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第一次台湾海峡危機

出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)』

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第一次台湾海峡危機

台湾海峡
1954年9月3日-1955年5月1日
(7ヶ月4週間)
場所台湾海峡
結果 中華人民共和国撤退、従前のまま、中華民国アメリカ合衆国米華相互防衛条約
衝突した勢力
中華民国の旗 中華民国
アメリカ合衆国の旗 アメリカ合衆国
中華人民共和国の旗 中華人民共和国
指揮官
中華民国の旗 劉玉章英語版 中華人民共和国の旗 彭徳懐
中華人民共和国の旗 徐向前

第一次台湾海峡危機1954年-1955年台湾海峡危機台湾危機沖合群島危機1955年台湾海峡危機とも呼ばれる)は、中華人民共和国政府と中華民国政府の間で起きた短期の戦争である。中華人民共和国は大陳群島英語版を封じながら江山島英語版を襲撃した。アメリカ合衆国海軍と中華民国海軍は、大陳群島から台湾に中華民国の軍民を避難させるのに共同作戦を行った。大陳群島は危機の間に領有権を奪われたが、アメリカの報道は、殆ど度々砲の打合いが行われた金門県馬祖島にのみ焦点が当てられた。

国共内戦蒋介石中国国民党政府と130万の支援者が中国大陸にいられなくなり台湾島に政府を移しながら1949年に収束に向かった。西部と南西部で交戦が続いていたとはいえ、中華民国の支配する領域は、台湾、澎湖県、中国南東部の沿岸沿いの数個の島々に殆ど限られた。海南島は1950年に中国に陥落し、舟山市の島々は、第一次台湾海峡危機以前の1950年5月に国民党の手で奪還された。

台湾本土と中国大陸の間の台湾海峡に位置する馬祖島と金門県は、中国共産党に対する国民党の第一線であり、蒋介石の手で大いに強化された。浙江省沖の島々は、大陸に反攻する足掛かりと見られ、蒋介石の出身地の減少する地元政府が存在した。

紛争

アメリカ合衆国ハリー・S・トルーマン大統領は1950年1月5日に米国は台湾海峡に関するいかなる紛争にも関わることはなく中華人民共和国の攻撃があっても介入することはないとする「台湾不干渉声明」を発表した[1]。しかし1950年6月25日に朝鮮戦争が勃発すると、トルーマンは「台湾海峡の中立化」はアメリカ合衆国にとって最大の関心事であると表明し、事実上アメリカの保護下に台湾を置きながら中華民国と中華人民共和国の紛争を防ぐ為に台湾海峡にアメリカ海軍第7艦隊を派遣した。

1950年6月27日にトルーマン大統領は以下のコメントを発表した。[2]

"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. "Accordingly, I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The 7th Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."

President Truman later ordered John Foster Dulles, the Foreign Policy Advisor to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, to carry out his decision on neutralizing Taiwan in drafting the Treaty of San Francisco of 1951 (the peace treaty with Japan), which excluded the participation of both the ROC and the PRC. No recipient was specified in the treaty of Taiwan's sovereignty, which supporters of Taiwan independence have used to argue for their position.[3] According to the author George H. Kerr, a supporter of Taiwanese independence, in his book Formosa Betrayed, the political status of Taiwan was under the trust of the Allied Powers (against Japan). It would be the responsibility of the United Nations if this could not be resolved in near future as designed in the peace treaty.

The Nationalist Chinese Government maintained as its goal the recovery of control of mainland China, and this required a resumption of the military confrontation with the Red Chinese. Truman and his advisors regarded that goal as unrealizable, but regrets over losing China to international communism was quite prominent in public opinion at the time, and the Truman Administration was criticized by anticommunists for preventing any attempt by Chiang Kai-shek's forces to liberate mainland China.

Truman, a member of the Democratic Party did not run for reelection in the presidential election of 1952, even though he was eligible to do so. This election was won by the Republican Dwight Eisenhower, a World War II general.

On February 2, 1953, the new President lifted the Seventh Fleet's blockade in order to fulfill demands by anticommunists to "unleash Chiang Kai-shek" on mainland China.

In August 1954, the Nationalists placed 58,000 troops on Quemoy and 15,000 troops on Matsu. The ROC began building defensive structures and the PRC began shelling ROC installations on Quemoy. Zhou Enlai, Premier of the People's Republic of China responded with a declaration on August 11, 1954, that Taiwan must be "liberated." He dispatched the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to the area, and it began shelling both Quemoy and the Matsu Islands.

Despite warnings from the U.S. against any attacks on the Republic of China; five days before the signing of the Manila pact, the PLA unleashed a heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy on September 3, and intensified its actions in November by bombing the Tachen Islands. This renewed Cold War fears of Communist expansion in Asia at a time when the PRC was not recognized by the United States Department of State. Chiang Kai Shek's government was supported by the United States because the ROC was part of the Containment of Communism which stretched from a devastated South Korea to an increasingly divided Southeast Asia.

On September 12, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the use of nuclear weapons against mainland China.[要出典] Eisenhower, however, resisted pressure to use nuclear weapons or involve American troops in the conflict. However, on December 2, 1954, the United States and the ROC agreed to the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, which did not apply to islands along the Chinese mainland. This treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on February 9, 1955.

After two failed attempts, the PLA seized the Yijiangshan Islands on January 18, 1955. Fighting continued in nearby islands off the coast of Zhejiang, as well as around Quemoy and the Matsu Islands in Fujian. On January 29, 1955, the Formosa Resolution was approved by both houses of the U.S. Congress authorizing Eisenhower to use U.S. forces to defend the ROC and its possessions in the Taiwan Strait against armed attack.

In February, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill warned the U.S. against using nuclear weapons, but in March, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated publicly that the U.S. was seriously considering a nuclear strike. In response, the NATO foreign ministers warned at a meeting of the alliance against such action. In late March, U.S. Admiral Robert B. Carney said that Eisenhower is planning "to destroy Red China's military potential."

Aftermath

Some scholarsTemplate:Who? have argued that the PRC backed down in the face of American nuclear brinksmanship and in light of the lack of willingness by the Soviet Union to threaten nuclear retaliation for an attack on the PRC. OthersTemplate:Who? see the case as an example of effective application of extended deterrence by the United States. In any case, the Red Chinese government stated on April 23, 1955, that it was willing to negotiate. On May 1 the PLA temporarily ceased shelling Quemoy and Matsu. The fundamental issues of the conflict remained unresolved, however, and both sides subsequently built up their military forces on their respective sides of the Taiwan Strait leading to a new crisis three years later. There are strong indicationsTemplate:Says who? that Mao used the crisis in order to provoke the United States into making nuclear threats. Other scholarsTemplate:Who? have argued that Mao and the Soviet leadership carefully pursued a limited aims strategy to boost morale and for domestic political gain by seizing the Dachens and had no intention to escalate the conflict with the United States.

関連項目

読み物

  • Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007). A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America. Wiley. ISBN 0-471-98677-1
  • Bush, R. (2006). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1290-1
  • Carpenter, T. (2006). America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1-4039-6841-1
  • Cole, B. (2006). Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-36581-3
  • Copper, J. (2006). Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan. Praeger Security International General Interest. ISBN 0-275-98888-0
  • Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
  • Gill, B. (2007). Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-3146-9
  • Shirk, S. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-530609-0
  • Tsang, S. (2006). If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-40785-0
  • Tucker, N.B. (2005). Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-13564-5

参照

外部リンク