Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XIX

National Security Policy

United States Government Printing Office

Washington

U.S. Department of State

Office of the Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

This ebook was generated on May 29, 2018.

Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page  to access updates.

About the Electronic Edition

The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State has embarked on a program to release an ebook edition of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which was established in 1861. Far lighter and more portable than printed editions of FRUS, the ebook edition offers the full content of each volume and makes use of the full-text search and other reading features of most ebook devices and applications, including bookmarking and note-taking. Unlike the web-based edition of FRUS, the ebook edition, once downloaded, can be accessed even without internet connectivity.

In creating the FRUS ebook edition, we endeavored to maintain fidelity with the original printed edition. One challenge in this respect is representing original page numbers from printed editions in ebooks. For readers who need to cite material in this ebook, we recommend citing document numbers instead of page numbers, since document numbers are persistent, media-neutral identifiers. In older FRUS volumes (before the subseries covering the Johnson administration), where cross references use page numbers rather than document numbers, we append to each page number a bracketed list of the document numbers that correspond to it.

The Office of the Historian has worked to ensure that this ebook is error-free and works on a broad range of devices. Please email history_ebooks@state.gov with any feedback.

To learn about updates to this ebook, other ebooks, and the ebook initiative in general, visit our ebooks homepage , and follow us on Twitter at @HistoryAtState  and Tumblr at HistoryAtState .

Office of the Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of State

May 2018

Contents

Preface

List of Sources

List of Abbreviations

List of Persons

United States National Security Policy

Basic National Security Policy; Estimates of Threats to the National Security; Military Posture, Strategy, and Weapons Development; Missile Programs; Scientific and Technological Capabilities; Concern for Continental and Civil Defense; Status of Overseas Bases; Defense Budget; Coordination of Military, Economic, Political, Ideological, and Psychological Programs; Organization for National Security (Documents 1-174)

Index

Errata

Preface

The publication Foreign Relations of the United States constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925:

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.

b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification: in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, Volume XIX

The focus of the volume is policy formulation and decisionmaking on national security issues in the foreign affairs community in Washington. The editors selected documents on the basis of their importance in elucidating the review and formulation of U.S. national security policies. These policies included basic national security doctrine, the U.S. missile program, and other scientific and technological developments to deter war and to reduce U.S. vulnerability in the event of surprise attack. The editors also sought to include estimates of probable popular reactions to nuclear war and of destruction and casualties in the event of general war, responses to local aggression, limited war, internal subversion, and civil defense.

Very few documents concern diplomatic negotiations or reporting from abroad. Arms control and atomic energy are also national security issues, but documentation on these subjects, including disarmament talks in Europe, is contained in Volume XX, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy. The political-military capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, which U.S. policymakers perceived as an omnipresent threat to the security interests of the United States and its allies, receive considerable attention in this volume, but national security issues pertaining primarily to other countries or regions are treated in geographical volumes in this series.

Documents on national security questions usually involved or were prepared for high-level officials in the Eisenhower administration, especially the Secretary of State and the President. Occasionally, records documenting lower-level exchanges and discussions were selected to provide more complete coverage of key subject areas.

The major decisions on national security questions were made by President Eisenhower, usually after recommendations from and discussion in the National Security Council (NSC). The most important Presidential records are the relevant White House files at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, to which the editors had complete access. The Eisenhower Library contains, among other important collections, the memoranda of discussion at the NSC meetings, usually prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary S. Everett Gleason, and the memoranda of conferences with the President, prepared by the President’s Staff Secretary, Andrew J. Goodpaster.

The Department of State’s collections of NSC papers and correspondence are also of the highest value. Some of these documents are available in the central (decimal) files and lot (office) files deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C. Later Department records will be transferred to NARA and made available for scholarly research. NSC materials located in NARA include the numbered NSC papers and related documentation.

Because White House and Department of State records contain many significant Department of Defense documents, the editors did not seek further access to the Department of Defense files. The editors perused the official papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the manuscript collections of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Admiral Arthur M. Radford, and General Nathan F. Twining.

The 174 documents printed in this volume furnish an accurate and comprehensive record of basic U.S. national security policy doctrine. To supplement the documents published here, the editors have identified or cited in the annotation many additional documents from the large body of records on U.S. national security policy. Footnotes, for instance, summarize documents that space limitations prevented from publishing, and editorial notes describe other important record collections. In addition to providing readers with a more complete context for the issues, these editorial devices will assist scholars who are interested in undertaking additional research to learn more about the complexities and nuances of the policymaking process on national security matters.

Some documents originally selected for inclusion in the volume could not be declassified. In particular, documents in the subject areas of nuclear weapons and “finished intelligence”, which comprise interagency analyses of a wide range of national security-related subjects, were withheld in whole or in part. The editors have referenced denied and excised documents in bracketed insertions in the texts of the documents or in the annotation. The exclusions have obviously restricted the coverage of a few subjects, but the editors are confident that the excisions do not compromise the fundamental accuracy of the volume.

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, in particular David Haight; the National Archives and Records Administration; the Department of Defense; and other specialized repositories who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Editorial Methodology

The documents in the volume are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversations are placed according to the time and. date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the Editor in Chief and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an omission in roman type. Brackets are also used to indicate text that has been omitted because it deals with an unrelated subject or because it remained classified after the declassification review process. The amount of material not declassified has been quantified by noting the number of words, lines of source text, or pages of source text that were omitted. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document’s source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or Secretary of State read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in this volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs of participants and other first-hand accounts has been used where possible to supplement the official record.

Declassification Review Procedures

Declassification review of the documents selected for publication was conducted by the Division of Historical Documents Review, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State. The review was made in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the criteria established in Executive Order 12356 regarding:

1) military plans, weapons, or operations;

2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;

3) foreign government information;

4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;

5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;

6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;

7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

8) cryptology; and

9) a confidential source.

Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State and of other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and communication with foreign governments regarding documents of those governments. The principle of declassification review is to release as much information as is consistent with contemporary requirements of national security and sound foreign relations.

William Klingaman, David S. Patterson, and Ilana Stern compiled this volume under the supervision of Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Neal H. Petersen provided initial planning and direction. Rosa Pace assisted with the preparation of the lists of sources, names, and abbreviations. Rita M. Baker of the Editing Division of the Historian’s Office performed the technical editing. Barbara A. Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief) oversaw production of the volume. Catherine Dettmar of Editorial Experts, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia, prepared the index.

William Z. Slany

The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

List of Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

1. Indexed Central Files. Documents from the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1955–1957 are indicated by a decimal file number in the first footnote. Among the most useful of these files in the preparation of this volume were 110.12–HE, 711.5, 740.5, and 741.5.

2. Lot Files. Reviewed much more extensively than the central files were the lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

INR Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

INR Files: Lot 58 D 776

Miscellaneous files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the years 1946–1957.

INR–NIE Files

Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates, retained by the Directorate for Regional Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for 1955.

PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for 1956.

PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957–1961.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148

Miscellaneous files concerning subjects considered by the National Security Council during the years 1949–1962, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947–1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171

Restricted data files maintained by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1957–1967.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Papers of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959, including General Memoranda of Conversation, Meetings with the President, General Telephone Conversations, and White House Telephone Conversations. Dulles was Secretary of State, 1953–1959.

Hagerty Papers

Papers of James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, 1953–1961.

Herter Papers

Papers of Christian A. Herter, 1957–1961. Herter was Under Secretary of State, 1957–1959, and Secretary of State, 1959–1961.

National Security Council Staff Records

Disaster File.

President’s Daily Appointments

Records of the appointments of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–1961.

Project “CleanUp”

Project “Clean Up” collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, Henry R. McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1953–1961.

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records

Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray), 1952–1961.

Staff Secretary Records

Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary (Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell), 1952–1961.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, as maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administration Series, and the International File.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

JCS Records

National Archives Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NSC Records

National Archives Record Group 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Twining Papers

Papers of General Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 1955–1957, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957–1960.

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Burke Papers

Papers of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, 1955–1961.

Radford Papers

Papers of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953–1957.

Published Sources

Official Documentary Collections

U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin, vols. XXXII–XXXVII. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955–1957.

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, 1956, and 1957. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958 and 1959.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Organizing for National Security: Inquiry of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate. 3 vols. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.

Memoirs, Autobiographies, Diaries

Note: The publications listed below were consulted at the time this volume was prepared in 1978, 1979, and 1980. The Department of State takes no responsibility for their accuracy nor endorses their interpretation of the events.

Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration. New York: Harper, 1961.

Berding, Andrew Henry Thomas. Dulles on Diplomacy. Princeton, N.J.: P. Van Norstrand, 1965.

———. The Making of Foreign Policy. Washington: Potomac Books, 1966.

Cutler, Robert. No Time For Rest. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years. Mandate for Change, 1953–1956. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963.

———. The White House Years. Waging Peace, 1956–1961. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.

Hughes, Emmet John. The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years. New York: Atheneum, 1963.

Jurika, Stephen, Jr. From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, 1980.

Killian, James R., Jr. Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977.

Larson, Arthur. Eisenhower: The President Nobody Knew. New York: Charles Scribners, 1968.

Strauss, Lewis L. Men and Decisions. New York: Doubleday, 1962.

List of Abbreviations

A, airgram; Army

AEC, Atomic Energy Commission

AEW, Aircraft early warning; airborne electronic warfare

AF, Air Force

ASM, air-to-surface missile

BOMARC, Boeing-Michigan Aeronautical Test Center missile; U.S. Air Force surface-to-air delta winged area defense missile

CEA, Council of Economic Advisers

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic

CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCONAD, Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command

CONAD, Continental Air Defense Command

CW, chemical warfare; chemical warhead

DEW, distant early warning

DOD, Department of Defense

ECM, electronic countermeasures

EDC, European Defense Community

ELINT, electronic intelligence

EUR/RPM, Office of Regional Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCDA, Federal Civil Defense Administration

FY, fiscal year

GNP, gross national product

IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee

ICA, International Cooperation Administration

ICBM, inter-continental ballistic missile

ICIS, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

IIC, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IOC, initial operation capability

IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile

ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

KT, kilotons (upper case = yield)

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MIG, A.I. Mikoyan i M.I. Gurevich (Soviet fighter aircraft named for designers Mikoyan and Gurevich)

N, Navy; nuclear-powered ship

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NESC, Net Evaluation Subcommittee

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

n.m., nautical mile

NOA, new obligational authority

NSC, National Security Council; NATO Supply Center

NSCID, National Security Council Intelligence Directive

OCB, Operations Coordinating Board

ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

PB, Planning Board (National Security Council)

PCG, Planning Coordination Group, Operations Coordinating Board

PPS, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

R and D, research and development

RCA, Radio Corporation of America

ROK, Republic of Korea

S, Office of the Secretary of State

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

SAGE, semi-automatic ground environment system

SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SHAEF, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces

SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe

SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate

SUSAC, Soviet Union Strategic Air Command

TCP, Technological Capabilities Panel

USA, United States of America; United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USMC, United States Marine Corps

USN, United States Navy

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

List of Persons

Editor’s Note: The identification of the persons in this list is generally limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary. Where no dates are given, the official held the position throughout the period covered by this volume.

Adams, Sherman, Assistant to President Eisenhower

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and, until May 1955, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Amory, Robert, Jr., Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Anderson, Clinton P., Democratic Senator from New Mexico; Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, January 1955–January 1957; thereafter Chairman

Anderson, Dillon, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, April 1955–September 1956; thereafter Consultant to the President

Anderson, Robert B., Deputy Secretary of Defense until August 1955; Secretary of the Treasury from July 1957

Beam, Jacob D., Director, Office of East European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, March–October 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, October 1955–June 1957; Ambassador to Poland from August 1957

Bowie, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 1955; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and Department of State representative on the National Security Council Planning Board, August 1955–October 1957

Bridges, Styles, Republican Senator from New Hampshire

Brownell, Herbert, Jr., Attorney General of the United States until November 1957

Brucker, Wilber M., Secretary of the Army from July 1955

Brundage, Percival F., Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, until April 2, 1956; thereafter Director

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 1955

Cutler, Robert, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs until April 1955 and from January 1957

Dodge, Joseph M., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy until July 1956

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State

Durham, Carl T., Democratic Representative from North Carolina; Vice Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, January 1955–January 1957; thereafter Chairman

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States

Elbrick, C. Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until February 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Farrell, Major General Francis W. (Lieutenant General from 1957), Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Affairs until 1957

Fisk, James B., Member, General Advisory Committee, Atomic Energy Commission; Member, Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization

Flemming, Arthur S., Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until February 1957

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Goodpaster, Colonel Andrew J. (Brigadier General from January 1957), Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower

Gray, Gordon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1955–February 1957; Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization from March 1957

Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to President Eisenhower

Herter, Christian A., Consultant to the Secretary of State, January–February 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board

Hollister, John B., Consultant to the Secretary of State, May–July 1955; Director, International Cooperation Administration, July 1955–July 1957

Hoover, Herbert C., Jr., Under Secretary of State and Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board, until February 1957

Hughes, Rowland R., Director of the Bureau of the Budget until April 1956

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury until July 1957

Jackson, William H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 1955–January 1956; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, January–September 1956; Acting Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, September 1956–January 1957

Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Democratic Senator from Texas; Minority Leader of the Senate until January 1955; thereafter Majority Leader of the Senate

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Killian, James R., Jr., Head, Technological Capabilities Panel, Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization, from June 1955; Chairman, President’s Board on Foreign Intelligence Activities, from 1956; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for Science and Technology from November 1957

Kishi, Nobusuke, Secretary General, Japan Democratic Party (liberal–Democratic Party from 1956); Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 1956–July 1957; Prime Minister from February 1957

Knowland, William F., Republican Senator from California; Senate Majority Leader until January 1955; thereafter Senate Minority Leader; Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Larson, Arthur, Under Secretary of Labor until November 1956; Director, U.S. Information Agency, December 1956–November 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to President Eisenhower

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Lloyd, Sir Selwyn, British Minister of Supply until April 1955; Minister of Defense, April 1955–December 1955; thereafter Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Loper, Major General Herbert B., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy and Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission

Macmillan, Harold, British Minister of Defense until April 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April–December 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 1955–January 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury

Martin, Joseph W., Jr., Republican Representative from Massachusetts; Speaker of the House of Representatives until January 1955; thereafter Minority Leader of the House of Representatives

Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr., Assistant Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower

Mollet, Guy, President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe until January 1956; Prime Minister of France, February 1956–June 1957

Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Nixon, Richard, Vice President of the United States

Norstad, General Lauris, Air Deputy, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, until November 1956; thereafter Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

Pate, Lieutenant General Randolph M., Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff until January 1, 1956; thereafter Commandant

Persons, Major General Wilton B., Deputy Assistant to the President

Peterson, Val, Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration until June 1957; Ambassador to Denmark from August 1957

Quarles, Donald A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development until August 1955; Secretary of the Air Force, August 1955–April 1957; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense

Rabi, Isidor I., Chairman, General Advisory Committee, Atomic Energy Commission, until 1957; Member, Science Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization, 1955–1956; thereafter Chairman; Representative to Negotiations for the Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency from August 1955

Radford, Admiral Arthur M., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until August 1957

Ridgway, General Matthew B., Chief of Staff, United States Army, until June 1955

Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 1955–April 1957

Rockefeller, Nelson A., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower until December 1955; Chairman, President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization, until 1957

Saltonstall, Leverett, Republican Senator from Massachusetts

Spaak, Paul-Henri, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs until May 1957; thereafter Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Sprague, Mansfield D., General Counsel, Department of Defense, October 1955–February 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Stassen, Harold E., Director of the Foreign Operations Administration until June 1955; Special Assistant to President Eisenhower from March 1955 and Deputy Representative to the U.N. Disarmament Commission from August 1955

Strauss, Lewis L., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission

Streibert, Theodore C., Director of the U.S. Information Agency until December 1956

Taylor, General Maxwell D., Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, and Eighth U.S. Army, until March 1955; Commander in Chief, Far East Command, April 1955–June 1955; thereafter Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Twining, General Nathan F., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, until July 1957; thereafter Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Von Neumann, John, Member, Atomic Energy Commission, until February 1957

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense until October 8, 1957

Zhukov, Georgii Konstantinovich, Soviet Minister of Defense, February 1955–October 1957

United States National Security Policy[1]

[1] Continued from Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, pp. 1 ff. A substantial portion of the documentation appearing in the Foreign Relations series for 1955–1957 concerns subjects important to the national security. The material in this volume deals with the formulation of high-level, general policy and should be considered in conjunction with policy papers on specific issues and areas found elsewhere in the Foreign Relations series.

For an extensive analysis of the making of national security policy, see Organizing for National Security: Inquiry of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 3 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961) and Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy Making at the Presidential Level (New York: Praeger, 1965).

Contents

Basic National Security Policy; Estimates of Threats to the National Security; Military Posture, Strategy, and Weapons Development; Missile Programs; Scientific and Technological Capabilities; Concern for Continental and Civil Defense; Status of Overseas Bases; Defense Budget; Coordination of Military, Economic, Political, Ideological, and Psychological Programs; Organization for National Security (Documents 1-174)

Basic National Security Policy; Estimates of Threats to the National Security; Military Posture, Strategy, and Weapons Development; Missile Programs; Scientific and Technological Capabilities; Concern for Continental and Civil Defense; Status of Overseas Bases; Defense Budget; Coordination of Military, Economic, Political, Ideological, and Psychological Programs; Organization for National Security

1. Memorandum by Jacob D. Beam

Washington, December 31, 1954.

Source: Department of State,PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Record Copies, Jan.–May, 1955. Top Secret.

2. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty)

Washington, January 3, 1955.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Diary Series.

3. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty)

Washington, January 4, 1955.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Diary Series.

4. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State

Washington, January 4, 1955.

Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5440/1. Top Secret.

5. Memorandum of Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 5, 1955

Washington, January 5, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on January 6.

6. National Security Council Report

Washington, January 7, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5501. Top Secret.

7. Editorial Note

8. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty)

Washington, February 1, 1955.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Diary Series.

9. Report by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee

Washington, February 14, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Top Secret; Restricted Data. The 42-member Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization was formed in response to a Presidential request made to the committee at a White House meeting on March 27, 1954, that a study be made of U.S. technological capability to reduce the threat of surprise attack. The resulting panel, frequently referred to as the Killian Committee after its director, Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., interpreted its mandate broadly. The committee set as its objective an examination of the current vulnerability of the United States to surprise attack and an investigation of how science and technology could be used to reduce that vulnerability by contributing to the following five developments: An increase in U.S. nuclear retaliatory power to deter or at least defeat a surprise attack; an increase in U.S. intelligence capabilities to enhance the ability to predict and give adequate warning of an intended surprise attack; a strengthening of U.S. defenses to deter or blunt a surprise attack; the achievement of a secure and reliable communications network; and an understanding of the effect of advanced technology on the manpower requirements of the armed forces.

10. Editorial Note

11. Supplementary Notes of the Legislative Leadership Meeting, March 1, 1955, 8:30–10:30 a.m.

March 1, 1955, 8:30–10:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich. Copies sent to Whitman and Minnich. Present at the meeting were: the President; Senators Knowland, Saltonstall, Millikin, and Bridges; Representatives Martin, Halleck, Allen, and Arends; Secretary Humphrey; Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield; Sherman Adams; General Persons; Gerald Morgan, Special Counsel to the President; James Hagerty; Murray Snyder, Assistant Press Secretary; Bryce Harlow; Howard Pyle, Fred Seaton, and Jack Martin, Administrative Assistants to the President; Homer Gruenther, and Earle Chesney, Assistants to the Deputy Assistant to the President; and Minnich. (Ibid.,Eisenhower Records, President’s Appointment Book) An agenda of the meeting attached to the source text lists eight items; the notes printed here presumably relate to item 3, military reserve bill.

12. Editorial Note

13. Editorial Note

14. Editorial Note

15. Editorial Note

16. Editorial Note

17. Memorandum of Discussion at the 241st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 17, 1955

Washington, March 17, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Coyne on March 18.

18. Memorandum of Discussion at the 243d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 31, 1955

Washington, March 31, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on April 1.

19. National Security Council Report

Washington, April 1, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5515 Series. Top Secret.

20. Memorandum of Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 7, 1955

Washington, April 7, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on April 8.

21. Editorial Note

22. Editorial Note

23. Outline for a Speech by the Secretary of State

Washington, May 19, 1955.

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Chronological, Jan.–Dec, 1955. Confidential. Drafted by Carlton Savage, John Campbell, and Robert Bowie, all of the Policy Planning Staff. The draft itself is not dated, but a covering memorandum from Bowie to Dulles was dated May 19. A handwritten notation on this memorandum indicated that copy no. 1 was handed to the Secretary by Bowie on May 20, that this outline was for a speech before the Magazine Publishers Association at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and that the speech was not published. Bowie’s memorandum stated that the outline was written on the assumption that the speech would be off-the-record and not broadcast or published, adding that he would question the wisdom of publishing this kind of speech. The memorandum further indicated that the speech was given May 23. (Ibid.)

24. Memorandum of Discussion at the 250th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 26, 1955

Washington, May 26, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 27.

25. Editorial Note

26. Editorial Note

27. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, June 14, 1955.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff prepared this estimate, which was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on June 14. The Assistant to the Director, FBI, abstained since the subject was outside the jurisdiction of the FBI.

28. Memorandum of Discussion at the 252d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 16, 1955

Washington, June 16, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Libratry, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Coyne on June 17.

29. Editorial Note

30. Memorandum of Discussion at the 257th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 4, 1955

Washington, August 4, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Lay and Robert Johnson on August 5.

31. Editorial Note

32. Editorial Note

33. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, September 7, 1955.

Source: Department of State,PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Atomic Energy—Armaments. Top Secret.

34. Memorandum of Discussion at the 258th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 8, 1955

Washington, September 8, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on September 15.

35. Editorial Note

36. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, October 3, 1955.

37. Editorial Note

38. Memorandum of Discussion at the 263d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 27, 1955

Washington, October 27, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on October 28.

39. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, November 1, 1955.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 1 November 1955.” The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, because the subject was outside FBI jurisdiction.

40. Memorandum of Discussion at the 266th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 15, 1955

Washington, November 15, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 16.

41. Editorial Note

42. Editorial Note

43. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, ICBM Programs. Top Secret. On November 30, Bowie forwarded a copy of this study to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State with a covering memorandum stating that it was prepared by the Policy Planning Staff and cleared in draft with EUR and FE. Preliminary drafts, internal memoranda, and records of staff meetings reveal that its primary author was Henry D. Owen and that it was based in part on an Office of Intelligence Research study prepared at Owen’s request. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70) The source text is not dated, but the Department of State record copy is dated November 29 and contains a handwritten marginal note that it was sent to Lay at the NSC on November 30 and used at the Council meeting on December 1. (Ibid.,S/P Record Copies, Jan.–Dec. 1955) Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and of Central Intelligence and the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

44. Report Prepared in the Department of Defense

Washington, undated.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, ICBM Programs. Top Secret. The source text is not dated, but it was submitted under cover of a memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council on November 30. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and of Central Intelligence and the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

45. Memorandum of Discussion at the 268th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, December 1, 1955

Maryland, December 1, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on December 2.

46. Memorandum of Discussion at the 270th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, December 8, 1955

Maryland, December 8, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. The memorandum of discussion on item 1 was prepared by Coyne on December 9.

47. Editorial Note

48. Report by the ODM–Defense Working Group

Washington, December 20, 1955.

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Basic Natonal Security Policy. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from two members of the ODM–Defense working group, John F. Hilliard, Deputy Assistant Director, Manpower, ODM, and Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel, III, USA, Defense Member,NSC Planning Board, to the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated December 21. The report was transmitted to the NSC Planning Board, under cover of a memorandum by Lay, dated December 21, for use by the Board in connection with its review of basic national security policy.

49. Diary Entry by the President, January 11, 1956

January 11, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

50. Editorial Note

51. Memorandum of Discussion at the 272d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 12, 1956

Washington, January 12, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 13.

52. Memorandum of Discussion at the 273d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 18, 1956, 9 a.m.

Washington, January 18, 1956, 9 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 19.

53. Diary Entry by the President, January 23, 1956

January 23, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret.

54. Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Anderson)

Washington, January 23, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret. A copy was distributed to Goodpaster.

55. Editorial Note

56. Editorial Note

57. Memorandum by the NSC Planning Board

Washington, undated.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a memorandum for the NSC from Gleason, dated February 13. Gleason noted that the Planning Board’s memorandum was being transmitted for the Council’s information, and for their consideration of the recommendations in paragraphs III–3, IV–1–b, –2–c, –3–b, and –4 thereof in connection with the Council’s consideration of NSC 5602, scheduled for February 27.

58. Supplementary Notes on the Legislative Leadership Meeting, White House, Washington, February 14, 1956, 9:30–11:21 a.m.

Washington, February 14, 1956, 9:30–11:21 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich. Copies were sent to Ann Whitman. The meeting was attended by the President and Vice President Nixon, Senators Knowland and Bridges, Representatives Martin, Halleck, Leo Allen, and Arends, Attorney General Brownell, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson, Quarles, Sherman Adams, Persons, Hagerty, Harlow, Seaton, Goodpaster, Gerald Morgan, and I. Jack Martin, The time of the meeting and the list of participants is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.,Eisenhower Records)

59. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, February 24, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted with the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Wilson, infra. to the National Security Council under cover of a memorandum from Gleason, dated February 24.

60. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, February 24, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret.

61. Memorandum of Discussion at the 277th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 27, 1956

Washington, February 27, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on February 28.

62. Memorandum of Discussion at the 278th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 1, 1956

Washington, March 1, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on March 2.

63. Editorial Note

64. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, March 12, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret.

65. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 13, 1956, 2:15 p.m.

Washington, March 13, 1956, 2:15 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 14.

66. National Security Council Report

Washington, March 15, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret.

67. Memorandum of Discussion at the 280th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 22, 1956

Washington, March 22, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on March 23.

68. Diary Entry by the President, March 30, 1956

March 30, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret.

69. Notes on a Meeting With the President, President’s Office, White House, Washington, March 29, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Washington, March 29, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Secret. No drafting officer is indicated.

70. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 30, 1956, 3 p.m.

Washington, March 30, 1956, 3 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 2. Another memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Burke on April 2, is in Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.

71. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting Between the President and the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Taylor), White House, Washington, April 2, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Washington, April 2, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Personal and Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 3. The time and date of the meeting are written by hand on the source text.

72. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, April 5, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

Washington, April 5, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 5.

73. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the President

Washington, April 17, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Radford. Top Secret. A note on the source text in unidentified handwriting reads: “4/18—Memo handed to Sec. of State who will return.”

74. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, April 18, 1956, 9:30 a.m.

Washington, April 18, 1956, 9:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 18.

75. Memorandum of a Luncheon Conversation Among the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey), and the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), Washington, April 19, 1956

Washington, April 19, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on April 25.

76. National Security Council Report

Washington, April 23, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5604 Series. Top Secret.

77. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 14, 1956, 3:45 p.m.

Washington, May 14, 1956, 3:45 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 14.

78. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 18, 1956, 9 a.m.

Washington, May 18, 1956, 9 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 18.

79. Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 17, 1956

Washington, May 17, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 18.

80. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 24, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

Washington, May 24, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 24.

81. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State

Washington, June 13, 1956.

Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5606 Series. Top Secret.

82. Memorandum of Discussion at the 288th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 15, 1956

Washington, June 15, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 18.

83. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, June 28, 1956.

Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, 311–National Security. Secret.

84. Editorial Note

85. Memorandum of Discussion at the 292d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 9, 1956

Washington, August 9, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Marion W. Boggs on August 10.

86. Memorandum of Discussion at the 293d and 294th Meetings of the National Security Council, Washington, August 16 and August 17, 1956

Washington, August 16 and August 17, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on August 18.

87. Editorial Note

88. Editorial Note

89. Memorandum From the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 2, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/10–256. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary of Defense Wilson.

90. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 2, 1956.

Source: Department of State,PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487. Top Secret.

91. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 2, 1956.

Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5611 Series. Top Secret. Copies were sent to U and C.

92. Memorandum of Discussion at the 299th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 4, 1956

Washington, October 4, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on October 4.

93. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 11, 1956

Washington, October 11, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

94. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President

Washington, November 20, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret.

95. Memorandum for the File of a Meeting With the President, Washington, November 21, 1956, 8:30 a.m.

Washington, November 21, 1956, 8:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Lay. Copies were sent to Jackson and Goodpaster.

96. Report to the President and the National Security Council by the Panel on the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development

Washington, November 21, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development. Top Secret. Another copy of the report is Ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Civil Defense.

97. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 21, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Washington, November 21, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

98. Editorial Note

99. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Augusta, Georgia, December 7, 1956

Georgia, December 7, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 15.

100. Memorandum of Discussion at the 306th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 20, 1956

Washington, December 20, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security, on December 21.

101. Memorandum of Discussion at the 307th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 21, 1956

Washington, December 21, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on December 21.

102. Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)

Washington, January 1, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower library, Whitman File. Confidential.

103. Memorandum of Discussion at the 308th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 3, 1957

Washington, January 3, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 4.

104. Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)

Washington, January 7, 1957.

105. Memorandum of Discussion at the 309th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 11, 1957

Washington, January 11, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 11.

106. Editorial Note

107. Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Bennett)

Washington, January 30, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HE/1–3057. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Christian A. Herter, Murphy, and S/S.

108. Memorandum of Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 7, 1957

Washington, February 7, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on February 8.

109. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, February 25, 1957.

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy. Top Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Gleason to the NSC, dated March 1, not printed.

110. Memorandum of Discussion at the 314th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 28, 1957

Washington, February 28, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on March 1.

111. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, March 19, 1957.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, on March 19. The Assistant Director, FBI, abstained since the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

112. Memorandum of Discussion at the 317th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 28, 1957

Washington, March 28, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on March 29.

113. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 29, 1957, 11:15 a.m.

Washington, March 29, 1957, 11:15 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 1.

114. Memorandum of Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 4, 1957

Washington, April 4, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 5.

115. Editorial Note

116. Memorandum of Discussion at the 319th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 11, 1957

Washington, April 11, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 12.

117. Memorandum of Discussion at the 320th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 17, 1957

Washington, April 17, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 19.

118. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 20, 1957

Washington, May 20, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 21.

119. Memorandum of Discussion at the 325th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 27, 1957

Washington, May 27, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on May 28.

120. National Security Council Report

Washington, June 3, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Series. Top Secret.

121. Memorandum of Discussion at the 326th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 13, 1957

Washington, June 13, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 14.

122. Editorial Note

123. Memorandum of Discussion at the 327th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 20, 1957

Washington, June 20, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 21.

124. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, June 27, 1957

Washington, June 27, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on June 28.

125. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the President

Washington, July 1, 1957.

Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, U.S. Security Effort Overseas. Top Secret. The words “revised draft” are typed on the source text next to the date. An earlier draft, dated June 19, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler. Cutler incorporated into this memorandum some suggestions on the June 19 draft Secretary Dulles sent to Cutler in a letter dated June 25. The second subtopics (a), (b), and (c) in paragraph 3, for example, were taken almost verbatim from Dulles’ letter. (Ibid., Project Clean Up)

126. Memorandum of Discussion at the 329th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 3, 1957

Washington, July 3, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on July 5.

127. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)

Washington, July 3, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense; Director, Joint Staff; and the Special Assistant to the JCS for National Security Affairs.

128. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the President

Washington, July 5, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, U.S. Security Effort. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “read by P and approved. RC”. In a letter to Radford, dated July 8, Cutler said he took up this memorandum with the President (a copy of which he enclosed in his July 8 letter to Radford) “this morning.” (Ibid.)

129. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President

Washington, July 10, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret.

130. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 10, 1957, 10 a.m.

Washington, July 10, 1957, 10 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 12.

131. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, July 16, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Top Secret.

132. Memorandum of Discussion at the 331st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 18, 1957

Washington, July 18, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Marion W. Boggs on July 19.

133. Memorandum of Discussion at the 332d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 25, 1957

Washington, July 25, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on July 26.

134. Memorandum of Discussion at the 333d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 1, 1957

Washington, August 1, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on August 2.

135. Diary Entry by the President, August 5, 1957

August 5, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret.

136. Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, August 6, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Top Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

137. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the President

Washington, August 7, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler. Top Secret.

138. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President

Washington, August 9, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Missiles. Secret.

139. Summary of a Conference on the Army Missile Program, Washington, August 12, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Washington, August 12, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Major John S.D. Eisenhower, Acting Staff Secretary, on August 14. The source text bears the initials “D.E.” in the President’s handwriting. A cover sheet contains the following typed notation: “I believe John wants you to initial if correct.”

140. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, August 16, 1957

Washington, August 16, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by John S.D. Eisenhower on August 20.

141. Editorial Note

142. Editorial Note

143. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President

Washington, September 12, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Secretary Dulles and Cutler.

144. Editorial Note

145. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 8, 1957

Washington, October 8, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 8.

146. Memorandum of Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 10, 1957

Washington, October 10, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 11.

147. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 14, 1957

Washington, October 14, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 15.

148. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 15, 1957, 11 a.m.

Washington, October 15, 1957, 11 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 16.

149. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 23, 1957

Washington, October 23, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 26.

150. Memorandum of Discussion at the 341st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 24, 1957

Washington, October 24, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 25.

151. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 29, 1957

Washington, October 29, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 30. For President Eisenhower’s diary entry on this conference, see vol. XX, p. 754.

152. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 31, 1957

Washington, October 31, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 31. A cover sheet bears the typed notation: “with General Twining on rivalries, etc.”

153. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 4, 1957

Washington, November 4, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 6.

154. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting Held at the White House, Washington, November 4, 1957

Washington, November 4, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 6.

155. Editorial Note

156. Memorandum of Discussion at the 343d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 7, 1957

Washington, November 7, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 8.

157. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, November 7, 1957

Washington, November 7, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on November 7.

158. National Security Council Report

Washington, November 7, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5724. Top Secret; Special Handling. Appendix C, a table entitled “Approximate Increased Costs of Defense Measures, 1959–1963);” Appendix D, a table entitled “Projected Federal Receipts and Expenditures (Fiscal Years 1959–1963);” and Appendix G, entitled “Organization and Roster of Security Resources Panel,” are not printed.

159. Editorial Note

160. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 11, 1957, 5 p.m.

Washington, November 11, 1957, 5 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 16. Another summary of this meeting is in a memorandum from Goodpaster to Cutler, dated November 13. (Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Cutler)

161. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, November 12, 1957.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 12. The Assistant Director of the FBI abstained since the subject was outside his jurisdiction. The cover sheet also notes that NIE 11–4–57 superseded NIE 11–4–56, which was not declassified. (Ibid.)

162. Memorandum of Discussion at the 344th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, November 12, 1957

November 12, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 13.

163. Editorial Note

164. Memorandum of Discussion at the 345th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 14, 1957

Washington, November 14, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 15.

165. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 22, 1957

Washington, November 22, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 23.

166. Memorandum of Discussion at the 346th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 22, 1957

Washington, November 22, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 25.

167. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, November 25, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Harlow Records, Leadership Meetings (Bi-Partisan). A draft of this memorandum, identical to the text printed here except for the change noted in footnote 3 below, was drafted by Philander P. Claxton, Jr., Legislative Management Officer, Congressional Relations. It was enclosed with a memorandum from Macomber to Harlow, dated November 25, containing a suggested outline for the Congressional leadership meeting on December 3. (Eisenhower Library, Harlow Records, Leadership Meetings (Bi-Partisan))

168. Memorandum of a Conversation, Governor Adams’ Office, White House, Washington, November 27, 1957, 9:45 a.m.

Washington, November 27, 1957, 9:45 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

169. Minutes of a Bipartisan Congressional Meeting, Washington, December 3, 1957, 9:05 a.m.–2 p.m.

Washington, December 3, 1957, 9:05 a.m.–2 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich.

170. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, December 5, 1957

Washington, December 5, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. A note on the source text indicates the meeting took place following We NSC meeting.

171. Memorandum of Discussion at the 348th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 12, 1957

Washington, December 12, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on December 13.

172. Editorial Note

173. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, December 24, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Top Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Lay to Killian, dated December 26, which reads in part: “In accordance with the understanding in the meeting last Monday [December 23] in General Persons’ office, I requested the Defense Department and CIA to advise as to the extent to which the factual information contained in the so-called Gaither Report (as distinguished from opinions and conclusions, etc. which constitute advice to the President) had been provided to the Senate Preparedness Committee in the course of testimony before that Committee.” The Department of Defense reply, unsigned and undated, is also attached to Lay’s memorandum.

174. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, December 26, 1957

Washington, December 26, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret-Personal and Private.

1. Memorandum by Jacob D. Beam[2]

Washington, December 31, 1954.

This morning I had a talk with Mr. James Lay about the background of the decision to set up the special subcommittee.[3]

Mr. Lay said the decision arose out of Admiral Robbins’ briefing of the President on Soviet net capabilities.[4] The President had asked Admiral Robbins whether he was satisfied about our ability to evaluate Soviet capabilities and to take action to counter them. Admiral Robbins said he was generally satisfied except for one point, namely, our capacity to obviate delay in taking necessary decisions to anticipate and meet a Soviet attack. The President accordingly suggested the appointment of a sub-committee to study this problem.

The impression gained from Mr. Lay is that we are expected to concentrate on actions indicative of the intent of the USSR, which is the one nation capable of physically hurting the US, to engage in hostilities with the US at some point. Such Soviet actions would be of a nature which either (I) directly threaten the US or (II) demonstrated intent to promote a hostile situation within which the USSR contemplated hostilities against the US.

The President himself carefully drafted the terms of reference of the sub-committee. From his comments to Mr. Lay, the President seems to have had in mind the following:

Under Category I the President wishes us to try to anticipate, by a judgment on indications of Soviet hostile intent, the need for immediate U.S. military action to save the U.S. from attack. Our own counter-measures to such established indications would include orders for the evacuation of American cities, for the dispersal of SAC, for mobilization, etc., and for possible U.S. preventive military action. The President indicated that should the need so require, he might be prepared to give advance authority to local commanders to act.

Under Category II the conditions seem wider in point of time and scope. The President apparently had in mind anticipating, and possibly deterring, by various types of U.S. action, the development of hostile situations which could involve Soviet hostilities against the U.S. Possibly the threat might be of lesser urgency than under Category I and would give time for U.S. preparedness measures, including mobilization and changes in troop dispositions, as well as U.S. diplomatic action. Although the U.S. reaction would encompass measures of a military nature, other accompanying steps would also be open to the U.S., which Mr. Lay felt we should likewise consider. All of our actions under these circumstances would, however, be in the direction of preparing the U.S. for an ultimate military decision, including possibly preventive action against the USSR to protect the safety of the U.S.

[2] Source: Department of State,PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Record Copies, Jan.–May, 1955. Top Secret.

[3] Reference is to the special subcommittee of the NSC Planning Board organized pursuant to the President’s directive at the November 4, 1954, Council meeting that such a committee be established to prepare for Council consideration a study and report on “possible Soviet actions which might constitute clear indication of hostile intent.” This directive was formally recorded as NSC Action No. 1260–c. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) In a November 29, 1954, memorandum to Robert Bowie, Lay noted that the President subsequently approved specific terms of reference for the subcommittee, directing it to prepare a study and report “on what series or group of possible Soviet actions should leave no doubt in the President’s mind as to the need for taking immediate military action to save the United States from the consequences of enemy attack, or to ameliorate the existing hostile situation.” (Ibid., PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Record Copies, Jan.–May, 1955) The subcommittee’s study and draft report formed the basis for NSC 5515/1, Document 19.

[4] Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Naval War College and Staff Director of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee. This subcommittee was established by NSC 5423, “Directive for a Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee,” June 23, 1954, a JCS report that was adopted at the 204th meeting of the National Security Council on June 24 (NSC Action No. 1164) and approved by the President that same day. Admiral Robbins orally briefed the NSC at its 222d meeting on November 4, 1954. A copy of NSC 5423 is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5423 Series; copies of the memoranda of discussion at the June 23 and November 4 NSC meetings are in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

2. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty)[1]

Washington, January 3, 1955.

[Here follows an account of a discussion with Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson.]

Bobby Cutler came in with Colonel Goodpaster early in the morning to discuss the need in their opinion for the President to make an additional statement on the cutback in the armed forces and the reason why. They are fearful, of course, that the Democrats will try to make this an issue in Congress and that Ridgway and the Army will try to make a case for a larger number of ground forces. We all agreed that the President should make a statement in which he would say that he made this decision as Commander-in-Chief and that he thought it was the best possible defense plan for the United States, rather than to have some people attack it by saying that it was done only to save money and to help balance the budget; in other words, endangering the security of the nation for political considerations.

At noon Cutler, Goodpaster, Persons and myself went in to discuss this with the President, and he agreed to the necessity for making such a statement. I told him there were three or four ways to do it: (1) he could make such a statement at a press conference, but that since we did not plan to hold a press conference this week because of the State of the Union Message,[2] it would be delayed until the following Wednesday and that might be too late; (2) We could call the White House correspondents into the President’s office and he could give them a fill-in; (3) We could put out a formal statement; (4) We could release an exchange of letters between the President and Wilson.

The President chose the latter and recommended that Wilson’s letter say that he was asking for permission to put on paper the discussion that the President had with the Defense heads in December when this whole matter was under discussion. Goodpaster was given the job of drafting the letter and calling Wilson to inform him of the decision. Wilson, of course, entirely concurred in this as did Foster Dulles.[3]

At 2 o’clock the President had a joint meeting of the Cabinet and the Republican leaders—Senators Knowland, Millikin, Saltonstall, Bridges; Congressmen Martin, Halleck, Arends, Allen—to discuss the State of the Union Message. Bryce Harlow gave a summary of each paragraph and a general discussion was held throughout the meeting.

The question of manpower and the armed forces program came up almost immediately when Styles Bridges said he fully expected that this would be the first political attack to be launched by the Democrats. The President said that, as a matter of fact, he had just discussed this with members of his staff and that there was nothing to which he had given so much personal attention since he had been in office as to the defense plans of the nation. He said that our defense plans must keep pace with science and the new developments in warfare; that we must maintain a proper balance with our economic strength.

“It is a question,” the President said, “of blunting the threat of attack by establishing an adequate continental defense and building up our guided missiles here at home, and secondly, to emphasize the retaliatory concept of warfare by putting more money into the air and developing a better early warning system. In the kind of war we are faced with, how long do you think it would take us to ship ten divisions to Europe or six to Japan? Enemy submarines would be swarming the seas, and troops at either the port of embarkation or debarkation would be sitting ducks for atomic aerial attack. What we have got to do in our new thinking is to realize that there will be a period when all we can do is to divert disaster. If we have time to do that job and hit back hard, then we can do the rest in time. But unless we do this, gentlemen, take my word for it we are going to be shot to pieces. As a matter of fact, Al Gruenther is very hopeful that we can set up our Reserve program here in this country in a hurry so that he can then go to the European countries and appeal for them to do the same thing. If we have an atomic attack, we will need those Reserves here at home. Can you imagine what would happen in New York or Detroit, or Washington or Pittsburgh or any one of our big cities, if they got hit by an atomic bomb. The Fire and Police forces of those cities would be inadequate to cope with the panic and disaster that would result. That is why we need a disciplined Reserve which could move in immediately to take over and preserve order. We have got to lay this whole program on the line and get the American people to realize what it is all about. I am going to outline these thoughts in a letter to the Secretary of Defense, and you will see Jim Hagerty making it public within a very short time.”

[Here follows discussion of the President’s State of the Union Message.]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Diary Series.

[2] Delivered on January 6; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 4–30.

[3] See footnote 2, infra.

3. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty)[1]

Washington, January 4, 1955.

[Here follow Hagerty’s notes on another subject.]

Off and on during the day Goodpaster, Cutler and I worked on the draft of a letter from the President to Wilson outlining the President’s philosophy behind the cut in manpower in the Armed Services. All of us, including the President, feel that it is necessary prior to the State of the Union Message to get a clear-cut statement of the President’s beliefs before the American people. The reason for it is this:

Since the manpower cut was announced by the Secretary of Defense in December the Democrats have been chewing at it. They think they have an issue—that they can make an argument to the American people that we are cutting our Armed Services just for budgetary reasons in an attempt to try to save some money. Of course, nothing could be farther from the truth and the reasons we are taking the steps we have is so that we can put more emphasis on nuclear weapons, guided missiles and the Air Force.

As the President has said privately many times, it would have been impossible for him to invade the Continent in the way he did if the Germans had had the atomic bomb. The deployment of troops in the ports of debarkation would have been blown off the earth with that bomb and the great mass of ships coming across the Channel would have been actually disintegrated. Consequently in an atomic attack or an atomic war it is going to be virtually impossible to move land troops to Europe or to Asia, and we will have to depend upon long range bombers, guided missiles and the like to carry the attack to the enemy and to stop them from coming over here. In a like manner bombing of our cities is going to create panic and riots within those cities and it is going to be necessary to have a strong ready Reserve to throw into those areas merely to keep order and to get our production going again.

Cutler, Goodpaster and myself think it is very necessary for the President to say to the American people that he has made these decisions as Commander-in-Chief with his wide background of military affairs—that it is a military decision, not a budgetary one. The President agreed fully with this and after bringing in several drafts of the letter to him, he finally said that this was one he would like to work on alone overnight, and we left it with him with an agreement that we would pick it up from him tomorrow and release it for Thursday morning papers prior to the delivery of the State of the Union Message.[2]

[Here follows Hagerty’s entry on a date for release of the State of the Union Message and the budget.]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Diary Series.

[2] On Wednesday, January 5, the White House Press Office issued a press release containing an exchange of correspondence between the President and the Secretary of Defense; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, pp. 2–6.

4. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, January 4, 1955.

SUBJECT

Basic National Security Policy

As the Council has already considered the basic issues of NSC 5440/1[2] at two meetings in November and December,[3] the discussion on Wednesday[4] probably will be devoted largely to clearing up remaining points of disagreement in the paper and giving it final approval.

I

Many of the unagreed points are changes proposed by the JCS by their memorandum of December 17.[5] The latest JCS memorandum of December 30,[6] however, states that even these proposed revisions would not meet their basic objections, which apply to the present draft (NSC 5440/1) as well as to its predecessor (NSC 5440).

The new JCS memorandum also notes that no “cognizance” has been taken of the JCS recommendation, first made on November 12, that an ad hoc or existing agency of the NSC be charged with formulating a statement of the methods of implementing para. 45 of NSC 162/2.[7] This is the paragraph which states: “… [8] the broad aim of U.S. security policies must be to create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty, conditions under which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet the Soviet-Communist threat with resolution and to negotiate for its alleviation under proper safeguards.”

Although the JCS remain dissatisfied with the national strategy outlined in NSC 5440/1 they have yet to state what strategy they would propose instead. You raised these questions at the meeting of December 21, but General Twining did not amplify the JCS position.

II

As Section A is in the nature of an intelligence estimate, General Cutler will suggest leaving it as it is, without an attempt to have the Council resolve the splits in it. In case any member should wish to have one or more of these points discussed, however, the following brief comments may be helpful:

Page 1, preliminary para. This statement, based on the intelligence estimate which follows, should be retained.

Page 2, para. 6. The version in the main text makes the point necessary to the argument. This is not the place for discussing the composition of the forces necessary to provide the deterrent to aggression.

Page 5, para. 14. The addition proposed by the JCS unnecessarily singles out one of many aspects and would clutter up the clear-cut listing of Soviet objectives.

Pages 6–7, para. 17. The discussion of current Soviet policy is balanced and cautious. While pointing out the advantages to the U.S.S.R. of the “peace offensive” and the possible motives behind it, the text also stresses the flexibility of Soviet policy.

Pages 7–8, para. 20. The difference between the two versions is largely one of emphasis. While the point necessarily involves speculation, the version in the footnote seems preferable in that it gives more emphasis to (a) the importance in Soviet calculations of the attitudes of our allies, and (b) continuing Soviet caution in pursuing aggressive policies that might lead to nuclear war.

III

The following are the principal unagreed points in the policy sections of the paper which the Council will be asked to resolve:

Page 9, para. 21. Recommend: deletion of the bracketed words. The phrase “fundamental values and institutions” includes our free enterprise economic system. Inclusion of the reference to the economy proposed by Treasury would set an absolute limit on the basic objective of preserving national security. The point is covered adequately in the statement of basic problem (para. 23).

Page 9, para. 25. Recommend: retention of bracketed phrase. “Other basic Communist military strength” refers principally to the Chinese Communist armies and to the total satellite addition to the power of the Communist bloc. If the estimate is correct (paras. 7, 8, 14b, 15, 16), it is hard to see how this power can be significantly reduced without large-scale war.

Page 10, para 26(c). Recommend: retention of the present text. The JCS footnote raises their basic objection to the paper and reverts to the proposals made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of their memorandum of December 17.

FE also has some comments on this paragraph and is submitting a separate memorandum to you on it.

Page 10, para. 27. Recommend: deletion of the bracketed sentence, which is harmless but unnecessary.

Page 11, para 32. Recommend: deletion of the proposed JCS addition, which is redundant and confusing.

Page 12, para. 35. Recommend: retention of the sentences in brackets. They are of great importance in that they point to the need, and the reasons, for avoiding actions generally regarded as provocative. It is not enough merely to reject preventive war or acts “intended to provoke war.”

Page 15, para. 42. Recommend: deletion of the bracketed sentence. It is unacceptable for a long-term policy paper in that it sets an absolute limitation and allows no flexibility. If it is considered advisable to include reference to the desirability of reducing foreign economic aid, the present sentence could be accepted with the additional words: “so far as is consistent with U.S. security objectives,” which appear in the corresponding sentence of NSC 5422/2 (para. 23).[9]

Page 16, para. 48. There is no disagreement on this paragraph. However, the present wording may be somewhat misleading, since the paragraph really refers to negotiation rather than to the entire political strategy. Recommend: that you propose revising the opening clause, for clarification, as follows: “In using negotiation as a means of carrying out this strategy with respect to Communist China … ”.

R.R.B.

[1] Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5440/1. Top Secret.

[2] NSC 5440/1 is not printed. (Ibid., NSC 5440 Series) NSC 5440 is printed in Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 806.

[3] For texts of the memoranda of discussion, see ibid.,  pp. 787 and 832 .

[4] See infra.

[5] For text, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 828.

[6] Transmitted under cover of a January 3 memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council, the JCS memorandum of December 30 stated: “Although minor revisions have been effected and certain of the general comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are referred to in footnotes, it is considered that the basic policy as outlined in the original version of NSC 5440 has not been significantly altered in its revision.” As a result, the comments expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their December 17 memorandum, inasmuch as they were addressed to the general orientation of basic national security policy and set forth the factors that they believed should control its formulation, “remain valid and are generally applicable to the draft policy as revised.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5440/1).

[7] For text of NSC 162/2, dated October 30, 1953, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 577.

[8] All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

[9] “Guidelines Under NSC 162/2 for FY 1956,” August 7, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 715.

5. Memorandum of Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 5, 1955[1]

Washington, January 5, 1955

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5440/1; NSC 162/2; NSC 5422/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy”, dated October 11, 1954;[2] Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 20, 1954 and January 3, 1955;[3] NSC Actions Nos. 1286–b–(2) and 1290;[4] NIE 11–4–54; NIE 11–6–54[5] )

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at some length on the reference report, stressing once again the comments and criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had reemphasized their earlier views with respect to this proposed basic policy. He then called attention to the various differences of view, and indicated that since this would constitute final Council consideration of the paper, these differences of view would have to be decided. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s notes is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

The first difference of opinion occurred in the introductory paragraph of Section A (Estimate of the Situation).[6] As presently written, this paragraph indicated the majority opinion of the NSC Planning Board that the present Soviet challenge constituted “a peril greater than any the United States has ever before faced.” The President indicated sympathy with the minority point of view represented by the Director, Bureau of the Budget,[7] and said that he could see no use in setting forth this peril in comparative terms. It was sufficient to say that this challenge constituted a grave peril to the United States.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out the various remaining differences of view with respect to the intelligence estimate, indicating that while the Council should take note of these differences in judgment, it was not necessary that the Council should resolve such differences. They would remain indicated in the footnotes, as was the case normally with national intelligence estimates.

Turning to the body of the paper (Section B, “Outline of U.S. National Strategy”), Mr. Cutler pointed out that the first split view occurred in paragraph 21, which read as follows:

“21. The basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions [without seriously weakening the U.S. economy.]”[8]

The President indicated his belief that the bracketed phrase, which had been proposed by the Treasury member and the Budget adviser of the Planning Board, was superfluous, inasmuch as the U.S. free economy was obviously one of the fundamental values and institutions referred to earlier in this paragraph. Accordingly, the bracketed phrase was deleted.

Mr. Cutler then moved on to paragraph 24, which read as follows:

“24. The Soviet bloc-free world conflict can be resolved in accordance with U.S. security interests only through either (a) overthrow of the Soviet regime and its replacement by a government with no expansionist or other objectives inconsistent with U.S. security; or (b) modification of the Soviet system so that its leaders for practical purposes abandon expansionist policies and accept either formal or de facto arrangements consistent with U.S. security interests.”

He explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to insert, after the term “Soviet regime”, the phrase “including the destruction of its international Communist apparatus”. The Planning Board members other than the JCS adviser, however, felt that such destruction was included in both policy (a) and policy (b). The idea was thought to be implicit. Secretary Dulles said that while indeed the thought might be implicit in the paragraph as written, he felt that it was sufficiently important to be made explicit. Accordingly, he had made a redraft of paragraph 24 which took account of the proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[9]

The President inquired what was meant by the term “international Communist apparatus”. Did this refer merely to the local Communist parties in the various countries, or did it include the mechanics by which the Kremlin controlled these parties? It seemed to the President a terrific undertaking for the United States to try to destroy the local Communist parties throughout the world. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that these local Communist parties would wither on the vine if the directing regime in the Kremlin were destroyed. The President, however, doubted the accuracy of this statement, as did Secretary Dulles, who believed that at least some of the local Communist parties would manage to survive the destruction of the Soviet regime.

Returning to his earlier thought, the President said that while it might be possible for the United States to “neutralize” the Communist apparatus in the free world, it would be next to impossible to destroy it completely. In accordance with the President’s view, Secretary Dulles suggested the substitution of the term “disrupt” for the term “destroy” in his new draft of paragraph 24, which he proceeded to hand to Mr. Cutler, who read it to the meeting. With this change, Secretary Dulles’ redraft of paragraph 24 was accepted.[10]

Mr. Cutler then turned to paragraph 25, reading as follows:

“25. The U.S. and its allies have no foreseeable prospect of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of reducing Soviet armed strength—the core of Communist power—[or of significantly reducing other basic Communist military strength,][11] except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation by the U.S. of such action for this purpose is not an acceptable course either to the U.S. or its major allies.”

The bracketed phrase, he said, had been proposed by the State, Treasury,CIA and Budget members of the Planning Board, and referred primarily to the military strength of Communist China and the European satellites.

The President said that he was inclined to agree with the sense of the bracketed phrase, since he saw little possibility that other basic Communist military strength could be reduced over the period of the next five years. Accordingly, it was agreed to include the bracketed phrase.

The next split occurred in paragraph 27, which read as follows:

“27. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. [The concrete goals of general strategy between now and the time when the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency.]”[12]

The bracketed sentence, said Mr. Cutler, had been proposed by the Defense, ODM and JCS members of the Planning board. The other members of the Planning Board believed that this language might seem to indicate the desirability of resorting to armed force between now and the time when the USSR had greatly increased nuclear power, and these members therefore believed that the sentence was inconsistent with the basic strategy outlined in NSC 5440/1.

Dr. Flemming said that apropos of this paragraph it had seemed to him as he had read through the report that there was inadequate recognition of the necessity of developing concrete programs to meet the Soviet threat with some kind of time-table in mind. The President indicated his belief that there must be a lot of people in the Executive Branch working in the field of formulating programs. Governor Stassen pointed out that it was the responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board[13] to develop concrete programs to carry out agreed U.S. policy.

Mr. Cutler indicated that if NSC 5440/1 were approved by the President, Mr. Cutler proposed to suggest to the President the appointment of a high-level committee made up of members of the OCB, with Mr. Nelson Rockefeller as chairman, whose responsibility it would be to work out programs to put this new policy into effect. The President said that in that case the present report amounted simply to being a directive to this OCB committee. Governor Stassen was of the opinion that the work of the committee amounted to drawing up courses of action to carry out the strategy outlined in NSC 5440/1.

Secretary Humphrey felt that if the term “goals” in the bracketed sentence were changed to read “programs”, the issue could be settled without any misunderstanding that the sentence suggested a resort to armed force. The President said it seemed to him that the Council was now getting into the realm of semantics, but he had no objection to Secretary Humphrey’s proposed change, which was subsequently adopted by the Council.

Mr. Cutler then said that he had overlooked a change which the Secretary of State desired to make in paragraph 26–c, which read:

“c. Fostering changes in the character and policies of the Communist regimes by making clear to them available alternatives which are in their basic interests and do not conflict with those of the U.S. and by exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this strategy.”

Secretary Dulles said that this, too, might appear to be a matter of semantics, but that he felt that subparagraph c should be rewritten to read as follows:

“c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet–Communist bloc regimes:

“(1) By influencing them toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and

“(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy.”

Mr. Allen Dulles said that Secretary Dulles’ redraft would be improved if our influence was not confined solely to the Communist regime, but was also exerted on the peoples of the Soviet bloc. Secretary Dulles expressed skepticism as to whether popular pressure would succeed in making many significant changes in the Communist regimes. He admitted, however, that we might be able to bring influence to bear to break the captive peoples away from their regimes. The President said that this was also his view, and after further discussion the draft proposed by Secretary Dulles was adopted by the Council subject to language which would indicate that our influence was to be directed not only at the regimes but also at the peoples of the Communist states. Even in dictatorships, said the President, some attention had to be given to public opinion.

The next important split, continued Mr. Cutler, occurred in paragraph 32, which read as follows:

“32. The United States must also have other ready forces, which, together with those of its allies, must be sufficient (a) to help deter any resort to local aggression, or (b) to punish swiftly and severely any such local aggression, in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into total nuclear war. Such ready forces will be in addition to those assigned to NATO; [they must be in properly proportioned relationship with the versatility to meet aggression in all its forms;][14] must be suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability; and must also, along with those assigned to NATO, be capable of discharging initial tasks in the event of general war.”

After explaining his understanding of why the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to include the bracketed phrase, Mr. Cutler asked General Twining if he wished to add anything to this explanation. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs had suggested this language in order to ensure a proper balance of forces in our deployments so that these forces would be able to carry out whatever jobs they had to do.

The President indicated that he did not care one way or another, and that it was all right to include the bracketed phrase if the Joint Chiefs so desired.

Secretary Dulles inquired about the last sentence of the paragraph, dealing with initial tasks in the event of general war. Secretary Dulles wondered whether this implied that the United States must have forces in being capable of carrying out all subsequent as well as all initial tasks in the event of general war.

Mr. Cutler indicated that this was not the intention of the authors of the paragraph, but Secretary Humphrey likewise expressed concern lest this phraseology appear to open the door to the return of the concept of balanced forces “for all purposes everywhere”. Up to now this Administration had made clear its belief in the idea of selectivity in the composition of its armed forces, and it would be a bad mistake to abandon the principle of selectivity for that of balance. Along the same lines, Secretary Dulles pointed out that the President had only recently informed the Congressional leaders that the Administration’s military program would ensure forces adequate for the initial tasks of general war, but that it would not be necessary for the United States to have ready and in being at the outset of general war all the military forces it might need subsequently in the course of prosecuting such a war.

The President said that he did not understand the connection of the problem being discussed with the disputed language in the bracketed phrase. Mr. Cutler pointed out to the President that it was not to the term “versatility” that Secretary Humphrey objected, but to the idea of forces “to meet aggression in all its forms”. Secretary Humphrey said that Mr. Cutler was quite correct, and that what he feared was that complete coverage to meet every kind of future military contingency was creeping back into our thinking. He most strenuously objected to the concept of forces in being to meet every possible kind of emergency. If we accepted such an idea we would be “all over the lot again”.

As Mr. Cutler was suggesting a revision to meet Secretary Humphrey’s point, the President turned to Secretary Humphrey and said what you mean is that we should continue to adhere to our basic doctrine of the so-called “new look”. When Secretary Humphrey agreed, the President said that he still did not see any suggestion of changing the new look concept of the bracketed phrase.

Mr. Cutler said that perhaps the Chiefs of Staff desired to comment on this issue. Admiral Carney and General Ridgway both expressed a desire to speak. General Ridgway spoke first, [7 lines of source text not declassified]. To recapture and hold such large areas would require the deployment of considerable ground forces. That is what versatility meant to him, said General Ridgway—“ground forces ready to do this kind of job.”

Expressing a measure of agreement with General Ridgway’s reasoning, the President nevertheless argued that the kind of situation described by General Ridgway as possible [2 words not declassified] would almost certainly call for partial mobilization by the United States. The job [7 words not declassified] couldn’t be done by a regimental combat team and three or four Marine battalions. On the other hand, it was impossible to have sufficient ground forces in being to meet every kind of military contingency everywhere in the world. Partial mobilization would have to be the answer. General Ridgway replied by pointing out that speed of deployment would be of the essence in many such contingencies. Accordingly, we must have at least certain forces in being to meet such situations. Our ground forces, at least, were growing very small in number. He was not, insisted General Ridgway, arguing, as Secretary Humphrey said, that it was necessary for us to have every variety of military force in being all the time.

Secretary Wilson said that he certainly was not in favor of earmarking this division or that division for future use in each of the various places in the world where divisions might some time be needed. What he did favor was having mobile forces at hand and ready to go to different parts of the world as the situation might require.

Admiral Carney said that, speaking from the point of view of the Navy, he felt that if we tailored all our military forces to a single concept of warfare, it would be unsound. The U.S. forces should have sufficient versatility to enable them to meet various circumstances short of general war, as well as general war itself.

Mr. Cutler then suggested a further revision of this paragraph to take account of the discussion. This was adopted, with a comment by the President that he had always imagined that military forces were by their very nature presumed to be versatile.

Mr. Cutler then indicated that the next split occurred in paragraph 35, which read as follows:

“35. The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. [The United States and its allies will also have to forego actions regarded as provocative, if such actions would foreclose the requisite support for the use of force should this become necessary. Moreover, it the Communist rulers should conclude that the United States is bent on aggressive war, they may feel that they have no choice but to initiate war themselves at their own time. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war.][15] At the same time the United States and its major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war, and the United States must make clear its determination to prevail if general war eventuates.”

As soon as Mr. Cutler had finished reading paragraph 35, Mr. Allen Dulles indicated his desire to withdraw the support given by the CIA member of the Planning Board to the bracketed sentences in this paragraph.

The President said that he found it very difficult to understand the contents in the bracketed phrase apart from specific situations which might arise. He felt that the wording was much too speculative. Secretary Dulles said that he was quite prepared to see both the first and the second sentence in the bracketed portion of the paragraph deleted. The other members of the Council promptly agreed.

Apropos of paragraphs 39, 40, 41 and 42, dealing with economic assistance, particularly to less developed areas, Mr. Cutler noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired to include somewhere in these paragraphs reference to the desirability of ensuring a better supply of food to such areas. He indicated that the Planning Board had been reluctant to adopt the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it singled out only one of many items of economic assistance, although they had no objection to the proposal in itself.

The President, disagreeing with the Planning Board, said he thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had “got something” on this point. Adequate food, he said, was more conducive to good morale than almost anything else he knew, citing as an illustration the powerful effect of the 10-pound food packages which Governor Stassen had distributed at Christmas. In accordance with the President’s view, the Council agreed to include a specific reference to providing adequate dietary conditions.

Mr. Cutler went on to point out that at the end of paragraph 42, which dealt with economic assistance to underdeveloped areas, there was a division in the Planning Board. The Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board desired to add a final sentence which read: “The total level of U.S. economic assistance worldwide should, however, be progressively reduced.” Although, said Mr. Cutler, this language was taken from the “Guidelines Under NSC 162/2”,[16] the other members of the Planning Board had been disinclined to include it in the present paper.

Secretary Humphrey said that he thought it most desirable from every point of view to include the sentence in question. The President, turning to Secretary Humphrey, said that the real criterion with respect to the level of U.S. economic assistance was the security advantage which the United States obtained. He pointed out that U.S. economic assistance to Turkey was the best possible way to buttress our security interests in the Near Eastern area. Moreover, it was much better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their own armed forces than to create additional U.S. divisions.

The Director of the Budget also believed that the sentence in question should be included, if for no other reason than if it were left out, those who were not familiar with the point of view of the Administration might misinterpret the omission.

Secretary Dulles suggested a revision of the disputed sentence which would read that the total level of U.S. economic assistance “should be reduced as rapidly as is consistent with U.S. security interests.” Mr. Hughes indicated that this revision was satisfactory to him. Our policy has been going in the direction of reducing the level of our economic assistance, and we certainly did not wish to change directions now. The President, however, reiterated that the first criterion with respect to the level of U.S. assistance was the vital interests and the security of the United States.

Secretary Dulles then said he wished to raise another point contained in paragraph 42. He referred to the sentence which read: “Specifically, the U.S. should support a new initiative, in which industrialized free world nations and underdeveloped nations of Asia would both participate, aimed at significant economic improvement in South and Southeast Asia, where the Communist threat is especially dangerous.” Apropos of this sentence, Secretary Dulles said that he sometimes worried over the great emphasis we were putting on economic assistance to South and Southeast Asia. There was almost as much danger from Communism in the Americas. Accordingly, should we single out the areas of South and Southeast Asia for special mention? To the United States itself, the situation in the Americas was more dangerous than the situation in Southeast Asia, although, of course, this was not the case with the people of Southeast Asia.

Mr. Cutler suggested deletion of this sentence, but Governor Stassen expressed some reluctance at this proposal. He pointed out that we can effect changes in any situation in the Americas without being obliged to resort to general war. If, on the other hand, we were to lose Burma to Communism, we could only regain it by resorting to war.

Mr. Rockefeller inquired, with respect to paragraph 42, whether it was the intent of this paragraph to suggest that money and money alone could develop sounder economic conditions in the backward areas. If so, the argument was erroneous, for there were a variety of other means for improving economic conditions.

Mr. Cutler explained that the point raised by Mr. Rockefeller was covered in paragraph 41, and again suggested the omission of the sentence to which Secretary Dulles had taken exception. Governor Stassen then inquired whether omission of this sentence would constitute a change in the recently adopted U.S. policy toward the Far East (NSC 5429/5).[17] Mr. Cutler assured Governor Stassen that this was not the case, whereupon Governor Stassen indicated his approval for deletion of this sentence.

Dr. Flemming then observed that by and large the present report nowhere gave sufficient emphasis to the information, cultural, education and exchange programs. The President agreed that these programs had not been mentioned, but said that he presumed that they would be included in the programs subsequently formulated to carry out the policy and strategy in the present paper.

Secretary Dulles said that he wished to express his complete agreement with Mr. Rockefeller that there had been in the past too great emphasis on financial and economic assistance to friendly nations. Mr. Allen Dulles expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles, and cited the case of Italy to prove his point. Very large sums in the shape of U.S. assistance had been poured into Italy without any notable effect on the level of Communist strength and membership. Economic aid, said Mr. Dulles, was obviously important; but it was not the whole answer to our problems. Both Secretary Humphrey and the President expressed agreement with these views. Dr. Flemming suggested that this idea deserved a new paragraph, and Secretary Dulles agreed that it would be desirable to include a new paragraph dealing with cultural and ideological matters. Mr. Cutler said that such a paragraph would be inserted.

Mr. Cutler then asked the Council to look at paragraph 49–b, dealing with a sound U.S. economy and reading as follows:

“The Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures into balance, or into substantial balance, with its total annual revenues, and should maintain overall credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy.”

He then went on to explain that Dr. Burns[18] had been unable to be present, and wished him to convey Dr. Burns’ views as to this paragraph. Dr. Burns said that from a technical point of view it would be more correct to delete the word “annual” before “expenditures” and “revenues”. On the other hand, he would not recommend deletion at this time, since if we were now to tinker with the language people would put the wrong construction on the change.

Secretary Dulles said that he wished to suggest a further revision of this paragraph, designed to make clear that revenues alone were not the absolute criterion. Obviously we would like revenues and expenditures to be in balance, but sometimes, said Secretary Dulles, it was every bit as important to find revenues to meet expenses as it was to cut expenditures in order to meet revenues. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles believed that the language should read “to bring its total annual expenditures and its total annual revenues into balance, or substantial balance”.

Secretary Humphrey indicated that he would not object to the proposed language unless it meant that we were now contemplating going before Congress and asking an increase in taxes. Of course, under different world conditions, it might be necessary to do this. Secretary Dulles then asked Secretary Humphrey just what he proposed to do if he failed to prevent Congress from slashing the excise taxes in the next session. Did Secretary Humphrey propose to cut national defense expenditures if the excise taxes were thrown out by the Congress? As the President was expressing his agreement with the position taken by the Secretary of State, Secretary Humphrey answered by saying that if in the next session of Congress we got a big cut in our revenues, we would have to take a good hard look both at our revenues and at our expenditures.

Secretary Wilson indicated that he also would go along with Secretary Dulles’ view, adding that under certain conditions he would vote for a deficit. Secretary Humphrey replied that so would he, but certainly not under present conditions. Secretary Dulles again proposed the phraseology “bring its total annual revenues and expenditures into balance”. The President said isn’t that what the present paragraph means substantially? Mr. Hughes said that as far as he could see, it didn’t mean anything really different but, once again, new language may give rise to misunderstandings. Mr. Cutler thought that it was rather a question of difference of implication than a matter of exact meaning. Secretary Humphrey counselled against changing the phraseology if we really didn’t mean to change our concrete objective. The President said that in any case we must never fail to emphasize that the United States will do what it has to do to protect its security. Whatever language is adopted should leave no doubt on this point. The Council thereupon adopted the language suggested by Secretary Dulles, with respect to paragraph 49–d, reading as follows:

“d. [The aggregate of Federal expenditures, not essential to the national security, should be minimized.] [Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to a necessary minimum].”[19] Every effort should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal Government.“

The Council after some discussion adopted a revision suggested by Dr. Burns, to the effect that all Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to the necessary minimum.

As the Council was concluding its discussion of the report, Secretary Dulles noted that at the end of the report there were paragraphs dealing with the importance of an adequate intelligence system, manpower, research and development, etc.. Pointing out that he had mentioned at earlier meetings of the Council the lack of an adequate U.S. organization to deal with the Communist tactics of subversion in free world nations, Secretary Dulles inquired whether there should not be specific mention at this point of the necessity of strong governmental backing to solve this problem. Mr. Allen Dulles, in response, referred to a paper on the subject which he was about to present to Mr. Rockefeller.[20] Secretary Dulles, however, was still of the opinion that this problem deserved mention in this report. Mr. Allen Dulles said that he would in that case be glad to prepare such a paragraph, which could then be considered by the other Council members. The President expressed approval of this proposal.

At the conclusion of the discussion of NSC 5440/1, Mr. Cutler indicated that the President had a related matter which he wished to bring up for Council discussion and advice. The President then held up a manuscript which he said was the draft of a letter to Secretary Wilson in reply to a note from Secretary Wilson asking for a Presidential statement for public release relative to the military program for the next fiscal year.[21]

The President then explained that what he had been trying to do was to put in language that could be clearly understood the position which the NSC had recommended and on which he had decided, as to what our security required from the military point of view. This would be most valuable for future discussions with the Congress, and he wanted to be sure that he had a convincing and succinct statement of the Administration’s position on this subject, and one which could be published without injuring the national security. The President then read his draft letter, after which various members of the Council, including Secretary Wilson, Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Stevens, and Secretary Dulles, all made suggestions for the President’s consideration in revising the present draft of the letter. Much of this discussion centered about the level to which the armed forces of the United States should be reduced, as a goal for the end of the Fiscal Year 1956. The President, on this subject, told Secretary Wilson to be prepared to defend a figure of 2,850,000.[22]

The National Security Council:[23]

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5440/1) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 3, 1955.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5440/1, subject to the following changes:

(1) The introductory paragraph on page 1: Change “a peril greater than any the United States has ever before faced.” to “a grave peril to the United States.”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(2) Paragraph 21: Delete the bracketed phrase and the footnote relating thereto.

(3)

Paragraph 24: Reword to read as follows:

“24. In meeting this threat, the U.S. must choose between two main lines of policy, aimed respectively at:

“a. Destroying the power of the Soviet-Communist bloc; or

“b. Modifying the policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc along lines more compatible with U.S. security interests.

“Either policy would include action to disrupt or neutralize the international Communist apparatus in the free world.”

and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(4) Paragraph 25: Include the bracketed phrase and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(5)

Paragraph 26–c: Reword to read as follows:

“c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regime:

“(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and

“(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy.”

and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(6) Paragraph 27: Include the bracketed sentence, substituting “programs for the” for “concrete goals of”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(7) Paragraph 32: Revise the second sentence to read as follows:

“Such ready forces will be in addition to those assigned to NATO; they must be properly balanced, sufficiently versatile, suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability, to perform these tasks; and must also, along with those assigned to NATO, be capable of discharging initial tasks in the event of general war.”

(8) Paragraph 35: Delete the first two sentences within the brackets; include the last sentence within the brackets; and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(9)

Insert a new paragraph following paragraph 37, to read as follows:

“Recognizing that the Soviet bloc is at present stressing and effectively utilizing subsersive forces and techniques, the U.S. should strengthen its effort against such forces and techniques by developing and employing in a well-coordinated manner all means at its disposal appropriate to this purpose; specifically including covert operations and other pertinent political, information, economic and military programs and activities. [1 sentence (21 words) not declassified]

and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

(10) Paragraph 41: In the second sentence, after the words “economic growth”, insert “, providing adequate dietary conditions,”; and delete the last sentence of this paragraph and the footnote at the bottom of page 14.

(11)

Paragraph 42: End the first sentence after the words “effectively used”; delete the second sentence; include the sentence in brackets, revised to read as follows:

“The total level of U.S. economic assistance worldwide should, however, be reduced as rapidly as is consistent with U.S. security interests.”

and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(12)

Insert a new paragraph following paragraph 42, to read as follows:

“U.S. financial assistance alone cannot produce satisfactory economic growth in less developed areas, and external assistance should be used in a way to promote and not decrease local incentives and self-help. In addition to the provision of financial assistance, the United States should train indigenous leaders, develop skills, and provide competent advisers. U.S. information, cultural, education and exchange programs should also be strengthened.”

and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

(13) Throughout the paper, substitute “less developed areas” for “underdeveloped areas” wherever these words appear.

(14)

Paragraph 49–b: Reword to read as follows:

“b. The Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures and its total annual revenues into balance, or into substantial balance; and should maintain over-all credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy.”

and delete the footnotes relating to this subparagraph and subparagraph 49–c.

(15) Paragraph 49–d: Substitute for the bracketed sentence the following: “All Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to a necessary minimum.”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(16) Paragraph 53–b: Include the bracketed phrase, substituting “feasible” for “possible”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.

c. Noted and discussed a proposed statement by the President, as read at the meeting, with relation to the purpose, composition, and size of the active armed forces of the United States.

d. Noted that the President had revised his decision, stated in NSC Action No. 1286–b–(2), to read as follows:

“(2) towards a general target for personnel strengths at June 30, 1956 of approximately 2,850,000 (including therein an Air Force personnel strength of 975,000); force and manning levels to be determined after further study.”

Note: NSC 5440/1, as amended, approved by the President and subsequently circulated as NSC 5501. The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense; and a revised page covering NSC Action No. 1286–b–(2) subsequently circulated, to include a footnote referring to the subsequent action in d above.

[Here follow agenda items 2–6.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on January 6.

[2] For text, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 738.

[3] These memoranda transmitted the JCS memoranda of December 17 and 30, cited in footnotes 5 and 6, supra.

[4] NSC Action No. 1286–b–(2), taken at the 228th meeting of the National Security Council on December 14, 1954, noted the President’s decision that the Department of Defense should begin to move toward a general target for personnel strengths of the armed forces of 2,815,000 by June 30, 1956, with an Air Force strength of 975,000 included therein. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) For text of NSC Action No. 1290, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844, footnote 10.

[5] Excerpts from NIE 11–4–54 are printed ibid.,  vol. VIII, p. 1248. NIE 11–6–54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field,” October 5, 1954, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

[6] References in this document to paragraphs of NSC 5440/1 correspond to paragraphs of NSC 5440, printed in Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, p. 806 and of NSC 5501, infra.

[7] Rowland R. Hughes.

[8] Brackets in the source text.

[9] This redraft, dated January 4, was prepared for the Secretary by John C. Campbell of the Policy Planning Staff. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Chronological)

[10] For the full text, see paragraph b (3) in the NSC Action below.

[11] Bracket in the source text.

[12] Brackets in the source text.

[13] Established by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10483 of September 2, 1953 (18 Federal Register 5379), the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was designed to provide a mechanism for coordinated interdepartmental implementation of national security policies adopted by the National Security Council and approved by the President. OCB documents are in Department of State, OCB Files: Lots 62 D 430 and 61 D 385.

[14] Brackets in the source text.

[15] Brackets in the source text.

[16] See footnote 9, supra.

[17] “Current U.S. Policy in the Far East,” December 22, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, p. 1062.

[18] Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.

[19] All brackets in this paragraph are in the source text.

[20] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[21] See footnote 2, Document 3.

[22] An increase of 35,000 from the personnel target set in NSC Action No. 1286–b–(2).

[23] Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1293. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

6. National Security Council Report[1]

Washington, January 7, 1955.

NSC 5501

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCES

A. NSC 162/2

B. NSC 5422/2

C. NSC 5440/1

D. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 20, 1954 and January 3, 1955

E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy”, dated October 11, 1954

F. NSC Actions Nos. 1251, 1272, 1279, 1286, 1290 and 1293 [2]

G. NEE 11–4–54; NIE 11–6–54

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, at the 230th meeting of the Council on January 5, 1955,[3] discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5440/1) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 3, 1955. The Council adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5440/1, subject to the changes set forth in NSC Action No. 1293–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5440/1, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5501, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. As basic policy, this paper has not been referred to any single department or agency for special coordination.

The enclosed statement of policy as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2, and constitutes the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with this basic policy.

James S. Lay, Jr.[4]

[Here follows a one-page table of contents.]

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Section A

Estimate of the Situation

The Soviet-Communist challenge in this era of approaching nuclear plenty constitutes a grave peril to the United States.

I. Relative Communist Bloc and Free World Capabilities

1. Soviet air-atomic capabilities are rapidly increasing. Already the USSR has the capacity to inflict widespread devastion on major free world countries allied to the U.S. and serious damage to the U.S. itself. Over approximately the next five years the USSR will almost certainly develop the net capability to strike a crippling blow at the United States.[5]

2. At present the U.S. can inflict massive damage on the Communist bloc by nuclear striking power. Even when the USSR arrives at the point where it can strike a crippling blow at the U.S., the U.S. will still be able to inflict equal or greater damage on the USSR, provided that it takes adequate measures to protect its effective retaliatory power.

3. The Soviet guided missile program, over the next few years, will bring increasingly longer-range missiles into production. Assuming an intensive effort, the USSR may develop roughly by 1963 (1960 at the earliest) operational intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. program for missiles of this type should approximate this timetable, provided that intensive effort continues. There is no known defense against such missiles at this time.

4. Thus a situation is appoaching in which a total war involving use by both sides of available weapons would bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of both Western civilization and the Soviet system. This situation could create a condition of mutual deterrence, in which each side would be strongly inhibited from deliberately initiating general war or taking actions which it regarded as materially increasing the risk of general war. In any case, war would remain a possibility, if only because of the element of miscalculation by either side or because of a technological break-through by the Soviets leading them to believe they could destroy the U.S. without effective retaliation.

5. The Communist bloc will maintain and further develop formidable conventional forces, with improved combat effectiveness and a large increase in submarines. The principal limitations will be logistic problems and deficiencies in specialized experience, training and equipment.

6. The free world can make substantial progress in building military strength through the continued improvement of NATO forces, the introduction of West German units, some Japanese rearmament, and the progressive development of new weapons systems and of production facilities. Introduction of nuclear weapons into the NATO defense system on the basis of agreed policy will be of crucial importance. Provided that it has the will to do so, the free world coalition has the capacity to maintain sufficient conventional and nuclear military strength and mobility[6] to constitute a major deterrent to Communist military aggression and to maximize the chances of dealing effectively with such aggression if it should occur.

7. The stability of the USSR and its hold over the European satellites are unlikely to be seriously shaken over the next few years, despite measures which the U.S. may find it feasible to take to weaken Soviet control. However, the control system of the USSR will continue to be faced with important problems (such as discontent in the satellites, agricultural difficulties, and pressures for satisfying consumer wants), some of which may be susceptible to a limited degree of exploitation from outside.

8. Communist China is likely to continue vigorous and cohesive, but will face internal problems much greater than those of the USSR. The Sino-Soviet tie probably will remain strong for the next few years not only for ideological reasons but also because it furthers the purposes of both parties.

9. In absolute terms, the growth of the U.S. economy should be greater than that of the USSR; and U.S. productive capacity in 1959 will still be more than twice that of the USSR. Nevertheless, the economic growth of the USSR can be expected to continue at a rate considerably higher than that of the U.S. or of other major free world countries. The difference in growth rates will probably be even greater in the industrial sector, despite some increased Soviet emphasis on agriculture and consumer goods. Moreover, the USSR will be devoting to capital investment, and to uses contributing to war potential, a much greater proportion of its resources.

10. Soviet economic progress, in spite of the fact that Soviet living standards are low compared to those of the U.S., will be for many peoples with lower living standards an impressive example, and will probably constitute an important element in spreading Soviet influence, especially in Asia. Communist China, if its industrialization continues as expected at a rate relatively rapid as compared with that of other Asian countries, will also exert considerable attractive force on Asian peoples, especially if economic improvement in free Asia is slow or non-existent.

11. The existing structure of U.S. alliances can probably be maintained, and could possibly be extended, particularly in the Middle East. However, there will be serious strains on these alliances, especially the ties between the U.S. and its major allies, resulting from growing fears of atomic war on the part of the allies, differing attitudes on China, and greater receptivity by the allies to Soviet overtures. Our allies will probably be more reluctant than the U.S. to participate in actions which appear to them to involve appreciable risks of war in order to prevent further Communist advances in areas which do not directly involve their vital interests.

12. Less developed countries will continue to be a major source of weakness in the position of the free world, owing to such factors as political instability, economic backwardness, extreme nationalism, and the colonial issue. The dangers of subversion will be great, especially in countries under the shadow of Communist power and subject to direct Communist pressures and intervention. In Southeast Asia the present situation is extremely precarious. Failure of the free world to deal more effectively with the problems of less developed areas will weaken the free world and benefit international communism, even in countries where actual Communist take-over is not imminent.

13. As the lines between the Communist bloc and the Western coalition have come to be more clearly drawn over the last few years, a situation has arisen in which any further Communist territorial gain would have an unfavorable impact within the free world that might be out of all proportion to the strategic or economic significance of the territory lost.

II Probable Soviet and Chinese Communist Intentions and Strategy

14. The USSR has not modified its basic hostility toward the non-Communist world, and especially toward the U.S. as the power center of that world, or its belief in the ultimate triumph of Communism. The Soviet leaders can be expected to seek constantly, by every means they find advantageous, to extend Communist power and to weaken those forces, especially U.S. power and influence, which they regard as inexorable enemies of their system. However, they will almost certainly avoid pursuing their long-term goals in ways which jeopardize the security of the regime or their control of the Communist bloc. Soviet objectives can be listed as follows, in descending order of importance:

a. The security of the regime and of the USSR.

b. Maintaining the Soviet hold on the European satellites, and keeping China within the Communist bloc.

c. Elimination of U.S. influence from Eurasia, and the isolation of the U.S.

d. Expansion of Soviet Communist power throughout Eurasia.

e. Elimination of the U.S. as a competing power center.

f. The spread of Communism throughout the world.[7]

15. The Chinese Communist regime remains bitterly hostile to the U.S., and ostensibly committed to the conquest of Formosa. It will attempt to expand its power on the mainland of Asia and to expel U.S. power and influence therefrom. In pursuit of this end, it probably will place primary emphasis on penetration and support of subversion in neighboring countries.

16. Provided that the U.S. and free world have at all times an adequate military posture and the necessary determination, it appears unlikely that, within the next five years, the USSR or Communist China will deliberately initiate war, or engage in overt military aggression if in its judgment such aggression would involve appreciable risk of war with the U.S.[8] They will try to avoid courses of action which in their judgment will clearly involve such risk. However, they probably would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking military counter-action against Western actions considered to be an imminent threat to their security. Moveover, general war might occur as the climax of a series of actions and counter-actions which neither side originally intended to lead to that result.

17. The emergence of increased flexibility in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy since the death of Stalin has introduced a significant new factor in the situation. The Soviet leaders have almost certainly regarded their “peace offensive” as their most effective present tactic for dividing the free world and isolating the U.S. from its allies. A principal aim has been to prevent the rearmament of West Germany in association with the Western Powers. If the Paris agreements are ratified, the Soviets may revert to a more uncompromising and menacing posture. On the other hand, the “soft” line may further be motivated by domestic preoccupation and fear of general war, and the Soviets may, therefore, desire an extended period of reduced tensions, without sacrificing their basic security interests. Even should that be the case, Soviet policy will mainly seek tacit understanding not to resort to force to change the present territorial division between the Communist bloc and the free world. In any event, whatever Soviet concessions are made will, for some time, almost certainly be confined to relatively minor issues. Although it appears very unlikely, the Soviet leaders might be led by the fear of nuclear destruction to accept an effective system of armaments control, with whatever changes would thereby be required in their present practices and concepts.[9]

18. Whenever the Soviet “soft” line is dominant, our allies will be eager to explore it seriously, and will probably wish, in seeking a basis of “coexistence”, to go to further lengths than the U.S. will find prudent. Even if the USSR offers no real concessions, these tendencies will probably persist, supported by large segments of public opinion. It will be a major task, therefore, to maintain the necessary unity and resolution in the free world coalition whenever and wherever the Soviets press their “peace offensive”.

19. Despite the talk of “coexistence”, the Communist powers will continue strenuous efforts to weaken and disrupt free-world strength and unity and to expand the area of their control, principally by subversion (including the support of insurrection), while avoiding involvement of the main sources of Communist power. This strategy will probably present the free world with its most serious challenge and greatest danger in the next few years.

20. Attainment by the USSR of the capacity to inflict crippling damage on the U.S. almost certainly would not tempt the Soviets to initiate general war, unless they believed that they could neutralize, or by initial surprise could destroy, U.S. retaliatory power before it could be used. They will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be likely to be subjected even to limited nuclear attack. After attaining atomic plenty, however, the Communist powers probably will increase the pace of their attempts at progressive local expansion, supported by force or threat of force, provided they estimate that such action can succeed and will not provoke U.S. counteraction involving appreciable risk of general war.[10]

Section B

Outline of U.S. National Strategy

21. The basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions.

22. The basic threat to U.S. security is posed by the hostile policies and power, including growing nuclear power, of the Soviet-Communist bloc, with its international Communist apparatus.

23. The basic problem confronting the U.S. is how, without undermining fundamental U.S. values and institutions or seriously weakening the U.S. economy, to meet and ultimately to diminish this threat to U.S. security.

24.

In meeting this threat, the U.S. must choose between two main lines of policy, aimed respectively at:

a. Destroying the power of the Soviet-Communist bloc; or

b. Modifying the policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc along lines more compatible with U.S. security interests.

Either policy would include action to disrupt or neutralize the international Communist apparatus in the free world.

25. The U.S. and its allies have no foreseeable prospect of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of reducing Soviet armed strength—the core of Communist power—or of significantly reducing other basic Communist military strength, except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation by the U.S. of such action for this purpose is not an acceptable course either to the U.S. or its major allies.

26. Hence, U.S policies must be designed to affect the conduct of the Communist regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests and to encourage tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:

a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S. security.

b. Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of interest and common purpose, and the necessary will, strength and stability, to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of free peoples.

c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:

(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and

(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy.

27. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. Programs for the general strategy between now and the time when the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency.

28. Provided that it is resolutely pursued, this general strategy offers the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of the Soviet bloc-free world conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment. Failure resolutely to pursue this gerneral strategy could, within a relatively short span of years, place the U.S. in great jeopardy.

Section C

Elements of National Strategy

I. Military Problem

29. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the U.S. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of total nuclear war, the possibility of local conflicts developing into total war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interests: that it will not pay.

30. If this purpose is to be achieved, the U.S. and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop. In addition, the U.S. and its major allies must show that they are united in their determination to use military force against such aggression.

31. As part of its military forces, the U.S. must develop and maintain its effective nuclear-air retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The U.S. must also continue accelerated military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

32. The United States must also have other ready forces, which, together with those of its allies, must be sufficient (a) to help deter any resort to local aggression, or (b) to punish swiftly and severely any such local aggression, in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into total nuclear war. Such ready forces will be in addition to those assigned to NATO; they must be properly balanced, sufficiently versatile, suitably deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability, to perform these tasks; and must also, along with those assigned to NATO, be capable of discharging initial tasks in the event of general war.

33. Such a policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other free world countries, in furnishing bases for U.S. military power, especially strategic air, and in providing their share of military forces. To succeed, the basic strategy and policy of the U.S. must be believed by our appropriate major allies generally to serve their security as well as ours. Thus, it is important for the United States to take the necessary steps to convince them that such is the case, to strengthen the collective defense system, and to utilize, where appropriate, the possibilities of collective action through the UN. In addition, the United States should continue to provide military and other assistance to dependable allied nations where such assistance is necessary to enable them to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power.

34. The ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will of the free world to resist aggression. As the fear of nuclear war grows, the United States and its allies must never allow themselves to get into the position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation. However, the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use will best advance U.S. security interests. In the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.

35. The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word or conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war. At the same time the United States and its major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war, and the United States must make clear its determination to prevail if general war eventuates.

II Strengthening the Free World

36. The United States should place more stress than heretofore on building the strength and cohesion of the free world, and take adequate actions for the purpose of (a) creating cohesion within and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily improving the relative position of the free world; and (b) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the free world. Success in these endeavors will depend heavily on the degree to which the U.S. and its major allies can attain agreement on basic objectives and actions to achieve them.

37. Direct action against the Communist apparatus must rest largely with the local governments concerned, although the U.S. should be able to help significantly, chiefly through covert means. In countries vulnerable to subversion, the U.S. should, as one of its objectives, assist in the development of adequate internal security forces. In case of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control, the U.S. should take all feasible political, economic, and covert measures to thwart it, and, it appropriate, should take military action, if required to cope with the situation.

38. Recognizing that the Soviet bloc is at present stressing and effectively utilizing subversive forces and techniques, the US. should strengthen its effort against such forces and techniques by developing and employing in a well-coordinated manner all means at its disposal appropriate to this purpose, specifically including covert operations and other pertinent political information, economic, and military programs and activities. [1 sentence (22 words) not declassified]

39. The existence of conditions in the free world which the Communists can exploit makes it very difficult for the free world to overcome its divisions, fears, and weaknesses. In many cases, the U.S. faces the choice of (a) taking timely action to help remedy such conditions, or of (b) allowing the situation to deteriorate with the prospect of later trying to prevent Communist gains by more costly and less certain measures, or even military action. The ability of the free world, over the long pull, to meet the challenge and competition of the Communist world will depend in large measure on the capacity to demonstrate progress toward meeting the basic needs and aspirations of its peoples.

40. Two of the basic problems in the economic field are: (a) industrialized areas require further economic growth and expanded trade; and (b) the less developed areas seek to develop and modernize their economies and must also maintain a substantial volume of exports of primary products. It should be within the capacity of the free world, with U.S. initiative and leadership, to turn these two problems into mutually supporting assets for the promotion of appropriate economic strength and growth.

41. A necessary condition for such strength and growth is a high level of international trade within the free world. In order to foster this, the U.S. (a) should continue to press strongly for a general reduction of trade barriers; (b) must take the lead by reducing further its own tariff level over the next few years; and (c) should also support sound moves to widen the convertibility of currencies.

42. The dangers to free world stability are particularly acute in the less developed areas. The task of speeding up their economic growth, providing adequate dietary conditions, and promoting stability presents a multitude of problems, political and social as well as economic. For example, it calls for some changes in traditional habits and attitudes and for greatly expanded training in administrative and technical skills. In any case, new capital investment is a prerequisite to growth. Local capital will have to be supplemented by the provision of capital from abroad. In addition to external public and private investment and IBRD loans, substantial financing from U.S. public funds (including the Export-Import Bank) will be necessary, in some cases over an extended period, to help achieve the economic progress essential to U.S. interests.

43. In order to promote conditions of sound development in less developed areas the United States should be prepared to use economic means available to it where (a) such action serves U.S. objectives, (b) such development cannot be financed by local or other foreign capital, and (c) such assistance will be effectively used. The total level of U.S. economic assistance worldwide should, however, be reduced as rapidly as is consistent with U.S. security interests.

44. U.S. financial assistance alone cannot produce satisfactory economic growth in less developed areas, and external assistance should be used in a way to promote and not decrease local incentives and self-help. In addition to the provision of financial assistance, the United States should train indigenous leaders, develop skills, and provide competent advisers. U.S. information, cultural, education and exchange programs should also be strengthened.

45. U.S. political policies must be adapted to conditions prevailing in each less developed area. The U.S. should not exert pressure to make active allies of those not so included. The U.S. should provide assistance on the basis of the willingness and ability of countries to strengthen and defend their independence against Communist expansion rather than on their formal alignment with the U.S. As far as possible, the U.S. should attempt to work with rather than against those forces, such as constructive nationalist and reform movements, which are likely to remain powerful over a long period.

46. Where disputes and tensions between free nations threaten to impair free world strength and cohesion, the U.S. should exert its best efforts to help settle them or at least moderate their effects. In addition to efforts to settle specific current controversies, the U.S. should develop long-term policies to deal with deep-seated problems (such as those involved in the evolution of colonial peoples).

III. Political Strategy Against the Communist Bloc

47. The U.S. should develop a political strategy against the Communist bloc designed (a) to reduce the likelihood of aggression, (b) to influence, in ways favorable to U.S. and free world interests, decisions and developments within the Communist bloc, such as toward greater emphasis on internal problems, and (c) to foster long-run trends which might lead to basic changes in the outlook or character of Communist regimes.

48. In pursuing this strategy, the U.S. should seek (a) to convince the Communist regimes that alternatives exist to their present policies which would be acceptable to the U.S. and which they might come to consider compatible with their basic security interests, (b) to give to the Communist regimes a clear conception of the true U.S. and free world purposes and uncompromising determination to resist Communist aggressive moves, and (c) to exploit, in ways consistent with this strategy, differences within the Soviet system or between the USSR and other members of the Communist bloc.

49. The U.S. should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby.

50. In applying this strategy to Communist China, the U.S. must take account of non-recognition of the regime and the regime’s recent and continuing aggressive policies. However, the U.S. should be ready to participate in talks including Communist China on specific subjects on an ad hoc basis, where the general objectives mentioned in connection with negotiations with the USSR would be served thereby.

IV. Domestic Strength

51. Sound U.S. Economy

a. A strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy is essential to the security and stability of the free world. The level of expenditures for national security programs must take into full account the danger to the U.S. and its allies resulting from impairment, through inflation or the undermining of incentives, of the basic soundness of the U.S. economy or of the continuing expansion of the U.S. economy under a free enterprise system.

b. The Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures and its total annual revenues into balance, or into substantial balance; and should maintain overall credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy.

c. Nevertheless, the U.S. must continue to meet the necessary costs of the programs essential for its security.

d. All Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to a necessary minimum. Every effort should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal Government.

e. The United States should also seek (1) to maintain a higher and expanding rate of economic activity at relatively stable price levels, and (2) to maximize the economic potential of private enterprise by minimizing governmental controls and regulations and by encouraging private enterprise to develop natural and technological resources (e.g., nuclear power).

52.

Internal Security

Internal security measures should be adequate to meet the threat to U.S. security of covert attack by the Soviet bloc on the United States by means of sabotage, subversion, espionage, and particularly the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons.

53.

Civil Defense

An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is an improved and strengthened civil defense program which seeks to minimize damage from nuclear attack by both preventive and ameliorative measures.

54. Support by U.S. Citizens

a. No national strategy to meet the Soviet threat can be successful without the support of the American people. During a time of increasing Soviet atomic power, the determination of U.S. citizens to face the risks involved in carrying out such national strategy will be of increasing importance. Continuing efforts should be made to inform the American people of the demands on their spiritual and material resources necessary to ensure U.S. security during a period of armed truce, which may either continue for many years or be broken by an atomic war.

b. Eternal vigilance is necessary in carrying out the national strategy, to prevent the intimidation of free criticism. Necessary protective measures should not be used to destroy national unity, which must be based on freedom and not on fear.

V. Other National Security Measures

55. Mobilization Base

a. Essential to the strong security posture required by the national strategy is a mobilization base adequate to maintain military readiness and to provide the basis for successful prosecution of general war, based on (1) an approved military plan, (2) allowance for estimated bomb damage, and (3) a determination as to U.S. provision of allied material requirements.

b. The U.S. should continue to seek to achieve as quickly as feasible minimum stockpile objectives for materials the shortage of which would affect critically essential security programs. The stockpiling program should not normally be used to help stabilize international markets for exports of less developed countries; exceptions being made only on a case-by-case basis where there would be clear net advantage to the U.S.[11]

56.

Intelligence

The United States should develop and maintain an intelligence system capable of:

a. Collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world.

b. Accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic and subversive courses of action affecting U.S. security.

c. Forecasting potential foreign developments having a bearing on U.S. national security.

57.

Manpower

The United States should develop an adequate manpower program designed to:

a. Expand scientific and technical training.

b. Provide an equitable military training system.

c. Strike a feasible balance between the needs of an expanding peacetime economy and defense requirements.

d. Provide for an appropriate distribution of services and skills in the event of national emergency.

58.

Research and Development

The United States should conduct and foster scientific research and development so as to ensure superiority in quantity and quality of weapons system, with attendant continuing review of the level and composition of forces and of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for successful prosecution of general war.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5501. Top Secret.

[2] Taken by the National Security Council at its 218th meeting on October 22, 1954, NSC Action No. 1251 noted an oral presentation by Cutler of the principal elements of existing basic national security policy and the procedures for review of that policy, and indicated that each member was to submit for consideration at the November 18 NSC meeting the changes that he thought should be made in the language of the existing basic policy statement. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) For text of NSC Action No. 1272, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954 , vol. II, Part 1, p. 800, footnote 12. For text of NSC Action No. 1279, see ibid.,  p. 806, footnote 4. Regarding NSC Action Nos. 1286 and 1290, see footnote 4, supra. Regarding NSC Action No. 1293, see footnote 23, supra.

[3] See supra.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[5] The Director of the Bureau of the Budget notes that the net capability estimate prepared by the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee in accordance with NSC 5423 did not cover the period beyond July 1, 1957. [Footnote in the source text. The net capability estimate was presented at the 222d meeting of the National Security Council, November 4, 1954; a copy of the memorandum of discussion is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Regarding NSC 5423, see footnote 4, Document 1.]

[6] The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe this clause should read “… maintain sufficient conventional armed strength, including the capability for adequate and timely reinforcement, along with U.S. strategic nuclear striking power,…” [Footnote with ellipses in the source text.]

[7] The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose adding the following sentence to subparagraph f: “In this connection Latin America should be viewed as a prime Soviet target and one most sensitive to U.S. interests.” [Foonote in the source text.]

[8] An important possible exception to this estimate is a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. The Chinese Communists will almost certainly increase their probing actions against the Nationalist-held off-shore islands and will probably try to seize them, if they believe this can be done without bringing on major hostilities with the U.S. A further possibility of Communist aggression is a Viet Minh attack on South Vietnam in the event the 1956 elections are blocked by Western action. [Footnote in the source text.]

[9] The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe this paragraph over-stresses the significance of the present Soviet “soft” tactics as indicative of a possible basic shift in the Soviet policy; the Soviets have recently demonstrated that this “soft” tactic is subject to radical reversal whenever it suits their interest. [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] The State, Treasury and Budget members believe that the sentence should read: “Even after attaining atomic plenty, the Communist powers probably will not attempt progressive local expansion, supported by force or the threat of force, unless they estimate that (1) such methods can succeed and will not provoke U.S. counteraction involving appreciable risk of general war, and (2) fear of atomic war will drive the allies of the U.S. in the direction of neutrality toward or appeasement of the USSR.” [Footnote in the source text.]

[11] For subsequent modification of paragraph 55–b of NSC 5501, see Document 50.

7. Editorial Note

On January 27, the National Security Council, at its 234th meeting, adopted NSC 5502, “U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities,” January 11, and NSC 5505, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” January 18. (NSC Actions No. 1315 and 1314, respectively; Department of State S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The amended reports were approved by the President on January 31 and circulated as NSC 5502/1 and NSC 5505/1. For texts, see volume XXIV, pages 11 and 19.

8. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty)[1]

Washington, February 1, 1955.

In at 8:15. Legislative Leaders meeting at 8:30 with the following in attendance: The President, the Vice President; Senators Knowland, Millikin, Saltonstall, Bridges; Congressmen Martin, Halleck, Arends, Allen; White House staff.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Bridges started off a discussion when he asked the President how he would recommend the Senators handle the Ridgway testimony of yesterday[2] when Ridgway said that the cuts in Army personnel would jeopardize to a degree the security of the United States.

The President, in reply, launched into a long and exceedingly emphatic discussion of this question which ran as follows:

“Gentlemen, Ridgway is Chief of Staff of the Army. When he is called up on the Hill and asked for personal convictions, he has got to give them. Each Service has as its head and has traditionally had as its head, people who think that their service is the only service that can ultimately save the Unites States in time of war. They all want additional manpower and they always will. But we must realize that as Commander–in–Chief, I have to make the final decisions. I have to look at this whole question of the military establishment as one which must be kept in balance. I have to consider—which the heads of the services do not—the very delicate balance between the national debt, taxes and expenditures. I have to decide what is necessary for adequate security. If I had all the money I wanted right now, I wouldn’t use that money to keep 300,000 men in the Army. I would use it for other purposes. Why, even from the question of the defense of the United States I would much rather put that money into new highways and roads so that we could get around this country in a hurry in case of attack.

“You see, actually, the only thing we fear is an atomic attack delivered by air on our cities. Suppose that attack were to occur tomorrow on fifteen of our cities. God damn it? It would be perfect rot to talk about shipping troops abroad when fifteen of our cities were in ruins. You would have disorder and almost complete chaos in the cities and in the roads around them. You would have to restore order and who is going to restore it? Do you think the police and fire departments of those cities could restore order? Nuts! That order is going to have to be restored by disciplined armed forces. It’s going to have to be restored by our military forces and by our Reserve. That’s what our military is going to be doing in the first days of an all-out atomic attack. They are going to have to restore order and get our production going again. Anyone who thinks we are going to immediately ship out of this country division after division is just talking through his hat. It couldn’t be done and if I tried to do it, you would want to impeach me. That’s the trouble with Ridgway. He’s talking theory—I’m trying to talk sound sense. He did the same thing at shape. I was there before Ridgway went over and he tried to ruin it with the same sort of talk. We have to have a sound base here at home. We have got to restore order and our productivity before we do anything else. That’s why in our military thinking today we have to put emphasis on two or three things first. One—we have to maintain a strong striking retaliatory air force and secondly, we have to build up our warning system so that we can receive as much advance notice as possible of any attack.

“What do you people think would happen if this city were hit today by an H-bomb? Do you think you would vote or ask me to send the troops at Fort Meade overseas—or would you be knocking on my door to get me to bring them in to try to pick up the pieces here in Washington? We have to do that. All our military plans are based really on two main things—One, to destroy the enemy’s production and two, protect your own. To do that we need not just more men. We need more equipment, an expanded air force and an expanded warning system.”

As the President was talking, you could hear a pin drop in the room. He pounded the table quite a few times for emphasis, and everyone in the room, I am sure, realized both the seriousness of the situation and the President’s arguments.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Diary Series.

[2] Given at a January 31 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee.

9. Report by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee[1]

Washington, February 14, 1955.

MEETING THE THREAT OF SURPRISE ATTACK

[Here follow the undated letter of transmittal from the steering committee of the Technological Capabilities Panel to the President, a preface outlining the objectives and scope of the study, and a table of contents.]

Part I

SURPRISE: ITS NEW IMPORTANCE AND MEANING

[Here follow sections 1–3 entitled, “The Threat,” “The New Importance of Surprise,” and “The Revolution in Weapons: Its Nature and Significance.”]

4. A Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia

In order to clarify the effects of evolving technology on our military position relative to Russia, we have constructed a timetable showing the pattern of change that seems inherent in the developing weapons technology over the next decade or so.

This timetable reflects a careful evaluation of the present status and future trend of military technology, particularly the technology of air-atomic power. It also assumes the correctness of the current national intelligence estimates of the corresponding Soviet air-atomic power. It is obvious that a serious error in these estimates of Russian capabilities would destroy the foundations on which this timetable is constructed. At present we see no better alternative than to base our assumptions on these estimates.

A framework of this kind, showing the changes possible in our position relative to the USSR, is of fundamental importance in analyzing the problem of surprise, in planning our program of military technology, and in the formulation of broad national policy with respect to national security and to our relations with the USSR. The periods and possibilities described below must be considered in our planning if we are to give proper weight to the technological factors.

Period I—The Present Phase

Because of our air-atomic power we have an offensive advantage but are vulnerable to surprise attack.

Characteristcs

1. Because of the strength of SAC and our large capability in atomic bombs, the striking power of U.S. is great relative to USSR.

2. We do not yet have large multimegation capability.

3. No reliable U.S. early warning; our defense system is inadequate; therefore SAC is vulnerable and U.S. is open to surprise attack.

4. Evidence is accumulating that Soviets are developing their long-range delivery capability.

Effects

A. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviets can mount an air strike against the other that would surely be decisive.[2] The U.S., however, could mount a sustained air offensive that would inflict massive damage and would probably be conclusive in a general War.

B. Because of our vulnerability, Soviets might be tempted to try a surprise attack. They might be so tempted in order to attack before we achieve a large multimegaton capability.

Period II (Starting 1956/57—Ending 1958/60)

We will have a very great offensive advantage relative to USSR and will be less vulnerable than previously to surprise attack.

Characteristics

1. We will have achieved substantial numbers of multimegaton weapons in addition to our large stockpile of atomic bombs. Soviets will not have.

2. Some improvement in Russian delivery capability.

3. Both Russia and the U.S. are achieving increased defense capability but both continue vulnerable to surprise attack.

Effects

A. Our deterrent power greatly increased; our military power relative to that of Russia at its maximum. The U.S. can mount a decisive air strike; the USSR cannot. In the event of conflict the U.S. would be severely damaged, but would emerge a battered victor even if the USSR mounted a surprise attack on the U.S.

B. Because the U.S. will have a substantial stockpile of multimegaton weapons and the ability to deliver them on target, this is a period, possibly of short duration, when the U.S. will possess great relative military strength. Our military superiority may never be so great again.

An intensive study should be undertaken to determine what diplomatic and political policies will be most appropriate during Period II to turn it to our best advantage and to the advantage of the free world. These policies should recognize that any war which might occur would result in severe damage to the U.S. despite our great relative strength.

Period III

This is a period of transition from Period II to Period IV involving the occurrence in some order of the following characteristics:

Characteristics

1. The development by the Soviets of a multimegaton capability. The firing of a multimegaton weapon would be positive evidence that the Soviets have begun to develop a capability with this weapon. The absence of such an explosion is not positive assurance that they have not begun to develop this capability. Although possible, the stockpiling of multimegaton bombs would be improbable without a test firing. The Russian test firing of August 1953 was not conclusive evidence of their ability to make a modern multimegaton weapon.

2. The availability to the Soviets of a large number of high-performance jet aircraft capable of reaching U.S. targets.

3. Substantial strengthening of U.S. defenses, including the achievement of an effective continental defense system and the reduction of the vulnerability of our strategic delivery systems.

4. Continued improvement in U.S. delivery capabilities, probably offset to some extent by further improvement in Russian defense.

These four characteristics will occur somewhat gradually so that overlap in time is almost inevitable.

Effects

A. If our defenses against conventional attack are strengthened before the USSR has attained a multimegaton capability and adequate delivery forces, the deterrent power of the U.S. is increased. From the standpoint of military strength, this would continue to be a phase favorable to the U.S.

B. Deterrent effect of U.S. power dangerously lessened if Soviet production of multimegaton weapons and an adequate conventional delivery capability is achieved prior to the development of an adequate U.S. warning and defense system and before we have achieved a reduction of the vulnerability of our strategic delivery systems. Under these conditions, Soviet possession of such weapons and delivery capabilities would place the U.S. in danger of surprise attack and possible defeat.

This situation might develop as early as 1958. If we permit our military position to worsen to this extent, we will be in a poor position to ward off Russion political and diplomatic moves or to make such moves of our own.

Period IV (Indefinite in length; possibly beginning within a decade)

An attack by either side would result in mutual destruction.

This is the period when both the U.S. and Russia will be in a position from which neither country can derive a winning advantage, because each country will possess enough multimegaton weapons and adequate means of delivering them, either by conventional or more sophisticated methods, through the defenses then existing. The ability to achieve surprise will not affect the outcome because each country will have the residual offensive power to break through the defenses of the other country and destroy it regardless of whether the other country strikes first.

The intercontinental ballistic missile can profoundly affect the military posture of either country with respect to Period III and Period IV. If the U.S. were to achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capability first, it could maintain that position of advantage, described in III–A above, so long as the Soviets did not have this missile capability. If the Russians achieve an intercontinental ballistic missile capability first, they might gain a comparable position of advantage.

Period IV is so fraught with danger to the U.S. that we should push all promising technological development so that we may stay in Periods II and III–A as long as possible, and, if we pass into Period IV, may escape from it into another period resembling II or III–A.

It is recognized that Period IV would be a period of instability that might easily be upset by either side and that a world catastrophe might occur.

Should we arrive at a condition where the contest is drawn and neither contestant can derive military advantage (i.e., Period IV), we need not assume that this state is unchangeable or that one country or the other cannot move again into a position of relative advantage. We see no certainty, however, that the condition of stalemate can be changed through science and technology. This does not mean that some now unimagined weapon or development, far afield from any present weapons system, might not provide an advantage to one side or the other.

Implications of the Timetable

The periods of relative military strength which we have delineated reflect our own appraisal of the technological, intelligence, and military factors affecting our military position in relation to that of Russia. While we originally had other objectives in constucting the table it is apparent that it has implications for our diplomatic policy and international negotiations. It seems clear, for example, that Period II (also Period III–A) may be from the standpoint of relative military strength a very favorable period for political moves and diplomatic negotiations.

We emphasize that even though our relative military strength may change in the manner suggested in the table, we still remain in a position where the United States can be grievously hurt.

The timetable points up other urgencies in our program. We must press forward in the United States to fill the gaps and correct the weaknesses in our offense and defense. Our capacity to maintain a position of advantage will depend upon our carrying through, thoroughly and without delays, the remedies already available, authorized, or planned to overcome present weaknesses.

We must also press forward to develop more sophisticated offenses and defenses. We must constantly seek new technological breakthroughs that will bring about significant advances in our military power. The Russians will certainly do everything possible to achieve an advantage by searching for big advances in their weapons technology.

In the succeeding parts of this report, we have sought to point out the places where we need to carry through, to expedite, and to complete currently accepted improvements in our weapons systems which will provide new strength in both offense and defense. We have sought to suggest the new decisions, undertakings, and developments which we believe to be important to the continued buildup of our military strength. We have tried to pick up those promising developments that might be important new advances in technology and in intelligence. All these things that we analyze, report upon, and recommend are designed to keep us in a position of advantage in terms of the timetable we have constructed.

[Here follow sections 5–13 entitled “Nuclear Striking Power,” “Defense of North America,” “Overseas Communication: Information and Early Warning,” “Intelligence,” “Maintaining Alertness,” “Need for Skilled Military Manpower,” “Strategic Planning and Technology,” “Toward a Weapons Spectrum for Limited Wars,” and “A Sense of Urgency without Despair.”]

Part II

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. General Recommendations

We recommend that:

1. After review by the President and the National Security Council of the “Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia,” consideration be given to the recommendation in this timetable that an intensive study be undertaken to determine what diplomatic and political policies will be most appropriate during Period II to turn it to our best advantage and to the advantage of the free world. (See pages 10 through 13, Part I.)[3]

2. The National Security Council formally recognize the present Air Force program for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile as a nationally suported effort of highest priority.

3. Actions be taken to permit the present unacceptable ground vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command to be reduced more rapidly. We recommend, further, that the emergency measures, discussed on page 68 of Part III,[4] be carefully examined by the National Security Council in relation to the immediacy of the threat.

4. The National Security Council examine the specific recommendations we have made for strengthening our continental defenses with a view to incorporating them in an early revision of NSC 5408.[5]

5. The National Security Council examine the technical, procedural and personal links by which early warnings are translated into responsive national action. We recommend, further, that a mechanism be established within the Executive Office of the President for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of readiness tests.

6. The National Security Council establish policies and take actions which will permit the full exploitation of the intelligence and other advantages which can be made available to us through the establishment of stations on the polar pack ice, particularly on the Eurasian rim.

7.

The National Security Council initiate preparatory studies of the problems of international negotiation in the following areas growing out of recommendations of this report.

a. Atomic Weapons in Air Defense. Negotiations with Canada to provide our air defense forces with authority to use atomic warheads over Canada.

b. Extension of the Planned Early Warning Line. International negotiations for the seaward extension of the Distant Early Warning Line from Greenland via Iceland and the Faroes, to join future NATO warning systems.

c. Remote Sea Monitor Line. International negotiations for the installation of a submerged, sea traffic monitor line extending from Greenland to Iceland and to the United Kingdom.

8. A re-examination be made of U.S.-Canadian continental defense relationships with a view toward bringing about still more effective cooperation between the two countries.

9. A re-examination be made of the following principles or practices of international law from the standpoint of recent advances in weapons technology:

a. Freedom of the Seas. Radical extension of the “three-mile limit” to permit control of surface and subsurface traffic from the coastline to beyond the likely striking range of sea-launched nuclear missiles.

b. [remainder of paragraph (4½ lines of source text) not declassified]

10.

An agency be established, or designated, having responsibility for investigating the reliability of the overseas communications networks, and for planning and promoting technical and other improvements needed to achieve a considerable reduction in the vulnerability of our overseas communications.

We recommend, further, that a communications office be established, or designated, having responsibility for the continuous collection and evaluation of information on the current performance of all vital links of the overseas communications networks; and that this, or a related office, have responsibility for coordinating the rapid interchange and rerouting of traffic in the event of widespread interference with our communications.

11. A study group be appointed to undertake an exhaustive examination of the techniques and the weapons technology for peripheral wars. Such a technical study might be but a part of a more comprehensive examination of the peripheral war problem.

12. A study, as a follow-up to this present report, be sponsored by the Executive Office of the President within two years. The technology of national defense is dynamic in nature and requires continual review and evaluation to take into account international and political, as well as technological change.

2. Specific Recommendations

A For Still Further Strengthening Our Striking Power, we recommend that:

1. The development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (with about 5500 nautical mile range and megaton warhead) continue to receive the very substantial support necessary to complete it at the earliest possible date.

2. There be developed a ballistic missile (with about 1500 nautical mile range and megaton warhead) for strategic bombardment; both land-basing and ship-basing should be considered.

3. The program for the development of high energy aircraft fuels, and propulsion systems capable of using them, be approved and receive strong support.

4. Supplies of high energy aircraft fuels adequate for development and testing of engines and equipment be manufactured and made available at an early date.

5. The program directed toward development of aircraft nuclear propulsion systems continue to receive strong support and that the program include a propulsion system for bombers.

6. The Strategic Air Command be provided additional bases in numbers sufficient to permit its bombers to be airborne towards target within the warning interval, as well as to limit to a reasonable number the bombers at risk at each base.

7. The new significance of the striking power of small aircraft, which would come with the availability of lightweight megaton bombs in quantity, be taken into account in future planning.

8. The Department of Defense conduct further studies and experimentation to determine the feasibility of a seaplane nuclear bomber force.

9. As a first step in comparing the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the United States and the USSR in a possible nuclear air war, a comprehensive comparison of U.S. and USSR Bravo, Romeo, and Delta target systems be undertaken in the context of a single symmetric study, using common terms of reference and a common framework of analysis.

10. For planning purposes, the maximum yield per weight of nuclear weapons be taken as [7 words not declassified].

11. For U.S. defense planning purposes, it be considered technically feasible for the USSR to deliver, by ship or by submarine, very large and heavy, though expensive, bombs having yields up to about [2 words not declassified],

12. For U.S. defenses planning purposes, it should be considered technically feasible for the USSR to construct, for clandestine introduction into the United States, nuclear bombs having yields as high as megatons.

13. Current studies directed toward better understanding of the radiological hazards that may result from the detonation of large numbers of nuclear weapons be continued.

14. Plans for the military use of nuclear bombs should not at this time be restrained because of the long-term radiological hazard.

B. For Strengthening Our Continental Defense

Recommendations Essentially Covered in NSC 5408[6]

1. We endorse the planned Distant Early Warning line, including the seaward portions, and urge its installation without delaying for technical or geographic refinements. We recommend early installation of the proposed extension of the North Canada Line to Greenland and shifting to the northern terminus of the Atlantic extension from Newfoundland to Greenland, in accordance with the suggestion of CONAD.

2.

We endorse the planned additions of long-range radars and gap-filler radars to the continental United States and Canadian radar nets, including extensions of contiguous radar coverage to seaward (Atlantic and Pacific).

Recommendations for Extending or Changing Emphasis in NSC 5408[7]

3. We recommend that nuclear warheads be adopted as the major armament for our air defense forces and that this step be implemented by:

a. Expeditious development, procurement, and deployment of sufficient weapons to provide a high kill capability at an early date.

b. Commencement of negotiations with Canada to provide defense forces with authority for instant use of atomic warheads wherever needed over Canada.

c. Use of the high-altitude shot at the next atomic test series as a springboard for a public information program with the dual objective of allaying possible civilian fears and informing our enemies and allies that we are using our atomic capabilities for defensive purposes.

4. We recommend an intensified effort to create effective defenses at low and very high altitudes, and a broadened attack on the basic technical problems involved. Important elements of this program are (specific recommendations are given in Part IV, Sections 3 and 5):[8]

a. Interim rules, pending completion of the warning and continental radar nets, to keep Nike batteries in alert status and free to fire on aircraft above a predetermined altitude.

b. Firm planning for the evolution of a radar net to match the needs and capabilities of the SAGE system.

c. Further development of air-to-air and ground-to-air nuclear weapons.

d. Development of interception systems and tactics specifically for high-altitude combat.

e. A bold attack on the critical problems of fire control and guidance for combat at low altitudes.

f. Accelerated development of specific low-altitude weapon systems.

g. A broad program of research and development in the field of radar.

h. An extensive and realistic study of the technical and tactical innovations needed to fight an air battle in the presence of determined enemy jamming and electronic cover.

i. A greatly enlarged program of field and operational trials and experiments to support the developments and investigations recommended.

5. We recommend that defenses against attack from or over the sea be—in plan, organization, and operation—an integral and coordinate part of the over-all continental defenses; this can be achieved only if the responsibilities, missions, and means now under the authorities of CONAD, CinCLant, and CinCPac are coordinated for joint action.

6. We recommend that programs for submarine detection and surveillance systems be advanced and modified as follows:

a. [remainder of paragraph (2½ lines of source text) not declassified]

b. [remainder of paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

7. We recommend that a positive program to invigorate our non-military defenses be instituted by:

a. Immediate initiation by the Federal Civil Defense Administration of a study of the casualties expected from typical thermonuclear attacks under various conditions of evacuation and shelter. This study, which should be made by a group with access to all necessary classified data, should point out at an early date the factors influencing the proper balance between shelters and evacuation and provide data for individual community planning.

b. Prompt formulation of a new national civil defense policy designed to cope with the new threat from thermonuclear weapons and radioactive fall-out from surface bursts.

c. Clear statements of this policy by the President and other high government officials, informing the public of the nature of the threat, the anticipated effects of thermonuclear weapons and the defense measures designed to give all individuals maximum opportunity for survival. These statements should provide the leadership required to five public assurance that, when this policy is implemented, megaton bomb attacks will not produe national collapse.

d. Re-examination and re-statement of the proper relationships that must exist between civil and military authorities in order to cope with the disaster conditions that may follow a large-scale attack.

e. Providing the Federal Civil Defense Administration with authority and the necessary funds to carry out an orderly and continuous research and development program designed to solve its own particular problems.

f. Further attention to measures to reduce the vulnerability of our essential civilian-supporting industries, in addition to those measures now directed toward the dispersion of direct war-supporting industries.

Recommendations Requiring New Action

8. We recommend further development of the warning and surveillance system by:

a. Early installation of a radar line 500 to 700 miles from our continental boundaries to provide the required unmistakeable signal of an actual attack and to provide tracking information on which to base deployment of defensive forces. The planned mid-Canada line would furnish the northern element of this line.

b. Extension of the Distant Early Warning Line from Greenland via Iceland and the Faroes to join the NATO warning system (virtually non-existent at present) at some point recommended by shape. Long-range, land-based radars should be used wherever possible. They should be installed as soon as feasible, regardless of when other components can become operational. By themselves they could give satisfactory cover, except at low altitudes midway between stations.

c. Consideration of ultimate replacement of the Alaska–Hawaii line by a system of fixed radars along the Aleutians plus an overwater line to Midway. Such a system would increase initial warning and reduce the overwater link.

d. Determination of the effectiveness of Airborne Early Warning planes in trailing unknown aircraft crossing the Distant Early Warning Line, as a step toward developing a distant surveillance capability.

e. Experimentation with fixed radars and listening devices and with irregular Airborne Early Warning patrol planes in important areas near the enemy’s perimeter, particularly in the neighborhood of his forward launching bases. Should they prove effective, consideration should be given to their permanent adoption in appropriate areas (e.g., in refueling areas)—for intelligence purposes, to give possible early alert of potential attack, and to harass the enemy.

9. To exploit the full potentialities of defense in depth, to protect our peripheral cities, and to minimize the danger from large bombs anywhere within our borders, we recommend continuing outward extension of the combat zone, by:

a. Providing a zone of radar surveillance for about 300 miles beyond the programmed extensions of contiguous radar coverage over the Atlantic and Pacific; this need would be met by the zonal coverage provided by the radar line of recommendation 8a.

b. Extending prime radar coverage northward to approximately the mid-Canada line and low-altitude coverage (gap fillers) to a distance well beyond the heavily populated regions of Canada; taking steps to enable our interceptors to supplement the Canadan defense forces in this region (i.e., by obtaining the necessary agreements and bases).

c. Exploiting future improvements in interceptor ranges by corresponding extensions to seaward of the full weapons control capability, and of the surveillance-only zone beyond. [Note: Extension of the Atlantic zone may ultimately justify elimination of the Greenland–Azores warning line (recommendation 1), provided the Greenland–Iceland–Europe line (recommendation 8b) has been installed.][9]

d. Immediate development and installation of effective data processing and transmitting equipment and procedures to integrate overwater surveillance information into a system linked with the land-based “ground environment.”

10. Drastic revision of the function and traditional form of the interceptor aircraft to conduct effective combat at very high altitudes. We believe that the burden of speed and maneuverability in combat must be shifted to the air-to-air missile, and that the interceptor must become a launching platform having adequate radar and the range and mobility needed to marshal forces against a concentrated attack. We recommend a broad program of study and development to understand and exploit the potential of guided missiles in air-to-air combat.

11. In order further to improve our sea defenses, we recommend that:

a. [remainder of paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

b. [remainder of paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

12. We recommend that comprehensive programs be instituted to provide effective control of surface and, insofar as possible, subsurface traffic in both oceans from the coast lines to beyond the likely striking range of sea-launched attacks. For proper implementation:

a. International arrangements should be made for the establishment of information reporting procedures and of control measures.

b. Studies should be made of appropriate changes in the concept of the “three-mile limit” to permit actions in keeping with the threat; for realistic implementation of any policy changes, the missions of the Coast Guard and Navy must be amended and forces increased to equal the tasks of inspection and control.

c. Sea traffic plots should be established utilizing modern techniques for correlating, analyzing, storing and displaying traffic information gathered from both military and civilian sources. Traffic patterns as well as individual ship movements should be care fully watched.

d. Maximum utilization should be made of the surface surveillance capability of the seaward components of the air defense radar system.

e. The feasibility of shore-based low-frequency radar for long-range detection and tracking of surface traffic should be vigorously explored and, if warranted, systems should be installed.

13. Although the technical problems that must be solved in attaining a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles are extremely complex, there are sufficiently promising leads to justify an expanded and accelerated research effort on a broad front. Accordingly, we recommend that there be established a strong, balanced program of theoretical and experimental investigations of the basic problems of detection, interception and destruction. We suggest that the newly established Special Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board give early consideration to the formation of a full-time technical group to carry out a rapid but thorough examination of the entire problem, with the objective of laying the framework for the expanded program.

14. One important element of defense against ICBM attack— warning in minutes—is attainable. We recommend the immediate initiation of component development, engineering design and planning for the installation of a radar detection system to provide the maximum practicable amount of warning on the approach of ballistic missiles to the United States from likely launching areas.

C. For Improvement and Better Use of Our Intelligence

1. Because we are unable to conclude that the United States surely will, or surely will not, have useful strategic warning in the event of a surprise attack, we recommend that our planning take serious account of both possibilities.

2. The fact that the probability of strategic warning increases with the size of the attack gives added support to the recommendations that our striking forces be further dispersed and that our defenses be strengthened.

3. We must find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross underestimation of the threat. To this end, we recommend adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in science and technology.

[numbered paragraphs 4–10 (½ page of source text) not declassified]

D. Through Better and Safer Communications

Overseas communications systems less vulnerable to jamming and sabotage are urgently needed. Without them, messages containing strategic-warning information may not reach our intelligence centers at a critical time. We recommend the following technical improvements in communications equipment:

1. Immediate steps be taken to insure equipment integrity in the face of possible sabotage.

2. The program for increased transmitter power be given all possible encouragement.

3. Further study in improved antennas be carried on very actively.

4. Consideration be given to the value of adaptation of RCA self-checking code system equipment to military circuits.

5. Tests and other work on the NOMAC system be carried on with highest priority.

6. Further studies of feasibility and usefulness be made of high-speed (Squirt) transmission.

7. Further study be made of multifrequency switching to determine whether such military equipment should be developed.

8. In the design of future equipment, consideration be given to possible use of facsimile in the case of jamming.

9. The services be prepared to use CW (hand code) operations in cases where experienced operators can be provided.

10. Operational tests be made of the communications zone indicator (COZI) system under jamming conditions and, if results prove favorable, that the equipment be added to the communications system.

11. Jamming tests be made at reasonable intervals under conditions that will tax to the limit the ability of those charged with operating the facilities to use evasive techniques, alternate routings, and their operational understanding.

12. Extensive studies and tests be made immediately to determine the jamming characteristics of forward-scatter transmissions and that where it appears effective the services be encouraged to install such systems where geographic conditions permit.

13. Further work on the development of the Janet equipment for meteor-trail transmissions be encouraged.

14. Further study and evaluation of the artificial satellite transmission system be made.

15. The merits of Voice of America point-to-point circuits be studied in detail and, if the results look promising, immediate steps be taken for the implementation of a conversion program.

16. The problem of cable vulnerability be given thorough study in the light of the present political situation and modern technology for mining and cable cutting.

17. Efforts be made to bring to a conclusion present studies to determine:

a. If an old cable between San Francisco and Guam is worth acquiring and rehabilitating.

b. Whether a completely new broad-band cable in the Pacific area should be planned.

E. For Better Maintenance of Equipment, we recommend that:

1. A professional “hard core” military maintenance force for each service be developed of sufficient stability to satisfy future military needs for maintenance personnel.

2. Careful and continuing study be given to the effects of the recently enacted re-enlistment bonus, and, if enacted, of the proposals contained in the President’s recent message to Congress to determine whether stonger incentives are required to correct the precarious lack of highly trained maintenance personnel.

3. Greater efforts be made to develop a career motivation for skilled maintenance personnel by providing an organizational environment that recognizes the skill attainments of such personnel and that permits a greater range of promotional opportunities.

4. More attention and emphasis be given to long-range personnel planning in the highly skilled technical manpower areas, and to the impact that planned new weapons systems will have on future requirements for technical maintenance personnel.

5. The specific use of industrial contractors for the maintenance of weapons systems in the ZI and overseas be given more extensive study by the Department of Defense. This requires investigation of the kinds of military operations that can be served through industrial maintenance contracts and of ways in which civilian maintenance can be adapted to the military system, particularly under conditions of emergency.

6. Consideration be given by each service to the organization of a select corps of maintenance personnel willing to serve extensive periods of time in the Arctic area, in anticipation of expanded military operations in that area.

[Here follow Part III with a section entitled: “Nuclear Striking Power: An Element of Defense;” Part IV with a section entitled: “Defense of North America;” Part V with a section entitled: “Intelligence: Our First Defense Against Surprise;” Part VI with a section entitled: “Overseas Military Communications;” Part VII, entitled “Skilled Manpower in the Armed Forces;” and an Appendix containing a history and organization of the Technological Capabilities Panel and an organization chart.]

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Top Secret; Restricted Data.

The 42-member Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization was formed in response to a Presidential request made to the committee at a White House meeting on March 27, 1954, that a study be made of U.S. technological capability to reduce the threat of surprise attack. The resulting panel, frequently referred to as the Killian Committee after its director, Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., interpreted its mandate broadly. The committee set as its objective an examination of the current vulnerability of the United States to surprise attack and an investigation of how science and technology could be used to reduce that vulnerability by contributing to the following five developments: An increase in U.S. nuclear retaliatory power to deter or at least defeat a surprise attack; an increase in U.S. intelligence capabilities to enhance the ability to predict and give adequate warning of an intended surprise attack; a strengthening of U.S. defenses to deter or blunt a surprise attack; the achievement of a secure and reliable communications network; and an understanding of the effect of advanced technology on the manpower requirements of the armed forces.

[2] Decisive is defined as follows: (1) ability to strike back essentially eliminated; or (2) civil, political, or cultural life reduced to a condition of chaos; or both (1) and (2). [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] These pages comprise Part I, Section 4, printed above.

[4] Not printed.

[5] For text, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 609.

[6] In grouping our recommendations we have considered as incorporated in NSC 5408 those approved programs described in the November 1954 Progress Reports on NSC 5408. [Footnote in the source text. Copies of these progress reports are in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5408 Series.]

[7] In grouping our recommendations we have considered as incorporated in NSC 5408 those approved programs described in the November 1954 Progress Reports on NSC 5408. [Footnote in the source text.]

[8] Not printed.

[9] Brackets in the source text.

10. Editorial Note

On February 14, NSC 5511, “A Net Evaluation Subcommittee,” was approvd by the President to supersede NSC 5423 (see footnote 4, Document 1). The President’s action was in keeping with the recommendation of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee that a permanent procedure be established to ensure a “continuous evaluation” and a “continual watch for significant changes; such procedure to provide for a report to the National Security Council at least once a year.” This recommendation was adopted by the Council at its 222d meeting on November 4, 1954. (NSC Action No. 1260–b; Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

According to the directive in NSC 5511, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was to provide “integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental U.S. and key U.S. installations overseas, and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those net capabilities.” These evaluations were to be submitted to the Council by October 1 of each year and were to “Relate to the situation on a critical date normally about three years in the future.” In addition to these annual reports, the subcommittee was to submit a new evaluation whenever it felt that a change had become apparent “that would significantly alter the net capabilities of the USSR.”

The subcommittee established pursuant to this directive was chaired by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and included the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Lieutenant General Harold L. George, USAF. (Ret.), was appointed by the President to serve as director.

On October 27, the National Security Council heard an oral presentation of the subcommittee’s first annual report (see Document 38). On May 24, 1956, NSC 5511 was superseded by a new directive bearing the same title, NSC 5605, which was itself superseded on December 24, 1957, by NSC 5728. Subsequent evaluation reports, also in the form of presentations to the National Security Council, were formulated by the subcommittee in response to the new guidelines set forth in each of these two directives, the first of which also added the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee to the subcommittee.

NSC 5511 and NSC 5605 are not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5511 Series and NSC 5605 Series, respectively) For the subcommittee’s presentation of the 1956 and 1957 Net Evaluation, see Documents 100 and 162, respectively.

Regarding NSC 5728, see footnote 6, Document 162.

11. Supplementary Notes of the Legislative Leadership Meeting, March 1, 1955, 8:30–10:30 a.m.[1]

March 1, 1955, 8:30–10:30 a.m.

National Security—In discussion of the opposition to the Administration’s plan for reducing force levels of the services, the President remarked on the irony of having spent a good part of his life fighting for an increase in the strength of the Army from 118,000 to 121,000, and then getting to the time when an Army of a million men backed by large reserve forces would be regarded as too small.

The President said there comes a limit to how much defense we can buy, and then morale and spirit and such things become of top importance. He noted how some say we should have more divisions on hand because many of the divisions of some of our allies aren’t as effective as they should be. But if a great Russian land attack occurs, he pointed out, it would do no good to ship divisions; by the time these divisions could be getting into full action, the damage would be done.

The President said that if you graph the curves of various elements and their strength and effectiveness at particular times, you can see how you must concentrate on the curves that are most practical. If, for instance, Cleveland were bombed, forces at Camp Hood could not do much good when there would be such chaos in the transportation system. But, he thought, it would be useful to have a good “home guard.”

Sen. Saltonstall remarked on General Ridgway’s “need a big army” line.

LAM

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich. Copies sent to Whitman and Minnich. Present at the meeting were: the President; Senators Knowland, Saltonstall, Millikin, and Bridges; Representatives Martin, Halleck, Allen, and Arends; Secretary Humphrey; Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield; Sherman Adams; General Persons; Gerald Morgan, Special Counsel to the President; James Hagerty; Murray Snyder, Assistant Press Secretary; Bryce Harlow; Howard Pyle, Fred Seaton, and Jack Martin, Administrative Assistants to the President; Homer Gruenther, and Earle Chesney, Assistants to the Deputy Assistant to the President; and Minnich. (Ibid., Eisenhower Records, President’s Appointment Book) An agenda of the meeting attached to the source text lists eight items; the notes printed here presumably relate to item 3, military reserve bill.

12. Editorial Note

On March 2, Executive Secretary James Lay transmitted to the National Security Council Parts 2, 3, and 5 of NSC 5509, “Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1954.” The remaining portions of the report were subsequently submitted to the Council as they were received from the responsible agencies. Part 1, The Military Program, was prepared by the Department of Defense; Part 2, The Mutual Security Program, was prepared by the Defense Department and the Foreign Operations Administration pursuant to NSC 5434/1, “Procedure for Periodic NSC Review of Military Assistance Programs,” dated October 18, 1954. Part 3, The Atomic Energy Program, was prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission; Part 4, The Mobilization Program (Including Stockpiling), was prepared by the Office of Defense Mobilization; Part 5, The Civil Defense Program, was prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration; Part 6, The USIA Program, was prepared by the United States Information Agency; Part 7, The Foreign Intelligence Program and Related Activities, was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee; Part 8, The Internal Security Program, was prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security; and the Annex, Activities of the OCB, was prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board.

Part 6 is printed in volume IX, page 504. Part 7, which was submitted on March 4, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5509 Series) A copy of NSC 5509, without Parts 1 and 3, is ibid. A copy of Part 1 is ibid., S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Part 3 has not been found in Department of State files and the Department’s copy of NSC 5509 contains a note stating that it was given special limited distribution.

Various portions of NSC 5509 were discussed at the 236th, 243d, 246th, and 247th meetings of the National Security Council on February 10, March 31, April 7, April 28, and May 5. For the memorandum of discussion at the April 7 meeting, see Document 20. Copies of the other NSC memoranda of discussion are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

13. Editorial Note

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Public Law 83–703, enacted August 30, 1954; 68 Stat. 919) empowered the President to authorize the Department of Defense, with the assistance of the Atomic Energy Commission, to cooperate with a regional defense organization to which the United States was a party. It further authorized the Defense Department and AEC to communicate to that organization, so long as it continued to make substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense effort, certain atomic information necessary to the development of defense plans, including the training of personnel in the use of and defense against atomic weapons, and the evaluation of the atomic capabilities of potential enemies. Such cooperation, however, was only to be undertaken in the context of an agreement entered into for that purpose by the member nations of that regional organization.

A draft of such an agreement between the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was prepared in the fall of 1954, with the cooperation of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, and was submitted to the North Atlantic Council for negotiation. On March 2, 1955, the North Atlantic Council approved a draft agreement as well as a revised set of security regulations for NATO. The March 2 draft agreement, an April 2 letter from Secretary of Defense Wilson to the President recommending approval, and an April 13 letter from the President to the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Clinton Anderson, transmitting the agreement to the Joint Committee, are all printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 25, 1955, pages 687–689.

14. Editorial Note

At the 239th meeting of the National Security Council on March 3, Robert Cutler led a discussion on NSC 5513, “Attack Warning Channels and Procedures for Civilians,” dated February 17. The Council debated various problems raised by NSC 5513, which had been prepared by an ad hoc committee chaired by Cutler, in light of the views submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and adopted an amended version which was circulated as NSC 5513/1 and approved by the President on March 5.

This report was referred for implementation to all appropriate agencies of the government under the coordination of a special committee of the National Security Council established for that purpose and composed of representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. The committee was chaired by Commander Edward L. Beach, Naval Aide to the President. NSC 5513/1 is in Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5513 Series. The memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting of March 3, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

15. Editorial Note

In a series of conversations on March 6 and 7, the President and the Secretary of State discussed the importance of educating the public on the distinction between “atomic missiles for tactical purposes and the big bomb with huge radioactive fall-outs.” According to Secretary Dulles, “the President felt strongly that we must get acceptance of the use of atomic weapons as ‘conventional’” and thought that a reference to atomic missiles might usefully be inserted “in an incidental way” in the Secretary’s forthcoming report to the nation on his 2-week trip to Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific to indicate that these tactical weapons, as opposed to weapons of mass destruction, would be used interchangeably with conventional weaponry. (Dulles’ memoranda of conversation are in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

Accordingly, in his radio and television address on March 8, the Secretary, in the course of his discussion of allied defense power in the Far East, stated that “the United States in particular has sea and air forces now equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers.” (Department of State Bulletin, March 21, 1955, pages 459–464)

In response to a question at his news conference on March 15, Secretary Dulles elaborated on this statement. According to press acounts of the conference (a complete transcript has not been found in Department of State files), the Secretary expounded a policy of “lessthan-massive retaliation” by the United States anywhere in the world based on the use of small nuclear weapons against military targets rather than full-scale, city-destroying hydrogen bombs. According to the Secretary, the likelihood that weapons of mass destruction would be used would decrease with the increased availability of tactical nuclear weapons. Dulles went on to say that unlike the situation in World War II, these new weapons offered a chance for battlefield victory without harming civilians and he indicated that in the event of a major assault against Formosa, the United States might well intervene with forces so equipped. (The New York Times, March 16, 1955, pages 1–2)

On March 16, Lewis Strauss informed Hagerty that Dulles had checked with him before making this statement and that “he [Strauss]was all for it,” telling Hagerty that “we wanted to show our enemies that we now deal with A-bombs as conventional weapons.” (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers, Diary Series)

At his news conference that day, President Eisenhower said he could see no reason why, in a combat situation where they could be used on strictly military targets, tactical nuclear weapons should not be used “just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else. I believe that the great question about these things comes when you begin to get into those areas where you cannot make sure that you are operating merely against military targets. But with that one qualification, I would say, yes, of course they would be used.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, page 332)

16. Editorial Note

On March 10, the President, in a letter to Nelson A. Rockefeller, established the Planning Coordination Group (PCG) within the framework of the OCB and designated Rockefeller chairman. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Rockefeller) The President thus put into effect Budget Director Hughes’ proposals to strengthen the coordination of economic, psychological, and political warfare and foreign information activities. Hughes’ recommendations, contained in a March 3 memorandum to the President, called for the establishment of a special grouping of OCB members chaired by Rockefeller and consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, with representation from other agencies when appropriate.

This Planning Coordination Group, “with reference to overt and covert actions to implement those national security policies appropriate to its functions,” was to advise and assist the responsible operating agencies in the coordinated development of plans and programs whose implementation, with respect to overt actions, was to be coordinated by the OCB. In addition, the PCG was to be advised “in advance of major covert programs initiated by the Central Intelligence Agency.” Furthermore, the PCG “should be the normal channel for giving policy approval for such programs as well as for securing coordination of support therefor among the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.” The PCG was also directed to coordinate the implementation of the policies contained in NSC 5502/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities,” and NSC 5505/1, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” both of which were approved by the President on January 31. (See Document 7)

On December 14, the Planning Coordination Group met and approved a report stating that, after 7 months’ experience, it was clear to the four constituent members that the PCG mechanism would not be able to accomplish its assigned objectives and they were therefore recommending that the President abolish the PCG effective December 31. On December 20, the President approved this recommendation.

Department of State records on the PCG are in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, PCG, and ibid., Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare.

17. Memorandum of Discussion at the 241st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 17, 1955[1]

Washington, March 17, 1955

A list of attendants at this meeting is attached hereto. There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel[2]

Before the regular NSC meeting of March 17, a special presentation was made on intelligence and covert activities in the President’s office, with the following individuals in attendance:

The President of the United States

Herbert Hoover, Jr., Acting Secretary of State

Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense

Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Arthur S. Flemming, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence

Lt. Gen. R. J. Canine, Director, National Security Agency

Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President

Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President

Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary

James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC

J. R. Killian, Jr., Director, Killian Committee

E. H. Land, Member, Killian Committee

At the regular NSC meeting, which began at 9:45 a.m. and which was held in the Broadcast Room of The White House, Dr.Flemming made the following introductory remarks: He recalled that the Science Advisory Committee of ODM met in the President’s office some months ago, at which time the President mentioned technological aspects of our defense program which he desired to be further explored. As a result, a highly competent panel of the Science Advisory Committee was established under Dr. Killian. Dr. Flemming said the panel had undertaken its task enthusiastically; that over forty key scientists participated in the work of the panel, with a considerable amount of sacrifice and effort on their part. He expressed appreciation to the members of the panel, and particularly to Dr. Killian, for giving unstintingly of both time and effort. He then introduced Dr. Killian.

Dr. Killian advised that the work of his panel had not been fruitless. He commented on the cooperation and support received from every agency, stating it was generous and complete. He mentioned the high quality of most of the personnel in the several agencies who deal with problems involving the subject of his report. He mentioned that his panel submitted its report in a desire to be helpful; that the panel did not express superior judgment in any sense; and that the panel was acutely aware of the many practical difficulties in the way of fulfilling some of the recommendations in the report. He said his panel had sought to assist, to the extent of its abilities, by recommending the best conceivable defense. He noted that he and his associates in this work had the responsibility of preserving the amenities and the confidential character of the relationship which they had enjoyed as regards highly classified areas of Governmental business by virtue of their work on the panel.

The following individuals then briefed the Council on the highlights of the report, covering the Preface and pages 3 through 33 of the report: Messrs. Killian, Fisk, DuBridge, Sprague and Land.

At the conclusion of this briefing, Mr. Cutler advised the Council that there had been circulated, prior to the meeting, a draft Council action on the recommendations of the report. He summarized its content and indicated that the Departments concerned would have an opportunity to study it further before final action was taken thereon.

Mr. Smith, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, noted that in his portion of the briefing Dr. DuBridge spoke in terms of SAC being based ultimately in the United States. Mr. Smith asked if such a policy would be consistent with what we are doing now. Dr. DuBridge replied in the affirmative, stating that we do not recommend replacing, displacing, or obliterating our present foreign bases. Dr. DuBridge said that, looking to the future, this recommendation regarding SAC was aimed at the time when the United States would have a better long-range intercontinental bombing force which for security purposes would be based in the United States without adversely affecting the accomplishment of its operational objectives. Mr. Smith then inquired why the briefing did not emphasize the refueling problem, and Dr. Killian replied that refueling was covered in detail in the body of the report.

The President referred to that portion of the briefing which indicated that the United States was approaching attainment of maximum yields from nuclear weapons, whereas the Russians were not. He then made reference to the proposal which has been made that the United States declare a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons of certain sizes or yields, and queried whether it wouldn’t be a good idea to endorse such a moratorium proposal, particularly since we were so far ahead of the Russians in this area. Dr. Fisk replied that a moratorium which would restrict nuclear tests on the part of the United States wouldn’t be a good idea in terms of what the United States still needs to do. He said he was speaking not in terms of achieving greater explosive yields, but rather in terms of tests which would enable the United States to tailor nuclear weapons to a variety of military needs. Dr. Fisk added that we could not be assured that the Russians have not tailored their atomic weapons to their military needs. The President asked whether it would be practical for the United States, in a moratorium-type approach to the problem, to cut off at 100 k.t. on the grounds that if the Russians detonated nuclear devices of greater yields we would be able to discover that fact and turn it against them psychologically.

Mr. Holloway stated that if the United States restricted its nuclear tests, this wouldn’t give us any guarantee that the Russians would restrict theirs. The President questioned whether the Soviets might stockpile thermonuclear bombs based on intelligence obtained about our bomb tests without an actual Soviet full-scale test. Mr. Holloway expressed his firm belief that such a step would require an exceptional amount of courage on the part of the Soviet scientists to be sure their designs would actually work.

At this point, the President spoke in terms of having a continuing panel (with the scientists well represented) which could perform a very helpful advisory role on the kind of information that could be given to the public with respect to this general subject. He said that he did not believe there was any agency in Government which was looking at this problem from this standpoint on a continuing basis, and he said he thought that the scientists could effectively cooperate with the Government in this area.

Turning to another aspect of the subject, the President inquired of Dr. Killian whether his panel found an unsatisfactory situation in respect to the present disposition of atomic weapons, which arrangement he had approved for the military. Dr. Killian replied that he and one other member of the panel had been primarily responsible for looking into this aspect of the subject; that they had done so; and that they had found the present arrangements for the deployment of atomic weapons to be first-rate.

The President concluded the discussion with pertinent comments concerning several aspects of the general subject, and he expressed his deep appreciation to Dr. Killian, members of the Killian Committee, and other scientists who had given much of their time and efforts to the study on which the Council was briefed today by the Killian Committee.

The National Security Council:[3]

a. Noted and discussed the report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of ODM, dated February 14, 1955.

b. Referred the Recommendations, in pages 37–46 of the above-mentioned Report, to the below-mentioned departments and agencies of the Executive Branch (in appropriate coordination in each case with the other interested departments and agencies indicated in parentheses) for study, report, and recommendation on or about May 15, 1955 to the National Security Council[4] (such studies to include estimates of the general magnitude of net added or reduced costs to the Government of implementation):

(1) Department of State: General Recommendations 7 and 9 (Defense, Treasury, and Justice); Specific Recommendations B12 a (Defense), B12 b (Defense, Treasury, and Justice).

(2) Department of Defense: General Recommendations 2, 3, 8 (State), 11 (State, CIA); Specific Recommendations A1 (AEC), A2 (AEC), A3 (ODM), A4 (ODM), A6, A7 (State), A8, A9 (CIA, ODM, FCDA), A14 (State, AEC), B1 (State), B2, B3 (State, AEC), B4 (AEC), B5, B6, B8, B9 a, B9 b (State), B9 c, B9 d, B10, B11 a (Treasury), B11 b (State), B12 c (CIA), B12 d and e, B13, B14, C1 (CIA), C2, C5 (CIA), C6 (CIA), C6 (CIA), C8 (State and CIA), E1 through E6 (all with ODM).

(3) Central Intelligence Agency: General Recommendation 6 (Defense); Specific Recommendations C3 (Defense), C4, C7 (Defense), C9, C10.

(4) Office of Defense Mobilization: General Recommendation 10, Telecommunications Adviser (Defense); Specific Recommendations B7 d (Defense, FCDA), B7 f (IIC, ICIS, FCDA), D1 through D17, Telecommunications Adviser (Defense to prepare initial report on D5, D6, D10, D11, D13 and D14 for coordination by ODM).

(5) Atomic Energy Commission: Specific Recommendations A5 (Defense), A10 (Defense), All (Defense), A13 (State, Defense, FCDA).

(6) Federal Civil Defense Administration: Specific Recommendations B7 a (Defense, ODM,AEC), B7 b (AEC), B7 c (AEC).

(7) Bureau of the Budget: Specific Recommendation B7 e (FCDA).

(8) NSC Planning Board: General Recommendations 1, 4 and 12.

(9) Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security: Specific Recommendation A12 (AEC).

(10) The Special Committee of the NSC Established to Coordinate the Implementation of NSC 5513/1: General Recommendation 5.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the respective departments and agencies mentioned therein.

J. Patrick Coyne

Attendance at the 241st Meeting of the National Security Council Held in the Broadcast Room of The White House on Thursday, March 17, 1955

The President of the United States, Presiding

Herbert Hoover, Jr., Acting Secretary of State

Harold E. Stassen, Director, Foreign Operations Administration

Arthur S. Flemming, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury

Herbert Brownell, Jr., the Attorney General

Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Rowland R. Hughes, Director, Bureau of the Budget

Theodore C. Streibert, Director, U.S. Information Agency

J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

Lieut. General Harold L. George, Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee

Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Thomas S. Gates, Acting Secretary of the Navy

Trevor Gardner, for the Secretary of the Air Force

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations

General Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Lieut. Gen. R. McC. Pate, Acting Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

Donald A. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense

James H. Smith, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air

Frank B. Higgins, Assistant Secretary of the Army

NSC Planning Board:

Robert R. Bowie, Department of State.

Brig. Gen. C. H. Bonesteel, III, Department of Defense

Brig. Gen. R.W. Porter, Jr., Foreign Operations Administration

William Y. Elliott, Office of Defense Mobilization

H. Chapman Rose, Department of the Treasury

Maj. Gen. John K. Gerhart, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency

Elmer Staats, Operations Coordinating Board

Charles E. Nelson, Atomic Energy Commission

W. Barrett McDonnell, Department of Justice

Ralph E. Spear, Federal Civil Defense Administration

Steering (Killian) Committee:

J. R. Killian, Jr., Director

J. B. Fisk, Deputy Director

J. P. Baxter, III, Member

J. H. Doolittle, Member

L. A. DuBridge, Member

L. J. Haworth, Member

H. G. Holloway, Member

E. H. Land, Member

R. C. Sprague, Consultant

Lt. Col. Vincent Ford, USAF

David Z. Beckler, Office of Defense Mobilization, Executive Staff

Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence

Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President

Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President

Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President

Fred A. Seaton, Administrative Assistant to the President

J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security

Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary

James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC

S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Coyne on March 18.

[2] For extracts from this report, see Document 9.

[3] Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1355. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[4] See Document 25.

18. Memorandum of Discussion at the 243d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 31, 1955[1]

Washington, March 31, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Study of Possible Hostile Soviet Actions (NSC 5515; NSC 5438;[2] NSC Action No. 1260–c;[3] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 30, 1955[4] )

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council and read the three different categories of Soviet actions with which the paper was concerned.[5] With respect to Category II, which dealt with specific Soviet actions which should be judged as a clear warning that Soviet attack on the continental U.S. was probably imminent, Mr. Cutler pointed to subparagraph i, listing “Soviet action to assassinate or to attempt to assassinate key U.S. civil and military authorities”. Mr. Cutler indicated his own view (with a smile) that a Soviet attempt to assassinate President Eisenhower should be placed in Catetegory I, as indicating that Soviet attack was not merely probably imminent but certain or imminent. The Planning Board, however, had disagreed. The President laughed, and said that the Planning Board was undoubtedly right, and the attempt to assassinate him might merely be based on personal dislike.

Mr. Cutler then indicated the view of the Planning Board that the present report should be handled with very great caution and that the Council might well confine itself to merely noting the report. The President agreed, and stated that the paper had largely served its purpose after it had been presented to himself. He had simply wanted to know what the members of the various staffs felt about possible hostile Soviet actions, and he thought that the paper had been useful. He was sorry that it had taken so much time and trouble to prepare.

Secretary Wilson said that he had only one suggestion to make regarding this report. Would it not be useful to turn the picture around and examine what actions the United States was taking or might take which the Soviet Union could judge to be indications of the likelihood of a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union?

Governor Stassen said that he wished to make a comment about the third category of Soviet actions—namely, actions which should be judged not as indictions that attack was imminent or probably imminent, but as a possible prelude to Soviet attack or as creating a serious international situation which, through action and counteraction, might eventually lead to Soviet attack on the continental United States. Would it not be wise, inquired Governor Stassen, to study how the United States can get itself in a position to counter such threatening Soviet actions without actually setting in motion the chain of action and reaction which might lead to war?

The President merely commented that this would be a good trick if you could pull it off.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference Study (NSC 5515) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 30.[7]

b. Noted the Study contained in NSC 5515, amended as follows:

(1) Paragraph 7, last sentence: Change to read as follows:

“Moreover, it should be noted that nothing in this Study affects the mission of the Watch Committee of the IAC, which is ‘To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its Allies, which endangers the security of the United States. ’”[8]

(2) Paragraph 8, last sentence: Delete.[9]

(3) Paragraph 9–e, last line: Delete the word “ports” and substitute therefor the words “coastal target areas.”[10]

(4) Page 8, Annex: Delete.[11]

Note: NSC 5515, as amended, subsequently circulated as NSC 5515/1.

[Here follow agenda items 3–7.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on April 1.

[2] NSC 5515 is not printed, but see NSC 5515/1, infra. NSC 5438, “Transmittal of Information to the IAC Watch Committee,” November 30, 1954, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5438 Memoranda)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 1.

[4] This memorandum transmitted to the NSC a March 29 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Department of Defense; see footnote 7 below. (Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5515 Series)

[5] Reference is to paragraphs of NSC 5515/1.

[6] Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1366. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[7] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their March 29 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, recommended that the Secretary “concur in the document” subject to the changes that were in fact adopted by the Council and are listed in paragraph b below. Chairman Radford did not participate in this action.

[8] The Joint Chiefs wanted this change for reasons of “clarity and accuracy.”

[9] The Joint Chiefs wanted this deletion for “editorial” reasons.

[10] The Joint Chiefs wanted this substitution for reasons of “accuracy.”

[11] The Annex, “Manifestations of a Drastic Change Toward an Offensive Posture by Soviet Military Forces,” was deleted at the request of the Joint Chiefs who felt it contained “an arbitrary list of a few of the numerous indicators that could be used. Such a list would in all probability be misleading to the users of the paper. In addition, the listing of these indicators is outside the scope of the paper, and is not required.”

19. National Security Council Report[1]

Washington, April 1, 1955.

NSC 5515/1

STUDY OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE SOVIET ACTIONS

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCES

A. NSC Action No. 1260–c

B. NSC 5438

C. NSC 5515

D. NSC Action No. 1366[2]

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, and Mr. J. Walter Yeagley for the Attorney General, at the 243rd Council meeting on March 31, 1955,[3] noted the Study contained in NSC 5515, amended as set forth in NSC Action No. 1366–b, and enclosed herewith as NSC 5515/1.

Because of the sensitivity of the information therein, this Study is being given a limited distribution; it is requested that special security precautions be observed in its handling and that access to it be limited on a strict need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.[4]

STUDY OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE SOVIET ACTIONS

Scope of This Study

1. This study, based on a report by a special subcommittee of the NSC Planning Board,[5] describes what possible Soviet action or series or group of actions should leave no doubt in the President’s mind as to the need for taking immediate military action to save the United States from the consequences of enemy attack, or to postpone, lessen or prevent imminent enemy attack.

2. For purposes of this study, the term “military action by the U.S.” includes action ranging from lesser measures (such as mobilization, redisposition of U.S. forces, a possible warning to the USSR accompanied by a limited demonstration of force, etc.) all the way to actual hostilities. The study is limited to consideration of the Soviet actions which might be taken; it does not identify the sources or methods by which intelligence or information of such actions might be derived, or identify the precise nature of the military actions (war plans) which might be taken. While refraining from dealing with the nature of U.S. counteraction, the study nevertheless does not imply that the U.S. response should necessarily be uniform in nature. The U.S. response would have to be adapted to the danger to the U.S. inherent in each instance, and might include actions other than military measures.

