
**Legislative Redistricting in Illinois:
An Historical Analysis**

by
Paul M. Green

**A Background Paper for the
Committee of 50 to Re-examine the Illinois Constitution**

Illinois Commission on Intergovernmental Cooperation
A service agency of the Illinois General Assembly

LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING IN ILLINOIS: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Staff Introduction

This history of legislative redistricting in Illinois was prepared for the Committee of 50 by Paul Green of the Institute for Public Policy and Administration at Governor's State University.

The 1970 Illinois Constitution stipulates that legislative and representative districts "shall be compact, contiguous, and substantially equal in population." Legislatures are regularly redistricted following each decennial census, and the authority for redistricting resides with the General Assembly.

If the General Assembly fails to agree on a redistricting plan by the end of the legislative session in the first year following the census, the legislative leaders appoint an eight-member commission to draw up a plan. If this commission fails to file a plan approved by at least five of its members, the state Supreme Court submits the names of two people of opposing political parties to the Secretary of State, who draws at random one of the two names to serve as a tie-breaker.

There have been court challenges to redistricting plans drawn up under the constitutional guidelines, but the courts have found the basic structure sound, and have ruled that the United States Constitution has not been violated, despite the fact that participation in the process is effectively denied to people outside the two major parties.

Redistricting is not likely to be cited as a reason to convene a new constitutional convention, but in the event that one is held, redistricting issues may become a part of the convention debate. One question which is a likely possibility is the issue of race and redistricting. Racial district entitlement could be a controversial point at any future convention, since most of the recent congressional and court redistricting cases have been focused on equitable representation for minorities.

LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING IN ILLINOIS: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

by Paul M. Green
Governor's State University

For the purpose of this report, reapportionment is defined as the process of redividing the state's population by the number of legislative districts and using that quotient as the target population average for all new districts. Redistricting is the actual drawing of legislative boundaries so that each district comes as close as possible to the targeted population figure. Although personality, individual ambition, and policy issues have often affected reapportionment debates, the final redistricting outcome in Illinois has usually been the result of the interaction of three conflicting historic themes: territory vs. population, geography vs. party, and incumbent vs. challenger.

I. THE THREE MAIN THEMES

The first theme, territory vs. population, has been an ongoing issue in Illinois reapportionment struggles since the last third of the 19th century due to the dramatic surge in Chicago's population. Table 1 at the end of this report depicts population growth from 1870 to 1980 in Illinois, Cook County, and the city of Chicago. The percentage of Cook County residents living in the city explains why, historically, people residing in Illinois' 101 other counties have feared a state takeover by a single super county in the northeastern part of the state composed mostly of big-city residents. Table 1 also shows that Cook County, boosted by Chicago's amazing growth, tripled its percentage of Illinois' population from 1870 to 1910. This population explosion so frightened downstaters that they blocked any legislative reapportionment and redistricting in the state from 1901 to 1955.

Table 2 illustrates the effect of downstate efforts to thwart equitable representation based on population as mandated by the 1870 constitution. In 1930 a solid majority of Illinois residents lived in Cook County, but that county contained only 37 percent of the state's legislative districts. Downstate would have had to give up eight seats (14% of the state's total districts) in order to put population representation in balance.

In the early 1950s, downstate territorialists, unable to prevent Republican Governor William G. Stratton and Chicago Democrats from pushing a constitutional amendment mandating reapportionment and redistricting, cut a deal giving downstate permanent dominance in the state Senate. The amendment called for a so-called "little federal" system, whereby population would be used to reapportion the House only, while territory would be used for the Senate.

Following the 1955 House reapportionment and two U.S. Supreme Court "one-man, one-vote" decisions [Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964)] affecting the Senate, territorialism legally ended as a viable issue in Illinois redistricting politics. However, though downstate territorialists lost the battle, Chicago population advocates may not have won the war. Tables 1, 2, and 3 all reveal one common fact: the city of Chicago is losing people, and unless a dramatic demographic shift occurs, population-based

reapportionment and redistricting will work against the big city. Ironically, Chicago politicians may now have to fight against the ever-growing new power in the state -- the suburban constituency - with the same kind of rear-guard action that was used against them by downstaters.

The second theme in Illinois reapportionment and redistricting is the battle between loyalty to one's geographic area and loyalty to one's political party. This theme has had particular significance among downstate Democrats who, after the turn of the 20th century, found themselves no longer in control of their party's fortunes. For many non-Chicago Democrats, a map favoring their party was usually a map favoring the big city and its Democratic organization. Democratic downstate representatives could find some comfort in cumulative voting which at least guaranteed their districts a seat -- thus perhaps preventing local anger over their party's map from costing them their jobs. Also, since there was no redistricting for fifty years, the issue was moot for a long period of time. However, the 1955, 1965, 1971 and 1981 reapportionments clearly show that the problem of area vs. party loyalty was not dead, especially among downstate Democrats. Today a shift in lines can tip the power balance from one party to another, although other political factors following reapportionment often diminish the importance of redistricting. Moreover, the abolition of cumulative voting due to the 1980 cut-back amendment (which reduced the House from 177 to 118 members) will make it more difficult for map makers, because party loyalists from weak party areas will be unable to hide behind guaranteed House seats.

The third theme running throughout Illinois reapportionment history is incumbent vs. challenger. Self-preservation is a strong human characteristic, especially among Illinois legislators who have had to draw political boundaries for their next election. There is an old adage in Illinois politics that "a good map maker is worth 500 precinct workers," and indeed creative cartography has preserved many an incumbent in this state.

A final note on the general overview of reapportionment in Illinois. In 1981 a fourth theme emerged in redistricting politics: race vs. party. Some black Chicago Democrats, most notably 29th District Representative Monica Faith Stewart, deserted their party's side in the redistricting struggle by voting for a Republican map. Ms. Stewart argued that race was the decisive factor in her vote, claiming that "she needed to protect political boundaries of poor people" and that she advocated "political programs and not party progress." GOP map makers were accused of satisfying not only her redistricting wishes, but also those of blacks advocating the retention of three black congressmen from Chicago.

Democrats criticized their party's turncoats for supporting the Republican legislative and congressional maps. Party loyalists claimed that these maps would guarantee the GOP 65 out of 118 state House seats and give the Republicans total domination of the congressional delegation. Despite pleas for Democratic party unity, these few black defectors refused to accept the 1981 redistricting commission's map. Their demands for greater representation in Springfield finally ended up in federal court.

II. LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT: THE EARLY YEARS

In 1870 the state of Illinois had a little over 2 1/2 million residents. From 1810 to 1860 Illinois population had doubled every decade, but in 1870 statewide population growth had slowed down to 16 percent. Without question, Illinois was still an agricultural state. Though it stretched for approximately 400 miles from north to south (the equivalent of a state from Boston, Massachusetts to southern Virginia), there were few incorporated cities throughout Illinois. In fact, in 1860 only one out of eight Illinoisans lived in a town of 4,000 people or more.

The year 1870 found the state of Illinois adopting a new state constitution. At the same time, its people began to realize that a giant, potentially dominating city was looming in the northeastern part of the state. The city of Chicago was a boom town, developing at a rate almost unprecedented in world history. From 1840 to 1870 Chicago had grown from a town of 4,000 to a city of almost 300,000, representing 12 percent of the state's population. And between 1870 and 1900, Chicago would quintuple in size into a city of 1.7 million people, giving it over 35 percent of Illinois' residents.

Many Illinoisans were concerned not only with Chicago's rising population, but also with the individuals who made up a large part of its skyrocketing growth. Chicago was quickly becoming an ethnic, immigrant city: almost 80 percent of its people in 1890 were either foreign-born or children of the foreign-born. By 1900 nearly three-fourths of the state's foreign-born residents lived in Chicago. The city of Chicago was becoming unlike the rest of Illinois, both in size and in ethnic makeup, and though its voting patterns did not differ much from the rest of the state, the seeds of regional conflict had been sown.

Some animosity towards Chicago surfaced in the 1870 constitutional convention. According to historians Ernest Bogart and Charles Thompson, downstaters "condemned every proposition advanced in the interest of Cook County," because many delegates believed "Chicago was a hotbed of political corruption."¹ Despite these feelings, delegates to the convention put together a constitution that lasted 100 years; gave Illinois its unique method of cumulative voting to insure significant minority representation in the lower house; and structured legislative districts and reapportionment procedures for the first time in the state's history.

The 1870 constitution provided for the division of the state into fifty-one legislative districts on the basis of population. Each district was to be contiguous, compact, and observe county lines as much as possible. Each district would have one senator and three representatives, and every ten years all districts would be reapportioned based on the federal census. Redistricting under the 1870 constitution marked the first time that "the number of legislative districts were absolutely fixed with no leeway for increasing the number of districts to meet expanding population."² Under previous state constitutions, new districts could be created at any time to meet population growth.

In 1872 the Illinois legislature redistricted itself for the eleventh time in the state's history. Tables 2 and 3 show that Cook County (basically Chicago) received equitable representation in the House and Senate. In the 1882 and 1893 reapportionments, these same tables show similar fairness,

though in the latter reapportionment Cook County was slightly shortchanged. Ironically, the 1893 reapportionment was the only one in Illinois history that took place while the Democrats controlled the governor's office and both houses of the legislature.

An analysis of the legislative district maps of 1872-1882 and 1893 reveals that the eight districts Cook County gained during this period (see Table 2) came at the expense of the central and northwestern parts of the state. Southern Illinois maintained its complement of ten districts, though the 1893 map shows these districts taking in some central counties. All three reapportionments were settled by the legislature after some debate, but with no real political fireworks.

III. 1901: THE ARMAGEDDON OF ILLINOIS REAPPORTIONMENT?

Unlike the three previous redistrictings, the 1901 edition was an all-out war where smoldering resentments exploded into open hostility. The effects of this reapportionment changed the course of Illinois political history, and it represents an early case study of the ongoing Chicago-downstate feud.

