「フィリッパ・フット」の版間の差分
削除された内容 追加された内容
LightgrayShips2015 (会話 | 投稿記録) |
とりあえず途中まで改訳。en:Philoppa Foot 22:19, 26 July 2012 を翻訳のため転記、翻訳。しばらく対訳方式にします。訂正歓迎 |
||
1行目:
{{翻訳中途|1=[http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Philippa_Foot&oldid=
{{Infobox_哲学者
<!-- 分野 -->
19 ⟶ 18行目:
|特記すべき概念 = [[トロッコ問題]]、 [[徳倫理学]]|
}}
'''フィリッパ・ルース・フット'''（Philippa Ruth Foot、旧姓Bosanquet、[[1920年]][[10月3日]]-[[2010年]][[10月3日]]<ref>{{citenews|url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/05/philippa-foot-obituary|title=Philippa Foot obituary|publisher=[[The Guardian]]|date=5 October 2010}}</ref>）は[[イギリス]]の[[哲学者]]。[[倫理学]]分野における業績で著名。
今日の[[徳倫理学]]を築いたうちの一人と目されている。[[1950年代]]・[[1960年代]]の研究とそれ以降では立場に大きな違いがあり、後年は[[アリストテレス]]の[[倫理学]]を現代に復活させ、それが現代社会の問題に対しても適応可能であり、[[義務論]]や[[功利主義]]といった現代持て囃されている倫理学説にも対抗しうるものであることを示そうと試みたものと捉える事が出来る。また特に[[帰結主義]]を批判して、[[分析哲学]]の内に[[規範倫理学]]を再び打ち立てようとした研究も非常に重要である。よく知られた例はいわゆる「[[トロッコ問題]]」であり、この問題については今も議論が続けられている。フットの方法論には後期[[ウィトゲンシュタイン]]の影響が見てとれるが、ウィトゲンシュタインによって扱われた題材をそのまま取り上げることはほとんどなかった。
'''Philippa Ruth Foot''' (née '''Bosanquet'''; 3 October 1920 – 3 October 2010<ref>{{citenews|url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/05/philippa-foot-obituary|title=Philippa Foot obituary|publisher=[[The Guardian]]|date=5 October 2010}}</ref>) was a [[United Kingdom|British]] [[Philosophy|philosopher]], most notable for her works in [[ethics]]. She was one of the founders of contemporary [[virtue ethics]]. Her later career marked a significant change in view from her work in the 1950s and 1960s, and may be seen as an attempt to modernize [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] ethical theory, to show that it is adaptable to a contemporary world view, and thus, that it could compete with such popular theories as modern [[deontology|deontological]] and [[utilitarianism|utilitarian]] ethics. Some of her work was crucial in the re-emergence of [[normative ethics]] within [[analytic philosophy]], especially her critique of [[consequentialism]]. A familiar example is the continuing discussion of an example of hers referred to as the [[trolley problem]]. Foot's approach was influenced by the later work of [[Wittgenstein]], although she rarely dealt explicitly with materials treated by him.
母の[[エスター・クリーブランド]]は、[[アメリカ合衆国大統領]]を務めた[[グロバー・クリーブランド]]の娘であり、エスターは[[ホワイトハウス]]で生まれた。父方の祖父は1900年から1917年まで[[ロンドン上級弁護士]]を務めた[[フレデリック・アルバート・ボーザンケト]]卿。
Foot was the daughter of [[Esther Cleveland]] (who was born in the [[White House]]), and a granddaughter of U.S. President [[Grover Cleveland]]. Her paternal grandfather was Sir [[Frederick Albert Bosanquet]], the [[Common Serjeant of London]] from 1900 to 1917.
[[オックスフォード大学]][[サマーヴィル・カレッジ]]の学生として哲学の勉強を始める。後、[[チューター]]。当時繰り返し行った[[エリザベス・アンスコム]]との議論を通じて、[[非認知主義]]の誤りを悟る。
Foot began her career in philosophy as a student and tutor at [[Somerville College, Oxford|Somerville College]], [[Oxford University|Oxford]]. She spent many hours there in debate with [[G.E.M. Anscombe]], who persuaded her that [[non-cognitivism]] was misguided.
[[カリフォルニア大学ロサンゼルス校]]哲学科でGriffin Professorを長い間務めた。
For many years Foot held the position of Griffin Professor of Philosophy at the [[University of California, Los Angeles]].