3. Possible Soviet actions have been examined in terms of their bearing on the imminence and probability of an attack on the U.S. by the USSR. The possibility can not be excluded that certain actions, obviously acts of war, might be undertaken by the USSR without warning, such as a declaration of war on the U.S., a Soviet military attack on the continental U.S., or the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the U.S. However, such acts are outside the scope of this study, the purpose of which is to identify and anticipate Soviet actions preliminary to an attack.

4. Possible Soviet actions preliminary to an attack upon the continental U.S. are listed in the next section of this study under three categories according to the degree of certainty or imminence of such an attack.

5. There is no hard and fast dividing line between the categories of possible Soviet actions. It is probable that Soviet actions enumerated in category I would not occur in isolation from those listed in categories II or III. The impression of simplicity and precision given by the lists which follow should not be allowed to disguise the fact that a difficult and complex value judgment would be involved in determining the exact significance of certain of these actions within the context of the general situation existing at the time of their occurrence.

6. This study can be considered valid only in terms of the current world situation and of Soviet capabilities as set forth in current National Intelligence Estimates. As the world situation and Soviet capabilities develop in the future, the significance of certain of the Soviet actions considered herein will doubtless change. Therefore, this study cannot be viewed either as a long-range or all-inclusive guide.

7. It is assumed that firm and conclusive evidence that the USSR had decided to undertake any of the actions listed below would be equivalent to the occurrence of the act itself. The order of listing in any category is not necessarily an indication of priority. Moreover, it should be noted that nothing in this study affects the mission of the Watch Committee of the IAC, which is “To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its Allies, which endangers the security of the United States.”

Possible Hostile Soviet Actions

8. Although as previously mentioned the possibility of total surprise cannot be excluded, it is considered that Soviet actions immediately threatening the safety of the continental U.S. would probably occur against a background of increased international tension and a drastic change toward an offensive posture by Soviet military forces.

Category I

9. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged in and of itself as clear evidence that Soviet attack upon the continental U.S. is certain or imminent:

a. Penetration of the continental air control and warning system by Soviet aircraft in a flight pattern indicating attack upon the continental U.S.

b. Introduction into or possession within the U.S. of a complete nuclear weapon, assembled or unassembled, or of the nuclear components of a nuclear weapon, of Soviet origin or under Soviet direction.

c. Soviet attacks against U.S. territories (Alaska and Hawaii), U.S. possessions, the Pacific Trust Territory, the Panama Canal Zone, U.S. armed forces or bases overseas.[6]

d. Soviet attack against the countries or territories covered by the NATO mutual defense guarantees.

e. Concentration of Soviet submarines in a postion and in sufficient numbers to permit effective attacks on major U.S. coastal target areas.

f. Laying of Soviet minefields in approaches to U.S. ports or in coastal shipping routes (an action regarded as unlikely).

Category II

10. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged as clear warning that Soviet attack upon the continental U.S. is probably imminent:

a. Soviet aircraft in a flight pattern capable of attack upon the continental U.S. detected in the approaches to the continental air control and warning system.

b. Any concentration of Soviet submarines in the approaches to the continental U.S. coast, particularly if accompanied by the absence of substantial numbers of long-range submarines from their normal stations.

c. Extensive preparations by the long-range air force for early offensive operations. A few, but by no means all or conclusive, manifestations of such a situation might be (1) movement of key atomic technicians to launching sites, (2) extensive standdowns of long-range air units for maximum maintenance, (3) unusual or increased logistical activities under high priority to launching sites, (4) massing of substantial numbers of long-range air units at forward bases.

d. Delivery of an ultimatum to the U.S. under threat of attack.

e. Soviet attack against any of the following: Japan, the Ryukyus, South Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Philippines, Australia, or New Zealand.

f. Soviet attempts to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into bases abroad where U.S. forces are located or into areas under U.S. jurisdiction outside the continental U.S.

g. Soviet attempts to introduce into the U.S. or areas under U.S. jurisdiction significant amounts of biological, chemical or radiological warfare agents.

h. Destruction, or attempted destruction, by Soviet sabotage teams or indigenous communist teams under Soviet instructions of key military or industrial facilities.

i. Soviet action to assassinate or to attempt to assassinate key U.S. civil and military authorities.

Category III

11. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged as a possible prelude to Soviet attack upon the continental U.S., or as creating a serious international situation which, through action and counteraction, might lead to Soviet attack on the continental U.S.:

a. Delivery of a Soviet ultimatum, under threat of attack, to a NATO country or Japan, including an ultimatum to remain neutral.

b. Soviet or East German blockade of West Berlin; Soviet blockade of Vienna.

c. Soviet attack against Iran.

d. Soviet attack against Yugoslavia.

e. Soviet attack against Sweden.

f. Soviet occupation of Finland.

g. Soviet active assistance, either by the provision of organized offensive armed forces or nuclear weapons, to Far Eastern communist forces engaged in hostilities against any area covered by a U.S. defense agreement, or area related thereto.

h. Setting up by Soviet-controlled or communist party-controlled personnel of signal devices for the purpose of directing bombing or guided missile attacks against the U.S., Canada or Mexico.

i. Organized armed insurrection in the U.S. by communist party members or persons under Soviet direction (an action regarded as unlikely).

j. Distribution in the U.S. of previously cached weapons, ammunition, explosives, or instruments capable of supporting enemy attack or insurrection, by communist party members or persons under Soviet direction.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5515 Series. Top Secret.

[2] See footnote 6, supra.

[3] See supra.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[5] This subcommittee was composed of representatives from four government agencies. The chairman, Jacob D. Beam, represented the Department of State. Colonel Weldon H. Smith, USAF, attended for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Huntington Sheldon, Assistant Director for Current Intelligence, and his alternate, Dr. Ray S. Cline for the CIA; and Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director, for the FBI. A copy of the subcommittee’s draft report, submitted to the National Security Council Planning Board on February 28, is in Department of State,PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Record Copies Jan.–May, 1955.

[6] The term “attack” as used in this study refers to offensive action undertaken for the purpose of destroying or overwhelming a strategic objective. An “attack” is distinct from a skirmish or armed reconnaissance. [Footnote in the source text.]

20. Memorandum of Discussion at the 244th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 7, 1955[1]

Washington, April 7, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1954: The Military Program (Memo for All Holders of NSC 5509 from Executive Secretary, dated April 6, 1955; NSC 5509, Part 1—The Military Program[2] )

Mr. Dillon Anderson, who replaced Mr. Cutler as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on April 1, 1955, briefed the Council on the subject, and then introduced Admiral Radford. Admiral Radford said that he would open the presentation on the subject by a general statement with respect to the deployment of U.S. forces world-wide as of December 31, 1954 and as planned by June 30, 1955. Thereafter the four Chiefs of Staff would speak in greater detail on their respective programs.

At the conclusion of his general statement, Admiral Radford called on General Ridgway to describe the status of the Army programs. In general, the Chief of Staff of the Army described the Army’s capabilities as inadequate to carry out its present responsibilities and commitments.

At the conclusion of his report, General Ridgway called on Admiral Carney to discuss the status of the Navy’s programs. Admiral Carney’s conclusions were less pessimistic than General Ridgway’s, but he did emphasize notable deficiencies in naval capabilities in the Atlantic resulting from the demands on naval capabilities in the Pacific as a result of the disturbed situation in the Formosa area.

At the conclusion of Admiral Carney’s report, the President referred to a statement which Admiral Carney had made respecting the deployment commitments of the U.S. Navy. If, asked the President, general war were to break out, would the present large forces of the U.S. Navy be kept in the Western Pacific, or would there be a redeployment from the Pacific to such other area as was the scene of actual hostilities? Admiral Carney replied that present plans in such an emergency called for redeployment from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The President agreed that such a redeployment would have to be undertaken.

Admiral Carney then called on General Twining. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force summed up his presentation by reassuring the Council that the Air Force programs were either on schedule or ahead of schedule, except for certain deficiencies which did detract somewhat from its capabilities. Nevertheless, General Twining said that an acceptable combat-ready U.S. Air Force was presently available.

General Twining called on General Shepherd to report on the status of Marine Corps programs. General Shepherd summed up his statement with the observation that in general the Marine Corps programs were advancing satisfactorily, although current personnel reductions would affect to some degree the capability of the Marine Corps to carry out its mission. Nevertheless, he assured the President that the Marine Corps was at this time prepared to carry out its commitments.

The President referred to a statement by General Shepherd indicating that while the Marine Corps had sufficient military end items and matériel to enable it to carry out its missions throughout the period D-plus-three-months, there would be difficulties in this field after the expiration of the three-month period. The President asked whether the procurement possibilities after the three-month interval were sufficient to provide what would be necessary for the Marine Corps. General Shepherd answered in the affirmative, but Dr. Flemming said that this was doubtful if, during the course of the war to that date, an attack on the continental United States had occurred. The President therefore suggested that it might be desirable to provide in some safe place more of the military end items which General Shepherd would need and might not have immediately on hand after the period D-plus-three-months. Dr. Hemming said that we would certainly be in better shape if we could stockpile such items in sufficient amounts to last longer than three months. The President thought a six-months stockpile would be appropriate, and Admiral Radford replied that such a six-months stockpile would provide the basis for all but the most critical military end items to be stockpiled.

The National Security Council:[3]

Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on Part 1 of NSC 5509 transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 6.

[Here follow agenda items 4–8.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on April 8.

[2] The April 6 memorandum transmitted Part 1 of NSC 5509; see Document 12.

[3] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1373. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

21. Editorial Note

On April 22, NSC 5517, “Priorities Relative to Pre-D-Day Allocation of Military Equipment,” was approved by the President. This statement of policy was designed to govern “the allocation of military equipment to U.S. forces and to the forces of all friendly foreign countries receiving equipment from the United States under current approved programs” and was to be applied to all forms of military assistance, including reimbursable assistance.

A revised statement of priorities, NSC 5517/1, was adopted by the National Security Council as NSC Action No. 1431 on August 11 and approved by the President that same day. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Copies of NSC 5517 and 5517/1 are Ibid.: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5517 Series, and Ibid.: Lot 62 D 1, Military Equipment, Priorities Relating To. These files also contain copies of memoranda from 1956 and 1957 of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Planning Board on proposed amendments to NSC 5517/1. The National Security Council amended one paragraph of NSC 5517/1 on February 21, 1957 (NSC Action No. 1670), which was subsequently approved by the President on February 25. (Ibid.: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Further revisions were adopted by the Council and approved by the President on March 12, 1958. (NSC Action No. 1872; ibid.) This revised statement of policy was circulated as NSC 5806.

22. Editorial Note

At the 247th meeting of the National Security Council, May 5, Allen Dulles began his oral briefing on “Significant World Developments Affecting United States Security” with the following comments:

“The Director of Central Intelligence informed the Council that the weather in Moscow on May Day had been so bad that the expected fly-bys of new aircraft had not materialized. Accordingly, we were now left with only such evidence on the numbers of the Type 37 jet heavy bomber as we had been able to collect during the period of rehearsals. We believe, continued Mr. Dulles, that at least eleven such Type 37 bombers had been in the air in Moscow in the rehearsal period. This information, together with evidence on certain other types of aircraft, was in the process of analysis by the Air Force and would be the subject of a report in the near future. Meanwhile Mr. Dulles expressed some anxiety as to the effect, particularly on members of Congress and the Congressional committees, of news about the appearance of a number of the Type 37 bombers.

“The President agreed, and said that it was quite possible that comments would be made on these developments by members of Congress in connection with the hearings on the Defense Department budget.

“Admiral Radford said that what particularly distressed him was that our intelligence estimates on these Soviet aircraft had proved again to be so badly off track. In point of fact, the Soviets had done just as good a job in the development of the Type 37 bomber as the United States had managed to do with its own counterpart, the B–52 bomber. He repeated that our intelligence was way off the beam.

“Secretary Wilson pointed out that we still did not know very much about the speed, performance, and durability of the Type 37 bomber. Admiral Radford replied that he believed that in these respects the Type 37 bomber compared very favorably with our own heavy bombers and, indeed, that it was indicated that the Soviets had outdistanced us in the jet engine field. Secretary Wilson added that the Soviet Type 37 had four larger jet engines instead of our six jet engines of a smaller size.

“Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that we did not get our intelligence information with regard to these Soviet aircraft by clandestine methods. What we know we get by overt means as circumstances permit. The President said that it was precisely this fact which made him almost apoplectic when our Services published so much information about new weapons development.

“Admiral Radford said that in any case it was going to be very embarrassing for him when he went back to Capitol Hill to testify before the Congressional committees. He had got a very bad going over last year, owing to faulty intelligence estimates, and he anticipated a worse going over on the next occasion.” (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

23. Outline for a Speech by the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, May 19, 1955.

I. Introduction

1. In recent weeks Soviet diplomatic activity has been of a range and intensity unequalled in the last decade. Clearly they are trying very hard to do something; they are engaged in some sort of an important campaign.

2. It is most important that we give close study to the implications of what they have done; we must see whether these Soviet efforts afford real opportunities for improving the prospects of peace and freedom.

II Recent Soviet Activity

In swift succession the Soviets have:

1. signed an Austrian peace treaty which provides for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Austria;

2. presented a disarmament proposal which in some respects represents an important narrowing of Western and Soviet differences;

3. announced a mission or the very top Soviet leaders to Yugoslavia;

4. accepted a proposal to hold talks with the leaders of the U.S., UK, and France;

5. held a conference at Warsaw to organize Communist bloc counter to NATO;

6. imposed heavy tolls on truck traffic to Berlin inconsistent with 1949 agreement on access;

7.

engaged in a whole series of public statements by Soviet leaders, directed to questions of foreign affairs.

(Describe each of above actions briefly.)

III. Reasons for Soviet Activity

We cannot pretend to be able to say with certainty just why the Russians are so active. On many things we can only conjecture. But various reasons suggest themselves:

1. Soviet actions are in large part a reaction to the achievements of the Free World in developing strength and unity through collective means. They are all in some manner related to the important fact that the West has achieved a greater solidarity mainly through NATO, and that the Federal Republic has become a full partner in the Western Community.

2. The Russians may also be coming to realize more fully the tragedies and devastation which would take place if their policies should lead them and the world into a war. They are aware that the growing unity of the West is accompanied by a steadily developing capacity for defense and retaliation. Their own familiarity with the awful consequences of modern weapons may have increased along with their own modern capabilities. We may surmise that the Russians have been sobered by a growing awareness of the meaning of modern war.

3. It may also be that the Soviets find themselves overextended; they are having to give massive support and assistance to Communist China; their controls in the satellites cannot be maintained without cost to Russia; their massive military machine is an expensive drain on resources; and their domestic problems in expanding food and consumer goods for their people appear to be giving them some trouble.

4. The Russian leadership, or some of the men in it, may have concluded that Russian security and domestic interests have not been well served by previous policies; that those policies have led only to greater strains and potential dangers for Russia itself; and that a changed relationship with the outside world would serve them better. Or they may merely consider that less aggressive tactics are more likely to succeed in dividing the West and lowering its guard.

IV. Goals of Soviet Action

We can see some of the things that the Soviets would like to achieve by their present activity:

1. They would like to reverse the admission to NATO of the Federal Republic or to forestall the development of German forces, especially with close U.S. collaboration. Toward this end, at Warsaw and elsewhere, they have put forward the idea of a neutralization of “two Germanies”; they have proposed a formula for withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany and a continuation of four-power control as one part of their disarmament proposals; they have talked of the Austrian treaty as a pattern for a German solution.

2. They would like to weaken the security aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty and in particular to eliminate U.S. participation in European defense. Toward this end they have included withdrawal from foreign bases in their disarmament proposals; they have inserted in their Warsaw treaty clauses which invite the European NATO countries to abandon NATO and join in a general European security arrangement with the promise that the Warsaw arrangement would then be abandoned; they have tried to give the impression in statements about the Yugoslavia mission that there is no difficulty in a former antagonist getting along with Russia if only it will abstain from entering collective security treaties which the Soviets do not like; they have sedulously cultivated the ideas of neutrality and neutralism for non-Communist states.

3. They may wish to reduce the threat of nuclear war and the economic drain of large armaments. Their recent proposals on disarmament leave many questions unclear but they do constitue a major step toward previous Western positions.

V. Uncertainties of Soviet Position

1. We cannot, however, at this stage foresee to what degree Soviet activities are addressed toward serious negotiation about those major problems which require for solution a considerable change in Soviet policy.

2. Thus none of the Soviet actions so far clearly indicates:

a. that they are ready to give up their control of East Germany and allow the unification of a genuinely free Germany;

b. that they are willing to accept adequately safeguarded disarmament and removal of the threat of atomic weapons;

c. that they are willing to extend freedom to the Eastern European satellites.

3. Obviously there are good grounds for scepticism in the light of past experience.

VI. Our Task

1. In the coming meeting of Heads of Governments and in the months to come, we must explore carefully the possibilities that there may be some way forward toward just solutions of the problems that now cause tensions between the Soviets and the free world.

2. The recent Soviet activities give us some reason for hope that progress may be made. We know that our policies of unity and strength for the free world have already been productive. We can hope that the Russians have become convinced that their own interests will be better served by settling some of the pressing problems of the world. This need not mean that they have suddenly “reformed” but merely that they have adjusted their policies to changed conditions or placed greater emphasis on specific goals, such as security.

3. We must not expect miracles. We must not expect rapid or easy solutions. But we must move forward with care and purpose in the hope that we can really achieve a turning of the tide of history.

[1] Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Chronological, Jan.–Dec, 1955. Confidential. Drafted by Carlton Savage, John Campbell, and Robert Bowie, all of the Policy Planning Staff. The draft itself is not dated, but a covering memorandum from Bowie to Dulles was dated May 19. A handwritten notation on this memorandum indicated that copy no. 1 was handed to the Secretary by Bowie on May 20, that this outline was for a speech before the Magazine Publishers Association at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and that the speech was not published. Bowie’s memorandum stated that the outline was written on the assumption that the speech would be off-the-record and not broadcast or published, adding that he would question the wisdom of publishing this kind of speech. The memorandum further indicated that the speech was given May 23. (Ibid.)

24. Memorandum of Discussion at the 250th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 26, 1955[1]

Washington, May 26, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. Accelerated Production of B–52 Heavy Bombers

The President stated that Secretary Wilson wished to make some remarks to the Council regarding the program for the production of the B–52 heavy bomber.

Secretary Wilson said facilities for the production of B–52 aircraft had recently been doubled. He had not believed, said Secretary Wilson, that the Soviets would have been able to manufacture as many as ten of their so-called Type 37 heavy bombers in one year. Since they had, however, he believed that we should step up our B–52 production program. Secretary Wilson added that the President had already given his approval to this change in the program, which would now be increased from eleven or twelve B–52’s each month to seventeen a month.

Secretary Wilson then alluded to the fact that the Defense Department was getting quite a going-over in the Senate, especially by Senator Symington. Accordingly, Secretary Wilson proposed to tell the appropriate Senate committee about the increase in the B–52 program, and also to tell the committee that there appeared to be no immediate need for additional funds for increasing the production of these aircraft. He had authorized Secretary Talbott to state that the increase in the production of B–52 aircraft had been approved by the President and by the Secretary of Defense.

The President inquired how many B–52’s were now actually flying. Admiral Radford replied that there were nineteen or twenty.

Secretary Wilson added that we were also increasing the program for the production of F–100 aircraft by adding a second facility.

At the end of the discussion, the President warned Secretary Wilson that whatever he did about aircraft production would be subject to politics in Congress. Accordingly, there was no sense in becoming frantic about criticism.

The National Security Council:[2]

Noted the President’s approval of the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense that production of B–52 heavy bombers be promptly accelerated.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President (on May 27, 1955), subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 27.

[2] The following paragraph and Note constitute NSC Action No. 1410. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

25. Editorial Note

On June 8, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted to the National Security Council for its consideration NSC 5522, “Comments on the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee.” These comments on the recommendations contained in the Killian Committee report were prepared by the various departments and agencies and by the Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1355–b; see footnote 3, Document 17. Comments submitted after June 8, as well as a summary and index prepared by the NSC Staff, were subsequently added to NSC 5522 as they were received.

NSC 5522 was the subject of discussion at the 257th meeting of the National Security Council on August 4; see Document 30. A copy of NSC 5522 is Department of State, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171.

26. Editorial Note

At the invitation of Nelson A. Rockefeller, a group of 11 experts in Soviet-American relations met in Quantico, Virginia, June 5–10, to explore methods for exploiting Communist bloc vulnerabilities. The group, known as the Quantico Panel, consisted of the following members: Dr. Frederick Dunn, Director of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; C. D. Jackson of Time–Life; Drs. Ellis A. Johnson, Paul Linebarger, and George Pettee of Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Max Millikan of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Philip Mosely, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University; Dr. Stefan Possoniy of the Department of the Air Force; Dr. Hans Speier of the Rand Corporation; Dr. Charles A. H. Thomson of the Brookings Institution; and W.W. Rostow of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who was designated the panel chairman.

The Quantico Panel Report was submitted to Rockefeller under cover of a memorandum of June 10 from Rostow. The report consisted of five chapters and four appendices, plus ten papers prepared by individual panel members. In his covering memorandum, Rostow wrote that the one impression that stood out in his mind was “the unanimous belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now enjoys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.” He noted further that the “next two or three years afford the United States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of essential positions of strength” and that this kind of negotiation, “along with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World strength, could create the conditions for victory in the cold war.” Rostow’s covering memorandum and a summary of the recommendations by the panel are printed in volume V, page 216.

27. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

Washington, June 14, 1955.

NIE 100–5–55

IMPLICATIONS OF GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES FOR THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE FREE WORLD

The Problem

To estimate the effects of increasing nuclear capabilites on public attitudes and national policies in the Communist and non-Communist world (excluding the US).

Assumption

That no international agreement is reached to restrict or prohibit the production, testing, or use of nuclear weapons.

Conclusions[2]

1. The most important effect in non-Communist countries of growing nuclear capabilities is to diminish the willingness of most governments and peoples to incur risks of war. A second effect is to increase public desire for a reduction of international tensions, and for the use of all possible means, even including those which the governments themselves may consider ill-advised, to work towards a settlement with the Communist powers. Finally, there is increased public pressure on governments to find some means of international disarmament, and especially some means of insuring that nuclear weapons will not be used in war. (Para. 18)

2. Evidence from the USSR indicates that the Soviet rulers are well aware of the nature and the power of nuclear weapons, which had generally been minimized publicly in Stalin’s time. We believe that they are deeply concerned by the implication of these weapons. US nuclear capabilities almost certainly constitute a major deterrent to overt military aggression by the USSR. (Paras. 13–14, 22)

3. As nuclear capabilities further increase, and the possibilities of mutual devastation grow, the tendencies to caution and compromise presently discernible in non-Communist countries will probably be accentuated. Aversion to risks of war, pressures for disarmament, and fear of general war, will almost certainly be more marked than now. The difficulties of conducting policy against such adversaries as the Communist leaders will probably be increased, and the chances may become greater of a weakening of the non-Communist position by successive concessions. At the same time the Soviet leaders themselves, because of their recognition of the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, will still almost certainly be concerned not to pursue aggressive actions to the point of incurring substantial risk of general war. (Para. 26)

4. We believe that the allies of the US, and especially the major allies, will continue in the alliance despite the increase of nuclear capabilities, at least as long as general war does not appear imminent. If general war appeared imminent or actually occurred, their policies would depend in large measure on the course of events. Some of the allies might have no choice, and could not remain uninvolved even if they wished to do so. Some might consider the issues at stake insufficiently important to risk general war, and might therefore declare themselves neutral at an early stage of the crisis. Some governments might estimate that full-scale nuclear war between the US and the USSR would end with complete or near complete destruction of the war-making potential of both powers, and therefore that neutrality might be both a safe and a profitable position. If events developed in such a way as to confront governments with a clear and immediate choice between nuclear devastation and neutrality, we believe that practically all would choose neutrality. (Paras. 27, 30)

5. As its nuclear capabilities grow, the USSR will have a greatly increased capability to inflict destruction, particularly on the US itself. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders will probably still not be confident that they could attack the US with nuclear weapons without exposing the USSR to an even more devastating counterblow. We believe, therefore, that the USSR will continue to try to avoid substantial risks of general war despite the increase of its nuclear capabilities. However, as these capabilities grow, Soviet leaders may come to estimate that the US, because of fear for itself or for its allies, or because of pressure by its allies, will be increasingly deterred from initiating full-scale nuclear war. They may therefore come to belive that local wars will be less likely than at present to expand into general war, and thus that superior Bloc military capabilities in certain local areas can be exercised without substantial risk of provoking general war. (Para. 31)

[Here follows the discussion section (paragraphs 6–32) covering the following topics: “Current Opinion Concerning Nuclear Weapons,” “Influence of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities on Current National Policies,” and “Probable Future Developments.”]

[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff prepared this estimate, which was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on June 14. The Assistant to the Director, FBI, abstained since the subject was outside the jurisdiction of the FBI.

[2] These conclusions were read by Allen Dulles to the NSC on July 14. According to the memorandum of discussion, “the only comment was made by the President to the effect that the people of the world are getting thoroughly scared of the implications of nuclear war. They were running for cover as fast they could go.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

28. Memorandum of Discussion at the 252d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 16, 1955[1]

Washington, June 16, 1955

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

Continental Defense (NSC 5408; Progress Reports on NSC 5408, dated June 1, 1955; NSC Action No. 1273–b–(4)[2] )

Mr. Dillon Anderson advised that the third series of Progress Reports on Continental Defense were before the Council for consideration; that, at the President’s direction, such reports were submitted semiannually by the six agencies[3] responsible for implementing the Council’s Continental Defense policy (NSC 5408). He added that the third series of reports had been reviewed by the NSC Planning Board and by Mr. Robert C. Sprague, the Council’s able consultant on Continental Defense. He noted that Mr. Sprague had spent several hours with the Planning Board when it considered the Department of Defense Progress Report on the subject; that Mr. Sprague’s views had thereafter been circulated to the Planning Board members in order that (a) they might provide advance briefing thereon to their respective principals, and (b) points raised by Mr. Sprague might be covered in the oral presentation of the military services at today’s meeting.

Mr. Anderson indicated that because of its extraordinary sensitivity, a very special procedure had been followed with respect to the Department of Defense report on Continental Defense; that review thereof had been restricted on a need-to-know basis to Planning Board members or their representatives, with such review taking place in the NSC Staff offices; that all copies of the Defense report would be returned to the Department of Defense with the exception of a minimum number of copies which would be retained in NSC Staff files for completion of Council records and for further review on an absolute need-to-know basis.

After suggesting the procedures to be followed in order to expedite the Council’s work at the meeting, Mr. Anderson called on Admiral Radford for any introductory remarks he wished to make prior to the oral presentations by the three Services. Admiral Radford had no remarks at this point. Major General Gerhart thereupon advised the Council that the Services’ presentations would be made by the following individuals; Colonel Bothwell, USAF, who briefed the Council on the status of the Air Force elements of the Continetal Defense program; Colonel Turner, USA, who briefed the Council on the Army elements of the Continental Defense program; and Captain Leverton, USN, who briefed the Council on the Navy elements of the Continental Defense program. Following the completion of the presentation by the Services (covering 65 minutes), Mr. Anderson called on Mr. Sprague to give the highlights of his independent views on the Department of Defense report. Mr. Sprague then summarized the highlights of his June 16, 1955 report on the subject, copies of which were available on the Council table throughout the NSC meeting.[4]

[2 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Wilson mentioned at this point that Defense had already planned stepped-up production of our B–52’s by 35% and, in addition, had asked for the transfer of additional funds to the Secretary of Defense for allocation for research purposes in those areas of continental military defense which seemed most promising.

The President said he was grateful to Mr. Sprague for his contribution, and mentioned that, if he were Mr. Sprague, he would not be apologetic in advancing differing views from other individuals who, like Mr. Sprague, were also concerned with our Continental Defense problems.

Mr. Allen Dulles referred to the figures used in that portion of the Sprague report of June 16 which reflected that by mid-1957 the Russians would have [1 number not declassified] modern bombers in operation. He said that while these figures were taken from CIA’s estimates,[5] they must be studied with a great deal of care before final conclusions were reached on Soviet long-range delivery capabilities. He said that while he would not discount the increased attention being devoted to long-range delivery capabilities by the Soviets, he personally was inclined to the [1 word not declassified] estimate, which takes a somewhat less alarmist view than the estimate prepared by CIA and used by Mr. Sprague in his June 16 report. He said that while the situation was more grave than indicated by the intelligence estimate of last November, he thought that more study was needed before firm conclusions were reached on the basis of the evidence now available.

Secretary Wilson, reverting to his prior reference to the stepped-up production program for the B–52, mentioned that some 200,000 people in the United States were now working either directly or indirectly on the B–52; that the plane was a very good one; and that Defense felt the production program for the B–52 was now ready to be pushed with safety. As to this point, the President observed that this increased production would result in putting more planes on the same number of SAC bases.

The President then commented that the value of Mr. Sprague’s survey was not limited to questions of the intelligence estimate alone; that its great value lay in making us reassess our programs in relation to the major items raised by Mr. Sprague for the purpose of seeing if we were placing proper emphasis on the right programs. He said that our great objective here is (a) to avert disaster, and (b) to win the war, if it comes. He added that he personally would agree with the more conservative estimate of the USSR’s long-range air delivery capability.

Secretary Humphrey, noting that our Government was placing great reliance on its massive retaliatory capability, said he would like to know if the Air Force thought an attack, such as that earlier described by Mr. Sprague, could wipe out our retaliatory capability. He asked if 15 or 16 bombs on our SAC bases could put us out of business. General Twining replied that he did not think a small attack could have that effect. He said the Air Force was more concerned over a larger attack. He stated that in the event of an attack such as that described by Mr. Sprague, it would be impossible for all the attacking aircraft to come in simultaneously over their respective targets; as a consequence, with the first attacking plane we would disperse other SAC aircraft. General Twining then went on to say that the Air Force did not believe it should plan to build fighters with interceptor capability at 57,000 feet. He said that if we were about to do that, we couldn’t do anything else. He concluded that he did not think the Soviets would sacrifice their heavy, long-range aircraft on a one-way mission with complete strategic surprise, as suggested by Mr. Sprague.

Admiral Strauss then asked General Twining how much time would be required to get all SAC planes in the air, assuming there was some warning, and General Twining replied that he thought it would be possible to get about 80% of the bombers off pretty fast and that the remainder, exclusive of SAC aircraft undergoing repairs or refittings, could be gotten off the ground within a period of one hour to 1½ hours.

Mr. Anderson expressed appreciation to Mr. Sprague on behalf of the Council for the work he had performed, and then went on to discussion of the ODM report.

Mr. Anderson summarized the highlights of the ODM report, noting that emergency relocation plans to insure the continuity of essential functions of the Executive Branch had reached a high state of readiness, and that there had been no substantial change in the status of the following continental defense programs which are the responsibility of ODM: (a) emergency plans for the relocation of the Legislative and Judicial Branches; (b) plans for the pre-emergency permanent removal of essential Governmental operations from the Washington, D.C. target area; (c) plans for continuity of industry, reduction of urban vulnerability, and physical security of industrial and Governmental installations.

Dr. Flemming said that he had no comments on the ODM progress report at this time, adding that in the evaluation exercise to follow on June 17, the officials concerned would assess the effectiveness of emergency relocation plans being tested in conjunction with “Operation Alert 1955”.[6]

Mr. Anderson then summarized the highlights of the FCDA report, noting that additional funds totaling $12 million had been requested for civil defense research purposes, including research on evacuation, radiological defense, warning, communications, public education and shelter. Mr. Anderson mentioned that varying degrees of progress were being made in the following additional continental defense programs which were the primary responsibility of FCDA: (a) civil defense education, training, and stockpiling programs; (b) Federal civil defense contributions to States for attack warning, communications and related purposes; (c) civil defense plan for dispersing urban populations.

Governor Peterson said that in the civil defense field a considerable amount of progress has been made of late, but it was not anywhere near an acceptable level. He said that in the final analysis, the safety of the American people in our large cities rested on passive defense, i.e., civil defense, which placed a tremendous responsibility on our civil defense forces. He noted that under the present law, State and local governments had primary responsibility for civil defense. He said that at their last conference, the Governors were agreed that primary responsibility for civil defense should not rest on the local people alone; that it should be a shared responsibility, i.e., shared between the Federal and the local governments. He said that he had asked the Governors to submit their proposed solution to this problem, and when the solution was submitted it would be staffed through the normal mechanism and eventually submitted to the President. He said that it might well be that the U.S. would have to have such a program, and to that end it might be necessary for the Administration to seek increased authority and responsibility for FCDA in this field. He said that he was fearful that when FCDA came up with recommendations for sound civil defense programs it would encounter severe budgetary problems. He concluded with the view that in this very involved field FCDA should proceed slowly and carefully before pushing too hard for greatly increased programs.

The President inquired whether FCDA expected to get the additional funds totaling $12 million which have been requested for civil defense research and related purposes. Governor Peterson replied that he thought that the Congress would appropriate these funds.

Mr. Anderson next took up the IIC–ICIS report, noting that the several programs assigned to the Committees were generally proceeding in a satisfactory manner, [remainder of paragraph (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Anderson then called upon Mr. Yeagley, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, who advised that the ICIS would complete in the near future a study [remainder of this paragraph and 6 following paragraphs (1 page of source text) not declassified].

Mr. Anderson next recommended NSC action on the third series of progress reports along the lines indicated in the final paragraph of this memorandum.

Dr. Flemming inquired how soon the Council would consider the agency comments on the Killian committee recommendations. Mr. Anderson indicated that they had been tentatively scheduled for NSC consideration in July,[7] but that they might have to be postponed because of more urgent matters. Dr. Flemming said that his inquiry was based upon his concern that the agency responses to the Killian recommendations be considered in sufficient time to be related to the preparation of the budget for the next fiscal year.

Secretary Wilson said that a lot of progress was being made in some of the areas referred to both in the Department of Defense report on Continental Defense and in the Killian report, and that, in so far as the Killian recommendations were concerned, he would be inclined to take a little more time in order to do a better job.

Governor Stassen observed that it would be well to have in mind that if the Soviets attempted a strike against the United States, they would probably be making all types of peaceful overtures just prior to the attack. Accordingly, Governor Stassen emphasized the necessity of good intelligence in order that there would be advance warning of an impending attack.

The President observed that this brought up the political aspects of the situation again. He said he knew of few cases in history wherein a government, after making a great many peaceful overtures, attempted a surprise attack; he said in those circumstances such political aggressors would have to take into account public and world opinion.

The President said he agreed with the recommended NSC action.

Secretary Humphrey said he understood that action to mean that when something new came up, the same general principles would apply as had applied in the past. He emphasized the necessity of weighing various aspects of the Continental Defense program on their relative merits, stating that if it were decided to accelerate greatly one particular aspect, efforts should be made to find other less important programs which could be cut down to compensate therefor, [remainder of paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Hughes said he assumed that the recommended action at today’s meeting would not be taken as a change of policy, to which the President responded that one change had already been indicated—namely, the stepped-up production in the B–52 program. The President added that he thought it necessary to use a rule of reason in assessing the various programs involved.

Secretary Humphrey said that if you don’t think about offsetting moves to compensate for increased programs, budgetary-wise and tax-wise the Government would be placed in a considerable bind unless there was real reason to change our policies, in which event it would be necessary to seek an increase in the tax program next year.

Secretary Wilson said that he did not favor any effort to bring before the Council by July final agency comments on the Killian report, to which Mr. Anderson responded that comments were now in from all agencies in one form or another.

Mr. Rockefeller mentioned the psychological and morale aspects of the subject, saying that he thought there should be a psychological plan to dovetail with the Continental Defense program.

The President, noting Mr. Rockefeller’s observation, said that there would be great chaos in the event of an attack, and consequently these psychological and related factors had to be carefully considered. Mr. Anderson suggested that these factors might be included in NSC 5408 when revised.

The Attorney General inquired if there wouldn’t be some advance warning, such as large troop movements in satellite countries, etc., in the event of the attack on our SAC bases envisaged by Mr. Sprague.

The President said he would think it odd if we received no warning at all, mentioning that our Air Force was unable to effect attacks with complete surprise during World War II, citing the air strikes against the Ploesti fields as an example. The President said that we were unable to make such attacks with complete surprise; that the enemy had warning of such attacks each time they were mounted.

The President reiterated his concurrence in the action recommended by Mr. Anderson.

The National Security Council:[8]

a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Reports on NSC 5408, covering the period from November 1, 1954 to April 15, 1955.

b. Noted and discussed the report of the NSC Consultant on Continental Defense, and referred paragraph 15 thereof to the Department of Defense for consideration.

c. Deferred any general revision in the basic Continental Defense policy (NSC 5408) until after the Council considers departmental comments on recommendations of the Killian Report relating to Continental Defense.

d. Agreed that, pending Council consideration of the comments referred to in c above, the United States should continue accelerated military and non-military programs for Continental Defense, placing emphasis upon achieving a state of readiness adequate to counter the increased capability for strategic nuclear attacks which the USSR will have obtained by July, 1957.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense. The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all responsible departments and agencies for implementation.

J. Patrick Coyne

[1] Source: Eisenhower Libratry, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Coyne on June 17.

[2] NSC 5408, “Continental Defense,” February 11, 1954, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 609. The progress reports of five of the six responsible agencies are in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5408 Series; the report of the Department of Defense has not been found in Department of State files. Regarding NSC Action No. 1273, see Foreign Relations , 1952-1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 801, footnote 17. Paragraph b–(4) stipulated that the next series of progress reports was to cover the period through April 15, and be submitted to the NSC Staff by May 20.

[3] The Treasury Department, the Defense Department, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference together with the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

[4] A copy of this report is in the Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. In a June 14 memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State, Robert Bowie stated that the essence of the Defense Department’s progress report was that some programs were doing well while others were behind schedule, but that the implications of greatest interest in this report were those brought out by Robert Sprague:

“Mr. Sprague comes to a conclusion of great significance to our national security and basic national security policies set forth in NSC 5501. Mr. Sprague concludes: (a) that at the present rate of development of our continental defense system the Soviets by mid-1957 will be able to destroy our nuclear retaliatory power by surprise attack; (b) that the situation can be rectified if certain programs are speeded up or enhanced; and (c) that to do so might cost during the next two years about $500 million in addition to funds presently programmed for continental defense (this figure represents a personal estimate on Mr. Sprague’s part and is not contained in his memorandum). It is also his personal belief that if the Administration or the Congress is unwilling to appropriate additional moneys for this purpose the necessary funds should be taken from other programs.

“It is quite possible that the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense will dispute Mr. Sprague’s conclusion, but it is a subject of such critical importance to our national security and our national strategy that any doubt should be resolved in favor of greater efforts so that our retaliatory force, at least, will receive greater protection at an earlier date.” (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70 S/P Chronological)

[5] NIE 11–7–55, “Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the U.S. and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through 1 July 1958,” dated June 23, and NIE 11–3–55, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960,” dated May 17, are ibid., INR–NIE Files.

[6] Operation Alert was an annual nationwide civil defense exercise. A description of Operation Alert 1956 and its relationship to civil defense efforts is contained in Eisenhower’s letter to Val Peterson, dated July 17, 1956, printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 598–602. A series of reports on Operation Alert for the years 1955, 1956, and 1957 from Gordon Gray to the President are not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Exercise Progress and Evaluation Reports)

[7] See Document 25.

[8] “Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1417. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Actions by the National Security Council)

29. Editorial Note

The Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union met at Geneva from July 18 to July 23. The preparations for the Summit Conference, the development of the United States position, the discussions among the United States, United Kingdom, and French Delegations prior to the conference, and the proceedings of the conference itself are documented in volume V.

30. Memorandum of Discussion at the 257th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 4, 1955[1]

Washington, August 4, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Recommendations of the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM (Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, dated February 14, 1955; NSC 5522; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 26 and August 1, 1955; NSC Action No. 1355[2] )

The Council discussion was introduced by a briefing by Mr. Dillon Anderson on the Killian report and the agency responses. Following a general introduction of the subject he proceeded to a paragraph-by-paragraph discussion of the proposed Council action[3] (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting[4] ).

In connection with paragraph a of the proposed action, Dr. Flemming inquired whether the Planning Board’s recommendation meant that the Planning Board would report back to the NSC on the Timetable before it completed its review of NSC 5501. The President stated that since the Timetable affects the other Panel recommendations, he assumed that the Planning Board would make such a report prior to completion of its review.[5]

Secretary Dulles noted that Governor Stassen’s presentation on disarmament had also included a timetable, and it had been the Secretary’s understanding that this Stassen timetable would be a guide to what our disarmament program should be. He inquired of Governor Stassen as to whether this was not correct.

Governor Stassen confirmed the Secretary’s statement, and stated that his timetable was one covering ten years. It is the second five years which we would like to avoid. Any speed-up of the timetable would therefore be of significance to our disarmament policy.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that he didn’t want to leave the impression in this discussion that our international policy was determined and enforced by obliteration and warfare such as was envisaged in the Timetable and the Panel’s recommendation. Governor Stassen thought that that was not what the Panel had in mind. The Panel’s premise was that the Soviets would be more amenable during the period when they had, and knew that they had, a lesser power position, than they would be later. It didn’t mean that we should use our relative military advantage for military purposes.

The President said that he assumed that what was intended here was the same thing that we meant when we talked about negotiating from strength. He also believed that Secretary Dulles’ view was correct.

Governor Stassen suggested that the Soviets might desire a period of peace during which they could pull their manpower out of the army and put it into agriculture while they concentrated their military effort on such things as the missiles program.

The President said that in everything we have placed reliance on the Timetable; it should therefore be reviewed and a report made back to the Council. The Council should be notified of any radical change in the Timetable while the work is still going forward on the revision of basic policy. Mr. Anderson pointed out that the Planning Board planned to examine the policy implications of the Timetable and report back to the Council on them. The President said that that was true, but there should nonetheless be a report back on the Timetable itself which would indicate the changes that should be made in the various periods described.

Mr. Sprague told the Council that the Panel members concerned had recently reconsidered Period II in the light of recent intelligence, and that it was their unanimous opinion that the period may end nearer the end of 1958 than in 1960. There had been estimated an improvement in Soviet delivery capabilities but not in their nuclear weapons capabilities since the date of the Panel report.

Mr. Anderson then presented the briefing note regarding paragraphs b through d. After he had introduced paragraph d, he said that he believed the President had some views as to the kind of briefing that he desired on the vulnerability of SAC. The President said that the kind of briefing that would be valuable to the Council was not one which would go into great detail on the kinds of protection that might be provided, but one which would indicate where we were exposed and how badly, and that would give some idea of what could be done about the situation.

After Mr. Anderson’s presentation of paragraph f of the proposed action, Dr. Flemming said that it was true that there was general agreement among the agencies concerned that it would not be practical to set up an office to handle the rapid interchange and rerouting of communications traffic, but there was still some feeling that the basic idea in the Panel recommendation should not be dropped. He felt, for example, that it would be useful to have a display center at which the status of our communications networks would be clearly indicated at all times. Dr. Flemming also felt that it would be desirable to work out a three-Service procedure, under which each Service would transmit, on the same basis as its own first-priority messages, the first-priority messages of the other Services. He felt that these proposals could be worked out by the agencies.

The President said that every time a new function or need was identified, it was suggested that a new department be set up. This led to confusion and overlapping. Nonetheless, the idea that, in the event of extensive jamming, rapid action would be required to get warning information through to responsible officials, was, he felt valid. He would like, he said, to have this matter followed up and reported on to the NSC. Secretary Wilson said that Defense was the only department that could do the things proposed. In response, the President said that if this were the case, Defense should be the department to report. Mr. Anderson said that he believed that the action the President desired could be taken under the Council action proposed by the Planning Board. In response, the President said that it could be done, but he wanted to know whether it was done.

(Note: The following portion of this memorandum was dictated by Mr. Lay from Mr. Johnson’s notes.)

Mr. Anderson spoke from his briefing notes regarding paragraph g. He added that prior to revision of NSC 5501, the Planning Board would be submitting, within the next thirty days, related policy recommendations as to U.S. action in the event hostilities are renewed in Indochina.

The President said he wished to issue one word of warning. From the beginning, the U.S. has pursued a policy of supporting the free world economically and militarily, and has regarded itself as a central reserve ideologically, militarily and industrially. However, we do not want to get the idea that wherever there is a peripheral war we will send off U.S. expeditionary forces. Ground forces for such wars will have to be supplied indigenously, and we are trying to build them up. Support will come from us with our mobile reserve of naval and air forces and logistic support. If this sort of aggression, however, gets to be too common, we may have to fight a major war because we can’t go around wasting our strength, [remainder of this paragraph and next paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Anderson then presented the briefing note regarding paragraph h.

The President commented that, as he recalled his decision, U.S. capability to damage the USSR was included in the net evaluation directive.[6] He said that he had always talked about reciprocal action and counter-action, and assumed that it would be included in any such study. We have to calculate what we have done to them to know what they can do to us.[7]

General Twining assured the President that the first 30-day war period is being war-gamed to show the damage we could do to the Russian Air Force but not to Russian industry.

The President said that “You have assumed, then, that they will attack us in the same way—that is, hit our SAC—as we would attack them.”

General Twining said that Admiral Radford had been planning, in the report to the Council of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, to show only what had been done to the U.S., but that he (Twining) was sure that the report could show the effect of our attacks on the Russian Air Force.

The President stated that, if we are confining U.S. attacks initially to the Russian SAC, the present study will give the picture. He agreed that we should knock out their SAC first.

Mr. Anderson thought that in the present study the U.S. attack on the Russian SAC was incidental, and he thought that the President wanted a complete evaluation on the other side, namely, what we could do to them.

The President said that, if our plans for attack don’t include other targets, then we don’t need a complete evaluation.

Mr. Anderson asked whether the President wished, therefore, that the study be completed as planned. The President wondered whether we should not also study, after the first thirty days are over, then what do we do?

Dr. Flemming believed that it was not necessary to wait until the October 1st report to decide whether to expand the terms of reference of the George Committee.

The President thought that it would be sufficient to be sure that General George was taking account of our power to damage the Russian SAC.

[1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Anderson then presented his briefing notes on paragraphs i, j and k.

Regarding informing the public on civil defense, the President admitted that this was very difficult because we want to avoid hysteria on one side and complacency on the other. Secretary Dulles commented that what we should say also depends on the reaction of our foreign friends. Governor Peterson stated that, for the first time, FCDA got enough money from Congress to do more basic research, and he thought that we should now do more working and less talking in the next few months. The President summed up by saying “ We will have to figure out what the various agencies (FCDA, Defense, AEC, and others) should keep before the public on this subject.

[2 paragraphs (½ page of source text) not declassified]

With regard to the recommended improvement of continental defense relations with Canada, Dr. Flemming thought we shouldn’t just turn that recommendation down, since all the Panel meant was to keep it under constant reexamination. The President thought this was true of any aspect of our relations with all countries.

Regarding the recommended extension of the three-mile limit, Dr. Flemming thought the panel was concerned with controlling hostile vessels approaching our shores in the event that a sea plot indicated unusual concentrations of such vessels. Mr. Sprague said that the Panel had no disagreement with what is proposed by the agencies and the Planning Board.[8] Secretary Wilson asked if we were being realistic in this matter. The President admitted that the three-mile limit had been set by the range of cannon on sailing ships. However, he thought that when we have a strong Navy and the other side is weak, this limit is to our advantage. Secretary Wilson said he always gets concerned where technological change requires a reexamination of old concepts. He thought we sometimes tend to put our heads in the sand. The President thought this was a good general proposition, but questions its applicability here. However, he suggested that Defense might study this further and bring any suggestions before the NSC if necessary.

Mr. Anderson stated that he understood that, with regard to the rejection of the recommendation that Nike’s be free to fire at planes above a certain altitude, the Panel concurred in the Defense comment. In answer to the President’s question as to how long it takes Nike to get in the air, Mr. Sprague said that some are on 15-minute alert.

After briefing the Council on paragraphs 1 and m, Mr. Anderson explained the split views in paragraph n.

The President said that, if we just continue to look over the shoulders of the people in charge of these various projects, we will interfere with their work. He would rather take the judgment of the department heads on this matter. If we overload the staffs with reports, things are glossed over and dished up to us. He suggested that the next time this subject is reported on, he would like use made of maps and diagrams to show the Panel recommendations and where the departments agreed and where they didn’t. He thought such visual aids would show the position where the Panel recommendations would place the U.S. defensively and how far the departments would go along with them. Mr. Anderson suggested that the next status reports from the agencies, such as Defense, could be done in that way.

Dr. Flemming, noting that certain items are earmarked for report by December 1, suggested that thirty days prior to that the responsible agencies should be provided with an opportunity to make a progress report on significant developments.

Secretary Wilson asked how do we get out of this reporting system. We bury ourselves in paper work so that there are too many reports and not enough people working. Mr. Anderson commented that Dr. Killian felt that the earliest a meaningful report would be possible is the year’s period suggested by the majority.

Dr. Flemming agreed regarding an over-all report, but thought that some recommendations were so significant we should have a progress report on them in the meantime. He commented that we have had an outstanding group of scientists make this study, and therefore shouldn’t just put it on the shelf, but give some assurance of a follow-through.

The President said it would be all right if the agencies thought that a progress report would be desirable, but that he would not put it on the schedule. In answer to Mr. Anderson, the President said that the progress reports should be largely on a voluntary basis.

Governor Stassen said there was one aspect which affected his disarmament studies. He noted that the heartland of the free world was the East-Central industrial triangle of the United States. One of our strengths is that this area is so much further from the Russians than their targets are from us. A 1500-mile missile is therefore more important to us than to the Russians. Governor Stassen felt that having this project a component development of a 5500-mile missiles is not enough, particularly in a matter where we are as far behind as we now know. He thought we should make the 1500-mile missile a special objective rather than a part of the 5500-mile missile development.

Secretary Wilson noted that the decision was made some years ago not to push the 1500-mile missile. Defense is now reviewing five plans and will come up in December with its choice. We now have additional information we didn’t have at the time the original decision was made.

Governor Stassen believed that if we just look at the 1500-mile missile as part of the ICBM program, it would not move as fast as if it were a separate project. Yet the 1500-mile missile would cancel out the advantage the Russians would otherwise gain by achieving the 5500-mile missile first.

Secretary Wilson pointed out that there are other developments for the 1500-mile range, such as pilotless ships that will fly faster and more accurately and can do the trick better than a missile.

General Twining pointed out that we may not always have our overseas bases to launch the 1500-mile missile. Governor Stassen nevertheless thought that there should be another project on the 1500-mile missile if we assume our bases are available. On such an important matter Governor Stassen felt we needed to bet on two or three possibilities.

The President said he agreed in general with Governor Stassen’s point. However, if the Russians can fire 1000 a day at us and we can fire 1000 a day at them, then he personally would want to take off for the Argentine. Governor Stassen commented that we still need them in order to keep the Russians from starting to use them against us. The President agreed that we do need some of these missiles as a threat and a deterrent; but we don’t want to produce them in quantity because we can’t fight that kind of a war.

Secretary Dulles said that we don’t want to put all our eggs in the 1500-mile basket because our bases are doubtful. [1 sentence (23 words) not declassified]

Secretary Wilson said that he was worried about the number of new projects we have already. Once they get started, we can’t stop. Congress will always vote for new stuff (such as opposing the reduction of Marine strength), but it will never eliminate old projects or provide the taxes to pay for new ones.

Governor Stassen thought that the decision made earlier on the 1500-mile missile was now shown to be wrong. General Twining pointed out that availability of bases had been an important element in that decision. Secretary Wilson said that big rockets cost twice as much or more than a plane, and can only be used once.

The President agreed to the December 1st reporting date on the 1500-mile missile. However, he thought that Governor Stassen’s point was valid, that we should exploit the advantage now of our overseas bases. At some future time we may have to take account of the possibility that they will not be available, and so the ICBM must also be pushed.

Mr. Sprague pointed out that both the long- and medium-range missiles aren’t going to replace manned bombers, for three reasons: First, they are one-way devices; secondly, they can carry a much smaller warhead, but are also expensive in fissionable material; and third, their accuracy is less. On the other hand, they are a nasty thing to defend against, and therefore we need that program. He said that the Panel agreed with the Planning Board’s recommendation for delay until December 1st to pick the best approach.

The President stated vigorously that, if this is the only means of waging war, he would never wage it. If we wage such a war to establish respect for free government in Europe and Asia, we won’t have that type of government left ourselves. He thought we should develop a few of these missiles as a threat, but not 1000 or more. The nature of conflict has gotten beyond man. We are getting to the point where it is no longer worthwhile to have the operating staffs study such a war.

Secretary Dulles commented that, as we approach this period, peripheral wars will become more important as general war is no longer possible. Then what do you do? The President thought that when you start a little fight there is every chance that it will get larger. Korea stayed a little war, and we have criticized others for their action to keep it so.

Secretary Wilson thought that little people can fight little wars, but big people such as us cannot fight little wars.

The President expressed the hope that the future character of war will repel men from the use of force. In a few years it may be possible for Guatemala to build these weapons to threaten us. The President noted that Mr. Baruch brought up this possibility to the USSR in 1946 or 1947 in trying to sell them on atomic controls. Mr. Baruch pointed out that Greece or Turkey might be able to make these weapons in the future, and they would be more willing to fight the USSR than the United States. The President said that research reactors are being put up in every country, and they may soon be able to build bombs.

With regard to the split views as to another Killian-type study, Dr. Flemming said that he withdrew his split and supported the majority.

The President said that he would like to see some social scientist brought into our security planning to study how long civilization can take these weapons developments.

Mr. Anderson said that the Planning Board would make some recommendations on how that might be done.

The National Security Council:[9]

a. Study of the TCP Timetable and its Policy Implications: With respect to General Recommendation 1, directed the NSC Planning Board to examine in the light of recently available intelligence the validity of the “Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia”, and its policy implications, as part of the Planning Board review of key aspects of basic national security policy; and to report to the Council promptly any significant changes which, during the course of such examination, the Planning Board believes should be made in this “Timetable”.

b. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program: Noted that, with respect to General Recommendation 2 and Specific Recommendation A–1, the Planning Board will prepare at an early date a recommended Council action, based upon the Defense briefing of July 28, and formulated in the light of the recommendations of the Department of Defense.[10]

c. Development of a 1500-mile Ballistic Missile: Noted that, with respect to Specific Recommendation A–2, the Department of Defense concurs in principle, has five development plans under consideration, and will report to the Council not later than December 1, 1955, on the status of these plans, indicating, if possible, which of these plans it proposes to implement and an estimate of the time when such a missile might become operational.[11]

d. The Security of SAC: Agreed that, with respect to General Recommendation 3 and Specific Recommendations A–6 and C–2, the security of the Stategic Air Command is so vital to the basic national security policy of the United States that the Council should be briefed by the Department of Defense at an early date on the subject of the vulnerability of SAC to attack.[12]

e. Translation of Early Warning into Action; Planning and Execution of Readiness Tests: With Respect to General Recommendation 5:

(1) Noted that ODM will examine and study jointly with each department and agency involved and report to the Council on the technical, procedural and personal links by which the decisions resulting from receipt of attack warning information are translated into responsive national action; such examination and study will be directed primarily to interagency links and procedures rather than to those internal to any department or agency of government.

(2) Noted that ODM will serve as the mechanism within the Executive Office of the President for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of integrated national readiness tests intended to test the capability of the Federal Government as a whole to functon effectively in an emergency and specifically to serve the President as necessary in the decision-making process.

(3) Agreed that responsibility for implementation of NSC Action No. 1342–c,[13] which applies to procedures for the general Public, should be transferred from the Committee on Attack Warning Channels and Procedures for Civilians (NSC 5513/1)[14] to FCDA.

f. Overseas Communications Networks: With respect to General Recommendation 10:

(1) Noted that the Office of Defense Mobilization, with the advice and assistance of other interested agencies, will coordinate the functions outlined in the first sentence thereof (investigating the reliability and reducing the vulnerability of the overseas communications networks); and that the Department of Defense will assume responsibility for providing continuing collection and evaluation of information on the current performance of all vital links of Government-owned and common carrier facilities used in the overseas communication networks.

(2) Requested the Department of Defense to report to the Council as soon as possible measures being taken to implement its responsibilities under (1) above and to make possible the rapid interchange and re-routing of traffic in the event of widespread interference with military communications.

g. Examination of Peripheral War Problem: With respect to General Recommendation 11:

(1) Noted that the proposal for a study of techniques and weapons technology for peripheral wars is being implemented through a study by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and through a study under a CIA contract.

(2) Directed the NSC Planning Board to make a comprehensive study of the peripheral war problem, as a part of the Planning Board review of key aspects of basic national security policy, taking acccount, to the extent that they are available, of the results of these and other studies and reports being prepared on this subject.[15]

h. Comparative Study of U.S. and USSR Target Systems: Agreed, with respect to Specific Recommendation A–9, that further consideration—including consideration of the desirability of changing the terms of reference of the next net capabilities evaluation to include a comprehensive examination of the capability of the U.S. to injure the USSR as well as the capability of the USSR to injure the U.S.—should be deferred until after the completion of the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee on October 1, 1955.

i. Noted that the responsible agencies have concurred either in full or (as indicated by an asterisk) with qualifications in the following recommendations and will implement them as indicated in their comments:

General Recommendation 4: Revision of NSC 5408 (NSC Action No. 1417–c).[16]

*General Recommendation 6; Specific Recommendation C–7: Establishment of stations on the Polar ice pack for intelligence and other purposes.

*General Recommendation 7a: Negotiations with Canada for authority to use atomic warheads for air defense over Canada.

General Recommendation 7c; Specific Recommendations B–6b and B–11b: Sea detection and surveillance systems [16 words not declassified].

General Recommendation 9b: Reexamination of the international legal concept of freedom of space.

A–3 and A–4: Support of high energy aircraft fuel program.

A–5: Support of aircraft nuclear propulsion program.

A–7: Use of small aircraft in striking force.

A–8: Determining the feasibility of a seaplane nuclear bomber force.

A–10: Assumption with respect to the maximum yield per weight, nuclear weapons.

A–11: U.S. defense planning to assume feasibility of very large bombs.

A–12: U.S. defense planning to assume feasibility of clandestine introduction of megaton weapons.

B–2: Endorsement of long-range and gap-filler radar program.

B–3: Nuclear warheads as the major armament for air defense.

B–4c through B–4h: Intensified effort to create effective defenses at low and very high altitudes (air-to-air and ground-to-air nuclear weapons; high altitude interception; fire control and guidance; low altitude weapons systems; radar R and D program; effect of enemy jamming on air battles).

B–5: Coordination of activities of CINCONAD, CINCLANT and CINCPAC to meet attack over the sea.

B–7a, b and e: Initiation of new civil defense research and formulation of a new civil defense policy.

*B–7c: Informing the public on the nature of the threat, effects of thermonuclear weapons, and civil defense measures.

B–7d: Reexamination and restatement of civil-military relations under disaster conditions.

B–7f: Further attention to measures to reduce vulnerability of civilian-supporting industry.

B–8c: Consideration of ultimate replacement of Alaska-Hawaii line by Aleutians-Midway line.

B–8d: Determination of effectiveness of AEW planes in trailing aircraft crossing DEW line.

B–8e: Experimentation with surveillance near enemy’s perimeter, particularly near forward launching bases.

B–9b: Extension of radar cover northward and use of U.S. interceptors in Canada.

B–9d: Immediate development and installation of data-handling equipment to integrate over-water surveillance with “ground environment”.

B–10: Drastic revision of function and form of interceptor aircraft to conduct effective combat at very high altitudes.

B–12a, c and e: Introduction of certain measures for control of surface and subsurface ocean traffic.

B–12d: Making maximum use of surface surveillance capability of air defense radar.

B–13 and –14: Studies and warning equipment component development for defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

C–l: Planning to take account of both the following possibilities: (a) that there will be strategic warning of surprise attack; and (b) that there will not be strategic warning of surprise attack.

C–3: Vigorous program for application of science and technology to intelligence.

C–4: Discovery of intelligence hoaxes.

C–5: Establishment of procedure for automatic downgrading classification of information re enemy military in event of war.

C–6: Solution of administrative and technical problems in the field of ELINT (electronic noise listening) (being implemented under NSCID 17).[17]

C–8: Initiation of program for small earth satellite (being implemented under NSC 5520).[18]

C–9: Application of principles and technology of information retrieval to intelligence data.

C–10: Heavy long-term investment in preparation of covert agents.

*D–1 through D–17: Technical improvements in communications equipment.

E–1 through E–4: Development of a professional military maintenance force.

E–5: Use of industrial contractors for military maintenance.

j. Noted that the following recommendations, in which the responsible agencies concurred in principle, will not be implemented at present but will receive further consideration by those agencies:

General Recommendation 7b; Specific Recommendations B–1 and B–8b: Installation of DEW line without delay for technical and geographical refinements; early installation of extension of north Canada line to Greenland; and shifting of northern terminus of Atlantic extension from Newfoundland to Greenland; extending DEW line from Greenland to join NATO system with early installation of ground-based components; and related international negotiations.

B–4a: (That part of the recommendation relating to maintaining Nike radars in a continuous alert status.)

B–4b and B–4i: Intensified effort to create effective defenses at low and very high altitudes (matching radar net to needs and capabilities of SAGE system; field and operational trials and experiments).

B–8a: Installation of new “action” line 500–700 miles from U.S. boundaries.

B–9a: Extension of contiguous radar cover by 300 miles.

B–9c: Extension seaward of air control and surveillance zones to exploit future improvements in interceptor ranges.

É–6: Consideration of establishment of Arctic military maintenance corps.

k. Noted that the following recommendations, in which the responsible agencies do not concur, will not be implemented:

General Recommendation 8: Reexamination of U.S.–Canadian continental defense relationships.

General Recommendation 9a and Specific Recommendation B–12b: Reexamination of three-mile limit and revision of missions of Navy and Coast Guard accordingly.

B–4a: (That part of the recommendation relating to maintaining Nike batteries in a free-to-fire status.)

B–6a: Accelerating Pacific “Caesar” Lofar system and San Salvador-Hatteras station.

B–11a: Installation of harbor entrance detection and surveillance equipment.

l. Agreed that the implementation of any of the recommendations in the TCP Report by the responsible agencies should be guided by the national strategy contained in NSC 5501; and noted that final determination on any relevant budget requests will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

m. Noted that the Secretary of Defense, prior to December 1, 1955, will report to the President and the National Security Council his recommendations as to whether new funding beyond that currently available or contemplated should be requested for Fiscal year 1956 or Fiscal year 1957 to implement (in accordance with paragraphs b, c, d, f, i, and, if implementation is subsequently decided upon, j) those recommendations of the TCP Report which are the responsibility of the Department of Defense.

n. Agreed that a report on the status of those recommendations in the TCP Report which are to be implemented or which will receive further consideration by the responsible agencies in accordance with the above actions, should be included in the next annual status reports on U.S. programs for national security (as of June 30, 1956);[19] with the understanding that the responsible agencies may, if they deem it appropriate, make an interim progress report to the Council at any time on significant developments with respect to those recommendations for which they are responsible.

o. Follow-Up Study: Concurred in principle with General Recommendation 12, but deferred decision as to a further study and its nature, until receipt of the next annual status reports on U.S. programs for national security (as of June 30, 1956) referred to in n above.

p. Noted the President’s desire that a study be made by a group of scientists, analyzing the implications for and effects upon the civilian populations of the world of the developments in weapons technology foreseen by the TCP Report; and the President’s request that the NSC Planning Board prepare recommendations as to now such a study might be organized.[20]

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the appropriate agencies as follows:

a: NSC Planning Board.

b: NSC Planning Board and Defense.

c: Defense.

d: Defense.

e: (1) and (2), ODM; (3), FCDA.

f: (1), ODM and Defense; (2), Defense.

g: (1), Defense and CIA; (2), NSC Planning Board.

h: NSC Planning Board.

i, j, k and l: All responsible agencies.

m: Defense.

n: All responsible agencies.

o: NSC Planning Board.

p: NSC Planning Board.

JSL

RHJ

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Lay and Robert Johnson on August 5.

[2] Extracts from the report are printed as Document 9. Regarding NSC 5522, see Document 25. The memoranda are filed in the minutes of the meeting; see footnote 4 below. Regarding NSC Action No. 1355, see footnote 3, Document 17.

[3] See paragraphs a–p of NSC Action No. 1430, below.

[4] The minutes of all National Security Council meetings are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File. The briefing note is filed in the minutes.

[5] Reference is to “A Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia,” Part I of the Killian Panel’s report, Document 9. Regarding the Planning Board review of the timetable, see Document 40.

[6] Reference is to NSC 5511, “A Net Evaluation Subcommittee,” approved by the President on February 14; see Document 10.

[7] The President emphasized this concern in a conversation with Dillon Anderson on August 3. A memorandum for the record written by Anderson on that date indicates the President’s strong feeling that the effect of war on both the U.S. and Soviet side should be examined. Anderson noted that he informed the Joint Chiefs of the President’s wishes. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Technological Capabilities Panel)

[8] This reference and others in this document are to the agency comments and proposals conveyed in NSC 5522.

[9] Paragraph a–p and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1430, approved by the President on August 11. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[10] The Planning Board’s proposed action was submitted on August 30; see footnotes 3 and 4, Document 33.

[11] For the report of the Department of Defense submitted on November 30 and the NSC memorandum of discussion on the report, see Documents 44 and 45, respectively.

[12] See Document 46.

[13] NSC Action No. 1342 noted the President’s request that a study be made of ways to conduct realistic drills of civilian emergency procedures. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Actions by the National Security Council)

[14] See Document 14.

[15] On September 2, the Planning Board established a working group to study the problem of local aggression and subversion. This group was composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, and the CIA and was chaired by Policy Planning Staff member Elbert G. Mathews. The report of this working group was submitted on November 7, under cover of a memorandum from Mathews to Executive Secretary James Lay. According to this memorandum, the group studied the following problem: “How may the U.S. and the rest of the free world effectively deter or counter attempts to extend Communist control progressively by (a) overt local aggression or (b) subversion or insurrection.” The report was actually submitted in two parts. The basic 38-page report defined the problem, discussed the elements and objectives of an effective deterrent, and concentrated on “the particularly acute situations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.” The second part consisted of a proposed revision of Section C of NSC 5501 incorporating the conclusions of the working group. The report was submitted by Lay to the Planning Board with a covering memorandum dated November 8, and is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Basic National Security Policy.

[16] NSC 5408, “Continental Defense,” dated February 11, 1954, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 609. Regarding NSC Action No. 1417, see footnote 8, Document 28.

[17] NSCID 17, “Electronic Intelligence,” dated May 16, not printed. (Department of State,S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Intelligence Directives)

[18] NSC 5520, “U.S. Scientific Satellite Program,” dated May 20, is printed in vol. XI, p. 723.

[19] These reports were issued as NSC 5611, “Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1956”; see Document 84.

[20] On September 26, 1955, Lay transmitted to the National Security Council the Planning Board’s proposed directive for a study of the human effects of nuclear weapons development, a copy of which is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Atomic Energy—Armaments. The resulting study, performed by a special panel of scholars and scientists, was submitted to the President on November 21, 1956, by Val Peterson and was discussed at the 312th NSC meeting, February 7, 1957; see Document 108. A copy of the panel’s report is in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development.

31. Editorial Note

On August 15, Secretary Dulles prepared a memorandum entitled “United States Post-Geneva Policy.” The memorandum was approved by the President and transmitted to all United States Chiefs of Mission on the same day. It was subsequently circulated among United States officials as position paper POM B–7/51, August 24. For text, see volume V, page 551.

32. Editorial Note

On August 31, S. Everett Gleason transmitted to the National Security Council Parts 5, 6, and 7 of NSC 5525, “Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1955.” The remaining parts of this report, which consisted of eight sections and an appendix, were subsequently transmitted to the Council as they were received from the responsible agencies. For information on the contents of and the agency responsible for each section, see Document 12. In his covering note, Gleason stated that beginning with NSC 5525, all status reports would henceforth be submitted on an annual, rather than a semiannual basis.

A copy of NSC 5525, without Parts 1 and 3, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5525 Series. Copies of Parts 1 and 3 are ibid., S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. The Top Secret portions of Part 3, however, are not included in the Department of State copy; according to a covering memorandum, they were given only a “special, limited distribution.” Portions of NSC 5525 were discussed at the 264th, 265th, and 269th meetings of the National Security Council on November 3 and 10 and December 8. The memoranda of discussion at those meetings are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Part 2 of NSC 5525 is printed in volume X, page 15. The portion of the memorandum of discussion at the December 8 NSC meeting that considered Part 2 of NSC 5525 is ibid., page 44. Part 6, prepared by USIA, is printed in volume IX, page 529.

33. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

Washington, September 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

NSC agenda item for September 8, 1955: “Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Program”

The Killian Group recommended that the NSC formally recognize the present Air Force program for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile “as a nationally supported effort of highest priority.”[2] The attached Planning Board proposed NSC action (dated August 30, 1955)[3] states that the ICBM program is “a program of the highest priority”, that the Secretary of Defense will prosecute the program with “all practicable speed”, and that he will brief the NSC at least once a year on the status of progress.

The NSC was briefed on this subject at its July 28 meeting,[4] attended by Secretary Dulles. As presently planned the intercontinental ballistic missile will carry a warhead with a yield of several megatons, will have a range of about 5,500 miles, and will be in flight about thirty minutes. Its launching platforms could be made almost invulnerable to attack and an effective defense against it would be extremely difficult, if possible, No more than fifteen minute warning appears attainable.

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

Obviously, as stated in the action proposed by the Planning Board (paragraph a), “There would be the gravest repercussions on the national security and on the cohesion of the free world, should the USSR achieve an operational capability with the ICBM substantially in advance of the U.S.”

In the Defense Department the ICBM program is already rated as “highest priority”. About 180 other projects, however, are said to enjoy this same rating. Moreover, it is understood that, even with this rating, the ICBM program has been seriously delayed by the existing procedures for clearance and approval. It has been estimated that as much as a year or more could be saved by cutting through some of this procedural routine.

To draft an NSC action which will have this effect is difficult. The Planning Board was told that the Secretary of Defense has the authority to short cut the routine procedures. Doubtless to do so will entail certain risks of waste of funds and effort. In view of the stakes involved, it appears that these risks should be taken.

The proposed action appears to be as good as can be devised for this purpose. Much will still depend on how it is applied but it serves to highlight the crucial importance of this program and the necessity of the utmost expedition in carrying it through.

[1] Source: Department of State,PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Atomic Energy—Armaments. Top Secret.

[2] See General Recommendation No. 2 of the report of the Killian Committee, Document 9.

[3] This proposed action, not attached, is in the Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Atomic Energy-Joint Committee, but with two revisions described by Dillon Anderson and printed in the NSC memorandum of discussion, infra.

[4] This briefing was in the form of an oral report to the National Security Council on July 28 on the status of the ICBM program. The NSC memorandum of discussion of that meeting merely took note of the fact that this report had been given. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

34. Memorandum of Discussion at the 258th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 8, 1955[1]

Washington, September 8, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Program (NSC Action No. 1430–b; Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM, dated February 14, 1955; NSC 5522; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 30, 1955[2] )

Mr. Anderson briefed the National Security Council on the background of the ICBM program, in the course of which he read the Council action recommended by the NSC Planning Board[3] and amended by the President at Denver on September 5. He then suggested that the Vice President, as Chairman, might wish to invite questions and comments.

Secretary Humphrey indicated that there were two questions he would like to ask. First, he would like to ask General Twining how really superior the ICBM was to airplane delivery of nuclear weapons in the event of U.S. retaliation, on the assumption that the Russians had a 5000-mile missile with a considerable degree of accuracy as to the point of delivery. Secondly, he would like to inquire, from the point of view of the United States and with the world situation as it was today, how much advantage there was in the possession of a 5000-mile missile as compared with a 1500-mile missile.

Secretary Quarles undertook to answer Secretary Humphrey’s two questions. He said that, in the first place, it was most desirable to place the ICBM in its proper perspective. It was not in itself a single entity, but rather part of a program, which program of the Department of Defense contained two other significant missiles programs, though admittedly these other programs did not have the potentialities of the ICBM. The first of these two was the “Navajo” project, which Secretary Quarles briefly described. He thereafter pointed out that the Navajo weapon would be of great help to us if we came out second-best to the Soviets in achieving the ICBM. He said he also wished to emphasize that of course our manned aircraft capability was still the most important single capability in this field.

Secretary Humphrey then asked a further question, as to the significance of the difference in capabilities between the ICBM and the manned aircraft. Secretary Quarles replied that the manned aircraft was superior to the ICBM, both in accuracy and weight of destructive force. He added that the appraisal of the importance of the ICBM set forth in the Council action proposed by the Planning Board constituted an exactly correct appraisal. However, this appraisal needed to be viewed in the context of the whole problem, in which case the ICBM would appear as a back-up weapon rather than as the prime weapon.

The Vice President and Govenor Stassen concurrently raised the question of the terrific speed of the ICBM. Did not this speed carry with it the danger that the Soviets would be able to destroy U.S. retaliatory capabilities with the ICBM? To Governor Stassen this seemed the crucial aspect of the problem. Secretary Quarles replied that this would certainly be true if the Soviets were able to achieve a sufficient number of ICBM’s with the necessary degree of accuracy in delivery. But that they should be able to do so required a very great stretch of the imagination. Moreover, the fears that Governor Stassen had expressed applied more cogently to our overseas bases than to our bases on the American continent. Secretary Quarles expressed the opinion that the Russians were not likely to achieve the requisite number of ICBM’s with the requisite degree of accuracy in the period up to 1960.

Governor Stassen then said that the accuracy of the ICBM and its devastating effects would of course depend on Soviet achievement of thermonuclear warheads for their ICBM. Secretary Quarles replied that this was likely.

Secretary Humphrey then stated to the Council that it was his judgment that we ought to make the ICBM program a program of continuous development but not something which must be attained next year.

Secretary Quarles commented that the ICBM program possessed all the priority and importance which the proposed NSC action confers on it. He believed that we should give the ICBM program all of the backing which we can practicably.

Dr. Flemming then inquired as to the meaning of the term “a program of highest priority” as contained in subparagraph c of the proposed NSC action.[4] Did, for example, the term “highest priority” indicate an overriding priority? Secretary Quarles replied that ascribing to the ICBM the highest priority, as was done in the proposed NSC action, would put the Secretary of Defense in the position of being able to issue a directive to get ahead with the prosecution of the ICBM program in such fashion that no other priority program would interfere with it. This priority prevailed against all other priorities unless it was the judgment of the Secretary of Defense that it was desirable to modify this course of action. Dr. Flemming said he understood that in effect there were two or three programs in this top priority category which from time to time might have to be maneuvered. Secretary Quarles confirmed that such was his understanding.

Dr. Flemming then said that it was his understanding that if the proposed action were accepted, the National Security Council would gets its first report on the development of the ICBM program next December. Mr. Dillon Anderson confirmed Dr. Flemming’s understanding, and indicated the likelihood that the report on the ICBM program would be given to the National Security Council at approximately the same time (December) that the Department of Defense would report on the progress made in achieving the 1500-mile missile.[5]

The Vice President said that he understood that no warning system would operate against an ICBM. Secretary Quarles replied that it was the belief of the Defense Department that we could perhaps attain at least a 15-minute warning of the approach of an ICBM. He pointed out that once such a missile enters the upper atmosphere it is committed to a certain course. Accordingly, we would know where it would land, and this knowledge gave hope of providing 15 minutes for people to take cover before the strike occurred.

The Vice President then turned to Dr. Von Neumann and asked him whether, in his judgment, the proposed NSC action on the ICBM program “went far enough”. In responding, Dr. Von Neumann emphasized that he was speaking for himself only and not for the Chairman, AEC. He then went on to say that while he might be accused of merely playing with words, it seemed to him desirable to change the wording in subparagraph d[6] to read that the program would be prosecuted “with all possible speed” rather than as written, “with all practicable speed”. Such a change would probably make no substantial difference in the actual prosecution of the program, but it might be useful. Dr. Von Neumann then went on to comment that the task of intercepting an ICBM was horribly difficult. Once it was launched, all that we would know is what city it was going to hit. Moreover, the ICBM would be able to take at least some slight evasive action. Only a very heavy atomic missile could possibly intercept it.

Secretary Humphrey then inquired how much an ICBM would cost. Dr. Von Neumann said that this was a difficult question to answer, but that he would guess that after several of the missiles had actually been manufactured, the cost would be about $1 million apiece. Secretary Humphrey said in short, that would be “relatively cheap”, and Dr. Von Neumann said yes.

Governor Stassen then inquired of Dr. Von Neumann as to the accuracy characteristics of the ICBM. Dr. Von Neumann replied, and concluded with a statement that we have no evidence at this point that the Russians actually have a thermonuclear warhead for their ballistic missiles. On the other hand, we must certainly assume that they would have such a warhead in a matter of two or three years.

Secretary Humphrey then asked whether there was a tremendous gap between the difficulties of making a 1500-mile ballistic missile and a 5500-mile missile. Dr. Von Neumann replied that it was a matter of extension rather than of difference in kind. Things that looked highly feasible in a 1500-mile missile looked much more difficult when applied to a 5500-mile missile. We know, for example, that every one of the 1500-mile missiles will actually work. Nevertheless the achievement of a 1500[5500]-mile missile would follow along the same path as would lead to success with a 1500[1500]-mile missile.

Dr. Flemming then raised the domestic political implications of the ICBM program, and pointed out that a lot of questions about this program would inevitably be asked on Capitol Hill. Since this was the case, he believed that it would be wiser to have the directive read that the Secretary of Defense would prosecute the program with all “possible speed” rather than with all “practicable speed”. Secretary Quarles commented that the difference in wording was quite academic so far as it concerned the actual course of action in the prosecution of the ICBM program. This program was in any event a multi-billion dollar program. For his conservative blood, said Secretary Quarles, that was enough, and he was opposed to providing any stronger basis than already existed for individuals who felt that there were all kinds of other alternative possibilities in the prosecution of the program and wanted another billion or so in order to try out such possibilities. Secretary Quarles emphasized that we would probably not have a real solution to the ICBM earlier than 1959, and again stressed his view that the ICBM was not “a replacement weapon”. The background of our strategic force, he said, was still the manned aircraft. In adopting the proposed NSC action, the Department of Defense would contemplate a billion-dollar bulge in its budget for the Fiscal Year 1957 or 1958.

The Vice President said that as he saw it, the adjective “practicable” meant that you would spend about all the money on this program that you practicably could. Secretary Humphrey said he believed that the phrase “all practicable speed” was the proper one to use. It was essential that you know what you are spending your money for.

The Vice President then pointed out that what he was trying to do in part was to anticipate the domestic political problem to which Dr. Flemming had just alluded. For this reason, the Vice President said, he would again like to repeat his question as to the meaning of the phrase “all practicable speed”. Secretary Quarles replied that it was a very difficult question to answer. The research people on the ICBM project were constantly perceiving marginal possibilities for carrying it through which are not now actually in the program. Beyond these marginal possibilities there were several alternative approaches to the problem. Accordingly, it became very difficult to define the precise meaning of such phrases as “all practicable speed” and “all possible speed”. He said that he rather liked the adjective “practicable”, but the phrase “all possible speed” was not objectionable to him.

Secretary Hoover said that he had one comment to make at this point. He explained that he was speaking as an individual with an engineering background, and that he was addressing himself to the problem of the ICBM in the context of our Foreign Relations. If the Soviets were to demonstrate to the world that they actually had an ICBM before we had such a weapon, the result would have the most devastating effect on the Foreign Relations of the United States of anything that could possibly happen. Secretary Hoover pointed out that the Western coalition was held together essentially by the knowledge of the members of the coalition of the ability of the United States to protect them. If this umbrella of protection were removed, neutralism would advance tremendously throughout the free world. From a developmental point of view, continued Secretary Hoover, we in the State Department view the ICBM project as in very much the same category as the Manhattan Project during World War II. All possible avenues to success would be tried, and we should not confine ourselves only to those which seemed most likely to produce results. In the State Department it was understood that there were some 180 projects in the Defense Department in the category of “highest priority”. The State Department believed that the ICBM project should be at the very top of this priority, even if to put it there inevitably meant going down certain unproductive avenues. Accordingly, it seemed to Secretary Hoover that the difference between the phrases “all practicable speed” and “all possible speed” was not a mere verbal difference, but constituted the very essence of the problem.

Secretary Humphrey said that he still thought that the difference between these two phrases was largely academic. What you actually should do was to spend all the money you could that would be productive of results in achieving this capability. You should follow all reasonable avenues of approach to success. Essentially the difference in the two sets of words was the difference between a sensible approach to a solution of the problem and a crash approach.

Secretary Hoover replied by stating that when you absolutely have to get a job done, you have to take something of the shotgun approach. There are a number of very difficult decisions which those who directly manage the ICBM program are obliged to take. In making such decisions these project managers should feel free of restraints. Secretary Hoover added that he would strongly recommend that we make the most complete use of all our resources to achieve this objective, even if in so doing waste was involved. The stakes were too high to permit any other course of action.

Governor Stassen said he wished strongly to support these views of Secretary Hoover, and asked Secretary Humphrey whether he would not agree to the use of the words “all possible speed” provided additional language were inserted as a safeguard—for example, a statement that the Department of Defense would check back with the National Security Council if vast additional sums should be involved.

Secretary Humphrey did not reply directly to Governor Stassen’s inquiry, but himself put the question as to whether the reports by the Department of Defense to the National Security Council on the progress of the ICBM program would not contain cost estimates and therefore act as or constitute a kind of check on it.

Secretary Quarles suggested that regardless of the choice of words, whether “all possible speed” or “all practicable speed”, the Science Advisory group should be asked to report to the National Security Council as to whether there were any areas of scientific progress toward the achievement of an ICBM which were not being adequately explored in the current ICBM program. Secretary Quarles believed that reporting such information was much more significant than the issue of the words to be selected.

Secretary Hoover said he had yet another observation to make. This was to call the attention of the Council to the fact that the earth satellite exercise had gone a long way to help the peoples of the free world realize that we were forging ahead in our technological capabilities.

Mr. Dillon Anderson stated his understanding that the language of the proposed directive, as modified and approved by the President, would produce a situation in which no other project within the Department of Defense would enjoy a priority as high as the ICBM program. As the President understood the proposed NSC action and directive, the ICBM would certainly not be one of the 180 top priority projects.

The Vice President then referred to the letter which Senators Anderson and Jackson had written to the President, urging a crash program for the achievement of an ICBM.[7] On this point the Vice President said that when he and Mr. Dillon Anderson had talked to the President at Denver on September 5, the President had indicated that he did not favor a crash program for the ICBM of the Manhattan type. Dr. Flemming said that nevertheless we ought to avoid any possibility that the ICBM program should be merely one of 180 other top priority programs.

General Twining observed that no other project within the Air Force had a priority as high as the ICBM. He said that he was greatly impressed with Dr. Von Neumann’s idea of a report to the National Security Council on what avenues of approach to achieving an ICBM were not actually being explored. He then went on to point out his view that it was essential that all parts of the ICBM program go forward together, so that the end result would be a complete weapon capability with the ICBM ready to be used. He was therefore opposed to a Manhattan-type project.

Dr. Flemming said he now understood that no other project enjoyed so high a priority in the Air Force as did the ICBM; but would this proposed directive assure that no project throughout the entire Department of Defense would enjoy as high a priority as the ICBM? Secretary Quarles replied by stating that the ICBM project under this directive would enjoy a special priority and would, alone among all the projects, be given special treatment in the Department of Defense.

Governor Stassen then suggested that, after the statement that the U.S. ICBM program is therefore a program of the highest priority, the words “above all others” should be inserted. Secretary Quarles replied that he still preferred the existing language without Governor Stassen’s addition, because the existing language would assure the Defense Department of greater flexibility.

Dr. Von Neumann commented that the question of these different phrases was more or less academic as far as the National Security Council was concerned. The members of the Council actually knew what was intended by these words. However, the precise choice of words became much more important the further down the line you went and the further you got away from the clear understanding of the words in the National Security Council.

Mr. Dillon Anderson then said he thought it desirable to add one or two facts bearing on the domestic political aspects of the problem. He summarized the President’s proposed response to the letter sent him by Senators Anderson and Jackson. This response would indicate that the President did not like a Manhattan type of project for the ICBM program. The President had expressed the thought that if we went beyond the priority assigned to the ICBM by the presently proposed NSC action, the result would be to destroy the flexibility which was required by the responsible department and might actually delay development. In sum, the President believed that the language of the present directive went as far as one could go without getting into a panicky or frantic state of mind.[8]

Secretary Humphrey then suggested that subparagraph c might be amended to read “The U.S. ICBM program is therefore a program of the highest priority above all others, except as directed by the President.”

Secretary Robertson said that of course this entire matter had been discussed at the greatest length in the Defense Department. He could assure the Vice President and the National Security Council that the ICBM program was enjoying the very highest priority not only in the Air Force but in the entire Defense Department. All internal pressure will be directed by the Department of Defense along this line, and questions of judgment as to practicability will be answered in terms of this kind of priority.

Governor Stassen said that he not only seconded the suggested revision of subparagraph c made by Secretary Humphrey, but would also add the suggestion made earlier that the Department of Defense report to the National Security Council on avenues of approach to the achievement of an ICBM which were not being currently used in the ICBM program.

Dr. Flemming again warned the Council that this whole ICBM program could flare up into an intensely emotional political issue. Hence, he would resolve all doubts by choosing to use the strongest possible words as to the manner in which the program would be prosecuted. He would therefore still recommend “all possible speed” rather than “all practicable speed” because the use of the term “all possible speed” would expose the ICBM program to all kinds of difficulties.

The Vice President said he had been very greatly impressed by Secretary Hoover’s earlier argument that the important thing is not merely the achievement of a developed weapons capability in the ICBM field, but, from the point of view of Foreign Relations, that the peoples of the free world believe that you have achieved an ICBM. Accordingly, it seemed of the utmost importance to the Vice President that the United States get an experimental ICBM missile and not wait for the final and developed weapon which General Twining desired from the military point of view.

At this point Mr. Dillon Anderson placed before the Council the three proposed revisions which had been suggested in the course of the discussion. Before these issues could be decided, Secretary Hoover said he had one more question to put to Dr. Von Neumann with respect to the latter’s argument that the language adopted by the Council, while quite clear in its meaning to the Council itself, might be much less clear to those on the firing line who were intimately engaged in the prosecution of the ICBM program. Would the language “to be prosecuted with all possible speed” have a clearer meaning to these people than the term “all practicable speed”? Secretary Hoover said he believed it would, and Dr. Von Neumann agreed with him.

Secretary Robertson then referred to Secretary Hoover’s earlier reference to the foreign policy aspects of these weapons developments, and raised the question as to the foreign policy implication of the possiblity that the United States would develop a 1500-mile ballistic missile prior to the achievement by the USSR of a 5500-mile missile. Would prior achievement of a 1500-mile missile in effect counter somewhat the achievement by the Russians of a 5500-mile missile prior to the U.S.? In short, should we make a particular try for the 1500-mile missile? Secretary Robertson thought that some study should be given to the foreign policy implications which he had raised.

Secretary Hoover expressed interest in such a proposed study, and pointed out first that most of America’s allies were within the range of a Soviet 1500-mile weapon. Futhermore, he questioned whether our allies would permit us to use overseas bases on their territory from which to launch 1500-mile missiles.

Governor Stassen said there was yet another subject which ought to be studied. Will we not soon have to assume that the Soviets will beat us out in the race to achieve an ICBM, and should we not therefore consider what moves we will make if this indeed becomes a fact? Governor Stassen then inquired whether the Russians would feel it necessary to make tests of an ICBM before being assured that they have actually achieved an ICBM capability. Dr. Von Neumann answered in the affirmative, and said that a number of tests would in all probability be made by the Russians, who thought much as we did with regard to the necessity of tests. He pointed out, however, that the test might be made by sending the missile straight up into the air rather than directing it across a stretch of 5500 miles.

Secretary Humphrey explained that he was not yet quite clear on this difference between the problems presented by the development of the long-range and the medium-range ballistic missiles. Does work on these two weapons go along together, or do they develop along separate courses? Secretary Quarles replied that the technology of the long-range weapon was very similar to the technology of the shorter range weapon, if you perfected the technology of the ICBM, you would be perfecting the technology of the shorter range missile. On the other hand, if you concentrated on the 1500-mile missile you would be likely to get it earlier. General Twining added that of course the British were pushing hard for the development of a 1500-mile missile, and we were giving them all the help we could.

As Mr. Anderson was about to sum up the consensus of the Council as to changes in the proposed directive, the Acting Director of the Budget, Mr. Brundage, said he had one other concern, which had been called to his attention by the Budget member of the NSC Planning Board. Could the language in subparagraph d of the proposed action, to the effect that “all other Executive departments and agencies will assist the Department of Defense as required”, give the Secretary of Defense authority over other Executive departments and agencies? Dr. Flemming pointed out that the President was the source of the Secretary of Defense’s authority here, and Governor Stassen said that he supposed this language was inserted in order to avoid delays which might be caused by resorting to regular budgetary review. Mr. Anderson said that if any dispute arose in this area it would presumably go to the President to be resolved. Dr. Flemming added that so far as his interpretation was concerned, he believed that this language meant that the ODM would give the requirements of the Secretary of Defense an overriding priority in ODM and would assure the Secretary of Defense that he could get anything from ODM that he required.

At this point Mr. Dillon Anderson presented to the Council the three revisons in the proposed directive which had been suggested in the course of the discussion. The Council decided to revise subparagraph c by inclusion of the words “above all others, except as directed by the President.” It also accepted the amendment to subparagraph d which inserted the phrase “including avenues not explored”. The Council rejected the proposal that the phrase “all practicable speed”, in subparagraph d, be replaced by the phrase “all possible speed”.

The National Security Council:[9]

a. Agreed that:

(1) There would be the gravest repercussions on the national security and on the cohesion of the free world, should the USSR achieve an operational capability with the ICBM substantially in advance of the U.S.

(2) In view of known Soviet progress in this field, the development by the U.S. of an operational capability with the ICBM is a matter of great urgency.

(3) The U.S. ICBM program is therefore a program of the highest priority above all others, except as directed by the President.

(4) The Secretary of Defense will prosecute the program with all practicable speed, and all other Executive departments and agencies will assist the Department of Defense as required. The Secretary of Defense will report promptly to the NSC any significant developments or causes of delay in this program (including avenues not explored), and additionally will give the Council a special briefing at least once a year, normally in December, on the status of setting an earlier target date for operational capability and the arguments for and against such a proposal.

b. Requested the Department of State to report to the Council, not later than December 1, 1955, on the foreign policy implications of a demonstration by the USSR that it had developed an intercontinental or a 1500-mile ballistic missile prior to the U.S., and an estimate of the extent to which U.S. achievement of a 1500-mile missile would counter the implications of Soviet achievement of an ICBM or a 1500-mile missile.[10]

Note: The action in a above subsequently approved by the President, subject to the following amendments:

Paragraph a–(3): Change to read as follows:

“(3) The U.S. ICBM program is therefore a research and development program of the highest priority above all others, unless modified by future decision of the President.”

Paragraph a–(4): In the second line, change “all practicable speed” to “maximum urgency”.

This action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and other participating agencies. The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on September 15.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30. The Panel report is printed as Document 9. Regarding NSC 5522, see Document 25. The August 30 memorandum is filed in the minutes.

[3] See the memorandum, supra.

[4] See paragraph a (3) of the NSC Action below.

[5] See Document 44. The report was discussed by the NSC on December 1; see Document 45.

[6] See paragraph a (4) of the NSC Action below.

[7] Dated June 30, not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Atomic Energy–Joint Committee)

[8] The President explained this position in a letter to Senator Anderson, dated September 13. Emphasizing that “the earliest development of ICBM capability is of vital importance to the security of the United States,” the President stated that “nothing surmountable shall stand in the way of the most rapid progress on this program” and that none of the delays common to normal peacetime development or procurement programs would be tolerated. The President took note of the NSC Action, printed below, ensuring that the Departments of Defense and the Air Force would prosecute the program “with all speed,” but he declined to set up an alternative organizational procedure that would involve “lifting this program completely out of the context in which it is established.” Such a step, the President believed, “could and probably would cause the loss of some of the momentum the program has where it is and postpone the date of operational capability.” (Ibid.)

[9] Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1433, approved by the President on September 13. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[10] See footnote 5 above.

35. Editorial Note

On September 24, President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack while visiting relatives in Denver, Colorado. During his illness and convalescence, Vice President Nixon presided at the meetings of the Cabinet and the National Security Council. At the 259th NSC meeting on September 29, the members discussed the functioning of the NSC during the President’s illness and agreed that the Council, with the Attorney General in attendance, should continue to function in accordance with its statutory capacity “with the understanding that each member may request that national security matters, which would normally be brought directly to the President’s attention, be placed on the Council agenda for information and an exchange of views.” (Memorandum of discussion, September 30; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) On November 21, the President attended his first National Secutiy Council meeting since his illness; the meeting was held at Camp David, Maryland.

36. Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, October 3, 1955.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENERAL COMMENTS ON NSC 5501

I. General

1. NSC 5501 remains generally valid as an expression of basic national security policy. Although some revision would, in any event, be required to take into account more recent estimates of comparative capabilities and other changes, the basic problem concerns the nature of the change of external climate which has occurred since the approval of NSC 5501 and the implications this change holds for the directions of U.S. policy.

2. The underlying concepts of NSC 5501 were designed for a world situation in which flexibility had just begun to mark Soviet policy, in which the requirements of free world strength and cohesion had begun to shift from safeguards against imminent aggression to preparations for long-term competition, and in which the U.S. had begun to ready itself for the possibility of negotiations with Soviet-Communist power.

3. The coming period seems likely to be characterized by decreasing fear of overt Soviet aggression; greater horror of nuclear war; full exercise of Soviet-Communist diplomatic resource; and by prolonged negotiations with the USSR, and possibly Communist China.

4. The paragraphs which follow raise some of the issues inherent in the new situation. Specific comments of the Department on textual changes in NSC 5501 will be submitted later.

II. Estimate of Significant Change in the World Situation

5. Current Soviet policy appears to be marked by: (a) a recognition that general war no longer can advance its own national interests; (b) a greater emphasis in its diplomacy on “amiability” and lure than on threat; (c) a possible interest in negotiating on some major problems, such as disarmament; (d) a hardening of their positions on some of the main areas of dispute, such as Germany; (e) the continuing objective to eliminate NATO, U.S. overseas bases, and U.S. influence abroad; (f) unclarity as to whether the Soviets view détente as a durable modus vivendi or a short-term modus operandi.

6. The free coalitions now seem to regard Soviet military aggression as unlikely and to contemplate general war, if it should occur, with even greater dread. These factors have already had a number of consequences of basic significance for the course of U.S. policy: (a) stronger impulses inside the free world toward neutralism and disengagement; (b) greater reluctance to continue to build up national and coalition military establishments; (c) tendencies toward trusting accommodation; (d) more selfish pursuit of separate national interests and ambitions previously submerged by a sense of common danger.

III. Opposing Intentions and Strategy in the New Situation

7. In the period ahead, the USSR will achieve advantage if, without curtailing its offensive capabilities, expansionist ambitions, and the internal strait-jacketing of its people, it can impair will and capability to resist in the free world. The U.S. will improve its position if, by maintaining the essentials of free world strength and cohesion, it can create conditions which will induce the USSR to advance further toward responsible participation in a world order.

8. In the period ahead, Soviet strategy is likely to operate primarily against free world unity: seeking to disrupt alliances; promote neutralism; lower political and military vigor; reduce U.S. influence; and isolate the U.S. from its allies and from the uncommitted states.

9. U.S. policy will have to seek to create conditions which will (a) thwart the Soviet efforts to disrupt the free world; (b) influence the Soviets, over a period of time, to modify their conduct and to revise their practical goals; (c) encourage them to take measures which will make it more difficult to abandon a peaceful policy; (d) induce them to reduce their military capabilities.

IV. Elements of National Strategy in the New Situation

10. For the pursuit of these objectives, many of our present policies are sound and should be carried out vigorously; others will require modification; and certain new elements will have to be added:

a. In military policy, our deterrent to general war must be maintained and our ability to apply force, if needed, flexibly and selectively, must be improved in order to deter Communist moves in vulnerable local situations. In view of the probable reluctance of the free world to maintain present levels of military spending in a prolonged détente, as well as for other reasons, we should vigorously seek mutual reductions in military establishments with the Communists. Agreement on effective disarmament is the only promising approach in affecting the growth of a Soviet capability to imperil the continental U.S.

b. In maintaining our alliances, we shall need additional emphasis on measures for unity and staying power over the next period. We shall have to attempt to replace the cement of fear with new means of cohesion, such as steps toward integration and sound regionalism, and common efforts to use technological advances for peaceful ends. In addition, we shall have to consider ways of adjusting our own positions to a less tightly knit coalition.

c. In East-West non-military competition for the underdeveloped areas, the Soviet-Communist challenge seems likely to intensify and to expand to areas it has hitherto neglected, i.e., the Middle East and the other American Republics. In the Far East, South and Southeast Asia, some of the new states may, however, feel freer to work more closely with the rest of the free world in an atmosphere of détente. The strengthening of the healthy nationalism of those areas and assistance to their governments in achieving stability will be cardinal tasks for U.S. policy. Basic changes in the Soviet-Communist world cannot be expected if its creeping expansionism proceeds unchecked.

d. In our economic policy, both toward our allies and the neutrals, we must place increased stress on fostering growth, and balancing of international accounts by trade and development.

e. The expansion of East-West contacts and the opening of the bloc to the leaven of non-communist influence provide valuable means of making more difficult the reversal of present Soviets trends, correcting the image of the West sedulously cultivated for years inside the USSR, and influencing the evolution of society and economy toward peace and peaceful development.

[1] Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Record Copies, Jan.–Dec. 1955. Top Secret. According to a typewritten note on the cover sheet, this paper was prepared by Robert Bowie and William Leonhart after they had received the Department of State’s comments on NSC 5501, Document 6. This paper was submitted to the Planning Board by Bowie, and was circulated at the Board’s October 3 meeting. Copies of the preliminary papers and the comments on NSC 5501 that were written by various PPS members are in Department of State,PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70.

The examination of key aspects of national security policy begun by the Planning Board in August ultimately led to the revision of portions of NSC 5501 and the issuance on March 15, 1956, of a new basic policy paper, NSC 5602/1, Document 66. The records of Department of State involvement in the various working groups assigned by the Planning Board to report on different aspects of national security policy (including those established pursuant to NSC Action No. 1430) and in the drafting of a revised text of the basic paper are in Department of State, PPS Files for 1955 (Lot 66 D 70) and 1956 (Lot 66 D 487). See especially the folders labeled Basic National Security Policy, NSC 5602/1 (Basic National Security Policy), the records of PPS meetings, and the various members’ chronological files.

37. Editorial Note

From October 27 to November 16, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union met at Geneva. For documentation on United States participation in this conference, and on Secretary Dulles’ subsequent reports to the President and the National Security Council, see volume V.

38. Memorandum of Discussion at the 263d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 27, 1955[1]

Washington, October 27, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. Net Evaluation Subcommittee Report (NSC 5511[2] )

Mr. Anderson said that the next item on the agenda would be the Net Evaluation Subcommittee’s report which would be presented in the Broadcast Room of the White House. Admiral Radford commented that the Net Evaluation report which the Council was about to hear had been much more difficult to prepare than its predecessors. Moreover, it went further into very highly classified intelligence information, although not as far as General George, who had directed the preparation of the report, had wanted to go. Admiral Radford also expressed the opinion that the National Security Council directive establishing the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was too broad in its terms. He likewise warned that the Council would be hearing statements made in the course of the forthcoming presentation which he hoped the Council would not accept as altogether factual. Many of the conclusions of the Net Evaluation report would actually be approximations based on certain assumptions. If one changed these assumptions, and it was quite reasonable to do so, one would get different answers. Finally, Admiral Radford expressed considerable doubt as to the value of the exercise performed by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in view of the immense amount of work and the considerable expense involved in the months which were consumed in preparing the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee.

The Council then moved from the Cabinet Room to the Broadcast Room of the White House.

Mr. Anderson opened the discussion on this item, advising that the purpose of the meeting was to hear a briefing on the first annual report by the Council’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee which was established pursuant to a new directive recommended by the Council and approved by the President on February 14, 1955. [3] He recalled that the directive established a permanent procedure (in the form of a Net Evaluation Subcommittee) to provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental U.S. and U.S. installations overseas, and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those net capabilities. Mr. Anderson mentioned the makeup of the Subcommittee and the fact that the President had appointed Lieut. General Harold George, USAF, retired, as the Subcommittee’s staff director. Mr. Anderson also indicated that in addition to the regular attendants at this Council meeting, there were present for this briefing the members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, General George and the members of the Subcommittee staff, and the Planning Board members and advisors. Mr. Anderson then called upon Admiral Radford, as Chairman of the Subcommittee, to make any additional comments he deemed appropriate.

Admiral Radford observed that the report the Council was to hear today was an interesting and highly sensitive one. He requested that details of the briefing which was to ensue not be covered further in any debriefing in the several departments and agencies concerned. He indicated that General George has been engaged in intensive work on this project since his appointment by the President last February. He noted that earlier in the week the Subcommittee had heard the briefing which was about to be put on for the Council and that insofar as he, Admiral Radford, knew, the Subcommittee members were in unanimous agreement on the report. Admiral Radford indicated that while the individual members of the Subcommittee were responsible for elements of the report falling within their respective jurisdictions, that only the Chairman is responsible for the report as a whole. Admiral Radford concluded with the opinion that the Subcommittee staff has done an excellent job, whereupon he called upon the staff director to initiate the briefing.

General George outlined in brief the general approach taken by the Subcommittee staff to the implementation of NSC 5511. He indicated that two basic plans were worked by members of the staff who simulated the role of war planners in the Kremlin. In brief, the first plan (Plan A) assumed a Soviet surprise attack on the United States with no strategic warning. The second plan (Plan C) assumed a Soviet attack preceded by sufficient strategic warning to place U.S. military and civil defenses in a condition of full alert in order to initiate U.S. retaliatory action. General George then called upon the Deputy Director of the staff, Major General Gordon B. Rogers, who introduced the following individuals: Colonel Worth Kindred,USA, and Colonel Edward Herbes,USAF, who gave the briefing on Plan A and on the war-gaming of that plan, including U.S. retaliatory action as well as estimated damage effects resulting from the Soviet attack and the U.S. retaliatory attack.

Plan C was thereupon presented, along lines identical to Plan A, by Colonel George W. Criss, USAF, and Captain Frank Turner, USN.

Next Dr. Ludwell Montague, CIA, briefed the Council on various aspects of the threat to the United States posed by the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons by the USSR.

Colonel Criss thereupon briefed the Council on significant variables which could substantially alter the estimates and conclusions reached by the Subcommittee in its war-gaming of Plans A and C. These variables included basic questions as to (a) the size and make-up of the Soviet nuclear stockpile (b) fallout effects (c) the psychological impact upon the populace of large scale nuclear weapons (d) strategic warning and (e) programmed U.S. military posture at the time of attack.

The formal briefing was terminated with the presentation of the conclusions reached by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. These conclusions were presented by Colonel Richard Ross, USMC.

The Vice President, at the suggestion of Mr. Anderson, invited the Council members to comment on the briefing and to raise any questions that they might have with the Subcommittee.

Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that when the Subcommittee received the briefing by General George’s staff earlier in the week, questions had arisen and were answered at that time. As a consequence, Mr. Dulles had no questions to put to the Subcommittee today. He wished to mention, however, that all of the member agencies of the Subcommittee did not participate in the war-gaming covered in the formal briefing.

Dr. Flemming said he had no questions and he expressed appreciation to General George and his staff for the excellent work performed by them.

The Vice President said that he appreciated not only the great effort and many hours which the staff had devoted to this project, but also the excellent and concise manner of presenting their very complicated report. He said that he assumed that the Subcommittee’s evaluations were based on the best evidence available as to the contemplated capabilities of the USSR in 1958 and Admiral Radford advised that his assumption was correct.

The Vice President then inquired whether the Soviets were aware of our nuclear and delivery capabilities and if not, he wondered whether it would be in the interest of the United States to create such an awareness on the part of the USSR. Admiral Radford responded that the USSR probably had much better intelligence on our nuclear stockpile and delivery capability than we had on theirs. In fact, he said, we publish a considerable amount of information relating to aircraft delivery and fighter capability, all which is readily available to the USSR.

The Vice President observed that up to a point there could be substantial benefit accruing to the United States if the USSR were cognizant of our great nuclear and delivery capability.

The Vice President noted that the portion of the briefing which dealt with clandestine attack appeared to be the closest thing to a recommendation made by the Subcommittee and he inquired whether the Subcommittee had further recommendations to make with respect to clandestine attack or to other aspects of the subject. Admiral Radford said that the Subcommittee was not asked to make recommendations; that General George’s people had some recommendations but that it was his (Admiral Radford’s) view that in lieu of Subcommittee recommendations as such, each member of the Subcommittee should suggest any action in his particular area of responsibility which he considers appropriate.

Dr. Flemming observed that the evaluations and briefing provided by the Subcommittee are basic to the Council’s thinking on numerous subjects and problems which are constantly arising in the field of national security. He noted that many of these problems are being reexamined regularly by the Council and he expressed the view that today’s briefing would substantially aid the Council in its thinking on such problems as they come up for discussion at future Council meetings.

Secretary Humphrey, observing that it did not appear that the DEW Line seemed to serve any particular purpose in terms of the attacks contemplated under Plans A and C, asked what value, if any, the DEW Line seems to have in terms on enemy attack. General George responded that the DEW Line is of great importance, particularly in terms of a surprise attack such as is envisaged under Plan A, because it would be the one means of alerting for such purposes as getting planes off the ground to meet such an attack.

Mr. Rockefeller inquired why, in terms of clandestine nuclear introduction, the Mexican Border was not considered just as vulnerable as shipments via the diplomatic pouch or other shipments under diplomatic seal. Admiral Radford responded that both means of introduction were considered by the Subcommittee, but time did not allow of the staff going into detail thereon at this particular briefing.

Secretary Herbert Hoover inquired whether the Subcommittee considered in its evaluations the possible use of intercontinental ballistic missiles and General George responded in the negative, stating that such missiles were not deemed to be programmed and operational by the 1958 date used as the basis for the Subcommittee’s studies.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that one of the basic questions which remains unanswered at the present is whether the USSR will have megaton weapons for use by 1958.

Mr. Dodge inquired whether it would be likely that the Soviets would develop and stockpile such large weapons without testing them and Admiral Foster, AEC, responded that it is the consensus of atomic energy officials both in the United States and the United Kingdom that it is unlikely that the Soviets would risk the chance of failure which could flow from stockpiling untested high yield thermonuclear weapons.

Mr. Anderson, reverting to the references made earlier in the meeting with respect to clandestine introductions indicated his understanding that a report on the diplomatic pouch problem would be forthcoming from the Council’s internal security committees in the near future. He thought it desirable that the Planning Board consider that report in the light of the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee and in the light of the Council’s discussion of the diplomatic pouch problem.[4]

The Vice President commented on the great amount of work which has gone into this study and referred to the need for following up on national security problems highlighted by the study. He said, where appropriate, he assumed the Planning Board would follow through on these problems.

The National Security Council:[5]

a. Noted and discussed the first annual report by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5511.

b. Noted that each responsible Executive department and agency would review its program in the light of the above-mentioned report, and submit any resulting policy recommendations to the Council through the NSC Planning Board.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the responsible Executive departments and agencies.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on October 28.

[2] See Document 10.

[3] Reference is to NSC 5511.

[4] On December 1,NSC 5527, “Reappraisal of U.S. Policy Regarding Soviet Bloc Shipments Afforded Diplomatic Immunity,” was transmitted by Lay to the National Security Council and referred by him to we Planning Board for comment and recommendations prior to Council consideration. See Document 63.

[5] Paragraph a–b and the Note that follow consititute NSC Action No. 1463, approved by the President on November 2. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95. Records of Action by the National Security Council)

39. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

Washington, November 1, 1955.

NIE 100–7–55

WORLD SITUATION AND TRENDS

Foreword

The focus of this estimate is primarily on prospective trends in the global power struggle between the Bloc and the Free World over the next several years. Any such global projection is necessarily highly speculative. Among other things it cannot, as an intelligence estimate, take full account of US policies, which will have a great impact and will doubtless be altered somewhat if only in response to such trends as those projected herein.

Estimate

I. The Current World Situation

1. The salient feature of the present global situation is a change in the character of the East-West conflict. Three factors appear to have brought about this change: the growing number and destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the growth of Western strength and unity in response to the postwar Communist threat, and (at least partly as a result) the subsequent shift in Bloc tactics. The change in the external manifestations of Bloc behavior has been extensive, but the activities of the international Soviet network of subversion and espionage continue at a high level, the USSR has made no major concessions of substance, and we see no evidence of any alteration in basic Soviet objectives.

2. In the immediate postwar period the Kremlim aimed at capitalizing on the war-weariness of the non-Communist world to consolidate and expand Communist influence and power. To this end, the USSR generally showed itself under Stalin’s leadership uncompromising in negotiation, abusive in propaganda, and aggressive in action. It was soon joined by Communist China. Eventually, however, the Soviet and Chinese conduct brought forth a vigorous Western reaction, developed under US leadership. Full mobilization of Free World counterstrength was precluded by wide variations among Free World countries in the degree of their concern over the Communist threat, and by their preoccupation with internal problems, colonial issues, or other disputes. Nevertheless, there was an increasing tendency toward division of the world into two armed and hostile camps.

3. The Shift In Soviet Policy. The increase in Free World will and ability to resist led to narrowing of opportunities for Bloc expansionism and a growing risk that local military aggression would lead to general war, which the Soviet leaders apparently desired to avoid. Faced with a world situation increasingly inhospitable to their aims, the Soviet leaders began to seek a way to restore their maneuverability short of the alternative extremes of war or of accommodation at unacceptable cost. Especially since early 1955, these leaders have become less openly belligerent in their attitudes and have made a series of conciliatory gestures. They ceased the USSR’s long standing procrastination on an Austrian peace treaty, indicated apparent willingness to accept some important aspects of the Western position on disarmament, reduced the hostility of their propaganda, and substantially increased Soviet contacts with the West. The USSR at the “Summit” Conference[2] and since has sought more or less consistently to convince the Free World that is is possible to establish conditions of “mutual trust.”

4. A complex of factors probably shaped the new Soviet policy. The immediate impetus was probably supplied by the prospective rearmament of West Germany, which appeared to be finally confirmed by the ratification of the Paris Accords in February 1955. However, influencing in a more general way all Soviet policy considerations must be a realization of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the fact that at present US nuclear capabilities greatly exceed those of the USSR. At least as long as this gap exists the Soviet leaders will almost certainly wish to minimize the risks of general war. Also in the background of Soviet policy-making may be the mounting economic burden of the military establishment, especially manifest in the increasing costs of new weapons systems. Further large annual increases in military expenditures would in time force the USSR to pay a price in reduction of the high rate of economic growth which has always been a basic Soviet aim. The Soviet leaders may believe that a period of relaxed international tensions would permit spreading the increasing cost of their military establishment over a longer period of time.

5. The death of Stalin was probably also a factor since it allowed his successors to exercise greater flexibility. The collective nature of the new leadership probably made it more responsive to the variety of pressures pointing toward a new policy. Finally, the new Soviet leaders probably concluded that a reduction in international tensions, if achieved, would promote the opening of rifts in the Western coalition, bring about a decline in the Western defense effort, and thus offer profitable new opportunities for Communist political action.[3]

6. But while the USSR clearly desires a less tense relationship with the Western Powers, it apparently seeks to achieve this on the basis of the territorial status quo, at least in Europe, and without any settlements which would impair the Soviet power position. The Soviet leaders have been intransigeant on Germany, and have rejected even discussion of the status of the European Satellites or of international Communism. The Free and Communist Worlds are still far apart on main issues, except possibly on some phases of the disarmament questions.

7. Communist China has adopted a course generally similar to that of the USSR. At the Bandung Conference[4] Peiping stepped up its policy of wooing its fellow Asian states. While steadily reinforcing its military threat in the Taiwan Strait area and firmly reiterating its claims to Taiwan, Peiping also apparently believes that for the present it is necessary to move toward its objectives by political action.

8. Meanwhile, Peiping and Moscow are turning to a new cold war offensive, involving for the first time the use of military and economic aid to non-Communist countries. Particularly notable is their new emphasis on the highly vulnerable areas of South Asia and the Middle East. The Bloc is offering expanded trade and economic and technical assistance, often on highly favorable terms, to a numbers of countries. Most recently it has made arms available to Egypt and is offering them to Syria and Saudi Arabia as well as to Austria and Finland.

9. The Free World Reaction. The Free World’s reaction to the shift in Bloc policy must be considered against the background of growing concern over the devastating consequences of all-out nuclear war. The most important effect of growing nuclear capabilities is to diminish the willingness of most governments and peoples to incur risks of war. This has led in turn to growing public pressures for a reduction of cold war tensions, for negotiations toward East-West settlements, and for some form of disarmament.

10. Against this background the shift in Bloc conduct has already had a marked impact on the non-Communist world. It has inspired widespread belief that the likelihood of general war has lessened, and hope that a lasting East-West détente can be arranged. This atmosphere has also reduced the incentive for Free World countries to submerge their differences in the face of a common threat; such disputes as that over Cyprus have taken on extra intensity. Throughout the Free World, there is greater willingness to accept Soviet offers of trade and aid and to normalize relations with the Bloc. Austria has accepted a policy of neutrality, and Yugoslavia has opted for a flexible “middle position” between East and West. Egypt and other Arab states are receptive to Bloc arms aid, which aggravates the explosive Arab-Israeli situation.

11. Meanwhile nationalist agitation in the remaining colonial areas continues to create frictions between the European powers and their former dependencies in Asia, and even among the Western Powers themselves. [1 sentence (22 words) not declassified]

II. Trends in the Balance of Military and Economic Power

12. The coming period will almost certainly be characterized by a continuing build-up of Bloc economic strength and, except possibly in the event of effective arms limitations, of Bloc military capabilities. There is no indication that the USSR and Communist China are likely to abandon their objective of rapidly narrowing the gaps between their own and Western power. Though the economies of the Western countries remain subject to considerable fluctuation, they at present appear likely to continue a high level of activity. But whether the West would be willing to maintain prudent military strength in the event of a protracted reduction of tensions is uncertain.

13. Trends in Military Balance of Power. Although the USSR already has substantial nuclear warfare capabilities, it is unlikely at least until mid-1958 to acquire such capabilities sufficient either to neutralize US retaliatory power or to inflict decisive damage on the US. During this time, therefore, the US will retain a substantial advantage over the USSR in nuclear warfare capabilities.

14. However, Soviet delivery capabilities are growing steadily, the size and flexibility of the Soviet weapons stockpile are increasing, and the USSR probably will begin acquiring multi-megaton weapons during the next few years. The USSR also appears to be broadening its strategic concepts to give greater emphasis to the twin factors of surprise and long-range nuclear attack and to be adapting its forces in this direction. At some time after mid-1958, the USSR will almost certainly have acquired a greatly increased capability for nuclear warfare against the US and the relative advantage of the US in this respect will have greatly decreased. Moreover, Soviet capabilities in guided missiles are believed to be growing rapidly. For example, at some time during the 1960–1965 period the USSR (as well as the US) probably will acquire militarily significant quantities of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

15. Thus a situation is approaching in which a total war involving use by both sides of available nuclear weapons could bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of both Western civilization and the Soviet system. This might result in a condition of mutual deterrence, in which each side would be strongly inhibited from deliberately initiating general war or taking actions which it regarded as materially increasing the risk of general war. However, general war would remain a possibility, if only because of the element of miscalculation by either side. Local wars might become more likely than at present, since the USSR’s growing nuclear capabilities might lead it to calculate that increasing US and allied unwillingness to initiate nuclear war would permit Soviet local aggression without substantial risk of general war.

16. General war would also be a possibility in the event that the USSR, either because of an unexpected technological breakthrough or for other reasons, came to believe it could destroy the US without effective retaliation. In an era of rapid technological development it is always possible that a condition of nuclear stalemate may prove transitory. Much may depend upon which side can acquire or maintain technological superiority, in turn largely a function of the application of trained scientific and technical manpower. Though the present scientific assets of the USSR are less than those of the US (and those of the Bloc as a whole far smaller than those of the West), the USSR almost certainly is increasing its scientific assets more rapidly than is the US.

17. Although the USSR is rapidly developing its nuclear striking power it and the Bloc as a whole are also making major efforts to re-equip and reorganize their conventional forces. The Bloc may somewhat reduce the over-all personnel strength of its forces, but these forces are being intensively modernized and their capabilities are steadily improving. In the Far East, Communist China is rapidly developing formidable military strength, though it remains substantially dependent on the USSR for equipment and logistic support.

18. The Western coalition retains a potential for further substantial increase in its military strength. However, the realization of this potential depends upon Western will to do so, a will which even now does not appear to be strong, and which would probably decline markedly in a period of reduced tensions.

19. Trends in Comparative Economic Strength. The USSR gives every sign of continuing its intensive economic expansion, notably in heavy industry. The Soviet economy still faces numerous problems, particularly in the fields of agriculture, industrial productivity, and allocation of manpower. Over the long run the rate of economic growth will depend partly on the scale of military effort the USSR decides to support. The previous rapid rate of Soviet economic growth will continue to decline; nevertheless, this rate is likely to remain substantially higher than that of the US. In broad terms we estimate that Soviet GNP (in 1954 little over one-third that of the US) will increase by 1965 to somewhat under half that of the US. But the US economy will probably continue to draw ahead in absolute terms, the gap in GNP increasing from an estimated $228 billion in 1954 to around $294 billion in 1965. On the other hand, the USSR will probably continue to devote a much higher proportion of its resources to investment and military use than will the US. Because of the increasing importance of forces-in-being in an age of nuclear weapons, economic and industrial strength is becoming a less dependable measure of national military power than in past years.

III. Trends in Bloc Stability, Cohesion, and Policies

Trends in Bloc Stability and Cohesion

20. Over the next several years at least it seems unlikely that the nature of the Soviet political system will significantly change or the stability of the regime be seriously weakened. Maneuvering for power among the present collective leadership will probably continue but it is likely to be confined to the small group at the top and not to result in open violence involving the police or armed forces. Despite the continued existence of major problems such as those in agriculture, and possible future requirements for increases in consumer goods, we see little likelihood of any early development of internal pressures so great as to compel a basic alteration of Soviet policies. Soviet efforts to reduce international tensions appear to have been received with relief and approval by the Soviet people.

21. In the European Satellites the post-Stalin leadership is attempting to modify the more obvious manifestations of Soviet control, and may proceed further on this course. However, the USSR almost certainly will not abandon its hold over the Satellites, nor is it likely that any upsurge of Satellite nationalism will seriously shake this hold. The Satellite regimes share a common interest with Moscow in maintaining tight Communist control over populations which are still basically hostile. A prolonged reduction of tensions would accelerate the already evident decline of popular hope for liberation, and hasten the process of adjustment to Communist rule.

22. Though the Peiping regime faces internal problems much greater than those of the USSR, its control over the people is becoming increasingly firm. Meanwhile Communist China’s prestige and influence within and outside the Bloc are growing, and the USSR will remain careful to treat it as a partner. Latent conflicts of interest between the two powers may eventually come to the fore, but ideological ties, China’s need for industrial and military aid, the USSR’s interest in a strong Communist power base in the Far East, common fear of US power, and common interest in the extension of Communist power will probably continue to dictate a close alliance for some years to come.

Major Trends in Soviet and Chinese Communist Policy

23. Despite the pronounced change in Soviet tactics, we see no indication that the USSR has given up its long-range aim of achieving a Communist-dominated world. Indeed the new Soviet leaders exhibit an air of confidence in their growing economic and military strength and in the ultimate victory of Communism. What they apparently have decided is that the existing world situation requires a shift from their previous line if they are to make progress toward their ultimate aims. Thus the East-West conflict is merely shifting from a phase marked by direct Bloc threats and pressures to one marked by increasing emphasis on less obvious forms of Communist political warfare.

24. The Soviet policy of seeking a general easing of cold war tensions seems pointed toward three main objectives: (a) reducing the threat of nuclear conflict arising from continued tensions, particularly during the period of Soviet nuclear inferiority; (b) gaining time to continue the USSR’s military build-up and to deal with its economic problems; and (c) opening new opportunities for undermining Western strength and extending Communist penetration of the Free World. In attempting to undermine Western strength the USSR will concentrate on neutralizing US nuclear power, inducing a reduction in Free World military forces, isolating the US, and bringing about its withdrawal from Western Europe and from bases around the Bloc. Integral to this objective is the aim of postponing and minimizing the rearmament of West Germany and Japan and if possible weaning away such potentially powerful US allies.

25. Communist China will find it difficult to adopt as flexible and amicable a pose as has the USSR. It is still dominated by unrealized territorial claims, revolutionary fervor, and strong nationalism and anti-Westernism. Nevertheless, for some time it probably will also see advantages in conforming to over-all Soviet policy. Among such advantages would be a relaxation of East-West trade controls and a greater likelihood of achieving UN membership. Peiping appears increasingly disposed to concentrate on creation of a strong Communist power center. It will probably attempt, through subversive penetration and diplomatic negotiation, to weaken hostile power on its periphery and to create new opportunities for expanding its influence without risking a military showdown with the US. Peiping remains determined to eliminate the Nationalist government as unfinished business of the revolution.

26. Likelihood of Peripheral Aggression and Subversion. At least so long as the USSR suffers a marked inferiority in nuclear capabilities, neither Peiping nor Moscow is likely to undertake or sponsor any local aggression which in their judgment would involve appreciable risk of general war. If the weakness of non-Communist positions in Indochina, Taiwan, or other areas appeared to offer opportunities which they estimated would involve minimal risks of effective counteraction and which could be localized, they might instigate or undertake local aggression. But as long as they pursue their present policy they would carefully weigh whether such a move would vitiate their over-all attempts at reducing tensions.

27. Tactics for Undermining Western Strength. Far more likely than overt military aggression are continued Communist efforts at penetration and subversion in vulnerable areas, designed to create eventual “revolutions” from within. However, except possibly in Southeast Asia, the more overt forms of subversion are likely to be soft-pedalled, at least in the short run, in favor of subtler forms of political action such as efforts to entice non-Communist parties into popular fronts, to promote neutralist policies, and in general to substitute Bloc for Western influence.

28. At the same time the USSR and Communist China will probably re-emphasize their desire to negotiate, but they are unlikely to make any major concessions on key issues such as Taiwan or Germany. Nevertheless, they may demonstrate considerable flexibility in other fields. It is possible, for example, that the Bloc might make various arms reductions or undertake additional or even complete withdrawals of nonindigenous Communist forces from areas like North Korea or even from some areas in Europe, if they estimated they could thereby create pressures for substantial Western concessions in return.

29. In Europe, the short-term Soviet aim appears to be a general détente based on the status quo, which would legitimize all the Satellite regimes, including that of East Germany. The USSR appears determined not to accept German reunification unless the European situation is so altered as to insure that a reunited Germany would not become a partner of the West. Meanwhile, by creating an atmosphere in which further rearmament may appear unnecessary and by advancing their all-European security proposals, the Soviet leaders aim to undermine NATO and bring about a withdrawal of US forces from Europe.

30. In the Middle and Far East the Communists will step up their current campaign against Western efforts to build defensive strength and alliances. They will seek to play on nationalist and anticolonial sentiments and to encourage divisive conflicts. By further offers of increased trade and of economic and military assistance, Moscow and Peiping will take advantage of the demands of the underdeveloped countries for external aid. Their aims will be to promote neutralism, undermine Western influence, and create subversive assets.

31. Soviet Policy toward Disarmament. At present the USSR probably hopes to obtain some form of arms limitation which would greatly reduce the risk of surprise nuclear attack and all-out nuclear warfare. Such a development would minimize the gravest threat to Soviet security while leaving the USSR in a position to pursue its long-range aims by political action, or even to resume overt expansionism, without incurring unacceptable nuclear risks. The USSR may also desire some lessening of its present arms burdens in order to permit greater allocation of resources to agricultural and other economic uses.

32. Therefore, the USSR probably aims to commit the West to fixed levels of reduced armament and to limit Western freedom to employ nuclear weapons, but without agreeing to unrestricted inspection. To achieve these gains, the Soviet leaders will probably be willing to agree to similar restrictions, and to accept some limited form of inspection. Meanwhile, the USSR will hope, through agitation of the disarmament issue, to divide Western opinion, to encourage a relaxation of military effort in the West, and to induce a withdrawal of US forces from overseas areas.

33. Probable Duration of Current Phase of Soviet Policy. Although Soviet policy has shown itself capable of sudden reversal, which could again occur if the present policy failed to achieve its expected results or led to developments prejudicial to Soviet interests, our assessment of Soviet motivations leads us to believe that the Soviet leaders intend to persist in their present course for some time. The care which they have taken to publicize it within the USSR, thus encouraging popular expectations of relaxed international tensions, also suggests that they do not intend to abandon this new tactic in the near future. The new line of Soviet policy does not, of course, rule out the occurrence of various Communist-incited crises and disturbances in the world, which may even lead to appreciable losses in Western positions. We believe, however, that the Bloc will take care that no one of these is of such magnitude or importance as to return the world to conditions of tension comparable to those existing in the years around 1950.

34. The Soviet leaders may nevertheless regard the present phase as only an interim one, to be used to narrow the gap between their own and US nuclear capabilities and to soften up the Free World. Once they had achieved an adequate nuclear capability and possibly created new revolutionary opportunities, or if it became evident that their policy was not producing substantial successes, they might again adopt a more aggressive policy, believing that in any resulting crisis they could outbluff the West. However, such a reversion would depend in great measure on the Bloc’s estimate of Free World will and deterrent strength.

35. Provided that the US and its allies maintain adequte deterrent strength, it remains unlikely that the Bloc would deliberately initiate general nuclear war or local aggression seriously risking this outcome. Even if the USSR vastly increased its nuclear capabilities, barring a technological breakthrough it still could not be confident that even a maximum surprise attack would prevent retaliatory devastation of the USSR. The Soviet leaders may be coming to feel that nuclear war in an age of super-weapons involves unacceptable risks and that therefore they must pursue their ultimate objectives by means which minimize the danger of nuclear war.

36. An extended period of reduced international tensions and wider East-West contacts would present problems for the Bloc as well as the West. The relaxation of harsh police controls may be difficult to reverse, and the promise of higher standards of living may be difficult to abandon. If a change in Soviet foreign policy required reversion to a policy of sacrifices enforced by drastic controls, internal discontent would result, although it could almost certainly be kept in check.

37. However, a relaxation of domestic controls and of the atmosphere of hostility in East-West relations could, if continued over the much longer run, combine with other factors to create real problems for the leaders in the Kremlin. There are signs that industrialization, urbanization, and the system of mass education have produced a bureaucratic and managerial group which might become increasingly devoted to the preservation of its privileges and vested interests and less willing to risk these to advance the cause of world Communism. If current Soviet policy is not reversed it is conceivable that such developments might reach significant proportions over a very long period and might ultimately create pressures for change within the Bloc, particularly in the event that the actions of the Free World prevent Communist victories. Of course if the hard Communist core in the Kremlin foresaw that such developments would threaten their control, they would probably attempt to reverse the trend by force and repression. [5]

IV Prospective Trends in the Free World

38. So long as the Bloc maintains its present course, a period of apparent stabilization in Bloc–Free World relations will probably exist. It will be marked by reduced fears of Bloc military aggression in the context of prolonged East-West negotiations and of increased diplomatic, economic, and cultural contacts. To most of the nations of the Free World, the course of international events will seem to be dominated less than before by action and counteraction in an East-West struggle. They will therefore feel more free to concentrate on internal problems and on pursuit of their separate national interests.

39. While a less strained international atmosphere would reduce the sense of commom danger which has bound many Free World countries, it might also facilitate greater economic and social progress in many areas, as countries tend to concentrate more on these matters. Increased international trade would probably develop. If the Free World should be thus strengthened, and if the Free World maintained adequate military strength, Bloc opportunities for subversive or expansionist gain would probably be narrowed.

40. But there is also grave danger that the Bloc’s new policy, together with the increasing recognition of the consequences of nuclear war, will create an even more serious threat to the Free World than did Stalin’s aggressive postwar policies. The US and its allies probably now are confronted by a period of less obvious hostility, harder to identify as such or to meet by such means as deterrent forces or military alliances. While critical threats will still exist in such vulnerable areas as the Taiwan Strait and Indochina, the new phase of the East-West conflict—provided it lasts for any period—may be characterized more by gradual erosion of Free World positions than by acute crises. Adjustment to this new situation is likely to present serious problems to the West.

41. The Bloc will not be able easily to overcome all the fear and suspicion created by its past actions. Cautious attitudes on the part of many Free World governments will continue and Bloc intransigeance on major issues would diminish somewhat the impact of its studied amicability. Nonetheless, the new Bloc behavior will accentuate already evident Free World tendencies to make concessions in order to arrive at acceptable settlements with the Bloc. For example, strong support already exists for a shift in Western policies toward Communist China. Very strong pressures are also developing for greatly expanded East-West trade, even in presently controlled items.

42. The continued growth of Bloc and Western nuclear capabilities will further stimulate tendencies toward accommodation in non-Communist countries. This factor will be especially important in Western Europe and Japan. Even wide recognition that the US will for a few years retain a significant nuclear advantage over the USSR will not overcome these tendencies.

43. There is likely to be strong popular pressure upon the governments of non-Communist countries for an agreed reduction in armaments, particularly to reduce the risk of nuclear war. However, the allies of the US will probably be cautious about urging any arms limitations which would neutralize US nuclear deterrent power without full guarantees of comparable restrictions on Soviet power.

Trends in the Western Alliances

44. Great difficulty will be encountered in maintaining military deterrent strength and in preserving the cohesion of the Western alliance systems. If the threat of Bloc aggression appears to diminish some loosening of these alliances seems inevitable; in any event their further extension will prove exceedingly difficult. European NATO force levels probably will decline; West German rearmament (likely to be even slower than now planned) will probably be insufficient to compensate for lower arms outlays in other countries, for the probable continued diversion of French forces to North Africa, and for the lack of cohesion in the Balkan alliance. Greater strains will probably develop among some allied countries. Far East issues will almost certainly create further frictions, expecially as crises recur in the Far East where the interests of the European NATO allies are becoming less engaged. Further intra-NATO strains will probably also develop over divisive issues such as Cyprus, the Saar, and North Africa.

45. Nevertheless, we do not foresee any developments over the next several years which will cause the disintegration of NATO. The interest of the European members in US economic and security commitments will almost certainly dictate NATO’s preservation. We do not believe that even the advent of nuclear plenty would lead most allies of the US, especially the major ones, to abandon their alliances, particularly since they recognize the vital importance of being under the umbrella of US deterrent power. However, in event of a major crisis involving imminent danger of nuclear war, the internal strains which most NATO members would experience make it impossible to predict their behavior.

46. Another major threat to the NATO structure may in time develop from increasing West German restiveness over reunification. The present government is firmly attached to NATO and, in the short term at least, security preoccupations will remain an overriding bar to any German deal with the USSR. But if reduced tensions continued for a long time and the West Germans came to believe that the Soviet threat to their security had materially lessened, mounting frustration might lead them to seek reunification at the price of abandoning NATO.

47. Japan, because of its security and economic needs, will probably remain basically aligned with the US. But it will assert progressively greater independence of the US, while normalizing relations with the Bloc. Japan’s serious political and economic problems make it unlikely that it will develop sufficient power and prestige over the next decade to play a major role as a leader of the non-Communist Far East, though its contribution to Free World power in this area should gradually increase.

Trends in the Uncommitted and Underdeveloped Areas

48. In a situation of reduced tensions, the problems created by the emergence in the Middle East, Far East, and in Africa of a growing number of underdeveloped and, in many cases, uncommitted countries will assume increasing prominence. Western colonial rule is rapidly disappearing in Asia, and a similar development is already accelerating in Africa; in both areas rising nationalist pressures will continue to weaken remaining European rule. The hallmark of all the emergent nations is a determination to be free of undue foreign influence coupled with an often conflicting desire to create strong modern states. To the extent that they see a reduced threat to them from Communist expansionism, their existing tendencies toward neutralism will be reinforced. At the same time, they require and are actively seeking outside aid in their development. Western failure at least partially to meet their demands may make them increasingly receptive to offers of Bloc aid. Similarly, Western failure to recognize and adjust to the anticolonial and in some cases racial sentiments in these areas would stimulate existing antagonisms.

49. Meanwhile the political instability and economic backwardness of the less developed countries of Asia and Africa will continue to be a major source of weakness in the Free World. Those in peripheral areas under the shadow of Communist power remain vulnerable to direct Communist pressures and intervention, as in most of mainland Southeast Asia. South Vietnam and Laos in particular, though they are making slow progress toward viability, are still critically weak and face such a serious internal and external subversive threat as to make their position extremely precarious.

50. The situation in the Middle East and South Asia makes these areas dangerously susceptible to Bloc exploitation, particularly to the Bloc’s new campaign of declared peaceful intent, broadened relations, and offers of arms and of expanded trade and aid. The existence of such disputes as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the differences between India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan facilitate Soviet efforts to disturb area stability and substitute its own for Western influence. Many of these countries will be willing to play off the Bloc against the West.

51. In these areas the “battle of ideas” for influencing the attitudes and allegiance of potential leadership groups will also prove increasingly important. The current Bloc effort to establish its international respectability will help open new lines of communication to these groups, particularly those on which the Communists concentrate, the intelligentsia and the youth.

52. But the situation in the underdeveloped and largely uncommitted areas will present opportunities as well as risks for the West. In the contest between the Bloc and the West for influence in the areas, the West has great assets. Its capacity for economic and technical aid is far greater than that of the Bloc. In view of the way in which the prospective peaceful uses of atomic energy have caught the world’s imagination, US policies in this field will be of great importance. Moreover, the force of emergent nationalism in Asia and Africa, which has initially manifested itself in anticolonial sentiment and in conflicts with certain of the Western Powers, may prove in time to be an increasing counterforce to Communist penetration. In addition, conflicts of interest like those which potentially exist between India and Communist China may become a considerable force on the Western side. The speed of industrialization and of improvement in living standards achieved respectively in India and in Communist China may come to be regarded in some Asian countries as a test of whether totalitarian or non-totalitarian methods are best suited for pursuing their own economic growth.

General Trends

53. One of the most dangerous political trends over the next several years will probably be a futher blurring of the lines which have divided the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Many Free World countries embarked on a policy of defensive alliances less because of ideological convictions than because of the danger of general war or Bloc local aggression. The apparent abatement of this danger, if the Bloc persists in a convincing demonstration of peaceful intent, may result in increasing neutralism and a trend toward a greater number of uncommitted states.

54. These trends will be reflected in the United Nations, which may increase in importance as a forum for attempts to reconcile diverse interests in a period of decreased emphasis on East-West conflict. The US is already becoming less able to count on strong UN majorities for positions which it wishes to espouse; the Latin American countries, for example, may take more independent positions.

55. A trend may also emerge toward new groupings independent of both the West and the USSR. Afro-Asian ties will assume increasing importance, though the loose Afro-Asian group in the UN seems too diverse to serve as a base for anything other than advancement of certain common interests, particularly on colonial issues. Though India will remain preoccupied with a host of pressing internal problems, its international influence will probably continue to grow and it may serve as the focus for a loosely coordinated group of nations.

56. If the Bloc is heavy-handed in its policies, engages in patently subversive efforts, or reverts to local aggression, the impact of its present line would be offset and many non-Communist states again alienated. On the other hand, if the Bloc maintains an ostensibly peaceful posture over an extended period, the opportunities for the extension of Communist influence may be greatly improved. Local Communist parties may be more able to obscure their objectives and their international affiliations and to play an ostensibly normal role in the political life of Free World nations. Real danger would exist that piecemeal Communist “peaceful gains” in various areas would not be recognized as threatening, and Free World opposition to such moves might become greatly weakened.

[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 1 November 1955.” The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, because the subject was outside FBI jurisdiction.

[2] Reference is to the Meeting of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union held at Geneva, July 18–23. See vol. v, pp. 119 ff.

[3] [Footnote in the source text not declassified]

[4] Reference is to the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung, April 18–24. See vol. XXI, pp. 81 ff.

[5] The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff and The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army, while agreeing generally that these developments are conceivable over the much longer run, would nevertheless omit this paragraph. Viewed in the light of an absence of evidence and of this very long term as a hypothesis, the paragraph is not relevant to the world situation as it now exists or as it will confront the US over the next several years. [Footnote in the source text.]

40. Memorandum of Discussion at the 266th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 15, 1955[1]

Washington, November 15, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Characteristics of the Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia (Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM, dated February 14, 1955;[2] NSC 5522;[3] NSC Action No. 1430-a;[4]

Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 2,[5] and 9,[6] 1955)

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the background of the reference report from the NSC Planning Board (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).[7] At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Anderson indicated that Secretary Wilson wished to make a statement.

Secretary Wilson stated that the various recent reports and recommendations, such as those of the Killian Committee, were putting a very expensive load on the budget of the Defense Department. This underlined the necessity of evaluating, first, how much money we can appropriately spend on the defense of the United States and, second, how to determine the correct allocation of funds between the requirements of the offense and the requirements of the defense. It might come, he added, as a considerable shock to the members of the National Security Council to learn that, according to the unilateral estimates of the Services, it would cost approximately $45 billion a year for some years if the Defense Department were to carry out the recommendations of the Killian Committee together with the regular military and military assistance programs.

All this, continued Secretary Wilson, would provide the National Security Council with some idea of the great difficulty which he was encountering in attempting to determine the over-all figure for the Defense budget for the Fiscal Year 1957. He wondered whether the Council would consider a figure of $38.5 billion as a reasonable ceiling for the Fiscal Year 1957. Actually, Secretary Wilson said that he was presenting to the Services the figure of $34 billion, but it could be safely anticipated that there would be vigorous protests on it. In any case, when the Council talked about the various programs recommended by the Killian Committee, it should be better aware of the problem posed by the costs of implementing these programs. Certainly every effort must be made to try to establish some priorities among all these conflicting programs. On the one hand, it was impossible to disregard the factor of costs. On the other hand, it was likewise difficult to determine a certain top figure and then simply tell the Services to carry out what programs they could while keeping within the figure selected. In addition to all this, there was the problem of ever-increasing costs. Steel was up $7 a ton over last year.

Admiral Radford pointed out to the Council that in point of fact the Defense Department had established some priorities based upon agreed national policies. The difficulty was that these papers gave rise to directives to the military services, and they felt obligated to carry out these directives, though sometimes, as in the case of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the costs of carrying out these directives were greater than anticipated.

At this point the Vice President called on the Acting Director of the Budget. Mr. Brundage stated that the Administration seemed to encounter very great trouble in putting an end to old projects and programs when it got into new projects and programs. This was true not only in the area of national defense and foreign policy. It was likewise true of the whole range of domestic programs. Although much that Secretary Wilson said seemed to be correct, the fact remained that there was no priority “on stopping things”.

Dr. Flemming then said that he wished to be heard on this subject. He first reminded the Council of the President’s great interest in the so-called Killian Committee Timetable when it had first been considered by the National Security Council last summer.[8] If, said Dr. Flemming, he correctly understood the contents of the Planning Board’s report now before the Council, the members of the Planning Board regard the Killian Committee Timetable as of greater importance now than when it had initially been considered. If one links all this up with the recent Soviet moves and maneuvers in the Middle East, Dr. Flemming said he could not avoid a strong feeling that the United States is going through a period which was tantamount to a parting of the ways in terms of national security policy. Of course, continued Dr. Flemming, he was as anxious as anyone to hold expenditures down. But he did hope that no doubts as to national security programs would be resolved in favor of some fiscal advantage unless there were very sound reasons for such a resolution. Let us not set some ceiling figure and say that we will do all that we can for the defense of the United States within the limits of this figure. Instead, we should carefully evaluate our national security situation and decide in each case which programs were required and what was the relative risk involved. The Administration must do all that it could to maintain the U.S. on the offensive and not permit it to be shoved into the defensive.

Dr. Flemming went on to express strong approval of the President’s directive accelerating the program for the achievement of an intercontinental ballistic missile.[9] He said he also believed that the high priority now being accorded programs for continental defense was thoroughly justified. Finally, we must not lower our sights at the wrong time with respect to our programs of military and economic assistance to friendly nations. The Secretary of Defense, concluded Dr. Flemming, should be made to feel the wholehearted support of the National Security Council if he decides that the figure for the Defense budget for FY 1957 must be advanced to $38.5 billion.

Secretary Wilson commented that he was not sure that the Defense Department could do a reasonable job even with the figure $38.5 billion. Admiral Radford certainly did not believe that it could, and it was at any rate going to prove a rough job to carry out the necessary programs with an FY 1957 budget of $38.5 billion.

Secretary Hoover said that it was advisable to point out to the Council here that Secretary Dulles had just requested that the Administration not freeze the figure for U.S. military and economic assistance programs for the coming fiscal year until he could return and take part in the discussion of these programs.

The Director of Central Intelligence said that further examination of the recent Soviet nuclear test[10] might have some bearing on the Killian Committee Timetable problem. [2 sentences (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Admiral Strauss said that he had a somewhat different interpretation of the implications of the Soviet test than had the Director of Central Intelligence. It was Admiral Strauss’ feeling that what had occurred might well turn out to have been the test of a warhead on a ballistic missile. [1 sentence (31 words) not declassified]Moreover, continued Admiral Strauss, if the Soviets were successful in cutting the lead time for the production of a ballistic missile as rapidly as they had succeeded in cutting the lead time for the production of their recent aircraft types, the date of mid-1958 might actually be too late as marking the end of Period II of the Killian Timetable, during which the United States would enjoy a period of maximum military advantage over the Soviet Union. Admiral Strauss said he preferred to believe that the end of Period II might come as early as mid-1957.

Secretary Wilson interrupted to say that he believed that it was a safe assumption that any technological achievement of the United States would be duplicated by the Soviet Union within a period of two years. Somehow or other they seem to have “infiltrated us” to such a degree.

Admiral Strauss continued his remarks on lead times by pointing out that the Soviet Union had achieved the Bison bomber in five years, starting from scratch. It had taken the United States seven years to build the B–52 bomber. The Soviets cut out a lot of excess detail and cut out a lot of testing of their aircraft and weapons. Admiral Radford agreed with Admiral Strauss’ conclusions, but pointed out that of course the Russians cared nothing whatever about accidents. We had to be careful of human life and accordingly more careful in our testing.

Admiral Strauss then stated his belief that instead of approving the Planning Board report on the Killian Timetable at this time, the National Security Council would be well advised to await further data on the most recent Soviet nuclear test. He repeated his belief that if his fears were borne out it might be necessary to advance the date at which the end of Period II of the Timetable would be reached.

Mr. Dillon Anderson pointed out to the Council that the action called for by the Killian Timetable report was simply noting. The report could be readily revised at any later date if any developments pointed to the desirability of revision.

The Vice President observed that, so far as he understood, the implications of the Killian Committee Timetable were to be taken into account by the National Security Council in recommending a revision of the basic national security policy (NSC 5501). To the Vice President, “the big news” from the present report on the Killian Committee Timetable was that the years 1956 to 1958 constituted the period of maximum military advantage for the United States over the Soviet Union. Perhaps, indeed, these years constituted the last period of such advantage that we would have over the Soviets. He asked Secretary Hoover whether he was right in this deduction and whether this meant forceful diplomatic steps by the United States to take advantage of its opportunity. Secretary Hoover replied that the Vice President was correct, but pointed out the difficulties which confronted the State Department in the area of diplomatic action. We simply could not make use of our ultimate military force as a means of carrying out our diplomatic moves. To this the Vice President replied that when one sees what the Soviets have been able to achieve throughout an era in which their atomic strength was much less than that of the United States, one dreaded to think what they might do when their atomic strength came to equal that of the United States.

Admiral Radford said that all he could add was a conviction that sooner or later we must “get tough” with the Soviets and tell them bluntly that there were certain things they could not do.

The National Security Council:[11]

a. Noted and discussed the results, as set forth in the report enclosed with the reference memorandum of November 2, of the Planning Board’s review of the validity of the “Characteristics” in the “Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia” contained in the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee.

b. Noted that the Planning Board, on the basis of its review of the validity of the “Characteristics”, will analyse the “Effects” and policy implications of the Timetable in connection with its current review of basic national security policy; subject to any changes which may be required in the “Characteristics” following evaluation of the recent Soviet atomic tests.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 16.

[2] Document 9.

[3] See Document 25.

[4] See footnote 9, Document 30.

[5] According to paragraph a of Action No. 1476, printed below, the memorandum of November 2 transmitted the Planning Board’s report on its examination of the validity of the Killian Committee timetable. Neither the memorandum nor the report has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[6] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[7] Neither the briefing note nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[8] See Document 30.

[9] Reference is presumably to NSC Action No. 1433; see footnote 9, Document 34.

[10] Dulles described this test to the Council at its 269th meeting on November 10. (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

[11] Paragraphs a–b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1476, approved by the President on November 18. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

41. Editorial Note

At the 267th meeting of the National Security Council on November 21, Secretary Dulles gave an extensive oral briefing on his recent activities and his impressions on a wide range of foreign policy concerns. He discussed the Geneva and Foreign Ministers Conferences, his visits to Italy, Spain, and with Marshal Tito, and his survey of problems in the Near East. After his presentation, the meeting continued:

“After a brief pause, the President said that he had a few remarks to make on the subject of Western Europe. Smilingly he said that all the members of the Council realized that this area was one of his pets. Moreover, nearly all those present around this table had been engaged in work with large human organizations. Accordingly all knew the great value to be attached to the morale factor in large organizations. It was by working with the group that the individual achieved his greatest satisfaction and success. Secretary Dulles had just touched on NATO as an organization which U.S. policy should support harder than ever in view of the fact that Germany was not likely to be united for some time to come. Actually, said the President, the Secretary of State really underestimated the case he had made. The unity of Western Europe today, continued the President, would solve the peace of the world. A solid power mass in Western Europe would ultimately attract to it all the Soviet satellites, and the threat to peace would disappear.

“Continuing in this vein, the President said that there was one thing that all of those present could do as individuals to forward the objective he had just mentioned. Whenever occasion arose for any member of the National Security Council to talk in public about foreign policy, that talk should stress the great advantages of a more nearly united Europe—cultural, economic, moral, and otherwise. The President referred to his own speech, made on July 3, 1951, at the English Speaking Union in London, on the general subject of a United States of Europe. After that speech, the President said, he had gotten the warmest compliments of no less a person than Winston Churchill, who said that the speech, from the point of view of logic, was the best speech which had been delivered in this generation.

“At this point, with even greater emphasis the President repeated his view on the desirability of developing in Western Europe a third great power bloc, after which development the United States would be permitted to sit back and relax somewhat. To help to produce such a development it must be demonstrated to all the countries of Western Europe individually that each and every one would profit by the union of them all and that none would lose. The President cited the development of the American historical pattern as an illustration of the point he was making.

“Turning next to NATO specifically, the President exclaimed ‘For God’s sake let us not be stingy with an ally.’ We should, for instance, give our NATO allies the chance to use some of our modern weapons. Nike, for instance, should be made available, although, said the President laughingly, Nike was obsolete—but he didn’t wish to be quoted thereon. In point of fact, however, instead of being generous, we treat many of our NATO allies like stepchildren, and then expect them to turn around and commit themselves to fight with us. By such actions we cut our own throats. Our allies certainly ought to know more about our new weapons. Our policy was in great contrast to the generosity which the British had shown in sharing with us their discoveries about radar at the beginning of the second World War.

“General Twining pointed out to the President that we were making fairly good progress in carrying out the views which the President had just stated. Secretary Dulles said that of course we were inhibited from sharing our atomic weapons with our allies by our own legislation, though Secretary Dulles believed that we could do a lot more in other weapons fields than we are currently doing to share some of the benefits with our allies.

“After repeating once more his suggestion that at every opportunity in public statements and addresses the members of the National Security Council should stress support for the idea of European integration (but should clear their speeches with the Secretary of State), the President terminated this phase of the discussion and inquired whether any member of the Council had any other matters which he wished to bring up for discussion.

“Secretary Wilson said that he had a certain number of things to talk about, but he was not sure that this was the time to bring them up. Important budgetary decisions would have to be made in the next three weeks.

“The President, in response to Secretary Wilson’s statement, said that it would be well to bear in mind the old adage, ‘Be not the first by which the new is tried, nor yet the last to put the old aside.’ While, said the President, he could see a lot in what Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford had said to him the last time they saw him in the hospital at Denver, he was still convinced that the Administration had the means at hand to make budgetary cuts in the Defense Department if we actually had the courage to go ahead and make these cuts. For example, continued the President, do we really need to have as much air and sea lift as we think we need to have in order to transport our forces rapidly to various trouble spots?

“Secretary Wilson then said that what troubled him with respect to our national security policy, was the fact that we had taken on such a ‘lot of losers’ as allies and clients—for example, Korea, Formosa, and Indochina. The Near East, in Secretary Wilson’s opinion, was on the contrary an area of real value to the United States which some day might become self-supporting.”

After some general discussion on the foreign aid item in the fiscal year 1957 budget, the Council turned to the budget of the Defense Department:

“Secretary Wilson then pointed out that he had tentatively given the Services a total Defense Department ceiling for the FY 1957 budget of $34 billion. The effect of this on the military services had been so explosive that it had almost brought down the Pentagon.

“The President said that of course the Council was aware of how anxious he was to balance the budget, but never, of course, at the cost of the welfare of the United States. Nevertheless, he could not overemphasize the importance to our national security itself of balancing the budget. It was obvious that there would be some tough decisions to make.

“Secretary Humphrey said that there was very little doubt that we were going to balance the budget this year; it was about next year that he was really worried. Director Hughes, with a smile, warned Secretary Humphrey that if he was careless and let another billion slip into the 1956 expenditures, the budget for this year would not be balanced. The President inquired whether it was not likely that the Treasury’s income would continue to go up. Secretary Humphrey replied that this was somewhat difficult to say.

“The President then turned to General Twining and said that he wished to put a question to him. What exactly did General Twining think of the value of the seaward extensions of our early warning line for continental defense? General Twining replied that he thought these extensions were ‘pretty vital now’. The President expressed some skepticism of the value of these extensions, and noted the extremely high cost of developing them.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

After more discussion on foreign aid programs, the Council adopted NSC Action No. 1480. As a result of the President’s comments on Western Europe, NSC Action No. 1480–b, approved by the President on December 1, was formally recorded as follows:

“Noted the President’s expressed conviction that European integration, with West Germany playing a part, would be a major contribution to world peace; that a unified Europe (achieved by strengthening and expanding into other areas the concepts of NATO, the Brussels Pact, and the Coal and Steel Community) would constitute a focus of power, in addition to the U.S. and USSR, which would greatly advance the material and moral well-being of European peoples and the security interests of the United States; that encouragement of this concept in speeches by Council participants would be an appropriate way of seeking the objective of European integration.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

42. Editorial Note

On August 16, Nelson A. Rockefeller invited the following individuals to participate in a group study and review of the psychological aspects of future United States strategy: CD. Jackson of Time, Inc., former Special Assistant to the President (1953–1954); Dr. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard University; Colonel George A. Lincoln of the United States Military Academy; Stacy May, a consulting economist; Dr. Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University; Dr. Stefan T. Possoniy of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania; William Webster of the New England Electric System; Drs. Ellis Johnson, Paul Linebarger, and George Pettee of The Johns Hopkins University; and Major General Frederick L. Anderson,USAF (ret.), who was designated the panel chairman.

The 12 members of this panel, which was often called the Quantico II Panel, met in Washington in late August and at Quantico, Virginia, in September in order to develop, in the light of the post-Geneva situation, an “optimum, integrated national program within which specific long-term military, economic, technological and ideological programs can be developed and financed.” On November 29, Major General Anderson submitted the panel’s findings to Rockefeller in a report entitled “Psychological Aspects of United States Strategy,” as well as a source book of papers prepared by individual members for the panel’s consideration in the preparation of its report.

In his letter of transmittal to Rockefeller, which prefaced the report, Anderson listed the four actions deemed by the panel to be “urgent and vital”:

“1. Explaining to the people of the United States the gravity of the world situation and spelling out what is required to overcome it.

“2. Increasing the military budget to provide for the improvement of the air defense of North America, for the establishment of an acceptable air defense of Western Europe, and for the development of a greater capability to deter limited war and to deal with it if it occurs.

“3. Providing the leadership, on a continuing basis, for Free World political, economic, and cultural common action to achieve dynamic growth, thus eliminating vulnerabilities to Communism.

“4. Continually applying pressure on the Soviet bloc to expose the insincerity of their intentions and tactics.”

On Friday, December 2, Rockefeller forwarded a copy of the panel’s report and the source book to the President, saying, in a letter of that date, that he believed “it comes to us at a very opportune time, when a hard look is being taken at where we stand in light of Soviet tactics and intentions as exposed at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, and their recent actions in the Middle East and Asia,” and adding that, “in this regard, I will furnish you Monday morning a personal report.” This report, “Action Program for Free World Strength,” dated December 5, was a 22–page memorandum plus several tables and annexes. It was transmitted under cover of a letter from Rockefeller to the President of the same date. The letter and memorandum are in the Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, National Security. Rockefeller’s December 2 letter to the President is ibid., Whitman File, Administration Series, Rockefeller. Copies of the Quantico II Panel’s report as well as the source book of individual papers are ibid., Project Clean Up Records, Psychological Aspects of U.S. Strategy, and in Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148.

43. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

U.S. and Soviet Missiles

The Problem

1. In Action No. 1433 the National Security Council on September 8, 1955, “requested the Department of State to report to the Council, not later than December 1, 1955, on the foreign policy implications of a demonstration by the USSR that it had developed an intercontinental or a 1500-mile ballistic missile prior to the U.S. and an estimate of the extent to which U.S. achievement of a 1500-mile missile would counter the implications of a Soviet achievement of an ICBM or a 1500-mile missile.”

Discussion

2. The problem, as thus posed, calls for an evaluation of four alternative contingencies:

(a) the Soviets achieve a medium-range missile ahead of the U.S.;

(b) the U.S. and the Soviets simultaneously achieve a medium-range missile;

(c) the Soviets achieve an ICBM before the U.S. achieves a medium-range missile;

(d) the U.S. achieves a medium-range missile at the same time as the Soviets achieve an ICBM.

I. Effect of a 1500-mile Missile

A. Prior Soviet Achievement

3. The Soviet leaders will wish to avoid general war, at least so long as they believe that this might involve heavy nuclear attacks upon the U.S.S.R. They would, even after developing a 1500-mile missile, not take actions which they expected greatly to increase the risk of general war. Their view of the risks that would attach to specific Bloc actions might be altered, however, since they might expect U.S. leaders to be moved to caution by the view that prior Soviet development of a medium-range missile had somewhat worsened the relative U.S. power position. The Communists might thus embark on a somewhat more aggressive policy, which could increase the danger of war through miscalculation.

4. The first reaction on the part of free-world countries to prior Soviet development of a medium-range missile would probably be dismay at this evidence that the U.S.S.R. was capable of more rapid technological progress than the U.S. Present confidence in U.S. strength, which rests on a contrary assumption, would be impaired.

5. As time went on, increasing consideration would also be given to the potential effect of these missiles on Western Europe and Japan in the event of war. While most Japanese and Europeans already consider that their countries would be devastated in a war, this belief would be powerfully strengthened by Soviet possession of a megaton missile against which there was no defense and whose launching sites were practically invulnerable to attack. The fact that the West did not also have a weapon against which there was no defense, but would be relying on aircraft delivery against which some defense is possible could, at the same time, reduce confidence in the Western deterrent to Soviet attack.

6. Because of this increased fear of the consequences of war and reduced confidence in U.S. strength, groups which have been advocating a policy of greater independence from the U.S. would be encouraged, and many persons who have been tending in this direction would find rationalization at hand to warrant a more explicit shift. Some governments, for example in Japan, would find themselves under increasing pressure to modify their policies to reflect these trends in public opinion. The steps which they might take as a result would probably not involve major change in their basic policies, at least in the first instance, but might create frictions with the U.S. which could have a serious cumulative impact on relations between them and the U.S.

