Nosebreak-attacking honeynets

M Dornseif, T Holz, CN Klein - … from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC …, 2004 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
M Dornseif, T Holz, CN Klein
Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC Information Assurance …, 2004ieeexplore.ieee.org
It is usually assumed that honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable
them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a
method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any
substantial logging taking place.
It is usually assumed that honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial logging taking place.
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