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Geojedo Camp was built to hold prisoners shortly after the outbreak of the [[Korean War]].
Geojedo Camp was built to hold prisoners shortly after the outbreak of the [[Korean War]].


In February 1951, [[Eighth United States Army|Eighth Army]] commander [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Matthew Ridgway]] launched Operation Albany, which evacuated all Communist POWs to Geoje-do, which was far removed from the battlefield and regarded as secure territory.
In February 1951, [[Eighth United States Army|Eighth Army]] commander [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Matthew Ridgway]] launched Operation Albany, which evacuated all Communist POWs to Geoje-do, which was far removed from the battlefield and regarded as secure territory.

The first collective violence against camp guards occurred on 18/19 June 1951, when some North Korean officers protested having to dig latrines and garbage pits. When a South Korean guard detail entered Compound 76, the prisoners stoned the guards and the soldiers opened fire, killing three POWs.
More incidents followed: demonstrations within the compounds, work refusals, threats against camp personnel, and some 15 murders of Korean prisoners. In July and August 1951, the guards killed eight more POWs. On one occasion, the guards had to rescue 200 POWs from Compound 78, where hard-core Communists had executed three supposed collaborators in a plan to control the compound.
In late September 1951, General Van Fleet and his staff visited Geoje-do and concluded that the physical conditions were adequate but that there were too few guards and they were poorly disciplined. POWs had too much free time and independence, and the indoctrination program instruction was too classroom oriented. Van Fleet sent a new U.S. Army military police battalion to the island, which brought the 8137th Military Police Group up to three battalions and four escort companies.
In December 1951, a battalion of the U.S. [[23rd Infantry Regiment (United States)|23rd Infantry Regiment]] augmented the guard force as did additional South Korean MPs. While the guard force now numbered 9,000 officers and men, it was still 40 percent below the force requested by the cam commander.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historynet.com/war-behind-the-wire-koje-do-prison-camp.htm/4|title=War Behind The Wire: Koje-do Prison Camp|author=Allan R. Millett|date=20 January 2009|accessdate=25 August 2014}}</ref>


By 1952 over 170,000 prisoners of war (about 85% North Korean and the rest from China) were held at the camp, however, U.N. forces lacked sufficient manpower and experience in controlling such large numbers of prisoners.
By 1952 over 170,000 prisoners of war (about 85% North Korean and the rest from China) were held at the camp, however, U.N. forces lacked sufficient manpower and experience in controlling such large numbers of prisoners.
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The UNC delegation at the [[Korean Armistice Agreement#Armistice discussions|Panmunjom peace talks]] took a stand on the principle of voluntary repatriation of Communits POWs and to this end set out to conduct prisoner screenings to determine whether each POW wished to be reptriated to North Korea or Mainland China. On 2 February 1952, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [[U. Alexis Johnson]] proposed the screening of the POWs. This involved interviewing the prisoners and segregating them into repatriates and nonrepatriates. The latter would be removed from the POW lists and the Communists would be offered an all-for-all exchange of the remainder. On 27 February 1952, the Johnson plan was approved by President [[Harry S. Truman]] as the final and irrevocable U.S. position at the Panmunjom talks.
The UNC delegation at the [[Korean Armistice Agreement#Armistice discussions|Panmunjom peace talks]] took a stand on the principle of voluntary repatriation of Communits POWs and to this end set out to conduct prisoner screenings to determine whether each POW wished to be reptriated to North Korea or Mainland China. On 2 February 1952, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [[U. Alexis Johnson]] proposed the screening of the POWs. This involved interviewing the prisoners and segregating them into repatriates and nonrepatriates. The latter would be removed from the POW lists and the Communists would be offered an all-for-all exchange of the remainder. On 27 February 1952, the Johnson plan was approved by President [[Harry S. Truman]] as the final and irrevocable U.S. position at the Panmunjom talks.