7. There would, in any event, almost certainly be increased resistance on the part of U.S. allies to any U.S. policies which were believed to carry risks of war. Some allied governments might also become more inclined to modify their positions on such issues as disarmament if they believe that an accommodation with the U.S.S.R. on these issues would significantly reduce the risk of war.

8. If these more independent allied attitudes and policies generated public pressures in the U.S. for a more unilateral U.S. policy, this would become evident to our allies. They might then feel that they could no longer depend on the U.S. and should reduce even further their ties with the U.S. Pressures for limiting U.S. base rights might begin to mount.

9. The U.S.S.R. could play skillfully upon this situation, by suggesting to U.S. allies that it would be possible to reach “reasonable” agreements with the Bloc and thus to re-orient their foreign policies away from the U.S. A conciliatory Communist posture might thus convince a considerable body of opinion in allied countries that it would be feasible to follow a middle course in the cold war and, in this way, surely to avoid the horrors which could now be visited on their countries in the event of war.

10. The cumulative effect of mutually reinforcing events in allied countries, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could thus be gravely to weaken the effectiveness of U.S. alliances. While present governments in most allied countries would probably continue to estimate that U.S. thermonuclear striking power remained adequate to deter Communist attack and would, therefore, maintain the alliances with the U.S. which enabled them to profit from that deterrent, the impact of the forces and events described above could render this connection increasingly tenuous.

11. If the Bloc’s foreign policy became somewhat more aggressive as a result of its achievement of a medium-range missile, some allied governments would begin to doubt that U.S. deterrent power was still effective. This would intensify the trend toward neutralism described above. If the Bloc took actions which made general war seem an imminent probability, the popular demand for accommodation in countries that were under direct pressures from the Bloc and for neutrality in other countries might well become irresistible. While this possibility would exist, at least to some extent, whether or not the Soviets had achieved a medium-range missile, it would be strengthened by this development.

B. Simultaneous U.S. and Soviet Achievement

12. If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both developed 1500-mile missiles, the Kremlin would probably consider that this altered the balance of power, potentially at least, to the Bloc’s disadvantage. For while the Bloc had only acquired the capability to destroy U.S. overseas bases and allies, the U.S. would have become able to strike at the centers of Communist power—if it could operate from launching sites on the Bloc’s periphery. The Bloc would try, probably by alternately “hard” and “soft” tactics, to persuade countries on its perphery not to permit such sites to be constructed. If these efforts failed, Communist leaders would probably estimate that they were entering upon a period of relative military inferiority which would last until their acquisition of an intercontinental missile. They might fear that this advantage would stimulate the U.S. to a greater willingness to risk war and feel, therefore, that they had to show even greater caution than at present if they were to avoid war. They would be unlikely, however, to surrender any of their present positions of strength, e.g., in the satellites or East Germany, to this end. They would expect such a surrender merely to strengthen U.S. power and to stimulate the U.S. to further demands, which would be more dangerous to Soviet security and more difficult peacefully to resist.

13. If the U.S. achieved a 1500-mile missile simultaneously with the U.S.S.R., free-world countries would be relieved that Soviet technology had not outstripped that of the U.S., but they would still be concerned at their own increased vulnerability. U.S. possession of a medium-range missile would not, in their view, reduce this vulnerability any more than the existence of SAC does now. The availability of U.S. medium-range missiles would, however, strengthen their confidence in the U.S. deterrent power. The trend toward neutralism would thus be less than if the Soviets alone had achieved a missile but greater than if neither side had achieved a missile.

14. Soviet efforts to dissuade free countries from granting missile bases to the U.S. would probably fail, since these countries would believe that they were maximizing the deterrent to war by allowing such bases to be placed on their territory. This would, of course, not be true if these countries believed that the Soviets were sufficiently in earnest to make war on them if they refused to heed its pressures. They would be less likely to believe any Soviet threats to this effect, and so more likely to grant base rights, in the event of simultaneous U.S. and Soviet achievement of a missile than in the event of prior Soviet achievement. If, on the other hand, the U.S. tried to exploit its achievement of a 1500-mile missile by adopting a tougher stance toward the U.S.S.R., most U.S. allies would probably be moved by their fear of war to seek a more neutral position in the East-West struggle.

II. Effect of Intercontinental Missile

A. Prior Soviet Achievement

15. The Soviet leaders would probably only initiate general war if they felt a high degree of certainty that the U.S.S.R. would not be exposed to nuclear devastation during its course. It seems unlikely that their possession of an ICBM would cause them to feel this degree of certainty. They would fear that sufficient SAC aircraft might survive a surprise attack, whether because they were dispersed or because they were already in the air, to permit the U.S. to retaliate on a very large scale against the U.S.S.R. The Soviet leaders would, therefore, probably only attempt to capitalize on free world reactions to their new capacities by a more aggressive foreign policy in so far as they thought that they could do this without precipitating a thermonuclear conflict.

16. If free world countries believed that Soviet achievement of an ICBM endangered the U.S. retaliatory capability, they would lose confidence in the U.S. deterrent. They might then be willing to break their alliances with the U.S. under extreme Soviet pressure, since they would fear that these alliances might stimulate rather than avert Soviet attack upon them.

17. If, as seems more likely in the light of the reasoning suggested in paragraph 15, free world countries did not believe that Soviet prior development of an ICBM endangered the U.S. retaliatory capability, they would react to this achievement much as they would to Soviet prior achievement of a medium-range missile—only more so. There would be one new element in their reactions, moreover: They could not help but wonder whether the U.S. willingness to act in their behalf would be reduced by the apparently greater U.S. vulnerability to nuclear attack. To the extent that the U.S.S.R. was able to exploit this doubt, there would be a greater likelihood that some nations, especially those on the periphery of the Bloc, would accede to Soviet pressures. But the course of events would depend so much on the ability of the U.S. to display a convincing determination not to be outbluffed and on the readiness of the U.S.S.R to go far in risking war that speculation of a particularized sort is probably idle.

18. One important variable would be the timing of the Soviet achievement. Its impact would naturally be less if it followed Soviet achievement of such air-nuclear capabilities as would enable the U.S.S.R. utterly to devastate the U.S. For, in this event, Soviet development of an ICBM would—like Soviet development of a medium-range missile—be generally taken to dramatize, rather than to alter basically, the existing situation. Even in this case, however, the strain on U.S. alliances and the trend toward neutralism would probably be greater, on account of the more explicit U.S. vulnerability to instant devastation, than if the Soviets had merely achieved a medium-range missile ahead of the U.S.

B. Simultaneous U.S. and Soviet Achievement

19. If the U.S. achieved a 1500-mile missile at the same time as the U.S.S.R. achieved an ICBM, the leaders of the Bloc would probably conclude that both sides had gained in something like equal proportions and that general war had been rendered vastly more destructive for them both. Their reaction to this situation would probably be along the same general lines as their reactions to a condition of “nuclear stalemate”, which might already have occurred. It would differ from their reaction to prior achievement of an ICBM principally in so far as differing free world reactions seemed to offer lesser opportunities for exploitation.

20. Free world countries would take a less discouraged view of U.S. technological capacities if the U.S. achieved a 1500-mile missile simultaneously with the Soviets than if the U.S.S.R. alone achieved such a missile. They would consider—like the Soviets—that U.S. achievement of a 1500-mile missile and Soviet development of an ICBM made war even more destructive than previously. The extent to which they would consider that this altered the U.S. situation would depend on the extent to which the Soviets had been generally believed, prior to their achievement of an ICBM, to possess the capability to devastate the U.S. Even if such a condition of apparent “nuclear stalemate” had already been believed to exist, however, free world countries might be concerned, at least for a while, lest U.S. or Soviet policy change as a result of the more explicit U.S. vulnerability.

Conclusions

21. Soviet prior achievement of a medium-range missile would greatly reduce the free world’s confidence in U.S. technological superiority and enhance its fears as to the consequences of war. While existing governments’ confidence in the deterrent effect of U.S. retaliatory capabilities would cause them to maintain their alliances with the U.S., they might be under increasing public pressure to adopt a posture which reflected greater independence of the U.S. This could lead them to take a number of steps, none of which would be of great importance individually but all of which taken together could suggest a somewhat more “third force” orientation in the cold war. U.S. allies would, furthermore, almost certainly be more vigorous than now in opposing U.S. policies which they believed to carry any risk of war. They might also be more willing to compromise their present positions on outstanding East-West issues if they believed that this would reduce the chances of war. If U.S. opinion pressed for a more unilateral policy in reaction to these allied attitudes, U.S. allies might wish to reduce even further their dependence on the U.S. The Soviets could hasten the resulting trend toward neutralism by a skillful combination of conciliatory tactics, intended to persuade U.S. allies that accommodation with the Bloc might be had on reasonable terms, and of aggressive gestures designed to emphasize that these countries’ alliances with the U.S. could involve them in war.

22. Simultaneous U.S. achievement of a medium-range missile would help to sustain confidence in U.S. strength but it would not prevent U.S. allies from feeling that they were more vulnerable than before to widespread devastation in the event of war. Trends toward neutralism or accommodation would thus be less than if the U.S.S.R. alone had achieved a missile but greater than if neither side had developed this weapon.

23. Prior Soviet achievement of an ICBM would have the same effects, on a somewhat different scale, as prior Soviet achievement of a medium-range missile. It would also raise doubts in the free world as to the U.S. willingness to resist—and hence the U.S. ability to deter— Communist peripheral expansion, in view of the increased U.S. vulnerability to instant devastation. U.S. alliances could probably still be maintained, unless U.S. inaction in the face of Communist pressure confirmed these doubts, but the threat to the cohesion of the Western coalition would be greater than under any other circumstances envisaged in this paper.

24. U.S. achievement of a medium-range missile at the same time as the U.S.S.R. achieved an ICBM, while leaving doubts as to U.S. willingness to risk ICBM attack by resisting local aggression, would strengthen free-world confidence in the U.S. retaliatory power. The effect of this circumstance on the cohesion of U.S. alliances would thus be somewhat less than that of a prior Soviet ICBM achievement.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, ICBM Programs. Top Secret. On November 30, Bowie forwarded a copy of this study to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State with a covering memorandum stating that it was prepared by the Policy Planning Staff and cleared in draft with EUR and FE. Preliminary drafts, internal memoranda, and records of staff meetings reveal that its primary author was Henry D. Owen and that it was based in part on an Office of Intelligence Research study prepared at Owen’s request. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70) The source text is not dated, but the Department of State record copy is dated November 29 and contains a handwritten marginal note that it was sent to Lay at the NSC on November 30 and used at the Council meeting on December 1. (Ibid.,S/P Record Copies, Jan.–Dec. 1955) Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and of Central Intelligence and the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

44. Report Prepared in the Department of Defense[1]

Washington, undated.

REPORT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

A. Background

The purpose of this report is to give the status of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program as required by NSC Action No. 1433[2] and the status of the 1500 mile ballistic missile plans as required by NSC Action No. 1430c.[3]

As part of the National Security Council consideration of the Technological Capabilities Panel Report (NSC 5522),[4] the Department of Defense presented a briefing on the intercontinental ballistic missile program to the Council on 28 July 1955.[5] The question of the program priority was considered by the Council 8 September 1955.[6] In approving NSC Action No. 1433 resulting from the 8 September meeting, the President directed that the U.S. ICBM program be a research and development program of the highest priority above all others. It was further directed that the Secretary of Defense prosecute the program with maximum urgency; that all other Executive departments and agencies assist as required; and that the Secretary of Defense report to the Council in December on the status of the program and the major problems involved.

In its consideration of the ICBM project, the Technological Capabilities Panel also commented on a possible intermediate range (1500 mile) ballistic missile (IRBM) and recommended the development of such a missile with the suggestion that both land-basing and ship-launching be considered. The Department of Defense concurred in principle with the development of the IRBM capability; and the President approved NSC Action No. 1430c which noted that the Department of Defense had several different development plans under consideration and would report to the Council, not later than 1 December 1955, on the status of those plans, indicating, if possible, which the Defense Department proposed to implement and including an estimate of the time when an IRBM might become operational.

B. Organization

In response to the Presidential directive a study has been made of the administrative arrangements and management controls necessary to prosecute the ICBM program with maximum urgency. In addition, the study included consideration of the achievement of an intermediate range (1500 mile) ballistic missile capability at the earliest possible date. It was determined that the Department had the technical capability to undertake the development of an IRBM concurrently with the present ICBM effort, with a reasonable assurance of bettering the time schedule set for the ICBM. It was further determined that in order to carry out these programs at the maximum rate technology will permit, it would be necessary to devise a specialized management structure to minimize the delays inherent in program review and administration and the potential interference between these programs. There is at present no cheap and easy way which will permit the earlier achievement of a militarily usable weapon. Furthermore, it is believed that the early flight tests of the ICBM and IRBM vehicles during 1957 will satisfy the possible need for “demonstrations.” During the development of these missiles reasonable relaxation of range and accuracy requirements will be subject to constant consideration should advances in the operational availability dates be achievable. Further relaxation of reliability is subject to serious question since these missiles will be flying over friendly territory.

In keeping with the above, there has been established separate development programs for the ICBM and the IRBM. The ICBM program is that already underway in the Air Force as discussed in the TCP Report and subject of the Council briefing on 28 July. The IRBM program will consist of a land-based development by the Air Force (IRBM #1) and a joint Army–Navy program (IRBM #2) having the dual objective of achieving an early ship-launched capability and also providing a land-based alternative to the Air Force program. The IRBM program has been established with a priority second only to that of the ICBM program under the Presidential directive.

In order to serve as the OSD management agency there has been established the OSD Ballistic Missiles Committee under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.[7] This Committee will be the sole reviewing agency within OSD for all matters pertaining to the ICBM and IRBM programs including budget and apportionment requests, facilities, procurement and the composition of the technical programs. The ICBM Scientific Advisory Committee to the Secretary of the Air Force, modified as required, will also serve as the advisory committee to the OSD Ballistic Missiles Committee.

The Secretary of the Air Force has established an Air Force Ballistics Missiles Committee in his office to assist in the management of the ICBM and IRBM #1 programs. The Secretary of the Air Force has been authorized to approve the ICBM and IRBM #1 facility requirements, establish completion dates, delegate the agencies for construction which is able to meet the required objective and to approve the construction criteria and standards for construction. The organization of the Western Development Division which is the Executive Agency within the Air Force in carrying out the technical program was described in the 28 July 1955 briefing to the Council and remains unchanged.

The Joint Army–Navy program for the IRBM #2 will be directed by the Joint Army–Navy Ballistics Missiles Committee with the Secretary of the Navy as Chairman and the Secretary of the Army as Vice Chairman. Subject to the approval of the OSD Ballistics Missiles Committee, the Joint Army–Navy Committee has been authorized and directed to carry out all aspects of the IRBM #2 program employing methods reflecting maximum urgency. This Committee has also been delegated to approve IRBM #2 facilities.

The OSD Ballistics Missiles Committee, the Air Force Ballistics Missiles Committee and the joint Army–Navy Ballistics Missiles Committee have been organized and are currently functioning. No problems have been encountered in obtaining the assistance of other Executive Departments and agencies in the implementation of the Presidential directive.

C. ICBM Technical Program

The prosecution of the Air Force ICBM program continues to be marked by steady progress.

(1) Two contractors have been selected and contractual arrangements made for each major component of the missile system, such as the propulsion unit, the airframe, and the guidance and control units. Since July the major advance in this respect has been the selection of the Glenn L. Martin Company which will develop a two-stage configuration as the second airframe source.

(2) Initial flight testing, designed to assist in nose cone design, has begun at the Air Force Missile Test Center (Banana River, Florida). Of a planned total of 36 X–17 re-entry test vehicles, three have been fired to date.

(3) Prime contractor ICBM personnel total 8700 as of 15 November 1955.

(4) Funding has been adequate for all purposes, but facility acquisition has not been so rapid as desired. The new streamlined management structure is expected to correct this deficiency.

(5) A new development plan for the ICBM has been prepared to take advantage of the revised organization and the modified management controls and administrative procedures. This plan was devised with the objective of using it as an overall management and authorization document.

(6) The program for attaining the earliest operational ICBM deterrent capability has been under intensive study, and planning of operational facilities and forces is underway.

D. IRBM Technical Program

In planning the IRBM program, the recommendations of the Technological Capabilities Panel, the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. technological capability in the ballistic missile field were considered. Five possible actions were proposed to meet the indicated need:

(1) Use of second stage of the ICBM program.

(2) A separate IRBM project based on available designs.

(3) Support of the proposed United Kingdom IRBM development.

(4) A separate ship-launched IRBM development.

(5) Use of Triton.

There is general technical agreement that a land-based version of an IRBM can be developed earlier than a ship-launched version. However, the desirability of a ship-launched IRBM capability is so apparent that its strong consideration is believed to be warranted.

To meet existing military needs at the earliest possible date the Department of Defense has initiated an IRBM program having two separate objectives:

(1) The development of a land-based IRBM (IRBM #1) by the Air Force at the earliest possible date. In the conduct of this program the Air Force will make use of any applicable components or techniques developed within the ICBM program. This approach was adopted after it was shown that a direct “fall out” missile from the ICBM program such as the use of the ICBM second stage is not technically feasible.

(2) The initiation of a development program (IRBM #2) having the dual objective of achieving the earliest possible ship-launched capability and also providing a land-based alternate to the Air Force IRBM #1 program. The IRBM #2 program will be conducted jointly by the Army and Navy. Analysis of the Navy requirements indicate that a missile technically different from the planned Air Force approach will be required. However, in the development of a missile for ship-launching it is necessary to go through a land-launched phase thereby providing with a minimum of modification a land-based alternate to the Air Force IRBM #1 program. To assure achievement of the land-based as well as ship-launched IRBM capability equal priority has been assigned to the IRBM #1 and IRBM #2 programs. To minimize the potential interference to the ICBM program, maximum use will be made of contractors with experience in this field but not having major commitments within the ICBM program. Also, use will be made of the Redstone Arsenal team which has extensive experience in the design and firing of large ballistic rockets.

On the basis of current estimates of the technical state of the art it is believed that a surface ship-launching capability for an IRBM may be achieved appreciably earlier than a submarine launching capability. Accordingly the initial ship-launched version is planned for application to surface ships rather than submarines. Therefore development will continue of the submarine-launched ramjet propelled Triton missile.

United States interest and technical support of the United Kingdom ballistic missile program is continuing. Nevertheless, an operational missile cannot be expected from this program for several years after a U.S. capability has been achieved. Continued support of this program will strengthen appreciably the United Kingdom potential in this critical area and will provide additional highly skilled manpower in the support of our combined development objectives.

E. Funding

Funding estimated to be required to support the ICBM and IRBM programs is shown in the Financial Annex to this report. These estimates will be included in the report to the Council required by NSC Action No. 1430m[8] on the funding required for items related to the Technological Capabilities Panel Report.

F. Recommendations

It is recommended that the National Security Council:

(a) Note the substantial work done in implementation of NSC Actions No. 1433 and 1430c as indicated in the Department of Defense report; and note that the Department of Defense will report further on these programs as part of the Annual Status Report on Major Security Programs (30 June 1956) and as otherwise provided in NSC Action No. 1433.

(b) Recommend that the President approve that the IRBM research and development program is a program of equal priority to the ICBM program, but with no interference to the valid requirements of the ICBM program.

FINANCIAL ANNEX

Estimated Funds Required by Fiscal Year (millions)

1955

1956

1957

ICBM

$ 156

$ 355

$ 582(1)

IRBM

89.0

269 (2)

(1) Includes $30 millions for two U.S. launching bases to provide an emergency operational capability; does not include a possible additional $25 million which may be required primarily for range improvement purposes.

(2) Does not include funding for advanced bases or ship modification that would be required to provide an operational capability.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, ICBM Programs. Top Secret. The source text is not dated, but it was submitted under cover of a memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council on November 30. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and of Central Intelligence and the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[2] See footnote 9, Document 34.

[3] See footnote 9, Document 30.

[4] See Document 25.

[5] See footnote 4, Document 33.

[6] See Document 34.

[7] Membership of the Committee includes appropriate Assistant Secretaries of Defense and an Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget. [Footnote in the source text.]

[8] See footnote 9, Document 30.

45. Memorandum of Discussion at the 268th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, December 1, 1955[1]

Maryland, December 1, 1955

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

[3 paragraphs (½ page of source text) not declassified]

[Here follow discussion of unrelated subjects and agenda item 2, “Assistance to Egypt in Financing the High Aswan Dam;” for text, see volume XIV, page 812.]

3. Foreign Policy Implications of U.S. and Soviet Missiles (NSC Action No. 1433–b; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 30, 1955)[2]

Mr. Dillon Anderson suggested that the next item, the report on the vulnerabilities of SAC, be postponed at this time in favor of Council consideration of the three items dealing with ballistic missiles. He then called on Secretary Dulles to speak to the reference report (copy filed in the Minutes of the meeting).[3]

After Secretary Dulles had completed his summary of the report on the foreign policy implications of a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, Secretary Wilson stated that what he deduced from Secretary Dulles’ report was that the United States should push its programs for achieving an intercontinental ballistic missile and intermediate range ballistic missile just as hard as it possibly could. Secretary Dulles agreed, but added that it was of great importance that we consider carefully how to minimize the consequences of a Russian achievement of these weapons prior to the United States. Secretary Dulles warned that it was going to be very difficult to persuade public opinion on this score. If the Soviets got either of these missiles before the United States, we could surely count on the Soviets’ dramatizing their new capability to the limit.

The National Security Council:[4]

Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Department of State, transmitted by the reference memorandum and summarized at the meeting by the Secretary of State.

4. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs (NSC Actions Nos. 1430–c and 1433–a–(4); Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 30, 1955)[5]

Secretary Robertson spoke first on the subject of the missile programs in order to put the problem in its context and provide the necessary background. He said that after he had finished his part of the presentation, the three detailed programs would be treated separately in the space of approximately ten minutes each. Secretary Robertson then proceeded to summarize the general DoD arrangements for the achievement of U.S. ballistic missiles, as set forth in the reference memorandum (copy filed in the Minutes of the meeting).

While Secretary Robertson was explaining, with the assistance of charts, the complicated organizations set up in the Defense Department to carry out these programs, the President interrupted to inquire how often these several DoD committees met and what did they accomplish. He said he was deeply suspicious of committees as a method of getting things done promptly.

At the conclusion of Secretary Robertson’s remarks, the President said that as he remembered it, when the Killian Committee had brought in their original recommendation with respect to the IRBM and ICBM programs, it had been their view that the development of the intermediate range missile would come along naturally in the course of developing the intercontinental ballistic missile. Now, according to Secretary Robertson, all this had been changed and there were separate projects, one to achieve the intermediate range missile and the longer range missile. Before Secretary Robertson could explain, the President, with great emphasis, stressed the essentiality of the United States achieving these missiles, and pointed out that “the best was always the enemy of the good.” If we did not put every effort into getting an ICBM we would never get one. The President explained that he was not challenging the contents of Secretary Robertson’s report, but he was merely astonished at the difference between the information given him by the Killian report in July and the present report by the Department of Defense.

In the succeeding moments various people attempted to explain to the President that there was no conflict between the recommendations of the Killian committee and the present report by the Department of Defense. Mr. Robert Sprague, Consultant to the NSC and very familiar with the Killian Committee report, indicated that the President was under a misapprehension, and that the Killian Committee had warmly endorsed separate programs for the achievement of the intermediate range and the long-range ballistic missiles.

The President said he had a final point to make to Secretary Robertson. The latter had said in the course of his presentation that henceforth the status of the DoD programs for achieving a U.S. missile capability would be reported as a normal part of the annual report of the Department of Defense on the status of the U.S. military programs. On the contrary, said the President with great warmth of feeling, the Secretary of Defense was going to report to him on the developments in these programs at least once a month. The President said he was absolutely determined not to tolerate any fooling with this thing. We had simply got to achieve such missiles as promptly as possible, if only because of the enormous psychological and political significance of ballistic missiles.

Secretary Robertson was followed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Trevor Gardner,[6] who opened his presentation by expressing his appreciation of the enthusiasm which the President was showing for getting ahead with developing ballistic missiles. He then cited comparative statistics as to test firings of missiles, guided and otherwise, in the Soviet Union and in the United States in the course of the last calendar year. Of the Russian firings at least 13 were presumed to be of ballistic missiles. Secretary Gardner judged that the Soviets were probably two years ahead of us in progress toward the achievement of a ballistic missile.

After Secretary Gardner had proceeded to outline the status of the Air Force programs for the achievement of an ICBM, he was followed by Secretary Thomas, who described the joint Army-Navy program. Secretary Thomas was followed in turn by Major General Medaris, USA,[7] on the program for the development of the 1500-mile so-called intermediate range ballistic missile.

At the conclusion of these separate reports, the President commented that each of those who had reported seemed to be bragging about how much had been done since the job had been assigned to the reporter’s organization on November [September] 8. The President said he would like to know what had been going on since last July, when he had issued his strong directive on achievement of a U.S. capability in the field of ballistic missiles. Secretary Wilson undertook to assure the President that, despite appearances, no time had really been lost, and Secretary Robertson reassured the President on the display of teamwork among the three military services.

At the end of the discussion, the President referred to the mass of letters and telegrams which he was receiving from people all over the country, insisting that the program in the U.S. to achieve a ballistic missile should be placed in the hands of one single individual and that everything should be done to hurry the project to completion. These people had generally insisted that the country which first achieved an intercontinental ballistic missile would rule the world. The President said that he was somewhat skeptical of the latter point and of the unique importance of the ICBM from a strictly military point of view. On the other hand, he fully subscribed to the views of the Secretary of State as to the profound and overriding political and psychological importance of the U.S. achieving such a weapon.

The National Security Council:[8]

a. Noted the substantial work done in inplementation of the reference NSC actions, as indicated in the Department of Defense report, transmitted by the reference memorandum and orally presented at the meeting.

b. Noted the President’s directive that the Department of Defense should report each month to the President on the subject programs, in addition to its reports on these programs as a part of the annual status report on national security programs (June 30, 1956) and as otherwise provided in NSC Action No. 1433–a–(4).

c. Noted the President’s statement that the political and psychological impact upon the world of the early development of an effective ballistic missile with a range in the 1000–1700 mile range would be so great that early development of such a missile would, be of critical importance to the national security interests of the United States.

d. Recommended that the President approve that the IRBM research and development program is a program of equal priority to the ICBM program, but with no interference with the valid requirements of the lCBM program.

Note: The above actions, as adopted at the meeting, subsequently submitted to the President. The President, after further consideration and discussion with the Secretary of Defense,[9] approved a through c above, and issued the following directive instead of approving the recommendation in d above:

“The President directed that the IRBM and ICBM programs should both be research and development programs of the highest priority above all others. Mutual interference between these programs should be avoided so far as practicable, but if a conflict should occur in which strict application of paragraph c above would, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, cause major damage to the security interests of the United States, then the matter will be promptly referred to the President.”

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on December 2.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1433, see footnote 9, Document 34. The November 30 memorandum transmitted Document 44.

[3] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[4] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1483, approved by the President on December 21. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellanous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[5] Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30. The November 30 memorandum transmitted the report, supra.

[6] Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development).

[7] Major General John B. Medaris, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency.

[8] Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1484, approved by the President on December 21. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellanous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Actions by the National Security Council)

[9] The President gave his approval on December 21, and in a memorandum of the same date to Secretary of Defense Wilson, he explained his action as follows:

“It was with some qualms that I approved the plan of allowing three different Services to work on the problem of long-range ballistic missiles. This doubt was inspired not only by historical difficulties in achieving adequate coordination among the Services, but because of the uneasy feeling in my own mind that the August-to-November delay in issuing the necessary Defense directives in this matter had been occasioned by arguments among them as to who was to carry the responsibility. All this seemed to me to presage similar difficulties in the future. However, on your assurance that in the current plan all such differences were, and would continue to be, eliminated and that in your opinion two separate programs could be carried on simultaneously and with the resulting benefits of competition, all to be achieved without mutual interference, I approved the system that the Defense Department suggested.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Guided Missiles)

46. Memorandum of Discussion at the 270th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, December 8, 1955[1]

Maryland, December 8, 1955

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. The Security of SAC(NSC Action No. 1430–d)[2]

Mr. Anderson advised that this agenda item concerned the vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command to enemy attack from the air or to either conventional or nuclear sabotage; that the Killian Committee had urged in its report that the present “unacceptable” ground vulnerability of SAC be reduced more rapidly than contemplated by the various Department of Defense programs under way in that area; and that the Committee had suggested accordingly that the NSC examine three possible countermeasures: (1) construction of additional bases as a top priority emergency program; (2) institution of an emergency dispersal program, in which more airfields—including civilian ones—would be used; and (3) an increase in active defenses by diverting anti-aircraft guns and guided missiles from defense positions around cities to SAC bases. Mr. Anderson advised that, pursuant to the foregoing, the Council agreed that, because the security of SAC was so vital to U.S. basic national security policy, it should be briefed on the vulnerability of SAC. He then introduced Major General R.C. Lindsay, USAF,[3] who made a 35-minute presentation thereon.

Upon the completion of General Lindsay’s briefing, Dr. Flemming inquired whether there could be effected between now and 1957 any technological improvements for SAC additional to those outlined in the briefing. General Lindsay responded in the negative. Dr. Flemming inquired whether there could be effected between now and 1962 any technological improvements for SAC additional to those now programmed, as outlined in General Lindsay’s presentation. Dr. Flemming, noting that it is a long time between now and 1962, said he had in mind some of the technological developments proposed by the Killian Committee which were not covered in General Lindsay’s presentation.

The President, in response to Dr. Flemming, commented that we haven’t had any Killian Committee to tell us the Russian side of the story. He believed that the Russians too have major problems to be met in this whole area. He thought there is a limit on the amount of money that the United States can spend on such improvements. He commented that, from a long-term standpoint, the United States must, if possible, keep within budget levels in thinking of such problems over the next sixty years or so.

Dr. Flemming said it was his understanding that, when the Planning Board was briefed on this subject last week, some reference had been made to matériel and manpower difficulties affecting the security and strike capability of the SAC forces. He said that if such were in fact the case, it was possible to do something about both situations, if funds alone were the source of the manpower and matériel difficulties.

The President thought that if such were the case the officials responsible would be coming forward with advice to that effect.

General Lindsay indicated that funds alone were not the chief source of the problem.

Governor Stassen inquired whether, in terms of SAC’s dispersal program, the construction of weapons sites was moving forward in step with SAC’s program for dispersing its aircraft. Admiral Strauss responded that there is only a very slight lag between the two programs; that it is a natural one and not of such proportions as to be cause for concern.

Secretary Wilson commented, with respect to the general subject, that the stark facts are that the developments on both sides (U.S. and USSR) are such that in time both will be able to destroy the world, including the birds.

The National Security Council:[4]

Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by the Department of Defense, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1430–d.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. The memorandum of discussion on item 1 was prepared by Coyne on December 9.

[2] See footnote 9, Document 30.

[3] Director of Plans, Headquarters, USAF.

[4] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1488, approved by the President on December 13. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

47. Editorial Note

On December 8, Secretary Dulles addressed the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association at Chicago which he later cited, in a December 28 memorandum to Bowie, as an explication of United States post-Geneva policy. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Foreign Policy) In the course of this speech on the “new phase of the struggle with international communism,” the Secretary gave further sanction to the doctrine of “less-than-massive retaliation” that he had spoken of in March. See Document 15.

Quoting passages from his earlier speeches and articles, Dulles said that to give the idea of collective security a sensible and effective content, “the arsenal of retaliation should include all forms of counterattack with a maximum flexibility.” To deter aggression, the free world needed to have a choice of responses available and not be in the position “where the only response open to it is general war.” According to the Secretary, such a program was now a reality. The United States had developed with its allies “a collective system of great power which can be flexibly used on whatever scale may be requisite to make aggression costly. Our capacity to retaliate must be, and is, massive in order to deter all forms of aggression. But if we have to use that capacity, such use would be selective and adapted to the occasion.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 19, 1955, pages 1003–1007)

48. Report by the ODM–Defense Working Group[1]

Washington, December 20, 1955.

ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING U.S. AND FREE-WORLD TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY OVER THE U.S.S.R.

I. Origin of the Report

1. This report is submitted pursuant to the National Security Council Planning Board paper, “Review of Key Aspects of Basic National Security Policy,” dated 2 September 1955.[2] The relevant section is as follows:

“(3) Maintaining U.S. Technologial Superiority

ODM and Defense should prepare recommendatons, based on an analysis of the problems involved, on the policies required if the U.S. is to achieve and maintain future U.S. and Free World technological superiority over the U.S.S.R.”

2. In addition to the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Department of Defense, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation have participated in the preparation of the report. limited time available has precluded exhaustive study of the complex problems involved. There is obvious need for continuing study and action by all of the great number of Federal Agencies which play a part in furthering U.S. technology.

II. Estimate of the Situation and the Problem

3. Through intensive application of science and technology, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have today achieved weapons and means for their delivery by which each could inflict great devastation upon the other despite existing defenses. The rapidly approaching era of balanced nuclear capability between the two powers will probably establish a mutual deterrence to general war, and possibly though not necessarily to local aggressions, which can be maintained into the future provided neither side achieves by technological “breakthrough” or overall technological superiority a capability which would permit it to attack the other with confidence that its own homeland could not be devastated in retaliation. The U.S., even if it achieved such superiority, would not indulge in preventive war, but no such assurance can be felt about the Soviet Union. Thus the maintenance of technological superiority by the U.S. over the U.S.S.R. could mean the difference between peace and general nuclear war.

4. The relative technological superiority of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must be first of all considered in terms of continued maintenance of short-run technological superiority by the U.S. Unless the short-run problem in the decisive period which we are approaching is successfully solved, there may be no long run. This involves a selective approach on the crucial new weapons and weapons systems which determine the capability to annihilate or to prevent annihilation. This critical fact has already been recognized by the National Security Council in the unique priorities and organizational programs laid down for both the IRBM and the ICBM.[3] Further recognition of this problem is found in NSC treatment of Continental Defense.[4]

5. From incomplete data, it may be estimated that in certain important fields of weaponry the Soviets are now several years in advance of U.S. technology. For example, in terms of service ceiling of interceptor aircraft and the time they require to climb to that ceiling, the U.S.S.R. may be two to four years ahead of the U.S. In long-range ballistic missiles the U.S.S.R. may be leading by two or more years. In the combat range of tanks without refueling, U.S. tanks have only about one-third to one-half the range of Soviet tanks. Much more pertinent comparisons are those between the service ceilings of our radar and interceptor weapons systems compared to the ceilings of Soviet bombers; the comparison between their interceptors and our bombers; and the comparison between the stage of Soviet development in long-range ballistic missiles and our development of defenses against such missiles. Such comparisons are not reassuring from the U.S. point of view. We are relatively well off for the time being in the most important comparison of all—that between the totality of our offensive systems and those of the Soviets—but on the basis of current trends it will take continuous, unrelenting effort on the part of the U.S. to maintain such superiority on into the future.

6. Action on the short-run problem lies primarily within the responsibilities of the Department of Defense, requires adequate funds and other resources and the speeding up of important projects already underway. Thus a basic requirement is the simplification of the decision-making, clearance and coordinating functions within the Department and the assigning of appropriate priorities of effort. The Department of Defense is actively studying at its highest level the ways and means by which its management and operations from research on into production may be drastically speeded up. This study can be of vital importance, particularly if the National Security Council evidences an active interest in it and provides the stimulus of NSC and Presidential support.

7. The problem of achieving and maintaining technological superiority over the long run is deeply rooted in the fundamental dynamics of technology itself and in the factors which give it direction and maintain its creative vigor. Consequently, efforts toward technological superiority should not be focused on weapons systems alone but must broadly reflect superiority:

a. As manifested in the totality of operational weapons available at any given time and the ability to neutralize by defensive or offensive means any technological military threat;

b. As manifested in the development and employment of superior technology for the achievement of peaceful purposes both nationally and in cooperation with other nations;

c. As demonstrated by superior inventiveness and in the development of new knowledge through basic research;

d. As a potential embodied in the development of an adequate number of highly qualified scientists and engineers and in the maintenance of an expanding system of technological institutions and facilities in a vigorous state of health.

8. Although achievement of technological superiority in the short-run is imperative, it is essential that we commence with no further delay actions needed to assure long-range technological superiority.

9. The Soviets are continually expanding their educatonal facilities for the training of scientists and engineers. They are now graduating such persons in considerably greater numbers than the U.S. The best of their graduates are apparently fully the equal of our best, and there is evidence to show that the top administrators of Soviet research and development are first class scientists. Additonally, the Soviets have built up a superior complex for effectively utilizing their scientific and engineering manpower. They have created facilities, research centers, specialized institutes, and administrative policies and procedures, including effective methods for utilizing all possible Free World scientific information, which have enabled a high and increasing rate of technological advance, particularly in military fields. They have also developed a remarkably speedy cycle from research through to the quantity production of finished weapons.

10. Achievement and maintenance of technological superiority, both in the short-run and for an indefinite period of years, thus have become indispensable elements of the U.S. policies to deter general war and help deter local aggression; to maintain Free World leadership; and to provide the stability and progress in world affairs upon which genuine peace may be established. Failure to maintain technological superiority by the U.S. could result in loss of confidence by the Free World in U.S. technology and power; accelerated Soviet expansion geographically and economically; swing of important uncommitted nations into the Soviet orbit; defection of important countries now members of the Free World community; and attack on the U.S. at such time as Soviet military technology may achieve decisive superiority.

11. The scope, complexity and vital importance of the problem of maintaining technological superiority indicate the continuing need to utilize the best in scientific creative talents, both from within and without the government, in reaching for an adequate solution. An example of the value of this broad approach is the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of ODM.[5] Further recognition of the scope of the problem would indicate the desirability of the President having a key Advisor who can assist in correlating and energizing the efforts within the Federal Government to analyze and act upon basic aspects of the problem, and who can keep the President informed on progress. The long-run problem reaches from the educational aspect which involves the very fabric of American society, through the efficient use of resources—money, men and facilities—into the complex of applied research, development and production. Thus the individual selected to advise the President with respect to these problems would need to be an exceptionally gifted individual with a broad, practical background in the scientific, educational and administrative fields. Moreover, his organizational relationship to the President and to the National Security Council should be clearly defined and effectively maintained in order that he may in fact provide the leadership in galvanizing all the resources of the government in the crucial contest for technological superiority.

[Here follow 37 pages listing 16 conclusions and recommendations.]

[1] Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Basic Natonal Security Policy. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from two members of the ODM–Defense working group, John F. Hilliard, Deputy Assistant Director, Manpower, ODM, and Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel, III, USA, Defense Member,NSC Planning Board, to the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated December 21. The report was transmitted to the NSC Planning Board, under cover of a memorandum by Lay, dated December 21, for use by the Board in connection with its review of basic national security policy.

[2] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[3] See NSC Action Nos. 1433 and 1484, footnote 9, Document 34, and footnote 8, Document 45, respectively.

[4] See Document 28.

[5] Document 9.

49. Diary Entry by the President, January 11, 1956 [1]

January 11, 1956

This morning, in two successive appointments, first with Dillon Anderson and second with Arthur Flemming, the question of our mobilization stock pile was raised. There seems to be some concern as to whether we should not try to economize by cutting back our five year program, on the theory that in a limited war we could get all the strategic materials we needed, while in an all-out war the thing would be over in thirty to sixty days. I declined to cut back the program for two principal reasons.

(a). The theory of the thirty to sixty day war has nothing whatsoever to back it up. While it is obvious that in thirty to sixty days the two giants in the atomic field might conceivably accomplish a mutual destruction of terrifying proportions, yet this would not in itself necessarily end the war. Wars are conducted by the will of a population and that will can be at times a most stubborn and practically unconquerable element. In ancient times the final siege of Carthage is an example —in modern times the 1940 bombing of Britain and the 1943–44–45 bombing of Germany are others. Another observation under this same heading is that if our nation would suffer the kind of destruction that we know to be possible today, we could, even if considered militarily victorious, be wholly dependent upon reserve supplies for a matter of several years. This would be particularly true if ports and shipping were destroyed, and if the war encompassed some of the areas from which strategic materials come.

(b). The second reason is that I cannot possibly see how the United States can possibly lose anything in storing up imperishable supplies that it does not in itself produce in sufficient quantity. The material resources of the world are constantly being depleted, and at an accelerated pace. The time is bound to come when some of the items will begin to mount sharply in price. Some may even become almost completely exhausted. Only the discovery of substitutes or even changes in the habits of the mode of living of people will provide a long term answer. But the nation that has supplies of presently used scarce materials will obviously have more time to work out this problem than will others. This is the case where the provisioning of war reserves in raw materials does not constitute a drain upon the long term resources of the nation.

[Here follows the President’s entry on his afternoon meeting on the Middle East; for text, see volume XV, page 23.]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

50. Editorial Note

On November 10, 1955, and again on January 12, 1956, the National Security Council considered, as the first agenda item, “Defense Mobilization Planning Assumptions Applicable to Stockpiling.” For text of the memoranda of discussion of these meetings, see volume X, pages 551 and 556.

As a result of the November 10 discussion, the Council adopted NSC Action No. 1471, approved by the President on November 18. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) This action requested the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization to report on the effects of an assumed period of 3 years, as compared with 5 years, for the minimum stockpile and the long-term stockpile, based on certain specified assumptions, and to prepare its budget estimates relating to stockpiling programs for fiscal years 1956 and 1957.

At the 272d meeting on January 12, the Council adopted NSC Action No. 1498, approved by the President on January 16. NSC Action No. 1498–a noted the various recommendations on the subject. NSC Action No. 1498–b reads as follows:

“Adopted the following revision of paragraph 4 of NSC 5414/1, subject to a review of purchase schedules for each material by the Defense Mobilization Board, with a report from that Board to the National Security Council in the case of materials that have a major impact on national security:

“ ‘4. General war may last for an extended period up to four years. Although the first few months of conflict may be crucial in determining its outcome, planning for its duration should be based upon all assumptions herein stated, with particular emphasis on Paragraph 18. For planning the stockpile objectives for strategic and critical materials, a period of five years may be used. However, only the stockpile objectives based upon the planning period of three years currently used in Military Mobilization Planning should be completed on a priority basis the remainder of the five year objectives to be achieved on a longer and lower prioity basis (This language modifies Paragraph 55–b of NSC 5501 and should be taken into account in the current revision of that paper).’

“Note: The action in b above as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5414/1 and referred to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for appropriate implementation.” (Ibid.)

For the original language of paragraph 55–b of NSC 5501, see Document 6. A copy of NSC 5501 incorporating the language modifying paragraph 55–b is in Department of State S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5501 Series.NSC 5414/1, “Defense Mobilization Planning Assumptions,” dated April 30, 1954, is ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5414 Series.

51. Memorandum of Discussion at the 272d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 12, 1956[1]

Washington, January 12, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Defense Mobilization Planning Assumptions Applicable to Stockpiling,” summarized in the editorial note, supra.]

2. Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook

Mr. Anderson reminded the Council that at this season of the year it was customary for the Director of the Budget to discuss briefly with the Council the fiscal and budgetary outlook for the next couple of fiscal years. Mr. Hughes would present the estimate, after which Secretary Humphrey would make additional comments.

Mr. Hughes stood up, placed a chart before the Council, and assured the President that his report would be very short. The President commented that as long as there was a plus on Director Hughes’ chart, he could sit right down now (laughter).

Director Hughes analyzed the esimated expenditures and income for the remainder of FY 1956 and for FY 1957, indicating in conclusion that there would be an estimated surplus of $200 million at the end of FY 1956 and of $400 million at the end of FY 1957. However, Mr. Hughes warned that the margin between a surplus and a deficit was very close and could easily be upset either by action of the Congress to reduce taxes or action by the Executive Branch in bringing in supplemental budget requests. In short, said Mr. Hughes, while we were apparently in a good position, we should have to continue to fight in order to maintain this position, and to this end he called for uninterrupted team work.

In a philosophical vein, the President said that in the eyes of people like himself, who had been around this town for a long time, we were a “funny bunch”. In the old days, whatever the Executive recommended to the Congress to meet our national defense needs was torn to shreds by the Congress. Now, however, the members of Congress were the experts on how to meet the needs of our national defense. They proceeded to shovel on the money. This, said the President, was a complete reversal of all his earlier experience.

Secretary Wilson informed the Council that he was starting right now to work out the 1958 and 1959 Defense Department programs. Moreover, he was going to undertake a great innovation. Instead, as in the past, of asking each Service to estimate what it believed it needed to carry out its responsibilities, he was going to give the Services the initial figure. In short, he would ask them to calculate what they could do on the basis of a 5% increase over what they had now and a 5% decrease in funds currently available to them.

Mr. Anderson then called on Secretary Humphrey to comment on Mr. Hughes’ report. Secretary Humphrey began by saying with a smile that only the other day, talking with his associates in his office, where there was no danger that the Alsops or Drew Pearson would overhear the conversation, he, Secretary Humphrey, had said that if we finally succeed in balancing the budget it wouldn’t be our fault. By this, said Secretary Humphrey, he meant that we were still increasing the rate and amount of our military expenditure. What actually looked like a reduction of $1 billion in this area was, so to speak, “a phoney”. As Secretary Wilson had earlier pointed out, this apparent $1 billion savings had actually been pulled out of accumulated Department of Defense inventory. It was accordingly a one-shot affair. Secretary Humphrey then cited similar instances in other programs. Moreover, these programs had absorbed practically every cent that Secretary Wilson had succeeded in saving. In effect, therefore, what was making possible the balancing of the budget in FY 1956 and 1957 was not a reduction in expenditure but an increase in the Treasury’s income. We are guessing, continued Secretary Humphrey, that this increase will continue in the future, but this involves a very risky guess. In any event, we will have a real battle on our hands with respect to the repeal of the excise tax, although the atmosphere in Congress on this issue had improved somewhat of late. With respect to the next fiscal year, we are just comfortably assuming that the present good times and prosperity will continue on, although past experience provides no very good basis for such a cheerful assumption. We can only hope that we are right.

(At this point, Secretary Wilson and General Twining left the meeting to go to Capitol Hill. Secretary of the Army Brucker took Secretary Wilson’s place at the table, and Admiral Duncan took General Twining’s place.)

The President, again in a philosophical vein, said that it was all well and good to deplore spending, as Secretary Humphrey did, but you simply couldn’t sleep at night if you kept deploring something that you really couldn’t help. This country had accustomed itself to lavish spending in certain programs, and it was next to impossible to reverse the trend.

With a smile at Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Dulles said that he felt obliged to take exception to Secretary Humphrey’s opening statement, that if we balanced the budget it would not be our own fault. Secretary Dulles said he would hate to admit, at least in public, that the current good economic conditions in the United States were not the result of the sane fiscal policy pursued by Secretary Humphrey and this Administration. Likewise with a smile, the President said they could call him a demagogue if they wanted to, but he certainly proposed to take credit for this prosperity. Surely we have created confidence in the public. This was shown by the behavior of the stock market in relation to the President’s recent illness.

The National Security Council:[2]

Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, on the fiscal and budgetary outlook through Fiscal Year 1957.

[Here follow agenda item 3 on Antarctica (for text, see volume XI, page 640) and the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 13.

[2] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1499, approved by the President on January 16. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

52. Memorandum of Discussion at the 273d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 18, 1956, 9 a.m.[1]

Washington, January 18, 1956, 9 a.m.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Status of the Mobilization Base (NSC Action No. 1277; NSC 5501 Paragraph 55–a)[2]

The presentation on the “Status of the Mobilization Base” was introduced by Assistant Secretary of Defense Pike who thereafter called upon his Deputy, Mr. Lanphier,[3] who presented the bulk of the report. An introduction and summary of the contents of the presentation was distributed to the members of the Council just prior to the delivery of the report. This document together with a collection of the 27 charts used in the course of the presentation are filed in the Minutes of the meeting.[4]

At the conclusion of the presentation on the mobilization base which consumed the better part of an hour, the President was the first to speak. He said that it seemed to him that the results of the report on the mobilization base pointed to one very logical conclusion. This was that we should take all feasible measures to protect more effectively the mobilization base which is already in being. This, the President believed, could be accomplished without great additional expenditure. He said he had particularly in mind better protection for the control centers and storage depots of the mobilization base. He also had in mind better protection for the installations at our SAC bases. For a comparatively reasonable cost we could go a long way to assure protection of our mobilization base. Beyond this single conclusion, the President said, it was hard to go because it was so difficult at this time to forsee the type of war which the United States might be obliged to fight in the future. Mobilization planning on the assumption that such a war might not involve the use of nuclear weapons should proceed. On the other hand, mobilization planning should not be carried out to the extent of achieving our complete requirements for either kind of war, that is, general war without nuclear weapons and general war involving their use. The President expressed skepticism of this latter approach and said that our approach should above all be the one which would provide the nation with the greatest possible reactive power. It was foolish to accumulate a lot of military matériel which would gradually become obsolescent. It was very important, however, that we try to cut the ratio of loss for the matériel that we do acquire and store. We should never forget the lesson that modern warfare is a constant practice in improvisation.

The President then added that he would very much like to see the appropriate officials in the Pentagon sit down and ponder this problem of the character of a future war. They might first talk about the probabilities, second about the degree of damage the United States was likely to sustain, and third how we can plan without unnecessarily dispersing our efforts. In short, we must get a composite of thinking about the shape of a future war and the kind of mobilization base it would require on the most profound and careful basis.

Secretary Wilson commented that the presentation just made was designed to indicate where we are now with respect to the mobilization base. He added that he was by no means clearly satisfied with the existing status. In response the President said he would recall the saying of a very wise German soldier to the effect that all plans in war are worthless but planning itself is invaluable. The President repeated that as he had understood the presentation the amounts required for greater protection and dispersion of the mobilization base would not be tremendously large and furthermore might very well constitute the difference between victory and defeat in a future war. He added his opinion that the United States had never had as able a group of Chiefs of Staff as it now had. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense should be in a position to have the composite judgment on the required kind of mobilization base that the President had just indicated should be sought.

Secretary Wilson then requested that two of the charts previously displayed again be placed on the easel. These were the charts showing transportation losses and “Gross National Product with Projection for Mid-Range Plan Production Requirements”. With these charts in view Secretary Wilson said that what we must essentially plan on is how the United States is to survive the initial attack in a future war, particularly how it was to get through the first seven days or so. We must avoid planning to fight a future war along the same lines that we had fought the Second World War.

The President interrupted to repeat his conviction that we must promptly get started on measures for further dispersion of our mobilization base facilities and on getting more of these facilities built underground.

Secretary Wilson then expressed the opinion that the first objective of the Soviet Union in a future general war would be to separate Western Europe from North America. The President disagreed with Secretary Wilson and said that in his opinion the first Soviet move in such a war would be to try to neutralize the industrial capacity of the United States. The members of the Council indicated general agreement with the President’s view.

Governor Stassen referred to the point made in the course of the presentation that the production of certain vital electronic components was currently concentrated 100 per cent in a single target area. This was such a dangerous situation that Governor Stassen said he would like to revive an idea which he had mentioned to the members of the Council at an earlier discussion of the mobilization base. Would it not be possible to take factories and installations such as this and shift them from a target area to coal-mining areas of the United States where at the present time there was a surplus of labor and where such industries would be outside the target area of a Soviet attack. Governor Stassen believed that such transfers could be achieved without great cost and expressed the opinion that nothing would do more to discourage an enemy attack on the United States than the knowledge that our mobilization base and our vital installations were thoroughly dispersed throughout the country. The President expressed sympathy with the objectives sought by Governor Stassen’s proposal but pointed out that there would be difficulties in carrying it out because we purchased our military matériel from private firms under contracts.

Secretary Wilson said that in any event the President had put his finger directly on the first course of action we should take, namely, to give increased protection to what we already have available in our mobilization base. Secretary Wilson pointed out that it was much easier to disperse the production of components than it was to disperse large factories and installations. On the whole it would be better to fabricate more items at an efficient price at existing locations than to build additional plants in new locations.

Governor Stassen observed that the enemy would be well aware of those instances where there was 100 per cent production of some vital item concentrated in a single plant because the employees in such a plant were bound to know this fact.

Secretary Wilson did not reply further to Governor Stassen but said that the first thing he wanted to see happen was to get our basic thinking on the mobilization base sorted out. There were obviously many illogicalities and incongruities in present planning on the mobilization base.

Turning to Secretary Wilson the President said that he would like to have Mr. Wilson get the Joint Chiefs of Staff together with him and talk the whole problem out in some remote place away from the telephones for perhaps two days or for even a week. After such a meeting had reached conclusions as to the desired approach to Government planning and development of the mobilization base, the President said he would like to talk over this conclusion with the Secretary of Defense, [remainder of paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

Dr. Flemming stated that he nevertheless assumed that the United States mobilization planning should still envisage the possibility of general hostilities occurring outside of the United Sttates, for instance in the Far East. The President told Dr. Flemming that he ought to plan for full ground mobilization in view of the possibility of the miracle occurring that no nuclear weapons would be used but such planning would not be so detailed or so fully implemented as would be the plans for what we required for the initial phases of a war, that is, for the first seven days or so.

Dr. Flemming then said he would like to revert to the point earlier raised by Governor Stassen. It seemed terrible that the production of all landing gear for aircraft was concentrated in the city of Cleveland. It certainly should be possible to do something to rectify this situation, perhaps by way of dispersal. The President agreed with Dr. Flemmingthat close attention should be given to this kind of problem. While manufacturers generally hated to move away from the location where they had long been doing business, General Motors had done it and we ought to try to see what we can do. Secretary Humphrey said that he was pretty well aware of the problem of landing gear production. There would be nothing very difficult in setting up new installations to produce this item in other communities in the event that the city of Cleveland and all the technicians in this industry were to be destroyed in the initial phases of an atomic war. The President replied that if this operation was relatively small and did not cost very much, he did not see why the move could not be made before Cleveland was actually attacked.

In summing up the President stated that he was at least certain of one thing: we do have to engage in planning the mobilization base but let us not set up all our priorities on the assumption that we can do everything when we know that a great many things will not be done after the first nuclear strike.

The National Security Council:[5]

a. Noted and discussed a report by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization on the subject, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1277, as presented at the meeting and summarized in a written report distributed at the meeting.

b. Noted the President’s request that the Secretary of Defense together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff make a thorough analysis and report on the basic military planning concept which should govern the planning and development of the mobilization base.[6]

c. Noted the President’s statement that emphasis in mobilization planning should be given to the protection of existing critical supplies and facilities from destruction during the initial phases of a nuclear war.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items, including an oral briefing by Allen Dulles (for extracts, see volume X, page 64).]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 19.

[2] NSC Action No. 1277, taken by the NSC at its 226th meeting on December 1, 1954, included a directive by the President to the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization to prepare a revised presentation on the status of the mobilization base on the basis of 1) the revised approved military plan, 2) allowance for estimated bomb damage, and 3) a determination of U.S. provision of allied aid requirements. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Paragraph 55–a of NSC 5501 noted that the strong security posture required by the national strategy necessitated a mobilization base adequate to maintain military readiness, and to provide the basis for the successful prosecution of a general war. It added that this mobilization base must be based on factors (1), (2), and (3), cited in NSC Action No. 1277. (Ibid.: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5501 Series)

[3] Thomas P. Pike, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) and Robert C. Lanphier, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics).

[4] This report by the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization to the Natonal Security Council, dated January 18 and entitled “The Status of the Mobilization Base With Relation to the Joint Mid-Range War Plan for July 1957” is in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5501 Series. The 27 charts are filed in the minutes.

[5] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1503, approved by the President on January 24. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[6] In a memorandum to Lay, dated Februray 25, 1957, Secretary of Defense Wilson transmitted and summarized the report prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by himself, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1503–b. (Ibid., S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy)

53. Diary Entry by the President, January 23, 1956[1]

January 23, 1956

General George (retired from the Air Force), assisted by a staff group, made a presentation on net evaluation of the damage that would be anticipated in the initial stages of nuclear war between Russia and the United States.[2] The date chosen was July 1, 1956.

The report[3] was in two parts, each based on a particular assumption as to a condition under which war might develop. The first anticipated no warning until our DEW line was reached. The second anticipated a month of strategic warning, although without specific information as to when an attack would be launched by the Russians.

I

Under the first case, the United States experienced practically total economic collapse, which could not be restored to any kind of operative conditions under six months to a year. Members of the Federal government were wiped out and a new government had to be improvised by the states. Casualties were enormous. It was calculated that something on the order of 65% of the population would require some kind of medical care, and in most instances, no opportunity whatsoever to get it.

The limiting factor on the damage inflicted was not so much our own defensive arrangements as the limitations on the Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons in the year ’58.

While these things were going on, the damage inflicted by us against the Soviets was roughly three times greater. The picture of total destruction of the areas of lethal fall-out, of serious fall-out and of at least some damage from fall-out, was appalling. Under such an attack, it would be completely impossible for Russia to carry a war on further.

For ourselves, it would be clear that there would be no shipping in and out of our country except some small or improvised vessels for many months. It would literally be a business of digging ourselves out of ashes, starting again.

II

Under the second case, it was concluded that the major effort of the Soviets would be made against our air bases rather than against the United States alone. Nevertheless, there was no significant difference in the losses we would take.

It was concluded that there was little we could do during the month of warning in the way of dispersal of populations, of industries, or of perfecting defenses that would cut down losses. The only possible way of reducing these losses would be for us to take the initiative some time during the assumed month in which we had the warning of an attack and launch a surprise attack against the Soviets. This would be not only against our traditions, but it would appear to be impossible unless the Congress would meet in a highly secret session and vote a declaration of war which would be implemented before the session was terminated. It would appear to be impossible that any such thing would occur.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret.

[2] Regarding the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, see Document 10.

[3] No written report has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Depatment of State files, but see the memorandum, infra.

54. Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Anderson)[1]

Washington, January 23, 1956.

THE REPETITION OF THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE BRIEFING BEFORE THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Following the briefing above described at ten o’clock this morning,[2] there was some discussion, the substance of which I am setting out in this memorandum for the record.

The President expressed some surprise and some doubt about the conclusion in the report that strategic warning contemplated in Plan C would not cut down materially the amount of damage that would result to the United States from the Soviet atomic attack. He said he had believed that with strategic warning we could put ourselves in a position to defend against such an attack, and thus reduce to a greater degree than the report disclosed the amount of damage that would result to the United States. (One of the assumptions made in the report was that in the event that the Russians launched a full scale attack, the nature of the attack on the United States would be to reduce the number of continental targets and emphasize attack on Strategic Air Command bases.)

The President expressed the opinion that such capabilities as were played into action in the war games supporting the NESC report would certainly force a deterrent to the initiation of full scale general war with atomic weapons, if nothing else.

At this point, General George expressed the view that in such a situation as that assumed in 1958 there could and probably would be room for brush-fire or peripheral clashes, even of rather substantial size, and still not be enough to touch off all-out atomic blows; that in his opinion there would not be such an atomic exchange of blows as that contemplated in the report unless one nation obviously was embarking upon an all-out attack upon the heartland of the other.

The President again expressed his astonishment at our inability to defend ourselves better from aerial attack after a strategic warning. He pointed out that the U.S. success in the gaming appeared to lie in the stockpile differential between our assumed stockpile in 1958 and that estimated to be the amount in the Russian stockpile—a differential which the Committee assumed could be as much as 50% off in the estimates. It was pointed out that NIE estimates as to present and future size of Russian stockpiles were assumed to be correct.

At this point, Admiral Strauss made the point that if the size of the Russian stockpile approached parity with ours, the situation would become worse from our standpoint until we entered the phase of optimum or effective utility of thermonuclear weapons by both sides—and all of this short of and before taking into account the situation that would obtain when the ICBM capability could be attained.

The President observed that it was reasonable to assume that the Russians had conducted exercises similar to the NESC study, and that they had some appreciation of the implications for destruction of their regime and their country as a result of the use of thermonuclear weapons on a strategic scale. He said we had to give them credit for having some sense—that the whole prospect of an exchange of all-out blows with thermonuclear weapons simply staggered the human mind, and that he doubted that the human mind was capable of meeting and dealing with the kind of problems that would be created by such an exchange of blows.

Admiral Radford added that there were many variables in the thing, and that he could not answer a number of questions categorically as to the result of the full-scale use of thermonuclear weapons in general war. He added that in this war gaming exercise, we had, he felt, leaned over backwards to look at the worst situation from our standpoint, and assumed things which might not or would not necessarily have to happen in the event of atomic war. General Georgeexpressed disagreement with this thought, and said he felt it had been played out pretty faithfully along the line of a realistic appraisal of what would happen.

The President said, assuming that instead of the number of megatons estimated to be delivered on Russia, the amount was only 1/7th of that,—still this is the sort of thing the rational mind could not invite or take steps that might produce it. He went ahead to say he thought the report proved its usefulness, and he felt it was highly desirable to continue making these studies annually, since it kept the intelligence people alert, and needled and alerted the planners as well.

He said the thought kept occurring to him that after such an exchange as the games contemplate, it would be a long time before a country so struck would be shipping out any troops to fight any other kind of war.

Secretary Wilson expressed the view that the principal role of the Army would under such circumstances be to keep law and order at home. The President said that the report had led him to suspect that little wars in the future would be more apt to be in the form of internal rebellion rather than major external aggression, since the latter would be apt to bring strategic retaliation with thermonuclear weapons.

General George expressed the view that with the deterrent effect of the realization of what strategic thermonuclear war meant, the nature of warfare beneath such an umbrella would more likely be of the peripheral variety.

The President said he drew two further conclusions from the briefing,—first, that both sides would increasingly tend to avoid provoking such a situation as that played out in the war games; in other words, the deterrent against the use of all-out thermonuclear warfare would grow in proportion to the magnitude of the capability; second, he said he was all the more convinced that we could not prepare for little wars at great distances from the United States, and commit several divisions here and several divisions there to resistance against local aggression. Rather, we should trust, he felt, to the kind of major deterrent that the prospect of strategic thermonuclear war would bring.

Secretary Dulles said that this approach might be OK for us but that the people in these little countries who are friends of ours will continue to want to know what will happen if they are attacked. They would, he felt, want to have some tangible evidence that we will be in a position in such an event to come to their rescue and help them defend their countries against external aggression. The President’s response was that these little countries are going to have to be in a position to defend themselves on the ground, depending upon the United States to send in air, naval, and other forms of mobile support.

General George said he believed there would never be another Korea, meaning I took it that we would never, under such a policy as the President outlined, undertake to go in with our own ground forces without the willingness to use additional power that nuclear weapons give us to support the indigenous defending ground troops. The President said: “I will never commit our forces to battle where I cannot get at the heart of the enemy’s power and support”. He obviously had reference to the self-imposed limits upon our conduct of the Korean conflict.

Dillon Anderson[3]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret. A copy was distributed to Goodpaster.

[2] No formal briefing report has been found, but see the President’s summary of the briefing, supra.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

55. Editorial Note

President Eisenhower opened the 275th meeting of the National Security Council on February 9 with the following introductory remarks on the ballistic missiles program:

“Upon joining the National Security Council at the table, the President said that the members of the Council might be interested in the advice which Bernard Baruch was lavishing on the President with respect to the problem of our ballistic missiles program. The burden of Mr. Baruch’s argument, said the President, could be summarized in three parts: (a) If the Soviet Union succeeds in achieving long-range ballistic missiles before the United States, we will at once lose all our friends and allies, (b) The U.S. can achieve a long-range ballistic missile in a year’s time if we drive hard enough toward that objective, (c) The only effective way to drive at this objective is to appoint a czar over the missiles program who will represent the President directly. The President concluded with the comment that it was surprising what large numbers of people shared these views of Mr. Baruch.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Bernard M. Baruch was a civic leader and investment banker who had served as chairman of the War Industries Board during World War I, a government consultant during World War II, and United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946.

56. Editorial Note

The first agenda item at the 275th meeting of the National Security Council on February 9 was an oral briefing by Allen Dulles. He began as follows:

“The Director of Central Intelligence began by stating that it was his understanding that the President had requested a run-down of what he, Mr. Allen Dulles, had said to the committees of Congress when he had briefed these committees with respect to the Soviet ballistic missiles program. The President signified that he wished to have this run-down. Mr. Dulles then stated that on January 19, 1956, he had briefed the members of the Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. He reminded the President that he had discussed this Briefing with him before he had made it, and also stated that the contents of the briefing had been coordinated by the responsible intelligence authorities. Moreover, said Mr. Dulles, he had done his utmost to protect the sensitive sources of our knowledge of the Soviet missiles program. He then proceeded to describe the main points which he had made in this briefing.

“The only other briefing which Mr. Dulles had made, he said, was to the CIA Intelligence Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the House. This briefing was likewise based on a coordinated intelligence estimate on the subject of the Soviet missiles program.

“Secretary Robertson commented, at the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’ remarks, that certain members of these committees had been told about the sources of U.S. intelligence about Soviet missiles developments. The President said, with a sigh, that he did not know what more we could do to protect ourselves against skunks. If anyone was caught revealing the slightest shred of information about our sources of intelligence on this Soviet program, we ought to get him ’on the trigger’.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Four weeks earlier, on January 12, Allen Dulles had told the President at the conclusion of the 272d National Security Council meeting that a Congressional committee had asked him to give a classified briefing on the Soviet guided missile program. The President then told him not to give this briefing, since, according to Eisenhower, it would inevitably reveal the sources of United States intelligence information about the Soviet program. The President told Dulles to tell the members of Congress that “such a briefing would be contrary to the interests of the national security at this time.” (Ibid.) Subsequently, when it was decided that Allen Dulles would brief the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a conference attended by the President, Allen Dulles, Lewis L. Strauss, Secretary of Defense Wilson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., General Twining, and Colonel Goodpaster was held on January 18 to discuss Dulles’ presentation. A memorandum of this conference prepared by Goodpaster is Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Atomic Energy-Joint Committee.

57. Memorandum by the NSC Planning Board [1]

Washington, undated.

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5602) [2]

I. Introduction

1. The Planning Board has reviewed NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy”, and has submitted to the National Security Council the draft revision thereof issued February 8, 1956 as NSC 5602.

2. The Planning Board’s general conclusions are that certain significant changes in the estimate of the situation have taken place and that such changes call for the proposed revision. These proposals are all within the framework of the basic strategy described in NSC 5501, which in its essential features is believed by the Planning Board to remain valid.

II. Principal Changes in the Estimate of the Situation

1. The U.S. will acquire by about mid-1956 the capability to mount a decisive strike against the USSR and will maintain a marked net superiority in nuclear striking power from then until some time in 1958 (NSC 5602, Annex, para. 1).

2. The steady growth of Soviet military capabilities has continued, and in important instances, particularly in high-yield nuclear weapons, missile development and delivery systems, more rapidly than was estimated a year ago (NSC 5602, Annex, paras. 1–6 and 22).

3. The growth of Soviet technological capabilities involves a serious short- and long-term challenge, not only in the military area but also in its potential political impact on a world which has in recent years been reassured by the over-all technological predominance of the United States (NSC 5602, Annex, para. 12).

4. In their efforts to lull and divide the free world and expand their area of influence, the Soviets have added new methods and more flexible tactics, involving the use of trade, barter, and technical assistance, and diplomatic moves including the taking of sides in active intra-area controversies. Their newer methods are directed toward the progressive erosion of free world will and cohesion (NSC 5602, Annex, paras. 20 and 23).

5. Increasing U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities have produced growing apprehension about the catastrophic nature of general nuclear war (NSC 5602, Annex, para. 15).

6. U.S. alliances are confronted with new and increasing difficulties in some respects. These strains may become more marked, particularly in NATO, where certain countries already evidence (a) greater reluctance to maintain and strengthen military establishments despite increased economic strength, (b) tendencies toward accommodation and disengagement, and (c) more selfish pursuit of national ambitions or rivalries submerged by a sense of common peril and economic weakness (NSC 5602, Annex, para. 24).

7. The underdeveloped areas have become a major target of the new Soviet tactics. Soviet appeals to local aspirations, resentments and fears have been shrewdly combined to foster trends toward neutralism and enhance vulnerability to communist influence (NSC 5602, Annex, paras. 16, 17 and 18).

III. Basic U.S. National Strategy

1. The basic national strategy outlined in NSC 5501 (Section B) remains generally valid and sound for the situation we face.

2. Within this framework, however, the present situation requires additional effort in carrying out certain basic security programs and some significant shifts in emphasis as to others, in pursuing this general strategy.

3. Hence it is recommended that the Council, in reviewing basic national security policy, schedule a further and subsequent review of certain essential elements of national strategy to ensure that they are being carried out with the effectiveness, urgency and resources called for under present world conditions.

IV. Recommendations for Special NSC Review

1. The U.S. Approach to the Underdeveloped Nations

a. Paragraphs 19 to 30 of NSC 5602 restate the importance of the underdeveloped areas and the need for a more flexible U.S. political and economic approach and for broad and adaptable programs of U.S. assistance.

b. The current Communist political, economic and diplomatic offensive, involving widespread offers of technical, developmental and military assistance on a “trade not aid” basis, both bilaterally and through UN agencies, confronts the United States with one of its most serious challenges. Despite substantial assistance programs, the United States has not succeeded to date in developing an affirmative sense of community of interests with the underdeveloped countries. Hence their complex drives for improved conditions and status are effectively exploited by the new Communist offensive.

c. It is recommended that the Council, after submission to the President of the report on the subject now in preparation by the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy,[3] give further consideration to basic U.S. policies with respect to the less developed and uncommitted areas.

2. Flexibility and Mobility of U.S. Military Capabilities

a. Policies dealing with the capabilities and use of U.S. military forces required to deter or defeat Communist military aggression in its various forms are treated in paragraphs 9 to 17 of NSC 5602.

b. In particular, NSC 5602, like NSC 5501, emphasizes the need for flexible capabilities to deter or defeat local aggression by selective means which (a) are appropriate to the character and extent of the enemy action, and (b) can be brought to bear speedily and in a way best calculated to avoid the broadening of hostilities into general war. This matter raises the issue of the mobility and deployment of forces and the degree of their dependence on nuclear weapons in such situations.

c. In order to assist the Council in assessing these issues, it is recommended that the Council request the Department of Defense to make a presentation on the capabilities, with or without nuclear weapons, of the U.S. military forces referred to in paragraph 32 and other appropriate paragraphs of NSC 5501, to deal with local aggression in Vietnam, utilizing as appropriate a study transmitted to the Council on September 16, 1955.[4]

3. Maintenance of Technological Superiority

a. The Soviet Union is making rapid strides in weapons systems, in basic science and research and in non-military fields, and is overtaking the United States in the education and training of scientific and technical personnel. The proposed policy to deal with this problem is contained in paragraphs 18 and 49 of NSC 5.602.

b. It is recommended that the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the National Science Foundation, be requested to make a presentation to the Council on the problem of technological superiority.[5]

4.

Disarmament (para. 37 of NSC 5602)

In view of the importance of this issue, it is recommended that intensive efforts be continued on all aspects of the problem of devising a safeguarded system of disarmament.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a memorandum for the NSC from Gleason, dated February 13. Gleason noted that the Planning Board’s memorandum was being transmitted for the Council’s information, and for their consideration of the recommendations in paragraphs III–3, IV–1–b, –2–c, –3–b, and –4 thereof in connection with the Council’s consideration of NSC 5602, scheduled for February 27.

[2] A copy of NSC 5602, “Basic National Security Policy,” a draft revision of NSC 5501, issued on February 8, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. For the NSC discussion of NSC 5602 on February 27, see Document 61; for text of NSC 5602/1 as approved by the President, see Document 66.

[3] Not further identified.

[4] Memorandum for the National Security Council from the Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam“, dated September 16, 1955. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see vol. i, p. 535. Admiral Radford presented the Defense Department report on U.S. military capabilities to deal with local aggression in Vietnam to the National Security Council on June 7. For text, see Ibid., p. 703.]

[5] See footnote 11, Document 62.

58. Supplementary Notes on the Legislative Leadership Meeting, White House, Washington, February 14, 1956, 9:30–11:21 a.m.[1]

Washington, February 14, 1956, 9:30–11:21 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

Missile Development—Rep. Arends commented that it appeared that the Democrats would try for the rest of the session to build up criticism of the missile program.[2]

The President did not know of any way to avoid criticism in a political year. He wanted to point out, however, that there was no certain knowledge that the Soviets were able to develop yet a warhead sufficiently light to be carried on a missile. It was important too to remember that there already existed more certain methods of delivering weapons to the saturation point than through the use of missiles. But he did not want to belittle the importance of missiles for there was obviously a large psychological factor among our allies to be considered in regard to the Russian potential for shooting even a 1500-mile missile.

The President stated that the United States is rushing missile development, that the budget contains a request for $1.2 billion. He noted the suggestion for setting up a separate agency, but said that he would use instead the experience of all the agencies. He did see a need for a good man to be located in the Department of Defense to see to the coordination of a lot of this.

The President recalled that our experts had originally believed that the quickest intercontinental missile to be had was of the “flight” type rather than the ballistics type, though of course it would be more vulnerable to destruction than the ballistics type.

Mr. Reuben Robertson recalled that in the economizing of 1.948, work on the missile was cut out entirely, that the Defense Department funds were sharply reduced and that air research funds were cut from $185 million to $145 million.

The President stated that he had been coming down from Columbia at that time to consult, and when he was told that the expenditure program was going to be reduced below a certain point, he just couldn’t have any further part in it.

The Vice President was certain that the missile program was on a starvation diet until this Administration came along, but he was not proposing to play politics with this unless forced into the subject by the opposition.

Mr. Quarles said that missiles were starved until Korea when money became available, and Mr. Keller[3] came in to “beef up” the program of those missiles that were nearly ready for production. The strategic missiles were not “beefed up” until the 1953 study[4] by Dr. Von Neumann and others. Since then, this Administration has pumped money in as fast as it can be used, as even Trevor Gardner has admitted.

The President noted again that as far as Russia is concerned, all that is known is that they have propelled something a given distance. How far along they are with warhead and guidance systems is not known.

Ironically, the President said, he thought he would be hard pressed to justify putting so much money into missiles, only to find that newcomers appear and charge him with not doing enough.

Mr. Quarles branded as inaccurate and very dangerous the concept of an “ultimate weapon.” As for the talk about the Russians having the intermediate range missile, they already had the IL-28’s which are more effective than missiles and cannot adequately be defended against. We know that and the Russians know it, he said.

Mr. Quarles emphasized that the Russians will still be deterred by our power to strike an effective blow whether with missiles or otherwise.

The President commented on the vast number of missiles needed to make an effective attack on many cities—allowing for some being defective. Inability to pinpoint would require large numbers and the world would be a shambles before an atomic war was over. War up to now has been a contest, he said; but with nuclear missiles, it is no longer a contest, it is complete destruction.

The President said he did want to get guided missiles as quickly as possible for the sake of our friends. But in the meantime we have a deterrent power—which we’ve got to have for the sake of civilization. That’s why he talked disarmament so much, he said.

Mr. Robertson noted that the “business as usual” charge just wasn’t true. He pointed out that 25,000 people, of whom 10,000 are scientists, are working on the program, and more than 50,000 hours of overtime are being worked which is said to be the maximum for a program of long duration. Mr. Quarles added that overtime had been authorized even before the President’s “highest priority” determination, and that unlimited overtime is now authorized.

Mr. Robertson said Mr. Trevor Gardner’s concern was not with ballistic missiles, for which he said himself he couldn’t use any more money; he was concerned rather with the broad area of air research and development.

The President remarked that he had just been reminded of a talk he had had with Sec. Talbott who had been keen for appointing Gardner. His file also held a note about several Senators (Knowland included) cautioning against it. The President said he finally had told them to go ahead if they insisted but they would have to hold themselves responsible if it proved to be a mistake.

LAM

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich. Copies were sent to Ann Whitman. The meeting was attended by the President and Vice President Nixon, Senators Knowland and Bridges, Representatives Martin, Halleck, Leo Allen, and Arends, Attorney General Brownell, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson, Quarles, Sherman Adams, Persons, Hagerty, Harlow, Seaton, Goodpaster, Gerald Morgan, and I. Jack Martin, The time of the meeting and the list of participants is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid., Eisenhower Records)

[2] On February 8, during a news conference, Eisenhower responded to charges that had been made that week by two Democratic Senators that the United States was lagging seriously behind the Soviet Union in the production and development of guided missiles. Eisenhower noted that “as of now this thing is being researched and developed as rapidly as it can be done in this country, so far as my experts and my people in the Defense Department tell me.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, p. 236)

[3] Kaufman T. Keller, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Director of Guided Missiles, 1954.

[4] Not further identified.

59. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

Washington, February 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

NSC 5602

1. I am transmitting herewith for the information of the National Security Council the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 5602.[2] I concur in these views.

2. NSC 5602 was the subject of a special meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 23 February. Because I shall not be at the National Security Council meeting when NSC 5602 is discussed, I should like to use this opportunity to call the attention of the members of the Council to the general conclusions of the discussion in the Armed Forces Policy Council. It was our unanimous view that, while NSC 5602 is some small improvement in detail over NSC 5501, its predecessor, it does not represent the incisive and clear statement of the basic U.S. security policies which we believe is needed to meet the challenge of new Soviet moves. We feel that, since NSC 5501 was approved, the Soviets have made much progress. Their military strength is rapidly becoming more than adequate to make them feel that their basic objectives of protecting the security of their regime and of holding together the Soviet Communist Bloc are now well assured. In consequence, we feel that they are moving with far greater flexibility and assurance to isolate the U.S. from the rest of the free world and to create doubts in the minds of our allies as to U.S. intentions.

3. In the face of this considerably changed situation, we strongly recommend, whether or not it is desired to act on NSC 5602 in its present form, that a number of very fundamental problems confronting us should be thrashed out by a small group meeting with the President. On the basis of such discussions and a consequent clarification of the bases of new policy and national strategy, we feel there should then be produced for NSC consideration a much shorter, positive and affirmative statement of U.S. policy to meet the challenge of the new Soviet cold war offensive.

C.E. Wilson[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted with the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Wilson, infra. to the National Security Council under cover of a memorandum from Gleason, dated February 24.

[2] See infra.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

60. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

Washington, February 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

Review of Basic National Security Policy, NSC 5602

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff forward in the Enclosure[2] hereto their comments on NSC 5602. They consider that these comments, if adopted, will clarify certain important aspects of this paper.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are, however, more concerned with the over-all aspects of NSC 5602 which in their opinion is in essence a restatement of the Basic National Security Policy as contained in both NSC 5501 and NSC 162/2.[3] They feel strongly that there has been a marked deterioration of the Free World position in the past year, due mainly to a new and more flexible approach on the part of the Communist Bloc (USSR). Unless U.S. policy is realistically revised to meet the new Soviet tactics, U.S. leadership of the Free World will be jeopardized.

3. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, regardless of action taken by the National Security Council on NSC 5602, a complete restudy of the Basic National Security Policy be made as a matter of urgency.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford[4]

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret.

[2] Not printed.

[3] For text of NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy,” dated October 30, 1953, see Foreign Relations , vol. II, Part 1, p. 577.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

61. Memorandum of Discussion at the 277th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 27, 1956[1]

Washington, February 27, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

2. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5501; NSC 5602;[2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, dated September 16, 1955;[3] Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 13 and 24, 1956[4] )

Mr. Dillon Anderson began his briefing of the Council by inviting its attention to the Annex to NSC 5602, which contained the NSC Planning Board’s current “Estimate of the Situation”. He commented on the several paragraphs until he reached paragraph 3. As to paragraph 3, respecting the “Chances of General War”, he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to insert an additional sentence elaborating on the possibility of war occurring as a result of miscalculation on one side or the other.

The President commented that he could not see any essential difference between the sentence which the Planning Board had originally included on this point and the added language recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford explained that the Joint Chiefs believed that the danger of war by miscalculation was a consideration which could not be too strongly emphasized. The President then suggested that the JCS sentence be included.

Mr. Anderson continued his briefing of the remaining paragraphs in the Annex and, when he had concluded his briefing of the estimate of the situation, inquired as to whether there were any questions.

The President said he had an observation to make. He said he believed that we were inclined to use the word “neutrality” too loosely, as this estimate of the situation itself demonstrated. He explained that it was erroneous for people to charge that there could be no genuine neutrality in the world between the Communist and the Western nations. He reminded the Council that the United States itself had pursued a policy of genuine neutrality for the first 150 years of its life. In any event the United States, thought the President, must not keep seeking to achieve military as opposed to moral commitments from other nations. Those nations which made military commitments to the United States often made themselves highly vulnerable to Communist attack. The President then very forcefully stated that we should define the term “neutrality” more precisely. It should mean a moral, spiritual and, possibly, a political commitment to our side, but not necessarily a military commitment. Mr. Anderson assured the President that the view he had expressed had been set forth in paragraph 29 of NSC 5602.

Dr. Flemming said that while the Council was still considering the estimate in NSC 5602, he would like to raise a question with respect to the last two sentences in the memorandum which Secretary Wilson had sent to the Council containing the views of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 5602. These last two sentences stressed the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, and Dr. Flemming wished to know whether these sentences in point of fact took issue with the Estimate of the Situation in the Annex which the Council had just gone over.

The President replied to Dr. Flemming by stating that the view taken of Soviet strength in Secretary Wilson’s memorandum was generally true. The Soviets, continued the President, were holding their coalition together at the present time by quite different means because they had come to believe that it would be impossible to hold this coalition together solely by military force as in the past. He saw nothing really to challenge in Secretary Wilson’s estimate. Mr. Allen Dulles also stated that these views of Secretary Wilson were in line with the latest coordinated intelligence estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities.

Mr. Anderson stated that if there were no more questions about the estimative section of NSC 5602, he would turn to the body of the report, dealing with U.S. policy and strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He referred first to the Preamble on page 1, which he indicated was new and was designed by the Planning Board to suggest an affirmative approach to the problem of the Soviet Union rather than a reactive approach. The President said he could see nothing to object to in the Preamble, and that in fact he liked it.

Mr. Anderson then resumed his comments on the successive paragraphs of NSC 5602, pointing out that with respect to paragraph 6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended the deletion of the parenthetical phrase “including safeguarded disarmament”. The President commented that this seemed a very important matter, and deletion of the phrase might appear to be deliberate. Governor Stassen expressed the feeling that the phrase should be retained because disarmament was a basic way for the United States to try to reduce the Soviet threat, the more so because we had ruled out war as such a means. Secretary Dulles said he didn’t think it was vital one way or another, but inasmuch as the phrase was already in the paper, it might just as well remain. The President said that the phrase should stay, at least tentatively.

When Mr. Anderson had reached paragraph 7, dealing with the requirements for a flexible combination of military, political, economic, and other actions as a prerequisite of U.S. strategy, Secretary Dulles indicated that he wished to make a point. He said that he had no doubt that we could achieve a certain flexibility in carrying out our military, political, and economic actions; but we desperately needed more flexibility within the Executive Branch to deal with the problem of countering Soviet initiatives. Our procedures and our relations with the Congress were too slow and cumbersome. The President indicated that the point that Secretary Dulles had made could be raised at the appropriate stage in the Council’s consideration of NSC 5602.

Coming to paragraphs 11 and 12, dealing with the policies of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons and also with chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons, Mr. Anderson said he would read these paragraphs in their entirety because they were new. Having done so, Mr. Anderson indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended a change in the second sentence of paragraph 11. This now read “Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President.” The Joint Chiefs had suggested that the sentence should read as follows: “Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and will be used in military operations short of general war when the effectiveness of the operations of the U.S. forces employed will be enhanced thereby. For such operations, the decision as to specific uses will be made by the President.” Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not, as they usually did, given the reasons behind their proposed change, Mr. Anderson asked Admiral Radford if he would speak to the point.

Admiral Radford said he would be very glad to comment. There seemed, he said, to be a widespread impression that nuclear weapons were designed only for offensive use. In point of fact, however, these weapons affected our defensive strength just as much as our offensive strength. He cited various weapons to illustrate this assertion. Accordingly, continued Admiral Radford, it would make a tremendous difference defensively if our U.S. forces could not use nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves. It was his opinion that nuclear weapons would soon be so thoroughly integrated in the U.S. armed forces that inability to use these weapons would greatly reduce both our defensive and offensive capabilities. Indeed, the idea of some dividing line between use and non-use of these weapons was getting us further and further from the realm of the possible and the actual.

In response to Admiral Radford, the President adverted to the political implications in the use of nuclear weapons. In these peripheral or small wars which we are talking about, the United States might become involved, for example, through the United Nations. If this occurred, the use of nuclear weapons would raise serious political problems in view of the current state of world opinion as to the use of such weapons. While, said the President, he agreed emphatically with Admiral Radford from a strictly military point of view, we could nevertheless not ignore the political factor. He did not say that world opinion was right in its views about the use of nuclear weapons in small wars. It was nevertheless a fact, and the President predicted that it would be some considerable time before the United States reaches a point where it can adopt any military course of action it regards as appropriate without regard for the political repercussions of such a course of action.

Secretary Dulles said that he believed he had an idea which might reconcile the JCS and the Planning Board language in paragraph 11. Could we not, he asked, use a slightly different formula to cover the use of nuclear weapons in general war and in operations short of general war? He said he had no objection to the use of the JCS language with respect to general war, but he preferred the language suggested by the Planning Board with regard to operations short of general war.

The President said that having taken one position in response to Admiral Radford’s views, he was now about to take a quite different position in response to the point raised by Secretary Dulles. He asked that the Council imagine the position of a military commander in the field. His radar informs him that a flock of enemy bombers is on the point of attacking him. What does the military commander do in such a contingency? Does he not use every weapon at hand to defend himself and his forces?

Secretary Dulles responded by insisting that the language proposed by the Joint Chiefs was no more responsive to the situation described by the President than was the language of the Planning Board, inasmuch as the JCS language itself called for approval of specific use of atomic weapons by the President. Secretary Dulles agreed, however, that the United States forces would make use of nuclear weapons if these forces were directly attacked by the enemy. The President thought that this point should be made specific in the statement of policy.

Admiral Radford commented that in the event of an attack on our forces by an enemy using nuclear weapons, such U.S. defensive forces might suffer such severe initial defeat that they would be unable to recover and go on to victory. In such a case you would have to use nuclear weapons for defense. The President stated his agreement with the point made by Admiral Radford.

Secretary Humphrey said that he wished to raise the very important point of the costs of our preparation for war. He said that it was impossible to prepare dual methods of fighting a future war. Accordingly, we have got to use nuclear weapons in the event of a future war. When you talked in a policy [paper] about “maybe you will use them, maybe you won’t”, you were getting into very, very deep water. Secretary Dulles said that it appeared that we must choose between having all the military flexibility we wished and losing all our allies. The automatic employment of nuclear weapons in certain instances would surely cost us our allies. Secretary Dulles said he would freely admit that we must do more to educate our allies on our position, but that a decision now in favor of automatic use of these weapons might actually prove disastrous to the United States.

The President commented that we were now talking chiefly of defensive nuclear weapons. It would be well to remember that current U.S. forces have in every case at least some capability with so-called conventional weapons. What we are seeking now, in connection with paragraph 11, is language which will state that we can use any weapon available to us in the event that our forces are directly attacked by the enemy. Secretary Dulles agreed with the President.

Secretary Robertson said he wished to refer to the point earlier made by Secretary Humphrey with respect to the impossibility of preparing to fight two kinds of wars. He added that the Defense Department felt a very great need for Council guidance as to the manner in which preparation for future war should be made. Secretary Robertson then referred to the footnote at the bottom of page 6 of NSC 5602, in which the State Department proposed an additional paragraph to be inserted after paragraph 12 and to read as follows: “If time permits, the United States should consult appropriate allies, including NATO, before the final decision to use nuclear and chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons is made by the President.”[5] In addition to the qualification proposed by the State Department, “if time permits,” Secretary Robertson suggested the qualification “and if an attack on U.S. forces is not involved”. The President said he thought very well of Secretary Robertson’s proposal.

Secretary Dulles said he would like to pursue the discussion a little further. Suppose we turned our attention to the situation in Berlin. What happens if the Soviets impose a new blockade on Berlin? As the Council knew, it was agreed U.S. policy in this contingency to attempt to push through such a blockade. [remainder of paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

At this point the President suggested that the Council suspend action in paragraphs 11 and 12 until such time as it should receive the new paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealing with these problems.[6] Governor Stassen said he supported the position taken by Secretary Dulles, as opposed to the position taken by Secretary Humphrey. Secretary Dulles added a warning of the terrible repercussions which we would experience if we had recourse to the use of nuclear weapons against the colored peoples of Asia.

Admiral Strauss asked permission to speak at this point. He said he would simply like to add, for the information of the Council, that we have at present no radiological weapons and, as far as he knew, no requirement for them.

Dr. Flemming said he would like to refer once again to the memorandum sent to the Council by Secretary Wilson together with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As he understood Secretary Wilson’s position in this memorandum, the Secretary had concluded that the policy set forth in NSC 5602 did not represent the kind of policy the United States required in the face of the existing situation. Was the issue which the Council had been discussing, with respect to paragraph 11, an illustration of what the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind when they said that we should have a more incisive and specific policy statement than that contained in NSC 5602? Secretary Robertson replied that this was precisely the type of problem about which the Defense Department believed there was need for much clearer delineation of U.S. policy.

At this point Secretary Dulles again suggested that the best solution for the problem raised in paragraph 11 would be for the Council provisionally to adopt the language suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the use of weapons in general war, and the language proposed by the Planning Board with respect to the use of nuclear weapons in operations short of general war. We should also add, said Secretary Dulles, words to indicate that these concepts needed further elaboration and that we should have a study of them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In response to this suggestion, the President again stated that Council action on paragraphs 11 and 12 of NSC 5602 should be held in abeyance pending receipt of this study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was no need, thought the President, for immediate Council action on NSC 5602.

Mr. Dillon Anderson then undertook to explain to the National Security Council the origin and development of the ideas and language in paragraph 11. He pointed out that a high level committee had been set up in the Department of Defense which was called the “NSC 5501 Committee”. This Defense Department committee had initially decided on appropriate language to cover the problem of the use of nuclear weapons. They had thereafter sent this language to the Planning Board for its consideration, and this language had been adopted with some few changes by the Planning Board. Mr. Anderson indicated, however, that the Planning Board had had no knowledge of the special JCS study of this problem to which reference had been made in the course of the discussion. He wondered whether this problem should not be added to the other major problems set forth in the covering memorandum by the Planning Board to NSC 5602, which problems the Planning Board felt should be the subject of further study and consideration by the National Security Council.

The President then observed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have reported the contents of their study of the use of nuclear weapons prior to the time when the Planning Board had reached its decision as to appropriate language for paragraph 11. In other words, said the President, turning to Mr. Anderson, you and the Planning Board were under the impression that paragraphs 11 and 12, as agreed upon by the Planning Board, were acceptable to the Department of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Anderson nodded agreement, but Admiral Radford insisted that the JCS recommendation as to the language which the Planning Board should use for paragraph 11 was the same language which they were now proposing as a substitute for the existing Planning Board language. In point of fact, the Planning Board had not accepted the original JCS suggestions and had changed them in the course of its deliberations. Mr. Anderson agreed that this was correct, but pointed out that the Defense member and the JCS adviser of the NSC Planning Board had agreed to accept the revision made by the Planning Board in the language originally sent by the Joint Chiefs for inclusion in paragraph 11.

Dr. Flemming said he wished to raise a question with respect to paragraph 12, regarding chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons in general war. He asked whether he was correct in believing that our previous policy had been that we would have recourse to such weapons only in retaliation against their use by an enemy. Did the present language of paragraph 12 thus amount to a change in policy respecting the use of such weapons? The President commented that the chief purpose of paragraph 12 was to encourage research and development in these weapons fields. Mr. Anderson added that previous policy respecting the use of these weapons called for their use only in retaliation. Accordingly Dr. Flemming’s surmise was correct, and the present paragraph 12 constituted a change in our policy.

Secretary Dulles then asked the President whether Council action on paragraphs 11 and 12 was to be held in suspense. The President indicated that paragraph 12 was OK as written, but that Council action on paragraph 11 would be suspended pending further study and report to the Council by the Department of Defense.[7]

Mr. Anderson then moved on and called the Council’s attention to paragraph 13. He explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired to add language to this paragraph which would delineate the roles of the Army and the Navy in a future war. So far as he could ascertain, Mr. Anderson said, he believed the Planning Board entertained no objection to the additions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President said that of course this raised a problem. When you inserted language such as was proposed by the Joint Chiefs in this paragraph, the paragraph became almost a military directive and carried with it the assumption that you had the military capabilities called for by the directive. The President said that he believed that in a future nuclear war the chief task of the U.S. ground forces would be to preserve order in the United States. God only knew what the Navy would be doing in a nuclear attack. The President indicated that he was opposed to adding language which was suggestive of a military directive.

Secretary Humphrey expressed very great concern over the proposed new language. He inquired whether the National Security Council was not now trying to avoid so far as possible all duplication in war planning and all duplication for expenditures to meet a future war. It seemed to him that the Council was at long last reaching the point of decision as to the use of nuclear weapons in a future war. He went on to point out how greatly those who sat around this table had changed their views on this subject over the last two years. Acceptance of the proposed JCS additions might readily involve several billions of dollars in additional appropriations for the Army and Navy and this drastically upset the balance that we were now attaining between our economic well-being and our military preparedness. Accordingly, paragraph 13 and the problems it raised represented to Secretary Humphrey “the whole ball of wax” and “the real meat of the coconut”.

Admiral Radford pointed out that the language describing the missions of the Army and the Navy was a quotation from a letter written by the President to the Secretary of Defense last January.[8] He added that all the interested bodies and groups among the military were interested in getting such language in our basic policy paper as a means of protecting their appropriations. Secretary Humphrey said he agreed heartily with Admiral Radford that what was proposed by the Army and the Navy constituted appropriations language.

Secretary Robertson said he would like to comment on the charge of too much specificity in the proposed language for paragraph 13. He said that the additional language proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, detailed as it was, was presented on the assumption that the policy set forth in NSC 5602 would be satisfactory. If the Council were to adopt a quite different policy, as Secretary Wilson suggested in his memorandum, less detail would be required.

Secretary Dulles commented that the additional language proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for paragraph 13, as to the missions of the Army and the Navy, was designed simply to involve the NSC in a decision as to the missions of the different branches of the armed forces, and might very well be used as a basis for asking much larger appropriations.

Dr. Flemming said he wanted to emphasize and underline what Secretary Humphrey had said with regard to the necessity for a decision on the use of nuclear weapons. This issue, he added, had very great implications for our mobilization base. He added, however, that he did not agree with Secretary Wilson’s idea that a new and more incisive policy paper should be developed. We should instead attempt to make NSC 5602 more incisive and satisfactory. Admiral Radford stated that what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind was a new policy paper to replace NSC 5602.

The President then turned to Admiral Radford and said that if the suggestions of the Army and the Navy were accepted, we would be writing into paragraph 13 exactly what we expected the Army and Navy to be doing at the outbreak and initial stages of a future war. He again stressed that he did not believe that language suitable for war plans was likewise suitable for basic national security policy, and the language proposed by the Army and Navy seemed to him language suited to a war plan. A basic policy paper is not a war plan.

After Mr. Anderson had pointed out that the present text of paragraph 13 was almost identical with the corresponding paragraph in NSC 5501, General Taylor inquired whether the Council would like to have him state the reason why the Army had recommended, and he had supported, the inclusion of language describing the mission of U.S. ground forces. He had supported this language, said General Taylor, because approximately 40% of our ground forces would be fighting for their lives abroad while the air atomic war was going on. He believed that due recognition should be given to this fact, and said that in all probability the Chief of Naval Operations felt similarly about the role of the U.S. Navy.

The President replied by pointing out that our air atomic capability constituted in the first instance the great deterrent to war. Accordingly, it was in a quite different category from the problem of where our ground forces and our ships were to be deployed in the event of war. If we start now specifying precisely what our Army and Navy are going to do, we’ll never stop.

Secretary Dulles said that it seemed to him that paragraph 13 was dealing primarily with the problem of how you fight a war. These two ideas were separate and distinct, and should not be combined in a single paragraph. The President then indicated that the Council should go on to the next paragraph, and that he was not at the moment inclined toward inclusion of the additional language suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for paragraph 13. Before the Council moved on, Secretary Dulles secured agreement to certain changes in the language of the footnote on page 6.

Mr. Anderson then went on with his briefing, and invited the Council’s attention to paragraph 14, which dealt with the problem of U.S. military forces required to meet or to deter local Communist aggression. He pointed out that in the Planning Board’s covering memorandum a recommendaton had been made that the Department of Defense make a special presentation on the subject of our capabilities to deter or prevent such aggression in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in this recommendation.

When Mr. Anderson had finished reading paragraph 14, Secretary Robertson commented that the Defense Department felt very much about paragraph 14 as they had felt about paragraph 11, which seemed to be looking at peripheral and general war together.

The President said that he again found himself a little puzzled about the use and implication of the words “peripheral war”. He reminded the Council that when his Administration had first come into office, back in January of 1953, our big complaint was the Korean war, which we were obliged to fight with handcuffs on. Under the circumstances, we could not win such a war, and that left us no option but to end the war. Then the President said that the point that he was trying to make was that in the future these peripheral wars must not be permitted to drag out. We must now plan to fight peripheral wars on the same basis as we would fight a general war. After all, there was no good reason for drawing distinctions between peripheral and general wars. Had we not made up our minds that if the Communists renewed their aggression against Korea we would go “all out” to meet it?

Secretary Dulles put to the President the question of what we would do if the Vietminh undertook to attack South Vietnam. Would we proceed to drop atomic bombs on Peking? The President replied that we might not drop bombs on Peking, but just as quickly as the Communists intervened against South Vietnam we would certainly bomb the bases in China which were supporting the aggression.

Secretary Humphrey said that this discussion again pointed to the necessity that the National Security Council reach a unanimous decision on what kind of a war the United States was going to be prepared to fight if it occurred. Mr. Allen Dulles said that in a kind of a way a peripheral war was now going on in Laos. The President said, however, that the kind of war we were talking about was one in which the United States was intervening. Secretary Dulles pointed out that by the terms of the SEATO treaty the United States was committed to protect the territorial integrity of Laos.

Mr. Anderson again pointed out the Planning Board recommendation that the Department of Defense should produce a full study and presentation of the problem of local aggression to the National Security Council. Admiral Radford commented that the Planning Board recommendation was all right with him, though he doubted that it would be very productive. Secretary Humphrey said with considerable warmth that it was simply not possible for the United States to fight just little wars. If we get into any war at all we must go in with the determination to clean the whole mess up. Admiral Radford added that at any rate we could not let such little wars drag on.

Governor Stassen reminded the Council of his view that if the free world came to believe that the United States was only capable of fighting with nuclear weapons, we would lose much of our free world support. Admiral Radford took issue with this view, and pointed out that the Council adopted two years ago a policy of building up the nuclear capabilities of our armed forces and, moreover, he predicted that the use of these nuclear weapons would become accepted throughout the world just as soon as people could lay their hands upon them. The President concluded the discussion by calling for agreement on the Planning Board’s recommendation for a study and presentation to the Council of the local aggression problem.

Dr. Flemming asked if the Council would go back for a moment to paragraph 13. He believed that it would be useful to change the introductory phrase “As part of its military forces the United States must develop and maintain its effective nuclear retaliatory power, etc., etc.” to “As a deterrent to war the United States must etc., etc.”. The President agreed that Dr. Flemming’s phraseology was an improvement.

The Council then moved on to consider paragraph 16. After certain word changes were agreed upon, Secretary Robertson said he felt it was his duty to mention that the policy laid down in this paragraph was going to cost the United States a very great deal of money. Indeed, some $450 million was earmarked next year for NATO. The President remarked, with some chagrin, that when our divisions were originally sent to Germany they were sent there on the assumption that they would remain only until the French and the Germans could take up the slack. Now we are not only going to provide new weapons and spare parts to our NATO allies, but we must plan to keep our American divisions in Germany too.

Secretary Humphrey said that Secretary Robertson’s comment on costs impelled him to say that every time the military found a place where they felt they needed to spend more money, they must also find another place where they could make equivalent savings. There was not much doubt that Congress would face us with a tax reduction in the near future. We were desperately trying to find funds to launch a great roads program. We were simply not going to be able to get any more money out of Congress.

Admiral Radford said that these observations reminded him that he ought to mention the recent visit of the Italian Chief of Staff. General Mancinelli had informed him in effect that unless the United States provided support for the Italian armed forces at the rate of about $250 million a year, the Italian Government would have to reduce the levels of its armed forces.[9] Admiral Radford had replied that the United States would be glad to provide new weapons for the Italian Army if Italy itself would supply the necessary spare parts. Mancinelli had replied that Italy could not possibly do this. Accordingly, Admiral Radford charged that the Italians not only expect us to give them new weapons; they also want our financial help to support the existing force levels. It was tantamount to blackmail. Secretary Humphrey expressed emphatic agreement with this judgment, and warned that we were everywhere going to be faced with the proposition that either we help support the armed forces of our allies or else they would quit being allies.

At this point the President intervened to ask the question whether the United States must face national bankruptcy and the prospect of a totalitarian control as the only means left to deal with an implacable enemy. This was why, he said, he kept telling our Chiefs of Staff all the time that they must behave as statesmen as well as military leaders. They must somehow strike an appropriate balance between the military needs of the nation and our resources under our free enterprise economy.

Mr. Anderson went on to comment on paragraph 18, which was new and dealt with the necessity for a dynamic research and development program for military application. When he had completed his explanation, the President commented that he presumed that the words “increasing efforts” meant that the policy was recommending more money for military research and development. This might be well and good, but the President wanted to know whether the Defense Department had done all it could for research and development within the limits of existing funds. Perhaps it was doing this now. It was certainly not doing so a few years back. In short, the question he wished to put was, can we not increase the effectiveness as well as the scale of spending on our research and development program?

Secretary Robertson said that $1.6 billion was a lot of money to be set aside for basic research alone. When you added to this military pay and other things, the total rose from $1.6 billion to $5.4 billion. The President went on to say that he simply wondered how much money we were talking about in this paragraph. He was quite sure that simply adding more money to this program would not necessarily encourage the people involved in it to do their best work. Secretary Robertson admitted that he had found some support for the President’s argument in his recent tour of the various installations where our guided missiles programs were being carried out. In most of these places the provision of additional funds would not have accelerated the completion of the missiles programs.

The President then said that in any event (looking at Director Hughes) he would like to get the people from the research and development program together some time and find out where they are spending their money and at what point in carrying out the R&D program technical supervision and coordination had their first impact. Director Hughes answered that the Bureau of the Budget had already tried to follow out the President’s suggestion with Dr. Waterman’s group,[10] but the results so far had not been very productive. Mr. Andersonsuggested that the President might wish to add this problem to the other areas in which the Planning Board had recommended further detailed study.

With respect to the last sentence of paragraph 18, which called for the speeding up of the means whereby important scientific discoveries could be translated into a flow of new weapons, Secretary Robertson pointed out that a full-fledged study was being carried forward by the Department of Defense as this problem related to manned aircraft.

Mr. Anderson next drew the Council’s attention to paragragh 24, which called on the United States to encourage a high level of international trade within the free world and to take the lead in this process by reducing further “its own tariffs and other trade restrictions over the next few years”. The Treasury and ODM members of the Planning Board had recommended the addition of the phrase “with due regard to national security and total national advantage”.

The President expressed surprise at this split of views, and said that if we did not consider national security and total national advantage already, we should certainly now move to do so. He looked on the whole problem of reducing trade restrictions and tariffs in terms of our national security and total national advantage. Accordingly, it was agreed to accept the additional phraseology proposed by the ODM and Treasury members of the Planning Board.

Mr. Anderson then went on to paragraph 25. Admiral Radford raised a question with respect to paragraph 25–b, which indicated that the United States might find it expedient to continue economic assistance to certain European countries (e.g., Spain, Yugoslavia, Turkey), etc., etc. Admiral Radford wanted to know whether the specification of these three countries meant that we would not furnish such economic assistance to any other European countries. Mr. Anderson explained that this paragraph had been inserted because of the virtual cessation of U.S. economic aid to European countries, and the Planning Board’s view that in certain exceptional circumstances it might be desirable to continue such economic aid.

The President expressed some doubt as to the wisdom of specifying only these three countries. If it was expedient to assist these countries, it might be expedient to assist others. Secretary Dulles commented that we were already committed to economic assistance in the case of Spain and Turkey, and that we were in addition giving a lot of Public Law 480[11] assistance to Yugoslavia. The President then directed the deletion of subparagraph 25–b.

The Council moved on to consider paragraph 27, which dealt with United States programs to promote sound development in the less developed nations. Mr. Anderson pointed out that there was a split in paragraph 27, occasioned by the proposal of the Treasury, ODM and Budget members of the Planning Board to insert the phrase that despite such assistance as we might be required to provide less developed nations, “over the long run the total lever of U.S. economic assistance world-wide should be reduced as rapidly as is consistent with U.S. security interests.” Mr. Anderson suggested that Director Hughes might wish to speak to this point.

Mr. Hughes pointed out that the proposed language had existed in NSC 5501. If now this language were to be omitted, it would look as though we had changed our policy on reducing the total level of U.S. economic assistance, and he believed it was still our policy objective to do so. Accordingly, he favored inserting the bracketed phrase.

Secretary Dulles said that in point of fact we were asking Congress for an extra $100 million this year for assistance to less developed nations. If we were going to be logical, therefore, we should introduce the word “increased” along with the word “reduced” in the sentence in question.

Secretary Humphrey said that it was his emphatic view that over the long run the United States should get out of the field of providing economic assistance to foreign nations. This was not the kind of a burden that the people of the United States would be willing to bear indefinitely, and it should be our objective to get out as rapidly as we could. If Congress once got the idea that the burden of foreign aid was regarded by the Executive Branch as permanent, we would certainly be in hot water.

Secretary Dulles said he believed the use of the term “permanent” was very dangerous. Our real objective is to provide for the security of the United States, and to that end it was an illusion to imagine that we can reduce the level of our foreign assistance expenditures in the near future. The President agreed that, particularly in view of the new Soviet tactics, the inclusion of this phraseology might lend itself to illusions. However, he said, he would not object to including this proposed language if to it were added the thought that it would not be possible to reduce the total level of U.S. economic assistance for a long time to come. After further discussion, the President suggested new language to meet the point. We should say in effect that the level of U.S. economic assistance should attain but not exceed a total level consistent with U.S. security interests. If language to this effect were included, the language proposed by the Treasury, ODM and Budget should be deleted.

Proceeding to a consideration of paragraph 27–b, on U.S. foreign economic programs, Mr. Anderson pointed out that this subparagraph was new. After Mr. Anderson had read the language, the President commented that here again, as in the military field, the Soviets have every opportunity to play us for suckers. We must be careful not to be drawn into matching every Soviet offer of assistance to foreign nations.

Secretary Humphrey commented that paragraph 27 raised terrific questions. Our economic assistance to underdeveloped nations was rendered on a government-to-government basis. As a result, our policy was actually achieving nothing but the building up of little imitations of the Soviet Union throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world. If we continued this policy it would mark the end of all hope for setting up free individual enterprise in any of these countries. This result would be a far cry from our own idea of the kind of world we wanted to see.

The President, in response to Secretary Humphrey, stated that he could see no good reason why the present paragraph should not contain language designed to encourage the investment of private capital in the programs for building up the underdeveloped countries. To develop private enterprise in these areas had always been a part of our foreign policy. Mr. Anderson agreed to insert language to meet the President’s point.

Secretary Robertson pointed out that many of our allies have begun to think that nations who professed a policy of neutrality were more successful than actual allies of the United States in securing U.S. economic assistance. He believed that Admiral Radford might wish to speak further on this subject. Admiral Radford elaborated on this point and cited various examples, notably Pakistan. Secretary Humphrey added the comment that in Latin America it was often argued that the only way to extract money from the United States was to plead the danger of Communism. The President commented that the sad fact was that we did not have enough allies really determined to maintain their freedom to a point where they were willing to see the United States spend its money in the really critical areas.

Governor Stassen pointed out his view that regional arrangements for economic assistance were the best way to counter the new Soviet tactics. He felt that it was a mistake that the present paper contained nothing by way of support for the idea of extending U.S. aid on a regional rather than an individual country basis.

Mr. Anderson then pointed out that the problem of aid to underdeveloped countries was yet another area for which the Planning Board was recommending special study in its covering memorandum. The President inquired if this was not a subject on which Joe Dodge was also working. When it had been pointed out that this was indeed the case, the President suggested that the Council not act on the subject until these additional studies had been completed.

Moving on to paragraph 30, which dealt with the problem of nationalist and reform movements in colonial areas in Asia and Africa, Mr. Anderson invited attention to the ODM proposal that the “extension of the trusteeship principle in appropriate circumstances with strategic safeguards may offer a defensible and acceptable alternative to strictly colonial control.” The President asked Dr. Flemming what precisely the ODM Planning Board member had in mind in proposing this language. In turn, Dr. Flemming asked Mr. Anderson what Dr. Elliott had had in mind. Mr. Anderson explained. Secretary Dulles then commented that the area of possible use of the trusteeship principle was too meager to deserve being singled out in this fashion. Dr. Flemming agreed to drop the proposal.

At this point Mr. Anderson indicated that it was quarter to twelve, and that the Council might wish now to adjourn and complete its consideration of NSC 5602 at its next meeting on Thursday, March 1. The Council agreed with this suggestion, but Secretary Dulles stated that he might not be able to be present at the meeting next Thursday, and wished to say a few words about the problem of flexibility which he had mentioned earlier in the morning’s discussion. The President indicated that Secretary Dulles should proceed.

Secretary Dulles said that, at least in those sections of the paper which had been covered this morning, there had not been adequate recognition of the need for greater administrative flexibility on the part of the United States in countering the current Soviet economic offensive. When we devised programs of economic assistance under the existing arrangements, we had to explain every single last item to the Congress on every expenditure which we proposed to make. This would be absurd in the case of military planning, which was permitted great flexibility, and we needed similar flexibility in the cold war.

Director Hughes indicated that the Bureau of the Budget was giving this matter of administrative flexibility the most intensive study. Both the Bureau of the Budget and Mr. Dodge were strongly in favor of trying to secure the required flexibility.

Secretary Dulles said that he was glad to hear this, but still believed that the problem required special mention in NSC 5602. With this view the President expressed agreement. Thereupon Secretary Dulles said he would like just to outline a kind of example of what he had in mind. Suppose, for instance, the United States went to the Czechoslovakian Government and said in effect that Czechoslovakia needed a lot of cotton. We would be glad to give this cotton to Czechoslovakia, together with butter, meats, fats, and other foods of which we had large surpluses. We would then propose some kind of a deal by which in return for these commodities Czechoslovakia was to provide us with war goods or other things. Any such proposal as this to Czechoslovakia would simply “raise hell” in the Soviet satellite countries. The Soviets, said Secretary Dulles, are grievously exploiting the satellites. Why can’t we exploit this fact, just as the Soviets are exploiting our allies and the neutral nations? Secretary Dulles pointed out that this, of course, was just an off-the-cuff suggestion and that it had not been staffed. But if the United States were to decide to make such moves as this, they would have to be made quickly if they were to be effective. Under the existing lack of flexibility we simply could not move quickly enough.

The President inquired whether he could not put some such suggestion as that made by Secretary Dulles in the next message he was to send down to the Congress. Director Hughes added that it would be next to impossible to get the Congress to agree to any such proposal as that outlined by Secretary Dulles.

The President said that of course the trouble was that the Congress believed that any and all U.S. trade with the Soviet bloc was wrong and bad. On the contrary, the President said, what he wanted to set in motion was centrifugal forces rather than centripetal forces in the Soviet bloc. U.S. trade with the bloc might eventually prove to be such a centrifugal force.

Secretary Dulles closed the discussion by stating that his plan was only an illustration of the kind of flexibility that the President might need in the future in dealing with the new Soviet tactics.

Thereafter the Council adjourned, with the understanding that it would consider the remainder of NSC 5602 at its next meeting.

Note: Council action resulting from the above discussion is incorporated in the action on the same subject contained in the memorandum on the 278th NSC meeting.[12]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on February 28.

[2] NSC 5602 is not printed, but see NSC 5602/1, Document 66.

[3] For text, see vol. I, p. 535.

[4] See footnote 1, Document 57, and footnote 1, supra, respectively.

[5] In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, dated February 24, Bowie recommended that the final clause of this sentence should be redrafted to read: “before any final decision to use nuclear or chemical, bacteriological, or radiological weapons is made by the President. (Underlining to indicate changes.)” The underlined words are printed in italics. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, S/P Chron. TS)

[6] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[7] See footnote 9, Document 62.

[8] Reference is to Eisenhower’s letter to Wilson, dated January 5, in which the President wrote in part: “Other essential tasks during the initial period following a possible future attack would require the Navy to clear the ocean lanes, and the Army to do its part in meeting critical land situations.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, p. 4 ) The Joint Chiefs repeated this sentence verbatim in paragraph 1–c of the enclosure, not printed, attached to the memorandum to Secretary Wilson, supra.

[9] No record of Radford’s meeting with General Giuseppe Mancinelli, Italian Chief of Staff, has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[10] Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation and Member of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific Research and Development.

[11] Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. (68 Stat. 454)

[12] See the NSC memorandum of discussion, infra.

62. Memorandum of Discussion at the 278th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 1, 1956[1]

Washington, March 1, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

2. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5501; NSC 5602; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, dated September 16, 1955; Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 13 and 24, 1956)[2]

Mr. Dillon Anderson suggested that the Council resume consideration of NSC 5602 where it had stopped at last Monday’s meeting. He proceeded to read paragraphs 33–a and –b, indicating that this paragraph and its successor referred to the subject of East-West relations. He also noted that the specific NSC policies on this subject—namely, NSC 174[3] and NSC 5505[4] —were awaiting revision by the NSC Planning Board. He pointed out that paragraph 35 of NSC 5602, likewise on East-West contacts, constituted a new paragraph not covered by NSC 5501. He said that the Planning Board believed the problem set forth in paragraph 35 was becoming of increasing importance, and he accordingly read the paragraph in toto. He noted that in general adoption of paragraph 35 would tend to liberalize somewhat existing policy with respect to the exchange of persons and delegations between the USSR and the United States. Finally, he pointed out that this problem had been the subject of a special report by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC–D–103, entitled “Intelligence Aspects of the Exchange of Delegations With the USSR and the European Satellites”;[5] copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). Accordingly, he would invite the comments of the Director of Central Intelligence at this point.

Mr. Allen Dulles read the highlights and conclusions of the above-mentioned estimate, stressing that previous exchanges of delegations, notably the exchange of delegations of farmers, had been on the whole more advantageous to the USSR than it had to the United States, [remainder of paragraph (4½ lines of source text) not declassified]

[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Dulles said that he did not know whether the point was covered elsewhere in NSC 5602, but this particular estimate of the net advantage or disadvantage to be achieved by the exchange of delegations was based on considerations of net gain or loss applying only to the U.S. and the USSR. Visits to the United States of Soviet nationals and delegations would be relatively without danger to the United States, because this country was prepared to handle the risks inherent in such visits. Other countries were less capable of meeting the danger, and we could not afford to ignore the effect of our own example on third countries whose thinking on the subject of the Communist danger was not so clear, strong and united as our own. Countries such as Liberia, for example, might not be able to absorb Soviet visitors without dangerous repercussions. Such countries would be put in an awkward position if the Russians turned to them and said the United States permits us to send delegations to visit it; why do you not do likewise? Quoting from the Bible text, Secretary Dulles warned that we should not follow courses which might cause our neighbors “to stumble”.

Although the President said he thought that Secretary Dulles’ point seemed to be covered in paragraph 36, Secretary Dulles went on to say that we were currently trying to induce Liberia and Uruguay not to accept Soviet visitations, on the assumption that while we could successfully handle such visits, they could not.

The President said that this seemed rather too bad, inasmuch as one of our objectives at Geneva last summer had been to invite and encourage closer contacts between East and West. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the emphasis at Geneva had been rather on the exchange of information and ideas than on the exchange of persons, and he said he still favored the former type of exchange.

Governor Stassen suggested that another aspect of this issue needed to be emphasized. We can also be adroit in making use of the results obtained by visits to the Soviet Union made by other free world citizens. This whole thing, he believed, represented a new situation; that is, both a new threat to the free world and a new opportunity for it. Perhaps the United States could contribute some help to the weaker countries which received Soviet delegations, by assisting these countries [10 words not declassified].

The President said that he would like to [12 words not declassified] see if it were possible to turn the exchange of delegations into a procedure which would be more definitely to the advantage of the United States. [1 sentence (4½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Allen Dulles commented vigorously that the exchange of persons and delegations between the U.S. and the Soviet bloc countries was a major problem and potentiality for the United States, and that it required to be studied with the very closest care. If properly handled, such exchange of persons could conceivably mean an opportunity to change the whole situation in the Soviet Union.

The President then turned to Mr. Dulles and told him to look into the situation along with the FBI. He further indicated that language should be inserted in paragraph 35 by way of warning of the dangers of the example set by the United States, in accepting Soviet delegations, on countries more vulnerable than the United States to Communist exploitation through the agency of such delegations.

Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the considerations which applied to exchange of persons also applied to trade and to negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR. He added that it was very difficult for many other countries to control their Soviet visitors. Governor Stassen, on the other hand, repeated his earlier view that the exchange of persons presented the United States with both a great threat and a great opportunity. He said he believed that this paragraph was one of the most important in NSC 5602.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President then inquired of the Council which agencies of the Government should make a study of this problem. He first suggested that this be done by Mr. Allen Dulles and by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. Mr. Dulles, however, indicated the desirability of adding other officials, and suggested that the OCB undertake the study with the assistance of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and the Department of Justice. The President indicated that what he wished this study of paragraph 35 to contain was primarily an analysis. What would the United States gain by such exchange of persons, and what would it lose? What were the risks, and what were the advantages?

Mr. Allen Dulles touched on the likelihood of a considerable influx of U.S. tourists to the Soviet Union in the coming months. He indicated that if we did not reciprocate by admitting Soviet tourists, we might lend color to the familiar charge of the Soviet Union that it was the U.S. rather than the USSR which maintained an Iron Curtain.

At this point Mr. Anderson referred to the fact that Mr. William Jackson, who had taken over from Nelson Rockefeller, was present today for the first time in his new capacity,[6] and would almost certainly have useful views on this subject.

Mr. Jackson stated that the considerations which the National Security Council had been discussing in connection with paragraph 35 were available in more detailed form and could readily be brought to the Council’s attention. What was required, however, more than detailed considerations, was the exercise of an act of judgment by the National Security Council; that was the heart of the matter. Mr. Jackson added that what had scared him at Geneva was the fact that the Soviets wanted exchange of persons and the development of East-West contacts, and that was all they wanted. From a procedural point of view, the NSC needs to have the considerations pro and con spelled out in greater detail so that the President could reach a judgment between them.

At this point the Secretary of State made reference to the fact that certain areas of the United States were now closed to Soviet visitors (in accordance with paragraph 3 of NSC 5508/1[7] ). This had caused embarrassment in the case of a distinguished Soviet violinist, who had been unable to perform at a concert in Rochester, New York. Secretary Dulles believed that it might be desirable to review the policy set forth in NSC 5508/1. The Attorney General commented that the accompanist of the Soviet violinist was a well-known espionage agent. The President wondered whether we could not make exceptions to our geographical restrictions in the case of artists such as this. The Attorney General indicated that it was within his competence to make exceptions. Secretary Hoover pointed out the difficulties which confronted OCB in determining the advisability of admitting Soviet delegations, and supported Secretary Dulles’ suggestion that the time had come for a review of the policy in NSC 5508/1. If a revision were made, the policy should be set forth in greater detail.

Mr. Anderson then invited the Council’s attention to paragraphs 36 and 37, dealing with the problems of negotiation with the Soviet Union and disarmament, respectively. He noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed a substitute for the existing paragraph 36, emphasizing the dangers of making concessions to the Soviet Union on any implication of its good will or its good faith. He read the substitute paragraph proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then asked Admiral Radford to enlarge on the reasoning of the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral Radford said that the reasons behind the proposed JCS substitution were clearly set forth in their memorandum. The same considerations, moreover, applied to negotiations with the Soviet Union as applied to the exchange of visiting delegations, which the Council had just discussed. Every negotiation between the United States and a Communist country, whatever other advantage it might have for the Communists, provided them with a little more “respectability”. There were also great propaganda advantages for the USSR. This had been true of the Geneva negotiations, particularly in their repercussions in the Far East. In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff simply felt that a readiness to negotiate was one thing; but we must not forget the repercussions of our negotiations with the Soviets on other countries.

The President inquired as to the precise difference between the language suggested by the Planning Board and that suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the problem of negotiations. Mr. Anderson read the JCS language, and pointed out that in general the Joint Chiefs stressed the need for caution and the danger that the USSR would be the gainer by U.S. concessions.

Secretary Dulles said that he could perceive no objection to the phraseology of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if they would take the word “clearly” out of their first sentence. It was never possible to state “clearly” when negotiations would appear to serve the security interests of the United States. Often you had to enter into negotiations before you could perceive either a clear advantage or a clear disadvantage.

Governor Stassen countered by suggesting that there was something of value both in the language suggested by the Planning Board and in that suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, he recommended retaining the language suggested by the Planning Board and adding to it that proposed by the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral Radford contended that the language of the Planning Board tended to emphasize only the “good side” of negotiations with the Soviet Union. The JCS language, on the other hand, added a warning as to the “bad side”. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that we should be much less anxious to negotiate with the Soviet Union, and should carefully weigh the pros and cons before we did so. Governor Stassen agreed, but pointed out that if the JCS language were added, both sides of the question would receive due emphasis. The President agreed with this proposal.

Mr. Anderson then turned to paragraph 37, on disarmament. The Secretary of State left the meeting to keep an appointment at the State Department, and Secretary Hoover replaced him at the Council table. With respect to paragraph 37, Mr. Anderson pointed out the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an additional sentence which would stress the importance of safeguards against violations and evasions of a disarmament agreement, and especially the importance of the inspection system.

Governor Stassen agreed with the desirability of adding the language proposed by the Joint Chiefs, but thought that the sentence would come better at the end of the existing paragraph. He said that his own position did not differ from that taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary Robertson said that he was uncertain of the meaning of the language in paragraph 37 which said that, along with the search for a safeguarded disarmament system, the U.S. should seek concurrently in related parallel steps to resolve other major international issues. Mr. Anderson explained the import of this language. The President enlarged on this explanation, and cited the unification of Germany as an example of a major international issue. He said, with a sigh, that this was probably not much more than a collection of “pious platitudes”.

Mr. Anderson indicated that there were no major issues until paragraph 45, on the mobilization base, where there was now a three-way split. On the left-hand side of page 25 was the language on the mobilization base proposed by the majority of the Planning Board; on the right-hand side was language proposed by the Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while accepting in the main the language of the majority proposal, had nevertheless suggested a revision and shortening of this language which would eliminate all the details in paragraph 45–b and substitute therefor the statement that “the mobilization base should be predicated upon war plans”.

Dr. Flemming indicated that as far as he was concerned, he liked the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and believed that their revision of the introductory phrase in paragraph 45–a constituted a clarification. He also agreed to the elimination of the details in paragraph 45–b. On the other hand, as for the rest of the language in 45–a, he much preferred the language of the majority of the Planning Board to the shorter version proposed by the Treasury and Budget.

Mr. Anderson said that probably Secretary Humphrey or Mr. Brundage, the Acting Director of the Budget, would wish to comment at this point.

Secretary Humphrey said that he simply believed that the degree of detail in which the statement of the majority had been set forth was too great, until such time, at least, as we have agreed on how we propose to fight a future war, and until we have a basic defense plan for the United States. If we did otherwise, we would be laying the policy groundwork for a lot of things in our mobilization base that may never be required. Secretary Humphrey said with great emphasis that we must always strive to balance what we wanted in our national defense against what we could afford to spend. This was the practical approach. Accordingly, all the generalities which occurred in the language of the majority, respecting all the things we’d like to have in our mobilization base, could be very dangerous indeed.

Mr. Brundage said he felt the same way. He could find nothing to quarrel with in the statement on the mobilization base which had been in NSC 5501 and which was in the main now being proposed by the Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board. He did not believe that the implications of the more detailed language of the majority proposal had been sufficiently explored

Admiral Radford said that he was inclined also to agree with Secretary Humphrey’s position, although when this subject had come up for discussion among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he had indicated that he did not care one way or another as between the two versions. The real problem regarding the mobilization base at the present time was whether or not our mobilization base was intended to make allowance for enemy bomb damage and for the provision of support by the United States to its allies in a major war. In the event that it were not actually destroyed in the initial phases of a war, said Admiral Radford, the United States now has a mobilization base better than it had ever before had in its history. Admiral Radford expressed skepticism as to the possibility of doing much by way of dispersion to diminish the vulnerability of the mobilization base. Moreover, though there was some real advantage in safe storage, this was difficult and expensive to achieve. Secretary Humphrey expressed hearty agreement with the sentiments of Admiral Radford.

Dr. Flemming observed that the recent comments of Secretary Humphrey, Mr. Brundage and Admiral Radford, had been directed more to paragraph 45–b than to 45–a. In so far as these comments applied to paragraph 45–b, he was inclined to agree. As to paragraph 45–a, however, it was in fact the mobilization base policy currently being followed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the ODM. While he was perfectly willing to agree to the elimination of paragraph 45–b in favor of the brief JCS substitute, he did feel it essential to point out that the issues identified in paragraph 45–b were all issues which the Administration must ultimately face and resolve.

Turning to Secretary Humphrey, the President said that he failed to see any particular language in paragraph 45 which seemed to call for additional expenditures. So far as he could see, the staff people who had formulated this language were simply trying to spell out in more precise language the existing directives regarding the mobilization base. Secretary Humphrey replied that if the language did not mean that any new things were to be done in this area, why was it necessary to have new language at all? This would only get us into trouble. Dr. Flemming assured the President that the language recommended by Defense and ODM in paragraphs 45–a–(1), –(2) and –(3) would not be the basis for the development of any new mobilization base programs. Futhermore, he insisted that from a fiscal point of view there were no essential differences between the language on the right and left sides of the page, although the longer version on the left represented a more accurate description of the requirements of our mobilization base.

Mr. Brundage said he emphatically believed that more work should be done in defining the term “mobilization base”. Mr. Anderson referred to the language on the mobilization base which occurred in the previous basic national security policy, NCS 5501. It had the advantage of brevity, and did not differ in substance from what was recommended in the right-hand column. He also reminded the Council that Defense and ODM were developing a new study of the requirements of the mobilization base.

The President warned that the Defense Department must not “clam up” and refuse to give enough of the outlines of its war plans so that ODM could not go ahead and do the job which was required of them. Dr. Flemming assured the President that to date, at any rate, the military had not clammed up on ODM. He again pointed out his agreement with the JCS proposal to drop most of paragraph 45–b. On the other hand, sooner or later, in dealing with the mobilization base, we should have to face up to the problem of whether this base must include support of our allies and the element allowed for bomb damage.

The President observed that one of the main troubles confronting the Council in considering the mobilization base was, as Mr. Brundage had just suggested, the fact that no one had yet given us a clear definition of what was meant by the term “mobilization base”. Once we had defined this term, we wouldn’t scare so many people into thinking that our mobilization base called for enormous reserves of war material. In any event, the President said, he was personally quite satisfied with the brief language on the right-hand page proposed by the Treasury and the Budget. On the other hand, if Dr. Flemming preferred the more detailed language on the left, the President saw no objection to its adoption.

At this point Mr. Anderson suggested that the language on the left-hand side of the page had the support of the Defense Department and was not, as he had earlier suggested, proposed solely by the ODM.

Secretary Humphrey said that this discussion was not very useful. He was not interested in words, but only in concrete issues. In short, he did not wish to adopt language which would ultimately mean the addition of $5 billion to the Defense Department budget.

Secretary Robertson said that the Defense Department was hard at work on its study of the mobilization base. Before completing its task, however, it required clearer guidelines from the National Security Council. Admiral Radford said that at the present time the military were operating on the basis of having war reserves sufficient to last for six months in a future war. This was the basis given to the military in a directive from Secretary Wilson. On the other hand, provision for aid to our allies had not been cranked into this mobilization base concept. Moreover, the concept assumed that the United States would make at least as good a recovery from the initial attacks as would the Soviet Union. If we went beyond this six-months reserve concept, Admiral Radford freely admitted that the mobilization base would cost a lot more money.

Addressing himself to Admiral Radford, the President inquired as to whether any of our allies overseas had been building facilities to provide spare parts and ammunition for the weapons we gave them. It had always been the President’s idea that we should simply provide these allies with weapons in amounts for which they were in a position to provide replacements and ammunition.

Secretary Humphrey said that if the Council was convinced that the policies concerning the mobilization base under which we are now operating are the right policies, why could not this fact be stated in very simple terms? Introducing a lot of generalities in the statement on mobilization base would inevitably cost money. Secretary Robertson assured Secretary Humphrey that paragraph 45–a conformed almost exactly to the actualities of what we were now doing to build up our mobilization base. Secretary Humphrey said that if he was assured that it would not cost any more money, he was willing to accept the language proposed by the majority of the Planning Board. The President concurred in this propsal, and went on to state that he wished the Department of Defense and the ODM to get together and provide an agreed definition of the term “mobilization base”.

Mr. Anderson said the next important paragraph was 48, dealing with the manpower program. Subparagraph 48–a contained a split as follows: “Expand and improve scientific and technical training [at all appropriate levels as a matter of national urgency requiring Federal leadership].”[8] The Treasury and Budget members of the Planning Board proposed deletion of the bracketed phraseology.

The President said that he was getting “a little tired” of statements like this in paragraph 48–a, which called for more Federal leadership. All we seemed to be doing these days was to shout more and more about the need for additional technical and scientific personnel. He personally would very much like to see a thoroughgoing study of this problem from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, particularly an analysis of the number of students entering scientific fields. He warned that a country like this needed a great deal more than simply scientists if it was to be properly run. We could not afford to neglect our social sciences and other professions. The President stated with emphasis that there is an inherent balance in civilization, and we should attempt to define it. Why, therefore, call for Federal money and leadership to be devoted to the sciences only? If we did this we would find all young people going into the sciences, while as a matter of fact we needed equally trained lawyers and good statesmen in the country.

Mr. Anderson pointed out that the President had captured the essence of the split in views respecting paragraph 48–a. He went on to say that a considerable study of our scientific and technological manpower problems had already been made. In this study, representatives of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare had participated. Moreover, the Planning Board had recommended that this study be made the subject of a presentation to the National Security Council. In reply, the President stressed that he wanted the heads of HEW to approve the analysis and findings of any study of our technological and scientific manpower problem. He was not willing simply to take the word of staff representatives from that Department. He added that he believed the Council should take a hard, cold look at our needs in this field. If necessity dictated it, he said, he would be willing to provide funds for Federal scholarships to able scientific students. On the other hand, he did not wish to pour Federal money into the colleges and universities as a means of encouraging scientific training. All too often such funds ended up being diverted to overhead. Above all, the President called for a businesslike approach to the problem.

Mr. Anderson said he judged from the President’s remarks that he favored deletion of the bracketed language. The President said that he did wish to see it removed, because as it was written no one could see the limit of money involved in carrying out the proposed policy.

Dr. Flemming said that he was glad to hear the President’s views on this matter. He had just sent the President a written statement on scientific problems which he would now recall. He did add, however, that at the secondary school level the teaching of the social sciences was much more effective than the teaching of mathematics and the natural sciences. The President quipped, why then do we get so many left-wingers from our high schools? The President went on to state that his show of emphasis in his remarks on this subject should not be misunderstood. Of course he wanted to encourage the study of the sciences by our young people.

Secretary Humphrey observed that these things come and go in waves. We were in real difficulty a few years ago because there were more engineers being trained than there were jobs for them to fill. He himself had started life as an engineer, but had changed because he could not earn enough money to get married (laughter).

The President repeated his earlier view that money might be found to give scholarship assistance to promising Ph.D. students in the sciences. Admiral Strauss, however, pointed out that the real bottleneck was at the secondary school rather than at the university level. There were too few teacher of the sciences in our secondary schools, and those we had were not particularly competent. This was a very serious matter indeed, and could not be remedied as a matter of urgency. It would take years to correct the imbalance, but every effort should be made to do so. Progress over the short term might be made if large companies would lend their employees for a certain number of days each month to teach the sciences in our secondary schools of the communities in which these companies were situated. Over the long term the most feasible solution would be to have the colleges and universities stipulate the sciences as requirements for entry.

The President appeared surprised to learn that the problem was largely at the secondary school level, and inquired how many scientists our colleges and universities were now turning out and how many we needed. Secretary Hoover said that we were producing about 25,000 engineers a year from our colleges. We wanted to increase that number to at least 50,000.

Admiral Strauss pointed out that last year 32% of the college students who had entered upon a scientific course in college either switched to some other major field or flunked out of college as a result of inadequate scientific preparation.

Mr. Anderson said that the Council had now completed its consideration of NSC 5602, and recapitulated the decisions of the Council. In particular he suggested that paragraph 11 of NSC 5602 be tentatively adopted subject to revision following consideration of the study of nuclear weapons expected from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President said he understood that the Department of Defense wanted to suspend action on paragraph 11. Admiral Radford, however, stated that he believed paragraph 11 as it stood would be satisfactory without the additional language proposed by the Department of State. Secretary Robertson pointed out that the new paper from the Joint Chiefs, on the subject of the use of atomic weapons, would be ready for the President’s consideration early next week. The President indicated that action on paragraph 11 would be suspended.[9]

At the very end of the meeting, Admiral Strauss pointed out, with respect to paragraph 12, that the United States possessed no radiological weapons and, moreover, he knew of no requirement for such weapons. In the light of this information, inclusion of the reference to radiological weapons in paragraph 12 might lead to a misunderstanding. Accordingly, the President directed the deletion of the reference to radiological weapons in paragraph 12.

The National Security Council:[10]

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 5602) in the light of the conclusions, comments and recommendations of the NSC Planning Board contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of February 13, and the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in the enclosures to the reference memorandum of February 24.

b. Adopted NSC 5602, subject to:

(1) Addition (on page 6, paragraph 11) of a final sentence reading: “Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.”

(2) Substitution (on page 6, paragraph 12) of the words “chemical and bacteriological” for the words “chemical, bacteriological and radiological”.

(3) Deletion of the footnote on page 6, and insertion of an additional paragraph 12 as follows:

“If time permits and an attack on the U.S. or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons is made by the President.”

(4) Change of the lead-in clause in paragraph 13 to read: “In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war,”; and insertion in the 2nd line of paragraph 13, between the words “maintain” and “its”, of the following: “as part of its military forces”.

(5) Deletion (on page 9, paragraph 16, 3rd line from top of page) of the words “at least”.

(6) Insertion (on page 9, paragraph 16, 3rd line from end of paragraph) of the word “U.S. allies”.

(7) Substitution (on page 9, paragraph 18, 4th line) of the word “effectiveness” for the word “efforts.”

(8) Inclusion (on page 13, paragraph 24) of the bracketed phrase, and deletion of the footnote relating thereto.

(9) Substitution (on page 13, paragraph 25–b) of the words, “such as Spain, Yugoslavia and Turkey,” for “(e.g., Spain, Yugoslavia, Turkey)”.

(10) Insertion (on page 14, paragraph 26) of a new sentence after the 4th sentence, reading: “Utilization of private investment should be encouraged to the maximum feasible extent.”

(11) Insertion (on page 14, paragraph 27–a) in the last sentence, after the words “should be at”, of the words “but not exceed”; and deletion of the bracketed sentence and the footnote relating thereto.

(12) Insertion (on page 15, paragraph 27–b–(3)) of the word “apparent” before the word “attractiveness”.

(13) Insertion (on page 15, paragraph 27–c) of a new subparagraph (3), reading as follows:

“(3) To exercise greater flexibility in planning, timing and administration of economic aid programs.”

(14) Deletion (on page 17) of the footnote to paragraph 30.

(15) Addition (on page 19, paragraph 35) of a final sentence reading: “In considering proposals for such free world-Communist bloc contacts, the United States should take account of the effect of the U.S. example upon other free nations more vulnerable to Communist penetration.”

(16) Deletion (on page 19, paragraph 36, 2nd line) of the word “clearly”; and addition at the end of paragraph 36 of the following sentences: “The United States should not, however, make concessions in advance of similar action by the Soviets, in the hope of inspiring Soviet concessions. Until the USSR evidences a modification of its basic hostility toward the non-Communist world through concrete actions, agreements should be dependent upon a balance of advantages to the non-Communist world and not upon implied good will or trust in written documents.”

(17) Addition (on page 20, paragraph 37) of the following final sentence: “The acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depend primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.”

(18) Adoption (on page 25, paragraph 45) of the Majority Proposal in the left-hand column, changed as follows:

(a) Substitution for the lead-in phrase of subparagraph a of the following:

“a. Inasmuch as no one can foresee with certainty the nature and extent of future conflicts in which the United States may become involved, the national mobilization base must be so constituted as to maintain military readiness to enter combat, ranging from local to general war, and to provide the capability of meeting expeditiously the needs of our national effort to bring hostilities to an early and successful conclusion. Such a requirement demands a mobilization base:”

(b) Substitution for subparagraph b of the following:

“b. The mobilization base should be predicated upon approved war plans.”

(19) Deletion (on page 29, paragraph 48–a) of the bracketed phrase and the footnote relating thereto.

(20) Insertion (on page 32, paragraph 3) of the following sentence before the present last sentence: “Moreover, a general war might occur as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions which neither side originally intended to lead to general war.”

c. Requested the Department of Defense to make a presentation on the capabilities, with or without nuclear weapons, of the U.S. military forces referred to in paragraph 32 and other appropriate paragraphs of NSC 5501, to deal with local aggression in Vietnam, utilizing as appropriate the study transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 16, 1955.[11]

d. Agreed that the Council, after submission to the President of the report on the subject now in preparation by the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, should give further consideration to basic U.S. policies with respect to the less developed and uncommitted areas.

e. Requested that a presentation to the Council on the problem of technological superiority be made by the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization and the National Science Foundation; with the collaboration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare on those aspects of the presentation respecting the educational objectives in the United States.[12]

f. Agreed that intensive efforts should be continued on all aspects of the problem of devising a safeguarded system of disarmament.

g. Requested the Operations Coordinating Board, with the participation of the Department of Justice, to prepare a study of the factors involved in implementing paragraph 35 of NSC 5602, dealing with free world–Communist bloc contacts;[13] and directed the NSC Planning Board to review pertinent policies (particularly NSC 5508/1 and NSC 5427[14] ) based upon such an OCB study.

h. Noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization, in consultation with the Bureau of the Budget, prepare for Council consideration a definition of the term “mobilization base”.[15]

Note: NSC 5602, as amended above and approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5602/1[16] for implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, with the understanding that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review. NSC 5602/1 is a substitute for NSC 5501, and is the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress Reports to the National Security Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5602/1.

The other actions above subsequently transmitted to the following departments and agencies:

c: Secretary of Defense.

d: Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy.

e. Secretary of Defense, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, Director, National Science Foundation, and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

f: Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament.

g: Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board.

h: Secretary of Defense, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, and Director, Bureau of the Budget.

(Note: The above action combines the action taken by the National Security Council on the subject at both the 277th and 278th meetings.)

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on March 2.

[2] See footnotes 2–4, supra.

[3] For text of NSC 174, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. VIII, p. 110.

[4] Not printed, but see NSC 5505/1, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” January 31, vol. XXIV, p. 20.

[5] Dated February 28, not printed.

[6] Special Assistant to the President.

[7] NSC 5508/1, “Admission to the United States of Certain European Non-Official Temporary Visitors Excludable Under Existing Law,” dated March 26, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5508 Memoranda)

[8] Brackets in the source text.

[9] In a memorandum dated March 15 to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Executive Secretary Lay stated that the President, taking note of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense entitled “Presidential Authorization for the Use of Atomic Weapons,” dated February 15, approved paragraph 11 of NSC 5602/1, with the addition of a final sentence. The paragraph, as approved, reads as follows: “It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.” (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Natl. Sec. Affs. Records, Presidential Approval–Atomic Energy)

[10] Paragraphs a–h and the Notes that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1522, approved by the President on March 15. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[11] Admiral Radford presented the Department of Defense report on U.S. military capabilities to deal with local aggression in Vietnam to the National Security Council on June 7. For text, see vol. i, p. 703.

[12] This presentation was made at the NSC meeting on May 31. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) NSC Action No. 1566, approved by the President on June 5, noted the discussion and “the President’s statement that the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare should devise programs of actions in their respective spheres of responsibility to meet the problem of maintaining free world technological superiority over the Soviet bloc; reporting to the President any further ways in which the Federal Government might help to meet this problem.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[13] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[14] NSC 5427, “Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection with Strategic Intelligence,” dated July 19, 1954, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5427)

[15] See Document 134.

[16] Document 66.

63. Editorial Note

At its 279th meeting on March 8, the National Security Council discussed the matter of a reappraisal of United States policy regarding Soviet bloc shipments afforded diplomatic immunity. This discussion centered in part on NSC 5527, dated December 1, 1955, prepared by the ICIS and the IIC, with the ad hoc participation of representatives of the CIA and the assistance of advisers from the AEC and the Naval Research Laboratory. (A copy of NSC 5527 is in Department of State, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, NSC 5527 Series.)

The Council adopted Recommendation 1 of NSC 5527, which noted that “No size or weight restrictions should be imposed at this time on diplomatic pouches and shipments under diplomatic seal from Soviet bloc countries.” It also noted the stand-by plans contained in Recommendations 2 and 3 of NSC 5527 for action in the event of a decision by the President to impose restrictions as recommended, and directed the IIC and ICIS to keep such plans under continuing review, with reports to the Council at appropriate intervals. The Council directed the United States Communications Board to study and report to the Council on the “feasibility of maintaining an adequate and secure U.S. communications system in the event of the imposition of limitations on diplomatic shipments set forth in Recommendation 2 of NSC 5527”; adopted Recommendation 4 of NSC 5527 with an amendment noted in the record; and directed the Department of State to “study the feasibility of obtaining international agreement prohibiting the shipment under diplomatic immunity of radioactive materials which would authorize adequate inspection, through detection devices, of such shipments; such study to be forwarded to the Council through the NSC Planning Board.” This study by the Department of State, dated August 21, is Ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Diplomatic Shipments (NSC 5527); the Communications Board study, dated September 14, is Ibid. This subject was considered again by the National Security Council at its meeting on September 20; see Document 88. The memorandum of discussion of the March 8 NSC meeting is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.

64. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

Washington, March 12, 1956.

SUBJECT

Military and Other Requirements for Our National Security

REFERENCE

Your Memorandum for JCS, dated 27 January 1956[2]

1.

In the reference you ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an

a. Outline military strategy for the United States which best meets the demands of our National Security, and

b. Guidance which can serve as the basis for the determination of the size, nature, composition, and deployment of the U.S. Armed Forces for the fiscal years 1958 and 1959.

You give us certain basic factors which you estimate will remain valid during the period in question and which we should take into account in making our forward plans.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed our current military strategy and posture and conclude that our basic military programs remain generally valid and that these programs will, so far as can be forecast at this time, continue to be valid through the period 1958–1960. In other words, is is our opinion that our current military programs continue to represent the minimum U.S. military forces required for national security.

3.

a. With the conclusion reached in paragraph 2, the question of cost arises in connection with the maintenance of these forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the maintenance of current leveled-off military programs will, in their opinion, become increasingly costly in the period just ahead. This is due to several factors, but principally to, (1) the stepped up missile program, (2) the increased cost of new equipment and weapons systems and the probable requirement to procure both more rapidly.

We estimate that, with careful management and continual review, annual military expenditure during the period 1958–1959–1960 may be held within approximately 38–40 billions, if our present force levels and deployments are maintained. In light of the projected increases in national population and productivity, this increase is believed compatible with the requirements of a sound economy.

b. If present grant military aid programs are maintained, at least an additional 3 billion annually will be required. New requirements in this area—such as an adequate air defense system for NATO and a program of new weapons, world-wide—cannot be met, in all likelihood, by compensation reductions. We estimate, therefore, that our military aid program, if not basically changed, will, as a minimum, amount to between 4 and 5 billion annually during the period 1958–1960. It may well be greater.

c. We realize that annual direct defense expenditures of the above magnitude (42–45 billion) may have serious effects on the economy of the United States, but we are unable to forecast a military situation vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc in this time period which will realistically permit much reduction, unless our present overseas deployments and our grant military aid programs are reduced.

d. From a strictly U.S. military point of view, reduction of our overseas commitments continues to be a desirable objective. It is obvious to us, however, that in the Far East little reduction can be made without running risks of a renewal of hostilities, while in Europe, the psychological effects of any sizeable withdrawal of U.S. forces might well undermine the whole NATO concept.

e. The grant military aid programs, sound in concept, have increased the economic and military strength of recipient countries, but generally have not enabled those countries militarily to become self-sustaining and, indeed, have encouraged some of them to demand continued and increasing financial support as the price of their adherence to our alliance. These programs should be examined with definite cut-off dates. In those few instances in which definite cut-off dates are not to our interest the United States should commit itself to establishing specific, definite, long-range support.

4. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in agreement that the military elements of the present national strategy have been generally adequate, they are of the opinion that in spite of our military posture, the free world situation is gradually deteriorating. Unless adequate steps are taken to change this trend, the United States will, in a span of a relatively short number of years, be placed in great jeopardy. Our basic national security objectives remain valid to the extent that they are feasible, but require vigorous new actions if they are to be attained or even if their feasibility is to be fully determined. The deterioration of the free world position leads the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the conclusion that either the programs for general strategy have not been resolutely implemented or that the general strategy is inadequate to cope with the situation now confronting the United States as the leader of the free world.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the unfavorable situations in which we find ourselves about the world to determine the reasons therefor. They are convinced that the problems confronting the United States leadership of the free world are primarily in the political, social, and psychological fields. The basic national security policy document, NSC 5501, contains statements, which are responsive to previously expressed concern by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicating that “Programs for the general strategy between now and the time the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency.”NSC 5501 also states “Failure resolutely to pursue this general strategy could, within a relatively short span of years, place the United States in great jeopardy.” (Paragraphs 26, 27, and 28 of NSC 5501)

6. The United States has based its national policy on the deterrence of war, large and small. Indispensable visible strength in being is not sufficient in itself for this purpose. It must be reinforced by a world-wide understanding that the United States will use that strength promptly to support national and free world interests when necessary. While our military programs have been reasonably successful in providing visible military strength, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there is a feeling throughout the world that the United States lacks the essential determination to act in time. Slowness of reaction time can be a critical weakness in the implementaion of any national policy. Decisiveness is endangered by the need to obtain concurrences of our allies and by the requirements of our constitutional processes. Ways to reduce this time of reaction require the attention of all agencies of the government involved in the implementation of our national policy. Our military strength will have little effect if every word and deed of our government and its representatives do not attest our national resolution to act promptly when the moment of decision arrives. We must appreciate the fact that the effect of our free debates and the operation of our free press tend to present a picture of confusion and indecisiveness to the rest of the free world. If this misleading picture can not be corrected, potential aggressors could again mistake the operation of our democratic processes as a sign of national confusion or weakness, with disastrous results.

7. The above line of reasoning and the conclusions that stem from it prompt the question as to what can be done to restore the confidence of the free world in our national determination to take necessary action in time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are certainly not entirely competent to answer that question, but can suggest actons which, if approved and taken, will, in their opinion, enable us better to meet current Communist tactics.

a. The Congress should, on request, give the President authority to act quickly in times of crises. This authority should include the use of the Armed Forces of the United States. We have in mind actions such as the passage of the Formosa resolution last year,[3] which undoubtedly has prevented the outbreak of hostilities in the Formosa Straits area up to date.

b. The Congress should also grant much broader authority than now exists to expend funds or to deliver equipment, without delay, for either military or economic aid projects. At present, the lack of flexibility in the administration of funds makes it difficult to handle emergency situations without much disruption and delay in other important projects.

c. Our national policy must not include the requirement that our “major Allies” always concur in our determination to oppose aggression. If there has been any single tendency in the execution of our national security policy which has operated against our national interest in the past few years, it has been an over-concern for the acquiescence of allies in major crises.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully appreciate the fact that the changes recommended in paragraph 7 above may be difficult to attain and recognize that they are far from being a complete solution to our problem. They are unanimous in their opinion, however, that unless additional flexibility is worked into our national strategy and greater emphasis is placed upon its implementation, it cannot be successful within the limited time period available.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford[4]

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret.

[2] In this memorandum, Secretary Wilson noted inter alia that he felt it would be desirable to study the Department of Defense program for the next several years, in order to project Defense plans through fiscal years 1958 and 1959. Wilson stated that “certain factors will remain valid during the period under consideration and should be taken into account in our forward plans: (a) a sound U.S. economy continues to be a necessary part of the fundamental values and institutions we seek to protect; (b) [item (b) (47 words) not declassified; President’s comments on item (b) from memorandum by Goodpaster attached to Wilson’s memorandum not declassified]. (Ibid., Military Planning)

[3] Reference is to H.J. Res. 159, adopted by the House of Representatives on January 25, 1955, and by the Senate on January 28, giving the President authority to employ U.S. armed forces as he deemed necessary to secure and protect Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

65. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 13, 1956, 2:15 p.m.[1]

Washington, March 13, 1956, 2:15 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

Admiral Radford

Colonel Goodpaster

Admiral Radford handed the President a memorandum, not yet in final draft,[2] representing the thinking of the Joint Chiefs as a result of their week in Puerto Rico. The President read it through, and then said it seemed to give a very dark picture. If this is what we face, it would imply that we should go to field conditions, declare an emergency, increase the military budget, and even go to a garrison state. In that case the Services would have to go to a much more spartan mode of living. The memorandum indicates that the President should have a number of extraordinary powers; he felt that in anything like the present circumstances, such ideas were rather unrealistic. He thought the memorandum seemed to say that the U.S. military position has worsened in the last three years; with that he would not agree. The Soviets have been turned away from the military form of international action. He did not think that we were worse off with regard to the USSR. Where we are badly off is with respect to the rising Arab nations in the Middle East.

Admiral Radford said that we are getting in trouble with our allies, which are putting forward heavy and increasing demands for support—Italy has asked for $290 million a year, with the alternative of cutting back their forces. The Turks question our aid to Egypt when we would not give them the $300 million loan they asked for to strengthen their economic system. He said we are in a period now when we are developing and buying the new weapons, while still procuring the old. It is probably necessary to make great outlays on guided missiles, but they are not the full answer by any means.

The President said that the memorandum seemed to say there was a need for an outlay of $38-49 billion for the U.S. military program proper. Secretary Wilson stressed how much money is going into new development—altogether it must come to $5 billion a year, including research and development, facilities, procurement of prototypes, etc.

The President said there seemed to be a premise that we are the only ones resisting Communism, and that if we are to have allies we must practically pay for their efforts. He thought it might be better to encourage some nations to be neutral. Admiral Radford said there is increasing difficulty in holding our allies together. He had asked General Gruenther if it wouldn’t be possible to reduce forces in Turkey, Greece and Italy. Secretary Wilson said the President was indicating a new policy—that it might be cheaper to maintain certain nations as neutrals. The President said it might be not only a cheaper, but a better and more effective way of obtaining our interests.

The President went on to say that the fact that money is needed abroad is not too hard to deal with. These needs can be, and have been, closely studied. It seems much harder, however, to do anything about the stated needs for our own forces—much harder to cut them. Secretary Wilson said that if we do not build missiles we will soon be having a big bill for supersonic bombers. Admiral Radford indicated that we will probably be having such a bill whether we build missiles or not. Secretary Wilson said that the memorandum makes it clear, as he had in his discussion with the President at Gettysburg, that our program is really several billion dollars larger than our funding at the present time. This is possible only because of reductions in carry-over, and other savings, and most of these now are “one time” savings. The President asked why it is not possible to cut manpower, particularly in the Army and the Marines. Admiral Radford said that overseas commanders will not agree to make cuts in their areas. Secretary Wilson said that if we don’t make some cuts, we will continue with a program that exceeds our funding. He was disposed to agree with the Chiefs in their views, unless some basic policy changes were made.

The President said we have taken in many areas such a strong anti-communist line that our allies are able to make demands on us, and claim that they are fighting our fight for us. He went on to say that in terms of our over-all military program we can’t prepare everything that might be desirable, and can’t be strong everywhere. The real question is where to take the risks. Secretary Wilson referred to costs that are being experienced through losses of aircraft. This figure, he thought, is now up toward a billion dollars a year. He wondered if flying hours might be reduced. Admiral Radford thought they should be kept up in order to maintain proficiency. Secretary Wilson referred to a study now being made by General LeMay[3] which involves operating comparable units at different numbers of hours per month.

The President said the paper ought to show first what we have accomplished in three years. If, after careful analysis of this, the Chiefs then said we must increase, he wouldn’t disagree. Next it should deal with the foreign field. We must keep NATO in shape but get other nations to face up to their responsibilities to carry on themselves. Then it must consider what is the maximum we can expect to get from arms. An adverse result is indicated by Secretary Dulles’ reports of the extreme concern of India over Pakistan’s military strength. It must analyze where the biggest return in security for the dollar can be obtained.

Admiral Radford referred to the cumbersome and slow-moving administration and performance on our aid commitments. The President said he would certainly like to get this straightened out. Secretary Wilson said that the MAAGs overseas are too large. The President said he felt the trouble was right around Washington.

The President thought the paper should be reorganized to show first the domestic military problem. This should cover a review of the U.S. military position vis-à-vis that of the USSR. It should explain the progress that has been made in the last four years. It should bring out that missiles are now coming along. It must then ask what guided missiles mean to us in a military sense. Also, it should consider whether the highly technological services, like the Air Force and Navy Air, are not getting somewhat old-fashioned in their thinking and composition. Next the paper should consider our alliances—what we must do to keep up confidence and maintain the alignment of free world countries, how to be selective in what we support, and how to correct the idea that “we are fighting your war.”

Admiral Radford said with reference to our allied arrangements that the British may drop joint planning with us with regard to Israel. The President said that Israeli distrust of the British is such that this action may improve our position at least with the Israeli rather than weakening it.

Secretary Wilson said that as he looked at the matter more military strength than we had over the past three years would not have bettered us in our international position during that period.

The President said that the paper seemed to create a misleading impression, and repeated that it should be organized into three parts, the first the domestic military situation, including the place and role of the missile; our present situation; the adequacy or excess of present force levels. Next would be considered the world military situation, and the whole situation in the free world.[4]

Secretary Wilson said that General LeMay is talking in terms of 1800 B–52s. Twining wants 800. The question is up as to whether a wing should include 30 or 45 aircraft. If 45, should the number of wings be decreased?

The President said that he urges each Chief of Staff to take the same attitude toward the importance of a sound economy as he knows Admiral Radford does—to recognize it as a fundamental element of over-all U.S. security strength. He also said that in many areas of the world he is inclined to have more faith now in economic aid to meet current problems than in military aid.

G

Colonel CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 14.

[2] The reference may be to the JCS memorandum, supra. The final draft dated April 17 is Document 73.

[3] The study prepared by General Curtis LeMay, Commander of the Strategic Air Command, has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[4] In a memorandum to Radford, dated March 14, Goodpaster enclosed an outline based on “my notes concerning the topical organization of the Joint Chiefs’ views suggested by the President.” This attached outline was divided into three main categories: Domestic Military Situation (or Problem); Our Alliances (Free World Military Situation); and The World Security Situation. (Radford Papers, Special File)

66. National Security Council Report[1]

Washington, March 15, 1956.

NSC 5602/1

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5501[2]

B. NIE 11–3–55; NIE 11–7–55; NIE 11–13–55;NIE 11–13/1–55; NIE 100–7–55; SNIE 100–8–55[3]

C. NSC 5602

D. Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 13 and 24, 1956

E. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, dated September 16, 1955[4]

F. NSC Action No. 1522[5]

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Ralph Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 277th and 278th meetings of the Council on February 27 and March 1, 1956, discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5602) in the light of the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 13, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 24, 1956, The Council adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5602, subject to the changes set forth in NSC Action No. 1522–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5602, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5602/1, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, with the understanding that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

NSC 5602/1 is a substitute for NSC 5501 and is the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress reports to the National Security Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5602/1.

