Korean DMZ Conflict

Korean DMZ Conflict
Part of Division of Korea
American and South Korean soldiers on the DMZ, August 26, 1967.
Date October 1966  – October 1969 Standort Korean Demilitarized Zone Result Undetermined
Belligerents
Vereinigte Staaten Republic of Korea (Third Republic)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Commanders and leaders
Charles H. Bonesteel III Park Chung-hee	Kim Il-sung
Casualties and losses
United States: 43 killed 111 wounded Republic of Korea: 299 killed 550 wounded	397 killed 12 soldiers and 2,462 agents captured

The Korean DMZ Conflict, also referred to as a Second Korean War, was a series of low-level armed clashes between North Korean forces and the forces of South Korea and the United States, largely occurring between 1966 and 1969; although other incidents between the two Koreas occurred thereafter.

Background

The Korean War had devastated both North and South Korea and while neither side renounced its claims to reunify Korea under their control neither side was in a position to force reunification.

In North Korea the departure of the People's Liberation Army in October 1958 allowed Kim Il-Sung to consolidate his power base and embark on the Chollima Movement of collectivised agriculture and industrialization to build a base for reunifying Korea by force. North Korea remained dependent on the Soviet Union for technology and on China for agricultural assistance. The Sino–Soviet split led to the Soviets suspending aid to North Korea in December 1962 saying that the DPRK was leaning too much towards China.

In South Korea, economic aid from the United States and other western nations allowed the South to rebuild rapidly, acheiving 5.5% annual growth by the mid-1950s. The April Revolution that forced President Syngman Rhee from office in April 1960 was followed by a brief period of democracy before a coup d'etat led by General Park Chung-hee seized power in May 1961. Despite the political turmoil the South Korean economy continued to grow, led by the industrial sector.

By 1962 the population and economy of South Korea was almost twice that of North Korea. Kim Il-Sung apparently recognised that the growing economic strength of the South would only increase over time and would give the South the ability to force reunification on its terms, but also the economic boom and the autocratic nature of the Park administration had given rise to widespread dissent. Without Soviet support a conventional attack on the South was impossible and so Kim saw a possibility to acheive reunification through unconventional warfare. On 10 December 1962 Kim proposed a new military strategy to the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, with increased emphasis placed on irregular warfare, agitation and propaganda, to be acheived by the end of the current Seven-Year Plan in 1967.

In June 1965 President Park signed a treaty normalizing relations with Japan which included payment of reparations and the making of soft-loans from Japan and led to increased trade and investment between South Korea and Japan. In July 1966 South Korea and the United States signed a Status of Forces Agreement establishing a more equal relationship between the two countries. With its growing economic strength and the security guarantee of the United States, the threat of a conventional invasion from the North seemed increasingly remote. Following the escalation of the Vietnam War with the deployment of ground combat troops in March 1965, South Korea sent the Capital Division and the 2nd Marine Brigade to South Vietnam in September 1965, followed by the White Horse Division in September 1966.

The start of the hostilities can be traced to a speech given by North Korean leader Kim Il-sung on October 5, 1966, at the Workers' Party of Korea Conference where the status quo of the 1953 Armistice Agreement was challenged. Kim Il-Sung apparently perceived that the division of effort by the South Korean military and the ever-growing escalation of the US commitment in Vietnam created an environment where irregular warfare could succeed in a way conventional warfare could not. Kim believed that he could force a split between the U.S. and South Korea through armed provocations targeting U.S. forces that, together with other worldwide commitments and small wars, would force the U.S. to reassess or relinquish its commitment to South Korea, allowing North Korea to incite an insurgency in the South that would topple the Park administration.

North Korean forces

In 1966 the Korean People's Army (KPA) deployed eight infantry divisions along the DMZ, backed by eight more infantry divisions, three motorized infantry divisions, a tank division and a collection of separate infantry and tank brigades and regiments. While strong, this conventional force did not possess a significant advantage over the South, and it was unlikely that the North could deliver a knockout blow before the U.S. could deploy additional forces.

The main unconventional warfare arm was the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Ministry of Defense under the operational control of the Liaison Department of the Worker's Party of Korea which included Unit 124, the 283rd Army Unit and the 17th Foot Reconnaissance Brigade. These units were all highly trained and indoctrinated, skilled in demolitions and small-unit tactics, they would usually operate in small teams of 2-12 men, lightly-armed with either PPS submachine guns or AK-47s. The Reconnaissance Bureau also controlled the 23d Amphibious Brigade, which used specially made infiltration boats to operate along the South Korean coastline. The Reconnaissance Bureau could also use conventional KPA and Korean People's Navy forces to support the infiltration and exfiltration of its teams.