Washington assumed that screening would take place in an atmosphere that guaranteed each POW freedom of choice, but at Geoje-do this was mot the case. There were numerous violent incidents among the unsegregated repatriates and non-repatriates, apparently instigated on the direct orders from the Communist high command, as the Communist leaders wanted a strong showing in favor of forcible repatriation to strengthen their hands at the bargaining table.
Washington assumed that screening would take place in an atmosphere that guaranteed each POW freedom of choice, but at Geoje-do this was not the case. There were numerous violent incidents among the unsegregated repatriates and non-repatriates, apparently instigated on the direct orders from the Communist high command, as the Communist leaders wanted a strong showing in favor of forcible repatriation to strengthen their hands at the bargaining table.


The first serious violent incident occurred on 18 February 1952 between a battalion of the U.S. [[27th Infantry Regiment (United States)|27th Infantry Regiment]] and Communist POWs resulting in one U.S. soldier killed and 138 POWs wounded. After the incident, Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General [[James Van Fleet]], appointed [[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier-General]] [[Francis Dodd (general)|Francis Dodd]] as the camp commander. In the meantime, specially trained Communist agents were instructed to be captured at the battlefront to gain access to the camp on Geoje-do, these agents conveyed to "loyal" prisoners the latest orders for creating disturbances by all available means.
The first serious violent incident occurred on 18 February 1952 between a battalion of the U.S. [[27th Infantry Regiment (United States)|27th Infantry Regiment]] and Communist POWs resulting in one U.S. soldier killed and 138 POWs wounded. After the incident, Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General [[James Van Fleet]], appointed [[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier-General]] [[Francis Dodd (general)|Francis Dodd]] as the camp commander. In the meantime, some 280 specially trained Communist agents were instructed to be captured at the battlefront to gain access to the camp on Geoje-do, these agents conveyed to "loyal" prisoners the latest orders for creating disturbances by all available means.


On 7 May 1952, General Dodd visited Compound 76 to listen to complaints aired by the Communist leaders of the camp. While standing near the gate of the compound, he and one of his subordinates were forcibly seized as the gate was opened to allow a work detail to pass through. The subordinate grabbed hold of a gatepost long enough for the American guards to rescue him, but Dodd was taken into the center of the camp and held hostage.
On 7 May 1952, General Dodd visited Compound 76 to listen to complaints aired by the Communist leaders of the camp. While standing near the gate of the compound, he and one of his subordinates were forcibly seized as the gate was opened to allow a work detail to pass through. The subordinate grabbed hold of a gatepost long enough for the American guards to rescue him, but Dodd was taken into the center of the camp and held hostage.

Revision as of 10:01, 25 August 2014

Geoje POW Camp

Geoje-do POW camp (Korean: 거제도 포로수용소) was a POW camp located in Geoje at the southernmost part of Gyeongsangnam-do, South Korea.[1]

History

Geojedo Camp was built to hold prisoners shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War.

In February 1951, Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway launched Operation Albany, which evacuated all Communist POWs to Geoje-do, which was far removed from the battlefield and regarded as secure territory.

The first collective violence against camp guards occurred on 18/19 June 1951, when some North Korean officers protested having to dig latrines and garbage pits. When a South Korean guard detail entered Compound 76, the prisoners stoned the guards and the soldiers opened fire, killing three POWs.

More incidents followed: demonstrations within the compounds, work refusals, threats against camp personnel, and some 15 murders of Korean prisoners. In July and August 1951, the guards killed eight more POWs. On one occasion, the guards had to rescue 200 POWs from Compound 78, where hard-core Communists had executed three supposed collaborators in a plan to control the compound.

In late September 1951, General Van Fleet and his staff visited Geoje-do and concluded that the physical conditions were adequate but that there were too few guards and they were poorly disciplined. POWs had too much free time and independence, and the indoctrination program instruction was too classroom oriented. Van Fleet sent a new U.S. Army military police battalion to the island, which brought the 8137th Military Police Group up to three battalions and four escort companies.

In December 1951, a battalion of the U.S. 23rd Infantry Regiment augmented the guard force as did additional South Korean MPs. While the guard force now numbered 9,000 officers and men, it was still 40 percent below the force requested by the cam commander.[2]

By 1952 over 170,000 prisoners of war (about 85% North Korean and the rest from China) were held at the camp, however, U.N. forces lacked sufficient manpower and experience in controlling such large numbers of prisoners.