At the time that the Council adopted the enclosed policy it also took the following actions (NSC Actions 1522–c through –h):

c. Requested the Department of Defense to make a presentation on the capabilities, with or without nuclear weapons, of the U.S. military forces referred to in paragraph 32 and other appropriate paragraphs of NSC 5501, to deal with local aggression in Vietnam, utilizing as appropriate the study transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 16, 1955.

d. Agreed that the Council, after submission to the President of the report on the subject now in preparation by the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, should give further consideration to basic U.S. policies with respect to the less developed and uncommitted areas.

e. Requested that a presentation to the Council on the problem of technological superiority be made by the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the National Science Foundation; with the collaboration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare on those aspects of the presentation respecting the educational objectives in the United States.

f. Agreed that intensive efforts should be continued on all aspects of the problem of devising a safeguarded system of disarmament.

g. Requested the Operations Coordinating Board, with the participation of the Department of Justice, to prepare a study of the factors involved in implementing paragraph 35 of NSC 5602, dealing with free world-Communist bloc contacts; and directed the NSC Planning Board to review pertinent policies (particularly NSC 5508/1 and NSC 5427) based upon such an OCB study.

h. Noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization, in consultation with the Bureau of the Budget, prepare for Council consideration a definition of the term “mobilization base”.

James S. Lay, Jr.[6]

[Here follows a two-page table of contents.]

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Preamble

1. The spiritual, moral and material posture of the United States of America rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality and freedom of the human being under God. These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and are the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world. When they are challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage. From this premise must derive our national will and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the basic objective of our national security policies: maintaining the security of the United States and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions.

Section A

Outline of U.S. National Strategy

2. The basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions.

3. The basic threat to U.S. security is posed by the hostile policies and power, including growing nuclear[7] power, of the Soviet-Communist bloc, with its Communist ideology and international apparatus.

4. The basic problem confronting the United States is how, without undermining fundamental U.S. values and institutions or seriously weakening the U.S. economy, to meet and ultimately to reduce to acceptable proportions this threat to U.S. security.

5. The United States and its allies have no foreseeable prospect of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of reducing Soviet armed strength—the core of Communist power—or of significantly reducing other basic Communist military strength, except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation by the United States of such military action for this purpose is not an acceptable course either to the United States or its major allies.

6. Hence, U.S. policies must be designed (1) to affect the conduct and policies of the Communist regimes, especially those of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests (including safeguarded disarmament); and (2) to foster tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:

a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S. security.

b. Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of interest and common purpose, the confidence in the United States, and the will, strength and stability necessary to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of the free peoples.

c. In addition to a and b above, taking other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:

(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the United States.

(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes to disrupt the structure of the Soviet-Communist bloc.

(3) By exploiting vulnerabilities within the bloc countries in ways consistent with this general strategy.

d. Destroying or neutralizing the international Communist apparatus in the free world.

7. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, psychological, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. Programs for carrying out this general strategy should be developed and conducted as a matter of urgency, with special emphasis in the period before the Soviets achieve nuclear parity.

8. Provided that it is resolutely pursued, this general strategy offers the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of the Soviet bloc-free world conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment. Failure resolutely to pursue this general strategy could, within a relatively short span of years, place the United States in great jeopardy.

Section B

Elements of National Strategy

I. Military Elements of National Strategy

9. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of total nuclear war, the possibility of local conflicts developing into total war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interests: that it will not pay.

10. If this purpose is to be achieved, the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop. In addition, the deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the United States and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force against such aggression.

11. It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.

12. To the extent that the military effectiveness of the armed forces will be enhanced by their use, the United States will be prepared to use chemical and bacteriological weapons in general war. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

13. If time permits and an attack on the United States or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons is made by the President.

14. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also continue accelerated military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into general war. Such ready forces must be sufficiently versatile to use both conventional and nuclear weapons. They must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Such forces must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons. However, these forces must also have a flexible and selective nuclear capability, since the United States will not preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation.

16. With the coming of nuclear parity, the ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will of the free world to resist aggression. The United States and its allies must avoid getting themselves in a position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risks of nuclear devastation. The apprehensions of U.S. allies as to using nuclear weapons to counter local aggression can be lessened if the U.S. deterrent force is not solely dependent on such weapons, thus avoiding the question of their use unless and until the deterrent fails. In the event of actual Communist local aggression, the United States should, if necessary, make its own decision as to the use of nuclear weapons. In the last analysis, when confronted by the choice (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.

17. National security policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other free world countries, in furnishing bases for U.S. military power and in providing their share of military forces. It is important for the United States to take the necessary steps to convince its allies, particularly its NATO allies, that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that the United States is committed to their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment. The United States should strengthen as practicable the collective defense system and utilize, where appropriate, the possibilities of collective action through the UN. The United States should provide new weapons (non-nuclear) and advanced technology to allies capable of using them effectively, taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities and the likely availability of funds. Atomic energy legislation as it relates to weapons should be progressively relaxed to the extent required for the progressive integration of such weapons into NATO defenses, to the extent of enabling selected allies to be able to use them upon the outbreak of war. The United States should continue to provide military and other assistance, including where deemed appropriate new weapons and advanced techology, to dependable allied nations where such assistance is necessary to enable them to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power. Special attention in the technological field should be directed to assisting selected U.S. allies rapidly to develop their own advanced weapons systems, and in other ways significantly to increase utilization of free world scientific and technological resources.

18. The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war. At the same time the United States and its major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war; and the United States must make clear its determination to prevail if general war eventuates.

19. Dynamic research and development for military application are a necessity for the continued maintenance of an adequate U.S. military posture and effective armed forces. Without increasing effectiveness in the research and development field, U.S. weaponry may in the future fall qualitatively behind that of the USSR with concomitant danger to U.S. security. U.S. research and development must be carried out with full recognition of this potential danger. Moreover, the United States must speed up, by all practicable steps, the means whereby important scientific discoveries can be translated into an appropriate flow of new weapons to the armed forces.

II. Political and Economic Strategy

A. Strengthening the Free World

20. The United States should place more stress than heretofore on building the strength and cohesion of the free world, and take adequate actions for the purpose of (a) creating cohesion within and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily improving the relative position of the free world; (b) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the free world; and (c) combatting the effects of Soviet bloc diplomatic and economic activities in the free world. Success in these endeavors will depend heavily on the degree to which the United States and its major allies can attain agreement on objectives and actions to achieve them, consistent with basic U.S. objectives.

21. Direct action against the Communist apparatus must rest largely with the local governments concerned, although the United States should be able to help significantly [4 words not declassified]. In countries vulnerable to subversion, the United States should, as one of its objectives, assist in the development of adequate internal security forces. [1 sentence (40 words) not declassified]

22. In combatting Soviet subversive forces and techniques, the United States should develop and employ in a well-coordinated manner [5 words not declassified] political, information, economic and military programs and activities. In particular, the United States should seek to alert countries which become targets of the new Soviet campaign of diplomatic and economic penetration to the dangers of subversion to which this campaign subjects them. [1 sentence (22 words) not declassified]

23. In the face of divisions, fears, and weaknesses, which in many cases the Communists can exploit, the United States must choose between (a) taking timely action to help remedy such conditions, or (b) allowing the situation to deteriorate with the prospect of later trying to prevent Communist gains by more costly and less certain measures, or even military action. The ability of the free world, over the long pull, to meet the challenge and competition of the Communist world will depend in large measure on the capacity to demonstrate progress toward meeting the basic needs and aspirations of its peoples.

24. Two of the basic problems in the economic field are: (a) industrialized areas require further economic growth and expanded trade; and (b) the less developed areas seek to develop and modernize their economies and must also maintain a substantial volume of exports of primary products. It should be within the capacity of the free world, with U.S. initiative and leadership, to turn these two problems into mutually supporting assets for the promotion of appropriate economic strength and growth.

25. A necessary condition for such strength and growth is a high level of international trade within the free world. In order to foster this, the United States should (a) continue to press strongly for a general reduction of barriers to such trade; (b) take the lead by reducing further its own tariffs and other trade restrictions over the next few years, with due regard to national security and total national advantage; and (c) also support sound moves to widen the convertibility of currencies.

26. a. The United States should encourage and support movements toward European unity, especially those leading to supra-national institutions, bearing in mind that the basic initiative must come from the Europeans themselves.

b. The United States may find it expedient to continue economic assistance to certain European countries, such as Spain, Yugoslavia and Turkey, to assist them in achieving stability and growth while maintaining necessary military forces.

27. The dangers to free world stability are particularly acute in the less developed areas, and are enhanced by recent Soviet initiatives. The task of speeding up their economic growth, providing adequate dietary conditions, and promoting stability presents a multitude of problems, political and social as well as economic. For example, it calls for some changes in traditional habits and attitudes and for greatly expanded training in administrative and technical skills. In any case, new capital investment is a prerequisite to growth. Utilization of private investment should be encouraged to the maximum feasible extent. Local capital will have to be supplemented by the provision of capital from abroad. In addition to external public and private investment and IBRD loans, substantial financing from U.S. public funds (including the Export-Import Bank) will be necessary, in some cases over an extended period, to help achieve the economic progress essential to U.S. interests.

28. a. The United States should be prepared to use economic means available to it to promote conditions of sound development in less developed nations where:

(1) The political and economic situation is important to the security of the United States.

(2) Such development cannot be financed by local capital or other non-communist foreign assistance.

(3) Such assistance will be effectively used.

U.S. economic assistance world-wide should be at but not exceed a total level consistent with U.S. security interests.

b. U.S. foreign economic programs should be designed to:

(1) Achieve our objective of promoting conditions of sound development in less developed nations in order to retain and strengthen them as members of the free world.

(2) Demonstrate to these nations that they can progress economically without becoming dependent upon the soviet bloc or endangering their independence.

(3) Counter so far as practicable the apparent attractiveness and damaging effects of the Soviet bloc economic offensive.

c. In order to make the most effective use of economic aid resources and to facilitate planning of longer-term projects and programs necessary for economic development, the Executive Branch should have authority:

(1) To make commitments extending over a period of years for assistance to such projects and programs.

(2) To modify existing requirements as to administration and supervision of aid programs and the conditions on which aid may be granted.

(3) To exercise greater flexibility in planning, timing and administration of economic aid programs.

29. U.S. financial assistance alone cannot produce satisfactory economic growth in less developed areas, and external assistance should be used in a way to promote and not decrease local incentives and self-help. In addition to the provision of financial assistance, the United States should train indigenous leaders, develop skills, and provide competent advisers.

30. U.S. political policies must be adapted to conditions prevailing in each less developed area. The United States should not exert pressure to make active allies of countries not so inclined, but should recognize that the independence of such countries from Communism serves U.S. interests even though they are not aligned with the United States. The United States should provide assistance on the basis of the will and ability of such countries to defend and strengthen their independence, and should take other feasible steps which will strengthen their capacity to do so.

31. The United States cannot afford the loss to Communist extremism of constructive nationalist and reform movements in colonial areas in Asia and Africa. The United States should seek (a) to work with, rather than against, such forces when convinced they are likely to remain powerful and grow in influence; and (b) to prevent the capture of such forces by Communism. Where disputes or tensions involve the relations of a major U.S. ally with a colonial or dependent area, the United States should use its influence in behalf of an orderly evolution of political arrangements toward self-determination and should seek to strengthen the forces of moderation in both the colonial and metropolitan areas.

32. The United States should continue its full support of and active leadership in the United Nations and specialized agencies, and should seek to make maximum use of the UN for the settlement of international disputes and as an instrument of collective security. The UN forum, moreover, can serve and should be used as an effective means to mobilize free world opinion in support of U.S. policies, to expose Soviet propaganda and activities, and to exploit the vulnerabilities of Soviet management of the satellite empire.

33. The United States should actively continue to carry out its programs for the peaceful uses of atomic energy in order to maintain U.S. leadership and initiative in this field.

B. Means of Directly Influencing the Communist bloc

34. a. The primary means for influencing Soviet conduct must be adequate political, military, and economic programs and actions. The USSR and Communist China cannot be expected to revise their methods of operation or their practical goals more conformably to U.S. interest unless further Communist expansion is prevented, present Communist techniques of pressure and inducement are effectively countered, and the relative position of the free world is manifestly improved.

b. The free world has in addition such specific means of influencing Soviet conduct as East-West relations, the negotiating process, and the exploitation of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities. U.S. policies on each of these subjects should be designed to achieve a consistent effect and should be carried out so as to be compatible with basic national security strategy and so as not to weaken the will to resist Communism in the free world.

35. In utilizing East-West relations, negotiations and exploitation of vulnerabilities to influence Soviet conduct, the United States should seek (a) to reduce the likelihood or capability of Soviet aggression or subversive expansion; (b) to give to the Communist regimes a clear conception of the true U.S. and free world purposes, including uncompromising U.S. determination to resist Communist aggressive moves and uphold freedom; (c) to convince the Communist leaders that alternatives exist to their present policies which would be acceptable to the United States and which they might come to consider compatible with their own security interests; (d) to correct the distorted image of the West which has been sedulously cultivated for years inside the USSR; (e) to encourage the Communist regimes to take measures which would make more difficult a reversal of peaceful policy and which might over the long run lead to basic changes in the outlook or character of Communist regimes.

36. In East-West relations the United States should continue to sponsor proposals for a selective expansion of free world-Communist bloc contacts, which are chosen with a view to:

a. Maintaining free world initiative and leadership for genuinely reciprocal reductions of the barriers to free communications and peaceful trade;

b. Increasing the acquisition of useful intelligence concerning the Communist bloc; and

c. Avoiding a net disadvantage to the United States from such contacts;

and which, if accepted, would favor evolution in the Soviet society and economy toward peaceful development, or, if rejected, would expose the persistence of expansionism behind the facade of Soviet tactics and propaganda. In considering proposals for such free world–Communist bloc contacts, the United States should take account of the effect of the U.S. example upon other free nations more vulnerable to Communist penetration.

37. The United States should continue its readiness to negotiate with the USSR whenever it appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby. Such negotiations have additional importance in maintaining free world initiative and cohesion, and are desirable in order to probe the intentions and expose the meaning of Soviet policies. The United States and its major allies should be prepared to sponsor genuinely reciprocal concessions between the free world and the Communist bloc which would leave unimpaired the net security position of the free world and would contribute to the ultimate peaceful resolution of the Communist threat. The United States should not, however, make concessions in advance of similar action by the Soviets, in the hope of inspiring Soviet concessions. Until the USSR evidences a modification of its basic hostility toward the non-Communist world through concrete actions, agreements should be dependent upon a balance of advantages to the non-Communist world and not upon implied good will or trust in written agreements.

38. The United States in its own interest should, as interrelated parts of its national policy, actively seek a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; concurrently, in related, parallel steps, make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues; and meanwhile continue the steady development of strength in the United States and in the free world coalition required for U.S. security. As the initial step in this international arms system, the United States should give priority to early agreement on and implementation of (a) such confidence-building measures as the exchange of military blueprints, mutual aerial inspection and establishment of ground control posts at strategic centers; and (b) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible. The acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depend primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.

39. In the exploitation of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities, the United States should design its policies and programs (a) to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and conduct in ways that further U.S. and free world security; (b) to weaken the ties which link the USSR and Communist China and bind their satellites; (c) to encourage bureaucratic and popular pressures inside the bloc for greater emphasis by the regimes on their internal problems, and on national interests in the satellites; and (d) to undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own system and ideology. The effort should be to pose for them the necessity of devoting attention and resources to these needs or facing increased disaffection with the regime or the satellite relationship if these needs are ignored.

40. In applying this strategy to Communist China the United States must take account of non-recognition of the regime, the hostility of the regime, its aggressive policy, and the undesirability of enhancing the power and influence of Communist China relative to free Asian nations. Moreover, the United States should not overlook any possibility, however remote, of fostering among the Chinese people demands for an alternative to the Communist regime. However, the United States should continue its willingness to participate in talks with, or including, Communist China on specific subjects on an ad hoc basis where the general objectives of its political strategy against the Communist bloc would be served thereby.

Foreign Information and Related Programs

41. a. Foreign information, cultural exchange, educational exchange and comparable programs are vital elements in the implementation of U.S. policies. These programs should be materially strengthened. U.S. policies and actions should be presented in a manner which will advance U.S. objectives, and their psychological implication should be carefully considered in advance.

b. In interpreting abroad U.S. policies and actions, the United States should seek to (1) project an image of the United States which reflects the fundamentally peaceful intent of U.S. policies, while making clear our determination to resist aggression; (2) delineate those important aspects of U.S. life, culture and institutions which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the United States; (3) persuade foreign peoples that U.S. objectives will actually aid the achievement of their legitimate national objectives and aspirations; (4) expose Communist aims and actions and adequately counter Soviet propaganda; (5) encourage evolutionary change in the Soviet system, along lines consistent with U.S. security objectives and the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the USSR; (6) assure the satellite peoples of the continuing interest of the U.S. in the peaceful restoration of their independence and political freedom.

III. Domestic Strength and Other National Security Measures

42. Sound U.S. Economy

a. A strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy is essential to the security and stability of the free world. The level of expenditures for national security programs must take into full account the danger to the United States and its allies resulting from impairment, through inflation or the undermining of incentives, of the basic soundness of the U.S. economy or of the continuing expansion of the U.S. economy under a free enterprise system.

b. The Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures and its total annual revenues into balance, or into substantial balance; and should maintain over-all credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy.

c. Nevertheless, the United States must continue to meet the necessary costs of the programs essential for its security.

d. All Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to a necessary minimum. Every effort should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal Government.

e. The United States should also seek (1) to maintain a higher and expanding rate of economic activity at relatively stable price levels, and (2) to maximize the economic potential of private enterprise by minimizing governmental controls and regulations and by encouraging private enterprise to develop natural and technological resources (e.g. nuclear power).

43. Internal Security. Internal security measures should be made adequate, by strengthening them as necessary, to meet the threat to U.S. security of covert attack by the Soviet bloc on the United States by means of sabotage, subversion, espionage, and particularly, the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons.

44. Civil Defense. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is an improved and strengthened civil defense program which seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack, including the effects of increasingly powerful weapons.

45. Support by U.S. Citizens

a. No national strategy to meet the Soviet threat can be successful without the support of the American people. During a time of increasing Soviet nuclear power, the determination of U.S. citizens to face the risks involved in carrying out such national strategy will be of increasing importance. Continuing efforts should be made to inform the American people of the demands on their spiritual and material resources necessary to ensure U.S. security by political, military and economic means during a period of armed truce, which may either continue for many years or be broken by an atomic war.

b. Eternal vigilance is necessary in carrying out the national strategy, to prevent the intimidation of free criticism. Necessary protective measures should not be used to destroy national unity, which must be based on freedom and not on fear.

46. Mobilization Base

a. Inasmuch as no one can foresee with certainty the nature and extent of future conflicts in which the United States may become involved, the national mobilization base must be so constituted as to maintain military readiness to enter combat, ranging from local to general war, and to provide the capability of meeting expeditiously the needs of our national effort to bring hostilities to an early and successful conclusion. Such a requirement demands a mobilization base:

(1) Adequate to maintain modern forces in being capable of successfully meeting and delivering the initial nuclear offensives, carrying out the other essential tasks in the early phases of general war, and conducting operations short of general war.

(2) Adequate, with appropriate war reserves, to support the prosecution of the succeeding phases of general war including support for the forces likely to be involved therein and for minimum essential civilian needs.

(3) Adequate to provide for prompt replenishment of the general war reserves which might be expended in military operations less than general war.

b. The mobilization base should be predicated upon approved war plans.

47. Stockpiling. For planning the stockpile objectives for strategic and critical materials, a period of five years may be used. However, only the stockpile objectives based upon the planning period of three years currently used in Military Mobilization Planning should be completed on a priority basis, the remainder of the five-year objectives to be achieved on a longer and lower priority basis. The stockpiling program should not normally be used to help stabilize international markets for exports of less developed countries; exceptions being made only on a case-by-case basis where there would be a clear net advantage to the United States.

48. Intelligence. The United States should develop and maintain an intelligence system capable of collecting the requisite data on and accurately evaluating:

a. Indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world.

b. The capabilities of foreign countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic and subversive courses of action affecting U.S. security.

c. Potential foreign developments having a bearing on U.S. national security.

49. Manpower. The United States should develop an adequate manpower program designed to:

a. Expand and improve scientific and technical training.

b. Provide an effective military training system based so far as possible on equitable principles.

c. Maintain the necessary active military forces with an adequate hard core of career leaders, specialists and the highly trained manpower required for modern war.

d. Develop and maintain Ready Reserve forces of appropriate size, screened, suitably organized and trained, and available for immediate mobilization.

e. Strike a feasible balance between the needs of an expanding peacetime economy and defense requirements, and develop incentives and improved public attitudes which will improve the ability of the armed forces and essential defense-supporting activities, including research, to obtain, in relation to normal commercial activities, highly trained scientific and technical manpower.

f. Provide effective manpower mobilization plans and an appropriate distribution of services and skills thereunder in order to meet the manpower requirements of any type of national emergency.

50. Research and Development. The United States must achieve and maintain a rate of technological advance adequate to serve its over-all national security objectives. To this end there are required:

a. Increased awareness throughout the nation of the importance to national security of technological advance and of the need for greater motivations for our youth to pursue scientific careers.

b. Strong continuing support by the U.S. Government for basic and applied research, in proper balance.

c. Improved methods for the evaluation, collation and dissemination of U.S. and foreign scientific information.

d. The fostering of foreign, or cooperative U.S.–foreign, scientific endeavor in friendly countries.

e. Facilitation of wider application by industry, within the bounds of security, of the results of governmental research and development including that performed for military purposes.

As research and development is translated into an operational capability with new weapons, there should be an attendant continuing review of the level and composition of forces and of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for successful prosecution of general war.

Annex

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

I. Relative Free World and Communist Bloc Capabilities

1. U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Capabilities. The United States is now capable of inflicting massive nuclear damage on the USSR, and will acquire by about mid-1956 the capability to mount a decisive nuclear strike against the USSR.[8] The United States will have a marked net superiority in nuclear striking power from then until some time in 1958. During that year, and thereafter, the USSR will almost certainly develop and maintain the net capability to strike a crippling[9] blow at the United States, but the United States should still be able to inflict equal or greater damage on the USSR, provided that it takes adequate steps to protect and to continue the development of its effective retaliatory power.

2. In an attack on the United States, especially a surprise attack, the USSR, at least until it develops a long-range ballistic missile capability, would place chief reliance on nuclear attacks by aircraft. Also, substantial launching of missiles from submarines would be possible, and clandestine methods could be used against specially selected targets. Chemical and biological capabilities would probably be employed as secondary means of attack. In any event, the most probable primary objective of an initial Soviet nuclear strike would be the earliest possible destruction of U.S. and allied nuclear capability, world-wide; but this would almost certainly be combined with attacks on other U.S. and major allied forces and war reserves, and on key production complexes.

3. Chances of General War. A situation is approaching in which a total war involving use by both sides of available nuclear weapons could bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of both Western civilization and the Soviet system. This could well result in a condition of mutual deterrence, in which each side would be strongly inhibited from deliberately initiating general war or taking actions which it regarded as materially increasing the risk of general war. However, general war will remain a possibility if only because of the element of miscalculation by either side. General war would also be a possibility in the event that the USSR, either because of an unexpected technological breakthrough or for other reasons, came to believe that it could destroy the United States without effective retaliation. Moreover, general war might occur as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions which neither side originally intended to lead to general war. In an era of rapid technological change, it is always possible that a condition of nuclear stalemate will prove transitory; much will depend upon which side can acquire or maintain technological superiority.

4. U.S. and Soviet Missile Systems. Relative U.S. and Soviet progress in guided missiles, especially surface-to-surface, could have a crucial bearing on relative over-all capabilities, both political and military:

a. The Soviets will probably obtain a limited operational capability in an 850-900-mile ballistic missile in the near future; a 1400-mile ballistic missile (with a low-yield warhead) in 1957; and a 1600-mile ballistic missile in 1958, with a high-yield warhead in 1959. Most of our overseas bases are within 1600 miles of the Soviet launching sites. With the accelerated emphasis now being given the U.S. development program, the United States should have a limited operational capability in a 1500-mile ballistic missile (with a high-yield warhead) by early 1959. It is possible that the Soviets could demonstrate a 1400-mile ballistic missile at any time; but the U.S. will not have this capability until 1957 or 1958.

b. With intensive effort, which must be assumed, the USSR could have a limited operational capability with an intercontinental ballistic missile with a high-yield nuclear warhead by 1960–61. This weapons system will create a direct and dangerous threat to the continental United States. With the accelerated emphasis given the U.S. ICBM program under current plans, the United States may be able to equal this timetable. There is no available direct defense against the ICBM at this time except a technically feasible detection system. However, studies and proposals suggest that the development of a weapons system with worthwhile defensive capabilities may be possible, if vigorously pursued.

5. By 1958, in addition to other short-range missiles: (a) both the United States and the USSR are likely to have operational surface-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads: (b) the United States will have, and the USSR may have, operational air-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads.

6. Bloc Military Capabilities. The Communist Bloc will maintain and further develop the effectiveness of its formidable conventional forces. The principal limitations will be logistic problems and deficiencies in specialized experience, training and equipment. Such reductions in force levels as may have been made are likely to be offset by improved combat effectiveness of remaining forces, and Soviet ability to mobilize massive forces rapidly will be unimpaired. The Soviets have stepped up their submarine building program to about 100 vessels a year. Soviet strategic and tactical doctrine and training procedures, moreover, now emphasize the advantage of surprise and provide for the integration of nuclear and chemical weapons in the operations of conventional forces. In the Far East, Communist China is increasing its already formidable military strength, although it remains substantially dependent on the USSR for equipment and logistic support.

7. Free World Military Capabilities.

a. U.S. During the past year, the U.S. retaliatory striking forces have been improved, both in delivery capabilities and in weapons quality. The U.S. Continental Air Defense System has also been improved. Other U.S. forces have been augmented with improved weapon and missile capabilities, and with modernized equipment. Those committed to NATO and the Far East are in a high state of readiness, with an atomic capability. In some geographical areas, the U.S. response to local aggression by other than air or naval striking forces would be slow and limited, and would in any case require the temporary diversion of forces, transportation, and other resources from planned initial tasks in a general war. The improvement in the capabilities of all U.S. forces is due in the main to the integration of nuclear weapons, in a wide range of yields, into our conventional forces. On the other hand, an increasing dependence on nuclear weapons may impair U.S. ability to intervene against local aggression without the use of such weapons.

b. Other Free World. Although in general our Western allies retain a potential for further substantial increases in their military strength, they are coming to consider overt Soviet aggression extremely unlikely, and many of them are beginning to believe that trends in military technology render their existing military programs obsolescent. European NATO force levels will thus probably decline to some extent; West German rearmament is likely to be even slower than now planned. In most of the Middle and Far East, further development of indigenous non-Communist coalition forces will be slow and difficult. The nations of these areas will generally not be able to assume any major share of the financial burden of defense against external attack. However, it may be possible to develop effective internal security forces.

8. Communist Capabilities in the United States.

a. The Communists in the United States have recently decided upon bolder and more open solicitation of public support. Emergence of Communist leaders from the underground and increased efforts at infiltration of bona fide political, religious, labor and social groups are taking place. Augmenting this internal threat is the presence of an estimated 20,000 “hard-core” Communists in countries immediately adjacent to our borders. Collection of U.S. strategic data remains an important Soviet-bloc objective.

b. The United States remains vulnerable to Soviet-Bloc clandestine nuclear attack, biological warfare, and conventional sabotage, through possible use of diplomatic immunity, low-flying light aircraft, merchant and small vessels, and because of our relatively unguarded coastal and land frontiers and inadequate safeguards at many vital installations and facilities.

9. Soviet Political Stability. Over the next several years at least, it seems unlikely that the nature of the Soviet political system will significantly change or the stability of the regime be seriously weakened. Despite the continued existence of major problems, such as those in agriculture and possible future requirements of increases in consumer goods, there seems little likelihood of any early development of internal pressures so great as to compel a basic alteration of Soviet policies. The USSR almost certainly will not abandon its hold over the satellites, nor is it likely that any upsurge of satellite nationalism will seriously shake this hold. A prolonged reduction of tensions would accelerate the already evident decline of popular hope for liberation and hasten the process of adjustment to Communist control in the satellites. However, such a reduction might also eventually tend to alter the nature of Communist control over the satellites, although such a change would not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of such control. An extended period of reduced international tensions and wider East-West contacts would present problems for the Bloc as well as the West. The relaxation of harsh police controls may be difficult to reverse, and the promise of higher standards of living may be difficult to abandon. If a change in Soviet foreign policy required reversion to a policy of sacrifices enforced by drastic controls, internal discontent would result, although it could almost certainly be kept in check. A relaxation of domestic controls and of the atmosphere of hostility in East-West relations could, if continued over the much longer run, combine with other factors ultimately to create pressures for change within the Bloc, provided the free world prevents Communist victories.

10. Communist China. Although Communist China faces internal problems much greater than those of the USSR, its control over the people is becoming increasingly firm. Meanwhile, Communist China’s prestige and influence within and outside the Bloc are growing, and the Soviet regime will remain careful to treat it as a partner. Latent conflicts of interest between the two powers may eventually develop, but the tie between the two regimes will probably remain strong at least for some years to come, not only for ideological reasons but also because it furthers the purposes of both nations, and because of the existence of common enemies.

11. U.S. and Soviet Economic Growth. During the decade 1951–1960 Soviet industrial production will have grown from roughly one-fifth to approximately two-fifths that of the United States. However, the absolute margin of the U.S. GNP over that of the USSR will be larger at the end of the period than at the beginning. The USSR will certainly continue to devote a much higher proportion of its resources to investment and probably a somewhat larger share to military use than will the United States. The United States, and to a lesser degree the USSR, have the economic capability if necessary to increase their current military efforts. Because of the increasing importance of forces-in-being in an age of nuclear weapons, economic and industrial potential for production after war begins is becoming a less dependable measure of the ability to achieve victory in general nuclear war than in past years. However, economic and industrial potential will continue to be a critical factor in cold war.

13. U.S. and Soviet Technological Capacity and Potential. The USSR has been systematically building at an accelerating rate a research and development complex of great effectiveness. It has committed manpower and monetary resources to this complex on a scale that has enabled it to rise from a position of marked inferiority and dangerously to challenge the supremacy of Western technology. The Communist technological threat is an immediate and formidable one in that advanced weapons that appear to match many of the best U.S. weapons are now becoming operational; it is a continuing one in that the Soviets have made remarkable technological progress in the last ten years and are now expanding their scientific and technological resources more rapidly than the United States. Additionally, the Soviets have developed remarkably speedy and efficient procedures for translating research into line production of excellent weapons. The possibility of their surprising the United States with new weapons that will be hard to counter cannot be discounted. Technological superiority rests heavily on the ingenuity and organizing ability of a relatively small body of scientific and engineering talent. The Soviets already equal or surpass U.S. output of scientists and engineers and, more importantly, they surpass the United States in producing teachers of science and engineering, in providing primary and secondary school instruction in these fields, and in inducing talented students to become scientists and engineers. Although they do not yet equal, they are approaching the United States in absolute numbers of scientists and engineers, and are concentrating very effectively their existing scientific engineering and production talent on the problem of military technology. The scientific potential of the U.S. allies can make a major contribution to the technological capabilities of the free world, and if better utilized can do much to meet the Communist technological challenge.

13. Free World Economic Prospects. The state of the U.S. economy is likely to remain the most important key to the economic well-being of the free world. If high levels of U.S. economic activity are maintained:

a. In Western Europe, the outlook is for continued growth, despite inflationary pressures in some countries and the UK balance of payments difficulties.

b. Despite improvements in its balance of payments position in the past year, Japan will face a long-run problem of supporting its growing population with its limited resources and dependence on external trade, especially as U.S. dollar expenditures decline. In order to avoid excessive dependence on trade with the Bloc, Japan must maintain expanding markets with the rest of the world.

c. Economic growth among the under-developed areas seems certain to vary widely; continued rather high rates of economic growth may be expected in certain parts of Latin America, while some countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, are apt to lag. There is grave danger that the economies of certain countries with large agricultural surpluses will be increasingly oriented toward the Bloc.

14. Effect of Communist Economic Progress on Other Areas. Soviet economic progress, in spite of the fact that Soviet living standards are low compared to those of the United States, will be an impressive example for many peoples with even lower living standards, arid could constitute an important element in spreading Soviet influence, especially in Asia. Communist China’s industrialization is expected to continue at a relatively rapid rate, as compared with that of other Asian countries, and will also exert considerable attractive force on Asian peoples if economic improvement in free Asia is slow or non-existent. The speed of industrialization and of improvement in living standards achieved respectively in India and in Communist China may come to be regarded in some Asian countries as a test of whether totalitarian or non-totalitarian methods are best suited for pursuing their own economic growth. Western failure to respond effectively to the needs of underdeveloped countries for outside aid in their development would, in some cases, also make them increasingly receptive to offers of Bloc aid. Although the USSR and Communist China are economically inferior to the United States and the West, their ability to absorb large amounts of goods in barter from under-developed countries has enabled them to make political gains by economic measures in this area.

15. Free World Alliances. The existing structure of U.S. alliances can probably be maintained but might become less effective. There is a growing unwillingness to submerge conflicting national interests and ambitions in the face of a reduced sense of common danger; prospects for significantly more cohesive political groupings have diminished. Since most U.S. allies contemplate the prospective consequences of nuclear war with growing dread, they will be increasingly reluctant to participate in actions which appear to them to involve appreciable risks of war. Thus prospects for maintaining the effectiveness of free world alliances will diminish unless the United States convinces its allies of the mutual benefit of collective effort and collective defense as a deterrent. It seems unlikely, however, that even the advent of nuclear plenty would lead most U.S. allies, especially the major ones, to abandon their alliances with the United States, particularly since they recognize the vital importance of being under the umbrella of U.S. deterrent power. However, in the event of a major crisis involving, in their view, imminent danger of nuclear war, the internal strains which most U.S. allies would experience would make their behavior uncertain and unpredictable.

16. Less Developed Countries. Less developed countries will continue to be a major source of weakness in the position of the free world, owing to such factors as political instability, economic backwardness, and extreme nationalism. The dangers of subversion will be great, especially in countries under the shadow of Communist power and subject to direct Communist pressures and intervention. In Southeast Asia the present situation remains precarious despite progress in Vietnam. Even in countries not immediately under Communist military pressures, e.g., India and Pakistan, dominant moderate forces will eventually lose ground if they cannot offer hope of more rapid and substantial material progress than has hitherto been achieved. Failure of the free world to deal more effectively with the problems of less developed areas will thus weaken the free world and benefit international Communism, even in countries where actual Communist takeover is not imminent.

17. Colonial Areas. Such colonial areas as still exist will present certain special problems for the free world. Nationalist sentiment is spreading rapidly; colonies and dependent regions not yet heavily affected will become so within a comparatively short period. Increasing conflicts between nationalist movements and colonial powers and between natives and European settlers are thus likely. These conflicts will be difficult to compromise on any lasting basis, and will probably involve spreading violence and a progressive weakening of remaining European rule in Asia and Africa. They will present possibilities for divisions and disputes within the free world, will diminish the usefulness of Western bases, and may offer opportunities for Communist exploitation.

18. Uncommitted Countries. The trend toward a greater number of uncommitted nations is likely to continue. A trend toward uncommitted groupings, independent of both the West and the USSR, may also emerge; for example, Afro-Asian ties will assume increasing importance, and India will probably grow in influence and may serve as the focus for a loosely coordinated group of nations. In these uncommitted nations, there will be a continuing contest for influence between the Communist Bloc and the United States and its allies; a large difference in their respective degrees of influence could substantially affect overall relative cold war positions. The dominant purposes of the uncommitted nations will be to maintain their independence and satisfy their economic aspirations. But on many cold war issues their positions tend to parallel those of the Bloc.

19. Effect of Bloc Expansion. Notwithstanding the above trend, the boundaries of the Bloc remain generally clear. Any significant extension of explicit Communist control, whether resulting from external aggression or internal subversion, would have most serious consequences which might be out of all proportion to the strategic or economic significance of the territory involved. On the other hand, a contraction of areas presently under Communist control would have a comparably significant effect.

II. Probable Soviet and Chinese Communist Intentions and Strategy

20.

Soviet External Objectives. The USSR has not modified its basic hostility toward the non-Communist world, and especially toward the United States as the power center of that world, or its long-range aim of achieving a Soviet Communist-dominated world and its belief in the ultimate triumph of Communism. The Soviet leaders can be expected to seek constantly, by every means they find advantageous, to extend Communist power and to weaken those forces, especially U.S. power and influence, which they regard as inexorable enemies of their system. However, they will almost certainly avoid pursuing their long-term goals in ways which jeopardize the security of the regime or their control of the Communist Bloc. Soviet objectives can be listed as follows:

a. The security of the regime and of the USSR.

b. Maintaining the Soviet hold on the European satellites, and keeping China within the Communist Bloc.

c. Elimination of U.S. influence and bases from Eurasia, neutralization of U.S. allies, and isolation of the United States.

d. Expansion of Soviet Communist power throughout Eurasia.

e. Elimination of the United States as a competing power center.

f. The spread of Communism throughout the world.

These Soviet objectives are unchanged. However, some Soviet diplomatic successes, increased striking power, and increased confidence that the United States excludes general war as a means of settling international disputes, have probably given the Soviet leaders more confidence in the security of their regime and the solidity of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

21. Chinese Communist External Objectives and Policy. Communist China’s external objectives are (a) the security of the regime, which the Chinese Communists consider impaired by the continued existence of a U.S. supported Nationalist Government on Taiwan; (b) the expansion of Chinese Communist power to the point where Communist China is the dominant power in Asia and U.S. influence is excluded from the Far East. Communist China’s pursuit of these objectives will be generally coordinated with the Soviet Union, but will reflect a difference of emphasis arising from its regional interests. Communist China will continue to pursue policies emphasizing political rather than military action as long as its objectives are acceptably served by this means. The Chinese Communists probably do not intend to attack Taiwan so long as the U.S. maintains its commitments to the Nationalists, but they may expect to induce a gradual erosion of the Nationalist position. Communist China will use the threat of force and continue to build up its armed forces in the Taiwan area; it may employ its armed forces against some of the off-shore islands at any time. If it avoids the use of force, Communist China will seek such potential advantages as a greater likelihood of relaxation of East-West trade controls and of achieving UN membership.

22. Prospects of Communist Aggression.

a. Provided that the United States and the free world have at all times an adequate military posture and the necessary determination, it appears unlikely that, within the next several years, the USSR or Communist China will deliberately initiate general war, or engage in overt military aggression which in their judgment would involve appreciable risk of large-scale hostilities with the United States. They will try to avoid courses of action which they believe would clearly involve such risk. However, they may come to estimate that offensive action limited to the off-shore islands would not involve them in large-scale hostilities with the United States. Further possibilities of Communist aggression are present in Indochina, e.g., renewed fighting in Laos or a Communist attack or large-scale insurrection against South Vietnam if the 1956 elections do not take place. Even where Communist use of force is estimated as unlikely, the threat of force greatly assists Communist subversion in peripheral area. The USSR and Communist China would, furthermore, probably not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking military counteraction against Western actions considered by them to be an imminent threat to the security of their regimes.

b. Attainment of the capability to inflict crippling damage on the United States may cause the Communist powers to increase the pace of their attempts at progressive local expansion, supported by force or threat of force. They will do this, however, only if they judge that their action could succeed and would not provoke a U.S. or allied counteraction involving appreciable risk of general war. Such increased attempts at local expansion will, therefore, depend in large measure on the Bloc’s estimate of free world will and deterrent strength. An important element in this estimate would be the degree to which the Communist powers had in the meantime isolated the United States from its allies or made gains elsewhere in the free world.

23. Current Soviet Policy.

a. While these Soviet objectives stated above will remain unchanged, the flexibility with which they are being pursued is increasing markedly. In 1955 Communist tactics against the free nations shifted in emphasis from reliance on violence and the threat of violence to reliance on division, enticement and duplicity. While the USSR apparently desires a less tense relationship with the Western powers, it seems clear that it will not, in order to achieve this, concede territories now under its control, notably East Germany, or make any agreements which would impair the relative Soviet power position. Nor is it likely to forgo any ready opportunities for expanding its influence in other areas, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, by non-military means. The Soviets have made significant gains in technology and in the industrialization of their country and are thus in an increasingly favorable position to foster and develop trade relations with underdeveloped raw resource countries. They are seeking to use to their advantage the greater prestige and acceptance among the family of nations which resulted from the Summit Conference and thus overcome the stigma of Godless barbarism which they have borne in varying degree ever since the Russian revolution. While depicting the United States as preoccupied with military alliances and preparations, the Soviets are devoting more attention and resources than before to the elimination, by diplomatic and economic means, of U.S. influence, alliances, and bases in Asia and Africa.

b. The Communist powers will maintain, and even increase, efforts to weaken and disrupt free world strength and unity and to expand the area of Communist influence or control. Particularly if the USSR succeeds in improving its reputation for peaceful intentions, such efforts will present the united States with a serious threat difficult to deal with because less likely to manifest itself through readily identifiable crises, but more likely to lead to gradual erosion of free world positions. Specifically, the Soviets will play upon changing European attitudes toward NATO, seeking to undermine confidence in the United States and to bring about an eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, and will seek to pursue “popular front” tactics in such countries as France and Italy. In the Middle and Far East, the Communists will step up their campaign against Western efforts to build up defensive strength and alliances, exploiting nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiments, encouraging divisive conflicts, and employing further offers of trade and of economic and military assistance. Their aims will be to promote neutralism, undermine and replace Western influence, and create subversive assets. They may be expected to exploit the horror of nuclear warfare resulting from USSR and U.S. capabilities as suits their political purposes. In very vulnerable areas the Communists may employ more aggressive subversive tactics where it will serve their purposes to seize power or disrupt the local government.

24. Free World Reaction. Wherever an ostensibly “soft” Bloc line is dominant, our allies will be prone to explore it seriously, and some will probably, in seeking a basis of “coexistence”, tend toward trusting accommodation. Even if the Bloc offers no real concession, this tendency will probably persist, supported by large segments of public opinion. The unity and resolution of the free world coalition will, therefore, be substantially affected by the U.S. ability (a) to convince its allies that the United States is making serious efforts to resolve outstanding issues by agreements compatible with free world security, and (b) meanwhile to maintain its strength while the threat persists.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret.

[2] Document 6.

[3] NIE 11–3–55 was not declassified.NIE 11–7–55, “Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1958,” June 23, 1955, is not printed. (Both in Department of State, INR–NIE Files) NIE 11–13–55, “Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Summit Conference,” October 4, 1955, is not printed. (Ibid.) NEE 11–13/1–55, “Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers’ Conference,” December 6, 1955, is not printed. (Ibid.) NIE 100–7–55 is Document 39. SNIE 100–8–55, “Probable Trends in the Military Programs of Selected Free World Governments,” December 13, 1955, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

[4] See footnotes 2–4, Document 61.

[5] See footnote 10, Document 62.

[6] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[7] As used in this paper, the term “nuclear” refers to any military device of any size or purpose which utilizes energy released in the course of nuclear fission or fusion. [Footnote in the source text.]

[8] For the purposes of this estimate, “decisive” means damage such that either (1) the ability to strike back is essentially eliminated, or (2) civil, political, and cultural life is reduced to a condition of chaos. “Strike” means an action carried to completion within hours or days, as compared to an “offensive” which is of longer duration. [Footnote in the source text.]

[9] “Crippling” is used to indicate a degree of destruction, disruption and loss of life that, while not decisive, would raise serious question as to the ability of the United States to recover and regain its status as a great industrial nation for a considerable period of years. [Footnote in the source text.]

67. Memorandum of Discussion at the 280th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 22, 1956[1]

Washington, March 22, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3. Item 1 was a report by Secretary Dulles on his recent trip to Asia and the Far East. For item 2, see volume XXIV, page 72. For item 3, see folume XXV, page 128.]

4. Duplications of Anticipated Trends in the U.S. Military Program

The Executive Secretary reminded the President that he had earlier said that he wished at the end of the meeting to raise another matter on which he wanted to have the views of the National Security Council. The President hesitated for a moment, and then said that the matter in question was to hear from the Secretary of Defense whether the latter was doing as good a job in searching out economies and making savings in the Defense Department as he was in making requests for new funds. The President added that he had put this question to Secretary Wilson in a memorandum.[2] (The apparent occasion for the President’s memorandum to Secretary Wilson was a memorandum to the President from the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, pointing out that while the Army and the Navy had made some progress in reducing the numbers of their civilian employees, the Air Force had actually increased the number of its civilian employees.[3] )

Secretary Wilson said that he had received the President’s memorandum but, of course, had not had time to make a full investigation. He could point out at this time, however, that unlike the Army and the Navy, whose positions were relatively stabilized, the Air Force was still building up to its agreed levels of forces and equipment. He proposed to get his people together promptly to see where we were now at, but added that he would like to say now that he was “in some trouble”. It was proving to be very difficult to keep the current expenditure rate in the Defense Department for FY 1956 down to the levels which had been estimated earlier. He believed that the total expenditures of the Defense Department as a whole would actually prove to be higher than the earlier forecast.

As for the probable expenditures for FY 1957, Secretary Wilson said that he had likewise made the best forecast he could at the earlier time. It had proved necessary, however, to crank some of the things eliminated back into the FY 1957 budget. They were spending a very great deal on research and development, for which there was a continuing demand for funds. We were also getting into the stage now of replacing and modernizing our equipment, and this was a very expensive operation. As best he could now foresee, the prospect for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960 was one of increasing Defense Department expenditures. These increases were not the result of extravagance, but were based on the realities which we faced. Accordingly, said Secretary Wilson, he feared he had a rather poor report to make on this whole matter. It should not be forgotten, however, that the problem ultimately gets back to the basic matter of U.S. commitments and U.S. troop deployments. Unless such commitments and deployments were changed, Secretary Wilson said, he found it hard to criticize the military requirements for carrying out these commitments which were given to him by his military people.

The question of whether or not the United States was keeping ahead of the Soviets in the production of jet bombers, guided missiles, and supersonic fighters was another matter. There was a real possibility that the Soviet production of supersonic fighters might make our own B–36 aircraft obsolete. At any rate, this was the opinion of many Air Force people, and a review of the matter was now in progress in the Defense Department. In general, Secretary Wilson felt that we might actually slip behind the Russians if we do not exert ourselves more in this area of the supersonic fighters, etc.

The President observed that if the gist of Secretary Wilson’s report was accurate, we appeared to have spent a great deal of money to no very good purpose.

Secretary Wilson pointed out that the B–36 was, after all, a very old problem, in the early stages of which Admiral Radford himself had been involved. The President inquired the precise number of B–36’s which were now in operation. Secretary Wilson replied that 330 of these aircraft were now in operation.

After pointing out that the Defense Department was now gearing itself to face Senator Symington’s[4] investigation of the capabilities of the Air Force, Secretary Wilson said that the big question now facing him in the Defense Department was a complete review of all our existing intelligence material with respect to the Soviet missile program and to the production of Soviet jet bombers and supersonic fighter aircraft. Vis-à-vis the Soviet effort, Secretary Wilson said that he opposed the view that we should simply sit where we are. We should speed up, should increase both our production of B–52’s and our production of new fighter aircraft. Otherwise we could not honestly go before the people of the United States and honestly tell them that we were staying ahead of the Russians. Again, said Secretary Wilson, this report wasn’t very cheerful. He would like, if the President agreed, to provide him with “an up-to-date look at the whole business”, starting with the basic intelligence material.

Director Hughes said he wished all the members of the Council to realize that the Bureau of the Budget had not dictated to the Department of Defense the expenditure figures which were now being discussed. The level of expenditures had been devised by the Department of Defense with some help from the Bureau of the Budget. They had figured on a $34.5 billion expenditure level for FY 1956 and for FY 1957. All this indicated that we had reached a vital crossroads. The problem which now faced us was whether or not we proposed to adhere to our total budget program as it had originally been formulated.

The President commented that this whole matter worried him. After all, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the jury who must decide our military requirements. He had nearly fainted when General Taylor, able as he was, had suggested to him that the size of the Army should now be increased to 28 divisions in view of our worldwide commitments. 28 divisions, in the President’s opinion, was far too large a number in the light of the kind of future war we may be called upon to fight. In reply, Secretary Wilson undertook to defend General Taylor’s figure by reference to existing U.S. commitments. He repeated that unless these commitments were changed he could not escape the terrible pressure which came from all his military people. Except from Admiral Radford, he got no help from his military advisers in trying to turn expenditures in a downward direction.

The President stressed the responsibility of the heads of each department for expenditures. He added that the great question to be faced was what our minimum commitments should be in terms of our national security. Referring to the U.S. divisions in Europe, the President pointed out that when these troops were first sent over we had confidently expected to bring some or all of them back to the United States when indigenous European strength had been built up. Now the prospect is that they will stay there indefinitely, because the European nations have not been built up. The security of the United States, said the President, is essentially based on the aircraft and on the capability to deliver the bomb. In other military areas we could certainly reduce expenditures if the three Services would really get together and determine to do so in a spirit of mutual understanding.

The President then indicated that the meeting was at an end, but Secretary Humphrey asked to be allowed to say a word. He said that he was not quite prepared at this time to present a complete picture of the nation’s financial situation. This might be ready within a couple of weeks, but he would like at least to sketch the outline at the present time. Our basic trouble, continued Secretary Humphrey, was no matter of details, but was instead a matter of fundamentals. It tied into what our foreign policy was and what was contained in the long list of NSC policy papers. In his opinion these policy papers were just filled with things that the United States ought to do. These papers reminded Secretary Humphrey of the little boy who went into the candy shop and ordered more candy than he could eat or pay for. Accordingly, Secretary Humphrey believed that all these policies should be reviewed. We were, in his opinion, way off base.

Turning then to the subject of the current financial picture, Secretary Humphrey said that our income was increasing a whole lot faster than we had estimated it would. We were now ahead by a billion or two. But our expenses were likewise running ahead of estimates by about the same amount. Accordingly, we could end up the fiscal year by being a billion under or a billion over. The prospects on the whole were still that income would exceed outgo, and that we could get a balanced budget. He was delighted that this was the case, but we actually deserved very little credit for this outcome.

Turning from the current picture and looking ahead, Secretary Humphrey said that this was where he perceived real trouble. Many of the reductions in the Defense Department were honest and accurate as of today, but they would be “phonies” for tomorrow, since many of the current reductions were one-shot affairs which would not be repeated in the forthcoming fiscal years. We were making plans all over the world to do a great many things that we were in no position to pay for. The current year was the biggest year in terms of income and Gross National Product in our history, and we are barely going to break even this year. What was going to happen in the future if we actually carry out what was called for in this flock of NSC policy papers?

In addition to the money we are spending for national security at home, said Secretary Humphrey, we are spending money all over the world, particularly as a result of our military and economic assistance programs and the support of our troops overseas. The result had been a terrific drain on our gold. Indeed, we had lost almost as much gold in the three years of the present Administration as we had lost in the years of the Truman Administration. Secretary Humphrey illustrated this point by citing figures on the drain of U.S. gold. In conclusion, he said he had one thing to point out, namely, that our programs were bigger than our pocketbook. We have got to make a basic review of our troop deployments and we have got to change our national security policies. We must not be borne down by a lot of poor weak allies. In reviewing our security programs we must make the decision as to exactly the kind of program we want. If it turns out that such a program will cost more than we have resources to pay for, we must go to the Congress and ask for increased taxes.

In reply to Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Wilson commented first on the manner in which the Department of Defense had contributed to the loss of gold which had been discussed by Secretary Humphrey. Secretary Wilson remarked thereafter that he wished he could say that he saw some way of carrying out our present defense programs and at the same time saving a billion or two instead of adding a billion or two of additional expenditures. He did not, however, see how we could do this and still stay ahead of the Russians.

Secretary Humphrey said that if this proved to be the case, we must either revise our entire national security program or else go to the Congress and ask for additional taxes. Secretary Humphrey expressed great dissatisfaction about the present deployment of U.S. forces overseas. He pointed out that we had actually failed to live up to the new-look strategy which the Administration had agreed upon shortly after the new Administration had taken office. Our main defense was supposed to rest on a striking force maintained in the United States and ready to be used anywhere. Actually, however, we had never carried out this new-look strategy.

The President pointed out that when all was said and done, we must defend the United States. The real question, he repeated, is what the long-term interests of the United States require abroad. He was sure that if we took our forces out of Europe today we would lose that continent. It was chiefly to Europe that our money was going. On the contrary, we might be able to reduce our forces in Japan.

Admiral Radford then informed the Council that in the last ten days or two weeks he had visited all the various locations where our extensive guided missile programs were being implemented. As a result of directives, some from the NSC itself, all these missile programs were being stepped up. Test schedules were being devised. It was the consensus everywhere that this schedule of programs and tests would be met. Admiral Radford said he was impressed with progress on these programs and appalled by the potentialities of these missiles. He added that of course these programs were tremendously expensive, even though they were still in the research stage. In six months’ time, moreover, we would be shifting from the research stage, and the Defense Department would be involved in shaping up a procurement program for these missiles, the training of men to operate them, and the provision of launching sites.

The President suggested that since there were several programs designed to produce long-range or shorter-range missiles, the exercise of selectivity would ultimately permit us to concentrate on the best long-range missile and the best short-range missile after the tests have been completed. This could result in some savings. While Admiral Radford agreed in the main with the President, he pointed out that in addition to the ICBM and IRBM and other surface-to-surface missiles, there was a whole family of other types of missiles.

The President then speculated as to whether, after we had achieved our objective of an intercontinental missile, we could cut down our production of intercontinental bomber aircraft. Admiral Radford was inclined to doubt whether missiles could ever wholly replace manned aircraft. The latter, for example, were essential, to search out targets in enemy territory. He could not, at any rate, quickly see us going over wholly to reliance on intercontinental missiles, and in any event, we were being obliged to commit a vast sum of money to carrying on our missile programs. The President said he agreed in the main with Admiral Radford, but felt that the achievement of intercontinental missiles would permit us some reduction in the production of manned aircraft. Must we forever keep on producing B–52’s? Why do we never seem to get any alternatives or substitutes?

Admiral Radford replied that part of the answer to the President’s dilemma would be provided by certainty as to the use of nuclear weapons in any future war. If the situation as to the use of such weapons remains fuzzy, the expense of maintaining the production of conventional weapons will continue to be saddled upon us.[5]

Secretary Humphrey repeated his view that our main trouble was caused by the fact that we had more commitments than we could carry out. Secretary Wilson agreed that at any rate we had a couple of “big losers” in Korea and Formosa. We were providing over $700 million to Korea each year. Could not these commitments be reduced? Admiral Radford replied that if we shut off Korea we might just as well quit our whole position in the Far East. In his opinion, neither Korea nor Formosa was a loser, and he felt obliged to disagree with Secretary Wilson on this issue. In his opinion Korea and Formosa were actually doing a job for the United States.

Secretary Wilson said that he had never meant to suggest that the United States pull out of Korea and Formosa altogether. He did believe that we might be able to cut down our commitments in these areas. The President commented that we could probably do something along this line when we got rid of old Rhee.[6]

The National Security Council:[7]

Discussed anticipated trends in the U.S. military program, and the implications thereof for the Federal budget, the U.S. economy and U.S. foreign and military policies.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on March 23.

[2] In this memorandum, dated March 20, Eisenhower requested a report on the Defense Department’s accomplishments since the previous autumn in its effort to substantially cut the civilian personnel in each of the services. Eisenhower added, among other things, that he was disappointed about the military authorities’ failure to suggest ways to save money in logistic or administrative operations. He noted that “every recommendation made by the military authorities seems to be for an increase in strength or in money or both.” The President requested that Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford be prepared to talk on these matters at the next Security Council meeting. (Ibid., DDE Diaries)

[3] Not found in Department of State files, but the March 20 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above contains a note from the President to the effect that the Bureau of the Budget had asked for his approval that afternoon on a “Supplementary” for 1956, approximating $50 million.

[4] Stuart Symington (D–Mo.).

[5] On March 23, Radford addressed the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington. During his speech, Radford listed seven “Key Factors in Future Military Planning,” one of which was the use of atomic weapons. Radford noted that “our present military force structures and our war plans provide for the use of atomic weapons when it is to our military advantage. They are based on present national policy of integrating nuclear weapons with other weapons in our military arsenal.” A copy of Radford’s address is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.

[6] Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.

[7] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1531, approved by the President on March 23. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

68. Diary Entry by the President, March 30, 1956[1]

March 30, 1956

Conversation with Bernard Baruch, March 28, 1956.

Mr. Baruch has written me or otherwise sent me messages several times concerning the need for greater progress in the guided missile field.[2] Because he has, in two great wars, been deeply involved in America’s logistic efforts, his opinions are certainly worth considering—if for no other reason than because of his standing and reputation in the public mind. In any event, I have explained to him the world situation as I see it, with special reference to the relative capabilities of the Soviets and ourselves in our capacity for inflicting destruction upon the other.

I pointed out that if our calculations are anywhere near correct, there is no question that in a matter of hours we could inflict very great, even decisive, damage upon the productive power of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The guided missile is therefore merely another, or auxiliary, method of delivering over the Soviet Union the kind of destructive force that is represented in the hydrogen bomb. Until we found the way to make a bomb of megaton size and put it in a small package, capable of being transported by ballistic methods, the ballistic missile was not even a serious threat.

I further pointed out that the ballistic missile and its early production will have greater effect on world psychological reaction because people see it as the “ultimate” weapon, and have a picture of guided missiles raining out of the skies in almost uncounted numbers; it is extremely important that the Soviets do not get ahead of us in the general organization of our atomic bomb effort, and the money we are devoting to it. In[On] this last point, I tried to show him that we are already employing so many of the nation’s scientists and research facilities that even the expenditure of a vastly greater amount could scarcely produce any additional results.

I also explained to him that I had decided not to make a “Manhattan Project” out of the research effort. Slow and varied type of development has been going on in this field, for some years, and the operating people who know most about the matter are in the services. Moreover, each of the services has in its direct employ, or through contract with large firms, the only scientists who have been constantly engaged in this work. This means that the matter must be kept in the hands of the services, but I do agree with Mr. Baruch that the civilian boss of the job should be a real boss and not a mere expediter.

The conversation then turned to trade. Since in the past he had spoken to me rather feelingly about the wickedness of any of our so-called friends who deal with the Communists, I was quite astonished to find that he now really favors a general plan of removing all restrictions on all trade with the Reds. This conforms to my view, except that we know that there are a few of our types of machinery that the Soviets want as patterns and models. These I would keep on the prohibited list. Otherwise, however, I believe that the effort to dam up permanently the natural currents of trade, particularly between such areas as Japan and the neighboring Asian mainland, will be defeated.

DDE[3]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret.

[2] See Document 55.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

69. Notes on a Meeting With the President, President’s Office, White House, Washington, March 29, 1956, 2:30 p.m.[1]

Washington, March 29, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

PRESENT

Admiral Radford

Deputy Director of Defense Robertson

Comptroller of the Department of Defense McNeil

Director of the Bureau of the Budget Hughes

Deputy Director of Bureau of Budget Brundage

Mr. Reed of the Bureau of the Budget

Governor Adams

General Persons

SUBJECT

Memorandum prepared by Defense, in response to request from the President, concerning 1957–58 Defense budget picture[2]

President first read memorandum and accompanying charts, asked question about relocation warning line (explained by Radford and Robertson).

The President said that whole effort represented a fine recommendation, but where was he to get the money since we are up to the limit of our indebtedness.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget interposed that the Bureau of the Budget had not been asked to concur in the recommendations under discussion.

The President questioned the figure set forward for the support of the Reserve force, saying that he did not think we had any substantial Reserve force. Robertson indicated the Reserve force was being increased, and that the requested appropriation is consistent with the increased program. The President said in an offside that he thought all the ingenuity had been lost (by the regular Armed forces) in scraping up people to do miscellaneous jobs.

The President asked specifically about the change in plans for ship construction. Radford explained that six ships in the ’56 program had been originally planned—three to carry guided missiles and three with more conventional batteries. However, the guided missiles to be put on such ships have progressed to the point where all six ships can be so outfitted, indeed the missiles are ready now, and it would be cheaper to install them at the construction time rather than to refit them later. The President queried what was so much more expensive about installation of guided missiles on ships (in place of the conventional batteries) and Radford explained that a different and more costly fire control system was needed. It was pointed out that these missiles have nothing to do with ballistic missiles. Robertson said that the tests on these “Talos” missiles have been encouraging.

The President said it looked to him as though first priority had been given to guided missiles. He asked if any program had been cut; Robertson said that it had; that Admiral Burke was complaining about what had been done to sonar research. Later in the discussion, the President again brought up his feeling that nothing had been cut down, that everything had been expanded. McNeil and Robertson assured him that some programs had been reduced, but that the figures did not show on the memorandum presented. The President commented that for his peace of mind it might be better to show where such savings had been made.

At one point in the discussion of the guided missiles program and cost, Robertson brought out the tremendous costs involved in the “range” that is being developed to test them.

Robertson said that he had discussed the question of the B–52’s with LeMay, and whether the B–52’s meant that the overseas bases would not be so necessary. LeMay will go along about not spending any more on African bases, but hopes that Spanish bases will be kept up. LeMay feels that we could take another look at the “Snark” missile, but doesn’t want to give up on the Navaho.

The question of duplication of research and of efforts bothers the President. He again referred back to the fact that nothing is ever eliminated from the requests saying that he thought he had gotten together the best possible group of officers, and he had yet to hear of anyone who would say he wanted to concede anything; he said he was discouraged to see that no one ever comes up to him to say “let’s get rid of something.” He realizes this is an old story—that it took the Army 50 years to get rid of horses after they had become obsolete. The President said he thought we were building up a very fine case for the people who say “we need more stuff.” Where do we get the money? You can’t raise taxes and expect people to invest their money, and investments are basis of American prosperity.

The President referred to the fact that some months ago he had issued orders that the three Services should not air, in the press, their fights and their advances in missile program, and he referred to the clippings Colonel Goodpaster had given him earlier in the afternoon. He said we want to spend more money, and we want to tell everybody exactly what we are doing. He read to the people the story about the Nike location, a statement by Secretary Brucker about “another kind of system,” and showed the photograph of an advanced type missile. Robertson said that Brucker “should not have said what he did.”

The President thought the recent publicity stories were disgraceful, and blamed the public relations departments of the three Services. Then he said he did not want to be quarrelsome, but he did not know where the money would come from—he mentioned the farm bill and what that would cost. But he said he had tried to get the Services together on some things (during the time when he came back to the Pentagon from the Columbia experience) and that obviously he had not gotten very far.

Radford injected a brighter note by saying that things were really moving very fast, and said that a great deal of defense appropriations were going into intercontinental defense, that some very firm directives had come from NSC (the President said they had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs), and that a lot of expenditures had come as result of Killian report and the report by Mr. Sprague.

The President agreed with Admiral Radford that he was not entirely convinced that the guided missiles are the answer to all the problems.

Radford said that they were getting a lot of new weapons, but at the same time they could not stop the production of the old ones. President interjected that he could not see what possible use the Army could have for jet planes.

Again about the guided missile programs. Four are under construction, hope is that one will come through. There are two big programs where the approach is quite different, one might work and one might not. The President questioned why the Army should have a 1500-mile ballistic missile program, since the Army does not have the equipment to see where they are hitting.

At one point the President indicated that in the matter of guided missiles he thought the Air Force ought to be the “boss.”

Robertson said that in the ICBM we have two ballistic missiles— one or both may or may not work. As far as the IRBM goes, they started with the Redstone organization of the Army because it was operating and in momentum. The Navy medium-range missile is being developed at Douglas.

Mr. Hughes said that the Budget questions were thoroughly gone into in December and certain choices were made, and for some time he felt they were being adhered to. Now apparently there seems to be a complete change of atmosphere.

There was some discussion of fighter planes—and the lead time necessary to get certain planes into production. The F–110 will be started in production in 60–61, but the F–125 will not be coming along until 62–64.

The President would like to see the Defense Department cut down to “spartan basis.” But he admitted that people he had known all his life were asking for more and more. He said, “I say the patriot today is the fellow who can do the job with less money.”

Mr. Robertson emphasized that Mr. Wilson had gone over in the fall the budget very thoroughly with the people in the Departments, had been tough—to the point that they were afraid they would go before the Congress and not have the individual Services with them. Mr. Wilson was able to get a figure of 700 million, and got a firm assurance from the Services that this was a program they could live with. Now when they go to the Congress, with the pressure for ballistic missiles, for B–52’s, and pressure from Symington and Russell committee,[3] it is going to be difficult. The President admitted it would be agonizing. These hearings will probably start about the 15th of April. Robertson emphasized that they would like to know as soon as possible whether the suggestions would be agreeable.

Mr. Hughes said that Budget would study the matter and present recommendations to the President, and it was indicated group would get together early next week for further discussion.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Secret. No drafting officer is indicated.

[2] Reference is presumably to the memorandum from the President to Secretary Wilson, March 20; see footnote 2, Document 67.

[3] Senate Armed Services Committee.

70. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 30, 1956, 3 p.m.[1]

Washington, March 30, 1956, 3 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Radford

General Twining

General Taylor

Admiral Burke

Colonel Goodpaster

Admiral Radford began by saying that unless brought under control, a situation may develop in which the Services are involved in increasing public disagreement among themselves. Also, the last four or five months, quite a large number of “split” issues have had to be taken up to Secretary Wilson. There are a number of points in the nature of basic questions on which clarification is needed.

The first is whether we will use atomic weapons in war. There is still reluctance in some quarters to plan on this basis. In actual fact, we are already largely committed as regards our force structure, and will become increasingly so as time goes on.

A second question is that of the roles and missions of the individual Services as applied to guided missiles.

A third question is a desire by the Army to have more control over its reconnaissance.

A fourth is the increasingly aggressive public relations policy of the Services, particularly the Army, but spreading to the others.

Admiral Radford thought that we face so many great and real difficulties, for example, in the Middle East, that we should avoid these distractions.

The President recalled that about a year and one-half ago he had stated some very strong views regarding what he termed “competitive publicity” among the Services. He thought that it was highly harmful to the Nation, and thought that it should be stopped. It is the responsibility of the Service Chiefs to give necessary instructions to public relations officers to accomplish this. It ought to be accepted policy to avoid things that are secret or are likely to give away secrets. Public relations activities, when carried out for the purpose of morale, are understandable, but there should be none of this competitive publicity.

Commenting on roles and missions, the President said he tends to look on the 1500- and 5000-mile missiles as being in the same class operationally. He thought it would be most harmful to have public quarreling over the responsibility for employment of such missiles. He has accepted the recommendation of the scientists that we proceed for the present with the development of four missiles, in order to make sure that all possibilities are explored. He feels that Secretary Wilson should put plenary powers in the hands of one man in the missiles field, and that one man should “do the talking.” He recognizes that there is an extremely difficult problem of coordinating air defense missiles with fighter aircraft.

With regard to this question of using atomic weapons, he said that the subject is one which calls for great care in discussion. He was clear in his own mind that in any war with the Soviets we would use them. Also, as soon as air defense atomic weapons are projected, he would certainly use them against any aircraft attacking the United States.

The President next discussed the fundamental reasons why needs of our economy must always be considered. It is the nature of our Government that everyone, except for a thin layer at the top, is working, knowingly or unknowingly, to damage our economy—the reason being that they see the need for more and more resources for their own Service or agency, and the valuable results that can be achieved through added effort in their own particular element. Unless there is someone who brings all of these together, the net effect is to create burdens which could sap the strength of our economic system. Similarly, there are great pressures on the military program from every particular element, and the catalytic factor provided by the Press and Congress might make it explode. In working for permanent security, we must give due consideration to the right “take” from the economy—one which will permit the economy to remain viable and strong.

The President is not expecting the Chiefs to abandon their basic convictions or conclusions about security needs. He is expecting that activities will be conducted on a spartan basis, and with awareness of the essentiality of a sound economy to true security. He referred to the adverse effects of fluctuations which would result from attempting too much for a short period, and then having to cut back deeply. He stressed the need for each Chief to subordinate his position as a champion of a particular Service to his position as one of the overall national military advisors. He would like to see them seek to be the first to suggest places where the program can be cut—particularly on a basis of one Service giving up a function if another Service would perform it.

The President said he must look to the Chiefs to work out ideas on specific problems. People sometimes try to depend too much on the President’s own military background and experience. Conclusions on specific problems should be developed by the Chiefs.

The President referred to a great mistake made by a former President. He took a decision in a matter of military policy and then invited individual Chiefs to debate that decision. On any major question, there is always a multitude of factors which could give the basis for dissent. However, decision is often mandatory, and after it is taken, successful results can be achieved if all then pull together.

The President said that whenever a matter is up for consideration he wanted the Chiefs to understand that any of them who wished could always come along with Admiral Radford to see him. In fact, his door is open to them at any time.

There was then discussion on a few random points. The President thought that if military needs were of the order of 36-1/2 billion as a “level off” figure, it is possible that could be attained without damage to the economy. He said he had had a visit from Mr. Baruch, who told him that he has changed his views on East-West trade, and would now open up wide for trade to expose how little the Soviets have to offer.[2] The President said that if difficulties were to arise requiring U.S. forces in the Middle East, he would plan to draw troops from Europe, since such commitment would in fact be for the protection of the oil supplies to Western Europe. General Taylor said troops could be brought in faster from the U.S. The President thought it was not desirable to deploy the central reserve as long as the USSR is not involved. General Taylor mentioned a plan to rotate a division from Germany to Libya for annual training.

Admiral Radford mentioned that Air Chief Marshal Dickson[3] will be here next week, and the President said he would be happy to see him.

The President then discussed some of his ideas concerning the Middle East—the need of building up Saud, and of developing a “package” which we could take to the British for agreement. The idea would be to balance off actions everywhere except to leave pressure on the area selected—perhaps Egypt. There was discussion of the necessity of joining the Baghdad Pact,[4] and the need for giving some assurance to Israel in that connection—and also of the danger that, with such assurance, Israel might take actions which would lead to their being attacked, thus committing the United States.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 2. Another memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Burke on April 2, is in Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.

[2] See Document 68.

[3] Sir William Dickson, British Marshal of the Royal Air Force and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

[4] The Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, generally known as the Baghdad Pact. For text, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 233, p. 199. The Pact was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3. Documentation on U.S. policy with respect to the Baghdad Pact is scheduled for publication in volume XII.

71. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting Between the President and the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Taylor), White House, Washington, April 2, 1956, 2:30 p.m.[1]

Washington, April 2, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

General Taylor’s meeting with the President, which lasted for about an hour, was devoted chiefly to an outline by the General of his thinking on Army aviation and Army missiles, and to an exchange of views and ideas on these subjects. The meeting was in the nature of an informal discussion, not concerned with specific decisions.

The discussion of Army aviation turned on what Army aircraft should do—the President was not immediately interested in the size of the Army program, or number of planes, as such. The President knows the Army has need for aircraft organic to its units in the field to join in carrying out their battle tasks. The type of thing that causes him concern is any indication that the Army is taking over support functions through lack of confidence that the Air Force will provide for their needs. Army planes to his mind should, in general, be as slow and as light as possible, designed for operations generally on the friendly side of the line. This type is safest from hostile fighters. General Taylor pointed out that under the new concepts that are developing, there will be great intermingling on the battlefield, without clear lines, and the need for target-finding, which will be very acute, raises the need for aircraft that can go in to observe and photograph more deeply. He emphasized that there was no thought of having aircraft which could not take off from small open fields.

The President said he had heard something about the Army wanting jets. General Taylor said this idea is simply for experimental purposes—to see what could be done with them. The President said there is a constant tendency to make aircraft bigger and heavier, and this might take the Army aircraft out of its proper role. General Taylor said that weights and numbers are not in his opinion matters for “Key West agreements.” It should be up to the Army to incorporate what they can best use in the performance of their operations. The President said he had never agreed with those who felt that Army combat units had to have their own close support aviation. General Taylor said there is good reason to feel that close support air operations are fading out of the picture. Missiles will take over this function. They both recalled that, except for dive bombing, close support aviation was limited in what it could contribute.

General Taylor mentioned Army thinking regarding use of small “drones” for reconnaissance of the battle area. The President questioned whether these might not be quite vulnerable to ground fire.

The discussion next turned to Army missiles. General Taylor showed the President a chart indicating the whole “family” of such missiles. He described briefly the present Nike, the Nike B and Nike 2 now under development, and the “Missile Master” for their coordinated employment. The President said that the problem of coordination of missiles (like anti-aircraft artillery) with interceptors is so difficult that it might be necessary, as in the war, to put all under the control of the Air Defense Commander. He said he thought that it would not be practicable to protect all vital areas with missiles, and those, once installed, are immobile. Interceptors will still be necessary. General Taylor said that interceptors could fill in the gaps, and that he thought in fact that this would be their greatest role, as bomber aircraft gain in speed and altitude.

General Taylor described the Honest John and the Little John rockets to the President, outlining their close support role. He said the Sergeant and the Redstone would be emplaced further to the rear and carefully sited in, and would be capable of close support and tactical interdiction. The President asked what use the Army would have for a 1500-mile missile. General Taylor said it is being developed by the Army to take advantage of Redstone experience. The Army had no clear proposals for using it at this time, but was simply asking that no decision be taken now freezing the Army out. Some of these could conceivably be placed in North Africa for support in Central Europe. The President referred to this use as flanking fire, indicating he could see some logic in it, although pointing out that he thought front-line people might be rather worried as to its accuracy when it was firing from such a distance. He also referred to the communications problem of bringing fire down when and where needed, from distant launching points.

The President said his general philosophy is to oppose a service assuming or duplicating a function simply because of lack of confidence that another would perform it. Rather he thought each service should insist on the others making good in providing support. If they fail, he would expect the matter to be brought to the Defense Department and to him.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Personal and Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 3. The time and date of the meeting are written by hand on the source text.

72. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, April 5, 1956, 10:30 a.m.[1]

Washington, April 5, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

The meeting began with the following present: Secretary Wilson, Secretary Humphrey, Director Brundage, Secretary Robertson, Colonel Goodpaster.

The President said that it had been reported to him that Air Force testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee left the distinct impression that the Navy does not contribute on strategic bombing. Also, in making strength comparisons, ours had been reported as a second-best Air Force because it is smaller than total Soviet air strength. He asked Admiral Radford for a comment. Admiral Radford said that there are well coordinated plans which incorporate Navy striking power in the total strategic bombing effort. Because of the way questions are asked, the impression has on occasion been left that the air picture is dark, by relating solely our own Air Force strength to Soviet total strength—including their naval air.

The President referred to the need to assure that Congressional inquiries heard an over-all presentation by Defense in initiating their work. Then they could bring in critics of the program, but they should wind up with Defense comment again at the end. There was further discussion on the tendency of questioners to engage in the “numbers racket,” creating false impressions of relative military position.[2]

At this point the following joined the conference: Secretary Quarles, Secretary Thomas, Under Secretary Finucane,[3] General Twining, Admiral Burke, General Pate. (General Persons had previously joined at the President’s request.)

The President opened this phase of the meeting with a full statement on the military budget situation. He said he had taken action on the final paper for FY–57. Mr. Brundage would consult with Secretary Robertson on one or two items but in general the Defense proposal will be approved. He said his great concern with this proposal had been that it would simply lay the groundwork for a permanently higher program in future years. From Congress he is being informed that inter-service tensions and rivalries are growing—even that they are worse than any time since unification. He doubts this. He thinks he has the best group heading the establishment that there has been at any time since World War II. This being the case, he sees no reason for any such report of tensions. What he wants is corporate opinion. Single service opinions and points of view are not of value to him.

Several specific things were mentioned affecting the Navy and Air Force. He was told that in the Air Force presentation, the Navy was assigned a zero rating in terms of its effect in strategic bombing. If this is the case, he wonders what in the world we are building Forrestal-type carriers for. He realizes that once the “Key West” agreements assigned strategic bombing to SAC. But times have changed and the Navy has units of great striking power. Admiral Radford has told him that targets have been assigned to each major force; he supposes the Navy concentrates on ports and coastal areas. If this is the case, their contribution cannot be ignored. He challenges any notion that ours is a second-class Air Force as some reports have apparently indicated. This type of comparison gives a wholly false picture. He said that he has discounted these reports of in-fighting and contention among the services. He thinks that unification has made great gains; which should not be ignored.

What this means in his mind is that a Chief of Staff of one service should not present just the picture of his own service alone. Each service supplements the other in over-all military strength. Those testifying should not make it look as though each does the job alone. He recognizes that in the early stages of a blitz the Army and Marine involvement in the atomic exchange may be less than the other services. If the war goes on, however, their contribution will tend to enlarge.

The President stated he was certain in his mind that we can stand on our whole program. If we talk in a unified sense, there will be no basis for people getting alarmed. We must, however, talk about the whole thing. He referred to a recent statement by General Spaatz[4] to the effect that the side which has the 5000-mile missile first can win the world [war?]; he thinks someone should talk to General Spaatz and give him a well-rounded and comprehensive picture of just what our strength is. He said Mr. Baruch had been in, very much concerned about the whole missile situation, and that he had left saying that he was satisfied and the whole matter was cleared up in his mind.

The President said his approach is to support the Defense establishment as a whole, not the particular services. This present inquiry seems to be concentrating on the services to get each to say they need a little more.

The President then went on to comment on the request from Congress to the Air Force as to what they would do with an additional $1.5 billion. He said a full answer to this would have to be that of course an additional sum like this could be used, but one must think of what its provision would do to the country as a whole. He commented that those present should realize that the Secretary of the Treasury is the one who finally persuaded him to approve this proposed supplemental. He was certain that everybody in this Administration is for a strong Defense establishment but it must be for the Defense establishment as a whole. Everyone should watch his tongue very closely to make sure he is not led into statements regarding his own service which have the effect of giving an impression that would not be borne out with regard to the Defense establishment as a whole. He said that it is not a question of looking for votes. So far as he is concerned, if he were not elected this fall it would simply mean that people should feel sorry for somebody else. What he is committed to is a sound program. He wants to keep a sound approach and a sound Administration. Everyone in the Defense establishment should nail his flag to the staff of the United States of America, and think in terms of the whole. He was convinced if people did that the problems would be avoided. He pointed out that he is not saying that anyone has done anything deliberate in weakening the Administration program. He just thinks that we are being used, by people who draw attention away from the whole and concentrate on the dissatisfactions that individual services may have. The President referred to an inquiry which is about to start, and said he felt the Committee should hear the responsible Defense officials first, then critics, then wind up with Defense again. He repeated that each man testifying must think of what the other services contribute. If he can’t bring himself to do this, he doesn’t belong in the position he holds. He must not allow himself to be led, through techniques playing on inter-service rivalry, to ask for additions for his own service above what is provided for in a combined Defense program which he considers to be adequate. At this point, Secretary Wilson told the President he had had a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council two weeks or so ago in which he had pointed out the efforts that would be made to split the group and play off one against another.

The President said he had information that, on one occasion at least, a questioner had detailed, more exact figures than General Twining had. He said this could only mean that information is being passed by someone not authorized to do so. If any subordinates were doing this, they should be found and severely disciplined. General Twining thought the information may be passed by industry. The President said that all should be put on notice that any such conduct of trying to influence administrative decision to get more orders (as Secretary Wilson suggested) would have just the opposite effect.

Secretary Thomas pointed out that all three of the service Secretaries have served in the Department of Defense. All are “on the team.” He pledged his full loyalty to the President and his program. Secretary Wilson repeated that he is trying to build up a team spirit. The President said the problem is that certain individuals are trying to split the group. He advised, when questions are asked, not simply to answer them in narrow terms and in the specific detail requested, but always to try to see that the perspective is given. We should understand that the questioner oftentimes is trying to create an impression through the incompleteness of the discussion, and therefore an attempt should be made to round it out. The President said that this supplemental will be before the Congress before individuals go down to appear in the new inquiry. Everybody should stand on that. General Persons advised all to be very careful of the “numbers racket”—to round out the explanation, for example to bring out that the problem is one of over-all deterrent power rather than matching item for item. The President said that when we have “enough” as was brought out in the evaluation report, comparisons of item by item are not too meaningful.

Secretary Wilson said that the approval of this supplemental “fills the hand” of Defense. He will be very disappointed if all top people do not battle it out on this basis.

The President said we must put our costs on a basis that we can sustain indefinitely. If they are allowed to run too high, the result would be to ruin the America we know and force us into a garrison state. He said that people should not be misled by enticements for more funds. The same man offering them is saying that he could cut the budget $8 billion.

Mr. Brundage asked for it to be made clear that if this supplemental is given, no more will be put forward. Missile costs will be absorbed. “Vanguard” is the only addition. Mr. Wilson said he did not know just where we will be next January with regard to missiles. The President said that a budget must mean something—it is not a question of simply adding on bits and pieces. It is the responsibility of all to make it be a meaningful management document.

Mr. Wilson said he is starting a long-range study which should come up with a three-year program. He thought it might be a good idea to start out with an allowable figure. The President said he did not think as simple an approach as that is possible. He felt the Chiefs, after thorough study, should indicate the minimum.

Secretary Wilson said the Chiefs do not pass on the question of an additional Forrestal carrier, or how many B–52 wings there should be. The President responded vigorously to this, saying that for example General Twining should take up with Admiral Burke each major element proposed for the Navy, and the outcome should be an agreement that if you (the Air Force) will do thus and such, I will save thus and such out of my (Navy) budget. If the Chiefs are not doing this, they should be doing it. This is a kind of advice which they can give, and they should be required to give. When he was a theater commander he did not allow each service to put in for whatever it wanted; the JCS are in his mind simply a corporate combined commander. They should consider these specific things together, and not waste so much of their time on abstractions like roles and missions. If they are not doing this kind of thing, what in the world are they doing?

Secretary Humphrey said this current action relates to the FY–57 budget. We should not get ahead of ourselves. He will have some very definite ideas regarding FY–58 and later years. Secretary Wilson said if we bring in the guided missiles, we should drop out some manned aircraft wings. Secretary Quarles and General Twining said they planned to do so. The President indicated he would like to have General Twining in some day soon to discuss with him the question of how many aircraft there should be in each wing. He saw savings out of putting 45 in a single wing rather than 30, providing the result is fewer wings.

At an earlier point the President said that we should be very careful in answering questions about individual items and services when the answer really turns on the bulk or totality of our armed strength. He also said that we should not get fixed ideas about new weapons supplanting old—for example, it would never be possible to set up so many Nike batteries that the whole of the United States was covered. Interceptors will continue to be required.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 5.

[2] On April 4, the President met with Senators James H Duff (R–Pa.) and Leverett Saltonstall and General Persons. During the meeting Eisenhower spoke on the subject of the relevance of “numbers” to the military position of the United States, as summarized in a memorandum for record by Persons:

“He pointed out that whether or not we had adequate air power should be based on the adequacy of our deterrent power and not on numbers alone. He made it clear that determination is necessarily a matter of judgment and cannot be worked out on a mathematical exact basis by anyone. He further made clear that if in the judgment of responsible officials the United States had adequate power to deter the Soviet from making an attack, he felt that there was no justification for adding additional aircraft and other weapons just for the purpose of trying to match in numbers those of the Soviets.

“The President pointed out that in any consideration of the adequacy of our security, we must take into account the striking power of our naval aviation as well as the location of our bases in close range of the Soviets. Furthermore, we have allies and the aviation of these allies must be taken into consideration in looking at the overall picture. He feels that there should be a close correlation between naval air power and the strategic air force and that he will instruct the Defense Department to insure this. He noted that in the public discussions of our air power, there is little or no mention of the tremendous air power which is in the hands of the Navy.”

[3] Charles C. Finucane, Under Secretary of the Army.

[4] General Carl Spaatz, USAF (ret.).

73. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the President[1]

Washington, April 17, 1956.

SUBJECT

Military and Other Requirements for National Security

Enclosed herewithin are the further views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject, organized in accordance with the topical outline which you suggested during discussion at the White House on 13 March 1956.[2]

Arthur Radford

Enclosure

MILITARY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY

I. Domestic Military Situation

a.

Review of the position of U.S. Military Forces Vis-à-Vis Those of the USSR.

The present posture of U.S. forces provides ready forces equipped, as appropriate, with atomic capability and the capacity to respond selectively and flexibly to local aggression or general war. The rapidity with which these forces could respond to local aggression is dependent upon the forces required for a given situation, the availability of transportation appropriate to the task, and the availability and security of bases and communications. In some geographic areas, response to local aggression would require the temporary diversion of forces, transportation, and other resources from planned initial tasks in a general war. It is estimated that, in the event of a general war, essential sea and air communications could be maintained, except in certain areas peripheral to the Soviet Bloc, where U.S. and allied capabilities would be marginal. While the Air Defense capabilities of the continental United States are improving at an accelerated rate, the increasing Soviet atomic stockpile, now estimated to include megaton weapons, and the improved Soviet delivery capability have in effect made any relative gain questionable. It is estimated that, at present, the atomic-air retaliation capability of the United States would provide a margin of relative advantage in general war to the United States and its allies which, when exploited effectively by other military forces, would assure eventual victory against the USSR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, view present comparative military strengths with concern but with confidence, and will continue to hold this view so long as the factor of atomic advantage remains in the U.S. favor. This present comparison is not bound to persist and may change. This change can come about at any time through U.S. failure or Soviet success in many areas, including the cold war, or through a combination of factors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the present trend in our military position vis-à-vis the USSR is not sufficiently favorable to warrant curtailment of existing programs.

b.

Review of the Progress of U.S. Armed Forces in the Last Four Years.

The United States has, in the execution of its military programs, improved the training of its armed forces and markedly enhanced their striking power and over-all capability in the last four years. Concurrent with the increasing delivery capability of SAC, certain carrier striking forces, tactical air forces, and units employing missiles and projectiles armed with atomic warheads have attained an offensive and defensive atomic capability. This total capability has been substantially increased by strategic deployment of atomic weapons systems. Furthermore, the development of air-transportable equipment, new techniques and weapons systems, along with the training of personnel have improved the capability of the U.S. land, sea, and air forces to meet local aggression as well as carry out tasks in event of general war.

c.

Estimated Place and Role of the Guided Missile a Few Years Ahead.

In due course, our present guided missiles capability will be increased to the point where it will greatly augment the offensive and defensive strength of our military forces. It must be borne in mind, however, that accuracy, pay load, reliability, and increased intelligence requirements are among the factors which will influence the future employment of these missiles. The rate of assimilation of guided missiles into our weapons systems will be governed by demonstrated capabilities rather than promised performance. Although certain guided missiles are already operational, it is too early to predict with any degree of assurance the extent to which the whole family of guided missiles may eventually replace current weapons systems. Some measure of the rate of progress expected, however, is set forth in the next succeeding paragraph.

d.

Measures by Each Service in the Next Few Years to Shift to More Modern Elements of Military Strength.

In the coming years the offensive and defensive forces of the United States will be converted to atomic ready forces at an accelerated rate. The availability of atomic weapons in virtually any size or configuration will provide the capability to apply firepower selectively. All Services are now expediting re-equipment of their forces with new weapons and are instituting programs for changes in organization and tactical dispositions to exploit the new weapons systems as well as to meet the requirements of modern warfare. Examples are:

Army—In the next few years the mobility, flexibility, and firepower or U.S. Army Forces will be progressively improved. By 1965 Army weapons systems will have completed a considerable transformation which is now in progress. Surface-to-surface missiles will have partially replaced medium and heavy artillery. Although conventional artillery weapons probably will still be retained at the division direct support level, significant amounts of light and medium conventional artillery will have been replaced by missiles systems. Antiaircraft artillery will probably have been entirely replaced by guided missiles systems. Divisional weapons other than artillery will continue to be

Navy—The Navy is shifting to new and modern heavy attack carriers, incorporating the latest technical advances, and capable of operating the latest type jet aircraft, equipped with atomic weapons and guided missiles. The Navy has two guided missiles cruisers and at present is continuing the changeover in both cruisers and destroyers to the use of antiaircraft defense missiles. Certain of the aircraft carriers are presently equipped with Regulus launchers and programs for surface-to-surface missiles in both submarines and surface ships are under way. The Navy is continuing the development of improved weapons delivery systems and, among others, anti-submarine and air defense weapons. Fleet and task force dispositions have been modified to provide greater defense against atomic attack. Amphibious operating doctrine has been altered to make assault units less vulnerable in the attack phase and to provide for more rapid envelopment of the beachhead area.

Air Force—The Air Force is maintaining a qualitatively superior atomic weapon delivery system by the addition of B–52’s and KC–135 tankers. It is developing intercontinental missiles and other advanced atomic delivery systems. The Air Defense system is being expanded and perfected by more extensive radar coverage, the introduction of a semi-automatic ground environment, improved manned and unmanned interceptors and counter-air atomic weapons. Tactical forces are being equipped with atomic-capable aircraft and better transports. In view of the nature of modern war, primary reliance is being placed upon forces-in-being to gain and maintain air supremacy.

Marine Corps—While making steady progress toward realization of a helicopter-assault landing force capability, the Fleet Marine Forces are rapidly improving their interim combat effectiveness by integrating air and ground atomic support capabilities, adapting smaller forces for movement in combinations of fast shipping or airlift, and gaining in maintained as a part of the Marine forces-in-readiness. Promising developments for short-field air operations are expected to provide a major advance in the mobility and flexibility of Marine aircraft units in forward areas.

II. Our Alliances

a. What the United States Must Do to Maintain the Confidence and Alignment of its Allies.

(1) To maintain the essential confidence of our allies and their alignment with us, especially in NATO, requires on our part implanting in their minds the complete conviction that “U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that the United States is committed to their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment.”[3] At the same time we must emphasize that a basic tenet of U.S. policy is to deter war in any form—not provoke it.

(2) Basic to the maintenance of that essential degree of confidence on the part of our allies is the U.S. requirement for retaining, both at home and abroad, a strong military posture. To reinforce this position of strength the Congress should, upon request, give the President authority to act quickly in times of crisis, including the use of armed forces (Taiwan Resolution).[4] Such action by the Legislature would demonstrate our will and ability to react promptly against threats to the security of the United States or our allies.

(3) Besides convincing our allies of the basic United States aims as regards their security, the United States in asserting its leadership should show understanding and support for its allies in the immediate problems they face outside the formal context of alliances, when compatible with U.S. security interests.

b. How to be Selective in U.S. Support to Specific Areas or Countries.

(1) In addition to the above methods of fostering the strength of Free World alliances, military aid programs furnish tangible evidence of the U.S. aim to serve our allies’ security interests as well as our own. Economy, however, dictates that these programs be generally predicated upon eventual complete support of forces by recipient countries. Furthermore, military aid should not subsidize unrealistic national military or economic aspirations. Force levels should be limited to country support capabilities except where there are overriding requirements vital to U.S. national security. The United States should advise nations to concentrate indigenous support upon effective units essential to U.S. policies and war plans, and reduce or eliminate support of others in order to minimize requirements for U.S. aid.

(2) Those friendly nations which are incapable of coping with their own internal security problems should, as a first requirement for Mutual Security Act funds, be provided sufficient military and economic assistance to insure the stability and Western orientation of their governments. In order to achieve selectivity in providing military aid, other than for internal security, the criteria used should be derived from military necessity rather than from political considerations. Such U.S. military assistance should be based on a long-range plan to support specific national units which can be expected to contribute to the successful accomplishment of U.S. war plans. Military aid based on other considerations should be phased out as soon as practicable.

c.

How to Correct the Attitude that “We Are Fighting Your War,” Which Others Tend to Develop Toward the United States.

Although the attitude which certain of our allied countries develop that they are “fighting our war” is largely psychological, it is a continuing and real problem which must be appropriately recognized by the United States. The psychological aspects of our national programs should be given further emphasis, directed toward changing this attitude wherever it appears. On the military side, we must convince our allies by our day-to-day action in collective security arrangements that their national interests are being served equally with our own. In contacts incident to the operations of NATO,SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, and through the many military assistance groups around the world, we must continually stress the mutually beneficial results that accrue from our combined defense efforts.

d. How to Achieve Quick Action in Providing Military Arms Aid— How to Eliminate Long Delays.

(1) In order to close the existing gap between military aid commitments and deliveries, the time-consuming processes of the present budgetary requirements, interagency reviews, approvals, refinements, and rejustifications must be shortened, and broader authority be granted to the executive branch in the expenditure of funds and the delivery of equipment. The authority for determining the dollar values of country military aid programs, within ceilings established by Congressional appropriation, should be delegated to the Secretary of Defense. Necessary political and economic guidance required by the Secretary of Defense should be obtained from the Secretary of State and Director, International Cooperation Administration, respectively. Necessary interagency coordination, which is recognized as essential, can be achieved by parallel and concurrent planning.

(2) It has become increasingly important that the United States be able to take quick action in meeting unanticipated situations, comparable to Soviet speed in making deliveries to countries such as Egypt. Such emergency action could be effected through the establishment of strategic stockpiles under U.S. control in the European and Asiatic areas. Special authority and funding should be requested by the Department of Defense in order to establish strategic stockpiles for this purpose.

III. The World Security Situation

a. What is the Maximum We Should Expect to Get Out of the Military Mode of International Action?

(1) The development and maintenance of military strength in the United States and among our major allies, while indispensable to Free World security, has definite limitations in its application. Its principal purpose is to deter the Soviet-Communist Bloc from overt military action and, if aggression does occur, to oppose it promptly and successfully.

(2) Deterred for the present from overt military action, the Soviet-Communist Bloc is pursuing its expansionist objectives by non-military means. As examples, the Bloc’s recent economic penetrations into areas formerly associated exclusively with the West, its efforts to create and exploit divisive issues among Free World countries, and its encouragement of non-committed countries toward neutralism have resulted in a marked depreciation of Western influence in these areas. Our military mode of international action alone cannot be effective against such tactics. It can only contribute, by deterring military action; thus borrowing time during which the political, economic, and psychological programs of Free World strategy can function. Short of hot war, these latter measures must carry the burden. In the final analysis, the relative strengths of the opposing Blocs will, to a large extent, be determined by the success of the non-military elements of our national strategy.

b.

Where Would it be More Advantageous to Keep Countries Neutral Rather than Active Military Allies?

As pointed out above, the continuing effectiveness of our military programs as a deterrent to war will be measured not only by visible military strength, but by our success in achieving an unmistakable unity of purpose and will to act in an emergency. It must be recognized that the strength of a military alliance is not necessarily augmented by the admittance of additional members. From the purely military standpoint, the value of an additional member should be calculated on the basis of its potentialcontribution in geography, forces, and strength of purpose. A military alliance automatically involves certain additional commitments. Nations have come to expect that alliance with the United States entitles them not only to military protection but to an extensive program of military and economic assistance over an indefinite period. The United States cannot afford to give additional military commitments or to scatter its substance to countries whose contribution to United States and Free World security is either uncertain or of little value. In such cases the United States should not exert pressure to make active military allies of countries not so inclined.

c.

What Kind of Action in the Various Areas Gives the Biggest Return in Security to the United States from Resources Expended?

It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that programs modified as necessary in the light of the foregoing, if resolutely carried out, should bring the greatest return to United States security from the resources expended.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Radford. Top Secret. A note on the source text in unidentified handwriting reads: “4/18—Memo handed to Sec. of State who will return.”

[2] See Document 65.

[3] NSC 5602/1, para 17. [Footnote in the source text.]

[4] State Depart. Bulletin dated 7 Feb 1955. [Footnote in the source text.]

74. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, April 18, 1956, 9:30 a.m.[1]

Washington, April 18, 1956, 9:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Radford

Colonel Goodpaster

The President referred to a memorandum on military and other requirements for our national security which Admiral Radford had sent over yesterday.[2] While recognizing that the memorandum did not give a complete treatment of its subjects, he thought that it began to give a better grasp of the overall security problem than we have had up to now. He thought that discussion in the latter sections (particularly those parts relating to more selective application of military aid, and to economic aid) should now be applied to the various areas and countries of the world to see specifically what it would mean. Before doing so it might be desirable to have comment by the Secretary of State or the Planning Board on the document, particularly these sections. Out of such application a more definite schedule of actions might be developed.

Admiral Radford said that, on the basis of reading of State Department cables and military cables, he sees more of the security picture, in all probability, than any other single official. When he sees troubles beginning to show up, he tries to get top people in Government interested in the matter—frequently without much success. An example is the situation in Iceland, which turns on a matter of sale of Icelandic fish. For $10 to $15 million a year this incident could probably have been avoided. The President picked up his comment about the difficulties of arousing interest until a crisis is at hand, and said it showed the fallacy of relying on busy Cabinet officers in this respect. They have no time to think about distant problems and possibilities, but must concentrate on day-to-day activities. He said that he had told the Icelanders in 1951 that he was sure they would never be satisfied until they have some small force of their own—that the presence of sizable foreign forces would always be a difficulty. We could help them with such a force much more easily than in the field of economic aid. Admiral Radford said that a survey is being made to see if we could reduce the number of Americans on the Island, since this would help reduce the problem. (At the present time, Icelanders allow only 120 Americans a day out of the 6000 on the Island off the base area.)

Admiral Radford referred to problems in Latin America, where the countries are obtaining military equipment from the Communist countries. Also, a number of active trade negotiations are going on.

The President spoke at length on his ideas concerning trade. He felt that people approach the matter too narrowly. It is a certainty that nations will trade with each other. We should concentrate on copper and a half dozen items of most advanced machinery and electronics and encourage trade in everything else. There is a feeling that only the Communists would benefit from trade. He is confident that the West has skill in trading such that a net advantage would probably lie with them. He did see positive value in pressing forward with trade with the Satellites in Eastern Europe. Admiral Radford said that we are down to a very few items in terms of trade with the Satellites. We should try, however, to avoid giving them advanced items, thus letting them save the developmental costs which are frequently quite great. The President commented on how he understood Mr. Baruch has completely changed his views as to trade—two years ago he thought we should be very restrictive; today he would make trade completely free. Admiral Radford commented on how the Communists use their trade delegations to “bore in”—also, how they use their trade as a weapon for other objectives. The President said that if it were possible to get agreement between State, Commerce, Defense, and ODM as to what trade means to the world, it might then be possible to get through a national program in spite of the tendencies to demagoguery on this matter and the pressures for restriction arising out of our high prices and high wage rates.

The President next turned to the question of how the new Chiefs of Staff are making out in their work together—in particular, whether there are problems respecting Army attitudes. Admiral Radford said there has been some problem of Army morale, and the President recalled a recent conversation with his son which brought out that the lack of a doctrine that assigns the Army a definite and permanent mission has left them somewhat unsatisfied and even bewildered. Their role is rather hazy to many of them.

Admiral Radford said he is trying to point out to the Army that they have a great future—in terms of mobile warfare. The first step toward that is to streamline their requirements in the field. (Later he mentioned that the Army’s tendency to resist basing its forces on an atomic concept tends to work in just the wrong direction.) The President mentioned some of his recent conversations with General Taylor on Army aviation.[3]

At this point the President recalled an item he had seen in the newspaper about a new Air Force airplane capable of 1000–1500 miles per hour, and called Secretary Quarles to ask why it is necessary to have a big spread in the papers about this. He stressed strongly the need to avoid this type of thing which leads only to inter-Service “competitive publicity”.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 18.

[2] Supra.

[3] See Document 71.

75. Memorandum of a Luncheon Conversation Among the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey), and the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), Washington, April 19, 1956[1]

Washington, April 19, 1956

I said to Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson that from a political standpoint, I judged that the Soviet Union was now sufficiently committed to policies of non-violence so that I doubted that we would see from their side any repetition of the attack on South Korea. The spot of greatest possible danger of a military character from the Soviet Union was Iran. As regards Communist China, I felt that the risk was greater than from Soviet Russia and that we could not assume that fighting might not break out in any one of the three danger spots—Taiwan, Vietnam or Korea. Of these perhaps the one chiefly requiring local strength was Vietnam because there were no important targets in that area for our retaliatory power and because the Chinese Communists might act through the Vietminh.

In the case of Korea, and to a considerable extent in the case of Taiwan, I felt that the deterrent of our striking power was very considerable and that the need for local forces was primarily psychological.

I expressed the thought that military planning could take account of some of the political changes resulting from the Soviet “new look”.

JFD[2]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on April 25.

[2] Initialed for Dulles by Macomber.

76. National Security Council Report[1]

Washington, April 23, 1956.

NSC 5604

U.S. ACTION IN EVENT OF UNPROVOKED COMMUNIST ATTACK AGAINST U.S. AIRCRAFT

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5429/5 [2]

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack Against U.S. Personnel, Aircraft or Vessels”, dated February 4, 1955 [3]

The Secretary of Defense, by Reference B, recommended consideration of a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the provisions of paragraph 5–g of NSC 5429/5 (Annex A hereto)[4] be made applicable [7 words not declassified]. Following discussion of this recommendation by the NSC Planning Board, the Departments of State and Defense exchanged correspondence on the subject as contained in Annex B hereto.[5] Subsequently the Department of Defense provided answers to certain additional questions on the subject raised by the NSC Planning Board, as indicated in Annex C hereto. [6]

After discussion of the Annexes hereto, the NSC Planning Board submits herewith the enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, May 3, 1956.[7]

James S. Lay Jr.[8]

[Here follows a one-page table of contents.]

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. ACTION IN THE EVENT OF UNPROVOKED COMMUNIST ATTACK AGAINST U.S. AIRCRAFT [9]

[numbered paragraphs 1–4 (1½ pages of source text) not declassified]

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5604 Series. Top Secret.

[2] For text of NSC 5429/5, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 1, p. 1062.

[3] This memorandum transmitted memoranda from Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated February 3 and January 31, respectively, requesting that paragraph 5–g of NSC 5429/5 be made [29 words not declassified]. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5604 Series)

[4] Not printed.

[5] This annex, not printed, contained a memorandum, dated January 19, from Secretary Wilson to Lay transmitting the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make paragraph 5–g of NSC 5429/5 applicable to [6 words not declassified]; a memorandum dated August 22, 1955, from Under Secretary of State Murphy to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson, raising “certain questions of a political nature, which in the view of the Department of State would be likely to have a direct bearing on the desirability [17 words not declassified]”; a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Wilson, dated November 9, 1955, enclosing their replies to the questions put forth by the Department of State; a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray, dated November 21, transmitting the JCS replies; and a memorandum, dated December 2, from Murphy to Gray responding to Gray’s November 21 memorandum.

[6] Not printed.

[7] According to the memorandum of discussion of the 283d NSC meeting on May 3, the President “said that the proposed statement of policy on this subject was OK to him. It seemed to amount to nothing more than the inherent right of self-defense. [3 sentences (64 words) not declassified]” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The Council then adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5604. This action was formally recorded as NSC Action No. 1547. On May 8, the President approved NSC 5604, and directed its implementation by the Secretary of Defense. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[8] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[9] A note at the bottom of the first page reads: “(Editorially revised without change of substance, 2/16/59, NSC Action No. 2049)”

77. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 14, 1956, 3:45 p.m.[1]

Washington, May 14, 1956, 3:45 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Radford

Colonel Goodpaster

The President told Admiral Radford about the report he had just had from Dr. Killian and Dr. Fisk.[2] He said he regarded the problem as primarily one of making the right decisions. It was not a matter involving tremendous new outlays of funds, but an organizational question. He indicated agreement to the thought that there should be a Task Force approach, working on whole “systems”. Gradually, through such a process, it would be possible to concentrate attention on the truly critical elements and activities in the military sphere. In that sense the matter is one of extending the “new look”. He knew that Admiral Radford favored a more centralized type of approach to many of these problems, and certainly felt that would be necessary. The President said he had about reached the conclusion that some reorientation of the whole organization ought to be made sometime next year. It would involve strengthening the position of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of JCS, reducing the services to a more operational, less policy role. Later, he spoke of making the Chiefs of Staff in effect assistants to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—i.e., giving him the power to select and to reassign them. The Chiefs would then have the duty of implementing policy within their own service— not of developing over-all policy.

The President went on to say that he wants to put in his State of the Union message next January a very clear and direct statement as to the types of military establishment we should be maintaining, reflecting concentration on critical items as indicated above. Although this would not be put forward until January, it must be worked out very thoroughly ahead of time. He also said that he is thinking of asking for a new type of oath to be taken by all military and civilian officials who serve in the Pentagon—that on termination of their duty they will disclose nothing which the Department of Defense determines to be security information. He also said that he is planning to lay down stricter rules with regard to possible statements by retired officers on matters of governmental policy.

Admiral Radford said there is a considerable problem arising through people getting into “difficulties” in testimony before Congress—and that in some cases these difficulties arise because of lack of wholehearted support for the Administration position. He also said it is proving very difficult to get unanimity on major plans. He cited the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, in which the question has arisen whether atomic weapons would be used in “small wars”. If there is any planning on the basis that they would not, the way is then left open for a building up of service requirements. The President said he was inclined to feel that we would not get involved in a “small war” extending beyond a few Marine battalions or Army units. If it grew to anything like Korea proportions, the action would become one for use of atomic weapons. Participation in small wars, in his opinion, is primarily a matter for Navy and Air. Our job will be to support, but not to engage our main forces which must be kept clear for larger scale hostilities. Admiral Radford said, for example, that if there were trouble in Vietnam, we would certainly not move in with large Army forces. The task for the Army would be to “beef up” the MAAGs with Army personnel who could serve as advisors to indigenous ground forces. In addition, we would no doubt bring in Honest John, artillery and missile units to provide support.

Admiral Radford then discussed a proposal (which it appeared he had received from State) involving holding a ship loaded with military equipment ready to give to Egypt if aggressed upon, and a “stock pile” of F–86s (from Italy) to Israel if attacked. He was concerned that such an arrangement would leak out. He said he would like very much to discuss the whole matter with State (there are some significant military questions involved) before any decision in principle was taken. The President said it would be quite all right to talk to State, since his whole idea had been that, if the matter could be worked out in agreement, it would be okay with him.

Admiral Radford raised the question as to the Field Marshal[3] continuing at shape. The President discussed the possibility that the Standing Group might say the whole higher command should be changed at the time General Norstad takes over.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 14.

[2] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[3] Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

78. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 18, 1956, 9 a.m.[1]

Washington, May 18, 1956, 9 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

Colonel Randall[2]

Colonel Goodpaster

The President referred to his recent meeting with Drs. Killian and Fisk, in which they referred to the need for accelerating the developing of high altitude radar, SAC dispersal, and quicker reaction time for SAC in case of attack. He said there was a general recommendation for greater authority at the Defense level and less at the service level. Secretary Wilson said that the 1947 Unification Act[3] in effect gave the individual Chiefs and the Secretaries authority to go to the Congress simply by notifying the Secretary of Defense. The President said that Admiral Radford feels the need now for additional staff authority. He thought that the only way open now is to call in individuals before they are appointed and ask for their oath to accept decisions once made. The Secretary said that Secretary Quarles had indicated that 60,000 foot radar is technically “still not quite completely ready”. Production cannot be started earlier than planned but the completion of the program could be accelerated. Mr. Wilson said the indication is that the initial service budget estimates for 1958 will aggregate $50 billion (later he said this included atomic energy and foreign aid). He thought that consideration should be given as to how much should go into forces-in-being and how much into weapons, both new weapons and replacement and maintenance of what we have. He cited new projects such as the nuclear-powered airplane and the nuclear-powered ballistic missile which will absorb tremendous amounts of money.

The President said we must distinguish between a respectable posture of defense, and an all-out military build-up. In the present situation, an attempt to be completely secure could lead only to a garrison state, and even then could not succeed. He thought that in addition to the present major development programs, a few selected projects should be going forward, but these should not be service projects but rather defense projects.

Mr. Wilson thought that our intelligence is now over-estimating Soviet capabilities. The President said that he saw a need on Mr. Wilson’s part to have a Defense staff (“General Staff” is the term he used) to help him. Mr. Wilson said that a lot of the difficulty arises because the services base their requests on commitments, NSC papers, force levels, etc., which they say they can’t change. The President said that many of these are outdated—for example, the D-Day NATO commitments—but they can’t be changed because a public outcry would develop, which would harm our position with our allies as regards collective defense.

Mr. Wilson said that we as a nation have not yet recognized the fact that the Russians are coming to the point where they will have the capabilities to destroy us just as we will have the capability to destroy them. He felt that the recent Russian announcement of a 1.2 million man reduction means that they realize that there is no great ground threat to them, that there is little need to maintain large ground armies, and they are cutting theirs as a result.

The President said he is inclined to think that the Chiefs of Staff system we now have has failed. He had hoped the new Chiefs would do better, because he knew they were fine men. Apparently the system is wrong. He said he is astonished at what “one or two I have known all my life” have done. He said he has found General Pate (and General Shepherd before him) and Admiral Burke very sensible in everything he has seen of them. He said the great need is for Secretary Wilson to find a way of getting disinterested, competent advice, then deciding on a program, and then “setting his teeth” and holding to it.

There was discussion regarding the correlation of scientific groups such as Killian’s with Defense, and the President indicated he was ready for recommendations from Secretary Wilson on this at any time. Secretary Wilson said he planned to work up a list of a dozen or so things to be done bearing on the Killian recommendations, and see how many of them the President wanted. The President said he wanted Mr. Wilson to reach his judgment as to what needs to be done and then report to him.

The President asked as to Mr. Wilson’s thoughts regarding the organizational points made by Drs. Killian and Fisk. Colonel Randall said they had related in part to the Continental Defense Command where certain problems are under study now. I brought out that they related to a “systems” approach at the Secretary of Defense level.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 18.

[2] Colonel Carey A. Randall, USMC, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

[3] National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253); 61 Stat. 495.

79. Memorandum of Discussion at the 285th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 17, 1956[1]

Washington, May 17, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-5. Portions of item 1, Allen Dulles’ intelligence briefing, are printed in volume III, page 362. Item 4 concerns an OCB Progress Report on United States policy on Soviet and Satellite defectors which is printed in volume XXIV, page 99. Item 5, regarding an OCB Progress Report on United States policy toward Turkey, is Ibid., page 680.]

6. Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs (NSC Action No. 1486)[2]

In the course of the discussion of the Turkish Progress Report, Secretary Humphrey broadened the area of discussion by pointing out that there were a large number of National Security Council papers in circulation the terms of which required military assistance to our friends and allies far beyond our capabilities to pay for this assistance. In Secretary Humphrey’s view the people around the table at this time must decide what is to be done about this basic situation and to determine precisely how much the United States can afford to spend around the world. After all, every U.S. housewife has to budget her household expenditures and divide them up in terms of the total that she is given.

The President agreed that this was the customary role of the housewife, but pointed out to Secretary Humphrey that if the housewife has a sick child she pays the doctor, no matter what else happens. Similarly, we face emergencies in the case of some of our allies. The President said he must admit, however, that in the case of Turkey we have fooled around long enough. It was high time to convince the Turks that they must be content with a smaller military establishment. How were we going to convince an ally that he should agree to such a reduction?

Admiral Radford said that he had not so very long ago talked over the problem of NATO force goals, including force levels desirable in Turkey, with General Gruenther in Paris. Admiral Radford pointed out that in the first instance it is the responsibility of SACEUR to recommend appropriate NATO force levels, including Turkish force levels. SACEUR actually is still basing his recommendations on the Lisbon model of some years ago. [1 sentence (39 words) not declassified] In short, the United States must put itself in the position of being able to say precisely what the United States is prepared to do in the event of aggression, before we could hope for any general reduction of the NATO force levels. [1 sentence (21 words) not declassified]

The President stated that he regarded present NATO strategic concepts as being completely outmoded and as making no sense in the light of recent weapons developments and Soviet strategy.

Governor Stassen expressed the opinion that the current Soviet announcement of the reduction of its conventional forces seemed to provide the appropriate opportunity to review both our military aid programs and our own military force levels. He added his belief that we must do something to meet the Soviet shift of tactics and be prepared to meet a new kind of competition from the Soviet Union. It was certainly logical for us to place greater emphasis and reliance on our nuclear capabilities. This could very well mean a reduction of the level of forces now being maintained in Korea, Formosa, and elsewhere.

The President said that this business of arguing that you are going to defend these countries through recourse to nuclear weapons isn’t very convincing. In point of fact, these countries do not wish to be defended by nuclear weapons. They all regard these weapons as essentially offensive in character, and our allies are absolutely scared to death that we will use such weapons. Of course, in the defense of the United States itself we will certainly use nuclear weapons, but to use them in other situations will prove very difficult.

Admiral Radford invited the Council to consider the case of Iran. Here was a country which wanted a large army, and the United States will have to support this army if it is to be maintained at all. On the other hand, if the United States were in a position to give clear assurance to Iran that we would use nuclear weapons in order to protect Iran against Soviet aggression, we might then induce them to agree to a reduction in the level of their armed forces. But can we give such assurance to Iran and to the other members of the Baghdad Pact?

In reply to Admiral Radford, the President insisted that Iran was a rather special case. The only way that Iran could be attacked would be directly by Soviet forces, since there were no satellites which the USSR could send against Iran. Meanwhile, it has been made reasonably clear that such a direct Soviet attack on Iran would be likely to provoke global war. However, the situation in other areas, where satellite forces could be brought to bear, is much less clear than the situation in Iran.

Governor Stassen pointed out that the desire of so many countries to maintain considerable ground forces stemmed essentially from the fact that these countries fear that they may have to face large Soviet land armies. Now, however, that the Soviet seems to be shifting its military strategy, an opportunity is presented to us to shift our own military strategy and to induce our allies in NATO and elsewhere to shift theirs.

The President said he hoped Governor Stassen was correct, but if our allies gradually ceased to fear the aggression of Soviet land forces, they may now begin to clamor for a costly continental defense system against Soviet air atomic attack. Admiral Radford commented that it would cost approximately $20 billion to construct an effective continental defense system for the European NATO powers.

The President went on to comment that in a democratic country like the United States there was a high degree of continuity in the conduct and content of military and foreign policy. We cannot escape the demands of of continuity and we cannot abruptly shift our policies as a dictatorship could. Thus we have been urging the Turks in the past to build up a considerable military establishment. We are now changing our minds about the desirability of such a large Turkish military establishment. It is nevertheless going to be very hard to tell the Turks to stop.

Secretary Wilson observed that as far as he could see, this Administration was confronting two big policy problems. First, simply to carry out current national security policies is certain to cost billions more over the next few years than we have been spending to carry out these policies up to the present time. Secondly, our domestic economy is slipping. It was for this reason, said Secretary Wilson, that he had earlier remarked that he was in favor of securing our headquarters before we tried to secure our military outposts. [3]

Secretary Humphrey said that he agreed with both the points just made by Secretary Wilson. He was worried, he said, both about the short-term and long-term prospects for the U.S. economy. Despite severe short-term problems, he added, he believed that the long-term problems were even more serious. We were simply taking too much money out of our people in the form of taxes. We are doing this to a greater extent than any other country in the world. For example, we are spending approximately $45 billion a year on our national security, and about every five years these expenditures go down the drain and we have to begin all over again. Secretary Humphrey then invited the Council to imagine the effect on the U.S. economy if we could cut perhaps $15 billion from the $45 billion that our security programs cost. If this were reinvested it would create vast numbers of new jobs and considerably expand the size and improve the health of the national economy.

The President complained that he had been using this very argument countless times with Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Yet every time they came in to talk with him about these matters they always ended by raising the ante and insisting that more money was required if the Services were to meet their commitments.

In any event, said Secretary Humphrey, he strongly felt that the meeting today of the National Security Council was the best thing that had happened to it for a very long time. The problems discussed today were precisely those that the National Security Council had been created to discuss.

Secretary Wilson made reference to the current heavy criticism on the Hill and in the press on the alleged shortcomings of the Defense Department’s programs. He confessed that he did not quite know how to meet these criticisms. Moreover, things would be a lot worse when the economy starts to go down, as the results of the first quarter of the year had shown it was going to do. The many requirements for carrying out the current programs of the Defense Department were steadily increasing. Difficult as it was to make changes in these programs, the time had come when we must really take a good hard look at the situation.

The President recalled the period in the Administration’s early days when we were carrying through the so-called “new look” strategy. At that time we not only had General Ridgway raising hell, but on top of this we had the Congress insisting that we spend more and even appropriating funds for the Marine Corps over and above those requested by the Administration. What could we do in the face of this kind of Congressional action?

Governor Stassen said he felt sure that the recent Soviet move to reduce the level of the Soviet armed forces reflected in good part the success of the Administration’s policies to date. Now, however, we are facing new problems and a new situation, and we should realize this fact.

The President said our first task was to educate the American people and the Congress. The National Security Council could be as wise as so many Solomons and yet end in complete failure if we cannot convince the public and the Congress of the wisdom of our decisions.

Secretary Wilson then reverted to the President’s earlier remark as to the completely outmoded NATO strategy. Secretary Wilson said he agreed that the current force levels in NATO were unrealistic in view of the new weapons systems and changing Soviet strategy. Yet the NATO powers cannot or will not change these levels. The President’s response was a statement that if our NATO allies are not willing to stand by us, even though they are as aware as we are of the necessity of unity in the face of the Communist danger, then the United States would indeed have to undertake an agonizing reappraisal of its policies.

Secretary Wilson commented that, try as they would, he and Admiral Radford simply could not carry out their commitments on the basis of the budgets on which the Defense Department now operates. Secretary Wilson asked Admiral Radford’s confirmation of this statement, and Admiral Radford expressed agreement.

Consideration of this item closed after further discussion of the outmoded character of current NATO planning and current NATO force levels in terms of nuclear warfare.

The National Security Council:[5]

a. Agreed that continuation of all military programs in foreign countries receiving U.S. military and supporting assistance which approved NSC policies are now construed to require:

(1) Will in the aggregate require U.S. resources beyond those which are likely to be available for such purposes.

(2) Will, in many instances, place burdens upon the recipient countries which their resources will be unable to bear for a sustained period, even if supplemented by acceptable levels of U.S. assistance.

(3) May, in the light of new weapons systems and recent changes in Soviet-Communist strategy, not prove to be the most effective means of achieving U.S. national security objectives.

b. Agreed that in the forthcoming review of country policies pursuant to NSC Action No. 1486–e, the considerations in a above will be taken into account in order to seek a proper balance between the military program in each such country and its economic capability supplemented by acceptable levels of U.S. assistance.

c. Noted the President’s request that the State-Defense-Treasury-ICA Interdepartmental Committee complete its studies called for by NSC Action No. 1486–e with all practicable speed, and that these studies contain an approximation of the military effort that the economic resources of each country could probably sustain. [6]

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for information, and the action in c above transmitted to the Chairman, State–Defense–Treasury–ICA Interdepartmental Committee.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items. Item 8, “Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands,” is printed in volume III, page 362.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on May 18.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1486, taken during the NSC meeting of December 8, 1955, see vol. x, p. 44. According to NSC Action No. 1486–e (1), the NSC noted that “a high proportion of U.S. military and economic assistance is received by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, Formosa and Korea; and that in each of these countries the armed forces (a) do not represent total military requirements, (b) cannot be supported by the local economy now or in the foreseeable future, and (c) require U.S. subsidies at an annual cost ranging from $100 million to $1 billion to each of these countries.”

[3] During the 283d meeting of the National Security Council on May 3, Secretary Humphrey and the President had discussed the matter of spending money on bases abroad, instead of concentrating on bases in the continental United States. This conversation included the following exchange:

“Secretary Humphrey expressed the view that all this money being spent on bases throughout the world would be much better spent on producing B–52 aircraft in the United States. Think of all the money that the United States had poured into Formosa. Think of what it would have brought us in terms of B–52 aircraft. In the last analysis, said Secretary Humphrey, the United States will stand or fall on how strong we are. We must begin to be selective in our assistance to our allies, in a way we have never even approached before.

“The President replied that the matter of bases was nowhere near as simple as Secretary Humphrey indicated. We could do a lot more damage to the enemy with a small or medium bomber from the ring of nearby U.S. bases than we could inflict with much larger bombers based in the continental United States. It was unthinkable that we should abandon our bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Perhaps, speculated the President, what this Government should do is to sit down and agree on the total amount of money to be allocated to the defense of the United States, and agree thereafter on the rational division of this total amount among the various competing claims.

“Secretary Humphrey expressed absolute agreement with the President’s last thought. In his opinion we should decide precisely how much we can afford to spend for defense purposes, and then divide up the total on a carefully selective basis.

“The President said that the heart of the foreign assistance problem was the question of the eventual cost to the United States of any given ally, and how much that ally was worth to us. This was something which we ought to be able to calculate and thus reach a conclusion on how many allies we can afford to have.” (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

[5] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1560, approved by the President on May 24. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[6] These studies were made part of NSC 5610, “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs,” dated August 3. For the summary of the report and the discussion by the National Security Council of this item on October 26, see vol. x, p. 124. A copy of NSC 5610 is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series.

80. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 24, 1956, 10:30 a.m.[1]

Washington, May 24, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Radford

General Taylor

Colonel Goodpaster

The meeting was held at General Taylor’s request. He started with the statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1960[2] before them at the present time. Through it, the JCS will give guidance to the staffs which will serve as the basis for programs and funds. The paper is now split, with the Army and Marines following NSC 5602, as he understands it, and with the Air Force, the Navy and Admiral Radford taking the view that all planning must be based upon the use of atomic weapons. He stressed that the plan pertains to 1960, by which time both sides will have developed large stockpiles of thermonuclear weapons. A situation of mutual deterrence must be envisaged. He recognized that a big war, under such conditions, might come deliberately, but thought it was more likely that it would come through “backing” into it through a succession of actions and counteractions. In view of the tendency of thermonuclear capacity to deter both sides from a big war, any war that occurred would seem more likely to be a small war.

Two differences of view have developed within the Chiefs. The first relates to the definition of general war used as the basis for the plan. This is defined to be a war between the United States and USSR, using atomic weapons from the outset without restriction. The emphasis is on war starting with large-scale attack on D-Day, whereas the NSC has considered that it might arise step by step from smaller action. He said that the Air Force and Navy members regard this as the worst possible case, and therefore state that it would provide for all the others. He is inclined to disagree with this. He feels that this concept would leave us less flexible, and that the programs for fighting a big war would absorb all available funds.

The second difference arises in the firm commitment for the use of atomic weapons—in every case in a general war, and also in local wars where required for military reasons. He thought that this contravened the principle of “flexibility” which has been worked into NSC papers, and that it would result in tremendous atomic forces and defenses against them, tending to freeze out all other types of military forces— and that these latter are what would be needed to handle small war situations.

The President said he thought General Taylor’s position was dependent on an assumption that we are opposed by people who would think as we do with regard to the value of human life. But they do not, as shown in many incidents from the last war. We have no basis for thinking that they abhor destruction as we do. In the event they should decide to go to war, the pressure on them to use atomic weapons in a sudden blow would be extremely great. He did not see any basis for thinking other than that they would use these weapons at once, and in full force. The President went on to say that he did not care too much for the definition of general war as given. To him the question was simply one of a war between the United States and the USSR, and in this he felt that thinking should be based on the use of atomic weapons—that in his opinion it was fatuous to think that the U.S. and USSR would be locked into a life and death struggle without using such weapons. We should therefore develop our readiness on the basis of use of atomic weapons by both sides. He recalled that the United States had never been “scared” until these weapons came into the picture, and it is this type of war which justifies the great peacetime efforts we are now maintaining.

As to local wars, the President thought that the tactical use of atomic weapons against military targets would be no more likely to trigger off a big war than the use of twenty-ton “blockbusters.” In his opinion, we must concentrate on building up internal security forces and local security forces of the regions themselves. We would give mobile support, with the Air, Navy and Army supporting weapons, and perhaps put in several battalions at truly critical points. He was very clear that we would not, however, deploy and tie down our forces around the Soviet periphery in small wars. He thought that the support forces we provide would use the most efficient weapons, and over the past several years tactical atomic weapons have come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern armed forces.

The President went on to refer to the ideas of movement of large numbers of divisions in the the early months of an atomic war. He thought it was very unlikely that they could be moved, and thought that military planning is now emphasizing the forces immediately available, with much less interest in those following by months. The incorporation of new weapons such as rockets and missiles into the ground forces, with small mobile combat groups integrating their operations closely with them, should be stressed. General Gruenther had told him that he badly needs the two U.S. divisions shown to be sent to Europe in the first thirty days, but that when the President asked him how they could be gotten there, he simply said that was his (the President’s) problem. The President did not consider that anything like ten or twelve additional divisions in the first six months could be moved. If we have been heavily attacked, there would be neither the planes nor the air bases needed to take them there. He added that he thought Europe had come a great way toward this same manner of thinking.

Referring now to general war (the President used this term and “war between the U.S. and USSR” interchangeably), the President said that prudence would demand that we get our striking force into the air immediately upon notice of hostile action by the Soviets. Massive retaliation, although the term has been scoffed at, is likely to be the key to survival. He reiterated that planning should go ahead on the basis of the use of tactical atomic weapons against military targets in any small war in which the United States might be involved.

General Taylor drew attention to deterrence as the key factor in our present situation. We need diverse types of forces to deter large wars, and small wars as well. If we proceed on the basis of needs for actually fighting atomic wars, the needs for atomic striking forces and for continental defense are open-ended—practically limitless. He thought we should first calculate what is needed for deterrence and provide that (rather than what is needed for fighting an all-out thermonuclear war), should then provide the requirements for flexible forces usable in small wars, and finally put what remaining effort we have into the requirements for fighting an all-out war.

The President said he was very understanding that the position he had described did not leave the Army the same great role in the first year of war in relation to the other services as formerly. In his opinion, in the initial stages the Army would be truly vital to the establishment and maintenance of order in the United States. He went on to say that the Chiefs of Staff still thought much too much each in terms of his own service. He thought that each service should have what the corporate judgment of the Chiefs thought proper. He said that if the Chiefs can’t develop corporate judgment on the great problems that are facing us, the system as we now have it will have failed and major changes must be made. He referred to recent criticisms of the capabilities of carriers. He said that even if these charges are right, they should not be made in public; it is a matter that should be thrashed out in deepest security within the JCS. We shouldn’t tell an enemy our weaknesses—if they are weaknesses—and shouldn’t damage the confidence of our people and our allies in these weapons if they are as effective as he thinks they are. Similarly, the public criticism of the Nike is damaging to our country. If it is not a good weapon, we should determine that privately, and not notify the enemy but make our own corrections. Again, if it is a good weapon, we are harming the confidence of our public and our allies through this type of criticism. He recognizes that there are going to be differences of view, but considers that they should be worked out by the JCS. All should be thinking of the good of the country rather than attaining gains for a particular service. The President said he would like to see a Nike test firing, but has felt unable to do so because of the need to give psychological support to peaceful rather than military things.

General Taylor said that the decision of the President will initiate fundamental and rather drastic changes. The President did not feel that they would be too drastic. He said that, in any case, we are going to keep forces in the Far East and in Europe (even though the concept in Europe had been to have them there for a short period only—now it looks as though they must stay almost indefinitely). He felt that in the emphasis he has given on the atomic weapons lies the greatest safety and security for our country. He did not claim to be all wise in such matters, but he was very sure that as long as he is President he would meet an attack in the way indicated. With regard to the budget, while stressing the need to maintain the economic soundness of the U.S.— and specifically to avoid tax levels which would prevent the building up of capital productive industry, the President said he has told everyone that we must have what we need for security. He anticipates a fairly stable estimate which might be of the order, in his opinion, of $37 billion. Admiral Radford said that the decision of the President, in his opinion, supported the majority view, and General Taylor agreed. Admiral Radford said that the decision will have some far-reaching effects. For example, we should now tell our allies that support will be as the President described. If they can plan on that, they could cut down some of their forces. It might well mean that we would put into their country units such as Honest John and missiles with atomic warheads as support elements. The President said that these changes and others to be made would not necessarily be radical, but could be gradually applied.

Admiral Radford referred to additional requests coming in for programs that would run above the “maintenance level” the Chiefs had spoken of on their return from Puerto Rico. The Air Force will be coming in for an increase in strategic air units, partly needed because the problem of penetrating to targets will be becoming increasingly severe. The President thought that the development of higher, faster aircraft relates to this purpose. Admiral Radford said we still have a big program to carry out regarding Continental Defense, dispersal of air fields, and provision of guided missile air defense. He said there has never been complexity equal to this in terms of military planning.

The President thought there was need for a group like the advisory board he constituted while Chief of Staff. That produced no memos but concentrated on thinking about the major problems of the military forces. They were, with one exception, retired officers having no further assignments in view. Such a group under the Secretary of Defense or JCS composed of senior officers divorced from service, with a few scientists added, would be of the greatest value.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 24.

[2] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

81. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, June 13, 1956.

SUBJECT

NSC Consideration of Policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5606)[2]

NSC 5606 is a revision of NSC 5408 of February 11, 1954.[3] The principal purpose of the revision has been to produce an NSC paper which serves more as a general policy guide than did NSC 5408 which dealt more in specifics and was more of a program guide.

The principal substantive point in this paper relates to the great increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities for 1958, as now estimated, compared to estimates made last year and on which were based the presentation of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee on the net capabilities of the Soviet Union to damage the U.S. (See paragraphs 1 and 7, the attached memorandum of the Chairman of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee,[4] the attached comments thereon of the Director, CIA,[5] and the Summary of NIE 11–2–56 dated June 8, 1956, also attached.[6] ) In essence, the general agreement in the intelligence community is that the Soviets have a much greater supply of nuclear materials (U–235) than was estimated last year. You will recall that in describing the damage which could be done to the U.S. in 1958 the Subcommittee stated that if the Soviet capabilities were much greater than estimated, doubt would be raised as to whether they could then deal a “decisive” attack on the U.S. as opposed to a “crippling” attack.

In connection with the Planning Board’s work on this paper, Mr. Robert Sprague, the present NSC Consultant on continental defense, has raised questions concerning the adequacy of several specific defense programs and he may do so at the Council meeting.

It is always difficult to decide how far State should go in commenting on specific matters of a military nature. All that I can suggest is that as the conversation proceeds during the Council meeting you attempt by questions to satisfy yourself that the Department of Defense is not endangering the protection of our retaliatory capability by economies. You will note in this connection that the paper makes the protection of this capability the prime goal of continental defense (see paragraph 10).

With respect to the difference of opinion in paragraphs 24 and 25 on protection of industry and on civil defense we took no position because on the one hand such programs as might be approved could cost a great deal of money and, on the other hand, the justification therefor, particularly if there is to be a continuation of a fairly strict budgetary ceiling, was not presented at the Planning Board. I believe, for instance, that civil defense needs more support, but if the shelter program is to cost several billion additional, this is a matter of such importance as to require a special NSC presentation and decision.

[1] Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5606 Series. Top Secret.

[2] NSC 5606 is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5606 Series) Drafting information on NSC 5606 is Ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Continental Defense (NSC 5606). See agenda item 2 of the NSC memorandum of discussion, infra.

[3] For text of NSC 5408, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 609.

[4] Reference is to a May 31 memorandum, not found attached.

[5] This document was not declassified. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5605 Series)

[6] NIE 11–2–56, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” is not attached. (Ibid.,INR–NIE Files) A summary was later issued as NIE 11–2A–56, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program (Summary),” September 5, 1956. (Ibid.)

82. Memorandum of Discussion at the 288th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 15, 1956[1]

Washington, June 15, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows Allen Dulles’ oral briefing on developments in the People’s Republic of China, the situation in Israel, the forthcoming visit of the new Soviet Foreign Minister to Egypt, and the political and economic situation in Pakistan.]

As the final and most important topic of his intelligence briefing, Mr. [Allen]Dulles said that he would summarize the latest agreed National Intelligence Estimate with respect to the availability of fissionable material for the Soviet programs both for peaceful uses and for the development of a nuclear capability for war.[2] Recent intelligence had resulted in revising the estimate of availability of fissionable material upward by a [3 words not declassified]. Very great importance was attached to the estimate by the intelligence community, and accordingly, and because the subject was extremely complicated, Mr. Dulles said he would read the estimate. He touched upon weapons developments since the airburst of November 22, 1955. He then discussed the estimated production of plutonium and of U–233 [235?]. He then touched on the revised estimate of the Soviet production of U–235, which he emphasized had now been revised upward by a [3 words not declassified]. In this respect he called attention to the dissenting view of two members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, who believed that the production of U–235 should be revised upward by [7 words not declassified]. Lastly, he mentioned the possible allocation of Soviet fissionable material among the various types and sizes of nuclear weapons. He noted the relation of this increased Soviet capability to the conclusions reached in the last study by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee on the net capability of the USSR to inflict damage on the United States by a nuclear attack. He also pointed out the impact of the revised estimate on the Soviet program for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, both in the USSR and abroad.

Mr. Dulles summed up his findings with the statement that it was estimated that the Soviet Union now has a significant multimegaton capability and will in the near future have a major multimegaton capability. In concluding, Mr. Dulles suggested that other members of the Council might like to comment on this new estimate.

Admiral Radford said he wished to remind the members of the Council of the possibilities of error in this new estimate, which possibilities he said were admitted by those who were responsible for the new estimate. Mr. Dulles said that the possibility of error was clearly admitted by the estimators, and Admiral Radford continued with a statement that the Council should not get the erroneous impression that they had been listening to undoubted facts with respect to the revised estimate of Soviet nuclear capabilities.

The Vice President speculated that [23 words not declassified] the new estimate might represent a Soviet effort to mislead the Western powers. Mr. Dulles said that for technical reasons it would not be easy for the Russians to fudge our knowledge of their stockpile. [3 sentences (68 words) not declassified]

With reference to the views of the dissenting members of the IAC, the Vice President said that an increase in the Soviet stockpile of U–235 by a [3 words not declassified] was in itself so significant that he failed to see that it made any real difference whether the increase was by a [9 words not declassified] as the majority believed.

Admiral Strauss agreed emphatically with the Vice President that the estimated increase was of enormous significance, whichever estimate was correct. On the other hand, Admiral Strauss said, he was not greatly concerned over the effect of this increase in the amount of fissionable material on the Soviet program for the construction of power reactors for peaceful purposes. Indeed, said Admiral Strauss, he wished the Soviets would divert more of their fissionable material from their stockpile for the power reactor program, since this would mean less for their weapons program. However, he doubted that they would follow this course, and expressed the opinion that the Soviet power reactor program was “largely moonshine”.

Admiral Strauss then referred to the so-called Killian Committee timetable with respect to the period at which the Soviet Union could be expected to achieve a multimegaton capability sufficient to launch a crippling or a decisive attack upon the United States. He insisted that when the Killian Committee’s timetable had first come to the attention of the National Security Council, he had not believed that it was altogether realistic. He now believed even more emphatically than he had earlier that the critical period for the United States with respect to the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union would be reached at the end of 1957 or at the beginning of 1958, rather than in 1959 as initially set forth in the Killian Committee timetable.

Mr. Dulles then brought up the factor of deliverability of atomic weapons as a crucial part of the Soviet Union’s capability to launch a nuclear attack on the United States. He suggested that Admiral Radford comment on this subject.

Admiral Radford replied that he had already pointed out the importance of the deliverability factor, in his 31 May memorandum to Mr. Anderson (transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 7)[3] which the Council now had before it in connection with the subject of continental defense. Moreover, continued Admiral Radford, the so-called new intelligence on the size of the Soviet stockpile of U–235 was in one sense not really new at all. The National Security Council has known for a long time that the United States would at no very distant time have to face up to the situation which was now at hand if the revised estimate was correct. Indeed, in all our planning to date we have assumed that the Soviet Union would have a multimegaton nuclear capability at some future date. According to the new estimate, this date was now nearer rather than more remote.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the net of the new intelligence estimate which had been read by Mr. Dulles, was to emphasize a radical change in the estimate of the time at which the Soviet Union would achieve a multimegaton nuclear capability. Secretary Humphrey then inquired of Mr. Dulles whether the latter felt more secure about the reliability of this new estimate of availability than he had about the previous estimates on this subject. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative, on grounds that much more evidence was available to support this estimate than had been available for its predecessors. It was clear, he added, that the Soviets have been putting a lot more energy into their program for the development of nuclear weapons than they had previously. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the new estimate he had read did not go into the matter of deliverability of weapons because this matter had not been in the specific terms of reference of the new estimate.

Governor Stassen inquired whether if, as the estimate suggested, the Soviets were relatively short in the production of plutonium, this shortage would not be remedied by the securing of plutonium as a by-product of the processing of U–235 in Soviet power reactors. Such plutonium would then be available for the Soviet nuclear weapons program.

Admiral Strauss replied that this was probably true, but that the United States did a better job in this area by making use of a reactor specifically designed to produce plutonium rather than to secure it as a by-product. Admiral Strauss then went on to say that he had been so worried and concerned about the new intelligence on the Soviet stockpile of U–235, that he had gone over the findings of the estimate with a fine-tooth comb. He added that he was convinced that the new estimate was as nearly correct as we could possibly expect. We were badly enough off if the availability of U–235 to the USSR must be increased by a [3 words not declassified]. It was much worse, of course, if the stockpile was [2 words not declassified] as large as we had estimated before the new intelligence became available. Dr. Flemming suggested that it was always possible that they might have even more than [2 words not declassified] as much as the new estimate suggested. Admiral Strauss admitted that Dr. Flemming might be right, but he felt that this was less likely than that they had less than [2 words not declassified] the amount we had previously estimated that they had.

Mr. Dulles commented that while essentially he did not disagree with the view of Admiral Strauss with respect to the Soviet program for the development of power reactors, the Council should realize that the Soviets are quite prepared to resort to an economic program for the construction of power reactors simply because of the political and propaganda advantages which they might derive from such a power reactor program. Admiral Strauss expressed great doubt that the Soviets would ever be willing to divert large amounts of fissionable materials from their weapons program to be used for their power program. In the same vein, Secretary Humphrey said that the Council did not need to get very excited about any economic activity that was not really economically sound in character.

The National Security Council:[4]

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to increasing Chinese Communist industrial potential; the situation in Israel; the forthcoming visit of the new Soviet Foreign Minister to Cairo; the situation in Pakistan; and the revised estimate of the Soviet stockpile of fissionable material and of the Soviet nuclear power program.

As the discussion of the previous item drew to a close, the Vice President said that this discussion led naturally to a consideration of the next item on the Council agenda—namely, continental defense. He said, however, that he would like to interrupt the transition long enough to warn the Council of what bad shape the Administration’s mutual security program was in, so far as Congress was concerned. Lyndon Johnson[5] had informed him that at a recent poll of Democratic Senators, 31 of these Senators were recorded as favoring the billion-dollar cut made by the House, while only 17 were in favor of restoring at least part of the cuts made by the House.

With respect to this situation, the Vice President said he would like to make two suggestions. First, if General Persons called on any member of the Council to speak in favor of the bill to certain Senators, he hoped that this member would respond favorably. Second, if any member of the Council had any useful proposals to make on the subject, would he please get in touch with Governor Adams or General Persons.

The Vice President then went on to say that what was happening to the mutual security bill represented in a sense another failure on the part of Congress to follow the President’s leadership. Despite the fact that the leadership in both houses of the Congress is behind the President’s mutual security program, it was significant that while Sam Rayburn[6] favored the Senate committee’s proposal to restore part of the cut, all 21 Texas Representatives opposed restoration of the cut. The Vice President said that this vote represented a reaction by these members of the Congress to grass roots opposition to the foreign aid program. Accordingly, we must undertake the urgent job of convincing the Democrats, and especially of convincing the Republicans, to support the Administration’s position.

2. Continental Defense (NSC 5408; NSC Actions Nos. 1417–c[7] and 1430–i;[8] Annex D of NIE 11–56;[9] NIE 11–2–56;[10] NSC 5606;

Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Implications of the Revised Estimate of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities with Respect to the Conclusions of the 1955 Net Evaluation”, dated June 7, 11 and 13, 1956;[11] Memo for All Holders of NSC 5606, date June 8 1956;[12] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Continental Defense”, dated June 13, 1956;[13] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Status of National Security Programs and Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through Fiscal Year of 1959”, dated June 13, 1956[14] )

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council in considerable detail and at great length on the contents of NSC 5606. (A copy of Mr. Anderson’s briefing note is included in the minutes of the meeting.)[15] At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson’s briefing, the Vice President turned to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Secretary Humphrey said he wished to state that NSC 5606 represented a most timely development and one of the greatest possible significance. We were now face to face clearly with a situation that all of us had for a long time realized was a strong possibility. This derived not merely from the new intelligence on increased Soviet nuclear capabilities, but was also the result of the tendency of the National Security Council and the Executive agencies to construct piecemeal national security programs as we went along. As Admiral Radford had so often remarked in the Council, we have been adding on new requirements steadily, and they had now led to incredible future expenditures which were in fact far beyond anything which the Administration was actually contemplating. This particular report on continental defense policy very well illustrates the general point he had just been making, with this terrific jump in expenditures for the continental defense of the United States. Moreover, for the moment at least there was apparently no reduction contemplated in any other national security program to compensate for the proposed great increase in the program for continental defense. On the contrary, all the other national security programs were continuing to require increased expenditure. Accordingly, the President’s recent request in connection with the annual reports on the status of each of the national security programs, as of the 30th of June, should contain three-year projections of costs, was absolutely essential, [sic] Only thus could the National Security Council at an early date get a glance at the over-all picture of our programs and their estimated cost over the next few years. If the picture for all these other national security programs looked like the picture presented by the present report on the continental defense programs, this would involve a drastic reconsideration of our national security objectives, where we are and where we were going in the future.

In short, continued Secretary Humphrey, the people of the United States haven’t any idea in the world that their Government plans expenditures of the magnitude suggested by the estimates in NSC 5606. If we propose to make such expenditures in the future, this will involve drastic changes in our national security policies and a very great effort to readjust the thinking of the American people along very different lines. In point of fact, they are at present thinking in terms of a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. In fact, the Administration is going to have a real battle on its hands in trying to avoid a tax reduction this year. In conclusion, Secretary Humphrey repeated his view that the present report on continental defense policies was one of the most important things that the Council had ever done, and we must go on from here to get similar reports on the other major national security programs, in order that at long last we could see the over-all picture of where we are going and what we are going to do about it.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget then stated that he wished in the first instance strongly to support the position taken by Secretary Humphrey. Thereafter, however, Mr. Brundage said he thought that the reports mentioned by Secretary Humphrey should be supplemented by still other reports to make the over-all picture complete. Thus Mr. Brundage called for a report from Governor Stassen on the prospects for peace and disarmament. He called for a report by Secretary Dulles (who had joined the meeting when the subject of NSC 5606 came up) for a report on the diplomatic and political outlook. Finally, he called for a report “by our sociologists and educators” as to what kind of a country the citizens of the United States would like to have in the course of the coming years.

Dr. Flemming said that he would like to make two comments to the Council. First, he wished to state his complete agreement with the views just enunciated by the Secretary of the Treasury. Indeed, we did need the frame of reference for which Secretary Humphrey was calling, and Mr. Lay’s directive that the June 30 status reports should each contain three-year cost projections was of great significance. These reports would provide the checklist of all our basic national security policies and programs. When we sat down and put all these together, we would know what we were doing and where we were going.

Secondly, Dr. Flemming said he wished to comment on the specific paper before the Council, NSC 5606. He felt that this report on continental defense placed before the National Security Council the most serious situation that the Council had faced since it had originally got together at the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration. This was especially true in terms of the so-called timetable. It was now clear that we had much less time than we thought we had before the Soviet Union will have achieved a capability to deliver a crippling or decisive attack on the United States. At this point Dr. Flemming summarized the so-called Killian Committee timetable, with particular respect to Period III—B, the period in which, unless our continental defense programs were fully effective and kept up, the Soviet Union would have achieved the capability of a decisive surprise attack on the United States. The Killian Committee had said that such a period as III—B could come as early as 1958. Dr. Flemming believed that it was now clear that this period could approach earlier than 1958, and might even now be imminent. Accordingly, the present paper must be considered by the National Security Council in the light of this possibility.

Dr. Flemming then said that he had appreciated the position taken by his representative on the NSC Planning Board, Dr. Elliot, when he had stated, contrary to the view of the majority, that even before 1958 the USSR may be able to develop a net capability to strike a possibly decisive blow at the United States; whereas the majority on the Planning Board had used the term “a crippling attack” (paragraph 1 of NSC 5606). However, Dr. Flemming went on to say that he was not concerned with arguing about wording, in view of the fact that the Council had heard in the last Net Evaluation Subcommittee report that casualties in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States would run as high as 24 million people. Even if casualties of this magnitude implied only a crippling rather than a decisive attack, such casualty figures were quite enough in their significance for Dr. Flemming.

Thereafter, Dr. Flemming pointed out that the proposed continental defense program in its entirety provided one of the most effective deterrents to war that could be imagined. Accordingly, it was essential that the continental defense program be kept strong. This, of course, raised the question of accelerating certain continental defense programs. This precise question was not before the Council today, and would only come before the Council in July, after reports by the Department of Defense on the vulnerability of SAC bases and other problems.[16] Certainly, however, if the Council agreed that phase III—B of the Killian Committee timetable was likely to come earlier than 1958, then clearly the NSC must come to grips with the issue of accelerating the programs for continental defense. When this issue is thoroughly investigated, it may become clear that the main problem is the specific timing of expenditures for continental defense, rather than the amount of accumulating expenditure for continental defense over a long period of years.

Dr. Flemming concluded by stating his desire strongly to emphasize the significance of the new civil defense program. As he had suggested earlier, human resources may emerge as the limiting factor on the ability of the United States to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack. Despite this fact, the Council and the Administration had never really come to grips with the problem of civil defense. Dr. Flemming was sure that NSC 5606 was sound in calling for greater Federal emphasis and direction of the civil defense program. He urged that the issue of civil defense be met by the Council head-on, something which it had refused to do up to this point. Such a head-on confrontation was, of course bound to have significant fiscal implications.

The Vice President commented that from his reading of the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606, the programs in which the rising costs were most notable for the future were in (1) the area of civil defense and (2) defense against air vehicles. Dr. Flemming agreed with the Vice President, but pointed out that the projected increase in civil defense would occur only after the policy set forth in NSC 5606 was agreed to by the Council and the President, and not otherwise. By and large, Dr. Flemming said, he thought the civil defense program was the single most important proposal in this new policy statement.

Mr. Ralph Spear then asked the Vice President’s permission to give to the National Security Council the views of Governor Peterson on the civil defense program, explaining that, unhappily, Governor Peterson was unable to be present himself. Mr. Spear said that Governor Peterson felt strongly, as did Dr. Flemming, he judged, that this Administration had simply not come to grips with the civil defense problem in the United States. All kinds of studies had been made within the Government and outside. The results of nearly all of these studies agreed that a stronger Federal role was essential if civil defense was ever to be at all effective. With respect to the costly shelter program alluded to in NSC 5606, Mr. Spear pointed out that existing law places on the Federal Civil Defense Administrator responsibility for the development of measures to minimize casualties and damage. Governor Peterson felt that in this situation he had one of two major choices. On the one hand, he could put reliance on measures to evacuate people from our cities or to measures for dispersal. The other alternative was to provide shelter against the weight of nuclear weapons. These were the two alternatives, and certainly the present law contemplated some kind of shelter program, the costs of which were to be shared by the Federal Government and the States and municipalities. Unhappily, however, it had never been possible to get appropriations, up to now, for such a shelter program. Moreover, as we now look ahead to the period when intercontinental ballistic missiles might be employed, and when warning time would be a matter of only a few minutes, it seemed foolish to put very much reliance on measures of evacuation as opposed to the development of a shelter program.

Nevertheless, said Mr. Spear, Governor Peterson did not feel that if the Council adopted NSC 5606, paragraph 24 of that paper would give him carte blanche to start out on an extensive shelter program. Such a shelter program would, of course, go through the normal budgetary processes, just as did all other continental defense programs. Indeed the estimate of the cost of the shelter program, as set forth in the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606, could be described as so soft as to be virtually liquid. The truth of the matter was that FCDA simply did not yet have the basic figures on which to reach firm conclusions as to the probable cost of a shelter program. For example, they did not know as yet how much shelter was already available and at hand in many of our large cities. Findings on this subject could, of course, greatly influence the estimated cost figures for a shelter program. In point of fact, then, all that we really have at the present time are the rough estimated costs of beginning a shelter program; that is, Mr. Spear emphasized, the total cost to be borne both by the States and by the Federal Government. It could be that these total costs could reach ultimately a figure of $20 billion. In conclusion, Mr. Spear repeated again that, regardless of Council action on NSC 5606, Governor Peterson would not regard such action as giving him a green light to proceed on an elaborate shelter program. He would, however, feel obliged to come up with a shelter program which would thereafter be subject to the normal budgetary process.

Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson said that in the Department of Defense it was felt that the approach of NSC 5606, in looking at the total continental defense program, was the wise approach. Moreover, he said, he agreed with Secretary Humphrey’s point that other programs related to continental defense were bound likewise to show large increases. An example of this was the program for increasing the production of B–52 bombers. In regard to defense against air vehicles, Secretary Robertson said that the work of the Defense Department boiled down to three major areas: (1) provision of tactical warning of attack; (2) ways and means of destroying attacking enemy planes; (3) remedying the vulnerability of SAC. All three of these areas, continued Secretary Robertson, were now the subject of intensive study and work in the Defense Department. Even at this point in the study it had become clear that costs in all these areas would end up being substantially higher than originally estimated. Thus, originally it was estimated that the Distant Early Warning line would cost $100 million. It was now estimated that the DEW line would cost $400 million. In the face of facts such as these, the Defense Department was making every conceivable effort to eliminate duplication. Even so, we will have, predicted Secretary Robertson, very fundamental decisions to make in the near future.

With respect to these comments of Secretary Robertson, the Vice President observed that there was now in the Congress very strong pressure for increased strength and effectiveness of the nation’s retaliatory striking power. This pressure came from both political parties. Secretary Robertson replied to the Vice President by stating that the Defense Department felt that the current program for increasing our retaliatory striking power was a sound program, in that it kept our striking power in harmony and in step with the development of our defenses against Soviet striking power.

At this point, Mr. Anderson suggested that the Vice President might wish to call on Mr. Robert Sprague, NSC Consultant on Continental Defense, who had made valuable contributions to the Planning Board in the course of the formulation of NSC 5606.

Mr. Sprague said that it seemed to him that in analyzing this enormously complex problem of continental defense, there was one point which struck home most forcibly. Both in our basic national security policy, NSC 5602/1, and in this new proposed continental defense policy, NSC 5606, there was an underlying assumption from which everything else followed in logical sequence. This was the assumption that, as of mid-1956, the United States would have achieved the capability to launch a decisive attack on the USSR. Further in the assumption was the estimate that the USSR would be able by mid-1958, now up-dated to mid-1957, to launch a crippling attack on the United States, though it was assumed that the United States would be able to recover from such a crippling attack to the point of being able to retaliate against the USSR and to destroy it. Mr. Sprague said that as he understood our national policy and programs, there was little that we could do, in view of Soviet capabilities, to prevent the killing of millions of our people if the Soviet Union chose to launch an attack. We could, however, and it was indeed our policy to preserve our massive retaliatory capability and to be able to destroy the USSR if the latter should undertake to attack the United States.

This being the assumption underlying NSC 5602/1 and NSC 5606, Mr. Sprague went on to emphasize his conviction that if certain of our continental defense programs, as set forth in NSC 5606, were not promptly accelerated, the assumption would no longer hold good and the USSR would be in a position not merely to launch a crippling attack, but actually a decisive attack, not later than mid-1958 and possibly sooner. This was so vitally important that Mr. Sprague suggested a recognition of this importance should be made by the inclusion of new language in both NSC 5602/1 and NSC 5606. For this reason, he said, he had written out what seemed to him appropriate language.

Mr. Sprague went on to say that while granting the fact of an increasing nuclear capability on the part of the U.S. Navy, for instance, he was nevertheless sure that SAC was still the main reliance of the United States in carrying out its basic policy of being able to launch a massive retaliatory attack. Accordingly, the ability of SAC to retaliate must, above all other things, be made secure. After this, Mr. Sprague read to the Council the proposed language mentioned above, which he recommended should be included at the end of paragraph 1 of NSC 5606. In general, Mr. Sprague’s language stressed the need to accelerate certain continental defense programs, because otherwise the USSR might be in a position to launch a decisive attack on the United States as early as mid-1958.

In conclusion, Mr. Sprague commented on the vital importance that SAC be in a position to get the required percentage of SAC planes off bases and in the air within the estimated warning time of Russian attack. Mr. Sprague said that he did not know what the required percentage was—whether 50% of the planes on the ground, more or less. But in any case, enough must be got off the ground so that they would not be destroyed and would be able to retaliate massively against the Soviet Union. That a sufficient percentage of SAC planes could thus be got off the ground within the estimated tactical warning time, was not likely under present programs and schedules.

When Mr. Sprague had concluded his observations, the Vice President said that his immediate reaction was to invite the response of the Department of Defense. The Vice President added that he understood that the Department of Defense would give its reactions to Mr. Sprague’s recommendations in the course of next month.

At this point, Secretary Humphrey inquired of Mr. Anderson as to when the Council might expect to obtain the reports of the so-called Prochnow Committee dealing with anticipated expenditures by the United States on military and economic assistance to certain foreign nations. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that the Council had now received a full report on the continental defense programs. It would get status reports on all of our Defense Department policies as of June 30 or shortly thereafter. However, we did not have the status reports on foreign assistance, and until we got the whole picture the magnitude of the whole national security problem would not be clear. He then inquired of Mr. Anderson when the Defense Department status reports and the Prochnow Committee reports would come to the Council for consideration.

Mr. Anderson replied that the annual status reports on the national security programs of the various departments and agencies covering the period through June 30, 1956, would probably not be available for Council consideration earlier than August or September.[17] To this information, Secretary Humphrey responded by stating that piecemeal status reports don’t do very much good. Even this present report on continental defense, good as it was, wasn’t much use to the Council except as a warning. Certainly these status reports wouldn’t be really effective until all of them could be looked at together.

Agreeing with Secretary Humphrey, Dr. Flemming commented on the necessity of speeding up Council consideration of all the status reports on the national security programs. If the Council had to wait for all these reports to come in until next September, this might be too late a date for effective action in terms of the budgetary processes.

The Vice President likewise agreed on the need for a speed-up in the receipt of these reports. He pointed out that if what the Council had been hearing this morning was correct, a decision on the continental defense policy of the United States certainly could not wait very long, especially if the Council proposed to accelerate the development of these continental defense programs.

Secretary Humphrey again inquired why the Council could not get the status reports earlier than next autumn. Could we not advance the cut-off date from June 30 to the present time and thus hasten the compilation of the final returns?

Mr. Anderson explained the great difficulties involved in getting out the annual status reports and the three-year cost projections. He was seconded by Secretary Robertson, who explained to the Council that the authorities in the Defense Department had just presented him with their first “look-see” as to the prospects for the Fiscal Year 1958 Defense Department budget. Although this look-see was in a very preliminary stage, a very great rise in expenditures, even greater than the Joint Chiefs of Staff had estimated, seemed to be in the cards.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606 indicated a rise in costs for continental defense from about $3 billion currently to approximately $11 billion in 1960. If this was the situation in continental defense, Secretary Humphrey deduced that the total expenditures for the Department of Defense would probably rise from their current $40 billion a year to $60 billion or $80 billion in 1960 and thereafter. If anything like this really happened, the Administration would be faced with the gravest problems. The approach of the Administration to such problems, combined with achieving understanding of them by the American people, would be a tremendous undertaking. Accordingly, he repeated that at the very earliest possible date the Council must become aware of the trends of where our policies for national defense were going to lead us.

Admiral Radford expressed the feeling that there was no particular need to await all the details of the June 30 status reports in order for the Council to be in a position to tackle the problem just mentioned by Secretary Humphrey. In broad terms, at least, the relevant figures could be presented to the Council much sooner than next fall. Secretary Humphrey said that that was essentially what we needed and what he believed was possible. Admiral Radford went on to comment in the same vein that essentially he had heard nothing new about the situation in the course of the Council’s deliberations on NSC 5606. He had anticipated everything that the Council had been listening to this morning about the magnitude of the problem. Secretary Humphrey agreed with Admiral Radford, but stressed the fact that it was important to get the conclusions on paper so that we could see where to go.

Governor Stassen commented that the Administration was currently carrying out in the military field a number of concepts, strategies, and preparations which were no longer valid, although they had been valid when first undertaken five or six year ago. Five years ago we had all believed that the first line of defense of the United States lay in Western Europe. Now, with what we know about the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, we have come to feel that our front line is in our massive retaliatory capability and in the stability of the American economy. The situation currently in the air is a very different situation from that which existed five years ago. This indicates that we should contemplate a major shift in the emphasis of our programs and, accordingly, in our allocation of our resources for defense. We do not have to wait for the returns of the status reports to realize that we simply cannot carry out all of our military programs, both those that were valid five years ago and those that we deem valid now, without facing an absolutely impossible financial burden.