The 1900 census placed over a third of Illinois residents in the city of Chicago. Chicago's politicians in both major political parties began to throw their weight around. Downstaters resented Chicago's actions and fought back with their strongest weapon -- legislative control.

Illinois Democrats had always found their greatest support and leadership in southern Illinois. In fact, much of the movement for cumulative voting was to guarantee downstate Republicans some representation. However, the turn of the 20th century saw Illinois Democratic politics becoming more and more a Chicago game. The city's mayor at the time was Carter H. Harrison II, son of the martyred Columbian Exposition mayor of the same name, who was in his second of five city hall terms. His great party foe was Roger Sullivan, a man who had organized many of the city council "gray wolves" into a cohesive political organization. However, Sullivan and his cronies were unable to beat Harrison because the latter had more support from Chicago's large ethnic population and the undying loyalty of the city's infamous first ward aldermen, John "Bathhouse" Coughlin and Mike "Hinky Dink" Kenna.

Downstate Democrats still kept William Jennings Bryan, his "Cross of Gold" speech and old rural values tinged with Democratic populism close to their hearts. Chicago Democratic politicians had the votes. The state party had become a battleground for the Harrison and Sullivan forces, leaving the downstaters little choice but to cut a deal with one of the main city combatants.

Illinois Republicans were undergoing a similar internal political struggle. The party was no longer centered in Sangamon County. Abraham Lincoln's memory was still sacred, but it was now revered by GOP strategists in Chicago and Springfield. In Chicago, Republicans were particularly strong among native, German, and Scandinavian voters. In the newly-dawned 20th century, several GOP spokesmen were demanding more power over party affairs. GOP factional leaders like Charles Deneen, Fred Busse and William Lorimer were hungry for power within the party and for more influence in city and state government.

Who were these three Chicago Republicans, and what were they after? Charles Deneen was the GOP's south side leader. A former state representative, Deneen had been elected Cook County State's Attorney in 1896 and was re-elected to that post four years later. In 1901 Deneen was eyeing the governorship and control of the city and state Republican organization. Though he was never able to dominate the party, in 1904 Deneen did manage to win the governorship after a marathon party convention (he was the first Chicago Republican ever elected) and eventually became U.S. Senator. Fred Busse was Chicago's north side Republican leader, who in 1901 was serving in the state Senate after two terms in the House. Busse, too, had great dreams, and following the 1901 reapportionment he moved on to become state treasurer; in 1907 he was elected mayor of Chicago. William Lorimer, the son of a minister, was the GOP's west side boss. A born organizer, Lorimer was involved in several business enterprises, but his first love was politics. Lorimer served two long stints as congressman and a very short one as U.S. senator. His major claims to fame rest on his being the only sitting senator to be thrown out of the Senate for bribing his way to victory, and on being the man who brought William Hale "Big Bill" Thompson to Chicago politics.

Against this background of inter- and intra-party tension, Republican State Senator John McKenzie of Jo Daviess County introduced a resolution providing for the submission of a constitutional amendment which would permanently limit Cook County's representation in the legislature to one-third of the members. McKenzie was from the northwestern part of Illinois, and this part of the state, along with central Illinois, had given up the most districts to Cook County in the last three reapportionments. The McKenzie Resolution was a last-gasp downstate measure to prevent Cook County from swallowing Illinois government. As he said: "We believe the time has come when Cook County will rob the people of the state of Illinois of the representatives to which the people outside of Cook County are entitled."³ He then followed that barrage with a classic territory vs. population argument: "Cook County is only one of 102 units. In my judgment the 15 (present) senators can represent the interests of that county fully...."⁴ McKenzie closed his remarks with a ringing appeal to downstate Democrats, invoking a second general reapportionment theme, geography vs. party: "The chairman of the state Democratic committee is opposed to this and is undertaking to create the impression that it will be in the interest of the Democratic party to defeat this (resolution). I do not believe any country (downstate) Democrat will be fooled by this argument. The time has come for us to forget that we are partisans and to stand together."⁵

Cook County Republican Senator Thomas B. Milchrist led the response to McKenzie's attack: "In the name of the Lord, what has Cook County done that it should be discriminated against in this manner?"⁶ Milchrist and other Cook County senators railed against resolution proponents, claiming that their county paid more taxes than its fair share. Finally, resolution opponents stated that they believed the entire matter was unconstitutional.

McKenzie and his allies countered by chiding their Republican colleague Milchrist for working hand-in-hand with Hinky Dink Kenna and other "levee statesmen," even though the Cook County Republican "hates a Democrat like he does a rattlesnake." In his closing argument, the Jo Daviess County senator returned to his main theme: "Regarding the argument that representation

should be based entirely upon population...(just) because 75,000 Chinamen congregate in the city of Chicago, it is no reason why Chicago should send another member to take the place of a member from the country."⁷

The McKenzie Resolution passed overwhelmingly in the Senate 34 to 12. Only one downstate Republican, James Templeton of Bureau County, voted against it. None of Cook County's senate delegation, made up of six democrats and nine Republicans, voted for the resolution though four members were absent. Party loyalty meant nothing as all senators, save one, voted their geographic location over party affiliation and passed the resolution on to the House.

Downstate press applauded the Senate's action and urged House members to follow suit. An Illinois State Register editorial summed up the country counties' position on the one-third limitation resolution as a "now or never" proposition. According to the Register:

At the current ratio of increase in population, another decade will find Cook County containing nearly one-half of the population of Illinois. And under then existing conditions of the state constitution, this would entitle Cook to as many or nearly as many senators and representatives as the whole of the other 101 counties. This would result in the passage of laws not in the best interest of smaller cities, towns and rural areas...(Furthermore) after the upcoming reapportionment Cook will have more than one-third of the general assembly representatives and...no limiting amendment can be submitted since it takes two-thirds of the membership of the assembly to prepare a constitutional amendment.⁸

The 1901 reapportionment proceeded, with debate over McKenzie's resolution hanging over the deliberations. The final redistricting lines found Cook County gaining four more legislative districts at the expense of the southern and central-western parts of the state. Cook County now contained 37 percent of the legislative districts in Illinois -- an equitable ratio of representation to population.

The day after reapportionment's passage, the House voted on the McKenzie resolution. Mysteriously there was no debate, no speechmaking, and little fanfare. While the resolution missed attaining the magic two-thirds or 102 yeas by nine votes, it passed 93 to 48. The Chicago Tribune, the Republican newspaper in Chicago and a vocal resolution critic, commented "that a handful of country representatives, some Republicans and some Democrats, appreciated its injustice and refused to support it."⁹ The 1901 reapportionment was not downstate's Armageddon, as the final redistricted map gave Cook County's population its fair share of seats. However, the idea of permanently limiting the big county's representation had been planted in downstaters minds, and county members from both parties saw limitation implementation as the best defense against future reapportionments -- that is, if there were any future reapportionments.

IV. THE INTERIM: 1901 TO 1955

From 1901 to 1955, the Illinois legislature refused to reapportion and redistrict legislative districts in the state, despite the fact that the 1870 constitution explicitly provided for decennial reapportionment of representative districts based on population. For most of this interim period, Chicago and Cook County continued their amazing growth (see Table 1), resulting in a huge imbalance between the population of the state's largest county and its representation in Springfield (see Tables 2 and 3). The 1901 call for a constitutional amendment limiting Cook County's representation was forgotten as its advocates saw their goal put into practice without ever having it submitted to the voters.

Two obvious questions arise: How could the legislature avoid redistricting for over fifty years? Why could not both major parties in Chicago and Cook County muster enough political strength to force a reapportionment?

The answer to the first question lies in the 1870 constitution and the courts' interpretation of the concept of separation of powers. The 1870 constitution contained no legal enforcement clause to force the legislature to redistrict every ten years. Following each decennial census between 1910 and 1955, the legislature simply did nothing, though many legislators and several governors paid lip-service to the redistricting issue by stating that something should be done. According to David Kenney, "courts at both state and federal levels consistently refused to intervene in this problem. Since reapportionment was a legislative task, there was no direct executive action which could accomplish the redrawing of district lines."¹⁰ In 1926, for example, Chicagoan John Fergus attempted to get a writ of mandamus to force legislative reapportionment. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled (Fergus v. Marks, 321 ILL 510) that "the duty to reapportion the state is a specific legislative duty imposed by the constitution solely upon the legislative department of the state, and it alone is responsible to the people for a failure to perform that duty."¹¹

The second question dealing with Chicago and Cook County's inability to force redistricting presents a far more complicated problem. In brief, Chicago during this interim period became a Democratic city, despite the fact that the flamboyant Republican Big Bill Thompson was elected mayor three times between 1915 and 1931. Thus, it was not in the GOP's political interest to create more legislative districts for Democrats in Chicago. At the same time, Chicago Democrats were busy molding themselves into an awesome political juggernaut, an activity that took most of their time and talent.

The closest Illinois came to redistricting during the interim period occurred in the early 1920s. Under the 1922 proposed constitution, Cook County's delegation was limited to 19 seats in an expanded 57-member Senate (a one-third percentage duplicating the 1901 McKenzie Resolution goal) and a representation in the lower house based on the votes cast for governor in the election preceding the apportionment. In a radical departure from the 1870 Constitution, cumulative voting (minority representation) was to be abolished and replaced by 153 single member districts. In effect, the new constitution would have limited Cook County to minority status in the Senate while giving it a fair chance of acquiring a majority in the House.