[[オックスファム]]創立メンバーの一人で、[[無神論者]]<ref>[http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hrp/issues/2003/Foot.pdf Foot.pdf]</ref>。
歴史家の[[マイケル・リチャード・ダニエル・フット]]と結婚、後に離婚<ref>{{cite journal|last=Eilenberg|first=Susan|title=With A, then B, then C|journal=London Review of Books|volume=24|issue=17|date=5 September 2002|pages=3–8}}</ref>。
She was one of the founders of [[Oxfam]] and an atheist.[http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hrp/issues/2003/Foot.pdf]
She was at one time married to the historian [[M. R. D. Foot]].<ref>{{cite journal|last=Eilenberg|first=Susan|title=With A, then B, then C|journal=London Review of Books|volume=24|issue=17|date=5 September 2002|pages=3–8}}</ref>
== 非認知主義批判 ==
フットの1950年代後半の仕事を一言でいうと[[メタ倫理学]]といえる。すなわち道徳的判断や道徳的談話の地位に関する研究である。当時の代表的な論文は「道徳的論証」''Moral Arguments''および「道徳的信念」''Moral Beliefs''であり、前世代が行った倫理学理論への分析的アプローチの非認知主義的規則を覆した。
Foot's works of the late 1950s were [[meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] in character: that is, they pertained to the status of moral judgment and speech. The essays ''Moral Arguments'' and ''Moral Beliefs'', in particular, were crucial in overturning the rule of [[non-cognitivism]] in analytic approaches to ethical theory in the preceding decades.
非認知主義アプローチは古くは例えば[[デイヴィッド・ヒューム]]にも見られるが、[[アルフレッド・エイヤー]]、[[チャールズ・スティーブンソン]]、[[リチャード・マーヴィン・ヘア]]らによって分析的に定式化されたことで有名になった。これらの論者はよい／わるい、正しい／誤っているといったいわゆる「厚い倫理的概念」に注目し、こうした概念は当該の事柄の正しい何かについて主張するために用いられているわけではなくて、情動ないし（ヘアの場合）規範を表明するために用いられている。
The non-cognitivist approach may already be found, e.g. in [[David Hume|Hume]], but it was given its most influential analytic formulations in works of [[Alfred Ayer|A. J. Ayer]], [[C. L. Stevenson]], and [[R. M. Hare]]. These writers focused on so-called 'thin ethical concepts' such as "good" and "bad" and "right" and "wrong", arguing that they are not employed to affirm something true of the thing in question, but rather, to express an emotion or (in Hare's case) an imperative.
この種の「厚い」倫理的概念の分析は、それよりも具体性ないし「厚さ」の点で勝る卑劣、残忍、貪欲といった概念について特殊な切り分けを行う説明と関連している。それらの概念は、非認知的で「評価的」な要素を、明白で「単に記述的」な要素に結びつけていると考えられる。
This sort of analysis of 'thin" ethical concepts was tied to a special partitioning account of more concrete or "thick" concepts, such as "cowardly", 'cruel", or "gluttonous": these were supposed to combine a non-cognitive "evaluative" element with the obvious, "merely descriptive" element.
フットはこの区別を批判し、厚い概念というものの基礎をなす説明を問題にしようと考えた。道徳的判断の認知的で真理評価可能であるという性質を独特の仕方で擁護しようとして、[[合理性]]や[[道徳性]]を正面から論じたという点で、彼女の論文は非常に重要である。
Foot's purpose was to criticize this distinction and the underlying account of thin concepts. Because of the particular way she approached the defense of the cognitive and truth-evaluable character of moral judgment, these essays were crucial in bringing the question of the [[rationality]] of [[morality]] to the fore.
「厚い」倫理的概念を伴う実際的考慮（「でもひどいよねえ」「そりゃだめだわ」「それは彼女のだ」「しないって約束したんだ」）によって人々は他ではないある仕方で行動するよう仕向けられるが、それらは記述的であるという点では人生に関係する他の判断と変わるところはない。「火曜日には終わるだろう」とか「それにはだいたいペンキ3箱は必要だ」といった推論との違いは、事実に基づかない態度表目有為の「道徳的」要素が混じっているからではなくて、人間には卑劣なことや残忍なことをしない理由があるという事実によるものである。
Practical considerations involving "thick" ethical concepts – ''but it would be cruel'', ''it would be cowardly'', ''it's hers'', or ''I promised her I wouldn't'' – move people to act one way rather than another, but they are as descriptive as any other judgment pertaining to human life. They differ from thought such as ''it would be done on a Tuesday'' or ''it would take about three gallons of paint'', not by the admixture of any non-factual, attitude-expressing "moral" element, but by the fact that human beings have reasons not to do things that are cowardly or cruel.
フットはこの問題をライフワークとしており、すべての時期の著作で取り上げている。[[プラトン]]の対話篇に登場する非道徳家カリクレスやトラシュマコス、また[[フリードリヒ・ニーチェ|ニーチェ]]を繰り返し論じる中でもこの問題が取り上げられることがある。
Her lifelong devotion to this question appears in all periods of her work. It may be found in her continuing discussion of the [[Plato]]nic immoralists, [[Callicles]] and [[Thrasymachus]], and of [[Nietzsche]].