Secretary Humphrey said that Governor Stassen had put his finger on the essence of the problem. He again called for getting all the facts and figures together so that the Council could decide on what we could continue to do and what we could not do. Secretary Robertson said he believed that the requirements called for by Secretary Humphrey could be provided at least before August. Admiral Radford concurred in this opinion of Secretary Robertson.

Dr. Flemming said that he wished to be sure that these figures were to include all national security programs and not merely those national security programs for which the Department of Defense was responsible. Secretary Humphrey said that this was indeed the case, and called on Mr. Anderson to get all this material together as soon as possible and present it to the National Security Council.

Admiral Radford intervened to express his agreement with the points made by Governor Stassen in arguing that we have been following both old outmoded concepts of getting ready for a possible future war, as well as new and more valid ones. He also agreed that such a dual course of action was impossible.

Governor Stassen pointed out that when the results of the three-year projections of the costs of all national security programs has been put together and brought before the Council, these reports should have included in them the factors reflecting the growth of the U.S. economy and national income over the next three years. Otherwise the forthcoming reports would not be all-inclusive. Secretary Humphrey indicated his agreement with this suggestion, but pointed out that the rate of the growth of our economy and our national income had been much slower than the rate of our expenditures for national security.

The Vice President observed that it was all very well for the members of the National Security Council to discuss here what we should do and should not do with respect to getting rid of outmoded military concepts. On the other hand, the Secretary of State may well have something to say about what is feasible and what is not feasible from a political point of view with respect to dumping old concepts and defense strategies.

Dr. Flemming then expressed the hope that all these figures which the Council had been calling for could be got together in perhaps thirty days. Thereafter he recommended that the National Security Council have a two or three-day meeting to consider all the implications of these figures.

Mr. Anderson then suggested an appropriate form of Council action on NSC 5606. He pointed out that NSC 5606 contained an estimated three-year projection of the costs of the continental defense policies that were recommended. He went on to say that the Council could and would obtain similar three-year projections for all the other national security programs by next month. Thus all the cost elements could be brought together in a single paper by late July. This being the case, Mr. Anderson recommended that the National Security Council postpone any action on NSC 5606 until this date.

The Vice President said that this seemed suitable to him if there were no objections from other members of the Council. Dr. Flemming interjected the hope that by this time the Federal Civil Defense Administration could have priced out more firmly the probable costs of its proposed shelter program.

The Vice President then went on to suggest that the Council might now set a target date for its meeting on the status reports on the national security programs. He pointed out that certainly the President himself should be on hand when the Council considered matters of such great significance. Accordingly, the Vice President suggested that this problem be scheduled on the agenda of the National Security Council for the first meeting at which the President would be available to preside. This he thought might well be some time around July 15 or 20.

Governor Stassen said that he had one last thought to express before the Council finished its discussion. He referred to paragraph 26 of NSC 5606, which dealt with the problem of public education and participation in the continental defense effort. He invited the Planning Board to consider the kind of education the U.S. public should have— namely, to be convinced that whatever kind of attack would be made against the United States, the United States would survive the attack, win the war, and rebuild from the ruins. In short, we must instill courage and belief in victory in our people. We must exercise leadership. The people of the United States must know that their leaders are convinced that the country will come through any ordeal that it may be called upon to face.

The National Security Council:[18]

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5606, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to the reference NSC Actions, and the views of the Chairman, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, transmitted by the reference memoranda of June 7, 11 and 13, respectively; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum on June 13 on “Continental Defense”.

b. Deferred action on NSC 5606 pending earliest practicable Council consideration of the estimated three-year projection of all national security programs and the fiscal and budgetary outlook thereon being prepared pursuant to the President’s directive circulated by the reference memorandum on “Status of National Security Programs and Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through Fiscal Year 1959”, dated June 13.

c. Agreed that each department or agency responsible for preparing an annual status report should be requested to submit, not later than July 15, 1956, the estimated projection of its program for the next three years, being prepared pursuant to the President’s directive; without awaiting the completion of the regular annual report on the status of its program as of June 30, 1956. The object of this action is to facilitate the early action contemplated in b above. Each estimated three-year projection should clearly identify and project the status of the principal elements of each program in achieving the objectives in applicable national security policies, particularly NSC 5602/1; together with expenditure estimates related to each of these elements.

Note: The action in c above transmitted to all appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.

[Here follow the remaining three agenda items concerning the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, and East Germany, scheduled for publication in Volumes XXVI and XXVII.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 18.

[2] Reference presumably is to NIE 11–2–56, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” dated June 8. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

[3] See footnote 4, supra.

[4] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1573, approved by the President on July 9. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[5] Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D–Tex.), Senate Majority Leader.

[6] Representative Sam Rayburn (D–Tex.), Speaker of the House.

[7] Regarding NSC Action No. 1417, see footnote 8, Document 28.

[8] Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30.

[9] NIE 11–56, “Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959,” dated March 6, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

[10] NIE 11–2–56, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” dated June 8, is not printed. (Ibid.)

[11] The June 7 memorandum is filed in the minutes. The June 11 memorandum transmitted a memorandum from Allen Dulles to Dillon Anderson and a May 31 memorandum by Radford; see footnotes 4 and 5, Document 81. The June 13 memorandum transmitted a June 12 memorandum from Admiral Strauss. The June 11 and June 13 memoranda are in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5605 Series.

[12] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or in Department of State files.

[13] This memorandum transmitted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Continental Defense (NSC 5606). The Joint Chiefs found NSC 5606 to be generally acceptable, from the military point of view, as a statement of policy on continental defense to replace NSC 5408. However, they suggested certain specific changes to be incorporated in NSC 5606 before its approval. These changes were contained in an Appendix attached to their memorandum to Secretary Wilson, dated June 12. Their memorandum of June 12 and the June 13 memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council are in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Continental Defense (NSC 5606).

[14] This memorandum contained a directive by the President on the subject of (1) departmental and agency annual reports on the status of national security programs, and (2) a report by the Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget on the fiscal and budgetary outlook through fiscal year 1959. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5609 Series)

[15] The briefing note is filed in the minutes.

[16] See Document 86.

[17] See Documents 84 and 85.

[18] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1574, approved by the President on July 9. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

83. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

Washington, June 28, 1956.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing a memorandum regarding the preservation of U.S. overseas military bases, operating rights, and facilities.

Because of the President’s intimate and first-hand knowledge of this whole problem, I think you will agree that there is no one whose judgment in these matters is equal to his. I therefore plan to discuss this problem with him at an appropriate time, and am sending you the attached memorandum in advance to indicate the nature of the problem as I see it. I would, of course, wish to have you present when I raise this matter with the President. I will get in touch with you when I ask for the appointment to see him.[2]

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[3]

PRESERVATION OF U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES, OPERATING RIGHTS, AND FACILITIES

1. The Present Situation.

Throughout the world, we are faced with political developments which threaten the continuance of many U.S. overseas military bases, operating rights, and facilities in friendly and allied countries. In Iceland and Saudi Arabia, our existing base rights are in jeopardy. In Morocco, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the Azores, we are faced with difficult negotiations whose outcome is uncertain. In the Philippines and Okinawa, local opposition in some aspects of our overseas base programs has become so outspoken that the maintenance of our existing facilities is becoming a major internal political issue. In Thailand, criticism is beginning to mount, led by opposition elements. Even in Spain there are signs of possible trouble. Our British allies have already suffered from the general change of attitude and are faced with the loss of their existing bases and military rights in Ceylon and with major complications in Cyprus and Singapore.

2. The Basis of Our Existing System and the Trend of the Future.

The basis of our present system of U.S. military bases, operating rights, and facilities overseas stemmed from the Stalinist post-war policy of the use of force and the threat of violence (insurrection in Greece, absorption of European satellites, division of Germany, Berlin blockade, Communist-led uprisings in Vietnam and the Philippines, armed aggression in Korea, etc.). Our present overseas system largely developed following the aggression in Korea which caused a psychosis of fear in many free nations which did not alone have the capacity to defend themselves. They therefore welcomed the added protection which they received as a result of granting to the U.S. military rights and facilities which would serve to deter Communist attack or to protect them in the event of Communist aggression. The general pattern of cooperation from host countries that sought U.S. protection facilicated acquisition of base rights on reasonable terms, even from countries whose primary interest was in securing a financial quid pro quo (such as Saudi Arabia and Libya).

However, in the past eighteen months: (a) as a result of the major change in Soviet tactics, the general impression has been created that the danger of aggression and war has very substantially receded; (b) growth of nuclear capabilities has incited fear that U.S. bases may be a primary object of Soviet nuclear attack, with “fall-out” which would wipe out the surrounding population; (c) the Soviets have been stressing that they wish to help countries solve their economic problems, that there are no political strings attached, and that they do not want any military bases or rights because these are an infringement on sovereignty but that they are willing to supply military equipment without strings or conditions attached; (d) there has been everywhere a growing spirit of nationalism which in many instances regards the granting of military rights and facilities as a derogation of national sovereignty.

The above factors, together with natural frictions and jealousies on the part of local populations which are inevitable where substantial numbers of foreign troops are stationed for a long time within a country, have combined to sharpen local opposition to U.S. military operating rights and facilities overseas, even by non-Communist elements and to make them internal political issues.

3. The Necessity for U.S. Flexibility of Approach in Modifying Existing Programs.

To summarize, a strong tide is running against our present foreign base positions. If they are not to be engulfed by this tide, if we are to preserve our vitally important existing facilities but also prevent present allies from becoming hostile or neutral, we must be prepared to consider modifying some of our existing arrangements and procedures with respect to overseas bases and rights, and bringing them into keeping with the political and psychological realities of today and tomorrow. As history has proved with respect to the overseas positions of both the French and the British (Indochina, North Africa, Cyprus, etc.), we would not be able to maintain our existing facilities with a friendly enviroment if we wait until the pressures against them have become so great that nothing but total ejection will meet the local demands. We must assess the situation in the different countries most carefully and consider whether modifications should not, in some cases, be made to anticipate a time when irresistible pressures are built

It seems evident that if we are incapable of being flexible in the face of changing local conditions, we will create difficulties and will undermine local governments and political elements which are friendly to the U.S. It therefore seems imperative, in the interest not only of maintaining to the maximum extent possible our existing rights and facilities so as to deter Communist aggression but also in the overriding interest of preserving the position of U.S. leadership in the effort for free world unity, that we promptly re-examine our present program.

4. The Need to Develop the Idea of Common Interest and to Eliminate Symbols Interpreted as a Derogation of National Sovereignty.

We must find effective ways practically to demonstrate, through actual handling of U.S. overseas military facilities, that they are important elements of collective security for deterring aggression, and that the local people concerned have a full and mutual interest in the enterprise. Where this is done in Europe, with NATO, our bases are least under fire. We have had some success in developing a feeling of a collective and cooperative effort for a common end. We should begin now to explore what lines of action we can follow which will, with least sacrifice of military utility, increase the local sense of participation and self-interest in our other overseas military operations. In other words, we must develop the feeling that U.S. military rights and facilities are part of the security system of the host country. The sense of common interest will be valuable even in countries where local interest is primarily focused on financial returns from U.S. bases. In other host countries, it will be invaluable.

5. Outline of Study Required.

The Departments of State and Defense should as a matter of urgency undertake a case-by-case study of each of the local situations where we have military bases, operating rights, and facilities. The study should include for each place:

A. An analysis of existing arrangements:

i. the actual bilateral or other agreements involved;

ii. the procedures which have been applied by the U.S. military in terms of security precautions involving checking and search of visitors at installations, the flying of flags, local employment, etc.

B. Analysis of the local political and economic factors which affect, favorably or unfavorably, maintenance of U.S. facillities.

C. The desirability of various changes in existing facilities, designed to obtain greater over-all stability of our position.

D. Analysis of the relative strategic value and political feasibility of securing alternative bases elsewhere.

6. The study should be made at a sufficiently high level and with enough rapidity to enable conclusions to be promptly arrived at, for time is of the essence.

[1] Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, 311–National Security. Secret.

[2] According to a memorandum of conversation by Dulles on August 9, the Secretary asked Frank C. Nash, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, if he would undertake an overall study, as suggested in the memorandum attached to this letter, of the problems facing the United States in preserving an adequate system of overseas bases and operating facilities. Nash agreed to head up a task force for such a study. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation) On August 11, Dulles saw the President, who “agreed we should get someone from outside and thought Frank Nash would be acceptable.” (Ibid., Meetings with the President) A letter from Dulles to Eisenhower, dated October 3, indicated that an enclosed draft letter from the President to Nash on the latter’s appointment and assignment “has the full concurrence of Mr. Nash and the Secretary of Defense.” (Ibid., Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) Regarding the President’s letter and Nash’s report, see Document 172.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

84. Editorial Note

On August 6, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted to the National Security Council Sections D and F–J of NSC 5609, “Trends in National Security Programs and the Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through Fiscal Year 1959,” along with a table of contents and a complete set of tabs. This set of documents included estimated 3-year projections of national security programs through fiscal year 1959, and were prepared by the responsible departments and agencies in response to President Eisenhower’s directive as noted in Lay’s June 13 memorandum to the National Security Council (see footnote 14, Document 82). The copy of NSC 5609 in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5609 Series, also includes Section A, dated August 14, which was the report by the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget on “The Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through Fiscal Year 1959,” and Section C, dated August 7, which was the Department of Defense report on “Trends in National Security Programs Through Fiscal Year 1959.”

Section E of NSC 5609, a report dated August 6 from the Atomic Energy Commission, estimated a projection of the atomic energy program for the next 3 years through fiscal year 1959. A copy of this report is Ibid., S/S–RD Files, Lot 71 D 171. Section B, the Department of Defense report on “The Military Program,” was presented orally at the 294th NSC meeting on August 17 in the form of 31 charts; see Document 87.

85. Memorandum of Discussion at the 292d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 9, 1956[1]

Washington, August 9, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Reduction of SAC Vulnerability (NSC Actions Nos. 1430–d, 1488 and 1574[2] )

Mr. Dillon Anderson opened the meeting by noting that the first two items on today’s agenda were informational in nature and both related to continental defense. The first was a further report on measures designed to lessen the vulnerability to attack of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the last report on that subject having been made to the Council in December, 1955.[3] Today’s report, he said, would take into account the Killian Committee recommendations made last year, the new intelligence on Soviet nuclear and delivery capability, and the recommendations made to the Planning Board and the Council by Mr. Robert Sprague in connection with the draft revision of continental defense policy. Mr. Anderson noted that Mr. Sprague, the Council’s Consultant on Continental Defense, was in attendance at the meeting for purposes of the continental defense items to be considered. Mr. Anderson then introduced General R. C. Lindsay who, with the use of several charts, briefed the Council on the Air Force program objectives for increasing the deterrent and strike potential of SAC (SAC vulnerability).[4]

General Lindsay advised that the Air Force has recently completed an exhaustive study of all aspects of SAC vulnerability to determine the actions necessary to insure that our strategic forces can be preserved, protected and effectively employed. Whereas the Technological Capabilities Panel report (Killian report) was concerned primarily with SAC physical vulnerability, the Air Force has directed its recently completed study to the entire vulnerability problem of increasing the deterrent and strike capability of SAC, including offensive as well as defensive measures necessary to enhance SAC’s capability.

General Lindsay’s briefing was in three parts: (1) Major vulnerability areas and remedial actions; (2) remedial actions requiring further study and research; and (3) Air Force program objectives which are being recommended to increase SAC’s deterrent capability and strike potential.

General Lindsay emphasized that the program objectives which he would discuss have not been related to budgetary considerations. He noted that practical considerations dictated that caution be exercised in embarking on a program which, while greatly improving our posture in one area, may limit our ability to maintain an equally strong posture in other equally important areas. He emphasized that the magnitude of the program objectives being discussed represented the minimum actions proposed by the Air Force.

As to SAC vulnerability considerations, General Lindsay listed the following areas of vulnerability and commented on each along the lines indicated below:

1. SAC’s Base Structure: At present many SAC bases have two assigned wings and are jammed with as many as 130 aircraft which create operational problems and present highly profitable targets to the enemy. Several SAC units are located in coastal areas where the amount of warning time would be insufficient to get the majority of the craft into the air before an enemy attack. To reduce this vulnerability the Air Force has embarked on a program to disperse to a maximum of one medium wing per base and a maximum of one heavy squadron per base plus their associated tankers. Although the Air Force does not propose to evacuate coastal SAC locations, it plans to progressively reduce congestion at those bases and to locate new SAC units in the central United States. The Air Force is examining the possible use of Canadian bases to support tanker refueling operations since this would improve SAC’s strike capability, enhance its target coverage, reduce reaction time and increase the number of weapons which could be delivered on the initial strike wave. Only a minimum caretaker type force would be assigned to those Canadian bases. Tankers would not actually be assigned; instead such bases would be used for exercise and emergency purposes only. To increase flexibility in SAC operations the Air Force is now studying the possible use of additional compatible non-SAC bases which may be required on and after D-day. There are 272 such bases in the continental United States capable of supporting SAC regrouping operations, and by 1960 there will be 75 similar bases overseas.

2. Warning Time: Warning time is the next most vulnerable area, according to General Lindsay. He indicated that since it was not prudent to plan on strategic warning, Air Force planning for the future is based on the relatively limited warning to be obtained from our radar network. To increase tactical warning time, improvements must be made in the capability of the continental warning perimeter. This requires more gap-filler radars for low altitude coverage, as well as an enhanced ground observer corps. Since the enemy can effectively end-run the DEW line extension in the Pacific and attack from the south, two possible countermeasures are being considered: (a) A further extension of the DEW line south of midway (this is now being studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff); and (b) a southern radar net somewhat in the nature of the DEW line type of operation in the north.

3. SAC Response: General Lindsay indicated that an alert force is the best means to enable SAC to mount a significant initial retaliatory strike. This alert force concept is being studied now. Although one-third of the force on alert would be desirable, considerably less than that appears to be the best that can be attained. In addition, said General Lindsay, we must speed the decision-making process by which warning information is converted into action by the SAC forces. To achieve this, greater coordination between SAC and CONAD is required.

4. SAC’s Control and Communications Capacity: SAC’s control and communications is the next most vulnerable area, according to General Lindsay. A more comprehensive communications net is required. In addition, the Air Force is considering better protected control rooms, protected alternate headquarters, and a radiation monitoring system as well as a bomb impact location system.

5. The ICBM Threat: The ICBM threat has also been considered in terms of SAC vulnerability, leading to the Air Force’s belief that protective shelter may offer a considerable defense against this threat. An evaluation of the cost and effectiveness of protective shelters in the higher blast resistant ranges will be available about September 1, 1956, according to General Lindsay.

6. As to the vulnerability of the weapons stockpile, all of SAC’s weapons, as of the planned distribution for January 1, 1957, will be in relatively few sites, and over 50% will be located at only 13 sites. Of the total of 45 weapons sites, 38 will be on SAC bases, which are expected to be primary aiming points. A thorough evaluation of the stockpile vulnerability problem is an urgent requirement, and action is being initiated to cause this evaluation and to determine the additional actions deemed necessary.

General Lindsay next listed the following items requiring further study: (a) a southern radar net; (b) the extension of the southwest flank of the DEW line; (c) protected control rooms and protected alternate headquarters; (d) SAC requirements for use of compatible non-SAC bases; (e) the need for a radiation monitoring system.

General Lindsay next dealt with Air Force program objectives, emphasizing again that while the listed requirements are considered valid, the cost estimates to which he would make reference have not been related to budgetary considerations. (These estimates are contained in the chart which is filed in the minutes of the meeting and which is a copy of the chart which General Lindsay utilized in briefing the Council.[5] ) The highlights of this portion of General Lindsay’s briefing follow:

1. As to dispersal of the SAC forces, $168 million have been provided for FY 1957 to carry out the initial increment of the dispersal program with the objective of stationing a maximum of one medium wing and their associated tankers per base and one heavy squadron and their associated tankers per base. For FY 1958 the Air Force proposes a $340 million expenditure as the second increment to obtain dispersal of the SAC force. This would provide 31 heavy squadron bases and 20 medium wing bases.

2. As to improvement of the continental warning perimeter, there is involved a total package cost of $33 million through FY 1962, which funds would be used primarily for additional gap-filler radars.

3. As to speeding the decision-making process, the estimated cost is $2 million through FY 1962, which funds would be used primarily for additional communications facilities between SAC and ADC.

4. As to the alert force concept, the Air Force is proposing an expenditure of $50 million in FY 1958 as the initial increment for construction of the unique facilities necessary for alert operations, e.g., parking aprons, alert hangers, taxi ramps located adjacent to the take-off end of runways, etc.. Initial and annual operating costs for subsequent years are also reflected on the above-mentioned chart.

5. As to increased control and communications capacity, the funds set up as a program objective by the Air Force include $2.9 million in FY 1958 and $2.9 million in FY 1959 for the purchase of necessary security equipment.

6. As to Canadian tanker support bases, the cost for initial construction is $28 million for FY 1957. In addition, $122 million would be required to complete the program.

7. As to research on protective shelters, such research is urgently needed in view of the ICBM threat. Accordingly, the Air Force contemplates use of about $10 million for research and testing in FY 1957.

8. As to reduction of the vulnerability of the atomic weapons stockpile, estimates are not available at this time. As a by-product of the SAC base dispersal program, some reduction in stockpile vulnerability will be achieved; however, further study of the problem by the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission is warranted on a priority basis.

General Lindsay concluded his formal presentation with the observation that considerably more money could be profitably spent in the areas mentioned above; that continued analysis of these problems will be made in the light of future estimates of Soviet capabilities in order to determine what changes or additions may be necessary to reduce SAC vulnerability.

There was no Council discussion following this portion of the continental defense presentation.

The National Security Council:[6]

Noted a briefing by the Department of Defense on the subject, based upon a study initiated following the previous NSC briefing at the 270th Council meeting (NSC Action No. 1488).

2. Review of Certain Continental Defense Programs (NSC 5408; NSC Action No. 1574; NSC 560[6] ; Annex D of NIE 11–56;[7] NIE 11–2–56;[8] Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Implications of the Revised Estimate of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities with Respect to the Conclusions of the 1955 Net Evaluation”, dated June 7, 11 and 13, 1956[9] )

Mr. Dillon Anderson advised the Council that the second item on today’s agenda involved a briefing by the Department of Defense on two separate aspects of continental defense: (a) The Atlantic and Pacific seaward extensions of the early warning line, and (b) the early warning and control radars.[10] He advised that the date of completion of programmed improvements in these aspects of continental defense related to the Killian Timetable studies and in addition, that Mr. Sprague’s recommendations on these two aspects has been taken into account by the Department of Defense. General Lindsay thereupon introduced the Defense briefers, Lt. Col. George S. Weart,USAF, and Commander W.G. Boyer,USN.

Colonel Weart briefed the Council on the Air Force aspects of these two programs, and Commander Boyer on the Navy aspects thereof. Their briefings were substantially identical with the briefings given the NSC Planning Board by the Department of Defense on March 15, 1956.

In summary, Colonel Weart very briefly treated of each of the early warning lines, their capabilities and operational readiness dates. He singled out those areas where, by June 30, 1958, there will be a detection capability of upwards of 60,000 feet and those remaining areas where there will be a 40,000-foot detection capability. He indicated that by July 1957 the mid-Canada line and its previously planned extensions will be fully operational; that the planned NATO line was scheduled to be fully operational by the end of calendar year 1958; that an extension of the DEW line was now planned across Greenland, and that in 1960 it is planned that the early warning line from Argentia to the Azores will swing northward to Greenland, from Greenland to the Faroe Islands, and thence tie into the British radar system. He indicated that the North American Air Defense System will have a 65,000-foot detection capability by June 30, 1958.

In summary, Commander Boyer indicated that the Navy portion of this program called for five picket ship stations with supporting aircraft, radar equipment, etc., off each coast; that YAGRs and DERs are to be used for this purpose; that the entire YAGR–DER program would be completed by July 1, 1958; and that by July 1, 1957 the interim seaward line to the Azores would be fully operational, swinging northward later as indicated by Colonel Weart. He advised that the Navy portion of this program would provide some detection coverage up to 100,000 feet; that most of it would permit detection up to 70,000 feet, and that the minimum detection altitude would be at least 60,000 feet.

On the completion of the formal presentation on this subject by Colonel Weart and Commander Boyer, the Secretary of State observed that these briefings illustrated the great interdependence of our military and foreign policies—a factor which was not always recognized, particularly by some committees of the Congress. Indicative of such interdependence was the problem of negotiating for extension of base rights in the Azores in support of such things as the Atlantic air early warning barrier. Secretary Dulles noted that, when it was thought that Nehru would visit the United States, these negotiations were suspended so as not to conflict with the Goa situation. These negotiations were being held up again by the Portuguese pending completion of the visit of the Chief Justice to India. In view of the nature of Justice Warren’s visit, Secretary Dulles said he could not appreciate fully the reasons cited for the stand taken by the Portuguese. Nonetheless, he believed this did illustrate the sensitivity of the Portuguese to such matters, as well as the interdependence of military and foreign affairs operations. Secretary Dulles thought that in this respect the Canadian situation was much better, although the continental defense interests of the United States in Canada also involved related questions which were not always appreciated, particularly when such questions were handled separately by separate committees of the Congress which did not see such questions in their over-all context.

Secretary Dulles said he didn’t know what could be done about the situation to which he referred, but he did note that some of the assumptions on which military program objectives were based, as reflected by the briefings today, were complicated by economic, political, and other factors such as those previously cited by him. Being the Cabinet Member primarily responsible for foreign relations, the Secretary of State said he thought that he should make mention of these factors which consistently threatened efforts to accomplish objectives of a politico-military nature.

Secretary Wilson said that the Department of Defense was keenly conscious of the points made by Secretary Dulles. In addition, Secretary Wilson said he was also conscious of the fact that we had never before in our history had problems of the kind we were trying to cope with today. With thousands of our military and other personnel spread throughout the world, we had the problem of making our people realize that they were guests in these host countries. If we looked at our problems in a piecemeal way, he said, rather than in the proper perspective, we might become like the guest who overstayed his welcome. Accordingly, Secretary Wilson thought we must look at all of our overseas problems in this light and in a very broad way.

Secretary Dulles indicated that since such matters have worldwide repercussions, the Department of State had been looking at these problems in terms of running our overseas installations in a more austere fashion so that we might be able to remain in them longer.

Secretary Wilson observed that Americans overseas don’t mean to be offensive, but around the globe we acted as though the world was our oyster. This, he thought, was well illustrated by the story of the Britisher who, in commenting on this subject to an American in London, observed that “you are overpaid, you’re overdressed, you’re oversexed, and most of all, you’re over here.”

Secretary Dulles, addressing himself to the Director of Central Intelligence, observed that we had indications that the Soviets now have radars with a 70,000-foot capability. He wondered, based on the briefings at today’s meeting, if this meant that we were behind the Soviets in this field.

Mr. Allen Dulles confirmed that the Soviets do have a 70,000-foot radar capability. Since he was not an expert on our own radar capability, however, Mr. Dulles thought that aspect of the question could better be answered by the Department of Defense.

General Lindsay commented at this point that he didn’t think one could say the Russians have a complete 70,000-foot radar detection system in effect now. He said the Soviet’s 70,000-foot detection capability was spotty, as was our own.

Secretary Dulles said he had the impression that the Soviets now had a detection capability of 70,000 feet and that the United States did not have the same capability at this time.

Secretary Wilson noted that while he favored technical improvements in these areas, he believed another major problem entailed the human factor. Citing such examples as the recent ship collision off the Jersey coast, he noted that a wreck resulted despite the fact that the vessels had radar equipment. This illustrated to him the need not only for technical equipment but also for alert humans who had a grasp of their job and an appreciation of the need for thinking while on the job.

The National Security Council:[11]

Noted and discussed a briefing by the Department of Defense on the results of a review, in the light of the revised estimate of Soviet nuclear capabilities contained in Annex D of NIE 11–56 and NIE 11–2–56, of the following continental defense programs:

a. The Atlantic and Pacific seaward extensions of the early warning line.

b. High altitude capability of the control radar in the aircraft control and warning network.

[Here follow agenda items 3–5. For portions of item 4 and item 5, “Suez Canal Situation,” see volume XVI, page 165.]

Marion W. Boggs

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Marion W. Boggs on August 10.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30. Regarding NSC Action No. 1488, see footnote 4, Document 46. Regarding NSC Action No. 1574, see footnote 18, Document 82.

[3] See Document 46.

[4] According to a memorandum from Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff to Secretary Dulles, dated August 7, this briefing was intended to be part of the background for the NSC review of estimated 3-year projections of all national security programs scheduled for August 16 and 17. Stelle also noted that the “security of SAC is vital to basic national policy; the protection of its retaliatory capability is the essential element of continental defense, and is so recognized in NSC 5606 (‘Continental Defense’) on which the Council has deferred action pending the three-year status of program review.” (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487,S/P Chron.)

[5] The chart is not filed in the minutes.

[6] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1589, approved by the President on August 10. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[6] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1589, approved by the President on August 10. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[7] NEE 11–56, “Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the U.S. and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959,” dated March 6, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

[8] NIE 11–2–56, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,” dated June 8, is not printed. (Ibid.)

[9] See footnote 11, Document 82.

[10] According to the August 7 memorandum from Stelle to Secretary Dulles (see footnote 4 above) this briefing was intended to be part of the background for the NSC review of the estimated 3-year projections of all national security programs. Stelle added that the Department of Defense review of these programs was in response to the views expressed by Robert Sprague, questioning the adequacy of specific programs to maintain SAC’s operational readiness. According to Stelle, Sprague believed that “Soviet nuclear capabilities are already at a level and are continuing to develop at a rate that the period from mid-1956 to mid-1958 may be as critical for the US as the period from mid-1958 on, when the Soviets may achieve decisive capabilities. Hence he has urged the immediate acceleration of certain continental defense programs designed to preserve SAC’s retaliatory capability by extending the period of tactical warning.” Stelle also stated that the discussion of the Atlantic extension of the early warning line might invite questions on the subject of defense installations in Iceland, and the negotiations on base rights in the Azores. He attached status memoranda on these two items to his memorandum. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5606 Series)

[11] The paragraphs that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1590, approved by the President on August 10. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

86. Memorandum of Discussion at the 293d and 294th Meetings of the National Security Council, Washington, August 16 and August 17, 1956[1]

Washington, August 16 and August 17, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meetings.]

1. The Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through FY 1959 (NSC 5609;[2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Status of National Security Programs and Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through FY 1959”, dated June 13, 1956[3] )

Mr. Anderson introduced Items 1 and 2 together. He said that the presentations today and tomorrow were designed to give the Council the clearest possible view of the annual cost and projected trend, over the next three years, of programs developed in the departments to carry out the objectives in NSC 5602/1[4] and in related NSC papers. He recalled that on June 4 the President had directed that the annual status reports include an estimated projection of each program, through FY 1959, deemed appropriate to meet approved national security objectives. Thus each agency has described what it believes to be necessary to carry out its particular policy objective; but the total requirement for all these programs had not heretofore been matched against total resources available.

Mr. Anderson also recalled that the President requested Treasury and Budget, on the basis of agency figures, to prepare a report on the entire fiscal and budgetary outlook through FY 1959, to enable the Council to reappraise the emphasis to be given the various elements of national strategy.

Mr. Anderson noted that on June 15 the Council had considered a proposed continental defense policy (NSC 5606) which would have involved raising the current annual expenditure of $3 billion to nearly $12 billion by FY 1960. The Council had deferred action on continental defense pending consideration of the 3-year projections of all national security programs without awaiting the Fall status reports.[5]

Mr. Anderson said that the 3-year projections were embodied in NSC 5609, except for the military program, which would be presented orally. Today all programs except the mutual security and military would be presented in order in which they appeared in NSC 5609.

Mr. Anderson noted that NSC 5609 was not accompanied by Planning Board recommendations. It was thought that Council discussion of the presentations would be guidance for such future review of policies and relative emphasis as might be directed in the light of the presentations. Mr. Anderson then called on the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for the first presentation.

The Director, Bureau of the Budget, presented the fiscal and budgetary outlook through FY 1959.

The President noted that the Director had indicated that the military figures used in his presentation had not been screened by the Secretary of Defense. The President said the cart was before the horse, and wondered why it should be necessary for the National Security Council to go over estimates which the Secretary of Defense had not screened. Mr. Anderson said that this meeting had been called so that subsequent steps in preparing national security programs could be related to the guidance which would be forthcoming in the discussion here. This guidance would indicate the relative emphasis to be placed on various programs before the estimates were in final form. The President wondered whether such guidance could be forthcoming until the Secretary of Defense had coordinated the military estimates. He said there must be some duplication in the estimates submitted by the Services. Mr. Anderson said that programs developed in the Services are related to NSC objectives, and pointed out that a breakdown would show not only the Service estimates, but the areas and functions to which the programs were related. Thus the further steps to be taken in programming could take into account the President’s broad concepts of national strategy indicated in the light of the current trends and estimates.

Secretary Humphrey felt it would be useful to consider the broad trend of expenditures. A proposed increase of $10 billion based on present programs would seem to indicate that it was time for the Council to realize that the fiscal trend following the adoption of national security programs was always upward. This group, he said, advises the President.———[6] The President, interrupting, said that the Council did not advise him as to whether we should buy a new aircraft carrier or a new airfield. Yet the Service estimates might include both.

Mr. Anderson noted that the presentations on today’s agenda had been called for as a result of the Council’s consideration of the continental defense paper. The $12 billion figure in the latter paper was the basis for the Council’s decision on June 15 to consider 3-year projections in the Council on all programs related to national security objectives before acting on the continental defense paper.

The President said that as far as the Council was concerned there were not three Defense Departments, but only one. He still wondered why the Council should tackle the Service estimates.

Secretary Humphrey said that basic NSC policies were pushing us into this kind of thing. He felt that these policies needed review.

Secretary Wilson said he had earlier in the week raised the question whether a Council meeting on this subject was necessary, because Defense had little more to present than it had presented previously.

The President said that earlier presentations by Defense had made it clear that the cost of everything was increasing. He said that every time a paper came up containing a proposed expenditure figure, such as $54 billion, the figure could later be quoted, and any reduction of the figure could be interpreted as a cut in national defense. He added that our military strength must be related to our economic strength, so that our national security programs can be continued for as long as necessary. But the question is, where do we get the money?

Secretary Humphrey felt that it was pertinent to examine what the basic policy papers require. He said a $10 billion increase in expenditures was obviously impossible, and a $2 billion increase was equally impossible. The expenditure trend was in the wrong direction; it should be down and not up. If expenditures increased he would have to resist proposals for tax reduction. If taxes were reduced, the reduction might be cancelled out two years hence by tax increases. The basic problem is: Should we follow the trend of taking on every program, or should we go back to the “new look” of three years ago, when the basis of our security was thought to be the deterrent striking power of the Air Force? All that an expenditure of $44 or $54 billion for national security buys is a one-year deterrent to war. At the end of each year we have to start over and buy another year’s deterrent; in effect, last year’s expenditure goes on the scrap heap. Our expenditures for national security each year are about equal to the assets of 25 of the largest corporations in the United States. These corporations, with assets of $54.6 billion, produce 95% of the country’s autos, half its steel, 82% of its telecommunications, 75% of its heavy electrical equipment, half of its freight car movements, and 35% of its agricultural machinery, and include also the New York, Chicago and Pacific Coast utility companies.

Secretary Humphrey felt we could not spend $44 to $54 billion every year over a period of years for unproductive purposes without destroying our economic system. If the Council did not effect some reductions, the Soviets might be able to defeat us without firing a shot, because our economy will suffer a depression. He felt that we had been led astray in matters of national security by scientists and by vested interests—military, political and business vested interests. Since it is difficult to make a big saving in any one year, we must start making savings immediately and get the job done by small bites. If expenditures were reduced to $42 or $38 billion while economic activity is increasing, then we could reduce taxes and absorb the consequences.

The President said we had a few very basic policies. For example, we wanted to retain our retaliatory power as a deterrent; we wanted to have a good continental defense as part of the deterrent; we wanted to support the military strength of our allies in Western Europe and Asia; and we wanted to ensure that friendly nations were able to make a living. If you eliminated these policies, he said, where would you be? The NSC establishes these basic policies, but does not say how much or what it will take to carry them out. However, we have to do some of these basic things or cease to exist. What we want to do is find a Spartan way to carry out our policies. The President said that the proper NSC decision should be on the character of the defense we need. It was then the job of the Department of Defense to tell us what gadgets we should have for that kind of defense. He did not know how much reduction the Secretary of Defense could effect in defense expenditures; until this was known, the Council had insufficient data on which to base conclusions.

Secretary Wilson said he wished to mention a number of points: (1) We have not changed our NATO commitments; (2) the rate at which we build up is important, because “speed-up” programs cost more; (3) the new look policy has not been clarified or completely accepted by the Army. Secretary Wilson said he received incredible estimates from the Services, and that the civilian Secretaries wanted to leave him “holding the bag”. He added that force levels should be considered also. A study had been made concerning the possible reduction of 800,000 men, and this had leaked out.

In connection with Secretary Wilson’s first point, the President said he would change NATO commitments if necessary, but so far he had wanted to avoid undercutting Adenauer. In regard to the third point, he thought probably the Navy hadn’t fully accepted the new look policy either. As far as the 800,000-man reduction was concerned, the President wondered whether it was wrong to hope that the forces would eventually total 2.5 million.

Secretary Wilson said it was not wrong to hope for a 2.5 million-man force, but no great reduction of 800,000 at one time was possible.

The President asked whether the Services should prepare programs based on JCS decisions in Puerto Rico.[7] Admiral Radford said this had been done. The President said he understood that under the Puerto Rico program we would be spending $38 to $40 billion on defense. Now the Services seemed to be saying that we should be spending $48 billion.

Secretary Wilson said he had suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that their Puerto Rico estimate was low, since it did not take full account of the increasing cost of weapons and of research and development. He thought it would be impossible to maintain 2,850,000 men with expenditures of $48 to $40 [$50?] billion. He felt that forces must be reduced if expenditures were to be cut. He added that Defense was about to make a complete review of its projections. However, he was worried about a “leak” in a political year.

The President said that political year or not, we could not let people run wild before Congress.

Secretary Humphrey said that in Washington we hear the vested interests speak, but around the country the people are bitter about big expenditures.

The National Security Council:[8]

Noted and discussed a presentation on the subject by the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget, on Section A of NSC 5609.

2. Trends in National Security Programs Through FY 1959 (NSC 5609; NSC 5610;[9] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Status of National Security Programs and Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through FY 1959”, dated June 13, 1956; NSC Action No. 1574)

Mr. Anderson said that $10 billion of the $54 billion total was attributable to elements of national security policy other than the defense program. Presentations would now be made on these other programs, beginning with the Atomic Energy Program.

The Atomic Energy Program was presented by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

At the conclusion of Admiral Strauss’ presentation, Secretary Wilson said that Government activities appear to have a life of their own: they double in ten years, or, if the advice of scientists is accepted, in two years. He had stopped development of nuclear aircraft once, but now the project was going again and would waste a lot of money. It was even proposed that a plane weighing 600,000 pounds be built, although it would in his opinion be of little use as a weapon.

[2 sentences (54 words) not declassified]Secretary Humphrey wondered whether we weren’t building nuclear weapons beyond the requirements. Admiral Strauss said the large increase in numbers was due to building a great many small weapons which would be widely dispersed. He felt that nuclear weapons were the least expensive weapons in our arsenal. Admiral Strauss added that of course at some time we would have to put on the brakes.

Admiral Radford agreed that the numbers of nuclear weapons had increased because of emphasis on smaller weapons and wide dispersal. He added that this spring we had trouble in Congress resisting a bigger program. Secretary Humphrey said we must get accustomed to fighting the pressure of vested interests which wanted larger programs. Admiral Radford said we were dealing with great intangibles; we must make guesses and take calculated risks. The President said the time would come when we would have to fight Congress to get enough money. He was sure that the present period, when the Congress gives us more than we want, would be of short duration. The President said he remembered the time when Congress wouldn’t permit one division to stay in Korea, despite the pleas of the military, and look what happened. The President said that of course there was no exact answer to some of these problems, but that we did want to find out where money was being wasted.

Secretary Hoover asked how much nuclear material now being used for military purposes could be used for peaceful purposes if a disarmament agreement should be concluded. Admiral Strauss replied that all the nuclear material was intact, there being no perceptible deterioration in our lifetime, so that it could be used for peaceful purposes in the future.

Secretary Wilson wondered why it was necessary to push the program of atomic power plants, and thought that perhaps some indirect subsidization was involved. In response to a question from Secretary Wilson, Admiral Strauss said the time was not far off, perhaps only five years away, when atomic power reactors could compete economically in high-cost areas with power plants using fossil fuel.

The Mobilization Program was presented by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization.

Secretary Wilson asked whether the titanium program was not being pushed too hard. He said we couldn’t do the proper job for the country if highly scientific things were pushed without regard to cost. Secretary Humphrey said research could be ruinous if it got out of hand. Secretary Wilson thought that some of the ideas behind the stockpile were as dead as NATO commitments. He felt we wouldn’t need materials for a long war in this nuclear age, and that the whole mobilization program should be reviewed. Considerable money was being wasted on an outdated mobilization base concept. Dr. Flemming said that some of his programs were based upon military requirements, and that he would be glad to take another look at them in the light of the revised military programs. He added that the program he had presented reflected modifications in mobilization policy agreed on by the Council two or three months ago.

The Civil Defense Program was presented by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

At the conclusion of Governor Peterson’s presentation, the President asked whether there were any comments, or whether everyone was scared to death. He asked Mr. Allen Dulles what the USSR was doing in civil defense. Mr. Dulles replied that he didn’t think the Soviets were doing very much, but he would look into the question.

The President wondered how far we could go until we reached a state of complete futility. He knew the United States could withstand a heavy attack, but he didn’t know how much it could take. With reference to the figure of $13 billion for shelters, the President thought it would be easy to spend $113 billion on this program if we provided really good shelters. In thinking about this problem, he continued, we always reach the point of realizing that an attack on any such scale as contemplated in Governor Peterson’s presentation would result in the paralysis of both sides. He felt the problem was virtually unsolvable. Secretary Wilson reported that someone had said we don’t know what weapons will be used in World War III, but in World War IV everyone will have to use rocks.

Dr. Flemming asked whether there had been any consideration of combining shelters with structures having a peacetime use. Governor Peterson said that the Swedish pattern of building great underground shelters which were also used as garages, had been studied. The $13 billion estimate for shelters might be reduced if shelter construction could be made a joint undertaking with private business. He admitted that shelters cost a great deal of money, but said that it would not be of much use to spend $40 billion for military forces when they could not defend the people of the United States. His conclusion was that war is obsolete and military forces are obsolete, and he thought perhaps the world was losing its sanity. The President said that everyone could agree with the latter conclusion.

Secretary Humphrey said that perhaps shelter construction should be financed by a voluntary tax, with only the sums voluntarily collected being spent. Governor Peterson asked whether anyone would be willing to apply this principle to military programs.

The President said he considered the psychological effects on the people of nuclear weapons developments to be very important. Governor Peterson recalled that a study of this problem was underway.[10]

The USIA Program was presented by the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency.

Director Brundage said he assumed the estimates presented would be reviewed later. The President said that all of these figures would be reviewed through normal budgetary processes.

The Internal Security Program was presented by the Acting Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, as to investigative aspects, and by the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, as to the remaining aspects. There was no discussion of this program.

The Foreign Intelligence Program was presented by the Director of Central Intelligence.

[2 paragraphs (9 lines of source text) not declassified]

At this point the President wondered whether the meeting tomorrow should be a meeting of the Council or a small meeting in his office of those most directly concerned with the military programs. He thought perhaps it was not appropriate to have a Council meeting on the military programs until the figures became Secretary Wilson’s figures. Mr. Anderson pointed out that not only the military program, but also the mutual security program, was on tomorrow’s agenda.

Secretary Humphrey asked whether the departments that had made presentations should not review their programs. The President said that none of the programs presented were approved by the Council. He said the agencies devised programs to accomplish basic policy, priced them out, and then tried to get the money from Budget. Then both the agency and the Budget Bureau came to the President. If a policy question was involved, it was referred to the National Security Council. If not, the President decided. The President hoped that no one was laboring under the impression that the programs presented this morning were approved.

Secretary Humphrey said we should start with last year’s expenditure figure and decide how much to reduce from that point. Some such measuring device must be adopted, else there was no limit to the expansion of programs.

The President noted that both the AEC and ODM presentations had revealed large expenditures based on military requirements. Secretary Wilson thought that many agencies sought to base their programs on military requirements as a justification for expansion. He recalled that after the Korean war military expenditures had been reduced by $8 billion, while other expenditures had increased by $6 billion.

The President at this point referred to Secretary Humphrey’s earlier statement that certain governmental expenditures were annually equal to the assets of 25 big corporations. The President thought this analogy striking, but was not sure of its relevance to the problem at hand. Moreover, continued the President, many government expenditures are not unproductive, but go to building up assets such as roads, hospitals and schools.

Secretary Wilson said that the military costs should be given a good looking-over again. Economies possible three years ago might not be possible now, however. The President said that before Korea, military expenditures were $12 to $13 billion a year. Now we had gone up to a new norm in military expenditure, and Congress was temporarily making political hay by giving the Administration more money than it asked for. Secretary Wilson said that each Service wanted to build itself up into the biggest in terms of promotion, prestige, etc. The President said they don’t think of it that way; each Service thinks it can do the job best. Secretary Wilson said he didn’t think events in the world would have turned out differently in recent years if our military program had been 50% greater. The President agreed that once we reach a certain level of deterrence, we don’t need to continue to build up.

Friday, August 17, 1956

Mr. Anderson said that today’s meeting was a continuation of yesterday’s. The Council had heard presentations on all the national security programs except the mutual security and military programs. Today the latter two would be presented.

The Mutual Security Program was presented by the Director, International Cooperation Administration, and the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).

Secretary Humphrey said he didn’t understand how the figure given in the presentation for NATO ($1.8 billion) fitted into the regional figures. Mr. McGuire said that the NATO total had been made up separately because it was interesting; of course, it cut across regional lines—for example, it included Turkey and Greece—and therefore duplicated regional figures.

Mr. Anderson said he wished to clarify a point mentioned by Mr. Hollister. The presentations made yesterday had used expenditure, not program, figures. Director Brundage confirmed the accuracy of Mr. Anderson’s remark.

Secretary Wilson said that in listening to the mutual security presentation he had noted that the lead time for giving away dollars was not as great as the lead time for building planes.

Secretary Humphrey said he understood that the programs presented today, as well as those presented yesterday, were subject to budgetary review and were not being approved by the Council. The President said that was correct, but pointed out that Mr. Hollister had said that the mutual security program expenditures for the next few years were largely fixed because of the carry-over of unexpended funds.

Secretary Hoover pointed out that it was difficult to determine the foreign policy implications of our assistance programs when they had to be planned so far in advance. He understood that the FY 1959 programs were now being planned, although the situation might be entirely different in 1959. The President said it was difficult to make Congress see that our assistance programs ought to be carried on with the greatest possible flexibility and initiative.

Secretary Hoover said it was difficult to stop the assistance machine once it got started. He referred especially to Yugoslavia and Egypt. He said he had recently discovered that 14 Diesel locomotives were destined for Egypt, and unimaginable difficulty had been experienced in getting them out of the pipeline.

Secretary Humphrey asked whether it was not a fact that 75 to 80% of mutual security assistance goes to five places. Mr. Hollister said this was the case if NATO was considered one place. Secretary Humphrey said we were talking about Taiwan, Korea,NATO and Indochina for the most part. The President said that Korea was a particularly difficult case. If Communist Chinese forces were ever withdrawn from North Korea, we might be able to reduce our assistance to the Republic of Korea. Secretary Wilson said the Chinese Communists might leave North Korea if we didn’t support so many South Korean divisions, which were a big burden on the Korean economy. Secretary Hoover said North Korea might reduce its forces if Syngman Rhee would quit making so many “nasty noises”.

Secretary Humphrey then said he had discovered that no one in the United States knows or can find out how much U.S. money, in the form of grants, loans, etc., goes into any given country from all sources. This is embarrassing, especially since the recipient countries know how much they are getting. Secretary Wilson said we are fortunate that no scandals had developed. Secretary Humphrey said the situation was so confused that scandals could not be uncovered if they existed. The President said he believed that if our assistance programs were handled intelligently we would get our biggest bargain per dollar spent. He thought our aid programs were cheaper than buying obsolete military equipment.

The Military Program was presented by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in the form of 31 charts.

In connection with comparative shipbuilding costs, Secretary Humphrey asked whether naval vessels had achieved an increase in fire power equivalent to the increase in their cost. Admiral Radford said the effective killing power of naval vessels had gone up more rapidly than their cost. Secretary Wilson wondered whether this was a good comparison. He said nuclear weapons could be loaded on old carriers and old planes. Admiral Radford agreed that World War II aircraft could carry nuclear weapons, but said they would soon be shot out of the air, probably before they had delivered the weapons.

The President wondered how big our aircraft carriers were going to get and why we proposed to put a nuclear reactor in a big vessel. Secretary Wilson said Congress had crowded him into doing this.

Following the presentation of a chart on the cost of putting an AAA battalion in the field, Secretary Wilson noted that the production of missiles was very expensive, much more so than aircraft production; because when you shot a missile it was gone, but you could continue to use the aircraft. The President said he thought the missile method of fighting a war was very inefficient, but we had to use that method for psychological if for no other reasons.

After presentation of a chart on the research and development program, Secretary Humphrey asked how anyone could intelligently supervise such an extensive research program. Secretary Wilson said he was working at it. Secretary Humphrey felt that the scientists these days showed a tendency to run wild.

After presentation of a chart on new weapons systems, the President asked if anyone really believed that a nuclear-powered bomber would be worth while in our time. Admiral Radford said no. Secretary Humphrey said that work on projects of this kind explained the shortage of scientists, which had recently received so much attention. Secretary Wilson said that recent scientific and technical advances had been so great that anything called research had become sacred. If he tried to cut down on research he was apt to “get the business”. Secretary Humphrey said that the Council must be prepared for criticism, but must go ahead and reduce programs where necessary. He added that some of the ideas in the Killian report would ruin us. The President said he felt that on the whole the Killian report had been a moderating influence. Some Congressmen were much more extreme. Secretary Wilson pointed out that he had held up the nuclear aircraft project three years ago. He felt now that it was foolish to go ahead until we had more evidence that nuclear propulsion of aircraft would work.

After presentation of a chart on guided missile systems, the President asked whether the three Services were competing in these programs. Mr. McNeil said that all three Services were involved in these programs, and that in some cases they were competing, especially in the cases of Nike–Talos and Matador–Redstone. Secretary Wilson said he would get into trouble if he tried to drop one of these projects. The President said we might have to get into trouble; in any case, it would be no worse than the Suez problem.

Following presentation of a chart on continental defense programs, Secretary Wilson said that considerable expense had been incurred in unifying continental air defense commands. He added that the whole program was so new and different, it was impossible to tell whether we were receiving our money’s worth. Admiral Radford said no one could tell how good the continental defense is until it is used against an attacking force.

Following presentation of a chart on the cost of airlifting a division, the President said he would be flatly against providing for the airlifting of any more divisions. He felt that some of the projects being undertaken now were unwise. Secretary Wilson said that the principal difficulty in defense programs was that there was no measuring-stick as to the wisdom or efficiency of the programs. In business, only those items which ultimately produced a profit were manufactured; but, of course, this measure was not available in national defense.

The National Security Council:[11]

a.

Noted and discussed the following presentations on the subject, based on reports contained in NSC 5609:

(1) 293rd Meeting:

(a) The Atomic Energy Program, by the Atomic Energy Commission.

(b) The Mobilization Program, by the Office of Defense Mobilization.

(c) The Civil Defense Program, by the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

(d) The USIA Program, by the U.S. Information Agency.

(e) The Foreign Intelligence Program, by the Central Intelligence Agency.

(f) The Internal Security Program, by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

(2) 294th Meeting:

The Mutual Security Program, by the Department of Defense and the International Cooperation Administration.

b. Noted and discussed a presentation on the subject by the Department of Defense with respect to the U.S. military program, as orally presented at the 294th meeting.

c. Noted that each of the departments and agencies responsible for the programs presented at these meetings would review its projected program and estimated expenditures, in the light of the fiscal and budgetary outlook and the discussion at these meetings, in connection with the preparation of its Fiscal Year 1958 budget requests for normal budgetary review.

Note: The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all responsible departments and agencies.

Marion W. Boggs

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on August 18.

[2] See Document 84.

[3] See footnote 14, Document 82.

[4] Document 66.

[5] See Document 82.

[6] As on the source text. Presumably Boggs did not hear Humphrey’s comments.

[7] Regarding the JCS decisions in Puerto Rico, see Documents 64, 65, and 73.

[8] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1594, approved by the President on August 26. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[9] NSC 5610, “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs,” dated August 3, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series) For the NSC memorandum of discussion on NSC 5610, see vol. x, p. 124.

[10] See Documents 95 and 96.

[11] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1595, approved by the President on August 21. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

87. Editorial Note

On September 19, Executive Secretary Lay transmitted to all holders of NSC 5611, “Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1956,” Part 1 (minus Annex A) of NSC 5611, dated September 15, entitled “Department of Defense Report to National Security Council on Status of United States Military Programs as of 30 June 1956.” This document consisted of the following: The basic report on the military program; Annex A, the Statistical Data Supplement, which was available for reference only in the office of the Executive Secretary of the NSC; Annex B, the Report on the Status of Implementation of the Technological Capabilities Panel Recommendations; Annex C, the Report on the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Programs; and Annex D, the Report on the Continental U.S. Defense Programs. Lay also noted that Annexes B, C, and D were of a high security sensitivity and should be handled with special security precautions and limited in circulation on a strict need-to-know basis. Part 1 was classified Top Secret, Restricted Data, per the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. A copy of Part 1, without Annex A, is in Department of State, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Box 376.

On September 24, Lay sent a memorandum to all holders of NSC 5611 transmitting, inter alia, Part 2 of that document. Part 2 consisted of a report by the Department of Defense, dated September 15, on the status of military assistance programs, and a report by ICA, dated September 17, on defense-supporting and other non-military aid programs. A copy of Part 2 is Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5611 Series.

On October 4, the National Security Council discussed Part 1 of NSC 5611; see Document 92.

88. Editorial Note

At its 297th meeting on September 20, the National Security Council discussed the matter of a reappraisal of United States policy regarding the entry into the United States of radioactive materials through diplomatic shipments. The Council considered a Department of State study, which had been authorized at the NSC meeting on March 8. This study, transmitted to the Council by a memorandum from Executive Secretary Lay, dated August 21, noted that neither international agreements nor unilateral United States action on this subject was feasible at this time. William H. Jackson, who replaced Dillon Anderson as Acting Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on September 1, stated that the NSC Planning Board concurred in the Department of State’s conclusions. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who was acting as chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, also endorsed the conclusions of the Department of State report, and added that the IIC and ICIS would keep the problem under continuing review. After additional comments on this topic by Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. and the President, the National Security Council, in NSC Action No. 1603, concurred in the conclusion of the Department of State study that “neither international agreements nor unilateral U.S. action to prevent entry into the United States of radioactive materials through diplomatic shipments is feasible at this time,” and requested the IIC and the ICIS to keep the problem under continuing review and report to the Council if developments occurred which would warrant reconsideration of this conclusion. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File,NSC Records) NSC Action No. 1603 was approved by the President on September 25. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Record of Actions by the National Security Council)

Regarding the March 8 NSC discussion, see Document 63. A copy of the Department of State study, transmitted by Lay’s memorandum of August 21, is in Department of State,S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Diplomatic Shipments (NSC 5527), as are various intradepartmental and interdepartmental memoranda on the development of this issue between the NSC discussions of March 8 and September 20.

89. Memorandum From the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, October 2, 1956.

SUBJECT

Summary record of meeting, 2 October 1956

PRESENT

The President

Secretary Dulles

Mr. MacArthur

Mr. Elbrick

Secretary Robertson

Secretary Gray

Mr. McNeil

Admiral Radford

Col. Goodpaster

In the meeting today, the President indicated he thought there should be no decrease in U.S. divisions in Europe for the present, and no statement indicating that such decreases are planned.[2]

Nevertheless, he considers—as he has from the beginning of the NATO build-up—that the U.S. reinforcements sent to Europe were provided to bridge the crisis period during which European forces were building up; however, practical considerations have limited, and still limit, action or policy statements initiating withdrawal.

The President considers that significant manpower savings can and should be made by reducing the manpower strength of divisions, and by cutting down on administrative overhead and support elements. In addition, he feels that economy should be sought in other priority military programs.

The President indicated general agreement with Secretary Dulles’ memorandum of October 1, 1956, subject to revision of Section II thereof as agreed in the meeting. With these revisions, no objection to the provisions of the outline was indicated by those present. The memorandum as revised is attached.[3]

A. J. Goodpaster

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/10–256. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary of Defense Wilson.

[2] For documentation on this subject, see vol. IV, pp. 1 ff.

[3] Dulles’ memorandum of October 1 is not attached, but for the revised version, see Ibid., p. 96.

90. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, October 2, 1956.

SUBJECT

Recommendations in the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee,ODM (Killian Committee): Item 2— NSC Agenda 10/4/56 [2]

1. The Council is asked to note the status of implementation of the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) recommendations on “Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack”, as presented in the several agency reports contained in NSC 5611 (“Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1956”).[3] Oral reports may be given to the Council by Defense, AEC, ODM, FCDA and CIA.

2. The draft Record of Action, which the Council will be asked to approve:

a) notes a number of changes in programs to carry out tasks assigned to Defense;

b) requests Defense to supplement its Council briefing, in December, on the ICBM, with a report on the anti-missile missile program; and

c)

defers decision on a follow-up study to the Killian Report, which the TCP recommended “within two years”.

(Defense and ODM differ as to the need for this: The Planning Board agreed to defer a recommendation to the Council until the ODM consults its Science Advisory Committee, the TCP parent, on whether technological advance in the past two years justifies initiation of another study at this time.)

3. Five TCP Recommendations were assigned as our primary responsibility by NSC Action 1355.[4] We do not make an annual Status Report and therefore have not submitted an accounting. In the event that questions arise concerning their status, I am attaching a brief memorandum of comments you may care to use.

Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff

Washington, undated.

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF TCP RECOMMENDATIONS ASSIGNED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

General Recommendation 7 a–b–c:

“The NSC initiate preparatory studies of the problems of international negotiations in the following areas growing out of recommendations of this Report”.

a.

“Atomic weapons in air defense negotiations with Canada to provide our air defense forces with authority to use atomic warheads over Canada.”

[2 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

b.

“Extension of the Planned Early Warning Line—International negotiations for the seaward extension of the Distant Early Warning Line from Greenland via Iceland and the Faroes to join future NATO warning systems.”

[2 paragraphs (34 lines of source text) not declassified]

c.

“Remote Sea Monitor Line—International negotiations for the installation of a submerged, sea traffic monitor line extending from Greenland to Iceland and to the United Kingdom”.

[1 paragraph (22 words) not declassified]

General Recommendation 9–b:

[1 paragraph (37 words) not declassified]

Status: The Department’s Legal Adviser has this problem under current review. State has participated with Defense, the National Science Foundation, and the National Academy of Science in planning the program for launching an earth satellite as part of the US participation in the International Geophysical Year 1957–58. Our studies are continuing in cooperation with the interested agencies.

Comment: So far as law is concerned, space beyond the earth is an uncharted region concerning which no firm rules have been established. The law on the subject will necessarily differ with the passage of time and with practical efforts at space navigation. Various theories have been advanced concerning the upper limits of a state’s jurisdiction, but no firm conclusions are now possible.

A few tentative observations may be made: (1) A state could scarcely claim territorial sovereignty at altitudes where orbital velocity of an object is practicable (perhaps somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 miles); (2) a state would, however, be on strong ground in claiming territorial sovereignty up through the “air space” (perhaps ultimately to be fixed somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 miles); (3) regions of space which are eventually established to be free for navigation without regard to territorial jurisdiction will be open not only to one country or a few, but to all; (4) if, contrary to planning and expectation, a satellite launched from the earth should not be consumed upon reentering the atmosphere, and should fall to earth and do damage, the question of liability on the part of the launching authority would arise.

General Recommendation 2B–12–a:

“We recommend that comprehensive programs be instituted to provide effective control of surface and, so far as possible, sub-surface traffic in both oceans from the coastlines to beyond the likely striking range of sea-launched attacks. For proper implementation:

“a. international arrangements should be made for the establishment of information reporting procedures and of control measures.”

Status: The Department is awaiting the results of other studies, assigned to Defense, which will bear on the scope and type of the “international arrangements” desired. It is our understanding that Defense has recently consulted with Treasury to ascertain whether international arrangements for search and rescue operations could be expanded to satisfy defense requirements.

[1] Source: Department of State,PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487. Top Secret.

[2] Extracts of the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee (Killian Committee) are printed as Document 9. For NSC consideration of the report, see Document 92.

[3] See Document 87.

[4] Regarding NSC Action No. 1355, see footnote 3, Document 17.

91. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State[1]

Washington, October 2, 1956.

SUBJECT

Status of the US Military Program (NSC 5611, Part 1): Item 1—NSC Agenda 10/4/56[2]

1. Admiral Radford will present an oral briefing on the US Military Program, Part 1 of NSC 5611 (“Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1956”). We have a single copy of the Defense Report and three of its four annexes: technological capabilities, the ICBM and IRBM programs, and military continental defense programs. We have had access to Annex A—Statistical Data Supplement—in the NSC offices.

2. The Report is in general an excellent descriptive statement of the status of our forces in 1956, projected along present lines to 1960. It is not an analytical statement or a “new look”. It makes no attempt to present, or select among, alternatives in force levels or composition which changes in doctrine, the new technology, or budget decisions may require. The Report is thus of no great assistance, for example, to a reexamination of force commitments or strategy for Europe.

3. Within these limits a number of conclusions emerge which have major implications for foreign policy:

a.

A fixed rate of military development in the period from 1956–60 is assumed before the new weapons and delivery systems affect US military programs.

Force levels will remain relatively the same: total military personnel at 2.8 million in 1956 moving to 2.9 million in 1960 (Army from 1.03 million to 1.05; Navy from .87 million to .89; Air Force from .91 to .98). Army divisions, now at 18 active and 4 reserve will be 19 active and 3 reserve in 1960; Marine divisions will remain constant at 3. Air Force combat wings now at 131 will be 132 in 1960, and SAC wines will decrease from 51 to 47. Similarly, the production of military hard goods will be relatively stationary: $14.4 billion in FY 56, leveling off to $14.8 billion “for some period of time”, with guided missiles production offset by declines in vehicles, weapons, and ammunition.

b.

In maintaining the nuclear deterrent a number of critical weak-nesses remain:

In Continental Defense, improvements in our own defense system are believed to be fully matched by improvements in the Soviet capability to deliver an air attack against the US. Thus, despite the present level of effort, our relative defense capability remains as estimated in April 1955. Further, our improvements are not such as to indicate a potential capability to prevent a “seriously damaging” attack on the US. Attack damage studies indicate the mobilization base would suffer damage ranging from “severe” to “catastrophic”, depending on timing and on the effectiveness of defense.

SAC Vulnerability continues to be “a matter of concern” both for bases within and outside the US, as Soviet delivery capability increases.

In Control of the Seas the Report makes the flat statement that: “The rate of improvement is not adequate to maintain the present capability vs. the USSR”.

c.

NATO capabilities seem increasingly deficient, even in the field of conventional forces.

The quality of NATO forces varies widely in personnel and combat effectiveness. Particular deficiencies are noted in anti-aircraft weapons, aircraft control and warning systems, fuel distribution, antisubmarine and mine counter-measures and in Navy forces hampered by “growing obsolescence that is outstripping modernization measures’.

There is no discussion of the rate of deliveries planned for new weapons to NATO in the 1956–60 period or the effect these will have on maintaining NATO’s absolute or relative capabilities.

Two political developments draw specific comment: French movements to North Africa “continue to have a very serious impact upon NATO’s posture readiness”, and political developments in Iceland “could require a complete reexamination of US military requirements in the North Atlantic area”.

d.

Despite the range and extent of US military aid, Allied capabilities for local war remain at a low level

In Europe, the possibility of limited hostilities without a broadening into general war is considered “unduly optimistic”.

In the Middle East, even if the countries concerned cooperated fully and even if the US provided the necessary material and budgetary support, it would take at least 3 to 5 years to correct ground forces’ deficiencies; the development of effective air and naval forces would be longer and more expensive.

In Southeast Asia, “the most profitable field for the extension of communist influence”, local forces are capable only of anti-guerrilla and delaying actions.

In the Far East, only the ROK and Taiwan have sizeable forces; neither could halt unaided a determined Chinese Communist aggression.

e.

The US capability for fighting local wars, by conventional means, if necessary, remains uncertain.

NSC 5602/1 directed that “within the total US military forces there must be included ready forces … [3] to deter … and to defeat … local aggression.” The manner of treatment of the subject in the Report makes it impossible to determine the extent of capability for local war in situations in which less than total force may have to be applied. It does this by lumping together all military forces—except nuclear—air, continental defense, and missiles—in a single category of “ready forces … to respond … to local aggression … and to carry out general war tasks.” The resulting description of their organization ana capabilities does not distinguish between local war and general war operations.

The Report notes that combat ready forces in the Far East Command and in the Continental US could be deployed rapidly to Southeast Asia “depending on the availability of lift”, but does not treat the probable availability as to type, amount, or readiness. It does note that there is “necessary amphibious lift immediately available” only for one regimental combat team and a supporting air group.

The statement is made that: “If US forces in the Far East were committed to the defense of Taiwan or Southeast Asia, the US capability to resist Communist aggression in either Japan or Korea would be considerably reduced.”

f.

The rate of modernization for US forces, and the progress in the missile field are presented optimistically.

The IRBM is expected to be operational by mid-1959; the ICBM by late 1959 (in February of this year NSC 5602/1 estimated the operational date of the ICBM as 1960–61). Progress in the anti-missile missile program is limited and ten years are estimated for the development of needed radar tracking systems.

g.

There seems need for our reexamination of base requirements in view of the prospective availability of new weapons.

The Report notes that the greater availability of the B–52 and the KC–135 jet tankers will decrease our present requirements on overseas bases. Neither this nor missile progress is reflected in the treatment of our overseas bases requirements.

A status report on major base negotiations summarizes 19 negotiations: two were completed during the year, 17 are pending, of which 6 are for renewal of rights, 7 for extension of base areas and 4 for new country sites.

The new countries are Brazil, Lebanon, Pakistan and Thailand. Negotiating instructions have been forwarded to the US Embassy in Rio; the negotiations with Lebanon are stall under consideration; we advised Defense in April of this year that we could not concur in negotiations with Pakistan at this time; and the views of Embassy Bangkok have been requested as to the feasibility of negotiations for military rights there.

[1] Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5611 Series. Top Secret. Copies were sent to U and C.

[2] Regarding NSC 5611, see Document 87. For NSC consideration of NSC 5611, Part 1, see infra.

[3] All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

92. Memorandum of Discussion at the 299th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 4, 1956[1]

Washington, October 4, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Status of the U.S. Military Program (NSC 5611, Part 1)[2]

Mr. Jackson informed the Council that Admiral Radford would provide an oral presentation on the status of the U.S. military program as of June 30, 1956, based on Part 1 of NSC 5611 (Status of National Security Programs as of June 30, 1956). A copy of Admiral Radford’s report is contained in the Minutes of the Meeting.[3]

At the conclusion of Admiral Radford’s report, the President inquired whether any members of the Council had any questions they wished to put to Admiral Radford. There being no such questions, the President himself inquired as to the nature, range and accuracy of the Regulus missile to which Admiral Radford had referred in the course of his report.

The National Security Council:[4]

Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Department of Defense on the status of the U.S. Military Program as of June 30, 1956, based on Part 1 of NSC 5611.

2. Recommendations of the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM (Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, dated February 14, 1955;[5] NSC Actions Nos. 1355 and 1430;[6] NSC 5611, Part 1, Annexes B, C and D; Part 3, Annex I; Part 4, Annex 5; Part 5, Annex 2; Part 7, Annex C[7] )

Mr. Jackson summarized the current status of the recommendations of the Technological Capabilities Panel (the so-called Killian Committee) with particular reference to the ten recommendations of the TCP which the Council had set aside at an earlier meeting for subsequent consideration. Mr. Jackson also called attention to two recommendations by the NSC Planning Board with respect to the ten recommendations referred to above. He then called on Dr. Furnas[8] for his report.

At the conclusion of Dr. Furnas’s brief summary, the President thanked him and observed with a smile that it seemed to him that every new survey of our problems by a scientific team seemed to result in recommendations that we undertake additional things. He rather wished we could find a team which would recommend programs which we could dispense with. Secretary Robertson said the President would be happy to hear that the Navy Department had just conducted such a survey, with recommendations that certain programs be dropped.

The National Security Council:[9]

a. Noted the status, as set forth in NSC 5611, of those recommendations in the Technological Capabilities Panel Report which were to be implemented in accordance with NSC Action No. 1430.

b. Noted, as summarized orally at the meeting by Assistant Secretary of Defense Furnas, the following status of the recommendations in the Technological Capabilities Panel Report which, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1430—j, were to receive further consideration by the responsible agencies.

(1) Now being implemented to the extent indicated in NSC 5611:

General Recommendation 7b: Specific Recommendations B–1 and B–8b: Installation of DEW line without delay for technical and geographical refinements; early installation of extension of north Canada line to Greenland; and shifting of northern terminus of Atlantic extension from Newfoundland to Greenland; extending DEW line from Greenland to join NATO system with early installation of ground-based components; and related international negotiations.

B–4b and B–4i: Intensified effort to create effective defenses at low and very high altitudes (matching radar net to needs and capabilities of SAGE system; field and operational trials and experiments).

(2) Not now being implemented but still under consideration:

B–4a: (That part of the recommendation relating to maintaining Nike radars in a continuous alert status.)

B–8a: Installation of a new “action” line 500-700 miles from U.S. boundaries.

B–9a: Extension of contiguous radar cover by 300 miles.

B–9c: Extension seaward of air control and surveillance zones to exploit future improvements in interceptor ranges.

(3) Will not be implemented:

E–6: Establishment of Arctic military maintenance corps.

c. Requested the Secretary of Defense, in connection with the special briefing which he is scheduled to give the Council annually in December on the intercontinental ballistic missile program under NSC Action No. 1433–a (4),[10] additionally to brief the Council on progress in developing a defense against ballistic missiles.

d. Deferred further action as to the follow-up study proposed in General Recommendation 12 of the Technological Capabilities Panel Report, pending subsequent Planning Board recommendations pursuant to NSC Action No. 1430–o.

Note: The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on October 4.

[2] See Document 87.

[3] Neither the report nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[4] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1614, approved by the President on October 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[5] Document 9.

[6] Regarding NSC Action No. 1355, see footnote 3, Document 17. Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30.

[7] Parts 3, 4, 5, and 7 of NSC 5611 have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[8] Clifford C. Furnas, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development).

[9] Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1615, approved by the President on October 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[10] Regarding NSC Action No. 1433, see footnote 9, Document 34.

93. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 11, 1956[1]

Washington, October 11, 1956

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

Secretary Brucker

General Taylor

Colonel Goodpaster

The meeting was held to enable General Taylor to make a presentation to the President regarding proposed new tables of organization for[2] Army Airborne, Infantry and Armored Divisions. Only minor changes were involved in the Armored Division organization. Airborne and Infantry Divisions were cut quite substantially from present strengths. Four principles were observed: adapting the Division to the atomic battlefield; pooling at higher echelons all elements needed only occasionally; taking advantage of improved communication equipment by which a Commander can control substantially more than three subordinate units; basing organization on new equipment, some of which must still be developed.

The President spoke strongly in favor of smaller Divisions, and thought the changes were in the right direction, although he would have preferred units cut to a strength of about 10,000. He felt sure that on an atomic battlefield there would be dispersion such as we have never seen before. He thought that ground bursts would contaminate large areas, and that small units—largely self-contained—would be needed which could weave between contaminated areas. With such great dispersion the Infantry company could include support weapons. (General Taylor pointed out that to a considerable extent this was being done in the new organization.) The President thought signal communications would be a difficult problem at company and platoon level. General Taylor said this was true with present equipment but with “transistorized” radios, the capability should approach the need. The President questioned the assignment of personnel carriers as organic equipment. He is not inclined to think the Division should be loaded down with them, but they should be pooled at higher echelon. General Taylor said that the existing personnel carrier is unsatisfactory but that a new lighter one is being developed, and would be used both for personnel movement and for movement of supplies cross-country.

The President said he thought there should not be a publicity campaign about the divisional changes, and specifically thought that no emphasis should be given to the placing of atomic weapons in the Division (he was here following up on a memorandum from Mr. Jackson which I gave to him this morning).[3] He thought the Divisions should be regarded simply as experimental. General Taylor said he wanted to phase into this new organization, beginning in February, and extending through the following year and a half or two years, and the President seemed to accept this schedule.

General Taylor asked if it would be all right to inform the NATO authorities of the new Division, and the President said that he thought such action would be quite desirable. He asked if General Gruenther wanted this done, and General Taylor said he did. The NATO briefing would be on a classified basis.

Reverting to the matter of public announcement, the President recognized that information as to the new Divisions would gradually become known; he did not favor an active campaign of articles in Service journals, magazines, etc.

Secretary Wilson asked whether there would be a proposal that the personnel being taken from the Divisions would be used to form additional Divisions. General Taylor said that the savings would be offset to some degree, which cannot now be determined, by increases in corps and Army troops. The President said he would certainly think that the adoption of the new Divisions, based on fuller use of modern fire-power, would make possible over-all personnel reductions.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

[2] On the source text, the words “the reorganized” were crossed through and replaced with “proposed new tables of organization for”.

[3] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

94. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President[1]

Washington, November 20, 1956.

I am attaching for your information a copy of a memorandum I have recently received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the force levels and personnel strengths to be used as a basis for the preparation of the Fiscal Year 1958 budget.[2] I am also attaching a memorandum which I have addressed to the Secretaries of the Military Departments in regard to personnel strengths.[3] These papers are forming the basis for our review of the budgets submitted by the Military Departments, and we expect to commence our review of those budget proposals on Monday, 26 November.

I have discussed with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to how we would project our military programs forward into Fiscal Year 1959 and subsequent years. It would seem undesirable for us to fix a definite personnel ceiling or budgetary limitation for the years ahead, and I have explained that I thought we should discuss our forward program as being a substantially level one with the definite assumption:

(a) That we would maintain essentially level personnel strengths and force levels;

(b) That we would maintain essentially the same rate of expenditures for the Department of Defense as a whole; and

(c) That the above program would be based on the premise that there would be no inflation or deflation.

I thought that you might like to have the above information. I will keep you informed as to the progress we are making in the preparation of our 1958 budget.

C.E. Wilson

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret.

[2] In this memorandum, dated November 15, attached but not printed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that they agreed that the present international situation required continuation of essentially the present force levels and personnel strengths as far as preparation of the fiscal year 1958 budget was concerned.

[3] In this memorandum to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, dated November 16, attached but not printed, Secretary Wilson suggested: “At this time it would appear desirable to level off our active duty military strength at about the levels now expected to be achieved at the end of this calendar year and to maintain those strengths for the following 18 months.”

95. Memorandum for the File of a Meeting With the President, Washington, November 21, 1956, 8:30 a.m.[1]

Washington, November 21, 1956, 8:30 a.m.

The President met this morning at 8:30 with the following:

Gov. Val Peterson, FCDA

Mr. Ralph Spear, FCDA

Dr. Frank Fremont-Smith, Medical Director, Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, New York

Mr. William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC

The purpose of the meeting was to present to the President the report on “The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development” prepared for the President and the NSC by a panel, organized and assisted by FCDA, under the chairmanship of Dr. Fremont-Smith.[2]

Governor Peterson said that he was glad to say that the the report was affirmative and a little encouraging, and suggested that the President read the summary on page 3.

After reading the summary, the President said that this was just the kind of thing he had been looking for. He wished, however, to add one word of warning. He said that it was difficult during World War II for people to get over the feeling, prior to an air attack, that “it can’t happen here”. The problem is how you get people to face such a possibility without getting hysterical. You must guard against a crowd reaction of not knowing what to do, by getting individuals involved in finding the best solution. The President said he had always considered the civil defense problem basically one of gaining the cooperation and participation of the local population in each community.

Dr. Fremont-Smith agreed with the President, based on the experience of his panel. He said that as individuals they were appalled when they were first presented with this problem. However, as they became involved in studying it and trying to find the answers, they gradually developed into a team working together toward a solution. He said, however, that the panel members would never be the same. What the panel had in mind was, in effect, a series of small groups throughout the country going through a similar experience to that of his panel. He stressed that the issues to be discussed should not solely be civil defense, but the entire problem of national security in the nuclear age. He said that the groups must have a positive approach for survival, trying to achieve peace but being prepared for survival if war should come.

The President said that the very increase in our strength which such a program would achieve would have a deterrent effect on the possibilities of war. It would also make us better prepared if war nevertheless happened.

Dr. Fremont-Smith said that the development of teamwork through the proposed program would also cause people to support the Government in the steps necessary for our national security, even though some of them may involve real dangers. He said that we must not only tell the groups what we face, but also what we must do. We must get a spirit of working together for peace.

The President said that this is what we must all conclude when we have studied this problem.

Governor Peterson spoke of the exceedingly fine membership of the panel. He read parts of his transmittal memorandum stressing the backgrounds of learning and experience represented on the panel. He concluded that he felt that the Government frequently did not make sufficient use of social scientists.

The President said that he had been trying for two years to get such a study as this. He said that people kept making studies and reports to him of how we would fight wars, without giving sufficient attention to the study of what would be happening to the people involved. He agreed that there should be more studies from the social scientists’ viewpoint.

The President questioned whether the American Assembly[3] would provide a useful forum for the proposed program. He explained that the purpose of this Assembly had been to integrate the entire university faculty into studying a particular problem, after which businessmen would be brought in on the study.

Dr. Fremont-Smith said that the panel in fact had a group such as the American Assembly in mind. He said that his Foundation was in fact a similar effort in the social science field.

The President asked whether we should not consider a modest budget item to help set up similar study groups in each state. He thought, however, that the work should not be broadened out too suddenly without having developed leaders. He cited his experience in London, where everyone volunteered for air defense work after the air attacks occurred.

On Mr. Jackson’s suggestion, the President agreed that the report should be studied first by the NSC Planning Board to suggest the next step for consideration by the NSC.

The President expressed his appreciation to Dr. Fremont-Smith for the report, and to Governor Peterson for having arranged it.

James S. Lay, Jr.[4]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Lay. Copies were sent to Jackson and Goodpaster.

[2] This panel was organized in response to NSC Action No. 1430–p; see footnote 9, Document 30. A summary of the report is printed infra.

[3] The American Assembly consisted of about 60 men and women who met to study, discuss, and disseminate timely information on contemporary problems facing the United States. Eisenhower founded the American Assembly in 1950 when he was President of Columbia University.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

96. Report to the President and the National Security Council by the Panel on the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development[1]

Washington, November 21, 1956.

[Here follow a list of members on the panel, an undated memorandum of transmission from Val Peterson to the President and the National Security Council, an undated letter of transmission from Frank Fremont-Smith to Peterson, a one-page table of contents, and a statement of the mission of the panel.]

SUMMARY

1. The Panel believes that:

a. A massive nuclear attack on the United States resulting in casualties of the order of 50,000,000, without drastically improved preparation of the people, would jeopardize support of the National Government and of the war effort, and might well result in national disintegration (p. 9).

b. The major weakness in the preparedness of our people results from the fact that while pertinent information has been made available, it has not been successfully conveyed to them. The people would, therefore, be psychologically overwhelmed by the extent of damage and casualties in such an attempted “knock-out” attack (p. 10).

c. The prospect, however, is not a hopeless one. A vigorously supported program of “involvement” of the people would bring about a significant change, not only in post-attack attitudes and behavior, but also in the necessarily correlated pre-attack attitudes and behavior. A panel of governmental and citizen leaders should plan and implement a program of public education and action designed to involve progressively increasing numbers of citizens, their leaders, and organizations and institutions in the issues of national security in the nuclear age, including preparation for any possible nuclear attack and designed to sustain that involvement as necessary over a prolonged period (p. 11).

d. Such a program of “involvement” of the people would increase national unity and thereby strengthen the hands of our leaders in pursuing the policies and taking the actions necessary to preserve and develop the basic values of democracy. It would also result in greater citizen support of national efforts to prevent war (p. 17).

e. Involvement of the people would be substantially stimulated by independent evidence that action is being taken by Government at all levels to strengthen our civil defense program. To the maximum extent, civil defense programs and recommended measures should be blended into the normal governmental machinery and community patterns, and should have a recognizable social value in peacetime (p. 13).

f. Increased awareness of nuclear weapons effects would, to a varying extent in different nations, create public attitudes which would tend to restrain the initiation of general war by the duly constituted leaders of nations. (See text, page 19, for qualifications of this judgment.)

g. The heritage and institutions of the American people give them the potential strength to meet successfully the complex problems and perils of the nuclear age, but that strength must be nourished by effective knowledge and inspiring leadership (p. 12).

2. While we are unanimous in the judgments expressed above, we suggest that they be tested systematically during the period of implementation of any program of action which is adopted. The skills and tools required for this purpose are themselves well tested and available (p. 12).

[Here follows the text of the report.]

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development. Top Secret. Another copy of the report is Ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Civil Defense.

97. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 21, 1956, 2:30 p.m.[1]

Washington, November 21, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Strauss

Secretary Robertson

Admiral Radford

General Loper

General Luedecke [2]

Colonel Goodpaster

There was discussion of proposals for dispersal of nuclear weapons. A memorandum on the matter was shown to the President, and discussed with him. Charts showing the planned deployment were also shown and discussed.

The President stressed the desirability of having a considerable number of weapons in “safe reserve.” If too many were in forward bases, our ability to strike back after attack might be endangered. Admiral Radford thought that attention could well be given to assuring greater safety of those intended for SAC units in this country.

There was discussion of the advisability of carrying weapons in aircraft during their changes in deployment.

The President said he thought we must distribute these weapons in accordance with the best judgment of the Joint Chiefs. He would assume that necessary State Department concurrence was obtained.

Following further discussion, Admiral Radford undertook to determine what percentage of the total destructive kilotonnage would be in the U.S. as against other areas.[3]

G

Colonel, CE, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

[2] Major General A.R. Luedecke, USAF, Official Observer, Military Liaison Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission.

[3] According to an entry for November 21 in the President’s diary, Eisenhower dictated the following note concerning this meeting: “I approved today the Joint Chiefs of Staffs’ plan for the dispersal to bases, fields and ships afloat all the present atomic stock pile, nuclear and fission. I informed the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff that (a) the State Department should be in agreement with all dispersal involving overseas bases, and (b) today’s dispersal should mark the approximate number of those to be maintained permanently in the field. The bulk of those manufactured hereafter (except for air defense types) should be kept in United States reserve stocks.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

98. Editorial Note

On December 3, the first meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board Ad Hoc Working Group on Publicity in Connection With the Launching of Ballistic Missiles took place. This group had been formed when the Department of Defense decided to seek the advice of the OCB with respect to publicity in connection with the test launching of the ICBM and IRBM. According to a memorandum of this meeting by Richard Hirsch, OCB Staff Representative, the Defense Department sought OCB advice because it would have been difficult to maintain complete secrecy in this matter, due to the fact that the missiles, when placed on their launching stands at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida, would have been visible from the open sea and the noise of the test firings would have been markedly greater than anything previously noticed in that area. Furthermore, even though the Defense Department would have preferred not to make any announcement on the missiles until they had achieved full flight, it recognized that in view of the recent Soviet statement regarding rockets during the Suez crisis, the United States might find it desirable to have ready a stand-by press packet designed primarily for psychological purposes, as well as for disclosure to the press, in the event that knowledge of the firings became widespread, or in case there was a misfire or accidental air burst. (Memorandum of meeting, December 4; Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Ballistic Missiles)

The Ad Hoc Working Group held several meetings during December, and on December 12 the Operations Coordinating Board agreed, among other things, that the Working Group “should be continued indefinitely with the responsibility of keeping the situation continually under review so that the information plan can be adjusted accordingly.” (Memorandum from Alvin G. Waggoner, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Defense’s Special Assistant for Guided Missiles, dated December 19; Ibid. )

99. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Augusta, Georgia, December 7, 1956[1]

Georgia, December 7, 1956

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

Mr. McNeil

Colonel Randall

Governor Adams

General Persons

Mr. Brundage

Colonel Goodpaster

There was extended discussion of the military budget for FY-58. The President had read a memorandum of analysis prepared by Mr. Brundage,[2] which he considered excellent. Discussion brought out that a major segment of the budget is moving into the area of procurement, production, naval construction, and construction of facilities. On the ICBM, the President said that the main significance attaches to the first few of these missiles, and that consequently we should press forward strongly with development, but should hold down procurement. The President said he saw no reason for major programs for the development of atomic powered aircraft—that development of the reactor could and should go forward, on an orderly basis, under AEC auspices. He saw no particular reason for building one of the large carriers every year; he agreed to building one atomic powered carrier in order to determine its operational advantages, but thought that our program should be at the rate of one big carrier every other year.

After considering the Defense proposals on a line by line basis, the President asked Mr. Wilson to have the budget prepared on the basis of $38 billion for expenditures, $40.0 for “program” and $38.5 billion for NOA. Mr. Wilson said he would start work on this at once. (This involved a reduction of about $500 million below his figures.)

G

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 15.

[2] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

100. Memorandum of Discussion at the 306th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 20, 1956[1]

Washington, December 20, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Report by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee[2] (NSC Actions Nos. 1260, 1330, 1430, 1463 and 1532;[3] NSC 5605[4] )

Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Council’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee, introduced General Gerald C. Thomas, Director of the Subcommittee Staff, who outlined briefly the approach taken by the Subcommittee and its Staff in preparing the 1956 Net Evaluation. He indicated that pursuant to the Subcommittee’s terms of reference the Staff prepared two hypothetical Soviet war plans based on the following concepts: (a) An assumption of “Strategic Surprise”, and (b) an assumption of “Full Alert in the United States”. In these plans the USSR was credited with capabilities as estimated in pertinent National Intelligence Estimates. An operational analysis group was established to war-game the hypothetical Soviet war plans against hypothetical U.S. war plans, and this analysis group concerned itself with such tasks as (a) battle analysis; (b) assessment of damage to U.S. military forces and installations; (c) provision of data for further U.S. damage assessment by agencies directly concerned; (d) provision of data for assessment of damage in the Soviet bloc to the extent required by NSC 5605; and (e) estimation of residual military capabilities on both sides.

General Thomas introduced Colonel S.D. Kelsey, USAF, who covered in some detail the Subcommittee’s findings under the assumption of a Soviet achievement of “Strategic Surprise”. Colonel Kelsey thereupon introduced Captain W.B. Stevens,USN, who briefed the Council on the general impact and effects on U.S. national resources of the Soviet attacks perpetrated under the concept of “Strategic Surprise”.

Colonel W. L. Kindred, USA, then briefed the Council on the findings of the Subcommittee based on the assumption of “Full Alert”, and he in turn introduced Mr. Ludwell Montague, of CIA, who briefed the Council on the Subcommittee’s findings with respect to the clandestine threat under the assumption of both “Strategic Surprise” and “Full Alert”.

General Thomas next invited the Council’s attention to the variable critical factors involved in the preparation of net evaluations of this type, noting that variations in any one or more of the factors could substantially alter the Subcommittee’s evaluations. He indicated that these variable critical factors involve such vital subjects as (a) the size and make-up of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile; (b) the future size and composition of the Soviet long-range air force; (c) the number of Soviet guided missiles of various types expected to be operational in 1959; (d) actual and potential Soviet electronic countermeasures and counter-ECM capabilities; (e) the status of U.S. forces in 1959, etc.

General Thomas indicated that, despite the variable factors mentioned above and the lack of sufficient information concerning several of these critical areas, the Subcommittee believed that its basic data were adequate to support the following conclusions: (a) In 1959 a nuclear war initiated by the USSR would result in the mutual devastation of both the United States and the USSR, and neither side could expect to destroy the nuclear capability of the other or to be able to defend itself adequately against nuclear attack; (b) in 1959 the USSR will have the net capability of delivering a nuclear attack which could kill approximately 40% of the U.S. population, seriously injure another 13%, and disrupt the political, social, and economic structure of the United States; (c) if the United States should fail to maintain adequate alert nuclear forces that cannot be destroyed by surprise attack, the USSR by nuclear attack on the continental United States will emerge as the dominant world power in 24 hours; (d) the massive nuclear retaliatory capability of the United States is an indispensable deterrent to Soviet attack, but if the USSR were nevertheless to attack, this capability could not prevent catastrophic destruction in the United States; (e) with the advent of long-range ballistic missiles, the present concept of the military and civil defense of the United States against nuclear weapons will require extensive revision in view of the drastically reduced amount of warning time available against “Surprise Attack”.

Following the completion of the formal presentation by the Subcommittee Staff, Admiral Radford stressed the following points concerning the 1956 net evaluation: (a) The evaluation was based upon an immense effort by the Subcommittee Staff and by member agencies of the Subcommittee, which effort he was sure warranted commendation; (b) in the preparation of the report each of the members of the Council’s Subcommittee acted only within the area of responsibility of his own agency, and members of the Subcommittee did not participate in, nor judge the validity of results of, the military operations analysis which is the basis of the 1956 report; (c) certain of the information in the report is highly sensitive in nature and therefore necessitates the exercise of special security precautions in the handling of the report and the ancillary submissions on which it was based; (d) the report indicates a very detailed study of the U.S. Air Defense system and highlights weaknesses in that system; (Admiral Radford indicated that a committee has been set up to restudy and to report by next July on the Air Defense system) (e) the assumptions on which the report is based can vary widely, as emphasized by General Thomas, and as a consequence the Net Evaluation Report of 1956 should not be considered as a factual report. (Admiral Radford said that if the United States were subjected to a nuclear attack, the results might be along the lines indicated in the report; on the other hand, they might be either considerably worse or considerably less severe.)

The President indicated that the Subcommittee’s presentation prompted several observations on his part. He queried as to why we should put a single nickel into anything but developing our capacity to diminish the enemy’s capacity for nuclear attack. Rather than worry too much about the submarine menace, protecting shipping on the seas, etc., the United States should continue to concentrate on producing a force that is so good and so well distributed that the Soviets will not attack; and if they do attack, we should have also concentrated on our defenses so that we will be capable of knocking the enemy down.

The President said he believed that if there is a general alert and a general mobilization in the USSR, as envisaged under the “Full Alert” concept, the clandestine threat will disappear [remainder of paragraph (40 words) not declassified].

The President stated that in considering the magnitude and gravity of the problems covered in the Net Evaluation study, we come to the point of asking how much can or will the United States stand. He thought that the picture of the terrific destruction resulting from a nuclear attack warranted taking a look at the whole matter in terms of determining how much destruction the United States and its people can absorb and still survive.

The National Security Council:[5]

Noted and discussed the annual report for 1956 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to paragraph 4 of NSC 5605, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.

2. FY 1958 Legislative Recommendations by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator

Governor Peterson initiated FCDA’s oral briefing on the subject by reading the highlights of pertinent sections of the FCDA report entitled “Civil Defense Legislative Program” (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting; other copies to be distributed to the Council members in accordance with the oral request made by Governor Peterson at the time of this presentation).[6]

After covering the highlights of the report, Governor Peterson introduced Mr. Jack Greene,[7] who gave an oral briefing on the effects of exposure to radioactive fall-out. He pointed out that the destructive results from radioactive exposure are extremely severe, and that the solution to this problem may be found only in “evacuation, meaning distance, or shelter, meaning shielding.” He indicated that the FCDA studies reflect that evacuation is not practicable as the primary solution to the problem, and as a consequence the FCDA has concluded that it must look to a greatly enlarged shelter program if the U.S. population is to be protected against the devastating results which will otherwise accrue from radioactive exposure.

Following Mr. Greene’s briefing, Governor Peterson introduced Mr. Gerald R. Gallagher, who made a detailed analysis of the shelter program being considered by FCDA, which analysis in the main proceeded on the assumption that 20-megaton nuclear weapons would be employed against the United States and that 30-PSI blast shelters would be employed to provide reasonably adequate protection for the personnel sheltered therein. Mr. Gallagher stated that in FCDA’s approach to the problem it believes that special study should be given to locating shelters in such manner as to give protection from both blast and fall-out to a maximum number of people. According to FCDA’s present thinking, fifty million individuals will require shelters at a total estimated cost of $32.4 billion, $28.6 billion of which represents the Federal Government’s portion of this cost.

Governor Peterson emphasized that the evacuation concept is not being abandoned by FCDA; that evacuation should continue to be encouraged; that in FCDA’s judgment the primary civilian defense of the population against nuclear attack was to be found in a greatly enlarged shelter program. Accordingly, Governor Peterson recommended, in sum, legislative modifications (a) to provide for the initiation of a civil defense shelter program; (b) to permit greatly increased Federal support and financial assistance to the states and their political subdivisions in order to enable them to adequately develop their defense capabilities; (c) to vest larger civil defense responsibility in the Federal Government in order to make civil defense the joint responsibility of both Federal and local governments, etc. Governor Peterson indicated that FCDA’s proposed legislative program envisaged amendments to its organic act[8] to authorize a Federal Public Shelter Construction Program to provide the population with a substantial degree of protection against the effects of modern weapons, as well as amendments to appropriate Acts “to provide financial incentives for home shelter construction by individuals by (1) making available Federal mortgage insurance covering loans up to $2500 for such construction; and (2) providing an income tax deduction up to $2500 for such expenses.”

Governor Peterson indicated that a greatly enhanced Federal program of leadership is required in the civil defense field and that much more Federal participation, as well as leadership, is essential in all important aspects of the civil defense program.

Secretary Wilson said that he did not see how we can do all of the things referred to by Governor Peterson and at the same time limit ourselves to a 35-hour work week, as has been proposed. Secretary Wilson thought that rather than decreasing the number of hours in our work week, we should go the other way.

In response to the President’s inquiry, Governor Peterson advised that suitable home shelters have already been designed.

The President inquired as to how the air in these shelters is screened to eliminate radioactive particles. Governor Peterson responded that in the smaller shelters charcoal, fiberglass, glass wool, etc., provides sufficient screening, but that the shelters housing larger groups would necessitate more elaborate screening and air-conditioning equipment.

Admiral Strauss indicated that, without disparaging FCDA’s report, he thought it was essential to point out that, so far as we know, there are no 20- or 60-megaton weapons in existence, although the FCDA report was apparently based, at least in part, on the assumption that weapons of that magnitude would be employed in a nuclear attack on the United States. To this, Governor Peterson responded that the problem becomes even more aggravated if one proceeds on the assumption that smaller nuclear weapons would be employed in such an attack.

The National Security Council:[9]

Noted and discussed a report by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, explaining his FY 1958 legislative recommendations for strengthening and modernizing the civil defense program, with particular reference to the recommended initiation of a shelter program.

J. Patrick Coyne

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security, on December 21.

[2] Regarding these annual reports by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, see Document 10.

[3] All of these NSC Actions concern the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. NSC Action No. 1260, taken at the 222d NSC meeting on November 4, 1954, and NSC Action 1330, taken at the 237th NSC meeting on February 17, 1955, are not printed. Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30. Regarding NSC Action No. 1463, see footnote 5, Document 38. NSC Action No. 1532, taken at the 281st NSC meeting on April 5, 1956, is not printed. (NSC Actions are in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[4] NSC 5605, dated May 24, superseded NSC 5511 (both entitled “A Net Evaluation Subcommittee”). (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5605 Series)

[5] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1641, approved by the President on December 21. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[6] Neither the minutes nor the report has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[7] Director, Radiological Defense Division, FCDA.

[8] The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 1245).

[9] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1642, approved by the President on December 21. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

101. Memorandum of Discussion at the 307th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 21, 1956[1]

Washington, December 21, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

U.S. Military Program for FY 1958

The Special Assistant to the President informed the Council that the only item on the agenda for this meeting was a discussion of the U.S. military program for FY 1958. He then called upon Secretary Wilson, who in turn stated that Admiral Radford would make the initial statement with respect to this military program.

Admiral Radford said that he proposed to open the presentation with a brief review of the background of military thinking and estimates of the military situation as these two considerations bore on the Defense Department budget. He said he would start with the Joint Chief of Staff review initiated by an order of the Secretary of Defense in August 1953. The subsequent special study and review came up with certain important conclusions:

(1) The primary national responsibility was to ensure the survival of the United States as a free nation with a viable free economy.

(2) The principal threat to the United States was the long-range Soviet objective of destroying democracy and democratic institutions throughout the world.

(3) The most critical military factors in defense against this Soviet threat were the air defense of the continental United States and maintenance of our retaliatory capabilities against the Soviet Union.

(4) At the present time our military posture was seriously overextended.

(5) In order to rectify this overextension, it would be necessary to curtail the deployment of U.S. forces overseas.

(6) If such redeployment was carried out, the Joint Chiefs believed it to be essential that the national objectives of the United States short of a general war should be clearly stated so that our friends would be assured and our enemies made perfectly clear as to our intentions.

(7) The Chiefs believed that the United States must significantly improve its intelligence effort.

Admiral Radford then stated that the foregoing conclusions had since that time constituted the broad basis of our military planning. In addition, however, in 1954 and in 1955 large-scale studies were undertaken with the objective of analyzing the effect on our military posture of the rapid development of technology. Examples of such studies were those of Mr. Robert Sprague and of the committee headed by Dr. Killian.[2] The studies by Mr. Sprague and Dr. Killian’s committee had made strong recommendations hi favor of strengthening the continental defense of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, have reserved their opinion as to the ratio of resources to be devoted on the one hand to strengthening our continental defense and on the other to competing demands on these resources. They regarded this ratio as one requiring very delicate balancing.

By January 1956, continued Admiral Radford, it became evident that another full-scale review of our military program would be necessary. Such a re-examination was accordingly commenced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the orders of the Secretary of Defense. After the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Puerto Rico, it was concluded that our basic military program remained generally valid, but that to maintain this program over the future years would certainly involve increasing costs because of such factors as missile development, development of continental defense measures, and the introduction of new weapons. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs estimated that our annual military expenditure up to 1960 could be held to a level of approximately $38 to $40 billion. Admiral Radford said that he personally had felt that this level was somewhat on the low side. The Chiefs also estimated that our military defense assistance program would require expenditures of approximately $3 billion a year, although under certain circumstances this amount could be increased by as much as $1 or $2 billion a year.

In this review, as in the earlier review of 1953, the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed their view as to the desirability of reducing our overseas commitments and deployments, although they pointed out that this would be next to impossible in the Far East and would be very difficult to accomplish without undermining NATO if the redeployment of U.S. forces occurred too rapidly. In any event, in this review the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommended a full scale review of our military aid programs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded in March and April of 1956 that, in spite of the fact that our own U.S. military posture was generally adequate, the military posture of the free world generally was deteriorating.[3] Unless this deterioration were arrested, the results would put the United States in a very dangerous situation in the future. The Chiefs also stressed the need for vigorous political, economic and psychological courses of action, on grounds that we must assure the world that the United States was prepared to act in a timely fashion in the event of war in order to restore and bolster the morale of the free world.

Admiral Radford then noted that since this report of the spring of 1956, world events had moved quickly and not always in a direction which had been predicted. As examples he cited tension in the satellites and the crisis in the Middle East. These events have led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend certain actions designed to achieve our national security objectives. After briefly referring to these measures, Admiral Radford said that in conclusion he wanted to emphasize once again that both now and in the future the costs of our military program would continue to rise. In his view it was not possible at one and the same time to maintain a fixed level of forces and a fixed budgetary level. It was accordingly necessary for us to lower the level of our forces while at the same time assuring them increased effectiveness. He believed that this great problem could be solved if we kept ever in mind a basic objective and a basic fact. First, our objective of ensuring the survival of the United States and its free economy, and second, that the principal threat to the United States remained Russian-dominated world Communism.

At the conclusion of Admiral Radford’s introductory remarks, Secretary Wilson said that General Taylor would outline the program of the Army for FY 1958. General Taylor stated that it was his proposal to present the kind of Army that could be attained at the end of FY 1958 within a budget of $9 billion. Such an Army would consist of 1,000,000 men in 17 reorganized divisions, etc., etc.. With the use of a chart,[4] General Taylor discussed the five major categories of which this Army would consist—namely, overseas forces, strategic reserves, anti-aircraft defense forces for the United States, reserve forces, and forces for the support of our allies. These five categories, he pointed out, would be backed up by support forces deployed within the continental United States. Thereafter, General Taylor, with the assistance of a chart, briefly outlined the major Army unit forces deployment planned for FY 1958, after which he described in some detail the quality and qualifications of these forces. He added a warning that the Army could not afford to neglect so-called conventional arms and equipment.

In closing his report, General Taylor summed up assets and liabilities for the Army program as follows: With respect to assets, he indicated that the FY 1958 program would certainly enhance the combat effectiveness of the U.S. Army. A second asset would be the improved quality of our reserve forces. In the category of liabilities, General Taylor pointed out that the Army divisions would be reduced by two, and that the growing obsolescence factor was very serious. An additional liability was represented by the deterioration of our antiaircraft capabilities for the air defense of the United States.

Upon the conclusion of General Taylor’s presentation, Secretary Wilson called on Admiral Burke to describe the Navy Department program for FY 1958.

Admiral Burke remarked that the Navy had been working on this 1958 budget for a whole year past. The Navy Department proposed to request approximately $10.9 billion in new authorizations in its FY 1958 budget—a sum slightly less than that in the current Navy budget. Force levels for the Navy would be about the same as in FY 1957. Despite steady technological advances, Admiral Burke pointed out that the budget for research and development in the Navy had been reduced in favor of additional aircraft procurement and shipbuilding.

In the course of discussing the Navy’s aircraft procurement program, Admiral Burke indicated that 1257 new aircraft would be ordered for the Navy in the course of FY 1958, a figure less than the figure for FY 1956 or FY 1957. Admiral Burke concluded his discussion of the Navy program by a detailed statement on the shipbuilding and conversion programs. This portion of his report was accompanied by a chart entitled “Combat Effective Ships, 1956, vs. Present Planned Strength” (over a period of five years).

At the conclusion of Admiral Burke’s comments, Secretary Wilson asked General Pate if he wished to report on the Marine Corps program. General Pate replied that Admiral Burke had spoken for him, and that he had nothing to add. Secretary Wilson then called on General Twining to present the Air Force program for FY 1958.

General Twining spoke first from two charts. One was entitled “Comparison of Programs”; the second was entitled “New Obligating Authority and Service Obligations for FY 1957 and FY 1958”. General Twining pointed out that the Air Force program called for a request on the Congress for $17.7 billion in new obligational authority. He indicated that this was about $3 billion less than the Air Force would have wished to ask for in order to meet its estimated requirements. In general, however, the Air Force proposed to cut its program to fit the cloth. For example, there would be a cut in procurement of B–52 aircraft from about 20 to 15 or 17 a month. The objective of the B–52 procurement program called ultimately for 11 wings of this type of aircraft.

At this point General Twining turned to a discussion of the combat structure of the Air Force. This indicated a reduction in program combat wings from a total of 137 to a total of 128. The reduction would occur in the categories of fighter aircraft and tactical bombers. General Twining believed that this cut could be justified by the expected increase in firing power. He also pointed out that each B–52 wing would contain over 40 aircraft instead of 32, as originally proposed. In addition, General Twining indicated that the intermediate-range ballistic missile would be put into the inventory of weapons in 1960. This would be followed shortly thereafter by the addition of the intercontinental ballistic missile to the inventory. General Twining concluded his remarks with the observation that the presently programmed Air Force for FY 1958 represented the very minimum force that the United States should have in order to protect the security of the United States and to carry out the missions assigned to the Air Force by NSC and JCS policies.

Secretary Wilson then called on Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray for a brief analysis of the MDA program. Secretary Gray made his report on the basis of a series of charts entitled “Status Report on Military Assistance Programs”. Included in his remarks was a statement of the five major purposes of our military assistance program. He pointed out that in FY 1958 there would be a request upon the Congress by way of new obligational authority in the amount of $2.45 billion. He predicted that expenditure for that fiscal year would probably amount to about $2.6 billion. Secretary Gray referred to the embarrassing carry-over from previous fiscal years, but pointed out that the carry-over for this year was the least in size in all recent years. The total investment to date, from FY 1950 through FY 1957, in the MDA programs amounted to $22.4 billion.

At the conclusion of Secretary Gray’s report, the President turned to Secretary Brucker and asked him the following question: “Are you confident that the Army program previously described is the best Army program for the money?” Secretary Brucker replied in the affirmative, and said that the Army program for FY 1958 represented the best balanced program which could be gotten for the money. The one element, he said, which we wish to preserve is the combat edge, the razor edge. Secretary Brucker stated that he was opposed to simply dropping the personnel who could be saved in the proposed cutting of Army divisions from 19 to 17. He wanted this personnel to be enrolled in other extremely important Army units. Secretary Brucker also expressed anxiety over the cost of the upkeep of the Army plant, and emphasized the need for better housing for Army personnel in the near future.

In reply, the President stated his agreement that the Army is now producing better balanced forces than it had in the past; but what really concerned him, continued the President, was the correct balance between the proposed strength of our Army and the general economic strength and well-being of the country. This is the great decision which must be made, and the President said he judged that Secretary Brucker thought the proposed FY 1958 budget for the Army represented the best balance that we can devise. Secretary Brucker again replied that the program represented the best balance possible under the circumstance. He confessed that some of his people were unhappy over certain aspects of the proposed FY 1958 budget, but that he, Secretary Brucker, thought it was OK. The President said that, in short, Secretary Brucker believed that to go higher by way of budget for the Army would entail serious risk of inflation and damage to the nation’s economy. Secretary Brucker agreed.

The President then turned to Secretary Thomas and asked him to address himself to the same questions with respect to the Navy that the President had just put to Secretary Brucker respecting the Army.

Secretary Thomas indicated that he would like to state briefly the philosophy behind the proposed FY 1958 budget for the Navy. In this connection he mentioned the President’s statement of last fall to the effect that while we must never put dollars above defense, we must at the same time have a strong and free economy. Secretary Thomas said that he stood firmly behind this philosophy, and added his belief that the proposed Navy budget represented the best balance that was possible. He added that he sincerely believed that this country had much more powerful military forces than many of the critics believe, and he paid warm tribute to the President and to the policies of the Administration.

Secretary Thomas then pointed out that the Navy had faced two very basic problems in the course of formulating its FY 1958 budget. The first of these stemmed from the Navy’s worldwide commitments, as a result of which ships of the Navy had to be stationed all over the world. Secondly, the Navy was currently going through a transition greater than anything known in the past. The Navy was moving all at once from conventional to nuclear power and from conventional to nuclear weapons. The costs were obviously bound to be much greater. In conclusion, Secretary Thomas stated that in his opinion the proposed Navy budget was a very good and very acceptable program, even though, of course, it involved a calculated risk. Indeed, said Secretary Thomas, if he had had his own way he might have cut another billion or two from the Navy budget. But, he said to the President, the Navy was the most powerful Navy in the world, and that the proposed budget would keep the Navy in just that position.

The President then called on Secretary Quarles to answer the same questions. Secretary Quarles pointed out how carefully the Air Force budget had been worked over. He said that it represented the best balance which could be attained within the framework of the proposed 1958 budget. The program put first things first in terms of the missions of the Air Force. Though there were clearly to be fewer wings in the Air Force, the Air Force itself would actually be stronger. Nevertheless, Secretary Quarles warned that the Air Force program was marginal in certain respects. After the exercise at the National Security Council meeting of yesterday, Secretary Quarles said that he had come away with certain misgivings. (The reference by Secretary Quarles was to the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC on the net capabilities of the USSR to damage the continental United States.) Secretary Quarles had wondered whether we were doing quite all we should do in the light of the terrible threat depicted in yesterday’s report. Despite this, Secretary Quarles said, he did not question the proposed 1958 budget, and he assured the President that the Air Force would give the budget loyal support and make the best of it.

The President inquired of Secretary Quarles what he thought he could do right now to reduce the appalling threat depicted yesterday in the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. Secretary Quarles said that so far as he could see, there was nothing that one could do to reduce the threat markedly. Nevertheless, it might be wise to increase our air defense forces and to allocate larger funds to the building up of our own strategic striking force. Secretary Quarles said he was not actually recommending the above course of action, but found the problem troublesome.

The President stated firmly that the only area in which he disagreed with Secretary Quarles was that the President did not think that the suggested courses of action would markedly reduce the threat of the holocaust described yesterday. In short, if we do not now have enough military strength to deter the Soviet Union from nuclear attack, the President said he could not be sure that 20 times as much military strength would succeed in deterring the Soviets.

The President then said that he had one more question to address to General Twining. How many missiles can be carried in a B–52? General Twining replied that two of the largest missiles were within the capability of the B–52 to carry.

Secretary Wilson then inquired whether he might call on Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil for an analysis of the overall figures for the Defense Department budget for FY 1958. With the assistance of charts, Secretary McNeil turned first to the new obligational authority, the direct obligations, and the estimated expenditures for FY 1958. He pointed out that the total new obligational authority sought in FY 1956 was $34.2 billion. In FY 1957 this amount had risen to $36.7 billion. The request for new obligational authority for FY 1958 would be $38.3 billion. Turning to expenditures, Secretary McNeil indicated that the total for FY 1956 had been $35.7 billion; for FY 1957, $36 billion; and the estimate for FY 1958 was $37.8 billion.

After further detailed analysis by Secretary McNeil, the President stated that he wanted to make sure that at some point or other in the future the country would at last be able to achieve a leveling-off period on these expenditures and not face continually mounting costs.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether the over-all figures given by Secretary McNeil included or excluded the figures earlier given by Secretary Gray covering the military assistance programs. When Secretary McNeil indicated that his figures did not include MDAP, Secretary Dulles emphasized that this fact should be made crystal clear when Congress was briefed on the FY 1958 budget.

At this point the President inquired whether there were any other questions, and directed his inquiry particularly to Secretary Humphrey. Secretary Humphrey replied that he thought it unfortunate that everyone in the United States could not have heard this Council briefing. He believed that the results showed a marvelous coordination and teamwork. In fact, this was the “finest budget performance” since the Administration had come into power. The President replied facetiously that Secretary Humphrey had made his own speech for him. The President added that the proposed budget did represent some backing up in our hope that we could go along at an expenditure level of about $35 billion annually for the Defense Department program. Actually we were now pretty close to $40 billion, but the President confessed that he did not see how this latter amount could be reduced.

Secretary Wilson commented that other Executive departments’ and agencies’ expenditures had gone up by a comparatively larger ratio than had those of the Department of Defense. The President replied that this was no valid comparison. The other departments and agencies had done their best, just as had the Department of Defense. Secretary Wilson then added that he thought that by and large the FY 1958 Department of Defense budget was a good budget and that resources had been pretty well allocated among the Services. The preparation of the budget had been characterized by extraordinarily good teamwork.

Governor Stassen asked to be heard, and stated his agreement with the President that any small modification upward of the proposed budget would probably not greatly enhance our defensive capabilities against the Soviet Union. What we must really try hard to do was to open up the Soviet Union. The forthcoming year would provide the United States with the best opportunity to date to open up the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if we tried to drastically raise the levels of the U.S. defense budget, the Soviet Union might be led to conclude that war was inevitable and act accordingly.

The President stated that this reminded him that he wished to disagree with Admiral Radford’s statement at the beginning of the discussion, that the likelihood of war was now increasing. On the contrary, in the President’s opinion the USSR had taken a worse beating lately than at any time since 1945. Unless Admiral Radford meant that war might come from a miscalculation, he was therefore in disagreement with the point of view that the danger of war was increasing.

Admiral Radford replied that in part he had in mind the risk of miscalculation leading to war. He added that if the Soviets continue to have further troubles with their satellites, the United States would have to make up its mind what course of action to follow. The President said he was not impressed by this argument. He believed that the Soviets would be much more likely to worry about having to solidify themselves against satellite unrest. In present circumstances they were not likely to stick their necks out.

Secretary Dulles stated, apropos of this exchange of views, that in his opinion we had been witnessing a very drastic and very dramatic deterioration of the position of the Soviet Union in the course of the last two years. The men in the Kremlin do not now exert anything like the influence they exerted two years ago, either over the National Communist Parties outside the Soviet bloc or over the Soviet satellites themselves. Moreover, we can even discern in the Soviet Union itself a rising demand for greater freedom and a more liberal policy. All of this added up to a defeat and a setback for the Soviet rulers. In one sense, of course, this was a highly encouraging development for us. On the other hand, the setbacks of the last two years might call for a terrific effort by the Kremlin to achieve some kind of offsetting success. To achieve this the Soviets might therefore be willing to take risks which could be very dangerous to the free world, since they would be risks born of desperation.

The President said the only comment he had on this point was that there was no such thing as a success for any country involved in a major war today. Secretary Dulles expressed agreement, but pointed out the danger that the Soviets might be willing to run risks at the present time that they would have been unwilling to run two years ago. The President said that of course we must remain on the alert every single minute.

The President inquired whether there were any remaining questions or comments. Mr. Allen Dulles stated that he believed that a review of the subversive war was long overdue, and that the subject should come up for discussion early in the next year. As an example of dangerous developments, he pointed to the intelligence from Laos to the effect that the Pathet Lao people were about to be integrated into the Royal Government and the Royal Army. The President said that Nehru had expressed anxiety over this development in his recent conversations,[5] and asked Secretary Dulles if the Indian Prime Minister had referred to the same danger in his talks with the Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles said that Nehru had also raised this question with him, and added that he wondered if we had not been a little too strong in our indication to the Government of Laos that the taking in of any Pathet Lao people into the government would result in the cessation of all American assistance. This statement had been perhaps a little too strong, but it was apparently the hope of the Pathet Laos to secure the Ministries of Interior, Defense and Foreign Affairs in the newly integrated government. If the Pathet Lao secured even one of these three key ministries, the fate of Laos would be sealed and it would come under Communist control.

Secretary Wilson then suggested that, inasmuch as the budget cycle for FY 1959 would commence soon, it would be desirable to use the FY 1958 personnel strengths, force levels and dollar figures as the basis for planning for the FY 1959 military program and budget. Modifications could subsequently be made with respect to this planning basis if circumstances so dictated. The President indicated approval of Secretary Wilson’s suggestion. Secretary Wilson followed this suggestion with a question to the President as to whether he thought that the FY 1958 military program, as it had been presented in the morning’s discussion, was generally satisfactory. The President replied that the Defense Department program for FY 1958 was acceptable to him.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the President warmly thanked those who had briefed him and the Council on the military program for FY 1958.[6]

The National Security Council:[7]

a. Noted and discussed the U.S. military program for Fiscal Year 1958 as presented orally by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff, and Assistant Secretaries of Defense Gray and McNeil.

b. Agreed that the U.S. military program for Fiscal Year 1958 as presented was consistent with national security policy objectives.

c. Noted that for initial planning purposes in Fiscal Year 1959, the Department of Defense will utilize as ceilings the over-all force levels contained in the approved Fiscal Year 1958 budget, and a planned ceiling of $39 billion for both new obligational authority and expenditures.

Note: In approving the above actions the President stated that, except in the event of some unforeseen critical emergency of an international or economic character, he does not intend to request from the Congress during his term in office new obligational authority for the Department of Defense above $39 billion in any Fiscal Year.

The actions in b and c above and the above statement by the President subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for information and appropriate action.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on December 21.

[2] Reference is presumably to the report by Robert Sprague on Continental Defense, discussed by the NSC at its 252d meeting on June 16, 1955. The report is not printed, but see footnote 4, Document 28. The Killian Committee report is printed as Document 9.

[3] See Documents 64, 65, and 73.

[4] Neither this chart nor the ones mentioned below has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[5] Prime Minister Nehru of India made an official visit to the United States December 16–20.

[6] In a memorandum dated December 31, Goodpaster, on behalf of the President, requested the Chiefs of Staff and the Military Secretaries to confirm the following statement, to be used in the President’s remarks to Congressional leaders on January 1, 1957:

“Each of the Chiefs of Staff and each of the Secretaries has given his views on this military program.

“Although individual service Chiefs have pointed out specific areas in individual services in which increases in the program would be desirable, each Chief and Secretary has indicated that he considers a program of this magnitude—viewed as a whole—well-balanced and satisfactory.

“Each one has assured the President that he can and will give the program his wholehearted support, as involving an acceptable degree of risk and providing a reasonable and wise degree of security.”

All of the addressees initialed this memorandum. (Eisenhower Library, WhitmanFile)

[7] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1643, approved by the President on January 11, 1957. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

102. Memorandum for the Record by the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)[1]

Washington, January 1, 1957.

I showed the memorandum of December 31[2] to each of the Defense Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff to obtain their confirmation of its accuracy. They confirmed that the statement was correct. Several had comments relating to it.

Mr. Wilson said there would be no problem if the President were willing to say that he set the “ceiling.” I indicated that as I understood the process, the President had not set a ceiling, but had decided upon a figure between the present program and the one proposed, after considering and discussing the main elements of the program. I understood the position to be that of course he would say that the determination is his, but wished to know and to state that the others join him in it.

Governor Brucker emphasized the need which he foresaw next year for added funds for post and station maintenance, and asked if this feeling on his part impaired his concurrence with the President’s draft statement. I told him that it would seem to do so, if he held this view as a condition to concurring in the statement, but not if he holds it as an intent to press the matter strongly next year, but with confidence that the outcome decided on next year will be a sound one. He said he was inclined to regard it as the latter.

Secretary Quarles discussed and studied at length the reference to the program as “well-balanced and satisfactory.” He wondered whether the first part of that sentence and the last part were not in contradiction; I told him that, as I understood the matter, a Chief or a Secretary might feel that there were areas he would like to have strengthened in his own service, in some cases in order to have certain operational capabilities in his own service, but that he might recognize that the program balanced out this deficiency with capabilities provided in other services—or that even taking into account the deficiency, the resulting over-all military capability is consistent with acceptable risk and reasonable security for the United States. He said that he would interpret these words in the sense of “sound over-all,” accepting that this expression included “satisfactory over-all.” He accepted that the program is well balanced as regards use of the resources made available to the Air Force. He said that the statement goes further than he has up to this point obtained General Twining’s endorsement (he did not indicate that he had sought General Twining’s endorsement for going this far); he said that his actions should not in any sense be understood to commit or represent General Twining’s view— General Twining would have an independent reaction to offer. Secretary Quarles gave assurance of his loyal acceptance of the President’s judgment as to this program as a wise and reasonable one and of his own loyal performance in supporting it. He had asked whether his responsibility with regard to the passage concerning degree of risk and degree of security was simply to be willing to accept the President’s judgment in the matter, and I indicated that as I would understand the matter, it would be a question of exercising his own judgment on these matters insofar as he felt capable of doing so, and finding his own judgment consistent with the President’s and then feeling confidence in the President’s judgment on matters he felt to be outside his own competence. Mr. Quarles said he was in position to sign the statement after this discussion.

General Taylor asked what his signature would imply with regard to answering questions asked of him in the Congress, and referred to various points in the budget which are “soft” or “weak” from the Army’s standpoint. I told him that I understood the matter to be considered basically one of attitude, and that if these points were explained while maintaining adherence to the soundness of the budget and program over-all—and not as a means and with the intent of breaking down the budget—that the action would be consistent with his signature.

General Twining had no comment on the memorandum. Secretary Thomas, Admiral Radford, Admiral Burke and General Pate expressed strong concurrence. The latter said he planned to have his Legislative Liaison people ask key members of Congress to try to avoid “embarrassing” questions about the budget, i.e., those which would tend to break it down.

G

Brigadier General USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower library, Whitman File. Confidential.

[2] See footnote 6, supra.

103. Memorandum of Discussion at the 308th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 3, 1957[1]

Washington, January 3, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3. Portions of item 3 entitled “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security” are printed in the editorial note, volume XXII, page 338.]

4. Definition of the Term “Limited Initial Resistance” (NSC Action No. 1599; NSC 5612/1; NSC 5617; NSC 5701;[2] Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia”, dated January 2, 1957[3] )

Mr. Lay asked the President and the Council whether they wished now to consider the definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the term “limited initial resistance”. The President replied that he had read such definitions over a long period of years, and hadn’t on the whole found them very helpful. He then read to himself the JCS memo[4] which had been distributed to the members of the Council at the beginning of the meeting (covered by the reference memorandum of January 2). Upon finishing the memorandum, the President commented that he had “nothing against it”. He then went on to observe that what we ought to do with these underdeveloped countries was, in the first place, to see that by virtue of our military assistance program these countries have forces strong enough to assure internal stability. Thereafter it should be the objective of our program to see that they have sufficient forces to prevent enemy infiltration of their borders, and perhaps a small resistance force. That, however, was about the limit. In Pakistan we had certainly gone much too far, the more so because attacks by the Soviet Union will not be made on these countries in isolated fashion. Nor would the United States ever be likely to fight in India or in Pakistan. If we have to fight, we will fight in Moscow in order not to have to fight in Washington.

Secretary Humphrey warned the Council that we would never get out of our financial and economic troubles in connection with our assistance programs until we genuinely revised the objectives of our national security policies vis-à-vis the different foreign countries.

Mr. Brundage expressed the opinion that the definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of “limited initial resistance” seemed “pretty good” to him, though he had some qualifications on the time span of 45 days.

The President stated that personally he could scarcely imagine the United States getting deeply involved in war in South Asia with ground forces. The area was simply too peripheral to our vital interests. [1 sentence (35 words) not declassified]

The President commented, with respect to the discussion of money, that Prime Minister Nehru had not talked money with him at all in the course of his visit.[5] There was much that was still unclear about Nehru’s policies, but the President said that at the end of his conversations with Nehru he was at least sure of one thing: Nehru did not want Russia running his country.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Noted and discussed the definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly as to the period of time involved in each case, of the term “limited initial resistance” as used in NSC 5612/1 and as applicable to the term “limited resistance to external aggression” used in paragraph 68 of NSC 5617 (subsequently issued as NSC 5701).

b. Noted the President’s statement that the definition of the term “limited resistance” will have to be determined in each case according to we security interests of the United States.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 4.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1599, dated August 30, 1956, see vol. XXI, p. 250, footnote 14 . For text of NSC 5612/1, “U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia,” dated September 5, 1956, see ibid., p. 253. NSC 5617, “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia,” dated December 7, 1956, was amended and issued as NSC 5701 on January 10, 1957.

[3] The January 2 memorandum is filed in the minutes.

[4] The memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated December 21, 1956, is printed in volume XXI, p. 276.

[5] Prime Minister Nehru of India made an official visit to the United States December 16–20.

[6] Paragraphs a–b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1649, approved by the President on January 10. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

104. Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)[1]

Washington, January 7, 1957.

BASIS ON WHICH THE NSC MECHANISM CAN EFFECTIVELY SERVE THE PRESIDENT

1. The National Security Council should be the channel through which recommendations for national security policy reach the President for his decision.

a. The policy of the President is not permanently to assign an area of national security policy formulation as the responsibility of a department, agency, or individual outside the NSC mechanism.

b. The President should make decisions on national security policy—except in special cases of urgency—within the framework of the Council.

2. Except in special cases of urgency, security policy recommendations by the Council to the President should be based on written papers:

a. prepared by the Council’s Planning Board in deliberations at which the views of all affected departments and agencies are sought, debated, and integrated;

b. circulated to and studied, in advance of the Council meeting, by those to attend that meeting;

c. discussed by the Council at a meeting presided over by the President.

3. To assure that security policy recommendations for Council consideration are of high quality:

a. the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Chairman of the Planning Board, should participate in the Board’s deliberations;

b. each Planning Board Member should be recommended to the President by his department or agency chief, approved by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and appointed by the President;

c. the stature and abilities of the Planning Board Members must meet the same standard required for Assistant Secretary; their attendance at all regular Planning Board meetings should be required; and their alternates should be of high competence;

d. each department and agency should change its Planning Board Member about every third year in order to bring fresh points of view into Planning Board deliberations.

4. To make the agenda and operations of the Council responsive to current needs:

a. except as directed by the President, matters to be considered by the Council should insofar as possible deal with the making or alteration of broad policies—either policies for the future or policies immediately required by currently developing events—and with reports on the progress of carrying out approved policies. The Council does not concern itself with inter-agency conflicts not involving policy considerations;

b. papers submitted by the Planning Board for Council consideration should be shortened and sharpened. Each should include: a concise statement of the general considerations on which the policy recommendations are based; a succinct statement of long-range and short-range objectives; clear policy conclusions on major issues (but not a routine listing of courses of action); a brief indication of financial implications (but not detailed financial appendices);

c. fresh consideration should be given to the use of qualified, representative civilian Consultants—individually or as committees— for particular tasks;

d. fresh consideration should be given to the number of people authorized by the President to attend Council meetings.

5. Because the Operations Coordinating Board is a valuable mechanism for coordinating the planning of responsible departments and agencies under approved national security policies and of following up their performance thereunder, the office space of the OCB has been juxtaposed to the office space of the NSC Staff; and the OCB:

a. should be brought by Executive Order within the NSC structure;

b. should be financed through the NSC budget, which would be expanded to include its cost;

c. should have a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman appointed by the President, the latter being his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.[2]

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Administration. Attached to a letter to Dulles from Cutler, dated January 7. According to Cutler’s letter, the President approved this memorandum when he appointed Cutler his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Cutler is identified as the author of the memorandum in a memorandum from Hoover to Dulles, dated January 11. (Ibid.)

Eisenhower’s letter to Cutler, dated January 7, appointing him Special Assistant, outlined his duties in that position. Cutler would have the duties set forth in Cutler’s recommendations regarding the National Security Council, March 16, 1953, as approved by the President on March 17, 1953, printed in Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 245. In addition, Eisenhower wanted Cutler to concern himself “with assuring that there is proper coordination and timing of the execution of national security policies involving more than one Department or Agency,” and he designated him as a representative of the President on the Operations Coordinating Board and as Vice Chairman of that Board. A copy of Eisenhower’s letter to Cutler is in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Administration.

[2] On February 25, President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10700, which formally brought the OCB within the NSC structure. According to a press release by James C. Hagerty, dated February 25, the purpose of the Executive Order was to provide “a closer relation between the formulation and carrying out of security policies.” Offices of the OCB were to be moved to space adjacent to the offices of the NSC. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, OCB) The order also designated the Director of the International Cooperation Administration as a member of the OCB. Though the order specified only that the “Board shall have a chairman and vice chairman, each of whom shall be designated by the President from among its members,” the President had previously announced that he would designate Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter as chairman, OCB, and Cutler as vice chairman, OCB. These appointments continued the arrangements since the creation of the OCB in 1953 to have the Under Secretary of State serve as chairman and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as vice chairman. Executive Order 10700 became effective on July 1. (Fed. Reg. Doc. 57–1526, vol. XXII, No. 39, pp. 1111, 1113)

105. Memorandum of Discussion at the 309th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 11, 1957[1]

Washington, January 11, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Ballistic Missiles Programs (NSC Actions 1433–a, 1484 and 1615–c[2] )

Mr. Robert Cutler, newly reappointed Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, explained the nature of this agenda item, and called on Secretary Wilson. The latter in turn introduced Dr. E. V. Murphree, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on the missiles programs. Dr. Murphree indicated that he would make some general comments on the long-range ballistic missiles programs and would leave the details of each program to be treated subsequently by the representatives of the three Military Services. (The reports of Dr. Murphree and the Service representatives are filed in the minutes of the meeting.)[3]

Dr. Murphree stated that, thanks to significant technical advances in the course of the year 1956, the outlook for success in achieving the objectives of the ICBM and IRBM programs was much more promising. He reminded the members of the Council that by determination of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force was to have operational responsibility for the ICBM and for the land-based IRBM. The Navy was to have operational responsibility for the ship-based IRBM.

Dr. Murphree went on to indicate the considerable differences between the two ICBM missiles, Atlas and Titan, which were in the course of being developed. It was the present plan of the Defense Department to carry both the Atlas and the Titan programs to the point at which an initial operational capability would have been achieved with both missiles. He stated that the serious problem of reentry showed every likelihood of being solved, although, of course, we had no actual flight data as yet and would not have such data until next year.

With respect to the IRBM, Dr. Murphree said there were likewise two different missiles in the course of development, the Jupiter and the Thor. The first flight tests of the IRBM would occur in the very near future. It ought to be possible by the end of the calendar year 1957 to tell which of these two missiles was the more promising. But due to the great importance and urgency of achieving an IRBM capability, the Defense Department had decided to carry both the Thor and Jupiter programs forward through the calendar year 1957. Thereafter the move effective missile program would be carried forward and the other dropped.

After a brief comment on the estimated future costs of these missiles programs, Dr. Murphree indicated that it was the hope of the Defense Department that the British would build bases for the IRBM in the United Kingdom and would assume operational responsibility for the IRBM. From a number of points of view the British Isles offered the most advantageous location for IRBM bases.

After a brief comment on the development of Soviet long-range ballistic missiles capabilities, Dr. Murphree indicated that the representatives of the Services would discuss these programs in greater detail. The first report would be on the Air Force program, which would be presented by General Schriever.

With the aid of slides, General Schriever first discussed the “ICBM Development Timetable”. He was also optimistic with respect to the likelihood of a solution of the re-entry problem, basing his judgment on tests conducted to date and practically terminated at this point. It was the Air Force’s hope to have the first operational ICBM ready at a date early in 1959.

General Schriever then indicated the major difference between the Atlas 1½-stage missile and the 2-stage Titan missile. In so doing he was assisted by models of these missiles which had been brought to the Cabinet Room. He predicted that the first launching of the flight test missile Atlas would occur in the course of 1957. The first guided flight of an Atlas missile was likely to occur in 1958. The corresponding dates for tests of the Titan missile would be approximately one year behind the similar developments on Atlas.

Thereafter, and again with the aid of slides, General Schriever outlined the “Initial Operational Capability Force Build-up”. He noted that the program called for the first three launchers to be operational by the spring of 1959. The ultimate objective of the program was eight squadrons of missiles, four Atlas and four Titan.

General Schriever then turned to the Air Force IRBM program which was developing the Thor missile. As in the case of the ICBM, General Schriever outlined in the first instance the IRBM initial operational capability force build-up. He stated that the first launching of the Thor missile should come very soon in the current calendar year. The first guided flights of the Thor missile would occur in August 1957. Turning to the operational aspects of the IRBM program, General Schriever noted that current plans involved three phases. The first phase consisted of the achievement of an emergency capability for the IRBM in the United Kingdom by February 1958. Six missiles should be in existence by mid-1958, and four squadrons by 1960.

General Schriever noted that the foregoing arrangements still require high-level approval and, of course, negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom. General Schriever closed his remarks with a summary in which he stated that the Air Force believed that we were now entering upon the most critical phase in the development of our missiles—namely, the testing phase. In all essentials the program was on schedule, and the Air Force felt confident that we would achieve the objectives of the program within the time limits which had been set.

At the conclusion of General Schriever’s report, Dr. Murphree requested General Medaris to report on the Army’s IRBM program. General Medaris stated that the missile being developed under this program was called the Jupiter, with a range of 1500 nautical miles. There had been ten firings in 1956 of missiles of a Jupiter configuration, but the first complete Jupiter missile would be fired in February 1957. General Medaris expressed confidence that the Army IRBM program would demonstrate an emergency capability soon after October 1957. The program was on schedule.

Dr. Murphree indicated that Admiral Raborn would discuss the Navy’s IRBM program. Admiral Raborn referred initially to the change in the Navy program, which was now concentrating on the development of a missile called Polaris. This was a smaller weapon, with a solid fuel propellant instead of the liquid fuel propellant. This missile was thought much more suitable for sea-based missiles than the others. It was smaller; it had lower costs and greater safety; it was a 1500-mile range missile. The initial testing could be expected in 1961 and the first launching from a submarine in 1962. Admiral Raborn was likewise optimistic as to the prospects for success in completing the Navy IRBM program within the time limits originally set.

At this point in the presentation, Mr. Cutler said he wished to raise a point with respect to the earlier Council actions regarding the ballistic missiles programs. It was his understanding that the object of these programs was the achievement of a research and development capability for the missiles, but that there had been no authorization to date by the President for the creation of force units and inventories of missiles along the lines described by the previous speakers. He asked the President if this was not also his impression, and the President stated that he did agree with Mr. Cutler’s interpretation. Secretary Wilson argued, however, that it would be very difficult for the planners to proceed with the development of the missiles if they were to have no reasonable assurance that these missiles would enter our weapons inventory at some future date. Moreover, he was sure that before long we should have to face squarely the question of creating a real operational capability for the ballistic missile.

Dr. Murphree indicated that the final presentation by the Department of Defense on the missiles program would be given by his Deputy, Admiral Sides, who would discuss the status of developments of a defense against ballistic missiles. Admiral Sides stated initially that the Defense Department had concluded that an effective defense against ballistic missiles was technically feasible. Secondly, it concluded that the achievement of such a defense would require a complete new weapons and warning system. Thus, radars would be required which do not now exist. These radars would have to be powered by atomic energy. A network to provide warning would cost approximately $1.1 billion. It was estimated that such a warning network would provide an average of some 15 minutes of warning of the approach of a missile to its target. Admiral Sides then answered the question as to how important was such a brief interval of warning. With this 15 minutes, he stated, it would be possible for approximately one-third of our SAC planes to be got off the ground and into the air. This interval would permit warning to planes in the air not to land at their bases. Millions of lives might be spared if in this 15 minutes citizens in target areas could get into some kind of shelter. It would be possible also for the alert status of SAC to be improved.

The Vice President commented on the emphasis which the Navy program put on missiles to be launched from submarines. We must assume, he said, that Soviet development is paralleling our own. If this is indeed the case, what would be involved in a missile program to defend our coasts against attack from Soviet submarines carrying ballistic missiles? Admiral Sides replied that in view of the extended length of the U.S. coastline, there would be enormous costs involved in achieving the means of protecting these coasts against such a threat.

The National Security Council:[4]

a. Noted and discussed the second annual briefing by the Department of Defense on progress of research and development programs for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the status of developing a defense against ballistic missiles.

b. Noted the President’s statement that the presentation at this meeting of projected force units and missile inventories to achieve an initial operational capability for the ICBM and the IRBM in accordance with NSC Actions Nos. 1433–a and 1484, should not be interpreted as constituting Presidential approval at this time of any specific numbers of such force units and inventories.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follows agenda item 2, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

3. Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook

Mr. Cutler explained the nature of the forthcoming report and then called on Director Brundage to make it. (A copy of the report rendered by the Director of the Budget is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)[5]

At the end of Mr. Brundage’s statement, Mr. Cutler, as was customary, called on the Secretary of the Treasury for any comment he wished to make.

Secretary Humphrey commenced by stating that the members of the National Security Council had heard from him so often on this subject that they all must be thoroughly sick and tired of it. Nevertheless, he felt he must say that every single individual in this room carried a responsibility for determining what this Government should spend and how we should spend it. This determination was essentially more the job of the military departments than it was of the Treasury and the Budget. We must also admit that neither the military on their side nor Treasury and Budget on theirs, really knew very much what they were talking about. Defense is hard put to it to produce reliable information as to what this country needs at any given time for an adequate national defense. On the other hand, the Treasury was unable to say for sure just how much money this country is in a position to spend in the future before we go broke. Accordingly, the problem was one of balancing two sets of unknowns. It seemed to Secretary Humphrey that what we must do is to achieve a much higher degree of selectivity in our national expenditures. Secretary Humphrey illustrated this point by reference to the missiles presentation which had been heard earlier. Here we were, he said, engaged in spending billions of dollars to achieve a ballistic missile. At the same time we were spending other billions to produce aircraft like the B–52, early warning systems, etc., etc.; yet if these ballistic missiles really work, the early warning network would be overflown by the enemy and rendered useless. So how we get together all these considerations and make a selective choice in our expenditure—this was primarily the task of the Defense Department. The Defense people must decide what is generally in the national security interest for us to have in the way of defense. We could not continue to take billions of dollars from the pockets of our people while affirming our belief that our international position is generally a great deal better than it has been and that there is very little likelihood of war.

To continue spending on the scale that we have been spending, said Secretary Humphrey, would entail two very serious risks. The first one was that our people would rebel and refuse to stand for a continuation of such large expenditures. The second risk was that we might well overreach ourselves in our spending and thus again run into bad times. Accordingly, the only solution was more selective spending. Nor was it good enough simply to try to hold government spending at present levels. On the contrary, these levels must be brought down. In order to make a beginning of this, Secretary Humphrey said he had just one suggestion to make. The Departments of State and Defense should give a great deal more attention to what this Government should do about maintaining such large troop deployments (together with their civilian followers) all over the world. The time was at hand for these two departments to collaborate on the achievement of a radical change and reduction in this situation.

Secretary Wilson replied by stating that the Department of Defense found itself caught in the middle between the needs of national defense on the one hand and the availability of resources on the other. In this situation, if we hope to make any substantial cuts in our expenditures we would certainly have to change and reduce our commitments and our activities. In point of fact, moreover, the Defense Department had in recent years made many savings, despite the Budget figures which had just been presented. Even now the Defense Department was reconsidering the deployment of U.S. forces abroad and other Defense Department activities, because we could not possibly remain in our present frozen position if we are ever to achieve the savings objectives about which the Secretary of the Treasury had been speaking.

Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement with Secretary Wilson on this latter point, and stated that we are indeed “out of line”. If we were ever to get back into line, we must be willing to incur certain risks. The troublesome question was which risks to run. If the Democrats were smart, said Secretary Humphrey, and some of them were smart—they will soon be turning up in the public mind as the economy boys and the balancers of the budget. The Republicans would be put down as the true spendthrifts.

Secretary Dulles asked if he might now be heard. When the President indicated that he had the floor, Secretary Dulles said that he fully shared the views of Secretary Humphrey on the importance of avoiding unnecessary expenditures. Certainly some expenditures could be reduced by this Government without incurring unacceptable risks to the national security. For example, said Secretary Dulles, he was very dubious about the distant early warning (DEW) line and some of our continental defense programs. The DEW line was something of a Maginot Line idea and, as the missiles presentation earlier suggested, such lines could be overflown. Perhaps likewise in Korea, Japan and Germany there were U.S. programs which involved unnecessary U.S. expenditures. While, said Secretary Dulles, he thought it quite unlikely that the United States would ever become engaged in a war with the Soviet Union along the lines suggested by the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee a couple of weeks ago, he did think that if the United States were ever to get into a military posture inferior to that of the USSR, this country would suffer defeat without the occurrence of a war. He said he would illustrate the point of his remark by reference to the game of chess. In a chess game you wouldn’t normally ever go so far as to take your opponent’s king; you checkmate that king and don’t play out the rest.

Now, if the Soviet Union should ever get itself in a position where it could checkmate the United States, the Soviet Union would never have to resort to war in order to destroy the United States. We would be obliged to give in. And in a sense, continued Secretary Dulles, a war with the Soviet Union is being fought by the United States at the present time. Thus in our recent thinking about what we ought to do with respect to this terrible situation in the Middle East, we anticipated and counted on a significant Soviet reaction and challenge to our new proposals. We will get such a challenge. Nevertheless, we felt that we could accept this forthcoming challenge because Admiral Radford had stated that our own military establishment was superior to Russia’s and that the Russians knew that it was superior. Thus, if necessary, we could call checkmate on the Soviet Union.

In view of all this, Secretary Dulles said he thought that we would have to bear in mind that while these terrible missiles which we have heard described this morning might never be used, they are nevertheless essential to the national security. We simply cannot afford to be inferior to the USSR.

In closing, Secretary Dulles stressed that there was no incompatibility between what he was saying and what Secretary Humphrey had been saying. All that was required was that the two views be got together. In any event, Secretary Dulles felt that what he had said formed an important part of the total picture.

At the end of Secretary Dulles’ statement, Mr. Cutler reminded Secretary Humphrey that he would surely want to say something about the problematical nature of the projected increase in the Treasury’s receipts in the next fiscal year. Secretary Humphrey said he agreed emphatically that the likelihood of such an increase was far from certain.

Secretary Wilson stated that he and his military advisers all felt that this Government was already skating dangerously close to losing that superiority over the USSR of which Secretary Dulles had just spoken. Secretary Wilson also said that in his opinion this country had never been so prosperous as it was at the present time. Accordingly, if we needed to spend all that we were now spending in order to maintain our military superiority over the Soviet Union, he believed that our country could well afford the expenditure.

Secretary Humphrey said that he agreed with Secretary Wilson that there was certainly no immediate threat to the health of the U.S. economy; but such a threat could develop in the future if we go on spending at the present rate. Perhaps, added Secretary Humphrey, what we are facing is an absolute necessity for disarmament. Of course, if we have to maintain this expensive defense posture and go broke, it would be just too bad; we would have to go broke. However, Secretary Humphrey again called for greater selectivity in our spending, and added his belief that all our national security policies ought to be reviewed now “from the guts up”.

Secretary Wilson commented that his people kept saying that even present expenditures will not provide the United States with the military strength that it ought to have. About the only comfort he could derive from the situation was his belief that the burden of armaments on the Russian people was even worse.

Governor Stassen said that he would like to make one point with respect to the views of Secretary Humphrey. He would like to suggest a study which might conceivably prove fruitful. He referred to some of the major increases in our military effectiveness in the shape of missiles, atomic weapons, and the like. In view of this increase in our fire power, perhaps it would be profitable to conduct a study which might lead to a more rapid phase-out of certain categories of weapons which are becoming slightly obsolescent. Governor Stassen said he had in mind fighter bombers, medium bombers, aircraft carriers, and front line divisions.

As the Council was about to adjourn, the President said he had one point to make. It seemed to him, he said, that some world problems are insoluble. For instance, that is what we are getting up against with the advent of these ballistic missiles which had been described earlier. War had always been hitherto a contest, but it was preposterous to describe a war of missiles as a contest. The President added that he believed that there was already in the world all the deterrent power that could be used. That is, there was enough deterrent power so that each side could destroy the other side completely. The concept of deterrent power has gone as far as it can. In view of this incredible situation we must have more fresh thinking on how to conduct ourselves. We must also educate our European allies. At least they have now come to desire atomic weapons in their defense arsenals. But in any case, over the long run this country must get to a point where we can stabilize at least on a percentage basis of the gross national product to be devoted to our defense. Everyone who professes to be seriously concerned with the future of our country must do some fresh thinking. We cannot continue along our present line of thinking and acting without “busting” ourselves.

The National Security Council:[6]

Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 11.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1433, see footnote 9, Document 34. Regarding NSC Action No. 1484, see footnote 8, Document 45. Regarding NSC Action No. 1615, see footnote 9, Document 92.

[3] The reports are filed in the minutes.

[4] Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1653, approved by the President on January 12. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[5] See footnote 3 above.

[6] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1655, approved by the President on January 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

106. Editorial Note

At the 310th meeting of the National Security Council on January 24, Allen Dulles began his briefing on “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security” with the following comments:

“The Director of Central Intelligence informed the Council that on the [remainder of paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified].

“Mr. Dulles then provided certain statistics regarding the Soviet guided missile program. He stated that as of [25 words not declassified]. Mr. Dulles added his estimate of what the Soviet Union might have now and might be estimated to have in the future in the way of missile capability.

“Secretary Wilson commented that as of the present time the Defense Department was not attempting to produce any missiles in the range of 300 to 700 miles, for the very good reason that we did not know what we could do with a missile of this ranee if we succeeded in producing one. Nevertheless, this matter should be kept under study. Moreover, as for the 1500-mile intermediate range ballistic missile, even this missile did not look very valuable to the Defense Department unless we were sure of getting the cooperation of our allies in the matter of providing launching sites for ballistic missiles of this approximate range.” (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Regarding Soviet nuclear tests and missile program, see Document 115.

107. Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Bennett)[1]

Washington, January 30, 1957.

The following material consists of excerpts from an oral briefing offered Governor Herter at the Pentagon on Friday, January 25, which it seems appropriate to make of record. Governor Herter was accompanied by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. The statements recorded below are reported principally from the presentation in Mr. Gordon Gray’s office by Mr. Charles Sullivan, Director of the Office of Special International Affairs.

1. The Defense Department considers that atomic capability is a definite part of our military armor today. While we should be restrained in our publicity and should not go about flexing our muscles, we should not hide this fact of atomic power. The success of the SEATO maneuver, Operation Firm Link, at Bangkok last year is a case in point.[2] Honest John rockets with conventional warheads were used in that operation. Despite serious concern beforehand over reaction in Asia to this step, the operation was highly successful and there was no adverse publicity anywhere except, as to be expected, in the communist press. Failure to include atomic capability openly in our military posture would in Defense opinion raise doubts in Asian minds as to the firmness of U.S. intentions to defend our Asian partners.

2. With respect to NATO, reported UK plans to cut its forces in half could have very serious consequences.[3] Such reductions might well start a steady erosion of NATO forces. There is even some feeling in the Pentagon that U.S. forces assigned to NATO could be deeply cut. The prevailing Defense viewpoint is that the UK cannot cut its forces, even with the intent to restore the balance with atomic weapons, and maintain the same strength. NATO strength measured against NATO commitments is already at rock bottom.

3. There is encouraging progress in new weapons, both in U.S. capacity to produce and supply such weapons and in our allies’ capacity to absorb them in their military structures and employ them. [2 sentences (44 words) not declassified]

4.

The problem of operating bases in foreign countries is a constant preoccupation. The U.S. now has base rights in 38 countries, and negotiations involving some aspect of base rights are presently going on in some 20 countries. Exaggerated nationalism and constantly rising demands for increased payments and other forms of U.S. aid in exchange for base rights are coming to raise serious questions in some areas as to whether a given base is worth its cost both in financial terms and in terms of deteriorating U.S. relations.

The dollar worth of a base is difficult to estimate, although Defense attempts to calculate it on a completely pragmatic basis. What we are willing to pay to obtain a base depends in some measure on our investment already there (we have put $70 million into the Dhahran air base of which $20-25 million worth could be moved out if we should give it up) and is affected greatly by other bases which we may have in the same general area.[4] For instance, the price we were willing to pay in connection with the recent five-year extension agreement with Libya was keyed to our knowledge that the financial terms of any agreement are quickly known in other countries.[5] In the case of Libya we had always to bear in mind that negotiations with Saudi Arabia and Morocco[6] were coming along soon. As between the Libyan base and the Dhahran air base in Saudi Arabia, Dhahran is more expendable. With respect to Morocco, the Moroccans have been talking in terms of a total of about $430 million in payments and aid. It is anticipated that this unrealistic amount can be substantially scaled down in the negotiations. With respect to Spain, we have already programmed $350 million in aid to Spain through FY 1957 in return for the ten-year treaty which began running in 1953, and already the Spaniards are asking for more.[7] The JCS is thinking of giving up some of the Spanish bases, or at least not proceeding with planned construction, in view of the availability of the Moroccan facilities (unless, of course, the Moroccan situation should deteriorate).

5. With respect to future base negotiations conducted abroad, staff thinking in Defense is toward avoiding the use of high level missions from Washington in the future. Special representatives of high rank for negotiating purposes invariably results in the host country setting its sights higher and demanding a larger price. The recent Philippine negotiations offer an outstanding example of this point.[8] Experience would indicate that we would profit through the development in the Defense Department of a small group of personnel highly qualified in the business of base negotiations. Individuals from this group would be available for temporary assignment abroad to assist the resident U.S. Ambassador in the conduct of future negotiations for military facilities.

6. Both in the session in Mr. Gray’s office (presided over by Karl Harr[9] due to the illness of Mr. Gray) and in the later conversation in Deputy Secretary Robertson’s office, the dilemma of thermonuclear power was touched on. If we have nuclear weapons of such enormous power that we fear to use them because of the consequences which might ensue, and if our enemy knows that we fear to use our power because of the danger of the consequences, then what is the real value of that power as an arm of diplomacy? There was also discussed the other horn of the dilemma—the increasing economic pressures and inflationary dangers at home flowing from the staggering cost of modem day defense equipment.

WTB

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HE/1–3057. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Christian A. Herter, Murphy, and S/S.

[2] Regarding Operation Firm link, see vol. XXI, pp. 177–179.

[3] For the British announcement of reductions in their armed forces, see The New York Times, April 5, 1957, pp. 1 and 4.

[4] For documentation on the Dhahran airbase, see vol. XIII, pp. 249 ff .

[5] For documentation on the bases agreement with Libya, see vol. XVIII, pp. 415 ff .

[6] For documentation on the negotiations on bases with Morocco, see ibid.,  pp. 511

[7] Documentation on the Spanish bases is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.

[8] For documentation on the Philippine negotiations, see vol. XXII, pp. 579 ff .

[9] Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Council Affairs and Plans, ISA.

108. Memorandum of Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 7, 1957[1]

Washington, February 7, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development (NSC Actions Nos. 1430–p, 1448 and 1502; NIE 100–5–55; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 29, 1957[2] )

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the main points raised in the report on the subject by the Panel of scholars and scientists, as well as upon the reaction of the Planning Board to the Panel’s report.[3] In the course of this briefing, Mr. Cutler indicated the matters on which the Planning Board had expressed misgivings with respect to the program which the Panel had proposed. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is included in the minutes of the meeting.)[4] Upon the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Cutler called on Governor Peterson to express his point of view.

Governor Peterson stated that Mr. Cutler had expressed his, Governor Peterson’s, views as fairly as he had stated those of the Planning Board. He said he did feel that the Planning Board description of the program as something of a “gimmick” was rather gratuitous. Indeed, it was a flippancy which was wholly unnecessary, because there was nothing abnormal in the program which had been proposed by the Panel as a means of bringing home to the American people the character of a future nuclear conflict.

With respect to his own proposal that the program should be placed in charge of a newly created Special Assistant to the President, Governor Peterson said that perhaps the Federal Civil Defense Administration had leaned backwards a little on itself assuming responsibility for the program. In point of fact, FCDA believed that a Special Assistant could do a better job in heading this program because of the prestige which a Presidential Special Assistant would inevitably lend to it. Nevertheless, if there were a decision against creating a Special Assistant to head the program, the Federal Civil Defense Administration would gladly and gracefully accept the responsibility. Governor Peterson closed his remarks by stating that despite all the difficulties which the Planning Board had perceived in the Panel’s proposed program, the basic problem still remained to confront us—namely, that if nuclear war were to occur we could expect the disintegration of the nation if the American public were not better prepared to face such a war than is now the case.

The President commented that the crux of the matter lay in the Panel’s central conclusion that “a massive nuclear attack on the United States resulting in casualties of the order of 50,000,000 without drastically improved preparation of the people, would jeopardize support of the national government and of the war effort, and might well result in national disintegration.” This was a terrible kind of problem which we could not solve with our current military planning, for example, by talking of maintaining six divisions abroad. Speaking with great feeling, the President explained the background of his request that the Panel undertake this study. He went on to point out that the findings of the Panel had a very definite effect on our war plans. If the conclusion he had quoted above was a correct conclusion, the sensible thing for the United States to do in its war planning was to concentrate on what measures we should undertake in the first week of the war. It would all be over by that time. But in point of fact, we ignore this and continue to develop elaborate and long-range plans for prosecuting a future war in which we would be involved. If the views of the Panel are correct, we should certainly revise our war plans. The President was not very sympathetic, either, to the view that the carrying out of a large-scale U.S. shelter program would create anxiety in the Soviet Union and suggest to the Soviet Union the likelihood that we were about to undertake a preventive war. If a mere shelter program made the Soviets nervous, what, presumably, did they think about such things as our missiles program? The problem on which the Panel had concentrated its thinking, the President said, was the most serious problem which had ever faced the world.

Mr. Cutler again explained the Planning Board view as to the need for more details and a more definite program before the Council gave its blessing to a program of the sort suggested by the Panel. He pointed out that the Planning Board had regarded the Panel’s report as interesting, but did not feel that it had sufficient information as to what the Administration would be getting into if it bought the Panel’s proposed program. After all, said Mr. Cutler, we do not wish to get involved again in anything like our ill-fated “Operation Candor”.[5]

With respect to the problem of public information about the effects of nuclear war, the President insisted that he had informed the U.S. public on more than one occasion that if the United States became involved in a nuclear war, North America would in effect become a desert.[6] At the very least, the Panel’s report emphasizes again the vital need for an effective disarmament program.

The Attorney General expressed the view that in the process of informing the public, more emphasis should be given to discussions with the Governors of the states and the Mayors of our cities, rather than to rely, as the Panel suggested, on an approach to individuals. The approach to local units was the basis for developing our dispersal program, and the Attorney General believed that this was more effective than the mass approach and involvement recommended by the Panel. Governor Peterson replied that both he, in the civil defense program, and Dr. Flemming, on the dispersal plan, had been trying to move increasingly in the direction pointed out by the Attorney General.

Admiral Strauss called attention to the statement in the body of the report, regarding the consequences of nuclear attack on the United States, that “We have satisfied ourselves that sufficient information has been made available to them [the American people],[7] but it has not been successfully conveyed to them and incorporated in their feelings and actions.” Indeed, the President had just said that he himself had repeatedly called the public’s attention to these consequences, and cited excerpts from Presidential speeches. Accordingly, the public certainly had sufficient information. This being the case, the only thing we could expect from the kind of large-scale propaganda program recommended by the Panel would be, on the one hand, panic among our people, and, on the other, terrific pressure by the politicians to undertake a vast shelter program. Admiral Strauss expressed the opinion that no shelter program would offer an effective solution to the problem of nuclear devastation. On the contrary, by collecting large numbers of people in shelters located near areas under nuclear attack, all we would do would be to assure that these people would be incinerated or suffocated in their shelters.

Mr. Cutler stated that the Panel was not recommending anything which could be rightly called a propaganda campaign, but proposed an educational program which would be based on small discussion groups and which would be pitched in a low key precisely to avoid panic and hysteria. Indeed, this was one of the problems that had worried the Planning Board. They were unable to grasp how we could achieve the desired effects in the public mind if the program was constantly maintained in a low key.

The President repeated his view that if we accepted the conclusions that the Panel had reached as to the likelihood of national disintegration if a massive nuclear attack should occur, then we have got to follow a wholly different course of action than we are now following. This conclusion of the Panel stated in effect that this nation would be unable to react after a massive attack with casualties on the order of 50,000,000 people. Accordingly, it would seem that the only sensible thing for us to do was to put all our resources into our SAC capability and into hydrogen bombs.

Secretary Humphrey said that to him the problem raised by the Panel’s report had two main facets: First, what the Government does with respect to its own planning, and second, what the Government says to the public about its plans. It seemed to Secretary Humphrey altogether foolish to talk about catastrophic effects of nuclear warfare if at the same time we were unable to offer the American public any means and measures which would ameliorate these catastrophic effects. The public was aware of the horrors of nuclear attack. The public has been told about the probable nature of such an attack. Nevertheless, the public simply does not believe that such an attack is going to occur. Secretary Humphrey repeated his view that it would do no good for the Administration to scare the public to death as a result of being unable to tell them anything about what we are trying to do to ameliorate the catastrophic effects of a nuclear attack.

Secretary Dulles said that he could see no particular objection to the recommendation of the Planning Board that the program proposed by the Panel be studied for another three months. However, it was clear in his own mind that the Government ought never to adopt any such program as the Panel was proposing. We were here involved with a very dangerous and delicate problem which called for our best judgment. In the circumstances, we certainly could not carry out the program proposed by the Panel without creating a mob psychology which would compel us against our better judgment to accept a dangerously faulty disarmament program or else to undertake a vast and costly shelter program. Secretary Dulles did not believe that this country could avoid the perils which the Panel perceived as likely to result from a nuclear attack by creating a world opinion that might force us to do things which we do not want to do and which we think unwise. Instead, we should plan calmly the best measures we can to avert or soften the effects of a nuclear attack.

Governor Peterson replied that while he appreciated the logic behind Secretary Dulles’ statement, we were very likely to be faced with this mob psychology even if we do not undertake the program of involvement recommended by the Panel. Secretary Dulles insisted that we do not wish to incorporate this kind of information in the minds of our people, as the Panel has recommended.