The proposed constitution was submitted to the voters in a special election in December 1922. Perhaps never in the history of Illinois elections has any person or issue suffered a more humiliating defeat: statewide it lost 921,398 to 185,298, while in Cook County it was rejected by the astounding vote of 541,206 to 27,874 (a 17 to 1 margin). It carried in only 26 counties. Several articles in the constitution, such as those establishing a statewide general income tax and self-rule for large cities (Chicago), made it unpopular throughout most of the state. However, it was the representation article that turned off Chicago voters who, in the words of University of Chicago political scientist Charles Merriam, "refused to purchase home rule at the price of permanent limitation of representation."¹²

V. 1955: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT RETURNS

The 1950 census gave Chicago its largest population in history, over 3.6 million people, an increase of almost two million residents since the 1901 reapportionment. However, it was not Chicago's growth that snapped the state legislature into action. Rather, it was the remarkable population increase in suburban Cook County that finally created enough political pressure to change a half-century of legislative neglect.

By 1950, reapportionment inaction had made the suburbs more under-represented than Chicago (see Table 3). Politically, these suburbanites voted Republican, and though they were not blindly anti-city, their distrust of Chicago made them, on the surface, natural downstate allies. However, downstate Democratic and Republican fears about Cook County transcended political logic because any reapportionment that gave the big county more power was dangerous and, worse yet, it could cost them their legislative seats.

As discussions over reapportionment limped along, a new voice emerged, eager to put together a coalition capable of redrawing the state's legislative districts. In 1952 William G. Stratton, a Republican, was elected governor of Illinois. It can be argued that Stratton, a Lake County native then living in Grundy County, was the state's first suburban governor. A former two-term congressman and twice-elected state treasurer, Stratton at thirty-eight years of age reflected the upward mobility of the rising suburban constituency. A scrappy political infighter, Stratton had the vision, youth and muscle to attack the long-standing representation inequity stalemate. Moreover, Stratton's championing of reapportionment gave him the always desirable "political double" -- an issue that was good government in the eyes of big city newspapers and blue ribbon reform groups as well as good politics in vote-rich Cook County.

Stratton devised a "little federal" system plan to break the reapportionment deadlock. First, he submitted a resolution to the General Assembly calling for a constitutional amendment changing the "legislative apportionment sections of the constitution by making population the primary basis for representation in fifty-nine representative districts and area the prime consideration in setting up fifty-eight senatorial districts."¹³ Once safely through the legislature, the resolution would be placed on the ballot in the regular November 1954 election as an amendment to the state's constitution. If the voters approved the amendment, the actual redistricting would take place during the 1955 General Assembly under a new constitutional framework.

In hard numbers, Stratton's proposal gave Cook County thirty House districts (a bare majority) with Chicago receiving twenty-three of these districts. The Senate districts were permanently divided into thirty-four downstate, and twenty-four in Cook County (Chicago having eighteen of these districts). Stratton believed two features would make this resolution, and eventually the amendment, attractive to downstaters. First, the House would be reapportioned after every decennial census beginning in 1963 but the Senate would have its lines fixed, thus guaranteeing downstate perpetual Senate control. Second, in calling for eight new House districts and seven new Senate districts, the governor was attempting to defuse one of downstate's great fears of reapportionment -- further reduction of their districts. By making the redistricting pie bigger, Stratton would be able to give Cook County a bigger piece without cutting down downstate's portion in the Senate and only slightly diminishing it in the House.

Despite these political lures, downstaters balked at the reapportionment resolution in the General Assembly. Leading the opposition was the House Democratic minority leader, Paul Powell of Vienna. Powell eventually eased his opposition and supported the bill's passage in the House. However, once the resolution went on the ballot as a constitutional amendment, he led the battle against it in the 1954 campaign.

Stratton pro-amendment forces assembled a mighty band of civic and political leaders to push its passage. Prominent Chicago attorney Samuel W. Witwer was named chairman of the newly formed, blue-ribbon Illinois Committee for Constitutional Revision. The Cook County Republican chairman, Edward Moore, supported the amendment, as did the newly elected Cook County Democratic Chairman, Richard J. Daley, "who promised precinct worker support for the blue ballot (constitutional amendment)."¹⁴ However, it was Stratton himself who made the most elegant appeals for reapportionment reform and the amendment's passage.

For over a year, Stratton spoke out across the state, calling "reapportionment long overdue" and stating that "there was no place for mistrust." In one speech, he called for a modern political response to a half century of technology, arguing "we are no longer isolated and suspicious of one another...we listen to the same radio programs and read many of the same newspapers...."¹⁵ He also suggested that, "if the amendment is not adopted there doesn't seem much hope for any advance in Illinois government in the next few years."¹⁶

Downstate response to this pro-amendment onslaught was somewhat muted until the charismatic Powell personally joined the battle. He claimed that Stratton "was selfishly trying to use the remap to make political hay in Chicago."¹⁷ In a debate before the Sangamon County Bar Association in Springfield, State Senator George Drach of Springfield, an amendment supporter, argued that "downstaters should not lump Cook County and Chicago into one entity...(because) in Cook County outside Chicago residents face problems much more similar to those of downstate counties than to those of Chicago."¹⁸ Powell called upon an entire half-century of downstate fears about the big city by claiming in his singular style that if the blue ballot passed, "schools in sparsely settled areas in Illinois will be closed, a state property tax will be reinstated, the University of Illinois and the state capital will both be moved to Chicago, and a state sales tax would be cut to

benefit Chicago and Cook County residents."¹⁹ Finally, when Powell was asked if the situation amounted to "we've got them where we want them; let's keep them there", Powell responded, "yes", and then added that he favored "a reapportionment plan which would deny Cook County forever the chance to control either house of the state legislature."

Powell's rhetoric was no match for pro-amendment votes. The constitutional amendment passed overwhelmingly throughout Illinois, receiving 2-to-1 margins downstate and an 11-to-1 spread in Cook County. For the first time in fifty years the Illinois legislature redrew its boundaries, and this occurred when Republicans were in control of both houses and the state mansion as well.

The actual legislative redistricting in 1955 produced little fireworks. Naturally, both parties sought advantage, but except for some questions over district boundaries which placed incumbents against each other and some debate over the physical size of Chicago's Senate districts, all sides worked towards a successful reapportionment. In fact, the 1955 reapportionment was the last time the Illinois legislature redistricted itself without the aid of a special legislative redistricting commission or the courts.

The most interesting aspect of the 1955 reapportionment concerned the size of Chicago's Senate districts. The constitutional amendment's little federal system plan required the city's senatorial districts to average 11.8 square miles. Chicago's new mayor and Cook County Democratic chairman, Richard J. Daley, wanted to base as many districts as possible on the west side of the city. It was his party's strongest area, filled with powerful local Democratic politicians hungry to retain their power. However, the area was also losing people: the mid-1950s population flight from the city center to the periphery and suburbs was in full swing. The Chicago Tribune recognized Daley's ploy and condemned a proposed Senate redistricting map that "gave the area of the city with the lowest educational standards, the area that suffers most from blight...gang politics...and syndicate gambling...a disproportionate voice in the affairs of the state for as far in the future as anyone can see."²⁰

The Tribune urged Stratton to oppose Daley and the Democratic senate map. The governor refused for two reasons. First, Stratton wanted to have the first legislative reapportionment map in fifty years completed before his 1956 re-election campaign. Second, a somewhat overlooked provision in the 1954 constitutional amendment required that for redistricting purposes, the state was to be divided into three areas: Chicago, the county towns (suburban Cook), and downstate. No "overlapping" between the areas was allowed. Thus, however Chicago carved up its allotted eighteen senatorial districts, the outcome would have no bearing on the districts in the suburbs or downstate.

Without much downstate or suburban resistance, Stratton's Senate redistricting spokesmen, president pro tem Arthur J. Bidwill and Democratic Senate minority leader William J. Lynch (Daley's former law partner and close friend), huddled together and settled the district size issue. Daley and the Chicago Democrats gained a favorable senatorial map with the only political losers being city Republicans. On June 16, 1955, two weeks before the June 30 deadline, the Illinois House and Senate agreed on a reapportioned and

redistricted map for the state. Although many forces combined to create the new map, in the end it was the ability of Illinois Republican Governor William G. Stratton and Chicago's Mayor Richard J. Daley to work together that made reapportionment possible.

How did the first reapportionment in fifty years change the political landscape in Illinois? In raw figures, downstate gained two new Senate districts and lost three House districts, while Cook County picked up five Senate and eleven House districts. The Senate legislative map showed west-central and south-west Illinois picking up the two new downstate districts, with Chicago retaining its traditional eighteen Senate districts and suburban Cook being the beneficiary of the five new seats. In the House downstate losses were felt most in southeastern and central Illinois. Downstate gainers were four of the five collar counties surrounding Cook County: DuPage, Kane, Lake, and Will each received their own House district. As in the Senate, suburban Cook was the biggest beneficiary of the new House map. The country towns gained six new districts while Chicago garnered five. An interesting sidelight to the reapportionment's impact was that because of cumulative voting in the House, the new map gave several independent and reform-minded suburban Democrats an otherwise impossible opportunity to serve in the legislature.

Despite five decades of fears and apprehensions, the political ramifications of the 1955 reapportionment were not earthshaking. According to University of Illinois political scientist Sam Gove, "A post session analysis of the 1956 election concluded that reapportionment had brought about no profound changes...neither party balance nor structure was greatly disturbed. And, more importantly, no major legislation can be identified as resulting from reapportionment."²¹

VI. THE 1960S: REAPPORTIONMENT CHAOS IN ILLINOIS

Legislative reapportionment and redistricting in Illinois should have been routine following the 1960 census. The 1954 constitutional amendment and subsequent 1955 reapportionment had eliminated any need for redistricting the Senate. In the House, all fifty-nine districts were to be divided based on the state's population -- without crossing, if possible, the sanctity of the amendment's imposed separate political divisions -- Chicago, suburban Cook, and downstate. However, the intrusion of the federal and state courts into the reapportionment struggle, the blending of historic reapportionment themes in Illinois, and the continuing population shift to suburban Cook and the collar counties turned reapportionment into a political quagmire.