Geoje Uprising

The UNC delegation at the Panmunjom peace talks took a stand on the principle of voluntary repatriation of Communits POWs and to this end set out to conduct prisoner screenings to determine whether each POW wished to be reptriated to North Korea or Mainland China. On 2 February 1952, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs U. Alexis Johnson proposed the screening of the POWs. This involved interviewing the prisoners and segregating them into repatriates and nonrepatriates. The latter would be removed from the POW lists and the Communists would be offered an all-for-all exchange of the remainder. On 27 February 1952, the Johnson plan was approved by President Harry S. Truman as the final and irrevocable U.S. position at the Panmunjom talks.

Washington assumed that screening would take place in an atmosphere that guaranteed each POW freedom of choice, but at Geoje-do this was not the case. There were numerous violent incidents among the unsegregated repatriates and non-repatriates, apparently instigated on the direct orders from the Communist high command, as the Communist leaders wanted a strong showing in favor of forcible repatriation to strengthen their hands at the bargaining table.

The first serious violent incident occurred on 18 February 1952 between a battalion of the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment and Communist POWs resulting in one U.S. soldier killed and 138 POWs wounded. After the incident, Eighth Army commander Lieutenant General James Van Fleet, appointed Brigadier-General Francis Dodd as the camp commander. In the meantime, some 280 specially trained Communist agents were instructed to be captured at the battlefront to gain access to the camp on Geoje-do, these agents conveyed to "loyal" prisoners the latest orders for creating disturbances by all available means.

On 7 May 1952, General Dodd visited Compound 76 to listen to complaints aired by the Communist leaders of the camp. While standing near the gate of the compound, he and one of his subordinates were forcibly seized as the gate was opened to allow a work detail to pass through. The subordinate grabbed hold of a gatepost long enough for the American guards to rescue him, but Dodd was taken into the center of the camp and held hostage.

For the next 78 hours, Dodd was held captive. By his own admission he was treated well as hurried negotiations went on for his release. General Charles F. Colson was rushed to the island to take command, and he ordered a telephone rigged up to allow communication with Dodd. The POW leaders announced that in return for his release certain demands had to be met. Colson's main concern was to save Dodd's life and he also feared that a military operation might produce high casualties on both sides and thus he agreed to accept many of the POW's conditions. He was forced to sign a statement in which he admitted that the UN forces killed and wounded many POWs. He assured the prisoners that, after Dodd was released unharmed, "in the future POWs can expect humane treatment in this camp" and there would be "no more forcible" screening undertaken. The Communist delegation at Panmunjom used Colson's admission as a propaganda weapon to disrupt the armistice negotiations.

The Dodd incident coincided with the arrival of Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark as the new UNC commander on 12 May 1952. Clark sent combat troops to Geoje-do, and both Dodd and Colson were court-martialed and reduced in rank to colonel. A new POW command was established, and a new camp commander, Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, fluent in Chinese, was dispatched to bring the compounds under control. At the end of May, Operation Removal cleared refugees from the vicinity of the camps to prevent communication between the POWs and the Communist high command.

The Communist POWs tried to resist Boatner's efforts to dilute their strength. When Operation Breakup dispersed the Communist compounds into smaller units, on 10 June 1952 there was a serious clash. After more than an hour of fighting more than 150 prisoners were killed or injured. One U.S. soldier died and thirteen were wounded.

Thereafter, despite sporadic violence and acts of defiance, the POW camps were brought under control. The non-repatriates were then removed from Geoje-do, the Chinese repatriates were moved to Jeju-do and the Korean repatriates were moved to the mainland.

Closure and redevelopment

The camp was closed upon the signing of the 1953 armistice which ended the war. Tanks, trucks and other period armaments and artifacts are on display throughout the park as a memorial to the war which opened in 1997. The structure is meant to be reminiscent of the daily lives of the prisoners. The theme stresses the humane treatment of the internees.

War prisoners were also being interned in Daejeon, Incheon, Nonsan, Gwangju, Youngcheon, Busan, Masan and Daegu, and the UN introduced 6 villages in Gohyun gulf region which operated from 1950 to 1953.

References

  1. ^ A Guide to the Geoje POW Camp Park
  2. ^ Allan R. Millett (20 January 2009). "War Behind The Wire: Koje-do Prison Camp". Retrieved 25 August 2014.