The President broke in and said to Secretary Dulles that in other words the Secretary appeared not to believe in the principle of free government and in giving to the people the kind of information it ought to have. Apart from this, the President pointed out that what had initially got him interested in this problem was the fact that he had observed the evacuations of large cities during the latter years of the second World War. The people were really blind mobs, like a horde of locusts, and completely unmanageable. What the Panel was trying to suggest was that there are certain things we can do which might avoid a repetition of this sort of thing and might enable our people to help themselves more effectively in the event of a terrible attack.

Secretary Humphrey said he still wished to make his point that the Government ought not to scare the people to death by dwelling on the catastrophic results of nuclear war, unless at the same time we are in a position to tell them what to do to meet and counter the situation they would face.

Governor Stassen expressed the view that the points raised earlier by the Attorney General had been very wisely taken. If we followed this recommendation it might well mean the survival of at least local units of government. These could in turn gradually pull the nation together after an attack. He believed that the educational program should stress above all what measures could be taken after an attack to reconstitute society. The President asked Governor Stassen for an interpretation of what he was recommending, and suggested that Governor Stassen meant that we should not try to assure the survival of all the units of government, but to see that such units as did survive a nuclear attack would know in advance how to proceed with the restoration of some kind of order out of the chaos. Governor Stassen indicated that the President’s interpretation of his statement was correct, and that essentially he was advocating steps to assure the decentralized survival of the United States as a nation.

At this point, Mr. Cutler expressed the opinion that the discussion in the Council fortified his belief that the recommendations of the Planning Board for Council action had been sound; that is, that no basis for a Council decision with respect to the program recommended by the Panel now existed, but that the matter should receive further study for a matter of three months. The President commented that he had no objection to the recommendations of the Planning Board, but pointed out that he was searching desperately to find the best thing for us to do at the present time in order to minimize the terrible results of a nuclear attack on the United States, and he was certain that this could not be achieved by simply ignoring the danger.

Secretary Robertson said that the matter of timing was a consideration of great importance. As of the present, we had no solution to provide the people, as Secretary Humphrey had pointed out, and it was therefore dangerous to drive home too much the nature of the disaster which they might face. The President agreed that we did have to have something of a positive nature to tell the people, and Secretary Robertson went on to point out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now engaged in studying ways and means of moving our continental defense perimeter out further from our borders.

The National Security Council:[8]

a. Noted and discussed the Report by the Panel on Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development, transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 29, 1957.

b. Requested the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, with the assistance of other Government departments and agencies, to study the matter further and make recommendations to the Council within three months (1) as to whether a program of public education and action should be undertaken in this field, and (2) if such a program is to be undertaken, what should be its specific content and proposed limits.[9] In making the study and recommendations, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator should take account of the possible difficulties involved in such a program, including those which are set forth in paragraph 6 of the reference memorandum of January 29, 1957.[10]

c. Agreed that in the conduct of this study, individuals and organizations outside the Government as necessary may be approached, but that every precaution should be taken to avoid publicity until the Council has had an opportunity to consider the recommendations that are developed.

d. Requested the Intelligence Advisory Committee to prepare within three months a national intelligence estimate[11] on:

(1) The effects over time on human attitudes and behavior in foreign countries of a growing awareness of growing capabilities for mutual annihilation in the event of nuclear war;

(2) The probable attitudes of people in foreign nations toward the initiation of general war by the constituted leaders of nations, or members of power blocs, possessing mutually destructive technological capability; and

(3) Steps being taken in Communist and non-Communist countries to acquaint the people with the implications of nuclear warfare.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator for implementation. The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate implementation by the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

[Here follow agenda items 2-4. Item 3, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran”, is scheduled for publication in volume XII. For portions of item 2 and item 4 on the Suez Canal, see volume XVII, page 99.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on February 8.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1430, see footnote 9, Document 30. NSC Action No. 1448, approved by the President on October 19, 1955, authorized a study of the human effects of nuclear weapons development for submission to the President. NSC Action No. 1502, approved by the President on January 16, 1956, noted the President’s statement that he planned to ask Val Peterson to head a panel for the study. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) NIE 100–5-55 was not declassified. (Ibid., INR–NIE Files) The January 29 memorandum contained the Planning Board comments on the report of the Peterson panel. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous Files: Lot 66 D 95, Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development)

[3] The summary of the report is printed as Document 96.

[4] The briefing note was not filed in the minutes.

[5] Not further identified.

[6] See Eisenhower’s remarks at the Conference of the National Women’s Advisory Committee on Civil Defense, October 26, 1954, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 960–963; and his comments at his news conference on July 6, 1955, ibid., 1955, pp. 671–672.

[7] Brackets in the source text.

[8] Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1665, approved by the President on February 8. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[9] Val Peterson’s report and recommendations to the NSC, dated June 19, are not printed. (Ibid., Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development)

[10] Paragraph 6 of Lay’s memorandum to the NSC discussed certain aspects of the panel’s proposal for a “program of psychological defense” which caused the Planning Board concern. (Ibid.)

[11] SNIE 100–5–57, Document 111.

109. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

Washington, February 25, 1957.

SUBJECT

Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base

1. NSC Action No. 1503–b noted the President’s request that the Secretary of Defense together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff make a thorough analysis and report on the basic military planning concept which should govern the planning and development of the mobilization base.[2]

2. I believe that the new strategic concept (Appendix A), prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by me, provides the basic military planning concept which should govern the planning and development of the U.S. mobilization base. This strategic concept provides for two military eventualities: (a) cold war or military conflict short of general war and (b) general war, initiated with an atomic onslaught by the Soviets or as a result of hostilities which were not initially intended to lead to general war. The U.S. mobilization base must be fully responsive to these eventualities.

3. The introduction of atomic weapons into the military arsenal, and the change which these weapons have made in our strategic concepts of war, dictate a change in logistic planning. In the past, emphasis has been placed on the capability of our industrial facilities to expand for support of our forces in time of war. Our capability of expanding our industrial capabilities was, in fact, an essential element in our U.S. mobilization base. Our experience in past wars made it possible for us to forecast military requirements over an extended period. We were able to economize in times of peace by producing and stockpiling only those military supplies which would be required in war before industrial production could meet the demand. Our time and space advantages were the keys which permitted this type of mobilization planning.

4. The present concept concerning the initiation of a general war by a surprise atomic attack eliminates, for all practical purposes, the effect of our previous time and space advantages from mobilization planning. Our concept of the U.S. mobilization base, as related to potential industrial expansion after war commences, must be brought into agreement with this particular aspect of the strategic concept. Pre-D-day planning for mobilization will improve our capabilities to conduct general war. Our U.S. mobilization base should continue to provide for possible peripheral wars both with and without direct participation by U.S. forces. We must develop logistic objectives that are in consonance with our concepts of general war which will restore to the maximum the advantage previously afforded by time and space factors of our geography.

5. In consonance with our strategic concept (Appendix A) and Basic National Security Policy, the U.S. mobilization base should at this time be so planned and developed that for both general war and conflict short of general war it will:

a. Maintain the active forces in a condition of optimum readiness to execute initial wartime missions.

b. Maintain and support selected reserve forces in a condition of high readiness.

c. Maintain and support the phased expansion to the M + 6 months force levels.

d. Have the capacity to meet the combat requirements of all forces which would be mobilized by M+6 months.

e. Provide pre-D-day stocks of selected supplies and equipment outside the United States reasonably protected to insure that those forces surviving the enemy atomic attack will have a reasonable capability of performing assigned initial tasks effectively despite substantial interruption of resupply from the United States during the initial phase of war.

6.

In summary the U.S. mobilization base should be predicated on a military planning concept for meeting two distinctively different mobilization problems:

a. Conflict without damage to the U.S. production base.

b. Conflict characterized by atomic attack on the U.S.

Therefore, mobilization planning must be designed to meet the different eventualities outlined above with emphasis on those elements that will increase our D-day readiness and capability.

7. Your attention is invited to the fact that, for military planning purposes, the strategic concept provides that in military operations short of general war atomic weapons will be used when required in order to achieve military objectives (Appendix A—para. 2–f, page 8). It is understood, of course, that the actual use of these weapons in such a contingency is dependent upon Presidential authorization as set forth in para. 11 of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5602/1).[3]

8. It is requested that this memorandum and Appendix A be given a special limited distribution and that the contents be subject to special security precautions with access limited to those individuals having a strict “need-to-know”.

C.E. Wilson[4]

Appendix “A”

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

1. Strategic Concept for General War Beginning 1 July 1960

a. In the event of general war, a war in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the United States are overtly engaged, the basic military objective of the U.S. Armed Forces is the defeat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a degree which will assure the accomplishment of the U.S. national objectives in order to preserve the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. It is the policy of the United States that atomic weapons will be integrated with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. [1 sentence (18 words) not declassified]

b. General war may be initiated either by the Soviets with an atomic onslaught with little or no warning or may be the result of hostilities short of general war which were not initially intended to lead to general war.

c. A general war would consist of two phases, an initial phase of comparatively short duration, and a subsequent phase of indeterminate duration. The initial phase would be characterized by an intensive exchange of atomic blows and the initiation of operations and deployments by Army, Naval and Air Force forces designed to achieve strategic advantage. During this period, the U.S. atomic capability would be exploited fully, to the end that enemy military losses and the loss of the war-making capacity directly supporting enemy forces would be such as to either (a) bring about his capitulation or (b) provide a margin of relative advantage to the United States and its Allies sufficient to assure victory in the subsequent phase of operations. This subsequent phase would be a continuation of the initial phase operations, probably at reduced atomic intensity, and follow-up offensive operations to achieve victory and attain Allied war objectives. The ultimate strategy adopted, as well as the duration and outcome of this subsequent phase, will depend largely on the relative advantage achieved in the initial phase and the remaining relative capabilities.

d. Prior to the outbreak of a general war which developed as an outgrowth of a local or limited war the United States might achieve a significant degree of mobilization, deployment and commitment of resources. Such deployments might not improve our posture for general war. At any time during hostilities short of general war the USSR might initiate a large scale atomic attack, but the alertness of the Allies, the defense preparations and the deployments achieved might reduce casualties to civilian populations and to military forces and establishments from the proportions to be expected in a general war initiated by surprise Soviet atomic attack. However, once a large-scale atomic exchange has taken place, the war situation would probably develop along similar lines to a general war initiated by a surprise atomic attack but with greater Allied capability remaining after the atomic exchange.

e. The United States, in collaboration with its Allies, will:

(1) Defend the continental United States.

(2) Defend vital areas in the Western hemisphere and overseas.

(3) Destroy or reduce the military potential of the enemy by conducting offensive operations against the military forces of the enemy and the war-making capacity directly supporting those forces.

(4) Conduct operations required to maintain control of essential sea areas and protect vital sea communications.

(5) During the initial phase, conduct a strategic defense in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.

(6) Subsequent to the initial phase, and as dictated by the military situation then existing, conduct such operations as may be required to achieve Allied war objectives. Consequently, only broad guidance in terms of military objectives can now be determined for the conduct of operations in the subsequent phase.

(7) Accelerate the phased expansion of all U.S. military forces.

2. Strategic Concept for Cold War or for Military Conflict Short of General War Beginning 1 July 1960

a. The basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. During a period of cold war or military conflict short of general war, the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes can be expected to continue to prosecute through various means an expansionist policy detrimental to the security of the United States and Allies. Military conflict short of general war becomes more likely during this period because of the mutual deterrence to general war resulting from the possession by both sides of the capability to destroy each other even after a surprise attack. Unstable areas of the world, disagreement among nations of the Free World, and fear of atomic destruction will probably offer opportunities for the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes to exploit subversion and covert or overt armed aggression.

b. The United States and its Allies reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. A basic aim of U.S. military policy is to deter the Sino-Soviet Bloc from using its military power. Hence, during a period of cold war or military conflict short of general war, it is the policy of the United States to affect the conduct of the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interest and encourage tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies.

c. The military position of the United States for a period of cold war or military conflict short of general war will be influenced by the support and cooperation of appropriate major Allies and certain other Free World countries. The United States must convince its Allies that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as that of the United States. Military assistance will be provided by the United States as necessary to insure the availability of strategic bases and key military facilities and to enable other nations of the Free World to develop forces capable of maintaining internal security, of conducting defensive action against military aggression, and where practicable, of contributing to the collective military power of the Free World. In general this military assistance should be consonant with the economic capability of each nation, except where political or military considerations overrule and should include, wherever appropriate, new weapons and advanced technology.

d. The United States with its Allies must defeat the shifting tactic of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and improve the relative strategic position of the Free World. This will require military forces capable of:

(1) Providing a position of strength from which to influence international negotiations for peaceful settlement of basic differences.

(2) Reinforcing and exploiting U.S. political, economic, psychological and other actions in the Free World and elsewhere.

(3) Demonstrating U.S. intent and readiness to discharge its mutual security and treaty obligations.

(4) Deterring aggression.

(5) Maintaining the security of the United States, and readiness for initial tasks in a general war.

(6) Dealing swiftly and decisively with military aggression short of general war on a scale best calculated to achieve U.S. objectives and avoid the hostilities broadening into general war.

e. The United States military posture must provide:

(1) A forward deployment of U.S. ready military forces prepared to conduct operations immediately, from positions strategically selected both to counter local aggression and to carry out the initial tasks in a general war.

(2) Mobile ready forces, principally based upon U.S. territory, which can be deployed rapidly to provide reinforcement to forward deployed forces and indigenous forces in defeating aggression, or to fight unassisted in the event forward deployed forces are not available and effective indigenous forces are lacking.

(3) An atomic retaliatory capability, adequately safeguarded and ready for immediate and effective action.

(4) A defense system, including the use of atomic weapons, which will provide an acceptable destruction probability against attacks which the Soviets are capable of launching against the North American continent, in order to protect the war-making capacity and resources of the Western Hemisphere.

(5) Forces as necessary to provide the capability of maintaining essential land areas and sea and air communications.

f. [remainder of paragraph (20 words) not declassified]

g. Although military operations short of general war are not intended to provoke general war, military or political conditions might be created which would precipitate the initiation of general war by the USSR. Further, the United States, under expanding military operations, might achieve a significant degree of mobilization. Therefore, the deliberate initiation of general war by the USSR under these conditions is considered to be unlikely. It would obviously be more advantageous to the USSR to initiate general war by a surprise atomic attack on the United States.

[1] Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy. Top Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Gleason to the NSC, dated March 1, not printed.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1503, see footnote 5, Document 52.

[3] Document 66.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

110. Memorandum of Discussion at the 314th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 28, 1957[1]

Washington, February 28, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles on “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

2. Review of Basic National Security Policy: Basic Problems for U.S. Security Arising Out of Changes in the World Situation (NSC 5602/1; NIE 100–3–57; NSC 5707; memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957[2] )

Mr. Cutler briefed the National Security Council on the new procedure under which the NSC Planning Board proposed to carry out its task of revising our Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5602/1). (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is included in the minutes of the meeting.)[3]

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to the proposed agenda for future Council meetings to be devoted to the discussion of basic national security policy, as set forth in the reference memorandum of February 19, 1957. After noting the various issues which would be discussed by the Council between today and the middle of May, Mr. Cutler touched on the matter of a discussion paper “on national security costs in relation to total national resources”. He indicated that there had been some questioning of the wisdom of discussing this issue at the first Council meeting on the subject of basic national security policy, rather than at the end. Mr. Cutler said that the reason for getting this issue discussed early in the Council’s deliberation was that it provided an opportunity to thrash out the problem early in the game and obtain the views of the Council on this important matter, which the Council and the Planning Board could keep in mind as they dealt with subsequent issues.

After briefly describing the character of NSC 5707 and the relation of this paper to the National Intelligence Estimate on The World Situation (NIE 100–3–57), and to the Annex to NSC 5707, entitled “Economic Considerations”,[4] Mr. Cutler invited the Director of Central Intelligence to comment briefly and generally on the aforementioned National Intelligence Estimate.

(At this point (10:10 a.m.) Secretary Dulles entered the Cabinet Room, replacing Under Secretary Herter at the table.)

After repeating the three basic ground rules governing the Council’s discussion of NSC 5707, Mr. Cutler invited the National Security Council to consider the introductory paragraph to NSC 5707, entitled “Basic Problems for U.S. Security Arising Out of Changes in the World Situation”. Having read this paragraph, Mr. Cutler commented that it was intended to stress the factors of change and extreme fluidity in the existing world situation. He also pointed out that this absence of stability enhanced the danger of war through miscalculation. He invited the comments of the members of the Council but there were none.

Mr. Cutler thereafter asked the Council to consider the first of the seven major problems identified by the Planning Board in NSC 5707, namely, the problem entitled “Increasing Nuclear Capabilities”, reading as follows:

“The Problem:

“The increasing ability of the United States and the USSR to destroy each other in nuclear general war, and growing realization of this fact, more and more deter the United States and the USSR[5] from taking actions involving serious risk of general war. However, events during the past year have increased the fear of the United States and the USSR be coming involved in general war as a result either of spreading local conflicts or of actions by one power which the other would consider an unacceptable threat to its security.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

“a. U.S. Attitudes. Public support for U.S. security policies, particularly policies involving risks of war, will increasingly depend on public conviction that the United States has an effective and usable military capability.[6] If public confidence should weaken, this could put into question whether and how the United States would counter Soviet actions jeopardizing U.S. interests.

“b. U.S. Alliances. Our allies will increasingly (1) weigh the added security of U.S. alliances against what they may regard as the increasing risk of association with the U.S., (2) be susceptible to Soviet nuclear threats, (3) seek nuclear weapons in order to pursue their own interests.

“c. Local War. The Soviet bloc may be increasingly encouraged to initiate actions short of general war if it believes the United States lacks the capability or the will to react effectively on a local scale and would not react by resort to general war. Such actions would most likely take the form of indirect aggression, i.e., exploiting local conflicts or civil war. Deterrence or defeat of such actions will increasingly depend upon the United States maintaining forces to cope speedily with local Communist or Communist-inspired aggression in a manner calculated to localize the conflict.[7]

“d. Soviet Attitudes. The establishment of U.S. bases and nuclear-capable forces near the borders of the USSR would (where fully available) increase U.S. military strength but would increasingly stimulate Soviet counter-measures.

“e. Disarmament. Feasible and effective measures to control armaments are increasingly urgent.”

After pointing out the two footnotes on page 2,[8] Mr. Cutler said that this problem could perhaps be summarized by the statement that on the one hand the increasing nuclear capabilities of the United States and the USSR tended to create a greater deterrent to general war. On the other hand, these increasing capabilities enhanced the risk of local conflict and of general war through miscalculation. He asked for specific comments and, in particular, asked Secretary Dulles whether in his opinion the Planning Board had been correct in its statement of the problem and of the consequences for U.S. security.

Secretary Dulles replied that certainly increasing nuclear capabilities constituted one of the great problems which we faced. But he said that he could certainly not agree entirely with the Planning Board’s analysis of this problem or, indeed, with the other six problems set forth in NSC 5707. In point of fact, the Planning Board was not asking questions of the National Security Council; it was simply making statements with respect to these problems.

Mr. Cutler said that of course what the Planning Board was looking for was guidance, and it made little difference whether they sought the guidance in the form of statements or in the form of questions.

Secretary Dulles repeated that he did not dissent from the proposition that increasing nuclear capabilities was a major topic for discussion by the National Security Council. But it seemed to him that the Planning Board’s statement of the problem and the consequences of increasing nuclear capabilities and, indeed, the whole of NSC 5707, took an unduly pessimistic view of the situation faced by the United States. At an earlier period, the Council had feared that increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities would lead more and more to the development of neutralism. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has actually threatened two of our allies with the possibility of nuclear attack, the trend toward neutralism in Western Europe has actually lessened and the ties between ourselves and our Western European allies have actually been strengthened. There is indeed a greater desire among Western European nations than ever before to develop a capacity to react against Soviet attack and to work closely with the United States.

Mr. Cutler commented that if the Planning Board had stated the effect of increasing nuclear capabilities on U.S. alliances in the form of a question, the Secretary would have given a resounding “no” to the idea that the alliances were being weakened by the development of these nuclear capabilities.

The President expressed agreement with the views of Secretary Dulles, and indeed said he felt that Secretary Dulles’ case was obvious. For example, the British would not be talking of taking their troops out of Western Europe if they thought it at all likely that we would also take our U.S. forces out of Western Europe.

Secretary Humphrey commented that our real trouble stemmed from the fact that our Western European allies are relying too much on the United States and not enough on themselves. The real question is how much the United States can afford. There is danger that our allies will end by placing all their reliance on the United States. Mr. Allen Dulles observed that there was an element of truth in this, but that the allied attitude was rather natural, in view of the fact that the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Free World. Secretary Humphrey repeated with emphasis his view that our allies were practically placing their whole life and survival in the hands of the United States, in terms, first, of its massive retaliatory capability, and secondarily, on the maintenance of U.S. armed forces in Western Europe. Secretary Wilson expressed the belief that Secretary Humphrey’s appraisal of allied thought on this matter was perhaps a little extreme, but that the thinking of our allies was certainly moving in the direction indicated by Secretary Humphrey.

Mr. Cutler then asked for an expression of opinion from the Council as to the element of mutual deterrence which seemed to be developing as a result of the increasing nuclear capabilities of the United States and the USSR. Did the Council agree with the position taken by the Planning Board with particular respect to the point, in subparagraph c, that the Soviet bloc might be increasingly encouraged to initiate action short of general war if it believes the United States lacks the capability or will to react effectively on a local scale or would not react by resort to general war?

In response to Mr. Cutler’s request for guidance, Secretary Dulles said he took particular exception to the statement that deterrence or defeat of Soviet aggression on a local scale would depend upon the United States maintaining forces which could cope speedily with local Communist aggression. Why, he asked, should the United States alone be saddled with the responsibility for reacting speedily to such Soviet local aggression? It has been our theory in the past that such a reaction should largely be the responsibility of the countries which were attacked. We would do the “big stuff” (large-scale retaliatory attack). Our allies were expected to handle local hostilities.

The President commented that with respect to subparagraph c on local war, he believed that the Planning Board had entered into a field which was highly speculative in character, and one in which it was hard to reach clear and firm conclusions. Secretary Dulles repeated his view that the sentence on the necessity of U.S. forces as a deterrent to local acts of aggression by the Soviet Union ran contrary to the entire basic strategy of the United States. Secretary Humphrey agreed with Secretary Dulles that this idea was certainly contrary to what the United States desired, but that it nevertheless seemed to be the way things were heading. Secretary Dulles continued, saying that the deterrence of local aggression should depend, for example on the development of a worthwhile and effective German Army in Western Europe and similar effective forces being developed by our allies elsewhere in the Free World, such as in Turkey and in Korea. Therefore, he believed this statement on deterrence to be essentially false.

The President asked the Council to think back to the situation we confronted four years ago. At that time the Administration was of the opinion that the one thing we could do which would be most helpful to the Soviet Union would be to scatter our U.S. military forces in any and all areas overseas where we felt it possible that the Soviet Union might some day attack. Indeed, the sending of six divisions of American forces to Western Europe began initially under the guise of an emergency measure. Now it has become permanent. Nevertheless, our policy should be that our friends and allies supply the means for local defense on the ground and that the United States should come into the act with air and naval forces alone.

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to the second footnote on page 2 of NSC 5707, as being closely related to the issue the Council was discussing. Certain members of the Planning Board had expressed fear that the United States would refrain from becoming involved in military action to assist a small Free World country lest the result of the involvement end up with the United States becoming involved in general nuclear war.

Secretary Humphrey inquired whether the best answer to the question posed by Mr. Cutler was not likely to be obtained by picking out a few actual situations around the world and inquiring what the United States would do if Communist-inspired aggression broke out in any of these areas. He added that he personally did not agree with the Planning Board’s statement on deterrence of local war depending on the maintenance of U.S. forces to cope speedily with such local Communist aggression. On three separate occasions since this Administration had been in power, the National Security Council had faced the prospect and possibility of local wars caused by Communist aggression. In each case, when the chips were finally down, the military people came in and said that we could not undertake to fight such a war without the use of nuclear weapons. This had occurred in the case of a possible resumption of hostilities in Korea; it had occurred in Indochina; and it had occurred in the matter of Taiwan and the offshore islands. It therefore seemed to Secretary Humphrey that these actions of the Council demonstrated that we have crossed a bridge in the matter of the use of nuclear weapons, and that a lot of the Planning Board’s statement was purely theoretical. In practice, we must face up to the facts and decide what we propose to do.

Secretary Dulles commented that one notable fallacy in the approach to this problem in NSC 5707 was the assumption that any war in which nuclear weapons were used would necessarily develop into a general nuclear war and the United States using nuclear weapons against Moscow. The President, however, had not said this to Mr. Churchill on the occasion of the crisis in Taiwan or the crisis in Indochina. On these two occasions the United States had no intention of attacking Moscow. Accordingly, it is not true that we would be obliged to choose between doing nothing in the event of local Soviet aggression or else of engaging in general nuclear war.

Mr. Cutler stated that the Planning Board had not acted under any such assumption. NSC 5707 merely pointed out that if we were now faced with we same kind of crisis which we faced earlier with respect to the Chinese offshore islands, there would now be a more serious risk of involving the USSR in any hostilities which might eventuate.

Secretary Humphrey agreed with Mr. Cutler, and went on to say that we should ask the military what this country would do at the present time if we were to face another situation such as that in the offshore islands. Would we use ground troops to defend these islands against Communist aggression? Mr. Cutler commented that it rather seemed that when the Planning Board became very specific in its recommended courses of action, Secretary Humphrey complained and asked for more general statements. On the other hand, when the Planning Board was general, Secretary Humphrey always called on it to be more specific.

Mr. Allen Dulles observed that the situation today was very different than it was when the United States was involved in the crisis over Quemoy and the offshore islands. The Soviet capability of damaging Western Europe was far greater than it had been on the earlier occasion.

Secretary Humphrey said that he admitted that we ran the risk of becoming involved in general nuclear war if we used nuclear weapons to fight local wars. Mr. Cutler reminded the Council of the possible actions which it had discussed with respect to U.S. courses of action in the event that the Soviets used military force to reimpose their control over Poland. Secretary Humphrey thought the situation in Poland and that in the Chinese offshore islands altogether different. Poland lay on the borders of the Soviet Union and was regarded by the Soviet Union as vital to its security.

Secretary Dulles asked the Council members to read the first footnote on page 2 of NSC 5707. He insisted that the assumption underlying the views expressed in this footnote was that the United States would not dare to use nuclear weapons in a local war because of fear that such a course of action would involve general war. Secretary Dulles stated that he did not believe this assumption to be correct.

The President commented that if the Soviets were calculating on the wisdom of going to war with the United States, they would not be swayed by any fear that the United States would bomb airfields in Communist China. Their calculations would be based on quite other considerations.

Admiral Strauss stated that as he had read over these paragraphs and footnotes on the first problem of increasing nuclear capabilities, he had been of the opinion that the Planning Board was trying to direct the Council’s attention to the attitude of the public rather than to the policies of the U.S. Government. It was plain enough that there was a lot of talk in the newspapers about the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the USSR canceling each other out. He therefore hoped that the Council could indicate to the Planning Board that our policy should be to try to prevent such public attitudes from crystalizing, or to correct these attitudes before they crystalized.

Governor Peterson suggested that there should be an addition at the end of the first sentence of subparagraph a on page 2. The addition should read, “and an effective non-military defense.”

Mr. Allen Dulles expressed the view that the likelihood of the USSR letting itself become directly involved in general war was rather remote. They would go in for subversion instead.

Governor Stassen inquired whether the Council had not been of the general opinion in the past that if the United States began to use nuclear weapons in a local war, there would be a tendency for such a local war to develop into a general war. The President replied to Governor Stassen by stating that earlier this morning he had been shown a diagram. This diagram indicated that a 2 KT tactical nuclear weapon would create only one-twentieth of the damage wrought on Tokyo by the fire bomb raids of 1945. It therefore seemed “silly” to the President to think that resort by the United States to the use of these small tactical nuclear weapons would necessarily start a general nuclear war. Mr. Cutler speculated that the President’s illustration referred to too small a tactical weapon. Admiral Strauss doubtless had larger and more powerful ones in mind. The atomic bomb used against Nagasaki was of 20 KT. The President nevertheless repeated his view that there was no reason to think we would inevitably involve ourselves in general war if we made use of these tactical nuclear weapons in a local situation. Secretary Wilson commented that one thing was certain: We would have a general nuclear war if the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union ever got into direct actual combat.

Governor Stassen returned to his point that if the United States ever started on military action in order to secure a vital U.S. objective and in so doing made use of nuclear weapons, it was very likely that in turn nuclear weapons would be used against the United States. Certainly there was a likelihood of general war in that kind of a situation.

Mr. Cutler expressed the opinion that the Planning Board had been given guidance on the first problem in NSC 5707—that is, increasing nuclear capabilities. He therefore suggested that the Council turn to the second important problem identified by the Planning Board, namely, the decline in Western Europe’s position. He read the problem and the statement of the consequences, as follows:

“The Problem:

“The continuing decline in the power position of Western Europe relative to the United States and the USSR has been emphasized by recent developments, including the Franco-British failure over Suez.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

“a. Changing World Role. In the light of their changing status and of nuclear trends, the British, French, and other Western European countries may reconsider the implications of the Atlantic Alliance as well as their commitments elsewhere. Certain areas from which they retract will require strong U.S. support to maintain an independent existence.

“b. Western European Integration. A more realistic relation between Western Europe’s capabilities and commitments may develop. The internal condition of Western Europe remains sound. If, additionally, the area moves toward closer political, economic, and even military association, a trend toward a declining self-confidence may be partly checked and over time reversed, enabling Western Europe to continue as the strongest Free World area outside the United States. The United States can encourage and assist these moves.”

Mr. Cutler then solicited the views of the members of the Council. Was this not a major problem? Was not the decline of Western Europe’s position more apparent now than it had been before the Franco-British failure in Suez? He directed his questions particularly to Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Dulles said he would commence by striking out the title at the head of the problem—that is, “Decline in Western Europe’s Position”. Far from being in decline, there was now for the first time a real prospect that the position of Western Europe was definitely improving. This was the result of the growing measures toward European integration and delineation of a new relationship between Europe and Africa. Secretary Dulles believed that the Planning Board’s treatment of this problem was again too pessimistic. From a strictly military point of view, he admitted that the position of Western Europe had been declining ever since World War I. This had been most recently demonstrated in Suez. If one simply stopped with this military decline, one could well be pessimistic, but if the move toward European unification goes forward as it appears likely to do, and if a sounder relationship can be developed by Europe with Africa, the position of Western Europe is really much more hopeful than it has been in a very long time.

Mr. Cutler said that the Planning Board had tried to take account of the favorable factors in subparagraph b on page 4. Secretary Dulles said that if this were the case, he felt that there was a lack of balance in the Planning Board’s analysis of the position of Western Europe. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that in the past Europe had never faced a vast and powerfully armed Russia. Secretary Humphrey said that he personally was more optimistic today than ever before about the prospects of Western Europe. The President commented that both Ollenhauer[9] and Mollet[10] had told him of their enthusiastic support for the common market scheme for Western Europe. Secretary Dulles said that when he had read over NSC 5707 last night, he had come to the conclusion that its authors were all suffering from dyspepsia.

Dr. Flemming wondered how these optimistic views about the future of Western Europe could be fitted in with earlier comments by members of the Council that the British and the French and our other Western European allies could be expected to look increasingly to the United States for military support. As these Western European allies reduced their strength, was the United States expected to take up the slack?

Secretary Humphrey recommended that we back off and let these Western European states develop a greater degree of self-reliance. Much of the self-reliance that they have already developed derives from our policy and action in the Suez crisis. He again repeated that he was optimistic, but said that we must insist that our allies in Western Europe develop self-reliance.

Mr. Cutler observed that matters were in reverse. Our young men (the Planning Board) seemed gloomy. Our older men (the Council) seemed optimistic. Mr. Allen Dulles turned to Secretary Humphrey and said, optimistic or otherwise, the Secretary of the Treasury was going to have to lend the British and the French a lot more money, because they were both about to go bankrupt.

The President said that after all, the British were not saying that they were going to reduce their own defensive forces; they are merely getting weary of what we ourselves are doing in Western Europe— that is, maintaining large forces on the continent.

Governor Stassen expressed the opinion that, earlier, the National Security Council had been too gloomy in its prognostications of what was going to happen to Western Europe. At the moment, however, he feared that the Council was too optimistic. After all, the common market is not yet realized. While he too was basically optimistic on Western Europe’s prospects over the long haul, there were many hard problems facing Western Europe in the immediate future. The President said this all might be so, but the United States cannot take the whole world on its shoulders and nurse these nations. They must learn to help themselves.

Secretary Humphrey predicted that the less we did for Western Europe, the faster they would move in the direction of greater strength and unity. This had been proved only recently in the matter of the EDC. The European Defense Community had failed largely because of the stand-offish attitude of Britain. This attitude had now completely changed. The British now want a free trade area in Europe, of which the British would be a part. We must, of course, watch our step so as not ourselves to get sucked into such an area. The President said he would rather lend what was needed to a united Western Europe than anything we had done up to now to assist our Western European allies individually.

Governor Stassen again warned of undue optimism on the speed of the integration of Western Europe. The President, however, said that Prime Minister Mollet had informed him that the European common market would be a fact by next September, and that Ollenhauer had been equally optimistic. If this proved wrong and the integration didn’t happen, the President predicted that the Western European nations would perish in spite of anything the United States could do to help them. Governor Stassen agreed that the integration would occur, but that it would take five years to become a fact. The President replied that there had been a greater awareness and realization among the Western European powers of their own situation in recent months. This was a most desirable development.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that when he had spoken privately with Macmillan in Paris last December about the Suez situation,[11] Macmillan had said that Britain’s worst miscalculation was its miscalculation about the power of the United Nations. From this, said Secretary Dulles, one could deduce that Anglo-French moral weakness was really more significant than Anglo-French military weakness. The Anglo-French debacle at Suez did not so much expose military as moral weakness.

The President stated parenthetically that he was absolutely convinced that the Israelis had jumped the gun on the British and French.

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to the third major problem identified by the Planning Board in NSC 5707. He read the statement of the problem and the consequences as follows:

“DECLINE IN THE SOVIET POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE

“The Problem:

“While the economic and military strength of the USSR itself continues to grow, the Soviet power position in Eastern Europe, including the reliability of the satellite armed forces, has been weakened and its ideological claims have been damaged by Soviet repression in Hungary.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

“a. Soviet Position. Eastern European ferment increases both opportunities for Free World encouragement of evolutionary change and dangers from Soviet hypersensitivity to Western actions which the Kremlin considers threatening to its security interests in this area.

“b. Satellite Change. U.S. political and economic policy can strengthen forces and trends favoring orderly and gradual satellite developments toward independence. Limited economic assistance and cultural exchanges, on a selective basis, will have increasing importance, as will our broad political posture.

“c. Prospects of Violence. So long as the USSR attempts to dominate Eastern Europe, there will be a danger of further outbreaks of violence. Any significant resort to force inside the area could spread beyond control and eventually involve the United States, even if it decided at the time to refrain from military intervention. The USSR is unlikely to withdraw, in whole or in part, from the area without what it would consider a commensurate retraction of Western power.”

The President expressed the opinion that while the word “including” in the third line of the statement of the problem was probably correct, he felt that the term “particularly” would be an improvement.

Because time was running out, Mr. Cutler asked the Council to turn to the fourth problem, namely, the rising position of Communist China. He again read the statement of the problem and the consequence for U.S. security, as follows:

“The Problem:

“Communist China continues its economic and military growth. It is increasingly treated as a great power in the international community, passing its potential local rivals for leadership in the Far East and exerting greater influence in the Communist bloc.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

“a. Implications for Free Asia. Non-Communist Asians are increasingly sensitive to Peiping’s preponderant military power and rapid economic growth. Neither of its potential rivals, India or Japan, exerts a successful counter-influence in the area. Elsewhere, most of the other Free Asian states, including India, have been unable to match its rapid economic development.

“b. Acceptance. Present trends will require increasing effort and resources in order for the United States to prevent Communist China from being admitted to the UN and recognized by additional Governments, and could ultimately jeopardize the continuation of an independent Taiwan unless protected by an acceptable general settlement.

“c. Sino-Soviet Relations. The increasing role of Communist China in the affairs of the bloc could create opportunities for the United States to exert divisive pressures on Sino-Soviet relations.”

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the statement of the problem and the consequences did not represent the view of any department of the Executive Branch, but only of himself and the members of the Planning Board. He thereafter inquired whether there were any views as to the increasing strength of Communist China and the difficulties that this increasing strength would pose in the future for the United States.

Secretary Dulles replied that he disagreed more strongly with this portion of NSC 5707 than with any other part of the report. It seemed to him that the statement on the rising position of Communist China fully accepted the view that Communist China represented the wave of the future for Asia and that we must accommodate ourselves to this alleged fact. Such views as to the wave of the future prevailed not so very long ago with respect to the Soviet Union in Europe, but certain things had happened, and happened quite recently, to make the situation appear quite otherwise. These same people now feel that the wave of the future is with the Free World countries and not the Communist powers. Everywhere in the world the local Communist Parties have weakened, their discipline gone and their loyalty to Moscow seriously impaired. Indeed, Communist weakness generally had been so exposed that the Communist regimes could no longer even be sure of the loyalty of their own younger generations, who had been brought up with knowledge of nothing but Communist regimes. Thus Communism is not the wave of the future, but is rather a receding wave.

Secretary Dulles further predicted that developments would in the future come in Communist China which would just as effectively prove that Communism was not the wave of the future in Europe. Therefore, Secretary Dulles thought that there was no point whatsoever in the argument that we must make some kind of a bargain with Communist China in order to save Taiwan—for example, admitting Communist China into the United Nations. In the future—perhaps in one year, two years, five years—Communist China will be on the defensive. There is no need for the United States or the Free World, therefore, to accommodate to the Communist Chinese and give them what they want—the view which seems to be implicit in this section of NSC 5707. Indeed, NSC 5707 might be described as a rather dangerous paper. The Secretary said he had been informed that the Filipino Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had informed his Government that the “policy planning board” had now come to believe that the United States would be obliged to recognize Communist China. The Filipino official was, of course, disturbed and dismayed at this report.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that nowhere did NSC 5707 say anything about recognizing Communist China. Secretary Dulles answered that the paper certainly implied such recognition by the United States. Mr. Cutler said that obviously, then, Secretary Dulles did not agree with position taken by the Planning Board in this section of NSC 5707.

The President immediately returned to the presumed leak of information about the contents of NSC 5707. He pointed out that if this report had been carefully held in the Planning Board, and none of the members of the Council had seen it until today or very recently, how did this Filipino official see the paper? He said that it made him feel almost as though he ought to abolish all meetings, all conferences, and all reports.

Mr. Cutler commented that if the Planning Board was stopped from discussing all alternatives to existing policy, he was unable to see how it could continue to perform its business. The President replied that he did not quarrel in the least with the alternatives and policies discussed in the Planning Board. The real problem was how the contents of this paper had leaked. These leaks were altogether frightening. Mr. Cutler then stated that he knew our policy on Communist China was a sacred cow, and that he himself was personally responsible for raising this issue in NSC 5707. To this, the President replied that he had no objections to raising the issue, but he wanted these issues kept strictly within the limits of the Planning Board and the Council. Secretary Dulles then expressed doubt whether this paper itself had leaked out. The fact of the matter was that the Filipino official had got hold of an idea which was set forth in the paper.

The President went on to say that the Planning Board had the right to discuss anything that it felt it should discuss in an NSC paper, including the desirability of the assassination of the President; but whatever it discussed, the contents of the discussion must be kept secret. Mr. Cutler stated his view that leaks in this Government came from people whose ox was being gored, and he very much doubted that any disclosure could be traced to a member of the Planning Board. But in any event, he gathered from the discussion of this item that the Planning Board statement on the problem of the rising position of Communist China was not acceptable to the Council. He added, turning in the direction of Mr. Allen Dulles, that the views expressed by the Council on this matter seemed very different from those which were found in the National Intelligence Estimate.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the State Department intelligence people had concurred in the reference National Intelligence Estimate, and Mr. Cutler proceeded to read the statements in the NIE concerning Communist China and Taiwan.

Secretary Dulles said that the course of action which would most certainly undermine the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan and lose the island to the Communists, would be a general settlement between the United States and Communist China. The President said that he agreed with this statement of Secretary Dulles.

Mr. Cutler then directed the Council to the statement of the fifth problem, on the rise of nationalism, which read as follows:

“The Problem:

“The sharply accelerated growth of nationalism and anti-colonialism in Asia and Africa increases both aspirations for a better life and the risk of local conflicts between these newly emerging states.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

“a. Local Conflict While generally wishing to follow a policy of non-alignment, these countries will seek political support and military aid from the United States or the USSR in their disputes with each other. In the Middle East, particularly, this process could become cumulative—even to the point of hostilities involving the United States and the USSR.

“b. Economic Development If aspirations for economic development are frustrated, the likelihood will be increased that extremist elements will come into power. Capabilities in Asia and Africa for economic development vary widely; in some countries the principal problem is lack of administrative and technical skills; in others, additional resources are the major need.

“c. Base Arrangements. In the Asian-African area, as well as throughout the rest of the world, the retention of U.S. bases has been complicated by the rise of nationalism and lessened concern over Soviet aggression, and by pressures for additional economic aid and military assistance.”

Mr. Cutler expressed the view that there was not much need to discuss this problem at length, but that he would very much desire the views of the Secretary of State on the sixth problem, namely, the increasing role of the United Nations. He read the statement of the problem and the consequences for U.S. security, as follows:

“The Problem:

“The UN General Assembly’s involvement in world problems is increasing. The UN’s considerable prestige makes it a useful instrument not only for preventing or localizing small-power conflicts but also for gaining world support for U.S. policies. However, its membership today includes many countries which do not have the direct interest or ability to act in a responsible way.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

“a. Voting Procedures. The growing influence in the UN of nationalist-neutralist forces, as well as the unwillingness of the USSR to abide by certain UN decisions, may lead at times to UN action or inaction contrary to U.S. interests. This may require a re-examination of U.S. attitudes toward the UN.

“b. Decreased U.S. Reliance. Decreased support of the UN by the United States would, however, undermine the UN’s prestige and its usefulness as a means of settling or limiting international disputes and indirectly damage U.S. prestige.

Mr. Cutler then added some explanatory remarks about the discussion of the problem in the Planning Board.

Secretary Dulles said that, of course, there was a certain risk involved in the increased use of the United Nations, but it was not a very great risk. He recalled that at the very beginning of the UN, at the San Francisco meeting, he had forecast a time when the UN could be conceivably dominated by influence hostile to the United States. This prediction had been made in connection with discussions of the right of withdrawal from the UN. Nevertheless, he went on, U.S. influence in the UN is today greater than it has ever been before, despite the recent admission of a number of Soviet bloc countries. Even in Western Europe the attitude toward the United Nations is improving again. The recent debates on Algeria and Cyprus resulted in unanimous resolutions which pleased everybody. Secretary Dulles said he still believed that the UN is so constituted that if we have a sound defensible position, that position will not be overridden by the pro-Soviet bloc. On the whole, UN developments were encouraging if they were properly used. Of course, the voting procedure is bad and we should probably have some system of weighted voting, as he had once recommended. There should also have been a Charter review, but we were unable to get a review of the UN Charter because this objective was blocked by the very countries who are now squawking loudest about the voting procedures in the United Nations. An example of this is M. Spaak and his article on the UN in the January issue of Foreign Affairs. [12]

Governor Stassen inquired whether Secretary Dulles would not agree that the voting procedure in the United Nations is, theoretically at least, a risk to the United States. There was always the possibility of a number of little countries banding together.

Mr. Cutler said there was only time for a mention of the seventh and final problem, Continuing Budgetary Strains; but since this problem would be developed more fully at the next meeting of the Council on the subject of basic national security policy, it would be enough simply to read through the statement of this problem, which Mr. Cutler proceeded to do, as follows:

“Projections of the budget through FY 1961 demonstrate that the United States faces the prospect of continuing budgetary strains, and possibly the return of substantial deficits. Taking the most optimistic assumption of uninterrupted U.S. economic growth at a rate of $16 billion per year, presently approved programs would result in expenditures rising at least as rapidly as revenues through FY 1960 at present tax rates. On the assumption, which Treasury and Budget consider more realistic for planning purposes, that economic growth over this period is interrupted at some time by an adjustment at least as large as that in 1954, expenditures for present programs would result in sizable deficits.

“Assuming such an adjustment, a tax reduction of $6 billion, less than in 1954, would increase the budget gap to nearly $10 billion unless programs are cut. It is quite possible that Congress may in any event impose a tax reduction during this period.”

Mr. Cutler also briefly described the Annex to NSC 5707, which dealt with economic considerations and the budgetary and fiscal outlook for the next few years.

With respect to this problem and Mr. Cutler’s comments on it, the President stated that he was terribly interested in finding ways and means by which we can reduce or eliminate some of our programs. We have got to find ways and means of doing this. It was not so much a matter of the present costs of these programs, but the increasing costs of their upkeep. The President also expressed some doubt about the view that a tax cut would surely mean a loss of revenue to the Government. Under certain circumstances, a tax cut could actually result in an increase in the receipts of the Government rather than a decrease.

The National Security Council:[13]

a. Noted the comments of the Director of Central Intelligence on the highlights of the most recent “Estimate of the World Situation” (NIE 100–3–57, dated January 29, 1957).

b. Noted and discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 5707).

c. Agreed that, in its current Review of Basic National Security Policy, the NSC Planning Board should proceed along the lines set forth in the reference memorandum of February 19, 1957, as further developed by Mr. Cutler at this meeting.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on March 1.

[2] NSC 5602/1 is printed as Document 66. NIE 100–3–57 was not declassified. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) NSC 5707, “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Basic Problems for U.S. Security Arising Out of Changes in the World Situation,” dated February 19, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda) The February 19 memorandum is not printed. (Ibid.)

[3] Neither the briefing note nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[4] The Annex is attached to NSC 5707 in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda.

[5] One Member emphasizes the possibility that the Soviets might gamble on surprise attack if they believed they could effectively knock out U.S. retaliatory capacity. [Footnote in the source text.]

[6] Some Members wish to insert the following at this point:

The public confidence may be shaken if it comes to believe (1) that U.S. military power, which is increasingly being organized around the use of nuclear capabilities, is probably canceled out by powerful Soviet offensive nuclear capabilities and defense capabilities; (2) that U.S. nuclear capabilities are probably not usable to counter Soviet actions in various parts of the world which threaten U.S. interests; (3) that U.S. non-military defenses cannot secure U.S. survival as an effective community against the now known dangers of widespread fall-out in addition to other nuclear devastation. [Footnote in the source text.]

[7] Some members believe the following subparagraph should be included at this point:

Internal Security. The likelihood is increasing that the Soviets will place greater reliance upon covert activities against the Free World in general and on subversive activities directed against underdeveloped areas in particular. [Footnote in the source text.]

[8] Footnotes 6 and 7 above.

[9] A memorandum of conversation between the President and Erich Ollenhauer, leader of the West German Social Democratic Party, on February 28 is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.

[10] Guy Mollet, Prime Minister of France, visited the United States February 26-28.

[11] Not further identified. Regarding conversations between Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and Dulles at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings in Paris, December 11–14, 1956, see vol. XVI, pp. 1278 ff .

[12] Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “The West in Disarray,” Foreign Affairs, vol. XXXV, January 1957, pp. 184–190.

[13] Paragraphs a–c that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1675, approved by the President on March 1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

111. Special National Intelligence Estimate[1]

Washington, March 19, 1957.

SNIE 100–5–57

PROBABLE WORLD REACTION TO CERTAIN CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

The Problem

To estimate the world reaction to a major US shelter program phased over an eight-year period and costing about $32 billion.

Assumptions

1. The US Government would develop a strong information program that would justify a national effort of this magnitude. In particular, it would:

a. give intensive and extended publicity to the implications of nuclear warfare for human survival; and

b. make clear that there is sufficient risk of nuclear war to warrant the program.

2. At the same time, the US Government would make strong efforts to prevent undue misunderstanding or alarm, and particularly to minimize adverse reaction abroad by assurances that the program did not indicate any significant change in US foreign, defense, or aid policies, or any change in the US view of the likelihood of war.

The Estimate

1. General Reactions. World reaction to the postulated program would depend to a considerable degree upon the world situation existing at the time the program was subjected to Congressional and public consideration and upon the nature of the public debate which took place. The entire subject of nuclear warfare is technically complex and emotionally charged; the debate would be reported throughout the world, and many of the reports and discussions would be over-dramatized and distorted, in some cases deliberately. The US program would be quickly and vigorously exploited by Communist and anti-American propaganda.

2. Reactions would vary considerably throughout the world. Of all countries, Japan is most sensitive to developments respecting nuclear weapons, and would be most alarmed by initiation of the US program and by the publicity which would almost certainly accompany it. The peoples of Western Europe, conscious as they are of involvement in the East-West struggle and aware to a considerable degree of the nuclear threat, would also be greatly concerned. On the other hand, countries such as those in the Southern Hemisphere, far removed from the probable areas of nuclear warfare, would be far less interested. Other nations in which the population is only dimly conscious of the implications of nuclear weapons would also be largely unaffected. The following paragraphs, insofar as they describe reactions in a general way, must therefore be read with these distinctions in mind.

3. Reactions would also vary over time. As described below, we believe that the initial impact of the shelter program would be great throughout many areas of the world. With each annual congressional presentation there would be some revival of the matter. Nevertheless once the program was established and its implications understood and digested, it would tend to recede into the background of interest. Moreover, it is to be expected that during the next eight years many disclosures of the nature of nuclear warfare will be made, and many developments will affect popular ideas of the likelihood of general war. Thus some of the reactions described below might occur in any case, though in a different context from that indicated by the proposed program.

4. Reaction among the Major US Allies. The initial presentation of a program of this nature and magnitude, however qualified by the Administration, would almost certainly generate a good deal of alarm and confusion among the general public in allied countries. Some influential groups would interpret the program as indicating that the US had lost faith in its alliances, intended to cut its commitments, and was preparing to retire into “Fortress America.” Others, particularly those inclined to anti-Americanism, would allege that the US, despite its protestations of peace, had concluded that a showdown with the USSR was unavoidable. Many would demand that their own governments undertake a corresponding program. There would probably be demands for more progress on disarmament and possibly for immediately outlawing nuclear weapons. Extremists would claim that the US shelter program furnished evidence for the contentions they had long been arguing: that US bases should not be allowed on their national territory, that NATO was a failure, that governments allied to the US should renounce the alliance and make the best terms possible with the USSR.

5. Some of these views would initially be held to greater or less degree in all allied governments, who would ask themselves why the US should allocate to shelters such substantial additional resources, which could have been used for other defense purposes. They would fear that the shelter program might be part of a broader decision for American withdrawal, and that the US had lost some of its confidence that general war could be prevented through the deterrent power of its force in being. They would express these concerns to the US Government. However, if the US gives the assurances described in Assumption 2, we do not believe that they would be stampeded by these anxieties or by initial popular reaction. While elements of doubt would certainly persist and lead them to scrutinize other American actions with unusual care, governments, as well as influential elements of the public, would probably come to recognize that the shelter program, taken by itself, was a defensive measure and did not necessarily indicate any basic change in US foreign policy or substantially affect the likelihood of general war. However, they would be exposed to strong popular demands for shelter programs in their own countries. They would be likely to request US aid for carrying out such programs, and if aid were not forthcoming, they might divert resources from other defense expenditures for use on shelters, with resulting jeopardy to the NATO defense effort and its political unity.

6. The program would probably have an effect on NATO relationships, particularly if it were initiated at a time when there were unusually difficult and divisive issues before the community. In such circumstances, the announcement of the shelter program would tend to intensify already existing difficulties.

7. As time went on, the initial popular reactions would almost certainly diminish, and the more emotional manifestations would tend to disappear. Some people might find reassurance in considering that if the US thought such a shelter program worthwhile, then the possibilities of survival in nuclear war might not be as dark as they had previously supposed. Some might even estimate that the US overall military position had been strengthened. Any initial feeling that the program made the US free to pursue a more risky policy would give way to a realization that even the completion of the program would still leave the US exposed to vast destruction and danger, and would not put it in any position to engage in provocative actions against the USSR. Despite this tendency to see the program in a normal light, it must be recognized that the USSR and the Communists generally, as well as other anti-American elements, would continue to make capital of the subject in their propaganda.

8. If, despite the assurances given by the US Government, the implementation of the shelter program were accompanied by significant reductions in US foreign economic and security programs or commitments, allied reaction would be substantially more serious. In these circumstances the program would generally be viewed as fore-shadowing a substantial US withdrawal. Strong impetus would then be given to third-force and neutralist tendencies in Europe, to reconsideration of existing treaty commitments to the US, and to accommodation by some countries with the USSR. As a result of these general tendencies, US base arrangements might be jeopardized, allied defense expenditures reduced, and the US diplomatic position seriously impaired.

9. Reaction in Neutral Countries. Among the neutrals, particularly outside Europe, a US decision to implement a shelter program would almost certainly reinforce the desire to remain neutral. In India, for example, such a decision would provide a strong argument for justifying the role India has been playing. Among the more sophisticated of the underdeveloped countries, and particularly those which have hoped for US aid in development, there would be fear that a shelter program of the projected magnitude would in effect preclude the kind and scale of US economic aid for which they had hoped. In the larger number of countries which are uncommitted and outside the main stream of international politics, there would almost certainly be a reinforced desire to remain uncommitted; they would feel that it had become even more desirable to keep out of the quarrels of the great powers.

10. Soviet Reaction. The Soviet leaders would vigorously exploit a US shelter program in their continuing propaganda theme that the US was preparing for a new war, and they would utilize it in connection with other themes directed towards US allies as well as in neutral states.

11. Initiation of a US shelter program would not in itself lead the Soviet leaders to conclude that the US now believed war to be inevitable, nor would it be a critical factor in their estimate of US intentions. They might believe that a completed US shelter program would somewhat reduce the deterrents upon US action which are now exerted by Soviet capabilities. Thus, the inauguration of a shelter program would help to keep alive their anxieties over US intentions, and they might become particularly concerned if other US military expenditures or military preparations were to have a simultaneous and rapid increase. Even in this case, they would not rely solely upon these moves as indicators of US intentions, but would weigh all the factors in the US military and political posture and in its world position.

[Appendix (½ page of source text) not declassified]

[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, on March 19. The Assistant Director, FBI, abstained since the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

112. Memorandum of Discussion at the 317th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 28, 1957[1]

Washington, March 28, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Review of Basic National Security Policy: U.S. National Strategy (NSC 5602/1;NIE 100–3–57; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC 5707;NSC Action No. 1675; NSC 5707/1)[2]

Mr. Cutler commenced his briefing, pausing to explain the difference of view which had arisen in the Planning Board with regard to the statement of the basic threat to U.S. security in paragraph 1 of NSC 5707/1, reading as follows:

“1. The basic threat to U.S. security is presented by the combination of:

“a. The continuing hostility of the USSR and Communist China and their growing military and economic power;

“b. The unrestricted development of nuclear weapons systems; and

“c. Weakness or instability in critical areas where there is strong pressure for economic or political change.

“Some members believe that the basic threat is expressed in paragraph 1–a; that the development of nuclear weapons systems would not constitute a basic threat were it not for the continuing hostility of the Sino-Soviet bloc; and that the weakness or instability in critical areas, while posing serious problems to the United States, does not constitute a basic threat to U.S. security.”

The President said that personally he found himself in a position half-way between the two sides. Certainly, he said, the fundamental threat to the United States was constituted by the continuing hostility of the USSR and Communist China. However, this fundamental threat was intensified by the considerations in subparagraphs b and c. Secretary Dulles expressed his agreement with the President’s position. He added that hostility to the United States from a militarily impotent nation was a matter of no anxiety. Moreover, if a friendly country developed nuclear capabilities, that wouldn’t worry him very much either. The President ended the discussion by complaining that there was danger that we would be picking nits with boxing gloves; let the text stand as written.

Mr. Cutler continued his briefing (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting),[3] and apologized for NSC 5707/1 as not being in form or content likely to be very provocative and as calling essentially for a continuation of existing national strategy. He then asked the Secretary of State if he had any views on NSC 5707/1.

Secretary Dulles said he thought the paper was excellent, and that a great deal of information had been compressed into a small space. However, said the Secretary, he was not quite clear on the meaning of paragraph 8.

This paragraph reads as follows:

“8. Disengaging from overseas involvement: This strategy would:

“a. Curtail U.S. overseas influence and decrease the visible deterrent.

“b. Surrender the initiative.

“c. Permit concentration of resources in continental defense and retaliatory capability.

“d. Permit the reduction of overseas deployments and bases.”

In response to Secretary Dulles, both the President and Mr. Cutler pointed out that paragraph 8 seemed to call essentially for a “Fortress America” strategy. Still not satisfied, Secretary Dulles inquired whether paragraph 8 actually recommended that we renounce our treaties—such as NATO and SEATO—and otherwise abandon the Free World and our security commitments overseas. Or, on the other hand, was it merely a question of the location of our armed forces? Secretary Dulles went on to say that you could make a very good argument that you did not actually need to station U.S. armed forces in countries covered by SEATO.

The President commented that, as far as he could see, to carry out the alternative in paragraph 8 meant that the United States abandoned everything that it had believed in, and withdrew to the continental United States. Secretary Dulles pointed out that it would be perfectly possible to carry out the courses of action in subparagraphs 8–c and 8–d without abandoning our security commitments to our allies overseas. Indeed, you could carry out these two courses of action under existing national security policy without impairing our worldwide security and political commitments. The President paraphrased Secretary Dulles’ words by stating that the Secretary meant that we could be just as deeply involved morally in Europe as ever, even though meanwhile we had redeployed our forces from Europe to the continental United States.

Mr. Cutler inquired of Secretary Dulles whether he was recommending serious consideration of the courses of action set forth in subparagraphs 8–c and 8–d. Was the Secretary considering the possibility of bringing more of our military personnel back home? Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative, and the President agreed that this course of action was a good idea when we were in a position to carry it out. He added that a great many of our forces stationed abroad were deployed for political as well as for military reasons.

Secretary Wilson said he had a somewhat different slant on the national strategy problem, and one that was rather hard to express. He wondered if we could state a position along these lines: The United States should make every effort to find a common ground with the Soviet Union, which common ground would be mutually advantageous, “in order to take some of the heat off the world.” In other words, we should not just try to negotiate with the Soviet Union in order to secure advantages for ourselves, but instead try to achieve objectives in negotiation which would be advantageous both to the United States and the USSR.

Mr. Cutler reassured Secretary Wilson that the Planning Board had his point in mind, and that the forthcoming discussion paper on Political Issues would contain an exposition of this point.

The National Security Council:[4]

Noted and discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 5707/1) as guidance to the NSC Planning Board in its review of basic national security policy.

2. Review of Basic National Security Policy: National Security Costs in Relation to Total National Resources (NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC 5707;NSC Action No. 1675; NSC 5707/1; NSC 5707/2)[5]

Mr. Cutler briefed the National Security Council in very great detail with respect to the contents of NSC 5707/2, and also, in the course of his briefing, covered the series of charts and tables which had been transmitted to the Council in connection with the discussion of NSC 5707/2. (Copies of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note and of the charts and tables[6] are filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At one point in Mr. Cutler’s briefing, the President interrupted to point out, in connection with Chart No. 2 (entitled “Summary of Budget Expenditures by Function,FY 1950–FY 1958”), that in case any members of the Council were looking back with nostalgia to the low levels of defense expenditure just prior to the Korean war, these people should be aware that one of the reasons why the defense expenditures are so high now is because they were so low in the period 1949 and 1950.

When Mr. Cutler had finished his lengthy briefing, he called upon the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.[7]

Mr. Saulnier proceeded to speak in connection with Charts 7 and 8, entitled “Gross National Product in 4th Quarter 1956 Prices”. He said he would concentrate on the two models set forth in NSC 5707/2 with respect to the two assumptions underlying projections of the budget through Fiscal Year 1961. The objective here was to try to see what lies ahead. Accordingly, Mr. Saulnier explained, with reference to the chart, developments in the event of an uninterrupted growth in the gross national product through FY 1961, and what the situation would look like if allowance were made for an interruption of economic growth beginning in mid-1958 of about the severity of the 1953–54 recession.

In the context of the implications of these projections, Mr. Saulnier pointed out that he hadn’t tried any other models than the two set forth on the chart in paragraph 4 of NSC 5707/2, for one very good reason. What was the point of charting a more serious recession or depression, in view of the fact that the budget outlook is grim enough even under the assumption of the uninterrupted growth of GNP through FY 1961?

Mr. Saulnier recapitulated the budgetary outlook as follows: There was no substantial outlook for improvement in the balance of receipts and expenditures, even assuming uninterrupted growth of the economy.

Mr. Saulnier concluded with remarks directed to paragraph 6 of NSC 5707/2. He said that with respect to the vitality of our economy being enhanced by a tax reduction, he believed that while our economy was carrying today a very heavy load of taxation, the economy was able to bear this burden and, indeed, could carry an even heavier burden if we were willing to a make the sacrifices which would be entailed. This was not to say, he cautioned, that the American economy would not be greatly stimulated if the tax burden could be reduced. It was for this reason that, in the Planning Board discussion of the problem, he had lined up on the side of those in the Planning Board who sponsored alternative 6–a. The case for tax reduction, continued Mr. Saulnier, could be stated in brief as follows: Greater incentives, the release of funds for financing the expansion of the economy, and improvement in our present tax structure, which has many inequitable and awkward features. The best way to eliminate such inequities would be through a tax reduction rather than by efforts to tinker with the existing tax structure.

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Humphrey for an expression of opinion on NSC 5707/2 and the charts which had accompanied it.

Secretary Humphrey replied that he thought that all these figures were interesting as an exercise. Nevertheless, they were much more of an exercise than they were a guide to action. He explained that he believed this to be the case because initially what we were trying to do here at this meeting on this problem was to correlate two unknown quantities, the first of which was the magnitude and character of the Soviet threat to the United States. This threat was constantly changing, as were the methods of the United States in attempting to meet the threat. For example, a few years ago the National Security Council had adopted a policy (the new look) which called for a substantial reduction in the level of our armed forces and a substantial redeployment of U.S. forces abroad back to the United States. But nothing had ever really been done to carry out this new look policy.

Secretary Wilson interposed to object and to point out what had been accomplished by the Department of Defense in implementing the so-called new look policy.

Secretary Humphrey then went on to describe the other unknown quantity. No one, he said, could really tell you precisely what the American economy can stand in the way of expenditures over a long-run period. He agreed that we could raise taxes if an actual emergency required this course of action. He could not prove that our present tax levels are now so high as to be certain to harm the American economy if these levels are maintained over a number of years. Nevertheless, he believed this as an article of faith.

Quite apart from all this, Secretary Humphrey insisted that we must take account of the practicalities of the situation. Short of a greatly increased and more obvious threat of war, it was going to be almost impossible for the Administration to avoid a tax reduction over the next couple of years. Domestic politics makes this almost certain. Indeed, only yesterday, on the floor of the Senate, a tax reduction had almost been voted. The reduction had been avoided yesterday, but we are certain to get a tax cut in the United States in the near future unless there is another real war scare.

Secretary Humphrey also warned the Council that if we go back to deficit spending the result would be to impair popular confidence in the Government and turn any mild recession into something a good deal worse. Thus, in summary, none of the sets of figures in NSC 5707/2 and its accompanying charts really proved anything, although we can certainly discern a trend. In the light of the circumstances, the only safe course for the Administration to pursue is to reduce both taxes and expenditures.

Mr. Cutler then invited the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to comment on Annex C to NSC 5707/2, which consisted of projected increases in total Federal expenditures from FY 1958 through FY 1961 which would result if present policies and programs were maintained but no new programs were added. Mr. Cutler commented that the large increase in projected expenditures to carry on existing approved programs had probably been the most startling information coming to the Planning Board in the course of their study of these issues.

Mr. Brundage replied that the budget projections were not “extremes”, but simply forecasts of increasing expenditures under existing approved programs. Since the situation envisaged was so serious, Mr. Brundage expressed the hope that the National Security Council would take action at this meeting to correct the situation. He went on to say that, regardless of the various individual policy directives, the Bureau of the Budget was anxious for each department and agency to come up with budget projections for the next several years which would keep expenditures at a level not higher than the level of FY 1957 or FY 1958. Mr. Brundage admitted that this would be hard for the departments and agencies to do, but said that it would be extremely helpful in achieving a consistent budget policy throughout all the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.

Secretary Dulles pointed out at once that NSC 5707/2 was a discussion paper only, and not a per [paper] which called for Council action at the present time. Secretary Dulles also noted that there had been an abundance of non-security expenditures figures in NSC 5707/2 and its accompanying charts. The National Security Council should concern itself with these non-security expenditures as well as with expenditures for major national security programs.

Mr. Brundage replied that he had already asked the departments and agencies responsible for other than our security programs to make the budget projections which he had mentioned. He was now asking the departments and agencies responsible for our national security programs to follow suit.

Secretary Wilson said he agreed with Secretary Humphrey that we were certainly skating on very thin financial ice at the present time. On the other hand, he couldn’t quite bring himself to agree with the idea that we must project present levels of national security expenditures forever into the future.

Secretary Humphrey expressed the opinion that if one looked carefully at the figures showing the yearly increase in gross national product from 1939 to the present, one would find that the increase was almost exactly in relation to the depreciation in the value of the dollar during this same period. Mr. Brundage disagreed, and said that perhaps 50% of the increase in GNP would be accounted for by the depreciation in the value of the dollar. Mr. Saulnier also argued that there had been at least a modest increase in real GNP. Secretary Dulles expressed skepticism that the figures set forth in the paper and in the charts proved that a high level of taxation necessarily deprived the economy of a healthy growth. In certain years the economy seemed to grow most rapidly when taxes were heaviest.

Secretary Wilson thought that the big problem was how to stabilize the American economy in order to avoid either inflation or deflation. He then proceeded to defend the size of the Defense Department budget for Fiscal Year 1958. In accordance with the President’s wishes, Secretary Wilson said, he had tried to keep projected expenditures down to the absolute safe minimum. He had even slashed over a billion dollars from the budget at the last minute. Thereafter, he was suddenly confronted with increased wages for civilian employees of the Defense Department. In addition, there were steady price rises, particularly in steel. This was followed by the Hungary and the Israeli-Egyptian outbreak. Under the circumstances, he had done the best he could.

The President suggested that Secretary Wilson was getting off the question. The question, said the President, is whether expenditures for a machine tool are more useful than expenditures for a tank, so far as a healthy American economy is concerned. Certainly we in this Administration have done our utmost to keep expenditures down. We now feel a certain sense of defeat. Yet no one had ever really suggested to the President any program that he would willingly abandon—schools, medical services, national security, or anything else. Accordingly, the President concluded that the objectives suggested by Mr. Brundage were, for the present, the most we could hope for.

Secretary Wilson said he certainly did not wish to quarrel with his good friend Secretary Humphrey, but he did feel rather defensive about the Defense Department budget. Nevertheless, neither he nor Admiral Radford could see how in the future we could afford to carry out presently-approved Department of Defense programs if we were to follow Mr. Brundage’s suggestion that expenditures through 1960 be maintained at levels no higher than obtained in FY 1957. If this level were to be maintained, we should have to cut or eliminate presently-approved programs.

In reply, Secretary Humphrey said that of course he was not criticizing any single individual. On the other hand, we as a group must realize that we have got to stand for the interests of all the American people against vocal pressure groups of all kinds. These vocal groups, which began in the Roosevelt Administrations, made demands both in the military and the non-military fields and thus pushed expenditures upward.

The President reminded Secretary Humphrey that no Administration programs had been sent to the Congress without the President’s own explicit approval. In many instances he had given his approval to an Administration program simply in order to head off a worse program which would have been formulated by the Congress itself. The President went on to comment about the unhappy situation with respect to the severe Congressional cut in the budget of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. In view of what Congress had done to this comparatively modest program, the President invited the members of the Council to imagine what would happen if an atomic bomb were dropped on Kansas City. Indignation would be furious and bitter because the Government had not adequately protected the civilian population.

The Vice President pointed out that the effect of the present economy drive in Congress was unlikely to mean in the long run a very substantial budget cut—certainly not over $1 billion. Nevertheless, this economy drive would serve to put a brake on enlarged future programs. Accordingly, if we could achieve the objective mentioned earlier by Mr. Brundage, of placing a ceiling on future expenditures, there would be great advantages.

Secretary Humphrey stated that there were two things which the National Security Council should clearly realize before it left this subject. The first was how do we and other nations keep working toward the objective of living together in this world without transforming the world into an armed camp? Secondly, how can we make genuine progress toward disarmament so that the costs of armaments can properly be less? The President commented that we still have not exploited trade as much as we might in finding an answer to the first of Secretary Humphrey’s questions.

Before the discussion ended, the Vice President said he wished to underline one more point. The darkest aspect of the present economy drive in Congress is Congressional insistence on cutting the budget for foreign assistance and for informational and cultural exchange. These, said the Vice President, are the fields for which expenditures should be increased rather than cut.

The National Security Council:[8]

Noted and discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 5707/2) as guidance to the NSC Planning Board in its review of basic national security policy.

[Here follows agenda item 3, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

4. Ballistic Missiles Programs (NSC Actions Nos. 1433–a, 1484, 1615–c and 1653)[9]

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the reference problem (copy of briefing note [10] filed in the minutes of the meeting). He then called on Secretary Quarles to make his report to the Council.

Using the same charts which the President had seen in Bermuda,[11] Secretary Quarles first discussed the Thor (IRBM) program. He indicated the timing and the quantities of missiles which would be involved if Thor were finally chosen as the intermediate range missile. He explained that missiles which would be produced under this program for inventory and actual use would be “peeled off” from the missiles produced for testing. The missiles for inventory would provide nothing more than an initial operating capability. There was an admitted risk, said Secretary Quarles, in the beginning to place into the inventory weapons like the Thor before they were completely tested out, but this was a matter of saving time. The totality of the present program for obtaining an initial operational capability for the IRBM consisted of four squadrons, each squadron containing fifteen weapons.

The President indicated that he clearly understood the program which had been described by Secretary Quarles, who then went on to discuss in a similar fashion the two ICBM programs—the Atlas and the Titan. The initial operational capability for the ICBM was eight squadrons, with ten missiles in each squadron.

Secretary Wilson interrupted to point out the great difficulty at present of trying to decide between the Atlas and the Titan missiles, and why for the present the Defense Department was developing programs for both these missiles.

The President called for a report from the Department of Defense which would assume reasonable success in both the long-range and the short-range ballistic missile programs. Under this assumption the President asked that a report be prepared which would set forth the military advantages, as opposed to the psychological advantages, which would derive from having these missiles in place of the manned aircraft which would exist at the same time.

Secretary Humphrey said he supposed the President was aiming at what we would feel safe in cutting out if the missile programs proved a success.

Mr. Cutler then invited Secretary Quarles to read to the National Security Council his recommendations for Council action, which Secretary Quarles proceeded to do. The President expressed approval of Secretary Quarles’ recommendations, but directed an addition to these recommendations which would state clearly that if any changes were deemed necessary in the currently-approved program, such changes must be brought back to the National Security Council for consideration prior to being put into effect.

The National Security Council:[12]

a. Noted and discussed a briefing by the Secretary of the Air Force on the status of the current plans of the Department of Defense for the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), supplementing the second annual briefing on the subject at the 309th NSC Meeting (NSC Action No. 1653).

b. Noted the President’s approval of the plans presented by the Department of Defense (as outlined in the three charts displayed at the meeting, copies of which are made a part of this Record of Actions in the official NSC files)[13] to achieve initial operational capability for the IRBM and the ICBM at the earliest practicable date, in accordance with NSC Actions Nos. 1433–a and 1484, under the following conditions:

(1) These plans shall make use of available Research and Development facilities and production for test purposes, and shall be flexible to the end that missiles earmarked for inventory in present plans may be diverted to further development programs if a technical problem should arise requiring such change in plans.

(2) In order to avoid delays in operational capability, this approval includes initial arrangements for training or operational personnel and for the deployment of missiles involved in this initial operational capability.

(3 Presidential approval is not sought at this time for production arrangements beyond those provided for development purposes nor for the accumulation of inventories beyond those set forth in the initial operational capability plan.

(4) Whenever it is deemed necessary to make substantial changes in these plans, such changes must be submitted to the National Security Council for Presidential consideration.

c. Noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense prepare a report, assuming reasonable success in carrying out the plans for the IRBM and the ICBM, which would set forth the relative military advantages (excluding psychological considerations) of these missiles in comparison with manned aircraft and with non-ballistic missiles assumed to be available at the same time.[14]

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on March 29.

[2] NSC 5602/1 is printed as Document 66. NIE 100–3–57 was not declassified. (Department of States, INR–NIE Files) The February 19 memorandum is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda) NSC 5707, “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Basic Problems for U.S. Security Arising Out of Changes in the World Situation,” dated February 19, is not printed. (Ibid.) Regarding NSC Action No. 1675, see footnote 13, Document 110. NSC 5707/1, dated March 18, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

[3] The briefing note was not filed in the minutes.

[4] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1687, approved by the President on April 1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[5] NSC 5707/2, “Review of Basic National Security Policy: National Security Costs in Relation to Total National Resources,” dated March 19, is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

[6] Cutler’s briefing note and the charts are not filed in the minutes. Copies of Charts 1, 1A, 1B, 2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B, 6, 7, and 8 were transmitted as enclosures in a memorandum from Marion W Boggs to the NSC Planning Board, dated March 21. (Ibid.)

[7] Raymond J. Saulnier.

[8] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1688, approved by the President on April 1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[9] Regarding NSC Action No. 1433, see footnote 9, Document 34. Regarding NSC Action No. 1484, see footnote 8, Document 45. Regarding NSC Action No. 1653, see footnote 4, Document 105.

[10] The briefing note is filed in the minutes.

[11] Reference is to the meetings between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan at Bermuda, March 21–23. Documentation is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.

[12] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1690, approved by the President on April 1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[13] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[14] The Department of Defense report was discussed at the NSC meeting on June 20; see Document 123

113. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 29, 1957, 11:15 a.m.[1]

Washington, March 29, 1957, 11:15 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. I.I.Rabi[2]

Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner[3]

Dr. Detlev W. Bronk[4]

Dr. Hugh L. Dryden[5]

Dr. James B. Fisk

Dr. Albert G. Hill[6]

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.

Dr. Edwin H. Land

Dr. E.R. Piore[7]

Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.[8]

Dr. Alan J. Waterman

Dr. Jerrold R. Zacharias[9]

Hon. Gordon Gray

Mr. David Z. Beckler

Dr. Rabi recalled the last meeting of the group with the President,[10] and the inspirations which that meeting gave to their work. He said the group feels that it is reaching another turning point, and asked what the President might have in his mind for them.

The President stressed the valuable contribution they have made, and said he would certainly hope there would be no falling-off in enthusiasm. He hopes that they find their work challenging and interesting. The President mentioned the importance of re-evaluating war as an instrument of policy, and added that he studies and reflects at great length on how to deter war—which has now become so destructive.

Dr. Rabi mentioned a few of the things that concern the group. He felt that the military services may be carrying on functions based on obsolete items, long beyond the point of justification. He said that support by Defense of basic research is declining—there is a constant budget, but costs are rising so that real effort is going down. Defense is not venturing “risk capital” for future innovation. There tends to be a narrow focus on specific weapons systems, as against a search for basic information which might have application all across the board.

The President said he had a question regarding this deduction—it is where, in a society like ours, responsibility should be placed for basic research. Where is the dividing line between the efforts that should fall to government and those that should fall to universities and industry. He said he would be greatly helped by a set of simple yard sticks.

Dr. Rabi agreed with a statement by the President concerning duplication of effort. He said he had the impression that there is much duplication and much irrelevance in the present programs. He thought it was a mistake, however, to take basic research wholly out of the Defense Department. This is a function that cannot be handled just by liaison; people must be engaged and immersed in research themselves. He added that the amount of funds is not large, and went on to say that there was some indication that people are fearful that basic research would open up fruitful new lines for developmental research, thus adding to effort and expense. He said that the Defense Department needs this information if its developmental research is to be well planned. He concluded this statement by saying that this is one of the last places to try to economize, and that we should not try to define the area of investigation too narrowly. He called on Dr. Killian to comment, and Dr. Killian brought out the analogy with great industrial firms, who find that their research money best spent is that which is spent on basic research. The President pointed out that the industrial firms have the measuring factor of profit to work against, and this is lacking in the government. Mr. Berkner said that, in defense research, the rate of effort at $2 billion a year is exhausting the store of basic ideas. The President said he understood that about $5¼ billion was going into research and development when all things were added in. He thought that the group might advise him as to what should be the balance between research and development. Mr. Land said that in industry there is a constant tendency for the operators to take from research and give to development. The President of the company personally must hold out research funds. He said that the competitors one fears in industry are those firms—often small ones—with a big and vigorous research program. Finally, he added that if a company in industry does not have its own research, it becomes “stupid and clumsy” in its development efforts. He asserted that only the President could assure proper emphasis on research.

The President said he does not feel that all of this basic research belongs in the Defense Department—since it has a wider purpose than weapons alone. Dr. Rabi said that what is sought is simply NSC support on the principle of basic research. Then the group can set the proper dimensions for it. The squeeze is coming from a fixed budget in a time of rising costs. The President said he accepts the importance of basic research; but retains the question to what extent does the federal government have responsibility—to what extent is it desirable for the federal government to enter the field. Dr. Rabi commented on a point suggested by the President, and said that governmental support of research has not to date infringed on freedom. He said that we are now using our technological reserves to the full. There is no reserve of new ideas. He felt that unless we use our resources most effectively as between basic and developmental research, we may find our resources fully committed, with inadequate supplies of new ideas being generated.

The President reviewed the policy we have been following for ten years or more. It is to develop within the various areas and regions of the free world indigenous forces for the maintenance of order, the safeguarding of frontiers, and the provision of the bulk of ground capability. The United States develops the technical forces, particularly air and naval forces, to move in in case the need exceeds what the local nation can itself provide. This must be kept highly mobile. He was sure that the United States could not maintain old-fashioned forces all around the world. Dr. Rabi said that one thing the group was concerned about was the supposition that the Soviets might supply advanced weapons to the North Koreans. A great threat would then exist, and we might be obliged to meet it in Korea. We would not want to provoke all-out war by an attack at the centers of power. The President reaffirmed that we must avoid putting sizable forces into the area, with great logistical establishments behind them. We would be tied down and would be unable to meet rising problems in other areas.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 1.

[2] Professor of Physics, Columbia University, and chairman, Science Advisory Committee,ODM.

[3] Research associate, Carnegie Institution, and member, Science Advisory Committee.

[4] President, Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research; President, National Academy of Sciences, and member, Science Advisory Committee.

[5] Head physicist, National Bureau of Standards; director, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; consultant to Science Advisory Committee.

[6] Professor of physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; director of research, Weapons Systems Evaluations Group; and consultant to Science Advisory Committee.

[7] Director of research, International Business Machines Co., and consultant to Science Advisory Committee.

[8] Consultant to Science Advisory Committee.

[9] Professor of physics and director, Laboratory for Nuclear Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and member, Science Advisory Committee.

[10] Reference is to a previous meeting between the Science Advisory Committee and the President. No record of this meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

114. Memorandum of Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 4, 1957 [1]

Washington, April 4, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense (NSC 5408; NSC 5606; NSC Action No 1642; Cabinet Paper 56–32/1, dated December 21, 1956; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958”, dated January 3, 1957; SNIE 100–5–57; NSC 5709)[2]

In the course of his briefing of the National Security Council on NSC 5709, Mr. Cutler emphasized paragraph 6, which contained a number of important considerations on the over-all problem of protecting the civilian population which had deeply troubled the Planning Board. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)[3] He also read the recommendations of the Planning Board as set forth in paragraph 7 of NSC 5709, and concluded with a summary of Special National Intelligence Estimate 100–5–57 on the foreign reaction to the adoption by the United States of a large-scale shelter program. At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Cutler called on the Director of Defense Mobilization for his comments.

Mr. Gray said that the shelter program was one in a whole range of problems of the non-military defense of the continental United States. He believed that members of the Executive Branch, as well as members of Congress, had taken a “spotty approach” to the problem of shelter up to the present time. Some of these individuals took a shelter program very seriously; others dismissed it out of hand. Mr. Gray said that he personally took all such measures of non-military defense very seriously, because he believed that these measures constituted a genuine deterrent to war by the Soviet Union. In any event, it was clear to Mr. Gray, he said, that we need forthright policy with respect to shelter, whereas at the present time we are at a kind of halfway point between a policy calling for evacuation of target areas and a policy of providing shelter. It was also clear to Mr. Gray that up until the present time most of us had had an “all or nothing” approach to the problem of shelter against nuclear attack; that is, we tended to say that if we cannot afford to spend $32 billion (as advocated by the FCDA shelter program), there was no point in spending anything on a shelter program. Accordingly, Mr. Gray endorsed the Planning Board’s recommendations for the development of studies which would get the relevant facts together. Mr. Gray said that the Science Advisory Committee of ODM was very willing to undertake the study assigned to it in the recommendations of the Planning Board in NSC 5709. However, the Committee was not sure that it would be able to complete the study that was called for by the suggested date of July 1, 1957.

On a narrower point, Mr. Gray said, he personally felt that it had been a great mistake to permit the erection of new Federal Government buildings without any provision in them for shelter. The reasons for this lapse, he thought, was that no one has been assigned the authority to direct the inclusion of shelters, and he accordingly recommended that the President assign such authority somewhere in the Executive Branch. Mr. Gray concluded his comments by supporting the recommendations set forth by the Planning Board in NSC 5709.

Mr. Cutler then called on the Federal Civil Defense Administrator for his views.

Governor Peterson expressed himself as in thorough agreement with the Planning Board’s recommendations in NSC 5709, and stated his belief that in studying the feasibility of a shelter program we should proceed very slowly and with deliberation. However, with respect to all the different cost estimates for the several shelter programs that had been mentioned (his own, that of Dr. Teller, and that of the Naval Radiological Laboratory), Governor Peterson said he was obliged to point out that there are about ten different cost components in any shelter program. The total cost figure, therefore, depended on how many of these cost components were included in the total estimate. He cited as examples whether the cost components included the provision of food and water in the shelters, the provision of bedding, medical supplies, etc., etc.. Accordingly, no one really has a very clear idea of what any given shelter program will ultimately cost.

Governor Peterson also suggested that the Council bear in mind what alternatives are open to us if we have or do not have a shelter program. It was certainly the feeling of FCDA that if any shelter program were undertaken it should proceed slowly and deliberately. FCDA also was strongly in favor of dual-use shelters; for example, shelters which might serve as underground garages in the event that they were never put to use for their primary purpose of shelter from nuclear attack.

With respect to our previous policy of evacuation of our people from target areas, Governor Peterson pointed out that this policy had been proposed and adopted before we realized the full magnitude of the problem of radioactive fallout. In the present circumstances it was, of course, foolish to talk about tactical evacuation of a target area; although if strategic warning were available we could certainly “thin out” our cities in advance of the attack.

In concluding, Governor Peterson said he had one more thing to say. While he clearly realized the fiscal implications of a large-scale shelter program, no one could tell him that the United States could not afford to spend $3.2 billion each year for ten years for a shelter program if securing the shelter program really meant the survival of the United States in the event of a nuclear attack.

Mr. Cutler said he wanted to be sure that the Council understood that the NSC Planning Board had neither taken a position against nor in favor of a shelter program. The Planning Board was merely convinced that it needed a great deal more information on the subject before it could make an informed recommendation to the Council. Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State for his views.

Secretary Dulles said that it struck him that any such extensive shelter program would be extremely costly. In his opinion, we would obtain a much more effective defensive capability if we added the money which such a shelter program would cost to the budget of the Department of Defense in order that it might be used to increase our deterrent military capabilities.

Mr. Cutler then called on the Acting Secretary of the Treasury for any comments which he might wish to make on NSC 5709.

Secretary Burgess[4] replied that he had no comment to make except to state that the Treasury would be happy to undertake the study suggested for it in paragraph 7–d of NSC 5709. But he had serious doubts whether any “tricks” that could be devised in such a study would save the Government from assuming most of the burden of the cost of a shelter program.

When asked for his views, Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson stated that he agreed in general with the position of Secretary Dulles. He believed that large expenditures devoted to a shelter program would tend to undermine our military deterrent to a Soviet attack by taking away money needed to maintain and develop the deterrent. He did feel, however, that shelters should be built in new industrial plants and in new Government buildings.

Mr. Cutler then explained to the Council the serious dilemma that the Administration would find itself in if, when the issue finally became clear, the Administration had nothing to say one way or another with respect to a shelter program. This would put the Administration in an indefensible position.

Secretary Dulles replied that he did not believe that it would be “indefensible” to tell the American public plainly that there was no really effective (passive) protection against nuclear attack on the continental United States. After all, we have had to acknowledge that we have been wrong in adopting a policy which called for the evacuation of target areas. Secretary Dulles repeated his view that the best way to spend our resources and direct our efforts was on active measures of deterrence, so that we could be sure that the enemy would not dare to attack. Thus, if there must be a choice between static defense measures and active measures to deter attack, there was no real choice, and this fact would be readily understood by the American people. Secretary Dulles added that he thought there would be some use in a program which called for the inclusion of shelters in newly-erected public buildings, but he reiterated his opposition to any large-scale shelter program.

The President, turning to Secretary Dulles, asked him to suppose a situation in which, ten years from now, the United States and the USSR each had obtained all the hydrogen weapons it could wish. Suppose also that one of the two protagonists was ready to dig in and stick out a nuclear war, whereas the other protagonist was not. The side which had the shelters to take refuge in was likely to win the war after the initial exchange of nuclear blows. Nevertheless, the President added that he leaned toward Secretary Dulles’ views for the moment at least, although this matter of shelters was a very serious problem. The President added that, as he had been saying for the last five years, war is currently coming to such a state that it is no longer war in any traditional sense, but rather a contest between death and survival. This was the consideration which had earlier induced him to call together the panel of scientist and scholars who made the study of the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development.[5] The President added that he thought that the studies called for in paragraph 7 of NSC 5709 should be undertaken as a matter of urgency, but leaving to Mr. Cutler and the Planning Board the determination of the precise dates for the completion of these studies.

Admiral Radford added the comment that he had seen an advance copy of the British White Paper on the problem of the defense of Britain in a nuclear war.[6] The British reasoning was along the lines earlier suggested by Secretary Dulles. The British felt that they could not afford both an elaborate passive defense program as well as a program which called for building an active deterrent to nuclear attack. Accordingly, in the White Paper they had come out strongly in support of the deterrent program for the defense of the British Isles.

The National Security Council:[7]

a. Noted and discussed the interim report on the subject contained in NSC 5709, prepared by the NSC Planning Board.

b. Concurred in the recommendation of the NSC Planning Board that the following studies be made for presentation through the Planning Board to the Council on or before the dates below mentioned:

(1) A study by a Committee representing FCDA (Chairman), ODM,AEC, and the Department of Defense, of significantly different shelter programs (not to exceed five), the percentage of the civil population which would be protected by each, the degree of protection of the civil population afforded by each, and the material requirements and approximate costs of each. (July 1, 1957)[8]

(2) A study by the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization as to the relative value of various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath, taking into account probable new weapons systems. (September 15, 1957)[9]

(3) A study by the Council of Economic Advisers of the broad economic effects and consequences of the various alternative shelter programs defined under (1) above. (August 15, 1957)[10]

(4) A study by the Treasury Department of the types of Federal financial assistance to private industry and individuals (including consideration of grants, loans and tax incentives), to stimulate construction of shelters under the various alternative shelter programs defined under (1) above, and the estimated cost to the Federal Government of such incentives. (August 15, 1957)[11]

c. Agreed that, pending receipt of the study now under way under FCDA auspices relative to the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development, it is not necessary that further study be made on the psychological aspects of the problem.

d. Agreed that, because the foreign reaction as estimated in SNIE 100–5–57 is not of sufficient impact to be determinant in whether or not to adopt the FCDA proposal, no additional study on this subject is necessary.

Note: See following extra page.[12]

[Here follow agenda items 2–6.]

Note (for Item 1): The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted for implementation to the appropriate agencies as follows: (1) FCDA, ODM, AEC, Defense; (2) ODM; (3) CEA; (4) Treasury. The President directed General John S. Bragdon, Special Assistant,[13] to consult with the Committee preparing the study directed by b–(l) above, and with the CEA in preparing the study directed by b–(3) above.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 5.

[2] For text of NSC 5408, “Continental Defense,” dated February 11, 1954, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 609. NSC 5606, “Continental Defense,” is not printed, but see Document 81. Regarding NSC Action No. 1642, see footnote 9, Document 100. Cabinet Paper 56–32/1, dated December 21, 1956, summarized Cabinet discussion on a civil defense legislative program. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Papers) The January 3 memorandum is filed in the minutes. SNIE 100–5–57 is printed as Document 111. NSC 5709, “A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense,” dated March 29, is not printed. (Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5709 Memoranda)

[3] The briefing note is filed in the minutes.

[4] W. Randolph Burgess, Under Secretary of the Treasury.

[5] See Document 96.

[6] A copy of the British White Paper, entitled “Outline of Future Policy,” published on April 4, is in Department of State, Central Files, 741.5/4–557. It was printed in The New York Times, April 5, 1957, p. 4.

[7] Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1691, approved by the President on April 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[8] Report to the National Security Council by the Special Committee on Shelter Programs, dated July 1, is ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5709 Memoranda.

[9] In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, dated May 6, Cutler requested that “the scope of the study by the Science Advisory Committee be extended to take into account the subject of ‘Urban Redevelopment,’ an area which was recommended for inclusion in a comprehensive study of civil defense measures recently proposed by the President’s Committee on Government Organization,” also known as the Rockefeller Committee. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Civil Defense) Cutler’s memorandum confirmed arrangements that the Science Advisory Committee would undertake the study of urban redevelopment, as discussed in memoranda from David Z. Beckler to Gray, May 2, and Gray to Cutler, May 6. (Ibid.) The full study was conducted by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee. The panel, initially chaired by H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Ford Foundation, was commonly referred to as the Gaither Committee. See Document 155.

[10] The CEA report, “Economic Implications of Alternative Shelter Programs,” dated August 14, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5709 Memoranda.

[11] The Treasury report, “Financing a Shelter Program,” dated August 14, is ibid.

[12] The note, which was probably inadvertently omitted when the document was typed, was subsequently added as a separate page. It is printed below.

[13] Major General John S. Bragdon, USA (ret.), Special Assistant to the President.

115. Editorial Note

Allen Dulles’ briefing on “Significant Developments Affecting U.S. Security” to the National Security Council on April 4 at the 318th meeting was not declassified.

According to the memorandum of discussion at the April 11 319th NSC meeting, Allen Dulles reported “another nuclear test had occurred in the Soviet Union yesterday, making a total of three tests in the course of the last week. The detonation, said Mr. Dulles, was an extremely large one.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The Atomic Energy Commission later announced Soviet nuclear tests on April 3, 6, 10, 12, and 16, and indicated that the last one was one of the largest in its current series. (The New York Times, April 19, page 1)

116. Memorandum of Discussion at the 319th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 11, 1957[1]

Washington, April 11, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”. See the editorial note, supra.]

2. Military Mobilization Base Program (NSC Actions Nos. 1503, 1643 and 1680;NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base”, dated March 1, 1957)[2]

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the main business of the Council today was to return to its review of existing basic national security policy. The Council would have before it today two main discussion papers, the first on “Issues Affecting the Military Elements of National Strategy” (NSC 5707/3), and the second on “Military and Non-Military Aspects of Continental Defense” (NSC 5707/4).[3] Before turning to these papers, however, Mr. Cutler pointed out that Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil was present and was prepared to give, in response to Council action, an interim report outlining the military mobilization base program.

Secretary McNeil proceeded to give his report orally to the National Security Council. (A copy of Secretary McNeil’s report is filed in the minutes of this meeting.)[4]

The National Security Council:[5]

Noted and discussed an interim report on the subject by the Department of Defense, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1680–b, as presented at the meeting by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil.

3. Overseas Internal Security Program[6] (NSC Actions Nos. 1290–d and 1486–c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Constabulary Forces in Countries Threatened by Subversion”, dated November 28, 1955; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs”, dated December 7, 1955; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Overseas Internal Security Program”, dated March 19, 1957)[7]

4. Review of Basic National Security Policy: Issues Affecting the Military Elements of National Strategy (NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC 5707;NSC 5707/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1675 and 1680; NSC 5707/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base”, dated March 1, 1957; NSC 5707/3)[8]

At the conclusion of Secretary McNeil’s report on the mobilization base program, Mr. Cutler indicated that the Department of Defense would be prepared to give the Council a much more detailed report early in June on the same subject.[9] He then suggested that the Council turn to the last subject covered in the paper on the military elements of national strategy (NSC 5707/3), because this would follow logically on Secretary McNeil’s previous presentation. Mr. Cutler read paragraph 14, which briefly described the new military planning concept in relation to the mobilization base, and paragraph 15, which covered the questions which the Planning Board wished to raise in order to obtain guidance for the part of the revised basic national security policy which would be concerned with the mobilization base. Paragraphs 14 and 15 read as follows:

“14. The new military planning concept takes into account damage to the mobilization base resulting from nuclear attack against the United States; provides for the requirements for all forces which would be mobilized in general war by M + 6 months; provides for overseas pre-attack stocks; assumes the use of nuclear weapons in general and in local war.

“15. Questions.

“a. Will the new mobilization base required for forces which would be M + 6 months need to be (1) larger or smaller than the present base which assumes substantial wartime production? (2) better dispersed and protected in its key elements?

“b. Will the mobilization base resulting from the ‘new military planning concept’ prove inadequate to support a limited war in which the civilian economy cannot for political reasons be drastically cut?

“c. If it is estimated that each side will have (1960) the capability substantially to destroy the other, even after sustaining surprise attack, should mobilization base planning allocate resources primarily to (1) offensive and defensive capabilities required for the initial phase of general war; and (2) requirements for military operations short of general war, rather than requirements for subsequent phases of general war?

“d. Under the ‘new military planning concept’ should we revise our existing stockpile objectives now based on 3- and 5-year requirements?”

Mr. Cutler asked Secretary McNeil if he could attempt to answer question 15–a. Secretary McNeil replied that the new mobilization base required for forces which would be mobilized by M + 6 would be smaller and more selective than our mobilization base had been in the past. Secretary Wilson commented that when this Administration first came into power the Defense Department officers found themselves confronted with a very large mobilization base plan. In the years since 1953 it had proved very difficult to back out of this larger mobilization base plan, but progress was now being made in getting off this wicket.

With reference to a statement in Secretary McNeil’s report, on the number of rounds of 155 mm. ammunition which had been procured by the Defense Department for the mobilization base, Director Brundage inquired whether anybody could describe the kind of future war in which the United States would be likely to use 11,000,000 rounds of 155 mm. ammunition. The President seemed impatient, and said let the whole thing go to hell in a basket; it would require a great big academic study.

In further comment on the difficulties of making economies, Secretary Wilson stated that there were still veterinaries in our armed forces although there were no horses. Secretary Wilson said he could not seem to get rid of these people. Amidst much amusement, the President defended the presence of these veterinaries, on the ground that they were needed to inspect the meat (not always Government-inspected prime beef) which our soldiers ate. Returning to a serious vein, the President said that of course we have had a very lopsided mobilization base, and that it had got to be completely changed. He said that, for instance, he was strongly opposed to the maintenance of stand-by plants as part of our mobilization base. Secretary Wilson said that he had started two years ago to begin to break up the packages of machine tools. Among other things, he discovered that we were maintaining tools for aviation engines which we were sure we would never again use.

With respect to the mobilization base, the President said that the basic decision as to its nature would depend on whether, in the face of a future war, we were going to have to be concerned about our national security for a period of only 90 days, or whether we should have to provide for a longer period. The President stated that he believed personally that if the United States could survive a future war for a period of 90 days, we would be in a good position to pull through any subsequent period of warfare. On the other hand, the President said, he did not object to 5-year planning for the stockpiling of raw materials, he explained, because a future war would be so devastating that it might take this country that long a time to get back into production of essential raw materials.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the whole matter seemed academic to him, since the country had 5-year stockpiles in nearly every category.

At this point, Mr. Cutler said that paragraph 15–d of NSC 5707/3 concerned itself precisely with the possibility of revising our existing stockpile objectives, now based on 3- and 5-year requirements. The President stated that we should not add to the existing 3- and 5-year requirements, but that we should not dump on the market stockpile materials we have at hand.

Mr. Cutler then asked the Council to look at question 15–b, and asked the President for his views on the adequacy of the proposed new mobilization base to support a limited war as opposed to an all-out war. The President repeated views he had expressed in the past: that even if we got into a limited war we would immediately call for a general mobilization and full controls, which we would gradually get rid of subsequently just as fast as we could. If we did not put on tight controls at the very beginning of the conflict, everything would skyrocket.

Mr. Cutler went on to read paragraph 15–c, explaining the views of certain members of the Planning Board that mobilization base requirements for military operations short of a general war were more important than the requirements for the subsequent phase of general war. Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Radford for an expression of his opinion on the question asked in 15–c.

Admiral Radford replied that he found that all these questions contributed more to confusion than to clarification. The authors of the questions did not seem to understand how the military people have operated in the development of the mobilization base. In this matter the mobilization base is designed in the first instance to provide for the initial phase of general war and provision for that phase would cover pretty thoroughly the resources which would be required for a local or limited war. Secretary Wilson said that he too found himself confused over semantics and words in these questions. It seemed clear to him that the United States would never become involved in a limited war with the Soviet Union and, moreover, the United States would not pick on small nations and thus begin a small war. Mr. Cutler said he agreed with Secretary Wilson that we would not become involved in a small war by picking on some small nation, but we might nevertheless be drawn into a small war by circumstances beyond our control. Secretary Wilson replied that if this were proved to be the case, the war into which the United States got drawn would not remain a small war.

The President commented that the matters about which the Council had been talking up till now would receive no final answer until the officials of the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization got together and thought through the problem of a rational mobilization base for the United States.

The Director of Defense Mobilization, Mr. Gordon Gray, said he found difficulty in understanding the meaning of the term “the subsequent phases of general war”. The demands of a future war, he believed, would not stop at the end of 90 days. If the actual fighting were over by that time, the President pointed out, there would of course still be the problem of rehabilitation. The President went on to say that he could hardly envisage any massive offensive occurring after the 90-day initial phase of general war. Resources which had not been used up in that 90-day period would have to be devoted to rehabilitation.

Secretary Wilson observed that in formulating the budgets of the Department of Defense for the fiscal years 1959 and beyond under the President’s $39 billion ceiling, Secretary Wilson proposed to take into account three major elements: First, the $39 billion ceiling on new obligational authority; second, estimated cash expenditure; and third, force levels. Secretary Wilson added that it seemed to him essential to make a reduction in the force levels. The President suggested that we had better wait until Congress has begun to consider the appropriation requests of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year.

Secretary Wilson then turned to Mr. Brundage and asked whether the planning basis which he had just mentioned appeared satisfactory to the Director of the Budget. Mr. Brundage replied that this question depended on how large a tax cut we would want to have next year. Secretary Wilson replied that the field of tax cuts was not his responsibility.

Secretary Humphrey counseled that we must all take a very practical view of what our domestic situation demands and what our people would insist upon. Secretary Wilson said that we would agree to this if Secretary Humphrey would include also taking account in our budget of the international situation which confronted the country. Secretary Wilson expressed the belief that the United States could readily stand the present tax burden and the present level of expenditures for national defense for an indefinite period if this proved to be necessary. Secretary Humphrey said he agreed with this proposition, but warned that if we were to do this we would be required to keep the country thoroughly scared at successive time intervals. The President remarked that in the course of the last few years he had not received a single letter which advocated a reduction in the budget of the Department of Defense. Secretary Wilson said that there was no need for us to scare Americans; the Russians can be depended upon to do that.

Secretary Humphrey said that nevertheless the Administration was going to have a hell of a time to prevent a tax reduction right now. In fact, in his view, the only way to prevent Small Business from getting $600,000,000 worth of tax relief would be for the President to veto this Congressional proposal. The President turned to Secretary Humphrey and asked him how much he would be willing to pay to save his life. Of course, added the President, in paying what was necessary for our national survival we should in turn reduce expenditures for other types of programs. Secretary Humphrey replied that of course we should pay what we need to pay in order to survive, but the point of the matter was that we did not cut other programs which did not involve our national security.

The President then called for the next question, and Mr. Cutler said that the Council would perhaps best now go back to the first problem set forth in NSC 5707/3, which concerned our capability to oppose local aggression. Mr. Cutler read this section of the paper, as follows:

“Existing policy calls for U.S. ready forces which, with such help as may be realistically expected from our allies, are adequate to deter or cope with local aggression, pending application of additional U.S. and allied power, in a way calculated to avoid hostilities broadening into general war, and which are sufficiently versatile to use either conventional or nuclear weapons as circumstances dictate.

“3. Questions.

“a. Are we devoting adequate effort and resources to developing doctrine and ready forces best calculated to deal with local war without our enhancing the risk of spreading nuclear conflict?

“b. Will current plans for increasing integration of nuclear weapons into U.S. forces soon make the united States unable to participate in opposing local aggression without nuclear weapons?

“4. Alternatives.

“a. In addition to our present capabilities, possess a separate non-nuclear capability for conducting successful local wars under all predictable circumstances.

“b. Without increasing our over-all effort, sacrifice some part of our other military capability in order to increase our local war capability (nuclear or conventional).

“c. Concentrate substantially all of our military resources on the achievement of an improved and more secure massive retaliatory capability.

“d. Continue the policy of integrating nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; and extend that policy by deciding now that in military operations short of general war, nuclear weapons will be used when required in order to achieve military objectives.”

[1 paragraph (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

When asked by Mr. Cutler for his views on this subject, Admiral Radford stated that the President had just outlined the way the planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been developing ever since 1953. The military saw no alternative to such planning. He added that it was very easy to formulate the questions which the Planning Board had set down, but extremely hard to answer them. How, for example, would we define the term “local aggression”? The Joint Chiefs of Staff had to be much more definite and clear when they made use of such terms.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Admiral Radford went on to say that the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in fact now engaged in carrying out a policy that, in any action in which U.S. forces were involved, we would make use of nuclear weapons if it proved necessary. Accordingly, Admiral Radford called for a clearly-written directive in our basic policy so that we would in the future avoid the confusion on the subject which comes from papers such as NSC 5707/3.

Mr. Cutler defended with warmth the validity of the questions set forth by the Planning Board, after which Admiral Radford commented that the United States had at the present time very powerful military force, much of which was conventional in character. Whether we would need to go beyond the use of conventional weapons to the point of atomic weapons, would depend on the size and character of the local war in which we were involved. The particular advantage which the use of atomic weapons gives us is the capability to defend against being overrun in the future as we were in the initial phases of the Korean war.

The President pointed out firmly that the revision of basic national security policy offered us our chance to write the right kind of directive in the matter of the use of atomic weapons. He said he did not think it appropriate to blame the Planning Board for asking these questions. What was important was to see to it that from now on our basic policy gets into line with the planning which had been going on in the Department of Defense for over two years. Secretary Humphrey warmly endorsed the President’s suggestion. Admiral Radford recalled that representatives of the Department of Defense had strongly opposed the statement of existing policy summarized in paragraph 2 of NSC 5707/3 when our current basic national security policy (NSC 5602/1) had been adopted.

Mr. Brundage added that the real problem has been that so far the cost for the so-called new weapons have always been additive. There has been no corresponding subtraction. Admiral Radford denied that this had been the case, and pointed out that one bomber built today could accomplish as much as ten thousand bombers could accomplish in 1945.

The President said that he would very much like to see a draft of a revised statement of the military elements of our national strategy as written in the Defense Department. Mr. Cutler advised the President that such a draft would appear in the final version of our revised basic national security policy, which the Council would consider some time in May.[10] Meanwhile, however, he pointed out that the State Department had a certain interest in this policy area. Indeed, this fact had been emphasized by the action of the Council last week in holding the new Korean policy in abeyance until we could ascertain the effect on our allies of a course of action which would involve modernizing our forces in Korea with purely atomic weapons. The President said that the Council’s action in holding up the paper on Korea was related to a specific international agreement in the shape of the Korean Armistice Agreement. It had nothing to do with the general issue of whether or not to equip our U.S. forces with nuclear capabilities. Secretary Herter observed that Secretary Dulles felt that we still needed a considerable degree of flexibility in the weaponry of our armed forces.

The President stated very clearly his opinion that we had now reached a point in time when our main reliance, though not our sole reliance, should be on nuclear weapons. Up until recently our main reliance has been on conventional forces, to which we have added here and there in various units atomic capabilities. This situation must henceforth be revised.

Mr. Allen Dulles expressed the view that the outbreak of local wars was not the big problem which we faced in the world of today. The most dangerous problem was that of Communist subversion of weak and newly-developing nations. Reference to this problem, he thought, should be included in the paper. Mr. Cutler pointed out that the point was touched on later, and Mr. Dulles went on to say that he greatly feared that Congress would cut the CIA budget to bits and that this would have a serious effect on our anti-subversion programs in weak nations.

The President commented that he really did not know what more he could do in defense of the budget. He made statements on the subject practically every day.

Mr. Cutler at this point suggested that the Council turn to the next major problem, which related to the U.S. alliance system, and which read as follows:

“5. Existing policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate allies and other free countries in furnishing bases for U.S. military power and in providing their share of military forces. It visualizes progressive integration of nuclear weapons into NATO defenses only, with the United States retaining custody of warheads prior to hostilities.

“6. Questions.

“a. What effect does reduced support by our Allies have on our alliance system, including our share of the burden of these alliances?

“b. Will the growing gap between the capabilities of the United States and the USSR on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other make our allies increasingly less willing to provide overseas bases to the United States and to participate effectively in military operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc?

“7. Alternatives.

“a. Provide no nuclear capability to allies (reversing plans for combined U.S.-Canadian air defense, UK IRBM programs, and NATO’s new weapons program), meanwhile supporting allied conventional capabilities.

“b. Provide nuclear capability to selected allies, giving nuclear weapons and warheads to the latter where feasible and reducing their conventional capabilities accordingly.

“c. Under a NATO command, share with NATO allies the custody and delivery capability for nuclear weapons.”

Mr. Cutler offered the opinion that the most serious question was posed by paragraph 7–b above, and asked Admiral Radford if he would care to comment on the alternative set forth in that paragraph.

Admiral Radford observed that we were already committed to this action and had already gone down that road as far as our law would permit. For the time being, Admiral Radford thought that the law which prevented us from giving nuclear warheads to our allies was helpful, and he would not advise too hurried a change in the law. He repeated, however, that the alternatives in paragraph 7 do not really exist, because we have already gone too far down the road. Admiral Radford also expressed the view that the thought in paragraph 6–b was much too pessimistic, and that we did not need to worry too much about Soviet blackmailing of our allies in order to render our overseas bases in their territories untenable. The President seemed to agree with Admiral Radford, in pointing out that the Soviets had been writing the same threatening letters to our allies as long as six years ago. The President added, however, that he would like to see a change in the law so that, for one thing, we could prevent powers which do not now have the capability of making nuclear weapons from developing that capability [23 words not declassified].

Admiral Strauss observed that our allies seemed generally content to have the custody of warheads for atomic weapons remain in the hands of the United States provided we supplied these allies with the weapons to which the warheads could be added in case of necessity. Accordingly, Admiral Strauss expressed his agreement with Admiral Radford that it was not desirable to change the law on this subject at this time, although it might be desirable later. On this last point, Admiral Strauss said he was somewhat surprised to discover considerable sentiment in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress in favor of a change of law which would permit the United States to provide the British with nuclear warheads. Admiral Radford predicted we would come to the point where we would do this, but the timing of the action was extremely important.

[2 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

At this point Mr. Cutler invited the Council to turn to the next general subject, namely the U.S. military assistance programs, reading as follows:

“8. Existing policy is to provide military and other assistance, including where appropriate new weapons and advanced technology, to dependable allied nations when necessary to enable them to make appropriate contributions to collective military power.

“9. Question.

“Do advances in weapons-technology and the direct and indirect costs involved require changes in our present military assistance policy?

“10. Alternatives.

“a. Significantly reduce indigenous forces by additional deployment of U.S. nuclear forces.

“b. In extending military assistance, plan indigenous forces based on a firm commitment that U.S. forces will participate in the defense of the area.

“c. Where larger forces do not contribute militarily to U.S. strategy, support only lightly armed forces capable of maintaining internal security with U.S. commitment to assist in the event of external aggression.”

When he had reached paragraph 10–c, Mr. Cutler said he wished to refer at this point to the OCB Progress Report on the “Overseas Internal Security Program”, formerly called the “1290–d program”. He proceeded to brief the Council at some length on this progress report because it related to the alternative posed by paragraph 10–c of NSC 5707/3. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note on the “Overseas Internal Security Program”[11] is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler’s briefing, the President observed that the Director of Central Intelligence had a few minutes ago brought up the problem of the weakness of the governments of many of the newly-independent nations, and the fact that they were prey to Communist subversion. Such new governments are helpless unless they have the power to maintain internal order and security in their countries. That was all that we were trying to do in these countries with our overseas internal security program.

Secretary Wilson referred to a statement made by Mr. Cutler in his briefing on this subject, which Secretary Wilson said had troubled him. It related to the Operations Coordinating Board, which, said Secretary Wilson, he understood to be a coordinating and not an operating agency. The President could, of course, have asked the Department of Defense to take charge of the overseas internal security program if he had wanted to.

Admiral Radford said he was extremely anxious to explain the difference between overseas police-type forces and regular military forces—a difference which as just as plain as the differences between these two types of forces in the United States. As a police-type force was gradually built up in a country like Vietnam, for example, it would be possible to recall the regular military forces from the remote villages and reconstitute them as a regular military force. It would also be possible, as a result of the building up of police-type forces, to keep the level of regular military forces from getting any higher.

Turning to the question in paragraph 9, Admiral Radford stated that the substance of paragraph 9 should not have been put in the form of a question, but rather in the form of an affirmative statement. Nevertheless, he warned that we would still have to do a selling job if we were to induce the governments of our friends and allies to reduce the level of their armed forces in return for the modernization of the remaining forces with new weapons. We are making some progress along this line, but a lot remains to be done.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

Admiral Radford said he believed it was a serious mistake to relate these two programs too closely, because they were essentially quite different. Mr. Gordon Gray added his view that it was likewise a mistake to let the notion persist that the 1290–d program (now called the overseas internal security program) could effect great savings in our military assistance programs generally. Admiral Radford expressed agreement with Mr. Gray’s statement.

Mr. Cutler then asked the Council to turn to the final problem in NSC 5707/3, namely, the U.S. base system, reading as follows:

“11. Existing policy is predicated on allied and other free country contributions of bases and forces.

“12. Question.

“Is our present system of bases necessary and justifiable in the light of: (1) political uncertainties, (2) the growing dollar costs involved, and (3) the long-range prospect of intercontinental capabilities?

“13. Alternatives.

“a. Reduce our dependence on overseas bases by placing increased emphasis on U.S.-based and seaborne weapons systems.

“b. Expand the overseas base structure in order to improve U.S. capabilities for participation in local conflict.

“c. Enhance the continued availability of necessary bases by increasing host participation in the control and operation of bases.”

Having read this section in toto, Mr. Cutler again asked Admiral Radford to comment.

Admiral Radford replied that he and, he believed, all the Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that at the present time the United States needed overseas bases in certain areas and under certain circumstances, although we are gradually moving into a situation where dependence on overseas bases will be lessened. Indeed, the Chiefs believed that it may be impossible for us to use certain overseas bases in the future. Admiral Radford added the thought that it might also be best for the United States in the long run to pay rent for its overseas bases. In any event, we should certainly try to reduce our reliance on overseas bases, even though we may not be able to do so completely for some time.

Secretary Wilson said that our policy should be to attempt to maintain such overseas bases as we have at the present, but not in general to expand them, though of course there would occasionally be exceptions. He noted that these overseas bases had given very great concern to the Soviet Union.

The President commented that the problem of our overseas bases was something that we should have under constant study and review, because some of these bases become less valuable as circumstances change. Secretary Herter confirmed the difficulty of negotiations with respect to overseas bases, citing the instances of Portugal, Spain, and Morocco.

The National Security Council: (Action on Overseas Internal Security Program)[12]

Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board and the attached “Annual Status Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290–d”, for the period December 1955 through November 1956, prepared by the International Cooperation Administration and transmitted by the reference memorandum on March 19, 1957.

The National Security Council: (Action on NSC 5707/3)[13]

Noted and discussed the report on the subject contained in NSC 5707/3, in the light of the reports presented in Items 2 and 3 above.

5. Review of Basic National Security Policy: Military and Non-Military Aspects of Continental Defense (NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC 5707;NSC 5707/1; NSC 5707/2; NSC Action No. 1675; NSC 5707/3; NSC 5707/4)

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to the fact that little time remained, and that some attention should be given at this point to NSC 5707/4, which was concerned with the military and non-military aspects of continental defense. In the course of briefing the Council on NSC 5707/4, Mr. Cutler read paragraphs 5 and 6, which constitute, as he believed, the most significant statements of existing national security policy with regard to continental defense. These paragraphs read as follows:

“5. ‘The strength of the U.S. which must be so maintained is an integrated complex of offensive and defense elements. Each of these elements has its proper role in the defense of the vitals of America against attack and destruction. … [14] We shall not have satisfactory over-all strength if one element is allowed to develop out of proportion to the other elements.’ (Paragraph 2–a, NSC 5408)”

“6. ‘Just as there must be a proper balance among the several elements comprising our strength, there must also be a proper balance between military and non-military measures within the element of “continental defense”.’ (Paragraph 2–b, NSC 5408)”

Thereafter, Mr. Cutler called attention to the major new factors affecting the aforementioned policy statements, which factors were described on page 2 of NSC 5707/4.[15] He then turned to the policy questions which the Planning Board felt had been raised by the new factors. He pointed out that the questions in paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5707/4 could be passed over very briefly because the Council had only recently authorized a series of studies on the problem of providing shelter to protect the U.S. population from radioactive fallout and from blast and fire hazard. He then read paragraph 15, as follows:

“15. In planning and executing our continental defense programs, should additional emphasis be given to those measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of our strategic retaliatory striking power?**

“** One member believes the following subparagraph should be added:

“Is our early warning system being kept in phase with improvements in Soviet-manned aircraft delivery capabilities (i.e., very high and very low altitudes)?”

Mr. Cutler then asked Admiral Radford for his comments.

Admiral Radford replied that we were already giving high priority to measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of our strategic retaliatory striking power. The problem, therefore, was not one so much of additional emphasis as the manner in which we should try to reduce the vulnerability. This matter was the subject of study at the present time by a committee in the Defense Department. It was hoped that this committee would report its findings by July 1. Admiral Radford warned, however, that the measures for reducing the vulnerability of our retaliatory striking power would have to be adjusted under the Department of Defense budget ceiling, as were all other Defense Department programs.

Mr. Cutler inquired as to whether we were actually engaged in dispersing our SAC bases. Admiral Radford replied in the affirmative, and Secretary Quarles gave a brief description of the dispersal program for SAC. Secretary Quarles expressed the opinion that this was a well-planned program, and he would not recommend further dispersal measures at this time. General Twining also confirmed these views that the dispersal program was sufficient as of the present time.

Secretary Humphrey inquired of Admiral Radford as to how far our early warning network was proving effective. Admiral Radford indicated that the committee to which he had just referred was likewise studying this and, indeed, the whole field of continental defense. Meanwhile, he believed, the early warning network was steadily moving outward from the continental borders. He briefly commented on progress with respect to the mid-Canada line, the DEW line, and certain other elements of the early warning system. He predicted, however, that there would be new and serious problems when we moved into the era of the intercontinental ballistic missile.

Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council then give attention to paragraphs 16 and 17, which dealt with the problem of securing an effective defense against the ICBM and the related problem of assuring sufficient warning of the launching of an ICBM to permit the population to use shelter. The President commented that sufficient unto the day was the evil thereof. He added that he personally was doubtful if a course of action of pouring more money into research and development would provide the answer either to the interception of ICBMs or the warning of the launching of ICBMs. The President believed that the only way in which these terrible problems would be solved would be through the functioning of some brilliant scientific mind.

The National Security Council:[16]

Noted and discussed the report on the subject contained in NSC 5707/4.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 12.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1503, see footnote 5, Document 52. Regarding NSC Action No. 1643, see footnote 7, Document 101. NSC 5602/1 is printed as Document 66. NSC Action No. 1680, taken at the NSC meeting on March 14 and approved by the President on March 17, is not printed. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding the March 1 memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 109.

[3] Neither NSC 5707/3 nor NSC 5707/4 is printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

[4] The report is not filed in the minutes.

[5] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1698, approved by the President on April 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[6] This subject was discussed under the next agenda item.

[7] Regarding NSC Action No. 1290, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844, footnote 10. Regarding NSC Action No. 1486, see vol. X, p. 62, footnote 14 . The November 28, 1955, and March 19, 1957, memoranda have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. The December 7, 1955, memorandum is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5525 Series)

[8] Regarding NSC 5602/1, the February 19 memorandum, NSC 5707, NSC 5707/1,NSC 5707/2, and NSC Action No. 1675, see footnotes 2 and 5, Document 112. NSC Action No. 1680 is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[9] The Department of Defense made no presentation to the NSC on the mobilization base program for the remainder of 1957.

[10] For the discussion of the final version, which became NSC 5707/8, see Document 119.

[11] The briefing note is filed in the minutes.

[12] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1699, approved by the President on April 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[13] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1700, approved by the President on April 12. (Ibid.)

[14] Ellipsis in the source text.

[15] The “major new factors” affecting the above statements were contained in the following paragraphs on page 2 of NSC 5707/4:

“10. Loss of the overwhelming nuclear superiority which the U.S. has possessed hitherto.

“11. Increasing net capabilities of the USSR to damage the United States will threaten total national survival for the first time in U.S. history.

“12. Radioactive fallout as an after-effect of thermonuclear explosions vastly complicates both the military and non-military aspects of continental defense.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

[16] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1701, approved by the President on April 12. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

117. Memorandum of Discussion at the 320th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 17, 1957[1]

Washington, April 17, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–2. For item 2, “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Foreign Economic Issues Relating to National Security,” see volume X, page 703.]

3. Review of Basic National Security Policy: Political Elements of National Strategy (NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC 5707; NSC 5707/1; NSC 5707/2;NSC Action No. 1675; NSC 5707/3; NSC 5707/4; NSC 5707/5;NSC 5707/6)[2]

Mr. Cutler next invited the attention of the Council to NSC 5707/6. In the course of a short briefing, Mr. Cutler pointed out that the time was short, and that the Council might desire to pass over questions 3, 4 and 5 of NSC 5707/6 on grounds that these questions had previously been treated in prior discussion papers.[3] Since the Council accepted Mr. Cutler’s judgment, he invited their attention to the sixth question, reading as follows:

“6. How can the United States help to make the UN a more effective instrument for safeguarding the peace?

“a. Should the United States seek to create a permanent UN military organization (or otherwise strengthen the UN as an instrument for the settlement of international disputes)?

“b. In view of enlarged UN membership, (1) how can the United States most effectively utilize UN machinery to settle disputes and enforce security? (2) Is it feasible or desirable to limit UN activities in conformity with the UK view?”

Mr. Cutler called first on Secretary Dulles. The latter replied that he did not believe that a permanent UN military force was a realistic goal at the present time. He said he had been party to the whole operation in past years which attempted to set up such an organization. He also thought it not practical to earmark specific forces of member nations for UN use. In point of fact, the UN forces in the Middle East were proving effective, but this had been done on an ad hoc basis. If there had been a permanent UN force it would not have worked in the Middle East because it would have been made up of British, French and, indeed, possibly of Soviet contingents. The President said he agreed with Secretary Dulles’ conclusions, and Admiral Radford stated that as far as he was concerned it was “simply impossible” at this time to create a permanent UN military organization.

As to question 6–b, the President stated that there was really not much use talking about it. The State Department would have to wrestle with each problem in this area as it came up and play the music by ear.

Secretary Dulles commented that he was not quite certain of the validity of the statement that the United Kingdom desired to limit UN activities. It was true that not so very long ago the British had been very critical of the fact that the Guatemalan problem had been solved by recourse to the machinery of the Organization of American States. Now, however, they found the shoe on the other foot in the case of Cyprus, and they wished that they had some kind of regional organization, consonant with the UN Charter, which would help them solve such knotty problems as that presented by Cyprus.

Mr. Cutler then turned to question 7, which he read as follows:

“7. Assuming that the United States should maintain its secure retaliatory nuclear capabilities in the absence of a safeguarded disarmament agreement, are there measures in the field of control of armaments which could reduce the likelihood of resort to force? For example:

“a. What minimum measures of control might discourage or prevent countries now without nuclear weapons from developing such weapons?

“b. Would the exchange of ground observers lessen the chances of a Soviet nuclear attack?

“c. Should the United States review its present policy that any agreement on thinning out or withdrawal of opposing forces in Europe must be contingent upon prior German reunification?

“d. Should the United States consider agreements for control of armaments in other areas of tension, e.g., the Middle East?”

He explained what lay behind this question in terms of a written brief (copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting).[4]

The President said he felt obliged to quarrel with an assumption which underlay question 7 as set forth particularly in Mr. Cutler’s briefing. This, said the President, was the assumption that there would be no security for either the United States or the USSR if each of them kept on building up its nuclear capabilities. The President believed that security might result from such a course of action, for the good and sufficient reason that each side would realize the folly of resorting to a course of action in the shape of nuclear general war in which each country would be completely destroyed. This was the security of the stalemate.

Secretary Dulles said that what worried him most in this problem area was the probability that unless the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR found some safe way to stop the building up of nuclear weapons stockpiles, other countries would presently begin to fabricate nuclear weapons. Such a development would certainly decrease the security of the United States. The President stated his thorough agreement with Secretary Dulles’ position.

Mr. Cutler then referred to a recent telegram from Governor Stassen which raised much the same question as question 7 in a somewhat different context.[5] Apropos of this, the President said he was greatly interested in the various statements which suggested an apparently greater Soviet interest in disarmament than they had shown in any previous meetings of the Disarmament Subcommittee.

At this point Secretary Wilson intervened to say that the discussion up to this point has been rather in the stratosphere. What the Council really needed to consider was what was to be done about the Defense Department programs for the fiscal years 1959 and beyond. What would be the shape of our military programs for the fiscal years 1959, 1960 and 1961? At least, continued Secretary Wilson, he was certain that in these years we would require some reduction in our personnel strengths which could be compensated for through the increased fire power of our new weapons. As for fiscal year 1958 expenditures, Secretary Wilson said he could safely forecast that they would be over $38 billion and perhaps close to $39 billion.

Admiral Radford added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been facing some extremely tough problems in trying to think ahead even as far as fiscal year 1960. For example, should we continue to procure B–52 bombers, or should we shift to B–58s, or should we think largely in terms of guided missiles? Admiral Radford added his strong feeling that there would have to be a very drastic reduction in the current level of expenditure for continental defense in order to provide and maintain our offensive capabilities. The Joint Chiefs were up against this problem right now because the demands of our continental defense programs were simply skyrocketing.

From this subject the Council went into a discussion of the program for providing an atomic-powered aircraft. Secretary Wilson said that this was a most costly program, although he had succeeded in reducing funds allocated to it from the amount of $500 million a year to $150 million a year. The President expressed astonishment and anger. He did not believe, he said, that the atomic-powered aircraft could be shown to be in any sense a useful military asset. He believed that two or three scientists in a room and a budget of a few thousand dollars was all that should be devoted to this and similar programs. He added the comment that everyone seemed to be “going nuts” on research and development programs. Secretary Wilson, Admiral Strauss and Mr. Brundage indicated that they would confer shortly and present to the President a report and recommendations on the program for the development of an atomic-powered aircraft.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that although the time was short, he very much wished the Council to look at question 12 on NSC 5707/6, which read as follows:

“12. Can the United States confront the Soviets with choices which, without sacrifice of U.S. security, might offer the Soviets a greater sense of security in return for sacrifices of other Soviet interests (e.g., arms control of [or] force reductions in return for sacrifice of Russian positions in Germany, Eastern Europe or the Near East)?”

In the course of briefing the Council on what lay behind this question (a copy of the briefing note[6] filed in the minutes of the meeting), Mr. Cutler referred to the staff study recently completed by the Department of State on the withdrawal of forces from Central Europe. While he noted that this study (a copy of which is likewise filed in the minutes of the meeting)[7] had reached the conclusion that under existing circumstances and at the present time the United States should not seek an agreement with the Soviet Union by which Soviet forces would be withdrawn into the Soviet Union and U.S. forces withdrawn from Germany, Mr. Cutler pointed out that circumstances might change in the future. It was possible that we should either find ourselves compelled to bring back our forces deployed in Western Europe, or would find it desirable to do so. Accordingly, he would recommend that the Council now authorize a very high-level and fully secret study of this question and our response to it if the circumstances did indeed change.

The President replied that his impression of the matter was that the whole thing was in the political stage. It was accordingly up to the State Department to make proposals with respect to the area covered by question 12, rather than for the National Security Council to do so. If the United States once got a military capability in ballistic missiles, we would be just as safe in defending ourselves from the United States [Soviet Union] alone as we would be in having U.S. forces deployed in Western Europe. In short, our selfish interest in Central Europe was a political rather than a military interest, so that suggestions for the study called for by Mr. Cutler were really for the future. Meanwhile, the State Department should be ready to advise us as to what course of action to follow if any of the matters raised by Mr. Cutler’s briefing note came up for decision.

Admiral Radford pointed out that in connection with the studies which the Joint Chiefs were making as to the shape of the Defense Department programs for fiscal years 1959, 1960 and 1961, which he had mentioned earlier, the JCS would be examining alternative force structures. They would come up with various choices which the NSC would have to discuss and decide; so part of the problems mentioned in paragraph 12 and in Mr. Cutler’s remarks were already the subject of very urgent study in the Defense Department.

The President stated that he had no particular objection to having such matters as were covered in paragraph 12 the subject of study at the present time. He still insisted, however, that the deployment of U.S. divisions in Germany was not justifiable from a political point of view.

Admiral Radford warned that if we proposed in the future to deploy in NATO more than three U.S. divisions, such a course of action would require very severe cuts in other Defense Department programs.

Moved by Admiral Radford’s warning, Secretary Humphrey stated that if the United States decided that there are certain things which we had got to do (such as reducing our deployments abroad), we should make these changes in such a way as to derive the maximum advantage from them vis-à-vis the USSR.

Secretary Dulles said he was obliged to take issue with this point of view. He did not think it was wise for the United States to alter any strategic position on the assumption that the Russians would actually honor any agreements they made with the United States. Rather, we should base such changes on our own careful estimate of what was advantageous to ourselves. He said he certainly hoped that the State Department was studying the problem of the future of Germany. We might conceivably be confronted in a year or so with a united and a virtually neutralized Germany. He explained that he thought this might come to pass because of the mounting pressures on the Soviets. It was proving very costly to them to maintain their position in East Germany and in the other satellites. Secretary Dulles added that he did agree with the President that at the present time these problems were primarily political in character and that it was the responsibility of the State Department to keep them under study.

Mr. Cutler continued a vigorous argument on behalf of his proposal for a joint study by military and State Department officials with a report to the National Security Council, but he failed to carry his point.

There then ensued another brief discussion of concrete problems in the development of Defense Department programs for the coming fiscal years. At the conclusion of this discussion, the President expressed the opinion that we were at the limit of efficient spending in the military field.

At the very end of the meeting, Mr. Cutler asked the Council to take one brief look at paragraph 11, which he read as follows:

“11. Should the United States in general attempt:

“a. To maintain a high level of tension (through political isolation of the Soviets, propaganda, covert pressures, economic limitations, etc.); or

“b. To lower tensions and to negotiate acceptable partial agreements whenever possible?”

Thereafter he noted that Secretary Wilson has sometimes at Council meetings expressed the view that we should lower tensions and negotiate acceptable agreements with the Soviets when possible, The President said he was certainly opposed to increasing tensions. Secretary Dulles commented that in the State Department we did not think of these things in these terms. We did not recommend measures in the State Department which were consciously designed either to raise tensions or to lower tensions in the world. Certainly we were not trying to lower tensions by pretending that Soviet intrigues were not as bad as we knew they were. Instead, we dealt with each issue on its own intrinsic merits.

The National Security Council:[8]

Noted and discussed the report on the subject contained in NSC 5707/6.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 19.

[2] Regarding the NSC 5707 series, see vol. X, p. 180 .

[3] NSC 5707/6, “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Political Elements of National Strategy”, dated April 8, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda. Questions 3, 4, and 5 of NSC 5707/6 related to maintaining NATO cohesion, the extension of U.S. bases, deployed forces, and alliances outside the NATO area, and the necessary reassurances to U.S. allies “that the increasing integration of nuclear weapons in U.S. armed forces does not diminish U.S. capabilities or willingness to apply limited or local force.”

[4] The written brief is filed in the minutes.

[5] Reference is presumably to telegram 5610 from London, vol. XX, p. 469 .

[6] The briefing note is filed in the minutes.

[7] The study is filed in the minutes.

[8] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1704, approved by the President on April 18. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

118. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 20, 1957[1]

Washington, May 20, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

General Goodpaster

The Secretary told the President that he had been informed the House was going to cut $2½ billion from the Defense budget.[2] Half of this is bookkeeping—this includes the Army’s unobligated carryover of funds referred to in the President’s letter to Speaker Rayburn.[3] There would also be a cut in the total authorized for the industrial funds. Also, the Congress is estimating Deutsche mark receipts higher than now expected. The other half of the cuts will, however, cut into the program.

Mr. Wilson said there are several questions that must be considered: whether we would offer any complaint regarding the bookkeeping adjustments; what action we would take where the program cuts really hurt; what response we would make where, in some instances, changes in schedules make it possible to accept the cuts.

Mr. Wilson then turned to the rate of expenditures, and said that he is disappointed with actions of the Air Force. They “rode over” the civilian leadership in obtaining additional funds through the Symington hearings last year. Also, their expenditures are rising month by month, and the Air Force is not trying to help. He said he is thinking of putting a freeze on any new contract commitments other than food and certain other soft goods. He said that the attempt to gain speed in program operation greatly increases costs, which the contractors, who are not operating under a fixed sum bid, simply pass on to the government. The President thought we should shift more of our contracts to competitive, fixed sum bidding. He said that Mr. Wilson should go after the Air Force and Navy procurement officials and hold them down. He added that he thinks this performance is a reason supporting the Hoover recommendations on budgeting on an annual accrual basis.[4] In his opinion human nature is such that once the funds are authorized the responsible civilian officials lose practical control. He thought we should shift in large measure to a different kind of contract, which would make the manufacturer absorb some of the cost rises and wage increases.

Mr. Wilson said he also wanted to consider cutting overtime on missiles and the B–52. The President said that he felt Mr. Wilson could tell Congress that the effect of cuts would be to require the elimination of this overtime. Mr. Wilson said that the Defense expenditures are running about $2 billion over the estimate, and asked whether income is running sufficiently ahead to cover this overage. The President said that it is not, and that he wants every possible action taken to assure that we do not run into the red. Mr. Wilson repeated that he would like to freeze new contract commitments until he is able to get the expenditure rate down, and also see what the Congress does to the FY–58 budget proposal.

The President said he thought we should certainly not have overtime on both the B–52 and the ballistic missile projects. He suggested the matter be brought before the NSC, indicating how much the overtime is costing us, and recommending priorities as between items. In initial discussion he indicated reasons for stopping overtime on the B–52; in further discussion he indicated that, since the B–52 is a proven weapon, it might be preferable to take the ballistic missiles off overtime. The President indicated agreement to stopping overtime generally, and freezing new contract commitments.

Mr. Wilson said that the question is not only one of specific savings, but to try to establish a new psychology by means of some dramatic actions. The President suggested as a further step the desirability of cutting draft calls in half during the next two months, and Secretary Wilson said he would give further consideration to this.

Mr. Wilson said that approximately $7 billion of the annual Defense budget is for direct costs of the forces, and that the forces must be cut prior to the beginning of FY–59. The President suggested starting to cut the force strength now. Mr. Wilson said that the proposals he had made could affect the FY-58 budget and that there were some bookkeeping actions available to hold down payment prior to the end of FY–57 but that the remaining time is too short to allow too much of a cut to be made. The President stressed strongly that he wished savings and cuts still to be made in FY–57. The President reiterated the need for something like the Hoover recommendations on accrual budgeting in order to gain control of expenditures.

The President and Mr. Wilson then briefly discussed proposals relating to top Defense personnel changes.

G

Brigadier General USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 21.

[2] Supplementary Notes of the Legislative Leadership meeting on May 14, which summarizes a meeting among the President, 14 Republican Senators and Representatives, and other administration officials on the defense budget and missiles, among other things, is ibid., Legislative Meetings.

[3] Reference is to Eisenhower’s letter to Representative Sam Rayburn dated April 18, on the fiscal year 1958 budget; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 301-309.

[4] Eisenhower’s thoughts on congressional authorization of appropriations on the basis of annual accrued expenditures, as recommended in the Hoover Commission Report on Budget and Accounting, dated April 1956, are ibid., p. 308, and later in his letter to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives on the Hoover Commission recommendations, dated June 17, ibid., p. 465.

119. Memorandum of Discussion at the 325th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 27, 1957[1]

Washington, May 27, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

2. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC Action No. 1675; NSC 5707; NSC 5707/1; NSC 5707/2;NSC 5707/3; NSC 5707/4; NSC 5707/5;NSC 5707/6; NSC 5707/7; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic National Security Policy”, dated May 24, 1957)[2]

Mr. Cutler commenced his briefing with a reminder to the Council of the new approach to the revision of basic national security policy. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)[3] He suggested that before explaining to the Council the major differences which had developed in the paper on the use of nuclear weapons in local war, he would like to clear up certain less significant points of controversy. Accordingly, he asked the Council to turn to paragraph 12, on page 5 of NSC 5707/7, which read as follows:

“12. The United States will [produce and]*[4] be prepared to use chemical and bacteriological weapons in general war** to the extent that they will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

“*Proposed by ODM Member.

“**ODM Member proposes deletion of the phrase ‘in general’.”

After reading the paragraph and explaining the difference between the majority view and the ODM view, Mr. Cutler asked Mr. Gray to speak to the point.

Mr. Gray said that he did not wish to stand on the inclusion of the bracketed phrase “[produce and]”. He said, however, that he wanted at least to raise the question as to the wisdom of limiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons to general war as opposed to limited conflicts.

Mr. Cutler then asked Admiral Radford for his views. Admiral Radford replied that the text of paragraph 12 as written, without the bracketed language and without the deletion of the phrase “in general war”, was satisfactory to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford explained that if a situation developed in which a commander wished to use these weapons in a local conflict, he would apply for authority to order the use of such weapons, and we could make a decision at the time. As far as military planning was concerned, the question was not particularly serious.

Secretary Wilson said he favored leaving paragraph 12 as it was and as Admiral Radford had suggested. Mr. Gray repeated that he was not pressing for the changes proposed by the ODM Member of the Planning Board. The President said it was all right to leave it as written, because the phrase “be prepared to use” implied at least some production of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Accordingly, Mr. Cutler suggested that the paragraph be left as written in NSC 5707/7.

Mr. Cutler next invited the Council’s attention to another split of views, this time in paragraph 49, on page 21, reading as follows:

“49. Stockpiling. The United States should not authorize further procurement for additions to the stockpile for strategic and critical materials, except to complete the three-year objectives.*”

“* Pending further study of the effects of this paragraph, the ODM Member reserves his position.“

Mr. Cutler explained that in place of the present paragraph 49, Mr. Gray had proposed a revision in lieu of his present reservation on this paragraph. Mr. Cutler then read Mr. Gray’s suggested revision, as follows:

“49. Stockpiling. The United States should not authorize further procurement* for additions to the Strategic Stockpile beyond the 3-year procurement priority levels except in those limited cases where procurement, within the long-term objectives, is necessary to maintain a vital domestic materials mobilization base.

“* This limitation would not apply in those cases where commitments have already been made to purchase or otherwise acquire materials for the Strategic Stockpile or for transfer to it under the Defense Production Act or Commodity Credit Corporation programs.”

Describing Mr. Gray’s version as more exact in its terminology, Mr. Cutler called on Mr. Gray for further elucidation.

Mr. Gray emphasized that his proposed new language would not really change the spirit or intent of the first version of paragraph 49— that is, his revised paragraph would still confine new stockpiling procurement to the completion of the 3-year objectives. On the other hand, his language would protect the programs that we are now engaged upon with respect to certain materials such as lead, zinc, antimony, etc., pending the development of a Long-Range Minerals Program. [5] If the Council accepted the Planning Board language instead of Mr. Gray’s, the effect would be to put an immediate stop to further procurement of these minerals. Moreover, additional materials might be included next year, in accordance with the exceptions policy directed by the President in 1954. In short, we may feel that it will be necessary to procure some other commodities and materials in order to preserve a vital mobilization base. This was, in summary, the purpose of the changes proposed in his version of paragraph 49.

The President recalled that Mr. Gray had spoken of the possibility of jeweled bearings being stockpiled. Was anybody thinking of taking jeweled bearings out of the stockpile? Mr. Gray replied that jeweled bearings would be taken out of the stockpile only in the event of an emergency. The President stated that we already have a 3 year supply of these bearings, and why were we proposing to get any more? Secretary Wilson replied that the reason we were proposing to get more was the “interest” which certain people had in jeweled bearings. He added that he was sternly opposed to continuing to maintain the 5 year objectives for stockpile levels, and was even somewhat dubious about the 3 year objectives.

Director Brundage asked Mr. Gray whether he was still purchasing lead and zinc for purposes of the mobilization base. Mr. Gray said that he was purchasing lead and zinc in accordance with the President’s directive to support a certain domestic production of these minerals. In point of fact, we had lead and zinc running out of our ears, and we would stop purchasing lead and zinc as soon as the proposed Long-Range Minerals Program was finally adopted.

Mr. Cutler inquired whether Mr. Gray did not feel that his revised language was necessary in order to bring the national stockpiling policy into consonance with the views of Congress. Mr. Gray replied in the negative, and said that his revised language was designed to take account of the President’s directive of 1954.

Secretary Humphrey said he could perfectly well understand Mr. Gray’s argument in favor of trying to ease off procurement of such minerals gradually and not suddenly. Nevertheless, he believed that we really must decide to come to a full stop in procurement of these minerals at some definite date and before three or four more years go by. Essentially we were engaged in procuring lead and zinc in order to avoid raising the tariff on imports of these minerals. If Congress did not adopt the Department of the Interior’s Long-Range Minerals Program, why should we continue this subterfuge of purchasing lead and zinc to avoid raising the tariff on them?

Mr. Gray replied that if this were done he would have to recommend to the President that he change the Executive Order of 1954. If the National Security Council directed the cutting off of further procurement of lead and zinc while the Congress is engaged in considering the Long-Range Minerals Program, we would be facing a very difficult situation. Secretary Humphrey said that he was not suggesting the cutting off of the procurement of lead and zinc prior to the end of the current session of Congress. He was merely arguing against continuing to purchase lead and zinc in the course of future sessions of Congress.

Mr. Gray said that he too disliked the use of stockpiling funds for these purposes, but that he did not see how he could cut off such procurement until the Administration took a different view of the matter. Secretary Wilson said that we all understood Mr. Gray’s position, but when did Mr. Gray plan to stop future procurement of these minerals? Mr. Gray said that of course this was purely a political problem. He would like very much himself to get off the hook, but the matter was also related to the barter of surplus agricultural commodities for minerals having a strategic value to the United States.

The President said that the point was at least arguable. After all, the Council had decided to place these minerals, which did not deteriorate in value, in the stockpile in exchange for certain surplus commodities whose value after a time would deteriorate. He still believed that this policy made good sense.

Mr. Cutler then suggested that the Council adopt Mr. Gray’s proposed language temporarily, until such time as Mr. Gray could come in with new language and after adoption of the Long-Range Minerals Program. Secretary Wilson commented that Mr. Cutler’s proposal would put Mr. Gray in a better position, but would put Secretary Wilson in a worse position. After all, the Defense Department could establish no security need for this kind of procurement for the stockpile. The President argued that this was not precisely the case. One of our purposes in acquiring these strategic materials from overseas was to help our allies and friendly nations who were in need of help. Accordingly in one sense, at least, this type of procurement was related to national defense.

Mr. Cutler then suggested further language to meet the points raised in the discussion, and asked Secretary Dulles to speak. Secretary Dulles replied that he thought Mr. Cutler’s language was appropriate. The original procurement program adopted by the Council in the interests of national defense and national security had worked well, but it was now on the point of collapsing. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles trusted that we would soon be given the Long-Range Minerals Program. If we failed to get this program, then it would be necessary for the National Security Council to review the entire procurement policy. Mr. Gray and Secretary Wilson both found difficulties with the language suggested by Mr. Cutler, and Secretary Wilson suggested language which would continue procurement under Mr. Gray’s exception clause, “until mobilization base needs were clarified”. Mr. Gray, however, took exception to this proposal, and stated that while he agreed firmly that there should be no further additions to the strategic stockpile beyond the 3-year levels, he had nevertheless been informed by staff officials of the Defense Department that it was necessary to take measures to keep jeweled bearings in production in the United States. The President agreed with this point, and added that it was for reasons of national security that we had raised the tariff recently on jeweled bearings.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that in view of the variety of opinion and the length of time which the Council had given to this problem, it might be feasible simply to state that paragraph 49, on stockpiling, would be deleted and the subject brought up for separate consideration at a later time. The President agreed with Mr. Cutler’s suggestion.

Mr. Cutler stated that he would now like to have the Council turn to the major area of policy cleavage in NSC 5707/7. These cleavages occurred in paragraph 11, 15 and 17. At the same time, he invited the Council’s attention to the sheets which had been passed out to the members of the Council, on which were noted paragraphs 11, 15, 16 and 17 as they were set forth in existing policy (NSC 5602/1) and as these paragraphs would read in the proposed revisions in NSC 5707/ 7. (Copies of these sheets[6] are filed in the minutes of the meeting.) The existing and proposed versions of these paragraphs were read by Mr. Cutler as follows:

“ Existing Policy (NSC 5602/1)

“ Proposed Revision (NSC 5707/7)

“11. It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.”

“11. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons, to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States, to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view, and to use them when required to achieve military objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President.”

“15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into general war. Such ready forces must be sufficiently versatile to use both conventional and nuclear weapons. They must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Such forces must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons. However, these forces must also have a flexible and selective nuclear capability, since the United States will not preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation.”

“15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted.

“The use of nuclear weapons in limited war is unlikely by itself to result in general nuclear war. Furthermore, the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Therefore, to oppose local aggression, U.S. forces must have a flexible and selective nuclear capability and, when its use is required, apply it in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from broadening into general war.”

16. With the coming of nuclear parity, the ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will of the Free World to resist aggression. The United States and its allies must avoid getting themselves in a position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risks of nuclear devastation. The apprehensions of U.S. allies as to using nuclear weapons to counter local aggression can be lessened if the U.S. deterrent force is not solely dependent on such weapons, thus avoiding the question of their use unless and until the deterrent fails. In the event of actual Communist local aggression, the United States should, if necessary, make its own decision as to the use of nuclear weapons. In the last analysis, when confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.”

No comparable paragraph.

“17. National security policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other Free World countries, in furnishing bases for U.S. military power and in providing their share of military forces. It is important for the United States to take the necessary steps to convince its allies, particularly its NATO allies, that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that the United States is committed to their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment. The United States should strengthen as practicable, the collective defense system and utilize, where appropriate, the possibilities of collective action through the UN. The United States should provide new weapons (non-nuclear) and advanced technology to allies capable of using them effectively, taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities and the likely availability of funds. Atomic energy legislation as it relates to weapons should be progressively relaxed to the extent required for the progressive integration of such weapons into NATO defenses, to the extent of enabling selected allies to be able to use them upon the outbreak of war. The United States should continue to provide military and other assistance, including where deemed appropriate new weapons and advanced technology, to dependable allied nations where such assistance is necessary to enable them to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power. Special attention in the technological field should be directed to assisting selected U.S. allies rapidly to develop their own advanced weapons systems, and in other ways significantly to increase utilization of Free World scientific and technological resources.”

“16. U.S. security is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other Free World countries, in providing their share of military forces and in furnishing bases for U.S. military power (although U.S. dependence on such bases is likely to diminish over the long run). The United States should take the necessary steps to convince its NATO and other allies that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that, while their full contribution and participation must be forthcoming, the United States is committed to their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment. The United States should strengthen as practicable the collective defense system and utilize, where appropriate, the possibilities of collective action through the UN.”

“17. a. The United States and its allies must accept nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required. Taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities, and the likely availability of funds, the United States should continue to provide to allies capable of using them effectively advanced weapons systems (including nuclear weapons systems less nuclear elements).

“b. Additionally, the United States should in the future, as feasible and appropriate, provide selected major allies with nuclear weapons with nuclear elements under arrangements which insure their employment in accordance with combined operational plans and common objectives. The United States should assist selected major U.S. allies rapidly to develop their own advanced weapons systems (excluding nuclear elements except in the case of the U.K.) and in other ways significantly to increase utilization of Free World scientific and technological resources. To achieve the foregoing, atomic energy legislation relating to nuclear weapons should, as necessary, be progressively relaxed.”

In the course of commenting on paragraph 17–b, Mr. Cutler pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested the substitution of the phrase “the United Kingdom and Canada” for “selected major allies” in the first sentence of the paragraph, and the deletion of the last two sentences.[7]

Mr. Cutler then said that the State Member of the Planning Board had indicated great concern over the proposed revision of paragraphs 11, 15 and 17. While he had not actually suggested alternate language, he had set forth the general views of the State Department on these paragraphs in the Annex to NSC 5707/7,[8] beginning on page 23. Mr. Cutler then read paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Annex, as follows:

“3. Three factors greatly complicate the problem of dealing effectively with limited hostilities:

“a. The wide range of contingencies as to objectives, participants, locale, extent, weapons, tactics—and the degree of intervention required from the United States.

“b. Our continued dependence on our allies and other Free World countries. If local aggression is to be prevented, we must rely on them to maintain their will to resist, their appropriate share of military forces, and access to their territories for the Free World military operations. Our policy and strategy cannot succeed unless they consider that their interests are served as well as our own.

“c. The extensive capabilities available to the USSR for direct or indirect local aggression using both conventional forces and nuclear weapons systems, and extending from threat to enticement.

“4. To fulfill our political purposes, our military policy and strategy for dealing with limited hostilities must:

“a. Leave the President free to choose the appropriate means (including choice as to nuclear or non-nuclear weapons) for responding to limited hostilities in the light of actual political and military circumstances.

“b. Offer the best prospect for coping with limited hostilities effectively with minimum risk of their expanding into general war.

“c. Not risk erosion of alliance and base arrangements vital to our security.

“d. Not lead threatened nations to reject U.S. military support in case of limited hostilities; or facilitate Soviet indirect aggression and subversion or foster accommodation.

“e. Not prejudice our moral leadership in the world by appearing to commit us to use of undue force.”

As a procedure, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council look first at paragraph 17 of NSC 5707/7, pointing out that in addition to the objections of the State Member of the Planning Board, the AEC Observer believed it premature to authorize giving nuclear weapons to foreign nations or assisting them technically in developing their own, and that he was therefore opposed to modifying existing legislation on this subject.

The President turned to Admiral Strauss and asked why the Atomic Energy Commission was opposed to changing the existing atomic energy legislation relating to nuclear weapons. Admiral Strauss replied that the AEC objection was based on the belief that the protection of classified information relative to the construction of nuclear weapons was not adequately safeguarded by our allies. If such information became available to the Soviets it would constitute information some of which we do not think the Soviets now have. Admiral Strauss therefore counselled that our policy should be to keep nuclear warheads under our own U.S. control, although they should be located in close proximity to the weapons in which they would be used in the event of war.

Apropos of the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs, the President asked Admiral Radford whether he had carefully considered the effect on our other allies of a U.S. policy which would restrict the provision of nuclear weapons and warheads to the United Kingdom and Canada alone. Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs had considered this matter, but had agreed that from the point of view of U.S. national security the most important course of action was to give such nuclear weapons to Canada for the air defense of the continent, in which the role of Canada was an integral part of the total defense picture. Admiral Radford admitted that providing these weapons to the United Kingdom would constitute a more difficult problem. [1 sentence (44 words) not declassified]

The President then suggested that subparagraph 17–b be rewritten to state in effect that in order to integrate the air defense of the continent, it was essential that Canada be provided with ground-to-air nuclear weapons. Admiral Radford replied that for that matter the Joint Chiefs of Staff would just as soon drop out the entire subparagraph, since the matter could not now be decided in any event (presumably because of the requirement for a change in the legislation). The President said that this was the way he certainly felt about it. Secretary Wilson and Secretary Quarles agreed on the desirability of deleting subparagraph 17–b altogether, in view of the existing world situation.

Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Radford if he thought deletion of subparagraph 17–b was indeed the best solution, or would it be better to go back to the phraseology on this subject which was contained in NSC 5602/1, the old policy. On further consideration, Mr. Cutler suggested that perhaps the best solution would be to delete subparagraph 17–b and adopt subparagraph 17–a, provided the course of action in subparagraph 17–a could be accomplished now without any change in legislation. Admiral Strauss and Admiral Radford agreed that there was no existing bar to carrying out the course of action set forth in subparagraph 17–a.

Mr. Cutler then suggested that the Council turn its attention to paragraph 15, which contained the most serious split of views with respect to the use of nuclear weapons in local aggression and related matters. He reminded the Council that the President had requested the Defense Department to draft its views on this subject in the manner which most fully represented the views of the Defense Department. He then called on Secretary Dulles to speak on this issue.

Secretary Dulles stated that he wished to speak rather generally of the new concept formulated by the Defense Department in paragraph 15 and in several other places in NSC 5707/7. He said he would preface his remarks by saying that he believed he accepted as fully as anyone present, and certainly more fully than any of his State Department colleagues, the inevitability of the general use of nuclear military power as conventional. As new sources of power have been developed historically, there were inevitably great difficulties of adjusting to them; but nevertheless one had in the last analysis to be realistic and to make the adjustment. The real problem, therefore, was the timeliness of the steps proposed by the Defense Department in NSC 5707/ 7, rather than the ultimate inevitability of treating nuclear weapons as conventional weapons. This, said Secretary Dulles, was not the time, in his opinion, to go as far as these paragraphs of NSC 5707/7 suggested. In the first place, in point of fact the United States does not now possess any nuclear weapons which are really limited in scope and power. Our so-called “little bang weapons” are actually of the type which produced such sensational results at Hiroshima. Thus, whether we have yet reached a point where we could wage a limited war with this kind of nuclear weapons, is very doubtful indeed.

Secondly, the concept of selectivity simply cannot be disregarded, and the apparent proposal to do so would run counter to public opinion as it has come down through the ages. The time will undoubtedly come when atomic weapons will be so varied and so selective that we can make use of them without involving widespread devastation, but that time is not yet. Thus, whereas the language of paragraphs 15 and 16 of the existing policy (NSC 5602/1) had emphasized that we should be prepared to make use of force selectively, the proposed revision of paragraph 15 in the present paper (NSC 5707/7) merely says that we will use atomic weapons selectively. Secretary Dulles stressed that he did not believe that we were yet ready and prepared to exercise a selective nuclear capability. If he were wrong, and we already did possess this selective nuclear capability, it was certainly something that the National Security Council should know about.

At this point Admiral Strauss interrupted, and asked if he could point out that nuclear weapons were now being developed which were approximately 10%, or even 5%, of the size of the weapon used at Nagasaki. Admittedly, however, these small weapons were in comparatively limited quantity at the present time. They were expensive, but the number of them could be increased if this were directed by authority.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that if in fact we now do have sufficient nuclear weapons to permit us to use them and at the same time confine the effects to local theatres of operations, it was extremely important that we should know this fact. Admiral Strauss indicated that this was a recent development. Secretary Dulles continued, pointing out that even if we do now have this capability (and he had not known it), our allies certainly do not realize that we possess such a capability. Accordingly, we must convince our allies that we have this capability and that these weapons can be used in such a way as to avoid the entire devastation of vast areas. Until we do so, the course of action proposed in the revision of paragraph 15 could be very dangerous indeed. For example, Chancellor Adenauer[9] believes, as a result of deep religious feelings, that the use of this type of force and this sort of weapon is wrong. Furthermore, said Secretary Dulles, he well remembered, some fifty years ago this week, the Peace Conference of 1907 at The Hague. This Conference was called to try to control warfare by submarines and balloons, there being no aircraft to control or exclude. The attitude of the German delegation on this occasion made a very deep impression on everybody. It was their view that it was simply not practical to make exceptions of any particular weapon and, indeed, that perhaps the best deterrent to war was to avoid making war more humane. Perhaps the Germans were right in this respect, but their timing was certainly wrong, and a very bad impression was made for Germany.

For reasons such as this, the United States could not disregard important elements of world opinion, and Secretary Dulles said he was convinced that world opinion was not yet ready to accept the general use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts. If we resort to such a use of nuclear weapons we will, in the eyes of the world, be cast as a ruthless military power, as was Germany earlier.

Secretary Dulles indicated that each of the Assistant Secretaries in the State Department had been asked to give his reaction to this problem.[10] All of them were strongly opposed to the policy on the subject proposed in NSC 5707/7, because of the disastrous effect of such a policy on public opinion in the areas for which these Assistant Secretaries were responsible. Secretary Dulles predicted that all this would change at some point in the future, but the time had not yet come, even if the United States is beginning to manufacture these smaller nuclear weapons. The State Department people prefer the older concept that “force” would be applied selectively, rather than the new concept that “nuclear weapons” will be applied selectively. Hence Secretary Dulles said that it was his view that the policy proposed in paragraph 15 of NSC 5707/7 reflected the wave of the future. As our allies become more and more acquainted with the facts of our selective nuclear capability, this wave of the future will be accepted by them. Meanwhile, the limitations on this issue set forth in NSC 5602/ 1 should be retained in the new basic national security policy paper. To illustrate his point, Secretary Dulles alluded to specific illustrations in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of NSC 5707/7.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his general observations, Mr. Cutler suggested that before the Council got down to considering the details of the phrasing of the paper, it should hear from Admiral Radford or Secretary Wilson on the general subject which had just been discussed by Secretary Dulles.

Admiral Radford stated that he personally did not disagree with much that Secretary Dulles had said. Perhaps much of the difficulty stemmed from the use to which this paper would be put. It is, of course, not given wide publicity. Nevertheless, in the Free World people do believe that U.S. military planning is along the line set forth in NSC 5707/7, and furthermore, said Admiral Radford, in his view we really adopted the essentials of this policy as far back as 1953. We have gotten a decision from the President, and we are in fact planning essentially along the lines of the military strategy set forth in NSC 5707/7.

Admiral Radford went on to say that for many years to come our stockpile of atomic weapons will not be so great as to permit any promiscuous use of such weapons. Moreover, for years to come the United States will continue to have very great conventional military capabilities. Nevertheless, we cannot go along with the old language of NSC 5602/1 with respect to the military elements of our national strategy. The language of NSC 5602/1 was simply too open and too fuzzed up to be useful for military planning purposes in the Defense Department.

Secretary Wilson commented that he was conscious that his own personal point of view was not as different from that of the Secretary of State as might seem to be the case. NSC 5707/7 was, after all, a secret policy paper, and one that is looking ahead to the future. After the President had interrupted briefly to express his strong and continued opposition to sending classified NSC papers overseas, Secretary Wilson continued his remarks. He noted that in the area under discussion, our program must be evolutionary rather than revolutionary in character. As Admiral Radford had pointed out, the United States still has strong conventional military capabilities. But the other side of the picture was this: The Defense Department was often severely criticized for seeming to develop two or even three different kinds of strategy, and Secretary Wilson said he could not go for this course of action either. There was, after all, no real way of avoiding resort to new military power once such power appears in the world. Accordingly, nuclear power must be developed and exploited, although on an evolutionary basis.