Complicating the reapportionment issue in the 1960s was the elimination of the bipartisan support so evident in the last redistricting. Illinois Democrats still had Mayor Richard Daley as their leader, but the Republicans were without a main spokesman, as Governor William Stratton had lost his third-term bid in 1960 to Democrat Otto Kerner.

Even with political party good will on reapportionment, population movement inside the state would have created sticky problems for the legislators. For the first time in Illinois history, Chicago's population had declined in real numbers from the preceding census. Moreover, the city's percentage of the state's population dropped to 35 percent (a 7 percent decline from 1950), a figure equal to its state population percentage in 1900

(see Table 1). In 1963 Illinois legislators faced the unenviable task of having to reapportion a state where the two historical sectional antagonists --Chicago and downstate, especially southern Illinois--were losing population. Both areas now had to resort to political manipulation and gamesmanship to prevent legislative districts from being taken away by the rapidly growing suburban Cook and collar county regions of the state. The latter was a new third force in Illinois redistricting politics, and in the 1960s it began to flex its political muscle.

In the 1963 legislative redistricting session, the Republicans had a comfortable majority in the Senate and a skimpy one in the House. The Democrats balanced this GOP power with Kerner's control of the governorship. Two issues dominated the proceedings.

First, there was the question of whether Lake County in the far northeastern corner of the state, with nearly 300,000 people, should receive a second House district. Its House districts members represented twice as many people as some southern Illinois legislators from undersized downstate districts. But it was no longer possible simply to add new districts to the state's grand total; the addition of districts to one area required the elimination of districts somewhere else in the state. Despite the vocal dissent of Lake County's Republican Senator Robert Coulson, the GOP controlled legislature passed a redistricting bill that left Lake County with only one district. This action appeased GOP downstate representatives who had already agreed to give up one district but were unwilling to allow another one to be shifted to the northeastern part of the state.

The other issue dominating the 1963 redistricting proceedings was the number of House districts in Chicago. The 1960 census figures indicated that the city should give up two or three of its twenty-three districts to suburban Cook County. However, Mayor Daley and his Chicago Democrats challenged city district reduction efforts by introducing the so-called overlap map. Daley's strategy was to extend a number of Chicago districts into the suburbs to satisfy district population requirements, while leaving enough of the city in the boundaries so that they would remain under Democratic control. Democratic house minority whip John Touhy defended this action, stating that "city boundaries are of little or no consequence in any reapportionment of Cook County because the constitution in no way says that all of the districts allocated to either subdivision must be whole."²²

Republicans were outraged by the Democrats' reinterpretation of the 1954 constitutional amendment and by their blatant power move to save all of Chicago's legislative districts. After much intra-party wrangling, the GOP-dominated legislature finally passed a reapportionment bill that prevented Chicago expansion into the suburbs, while leaving Lake County with its one house district.

Immediate opposition to the reapportionment bill came from all sections of the state. Chicago Democrats claimed that the city was under-represented in the Senate, and few observers were surprised when Governor Otto Kerner promptly vetoed it, citing the inequitable situation in Lake County as a major factor. Following his veto, Governor Kerner appointed a ten-member legislative redistricting commission as mandated by the 1954 constitutional amendment. Each major party had five members on the commission and, in addition to the fact that not one legislator was selected, the commission's

most interesting appointment was Daniel Pierce, the Democratic state central committeeman from Lake County. The commission met throughout the rest of the year, quarreling over the same issues that had dominated the reapportionment debate in the General Assembly. By December 1963, the Chicago representation question remained the key sticking point, with the Democrats demanding twenty-three city-controlled House districts and the Republicans offering only twenty-one. After much name-calling, the commission reported itself deadlocked.

The commission's remap failure meant that by law Illinois House members would be selected in an at-large election. Even for a state famous for its rough and tumble politics, the events surrounding the 1964 at-large election were unique and often spectacular. Amidst cries of intra-party double-dealing and partisan charges of political chicanery, the Democrats and Republicans each nominated 118 candidates to the 177-seat Illinois House. It was argued that the 118 figure would guarantee minority party representation 59 seats in case of a landslide. House candidates were placed on a nearly yard-long, separate orange ballot that quickly won the nickname "bedsheet." The Lyndon Johnson romp over Barry Goldwater triggered a general Democratic House sweep in Illinois -- thereby preventing any thorough examination of how the cumbersome orange ballots were counted on election night. Throughout the state horror stories were told of weary election judges weighing instead of counting House ballots and of other judges disregarding individual choices and merely totaling straight party votes.

This election and reapportionment madness was short-lived, because in 1964 the state and federal courts entered the thicket of redistricting politics. In 1962 the United States Supreme Court broke with its traditional hands-off policy on reapportionment cases in its Baker v. Carr decision. In this landmark Tennessee case, the nation's highest court "recognized that legislative apportionment was a justifiable question",²³ and stated that any reapportionment should require districts which have contiguous and compact territory to contain as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. Though Baker v. Carr did not pertain directly to Illinois, it did generate much interest in the entire issue of equitable reapportionment.²⁴

The second redistricting case to affect reapportionment in Illinois was Germano v. Kerner, in which Joseph Germano, director of District 31 of the United Steelworkers Union, claimed that less than one-third of the state's voters could elect a majority of the Illinois state Senate. Germano's case was brought before a three-judge federal district court in July 1963. The justices' decision divided along party lines. The Republican judicial majority claimed "apportionment of the Illinois Senate is a satisfactory compromise between Cook County and downstate Illinois."²⁵ Judge Richard Austin in his dissent said that the 1954 constitutional amendment's mini-federal plan for the Illinois Senate was "an invidious discrimination by (its) failing to provide for periodic reapportionment of senatorial districts."²⁶

Germano appealed the decision to the United State Supreme Court. However, one week prior to the Court's action on his case, the nation's highest judicial tribunal rendered the most important decision in reapportionment history. In Reynolds v. Sims (June 16, 1964) the Court built upon the foundation established in Baker v. Carr by holding that representatives of both houses of state legislatures must be apportioned by population under the

equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court in effect established a presumption of unconstitutionality for any system deviating from the norm of equal representation. Chief Justice Earl Warren summed up the intent of this decision with his now famous statement: "Legislators represent people not trees or acres; citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes."

In Illinois leaders of both political parties agreed that the Court's action knocked out the state's "little federal" system and that future redistricting would radically shift power in the state Senate to the northeastern part of Illinois. Mayor Daley welcomed the decision and believed that the Democrats and Chicago would benefit from a population-based Senate reapportionment. George Mahin, executive director of the Better Government Association, differed with Daley. He argued that the chief beneficiary of the Court's ruling would be suburban Cook and the collar counties. The Chicago Tribune believed Reynolds v. Sims would not dramatically alter party strength in the state Senate. The newspaper argued, "The practical effect of the Supreme Court decision will be to take Senate seats away from Republican rural areas and give them to the Republican suburban area."²⁷

This point hit many downstate legislators extremely hard. The historic theme of territory vs. population, for almost 100 years rural downstate's battle cry against big city domination, was no longer a viable issue. For generations past, downstate legislators had brilliantly manipulated the state's reapportionment process to give their underpopulated areas a high degree of representation. In 1955 they had given up control of the lower house to Cook County and the northeastern part of the state, and then in 1964 the U.S. Supreme Court stripped away their ability to control the Senate. GOP Senate whip George Drach of Springfield, a leading advocate of the now illegal mini-federal plan, summed up the Court action by stating: "What the Supreme Court has apparently said is that people may no longer decide that they want area representation in their state legislatures."²⁸

One week after the Reynolds v. Sims decision, "the Supreme Court remanded the Germano suit to the (same) special three-judge federal district court which had upheld the Illinois senatorial apportionment (plan) by a 2-to-1 vote in July 1963."²⁹ On January 22, 1965, the three judges unanimously reversed their earlier ruling and warned that if the state failed to redistrict the Senate, Illinois voters would face the possibility of an at-large senate election in 1966.

With territory vs. population no longer a workable theme in Illinois reapportionment, the remaining themes -- party vs. geography and incumbent survival -- dominated the 1965 redistricting debates. The L.B.J. landslide had given Illinois Democrats a sweeping 118 to 59 bedsheet ballot victory in the House. However, in the Senate the Republicans had lost only two seats, thereby retaining control of the upper chamber with a 33 to 25 margin.

With the usual June 30 deadline facing them, Illinois legislators volleyed redistricting proposals at each other throughout the 1965 General Assembly session. Once again Chicago's desire to overlap some of its districts into suburban Cook highlighted reapportionment discussions. Both parties agreed that downstate should receive twenty-nine of fifty-nine House districts and twenty-nine of fifty-eight Senate districts, though each party had a different

version of how these downstate districts should look. The parties also differed on the number of legislative districts that Chicago should have in relationship to suburban Cook County. The Democrats, through overlapping, gave Chicago one more House district and two to three more Senate districts than did the Republicans who rejected any district overlapping.

Behind all the political maneuvering was a dual Democratic strategy that reflected the development of Chicago as a one-party Democratic city. Democratic strategists believed that, with city-suburban overlapping and favorable mapmaking in heavily Democratic southwestern Illinois, they could gain control of the state Senate, an event which had occurred only six times since 1870. If they were unsuccessful in this grand plan, the back-up strategy was to create as many districts as possible for Chicago, even if they had to trade off some downstate areas. Chicago Republicans were a vanishing breed, and Democratic map makers believed any district taking in a majority of city territory was an almost certain Democratic winner.

The Republicans, under the leadership of Senate President Russell Arrington of Evanston, stymied Democratic redistricting efforts. Once again the state legislature was unable to reapportion itself. This time the Illinois Supreme Court was ordered to handle the Senate redistricting, while Governor Kerner appointed still another legislative redistricting commission to reapportion the House.