In addition to the offensive forces, North Korea also deployed several thousand operator-agitators to choose, train, and supervise informants and guerrilla recruits, while others attempted to cause individual defections and unit dissatisfaction in the ROK military and generally undermine the morale of both the ROKs and the Americans.

Defense of the DMZ

The major U.S. ground combat units in Korea were the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) and 7th Infantry Division (7ID), I Corps and 8th Army. 2ID stood with the 3rd Brigade manning 29.8 km of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) essentially due north of Seoul on either side of Panmunjom, with another nine Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) Divisions manning the remaining 212.8 km of the DMZ. All U.S. and ROKA forces were under the unified operational control of United Nations Command (Korea) (who was also the commander United States Forces Korea), General Charles H. Bonesteel III. Both U.S. Army Divisions were seriously under strength as Vietnam had priority for manpower and equipment. Troops were equipped with M14 rifles rather than M16s, the only available tanks were older gasoline powered M48A2Cs, and there were a total of only 5 UH-1 Huey helicopters in South Korea seriously restricting the ability to hunt and engage infiltrators. Troops were generally draftees serving a 13 month tour, while experienced officers and NCOs preferred service in Vietnam to Korea. The ROK Divisions were well trained and highly motivated with many of the officers and NCOs veterans of the Korean War, but all their equipment dated back to that war; their standard rifle was still the M1 Garand.

The main operational objective of the US and ROK Divisions was to defend against a conventional invasion from North Korea in a repeat of the attack of June 1950. While there were regular infiltrations into the South for intelligence-gathering, unconventional warfare was not seen as a particular threat and the troops were not generally trained or equipped for this role. No counter-guerilla units or village militias existed in South Korea in 1966 and infiltrators were variously hunted by the ROK Army, Police and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency with no unified control.

The ground forces were supported by fighter-bombers of the USAF 314th Air Division and by the Republic of Korea Air Force. The seas around Korea were under the control of the United States Seventh Fleet and the Republic of Korea Navy. As with the Army, the war in Vietnam was the main focus of the USAF and the USN in the Pacific.

As hostile incidents increased during the summer of 1967, 7ID sent one infantry battalion at a time to augment the 3rd Brigade, as well as continuing to provide artillery forward observers both to its own battalion and the 3rd Brigade.

In the area of operations, an actual fence with guard posts stretches through the entire DMZ, just south of the DMZ or "South Tape" boundary. Every night observation/ambush positions were manned by American and KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army) troops.

In the fall, 2ID combat units rotated SCOSI (Security Control Operations South of the Imjim)

duty nightly in positions overlooking the Imjin River, which divided the 3rd Brigade area of operations from the rest of the division. Each line company level unit of infantry, armor, cavalry, and artillery were on duty for a week at a time.

Scale of conflict

During this period, KPA conducted infiltration activities which resulted in a series of firefights and artillery duels across the length of the DMZ. The hostilities were such that on April 1, 1968, the Department of Defense on the recommendation of General Charles H. Bonesteel III declared the DMZ-Imjin area as a hostile fire zone, entitling service members stationed in the area additional pay.

South Korea launched at least three retaliatory cross-border raids in late 1967 using small teams of North Korean defectors. The raids killed 33 KPA soldiers.

Timeline

1966

• 2 November: 2ID patrol (1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment) ambushed south of DMZ. Six U.S. KIA, one KATUSA KIA, one U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

1967

• 12 February: 2ID patrol (3-23 Infantry) ambushed south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 5 April: 2ID guard post engaged KPA infiltrators south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; five KPA KIA.
• 29 April: 2ID patrol ambushed KPA infiltrators south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA, one KPA WIA, one KPA captured.
• 22 May: 2ID barracks (1-23 Infantry) demolished by daylight explosion south of DMZ. Two U.S. KIA, seventeen U.S. WIA.
• 16 July: 2ID guard post attacked south of DMZ. Three U.S. KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 10 August: 7ID construction team (13th Engineers) ambushed well south of DMZ in daylight. Three U.S. KIA, sixteen U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 22 August: 2ID jeep destroyed by mine and ambush south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA, one U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 28 August: Eighth Army construction team (76th Engineers) ambushed in daylight near the Joint Security Area but still south of the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA, two KATUSA KIA, fourteen U.S. WIA, nine KATUSA WIA, three civilians WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 29 August: 2ID jeep destroyed by mine south of DMZ. Three U.S. KIA, five U.S. WIA; no KPA losses.
• 7 October: 2ID patrol boat ambushed on Imjin River south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.