Finally, said Secretary Wilson, he was profoundly troubled about the definitions of limited war. Any kind of war in which U.S. military personnel were involved was very liable to develop into a big war. Secretary Wilson did not think that the United States should fight small wars. It should keep out of them. There should be no more Koreas. Accordingly, Secretary Wilson advised that this matter be clarified in the present paper and not leave the Defense Department to develop two strategies, each one of which cost billions of dollars. He said he would recommend that the Defense Department concept be rewritten to take account of the evolutionary development of the use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Dulles commented that it likewise seemed to him that his own views were not greatly different from those of Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson. But the evolutionary process of which Secretary Wilson had spoken must be timed both with relation to the techniques of the art of war and with the development of public opinion. He said that he felt a great sympathy for and an acceptance of the views of the Defense Department, but he did not want the United States to get out of step with world opinion.

The President stated that he had talked over these problems with Mr. Cutler prior to the meeting. At this time the President said that he himself had proposed a new sentence as an introduction to the second paragraph of paragraph 15 of NSC 5707/7, which the President read as follows: “local aggression as used in this paragraph refers only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved.” The President said that he had also a substitute for the last sentences in the second paragraph of paragraph 15, which he thought might meet the points which had been raised in the Council discussion thus far. The President read these sentences as follows: “Therefore, military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on the development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.”

Admiral Radford first referred to earlier discussions on measures required to protect Taiwan from Chinese Communist aggression and the need to use nuclear weapons in its defense. He added that what the President had suggested seemed to him exactly what we needed by way of revision. Mr. Cutler agreed with Admiral Radford, and reread paragraph 15 in its entirety as amended by the President. In explanation of his amendments, the President pointed out that military action in Berlin could not be kept local in character; nor, probably, could military action in the Near East. Limited wars could really only be limited in underdeveloped areas.

Secretary Dulles then stated his objection to the statement in paragraph 15 that “The use of nuclear weapons in limited war is unlikely by itself to result in general nuclear war.” The President added that with respect to his inclusion of language in the last sentences of paragraph 15 to indicate the development of a flexible and selected capability for use as authorized by the President, this qualification was not likely to impose any problems, because in the contingency of limited war as opposed to general war, it would not be difficult, in a timely manner, to get the President’s authorization for the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Cutler suggested that if the language proposed by the President was agreeable, the Council look at paragraph 11, with particular reference to what he understood to be the views of the Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles said he would prefer the phraseology “and to use them when required to achieve national objectives” rather than the phraseology “when required to achieve military objectives.” The President and other members of the Council agreed with Secretary Dulles’ preference.

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to paragraph 17-a, and the Secretary of State indicated that he did not like the phraseology “The United States and its allies must accept nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World, etc., etc.”. The President asked Secretary Dulles whether he meant that in effect we, the United States, accept nuclear weapons as an integral part of our arsenal, and we are trying to educate our allies to the same acceptance. Secretary Dulles said that the President was right, and that we were furthermore making considerable progress in getting our allies to accept this concept. Admiral Radford noted that as far back as 1953 the State Department had been charged in our basic national security policy paper with the effort to convince our allies that nuclear weapons should be an integral part of the Free World’s arsenal. He added that the State Department had done very well in carrying out this task. Mr. Cutler suggested that in place of the word “must”, we should insert the phrase “should continue to persuade”. The Council accepted Mr. Cutler’s amendment.

Mr. Cutler then asked Secretary Dulles whether he believed it desirable, as was suggested in the State Department annex to NSC 5707/7, that there should be a further study by an informed and disinterested group of the problem of the limited use of force or hypothetical studies of limited war. Secretary Dulles replied in the negative, as did the President and Admiral Radford, both with emphasis. The President, however, added that he would like to have Admiral Strauss come in with a report and a diagram delineating nuclear weapons available to the United States, from the 10-megaton weapon all the way down to the smallest size of nuclear weapon, as encompassed in our present programs. This should include the percentages of the different categories of weapons.[11]

Secretary Humphrey turned to the President and said he had just one observation to make. Let us be sure that we are clear, and that the language we choose is clear, as to the kind of program we are planning—the program for military planning of weapons, not the program for diplomacy. Secretary Humphrey warned that if we did not tailor our military planning and our military expenditures to nuclear capabilities, the result would cost an awful lot of money. No misunderstanding can be permitted that we are engaged in developing and continuing two distinct military capabilities and two different military strategies. The President commented that there just must be good sense and good judgment in this matter. Secretary Wilson strongly supported the point made by Secretary Humphrey.

Although Secretary Dulles was obliged to leave the meeting at this point to keep his engagement with Chancellor Adenauer, Mr. Cutler asked the President’s permission to call attention to a number of other paragraphs in NSC 5707/7 which had been agreed to in the Planning Board but which, nevertheless, marked a significant change of emphasis over the equivalent paragraphs in NSC 5602/1. In the course of pointing out these agreed paragraphs, Mr. Cutler came to paragraph 19, reading as follows:

“19. In those countries with which the United States does not have mutual security agreements, the United States should, where appropriate, avoid the provision of grant assistance as a means of compensation for base rights.”

With respect to this paragraph, Secretary Wilson said he believed that it should be deleted in its entirety. The United States should decide only on an ad hoc basis what it should do by way of compensation for base rights. Moreover, it was inopportune to agree to the policy set forth in paragraph 19 at the very time that former Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash was engaged in a review of U.S. base problems world-wide.[12] Admiral Radford strongly supported Secretary Wilson’s views. The President commented that in place of paragraph 19 he would prefer to put in language suggesting that we should look at our overseas bases with a very jaundiced eye, to see if in point of fact we needed them all (laughter).

Mr. Cutler suggested elimination of paragraph 19, and this met with general agreement.

The National Security Council:[13]

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement of Basic National Security Policy contained in NSC 5707/7, prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of the discussion at the NSC meetings on the NSC 5707 Series; in the light of the revision of paragraph 49 of NSC 5707/ 7 proposed by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memoranda of May 24, 1957.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5707/7, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 5, paragraph 11: Revise to read as follows:

“11. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view; and to use them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President.”

(2) Page 5, paragraph 12: Delete the bracketed words and the footnotes.

(3) Page 6, paragraph 15: Revise to read as follows:

“15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted.

“Local aggression as used in this paragraph 15 refers only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Therefore, military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on the development of an appropriate flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.”

(4) Page 7, paragraph 17: Revise to read as follows:

“17. The United States should continue efforts to persuade its allies to recognize nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required. Taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities, and the likely availability of funds, the United States should continue to provide to allies capable of using them effectively advanced weapons systems (including nuclear weapons systems less nuclear elements).”

(5) Page 8, paragraph 19: Delete, and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

(6) Page 21, old paragraph 49: Delete the paragraph except for the title “Stockpiling*”, and substitute the following footnoted:[14]

“* Action on this paragraph has been deferred pending further report to and consideration by the Council of the views of the interested departments and agencies.“

(7) Pages 23 and 24: Delete the Annex and the footnotes relating thereto, in view of the revisions agreed upon in paragraphs 11, 15 and 17, and in the light of the agreement by the Council that a study as suggested in paragraph 5 of the Annex is not needed at this time.

c. Noted the President’s request that the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, make a presentation of the types of nuclear weapons produced or being developed, by size of yield, and the approximate percentage of each type in the stockpile.

Note: NSC 5707/7, as amended and adopted, approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5707/8,[15] for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, with the understanding (a) that progress reports to the Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5707/8, and (b) that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for appropriate action.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on May 28.

[2] NSC 5602/1 is printed as Document 66. Regarding the February 19 memorandum and NSC 5707, see footnote 2, Document 110. Regarding NSC Action No. 1675, see footnote 13, Document 110. Regarding NSC 5707/1–6, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 117. The May 24 memoranda transmitted to the NSC a memorandum on NSC 5707/7 from the JCS to Secretary of Defense Wilson, dated May 24, and a revision of paragraph 49 of NSC 5707/7 proposed by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

[3] Neither the briefing note nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[4] All brackets in this document are in the source text.

[5] Regarding the Long-Range Minerals Program, see the editorial note, vol. X, p. 689 .

[6] The sheets are filed in the minutes.

[7] In their May 24 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, transmitted to the NSC in the May 24 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above, the JCS offered two reasons for these changes: “(1) To limit the statement of policy to provide for only the near term objective. (2) To avoid untimely reference to changes in the Atomic Energy Act.” (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5707 Series)

[8] “State Reservation on Paragraphs 11, 15 and 17,” was attached as an Annex to NSC 5707/7. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

[9] Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was then having talks with U.S. officials in Washington. Documentation on his visit to the United States, May 24–29, is scheduled for publication in volume XXVI.

[10] The memoranda are in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5707 Series. A memorandum from Bowie to Dulles summarizing the memoranda was not declassified. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

[11] For a summary of Strauss’ report, see Document 121.

[12] Regarding Nash’s study, see footnote 2, Document 83 and Document 172.

[13] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1728, approved by the President on June 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[14] Because paragraph 19 was deleted, this paragraph became paragraph 48 in NSC 5707/8. See footnote 7, infra.

[15] Infra

120. National Security Council Report[1]

Washington, June 3, 1957.

NSC 5707/8

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5602/1

B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957

C. NSC Action No. 1675

D. NSC 5707; NSC 5707/1; NSC 5707/2; NSC 5707/3;NSC 5707/4; NSC 5707/5; NSC 5707/6; NSC 5707/7

E. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic National Security Policy”, dated May 24, 1957

F. NSC Action No. 1728 [2]

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, at the 325th Council meeting on May 27, 1957, discussed the draft statement of Basic National Security Policy contained in NSC 5707/7, prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of the discussion at the NSC meetings on the NSC 5707 Series, in the light of the revision of paragraph 49 of NSC 5707/ 7 proposed by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memoranda of May 24, 1957. The Council adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5707/7, subject to the amendments thereto set forth in NSC Action No. 1728-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5707/7, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5707/8, and directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, with the understanding that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

NSC 5707/8 supersedes NSC 5602/1, and is the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress reports to the National Security Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5707/8.

The Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, are being requested to prepare the study of the relation between U.S. gold reserves and the growth of U.S. foreign liabilities, referred to in the footnote to Section B—III of the enclosure. The Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, is being requested to prepare paragraph 48, on “Stockpiling”, in the light of the views of the interested departments and agencies, for submission through the NSC Planning Board to the National Security Council for consideration.

James S. Lay, Jr.[3]

[Here follows a table of contents.]

STATEMENT OF BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Preamble

1. The spiritual, moral and material posture of the United States of America rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality and freedom of the human being under God. These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society, and are the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world. When they are challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage. From this premise must derive our national will and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the basic objective of our national security policies: maintaining the security of the United States and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions.

Section A

Outline of U.S. National Strategy

2. The basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States, and its fundamental values and institutions.

3. The basic threat to U.S. security is presented by the continuing hostility of the USSR and Communist China and their growing military and economic power; in combination with the unrestricted development of nuclear[4] weapons, the weakness or instability in critical areas where there is strong pressure for economic or political change, and the menace of the intercontinental Communist apparatus.

4. The basic purpose of U.S. national strategy is to cope with these interrelated factors, without seriously weakening the U.S. economy, so as to minimize the threat to U.S. security and to create and maintain an international environment in which the United States can sustain its fundamental values and institutions.

5. The United States and its allies have no foreseeable prospect of stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of reducing Soviet armed strength—the core of Communist power—or of significantly reducing other basic Communist military strength, except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation by the United States of such military action for this purpose is not an acceptable course either to the United States or its major allies.

6. Hence, U.S. policies must be designed (a) to affect the conduct and policies of the Communist regimes, especially those of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests (including safeguarded disarmament); and (b) to foster tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:

a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S. security.

b. Maintaining and developing in the Free World the mutuality of interest and common purpose, the confidence in the United States, and the will, strength and stability necessary to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of the free peoples.

c. In addition to a and b above, taking other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:

(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the United States.

(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes to disrupt the structure of the Soviet-Communist bloc.

(3) By exploiting vulnerabilities within the bloc countries in ways consistent with this general strategy.

d. Destroying or neutralizing the international Communist apparatus in the Free World.

7. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, psychological, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another.

8. Provided that it is resolutely pursued, this general strategy offers the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of the Soviet bloc-Free World conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment. Failure resolutely to pursue this general strategy could, within a relatively short span of years, place the United States in great jeopardy.

Section B

Elements of National Strategy

I. Military Elements of National Strategy

9. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of total nuclear war, the possibility of local conflicts developing into total war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interests: that it will not pay.

10. If this purpose is to be achieved, the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop. In addition, the deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the United States and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force against such aggression.

11. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view; and to use them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President.

12. The United States will be prepared to use chemical and bacteriological weapons in general war to the extent that they will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

13. If time permits and an attack on the United States or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear chemical or bacteriological weapons is made by the President.

14. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or action which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted.

Local aggression as used in this paragraph refers only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Therefore, military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on the development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.

16. U.S. security is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other Free World countries, in providing their share of military forces and in furnishing bases for U.S. military power (although U.S. dependence on such bases is likely to diminish over the long run). The United States should take the necessary steps to convince its NATO and other allies that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that, while their full contribution and participation must be forthcoming, the United States is committed to their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment. The United States should strengthen as practicable the collective defense system and utilize, where appropriate, the possibilities of collective action through the UN.

17. The United States should continue efforts to persuade its allies to recognize nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required. Taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities, and the likely availability of funds, the United States should continue to provide to allies capable of using them effectively advanced weapons systems (including nuclear weapons systems less nuclear elements).

18. The United States should continue to provide military and support assistance to dependable allied nations were such assistance is necessary to enable them to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power. To the extent possible without sacrifice of U.S. security, the United States should seek to reduce requirements for military assistance by encouraging selected recipient countries (principally non-European) (1) to reduce large indigenous forces maintained to resist external aggression to a size commensurate with both the economic ability of the allied country to support and with the external threat, placing reliance for additional support on U.S. capabilities, and (2) to emphasize police-type forces for internal security purposes in lieu of large indigenous military establishments.

19. The United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. Hence, the United States should attempt to make clear, by word and conduct, that it is not our intention to provoke war. At the same time the United States and its major allies must make clear their determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war; and the United States must make clear its determination to prevail if general war eventuates.

20. Dynamic research and development for military application are a necessity for the continued maintenance of an adequate U.S. military posture and effective armed forces. Without increasing effectiveness in the research and development field, U.S. weaponry may in the future fall qualitatively behind that of the USSR, with concomitant danger to U.S. security. U.S. research and development must be carried out with full recognition of this potential danger. Moreover, the United States must speed up, by all practicable steps, the means whereby important scientific discoveries can be translated into an appropriate flow of new weapons to the armed forces.

II. Political and Economic Strategy

21. Political and economic progress in the Free World is vitally important (a) to maintain the effectiveness of the military deterrent by preserving the cohesion of our alliances and the political basis for allied facilities and capabilities; (b) as an end in itself, in strengthening the vitality and well-being of the free nations; and (c) to create the conditions which over time will be conducive to acceptable change in the Communist bloc. Behind the shield of its deterrent system, the United States should place relatively more stress on promoting growth and development in the Free World and constructive evolution in the Communist bloc.

A. Strengthening the Free World

22. The United States should take adequate actions for the purpose of (a) creating cohesion within and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily improving the relative position of the Free World; (b) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the Free World; and (c) combatting the effects of Soviet bloc diplomatic and economic activities in the Free World. Success in these endeavors will depend heavily on the degree to which the United States and its major allies can attain agreement on objectives and actions to achieve them, consistent with basic U.S. objectives.

23. In the face of divisions, fears, and weaknesses, which in many cases the Communists can exploit, the United States must choose between (a) taking timely action to help remedy such conditions, or (b) allowing the situation to deteriorate with the prospect of later trying to prevent Communist gains by more costly and less certain measures, or even military action. The ability of the Free World, over the long pull, to meet the challenge and competition of the Communist world will depend in large measure on the capacity to demonstrate progress toward meeting the basic needs and aspirations of its peoples.

24. Two of the basic problems in the economic field are: (a) industrialized areas require further economic growth and expanded trade; and (b) the less developed areas seek to develop and modernize their economies and must also maintain a substantial volume of exports of primary products. It should be within the capacity of the Free World, with U.S. initiative and leadership, to turn these two problems into mutually supporting assets for the promotion of appropriate economic strength and growth.

25. A necessary condition for such strength and growth is a high level of international trade within the Free World. In order to foster this, the United States should (a) continue to press strongly for a general reduction of barriers to such trade; (b) take the lead by reducing further its own tariffs and other trade restrictions over the next few years, with due regard to national security and total national advantage; and (c) also support sound moves to widen the convertibility of currencies.

26. a. The United States should encourage and support movements toward European unity, especially those leading to supra-national institutions, bearing in mind that the basic initiative must come from the Europeans themselves. The United States should continue the policy of providing financial and other assistance to promote such integration.

b. The United States should encourage and assist the development of the sounder relationship between Europe and Africa which is now emerging.

c. The United States may find it expedient to continue economic assistance to certain European countries, such as Spain, Yugoslavia and Turkey, to assist them in achieving stability and growth while maintaining necessary military forces.

27. a. Dangers to Free World stability are particularly acute in the less developed areas. The United States should support and foster economic growth in these areas in order to increase political stability and Free World cohesion. The task of speeding up economic growth and promoting stability presents a multitude of political, social, and economic problems, and calls for some changes in traditional habits and attitudes and for greatly expanded training in administrative and technical skills.

b. New capital investment is a prerequisite to growth. Utilization of private investment should be encouraged to the maximum feasible extent. Local capital will have to be supplemented by the provision of capital from abroad. In addition to external public and private investment and IBRD loans, the United States must be prepared to continue an economic development assistance program on a substantial and long-term basis, to help achieve the economic progress essential to U.S. interests.

28. a. U.S. foreign economic programs should be designed to:

(1) Promote conditions of sound development in less developed nations in order to retain and strengthen them as members of the Free World.

(2) Demonstrate to those nations that they can progress economically without becoming dependent upon the soviet bloc or endangering their independence.

(3) Recognizing that it is not U.S. policy to endeavor in each instance to match Soviet offers, counter so far as practicable the apparent attractiveness and damaging effects of the Soviet bloc economic offensive.

b. The United States should be prepared to use economic means available to it to promote conditions of sound development in less developed nations where:

(1) The political and economic situation is important to the security of the United States.

(2) Such development cannot be financed by local capital or other non-Communist foreign assistance.

(3) Such assistance will be effectively used and recipient governments are willing to take appropriate measures, when necessary, toward that end.

c. The total level of U.S. economic assistance worldwide should be consistent with the objectives we seek to achieve in the world, such as peace, the security and economic vitality of the United States, the independence of the new states, long-range security interests, and the development of future markets. Increases in economic development assistance should, to the extent politically and militarily feasible, be offset by decreases in other economic or in military assistance programs.

d. In order to make the most effective use of economic aid resources and to facilitate planning of longer-term projects and programs necessary for economic development, the Executive Branch should obtain authority for a fund to make loans for economic development repayable whenever necessary in local currencies.

29. U.S. financial assistance alone cannot produce satisfactory economic growth in less developed areas. External assistance should be used in a way to promote local self-help, incentives, and initiative in mobilizing local resources and developing sound programs. In addition to the provision of financial assistance, the United States should devote more effort (by training programs, aid to local institutions, and providing competent advisers) to the development of local leaders, administrators, and skilled personnel, recognizing that such people are essential for using and managing other resources effectively.

30. U.S. political policies must be adapted to conditions prevailing in each less developed area. The United States should not exert pressure to make active allies of countries not so inclined, but should recognize that the independence of such countries from Communism serves U.S. interests even though they are not aligned with the United States. The United States should provide assistance on the basis of the will and ability of such countries to defend and strengthen their independence, and should take other feasible steps which will strengthen their capacity to do so.

31. The United States cannot afford the loss to Communist extremism of constructive nationalist and reform movements in colonial areas in Asia and Africa. The United States should seek (a) to work with, rather than against, such forces when convinced they are likely to remain powerful and grow in influence; and (b) to prevent the capture of such forces by Communism. Where disputes or tensions involve the relations of a major U.S. ally with a colonial or dependent area, the United States should use its influence in behalf of an orderly evolution of political arrangements toward self-determination, and should seek to strengthen the forces of moderation in both the colonial and metropolitan areas.

32. The United States should continue its full support of and active leadership in the United Nations and specialized agencies, and should seek to make maximum use of the UN for the settlement of international disputes and as an instrument of collective security. The UN forum, moreover, can serve and should be used as an effective means to mobilize Free World opinion in support of U.S. policies, to expose Soviet propaganda and activities, and to exploit the vulnerabilities of Soviet management of the satellite empire.

33. The United States should actively continue to carry out its programs for the peaceful uses of atomic energy in order to maintain U.S. leadership and initiative in this field.

34. In countries vulnerable to subversion, the United States should, as one of its objectives, assist in the development of adequate local internal security forces, recognizing that direct action against the Communist apparatus must rest largely with the local government concerned. The United States should:

a. Seek to alert vulnerable countries to the methods and dangers of Communist subversion.

b. [remainder of paragraph (15 words) not declassified]

c. [remainder of paragraph (14 words) not declassified]

d. In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control, take all feasible measures to thwart it, including military action if required and appropriate to cope with the situation.

B. Means of Directly Influencing the Communist Bloc

35. a. The primary means for influencing Soviet conduct must be adequate political, military, and economic programs and actions. The USSR and Communist China cannot be expected to revise their methods of operation or their practical goals more conformably to U.S. interest unless further Communist expansion is prevented, present Communist techniques of pressure and inducement are effectively countered, and the relative position of the Free World is manifestly improved.

b. The Free World has in addition such specific means of influencing Soviet conduct as East-West relations, the negotiating process, and the exploitation of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities. U.S. policies on each of these subjects should be designed to achieve a consistent effect, and should be carried out so as to be compatible with basic national security strategy and so as not to weaken the will to resist Communism in the Free World.

36. In utilizing East-West relations, negotiations and exploitation of vulnerabilities to influence Soviet conduct, the United States should seek (a) to reduce the likelihood or capability of Soviet aggression or subversive expansion; (b) to give to the Communist regimes a clear conception of the true U.S. and Free World purposes, including uncompromising U.S. determination to resist Communist aggressive moves and uphold freedom; (c) to convince the Communist leaders that alternatives exist to their present policies which would be acceptable to the United States and which they might come to consider compatible with their own security interests; (d) to correct the distorted image of the West which has been sedulously cultivated for years inside the USSR; (e) to encourage the Communist regimes to take measures which would make more difficult a reversal of peaceful policy and which might over the long run lead to basic changes in the outlook or character of Communist regimes; (f) to expose the true nature of Communist imperialism.

37. In East-West relations the United States should continue to sponsor proposals for a selective expansion of Free World-Communist bloc contacts, which are chosen with a view to:

a. Maintaining Free World initiative and leadership for genuinely reciprocal reductions of the barriers to free communications and peaceful trade;

b. Increasing the acquisition of useful intelligence concerning the Communist bloc; and

c. Avoiding a net disadvantage to the United States from such contacts;

and which, if accepted, would favor evolution in the Soviet society and economy toward peaceful development, or, if rejected, would expose the persistence of expansionism behind the facade of Soviet tactics and propaganda. In considering proposals for such Free World-Communist bloc contacts, the United States should take account of the effect of the U.S. example upon other free nations more vulnerable to Communist penetration.

38. The United States should continue its readiness to negotiate with the USSR whenever it appears that U.S. security interests will be served thereby. Such negotiations have additional importance in maintaining Free World initiative and cohesion, and are desirable in order to probe the intentions and expose the meaning of Soviet policies. The United States and its major allies should be prepared to sponsor genuinely reciprocal concessions between the Free World and the Communist bloc which would leave unimpaired the net security position of the Free World and which would contribute to the ultimate peaceful resolution of the Communist threat. The United States should not, however, make concessions in advance of similar action by the Soviets, in the hope of inspiring Soviet concessions. Until the USSR evidences a modification of its basic hostility toward the non-Communist world through concrete actions, agreements should be dependent upon a balance of advantages to the non-Communist world and not upon implied good will or trust in written agreements.

39. The United States in its own interest should, as interrelated parts of its national policy, actively seek a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; concurrently, in related, parallel steps, make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues; and meanwhile continue the steady development of strength in the United States and in the Free World coalition required for U.S. security. As the initial step in this international arms system, the United States should give priority to early agreement on and implementation of (a) such confidence-building measures as the exchange of military blueprints, mutual aerial inspection and establishment of ground control posts at strategic centers; (b) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible; and (c) measures likely to forestall nations not now possessing nuclear weapons from developing a capability to produce them. The acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depend primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.

40. In the exploitation of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities, the United States should design its policies and programs (a) to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and conduct in ways that further U.S. and Free World security; (b) to weaken the ties which link the USSR and Communist China and bind their satellites; (c) to encourage bureaucratic and popular pressures inside the bloc for greater emphasis by the regimes on their internal problems, and on national interests in the satellites; and (d) to undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own system and ideology. The effort should be to pose for them the necessity of devoting attention and resources to these needs or facing increased disaffection with the regime or the satellite relationship if these needs are ignored. When feasible, the Executive Branch should seek changes in legislation relaxing present restrictions on the use of economic aid to foster the development of independence among the Eastern European satellites.

41. In applying this strategy to Communist China the United States must take account of non-recognition of the regime, the hostility of the regime, its aggressive policy, and the undesirability of enhancing the power and influence of Communist China relative to free Asian nations. Moreover, the United States should not overlook any possibility, however remote, of fostering among the Chinese people demands for an alternative to the Communist regime. However, the United States should continue its willingness to participate in talks with, or including, Communist China on specific subjects on an ad hoc basis where the general objectives of its political strategy against the Communist bloc would be served thereby.

C. Foreign Information and Related Programs

42. a. Strong foreign information, cultural exchange, educational exchange and comparable programs are vital elements in the implementation of U.S. policies. U.S. policies and actions should be presented in a manner which will advance U.S. objectives, and their psychological implication should be carefully considered in advance.

b. In interpreting abroad U.S. policies and actions, the United States should seek to (1) project an image of the United States which reflects the fundamentally peaceful intent of U.S. policies, while making clear our determination to resist aggression; (2) delineate those important aspects of U.S. life, culture and institutions which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the United States; (3) persuade foreign peoples that U.S. objectives will actually aid the achievement of their legitimate national objectives and aspirations; (4) expose Communist aims and actions and adequately counter Soviet propaganda; (5) encourage evolutionary change in the Soviet system, along lines consistent with U.S. security objectives and the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the USSR; (6) assure the satellite peoples of the continuing interest of the U.S. in the peaceful restoration of their independence and political freedom.

III. Domestic Strength and Other National Security Measures[5]

43. Sound U. S. Economy

a. A strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy is essential to the security and stability of the Free World. The level of expenditures for national security programs must take into full account the danger to the United States and its allies resulting from impairment, through inflation or the undermining of incentives, of the basic soundness of the U.S. economy or of the continuing expansion of the U.S. economy under a free enterprise system.

b. The Federal Government should maintain overall credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy and make a determined effort to keep its expenditures below its anticipated revenues by an amount sufficient to permit some reduction in the public debt and from time to time to provide for tax reductions; recognizing that the United States must continue to meet the necessary costs of the programs essential for its security.[6]

c. All Federal expenditures, especially those not essential for the national security, should be held to a necessary minimum. Every effort should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal Government.

d. The United States should also seek (1) to maintain a higher and expanding rate of economic activity at relatively stable price levels, and (2) to maximize the economic potential of private enterprise by minimizing governmental controls and regulations and by encouraging private enterprise to develop natural and technological resources (e.g. nuclear power).

44. Internal Security. Internal security measures should be made adequate, by strengthening them as necessary, to meet the threat to U.S. security of covert attack by the Soviet bloc on the United States by means of sabotage, subversion, espionage and, particularly, the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons.

45. Civil Defense. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is an improved and strengthened civil defense program which seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack. An effective civil defense program requires an increasing degree of Federal responsibility, support, and influence on the Civil Defense activities of the States.

46. Support by U.S. Citizens

a. No national strategy to meet the Soviet threat can be successful without the support of the American people. During a time of increasing Soviet nuclear power, the determination of U.S. citizens to face the risks involved in carrying out such national strategy will be of increasing importance. Continuing efforts should be made to inform the American people of the demands on their spiritual and material resources necessary to ensure U.S. security by political, military and economic means during a period of armed truce, which may either continue for many years or be broken by an atomic war.

b. Eternal vigilance is necessary in carrying out the national strategy, to prevent the intimidation of free criticism. Necessary protective measures should not be used to destroy national unity, which must be based on freedom and not on fear.

47. Mobilization Base. The mobilization base (military and non-military) should be designed to meet the requirements of (a) general war, initiated by the enemy with an atomic onslaught or as a result of hostilities which were not intended to lead to general war, (b) cold war, and (c) military conflict short of general war. Emphasis should be given to those elements that will increase U.S. D-day readiness and capability. The base should meet the following objectives:

a. Maintenance of the active forces in a condition of optimum readiness to execute initial wartime missions.

b. Maintenance and support in a high state of readiness of those selected reserve forces so essential to the execution of initial wartime missions as to require their being given priority treatment.

c. Maintenance and support of phased expansion to M + 6 months force levels.

d. The capacity to meet the combat requirements of all forces which would be mobilized by M + 6 months.

e. Pre-D-day provision and positioning of resonably protected stocks of selected supplies and equipment outside the United States to insure that U.S. forces surviving the enemy atomic attack will have a reasonable capability of performing assigned initial tasks effectively despite substantial interruption of resupply from the United States during the initial phase of war.

f. Maintenance and support of the industrial capacity to conserve and replenish stocks that may be used in a local war.

g. Development and maintenance in a high state of readiness of measures essential to survival as a nation, including minimum civilian needs and continuity of government.

Implementation of mobilization base objectives should emphasize immediate combat readiness and effectiveness, reflect any planned reductions in the over-all physical size of the military establishment, and provide for increased selectivity aimed at bringing the mobilization base structure, including equipment and standby facilities, in consonance with strategic concepts.

48. Stockpiling.[7] The United States should not authorize further procurement[8] for additions to the Strategic Stockpile authorized under P.L. 520, 79th Congress, beyond the 3-year procurement priority levels, except in those limited cases where procurement, within the long-term objectives described in the Presidential directive of April 14, 1954, is necessary to maintain the vital domestic production component of the materials mobilization base.[9]

49. Intelligence. The United States should develop and maintain an intelligence system capable of collecting the requisite data on and accurately evaluating:

a. Indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world.

b. The capabilities of foreign countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic and subversive courses of action affecting U.S. security.

c. Potential foreign developments having a bearing on U.S. national security.

50. Manpower. The United States should develop an adequate manpower program designed to:

a. Expand and improve scientific and technical training

b. Provide an effective military training system based so far as possible on equitable principles.

c. Maintain the necessary active military forces with an adequate number of career leaders, specialists and the highly trained manpower required for modern war.

d. Develop and maintain suitably screened, organized and trained reserve forces of the size necessary for selected missions in the early phases of war, and for the phased expansion to M + 6 months force levels.

e. Strike a feasible balance between the needs of an expanding peacetime economy and defense requirements, and develop incentives and improved public attitudes which will improve the ability of the armed forces and essential defense-supporting activities, including research, to obtain, in relation to normal commercial activities, highly trained scientific and technical manpower.

f. Provide effective manpower mobilization plans and an appropriate distribution of services and skills thereunder in order to meet the manpower requirements of any type of national emergency.

51. Research and Development. The United States must achieve and maintain a rate of technological advance adequate to serve its over-all national security objectives. To this end there are required:

a. Increased awareness throughout the nation of the importance to national security of technological advance and of the need for greater motivations for our youth to pursue scientific careers.

b. Strong continuing support by the U.S. Government for basic and applied research, in proper balance.

c. Improved methods for the evaluation, collation and dissemination of U.S. and foreign scientific information.

d. The fostering of foreign, or cooperative U.S.-foreign, scientific endeavor in friendly countries.

e. Facilitation of wider application by industry, within the bounds of security, of the results of governmental research and development including that performed for military purposes.

As research and development is translated into an operational capability with new weapons, there should be an attendant continuing review of the level and composition of forces and of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for successful prosecution of general war.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Series. Top Secret.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1728, see footnote 13, supra.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[4] As used in this paper, the term “nuclear” refers to any military device of any size or purpose which utilizes energy released in the course of nuclear fission or fusion. [Footnote in the source text.]

[5] A study will be made by Treasury, Budget and CEA of the relation between U.S. gold reserves and the growth of U.S. foreign liabilities. [Footnote in the source text.]

[6] Except in the event of some unforeseen critical emergency of an international or economic character, it is not intended to request for any Fiscal Year through FY 1962 an appropriation for the Department of Defense above the planning figure for FY 1959 (see NSC Action No 1643). [Footnote in the source text. Regarding NSC Action No. 1643, see footnote 7, Document 101.]

[7] The notation “(Revised 7/12/57)” typed on the source text indicates that this paragraph and footnotes 8 and 9 below became NSC Action No. 1747–b as agreed to at the NSC meeting on July 11, and approved by the President on July 12. See the NSC memorandum of discussion, vol. X, p. 703 .

[8] This limitation would not apply in those cases where commitments have already been made to purchase or otherwise acquire materials for the Strategic Stockpile or for transfer to it under the Defense Production Act or Commodity Credit Corporation programs, unless any such commitments can be canceled with advantage to the Government. [Footnote in the source text.]

[9] Through FY 1958 new mobilization base procurement could include lead, zinc, and battery-grade manganese (synthetic dioxide). At the current rate of purchase in accordance with the Presidential directive of April 14, 1954, the long-term objective for zinc would be reached in almost a year and the long-term objective for lead would be reached in almost two years. New purchases of zinc and lead for the Strategic Stockpile will end on the implementation of the long-range minerals program now before the Congress, even if this date precedes the attainment of the long-term objectives. [Footnote in the source text.]

121. Memorandum of Discussion at the 326th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 13, 1957[1]

Washington, June 13, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Types of Nuclear Weapons (NSC Action No. 1728–c)[2]

Mr. Cutler pointed out that at the Council meeting on May 27, the President had requested Admiral Strauss to “make a presentation of the types of nuclear weapons produced or being developed, by size of yield, and the approximate percentage of each type in the stockpile.” Admiral Strauss had made his presentation to the President and most of the members of the Council on board the U.S.S. Saratoga last week.[3] At that time the Secretary of State had indicated that he would like to return to the subject for further discussion at a later time. In addition to the presentation on the Saratoga, Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Strauss had briefed the Vice President and other members of the Council who had not been on the Saratoga, just prior to this morning’s meeting. The presentation had also been made to the NSC Planning Board. Mr. Cutler then said that Admiral Strauss would now like to comment briefly on the tactical use of nuclear weapons, and would be prepared thereafter to answer any questions.

Admiral Strauss emphasized that the subject of tactical use of nuclear weapons had arisen in his mind as a result of particular questions directed to him earlier by the Secretary of State. Admiral Strauss went on to point out that public opinion in the world today mostly considers nuclear weapons to be indiscriminate in character and capacity for destruction, and that therefore their use is likely to induce general nuclear war. The Soviets naturally encourage this illusion since, if nuclear weapons were to be totally banned, the Soviets would enjoy the great military advantage of their superiority in manpower. Thus, if the United States were inhibited from the use of nuclear weapons we might well be unable to respond to local Communist aggression. It was therefore essential that public opinion come to understand that the United States does possess tactical nuclear weapons, and that they can be used in military operations without causing indiscriminate devastation, [remainder of paragraph and 5 additional paragraphs (1 page of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that it was quite possible that the Soviets faced rather severe problems in the matter of testing very large weapons, because they had no completely empty spaces equivalent to our Pacific testing grounds at Bikini or Eniwetok. In short, if they were to test weapons of very great magnitude they might find it necessary to move whole populations. Governor Stassen pointed out that in his speech about May 1, Marshal Zhukov had claimed that the Soviet Union possessed a wide variety of nuclear weapons.[4]

The President inquired about the claim recently made by the Soviets that they had manufactured a nuclear bomb which was so big that they did not dare to set it off. Governor Stassen indicated that this claim derived from a rumor about a speech which Marshal Zhukov had made to some Polish journalists.

Turning to Admiral Radford, the President expressed great doubt as to whether it was possible to blow up concrete pillboxes by the use of atomic weapons. Admiral Radford agreed that this was doubtful, but pointed out that we had alternatives to use against such fortifications, as, for example, napalm bombs. Moreover, he said, with our present atomic capabilities we would not expect our forces to be held up by one line of pillboxes; it would be perfectly simple to go around them.

The National Security Council:[5]

Discussed the subject in the light of a presentation by the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, made pursuant to NSC Action No. 1728–c.

[Here follow agenda items 2–4. Item 3, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea,” is scheduled for publication in volume XXIII.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 14.

[2] See footnote 13, Document 119.

[3] A memorandum for NSC record, drafted by Cutler on June 7, reads in part: “At the Saratoga Conference on June 6, 1957, there being present the President, J.F. Dulles, Brundage, Wilson, Humphrey, Gray, Larson, Strauss, Goodpaster, Gates, Persons, Admiral Burke, Cutler, Admiral Strauss presented the report recently requested by the President (June 1/57) [5 words not declassified]. He spoke from two charts, [23 words not declassified]. The brief presentation provoked considerable questioning (total period about 25 minutes) relative [14 words not declassified].” (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Records, Chronological File)

[4] No statement on the Soviet Union’s possession of nuclear weapons by Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Soviet Minister of Defense, including his May Day speech, the complete text of which is printed in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. IX, No. 18 (1957), pp. 33–34, has been found.

[5] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1729, approved by the President on June 15. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

122. Editorial Note

On June 14 and 15, the annual Department of Defense (or Military) Secretaries’ Conference was held in Quantico, Virginia. The featured speaker on the morning of June 14 was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The Secretary spoke on the free world collective security system and its relationship to the strategic concepts of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons which brought “a higher degree of security at lesser cost than we could get if each had to try to get that for himself” and the need to counter peripheral acts of aggression with more limited warfare. Dulles acknowledged that massive retaliation, “which has served us so well and which will continue to serve us well, has certain weaknesses which have become increasingly apparent during the last two or three years as the Soviet Union as well as we have developed the increasingly massive destructive capability of nuclear weapons.” Citing the old adage, “the punishment should fit the crime,” he noted that “there is, I think, a growing question in the minds of some of our allies at least as to whether or not we would, in fact, invoke the power of retaliation which is represented by these terrible weapons which with their fallout capacity could perhaps destroy human life on the northern half of the globe,” especially if this retaliation seems to be excessive in relation to the aggression.

Fortunately, Dulles continued, the United States was gradually developing tactical (or small yield) nuclear weapons which would effectively counter “nibbling operations” undertaken by the Russians “on the theory that we would not, in fact, respond with the only weapon at hand because that would involve excessive cost to humanity.” He was hopeful that “these new possibilities for strengthening the free world” would provide “an adequate deterrent, an adequate defense,” without the United States and other free nations facing the choice of spending heavily on defense at the expense of other needs or burdening the populace with taxes or inflation which would “destroy the economic foundation which is one of the indispensable requisites of a vigorous and free society.”

Dulles concluded: “Now all of this that I have been talking about requires, as I think you can readily see, the closest cooperation between those of us who are primarily responsible for the political conduct of foreign affairs and those who are responsible for our military strategy and its implementation.”

Responding to questions following his talk, Dulles elaborated on the complicated problems arising from the stationing of United States forces abroad, the need for United States bases abroad, the financial costs of such bases, and the national resentments of United States presence in foreign countries. He also commented on Western colonialism which had brought racial discrimination abroad and had resulted in an anti-colonial legacy in Africa and Asia. The United States, he believed, “has been relatively free from the practice of those discriminations abroad although by no means wholly so, but in any event we are just lumped with the western Europeans, the whites, in that respect.” Therefore, “we have not only our own sins to bear but also the sins attributed to us by association and that is one of the very grave liabilities to which we are exposed and, of course, it is sought to be used for propaganda purposes by the Communists as they portray our own racial problems here at home; that is used to indicate this sense of white supremacy and it is a very grave problem and it affects our whole military-political strategy particularly in Asia.”

One consequence of the anti-colonial mentality related to atomic weapons is, Dulles noted, that “there is in the feelings of the [Asian] masses identification of the atomic weapon with this white supremacy and its having been used first by the United States against members of the so-called yellow race, and there is a greater measure of tolerance toward the development of atomic weapons, the testing of atomic weapons, by the Soviet Union than there is to that development and testing by the United States or Great Britain because a good many of the Asians take a certain degree of quiet satisfaction over the fact that a nation which is at least partly Asiatic, which has never been identified with the white Europeans in terms of colonialism, that that is now getting in a position to challenge the power which heretofore has been a monopoly of western whites.”

A typescript of Dulles’ untitled address, including the question-and-answer session, is in Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6–1457.

On June 15 Admiral Arthur Radford delivered an address, entitled “Defense Planning,” to the conference. Radford, noting that he would be completing his four-year term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in two months, offered his reflections on various planning problems facing the United States armed forces. He stressed the need for coordinated team work in the military in approaching these problems. He also referred to “certain restrictions and limitations” on the military, such as “valid objections from a political point of view” by civilian departments, which caused “unavoidable delay in our planning and programming.” Radford emphasized, however: “I am not complaining—I am explaining—why it is that the Joint Chiefs have great difficulties in coming up with the best solution to some of our more pressing problems.”

Radford went on to cite budgetary restrictions requiring “a reasonable ceiling to be put on our military expenditures,” and he affirmed that “there are better and more economical ways of planning for the future.” He added: “I am certain that there are actions which can be taken which will result in sizable reductions in our annual military expenditures and which will not materially or dangerously reduce our capabilities to successfully fight a global war or the kind of limited war that we should fight. I am also certain that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not take all or most of these actions, some more drastic and less justified actions may be taken outside the JCS.”

Finally, Radford made more specific remarks advocating reduction of United States deployments abroad, assistance to indigenous ground forces with small mobile support forces, dispersal of United States forces and SAC bases, prudent procurement programs, “maintenance of sufficient atomic striking power—our essential deterrent,” including more rapid development of “clean” nuclear weapons, and programs designed to retain skilled officers in the military, a more important concern because of future reductions in personnel in all the military services.

A copy of Radford’s address is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Radford.

123. Memorandum of Discussion at the 327th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 20, 1957[1]

Washington, June 20, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Relative Military Advantage of lRBM–ICBM vs. Manned Aircraft and Non-Ballistic Missiles (NSC Action No. 1690–c; NIE 11–5–57)[2]

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that the President, at the March 28 Council meeting, had requested the Defense Department to prepare a report, assuming reasonable success in carrying out plans for the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which would set forth the relative military advantages of these missiles in comparison with manned aircraft and with non-ballistic missiles assumed to be available at the same time. He then introduced General Samuel E. Anderson, Director of the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the Defense Department, who was to present the report.

General Anderson made his report (a copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting).[3] His general conclusion was to the effect that for at least the period 1960 to 1967, it would continue to be necessary to develop different weapons systems, including manned aircraft, ballistic and aerodynamic missiles. The report also recommended a review of the same problem by the Weapons System Evaluation Group at the end of a year’s time.

When General Anderson had concluded his report, the President asked if there were any questions from Council members. Secretary Quarles said he would like to add one point to General Anderson’s report. He indicated his view that the report given by General Anderson pointed up the need for a quantitative measure of the value of the several weapons systems which had been discussed. While we certainly needed to be more selective in our procurement of weapons, General Anderson had brought out the problems which made such selectivity difficult.

The Director of the Budget said he had a question with respect to the continued development of new types of manned aircraft. Were we at the end of the period of spending money on the development of new types of manned aircraft? Secretary Quarles replied that the Department of Defense felt it necessary to continue to develop new types of manned aircraft.

The President said he had one comment to make. One significant matter had not been mentioned in General Anderson’s report. This was understandable, because it had not been requested. This element was the total economic cost in relation to the performance of different weapons systems. Thus it was important that manned aircraft performed their initial missions and often returned to perform subsequent missions. On the other hand, missiles, once launched, never returned from their target. Accordingly, this element of cost should be established—at least in relative, if not absolute, terms—because ultimately there was a limit to what we can afford to pay for these weapons systems. The President again pointed out that the absence of reference to the cost element was not to be taken as a criticism. He had not asked that this element be included, and he emphasized that the report had been a very good one.

The Director of Central Intelligence reminded the Council that the intelligence community was following very carefully the problem of estimating Soviet capabilities in the missiles field. Indeed, a National Intelligence Estimate on this subject had been issued not long ago (NIE 11–5–57; copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). A particular effort was being made to try to determine on which of the various weapons systems the Soviets were placing greater emphasis.

The National Security Council:[4]

a. Noted and discussed a report on the subject by the Department of Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 1690–c.

b. Noted the comment by the President that, although not requested or included in the above-mentioned report, the economic element of total cost of each of these weapons systems, in relation to their effectiveness, must always be taken into account, in view of the fact that the maintenance of a sound U.S. economy sets limits to U.S. defense expenditures.

c. Noted the President’s approval of the recommendation that the above-mentioned report be reviewed one year hence in the light of technological and other developments during the year.

d. Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence invited attention to the National Intelligence Estimate on “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missiles Field” (NIE 11–5–57, dated March 12, 1957).

Note: The actions in b and c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 21.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1690, see footnote 12, Document 112. NIE 11–5–57 was not declassified. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

[3] Neither General Anderson’s report nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State Files.

[4] Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1733, approved by the President on June 21. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

124. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, June 27, 1957[1]

Washington, June 27, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT:

Secretary Wilson

General Randall[2]

General Goodpaster

Secretary Wilson said that the Chiefs have been developing the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1961. Although supposed to finish at the end of May, they had not resolved differences, and Secretary Wilson had not wanted to highlight split views at this particular time. He did feel, however, that it is time to cut down force strengths.

The President said he would like to see Defense prepare to go ahead with the reductions without advertising them. The reductions are a major bargaining point in our negotiations with the Russians. Secretary Wilson said he thought that 40% of the reduction should come from our forces overseas and afloat. He recalled that the President had agreed last spring to taking out 35,000 from Europe by streamlining. He felt 40,000 could be gotten out of Japan by early next year. He would like to get another 25,000 through decreases overseas.

Mr. Wilson then commented on budgetary problems. The President said he did not wish to get into the position of setting the exact dates for each component of the budget but instead felt that he would simply set an order of magnitude. He thought cuts should be made in the unobligated carryover of funds at the end of fiscal years. He said he wanted to get down to the point where NOA, expenditures and carryover stay steady, with NOA and expenditures at about the same figure. Mr. Wilson said that the tightest part of the budget for FY–58 will be the attempt to get expenditures below $38 billion. The President suggested that the unobligated carryover be reduced by perhaps $3 billion. This would allow flexibility in obligating.

In response to a question by Mr. Wilson, the President said he felt that cuts should be begun as soon as the Administration receives the appropriation bill. Mr. Wilson said that in two or three weeks he and Admiral Radford would bring in a plan for the President to look at.

Mr. Wilson then referred to another problem. The overexpenditures, which are chiefly in the Air Force, have thrown the program of obligations out of balance. Inflated costs and acceleration of the missiles program are chiefly responsible. If the services are called on to cut back to $38 billion it will be necessary to revise the program. This cannot be done simply in the service that overspends. Specifically, funds must be taken away from the Army, which did not overspend, in order to provide added obligational authority for the Air Force, which did. This action must be taken within the next month. The President recognized the difficulties, but said it is up to Defense to prepare the best program that can be arranged.

Secretary Wilson asked how stiff the $38 billion figure is for FY–58. The President said that Defense should work for the $38 billion figure in order to avoid the effort to increase taxes that would otherwise be required. Mr. Wilson said he would put figures together to work for it. He said that the figures might run a little higher due to the effect of inflation.

Referring again to the question of personnel, the President said it should be discussed in terms of a continuing process of cutting out personnel, attempting to avoid the use of specific figures such as a $2½ million figure.

Secretary Wilson said that the expenditure rate for the first half of 1958 will be greater than for the last half and will, as a result, carry us very close to the debt limit. The President said this simply means the cut backs will have to be made faster.

Secretary Wilson said he would have a plan for the President in mid-July.[3]

G

Brigadier General USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on June 28.

[2] Brigadier General Carey A. Randall, USMC, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

[3] See Document 133.

125. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the President[1]

Washington, July 1, 1957.

SUBJECT

Further Application of “New Look” to U.S. Defense Effort Overseas

1. The National Security Council discussion on June 13, 1957, relative to U.S. policy toward Korea[2] indicated urgent need for U.S. action to reduce the mounting costs of our total defense effort.

2. Whereas reductions should be made among the various elements of the total defense effort so that domestic and foreign programs be kept in proper balance, the Council discussion on Korea focused attention on reductions in the U.S. defense effort overseas. The greatly increased power of modern weapons contributes to the feasibility of such reductions.

3. The Council discussion, giving fresh emphasis to the President’s concept of the “New Look” in our overseas defense programs, covered (a) redeploying more U.S. forces from overseas toward the U.S., (b) reducing overseas indigenous forces supported by U.S. military assistance, and (c) persuading our allies to place more reliance on our retaliatory capability to protect them from attack. Underlying this Council discussion was recognition that adjustments in our overseas programs should not: (a) foster tendencies on the part of our allies to let down in their support of their appropriate share of the collective deterrent; (b) weaken the political foundations on which our collective security is based; or (c) jeopardize our ability to apply force in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid local hostilities from broadening into general war.

4. The Planning Board could provide necessary staff work as the basis for decisions under this policy development. The Planning Board could prepare for Council consideration alternative courses of action, together with estimates of their effects (based on coordinated intelligence studies).

5.

a. It is understood that consideration of the NATO area should not take place until after the German elections,[3] or of the Near East area until specific later authorization.

b. The Planning Board could, however, now proceed to a comprehensive consideration of our policy in the Far East along the lines indicated in 6 below. Any U.S. action which might be taken, as a result of such consideration, would give weight to preserving proper balance in the U.S. defense effort between this area and other areas of the world.

6.

a. Such Planning Board consideration of the Far East area would take into account: (1) the appropriate 1956 Prochnow Committee Reports;[4] (2) the Defense presentation to the Council of the overall U.S. ballistic and non-ballistic missiles programs;[5] (3) the Nash report on U.S. bases and facilities overseas;[6] (4) the OCB report on U.S. official personnel overseas (uniformed, civilian, dependents);[7] (5) the possibility of international agreements on disarmament; (6) results of Ambassador MacArthur’s study of the situation in Japan, the current Defense study of the reduction of U.S. military forces stationed in Japan, and the outcome of Prime Minister Kishi’s visit;[8] (7) further developments regarding the Korean situation as a result of the Council action on June 13, 1957; (8) the latest OCB Progress Report on Formosa. [9]

b. Such consideration by the Planning Board, on the basis of this memorandum, would include reexamination from the military, political, economic, and psychological points of view of U.S. objectives in the area; the need for U.S. presence in the area (in terms of military forces and civilian personnel); the requirements for U.S. support of indigenous forces in the area; inducing greater reliance by nations in the area upon U.S. retaliatory power as a deterrent. Taking all the foregoing into account, the Planning Board could propose alternative recommendations as to how, when, and where reductions might be made in U.S. forces deployed in the area and in indigenous forces in the area supported by U.S. military assistance (thereby making improvements possible in the economies of the countries concerned).

7. Such a review of Far East policy could develop for the Council broad principles, which would be tested by application to specific countries within the area.

8. Following the completion of such Far East review, the Council could determine to what extent the principles developed for that area could be applied to other areas, such as NATO and the Near East.

R.C.[10]

[1] Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, U.S. Security Effort Overseas. Top Secret. The words “revised draft” are typed on the source text next to the date. An earlier draft, dated June 19, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler. Cutler incorporated into this memorandum some suggestions on the June 19 draft Secretary Dulles sent to Cutler in a letter dated June 25. The second subtopics (a), (b), and (c) in paragraph 3, for example, were taken almost verbatim from Dulles’ letter. (Ibid., Project Clean Up)

[2] This agenda item in the NSC memorandum of discussion is scheduled for publication in volume XXIII

[3] The elections in West Germany were held on September 15.

[4] The Prochnow Committee was an interdepartmental committee chaired by Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The reports were specific reports on foreign aid and mutual security programs to Far East nations, Vietnam, Formosa, and Korea, prepared in response to an NSC request. See the NSC memorandum of discussion, December 8, 1955, and the memorandum from Prochnow to Secretary Dulles, July 27, 1956, vol. X, pp. 44  and 85 . The specific reports on each country are not printed. (Department of State, OFD Files: Lot 59 D 620, All Countries, U.S. Aid Programs 1956)

[5] See infra.

[6] Regarding Nash’s study, see footnote 2, Document 83 and Document 172.

[7] The OCB report on U.S. official personnel overseas, authorized by the NSC on July 18 (NSC Action No. 1752, approved by the President on July 22), was not considered by the NSC until April 24, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1900, approved by the President on April 25, 1958). (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[8] Nobusuke Kishi, Prime Minister of Japan, visited the United States June 19–21. Documentation is scheduled for publication in volume XXIII.

[9] Dated July 3, not printed. (Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5503 Memoranda)

[10] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

126. Memorandum of Discussion at the 329th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 3, 1957[1]

Washington, July 3, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Ballistic and Non-Ballistic Missiles Program

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that, at the President’s direction, he had requested the Secretary of Defense on May 21 to arrange for a full presentation before the National Security Council of all Defense Department ballistic and aerodynamic missile programs.[2] The information requested was, first, the cumulative cost of each missile program through FY 1957 and such programs’ projected annual cost estimated from FY 1958 through FY 1963. Secondly, the presentation was to include the estimated date of availability and retirement of each missile program, with clear indication of the extent to which the capabilities of each missile might overlap the capabilities of any other missile.

At the conclusion of his briefing (a copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting),[3] Mr. Cutler indicated that the Defense Department presentation would be opened by Mr. Holaday, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; would be carried on by Admiral Sides; and would conclude with comments by Deputy Secretary Quarles. He then called on Mr. Holaday, who, after some general remarks, turned the technical aspects of the presentation over to Admiral Sides. (A copy of the Defense Department presentation[4] is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of the presentation, which Mr. Cutler described as one of the most effective reports that he had ever heard made in the National Security Council, Secretary Quarles said he wished to make a few comments on the report. He said he thought it would be helpful to look at a chart which would summarize the terrible dollar cost figures in terms of the four main categories of missiles.[5] The chart indicated that through FY 1957 we had spent $11.8 billion on our missile programs. The cost of continuing these programs from FY 1957 through FY 1963 would amount to approximately $36.1 billion, for a grand total of some $47 billion.

Secretary Quarles followed with a chart analyzing the main categories of fund requirements: for research, for procurement, and for operational facilities. Secretary Quarles indicated his realization that the resources of the United States would be insufficient to support all these programs, and that some would have to be eliminated in the future as others have been eliminated in the past. Under certain assumptions, for example, the Navaho missile program will be completely dropped. Rascal would likewise virtually be eliminated.

In explanation of these heavy expenditures, Secretary Quarles emphasized the dynamic nature of our missile programs, pointing out that in this relatively new field things changed very rapidly. After citing examples to illustrate his point, Secretary Quarles indicated how the shifting of the technological base of our missile programs had presented very tough problems for decision in the Defense Department, and would continue to present such problems in the future. He then invited questions from the members of the Council.

The President said that with respect to the matter of eliminating missile programs, to which Secretary Quarles had referred, he wished to inquire whether the Defense Department conducted, so to speak, a court martial at regular intervals to decide which missile programs were to be “executed”. The President illustrated his point with a reference to the three missile systems—Thor, Jupiter and Polaris.

Secretary Quarles replied that a court martial to determine the fate of Thor and Jupiter was being convened now. The development of Polaris, on the contrary, was still so far in the future that no decision could yet be made with respect to this missile program.

Secretary Wilson commented that he did not believe we could afford to allocate more than ten percent of the funds of the Defense Department for activities in the missile field.

The President then explained that he had asked his question because so many of the missile systems discussed in the presentation seemed to him to resemble one another quite markedly in their capabilities. He pointed out that in such cases a choice must be made of the best all-round program, because we could not afford to carry on so many programs in the quest for a missile which would have the quality of perfection. Secretary Wilson replied that the Defense Department had been taking a look at the total picture of its missile programs every six months. Moreover, from time to time some of the programs had been eliminated between these six-months intervals when circumstances dictated that this could be safely done.

The President then said he wished to cite two examples which lay behind his question. The missile Tartar is in the course of development, and its estimated performance seemed to lie somewhere in between the Terrier missile and the advanced Terrier missile. Thus, merely because a weapon gave promise of slightly better capabilities, this is not a criterion for continuing a program to develop this weapon when costs were so extremely high. We cannot hope for a perfect family of these weapons designed to achieve every purpose in warfare.

Secretary Wilson pointed out that with the over-all budget ceiling of $38 billion annually, 1/10 of this amount (which Secretary Wilson had earlier indicated should be allocated to our missile programs) would amount to $3.8 billion annually. However, the charts had indicated that we had spent $11.8 billion on our missile programs in the fiscal 1956 and 1957. Accordingly, Secretary Wilson concluded, we must pull down the costs of our missile programs in the future.

The President inquired whether there were any further questions from members of the Council. There being no response, the President commented that he guessed everybody was thunderstruck at what he had heard on the subject of our missile programs and their costs.

Secretary Wilson expressed strong doubt as to the value of the Thor–Jupiter 1500-mile-range missiles, in view of the situation of our bases. Such an intermediate range missile, he believed, would be more useful to the Russians than to ourselves.

Mr. Brundage inquired as to the priority which had been given to the Navy’s Polaris missile. Secretary Wilson said he believed that the Polaris missile deserved a priority above that accorded to Thor and Jupiter.

Admiral Sides pointed out that allocating the same priority to Polaris as to Thor and Jupiter would not actually cost any more money or produce a missile in a shorter time. The allocation of such a priority would merely assure access to the needed materials.

Mr. Cutler recalled that on May 7 Secretary Wilson had written to the President to ask whether the same priority should be accorded to Polaris as had been accorded to the IRBM and ICBM programs.[6] Mr. Cutler indicated his belief that the President had not yet responded to the question asked by Secretary Wilson. The President confirmed Mr. Cutler’s understanding by pointing out that it was Secretary Wilson’s request of May 7 which had occasioned the President’s own request for the over-all presentation on our missile programs which the Council had heard today.

The National Security Council:[7]

Noted and discussed a report on the subject by the Department of Defense, as presented orally by Mr. Holaday and Admiral Sides, and commented upon by Deputy Secretary Quarles.

[Here follows agenda item 2, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on July 5.

[2] No record of the President’s request has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[3] The briefing paper is not filed in the minutes.

[4] The presentation is filed in the minutes.

[5] This chart and the one mentioned in the next paragraph are filed in the minutes.

[6] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files nor filed in the minutes.

[7] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1743, approved by the President on July 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

127. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)[1]

Washington, July 3, 1957.

SUBJECT

Draft “New Look” Memorandum for the President

1. I have reviewed your “New Look” memorandum for the President (revised draft, July 1, 1957).[2] I certainly agree that there is an urgent need for U.S. action to reduce the mounting costs of our total defense effort.

2. While agreeing that there is need for careful review and utmost economy in defense expenditures, I am inclined to the view that the approach indicated in your memorandum is not the correct one. My basis for this belief lies in the decision to adhere to a fixed financial ceiling for the Department of Defense for the next several years. This decision has generated a requirement for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the over-all problem of forces and force deployments. Such a study cannot be made of areas in isolation but must be made on a global basis. I further feel that it is incumbent upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrive at their recommendations in this matter at a relatively early date. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if approved by the Secretary of Defense, would then become the military foundation of such further work to be accomplished by the Planning Board and the National Security Council.

3. It seems to me that an approach as indicated above will keep NSC consideration of this most important subject in proper perspective, and I recommend its consideration in lieu of the program outlined in your memorandum.

Arthur Radford

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense; Director, Joint Staff; and the Special Assistant to the JCS for National Security Affairs.

[2] Document 125.

128. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the President[1]

Washington, July 5, 1957

The President:

1. It was proposed that the Planning Board now undertake to study the Far East area (“Further application of the New Look”)[2] with reference to feasible reductions in U.S. forces deployed there and in indigenous force levels there supported by U.S. foreign aid.

2. The JCS (Radford) suggest that such a study be not made in view of the JCS undertaking promptly to review U.S. force levels on a global basis in the light of the $38 billion “allowable” to DOD for expenditure in FY 58 and FY 59.[3]

3. The JCS proposal has the merit of (a) being global in approach, an obvious necessity before decisive action in any one area can be taken, (b) producing prompt military advice as to U.S. overseas force levels requisite to a P.B. (or any other integrated) study.

4. In addition to the above-mentioned budgetary limitation, will the JCS review take into account:

a. the much increased fire power given by modern weapons to smaller forces?

b. a review of the missions and commitments of U.S. forces overseas in the light of the current world situation?

c. consideration, in addition to U.S. force levels deployed overseas, to indigenous force levels supported by U.S. aid; on the basis not only of military factors and “allowables” for FY 58 and FY 59 for foreign military and economic aid but also taking into account political and economic ingredients (such as keeping a current regime in control, the pride and position of an indigenous regime, outbidding Communist aid offers, indigenous economic capabilities, etc.)?

5. If the JCS undertakings were to be completed in the reasonably near future (by Sept 1 ?), a P. B. study on a broader geographical basis and making use of the JCS review would prove more useful.

R.C.[4]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, U.S. Security Effort. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “read by P and approved. RC”. In a letter to Radford, dated July 8, Cutler said he took up this memorandum with the President (a copy of which he enclosed in his July 8 letter to Radford) “this morning.” (Ibid.)

[2] Document 125.

[3] See supra.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

129. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President[1]

Washington, July 10, 1957

SUBJECT

Military Program for Fiscal Year 1958 and Fiscal Year 1959, Based Upon Estimated Expenditures for the Department of Defense for Military Functions of $38 Billion Annually

1.

In your Budget Message to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1958,[2] the new obligational authority requested for the Department of Defense was $38.5 billion, including items for later transmission. The House of Representatives considered a total of $36.128 billion and reduced this amount by $2.574 billion. The Senate approved a restoration of $971 million. The Senate–House Conference has not acted, and while it is difficult to appraise accurately, they may recommend a compromise figure by restoring about two-thirds of this amount.

The action in reducing the new obligational authority for military construction resulted in a further reduction of $450 million from the $2.1 billion in the original Defense Budget. From the above it now appears that the total appropriation for the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1958 may be approximately $36 billion. By utilizing unobligated carry-over funds, we can take care of a $38 billion program in Fiscal Year 1958. However, the Fiscal Year 1958 appropriations of $36 billion and the use of carry-over funds to maintain the program of $38 billion will require the Department of Defense to request appropriations for Fiscal Year 1959 of approximately $38 billion if the cost of the military program is to continue at this level. This will give the appearance outwardly of a step-up in our military program of approximately $2 billion which will be difficult to explain to the Congress and the country.

2.

Your Budget Message contained an estimate of expenditures of $38 billion for Fiscal Year 1958 for the Department of Defense. It is my understanding that you feel the Department of Defense should operate within this amount, and the military programs for Fiscal Year 1958 should be adjusted accordingly. You have also directed that the Department of Defense should be limited to $38 billion in Fiscal Year 1959 for both new obligational authority and expenditures.

Based upon an analysis of the expenditures for the period January–June 1957, the Department of Defense is currently operating at a level of expenditures of approximately $40.250 billion. This rate, if projected on an annual basis, is as follows:

Army:

$ 9.6 billion

Navy:

11.1 billion

Air Force:

18.8 billion

OSD:

.750 billion

Total:

$ 40.250 billion

It appears desirable to make some re-distribution of expenditures for Fiscal Year 1958 between military departments:

Expenditures Estimated in Budget Message (Billions of Dollars)

Tentative Re-Distribution (Billions of Dollars)

OSD

.726

.750

Army

9.750

8.950

Navy

10.389

10.400

Air Force

17.600

17.900

Total

38.000[3]

38.000

The question of expenditures is further complicated by the restrictions on our program as a result of the effect of the debt ceiling under which the Administration is operating. Since the current operations of the Department of Defense are at a rate of approximately $40.250 billion, the Department of Defense is faced with the necessity of radically reducing the rate of expenditures in the early part of Fiscal Year 1958. In addition to the reduction of the program for Fiscal Year 1958, all possible measures within the authority of the Department of Defense are being considered which will reduce the drain on the Treasury for the first half of the Fiscal Year. It will be particularly difficult to meet the expenditure limitations during the first half of Fiscal Year 1958, and some relief in this regard may be necessary.

3. A further complicating factor in the military program is the effect of increased prices, and this effect in Fiscal Years 1958 and 1959 cannot be fully estimated at this time. The recent increase in wages and prices in the steel industry is an example of the situation we face. To the degree that price increases must be absorbed within an expenditure ceiling of $38 billion, our military program would have to be correspondingly further reduced. The proposed reduction in the military program contained in this memorandum makes no allowance for further price increases.

4.

To maintain a balanced military program, it appears necessary at this time not only to reduce procurement but to also make adjustments in the personnel strengths of the military services as indicated in the following table:

Presently Approved Personnel Strengths

Tentative Strengths End FY 1958

Tentative Strengths End FY 1959

Army

1,000,000

900,000

850,000

Navy

675,000

645,000

630,000

Marine Corps

200,000

180,000

170,000

Air Force

925,000

875,000

850,000

Total

2,800,000

2,600,000

2,500,000

In order to effect the above reductions, it will be necessary to reduce the present 1,150,000 military personnel serving overseas and afloat by approximately 100,000 in Fiscal Year 1958. It appears that these reductions can be made without major redeployment of combat units from Europe although the total personnel of 350,000 in Western Europe must be reduced by at least 35,000 during Fiscal Year 1958, principally in the Army and Air Force. Since some of the personnel in Japan will be redeployed to other areas in the Far East, a further reduction in the personnel serving in the Pacific area may be required in addition to the already-announced plans for reducing personnel in Japan by 40,000. The reduction in personnel serving afloat will require a reduction in the number of combat ships in commission by approximately 66 during Fiscal Year 1958.

Military personnel serving in U.S. territories and possessions must be reduced as a part of the overall plan. This will reduce transportation costs and reduce further construction of facilities and housing. As an example, it appears desirable to withdraw most of the combat ground forces from Hawaii which would have the additional advantage of avoiding housing costs and overinflating that area.

An overall reduction of military personnel abroad will reduce the dependents abroad, and some savings, particularly in transportation and support, will result.

The required personnel reductions abroad during Fiscal Year 1959 are difficult to determine at this time. They may require either further unit withdrawals from the Far East or reduction in combat forces in Western Europe.

The personnel reductions recommended in Fiscal Year 1958 should be made as early as possible, and since they will require the release of a large number of Reserve officers (approximately 20,000 in Fiscal Year 1958) from active duty and will also affect our draft calls for the entire year, an early announcement of these plans should be made. It will not be necessary to announce the personnel plans for Fiscal Year 1959 until they are finalized in your 1959 Budget, but their tentative approval is required at this time in order that the military services can be appropriately guided during the next six months and in order that the two programs can be consistent over the two-year period.

An important reduction in civilian personnel in each of the military departments will be possible with this proposed reduction in the program. Some of this reduction would involve U.S. citizen civilians abroad.

5.

Under the above personnel ceilings, it is believed that the following major forces can be maintained through Fiscal Year 1959:

Army:

13 Divisions (5 Europe; 1–2 Korea; remainder Continental U.S.)

8 Regiments and Battle Groups

100 Air Defense Battalions

40 Surface-to-Surface Missile Units

Navy:

13 Attack Carriers

9 ASW Carriers

12 Cruisers

220 Destroyers

112 Submarines

15 Carrier Air Groups

Marine Corps:

3 Marine Divisions (1 Pacific; 2 U.S.) (1 reduced strength)

3 Marine Air Wings (1 Pacific; 2 U.S.) (1 reduced strength)

Air Force:

105 Major Wings

Strategic Forces: 40 wings including 11 heavy bomb

Air Defense Forces: 28 wings

Tactical Forces: 25 wings

Air Lift Forces: 12 wings

For your information, the presently existing forces and those originally planned for end Fiscal Years 1958 and 1959 are attached.[4] The forces listed in the above program represent a preliminary appraisal of those that can be maintained in an effective state of readiness. After a careful review, it may be found practicable to increase them slightly and they will, of course, phase down to these figures on a gradual basis over the two-year period. As unnecessary support or logistic activities are uncovered, the additional personnel will be channeled into combat units. A more precise figure for all categories will be furnished you after complete staffing following your decision on the outlined plan herein presented. It is important to note that the general view among the senior officers, both civilian and military, in the Department of Defense is that it is more important to modernize equipment and maintain the units at a high state of readiness than to hold the number of personnel and units at a high level.

6.

The greatest immediate impact of the $38 billion expenditure plan will occur in the procurement field, particularly in aircraft and related procurement in the Air Force, aircraft and ship building in the Navy, and the procurement of missiles of all types in all services. Some important reductions in employment and activity will occur in some segments of the aircraft and electronic industries.

Also substantial cancellations are indicated in the missile field, some of which will affect employment and will have to be made prior to complete testing of the missiles concerned. The magnitude of the program as originally contemplated and its increasing cost due both to technical difficulties and basic cost increases is just too big.

Even with the adjustment in our military programs, the money available for expenditures for modernization is in the opinion of the military and civilians in the Defense Department a minimum. While we undoubtedly have a powerful military organization, it is also considered to be an absolute minimum in the absence of a real improvement in the international situation.

7. As you know, in addition to the funds budgeted for research and development, substantial funds are devoted to development from the procurement and production accounts. It is anticipated that all funds currently in the 1958 budget for research and development as finally approved by the Congress will be expended for this purpose and that any net reduction in the level of research and development will be effected by savings in the procurement and production accounts with corresponding increases in procurement for service use.

8. The final action in reducing the new obligational authority requested of Congress for military construction to $1.650 billion will delay important activities in this field. It is expected that it will have a substantial effect upon the operational readiness dates of the early warning system, the Continental Air Defense system, and the dispersal of the Strategic Air Forces. Action on this request is still pending in the Congress. We hope it will not be further reduced.

9. Some reduction in the level of support given to the Reserve Forces in all services will have to be considered in order that any savings resulting in these accounts may be applied to other more urgent needs. The greatest difficulty expected in this area is the adverse public and political reaction should these forces be reduced materially below those presently programmed. However, in view of the presently approved strategic concepts, the reduction in the Reserve Forces appears to be indicated in the order of 15% by the end of Fiscal Year 1959. Only those forces can be justified that can be brought into operation in the early stages of an emergency.

10.

Summary Recommendations. If the above program and general outline meets with your approval, it will require considerable detailed work in the process of finalization. The problems outlined above have been discussed in general terms with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have asked them to be prepared to meet with you to discuss this revised military program.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for Fiscal Year 1961[5] have not been formally submitted, but I have studied their individual proposals. They were prepared on a basis of expenditures for the Department of Defense of $39.0 billion rather than $38.0 billion. Since their views are in substantial disagreement, there seems to be no reason to ask them to re-work their submissions at this time until they are given further guidance.

From my personal study of the matter, the effects of the reductions discussed above are deserving of the most serious consideration. However, if no additional funds can be made available, they appear to be mandatory.

It we are to meet the $38 billion expenditure for Fiscal Year 1958, prompt action must be taken or we will be forced into more drastic actions later in this Fiscal Year. Should this occur, the effect upon our Fiscal Year 1959 and subsequent programs would be most disruptive and uneconomical.

I recommend that you discuss the above program with the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively and that we have your decision as soon as practicable. I feel very strongly that the Fiscal Year 1958 revised program should be discussed with Congressional leaders before being made public, particularly the changes in personnel strengths for Fiscal Year 1958. Following such a meeting I would recommend that you issue a public statement in this regard.

C.E. Wilson

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret.

[2] For text of Eisenhower’s budget message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 38–59.

[3] Includes $115 million not distributed. [Footnote in the source text.]

[4] Not printed.

[5] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

130. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 10, 1957, 10 a.m.[1]

Washington, July 10, 1957, 10 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

Secretary Quarles

General Randall

General Goodpaster

Secretary Wilson handed to the President a memorandum dated July tenth concerning the military program for fiscal year 1958–59.[2] The President read it carefully. He then said that he agreed with the proposal regarding the total strength of 2.5 million, but did not necessarily agree with the distribution to services. As to the other provisions of the memorandum, he thought they looked sensible, but would not say that this is exactly what is to be done. The President thought that our position should be that, in view of the action of the Congress, the Department of Defense must plan on appropriations of approximately $36 billion for FY 1958; expenditures must be kept to $38 billion, and even this figure exceeds NOA by $2 billion. Unless Congress appropriates more in FY 59, further reductions will be required. He said that his reading of the memorandum led him to think that it proposes generally a good plan. He would not, of course, approve every detail.

Secretary Wilson said that the Administration must inform Congress of the military program it plans to carry out. The President said he was quite willing to write letters to appropriate leaders of the Congress on this matter. He was inclined to question the usefulness of any long discussion of the matter with the JCS. Mr. Wilson stressed that both the military and civilian heads of the services would feel much better for such a discussion. The President said that the problem is that he is, as of now, not in position to make specific decisions such as the indicated cut of 150 thousand for the Army. The Chiefs would know that he was being purely arbitrary. He felt he had had general discussions before which should serve the purpose indicated.

Mr. Wilson then went on to report that there is about $25 billion in outstanding orders “hanging out” in the future, and if prices continue to rise the cost of these contracts may increase materially before the bills are paid. The President said this simply confirmed his view that we must state publicly that we have been studying the matter intensively in view of the Congressional cuts and have arrived at certain decisions which must be put into effect immediately. He would also indicate that rising prices may, in effect, necessitate further reductions. He thought there should be two letters, one to the Congress, and the second a letter back to Secretary Wilson based on Secretary Wilson’s memo. Secretary Wilson said he had told Congressman Mahon[3] that he would provide a new program as soon as Defense knew how much money would be available.

The President brought out that it would not be wise to use specific figures publicly. For example, use of the 2.5 million figure would destroy our negotiating position with the Soviets in the disarmament discussions now being conducted by Governor Stassen.[4] He asked whether the information could not be given in Executive Session without public disclosure. Mr. Wilson said that so many programs must be readjusted to their figures, and they must be disseminated so widely, that knowledge of them would leak. Mr. Wilson also said that Congress had given enough money to support the present personnel strengths. He and his immediate assistants did not feel, however, that such heavy cuts should be made in procurement as would be made if personnel strengths were kept at present figures. Mr. Wilson thought he might state in the letters that new strength figures would be set in the Budget Message next January. In the meantime, he would simply take action to “pinch down” 100,000 in strength by January first.

The President said it would be desirable to cut down in his estimation on the proportion of officers. Never before have we tried to maintain full strength in officers in peacetime. He thought the reports should state that we had estimated a certain amount as required; we have received a certain lesser amount; we will use up a certain amount of our balance; there are certain cost increases lying out ahead of us; and to meet this situation certain actions must be taken, in over-all effect along the lines suggested in Secretary Wilson’s memorandum.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on July 12.

[2] Supra.

[3] Representative George H. Mahon (D.–Tex.).

[4] For documentation on disarmament negotiations May–July 1957, see volume xx.

131. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

Washington, July 16, 1957

SUBJECT

Force Tabs for JSOP 61[2]

I forward herewith the divergent views of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and of the Chief of Naval Operations, together with a memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps on this subject.[3] You will note that these submissions were prepared on a basis of expenditures for the Department of Defense of $39 billion rather than $38 billion. Since their views are in disagreement at the higher figure, I feel little purpose would be served to ask them to rework their submissions until they are given further guidance.

In formulating my own views concerning this subject I have been mindful of several considerations, and prior to indicating my specific proposals, would desire to comment briefly on these points.

a. A major point to be taken into consideration is the financial one. Under a level ceiling for Defense expenditures over the next few years and with consideration for the necessity for modernization, together with the rising costs of new equipment, it is apparent that a cold look must be taken at the entire force structure with a view to determining which elements are necessary and how best and most efficiently to utilize the monies made available to the Military Departments by the Congress. In this connection I would comment simply that, in my opinion, it is more important to modernize than to attempt to hold a high level of personnel in the military services.

b. We must thoroughly understand and accept the strategic concept which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. If we adhere to the principles of this concept, and in light of the probable conditions which would exist in general war, it is apparent that we should re-examine our plans for large-scale deployments of U.S. forces, particularly ground forces, overseas in the first six months after D-day. Further, I would invite attention to the definition of local aggression (or limited war) which has been provided in the approved Basic National Security Policy (NSC 570//8).[4] This definition clearly indicates that there will be no large-scale employment of U.S. forces, particularly ground forces, in armed conflict short of general war. It is obvious then that there is, under these circumstances, no requirement for a large strategic reserve of ground forces in the United States.

c. An important factor which should have an influence on our force structure is the Military Aid and Assistance Program. This program has made possible the development of indigenous force capabilities throughout the world. These forces are designed to, can now, and should continue to make a substantial contribution to the security of the U.S. and our Allies. Our global planning must take these forces into account and, in the development of our own force structure, we must consider their capabilities. As the forces developed through the Military Aid and Assistance Program are primarily in the form of ground forces and some tactical air forces, I would feel justified in recommending some substantial reductions and definite changes in the Army force structure, together with substantial reductions in our tactical air units.

d. Another factor which must be considered is the increased fire power and capabilities of new weapons coming into inventory. Such new weapons and systems cannot be merely additive. In part, their effect can and should be applied to increase capabilities. In part, their effectiveness should be reflected in a decrease in current forces. Our tendency in the past, however, has been to apply the entire increase to capabilities. We can no longer do this. A case in point is the numerical strength of Air Force wings and Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. The number of aircraft in these units has been kept constant or increased while at the same time the aircraft themselves possess greatly increased capabilities. I believe we can safely reduce the complement of aircraft assigned to units.

e. Political and psychological factors have an influence on our force structure. This is particularly true in regard to overseas deployments. Under a level budgetary ceiling I am convinced that the United States cannot continue year after year to maintain large overseas ground forces and land-based air forces without reducing our own security. As certain of these forces are redeployed I feel that they either can be phased out of the military program or their place taken by smaller units which could lend specialized support to the indigenous forces in overseas areas.

f. Another factor which influences my thinking regarding our force structure is the questionable effectiveness of some of our weapon systems development programs. I am thinking here particularly of the philosophy of close-in air defense of targets in the continental United States under conditions of possible attack by high-yield weapons. Little purpose would be served in expending additional large sums of money on these systems when the resultant over-all damage to the United States in an attack would not be materially decreased. With consideration for our budgetary situation, I feel that we should rely more heavily on our early warning system and our retaliatory capability, and would therefore suggest holding in abeyance or reducing certain continental air defense programs, particularly short-range fighter interceptors and short-range missiles. I would further recommend serious study of ways and means of moving our continental air defenses outside the border of the United States.

g. I am convinced that D-day forces and forces which are immediately available subsequent to D-day are the only ones which would contribute appreciably to U.S. security in general war, as well as being the most readily available forces to cope with situations short of general war. Therefore, the selected reserve forces must be those, and only those, which can be brought into operation in the early stages of an emergency. I feel that the selected reserve forces force requirements, as stated by the various Chiefs of Services, are so large that the selective definition of these forces has lost its meaning.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, I forward below my recommendation concerning budget expenditures, within the 38 billion dollar limitation for the Department of Defense, for the Services for the fiscal years 1959 through 1961, together with an approximation of the total military personnel within the Services, and my thoughts regarding a general order of magnitude of major forces.

a. Budget (Billions of Dollars)

1959

1960

1961

Army

8.7

8.5

8.2

Navy

11.0

11.1

11.2

Air Force

17.6

17.7

17.9

Totals

37.3

37.3

37.3

b. Personnel Strengths (End strength for fiscal years indicated)

1959

1960

1961

Army

850,000

800,000

700,000

Navy

630,000

600,000

590,000

Marine Corps

170,000

150,000

135,000

Air Force

850,000

800,000

775,000

Totals

2,500,000

2,350,000

2,200,000

c. Forces

(1) Army

1959

1960

1961

Divisions

13

12

11

Regiments & Battle Groups

8

8

8

Air Defense Bns.

100

95

80

SSM

40

40

30

(2) Navy

1959

1960

1961

Attack Carriers

14

13

13

ASW Carriers

9

9

9

Cruisers

12

10

10

Destroyers

220

210

200

Submarines

112

112

110

Carrier Air Groups

15

14

14

(3) Marine Corps

1959

1960

1961

Divisions

3 (1 Red strength)

2

2

Air Wings

3 (1 Red strength)

2

2

(4) Air Force

1959

1960

1961

Strategic Forces

40 (including 11 HB)

38 (including 11 HB)

37 (including 11 HB)

Air Defense Forces

28

24

20

Tactical Forces

27

22

18

Airlift Forces

12

11

10

Major Wings

107

95

85

Note: Forces above to be comprised of units as indicated in the Air Force submission.

It may be appreciated that the effect of the reductions indicated above will be severe. If present inflationary trends continue, it will probably be necessary to make further reductions in military personnel and major forces. It is my opinion, however, that in view of the increased effectiveness of modern weapons and the approved strategic concept, the force structure indicated above will not necessitate acceptance of an unreasonable calculated risk to the security of the United States.

In connection with these manpower reductions, I would invite particular attention to the necessity for reduction of overseas deployments. So long as the Korean truce status remains essentially unchanged, I feel it would be most difficult and unwise to reduce U.S. ground forces in Korea below the two division level. This leaves us our NATO commitment as a source of further reduction in ground forces, associated tactical air forces, and their supporting structure in Europe. We must face up to this problem.

I recommend an early decision on this subject in order that program planning may proceed on an orderly basis.

Arthur Radford

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Top Secret.

[2] Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for Fiscal Year 1961 has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[3] Not attached and not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[4] Document 120.

132. Memorandum of Discussion at the 331st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 18, 1957[1]

Washington, July 18, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–4. Item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting World Security,” included an oral briefing on NIE 100–5–57, Document 111, and discussion of the Middle East printed in volume XVII, page 694. Item 4, “Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East,” is scheduled for publication in volume XII.]

4. Further Application of “New Look” to U.S. Defense Effort Overseas (Draft Memo for the President, same subject, dated June 19, 1957; NSC Action No. 1737; Revised Draft Memo for the President, same subject, dated July 1, 1957; NSC Action No. 1742)[2]

Mr. Cutler said this item covered a paper which he had drafted following the Council’s discussion in June on the size of the Korean forces supported by U.S. aid. The Korean discussion had broadened into consideration of the U.S. over-all defense effort. The revised draft dated July 1, incorporating suggestions from various sources, was the paper before the Council. In essence, this revised draft proposed that the Planning Board study the Far East with reference to feasible reductions in U.S. forces deployed there and in indigenous forces supported by U.S. aid.

Mr. Cutler then noted that Admiral Radford, after studying the revised draft, had commented as follows:

“While agreeing that there is need for careful review and utmost economy in defense expenditures, I am inclined to the view that the approach indicated in your memorandum is not the correct one. My basis for this belief lies in the decision to adhere to a fixed financial ceiling for the Department of Defense for the next several years. This decision has generated a requirement for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the over-all problem of forces and force deployments. Such a study cannot be made of areas in isolation but must be made on a global basis. I further feel that it is incumbent upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrive at their recommendations in this matter at a relatively early date. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if approved by the Secretary of Defense, would then become the military foundation of such further work to be accomplished by the Planning Board and the National Security Council.”[3]

Mr. Cutler said that the JCS proposal seemed to him to have the merit of (a) being global in approach, an obvious necessity before decisive action in any one area can be taken, and (b) producing prompt military advice as to U.S. overseas force levels requisite to a Planning Board study.

Mr. Cutler then asked Admiral Radford to comment upon his proposal, and particularly to indicate whether, in addition to the budgetary limitation, the JCS review would take into account (a) the much increased fire power given by modern weapons to smaller forces; (b) a review of the missions and commitments of U.S. forces overseas in the light of the current world situation; and (c) consideration, in addition to U.S. force levels deployed overseas, of indigenous force levels supported by U.S. aid, on the basis not only of military factors and budgetary limitations for fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for foreign military and economic aid, but also taking into account political and economic ingredients (such as keeping a current regime in control, the pride and position of an indigenous regime, outbidding Communist aid offers, indigenous economic capabilities, etc.).

Admiral Radford said the Joint Chiefs’ review would certainly take into account the first question noted by Mr. Cutler. The second and third questions, especially the second, would be taken into consideration to the extent possible. However, the third question involved a difficult consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could recommend that indigenous force levels be reduced because U.S. forces would be used to assist the country attacked. But it is sometimes hard to convince other countries that they can rely upon us. No military man in NATO disagrees with the statement that the U.S. deterrent power is the principal reason for the maintenance of peace. At the same time, all military men in NATO urge us, for political and psychological reasons, not to reduce our forces stationed in Europe.

Admiral Radford then said he had talked to the Joint Chiefs of Staff since he wrote the memorandum from which Mr. Cutler had read. As a result of this talk, he could not guarantee that the Joint Chiefs could produce an agreed paper on the subject.

The President referred to his statement at the Council meeting on December 21, 1956, that except in the event of some unforeseen critical emergency of an international or economic character, he would not request from the Congress during his term in office new obligational authority for the Department of Defense above $39 billion in any fiscal year.[4] The President said he wanted everyone to note the qualifications in this statement. He didn’t want to create the impression that he was sticking to a flat ceiling regardless of war, disaster, death and disease.

Secretary Humphrey said he was pleased that the President was not establishing a fixed flat sum as a ceiling in defense expenditures. In Secretary Humphrey’s view, inflation could not be controlled if level expenditure programs continued over a long period. Present spending promotes inflationary pressures which cannot be controlled in the absence of a reduction in spending. The President said that an important factor in our disarmament efforts was a possible reduction in military expenditures.

Secretary Wilson said he would like to make a presentation to the Council on the military programs for FY 1958 and FY 1959,[5] using as a basis a letter he recently wrote to the President and some charts which he was having prepared.[6] He noted that each of the Services had, in proposals to him, taken more than its share of the $39 billion figure set by the President; in fact, the sum of Army, Navy and Air Force requests was $42 or $43 billion.

In his presentation, said Secretary Wilson, he would like to describe his money plan, his personnel plan, and his redeployment plan. He was afraid he would have trouble getting $38 billion next year for military purposes. Secretary Humphrey also felt it would be difficult to get $38 billion. Secretary Wilson said he did not agree with the Secretary of the Treasury that military spending was causing inflation. The President said perhaps not, but certainly Government spending was a contributory factor in the present inflation.

Secretary Humphrey noted that Treasury was now facing some difficult problems. Another five cents of the dollar had recently been lost, and Treasury was just about to have to pay much higher interest rates. The President said that whatever the cause, inflation was proceeding.

Mr. Cutler suggested that further action on this item be postponed until Secretary Wilson had made his presentation on the military programs for FY 1958 and FY 1959.

The National Security Council:[7]

a. Noted and discussed the revised draft, dated July 1, 1957, of a memorandum for the President on the subject, in the light of the views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, thereon, as presented at the meeting.

b. Deferred action on the subject pending a presentation by the Secretary of Defense on the U.S. military program for FY 1958 and FY 1959 at next week’s Council meeting.

Marion W. Boggs

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Marion W. Boggs on July 19.

[2] The July 1 memorandum is printed as Document 125. Regarding the June 19 draft memorandum, see footnote 1 thereto. Neither NSC Action No. 1737, taken by the NSC on June 20, nor NSC Action No. 1742, taken by the NSC on June 26, is printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[3] Document 127.

[4] See Document 101.

[5] Wilson’s presentation is summarized infra.

[6] Wilson’s letter is printed as Document 129. The charts have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[7] Paragraphs a–b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1754, approved by the President on July 22. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

133. Memorandum of Discussion at the 332d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 25, 1957[1]

Washington, July 25, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

U.S. Military Programs for FY 1958 and FY 1959

Mr. Cutler said the Secretary of Defense would outline U.S. military programs for FY 1958 and FY 1959. Included in the presentation would be a brief indication of the effect of the programs on the military mobilization base. The Council would recall that Defense had presented an interim report on the mobilization base on April 11, in the light of the proposed new concept of M + 6 months.[2] A complete report would not be ready until October.[3] Mr. Cutler said the Defense presentation would take a look ahead at FY 1960 and FY 1961 based upon the trends as they are seen today. He then called upon Secretary Wilson, who said that General Randall would make the presentation. (The Department of Defense presentation,[4] as given by General Randall, is filed in the minutes of the meeting.[5] )

The Department of Defense presentation was followed by presentations by the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. (Copies of these presentations, including a summary of the remarks of the Secretary of the Navy,[6] are filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Secretary Wilson said that greater responsibility had been imposed upon him because of the difference of opinion which had developed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had reviewed this difference of opinion with Admiral Radford, and had developed the Defense program for FY 1958 and FY 1959 which had been presented by General Randall. With respect to the Army, the basic assumption underlying this program was that a change was taking place in the relationship between numbers of men and fire power. The program also assumed that a substantial redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe would be necessary. U.S. forces had been deployed to Europe for five years at a time when our only feasible action seemed to be the provision of marching men.

Secretary Wilson said he was proceeding on the principle of spending money where it would do the most good for national security, even if this involved departing from historical principles of allocation of funds among the Services. He said he did not agree with the program of missile development which the Army had proposed. For example, he felt the development of substantial Nike capabilities in the Middle West would not be worth what it would cost. He had decided not to go ahead with such a missile program, costing $500 to $800 million. Secretary Wilson then displayed a chart indicating that missile expenditures were at the rate of $225 million a month in June.

Secretary Wilson said he sympathized with the Army’s position, and realized that General Taylor appeared to be farther out of line than the other Services in his personnel proposals, primarily because of our NATO commitments. Secretary Wilson said he had considered 50,000 men as the “divisional slice” for the Army. The correctness of this figure would depend on how many outside divisional organizations were used. He said he felt we could get along through FY 1959 with 850,000 men in the Army, keeping two divisions in Korea and five under-strength divisions in Europe. Secretary Wilson noted parenthetically that we should perhaps adopt the UK system of making our divisions under strength when it was desirable for political reasons to maintain a certain number of divisions overseas.

Secretary Wilson said the possibility of keeping one division and one regimental combat team in Korea had also been discussed in the Pentagon, as had the possibility of deploying two Marine divisions to Korea.

Turning to the Navy, Secretary Wilson recalled that naval forces in the last few years had frequently been called upon to take action in emergencies short of war, e.g., the Tachen Islands, Formosa, and the Middle East. The Navy was a mobile, immediately available force, as was the Air Force; whereas the Army and the Marine Corps faced the problem of landing divisions in some foreign country’s territory. The Secretary said the United States was now doing something new in history—that is, it was keeping strong U.S. forces which, however, were not occupation forces, in foreign countries in time of peace. He felt that political pressures would eventually force us to bring our forces home. These pressures were becoming particularly strong in Japan. The trend of the times was toward maximizing air power, including naval air power, and minimizing the foot soldier.

Secretary Wilson said that perhaps General Pate’s plea for deferring additional cuts in the Marine Corps until FY 1959, on account of the timing of the expiration of Marine Corps enlistments, should be taken into account in planning the Defense program in detail. However, the statutes relating to the Marine Corps, while they prescribed the number of Marine Corps divisions, did not say how many men should be in each division.

Secretary Wilson said that the Defense program was subject to detailed staffing. The figures for the division of total manpower and funds between Services should be regarded as order of magnitude figures only. The allocation between the Services might be incorrect by as much as $500 million for FY 1958.

Turning to the Air Force, Secretary Wilson remarked that big ideas were being developed in all fields of activity. He realized, however, that the Air Force was faced with keeping manned planes in operation and at the same time developing guided missiles. It was difficult to weigh the military value in relation to cost of some of the new ideas for the development of new planes, new missiles, and new methods of propulsion.

Secretary Wilson said the problem of the Defense budget was complicated by economic inflation, which had increased Defense costs by as much as 5%, or $2 billion, over the last year. He thought that U.S. forces must be reduced if Defense was to live within its $38 billion ceiling, but warned that continued inflation might make it impossible to maintain this ceiling. He felt that unless disarmament were agreed upon, it would be impossible to reduce U.S. forces below the figures contained in the Defense presentation. He was sure that unless we could redeploy the Army in the next few years, it would be difficult to live within the $38 billion ceiling. Moreover, if personnel were not reduced, the United States would be spending all its defense dollars on personnel and maintenance.

Secretary Wilson said he had divided the cost of each Service by the number of men, and had found that one man in the Army cost $10,000 per year, one man in the Marine Corps cost $9,000, one man in the Navy cost $14,000, one man in the Air Force cost $20,000. This meant that in reallocating funds among the Services, if we take one man out of the Air Force, we get two back in the Army.

Admiral Radford said he regretted the lack of unanimity in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had repeatedly emphasized to the Joint Chiefs the fact that their failure to agree automatically required that their decisions be made for them by higher authority. He said the Joint Chiefs realized that a sound economy was a necessary U.S. capability, but were unable to agree on a detailed allocation of military expenditures. The plan produced by the Secretary of Defense was an extension of the New Look of 1953 brought up to date. Admiral Radford felt that the Services could decrease the impact of a reduction in forces by reducing the strength of their units (divisions, wings, etc.). Such a reduction in the strength of units would be justified because of recent increases in fire power. It was unnecessary to keep the same number of planes in a wing now that each plane had a capability equal to a whole World War II mission.

Admiral Radford also felt that redeployment could be compensated for. He said the concept of tactical air support would have to be changed because our tactical airfields in Europe, for example, were vulnerable to destruction by guided missiles. Moreover, we would be justified in reducing our present forces for air defense of the United States, since the present plan could not protect against the guided missiles of the future. Our program for the Air Force must envisage great change in Air Force structure as guided missiles are developed.

In conclusion, Admiral Radford said the Defense program was based on the principle of deterring a general war, but was not intended to be a reaction to every change in Soviet capabilities.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense said he believed the $38 billion ceiling provided the means with which to maintain a satisfactory defense posture, provided the necessary readjustments were made promptly. However, he felt it would be difficult to convince Congress that Defense needed as much as $38 billion a year at a time when our forces were being reduced. The new weapons which, in part, take the place of men, were just as costly, or more costly, than the men replaced.

The President said he appreciated the frankness of the presentations. He cautioned that everything said at the meeting should be kept absolutely secret. He said there was danger in assuming that we would continue to get $38 billion annually from Congress. He had already pointed out the dangers of a severe reduction in the budget for national defense. Nevertheless, Congress had now reduced new obligational authority to $36 billion. The President said we should review the history of Congressional appropriations for the armed forces. He recalled that right after World War II he had told President Truman that we could get along on $15 billion a year, but that figure had been reduced to $12.8 billion. The President said he was prepared to fight for a figure of $38 billion a year, but realized he might not be able to get that much. He said that he expected anyone who had anything to do with the Defense budget to defend the figure of $38 billion a year. Given the necessary determination, we could make the required adjustments in our defense programs, including redeployment of our forces. The President said he realized that the Army and the Marine Corps had the most difficult problem, and said that perhaps reductions in these forces should not go quite so fast. However, in order to develop missiles we must make reductions somewhere.

Referring to General White’s[7] presentation, the President said he was astonished that the Air Force should be puzzled by the varying number of wings—ranging from 70 to 137—authorized from time to time. It was inevitable that the organization and concepts of the Air Force undergo great changes in the midst of a scientific revolution— and we were in the midst of a scientific revolution. It should be remembered that the Korean war and the increase in our nuclear weapons stockpile were only two of the factors that influenced the number of wings in the Air Force.

The President then said that the cheapest and best military organization is one which is continuously developing and advancing on a stable basis over an extended period of time. He said we need not count on getting 17 divisions deployed to Europe by M + 6. In the event of general war, our retaliatory power would be the important factor.

In conclusion, the President repeated that $38 billion was the figure for which he would fight, but cautioned against the assumption that as much as $38 billion would be available every year. He remarked that Defense should develop only those programs which could be continued over a period of years.

General Twining, called upon by Secretary Wilson, said that in his view $38 billion annually would enable the United States to build deterrent forces. He believed Secretary Wilson’s allocation among the Services was a reasonable one, but wished to point out that this allocation and the $38 billion ceiling would require substantial redeployment of our forces.

The Secretary of State said that the Defense programs had foreign policy implications. He hoped that no decisions would be made on the Defense proposal without allowing the Department of State more time to consider these political implications. In the Defense presentation, General Randall had said that the Department of State would have the job of making redeployment of U.S. forces acceptable to foreign countries. However, Secretary Dulles said it was not clear just what was meant, in specific terms, by the proposed redeployments. The Department of State would need to study detailed plans for redeployment before it could comment usefully on the political implications. Secretary Dulles’ immediate reaction was that it would be better to reduce the size of our divisions in Europe than to pull these divisions out. He said that if we pulled all our forces out of Korea, President Rhee might start a war, and this would certainly not be conducive to a reduction in our military expenditures.

Secretary Dulles then said that low-level military officers frequently carried out a military program with which they did not agree, in such a way as to cause maximum political embarrassment. In the case of redeployments, if the rumor that we were pulling out of Germany, for example, became current, the Socialists might win the election there and then we would have no West German forces.

Secretary Dulles felt it was important to maintain Navy and Marine Corps capabilities to cope with new crises around the world. He said that the mobility of these forces, and the fact that they did not need to have permanent bases on foreign territory, meant that we could place great reliance on them to take action in the “trouble spots” of the world. However, the specific capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps had never been made entirely clear to him.

Secretary Dulles then warned that our allies may not be willing to supply sufficient indigenous forces to compensate for reductions or redeployments of U.S. forces. He said if our Mutual Security Program should be reduced, the United States might have to increase its forces to compensate for the lack of indigenous forces overseas.

Secretary Dulles was convinced that Soviet power was constantly increasing, if the USSR gets the impression that U.S. power is declining, it will be encouraged to keep up its military expenditures in spite of their burden on the Soviet economy.

Secretary Dulles concluded by repeating the hope that no long-range decisions on U.S. military programs would be taken until the Department of State was afforded an opportunity to study the political implications of the proposed programs.

The President said that U.S. forces committed to NATO were supposed to be emergency forces. The original concept was that the NATO countries would eventually supply their own forces. However, they had never really fulfilled their obligations in this respect.

Mr. Cutler said this was Secretary Humphrey’s swan song, and asked Secretary Humphrey if he had any comments.

Secretary Humphrey said this would be the last Council meeting he would attend. He thanked the President and the members of the Council for the privilege of working with them, and said he would miss them in the future. He said he agreed with the President that it would be unrealistic to plan on $38 billion in Defense appropriations every year. In Secretary Humphrey’s view, military expenditures should be gradually reduced. The longer these expenditures were kept at a high level, the sharper would be the reduction when it occurred. The reduction would inevitably come, because the present tax burden could not be continued much longer. A sudden reduction in military expenditures would be economically and militarily disastrous. Therefore, we should plan for annual reductions downward from the $38 billion ceiling. Secretary Humphrey thought there would be a public demand for redeployment of our forces and for greater “productivity” in the armed forces—that is, a better defense job for less money. He felt it would be possible to reduce expenditures without reducing our military power.

The President said he agreed with Secretary Humphrey’s remarks over the long run, but felt that these remarks ignored certain factors. It would not be possible for the United States to reduce military expenditures to the level desired by Secretary Humphrey unless and until we achieved a safeguarded disarmament agreement. We must convince the world that we are strong and will remain strong, in order to get such a disarmament agreement; and if we don’t get it, we will live out our lives, and our children will live out their lives, under the greatest tension, and perhaps we will even suffer an attack.

Secretary Humphrey said it was necessary to eliminate obsolete equipment more rapidly as modem equipment was developed.

The President said he would miss Secretary Humphrey, and that the Council would miss Secretary Humphrey’s speech at every meeting.

Secretary Wilson said he realized that U.S. foreign and military policies were intertwined. He wondered what the Secretary of State would propose in lieu of redeployment of U.S. forces if he was not prepared to agree to redeployment. Referring to Secretary Humphrey’s remarks, Secretary Wilson said he did not go along with the idea that the American public would demand continuous reductions in defense expenditures. He felt he could do a good job with $38 billion, although he would need some help from the Department of State as far as redeployment was concerned. He pointed out that if defense expenditures could be levelled off at $38 billion a year for a number of years, then as the country’s prosperity grew the defense percentage of Government expenditures would decline. He said some of his subordinates had suggested that the President should make clear the fact that we were operating under a ceiling on defense expenditures. The President said he had already made the ceiling clear and would do so again if necessary.

Secretary Wilson said many people do not realize the great changes that have taken place in weapons and military concepts in recent years, and he felt these changes should also be made clear to the public.

Secretary Wilson then wondered how he should go about presenting his FY 1959 program to Congress, and how soon he could disclose to his associates in the Pentagon the objective of the $38 billion ceiling and a force level of 2.5 million men. The President replied that Secretary Wilson must work these things out himself. He said he assumed that the figures presented at the meeting were planning figures, and that the actual figures should develop naturally. He felt, however, that it would be inappropriate to issue great directives.

Secretary Wilson said the FY 1959 plan was not too controversial, although he would have to take up with the Army the handling of overseas deployment in a way satisfactory to the State Department. Perhaps he should use the figure of $38 billion for planning and the figure of 2.6 million men for personnel in FY 1959, and then adjust the personnel figure up or down as necessary. Secretary Wilson felt that if his plan for 2.5 million men in FY 1961 leaked out, Congress might ask that personnel be reduced to this figure immediately.

Secretary Wilson suggested that one way to make a saving would be to put all government ordnance plants, etc., in the United States on a 4-day week. The President said that was one way to make a saving. Secretary Wilson said he would talk to the President about this again.

The President said he did not think it was profitable to talk widely about U.S. military programs for FY 1960 and FY 1961. He thought plans for these years should not be put down on paper, although they would, of course, continue to be discussed at the top level in Defense.

Secretary Humphrey said that anyone who thought he could not live within his budget should speak out now, because the Treasury balance was so low that if expenditures for the first half of FY 1958 exceed allocations, a special session of Congress will be necessary about Thanksgiving. The President agreed that the Government agencies must keep within their allocations in order to avoid exceeding the debt ceiling, and added that a special session of Congress would be quite a Thanksgiving present.

The National Security Council:[8]

a. Noted and discussed the presentation by the Secretary of Defense of plans for the U.S. military programs for FY 1958 and FY 1959, and possible trends for FY 1960 and FY 1961; and the comments thereon by each of the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Twining.

b. Noted the statement by the Secretary of State that the Department of State should have an opportunity to study and comment upon the foreign policy implications of U.S. military programs during their planning stage and prior to final approval; and the remarks By the Secretary of the Treasury as to the relation of military programs to the domestic economy.

c. Noted that the President:[9]

(1) Stated that, if the United States is not able on a continuous basis to convince the world and particularly the Soviet Union that we are strong and will remain so, we are not likely to obtain a safeguarded disarmament arrangement, in which case the next generation would continue to live in a state of world tension and might even suffer an attack.

(2) Emphasized that the most economical and effective military organization is one which is continuously developing and advancing on a stable basis over an extended period of time.

(3) Directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to consider jointly the foreign policy implications involved in the U.S. military program for FY 1959 while in the planning stage and prior to final approval, and involved in possible trends for FY 1960 and FY 1961 as outlined in the presentation by the Secretary of Defense.

(4) Assuming no unforeseen critical emergency or major change of an international or economic character:

(a) Would personally give full support for the next several years for an annual expenditure level for military functions and military construction of approximately $38 billion, and would expect Defense Department officials to do the same.

(b) Approved the U.S. military program for FY 1958, subject to final detailed staffing within the Department of Defense, within the following limits:

(i) Expenditure level for FY 1958 for military functions and military construction totaling $38 billion. Reaffirmed his directive that Defense Department expenditures for military functions and military construction during the first half of FY 1958 must be kept within $19 billion, in order to avoid exceeding the current debt limit.

(ii) Personnel strength of all military services at mid-FY 1958 of 2.7 million, with such further reduction by the end of FY 1958 as required to keep within the above expenditure level (but not below approximately 2.6 million) as may be decided in connection with the formulation of the FY 1959 budget.

(c) Authorized the Secretary of Defense to continue planning and preparation of initial FY 1959 budget submissions along the general lines of the FY 1959 program as proposed by him, including expenditures and new obligational authority for military functions and military construction of $38 billion.

(d) Stated that military personnel, units or funds for FY 1960 and FY 1961 should not now be finalized; but that planning beyond FY 1959, to the extent necessary in connection with the preparation of the 1959 budget, should be on the basis of annual expenditures and new obligational authority of approximately $38 billion and should recognize the trend toward more expensive military equipment with some reductions in personnel.

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

Marion W. Boggs

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on July 26.

[2] Document 109.

[3] Reference is to NSC 5720, Part 4, “The Mobilization Program,” one of a series of annual reports on the status of national security programs as of June 30, submitted to the NSC for information. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5720 Memoranda) A brief summary of several status reports is in the memorandum of discussion at the October 10 NSC meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

[4] Not printed. (Radford Papers, Special File)

[5] The presentation is filed in the minutes.

[6] The presentations are all filed in the minutes.

[7] General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF.

[8] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1755, approved by the President on July 31. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[9] In a memorandum to Secretary Wilson, dated July 31, Cutler noted that the President withdrew from the final text of the Record of Actions language in the preliminary draft that had referred to his warning in the Council meeting that the Congress and the people might not continue in the future to support a $38 billion annual expenditure level for military functions and military construction. Cutler added:

“At the same time he instructed me to say to you that he wanted the Defense Department to keep this warning constantly in mind.

“He also instructed me to say to you that in your planning for future years you should keep in mind the role of the Army, particularly in ‘cold war’.” (Ibid.)

134. Memorandum of Discussion at the 333d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 1, 1957[1]

Washington, August 1, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Definition of the Term “Mobilization Base” (NSC Action No. 1522–h; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base”, dated March 1, 1957; NSC 5707/8; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Definition of the Term ‘Mobilization Base’ ”, dated July 24 and 26, 1957)[2]

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this project (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).[3] He added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the Planning Board recommendation, and called on the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for comment.

Mr. Gray said that the proposed Planning Board definition[4] was satisfactory to ODM.

Mr. Brundage felt that the illustrations in the second paragraph of the definition were restrictive and subject to change from year to year. Since U.S. policy with respect to the mobilization base was already set forth in the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5707/8), he felt it was unnecessary to add illustrative material to the definition.[5]

Mr. Gray pointed out that the proposed definition contained a new element which had never before appeared in a definition of the mobilization base—namely, the services required for survival activities. He said this element appeared in the illustrative material in the second paragraph of the definition. Mr. Brundage said that some other new element might be thought of next year.

The President said perhaps we will think of something new next year. He felt the concept of survival must be an essential part of the definition of the mobilization base. He pointed out that global war could be divided into two stages: first, survival of the initial blows, and second, going on to win the war.

Mr. Cutler asked whether Budget would object if the illustrative material were placed in a footnote. The President said the illustrations in the second paragraph of the proposed definition were valuable. The elements affecting the state of readiness of essential military, civilian and survival activities must include everything. It seemed to the President that the Planning Board’s proposed definition was satisfactory as it was.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Noted and discussed the proposed definition of the term “mobilization base” prepared by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1522–h and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 24, 1957, and the proposed revision of that definition prepared by the NSC Planning Board: and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 26, 1957; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.

b. Adopted the revision of the definition prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July

Note: The definition referred to in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all interested departments and agencies.

[Here follow agenda items 2 and 3. Item 3, “U.S. Policy on Indonesia,” is printed in volume XXII, page 400.]

4. Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development (NSC Actions Nos. 1430–p, 1448, 1502 and 1665; NIE 100–4–57; NIE 100–6–57; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 29, June 19, and July 22, 1957)[7]

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this project, and added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the draft NSC Action proposed by the Planning Board. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note[8] is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Governor Hoegh[9] said FCDA concurred in Governor Peterson’s report[10] and in the draft Action proposed by the Planning Board. Governor Hoegh felt that this was not the solution, but a solution, to be strengthened and supplemented in the future. He felt it was an admirable grass-roots approach.

The President also thought this was a good approach. He said if we attempted to inform the public on the human effects of nuclear weapons by dramatic actions, we would create hysteria instead of spreading information. Working through the Foreign Policy Association and the American Assembly was a sound method. He favored the gradual approach. He wondered whether we had sounded out the Foreign Policy Association and the American Assembly. Mr. Cutler reported that FCDA had already been in touch with these organizations.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that there was a difference of opinion in the Planning Board as to the appropriate official to make the initial contacts with the Foreign Policy Association, the American Assembly, and other organizations. The President said this was a job for FCDA in the long run. Mr. Cutler said that many of the topics listed for group discussion fell in the State Department’s field, and suggested that the Secretary of State might be asked to collaborate with the Federal Civil Defense Administration in making the necessary contacts. The President and Secretary Herter agreed with this suggestion.

The National Security Council:[11]

a. Discussed the proposed program of group discussions of national security issues and related matters detailed in paragraph 7 of the report on the subject prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator pursuant to NSC Action No. 1665–b and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19, 1957, and the draft NSC Action thereon prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 22, 1957; in the light of the intelligence estimates prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1665–d (NIE 100–4–57 and NIE 100–6–57) and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.

b. Agreed that:

(1) In lieu of earlier recommendations for joint governmental-private sponsorship of such group discussions (reference memorandum of January 29, 1957), efforts should be made to stimulate such group discussions under private auspices.

(2) A gradual, developmental approach should be favored over a dramatic, nationwide approach.

(3) The Foreign Policy Association, the American Assembly, and other appropriate organizations should be encouraged to take the lead in the matter.

(4) The Federal Government should not be responsible for developing materials to facilitate the group discussions referred to in (1) above, but the cognizant agencies of the Federal Government should continue to make available, as part of normal information material, unclassified information designed to facilitate such group discussions.

c. Noted that the President designated the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, to make the initial contacts referred to in b–(3) above.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator and the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow agenda items 5–9. Regarding item 6, “Relation of Port Security Policy Toward Poland,” see Document 141. Item 8, “U.S. Policy Toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute,” is printed in volume XXIV, page 488.]

10. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs (NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1690 and 1743)[12]

Mr. Cutler noted that after the Defense presentation on the missile programs on July 8,[13] the President had asked the Secretary of Defense to recommend, not later than August 15, any missile programs which could be eliminated before October 1, 1957 (in addition to the missile programs which, as stated in the presentation, were scheduled to be phased out).[14] Mr. Cutler invited attention to NSC Action No 1484–c and the President’s directive issued in lieu of approval of NSC Action No. 1484–d (December 21, 1955). Mr. Cutler then called upon Secretary Wilson.

Secretary Wilson read a memorandum addressed to the President under date of July 31, 1957 (copy[15] filed in the minutes of the meeting), as follows:

“The present dual approach to the IRBM development program with its resultant excessive cost is no longer justified. I recommend that the Thor and Jupiter development programs be combined into a single missile program.

“I propose to establish a committee composed of three members, one each from the Department of Defense, the Air Force and the Army to consider both the Jupiter and Thor programs with the purpose of properly evaluating the engineering and scientific information provided by the work to date. This committee will be asked to recommend a final program which, when adopted, will be under the management of the Air Force. The advisability of a new name for the program will be considered at that time.

“I propose in the meantime to suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program. I further propose that overtime be eliminated except that necessary in conjunction with flight testing and for the small amount necessary to take care of emergencies. This applies to both contractors’ operations as well as those under our supervision.

“I conceive the new program as costing substantially less than the present dual approach.

“These changes may cause some delay in the program. While this cannot be definitely evaluated at this time, I believe it will not be great enough to be important in the light of the time it will take to work out operational use and deployment of the perfected missile.

“In respect to the ICBM programs, I propose to continue the Atlas at the highest priority. We are re-examining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies can be made.

“In respect to the Titan program, I believe that by reducing the pressures on this program we can make substantial economies in this alternative development.

“I would like to make it clear that the actions we are proposing at this time might be considered to depart from the directions that we received as a result of National Security Council Action 1433 on 8 September 1955 under which we were instructed to pursue these programs at highest priority and to explore promising alternative avenues of development. I should therefore like your approval for this proposed course of action.”

Secretary Wilson asked that the President approve the recommendations in this letter.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the President had previously laid great stress on developing guided missiles rapidly for their psychological effect. The President asked whether Deputy Secretary Quarles and Mr. Holaday agreed with Secretary Wilson’s recommendations, and Secretary Wilson replied in the affirmative.

[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Cutler wondered how long the committee referred to in Secretary Wilson’s letter would require for its deliberations. Secretary Wilson said he didn’t know.

The President asked why Secretary Wilson wished to put the single missile program, which would result from a combination of the Thor and Jupiter programs, under the management of the Air Force. Secretary Wilson said that the Air Force was responsible in accordance with its roles and missions, and that originally Jupiter had been put under the Army because of its Redstone experience. The President said that when he had agreed to the dual approach, he had also agreed that the force developing the missile need not be the one to utilize it. He still wondered why there should be an advance decision that the Air Force would manage the single missile program. Secretary Wilson said the Air Force would be responsible for installation and operational use, and that the Air Force had sufficient money in its 1958 budget, whereas the Army did not. The President said he wasn’t objecting too strongly to Air Force management, but he wondered what would happen to morale if a group of technicians in a service worked for a long time on a missile and then had it taken away from them. He thought Secretary Wilson had adopted the correct approach in general, but still wondered about this advance decision on management by the Air Force.

The President added that the part of Secretary Wilson’s letter dealing with canceling the production of missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program, made him smile, because he had suggested this some time ago. He had made the point that we should not approve components of production models unless we were sure the missiles would work. Secretary Wilson said that the United States had a “mess” of Jupiter and Thor missiles. The President said these missiles wouldn’t be a mess if they worked. Secretary Wilson said we had a missile that went 1500 miles, but it had no guidance and the re-entry problem was not solved. He said we had two versions of an ICBM, one a year behind the other. We were replacing the first before we were sure it would work. Secretary Wilson thought that if Atlas did not work, neither would Titan. The President said he agreed with what Secretary Wilson was proposing.

With reference to overtime, the President thought the real bottleneck in missile programs was not overtime, but thinking out the problems. Mr. Dulles said that he had no evidence of anything new or dramatic in the Soviet missiles program. The President said he thought Secretary Wilson’s plan was satisfactory.

Mr. Cutler said he understood that Atlas was continued at the highest priority, and that the priority of Titan was reduced. Secretary Wilson asked whether Admiral Strauss agreed with the recommendations in his letter, and Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative.

The National Security Council:[16]

Noted the President’s approval of the following recommendations by the Secretary of Defense presented at the meeting:

a. That the Thor and Jupiter development programs be combined into a single missile program.

b. That a committee composed of one member each from the Departments of Defense, the Air Force and the Army consider both the Thor and Jupiter programs and, after evaluating the engineering and scientific information available to date, recommend such final single missile program, to be under the management of the Air Force; with a report thereon by the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council not later than October 1, 1957.[17]

c. Meanwhile, as to the Thor and Jupiter programs:

(1) Suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program; and

(2) Eliminate overtime except that necessary in connection with flight testing and to take care of emergencies.

d. Recognize that, while the actions in a, b and c above may cause some delay in the IRBM development program, such delay is not expected to be significant in the light of the time required to accomplish operational use and deployment of a perfected missile.

e. Continue the Atlas program at the highest priority; reexamining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies can be made.

f. Reduce the priorities on the Titan program in an effort to make substantial economies in this alternative development.

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

Marion W. Boggs[18]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on August 2.

[2] Regarding NSC Action No. 1522, see footnote 10, Document 62. The March 1 memorandum is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series) NSC 5707/8 is printed as Document 120. The July 24 and 26 memoranda are not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

[3] The briefing note is not filed in the minutes.

[4] The proposed Planning Board definition, transmitted in the memorandum from the Executive Secretary to the NSC, dated July 26, cited in footnote 2 above, reads as follows:

‘For planning purposes the mobilization base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs.

“Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities; as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels; state of training; modernization of equipment; mobilization of material reserves and facilities; continuity of government; civil defense plans and preparedness measures; psychological preparedness of the people; international agreements; planning with industry; dispersion; and stand-by legislation and controls.”

[5] A footnote to the definition proposed by the NSC Planning Board reads: “The Bureau of the Budget agrees with only the first paragraph of the above definition.”

[6] Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1756, approved by the President on August 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[7] For references to NSC Actions No. 1430, 1448, and 1502 and the January 29 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 108. Regarding NSC Action No. 1655, see footnote 6, Document 105.NIE 100–4–57, “Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World,” and NIE 100–6–57, “Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries,” are not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) The June 19 and July 22 memoranda are not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development)

[8] The briefing note is not filed in the minutes.

[9] Leo A. Hoegh, Governor of Iowa, 1954–1957, became Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration in late June 1957.

[10] Reference is to the report by the Panel on the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development chaired by Val Peterson; see Document 96.

[11] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1759, approved by the President on August 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[12] Regarding NSC Action No. 1433, see footnote 9, Document 34. Regarding NSC Action No. 1484, see footnote 8, Document 45. Regarding NSC Action No. 1690, see footnote 12, Document 112. Regarding NSC Action No. 1743, see footnote 7, Document 126.

[13] The Defense presentation took place on July 3, not July 8. See Document 126.

[14] See Document 138.

[15] The memorandum is filed in the minutes, and is also quoted in full below.

[16] Paragraphs a–f and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1765, approved by the President on August 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[17] The report, given by William M. Holaday, is summarized in Document 146.

[18] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

135. Diary Entry by the President, August 5, 1957[1]

August 5, 1957

1.

This morning I made two telephone calls to the Defense Department,[2] the first to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Taylor.

Last week Mr. Wilson had a press conference in which he spoke very facetiously about an alleged Army intention of building an 800 mile ballistic missile. He spoke about it in terms implying strong disapproval, and he also implied that the Army had undoubtedly acted without any authority from the Secretary of Defense.

A memorandum to me from the Army[3] states that the proposition that was mentioned was incorrectly described in the question addressed to Mr. Wilson. On top of this, the Army has done nothing whatsoever in extending the range of the particular missile in question (I believe it is the Redpath)[4] but requested authority to introduce a solid propellant which it is alleged would give the missile an effective range of 400 to 500 miles (not 800 as alleged in the question directed to Mr. Wilson). The Army also states that its plan would be to use this weapon to get greater flexibility, but dependent completely upon the Air Force for reconnaissance necessary to report targets and results of findings.

Actually the whole proposition seems sensible to me, particularly in that development costs would be limited to modification for the change in fuel.

I suggested that the Chief of Staff seek an appointment at once with the Secretary of Defense, telling the Secretary that he was doing so at my instruction.

I am disturbed by the implication left in the newspaper stories that the Departments are operating in defiance of the Secretary of Defense’s orders when, as a matter of fact, it appears to me that the Army did everything possible to keep this matter strictly within the limits of regular and proper procedure.

A copy of the Army memorandum is filed with this account.

2.

My second call was to General White of the Air Force. A newspaper story states that in a recent public speech, he made comparisons between the Air Force and its sister services in the matter of their readiness to appreciate modern conditions and adapt their methods and equipment to those conditions.

I told him that I had no objection to his praising his own service as much as he pleased, but I did object to any representative of one of the services comparing himself or his own service with the others to their disadvantage and his own advantage. This in my opinion is destructive in terms of the whole general service morale.

It is the old question of whether service men are working first of all for their own service or for the good of the United States.

General White agreed that this had been an error, but stated that the document had been submitted to the Secretary of Defense before delivery as a public speech. He said also that he called specific attention to the paragraph that aroused my concern, and that the speech was approved by the Defense Department without comment. I suggested to him that hereafter if he had any doubt about any feelings that might be hurt, he consult with the Chiefs of Staff rather than with the Defense Department staff whose concern for such remarks might not be so acute.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret.

[2] A shorter summary of these two telephone calls, which Eisenhower made at 10:23 a.m. and 10:27 a.m., is ibid., DDE Diaries, White House Telephone Memoranda.

[3] Not found in the Eisenhower Library.

[4] Eisenhower presumably is referring to Redstone.

136. Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

Washington, August 6, 1957.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Commandant, Marine Corps

SUBJECT

Advance Planning Required in Connection with the FY’59 Budget

REFERENCES

(a) JCS Memo to SecDef, dated 16 July 1957, CM–502–57 [2]

(b) NSC Action No. 1755, dated 31 July 1957 [3]

(c) SecDef Memo to Military Departments dated 1 Aug. 1957, subj: “Expenditure Level for FY 1958” [4]

I have noted the divergent views of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and of the Chief of Naval Operations, together with a memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, on this subject. These reports, together with the comments by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been carefully considered.[5] They were also reviewed at the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting of Tuesday, July 23rd.[6]

All addressees heard the presentation which was made before the National Security Council on July 25th,[7] and had an opportunity to comment. I realize from the comments that divergencies of views exist in connection with the necessary military planning for the succeeding three fiscal years. I further recognize that at least some of these differences of opinion stem from the fact that the United States has certain commitments for deployments which individual Services are not in a position to reduce.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman designate have reported that they feel that no further effective detailed military planning can be accomplished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until the Military Departments have made further separate studies of the problems involved along the lines of the presentation made to the National Security Council. At the same time it is essential that further examination by the responsible civilian and military officials be made in line with reference (b). This is necessary as a basis for FY 59 budget planning and for further discussions with the Secretary of State.

As indicated in the presentation to the National Security Council, I concur generally in the comments of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in reference (a), except as may be noted in succeeding paragraphs. By attendance at the National Security Council meeting of July 25th, the addressees have had the benefit of the President’s thinking as well as of the other members of the National Security Council in regard to the presentation made and the broad trends necessary in our military planning, including the budget limitations that exist.

We now know that the new obligational authority appropriated by the Congress for FY 58 will be approximately $36 billion. The expenditure ceiling of $38 billion for the Department of Defense for FY 58 has now been re-affirmed and the amounts within this ceiling for each of the three Military Departments have been determined as set forth in reference (c). This establishes a factual basis for FY 58 on which we can project the planning for succeeding years.

To assist in your review, and as a basis for your recommendations, the following figures are established for planning purposes:

Expenditures (in billions of dollars)

1958 (authorized)

1959[8]

1960

1961

Army

$ 8.950

$ 8.600

$ 8.400[10]

$ 8.200[10]

Navy

10.400

10.5000

10.500[10]

10.500[10]

Air Force

17.900

18.1000

18.200[10]

18.300[10]

OSD[9]

.750

.8000

.900

1.000

$38.000

$38.000

$38.000

$38.000

Personnel Strengths

Approved strengths

End strengths

End strengths

Jan. 1, 1958

FY58[11]

FY 1959[11]

Army

950,000

900,000

850,000

Navy

660,000

645,000

630,000

Marine Corps

190,000

180,000

170,000

Air Force

900,000

875,000

850,000

2,700,000

2,600,000[12]

2,500,000

To maintain a balanced military program we should continue the modernization of our forces. Consideration of the increased cost of military equipment and the actions necessary under a level expenditure policy indicate that some further reductions in personnel strengths of the military services will be required in FY 60 and FY 61.

Adhering to the approved strategic concept and considering the power of modern weapons, it is apparent that active forces and reserve forces which would be immediately available subsequent to D-day are the only forces which would contribute appreciably to U.S. security in the initial phases of general war. While the forces must be designed primarily for deterring, and, if necessary, fighting a general war, I believe they contain within them the essential forces needed to cope with situations short of general war. Very little procurement for mobilization reserves should be contemplated in the future and a shrinking of the present industrial reserve mobilization structure will be necessary.

With consideration for the rapidly increasing costs of new weapons, it is apparent that under a level expenditure policy a decision must be made now as between keeping our forces modern or holding the number of military personnel and units at a numerically high level. Under the conditions of modern warfare, it is generally agreed military thinking that it is vital to modernize our equipment and maintain our military units in a high state of readiness rather than to hold numbers of personnel and units at a high level.

From the above it is apparent that the number of personnel in active Reserve units, including the National Guard, should be gradually reduced during the time period under consideration. For planning purposes I would like to have you consider a reduction of approximately 10% in FY 59 and further reductions of approximately 5% annually in the following two years.

I would like to have the Service Secretaries, with the assistance of the Service Chiefs, conduct in their own offices detailed studies of our military programs for FY 59, including personnel figures for the beginning as well as the end of FY 59, and for FY 60 and FY 61, to the extent required in connection with the preparation of the FY 59 budget. These studies should be submitted to me by September 3, 1957.[13] The purpose of these studies is to furnish me with comments on the practicability of achieving the desired personnel strengths within the corresponding budget limitations and to furnish me with comments as to the impact of these budget and personnel limitations on the commitments and missions of the various Services. I do not expect or desire complete formal staffing at this time.

The Service Secretaries should establish a small planning group in their immediate offices to consider these matters, limiting the participation to those absolutely necessary and furnishing me with a list of the personnel who participate in the preparation of these studies.

In addition to the basic study within the expenditure limitations expressed above for FY 60 and FY 61, you are requested to furnish me with your additional comments should these figures be increased or decreased by $300 million in each Military Department as indicated in the footnote below the expenditure table.[14] You should submit your views as to how you would distribute these amounts as between procurement, personnel and other areas in increments of $100 million above and below the base figure.

I expect that these studies will be considered by the Armed Forces Policy Council on September 10, 1957.[15] Following this meeting certain aspects of the problem may then be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their review and comment.

In order to minimize delays in the budget making process, I expect that Department staffs will proceed with FY 59 budget studies and preparations on the basis of guidance contained in a separate memorandum addressed to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. It should be clear, however, that the guidance furnished above for planning studies is not releasable to Department staffs except the small groups above noted until the studies herein requested have been submitted and the guidance contained herein has been modified or confirmed. Specifically, this means that year end personnel strengths for FY 58, FY 59 and beyond are not releasable at this time. For the present, therefore, and pending further advice from me, staff budget studies must be based upon each Department’s estimate of the personnel trends.

C. E. Wilson[16]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Top Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[2] Document 131.

[3] See footnote 8, Document 133.

[4] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[5] These reports and comments, which may have been attached to reference (a), have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[6] No record of this meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[7] See Document 133.

[8] Planning figures, for initial budget submissions, subject to final policy consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] Plus or minus $300 million. See subsequent paragraph this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] Plus or minus $300 million. See subsequent paragraph this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] Plus or minus $300 million. See subsequent paragraph this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] Plus or minus $300 million. See subsequent paragraph this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] Plus or minus $300 million. See subsequent paragraph this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] Plus or minus $300 million. See subsequent paragraph this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.]

[9] An increasing trend in the payment to retired military personnel is reflected in these figures. [Footnote in the source text.]

[11] Planning figures, for initial budget submissions, subject to final policy consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]

[11] Planning figures, for initial budget submissions, subject to final policy consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]

[12] See para. c. (4)(b)(ii) of reference (b). [Footnote in the source text.]

[13] Memoranda from Brucker to Wilson, and from Acting Secretary of the Navy W. B. Franke to Wilson, both dated September 3, and an unsigned memorandum (presumably by James H. Douglas, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force), dated September 5, are in the Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File.

[14] Reference is to footnote 10 above.

[15] No record of this meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[16] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

137. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the President[1]

Washington, August 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

Limited War in the Nuclear Age

1. The continuing importance to the United States of an ability effectively to deal with limited war is an issue which has constantly recurred in the Planning Board. Usually it has been raised by the civilian Planning Board members of non-military Departments, such as Mr. Bowie of State or Professor Elliott of ODM. Assistant Secretary Sprague of Defense has also shown concern.

2. Just recently I received interesting personal memoranda from two military representatives at the Planning Board table: Lt. General Farrell (the JCS Adviser) and Captain Morse,USN (the AEC Observer). These memoranda, coming from military men of demonstrated ability again focused attention on this issue of limited versus all-out war. I attach these memoranda (in abridged form):[2]

a. General Farrell’s thesis is that predominant reliance on increased firepower, essential as this element is, tends to obscure the need for other elements in conducting hostilities.

b. Captain Morse points to the effect upon the Soviets, and especially upon our Allies, of our becoming more and more the possessors of a vast deterrent power which we may be less and less inclined to use.

3. The issue of how best to deal with limited hostilities is a continuing one, to which an exact answer is difficult. In times of international tension and financial strain, the necessity for enhanced capabilities to deter global war takes priority. Nevertheless, many of us working on policy issues feel that continuing attention should also be given to the U.S. capability to deal with hostilities short of general war. The importance of this capability is recognized in our existing basic national security policy.

4. My suggestion is that some way be found to elevate in the highest councils the need for such continuing attention, without calling for increased financial expenditures. There may be many ways to bring about this elevation of attention.

5. One way might be for the President to constitute a top level Council Committee and give to it terms of reference so that this issue would receive continuing attention and not be brushed aside in the years ahead. Such a Committee might consist of two representatives from State, two representatives from Defense, and one from CIA, with an eminent retired officer as Chairman and with Mr. Bowie—in his new function at the Harvard Center for International Affairs—as a member or a consultant. One course which such a Committee might pursue would be periodically to present studies of existing U.S. capability effectively to deal with assumed local hostilities starting in trouble spots (such as Korea, the Offshore Islands, Syria, Indonesia, Indo-China, Thailand, Israel, etc.).[3]

Bobby

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler. Top Secret.

[2] Neither printed; the unabridged versions have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[3] In a memorandum to Cutler, dated August 9, Frederick M. Dearborn, Jr., commented in part as follows: “Although I do not have much official background on this subject, I have been disturbed ever since Dien Bien Phu about the effect of the deterrent policy on our capability for limited war.” He noted that he did not agree with General Farrell and Captain Morse in detail but, “I thoroughly agree to the need for further examination of the problem.” Dearborn went on to provide specific examples of the kind of contingency study he would like to see undertaken. (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, Chron—Dearborn)

Dearborn became a consultant on the White House staff in late April 1957 and was appointed Special Assistant to the President in June 1957. The origins of his appointment and his prospective duties are detailed in a memorandum from Cutler to the President, dated March 20 (Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Cutler), and in a memorandum from Cutler to Robert K. Gray, Special Assistant in the White House Office, dated April 9. (Ibid., Herter Papers)

138. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President[1]

Washington, August 9, 1957.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In response to your letter of 8 July,[2] we have again assessed each project in our current guided missile program. This reassessment has confirmed the remarks I made at the 3 July presentation[3] to the effect that this program can and must be reduced to meet budget limitations. In fact, as you will remember, we indicated we were critically reviewing the Navaho system. On 8 July, the Air Force recommended the cancellation of this program and I approved this recommendation the following day. This action will reduce the cost projections of the missile programs as presented to you by $1,948 million for the FY 1958–FY 1963 time period and will have an undetermined effect on FY 1958 expenditures. Except for the Navaho, in view of the complex inter-relationship between projected missile force structures and those of other weapons systems, I cannot, at this time, give you more than an indication of the areas wherein other reductions will be made.

The first of these refers to the apparent overlapping of the Nike and Talos programs that you indicated in your 8 July letter. I wish to assure you that these programs were very critically reviewed before I authorized the Army to go ahead with the addition of a land-based Talos program for modernization of the Nike systems. We were convinced at the time that a combination of these two systems would ultimately result in a more effective air defense than the same dollars could buy of either system alone. In our presentation to you, since the rate of build-up has not yet been specifically defined for either the land-based Talos or the Nike–Hercules, we showed these two programs in an additive way. It is my intention that this Talos program will be balanced by a commensurate reduction in the Nike-Hercules program. For this reason, the over-all totals presented to you can be reduced by the $701 million planned for FY 1958 through FY 1963 for the Talos. Moreover, I fully expect that the finally approved Nike-Hercules-Talos total force based on recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be substantially less than the total force now projected for Nike-Hercules alone. In the final analysis it is still possible that the Army version of the Talos might be dropped.

The reductions resulting in the Navaho and Nike-Talos systems which can be specifically defined at this time are shown in the following table:

FY 58

FY 59

FY 60

FY 61

FY 62

FY 63

Totals

Millions of Dollars

Navaho Reductions

159

269

420

500

466

134

1,948

Nike-Talos Reduction

61

221

278

117

19

5

701

Total Reduction

220

490

698

617

485

139

2,649

Regarding the other examples referred to in your letter of 8 July, the following remarks are pertinent:

(a) Jupiter–Thor—Steps are under way to consolidate these projects into a national land-based IRBM program. The mechanism for accomplishing this was given in my letter of 31 July 1957.[4]

(b) Atlas–Titan—This was also reported in my letter of 31 July 1957.

(c) Terrier–Tartar—The Navy requirement for these two missiles stems from the need for an air defense capability to replace 5-inch guns on ships with limited storage space. Both missiles are produced By the same manufacturer, with about 70% interchangeability in components. This is essentially one program. The Tartar operates without the separate Terrier booster, which reduces its operational capability. Space problems aboard ship make this necessary.

(d) Polaris–Triton—Discussions are under way with the Navy which may result in the phasing out of either Regulus II or Triton; a possible alternative would be [to] reduce the presently planned scopes of these programs to carry them both forward within the cost projected for Regulus II alone. Development of the Polaris missile will be carried on with a high defense priority. As pointed out in our presentation of 3 July 1957, this missile will provide many logistic and strategic advantages. In addition to its use on submarines we are giving serious consideration to its use as a land-based IRBM with a range of from 300 to 1500 miles. If this development is successful, it might at least in part supersede the Thor–Jupiter IRBM and should then be picked up by the Air Force for their mission.

Although we do not now anticipate further missile eliminations before 1 October 1957, a second area for possible reduction lies in a detailed review which I have instituted to determine to what extent certain missile force projections can or should be reduced.

Since the bulk of the projected funding needs are directly related to force requirements, I am reviewing the missile force projections, particularly as they are affected by related aircraft and ordnance weapons systems, as a part of my review of the over-all military force projection. In this manner the missile program adjustments will be kept consistent with the adjustments of related aircraft and ordnance programs.

The missiles to be reviewed are:

Surface-to-Air Missiles

Action

Nike-Hercules (A)

Review of force projection

Talos (A)

Review of force projection

Bomarc (AF)

Review of force projection

Hawk (A)

Review of force projection

Air-to-Surface Missiles

B–52 ASM (AF)

Program review

B–58 POD (AF)

Program review

Surface-to-Surface Missiles

Lacrosse (A)

Program review

Redstone (A)

Review of force projection

Regulus II (N)

Program review

As was stressed in our presentation to you on 3 July 1957, certain programs will be phased out during the development cycle; others will not be carried into operational use; and in other programs there will be a general scaling down of force requirements when confronted with a realistic appraisal of the resources available and the complementary weapons systems already existent. We expect to have certain actions completed in time to effect expenditures during FY 1958 and to provide for a sound FY 1959 budget and to continue our efforts to bring the program into proper balance thereafter.

I assure you, Mr. President, that your aims are fully appreciated and that the effort to attain them will be prosecuted on an urgent basis. I shall report significant progress to you as appropriate.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

C. E. Wilson

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Missiles. Secret.

[2] In this letter to Secretary Wilson, the President congratulated the Department of Defense on its “superior and most informative” presentation on missile programs to the NSC on July 3, and he asked Wilson to give him his recommendations not later than August 15 on any additional missile programs which could be eliminated before October 15. (Ibid. )

[3] See Document 126.

[4] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, but quoted under agenda item 10 in Document 134.

139. Summary of a Conference on the Army Missile Program, Washington, August 12, 1957, 10:30 a.m.[1]

Washington, August 12, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

The President

Secretary Wilson

Secretary Brucker

Secretary Quarles

Admiral Radford

General Lemnitzer

Major Eisenhower

The Problem:

The problem, as defined by Secretary Wilson, breaks down into four areas:[2]

(1) The IRBM or Thor–Jupiter problem.

(2) The need of the Army for 500-mile tactical missile.

(3) The Army’s request to modify the Redstone with a lighter warhead and modified guidance system to permit it to fire about 500 miles.

(4) The potential development of a lighter missile for Army use, having a solid propellant.

The problem of concern to the President was that of the Redstone improvement. He stated that it had been alleged that the Army had no requirement for a “several hundred mile missile” and that he felt the idea worthwhile for flexibility and economy. He was concerned, however, as to the value of improving the Redstone.

Discussion:

The discussion that followed centered on the following matters:

(1) Weight and practicability of the Redstone. Technical problems involved, such as propellants.

(2) Roles and missions allocations of 1956.

(3) Cost of Redstone improvement.

(4) Emphasis placed on tactical support by the Air Force.

(5) Relative accuracy of Redstone vs. IRBM.

(6) Wisdom of the concept of “time of greatest danger.”

Generally the positions taken by those present at the conference were as follows:

(1)

Secretary Wilson—There is some question as to the value of a 500-mile missile to the Army mission. However, working on the basis that the value be recognized, the Redstone has the following serious defects:

a. Heavy and bulky

b. Poor propellant

c. Cost, $80 million for the Redstone project

d. Availability and cost of warheads, the smaller, the more expensive.

In view of the above, Secretary Wilson’s recommendation is the development of a solid propellant missile to deliver a 1500-pound warhead 200 miles, with a view to utilization of a 600-pound warhead, when such a warhead becomes available, which will permit a range of 500 miles.

(2) Secretary Brucker and General Lemnitzer—The Army feels definite need for a missile of the 500-mile range, not so much to reach out into the enemy territory as to provide security for the missile itself by placing it well to the rear to fire in support of front line troops. As to the improvements of the Redstone itself, the Army representatives had this to say:

a. The Redstone is not so awkward as is pictured. When fully loaded it weighs 57,000 pounds but it does not weigh that much in a mobile situation.

b. The Russians are developing a 500-mile missile which will give them a capability not possessed by the United States.

c. The project at hand will require no new breakthroughs for development but rather a modification of a remodified item back to its essentially original form.

d. Costs by Army estimates will amount to $50 million rather than the $80 million estimated by the Secretary of Defense. (The apparent conclusion to this discrepancy is that the Army figures do not include procurement whereas the Defense figures include both procurement and R & D.)

e. No additional missiles above the currently planned number will be requested. In other words, the total number of Redstones plus modified Redstones will not exceed the number of currently planned Redstones.

(3) Admiral Radford’s position. Admiral Radford’s comments centered principally around the roles and missions decision. He pointed out that the decision to limit the Army to 200-mile missiles was made initially by General White and General Bolte,[3] and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this is still the official limitation. He states that the Air Force does not like to use the Redstone. He further states that if the Army develops a missile over the 200-mile range by present rules that missile will be taken over by the Air Force. Admiral Radford points out that the current IRBM with a minimum range of 300-miles can be so placed as to eradicate any possible gaps in the range spectrum.

(4) Secretary Quarles pointed out that the 1500-pound warhead is currently programmed for the IRBM.

(5) The President enunciated his views on several of these points:

a. He re-emphasized several times the unwisdom of taking a rigid view of missile ranges and of roles and missions of services.

b. He pointed out the real morale problem inherent in a service which feels that its talents are not being used to the utmost.

c. He expressed concern over the patchwork nature of the proposed Redstone program.

d. He pointed out the problem of the commander on the ground as regards the sometimes low priority given in tactical support by the Air Force. He further pointed out that current Air Force programs tend to take their cuts in tactical rather than strategic air. This fact is accentuated by the differences in the nature of the targets desired hit by the Army and Air Force. He stressed his disapproval of the concept of the “time of greatest danger,” adding that it had been a concept for several years. He pointed out that any building toward a peak would result in an uneven financing. He desires to achieve an evenness of financing as much as possible. (This was brought out in connection with the fact that Polaris would not be available as an Army substitute until after 1963.)

Decision:

The President’s final decision is as follows:

(1) The detailed planning and evaluation of all missile programs, such as the program tor the improvement of the Redstone, tall within the responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

(2) No service should feel that it is restricted within a rigid range ceiling. Specifically, the Army should not be denied a 500-mile missile on the mere basis that the missile possesses a range capability of over 200 miles.

John S.D. Eisenhower

Major, Infantry, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Major John S.D. Eisenhower, Acting Staff Secretary, on August 14. The source text bears the initials “D.E.” in the President’s handwriting. A cover sheet contains the following typed notation: “I believe John wants you to initial if correct.”

[2] In a memorandum to the President, dated August 10, Secretary Wilson provided details on these same “four basic problems in working out a sound ballistic missile program for the Army.” (Ibid., Missiles)

[3] Lieutenant General Charles L. Boité, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1953–1955.

140. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, August 16, 1957[1]

Washington, August 16, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

General Randall

Major Eisenhower

Expenditure ceiling—Mr. Wilson presented a copy of his plan for the expenditures of the three services in 1958,[2] pointing out that the figures for the first half must not exceed half of those shown on the memorandum. He pointed out that the Budget Director had estimated slightly higher but that Mr. Wilson had instructed him to keep expenditures within these limits.

The President stressed that the only way to get into an area where we have a strong position with the Congress as regards budgets is to eliminate soft estimates. By the time the budget is down to the point where further cuts would be truly injurious, we can fight for our estimates.

The difficulty, in Mr. Wilson’s view of the procedures thus far, is that we have attempted to go on a “requirement of services” basis and settle it down as the early expenditure goes on. We sometimes have a poor shopping list and at the end of the year some monies are not expended. When Congress discovers these unexpected items, it chops on the following year. Expenditure is of course a separate matter from obligational authority. The President stated that before very long the backlog of unexpected monies will be eaten; therefore, expenditures and NOA will be the same.

In that connection, Mr. Wilson pointed out that fiscal year 1959 should wash out that backlog. The Army previously had some unexpected funds which were used for make-up for other services. The division of monies for 1959 will be the same as those brought forth in the NSC meeting of 25 July.[3] The figures as shown for 1960–61 will be used, but more flexibility for planning will be allowed than was brought out at that meeting. In this connection, Mr. Wilson has required force levels from the services by September 10.

Discussion then lapsed into an analogy between the defense expenditure problem and that of mutual aid, with emphasis on the soft estimates. Mr. Wilson in this connection pointed out that on the foreign aid we will have to take a completely new look at what we will receive, what our requirements are, and what our allocations must be. The President mentioned parenthetically that he does not know how we will be able to get by with $620 million of defense support.

Mr. Wilson then expressed the opinion that he can see where we can save $150 million of mutual aid. Of course, this will involve by necessity President Rhee’s losing four divisions in Korea. The complication in this problem, according to the President, is that President Rhee is completely capable of cutting his forces entirely to the point where they are able only to maintain internal security and decide to abolish any idea of holding the front line.

Missiles

The committee for consolidation of IRBM No. 1 and IRBM No. 2 has been appointed. There will be no more of each type of missile ordered beyond a few for testing purposes. In this connection the President offered the opinion that if we had the missile problem to face over again—that is, if we were in the position we were five years ago—that he would institute an agency similar to the Manhattan District for missile development. The difficulty now is that of morale. From the way it is being handled in the press, it will appear that the Army and the Air Force are in a cat and dog fight over possession of the missile, with the Air Force emerging winner. This we know is not true since we are following plans which have been made of long standing. He went on to point out that the new IRBM will have as much of the Jupiter as the Thor. He emphasized the current morale problem of ground troops, again stating his conviction that ground troops at home will save this country in the next war and expressed his consternation at the reluctance of the Army to accept that as a role. He mentioned the pride of discovery which the Army has developed concerning the Jupiter and stressed it should not appear that we are deciding a great fight.

Mr. Wilson expressed the opinion that he was right in bringing the Army into the IRBM field since the developments at Huntsville had gotten quite far advanced. He agreed with the President that there will be at least as much Jupiter as Thor in the final IRBM. The IRBM was initially conceived as a “fall-out” of the ICBM. (That is, the ICBM would be a three-stage and the IRBM a two-stage rocket of the same design.) However, it did not turn out to be that simple and the fall-out from the 175-mile Redstone also resulted in an IRBM. The difficulty was that the group of German scientists located at Huntsville desired to get into longer range missiles. The Army’s viewpoint was that these missiles were really large mortars and that the Army was therefore going ahead and operating these missile units, even though on a sub rosa basis. He recognizes there is a large service morale problem which involves the entire future ballistic missile mission. (Mr. Wilson further allowed that he had previous experience with a bunch of inventors.)

The Army Missile Program

Mr. Wilson then brought up the subject of the Army missile program which had been treated in the discussion of August 12.[4] He expressed the feeling that if we had sufficient money we should let the Army go ahead with the modified Redstone. However, since the Redstone is becoming an obsolete weapon, Mr. Wilson said he “tends to choke” on developing it further. He recommends that the Army go ahead with a two-stage solid propellant missile, say 10,000–15,000 pounds, highly maneuverable. He states that it can be a good missile for the 200-mile range and does not know whether it can be boosted into the 500-mile range.

Again the President reiterated his statement of 12 August that the technical angles, which included cost and procurement, are not matters for the President. However, he reemphasized his desire that the Army not feel that it is forbidden to develop a good missile which has the capability of firing 500 miles.

Redeployment

Mr. Wilson brought up the fact that we still have not got all our combat troops out of Japan. One of the problems is where to put them, one of the solutions, of course, being to redeploy them home. His figures were that we can eventually redeploy 8,000 out of Korea, 40,000 out of Japan and 35,000 out of Europe, in view of the smaller divisions and the possible reductions in size of headquarters. In this connection the President said you can redeploy very easily so long as you don’t talk about it. Mr. Wilson expressed the opinion it would be difficult to keep this redeployment secret. However, he had every intention of keeping it secret until 15 September, the date of the German elections. The large trouble, in Mr. Wilson’s view, is President Rhee.

Proceeding further to the other services, he felt that he could redeploy 15,000 out of the Navy which will bring the total to about 100,000 redeployments from overseas. As to 1959, the plans there depend on what we will work out this fall. In summary, Mr. Wilson’s opinion is that the services could go to a figure of 2.5 million more and keep five divisions in Europe and two in Korea. He states that he still has to “make his sale” with the Army, who thinks they are one division short, Much apparently will come out of the meeting on 5 September between the Department of Defense and Secretary Dulles.[5]

Personnel

Mr. Wilson expressed satisfaction over the results of Mr. McElroy’s confirmation procedures before Congress[6] and stated that Dr. Foote’s would go up to the Senate today.[7] Mr. McElroy’s nomination had been reported out of committee unanimously except for a remark which Senator Byrd placed in the Record. The matter of concern to Senator Byrd is that “conflict of interest,” and involves a difference in viewpoint. The difference in viewpoint is that the Secretary of Defense, by one view, is not a procurement officer. A procurement officer’s is a technical job, and an old law requires that the procurement officer should have no interest in the contracting agencies. However, the three departments are separately administered, and whereas the Department of Defense may reach down into the services in exceptional cases, it is entirely possible for the Secretary of Defense to stay away from a situation which might involve a conflict of interest. With this last point Senate Byrd disagrees.

Disarmament

Disarmament was mentioned only briefly. Mr. Wilson expressed the hope that General Twining would take the same interest as Admiral Radford has taken.[8] He deplored the press’ tendency to paint a picture of a conflict between State and Defense.

Personal plans

Discussion then went to personal plans of Mr. Wilson. He plans to be off on leave in the next couple of days, but will be ready to return at a moment’s notice. This is the result of the current embarrassment caused by many high officials of the Government being absent during the most heated period of the Congressional session. Mr. Wilson’s plans are to make the change-over at a time from late September to 10 October.[9] He plans to make a speech for former Secretary of the Navy Thomas in California on 10 October. He then brought up the matter of the opportunity for the new Secretary of Defense to see the President at frequent intervals. The President expressed the opinion that is is better to stick with the policy that a Cabinet officer can delay any other appointment and can come to see the President whenever he wishes, rather than try to set a regular date for a meeting. Mr. Wilson mentioned the great aid it had been to him at first to be able to come periodically to make sure he was “in the ball park.”

In the matter of personnel, Mr. Wilson expressed the hope that Mr. Quarles may be prevailed upon to remain in the Defense Department. No trouble on this matter is anticipated at this moment. He also mentioned that Admiral Radford should be kept available if possible. However, the President stated that the fact that Congress had not kept him on permanent active duty makes it more difficult to make Admiral Radford available.

IRBM for UK

The next item discussed was the difficulty we are having in making good our commitments to the UK as regards the IRBM. On this subject the President was very familiar. The President was happy that he had been careful at Bermuda to tell Mr. Macmillan that the commitments to supply IRBM to Britain were not entirely firm because of the change in price and the difficulty of estimating for a product that is not yet complete.[10] The President, however, did express dismay at the vast difference between the initial estimate and the figures that are being put forth now. Mr. Wilson then assured the President that the picture is not so bleak as the $149 million figure (over $78 million estimated cost to US) in the fact sheet of 15 August and feels that a cutback in spare parts may ease the problem somewhat.

Hardtack[11]

When Mr. Wilson brought up the subject of Operation Hardtack, the President stated that this subject has him in a more awkward position than any other that he can think of. Here he is talking disarmament and at the same time planning a four-month period of atomic weapon testing which will involve twenty-five shots.

Mr. Wilson assured the President that of the twenty-five, only five were under the auspices of the Department of Defense.

He then went on to mention another item in cost figuring for guided missiles. The Defense Department, from its own point of view, gets warheads for nothing, since these are sent from AEC and are charged to AEC funds. However, the smaller the warhead the more expensive as regards the IRBM types. Therefore, Mr. Wilson will henceforth require all people in calculating costs of missiles to figure in the cost of the warhead as well. This is something which has not been done in the past and affected the Army’s optimistic figures as regards the cost of the 500-mile missile. The President acknowledged this proposal and felt that it was sound. However, he once again emphasized, in connection with the Army missile program, that a good weapon should not be taken away from the Army for the mere fact that it fires more than two-hundred miles.

John S. D. Eisenhower

Major, Infantry, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by John S.D. Eisenhower on August 20.

[2] Not found in the Eisenhower Library.

[3] See Document 133.

[4] See the summary of conference, supra.

[5] A memorandum of conversation of this meeting on September 5, 2:30–4:30 p.m., attended by Cutler, Secretary Dulles, several Department of State representatives, Quarles, General Twining, General Lemnitzer, and several other Department of Defense representatives, is in the Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, State Department.

[6] President Eisenhower nominated Neil McElroy, president of Procter and Gamble, as Secretary of Defense to succeed Wilson.

[7] Dr. Paul D. Foote, retired vice president of Gulf Oil Company, was nominated as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering). When the Senate refused confirmation because of possible “conflict of interest” problems stemming from his refusal to give up his Gulf pension or oil stocks, Eisenhower gave him a recess appointment until Congress reconvened in January 1958.

[8] General Twining succeeded Admiral Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 15.

[9] Wilson formally left office on October 8.

[10] Documentation on the meetings between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan in Bermuda, March 21–23, 1957, is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.

[11] See the memorandum of conference with the President, dated August 9, vol. XX, p. 699 .

141. Editorial Note

On August 1, 22, and September 12, the National Security Council discussed the relation of port security policy to United States policy toward Poland. At the August 1 meeting, the Council noted the arrival that day at the Port of New Orleans of the Polish ship Stefan Okrzeja, the exception to United States port security policy (NSC 5408) that had been made to permit the ship’s entry, the security procedures which would be followed, and the preparation of an NSC Planning Board study on the subject for later Council consideration.

At the meeting on August 22, the Council discussed the question of suspending port denial provisions to Communist vessels under NSC 5408 and permitting Polish flag vessels to enter specific United States ports for the purpose of loading cargo being made available under P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. The Council “requested the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) to develop adequate internal security procedures for the processing of ships’ personnel seeking temporarily to enter the United States via Polish vessels” and deferred action on the various proposals before the Council pending further study by the responsible departments and agencies and further recommendations thereon by the NSC Planning Board.

On September 12, the National Security Council agreed to allow Polish flag vessels to enter major United States ports for the specific purpose of taking on cargo to be shipped to Poland under the terms of any economic agreement between the United States and Poland. Moreover, entry authorized for a specific purpose did not preclude delivery or loading of other cargo in such ports during the same voyage. To permit this trade while the current United States policy toward Poland (NSC 5616/2) was in effect, the denial provisions of paragraph 21–c–(l) of NSC 5408 would be suspended. Polish vessels would normally be limited to the ten major United States ports listed in paragraph 21–b of NSC 5408, and the provisions of paragraph 21–c–(2) would apply to such vessels. The full provisions of NSC 5408 would remain applicable to the above types of Polish vessels seeking entry into other than the ten major ports and all other Polish ships seeking to enter any United States port.

[22 words not declassified] the Council noted that any future review of port security policy involving entry of any Communist bloc vessel as an exception to or under a suspension of paragraphs 21–c–(l) and 21–d of NSC 5408 should include consideration of limiting such entry to one or two minor United States ports on each coast where the vessel would be kept under strict surveillance.

For text of NSC 5408, “Continental Defense,” dated February 11, 1954, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, volume II, Part 1, page 609. For text of NSC 5612/2, “Interim United States Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary,” dated November 19, 1956, see volume XXV, page 463. The NSC memoranda of discussion of August 1, 22, and September 12, 1957, are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File,NSC Records. NSC Actions No. 1761, 1775, and 1781, agreed to at these NSC meetings, were approved by President Eisenhower on August 5, 23, and September 16. A footnote to the last Record of Action indicates that NSC Action No. 1781 was subsequently superseded by paragraph 33 of NSC 5808/1 (approved by the President on April 16, 1958) and the Treasury Port Security Programs (approved by the President on April 21, 1958). (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

142. Editorial Note

At the meeting of the National Security Council on September 12, Allen Dulles began his oral briefing as follows:

“The Director of Central Intelligence said he would first deal with the circumstances around the Soviet announcement of the successful launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile. He pointed out that on July 19 last, he had briefed the Council on the newly-established long-range guided missile range in the Soviet Union. Since that time, hard evidence had accumulated that this missile range was a fact, and that it extended a distance of 3500 nautical miles, from Tyura-Tam to Klyuchi in Kamchatka. Such a range could support limited missile flight testing.

“Thereafter, Mr. Dulles read the text of the Soviet announcement of the successful launching of an ICBM. He commented that the intelligence community could not say for certain that the Soviets had actually successfully tested such a missile along this range, but there were certain facts and indications which lent support to this contention. Our coverage of the Tyura-Tam site was not yet adequate. Nevertheless, we did not find certain indications of activities which we would have expected to find if the missile which was fired had been an ICBM. Of course, some such activities could have escaped us. In any event, there had been some [number not declassified] missiles fired over the Kasputin Yar range over the last [2 words not declassified], and between [2 numbers not declassified] of these missiles were estimated to be multi-stage weapons.

“We are currently re-examining our previous estimate that the Soviet Union could have an operational ICBM capability in 1960 or 1961. We may have to change this estimate. We consider this question to be one of the highest possible priority. We are likewise re-examining our previous estimate of the production by the Soviet Union of heavy bombers. We are not seeing as many on the airfields as we had expected.

“Secretary Anderson reminded the Council of the lengths to which we went some time ago in order to obtain a Soviet MIG aircraft, offering a reward if such an aircraft could be flown out of the Soviet bloc. Could we not succeed in obtaining the defection of some one of the brilliant Soviet scientists who are working in the missiles field by making a public offer of substantial monetary reward and security? There must be many discontented scientists in the Soviet Union.

“Mr. Dulles said he doubted the wisdom of making a public statement offering rewards of the sort suggested by Secretary Anderson. Any Soviet scientist of the caliber envisaged would know perfectly well that we would be very happy indeed to give adequate support, financial and otherwise, to any defector.” (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Allen Dulles briefed the NSC on the Soviet guided missile range on July 18, not July 19, as noted above. (Memorandum of discussion; ibid.) His briefing summarized the conclusions of NIE 11–5–57, which was not declassified. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

The text of the Soviet announcement of its successful ICBM is printed in The New York Times, August 27, 1957, page 6.

At the next meeting of the National Security Council on September 23, Allen Dulles again reported on the Soviet ICBM program:

“He referred to his briefing on this subject at the last meeting of the National Security Council, when he had reported the possibility of [2 words not declassified] flight test of a Soviet ICBM. Since that date further evidence has been acquired by the intelligence community, and Mr. Dulles said he would read their latest findings. These findings were, in substance, that the Soviet Union has probably flight-tested [12 words not declassified]. As yet, the intelligence community had no evidence as to the range, accuracy, or specific character of the missiles fired.

“After giving further data on the more numerous firings of shorter-range Soviet missiles, Mr. Dulles pointed up the conclusion that the USSR now has the capability of initiating ICBM flight testing. [1 sentence (27 words) not declassified](Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

143. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President[1]

Washington, September 12, 1957.