The Senate remap was hammered out between party leaders and a special five-judge panel in August. Illinois Republicans and Democrats agreed to a 21-9 district, non-overlap split between Chicago and suburban Cook, thereby leaving downstate with only 28 districts. Neither party was totally satisfied. Mayor Daley was able to win for Chicago a twenty-first district despite the fact that on a strict one-man, one-vote percentage population breakdown, the city was entitled to only 20.45 districts. In preventing city-suburban overlap, the GOP again bottled up Chicago Democratic efforts to move into the areas of population expansion in Cook County. Experts called the compromise a political split decision, with most agreeing that the Republicans would keep their traditional control of the Senate.

In the House redistricting, Democratic and Republican commission members settled on a new map in late November. The crucial political deal was an agreement that made House district lines identical to the Senate boundaries in Cook County. The 21-9 district breakdown in Cook County allowed downstate to keep its twenty-nine districts and gave the Chicago Democrats their extra district, while denying any city overlap into the suburbs.

Downstate Democrats called the House remap a sellout of their party in southern Illinois. Paul Powell, who by then had become Illinois secretary of state, denounced the map. "Republicans," he claimed, "got the best of it. What they call swing districts are not swing districts at all."³⁰ Downstate Republicans were only slightly less critical. Some boundary line adjustments downstate boosted their party fortunes, but the movement of several districts upstate sent shockwaves throughout Republican central and southern Illinois. Without much final resistance, downstate had become a junior partner in the running of the Illinois legislature.

In the final analysis, three years of spectacular and bitter redistricting battles gave neither political party a major victory. Chicago Democrats were unable to capitalize fully on their 1964 at-large House landslide and the first total population-based redistricting in the state's history. The one-man, one-vote ruling increased the number of Chicago's Senate districts but suburban Cook matched the city's gain, thus neutralizing any Democratic advantage. Illinois Republicans, traditionally fearful of Chicago unleashing its population on the rest of the state, found a new demographic reality in the continuing growth and political muscle of suburban Cook and the collar counties. This five and a half-county entity changed Illinois politics from its historic two-way, downstate-Chicago rivalry into a three-way tug of war.³¹

Geographically, downstate was the big loser in the final remap. Its politicians could only hope to play a balance-of-power role in Illinois legislative politics. Downstate Republicans had to tie their fortunes not to their geographic area, but to GOP party strength in the population rich suburban counties. The price was that the GOP party leadership moved from downstate to Chicago's suburbs. As for downstate Democrats, they were now more than ever the vassals of the Chicago Democratic organization. Inside the party's legislative hierarchy their number and influence had been reduced, though cumulative voting did offer job security to many House members. In sum, reapportionment in the 1960s saw territory v. population eliminated as a redistricting theme, and party become more important than geography in the politics of remapping.

VII. 1971 REAPPORTIONMENT: POLITICAL PARTY V. GEOGRAPHIC REGION -- AMIDST SUBURBAN GROWTH

The 1970 census once again revealed population trends damaging to Chicago and its ruling Democratic party. The big city now contained only 30 percent of the state's population -- a figure equal to its population share in 1890. Cook County's population dropped below 50 percent of the Illinois total for the first time since 1920, reflecting the population growth in the collar counties and a few downstate areas. Finally, almost 40 percent of Cook County's residents now lived in its suburbs, making it obvious to all that the historic view of Chicago and Cook County as one entity had ended.

Even though only six years had passed since the last redistricting, a major event had occurred that altered the 1971 reapportionment ground rules. In 1970 Illinois voters gave the state a new constitution that significantly changed redistricting guidelines and procedures.

First, the new constitution added on a state Senate district, thereby making the total number of legislative districts for both chambers equal at fifty-nine. The constitution also ordered the legislature to draw district boundaries identical for both the House and Senate. In the previous reapportionment, only Cook County had legislative district lines exactly the same.

Second, according to the 1970 constitution, the governor no longer selected the redistricting commission if the legislature was unable to remap itself. Instead, the top Republican and Democrat in the House and Senate would each choose two people to make up an eight-member redistricting commission. The legislatively appointed panel had thirty days to produce a

new map that was supported by five of its own members. If this commission became stalemated, the Illinois Supreme Court would select two persons (one from each party) whose names would be given to the Secretary of State. The secretary would then by lottery pick one of the names as the ninth tiebreaking member of the commission.

As for the overlap issue, the new constitution did not stipulate that redistricting considerations be restricted to three separate geographical regions (Chicago, suburban Cook and downstate). Thus, a controversial aspect of the 1954 constitutional amendment and a leading factor in the reapportionment battles of the '60s was eliminated as a redistricting issue.

The legislative line-ups in the 1971 reapportionment found the House with a slight Republican majority and the Senate evenly split between both parties. Because Democrat Paul Simon had been elected lieutenant governor in 1968, along with Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie,³² the Democrats by virtue of Simons's tiebreaking vote as Senate president controlled the upper chamber. This advantage would not last, however, since under the new constitution the lieutenant governor was no longer the Senate president.

Interestingly, party strength in the House was exactly the same as it had been in 1962 prior to the 1960s remap marathon. In the Senate, Democrats had picked up six seats in 1962 but these had not been maintained throughout the decade. Rather, Democratic Senate fortunes had fluctuated dramatically in the three elections since the 1965 reapportionment. However overall, the court decisions mandating a population-based Senate map had greatly increased the possibility for Illinois Democrats to challenge traditional GOP supremacy in the state Senate.

The political leaders who negotiated the 1971 remap reflected the new reality of Illinois politics. The Democrats were led again by Mayor Daley and his Chicago organization. Ostensibly, the mayor's main spokesmen were Senate President Cecil Partee of Chicago and, to a lesser degree, House leader Clyde Choate from southern Illinois. However, early in the bargaining, west suburban House Democrat Jerry Shea assumed a powerful position in the negotiations.

The GOP controlled the state mansion with Richard Ogilvie, a suburban Republican, who had previously been Cook County sheriff and president of the Cook county board. However, Ogilvie did not direct GOP remap strategy. Rather, the leadership rested mainly with House Speaker Robert Blair of south suburban Park Forest and assistant GOP Senate leader Terrel Clarke from suburban Western Springs. This Republican leadership reflected the growing power of the suburban constituency and the reduced influence of downstate in GOP politics.

As in other remaps, the amount of Chicago's legislative representation dominated redistricting negotiations. On a strict population-percentage breakdown, the city should have received eighteen districts -- a net loss of three seats from the 1965 map. However, the Democrats, cheered by the implicit acceptance of district overlapping in the new constitution, countered GOP strict population proposals with a map that retained all twenty-one city-controlled districts.

In the give-and-take negotiations Shea and Partee pushed "for overlapping districts that would bring enough suburban voters into the city-based districts to meet population standards but not so many that Democratic control would be threatened."³³ Politically, the correlation between the number of Chicago's legislative districts and the number of guaranteed Democratic victories had become nearly complete. The last Republican state senators in the twenty Chicago-dominated districts had been wiped out in the 1970 election.³⁴ In the House, the GOP had all but given up trying to capture two seats in any Chicago district. Given these political facts of life, suburban Republican legislators resisted Chicago Democratic map efforts, and once again the Illinois legislature was unable to reapportion itself.

Following the dictates of the new constitution, each legislative leader chose two members to be appointed to the redistricting commission. Democratic Senate President Partee, House Democratic leader Choate and Republican House Speaker Blair each selected themselves and their respective chief aides. Senate GOP leader Russell Arrington, ill during most of the remap proceedings, chose the assistant GOP Senate leader Clarke and, in a surprise, picked former Governor Stratton. Almost immediately after it had been legally formed, the commission leaked to the press a proposed compromise legislative district map. It appeared that the Democrats and Speaker Blair wanted a quick deal to avoid a prolonged political battle that might end up with a coin flip to see who would be a tiebreaking ninth member of a deadlocked commission.

Politically, the proposed map gave each party twenty-eight favorable districts, with the three remaining districts considered GOP leaning toss-ups. Geographically, Chicago Democrats kept twenty of their twenty-one districts. In return for this favorable Chicago redistricting, the Democrats gave Blair a great deal of freedom to remap the rest of the state. On paper Blair carved out a Republican map, but in his home suburban area GOP legislators howled at the compromise agreement. Clarke called the new map "a sellout of Republican suburban interests" for disregarding traditional separation of city and suburb and thus opening up the population-rich suburbs to Chicago Democrats.

Suburban Cook County Republicans were angered over Blair's efforts to restrict them from expanding into the growing GOP collar county areas. Blair, himself a Will County Resident, had only two suburban districts, the second and sixth, that took in some collar county areas. Suburban Cook GOP legislators believed that if Chicago district overlapping was stopped, they could embark on a "suburban creep" remap strategy. A geographically isolated and politically sealed Chicago would permit partisan mapmakers to create safe and secure suburban-based districts that pushed outward from the city's borders. Moreover, this kind of map would have a ripple effect, causing collar county districts to expand south and west into downstate counties, thereby increasing suburban representation in the legislature.

In August the redistricting commission, over the strong objections of Clarke and Stratton, approved the 1971 legislative remap. The final map was very close to the one printed in the newspapers a month before. Southern Illinois legislative representation dropped from seven to six districts, while the western part of the state, lamenting that it was "forgotonia," also gave up a district. Suburban Cook, based on its population, was short-changed, having their total number of districts marginally increased by only one (see Table 3).³⁵ The collar counties gained representation, as several of them

were given control of an added legislative district. Chicago Democrats took care of their own interests by taking twenty districts, and then expressed the hope that somehow downstate Democrats could find ten other winnable districts elsewhere in the state, so that the party could challenge the GOP for legislative control. In sum, the 1971 reapportionment produced a classic party v. geography redistricting confrontation, with Chicago Democrats and non-Cook County Republicans emerging as the victors.