== The rationality of morality ==
=== "Why be moral?" – early works ===
It is on this question
=== "Why be moral?" – middle works ===
Fifteen years later, in the essay
the fact that we have nothing to say in proof of the irrationality of at least some unjust people should not alarm us in our own defense and cultivation of justice and benevolence: "it did not strike the citizens of Leningrad that their devotion to the city and its people during the terrible years of the siege was contingent".
=== "Why be moral?" – later work ===
Her book, ''Natural Goodness'', attempts a different line. The question, what we have most reason to do, is tied to the idea of the good working of practical reason. This, in turn, is tied to the idea of the species of an animal as providing a measure of good and bad in the operations of its parts and faculties. Just as one has to know what kind of animal one is dealing with in order, for instance, to decide whether its eyesight is good or bad, the question of whether a subject's practical reason is well developed, depends on the kind of animal it is. (This idea is developed in the light of a conception of animal kinds or species as implicitly containing "evaluative" content, which may be criticized on contemporary biological grounds; although it is arguable, even on that basis, that it is very deeply entrenched in human cognition.) In our case, what makes for a well-constituted practical reason, depends on the fact that we are human beings characterized by certain possibilities of emotion and desire, a certain anatomy, neurological organization, and so forth.
Once this step is made, it becomes possible to argue for the rationality of moral considerations in a new way. Humans begin with the conviction that justice is a genuine virtue. Thus, the conviction that the well-constituted human practical reason operates with considerations of justice, means that ''taking account of other people in that sort of way'' is "how human beings live together." (The thought that this is how they live must be understood in a sense that is compatible with the fact that actual individuals often do not – just as dentists understand the thought that "human beings have n teeth" in a way that is compatible with many people having fewer). There is nothing incoherent in the thought that practical calculation that takes account of others and their good might characterize some kind of rational and social animal.
▲== 業績 ==
Similarly, of course, there is nothing incoherent in the idea of a form of rational life within which such considerations are alien; where they can only be imposed by damaging and disturbing the individual person. There is nothing analytic about the rationality of justice and benevolence. Rather, human conviction that justice is a virtue and that considerations of justice are genuine reasons for action, is the conviction that the kind of rational being that we are, namely, human beings, is of the first type. There is no reason to think such a kind of rational animality is impossible, so there is no reason to suspect that considerations of justice are frauds.
▲It is on this question - the "why be moral?" question (which for her may be said to divide into the questions "why be just?", "why be temperate?" etc.) - that her doctrine underwent a surprising series of reversals. In "Moral Beliefs" she had argued that the received virtues - courage, temperance, justice and so on - are rationally cultivated, and that it was thus rational to act in accordance with them. The "thick" ethical concepts she emphasized (without using this expression) in her defense of the cognitive character of moral judgment were associated with such rationally-cultivated traits, i.e. virtues; this is how they differ from randomly chosen descriptions of action. The crucial point was that the difference between "just action" and "action performed on Tuesday" (for example) was not a matter of "emotive" meaning, as in Ayer and Stevenson, or a secret imperatival feature, as in Hare.
Of course, it might be suggested that this is precisely not the case, that human beings are of the second kind, and thus that the justice and benevolence we esteem are artificial and false. Foot would hold that considerations of machismo and lady-likeness are artificial and false; they are matters of "mere convention," which tend to put one off of the main things. That being how it is with justice, was the position of the Platonic "immoralists" Callicles and Thrasymachus, and that being how it is with benevolence, was the view of [[Nietzsche]].
▲Fifteen years later, in the essay "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" she took this back when it came to justice and benevolence, that is, the virtues that especially regard other people. Though everyone has reason to cultivate courage, temperance and prudence whatever he or she desires or values, still, the rationality of just and benevolent acts must, she thinks, turn on contingent motivations. Though many found the thesis shocking, on her (then) account, it is meant to be in a certain respect inspiring: in a famous reversal of a remark of Kant, she says that "we are not conscripts in the army of virtue, but volunteers"; the fact that we have nothing to say in proof of the irrationality of at least some unjust people, should not alarm us in our own defense and cultivation of justice and benevolence: "it did not strike the citizens of Stalingrad that their devotion to the city and its people during the terrible years of the siege was contingent".
In the case of Callicles and Nietzsche, this apparently is to be shown by claiming that justice and benevolence, respectively, can be inculcated only by warping the emotional apparatus of the individual. Foot's book ends by attempting to defuse the evidence Nietzsche brings against what might be called, the common sense position. She proceeds by accepting his basic premise that a way of life that can only be inculcated by damaging the individual's passions, filling one with remorse, resentment, and so forth, is not true. She employs exactly the Nietzschean form of argument against certain forms of femininity, for example, or exaggerated forms of acceptance of etiquette. Justice and benevolence, she claims, however, "suit" human beings, and there is no reason to accept the critique of Callicles or Nietzsche in this case.
==Death==
Foot died on 3 October 2010, her 90th birthday.
== 代表的著作 ==
| |||