1968

• 20–21 January: 31 North Korean commandos crossed the border disguised as South Korean soldiers in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee at The Blue House. The failed Blue House Raid mission by Unit 124 resulted in 29 commandos killed, one committed suicide, and the last captured. Two South Korean policemen and five civilians were killed by the commandos. Other reports indicated as many as 68 South Koreans killed and 66 wounded, including about 24 civilians. Three Americans were killed and another three wounded in an attempt to prevent the commandos from escaping back via the DMZ.
• 22 January: U.S. 2nd Infantry Division guard post engaged by KPA infiltrators. Three U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 23 January: Seizure of the USS Pueblo (AGER-2) off the east coast of North Korea. One U.S. KIA.
• 24 January: 2ID position (1-23 Infantry) attacked south of DMZ by KPA Unit 124 exfiltrators. Two U.S. KIA; three KPA WIA.
• 26 January: 2ID defensive position (2-72 Armor) attacked south of DMZ by KPA Unit 124 exfiltrators
• 29 January: 2ID patrols and outposts engaged and repulsed four teams of KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.
• 6 February: 2ID guard post attacked. No U.S. losses; one KPA WIA.
• 27 March: 2ID reaction forces and ROK 25th Infantry Division ambushed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; three KPA KIA.
• 14 April: U.S. Army Support Group truck ambushed south of the Joint Security Area in daylight. Two U.S. KIA, two KATUSA KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 21 April: 7ID patrol (2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment)) engaged KPA infiltrator company in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, three U.S. WIA; five KPA KIA, fifteen KPA WIA.
• 27 April: 7ID patrol (2-31 Infantry) ambushed in the DMZ. One KATUSA KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 3 July: 2ID patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 20 July: 2ID patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses. 7ID patrol (1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment) ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 21 July: 2ID patrol (2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment) ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. WIA, one KATUSA WIA.
• 30 July: 2ID patrol (3-23 Infantry) ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, three U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 5 August: 2ID patrol (1-38 Infantry) ambushed south of the DMZ in daylight. One U.S. KIA, four U.S. WIA; one KPA KIA.
• 18 August: 7ID patrol (1-32 Infantry) ambushed south of the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA; two KPA WIA.
• 19 September: 2ID patrols (2-38 Infantry) and quick reaction forces (4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized), and the 2nd Division Counter Agent Company) isolated and destroyed KPA infiltrator squad. Two KATUSA KIA, six KATUSA WIA; four KPA KIA, one KPA WIA.
• 27 September: 2ID jeep ambushed in the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 3 October: 7ID guard post (1-31 Infantry) engaged KPA exfiltrator south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA.
• 5 October: 2ID patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 10 October: 2ID boat patrol engaged KPA infiltrator crossing the Imjin River. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA.
• 11 October: 2ID patrol ambushed KPA infiltrators in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; two KPA KIA.
• 23 October: 2ID patrol engaged KPA infiltrators in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, five U.S. WIA; one KPA KIA.
• 30 October: Ulchin-Samcheok (Gangwon-do) landings by 120-13- men of KPA Unit 124; 110 of them were killed, 7 were captured and 13 escaped.

1969

• 23 January: 2ID guard posts repulsed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.
• 4 February: 2ID guard posts repulsed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.
• 13 March: 2ID fence repair patrol (2-38 Infantry) engaged by KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.
• 15 March: 2ID marker maintenance patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, two U.S. WIA, one KATUSA WIA. Medical evacuation helicopter crashed after takeoff, killing five airmen and the three wounded.
• 16 March: 2ID patrol engaged KPA infiltrators in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.
• 20 March: 2ID patrol engaged KPA patrol in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.
• 29 March: 2ID patrol engaged KPA patrol in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.
• March: Six North Korean infiltrators crossed the border near Chumunjin, Gangwon-do and killed a South Korean policeman on guard duty.
• 15 April: KPAF fighters shoot down a US Navy EC-121 Warning Star aircraft over the Sea of Japan (East Sea)
• 15 May: 2ID patrol engaged KPA infiltrator. One U.S. WIA, one KATUSA WIA; unknown KPA losses.
• 20 May: 2ID guard post engaged KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA.
• 21 July: 2ID guard posts engaged and repulsed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.
• 17 August: Eighth Army helicopter (59th Aviation Company) strayed north of the DMZ and was shot down. Three U.S. captured.
• 18 October: 7ID jeep ambushed in the DMZ. Four U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses

See also: Division of Korea § Post Korean War infiltrations, incursions and incidents

External links

• U.S. Victory Lost in History
• "The Forgotten DMZ" at Korean War Project
• Daniel P. Bolger, "Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea 1966-1969" Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth Papers, No. 19