VIII: REDISTRICTING 1981 STYLE: NEW PLAYERS AND NEW RULES BUT THE SAME OLD HARDBALL POLITICS

In 1981 the Illinois legislature attempted to redistrict itself under the pressure of several important political "firsts". 1981 was the first modern legislative reapportionment in which Illinois Democrats were without the strict party leadership of Richard J. Daley. Since the former mayor's death, the Democratic organization had been at war with itself. Chicago's new mayor, Jane Byrne, and Daley's eldest son, Cook County State's Attorney Richard M. Daley, were locked in mortal combat, and both viewed the reapportionment legislative session as another skirmish to be fought before their probable showdown in the 1983 Democratic mayoral primary.

Another first was the result of the so-called "cutback amendment" passed by Illinois voters in 1980. It eliminated one-third of the House of Representatives by creating 118 single-member districts. No longer would cumulative voting or guaranteed minority representation assure that a party's House candidates, running in the opposition party's strong districts, would gain a seat in the General Assembly. For Illinois remappers it meant that they would not only have to allocate statewide representation, but that they would also have to eliminate 77 of the brethren.

In 1981, for the first time in recent redistricting history, remap did not dominate the legislative agenda. Republican Governor James Thompson's attempt to take Senate leadership from the divided Democrats in late January and the explosion of the transportation issue during the spring, placed reapportionment on the back burner for legislators and the media during most of the session.

Finally, in 1981 race emerged for the first time as a major theme in reapportionment politics. The threat of a black revolt against any map perceived as racially unfair placed the Democratic legislative leadership in a weakened power position vis-a-vis their Republican counterparts. GOP leaders offered several black legislators a generous cut of Chicago's districts in return for their support of the Republican statewide map. In fact, the potential of a black insurrection against their Democratic colleagues so excited many ardent GOP conservatives that some of them spoke on the importance of equitable black legislative representation for the first time in their political careers.

The year 1981 also saw two important trends continue to affect Illinois legislative reapportionment efforts. First, demographics continued to work against Chicago and the Democratic party. The 1980 census showed Chicago with slightly over 3,000,000 residents (see Table 3). Statistically, the state's big city had lost over 600,000 people since its population high point in 1950. Also, during this thirty-year period Chicago's percentage of Illinois'

population dropped 16 percent, while the city's portion of Cook County's population fell 23 percent. Chicago's substantial loss of residents was so great that even the huge population increase in its surrounding suburbs could not prevent Cook County's percentage of the state total population from dropping 6 percent since 1950.

The other trend showed that the makeup of Chicago's population continued its drift toward becoming less and less like the population of the rest of the state. In 1980 Chicago's black population reached almost 1.2 million (nearly 40% of the city's total), and its reported Hispanic count was over 420,000 (14% of Chicago's residents). The other 101 1/2 counties had a population of a little over 8.4 million people, with blacks constituting around 5 percent, while Hispanics made up less than 3 percent. As was the case 100 years before, Chicagoans were more ethnically diverse than their downstate neighbors, although today it is blacks and Hispanics that give the big city its unique character.³⁶ However, in contrast to the 19th century, Chicago is losing population and its political muscle in influencing state policy and statewide elections. In sum, much of the 1981 reapportionment battle would involve Chicago Democrats in an attempt to overcome both of these trends and to preserve as much as possible of the city's clout in Illinois politics.

In 1981 the Republicans controlled the House and the governor's mansion, while the Democrats held a razor-thin 30-29 majority in the Senate. Blair's 1971 map had not produced a decade of Republican leadership in Springfield. In 1974 Watergate gave the Democrats gains large enough for the party to win control of both legislative chambers. At the end of the decade the Republicans managed to win back the House but the Senate remained in Democratic hands. Ironically, going into the 1981 reapportionment, the state Senate, a body historically Republican, was the Democrats' safety valve on redistricting.

The public debate on reapportionment did not take place until late in the session. It appeared from the outset that the Democratic legislative leaders, Senate President Philip Rock and House minority leader Michael Madigan, were on the political hot seat. They had only two possible strategic alternatives in the entire remap question. First, they could put together a Democratic map, have it passed in the Senate, and then deal with the Republicans who were sure to pass a GOP map in the House. Second, they could stall the proceedings, play for a reapportionment deadlock, and then have the Democrats take their chances with the redistricting commission. Whatever strategy they employed, the Democratic leaders had to have complete unity in the Senate -- and whereas in past reapportionments that might not have posed any problem, in 1981 it was far from certain.

Besides reconciling the Byrne and Daley factions in the legislature, Rock and Madigan were faced with a potential black revolt in the House and Senate. Black congressional representation from Chicago was the catalyst for this movement, as black leaders demanded that the mapmakers keep three black city districts. Since Illinois was losing two congressional seats due to the 1980 census, most observers believed that the courts would eventually have to draw the politically volatile congressional map. However, in the interim Rock had to agree to retaining three black congressional districts on his Democratic map proposal, or else face the possibility of some black senators joining the Republicans on remap.

Thompson's Senate leadership actions, the partisan and regional frustrations stemming from the transportation crisis, and the looming uncertainty of a possible deal between blacks and Republicans, came crashing together during the final remap debate in late June. Republican State Senator Mark Rhoads believed he had the Democratic votes needed to pass a GOP map in the Senate. In a rare Sunday legislative session, Rhoads became outraged over the parliamentary tactics employed by Rock to delay a vote on reapportionment. Unable to control his anger, Rhoads attempted to charge the podium and get at Rock. However, before he reached the Senate president, Democratic downstate Senator Sam Vadalabene met Rhoads with a right to the jaw. According to eyewitness Al Manning of the State Journal Register, "...for a second it looked as though both benches were going to empty,"³⁷ but, with the television cameras grinding, the combatants were pulled apart. Later in the day, Rock called the remap bill and with total party unity the Democrats passed out their own bill, thus assuring a reapportionment deadlock.

In early July the four legislative leaders, following the mandates of the 1970 Constitution, each selected two members to the redistricting commission. None of the leaders selected themselves or their aides, as they had in 1971, but instead chose individuals who represented a cross section of their respective political parties. For one month the commission held meetings throughout the state at which incumbent legislators, various groups and political committees, and interested citizens expressed their views on reapportionment. The political intensity over remap had never been greater, and this highly-charged situation was further exacerbated by the necessity of cutting back the size of the legislature. Thus, it was not surprising when, after thirty days, it was reported that the eight-member redistricting body had reached an impasse.

The next step in the stalled remap process was to add a ninth member to the redistricting commission. This action had been feared by many political pros who had warned both parties against resting their redistricting fortunes on winning a "coin flip" or a "lottery". Nevertheless, the inability of the divided commission to reach a remap compromise forced the Illinois Supreme Court to submit two names to Illinois Secretary of State James Edgar. The court selected former Democratic Governor Sam Shapiro and former Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie, and on August 25 both names were placed in a black top hat once worn by Abraham Lincoln. After months of debate, hours of strategy sessions, thousands of dollars of computer time, the collected wisdom gained from 110 years of reapportionment history, and the reform redistricting procedures placed in the 1970 constitution, the 1981 legislative reapportionment process came down to its single most important act: Secretary Edgar drew Governor Shapiro's name out of a hat.

Governor Shapiro, on accepting his membership on the commission, told reporters, "I don't feel I am here either to rubber stamp a Democratic map or a Republican map."³⁸ The former governor vowed a fair redistricting effort, and he encouraged the eight other commission members to continue their efforts to reach a compromise. Two weeks later it was obvious to all that negotiations settlement was impossible and that the fate of the 1981 remap rested squarely with Shapiro.

Stories circulated throughout the state that Shapiro, a man who in his active public life had often shunned rough-and-tumble politics, was merely going to approve a partisan Democratic map. However, other items leaked to the press suggested that the Democratic commission members were divided on the remap. For almost two weeks Shapiro was consulted, begged, and cajoled about alternative redistricting possibilities. Taking no chances was independent Democratic State Senator Dawn Netsch of Chicago, who held a new conference to denounce a leaked potential remap that would have pitted her against fellow incumbent Democratic State Senator William Marovitz. Finally, on October 1, Shapiro submitted his redistricting plan, and one day later amid GOP howls of "unfair power grab," the commission approved the 1981 legislative reapportionment on a straight 5-4 party vote.

Sam Shapiro, who only a week earlier had been praised by GOP Senate Majority Leader James "Pate" Philip as "a fair and objective man", was now accused by the same Republican spokesman of making this reapportionment "a black day in Illinois history." State Representative Robert Barr, the Cook County Republican chairman, stated that "the map was carefully drawn to hurt the Republican party in the suburbs and to pad city Democratic districts with suburban population, without jeopardizing city control."³⁹ Downstate Republicans were only slightly less outraged. On the whole, the remap sent the Illinois GOP into a state of shock. They were not even slightly amused at downstate Democratic State Senator James Donnewald's assessment: "All's fair in love, war, and politics."⁴⁰

The new legislative map was a major departure from past reapportionments. Not only did it provide for 118 single-member house districts, but it also buried any notion of maintaining geographic divisions between city, suburb, and downstate. The Shapiro map split the state into seven legislative district regions,⁴¹ with many districts overlapping into new political territory. Moreover, the new map bore out the past warning about the problems entailed in a winner-take-all redistricting situation. Since the parties were unable to compromise on reapportionment, the "out of the hat" 1981 redistricting produced the most lopsided, partisan map since 1901.

The Senate map gave Chicago Democrats nineteen seats, eight of which were totally in the city, while another eleven overlapped from Chicago into suburban Cook. In other words, it gave Chicago approximately three and a half more seats than its population warranted. Suburban Cook, for the second reapportionment in a row, took it on the chin. Even with some collar county overlap, suburban Cook, with 20 percent of the state's population, received less than 17 percent of the Senate districts. Moreover, the 1981 map for the first time set up real potential conflict between suburban Cook and its collar county neighbors.

