of Knife 31

Khmer casualties

Estimates of Khmer Rouge casualties were 60 killed out of a land and sea force of about 300.

US casualties

Casualties during the operation were 14 Marines killed or missing (ten in the Knife 31 shootdown and four at the west beach), two Navy corpsmen killed, and two Air Force crewmen killed. Thirty-five Marines and 6 airmen were wounded.

Name	Age	Action	Place birth	Status
21st Special Operations Squadron, 352d Special Operations Group
2d Lt Richard Vandegeer	27	Pilot of Knife 31, perished in the crash	Columbus Ohio	Recovered
SSgt Elwood E. Rumbaugh	31	Flight Engineer of Knife 21, drowned after crash	Spangler, Pennsylvania	Remains not Recovered
2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division
LCpl Ashton N. Loney	20	Killed on Koh Tang Island, the only confirmed KIA	Albany, New York	Remains not Recovered
LCpl Joseph N. Hargrove	24 (DOB May 15)	Left behind during evacuation, captured and killed by Khmer Rouges	Mount Olive, North Carolina	Remains Not Recovered
PFC Gary L. Hall	18	Left behind during evacuation, captured and killed by Khmer Rouges	Covington, Kentucky	Remains not recovered
PVT Danny G. Marshall	18	Left behind during evacuation, captured and killed by Khmer Rouges	Waverly, West Virginia	Remains not recovered
LCpl. Gregory S. Copenhaver	28	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Port Deposit, Maryland	Recovered
LCpl. Andres Garcia	20	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Carlsbad, New Mexico	Recovered
PFC Richard W. Rivenburgh	21	Perished in crash of Knife 31	San Diego, California	Remains not recovered
PFC Walter Boyd	19	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Norfolk, Virginia	Recovered
PFC Antonio R. Sandoval	19	Perished in crash of Knife 31	San Antonio, Texas	Recovered
PFC Daniel A. Benedett	19	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Auburn King, Washington	Remains not Recovered
PFC James J. Jacques	18	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Denver, Colorado	Remains not recovered
PFC James R. Maxwell	18	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Center Ridge, Arkansas	Remains not Recovered
PFC Kelton R. Turner	18	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Los Angeles, California	Recovered
PFC Lynn Blessing	18	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Lancaster, Pennsylvania	Recovered
HM1 Bernard Gause, Jr.	34	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Birmingham, Alabama	Recovered
HN Ronald J.Manning	21	Perished in crash of Knife 31	Steubenville, Ohio	Recovered

Between 1991–99, U.S. and Cambodian investigators conducted seven joint investigations, led by the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting. On three occasions Cambodian authorities unilaterally turned over remains believed to be those of American servicemen. In October and November 1995, U.S. and Cambodian specialists conducted an underwater recovery of the Knife 31 crash site where they located numerous remains, personal effects and aircraft debris associated with the loss. The USS Brunswick (ATS-3), a Navy salvage vessel, enabled the specialists to conduct their excavation offshore. In addition to the support provided by the Cambodian government, the Government of Vietnam also interviewed two Vietnamese informants in Ho Chi Minh City who turned over remains that were later positively identified. As a result of these investigations the remains of 2LT Richard Vandegeer, LCPL Gregory S Copenhaver, LCPL Andres Garcia, PFC Lynn Blessing, PFC Walter Boyd, PFC Antonio R Sandoval and PFC Kelton R. Turner were identified.

Impact on Thailand

The Mayaguez incident had a direct effect on the political situation in Thailand. The U Tapao air base had been used by U.S. rescue forces despite an explicit refusal of permission by the relatively new civilian Thai government (after being refused by the Thai government, the US sought and obtained permission from the Thai military to proceed), resulting in considerable anger towards the United States. The Thai government called the act a violation of Thailand's sovereignty, and as soon as they returned to base, all the Marines were immediately flown to the Philippines. Many Thai groups called for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the country and exhibited an increased distrust of their own military, which they presumed to be complicit in the communications delay permitting the use of its air base.

Impact on U.S. military rescue planning

The U.S. military received much criticism for its handling of the incident. In addition to the failure of intelligence to determine the whereabouts of the crew of the Mayaguez and the presence of a sizable hostile force on Koh Tang, the timing of the operation was questioned until it became clear that combat had been underway four hours before the crew was released. Within the services the Marines in particular were critical of the ad hoc nature of the joint operation and the perceived pressure from the Administration for hasty action, although the success of Operation Frequent Wind had been the basis for many decisions made during the crisis. Vice Admiral George P. Steele, the Seventh Fleet commander later stated that: "The sad part of the Mayaguez is that we had sufficient force coming up with the Seventh Fleet, after it had been turned around from the evacuation of Vietnam stand down, to seize Southern Cambodia. I begged for another day or two, rather than commit forces piecemeal as we did .... The idea that we could use U.S. Air Force air police and Air Force helicopters as an assault force appears to me as ridiculous today as it did then."

When many of the coordination and communications problems arose again during Operation Eagle Claw, the hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1980, significant changes in joint and special operations were brought about.

See also

• List of hostage crises
• Wayne Fisk
• Tuol Sleng

References

• Dunham, George R. (Major USMC), and Quinlan, David A. (Colonel USMC), U.S. Marines In Vietnam: The Bitter End 1973-1975, Headquarters USMC, Washington D.C. (1990)
• Frisbee, John L., "The Mayaguez Incident", Air Force Magazine, Vol. 74, No. 9 (September 1991)
• Hunter, Ric, "The Last Battle of Vietnam", Flight Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 2000)
• Kissinger, Henry A., "Years of Renewal", ch. 18 ("Anatomy of a Crisis: The Mayaguez").
• Wetterhahn, Ralph, "The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident And The End Of The Vietnam War", Plume Publishers (2002)

External links

• Koh Tang Beach Vets/Mayaguez Recovery Website
• Capture and Release of SS Mayaguez by Khmer Rouge forces in May 1975
• 56th Security Police Squadron, Nakhom Phanom RTAFB, USS Mayaguez rescue operation
• CBS news reports of the Mayaguez incident and the search for the 3 missing Marines
• Left Behind but not Forgotten
• USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series Volume III Fourteen Hours at Koh Tang