Attachments
Summary
The provinces of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mai-Ndombe Province were affected by episodes of intense violence. In the context of ongoing armed violence and political tensions, the organization of upcoming general elections scheduled for 20 December 2023 was negatively impacted. The Group remained concerned that the electoral process might further trigger violence.
The humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to deteriorate, in particular in North Kivu, Ituri and Mai Ndombe Provinces. The number of internally displaced persons reached nearly 7 million across the country, the highest number ever recorded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and one of the largest internal displacement crises in the world.
The armed conflict in Mai-Ndombe Province extended into the neighbouring provinces, including Kinshasa Province, leaving hundreds of civilians dead and hundreds of villages, schools and medical facilities destroyed. Both the Teke and Yaka communities remained armed and mobilized. Captured or surrendered Mobondo combatants were conscripted into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), trained and sent to North Kivu to fight the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23).
In Ituri Province, intercommunity dialogues aimed at curbing rampant violence failed. The armed group Coopérative pour le développement du Congo/Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais (CODECO-URDPC) increased attacks on civilians, including at internally displaced persons camps. The Zaïre armed group, still opposed to all peace initiatives, continued to arm and train its combatants.
In North Kivu and Ituri, the intensification of Operation Shuja against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continued to impact the sanctioned armed group. However,
ADF remained resilient, adapting its strategies and tactics, including through increased attacks in Uganda.
In the context of the struggle to “liberate” territories from the grip of “foreign” armed groups, such as M23, Congolese armed groups adopted the Wazalendo or “true patriots” banner to gain legitimacy and better position themselves for possible future integration within FARDC.
In North Kivu, all parties to the conflict breached the ceasefire agreement. The newly created and Government-sponsored armed group coalition Volontaires pour la défense de la Patrie (VDP) triggered a flareup of violence. Heavy fighting resumed between M23, supported by the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) and FARDC supported by VDP, Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), private military companies and Force de défense nationale du Burundi (FDNB) troops. Civilians belonging to all communities found themselves in the crosshairs of the different parties to the conflict, exposed to retaliation and forced to flee.
Indiscriminate shelling, kidnappings and targeted assassinations were committed by both sides.
Special forces of the Republican Guard killed over 57 unarmed demonstrators in Goma, following rumours they had been infiltrated by M23.
In South Kivu, the M23 crisis had an impact on armed group dynamics, in particular in its northern territories. Armed groups tried to benefit from their Wazalendo status to further recruit, expand their influence and conduct criminal activities. Combatants of several Raia Mutomboki factions and Mai-Mai Kirikicho reached North Kivu to fight M23. In parallel, the collaboration between Twirwaneho and M23 was confirmed.
Armed groups and criminal networks continued to be involved in the exploitation and trade of natural resources. In Rubaya, Wazalendo armed groups controlled sites within the main exploitation perimeters, thus compromising the tin, tantalum and tungsten supply chain. The mining ban imposed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was not respected, and the supply chain was contaminated by minerals whose exploitation benefited these Wazalendo groups.
Primera Gold DRC continued to boost official gold exports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, there were important shortcomings in the implementation of the company’s due diligence obligations, notably relating to the origin of traded gold.
Acts of defiance towards mining officials could impact the fight against gold smuggling, which continued, notably owing to prefinancing involving moneylaundering by individuals and regional/international networks.