The new Senate map gave the five fast-growing collar counties eight complete Senate districts with another two overlapping into downstate areas. The other ninety-six counties ended up with the remaining twenty-one Senate districts. This meant that, based on statewide population, downstate would be slightly under-represented in the new Senate. Numerically, the new Shapiro Senate map favored Chicago, while it dealt equitably with the collars and shortchanged suburban Cook and, to a lesser degree, downstate.

The House map broke new ground in Illinois politics. Chicago was given twenty districts located totally within the city and control of eighteen more that overlapped into suburban Cook County. Due to the near evaporation of the Chicago Republican party, these thirty-eight districts would most likely elect only Democrats. Thus, with only 26 percent of the state's population, Chicago garnered over 32 percent of Illinois' representative districts, thereby giving the Chicago Democratic party nearly one-third of the House in the new General Assembly.

All of this, of course, dealt a serious blow to the Republican party. Not only were they undercut in the total number of districts they received; but because of overlapping the area was now also a potential battleground between suburban Cook and collar county Republican politicians.

As in the Senate map, downstate was given a fairly equitable number of House districts based on its share of the statewide population. Individually, certain district boundaries were instantly controversial, with the elongated north-central eighty-ninth district being the most conspicuous.

Initial Reaction and Final Outcome

Following the release of the Shapiro map, newspapers across the state examined its ramifications for their local legislators. In every region there were charges that the Democrats had stuck it to the Republicans. In the metro-east St. Clair-Madison County area, the Belleville News-Democrat reported that the final remap had all but ended any re-election hopes of Belleville Republican State Representative Celeste Stiehl. The State Journal-Register pointed out that Sangamon County would now be divided into four House and two Senate districts, giving the Democrats an excellent chance to increase their General Assembly membership in central Illinois. Further north, Raymond Hanania gave the following bleak analysis for area Republicans: "For the next ten years the future of southwest Cook County will remain in the hands of Chicago Democrats, with Republican legislators crammed into a corner that stretches into neighboring DuPage and Will counties..."⁴²

Other commentators concerned themselves with the entire reapportionment process and questioned both the fairness and efficiency of the current system. Ed Armstrong, editor of the State Journal-Register, chastised leaders in both political parties for thinking about themselves and "not about the citizenry to be represented." He also suggested that if the Republicans had won the flip, the map would have been physically different but not any less partisan. Ken Watson, a long-time Illinois political observer, summed up the views of many Illinoisans frustrated by the redistricting circus:

There has to be something better than to resort to the draw-from-the-hat procedure, which in its first test has resulted in an even more flagrant display of politics as usual than before. Unless the courts should intervene, the next ten years are likely to see a strange new chapter in legislative history. As in baseball you won't be able to tell your legislator from Chicago's or Cairo's without a scoreboard.⁴³

Illinois Republican legislators refused to accept the Shapiro map. In a move considered bizarre even by Illinois reapportionment standards, a Republican-nominated "non-partisan" group was formed to challenge the map. The new committee took the name Alliance for Fair Access to Illinois Representation and was aptly give the acronym FaiRep. University of Illinois Professor James Nowlan, a former Republican lieutenant governor candidate, became its spokesman. With solid GOP financial backing, FaiRep hired a LaSalle Street Chicago law firm and former U.S. Justice Department lawyer Jerris Leonard to handle any legal action. In late October the committee filed suit in federal court with several prominent Republicans, headed by Naperville Mayor Chester J. Rybicki, listed among the plaintiffs. The suit charged that the commission invidiously discriminated against suburban voters and Chicago minorities, and called for the appointment of a three-judge federal panel to rule on the constitutionality of the map.

The sudden surge of Republican sympathy for Chicago minority representation in the state legislature did not prevent city blacks and Hispanics from also filing separate law suits in the federal courts. Chicago blacks, led by State Representative Carol Moseley Braun and State Senator Richard Newhouse; and city Hispanics, led by the Mexican-American Legal Defense & Education Fund, also challenged the Shapiro map. Braun called the black action "one of the most significant civil rights struggles of the decade," while Newhouse, a former unsuccessful Chicago mayoral candidate, claimed "the blacks want seven Senate districts which would afford them fourteen House seats."⁴⁴ Virginia Martinez, the Hispanic spokesperson, argued that a favorable ruling on their suit would create two Hispanic Senate and four Hispanic House districts, thus giving Hispanics Springfield representation for the first time in Chicago history.

The federal court consolidated the three challenges into one case under the jurisdiction of District Court Judges Nicholas Bua and John F. Grady and Appeals Court Judge Richard Cudahy. Meanwhile, Illinois Democrats filed their own "friendly lawsuit" in the state Supreme Court. According to democratic redistricting commission member Michael McClain of Quincy, the action was initiated "because we wanted to get the ball rolling."⁴⁵ In late November the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the redistricting commission map, with only one modification -- the elongated north-south eighty-ninth House district was redrawn in a more compact east-west configuration. Illinois Democrats know this state victory would not halt the federal court proceedings, but many believed that this decision might have a favorable impact on that court decision.

In January 1982, following heated testimony -- which, among other things, established Democratic House Minority Leader Michael Madigan as the main architect of the Commission map -- the three-judge federal court rendered its decision. Except for some boundary changes which disentangled some suburban Republican incumbents from having to run against each other in the March primary, the GOP political interests once again lost out. The court unanimously dismissed Rybicki's accusations that the commission map was not compact and intentionally underrepresented suburban districts. In finding no existing district "a tortured, extremely elongated form which is not compact in any sense,"⁴⁶ the federal panel stated it was not their function to depoliticize such an inherently political process.

Blacks and Hispanics fared much better. In a 2 to 1 decision (with Grady dissenting), the court gave black plaintiffs another Senate and House district, arguing that through "packing and fracturing,"⁴⁷ the winnable districts available to Chicago blacks were not commensurate with their city population percentage. Judges Cudahy and Bua concurred with reapportionment experts who stated that minority candidates needed districts with 65 percent minority voters "to have a meaningful opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice."⁴⁸

The court also ratified a settlement between the Hispanic plaintiffs and the commission map makers worked out during the trial. An Hispanic district was strengthened on the northwest side around Humboldt Park, while another winnable Hispanic district was created in the southwest side Pilsen neighborhood.

Overall, Illinois Democrats won a great political and judicial victory: the three-judge panel decided not "to discard the entire commission plan because (only) part of it (was) infected by an unconstitutional purpose to dilute."⁴⁹ In the long run, Judge Grady's vigorous dissent in the black and Hispanic suits may be the most critical result of the 1981-82 reapportionment proceedings. Grady criticized his judicial colleagues for making race the crucial factor in legislative redistricting. He called the decision a "political compromise," not based on any constitutional principle, but on the belief that minorities were entitled to proportional representation. Grady pointed out a contradiction in the plaintiff's arguments for racial integration (tearing down racial walls in the city) and the court's belief that blacks need districts with at least 65 percent minority population in order to win. He argued that "separate but better off" was segregation, and little different from "separate but equal," even if the former might mean increased black representation. Grady advocated a compact and contiguous "color-blind map" that forbids any initial reference to racial or ethnic distribution (though he admitted adjustments might be needed if the map was clearly unfair to minorities.)⁵⁰ In short, Grady raised in his dissent the likely key reapportionment issue for the rest of the century: Will racial district entitlement dominate other legal redistricting questions, thereby making it far more difficult for future map makers to deal with the historical political reapportionment considerations of geography, party, and incumbency?

IX. WHERE WE STAND TODAY - 1987

Legislative redistricting remains the most political act in Illinois politics. Neither reform and revision, nor pressure and publicity, have made this mandated constitutional procedure more democratic or efficient. Partisan advantage is still the name of the game -- be it for an area, a party, an incumbent, or even now for a race. Illinois redistricting is not "political Darwinism" -- the fittest and the smartest have not always survived. Rather, the process has often been reduced to the survival of the luckiest. For example, in 1982 Michael Madigan was called the shrewdest man in Illinois politics, yet a GOP hat victory would have made Madigan a political goat for not protecting key Democratic interests with a compromise map.

Today, as in 1871, the city of Chicago and its power position vis-a-vis the rest of the state continue to dominate the remap debate. However, whereas 116 years ago Chicago was gaining people each decade at a record rate, it now finds itself losing population every ten years at a similar record pace. This population turnaround has changed big city politicians from acting as district "acquirers" to becoming district "preservers."

A final point: the courts and congress have remained active in the field of redistricting throughout the 1980s. Most of the attention has centered on the issue of equitable representation for racial minorities. For example:

1. 1980 - City of Mobile v. Bolden

The U.S. Supreme Court held that intent was the key factor in determining whether a redistricting plan had a discriminatory motivation to violate or limit minority representation.

2. 1982 - Voting Rights Act Amendment

Congress eliminated the crucial Bolden requirement of intent to determine discrimination and replaced it with a results standard. In amending Section 2 of the 1965 and 1973 Voting Rights Act, Congress also mandated that in the future courts are to look at the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the history, openness, and access of minorities and the political process. This law allows the courts to examine the political end (election results) as well as the means (political opportunity) to determine whether a redistricting plan discriminated against minorities.

3. 1984 - Ketchum v. Byrne

The U.S. Court of Appeals overturned the Chicago ward remap based on the amended 1982 Voting Rights Act because it did not grant minority citizens a reasonable and fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.

Looking to 1991, it seems certain that Illinois redistricting practices and procedures must be thoroughly cognizant of recent trends that have so dominated the entire issue of reapportionment.

TABLE 1

Population Breakdown Comparison
1870-1980

	Illinois	Cook County	% of IL Pop. in Cook County	Chicago	% of IL Pop. in Chicago	% of Cook Co. Pop. in Chicago	Growth of Chgo. over preceding census
1870	2,539,891	349,966	14%	298,977	12%	85%	186,805
1880	3,077,871	607,719	20%	503,185	16%	83%	204,208
1890	3,826,352	1,191,922	31%	1,099,850	29%	92%	596,665
1900	4,821,550	1,838,735	38%	1,698,595	35%	92%	598,725
1910	5,638,591	2,405,233	43%	2,185,283	39%	91%	486,708
1920	6,485,280	3,053,017	47%	2,701,705	42%	89%	516,422
1930	7,630,654	3,982,123	52%	3,376,438	44%	85%	674,733
1940	7,897,241	4,063,342	52%	3,396,808	43%	84%	20,370
1950	8,712,176	4,508,792	52%	3,620,962	42%	80%	224,158
1960	10,081,158	5,129,725	51%	3,550,414	35%	69%	- 70,558
1970	11,113,976	5,492,369	49%	3,366,957	30%	61%	-183,447
1980	11,418,461	5,253,190	46%	3,005,072	26%	57%	-361,885

TABLE 2

Cook County-State Population Comparison
to Legislative Representation

Census	Cook County Population	% of IL Pop. in Cook County	Illinois Leg. Districts	Cook Co. Leg. Districts	% of Districts in Cook Co.	% Rep. Diff. to pop. in Cook Co.	Cook Co. Leg. district adjustment needed to balance Pop. & Rep.
1870 Reapportionment 1872	349,996	14%	51	7	14%	0%	0
1880 Reapportionment 1882	607,719	20%	51	10	20%	0%	0
1890 Reapportionment 1893	1,191,922	31%	51	15	29%	-2%	+1
1900 Reapportionment 1901	1,838,735	38%	51	19	37%	-1%	0
1910	2,405,323	43%	51	19	37%	-6%	+3
1920	3,053,017	47%	51	19	37%	-10%	+5
1930	3,982,123	52%	51	19	37%	-14%	+8
1940	4,063,342	52%	51	19	37%	-14%	+8
1950 Reapportionment 1955--Senate House	4,508,792	52%	58 59	24 30	41% 51%	-11% 0%	+6 0
1960 Reapportionment 1965--Senate House	5,129,725	51%	58 59	30 30	52% 51%	+1% 0%	0 0
*1970 Reapportionment 1971	5,492,369	49%	59	30	51%	+2%	-1
**1980 Reapportionment 1982--Senate House	5,253,190	46%	59 118	28 58	48% 49%	+2% +3%	-1 -4

*In 1971 Reapportionment--two Cook County districts overlap into collar counties.

**Due to cutback amendment, 118 House members also 7 legislative (Senate districts) overlap Cook and collars.

TABLE 3

Chicago and Suburban Cook County
Population to Representation Ratio

Census	Chicago Pop.	% of IL pop. in Chicago	Leg. districts in Chicago or predominantly in Chicago & statewide %		Suburban Cook Pop.	% of IL pop. in Sub. Cook	Leg. districts in Sub. Cook & statewide %	
1870	298,977	12%						
Reapportionment 1872-			6	12%	50,989	2%	1	2%
1880	503,185	16%						
Reapportionment 1882			9	18%	104,534	3%	1	2%
1890	1,099,850	29%						
Reapportionment 1901			14	27%	92,072	2%	1	2%
1900	1,698,595	35%						
Reapportionment			18	35%	140,160	3%	1	2%
1910	2,185,283	39%						
			18	35%	219,950	4%	1	2%
1920	2,701,705	42%						
			18	35%	351,312	5%	1	2%
1930	3,376,438	44%						
			18	35%	605,685	8%	1	2%
1940	3,396,808	43%						
			18	35%	666,534	8%	1	2%
1950	3,620,962	42%						
Reapportionment 1955--Senate			18	31%	887,830	10%	6	10%
House			23	39%			7	12%
1960	3,550,414	35%						
Reapportionment 1965--Senate			21	36%	1,579,321	16%	9	16%
House			21	36%			9	15%
1970	3,366,957	30%						
Reapportionment 1971			20	34%	2,125,412	19%	10	17%
1980	3,005,072	26%						
Reapportionment 1982--Senate			19	32%	2,248,118	20%	8	14%
**House			35	30%			19	16%

*The 1982 reapportionment map has so many district overlaps in the Cook County area that it makes any traditional regional analysis almost meaningless.

**Dueto cutback amendment.

Notes

1. Ernest L. Bogart and Charles M. Thompson, Illinois: The Industrial State 1870-1893 (Springfield: Illinois Centennial Commission, 1920), p. 9.
2. Illinois Legislative Council Research Memorandum, November 28, 1980, p. 2.
3. Illinois State Register, March 1, 1901.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Chicago Tribune, May 2, 1901.
10. David Kenney, "Representation in the General Assembly" in Samuel Gove's Con-Con: Issues for the Illinois Constitutional Convention (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 136.
11. Quoted in Neil Garvey's, The Government Administration of Illinois (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1958), p. 65.
12. Charles E. Merriam, Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1929), p. 16.
13. Springfield Journal, July 3, 1955.
14. Chicago Tribune, November 1, 1954. At this time Daley was not Chicago's mayor; in fact, he was gearing for a primary fight against incumbent Democrat Mayor Martin Kennelly.
15. Springfield Journal, May 19, 1954.
16. Ibid., October 17, 1954.
17. Springfield Register, October 17, 1954.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Chicago Tribune, May 21, 1955.
21. Samuel K. Gove, "Reapportionment and Illinois Public Policy," Illinois Business Review, Vol. 23 (March 1966), p. 6.
22. McDowell, The Politics of Reapportionment in Illinois, p. 12.

23. Timothy O'Rourke, The Impact of Reapportionment (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980), p. 22.
24. According to Frederick J. Roberts, the U.S. Supreme Court did not use the expression "one man, one vote" in the Baker v. Carr decision. Rather, the court first used this celebrated phrase one year later in the lesser known case Gray v. Sanders (1963). See Frederick J. Roberts, "An Analytic Review of Underlying Apportionment issues and Some Project Results of the 1980 Illinois Reapportionment" (an unpublished paper presented at the Crossroads '80: Continuity and Change in Illinois Conference, Sangamon State University, Springfield, Illinois, October, 1980), p. 16.
25. McDowell, The Politics of Reapportionment in Illinois, p. 56.
26. Ibid.
27. Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1964.
28. Ibid.
29. McDowell, The Politics of Reapportionment in Illinois, p. 56.
30. Springfield Journal, December 1, 1965.
31. The suburban 5 1/2 is all Cook County outside Chicago and the surrounding counties of Lake, McHenry, Kane, DuPage, and Will.
32. Under the old 1870 constitution, voters could split their ballot on choosing the state's governor and lieutenant governor. The 1970 constitution abolished this practice by placing both offices together on the same ballot line and thereby forcing voters to vote for the same party in gubernatorial and lieutenant governor contests.
33. Charles N. Wheeler, "Reapportionment Begins Now," Illinois Issues (August 1978), p. 9.
34. In 1972 the Nixon landslide would help give Republican Edward Scholl a Senate victory in the northwest side 16th district. However Watergate and Democrat Robert Egan ended this political aberration by returning the seat back to the Democrats.
35. One could make a strong case that the second district was not a truly suburban Cook legislative district. Though Cook County residents make up the largest single block of voters, the district's collar county constituents have a majority of the vote. The second consists of parts of Cook, DuPage, Kane and Lake counties.
36. To understand the recent impact of race on Chicago and Illinois politics, one need only look at past population figures. In 1910 Illinois had only a little over 100,000 blacks, and most of them were strongly massed in far southern Illinois. Cairo, on the state's southern tip, was over one-third black, but in no other city in the state did blacks make up over 10 percent of the population. Racially, Chicago was typical of the rest of Illinois, yet because of its huge European immigrant population the city suffered severe discrimination in state government. Perhaps Chicago's vast population in relation to the rest of the state would have made it a target for downstate prejudice and fear no matter who lived there, but unquestionably anti-Chicago feelings were increased because of the city's population makeup.

37. State Journal-Register, June 30, 1981.
38. Arlington Heights Daily Herald, September 3, 1981.
39. Chicago Tribune, October 6, 1981
40. The State Journal-Register, October 4, 1981.
41. The seven legislative district regions are:
 1. Chicago
 2. Chicago-suburban Cook overlap
 3. Suburban Cook
 4. Suburban Cook-collar county overlap
 5. Collar county
 6. Collar county-downstate overlap
 7. Downstate
42. Southtown Economist, October 11, 1981.
43. State Journal-Register, October 12, 1981.
44. Chicago Tribune, October 26, 1981. Newhouse's numbers meant a probable increase of two black members in each chamber over what the commission map offered.
45. *Ibid.*, October 20, 1981.
46. Chester J. Rybicki v. The State Board of Elections of the State of Illinois, Memorandum opinion, January 12, 1982, p. 36. (Hereinafter noted as memorandum opinion). The federal court accepted the state supreme court's analysis of the compact and contiguous issue by adopting the latter's interpretation and very language concerning a district's compactness. The state court's decision, Schrage v. State Board of Elections No. 55661 (Ill. Sup. Ct. November 25, 1981) found fault with only the previously mentioned 89th district. Thus, in retrospect, perhaps state Representative McClain was very shrewd in "starting the ball rolling" in his friendly lawsuit.
47. Packing was defined as concentrating blacks in one or more districts so that they constituted an overwhelming majority in those districts. Fracturing meant unnecessarily splitting a geographically unified number of black residents between a number of districts.
48. Memorandum opinion, p. 76.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
50. On the black suit, Grady did partially concur with Cudahy and Bua's view that the commission intentionally diluted black voting strength on the south side. However, he vigorously differed with their decision concerning west side districts because of his general philosophical disagreement with the manner in which the racial issue was viewed by his judicial colleagues.