SUBJECT

Military Personnel Strengths for FY’58 and FY’59

REFERENCE:

Record of Action of the National Security Council at its 332nd Meeting held on July 25, 1957. Action No. 1755 [2]

At the National Security Council Meeting on July 25th Department of Defense presented information on the military programs for FYs ’58 through ’61. On August 6, 19571 addressed a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of Staff in which I requested them to study further the military program for FY ’59 and the program for FYs ’60 and ’61 to the extent required in preparation of the FY ’59 budget.[3] A copy of this memorandum is attached as Tab (A). The Secretaries of the Military Departments replied to this memorandum and copies of these studies are attached as Tabs(B),(C)and(D).[4]

On September 10th this matter was discussed in detail at a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council.[5] At this meeting the full implications of the reduction in our military program necessary in order to retain expenditures within a level budget of $38 billion annually during the FYs ’59, ’60 and ’61 time period were explored. In addition, the FY ’58 military program was discussed in relation to the subsequent years.

It was the opinion of the members of the Armed Forces Policy Council that it was highly important that we be able to announce the FY ’58 end year strengths for each of the Military Services as promptly as possible in order that an orderly reduction to these figures could be planned and the maximum benefit derived in holding expenditures for FY ’58 within the approved figure of $38 billion. In some cases the Military Services may wish to reduce their strength below the figures presently approved for 1 January 1958 in order to achieve maximum savings. It was obvious that the figures for end FY ’58 are well above the totals which we will be able to maintain during FY ’59 and it appears that they can be reached without materially affecting our deployments abroad.

For your convenience I have attached as Tab (E) my recommended end strength figures for FY ’58.1 would like your permission to proceed on this basis, recognizing that the information will become public as soon as we begin to implement the plan in the Military Services.[6] The Secretary of State is satisfied for us to proceed immediately with the ’58 adjustments on this basis.

I have also attached as Tab (F) the figures which were discussed with the National Security Council on July 25th and which you approved for initial budget planning for FY ’59. To date these figures have been held on a highly classified basis and the Military Departments now feel that they need permission to utilize them to a wider degree within their staffs as the basis for the initial ’59 budget submissions. After the review on September 10th I see no reason to use any different figures for our initial budget planning. I would like your permission at this time to downgrade these figures from “top secret” to “secret” so that the normal and necessary staff work on the details of the ’59 budget may proceed. The proposed figures are for planning purposes and, of course, are subject to your approval or modification after submission and after the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Secretaries have had an opportunity to make their final views known to you.

This proposed tentative ’59 plan is also satisfactory to the Secretary of State but he would like to have a week or ten days to clear certain features of it with certain of our Ambassadors who are in close touch with our allies and who the Secretary of State wishes to have advance information before we risk the information becoming public property. Following your approval I would withhold any formal documents to the Services until the Secretary of State has had the time he feels necessary.

This memorandum in substantially its present form was read at the Security Council Meeting this morning for the general information of the members[7] and General Cutler is familiar with the problems involved.

C. E. Wilson

Tab (E)

RECOMMENDED END STRENGTHS FOR FY ’58

Army

900,000

Navy

645,000

Marine Corps

188,000

Air Force

875,000

2,608,000

Tab (F)

PLANNING FIGURES FOR END STRENGTH FY ’59

Army

850,000

Navy

630,000

Marine Corps

170,000

Air Force

850,000

2,500,000

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Secretary Dulles and Cutler.

[2] See footnote 8, Document 133.

[3] Document 136.

[4] Attached memoranda from Brucker to Wilson and from Acting Secretary of the Navy W.B. Franke to Wilson, both dated September 3, and an unsigned memorandum (presumably by James H. Douglas, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force), dated September 5, are not printed.

[5] No record of this meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[6] In a memorandum to Secretary Wilson, dated September 17, Cutler wrote that the President had approved the permissions Wilson requested in this and the following paragraph, and his approval was reflected in the note he added to NSC Action No. 1787, which was adopted by the NSC on September 12 and approved by the President on September 16. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler) The note to NSC Action No. 1787 directed the Secretary of Defense “to continue urgently the search for unnecessary defense expenditures, with a view to avoiding reductions in combat forces and maintaining necessary military capabilities.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[7] The memorandum of discussion of the NSC meeting on September 12 is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

144. Editorial Note

On October 4, the Soviet Union launched an orbiting earth satellite, called “Sputnik I.” The satellite weighed 184 pounds and orbited the earth once every 88 minutes. For documentation on the international reaction to Sputnik and on the relationship between scientific satellites and national security policy and between scientific satellites and the ballistic missile programs of the military services, see volume XI, pages 754 ff.

145. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 8, 1957[1]

Washington, October 8, 1957

PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

General Randall

General Goodpaster

The agenda of the meeting is attached.[2]

Rate of expenditures. Mr. Wilson showed the President several charts on the trend of employment and wage rates in the aircraft industry illustrating the source of the “run away” on expenditures. He then showed charts indicating that, in September, expenditures were brought below the “manageable” figure of $3.4 billion per month. He said that expenditures would balance out at $250–275 million above the target for the first quarter in this fiscal year, but should be at or below the target next quarter. He said Defense could probably hit a $20.7 billion figure for the first six months, but not a $20.1 figure.

FY ’59 Budget. Mr. Wilson said he had arbitrarily divided the funds estimated to be available as among the three services, and had based the division on a force of 2.5 million men. One question to be considered was whether to put a $38 billion budget to Congress and let them cut it half a billion, or to put up a $38.5 billion budget. In this connection he said all services will say that the funds allowed are too small. The President said he is willing to adjust the figure to take care of rising costs; but to do so would contribute to further inflation and a further rise in costs. Mr. Wilson recommended as future budgetary procedure, projecting a continuation of the same general figures, then adjusting from that projection. He would let the services plan within such projections.

Cordiner Committee[3] implementation. Mr. Wilson referred to a memorandum[4] I had shown him recording the President’s general thinking in this matter. He thought that the Defense proposals would be in accord with that memorandum, and said that in fact they would be very close to what he proposed early last spring. The President said he had hoped that, if we are able to institute the Cordiner recommendations, we could stand sizeable personnel cuts without decreasing combat potential (through retention of trained personnel). He went on to say that he thought we must include some adaptation of the report in the program for the coming year.

Jupiter-Thor. Mr. Wilson recalled that, in starting the IRBM programs, he had put in the Army-Navy effort (from which the Navy has since dropped out) to see if they could make more rapid progress than the Thor project, which is a “fall out” from the ICBM. To date the test results of the Jupiter are substantially the best. The Air Force approach with Thor is to tool up on a substantial basis and correct and improve the missile as work goes along. He said if it were necessary to decide the matter today he would have to decide in favor of the Army missile. However, the actual warhead and actual guidance[5] have not yet been incorporated. The choice is to go ahead on the present basis and spend several million dollars more on the two programs or to chop off one program now. The President said he did not feel in position to make such a decision, not being a technician. He said also that Defense certainly could not stop the Jupiter at the present time. Mr. Wilson asked whether the President thought he should decide the matter before he leaves his office, and the President asked how long it would take to be in position to make a decision. Mr. Wilson said it should run several more months—perhaps as far as March next year. The President thought Mr. Wilson should not try to decide the matter before leaving his post.

Army 500-mile Redstone. Mr. Wilson said there was a split in the JCS on the Army’s developing this weapon. Although there is a solid propellant weapon in prospect, it is at least three to five years away. Redstone is based on a 6500 pound warhead; with a smaller warhead the additional range could be attained. The President said he felt the Army should not be stopped from having the 500-mile missile if they are close to achieving it. Operationally, it could be put 200 to 300 miles back from the front line—this is very apropos, since the front will be extremely fluid. The President interjected at this point that the probable sound course of procedure would be to abolish the Army, Navy and Air Force and Marines and go to task forces under Defense—but such an idea is probably twenty years away. Mr. Wilson said there was much to commend this proposal as a better means of decentralization than we have now. In summing up on this point, Mr. Wilson proposed to tell the Army they could put their 500-mile missile in the 1959 program, seeing what they can take out to provide the $45 million needed. The President agreed.

Anti-missile missile. Mr. Wilson said that trouble is rising between the Army and the Air Force over this missile. The Army has been assigned the missile, with Air Force having the long-range detection, but the Air Force is now initiating an approach involving an “area weapon.” The President interjected, with some vigor, that he thought we are going to have to go to a “Manhattan District” type approach in order to get forward in this matter. Mr. Wilson said that is exactly what he had wanted to propose to the President. The President added that he is coming to believe that perhaps we should do this for all missiles—not just the anti-missile missile.

Overseas deployments. Mr. Wilson said that to reach a force of 2.5 million it would be necessary to bring back something of the order of an additional 40,000 personnel from overseas. Even so, it would be possible to keep two divisions in Japan and five in Europe, running them under strength, however, as the British have done on the continent.

Earth satellite. Mr. Wilson said that a result of the Soviet achievement is to throw more emphasis on the missile program. He thought he had better remove certain overtime restrictions now in effect. These are of minor influence and cost, but some people will charge a slow-up in the program because of these restrictions. The President told him he could go ahead, but asked that the removal be very precisely defined. (He asked me to inform Mr. Brundage of this decision, and I did so.) With regard to the Vanguard, Mr. Wilson suggested letting it run on for a few months more. If the Navy should fail with its missile, however, or substantially slip in its timing, he thought we had better have a back up missile. The President said the use of the Redstone as the back up had been mentioned to him earlier in the day.[6] He thought that Mr. Holaday should keep track of the program day by day, and do what is necessary to have the Redstone ready as a back up.

Defense Department organizations. Mr. Wilson reported that all the principal jobs are filled. The only change which he would recommend would be to clarify Roles and Missions and thought that this would need to be done before too long.

Regular Appointments with the President. Mr. Wilson thought it would be well for Secretary McElroy and General Twining to have regular appointments with the President for some time, inasmuch as they are new to their duties, and the President agreed.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 8.

[2] Not printed.

[3] The Cordiner Committee, officially known as the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, was chaired by Ralph J. Cordiner, president of General Electric Company. Created to study personnel and pay practices in the military, the committee reported on May 8 that a significant gap existed between the structure of military pay, which had not changed since World War II, and rapidly changing military strategy. Many of the committee’s recommendations initially delayed for budgetary reasons were implemented in 1958. See Report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation (2 vols., Washington, 1957). Eisenhower’s comments on the Cordiner Committee recommendations at his press conference on June 19 are printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 474-475.

[4] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[5] The word “guides” was deleted and “guidance” inserted in handwriting on the source text.

[6] Reference is to a meeting at 8:30 a.m. among the President, administration officials, and scientists. For text of a memorandum of this conference, dated October 8, see vol. XI, p. 755 . Another memorandum of this conference, drafted by Goodpaster, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

146. Memorandum of Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 10, 1957[1]

Washington, October 10, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Implications of the Soviet Earth Satellite for U.S. Security.” For text, see volume XI, page 757.]

2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs (NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1690, 1743 and 1765) [2]

Mr. Cutler introduced the subject and indicated that Mr. Holaday, of the Department of Defense, would give the presentation. Thereupon Mr. Holaday read his report, with its conclusion that the time was not yet at hand when a clear choice could be made in favor of either the Thor or the Jupiter program, and that both should be continued until successful tests are achieved by one or the other missile.

The President pointed out that the early NSC directives on the development of the U.S. ballistic missiles program had emphasized that one of the first requirements was for the achievement of a workable intermediate range ballistic missile. If an attempt to develop an IRBM with a 2000-mile range was slowing up the achievement of an IRBM with a 1500-mile range, the President was altogether against it. (The President’s remark derived from a statement by Mr. Holaday that the British were pressing us to extend the range of our IRBM’s to 2000 miles.)

Mr. Holaday assured the President that the Defense Department was following the NSC directives implicitly, and its objective continued to be the achievement of an IRBM with a range of 1500 miles.

The President then inquired whether Mr. Holaday and his associates were keeping under constant study the possibility of resort to a Manhattan District approach for the achievement of the objectives of our ballistic missiles program. Mr. Holaday replied in the affirmative, and the President went on to say that we might have to consider this approach despite the fact that up until now we had rejected the idea of a new Manhattan District operation for the missiles program.

Referring once again to points made by Mr. Holaday, the President inquired what difference it made whether the Army or the Air Force conducted the test firings of these missiles. Mr. Holaday replied that the Air Force fires its missiles from fixed concrete installations on its airfields. The Army, on the other hand, makes use of the principle of “shoot and scoot”. It was the Army’s objective to make the installations for firing missiles mobile in character.

The President, after stating that he approved the recommendations with respect to Thor and Jupiter proposed by Mr. Holaday, went on to say that only yesterday he had again been asked how much of the delay in our earth satellite program derived from inter-service rivalry. The President said that he always denied the validity of such assertions, but the question showed the widespread belief in our country that we are competing among ourselves rather than with the Russians.

Mr. Holaday informed the President that there was very little rivalry to be observed in the Project Vanguard program. The President cautioned Mr. Holaday to watch this problem of inter-service rivalry all the time. The objective of the program was not to achieve a missile which a particular service desired, but instead to achieve the most efficient missiles system. The President felt that such matters as deployment, the character of the ground installations, methods of employment desired by the different military services, and similar matters, were completely secondary to the determination by the United States to fire a 1500-mile missile and hit something. The President emphasized that he was interested first of all in achieving such a vehicle, and that nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of getting it.

Mr. Holaday pointed out to the President that, after all, the development of ground support equipment for the missile must be carried along with the development of the missile itself. Otherwise we would end up having the missile but with no suitable installation from which to shoot it. Nevertheless, our main effort was, of course, to get the missile.

Thereafter, the President stressed once again the great political and psychological advantage of the first achievement of an IRBM and an ICBM. He noted that from the inception of the ballistic missiles program the Council had agreed that these political and psychological considerations were perhaps even more important than the strictly military considerations.

The Vice President referred to numerous press reports about interservice rivalry and lack of adequate support for the U.S. satellite and missiles programs. He warned again that we would be in for a very rough time when the Congress began investigating these rumors and reports. The Congressional investigators would light on every shred of evidence indicating undue delay or rivalry among the services. If they think that they have proved the existence of these obstacles, they will force on us a single-missile program whether we like it or not.

The Vice President then referred to Mr. Larson’s earlier remarks about the United States being first in the field on the next great breakthrough. In this connection he pointed out that the ICBM had been built up as the great ultimate weapon. The Russians felt that they had to possess an ICBM in order to frighten us. But the IRBM can be much more dangerous to the Russians than the ICBM to us. Accordingly, the IRBM is of extreme importance in the propaganda of the cold war.

Governor Stassen suggested that it might be desirable for the Administration to issue a laconic factual account of the entire missile development in the United States. This might be published some time between now and next January. This would help to correct the unfortunate impression provided by photographs of missile failures, which photographs had distorted the truth of our real progress in this field. Within the limits of security, we should do our best to counteract this distortion.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the OCB was concerning itself with publicity on the missile program, and was even now preparing a proposal for the President’s consideration.[3]

The National Security Council:[4]

a. Noted and discussed a report by the Department of Defense on (1) the readjustment of ballistic and aerodynamic missile programs since the July 3, 1957, presentation to the Council on the subject (NSC Action No. 1743); and (2) the study of combining the Thor and Jupiter development programs into a single missile program, as called for by NSC Action No. 1765.

b. Noted the President’s approval of the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense, contained in a–(1) above, that, because the various factors to be considered do not in total clearly favor the selection of one program at this time, both the Thor and Jupiter programs be continued until successful flight tests are achieved by either missile, in order that greater assurance of the early availability of an operable missile system may be achieved.

c. Noted the President’s instructions to the Department of Defense that, in approving the recommendation in b above:

(1) He would expect the Department of Defense to keep under constant study the most effective organizational structure for the ICBM and IRBM programs, including the possibility of concentrating such programs outside of the military services in one organization similar to the wartime Manhattan District; and, if deemed desirable as a result of such constant study, to make recommendations thereon to him.

(2) The overriding objective of the IRBM program, in view of the political and psychological impact referred to in NSC Action No. 1484–c, continues to be the successful achievement of an IRBM with approximately 1500 miles range and reasonable accuracy; and that the related problems of ground support, methods of employment contemplated by the various military services, and increased range, should not be allowed to delay such an achievement.

(3) Similarly, the overriding objective of the ICBM program continues to be the successful achievement of an ICBM with necessary range and reasonable accuracy, in priority over related

Note: In approving the action in b above, the President directed that the Secretary of Defense report to the Council as soon as more adequate test information shall have been accumulated as to the Thor and Jupiter programs and, in any event, not later than December 31, 1957.[5]

The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 11.

[2] For references to NSC Actions No. 1433, 1484, 1690, and 1743, see footnote 12, Document 134. Regarding NSC Action No. 1765, see footnote 16, Document 134.

[3] The OCB Report on the Department of Defense Recommendations With Respect to Ballistic Missile Information Policy, dated October 16, is in Department of State,S/SA Files: Lot 61 D 385, Ballistic Missiles.

[4] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1800, approved by the President on October 11. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[5] The NSC did not again consider priorities for ballistic missiles and satellite programs during 1957.

147. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 14, 1957[1]

Washington, October 14, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy

General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy asked if he might feel free to have General Randall attend future sessions, and the President said to do so by all means, if he wished. In further discussion, in which Mr. McElroy mentioned General Randall’s value for continuity and for bringing out the key issues of important questions, the President indicated that he would readily understand if Mr. McElroy, in replacing General Randall, were, as a means of improving attitudes in the Pentagon, to bring in a well-qualified Army man.

Mr. McElroy said that he foresaw the need for sessions on two days on the military budget this year. On the first day, he would plan to bring up major points for the President’s confirmation; on the second, the Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff would be given an opportunity to make known to the President their views concerning any areas in the military budget about which they have particular concern. The President indicated agreement to the proposal, although bringing out that he did not think the technique of telling the Secretaries and the Chiefs of decisions already made was the best one. Mr. McElroy said he would give further thought to this.

Mr. McElroy referred to the $38 billion figure and said he would like not to regard it as a rigid ceiling. The President welcomed this comment, saying that he had never wanted it to be called that. As a matter of fact, he had not wished to establish a figure at all, but had done so on the repeated request of Secretary Wilson. Although he had set it as a judgment as to a proper level, he promptly found that it was being spoken of as a rigid ceiling. In concluding discussion on this point, the President said Mr. McElroy could bring the group in whenever he wished.

Mr. McElroy next spoke about the anti-ICBM. This is now only at the stage of technological feasibility studies. At this point our interest is chiefly in whether it can be achieved, and what kind of money it would cost. He was thinking of organizing this activity in the Department of Defense, rather than in the services and making an early announcement in order to prevent the matter from getting to the point of intense rivalry. He mentioned the name of a Mr. Zeter (?) of Chrysler[2] as the type of man he had in mind, and thought he might be available. The President said he is willing to go ahead with this type of organization if Mr. McElroy so decides.

The question of the longer range Redstone was then raised. The President said he understood that there had been argument in the Chiefs about that matter. He felt that if the Army could show that it could carry out this range extension at reasonable cost, then they should go ahead, and Mr. McElroy indicated he would take this action now.

Next raising the matter of the Cordiner Report,[3] Mr. McElroy said he had an erroneous impression of the President’s position in this matter initially. Now he understood that the President is not opposed to it. The President said that last year he would have approved a general raise throughout government to cover the cost of living, but the proposals were not limited to that. He would have also approved Cordiner provisions pinpointed to key problems of retaining technicians and highly trained junior officers. He felt that action should go forward this year on a wise application of the theory of the Cordiner provisions. In fact, he would like to put it forward as a first order of business in the new Congress.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 15.

[2] Presumably James C. Zeder, director of engineering, Chrysler Corporation, and President, Chrysler Institute of Engineering.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 145.

148. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 15, 1957, 11 a.m.[1]

Washington, October 15, 1957, 11 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. I.I. Rabi

Dr. L. V. Berkner

Dr. H. A. Bethe

Dr. D. W.Bronk

Dr. J.B.Fisk

Dr. C. P. Haskins

Dr. A. G.Hill

Dr. J. R. Killian, Jr.

Dr. E. H. Land

Dr. H. Scoville, Jr.

Dr. A. T. Waterman

Dr. J. B. Wiesner[2]

Dr. J. R. Zacharias

Dr. D. Z. Beckler

General Cutler

General Goodpaster

The President said he wanted to have the group in to learn their state of mind and to see what ideas and proposals they might have that they would like to advance. He said he had been reflecting very earnestly on the question of how all of the many scientific activities throughout the government, or supported by the government, could be best supported. He referred to certain paragraphs in the National Science Foundation brochure on basic research.[3] He said it is all well and good to accept the importance of basic research, but government officials have some responsibility to assure that money provided is actually used for research, and not diverted to other ends. However, to do so might result in intrusion into university activity. He asked whether the group really thought that American science is being outdistanced, and asked for an expression of the state of mind of the members.

Dr. Rabi said that the problem the President had mentioned, of management of research in government, is of course of central concern to his group. He added that if the President wanted to do something about it, they could certainly make some suggestions to him. The President asked specifically how this work might proceed, and General Cutler suggested (and it was agreed) that the committee might prepare and submit a draft of terms of reference for such a study.

Dr. Rabi then went on to speak of our scientific position now and in the next few years in relation to the Soviets. He said that we can now see some advantages on our part. However, the Soviets have picked up tremendous momentum, and unless we take vigorous action they could pass us swiftly just as in a period of twenty to thirty years we caught up with Europe and left Western Europe far behind.

At Dr. Rabi’s request, Dr. Land then spoke—with great eloquence—about the great problem that is before us. He said that the country needs a great deal from science. But he felt that science, to provide this, needs the President acutely. The Soviets are now in a pioneering stage and frame of mind. They regard science both as an essential tool and as a way of life. They are teaching their young people to enjoy science. Curiously, in the United States we are not now great builders for the future but are rather stressing production in great quantities of things we have already achieved. In Russia science is now being pursued both for enjoyment and for the strength of the country. He asked if there is not some way in which the President could inspire the country—setting out our youth particularly on a whole variety of scientific adventures. If he were to do that, there would be tremendous returns. At the present time scientists feel themselves isolated and alone, but all of this could change.

The President questioned the statement that the Russians attempt to inspire all of their people with science. He thought they had instead followed the practice of picking out the best minds and ruthlessly spurning the rest. At least he had been given that impression when he associated with them. As to Dr. Land’s main point, however, he said he thought he could help and do part of the job. However, the need for a coordinated effort would still exist. In fact, he said he would like to try to create a spirit—an attitude toward science similar to that held toward various kinds of athletics in his youth—an attitude which now seemed to him to have palled somewhat. He would think that one speech would not do the job. There would be a need for great carry-through. He added that perhaps now is a good time to try such a thing. People are alarmed and thinking about science, and perhaps this alarm could be turned to a constructive result.

Dr. Rabi said that many of the policy matters that come up to the President have a strong scientific component. He pointed out that the President lacks a scientific advisor, or someone who can provide him with a scientific point of view. The President said that it might be well to have such an advisor, or even a small section, to support him. He said the group would have to recognize, however, that every such individual added simply adds to the burdens of the Presidency—but perhaps the individual could be a great help in getting the right point of view across. He said he would like to hear something more specific as to their ideas. Dr. Rabi said the first essential is to get someone whom the President can live with easily (in the sense of working with him agreeably); this individual should be completely sound scientifically as well. Dr. Killian added that a committee to back up the individual would also have great value, and the President agreed, using the analogy of the Council of Economic Advisors. The President said that such an individual could be most helpful. For example, he could keep a record of decisions and actions affecting scientific matters. He referred to his decision to give top priority to the development of operational ballistic missiles at the earliest possible date. Subsequently secondary considerations were introduced which tended to delay this overriding objective. One of the group suggested that the scientific advisor could help the President not to forget such policy decisions. The President interjected with vehemence that he had not forgotten this view but that those charged with the program had.

Dr. Killian said that these comments had great value in the long term for the creation of a more fertile climate for scientific activity. In the short term, there is missing a sense of urgency and mission in the scientific community. Certain subjects need to be attacked that are not now being investigated. He thought that if we continue to go as we are now the Russians will surpass us, and it will not take them long to do so. The question is how to get the research and development programs in Defense into focus. The need is more for leadership than for money. The President said he thought he had a fine man in Mr. McElroy. Already he has been impressed with Mr. McElroy’s approach. He thought it might be well for the group to meet with McElroy. (At this point I left the meeting and called Secretary McElroy, and on rejoining the meeting arranged an appointment for the group with the Secretary at 1:30 this afternoon.)

As I returned Dr. Wiesner was telling the President that much of the problem relating to the timing on missiles and the satellite came from our late start on them—rather than delays in their conduct after they were initiated by this Administration. The President said he has avoided going into that matter because it becomes immediately political, and he just does not want to do that.

I left the meeting again for a moment in connection with the McElroy appointment. When I returned the group was discussing the need for scientific collaboration with our allies. The President said that much of the difficulty went back to 1945 and the Fuchs case.[4] When this incident occurred, the Congress decided to bar all atomic information to the British. He asked General Cutlerand me to see that a careful examination is made of authority under the law for exchange of scientists and scientific information, and analysis of what would have to be done to set up a joint committee. Dr. Rabi suggested the need for a scientific man in the State Department, but this was not discussed. Dr. Hill (and others) said that our security regulations cause a large part of the difficulty with our allies—particularly in areas other than atomic. The President recalled how he has personally worked at this problem over a number of years.

In further discussion the President said that he would take the opportunity to speak out on the question of a proper attitude toward science (the Land suggestion), perhaps using his next press conference.[5] He would bring out that our people should take an interest and a concern in science, and not just leave the matter to scientists. Some follow-up would be needed, however. On the point of adequate recognition of scientists, he recalled that he had tried to get Mrs. Hobby[6] to set up a series of awards for distinction in science and the arts, something along the lines of the French Academy but of even higher standing. He indicated that success has not yet been achieved. He mentioned also his plan to visit the Redstone Arsenal and the missile firing center, and told how the problems of the Presidency affect such things, in that he had to cancel the visit because a trip by him to an Army post in the South at the present time would be harmful and misunderstood.

In concluding the meeting, the President asked me to have a check made into the restrictions that prevent exchange of information. He asked the group to include in the study for which they are to prepare terms of reference just what we have done in the area of science since 1945. As the group left the meeting, several of them came up to me to express their enthusiasm and appreciation for the session they had had with the President.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 16.

[2] Professor of electrical engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

[3] Not further identified.

[4] In 1949 British physicist Klaus Fuchs confessed to giving atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.

[5] For text of the transcript of the President’s news conference on October 30, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 776–777.

[6] Oveta Culp Hobby, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1953–1955.

149. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 23, 1957[1]

Washington, October 23, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Anderson

Mr. Brundage

Mr. McNeil

General Cutler

General Goodpaster

Secretary Anderson said that over the previous weekend there had been a great deal of talk of bad funding practices on the part of the government—that deliveries would be required and accepted with payment not being made until much later. He felt it was clear that there was need for a clarifying statement. Accordingly, he met with Mr. Brundage and Mr. McElroy to find out how much above $38 billion in expenditures we would have to go to be assured of paying for materials when delivered. He said the Defense Department stated they could make payments on time for $19.4 billion expenditures in the first six months of this fiscal year and $19.2 billion in the second. He said that Mr. McElroy does feel that some subcontractors will have to fund more of their work in progress and will have to hold down on inventories, but felt that they should be required to do so. Secretary Anderson said he had also talked with Mr. William McChesney Martin[2] about the matter. He intended to inform a few key banks that the need for capital for contractors to carry progress costs will be of the order of not more than $200 million instead of the $2 or $3 billion being discussed in the scare stories.

The President thought we should make a statement that in 1957 and 1958 procurement will be so much in each year, and that we will pay our bills when they come due.

Secretary Anderson said that the fund proposals allow for an additional $100 million for the Air Force and $100 million for the Navy after the first of the year. He thought that he could still hold the debt below the debt ceiling, with such figures, if all goes well with collections as now foreseen. He indicated he would meet with Secretary McElroy and get a statement out which should have a great stabilizing effect. He reported that at the beginning of trading on the 23rd, he had called Mr. Funston[3] in New York, that the market was up strongly at opening, and sentiment was strong for buying, with a great increase in confidence after the President’s speech the night before.

Secretary Anderson said that companies like Boeing are following a course which is greatly alarming their subcontractors, and in some cases the actions seem to be deliberate. For this reason Mr. McElroy is setting up a special place for subcontractors to come to if they feel that they have been treated unfairly. The President strongly endorsed this procedure.

The President thought that in the present climate a giant step toward unification could be made. This might permit the Secretary of Defense to close out numerous installations, cut down overhead, etc.

Mr. Anderson added to his earlier figures that $60 million additional is to be provided to the Army for the Jupiter project.

Mr. Brundage said he would like to have the $400 million addition as a ceiling, to be reached only if completely necessary.

The President said he thought that rising costs have made our figures out of date. He said he was absolutely determined that we will and must meet all U.S. obligations. He would, however, call in the big manufacturers and tell them that if they start up scare stories again we will change our contracting methods and deal directly with subcontractors. There was discussion of the fact that the big contractors have very little of their own equity, but are operating on government financing, and using government-contract-supported public relations officers to spread these scare stories.

Secretary Anderson said that Secretary McElroy received commitments from the Service Secretaries to meet these figures and not to run over.

The President and Secretary Anderson discussed further the action of big contractors in trying to start a scare campaign.

G

Brigadier General, US Army

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 26.

[2] Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

[3] George Keith Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange.

150. Memorandum of Discussion at the 341st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 24, 1957[1]

Washington, October 24, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1957 (NSC 5720, Part l)[2]

Mr. Cutler introduced General Twining, who, after making certain preliminary observations, called upon Colonel Rosson,[3] who made the presentation of behalf of the Department of Defense. The major topics discussed by Colonel Rosson and illustrated by charts[4] were the following:

1. Basic Objectives of the Military Program

a. Nuclear Retaliatory Capability

b. Continental Defense

c. Ready Forces

d. Control of the Sea Areas and Air Communications

2. Nuclear Air Retaliation

a. SAC

b. Tactical Air Forces

c. Naval Forces

3. Continental Defense System

4. Ready Forces

a. Continental U.S. and Hawaii

b. Europe and the Middle East

c. Far East-Western Pacific

5. Control of the Sea Areas and Air Communications

a. Anti-Submarine Capability

b. Submarine Capability

c. Protection of Air Communications

By way of summarizing the material which he had presented, Colonel Rosson introduced an additional chart, entitled “Summary Comparison of Selected Major Forces—Army, Navy and Air Force”.[5] This chart not only made the comparison in terms of the status of the military programs as of June 30, 1957, but included two additional columns giving the estimated size of selected major forces on June 30, 1958, and June 30, 1959, based on estimated budget support to be provided in this period.

The chart indicated that while we had 18 Army divisions as of June 30, 1957, we would have 15 Army divisions as of June 30, 1958, and 14 Army divisions as of June 30, 1959. The comparable figures for naval vessels were 967, 901 and 864. The comparable figures for combat wings in the Air Force were 137, 117 and 103.

At the conclusion of Colonel Rosson’s presentation, the President inquired as to the results of tests made to determine the efficiency of our military communications systems. Colonel Rosson replied that in general our test exercises indicated that there would be a severe overloading of these communications in the initial period of general war, but that the situation would improve thereafter.

Prompted by Mr. Cutler, the President inquired with respect to the concentration of SAC bombers on certain airfields. He had heard earlier that morning a report that all our B–52 bombers were concentrated on a single field. Colonel Rosson replied that this was not a statement of fact. Secretary Douglas added the information that there were three wings of B–52’s on three bases. Our 1958 program permitted only five additional bases, although our goal for FY 1958 would have been 11.

The Vice President inquired as to the meaning of the term “nuclear capable”. Colonel Rosson explained that this term defined a delivery capability for nuclear weapons. The Vice President went on to say that the reason that he had asked his question was that the term “operational capability” was now so much talked of in the press, especially in relation to Soviet missiles. Could Colonel Rosson also explain this term? Did this refer only to an initial capability? Colonel Rosson replied that the term “operational capability” was a term with progressive meaning, running all the way from an initial capability to a full capability in all units.

Governor Stassen expressed concern that the charts which had been displayed seemed to indicate that our aircraft capabilities were diminishing without indicating a concurrent increase in our missiles capability. After all, the basis on which we were cutting down on our aircraft capability was that we should have an increasing capability in missiles.

The President pointed out that no one could quarrel with the fact of the increased effectiveness of our combat wings, even though the number of these wings was fewer.

The National Security Council:[6]

Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Department of Defense on the status of the U.S. Military Program on June 30, 1957, based on Part 1 of NSC 5720.

[Here follows agenda item 2.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 25.

[2] NSC 5720, Part 1, “The Military Program,” dated September 23, is not printed. (Department of State,S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171,NSC 5720)

[3] Colonel William B. Rosson, Chairman’s Staff Group,JCS.

[4] NSC 5720, Part 1, contains several charts pertaining to the topics discussed by Colonel Rosson. The charts are filed in the minutes.

[5] The chart is filed in the minutes.

[6] The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1807, approved by the President on October 24. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

151. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 29, 1957[1]

Washington, October 29, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

Dr. Rabi

Admiral Strauss

General Cutler

Mr. Gordon Gray

General Goodpaster

Mr. Gray said the purpose of the meeting was to enable Dr. Rabi to present some findings of the Scientific Advisory Committee, regarding an emergency defense against the Soviet ICBM to the President. The essence of the recommendation was that, in view of a defect our scientists feel exists in the Soviet atomic weapon for their ICBM, we should proceed at once to develop an anti-ICBM system, particularly for the safeguarding of SAC, and should give consideration to discontinuing atomic tests at once, before the Soviets achieve the thing they are now lacking in their weapon.

Dr. Rabi said the Soviets must be expected to have an ICBM in the fairly near future, and to have a warhead for it. The warhead may be expected to have the same weakness our earlier ones had. By exploding a 100 KT weapon at an altitude over 100,000 feet, within several miles of the incoming Soviet weapon, pre-initiation of the Soviet weapon, with a low order explosion, would be induced. To safeguard SAC there should be initiated the construction of long-range radar for this defensive system, and this radar is estimated to cost about $10 million per site. He added that if the Soviets continue development and testing they seem certain to discover the feature that they now lack.

The President pointed out that if we were to discontinue testing, we should be making a complete, sudden reversal in our position. It is hard to see how we could do this in terms of our public opinion, and the opinion of our allies. He recalled that Mr. Stassen had suggested accepting an early cessation and we rejected his proposal. To do this now would require great skill of presentation and explanation. Dr. Rabi said he thought it was a tragedy that we did not stop our tests before the Soviets tested their thermonuclear warhead in their last series. The President recalled that he had often said that if we are ahead of the Soviets in these matters, we should agree to stop in order to freeze our advantage. Dr. Rabi said that if we continue to conduct tests we will get better weapons, but relatively the Soviets will catch up with us.

Admiral Strauss said that he is inclined to question some of the assumptions and conclusions of the study, and General Cutler suggested that as a next step the scientists holding various points of view should get together. With regard to the cessation of the testing, Admiral Strauss brought out that the Soviets can always “steal our secrets”, and I raised the point as to assurance against the possibility that tests would be conducted without our knowledge.

The President said that, in addition to the scientists, it is necessary to have the Secretary of State and others study this proposal, because we would be changing our international position. We would also have to take care to bring our NATO allies along. He would, however, like the group to bring together AEC’s scientists and others concerned to resolve a common view. Then he would have to consider what to do, if the change is made, in order to retain the confidence of our allies and our own people.

During the discussion Dr. Rabi indicated it had been a great mistake for the President to accept the views of Drs. Teller and Lawrence.[2] The President recalled that he had seen them because of a request by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. He added that he thought they were eminent in their field (as all agreed they were). He asked Dr. Rabi if there was mutual respect between the various groups. Dr. Rabi responded in a manner which tended to indicate that there was, although his statement was simply that they had known each other for twenty years or more.

With regard to the thermonuclear weapon, the President said he had always felt that the delay could have been fatal to us. He retains some question, however, as to whether the Soviets did not get the secret from us. General Cutler said that Dr. Bohr[3] had indicated he thought that the Soviets had developed that weapon on their own but had checked their line of development against the data they obtained from us.

The President said he would talk to the Secretary of State and tell him what we might be up against. He said the first thing to do is to get the scientists of the various groups together and see how they resolve the matter. They should consider whether tests could be conducted free from detection. At this point Dr. Rabi said the group was not recommending cessation of tests but simply that this action be studied. They were recommending action against the ICBM. On this point the President said it will be very interesting to observe how soon the Soviets are able to make the transition from initial test to a true operational capability.

G

Brigadier General USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 30. For President Eisenhower’s diary entry on this conference, see vol. XX, p. 754 .

[2] See the memorandum of conference with the President, June 24, ibid., p. 638.

[3] Niels H.D. Bohr, Danish nuclear physicist.

152. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 31, 1957[1]

Washington, October 31, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

General Twining

General Goodpaster

The President began by saying he had discussed the atomic energy program with Admiral Strauss yesterday, and had asked him to cut down all overhead, construction, administrative costs—everything but the weapons production.[2] He said that Admiral Strauss had, in explaining what AEC would do if cut $200 million, said they would take the major part of the cut out of weapons. The President then went on to ask what is going to be done with this tremendous number of enormous weapons. When we get into such figures, it is clear we are providing for elaborate reserves, and making very pessimistic estimates as to what can get to the target. However, the B–52, he understands, still has great penetrating power. General Twining confirmed that this is correct and added that the Rascal missile (air to ground missile) has just been very successfully tested, and this will help with penetration. He indicated that he has been thinking we are getting about enough of the large-sized weapons. He would say that the Air Force will not be happy until they get one for every aircraft plus a sizeable reserve.

The President asked whether the figures shown to him by General Twining in a memorandum setting forth JCS agreed recommendations on the atomic weapons stockpile objective for 1950 [1960?] could be reached without additional building or expansion of facilities.[3] He asked General Twining to take this paper to Admiral Strauss, indicating the President has seen his paper, and asked him to provide a statement that the AEC has facilities in commission and active operation to build these without additional construction costs. The President indicated he would hold up action on this matter until he received the letter from Admiral Strauss,[3] at which time he would plan to advise General Twining that the memorandum was approved.

The President then said he had two matters he wished to discuss. The first was the NATO atomic stockpile. He suggested that General Norstad might prepare a specific plan for this project prior to the NATO meeting, and suggested that General Twining send a man over to work with General Norstad as to what could be done under existing law. General Twining said that his office is now working up a plan which he would have taken over to be discussed and cleared with General Norstad at an early date. The President said it should go into all the major questions involved such as facilities, training, units, custody, etc.

The President said the second subject he wished to discuss arose out of his experience and observations as SHAEF and shape. He thought the joint staff should be organized functionally, with each section headed by a single person—in other words, a truly integrated staff. The individual heading each section would give a single recommendation (showing a nonconcurrence if one of his officers held a deep-seated contrary view). He said he would support legislation to give special recognition and special status to officers serving on the joint staff. For example, if the Director and Chairman approved his service for the first six months, he could be given an extra grade, under a provision that he would revert to the top of his previous grade when he left his joint assignment. The big thing is to create a national outlook so that when Chiefs ask for an answer they get, not what each service thinks, but what highly selected, highly intelligent men think to be the best solution.

General Twining told the President there have been no split papers by the Chiefs since he assumed his post. He also said that Mr. McElroy has promised him that when a minor point of disagreement is sent up for decision he will decide it promptly. General Twining thought real progress is being made in the joint operations.

The President reverted to his idea that we should put service on the joint staff in such a position that it is difficult to get an assignment, and an assignment is highly sought. He said he thought we should give a mark of distinction to people serving on the staff, and asked General Twining to look for a way to do this.

The President suggested that there might be great value in cutting down the service public information offices, and putting them in Defense, with the exception of very tiny groups which would simply answer questions.

General Twining thought there was much to be gained in this direction. He then said that he had drawn to the attention of the Chiefs service documents providing guidelines for speeches which in many cases simply tell how to criticize the other services. He had no quarrel with a man “bragging” on his own service, but thought it was harmful when he criticized another.

General Twining said he had also gotten out of the file Admiral Radford had left him many memoranda giving the President’s views on the functioning of the JCS. They had discussed these and found the observations very helpful.

The President spoke strongly in favor of raising the prestige of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in every possible way. He asked General Twining to see how the office could be organized for this purpose. He suggested first making the Director a true Chief of Staff, and second, letting each section be headed by a single man.

G

Brigadier General USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on October 31. A cover sheet bears the typed notation: “with General Twining on rivalries, etc.”

[2] No record of this meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[3] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[3] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

153. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 4, 1957[1]

Washington, November 4, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT[2]

Mr. Gordon Gray

Dr. Killian

Mr. Wm. Foster

Mr. McCloy

Mr. Gaither

Mr. Lovett

General Cutler

Mr. Stanton

Gen. Doolittle

Mr. Sprague

Admiral Carney

General Goodpaster

General Cutler began by saying the group had carried out its work pursuant to an instruction to examine active and passive defense of the United States.[3] He said the full report would be made to the Council on Thursday,[4] and recommendations would then go to the departments for study and comment.

Mr. Gaither made the presentation. He said the group had concentrated its attention primarily on the deterrent. They had therefore studied security in the broadest possible sense of survival in the atomic age. He had six principal points to make. The group appraised the threat very thoroughly. They had found that our active defenses are almost insignificant. They felt that our strategic air force could be knocked out on the ground today and that by 1959 SAC will be highly vulnerable to the ICBM, and our population critically vulnerable. They considered that the long-term risk to our people is increasing and will continue to increase. They felt that we must expand our basic strength, both that of the United States and that of the free world.

As to the threat, the group saw no change in Soviet objectives and felt that the growth of the threat therefore lies in the growing power of Soviet forces—e.g. their weapons, jets, new missiles, etc. The peril to the United States must be measured in megatonnage in the years ahead.

They felt that today our deterrent force is inadequate. In event of hostilities, we would have to expect population casualties of up to 50%.

They thought it was highly important to give greater security to our strategic offensive power through reducing response time and increasing warning time, through dispersing, and through providing a better active defense of SAC. They consider that we should increase our strategic offensive power through the introduction of diversified missiles. At least until we have the ICBM we should deploy IRBMs overseas beginning in 1959, when the Soviets may be expected to have ICBMs available.

The group thought we must improve our defenses. They were not decided with regard to blast shelters, feeling the matter needed more study. They were inclined to give priority to the strategic offensive over provision of blast shelters. With regard to fallout shelters, the group was initially skeptical but is now less skeptical (although not apparently decided). It is necessary to bear in mind that active defenses would not give an assurance of protection.

He then went on to deal with certain more fundamental points. He thought it was necessary to make every effort to improve the management of our security resources, referring to organization, communications, and decision-making. He said the group was heartened by plans for the mobilization of the resources of the free world. In conclusion, he said the group thought the American people could be brought to support the necessary programs. The President said all military strength is of course relative to what a possible adversary has. He did, however, feel that we are getting close to absolutes when the ability exists to inflict 50% casualties on an enemy. In those circumstances there is in reality no defense except to retaliate. He said he thought our strategic forces are stronger than the group may have indicated. Our bases overseas give a great capacity for dispersion. With regard to the ICBM, here is one case in which a central position is not an advantage to the Soviets. The free world holds the periphery and can pose a threat from a multitude of points. He felt that maximum massive retaliation remains the crux of our defense.

He was inclined to think that what we put into defense measures should be put into the security of our striking forces. For the next five years he thought that aircraft would still be the primary means of carrying out destruction, and during this period we have the capability of delivering the greater blow. The true critical period could be foreseen five years from now. He recalled that a scientific group in his office a few days ago had made just this point—that we are not behind now, but we must make great exertions in order not to fall behind.[5] This means we must educate our people for the scientific and technological needs, and must also educate our people so they will support what is required.

The difficult thing is that, in our democracies, we can apparently only do this with crisis, and we do not think government by crisis is the right process. The crux is, therefore, how to keep up interest and support without hysteria. He pointed out that to retain a free enterprise system we must retain incentives, and noted that the group’s study had not embraced these complications. This to his mind was the most difficult problem. Americans will carry a challenging load for a couple of years, but it is very hard to obtain the commitments to indefinite burdens.

He agreed with the recommendations on the dispersal of SAC, but pointed out that this seems to go very slowly. He agreed to the need for protection of fuels and weapons. In this connection he mentioned that we have dispersed many of our weapons. He thought it was hard to put across the necessity for a choice between guns and butter, but considered that this is what we face. He cited the need to have a plan to improve and strengthen our forces year by year, rather than to fluctuate and go by fits and starts. He said he was much encouraged by the fact that this group had come to these conclusions, in view of the influence he knew its members to have.

The President said he was inclined to think that shelters rank rather low in the list of priorities. He recognized that some might be developed on a local basis. In general, he thought it would be better to use the same funds for other things. Mr. McCloy said that the study on shelters had indicated a cost of the order of $100 per life possibly saved. The President said he was not opposed to shelters, and recognized that knowledge of a shelter capability in the United States would tend to deter the Soviets from attempting an attack, and that this consideration puts a little different light on the matter. But if 50% destruction of our industries and cities occurred, he did not see how the nation could survive as an organized society.

Mr. McCloy then cited the need for organizational improvement. He said there is a feeling in the country that interservice bickering and rivalry is hurting us a great deal. The President referred to proposals for a Manhattan project for missiles but said he had been advised five years ago when he considered this proposal, and had just been advised again, that development is so embedded in the services that a change would involve uprooting which would delay or hamper the program. He said that Mr. McElroy is preparing for all future development to go under a single director, and will go for authority, perhaps involving new legislation, to allow the top missiles man in Defense more power to control missile development. Mr. McCloy said that the interservice rivalry is now spreading to industry, universities, etc. which are tending to be tied to particular services.

The President said the key question is why can’t we be one in national defense. He mentioned that he was having the top military and civilian people in the Defense Department to a stag dinner that evening.[6] He said he is coming to think that the services should become training, logistical and administrative establishments, and that the joint staff should be made completely unified and integrated. There is advantage in having a new Secretary of Defense at this time, because he can take these steps without fixing blame or engaging in recriminations. With regard to the ballistic missiles, the President pointed out that we really began work in 1954 and 1955, when the light warhead came in sight.

Mr. McCloy referred to a feeling that is developing among our allies. They are now tending to recognize that the United States cannot wholly provide security—that they must themselves participate if security is to be maintained. In order to do so, however, there must be an exchange of information. The President said he hoped the group would educate some of those opposing exchange of information. Mr. McCloy said he thought the President could “blow the opposition out of the water.” The President recalled that he is a minority President with respect to Congress, and that he cannot alienate the Democratic party by attacking some of its leading members. Mr. Stanton said he recognized there is a difficult problem on the Hill, but thought that public education would help a great deal. The President said he is going to do his best to avoid partisanship in his speeches, trying to make them dispassionate, but will try desperately to get the facts across.

Mr. McCloy said that he did not see any tax reduction in the present situation. He pointed out that the proposals involve some increases in expenditures. The President said he wants at least token reduction in the “butter” side of government. He would be in better position to have defense costs go up in that case. He mentioned the $38 billion figure and recalled that the department kept coming to him and asking what will you give us. The JCS had estimated a $38 billion requirement during their visit to Puerto Rico in early 1955. He had said he hoped he would never have to go above $39 billion. Finally, he went in for $38 billion in the last Congress and was cut to less than $36. He recognized that an increase above $38 billion is inevitable. Inflation alone had resulted in a 6% rise in prices since that figure was established.

The President said that groups must be organized throughout universities, business groups, and other elements of influence, including all those who have taken an inside part in governmental affairs, to put across the needs of the situation. Mr. Foster said that the President is the one man who could accomplish this. He could go out and get support of nonpartisan groups. The President recalled the difficulties that must be foreseen. He mentioned that he had gone all out in two speeches last spring, had obtained splendid popular support, but that the effect on Congress was almost nil. He did feel that there is a spiral of confidence and optimism; if we clarify one major problem in the minds of the people, confidence will spread, he thought. He mentioned that someone had advised him recently not to say this is a problem that will last forty years, but simply to call for a spurt of activity now. He thought this was an inaccurate picture, and besides we must bring ourselves to carry the load until the Soviets change internally.

Mr. Stanton suggested that the opening speech of the President’s speech series would be much more effective if given from the White House, and soon. The President said he would restudy the scheduling of this speech with the idea of possibly giving it from the White House on Thursday November 7th.[7] In concluding the discussion, the President said he did not see any chance of the group finishing their job. He thought it would be well for the group to be kept together to review the matter every now and then.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 6.

[2] All those present at the meeting (except for the President, Gray, Cutler, and Goodpaster) were members of the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee; see Document 159. William C. Foster was executive vice president and director of the Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation. John J. McCloy was Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank. Robert A. Lovett, a former Secretary of Defense, was now a lawyer in private practice. Dr. Frank Stanton was President of the Columbia Broadcasting System. Robert C. Sprague was Chairman of the Board and Treasurer of Sprague Electric Company. Admiral Carney had joined the Westinghouse Electric Company in 1957.

[3] NSC Action No. 1691–b–(2); see footnote 7, Document 114.

[4] See Document 156.

[5] See Document 148.

[6] A memorandum of record of the meeting following that dinner is infra.

[7] See Document 159.

154. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting Held at the White House, Washington, November 4, 1957[1]

Washington, November 4, 1957

Following dinner on Monday evening (November 4) the President met with the Chiefs and Secretaries of the Military Departments for discussion in the Red Room. He said he wanted to have a kind of seminar, throwing out some ideas and having the others challenge them or add thoughts of their own.

He began by saying that he had had three conferences earlier in the day,[2] all of them greatly stressing that our people are deeply concerned over rivalry in our military establishment. The question was repeatedly raised, are we sufficiently unified? Are we getting the best personal judgment of our officers, rather than a parroting of service party lines? General White said he thought that the area of missile development is the one where there is least reality to the charges of harmful rivalry. There has been competition, but it has had a good effect. It is clear which service is to operate the various missiles, so rivalry of that kind has been eliminated. General Twining said that one of the great needs has been the need for timely decisions. If matters are allowed to drag on they will cause bad feeling. Now he has been assured by the Secretary that, when decisions are needed, they will be made. General Taylor said that a clear distinction should be made between missile development and missile use. In the case of the Army, they were not particularly interested initially in developing the 1500-mile missile, since their concern is with shorter-range weapons. However, they are pushing this project, with a full understanding that the product will be turned over to the Air Force. They do, however, feel the need for missiles of shorter range. General Twining intervened to say that this is one point that is clear—the Army is to have no missiles more than 200-mile range. He indicated that the Joint Chiefs were not agreed as to the Army having longer range weapons. The President said he did not accept the idea of such a fixed mile limitation. He saw great advantage in the Army having missiles that could be more centrally located, further back from the battle area which is bound to be a turbulent one, and able to fire on all parts of the sector. He thought that the Army should go ahead and take advantage of the possibilities of added range arising from lightened warheads, and then all of the services should consider how the resulting weapon could be effectively employed.

Mr. McElroy said that he is moving toward a more unified approach in the missiles field and cited the anti-ICBM as an example of a project of this kind. The President, referring to earlier discussion, said that the Joint Chiefs must be above narrow service considerations. He did not regard organization as an answer in itself, except as it leads individuals to take a broader outlook. He said each one should try to approach problems from a national standpoint accepting that he may be overridden on occasion. It is wrong to stress, or simply to press for Army, Navy, and other service interests. He recalled that in 1947 he had favored a tight merger of the services, but this had not been adopted. He indicated he still holds that view as the soundest solution.

He then went on to mention the excellent experiences he had had with integrated staffs in SHAEF and shape, and said he wanted to draw up another major proposal. He thought that the JCS should remain as they are presently constituted, that they should remove operational functions from the service staffs which thereafter would concern themselves with mobilization administration, logistics, etc. The joint staff should be organized on an integrated basis, reporting to the JCS as a corporate body. He said he would like to see every man on the joint staff given some special recognition. For example, after six months service he could be raised a grade if he were below the grade of Colonel. When he returned to his service, he could go to the top of the grade previously held. He thought the members of the JCS should turn over the executive direction of their service to their deputy and should concentrate on their joint responsibilities. He recalled previous discussions with them urging them to take the stance of soldier-states-men.[3] He then asked for comments.

Admiral Burke said he would venture to disagree on some aspects of the President’s proposal. He said that the individual Chiefs have different experiences and qualifications going back many years, as do the service members of the joint staff. The disagreements in the JCS do not arise because of service, he said, but because of the individual experiences of the members. He said that he must have staff help and advice, for which he had to look to his own office. Many of the problems that arise are not susceptible of final solution, but must be worked at day by day. It would be easy to generate a group eager to please the top men, and it is essential to have the deep judgment to bring to the problem. The President intervened strongly asking why it would not be better to have composite, well-thought-out positions, reflecting the experience of many people of differing backgrounds and of differing services brought to him rather than the views of his own service. Admiral Burke said he wanted to have all the angles presented at the JCS table. He cited intelligence as an area in which, in one headquarters, he had seen a whole staff section become nothing more than “yes men.”

The President said he thought each major command such as the Continental Command, the Far East Command, the European Command, and the Strategic Air Command should report directly to the JCS. The services should be given orders to support these commands. The JCS would study their problems, taking account of all resources, and look to the joint staff for assistance as to how to use the resources operationally.

General Taylor said he thought the real problem is a budgetary problem—to relate the Commander’s needs to what can be provided from available funds. He thought the President’s proposal required an overhaul of the existing commands. The President said what he had in mind is that the Joint Chiefs could tell commanders what is generally available. They could then work out the best use of these resources.

The President said he wanted the American people to have a complete faith in the services—that is what he is working for. In consequence, he hates to see the services rush into print, each trying to better its own position, often at the expense of the others. As a result of this, the American public has lost a large measure of confidence in the services. Secretary Quarles said we have gotten to think the situation is quite bad. One reason is that we only concentrate on the bad things. The essence of the problem is that each service receives an appropriation from Congress. Each must then appeal to the people and to the Congress. The key seems to be such an amount of reorganization as would have appropriations made to the Defense establishment, to be apportioned as to optimize our military forces in terms of the threats facing us. The President said if there were just one public relations office, that change alone would have a very great benefit. He would like to see the step taken which would bring out that the first and the great loyalty of all members of the defense establishment is to the Defense Department, which means the United States of America.

Admiral Austin[4] said that the joint staff has sometimes served in just the way the President has in mind. The Chiefs, when unable to agree, have on occasion asked, “What does the joint team think?”

The President said he thinks the United States is disturbed over the security situation. He does not want to be complacent about it, nor hysterical. But he thinks that our people now believe the services are more interested in the struggle with each other than against an outside foe. He said the people in Defense must give their heart to national interests and welfare. Mr. McElroy endorsed that. He said he would like to see, for example, at service association meetings the presentation of awards to members of other services. The President said that from the time a man is picked to serve on the joint staff, he should have a national spirit and outlook in all that he does.

Admiral Burke said he thought we have a rough six months or so ahead of us. He said he thought the Soviets would try to come forward with a series of events that would capture the world’s attention, and will try to compromise the United States all around the world with a series of charges and allegations. He thought that they would seek to dictate solutions in the Middle East, and attempt to play on the desires of minority groups. The President said he had no difference with this view. He thought, however, that when we are working on a broad front as we are, we must accept some “bulges” from time to time. We ought to remember the diversity and number of our accomplishments—our package power reactor, our many successful missiles, our atomic submarines, etc. In addition, he said he was very clear in his mind that there are many things we must do in the military, scientific and mutual security field. In the face of this challenge, it is deeply disappointing to see any of these top individuals devoting himself to his own service interests. He thought we have come to the time when we must forget these rivalries.

The President said he wanted to keep in close touch with the Chiefs and the Secretaries. In December we plan to have meetings with Congressional leaders. These will include a bipartisan meeting on foreign policy and defense.[5] The President thought it was essential that the group stay close together. They must stand firmly behind a plan which, he realized, may not fully meet anyone else’s desires. Once they have agreed to it, however, they should say this is what we believe. The President mentioned that he is trying to achieve token reductions in departments such as Agriculture, HEW, and nonmilitary activities of the Atomic Energy Commission. He thought it was clear that requirements for defense will continue to rise. He thought this action raises the obligation, however, that if savings can be found in Defense, the group must be sure to make them.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 6.

[2] For the record of one of these meetings, see supra.

[3] See Document 152.

[4] Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, USN, Director, Joint Staff,JCS.

[5] See Document 169.

155. Editorial Note

The Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee submitted its report, “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age,” to the meeting of the National Security Council on November 7. Often called the Gaither Report after the name of the committee’s chairman, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., the study was one of several authorized at the meeting of the National Security Council on April 4 to investigate the relationship between a Federal shelter program and other civil defense proposals.

According to the letter from the Steering Committee of the Security Resources Panel transmitting the Gaither Report to the President, dated November 7, “more than ninety persons of widely varying specialties and experiences,” including advisers and staff, participated in the committee’s work. The panel early decided that it “would not try for invention but, rather, would concentrate on the many studies undertaken by large and experienced groups, within our area of interest, both within and outside the military, and to try to relate them to our assignment.” Some members of the panel were given “access to particularly sensitive studies and Intelligence information, and the implications of these have influenced our final judgments.”

Gaither had to withdraw in September from further active direction of the panel because of ill health and was succeeded as director by Robert C. Sprague. Gaither subsequently rejoined the study as a member of the Advisory Committee and made the preliminary presentation of the report to the President on November 4; see Document 153.

William C. Foster was codirector of the Security Resources Panel and member of its Steering Committee. Other Steering Committee members were James Phinney Baxter III, President of Williams College; Robert D. Calkins, President of the Brookings Institution; John J. Corson, management consultant, McKinsey and Co.; James A. Perkins, Vice President of the Carnegie Corporation; Dr. Robert C. Prim, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Dr. Hector R. Skifter, Airborne Instruments Laboratories; William Webster, Executive Vice President of the New England Electric System; Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner; and Edward P. Oliver, technical adviser. Members of the Advisory Committee were: Gaither; Admiral Robert B. Carney; General James H. Doolittle; General John E. Hull, president of Manufacturing Chemists Association; Dr. Mervin J. Kelly, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, director of Radiation Laboratory, University of California; Robert A. Lovett; John J. McCloy; and Frank Stanton. Appendix G to the Gaither Report contains the organization and roster of the panel. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5724)

The NSC discussed the Gaither Report on November 7; see infra. Dulles also discussed the report with the President on November 7; see Document 157.

The Gaither Report, including Appendices A–F, was circulated as NSC 5724, Document 158. NSC 5724/1, dated December 16, contained the comments and recommendations of the various departments and agencies on NSC 5724. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95,NSC 5724) NSC 5724/1 was discussed by the NSC on January 6 and 16, 1958. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) NSC Action No. 1842, taken at the January 16 meeting and approved by the President on January 21, called for a series of reports throughout 1958 on active military defense, measures to strengthen United States nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent, and a nationwide fallout shelter program. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

156. Memorandum of Discussion at the 343d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 7, 1957[1]

Washington, November 7, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Active and Passive Measures to Protect the Civil Population (NSC 5408; NSC 5606; NSC Actions Nos. 1642, 1691, 1760 and 1776; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958”, dated January 3, 1957; NSC 5709; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense”, dated July 2 and August 14, 1957; NSC Action No. 1811)[2]

General Cutler opened the meeting by noting that at its meeting last week,[3] the NSC heard reports on three of the four studies called for by the Council’s action of April 4, 1957 relating to various aspects of a Federal Shelter Program.[4] He indicated that, with those studies as background, the Council would hear a presentation today of a study made over a period of several months by the Security Resources Panel of ODM’s Science Advisory Committee, which study deals with the relative value of various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath, taking into account probable new weapons systems.

Thereafter he noted that today’s presentation was for information and discussion purposes only; that the Council was not being asked to take action thereon today; that later copies of the Panel’s report[5] would be circulated for study, comment, and recommendation by the responsible departments and agencies.

General Cutler noted that each of the attendants at the meeting had been furnished with a copy of today’s program, which includes a list of the individuals who worked on the project, and with a copy of CIA’s “Current Appraisal of the Civil Defense Shelter Program in the USSR.”(Copies of these documents are incorporated in the Minutes of the meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)[6]

General Cutler then introduced Mr. Robert C. Sprague, Director of the Security Resources Panel. Mr. Sprague reviewed the highlights and major recommendations of the Panel’s report. (A copy of the Panel’s report is in the Minutes of the meeting.)[7]

Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and member of the Security Resources Panel, next provided the Council with an oral presentation of the highlights of the Panel report dealing with Active Defense.

Professor Wiesner was followed by Mr. William Webster, New England Electric System and member of the Security Resources Panel, who made an oral presentation on the highlights of the Panel report dealing with shelters.

Dr. Robert D. Calkins, President of the Brookings Institution and member of the Security Resources Panel, next provided an oral presentation of Costs and Feasibility of the recommendations made in the Panel report.

Mr. William C. Foster, Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation and member of the Security Resources Panel, then made an oral presentation on the elements of the Panel report relating to Management and Organization.

Mr. Foster and Mr. Sprague offered brief concluding remarks on behalf of all of the members of the Security Resources Panel.

At the conclusion of the formal presentation General Cutler asked Mr. Robert Lovett, as a member of the Advisory Panel, if he would say a word. Mr. Lovett replied that while he had no authority to speak for these old “re-treads” on the Panel, he believed that all of them certainly agreed that the report which had been presented was a very competent job. Moreover, the conclusions had been forced upon the members of the group against their own liking and inclination. Their conclusions presented a grim picture but there was light at the end of the tunnel. There was a solution. This was cold comfort but nevertheless comfort. While Mr. Lovett saw nothing too desperate in our present situation, it was clear that urgency of U.S. action was very real indeed.

The President commented that he was extremely sorry that insufficient time had been provided for discussion and clarification of the Security Resources Panel’s conclusions. Had time permitted, for example, he would have liked to explore further the views of the Panel on the organization of the Department of Defense. He was inclined to believe there was much to be said for the Panel’s recommendation that the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Agency be consolidated. Since there was so little time for discussion the President added that we would want to call on the members of the Security Resources Panel and the Advisory Group in the future. The President then went on to further exploration of certain matters. What he asked, can the American people be expected to put up with in terms of the allocation of the Gross National Product over the next several years? Was the Panel proposing to impose controls on the U.S. economy now? After all, this Administration had gotten rid of controls on the economy as soon as it came into office because of its conviction that in the absence of controls the American economy would develop more rapidly. Are we now to advocate the re-introduction of controls? Enlarging on a comment made in the course of the presentation about the 38-billion-dollar ceiling on the Defense Department program, the President reminded those present that he had urged upon the Congress appropriations amounting to 39.5 billion rather than 38 billion. In spite of a number of meetings with members of Congress on the budget, in spite of the fact that he had gone on television to urge the validity of his proposed appropriation, Congress had nevertheless cut the figure.

The President added that in the light of what had been presented at the Council meeting today it was essential that we neither become panicked nor allow ourselves to be complacent. It was necessary urgently to make an economic, psychological, and political survey of what could and should be done. In this context, perhaps the advent of Sputnik had been helpful. The President added that we certainly did not wish to appear frightened and he had received information today indicating that fear had pervaded the population of the United States. The President believed that we could correct this situation. The problem was whether we could correct the tendency of every American to try to get the maximum for himself out of the operation of our free economy. If we are going to have to use controls on the economy, we had better impose them promptly.

General Cutler then suggested that the Council hear from Mr. McCloy, likewise a member of the Advisory Panel. Mr. McCloy stated that although the figures presented in Mr. Webster’s presentation were indeed impressive, particularly in terms of the human lives which might be saved by a fall-out shelter program, he still had some reservations with respect to the usefulness of the shelter program. With respect to the question of the imposition of controls on the economy, Mr. McCloy doubted that further controls would be needed in order to carry out the improvement of SAC and our air defense capabilities along the lines recommended by the Panel. With respect to the shelter program (which presumably in Mr. McCloy’s opinion might involve the necessity for controls), he suggested that he would like to think further about this matter before reaching a decision. He also pointed out that he had himself not personally been to the Headquarters of the Strategic Air Command and accordingly he was obliged to take the word of others who had been as to the vulnerability of SAC. However, if SAC were in fact vulnerable, it must certainly be made invulnerable. It was also Mr. McCloy’s impression that shortcomings in the process of decision-making and inter-service rivalries were acting as a brake on the progress of our defense effort. Whether or not this was actually the case, the American public certainly believed it to be.

In conclusion Mr. McCloy pointed out that even if the Administration carried out all the defense recommendations proposed by the Security Resources Panel, the United States would still find itself in a situation of instability from the point of view of the political and foreign policy sides of the problem. Our present situation called for an imaginative domestic political program and an imaginative foreign policy.

The President indicated his inclination to agree with Mr. McCloy’s comments on inter-service rivalries and the decision-making process in the Department of Defense. He then referred to the great difficulties which he was encountering in preparation for his speech over television this evening.[8] There were so many details to be considered for inclusion in the speech that it was extremely hard to see how they could be fitted in while at the same time meeting the required emphasis and the changing situation.

The President then stated that he wished Secretary Dulles to speak to the Council on the effects of some of the Panel’s recommendations on our foreign policy and on the attitude of our Allies. The President was concerned about the effect of the development by the United States of a great shelter program when our Allies would have no such program themselves.

Secretary Dulles commented that in his last remark the President had already suggested what he, Secretary Dulles, wanted to say. The presentation by the Security Resources Panel had dealt with one aspect of the problem facing the United States, namely, the military problem, but the military aspect was only one part of the problem and problem must be viewed in its entirety. Our struggle against the Soviet Union was not solely military nor were the results of the struggle dependent wholly on the military measures taken by the United States. It should be remembered that the Soviet Union had made its greatest gains in terms of taking over other peoples and other areas during the years from 1945 to 1950 when the United States was more powerful than it had ever been before in peacetime and the USSR had not made any appreciable gains even though they now had great nuclear capabilities and general military capacity.

As to the impact on our Allies of the United States embarking on a great shelter program, Secretary Dulles thought that if we were to do so and our Allies could not do the same, we could surely write off all of our European Allies. It might be argued theoretically that the United States as the arsenal of the Free World requires the protection of shelters but to say that the American people must be saved from the effects of radiation and not the British and the French and the others was tantamount to losing our Allies.

Secretary Dulles then returned to the point that our struggle with the Soviet Union and international communism was not just a military struggle. Up to now it has been primarily a cold war. Accordingly, there was great danger that we should so focus our eyes on the military aspects of the struggle that we lose the cold war which is actually being waged, forgetting that an actual military conflict may never be waged. The Soviet Union could make enormous gains in the economic struggle between us if the United States devotes so much of its resources to military measures and shelter programs that no resources remain for waging and winning the cold war.

Secretary Dulles concluded by emphasizing that one point made by the Panel he most emphatically endorsed. The United States must maintain a deterrent capability, a capacity to damage the USSR to such a degree that the Soviets will be unwilling to start a war. This capability we must preserve at all costs. With such a deterrent capability, together with the resources needed to wage the cold war, we would be in a position to conduct our foreign policy in such a manner as to assure victory in the cold war.

The President commented that if those present were a group sitting in the Kremlin, we would probably adopt the recommendations and program of the Security Resources Panel in toto, regardless of the effect of such action on our people. As it was, however, we could not do this. We have before us a big job of molding public opinion as well as of avoiding extremes. We must get the American public to understand that we are confronting a tough problem but one that we can lick. The President concluded by pointing out that as consideration of the Panel’s report proceeded, we would want to be talking again with the members of the Panel who had drawn up this report.

Thereafter General Cutler outlined in a general way what he thought would be suitable Council action with respect to the Panel’s report.

At the conclusion of the meeting the President said he believed it would be interesting to make a test to find out how long the matters which had come before the Council this morning could be kept secret.

He also said that he could not thank the Security Resources Panel and its Advisory Group enough for the marvelous piece of work they had done.

General Cutler then requested the Statutory Members of the National Security Council and certain others, including Messrs. Sprague and Foster, to join the President in his office for a brief time. (See Attached for List of those attending this meeting.)[9]

S. Everett Gleason

At the meeting in the President’s office, after the regular meeting of the National Security Council,[10] Mr. Sprague presented orally highly classified information which he had received from Headquarters, Strategic Air Command on the following subjects:

(1) The relatively small number of SAC planes which (on a recent date when SAC was not in one of its various states of Alert) could have taken off on an attack strike within the probable tactical warning time. Mr. Sprague said that SAC, since the date in question, had made improvements in the number of planes which could take off but that this was a vulnerability which needed to be corrected urgently.

(2) The increased Soviet defenses which made it more difficult for any given number of SAC planes to reach Soviet targets. This difficulty was somewhat offset by the fact that even if SAC planes were intercepted over Soviet territory before reaching their targets, their nuclear weapons would still be detonated and cause fall-out on the USSR.

Mr. Sprague explained that he presented this information as an explanation in support of the recommendations by the Security Resources Panel as to the urgent need for reducing SAC vulnerability and improving SAC reaction time.

After Mr. Sprague had answered a question by Secretary Dulles in elaboration of his oral statement, the President thanked Mr. Sprague and Mr. Foster and the meeting adjourned without further discussion.

James S. Lay, Jr.

The National Security Council:[11]

a. Noted and discussed the Report to the President, prepared by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee pursuant to NSC Action No. 1691–b–(2), on “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age”.[12]

b. Requested the heads of the departments and agencies designated below (in appropriate coordination in each case with the heads of the other interested departments and agencies indicated in parentheses) to study the conclusions indicated and to submit initial comments and recommendations to the Council through the NSC Planning Board on or before December 15, 1957, with respect thereto:

(1) The Secretary of State:

(a) Page 11, paragraph IV–C–1: Pooling economic, technological and political resources with allies. (Defense, ODM, AEC)

(b) Page 11, paragraph IV–C–3: Measures to assure uncommitted nations. (Defense, ICA)

(2) The Secretary of Defense:

(a) Page 6, paragraph III–A–1: Lessening SAC vulnerability to Russian bomber attack.

(b) Page 6, paragraph III–A–2: Lessening SAC vulnerability to Russian ICBM attack.

(c) Pages 6, 7, paragraph III–A–3: Increasing strategic offensive power.

(d) Page 7, paragraph III–A–4: Augmenting forces for limited military operations. (State)

(e) Page 7, paragraph III–B–1: Eliminating weaknesses in our active defenses.

(f) Pages 7–8, paragraph III–B–2: Further strengthening active defenses.

(g) Page 8, paragraph III–B–4: Developing area defense against ICBM’s.

(h) Page 8, paragraph III–B–5: R&D program for improved antisubmarine effort and for defense against submarine-launched missiles.

(i) Pages 9-10, paragraph IV–A: Changes in organization of Defense Department. (Budget)

(j) Page 11, paragraph IV–C–2: Supplying nuclear weapons to NATO. (State, AEC)

(3) The Director, Bureau of the Budget:

Page 10, paragraph IV–A: Responsibilities of ODM, FCDA, Defense, ana local governments for protection of civil population. (Defense, ODM, FCDA)

(4) The Director of Central Intelligence:

Page 10, paragraph IV–B: Strategic warning and intelligence. (IAC)

(5) The Federal Civil Defense Administrator:

Page 8, paragraph III–B–3: Nationwide fallout shelter program. (State, Defense, ODM,AEC)

c. Requested the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, to submit to the Council through the NSC Planning Board, on or before December 15, 1957, initial comments and recommendations on “Costs and Economic Consequences” (pages 11–13, paragraph V).

d. Noted that the NSC Planning Board would consolidate the responses by the various departments and agencies to the Panel Recommendations into a single report for consideration by the Council.[13]

e. Pending the receipt of the initial comments and recommendations requested in b and c above, requested the Secretary of Defense, in making his presentations to the Council on U.S. Military Programs for FY 1959, to indicate the extent to which the conclusions in the Report will or could be implemented in the FY 1959 programs.

Note: The subject Report subsequently circulated as NSC 5724.

The actions in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted for implementation as follows:

b-(1): The Secretary of State

b-(2): The Secretary of Defense

b-(3): The Director, Bureau of the Budget

b-(4): The Director of Central Intelligence

b-(5): The Federal Civil Defense Administrator

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.

The action in e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 8.

[2] For references to NSC 5408, NSC 5606, NSC 5709,NSC Action No. 1642, and the January 3 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 114. NSC Actions No. 1760, approved by the President on August 5, and 1776, approved by the President on August 23, are not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The July 2 and August 14 memoranda are not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5709 Memoranda) NSC Action No. 1811, approved by the President on October 31, is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[3] The memorandum of discussion of this meeting is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File,NSC Records)

[4] See Document 114.

[5] The Gaither Report was circulated as NSC 5724, Document 158.

[6] Not attached but filed in the minutes of the meeting.

[7] The report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.

[8] See Document 159.

[9] The attached list, not printed, indicates that the following attended this meeting: President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, McElroy, Gray, Strauss, Quarles, Douglas, Twining, White, Allen Dulles, Cutler, Goodpaster, Sprague, Foster, and Lay.

[10] The following summary was drafted by Lay. A memorandum of conference with the President of this meeting, drafted by Goodpaster on November 7, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.

[11] Paragraphs a–e and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1814, approved by the President on November 8. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[12] The page and paragraph references below refer to this report, subsequently circulated as NSC 5724, Document 158.

[13] Agency comments and recommendations were consolidated by the NSC Planning Board into a single summary report, NSC 5724/1, dated December 16. Regarding NSC 5724/1, see Document 155.

157. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, November 7, 1957[1]

Washington, November 7, 1957

On the basis of Mr. Sprague’s confidential briefing as to the SAC reaction possibilities under certain extreme circumstances,[2] I expressed to the President the view that I felt that these possibilities were so remote in practice that I doubted whether we would be justified in going to the extremes in the way of cost that alertness would require. The possibility considered was that in a time of relative tranquillity and a reduction of international tension there would be mounted a massive surprise attack against the United States and simultaneously against all our important bases.

I said I considered that such an attack without provocation involving casualties of perhaps one hundred million would be so abhorrent to all who survived in any part of the world that I did not think that even rulers would dare to accept the consequences.

JFD

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on November 7.

[2] See the NSC memorandum of discussion, supra.

158. National Security Council Report[1]

Washington, November 7, 1957.

NSC 5724

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE SECURITY RESOURCES PANEL OF THE ODM SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DETERRENCE AND SURVIVAL IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5408

B. NSC 5606

C. NSC Actions Nos. 1642, 1691, 1760, 1776 and 1811

D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958”, dated January 3, 1957

E. NSC 5709

F. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense”, dated July 2 and August 14, 1957

G. Report by CIA, subject: “Current Appraisal of the Civil Defense Shelter Program in the USSR”, dated November 5, 1957

H. NSC Action No. 1814 [2]

The enclosed Report to the President on the subject, prepared by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee pursuant to NSC Action No. 1691–b–(2), is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council.

The National Security Council noted and discussed an oral presentation of the enclosed Report at its 343rd meeting today. Further Council action on the enclosed Report will be as specified in the Record of Actions of the 343rd Council meeting (NSC Action No. 1814).

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of this Report, and that access to it be limited on a strict need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.[3]

DETERRENCE & SURVIVAL IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

[Here follow a title page, letter of transmittal from the Steering Committee of the Security Resources Panel to the President, dated November 7, and a table of contents.]

I. Assignment

The Security Resources Panel was asked to study and form a broad-brush opinion of the relative value of various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath, taking into account probable new weapon systems; and to suggest which of the various active and passive measures are likely to be most effective, in relation to their costs. While fulfilling its assignment, the Panel was also asked to study the deterrent value of our retaliatory forces, and the economic and political consequences of any significant shift of emphasis or direction in defense programs.

The Panel has therefore examined active and passive defense measures from two standpoints: their contribution to deterrence; and their protection to the civil population if war should come by accident or design.

We have found no evidence in Russian foreign and military policy since 1945 to refute the conclusion that USSR intentions are expansionist, and that her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts of Soviet defense. We have, therefore, weighed the relative military and economic capabilities of the United States and the USSR in formulating our broad-brush opinions, basing our findings on estimates of present and future Russian capabilities furnished by the Intelligence community.

The evidence clearly indicates an increasing threat which may become critical in 1959 or early 1960. The evidence further suggests the urgency of proper time-phasing of needed improvements in our military position vis-à-vis Russia. A time table distinguishing four significant periods of relative military strengths is given in detail in Appendix A.

II. Nature of the Threat

A. Economic

The Gross National Product (GNP) of the USSR is now more than one-third that of the United States and is increasing half again as fast. Even if the Russian rate of growth should decline, because of increasing difficulties in management and shortage of raw materials, and should drop by 1980 to half its present rate, its GNP would be more than half of ours as of that date. This growing Russian economic strength is concentrated on the armed forces and on investment in heavy industry, which this year account for the equivalent of roughly $40 billion and $17 billion, respectively, in 1955 dollars. Adding these two figures, we get an allocation of $57 billion per annum, which is roughly equal to the combined figure for these two items in our country’s current effort. If the USSR continues to expand its military expenditures throughout the next decade, as it has during the 1950’s, and ours remains constant, its annual military expenditures may be double ours, even allowing for a gradual improvement of the low living standards of the Russian peoples.

This extraordinary concentration of the Soviet economy on military power and heavy industry, which is permitted, or perhaps forced, by their peculiar political structure, makes available economic resources sufficient to finance both the rapid expansion of their impressive military capability and their politico-economic offensive by which, through diplomacy, propaganda and subversion, they seek to extend the Soviet orbit. (See Figs. 1 and 2.)[4]

B. Military

The Soviet military threat lies not only in their present military capabilities—formidable as they are—but also in the dynamic development and exploitation of their military technology. Our demobilization after World War II left them with a great superiority in ground forces, but they had no counter in 1946 for our Strategic Air Force nor for our Navy. They had no atomic bombs, no productive capacity for fissionable materials, no jet engine production, and only an infant electronics industry. This situation was compatible with a then-backward country, so much of whose most productive areas had suffered military attack and occupation. Their industrial base was then perhaps one-seventh that of the United States.

The singleness of purpose with which they have pressed their military-centered industrial development has led to spectacular progress. They have developed a spectrum of A- and H-bombs and produced fissionable material sufficient for at least 1500 nuclear weapons. They created from scratch a long-range air force with 1500 B–29 type bombers; they then substantially re-equipped it with jet aircraft, while developing a short-range air force of 3000 jet bombers. In the field of ballistic missiles they have weapons of 700 n.m. range, in production for at least a year; successfully tested a number of 950 n.m. missiles; and probably surpassed us in ICBM development. They have developed air-to-surface and probably submarine-launched cruise missiles; built 250 to 300 new long-range submarines and partially modernized 200 others. They have created an air defense system composed of 1500 all-weather and 8500 day jet fighters; equipped at least 60 sites, each with 60 launchers, for a total of over 3600 launching pads for surface-to-air missiles provided with a sophisticated and original guidance system and a ground environment of 4000 radars. At the same time, they have maintained and largely re-equipped their army of 175 line divisions, while furnishing large quantities of military equipment to their satellites and Red China.[5]

III. Broad-Brush Opinions

The Panel has arrived at the following broad-brush opinions as to the present situation:

A. In case of a nuclear attack against the continental United States:

1. Active defense programs now in being and programmed for the future will not give adequate assurance of protection to the civil population. If the attack were at low altitude, or at high altitude with electronic countermeasures (jamming), little protection would be afforded. If the attack should come at moderately high altitude and without electronic countermeasures, some considerable protection will be afforded the civil population.

2. Passive defense programs now in being and programmed for the future will afford no significant protection to the civil population.

B. The protection of the United States and its population rests, therefore, primarily upon the deterrence provided by SAC. The current vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack during a period of lessened world tension (i.e., a time when SAC is not on a SAC “alert” status), and the threat posed to SAC by the prospects of an early Russian ICBM capability, call for prompt remedial action.

The Panel has arrived at the following conclusions as to the value, relative to cost, of various measures for protecting the civil population.

A. Measures To Secure and Augment Our Deterrent Power

Since the prevention of war would best protect our urban population, we assign the highest relative value to the following measures to secure and augment our deterrent power. These would protect our manned bombers from surprise attack, increase our forces available for limited military operations, and give us an earlier and stronger initial operational capability (IOC) with intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Basic elements in this program are:

1. To lessen SAC vulnerability to a Russian surprise bomber attack in a period of low tension (a present threat):

a. Reduce reaction time so an adequate number (possibly 500) of SAC planes can get off, weapons aboard, on way to target, within the tactical warning time available. This can be done by promptly implementing SAC’s “alert” concept.

b. Improve and insure tactical warning. Radars in the seaward extensions need to be modernized to assure tactical warning at high and low altitude, and the extensions need to be lengthened to prevent “end runs.”

c. provide an active missile defense for SAC bases (Nike–Hercules or Talos) against bombers.

2. To lessen SAC vulnerability to an attack by Russian ICBMs (a late 1959 threat):

a. Develop, to an operational status, a radar early-warning system for an ICBM attack.

b. Further improve SAC’s reaction time to an “alert” status of 7 to 22 minutes, depending on location of bases.

c. Disperse SAC aircraft, to the widest extent practical, to SAC and non-SAC military bases in the ZI and possibly also to commercial airfields in the ZI.

d. Protect a large part of SAC’s planes by providing 100 to 200 psi shelters, and equivalent protection for weapons, personnel, and other needed supplies and facilities.

e. Provide SAC bases with an active missile defense against ICBMs, using available weapons such as Nike-Hercules or Talos and the improved long-range tracking radars now existing in prototype.

3. To increase SAC’s strategic offensive power (to match Russia’s expected early ICBM capability):

a. Increase the initial operational capability of our IRBMs (Thor and/or Jupiter) from 60 to 240.

b. Increase the IOC of our ICBMs (Atlas and Titan) from 80 to 600.

c. Accelerate the IOC of the Polaris submarine IRBM system, which offers the advantages of mobility and greatly reduced vulnerability.

d. Every effort should be made to have a significant number of IRBMs operational overseas by late 1958, and ICBMs operational in the ZI by late 1959.

e. Hardened bases for the ICBMs should be phased in as rapidly as possible.

4. Augment our and Allied forces for limited military operations, and provide greater mobility, to enable us to deter or promptly suppress small wars which must not be allowed to grow into big ones. he Panel suggests that a study be undertaken, at the national rather than at a Service level, to develop current doctrine on when and how nuclear weapons can contribute to limited operations.

B. Measures To Reduce Vulnerability of Our People and Cities

The main protection of our civil population against a Soviet nuclear attack has been and will continue to be the deterrent power of our armed forces, to whose strengthening and securing we have accorded the highest relative value. But this is not sufficient unless it is coupled with measures to reduce the extreme vulnerability of our people and our cities. As long as the U.S. population is wide open to Soviet attack, both the Russians and our Allies may believe that we shall feel increasing reluctance to employ SAC in any circumstance other than when the United States is directly attacked. To prevent such an impairment of our deterrent power and to ensure our survival if nuclear war occurs through miscalculation or design, we assign a somewhat lower than highest value, in relation to cost, to a mixed program of active and passive defenses to protect our civil population.

1. A massive development program to eliminate two major weaknesses in our present active defenses:

a. The vulnerability of the radars in our ground environment and in our weapons control to “blinding” by enemy electronic countermeasures (ECM).

b. The small probability of kills against a low-level attack.

2. Further strengthening of our active defenses as soon as their vulnerability to ECM and low-level attack is removed. Current research affords hope that at least our weapons-control radars can be made proof against ECM. Radars can be located at high points to guard against low-level attacks, and a barrage-type defense against low-level attacks from the sea might prove a stopgap. An effective air defense system is so important to ensure continuity of government, and to protect our civil population, our enormously valuable civil property and military installations, that these development programs we suggest should be pushed with all possible speed.

3.

A nationwide fallout shelter program to protect the civil population. This seems the only feasible protection for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the hazards of radiation. The Panel has been unable to identify any other type of defense likely to save more lives for the same money in the event of a nuclear attack.

The construction and use of such shelters must be tied into a broad pattern of organization for the emergency and its aftermath. We are convinced that with proper planning the post-attack environment can permit people to come out of the shelters and survive. It is important to remember that those who survive the effects of the blast will have adequate time (one to five hours) to get into fallout shelters. This is not true of blast shelters which, to be effective, must be entered prior to the attack.

We do not recommend major construction of blast shelters at this time. If, as appears quite likely, an effective air defense system can be obtained, this will probably be a better investment than blast shelters. However, because of present uncertainties, on both active and passive fronts, it appears prudent to carry out promptly a research ana development program for such blast shelters since we must be in a position to move rapidly into construction should the need for them become evident.

A more detailed statement of the Panel’s findings on passive defense is included as Appendix B.

4. A program to develop and install an area defense against ICBMs at the earliest possible date.

5. Increased emphasis on the R&D program to improve the Navy’s anti-submarine effort, including defense against submarine-launched missiles. The principal protection against these latter may have to be provided by air and ballistic missile defense systems.

IV. Related Concerns

A. Improvement of Management of Defense Resources

The Panel has been impressed with the supreme importance of effective control and management of the resources allocated to defense.

The new weapons systems, in cutting across traditional Service lines, have caused management problems which have been difficult to resolve within existing legislative and organizational restrictions. We have lost ability to concentrate resources, to control performance and expenditures, and to change direction or emphasis with the speed that a rapidly developing international situation and rapidly developing science and technology make necessary.

We are faced by an enemy who is able, not only ruthlessly to concentrate his resources, but rapidly to switch from one direction or degree of emphasis to another.

A radical reorganization of the Department of Defense might cause such confusion, at least temporarily, as to weaken our defense. However, some immediate steps to more effective control and management of our defense resources are urgently needed and appear practicable.

Some such steps can be taken without new legislation and certainly they would be timely, even before the return of Congress in January. A further step would appear to be a decision within the Executive Branch to seek from Congress the amendment of present legislation, which freezes the organization of the Defense Department along lines that may have been appropriate before the evolution of present weapons systems, but which are clearly inappropriate today and may become intolerable in the near future.

Changes in the Defense organization might take the following lines:

1. An increased focusing of responsibility and authority in operational commands, with missions appropriate to integrated weapons systems.

2. The concentration of research and development responsibilities for the two or three major integrated and complete weapons systems in manageable organizational units.

3. A more effective concentration of the military departments and departmental staffs upon training and logistics.

4. More direct command channels between the Secretary of Defense and the operational commands.

5. A command post-type staff, responsible directly and solely to the Secretary of Defense to assist him, both in the essentially managerial task of control and command, and in the long-term planning his responsibilities require.

a. Such a staff should be organized as a staff, not as an interagency committee. Policy should be established to encourage the objectivity of officers serving on such a staff; and rotation would enable them to keep abreast of appropriate developments bearing on the mission.

b. Officers serving on such a staff should be selected and relieved directly by the Secretary of Defense. Satisfactory service on this staff should, as on certain other joint staffs, meet one of the preliminary requirements needed for consideration for promotion.

Through such evolutionary development, the functions of planning, budgetary control, and operational command could increasingly be brought together and responsibility focused and delegated, rather than bucked.

The Panel further believes that coordination in depth between the Defense Department and those responsible for other aspects of our national policy, particularly the State Department, can be improved, especially in the field of forward planning.

Existing plans to protect and care for people in the event of attack have become obsolete as a result of the growing threat, and are therefore ineffective. Provisions for relocating government officials and for evacuating civilians are unrealistic in many respects. The plans of many states and metropolitan areas for handling local police, fire, health, water, sanitation and related problems are primitive in many areas.

Protection of the civil population is a national problem requiring a national remedy. We urge the re-evaluation of the existing organizational structure that distributes responsibilities among the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the military, and state and local governments.

B. Strategic Warning and Hard Intelligence

Strategic warning—information obtained and correctly interpreted prior to the actual launching of an enemy attack on the United States—would be of immense value to this country. Further, it will become even more valuable as the maximum achievable tactical warning time shrinks to a matter of minutes in the case of a missile attack. At present, however, we have no assurance that strategic warning will be received.

We have too few solid facts on which to base essential knowledge of USSR capabilities and too few solid facts to learn how they are changing with time. From such observations, intentions may often be deduced. More positive and direct intelligence of USSR activities and accomplishments can be obtained by vigorous use of presently known techniques and available methods.

Because of their utmost importance to our actual survival, we urge exploitation of all means presently at our disposal to obtain both strategic warning and hard intelligence, even if some risks have to be taken, together with the vigorous development of new techniques.

C. Integration With U.S. Foreign Policy

The reduction of the vulnerability of the United States and its population should be made part of a broad program to improve the security and political position of the Free World as a whole, in accord with the enlightened self-interest of the United States.

If not so integrated into our foreign policy, any substantial program to reduce the vulnerability of the United States might be widely interpreted as signaling a retreat to “Fortress America.” The USSR would be sure to fully exploit the resulting uncertainties.

Such an integrated program might include:

1. Measures, some of which are already under way, to pool and make more effective the economic, technological and political resources of ourselves and our allies.

2. Supplying NATO with nuclear weapons, to remain in U.S. custody in peacetime, for use in wartime under NATO command—as a means of increasing confidence.

3. Measures designed to assure the uncommitted nations that their national interests are truly a matter of continuing concern to us.

Such an integrated and comprehensive program could significantly raise the level of hope, confidence and strength in the Free World, and could give renewed prospect of securing Russian agreement to safe arms control and regulation.

V. Costs and Economic Consequences

A. Costs

The added defense measures to which the Panel has assigned relative values will probably involve expenditures in excess of the current $38 billion defense budget.

The measures of highest value, to strengthen our deterrent and offensive capabilities, are estimated to cost over the next five years (1959–1963) a total of $19 billions.

Additional measures of somewhat lower than highest value, for the protection of the civil population, include a strengthening of active defenses, a fallout shelter program, and the development of a defense system to protect cities from missile attack. The estimated costs of these items total $25 billions over the next five years.

More detailed cost estimates are shown in Appendix C. To initiate the measures of highest value will cost $2.87 billions in 1959; and $3.0 to $5.0 billions per annum in the following four years. The entire program, including the lower-than-highest-value additional measures, would cost approximately $4.73 billions in 1959, and annual expenditures rising to a peak of $11.92 in 1961 and dropping to $8.97 billions in 1963. Several of these measures will involve further outlays in excess of operating and maintenance costs after 1963.

B. Feasibility

These several defense measures are well within our economic capabilities. The nation has the resources, the productive capacity, and the enterprise to outdistance the USSR in production and in defense capability. This country is now devoting 8.5% of its production to defense, and 10% to all national security programs. The American people have always been ready to shoulder heavy costs for their defense when convinced of their necessity. We devoted 41% of our GNP to defense at the height of World War II and 14% during the Korean War. The latter percentage is somewhat higher than would be required to support all our proposals.

C. Economic Consequences

The additional expenditures for measures of highest value are barely within the estimated receipts from existing taxes in the first three years, and more definitely within estimated receipts thereafter, assuming continued and uninterrupted high employment and growth. To the extent that economies can be achieved in existing defense or non-defense programs, the increase in total expenditures could be minimized. An increase in the debt limit would be necessary. This would be a precautionary measure against the possibility that revenues may initially fall below the estimates based on high employment and because expenditures normally run ahead of revenues during a portion of the fiscal year.

The demands of such a program (measures of highest value) on the nation’s economic resources would not pose significant problems. Aside from its psychological impact, increased defense spending would have some influence on capital investment. If a moderate recession is impending, tax receipts would decline, but the increase in Federal expenditures would help to sustain production and employment. Under conditions of full employment, the program would have some inflationary effects, requiring a continuation of monetary and credit restrictions.

To undertake the whole program of active and passive measures would involve outlays of $4.8 to $11.9 billions per annum over the next five years, and further unestimated expenditures thereafter. Except as economies can be achieved in defense and non-defense expenditures, these sums would represent additions to the Federal budget.

Large additional expenditures of this sort are still within the economic capabilities of the United States. They would necessitate, however, an increase in taxes, a somewhat larger Federal debt, substantial economies in other government expenditures, and other curbs on inflation. Additional private investment would be required, especially to carry out the shelter program which would impose heavy requirements for steel, cement and labor. In all probability, this program would necessitate some slow-down of highway construction and other postponable public works.

The early announcement of such a program would be a stimulus to the economy and would have an inflationary influence. Measures to cope with the inflationary problem posed by such an increase in defense spending should be planned as part of the program.

VI. Public Education and Political Consequences

The Panel urges an improved and expanded program for educating the public in current national defense problems, in the belief that the future security of the United States depends heavily upon an informed and supporting public opinion. We have been heartened by the recent announcement that positive steps will be taken to initiate what we hope will be a broad and sustained program of such education. We must act now to protect, for this and succeeding generations not only our human and material resources, but our free institutions as well. We have no doubt of the will and capacity of the American people to do so if they are informed of the nature and probable duration of the threat and if they understand what is required of them. Only through such enlightenment and understanding can we avoid the danger of complacency and the enervation of our inherent strengths.

VII. Deterrence and Survival

The measures advocated by the Panel will help to unite, to strengthen and to defend the Free World, and to deter general war which would expose our cities and bases to thermonuclear attack. They would improve our posture to deter or promptly to suppress subversion or limited war, which may be more likely in the years immediately ahead. No one of these lesser enemy moves might directly threaten our survival. Yet, if continued, they might nibble away the security of the Free World as Germany undermined the superior military power of Great Britain and France between 1936 and 1939.

If deterrence should fail, and nuclear war should come through miscalculation or design, the programs outlined above would, in our opinion, go far to ensure our survival as a nation.

To illustrate the urgency of prompt decision and rapid action, we submit in Appendix A a time table of relative strengths under our present programs and the assumed Russian programs. As this appendix indicates, the United States is now capable of making a decisive air nuclear attack on the USSR. The USSR could make a very destructive attack on this country, and SAC is still vulnerable to a surprise attack in a period of lessened world tension. As soon as SAC acquires an effective “alert” status, the United States will be able to carry out a decisive attack even if surprised. This could be the best time to negotiate from strength, since the U.S. military position vis-à-vis Russia might never be so strong again.

By 1959, the USSR may be able to launch an attack with ICBMs carrying megaton warheads, against which SAC will be almost completely vulnerable under present programs. By 1961-1962, at our present pace, or considerably earlier if we accelerate, the United States could have a reliable early-warning capability against a missile attack, and SAC forces should be on a 7 to 22 minute operational “alert.” The next two years seem to us critical. If we fail to act at once, the risk, in our opinion, will be unacceptable.

Appendix A

TIME TABLE

(Under Our Present Programs and Assumed Russian Programs)

Period A—Present Phase (starting now and ending 1959/early 1960)

Characteristics

1. U.S. has an adequate capability to make a decisive[6] air nuclear attack on Russia.

2. U.S. has an inadequate retaliatory capability if SAC bases are surprised at a time of lessened world tension, i.e., a time when SAC is not in a state of combat readiness. Prompt and aggressive implementation of the SAC “alert” concept would cure this defect.

3. USSR has capability to make a destructive attack on the U.S.

4. USSR has an inadequate retaliatory capability if SUSAC bases are surprised at a time of lessened world tension.

5. Although Russia will probably add to her inventory of long-range jet bombers during this period, the small number of these produced in recent months and the apparent lack of air-refueling of her large number of medium jet bombers indicate the Soviets are probably taking a calculated risk during this period and are shifting a large part of their national effort from manned bombers to long-range ballistic missiles.

Effects

1. A surprise attack by either SAC or SUSAC in a period of lessened world tension might almost completely disarm the other’s long-range air atomic strike capability, unless and until either side has successfully implemented an adequate “alert” concept.

2. During this period, a surprise attack could determine the outcome of a clash between these two major powers.

3. As soon as SAC acquires an effective “alert” status, the U.S. will be able to carry out a decisive attack even if surprised. This could be the best time to negotiate from strength, since the U.S. military position vis-à-vis Russia might never be as strong again.

Period B—(starting 1959/early 1960—ending 1961/1962)

Characteristics

1. The USSR will probably achieve a significant ICBM delivery capability with megaton warheads by 1959.

2. U.S. will probably not have achieved such a capability.

3. U.S. will probably not have achieved either an early warning of or defense against an ICBM attack.

4. SAC will have increased modestly its number of operational bases, but none will be hardened.

5. Rapid increase in USSR stockpile of fissionable material and in weapons technology will substantially increase megaton load that can be delivered by manned bombers in the U.S.

6. In spite of continuing additions to our continental defense net, the attrition imposed on a manned bomber attack at low altitude and/or with electronic countermeasures will probably destroy only a small portion of the attacking force.

Effects

1. SAC could be completely vulnerable to an ICBM attack directly against its bases and weapons stockpile.

2. If the USSR were successful in a missile disarming attack against SAC bases, manned bombers could then deliver a decisive attack against the U.S.

3. This appears to be a very critical period for the U.S.

Period C—(starting 1961/1962—ending 1970/1975)

Assumptions: As a minimum, the SAC missile bases will be hardened, the U.S. will have a reliable early-warning capability against a missile attack; and SAC will have a significant part of its force on a 7-to 22-minute operational alert. These minimum objectives will require much emphasis and effort if they are to be achieved early in Period C.

Characteristics

1. U.S. and USSR will substantially increase their respective ICBM capabilities.

2. USSR will have achieved an early-warning capability to detect ICBM attack.

3. U.S and USSR will begin to achieve some anti-ICBM defensive capabilities during the middle of the period.

Effects

1. An air nuclear attack by either side against the other could be decisive unless the attacked country had implemented, at a minimum, a nationwide fallout shelter program.

2. If all missile and bomber bases had also been hardened, the retaliatory strike could also be decisive if the attacker had not also implemented, at a minimum, a nationwide fallout shelter program.

Period D—(starting 1970/1975-onward)

Characteristics

1. U.S. and USSR both will continue to produce large amounts of fissionable material and long-range ballistic missiles.

2. Second and later generations of missiles, with solid propellants, CEPs measured in the thousands of feet instead of several miles, and with larger megaton warheads and quicker reaction time, will be put into production.

3. Both U.S. and USSR will develop improved means for detecting and defending against missile attacks.

4. The missiles in turn will be made more sophisticated to avoid destruction; and there will be a continuing race between the offense and the defense. Neither side can afford to lag or fail to match the other’s efforts. There will be no end to the technical moves and counter-moves.

Effects

1. The net megaton attack which each side could deliver through the other’s defenses might destroy approaching 100 per cent of the urban population, even if in blast shelters, and a high percentage of the rural population unless it were protected by fallout and blast shelters. An attack of this size and devastation would result in less than one-tenth the radiation required for world contamination.

2. This could be a period of extremely unstable equilibrium.

3. A temporary technical advance (such as a high-certainty missile defense against ballistic missiles) could give either nation the ability to come near to annihilating the other.

Implications of the Table

The above time table suggests the great importance of a continuing attempt to arrive at a dependable agreement on the limitation of armaments and the strengthening of other measures for the preservation of peace.

Appendix B

PASSIVE DEFENSE

Active defense cannot alone provide adequate protection to the civilian population. Even if most of the attacking weapons could be shot down, there would still be a major hazard from fallout. Passive defense will materially reduce casualties. The precise number differs widely with the type of program, the weight and pattern of attack, and the effectiveness of active defense.

The Panel has considered passive defense as a two-pronged[7] program: (1) shelters, and (2) survival in the aftermath of nuclear attack. Each aspect is interdependent with the other; and every shelter proposal must be examined in the context of the post-attack environment to see if, after varying conditions of attack, the sheltered population might reasonably expect to emerge into a situation permitting survival and recuperation.

A. Shelters

The many shelter plans examined by the Panel indicate that broad protection can be provided, and that the cost varies fairly directly with the effectiveness of the program. All programs are expensive, as might well be expected, since the cost of a nationwide effort is calculated by multiplying an amount in dollars per person by the two hundred million people we will be protecting in 1966. As a natural consequence, the programs must be kept simple, even spartan, to cut down on the cost per person. Safety, not comfort, is the keyword. Last, we emphasize a common aspect of all programs: none offers absolute protection, and even with a prohibitively expensive program we must anticipate heavy casualties if we are attacked.

We have centered consideration on a series of four programs ranging from fallout shelters alone through combinations of blast shelters and fallout shelters described in Fig. B–1.[8] The curves on the chart[9] show the benefits of the different shelter programs under varying conditions of attack that might penetrate our defenses.[10] The middle curve (Attack B—medium weight—divided between military and civilian targets—2500 megatons on target) shows that about half the population would be casualties were they completely without protection.

A program of fallout shelters for everyone would cost about $25 billion and would save nearly half the casualties. Such a program would be equally or more effective in saving lives (perhaps fifty million) under an attack directed entirely at military targets.

It does not appear that any practicable addition to our defense, regardless of cost, can offer so much of a return under as wide a variety of conditions. (For example, their use is not dependent on warning, since they may be entered from one to five hours after attack. Further, fallout shelters are not outmoded by the transition from bomber to missile attacks.) As a bonus, such a program of fallout shelters would have a significant additional advantage of permitting our own air defense to use nuclear warheads with greater freedom.

If an adequate active defense system cannot be devised, we may have to turn to blast shelters to reduce further the severe—and probably unacceptable—casualty list with fallout shelters only. A program that might reduce the casualties under this same Attack B to about 10% of the population will cost $20 to $30 billions more, depending on the level of protection furnished.

Blast shelters present substantially more difficult problems than do those designed for fallout alone. Not enough is known of the design problems, nor is there sufficient test experience, to be able to plan a nationwide system of such structures without further extensive research and development. Typical of the factors that complicate planning for blast shelters are the decisions of locating them[11] —particularly in view of the shorter time that will be available for the population to reach shelters as ICBMs come into use.

We have examined cost estimates on many shelter programs and find a wide variation. The general figures used herein are comparable to those used in the Interdepartmental Report and seem to represent a reasonably attainable figure at the 1957 price level. The cost given for any of these programs would include provision of over $10 billions’ worth of equipment and the supplies to maintain the sheltered population for approximately two to three weeks.

The question of how fast to build any shelters involves balancing the 1959 need against the desire to spread out the expense so as to avoid overloading our construction facilities and our capacity to produce construction materials. Perhaps five years for a fallout program would be an appropriate compromise; any blast shelter program would need to be spread over a longer period.

Any shelter program must presumably be accompanied by:

1. A strong program of organization and management of the construction phases to take advantage of all possible means of reducing costs by proper scheduling of manpower and materials and by efficient production-line techniques.

2. A program providing the necessary trained leadership and trained emotional and physical behavior in the general public requisite for their successful psychological and physical survival under shelter conditions and the aftermath.

B. Survival in the Aftermath

Our investigation of the post-attack environment has involved study of radiation levels, food supply, water, agriculture, transportation, utilities, communications, etc. Unquestionably, conditions may be harsh, increasingly so with each heavier level of attack assumed to penetrate our defenses. It appears, however, for the foreseeable future that sheltered survivors could pull through and remake a way of life in our own country.

Such a prediction presupposes careful planning, training and a strong central organization to handle both the attack and the post-attack situations. And—more important—it presupposes that the pre-and post-attack planning and organization have been done in parallel, with recognition, for example, that industrial preparedness is a necessary complement to any shelter program.

Far too tittle is really known about the recuperative powers of our industrial economy, and even less of the actual minimum requirements of the population surviving an attack. It is certain that there must be stockpiling of essential survival items to serve the surviving population for six to twelve months. In addition, the construction of additional hardened dispersed plants in a few critical industries (such as drugs and liquid fuels) is imperative. These seem problems of planning and ingenuity rather than items of major expense.

It seems that, for six or eight years, the safeguarding of industrial plant capacity should not be an overriding problem. But in the light of the heavier blows that are conceivable in the later 1960’s, and particularly with a well-sheltered population, certain programs should be begun now to protect industrial facilities vital to the survival of this larger surviving population.

We feel it important that, concurrent with other survival plans, a strong program of appropriate medical research be undertaken. This will cost relatively little money; it could have great peacetime value in any case; and, in the event of actual attack, the results of such work might prevent literally millions of casualties from becoming fatalities.

C. Summary

As a consequence of examining various shelter and survival programs, their costs and implications, and of relating these to active defense programs and plans, the Panel believes:

A combination program comprising at a minimum nationwide fallout shelters and augmented air defense will give more protection for a given sum than will either all-out reliance on a maximum shelter program or on an air defense without shelters. This conclusion rests on the assumption that the two major weaknesses in our active defenses can and will be eliminated.

A year from now, the value and cost of still further expansion of air defense can better be weighed against the relative value of blast shelters. Additional active air defense appears now to offer a more favorable prospect of preventing casualties for no more money than a blast shelter program would cost, and, further, would save industry and structures.

In view of the fact that intensive research and development is probably needed before commencing major blast shelter construction, it seems wise to defer any decision regarding blast shelters for a year, during which time a research and development program would be initiated, and presumably the necessary job of augmenting our active air defense would continue.

Of itself, a shelter program would, in the Panel’s opinion, forcibly augment our deterrent power in two ways: first, by discouraging the enemy from attempting an attack on what might otherwise seem to him a temptingly unprepared target; second, by re-inforcing his belief in our readiness to use, if necessary, our strategic retaliatory power.

Further, a shelter program might symbolize to the nation the urgency of the threat and would demonstrate to the world our appraisal of the situation and our willingness to cope with it in strength. It would symbolize our will to survive, and our understanding of our responsibilities in a nuclear age.

Needless to say, the benefits that can derive from an intelligent and coordinated passive defense program are realizable only in the context of a superior over-all organization, charged with responsibility for the total job and with authority and means to get this job done.

Appendix E

AN EARLY MISSILE CAPABILITY

The early acquisition by SAC of an ICBM capability and the implementation of an IRBM capability overseas will greatly increase this country’s offensive posture and deterrent strength.

An integrated program of Atlas and Titan, and an IRBM program including the achievement of a significant operational capability at the earliest possible date, should be given the highest national priority. It does not appear unreasonable nor too great a risk to consider at this time a rapid build-up of IRBMs and their deployment on overseas bases if they can be obtained. With a major effort, it appears possible to have at least one squadron in place during the last quarter of 1958, and 16 squadrons in place overseas before the end of 1960. Such a time scale would require decisions in the near future, some additional funds and an intensive training program in order to provide operational crews as rapidly as the missiles become available.

It appears possible to plan a build-up of ICBMs in the order of 60 squadrons (600 missiles) by the end of Fiscal 1963. The ICBMs will probably become available during 1959. The limiting factor in their deployment (assuming that no major technical difficulties are encountered) will be the rate at which launching sites and crews are made ready. The first site could become operational in 1959. The speed of build-up is adjustable over a wide range if one is prepared to take some risk now.

Except for the initial Atlas group, all ICBM bases should incorporate hardening against the Soviet ICBM threat.

The Polaris submarine-based weapon system, with its great mobility and security from attack, will be a valuable addition to a mixed strategic offensive force. Strong support should also be given to this program in order to speed up the first planned operational capability for 1963 by at least a year, and to increase the planned force of six submarines for 1965 by approximately a factor of three. A mixed offensive force complicates the defense of an enemy and increases his uncertainty.

The Polaris missile will be a solid-fuel rocket which makes it a much more desirable weapon than the early IRBMs for overseas deployment. It appears that the design of this missile for land-based use could be completed by early 1959 if desired. We believe that it is important to achieve this capability at the earliest possible time.

When this missile becomes available it might be phased into the liquid-fuel IRBM program

Appendix F

ACTIVE DEFENSE

An active continental defense system must contend with three different threats: manned bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. Each of these poses its own peculiar problems for defense, and each requires alerting for optimum operation. Defense and warning systems to contend with the submarine threat and the bomber threat exist, and are scheduled for improvement. However, these now have and, as presently planned, will continue to have limited capabilities. Design concepts exist for a variety of anti-ballistic missile defense and warning systems. But no operational units have as yet been built or tested.

A. Defense Against Manned Bombers

1.

Warning

The present and planned system for providing tactical warning of enemy manned bombers approaching the continental United States has serious limitations which can be corrected. This problem has been studied in detail by a subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ad Hoc Committee on Air Defense of North America, and an excellent report presented 30 June 1957.

In general we are concerned that:

a. The early-warning radar network is our principal means of collecting warning data on aircraft to permit two or more hours’ warning, which is absolutely essential in the near future (e.g., for the protection of SAC). However, the complete network is not scheduled to be operational until mid-1960; and, even at this date, much of the network will be equipped with obsolete equipment.

b. Even when completed, the presently planned system can be flanked with distressing ease, considering Soviet capabilities.

c. The presently operational seaward extensions have very poor radar coverage. A significant improvement is immediately feasible.

d. Identification and raid-size determination techniques are weak but can readily be improved.

e. Research on warning devices has lacked direction and emphasis. The search for new and improved techniques should be pressed with vigor. Infra-red techniques should receive particular attention.

We have no reason whatsoever to feel complacent about the effectiveness of our warning system. The cost of warning is small, its value is very real, and provision of the degree of warning required is well within our technical abilities.

2.

Air Defense System

The continental air defense system as it now exists, and as it is now planned to be, does not and will not provide this country with a significant level of protection. It has a number of “Achilles’ heels” which can be exploited by an intelligent enemy. It is ineffective in the face of electronic countermeasures, saturation tactics, and low-altitude attacks. We believe that it is possible, with a determined effort, to improve this situation markedly by 1961, and to have a highly effective air defense system by 1963. It is our belief that it would take only a moderate increase in total Defense Department budget, properly spent, to make a large improvement in the air defense system. But when we examine the history of air defense, we conclude that an effective air defense system is unlikely within the present organization framework. The lack of clear-cut single assignment of responsibility for weapons development, systems design, and implementation has allowed vulnerabilities to persist long after they were recognized. It is imperative that a competent technical group be given the responsibility for planning a balanced defense system in the light of continually changing technology and the continually changing threat. By the very nature of the problem we face, this group must be heavily technical with military support, as opposed to the present concept of being heavily military with technical advice.

B. Defense Against the Ballistic Missile

1.

Warning

A detection system capable of providing early warning against a ballistic missile threat is technically achievable. Such a system would ideally consist of a number of radars located far in the north, possibly at Thule and Fairbanks. An orderly program is recommended; however, in addition, we now believe that a crash program to provide some warning at the earliest possible time is vital, and we believe it could be attainable early in 1959.

The airborne infra-red detection system (mentioned earlier in this Appendix) may provide the earliest attainable system having the capability of providing ICBM warning. We urge that it be given a careful evaluation in the near future.

2.

Interception of Ballistic Missiles

Several systems have been proposed which appear to have capability of intercepting ballistic missile warheads at sufficient distances to prevent their doing serious damage. These systems fall into two distinct categories.

The first group are systems assembled from air defense components such as Nike-Hercules, or Talos, and existing long-range radars. These proposed early systems offer a reasonably high defense capability for points such as SAC bases against the early threat, but do not have the capability needed to provide protection for extended areas. In addition, early ICBM interception would occur at moderate altitudes— on the order of of 30,000 feet or less—so there is danger of damage to the population and structures from blast and heat. Because these systems are assembled from existing components requiring only moderate modification, a limited operational capability could be available in early 1960, with complete SAC base defense in 1962. These defenses would also have a capability against bombers and thus would prevent sneak attacks.

The other group of proposed missile defense systems aims to intercept the incoming warheads at much higher altitudes. To do this in the face of decoys poses a number of technical questions, the answers for which require a high-priority research and test program. However, the importance of providing active defense of cities or other critical areas demands the development and installation of the basic elements of a system at an early date. Such a system initially may have only a relatively low-altitude intercept capability, but would provide the framework on which to add improvements brought forth by the research and test programs.

C. Defense Against the Submarine-Launched Missiles

The submarine-launched missile threat is a formidable one for which there is presently no known adequate countermeasure. [2 sentences (52 words) not declassified] We believe that anti-submarine efforts should be greatly augmented, particularly in research and development. For the immediate future it seems that the principal protection against submarine-launched missiles will have to be provided by the air defense and ballistic missile defense systems. The submarine-launched missile threat imposes several additional requirements on the design of such systems. A submarine-launched missile defense system is required to acquire targets over a wide range of angles; and the warning time available to alert the system is considerably less—less even than is available against the ICBM. However, it may be noted that at least one of the missile defense systems mentioned above has been conceived with these requirements in mind.

In conclusion, we feel that planning and performance in active defense are inadequate. However, we believe that an adequate defense is feasible and, furthermore, that active defense is an essential part of the national military posture. The active defense system must be balanced, e.g., even in the ICBM era, the manned bomber will remain an important threat.

[1] Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5724. Top Secret; Special Handling. Appendix C, a table entitled “Approximate Increased Costs of Defense Measures, 1959–1963);” Appendix D, a table entitled “Projected Federal Receipts and Expenditures (Fiscal Years 1959–1963);” and Appendix G, entitled “Organization and Roster of Security Resources Panel,” are not printed.

[2] For References A–F, see footnote 2, Document 156. The CIA report is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) Regarding NSC Action No. 1814, see footnote 11, Document 156.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[4] Neither printed.

[5] By the very nature of the sources of intelligence information, none of the specific numbers cited above can be precisely known. The approximate size of each number, however, and more importantly the over-all order of accomplishment, are well established by the available data. [Footnote in the source text.]

[6] Decisive is defined as follows: (1) ability to strike back is essentially eliminated; or (2) civil, political, or cultural life are reduced to a condition of chaos; or both (1) and (2). [Footnote in the source text.]

[7] We have also examined such alternatives as evacuation and dispersal; the magnitudes of the costs and problems involved appear, to us, to make these unacceptable alternatives. [Footnote in the source text.]

[8] Not printed.

[9] These are not identical with the five plans considered in the Interdepartmental Report but, as evidenced by the chart, the correlation in cost results is extremely close. (Ref: Report to the National Security Council by the Special Committee on Shelter Programs, July 1, 1957.) [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] A level of attack, far above any that we believe need be seriously considered at this time, is conceivable in the distant future; and this, if not intercepted at a distance, could lay down such a level of radiation that very large areas could, as a practical matter, be unusable for a period of years. [Footnote in the source text.]

[11] And the elaborate public training required if they are to be used successfully by a high proportion of the public. [Footnote in the source text.]

159. Editorial Note

From the President’s office on November 7, at 8 p.m., Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a radio and television address to the American people on science and national security. In his talk Eisenhower discussed the present security posture of the United States in light of the Soviet Union’s successful launching of an earth satellite (Sputnik I) on October 4, and future problems involving American scientists and their relationship to the enlarged effort within the Federal government in the fields of science, technology, and missiles. For text of the President’s speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pages 789–799.

President Eisenhower also reported several steps he had taken to utilize the expertise of the scientific community in government programs. He mentioned first the creation of the office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and the acceptance of Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to fill this position. He also announced that the Department of Defense would establish a Guided Missile Director directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense to establish missile policy and prevent administrative and interservice disruptions in the missile program. The Department of Defense immediately created the Office of the Division of Guided Missiles. William M. Holaday, who had been serving as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Guided Missiles, became the Director.

Subsequently, on November 22, Eisenhower approved the transfer of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization to the White House, reconstituting and enlarging it as the President’s Science Advisory Committee. The purpose of this action was to promote a more direct relationship among the President, Dr. Killian, and the committee.

For text of a note summarizing the White House statement of the transfer of the Science Advisory Committee, see ibid., page 799.

160. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 11, 1957, 5 p.m.[1]

Washington, November 11, 1957, 5 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy

Secretary Quarles

General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said that the Defense budget had been prepared on a basis of guidelines for $38 billion totals for NOA and for expenditures. Service allocations are $8.6 billion for the Army, $10.5 billion for the Navy, and $18.1 billion for the Air Force, with $0.8 billion for Department-wide activities. Beginning and end strength personnel figures for FY 59, in thousands, are, for the Army 900 and 850, for the Navy 645 and 630, for the Marines 188 and 170, and for the Air Force 875 and 850, for a total of 2.5 million personnel.

The President recalled that part of the theory in going down to 2.5 million was that through increased compensation, and resulting better reenlistment rates, we could save on training establishments. Mr. McElroy recalled that we have not provided the increased compensation as yet, and it is not included in the $38 billion. He said there are several areas, including this one, where it seemed that we should do something over and above the $38 billion. These would include $700 million next year for the Cordiner program,[2] which he considered should be phased in over a four-year period, and for a 6% average increase for civilians, for those military personnel receiving less than that under the Cordiner proposals, and for retired personnel. Mr. McElroy said he had not provided for increases in prices for procurement that might occur. Also, he had provided for development of missiles on a research basis, but not for maximum procurement. This seemed generally reasonable in that we have not reached this point in our deployment plans, in the proving out of the weapons, or in negotiations with allies. However, he thought we could assume successful development of the IRBM as of a certain date, and successful negotiations by that date, and safely go ahead with a scheduled buildup of operational capability. For the Jupiter/Thor, he thought we should aim at a schedule to attain cumulative strengths of one squadron (of 15 missiles) in 1959, 4 in 1960, 8 in 1961, 12 in 1962, and 16 in 1963. To do this would require $150 million additional in FY 59. With regard to the Polaris, by accepting 85% of design performance we could markedly accelerate the program. This would involve $135 million additional in FY 59 for development costs, and $250 million NOA additional for two missile submarines, each with 16 missiles.

To carry forward, and accelerate, SAC dispersal, and reduction of reaction time, including alert and other measures, he would like to add about $200 million to the $100 million now in the program for these purposes.

In the area of satellite development, $100 million is included in the Air Force budget for work on the reconnaissance satellite. He felt that we should set up an additional $100 million for space development, including a manned missile.

He also had a proposal for increased antisubmarine capabilities, since we think that if we block off a big war we may need the means for a smaller one. No specific figure was mentioned and there did not seem to be consensus as to the priority of this project.

The President said he has a growing suspicion that the carrier has about run its course. He thinks that the atomic missile submarines make a great deal of sense but that the carrier may be passing to a lower level of significance. He recognized that great controversy and protest must be expected on this. He accepted that we will need carriers against certain types of attack but felt that the threat to them of the ICBM with hydrogen weapons is very great. The carrier forces require a great expanse of sea for their operations, and cannot be hidden in the Mediterranean. Hence, they would be immediately vulnerable to destruction. He said he asks himself the question constantly what the guided missile substitutes for. He feels it takes the place of artillery and manned bombers, but does not displace them completely. As of now he feels that the big bomber is the greatest deterrent to major war, and feels the same about the carrier, but considers that this is phasing out.

Mr. McElroy commented that in a situation like Syria or other crises in the Orient, people are very greatly impressed by a carrier show of force. The President raised the question of the life of our present carriers. He thought they should be good for something like another 15 years if simply modernized and kept up to date. He did not see valid reason for laying down any new carriers, and felt the old ones could be used for the missions requiring carriers.

The President said he thought the two most important things in the additional proposals were the pay increase and the proposal for dispersal and alert of SAC, including hangars and extra crews. He said there are several things we must do—we must keep SAC alert and dispersed, we must keep up our 15 carriers, and we must build submarines. He asked what the future level of annual outlay for the IRBMs would be if the additional funds now proposed were provided—would the costs not go up and up or would they remain the same as FY 59. Mr. Quarles said they would keep at about the same level as FY 59. The President stressed that there is nothing sacrosanct about the $38 billion figure, and that he thought allowances could and should be made for important additional programs. He asked whether Mr. McElroy is putting the reconnaissance satellite and the further satellite research and development under one man at the Defense level, and Mr. McElroy said this is what they are considering.

The President then went on to say that if Defense gets these additions they must be prepared to give up such things as excessive executive aircraft, etc. He thought they could certainly find $600 million or more this way. Then he felt we could do what needs to be done for approximately $39 billion or $39.5 billion. If the budget were carefully prepared he thought we could defend a budget that stays below $40 billion.

Mr. McElroy said there is also some question as to whether we can do what the military authorities think we should do in NATO and in Korea with the reduced force strengths. The President thought considerable reductions can be made through streamlining, but that we cannot reduce our combat units there (referring to Army units). Mr. McElroy said he may wish to ease up some on the Army manpower cuts in Europe and Korea, perhaps allowing 20,000 additional personnel for this purpose.

He said he would put the figures up to the NSC on the basis of a $38 billion budget. The President said he should then say what he thought might be the deficiencies—such as SAC dispersal and alert; improved pay; acceleration of missiles (which he is prepared to accept, but which he does not want to go beyond his and Mr. McElroy’s own good judgment). Mr. McElroy said the proposal for missile acceleration does not seem excessive as a pace. The President said the reconnaissance satellite could be added, and then there should be a balancing off of some savings, perhaps resulting in a budget of about $39.5 billion.

Secretary Quarles thought it might be well to let the Chiefs and the Secretaries present some of the needs, and the President accept them. The President said he would accept such a procedure, but is really working for the time when the Department comes in with a unified plan. He would like to see the Chiefs come in agreed on the priorities for additions; for example, they ought to agree on SAC dispersal, Cordiner proposals, etc.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 16. Another summary of this meeting is in a memorandum from Goodpaster to Cutler, dated November 13. (Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Cutler)

[2] See footnote 3, Document 145.

161. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

Washington, November 12, 1957.

NIE 11–4–57

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1957–1962

The Problem

To review significant developments affecting the USSR’s internal political situation, relations with Bloc states, economic situation, military programs, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through 1962.

Summary Estimate

1. Both the Soviet internal scene and Soviet external policy continue to be strongly marked by change and innovation. The ascendance of Khrushchev has further accentuated the flexibility and pragmatism of the post-Stalin leaders’ approach to their major problems. But none of the changes in Soviet policy suggests any alteration in basic aims or in the concept of an irreconcilable conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Indeed the Soviet leaders display a great deal of confidence, buttressed by their recent political and technological successes, in the prospects for ultimate victory of their side.

Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy

2. The respect of the Soviet leaders for US nuclear power will continue and they are unlikely to initiate general war or to pursue courses of action which, in their judgment, gravely risk general war, over the next five years. At the same time, however, they are probably confident that their own growing nuclear capabilities, added to their great conventional strength, are increasingly deterring the US and its allies from courses of action gravely risking general war. As a result the USSR probably regards itself as progressively achieving greater freedom of maneuver in local situations.[2]

The USSR’s posture during the Suez and Syrian crises convinces us that the use of threats will remain a basic element in Soviet policy. At times the Soviet leaders will probably bring the threat of Communist military strength into the open by menacing words or harsh diplomatic exchanges. Moreover, the USSR might go considerably further in certain situations—e.g., by supporting indigenous Communist or other forces in local military action, or even sending Soviet “volunteers,” judging that grave risk of general war would not result. Thus the risks of general war arising through miscalculation may increase.

3. But in general the Soviet leaders will probably continue to prefer non-military means of achieving their objectives. They probably regard the present world situation as ripe to develop further in their favor through continuation of such tactics. While determined to build up their armed strength against any eventuality, the present leaders have probably decided that a continuation of “peaceful co-existence” will best assure against the risks of nuclear conflict and at the same time offer far-reaching opportunities to weaken and divide the Western powers and to promote Soviet influence in the key underdeveloped areas of the world.

4. Almost certainly the Soviet leaders expect further crises as the interests of the two great power groupings clash in the Middle East and elsewhere. They will take a strong line in such crises. Yet we believe that in general they will continue to emphasize such tactics as high-level goodwill visits, broadened contacts, promotion of cultural and other exchanges, expanded foreign trade, long-term credits and technical assistance, and arms aid. Their aim will be to cause further blurring of the lines between the Communist and non-Communist worlds and to undermine and cause a retraction of Western, especially US, strength from around the periphery of the Bloc.

5. The Soviets will almost certainly intensify their efforts to woo the underdeveloped countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, in order to estrange them from the West and to lay the groundwork for growing Soviet influence. The USSR has the economic resources for considerably expanding its “trade and aid” campaign, while its extensive stocks of obsolescent arms will permit it to capitalize further on the desires of many underdeveloped countries to strengthen themselves vis-à-vis their neighbors.

6. The USSR clearly regards the chief immediate opportunities for expanding its influence to lie in the Middle East. It is shrewdly supporting Arab nationalism against the West and thereby attempting to avoid the appearance of seeking undue political influence of its own. It is also conscious of the extent to which vital Western interests are involved in the area, and of the risks which would arise from a direct test of strength between the great powers themselves. Nevertheless, its longer run aims are to eliminate Western military power and political influence from the area, to attain a position from which to control Middle East oil, and ultimately to dominate the area.

7. During the next few years the chief Soviet objective in Western Europe will be to weaken and divide the NATO powers and above all to induce a withdrawal of US military strength. To this end the USSR will continue to promote some form of European security treaty to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But the USSR will almost certainly remain adamant on German reunification on any terms except its own, however much this may limit its maneuverability in Western Europe.

8. As a means of forwarding their peaceful co-existence policy and of advancing their efforts to neutralize US nuclear striking power, the Soviets will seek on the whole to give the appearance of a flexible and constructive attitude on disarmament. They probably desire some form of simple “first-stage” agreement with minimum inspection and control but we remain convinced that they will reject comprehensive inspection and controls.

Trends in Soviet Relations With Other Communist States

9. The USSR’s reluctant acceptance of a degree of Polish autonomy and of Yugoslavia’s special position, as well as its recognition of Communist China’s stature and role within the Bloc, indicates a continuing belief that some greater flexibility in Soviet relations with other Communist states is both necessary and desirable in order to preserve and strengthen the Bloc. However, mindful of last year’s developments in Poland and Hungary, the USSR now seems determined to go slow in any further evolution of its relationships with the European Satellites, and above all to avoid any repetition of the Hungarian or even Polish experiences. It would almost certainly revert to repressive policies in event of serious threats to its position in Eastern Europe, Barring such developments, we think the USSR will pursue a cautious policy of economic aid, adjustment to national peculiarities, and toleration here and there of a somewhat greater degree of Satellite autonomy.

10. The strong identity of interest among the various Bloc regimes, their dependence upon Soviet aid and support, and the USSR’s overwhelming military power will tend to maintain the essential solidarity of the Bloc over at least the next five years. But the underlying forces released by developments since Stalin’s death will persist, creating further instability within the Satellites. Additional changes in intra-Bloc relations are likely.

Internal Developments

11. Two of the major problems posed by Stalin’s death have persisted: who is to rule, and how is the ruling to be done. While Stalin’s successors agreed on fundamental objectives—maintenance of Party dictatorship, continued military buildup, and rapid economic growth—they differed as to the policies best suited to pursue these aims in the conditions of the USSR today. These differences in turn complicated the problem of who was to rule, rendering the leadership unstable.

12. Now, after four years of uneasy collective leadership, Khrushchev has emerged as dominant. Although he still lacks the degree of power achieved by Stalin through the use of police terror, he has disposed of his major rivals and asserted Party mastery over the economic bureaucracy and the military. These developments have probably enhanced the stability of the Soviet leadership, though this leadership will be subject to continuing strain over the next several years as difficult policy problems arise. We think that only the most severe problems could threaten the present leadership arrangements, but, considering the magnitude of the problems which the regime faces, and the risks of failure in the bold programs which Khrushchev has undertaken, issues of such gravity could arise. In such an event Khrushchev would probably move toward absolute rule, if necessary attempting to reinstitute terror for this purpose. But important elements among the elite groups would be alert to and would probably oppose such a development, particularly if a recourse to terror were involved.

13. As to the question of how to rule, the present leadership has shown awareness of the need to overcome the alienation of the Soviet population which has been caused by fear and deprivation and expressed in apathy. Instead of a widespread use of terror, which in the end might not spare the leaders themselves, another approach was felt to be necessary in order to keep the society cohesive and responsive to central direction. In addition, a shift in emphasis to the use of incentives and the encouragement of initiative seemed to give promise of increasing Soviet strength, particularly in the economic field.

14. This approach has been extensively applied to the Soviet economy. A series of administrative reforms has sought to make better use of specialist knowledge, local talent, and individual initiative. The latest and largest of these is a radical reorganization of industry which seeks to transfer to officials on the spot more powers in the detailed execution of national policy. The incentive program particularly in agriculture, aims not only at stimulating higher labor productivity but also at increasing popular support for the Khrushchev regime. The highly ambitious housing and agricultural programs will probably be successful enough to provide a gain of perhaps as much as one-fifth in per capita consumption over the next five years.

15. The achievement of such a gain would probably produce some increase in popular support, but a consumption program of this size will compete more sharply than heretofore with requirements for industrial investment and defense. This competition has already been partly responsible for the abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956–60) in favor of a seven-year plan for 1959–65. The issue of competing priorities, however, has not been finally settled by this action and is certain to arise again.

16. Most of the changes which have occurred bear the stamp of Khrushchev; given his self-confidence and flexibility, the outlook is for further experimentation so long as he remains in power. By and large, we believe that his policies will be successful in generating more positive support among the population and in stimulating a further substantial growth in over-all Soviet power over the next five years. But his changes have created tensions and forces in Soviet society, the ultimate impact of which is difficult to foresee. The policy of a cautious relaxation applied in the intellectual field, for example, has had disagreeable consequences for the regime. Wider contacts with foreign countries have opened the USSR to disturbing influences. Youthful nonconformity is an increasing problem, and a number of critical writers are spreading among a small but increasing circle of readers a climate of dissatisfaction and of impatience with the pace of official reforms. The regime has made little progress in its counterattack upon these forces.

17. Moreover, Khrushchev’s expansion of the Party’s role as the chief instrument for managing the reform process places a heavy load upon it. With the downgrading of the secret police, the Party apparatus has assumed new responsibilities for insuring political conformity; with the abolition of most economic ministries it now has a much larger role in carrying out centrally determined economic policies. If the Party proves inadequate to these tasks, the prospects for success of the regime’s ambitious economic and political programs will be greatly diminished.

18. The role of the party becomes even more critical when viewed in a perspective extending beyond the period of this estimate. For the next five years at least, the regime’s totalitarian controls over the Soviet people almost certainly will not be seriously compromised. But over the longer run it is far from certain that the Soviet citizen can be educated to a higher level, urged to exercise his own initiative, given increasing opportunity for comparisons with other countries, and encouraged to expect a significant improvement in his living standard, and at the same time submit without question to a leadership which incessantly proclaims, and frequently exercises, the right to make all important decisions for him, regardless of his personal desires. Eventually it may turn out that the benevolent totalitarianism which Stalin’s successors seek to achieve is an impossible contradiction and that the forces released in the search for it will require the leadership to revert to earlier patterns of control or to permit an evolution in some new direction. Even the latter changes would not necessarily alter the basic threat which a dynamic USSR poses to the Free World.

Trends in the Growth of Soviet Power

19. Notwithstanding the many problems confronting the Soviet leaders, we foresee a further rapid growth in the chief physical elements of Soviet power over the next five years. Particularly notable will be the continued rapid expansion of the Soviet economy, further scientific and technical advances in a wide variety of fields, and a continued build-up and modernization of the USSR’s already massive military strength.

20. Economic Growth. Soviet economic growth over the next five years will continue to be faster than that of the US, though somewhat slower than during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951–55), chiefly because of some redirection of investment and a declining of growth in the labor force. We estimate the average growth in Soviet GNP as around six percent annually during the next five years. In dollar terms Soviet GNP would rise from about 40 percent of US GNP in 1956 to about 45 percent in 1962. However, estimated Soviet defense expenditures, in dollar terms, are already about equal to those of the US.

21. Scientific and Technical Progress. The rapid expansion of the USSR’s technical and scientific capabilities, critical to the growth of Soviet industrial and military power, will also continue. Although total Soviet scientific capabilities may not equal those of the US, the USSR has been able to make comparable achievements and to forge ahead in certain areas of critical military and industrial significance by concentrating its efforts in these fields. The number of university level graduates employed in scientific and technical fields already exceeds that in the US, and probably will be about 40 percent greater than that in the US by 1962.

22. Military Strength. Of outstanding significance has been the USSR’s progress in the development of advanced weapons and delivery systems:

[Paragraph a (16 lines of 2-column source text) not declassified]

b. The USSR has probably tested an ICBM vehicle and we now tentatively estimate that it could have a few (say 10) prototype ICBMs available for operational use in 1959 or possibly even earlier, depending upon Soviet requirements for accuracy and reliability.[3] The USSR could now have available ballistic missiles with maximum ranges of 75, 175–200, 350, and 700 n.m.; by 1958 it could probably also begin to have available a 1000 n.m. IRBM.

23. Meanwhile, the USSR will probably continue to maintain a balanced and flexible structure of strong naval, air, and ground forces, supplementing these with new weapons. Nevertheless, the manpower strength of the Soviet forces appears to have been reduced considerably from Korean War peaks, and some further reductions and streamlining are likely, though not to a substantial degree.

a. We estimate that the Soviet long-range bomber force has grown to some 1,500 bombers at present, though it includes a larger number of jet medium bombers and fewer heavy bombers than we had previously estimated. While we think that this force will not change significantly in size during the period of this estimate, we believe that it will be further strengthened by the replacement of obsolete Bull piston medium bombers with jets, by the introduction of additional heavy bombers, and by further development of inflight refueling. However, any estimate of future strength must be highly tentative, especially for heavy bombers, since Soviet policy in these respects is still shrouded in doubt. Subject to such qualifications, we estimate that the Soviets may by mid-1960 have about 400–600 heavy bombers and tankers of jet and turboprop types, in a long-range air force totaling something between 1400 and 1700 bombers. We also estimate that the number of heavy bombers and tankers will probably remain fairly steady after 1960, while the total long-range bomber strength will probably decline slightly.[4]

b. Further strengthening of Soviet air defenses will occur as a result of improved fighter performance, a higher proportion of improved all-weather fighters, better radar and communications equipment, and widespread employment of improved surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.

c. The Soviet ground forces have been extensively reorganized and modernized; further improvements in firepower and mobility are likely during 1958–62. Training and doctrine are being adapted for modern warfare, nuclear as well as non-nuclear. We still estimate about 175 line divisions, [22 words not declassified]. Increasing attention is being paid to airborne and air-transportable forces, whose capabilities will increase considerably by 1962.

d. The Soviets are engaged in an extensive naval program, especially in the submarine category. There are recent indications that a shift to new designs of submarines may be in progress. Their submarine force is estimated at about 475 at mid-1957, including nearly 300 submarines of modern design. We estimate that the submarine force will approximate 560 submarines by mid-1962. The first submarine propulsion reactor could now be available, and by mid-1962 the USSR could probably produce about 20 nuclear-powered submarines. A few converted missile-launching submarines could now be in operation; and by mid-1962 the USSR may have a total of 50 in all categories of submarines equipped with guided missile armament.

[Here follows the “Discussion” section, totaling 56 pages, on the following topics: internal political developments, trends in the Soviet economy, trends in Soviet science and technology, trends in Soviet military posture, trends in Soviet relations with other Communist states, trends in Soviet foreign policy, and an annex consisting of numerous tables on Soviet military strength.]

[1] Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the AEC participated in the preparation of this estimate, which was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 12. The Assistant Director of the FBI abstained since the subject was outside his jurisdiction. The cover sheet also notes that NIE 11–4–57 superseded NIE 11–4–56, which was not declassified. (Ibid.)

[2] Footnote in the source text not declassified.

[3] The estimate made in this paragraph must be considered tentative pending completion of SNIE 11–10–57: The Soviet ICBM Program. [Footnote in the source text. A summary of SNIE 11–10–57 was not declassified.]

[4] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,USAF, believes that the USSR would regard it as essential to have a more substantial intercontinental attack capability, providing for greater strategic flexibility and a much larger capability for re-attack—in short, a force which would provide the Soviets a greater chance of success in general war—while they are working to acquire an additional nuclear delivery capability with new weapon systems, including long-range missiles. He therefore believes that the 400–600 heavy aircraft estimated above would all be bombers and that by mid-1961 there will be 300–500 additional aircraft as tankers in operational units.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe, on the other hand, that the number of heavy bomber/tanker aircraft and the total number of long-range aircraft are both more likely to approximate the lower than the higher figures given above. See their footnote on page 33. [Footnote in the source text. Page 33 and the footnote are not printed.]

162. Memorandum of Discussion at the 344th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, November 12, 1957[1]

November 12, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Report by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NSC Actions Nos. 1260, 1330, 1430, 1463, 1532, and 1641; NSC 5605)[2]

General Cutler opened the meeting by informing the Council that it was to hear a briefing of the annual report submitted by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC, pursuant to the directive recommended by the Council and approved by the President on May 24, 1956 (NSC 5605). Under the terms of the aforementioned directive, the Subcommittee was established as part of a permanent procedure “to provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental United States and to provide continual watch for changes which would significantly alter its net capabilities.” General Cutler identified the members of the NSC Subcommittee as follows: General Twining, Chairman; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Chairmen of the Council’s Internal Security Committees. He also referred to the Subcommittee’s Staff Director, appointed by the President, General Gerald C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.).

General Cutler then introduced the Chairman of the Subcommittee, General Twining, who in turn introduced General Thomas.

General Thomas summarized the Subcommittee’s terms of reference as outlined in NSC 5605 noting that the report covered the period through mid-1960. He added that, although the USSR was not credited with an ICBM capability in this year’s report, the Russians will indeed have a substantial ICBM capability in 1960, according to reliable reports recently received by the Subcommittee. General Thomas indicated that in its war-gaming for purposes of this year’s report, the Subcommittee omitted overseas bases, confining itself, insofar as U.S. forces were concerned, to continental U.S. elements. He indicated that at the outset the Subcommittee Staff prepared auxiliary terms of reference and basic assumptions consistent with NSC 5605. These terms and assumptions facilitated the making of a realistic evaluation of U.S. and USSR capabilities and vulnerabilities. After outlining the Subcommittee’s general approach to the problem, General Thomas mentioned briefly the several agencies which contributed to and otherwise participated in the preparation of this year’s Net Evaluation Report.

General Thomas next introduced Brig. General W. W. Smith, USAF, the Deputy Director of the Subcommittee Staff. General Smith outlined in detail the basic assumptions on which this year’s net evaluation exercise was based. These included the assumption that the USSR would initiate war against the U.S. in mid-1960. Proceeding on that assumption, the Subcommittee had war-gamed the attack on the basis of its being perpetrated: (a) with no warning (strategic surprise), and (b) with full warning (full alert) and with U.S. forces on maximum sustainable alert.

General Smith thereafter outlined the auxiliary assumptions on which this year’s evaluation was based. These included, but were not limited to, the following: USSR would have adequate bases from which to launch an attack; they would have adequate refueling capability; they would be willing to expend some of their aircraft by assigning them to one-way missions; their nuclear warheads would be set to detonate on impact if the carrying aircraft were shot down; some of their submarines would have guided missile capabilities; they would risk strategic surprise in order to outflank the DEW Line; they would not engage in large-scale clandestine attack, etc. Insofar as the U.S. is concerned, General Smith indicated that some of the auxiliary assumptions included the following: the status of U.S. forces as of the time of the attack would be the same as those actually in being on March 1, 1957; a substantial portion of SAC would be in constant alert status; etc. General Smith then indicated that four hypothetical Soviet attacks were planned by the Subcommittee: (a) attack based on Strategic Surprise and aimed only at military targets, (b) an attack based on Strategic Surprise and aimed at composite targets, (c) an attack based on Full Alert and aimed only at military targets, and (d) an attack based on Full Alert and aimed at composite targets.

General Smith then called upon Colonel S. D. Kelsey, USAF, a member of the Subcommittee Staff, who presented in detail the highlights of the USSR’s attack on the continental U.S. He was followed by Captain W. R. Stevens, USN, a member of the Subcommittee Staff, who outlined in some detail the retaliatory attack made on the USSR by SAC. Colonel Kelsey then gave the results of the country’s damage assessment insofar as the U.S. was concerned. He was followed by Captain Stevens who summarized the results of the damage inflicted on the USSR.

Dr. L. L. Montague, CIA, a member of the Subcommittee Staff, presented the effects of Soviet clandestine operations on the continental U.S. [29 words not declassified]. Dr. Montague was followed by Colonel J.D. Raney,USA, a member of the Subcommittee Staff, who outlined the military action resulting from three alternative conditions of attack considered by the Subcommittee. Colonel Raney also described the damage done to the U.S. under each of these attacks. In essence, the conclusion was drawn that under any of the attack conditions described by Colonel Raney, the survival of the U.S. would hang in the balance.

General Thomas concluded the Staff presentation by noting that any evaluation of net capabilities at a time three years hence was necessarily speculative. As a consequence, the estimates made could be either high or low, but in any event were considered by the Subcommittee to be as realistic as any that could be made at this time. General Thomas noted that the Subcommittee report highlighted a number of deficiencies including: (a) lack of concrete information as to the size of the forces of both the USSR and the U.S. in mid-1960; (b) limitations on the kind and amount of operational data available concerning new weapons; (c) uncertainties as to the extent to which our air defense measures could be degraded by Soviet electronic counter-measures equipment; (d) the paucity of intelligence concerning Soviet guided missiles systems, etc.

General Thomas indicated that it was the conclusion of the Subcommittee that in the event of a Soviet attack on the U.S. in 1960, both the U.S. and the USSR would be devastated; that by such an attack the USSR in 1960 could kill from ¼ to ½ of the U.S. population and injure many more in the process; and that military and civilian leadership of the U.S. at the Seat of Government would be virtually wiped out.

Upon the completion of the Subcommittee’s presentation, General Cutler mentioned that access to the Subcommittee’s report was being strictly limited in accordance with the President’s direction; that only two copies thereof would be made; the President’s copy would be retained in the files of the NSC, and that a second copy would be designated for the NSC’s Disaster File.[3] He also mentioned that access to the report in any future instance would be decided in each case by the President. General Cutler then called for questions.

Admiral Strauss asked that one of the charts utilized by the Staff be re-exhibited, namely the chart dealing with Attack Conditions numbered VI and VIII (Full Alert vs. Strategic Surprise).[4] Admiral Strauss observed that the chart seemed to indicate that the same number of weapons were placed on target and yet there was a large difference in the weight thereof under the respective attack conditions simulated. It was pointed out to Admiral Strauss that the 12% increase in the weight of the weapons detonated is attributable to the fact in that, in that particular instance (Full Alert), larger aircraft were mounted where the larger attack occurred, thus enabling the Russians to carry larger weapons.

The President referred to that portion of the presentation dealing with Full Alert and queried as to the nature of the USSR’s calculations relative to our taking the offensive if we were to see tremendous mobilization occurring in the USSR. He wondered if the Russians would dare give the Free World such warning lest it be concerned that we would strike first upon seeing such tremendous mobilization. The President said that while the democracies don’t start wars, the Russians might calculate that they would in such an eventuality.

General Thomas commented that it was his own belief that it was not realistic or reasonable to think in terms of starting war under conditions of full alert for the opponent.

The President observed that from the presentation it seemed that we suffered more casualties when we were in a state of alert than when we were attacked with no warning. To this General Thomas responded that the distinguishing feature of an attack under conditions of full alert is that each of the adversaries can make a heavier attack under full alert than under conditions of surprise.

The President expressed his sincere thanks to the Subcommittee and its Staff for its presentation on the subject.

S. Everett Gleason

[Here follows a short summary of a meeting in the President’s office, prepared by Lay, to discuss a proposed change in the Net Evaluation Directive.]

The National Security Council:[5]

Noted and discussed the annual report for 1957 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to paragraph 4 of NSC 5605, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.

Note: Immediately following this NSC meeting, the President met with the statutory Council Members and the Members and Director of the Staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee to discuss the types of attack which should be used as the assumption for future reports by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. As a result of the discussion, the President requested the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, with the assistance of the Director of its Staff, to prepare for Council consideration modifications in NSC 5605 to provide that future net evaluations will assume one alternate type of attack each year in a three-year cycle.[6]

S.E.G.[7]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 13.

[2] For references to these NSC Actions and NSC 5605, see footnotes 2–4, Document 100. Regarding the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, see Document 10.

[3] The report is filed in the minutes.

[4] None of the charts is filed in the minutes.

[5] The paragraph and Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1815, approved by the President on November 12. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[6] Attached to a memorandum from General Twining to Cutler, dated November 20, is a draft prepared by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee staff of recommended changes to paragraph 3 of NSC 5605 to incorporate the President’s suggestions. A memorandum from Lay to the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, dated November 25, indicates that the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization had approved the proposed changes in paragraph 3 and asked the three statutory members to indicate their action. Secretary Dulles’ concurrence is indicated in his memorandum to Lay, dated December 2. All these memoranda are ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5605 Series. NSC Action No. 1838 indicates that the statutory members of the NSC as of December 24 concurred in the changes to NSC 5605 recommended by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, and the recommended revision of NSC 5605 was approved by the President on December 24 and subsequently circulated as NSC 5728. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) NSC 5728 is in the Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File.

[7] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

163. Editorial Note

President Eisenhower delivered a radio and television address to the American people from the Municipal Auditorium, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on November 13, at 9:30 p.m. In his speech the President discussed some of the actions in the national security area “to which we must give our most urgent attention.” He specifically mentioned accelerating the dispersal of Strategic Air Command to additional bases, providing facilities for faster response to emergency alarm, development of an active missile defense against missiles, additional funds for research on and testing of missiles, increased pay to military personnel to make military careers more attractive, possible cutbacks in some Federal civilian programs to maintain a balanced budget, and consideration of proposals to strengthen scientific education and basic research.

The third draft of this speech, dated November 10, prepared by Arthur Larson, Special Assistant to the President, is attached to a memorandum from Larson to Secretary Dulles, dated November 11, asking for the Secretary’s comments on the draft. A handwritten note on Larson’s memorandum by Phyllis D. Bernau, Dulles’ personal assistant, reads: “Sec told to ignore—I believe. PDB.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers)

For text of the President’s speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pages 807–817.

164. Memorandum of Discussion at the 345th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 14, 1957[1]

Washington, November 14, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Military Programs for FY 1959

General Cutler indicated that at this meeting the Defense Department would make the initial presentation of the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1959. After indicating the order of the speakers, General Cutler pointed out that at the end of the presentation, there would be ample opportunity for the Council members to express their views on the FY 1959 military program. General Cutler also emphasized that the President would like to obtain at this meeting the benefit of the corporate judgment of the members of the Council. Such a course would likewise be helpful to the Defense Department in making its final determinations which would be presented at the next Council meeting.[2] He thereupon called on Secretary McElroy. (A copy of General Cutler’s introductory remarks are filed in the minutes of the meeting.[3] )

In his opening remarks Secretary McElroy explained that the figures in the proposed FY 1959 Budget were based on the 38 billion dollar overall limit. The Budget did not contain a figure for the cost of the implementation of the Cordiner Report. Secretary McElroy added that the military departments would also separately present certain programs which it was their conviction we should implement but which could not be included under the 38 billion dollar ceiling which the Secretary of Defense had instructed the military departments to observe. Thereafter Secretary McElroy called on General Twining.

General Twining explained the background against which the FY 1959 Budget had been developed, referring in the course of these general remarks to a chart entitled, “Force Levels for the FY 1959 Budget.”[4] He added that the substance of his report would be presented by Colonel Nigro, USAF, and Captain J. W. O’Grady, USN. Colonel Nigro discussed the following subjects with the aid of charts: (1) Major Army Forces. Among other things he pointed out that the 18 Army divisions which had been in existence on June 30, 1957 would be reduced to 14 by June 30, 1959. On the other hand, missile commands would increase from 2 to 4. The overall personnel strength of the Army which amounted to 998,000 on June 30, 1957 would have to be reduced to 850,000 by June 30, 1959. (2) MajorNaval Forces. Colonel Nigro pointed out that the overall personnel strength of the Navy would have to be reduced from the FY 1957 figure of 877,000 to 800,000 in FY 1959. (3) Colonel Nigro’s next chart portrayed Major Air Forces. In his comments Colonel Nigro pointed out that under the FY 1959 Budget planning, SAC wings would be reduced by 7 from the 50 of June 30, 1957 to 43 on June 30, 1959. In part this was compensated for by significant increases in missile programs. There would be a very significant reduction in tactical Air Force wings and in the total personnel of the Air Force from 920,000 to about 850,000.

This subject was followed by comments on the status of the Air Defense System in FY 1959 and this in turn by a chart indicating the forthcoming FY 1959 deployments of the three military services in the Pacific–Far East area. It was pointed out that under the proposed budget it would be necessary to withdraw one U.S. division from Korea. This would be offset to some degree at least by an increase of two missile commands. The total reduction in personnel deployed in this area would amount to 51,000 by June 30, 1959. As for the deployment of naval forces there would have to be a reduction in the number of aircraft carriers and a reduction in our submarine capabilities in the Pacific. It was hoped that these reductions might be offset through the maintenance of combat-ready naval forces in the Central and South Pacific. With respect to the Air Force, there would be six wings in the area on June 30, 1959, a marked reduction from the levels of FY 1957. On the other hand, the strength of the Air Force wings would be enhanced by increased nuclear capabilities.

Chart 7 indicated the character of the deployment of U.S. military forces in the Europe–Middle East area which it was pointed out was the most critical area. Colonel Nigro and Captain O’Grady pointed out that the Army now had 5 divisions in Western Europe. The proposed FY 1959 program would require the withdrawal of two battle groups from this force. The result would be an overall decrease in U.S. Army forces in this area by approximately 18,500 men. Navy capabilities would likewise have to be reduced in the area and there would be significant decreases in the Air Force. Some 17 squadrons would have to be pulled out of the area. Inasmuch as these reductions related to the NATO commitment, the next chart indicated current U.S. NATO commitments.

The concluding subject and chart consisted of observations on the three most critical problems confronting those who had drawn up the military program for FY 1959. These were the problems of modernization, deployment and firepower. The general conclusion was a clear statement of the decrease in U.S. military capabilities in FY 1959 as compared to these capabilities in FY 1957. General Twining felt that this was a serious matter which required the most careful study.

At the conclusion of this portion of the presentation, the President said that he had thought it rather curious that while there was a proposed reduction in the total number of Air Force wings, the program nevertheless proposed an increase in the number of tanker aircraft squadrons. Colonel Nigro explained to the President that as B–52’s gradually replaced B–56’s, it was necessary to have additional jet tankers which accounted for the increase in the tanker squadrons.

At Secretary McElroy’s suggestion, Assistant Secretary McNeil presented the budget figures for all three of the military services pointing out that they were within the 38 billion dollar ceiling directed by Secretary Wilson. He likewise pointed out that subsequently the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff were to be permitted to indicate what each service felt it required above the 38 billion dollar limit.

Secretary McNeil dealt at great length and in detail with three major subjects illustrated by charts. The first of these gave the figures for New Obligation Availability, Direct Obligations, and Expenditures for the FY’s 1957, 1958, and 1959. The second chart broke down these figures in detail in terms of the major military categories of expenditure such as Military Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Major Procurement, etc. The third chart broke down the second chart into the amounts each service would require for each of the above-mentioned military categories.

In concluding his detailed report, Secretary McNeil pointed out that the figures he had presented did not include the cost for implementing the Cordiner recommendations or recommendations for a civilian pay raise.

Secretary McElroy next called on Secretary Quarles. The latter stated initially that the formulation of the FY 1959 military program had been an austere exercise. Moreover, certain urgently desirable programs had not been included in the 1959 Budget because of the ceiling placed on expenditures and NOA. Some of these urgent additional programs had Department-wide bearing and implications. It was with these that Secretary Quarles said he would deal, leaving to the Service Secretaries and other add-on programs which each service felt to be necessary.

Thereafter, Secretary Quarles in line with these comments dealt first with the feeling in the Defense Department that the Cordiner recommendations should implemented. If this was ultimately agreed, the implementation of the Cordiner plan and related matters would involve an addition of some 700 million dollars annually in the Defense Department Budget.

Secondly, Secretary Quarles dealt with the impact of the report of the Security Resources Panel (the so-called Gaither Report)[5] which had been presented to the National Security Council on November 7 of this year.[6] Secretary Quarles pointed out that if we implemented the list of programs to which the Gaither Panel had assigned an A priority, it would cost an additional 2.8 billion dollars in FY 1959. If we went further and implemented the recommendations to which the Gaither Panel had given a B priority, there would be an additional cost of 1.86 billion dollars. Secretary Quarles pointed out that these were definitely additive programs and had not been included in the estimates thus far given in this presentation. There would be further allusions to these recommendations in the subsequent reports by the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Thirdly, Secretary Quarles discussed the impact of the reductions which would have to be made in the FY 1959 programs on our forces deployed overseas. The most serious effect would be felt in NATO. The proposed 1959 Budget would call for the withdrawal of 2/5 of one of our five divisions deployed in Western Europe. General Norstad felt that such a reduction would have a most unfortunate effect as regards the current climate in NATO. It was not clear what could be done to meet General Norstad’s objections and anxiety but the Defense Department was trying to work out some plan which would not necessitate our going to the Paris NATO meeting next month with proposals for reducing the personnel of U.S. forces in the NATO area.

Secretary Quarles indicated that air force reductions in the NATO area were likewise a matter of great concern to General Norstad. Secretary Quarles thought it was possible that some of the aircraft and personnel which we had thought it necessary to take out of the NATO area could be left there as the result of a new plan they were working out with General Norstad but if this was successful it would add another 39 million dollars to the FY 1959 budget.

In the case of Korea, the proposed withdrawal of one of the two U.S. Army divisions was completely unacceptable from the point of view of our political relations with the Republic of Korea and affected our hope of inducing the ROK to make a substantial reduction of its own force levels. Accordingly, we were also trying to work out a plan which would avoid a decrease in U.S. Army personnel in Korea.

Secretary Quarles next turned to the problem of defense against Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. The sum of approximately 200 million dollars had been budgeted for this purpose by the Services for FY 1959. On the other hand, the Gaither Committee recommended strongly an acceleration of the programs for our defense against ICBM’s. Accordingly, the Defense Department believed that it was an urgent necessity that we add some 100 million dollars more to this program for FY 1959 although this amount would still fall short of meeting the acceleration recommended by the Gaither Panel.

As for our satellite programs, the reconnaissance satellite and space research and development, approximately 100 million dollars would be required although here again this sum would not meet the expectations and demands of enthusiastic protagonists of space research.

In conclusion Secretary Quarles pointed out that the three services in presenting their individual add-on programs would do so as a result of individual appraisal of the needs of each of the services by that service. The total of the resulting sums would, Secretary Quarles thought, doubtless be well in excess of what we judge to be feasible in the light of our overall fiscal situation. Accordingly, at the next Council meeting on this subject, Secretary Quarles indicated that the Department of Defense would be in a position to present a Defense Department package containing the approved add-on programs as opposed to the individual service estimates of what was required by way of add-on programs.

When Secretary Quarles had concluded his portion of the presentation, the President pointed out that Secretary Quarles had made mention that the Department of Defense as such was taking over direction of all the satellite programs. Secretary Quarles had then proceeded to mention the program for achieving an Air Force reconnaissance satellite. Did this mean that the Defense Department was not taking over direction of all satellite programs?

Secretary McElroy assured the President that all such programs would be taken over from the individual services by the Department of Defense. He then called upon Secretary Brucker to discuss the FY 1959 Army program. Secretary Brucker indicated that both he and General Taylor would deal with this subject. General Taylor first exhibited a chart entitled, “Application of Resources within Expenditure Ceiling of 8.6 Billion for FY 1959”. After explaining the application of resources, General Taylor stated his strong agreement with the comments of earlier speakers as to the seriousness of reducing Army deployments and capabilities in Western Europe and in Korea. General Taylor felt that there were three serious problems. The first was the reduction of Army overseas deployment, the second was the reduction of mobile strategic divisions at home in the U.S. and the third was the slow progress in the development of continental defense. If these problems could not be satisfactorily solved, the U.S. Army and our Allies would find themselves at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the USSR as the military capabilities of the latter continued to increase.

Secretary Brucker first spoke of the decline in the Army’s operational capabilities which would result from significant reductions in money available to the Army. He illustrated his point with charts entitled “The Decline of Available Money FY 1958–FY 1959” and a second chart indicating how under the FY 1959 Budget the Army’s rate of modernization would decline.

In his summary Secretary Brucker strongly recommended a reversal of the trends portrayed by the above-mentioned charts and asked for supplementary resources for the Army in FY 1958 and additional appropriations in FY 1959. He indicated a strong conviction that we should retain our present NATO and Korean deployments. The Army also recommended acceleration of the rate of modernization. If these Army recommendations were accepted, the result would be an increase of 53,000 men in the ranks of active Army personnel and in an increase of 738 million dollars for the Army FY 1959 Budget.

At Secretary McElroy’s suggestion Secretary Gates covered the presentation of the Navy Department Budget for FY 1959. He noted that if the recommendations of the Navy for programs which ought to be added to those now proposed under the 38 billion dollar ceiling were accepted, the result would be to raise the Navy Budget for FY 1959 by a figure of 1 billion 370 thousand dollars.

Similarly, Secretary Douglas explained the Air Force program for FY 1959 under the guidelines which established a ceiling of 18.1 billion dollars for the Air Force program in FY 1959. Thereupon Secretary Douglas suggested various add-on programs which the Air Force deemed it essential to include in the FY 1959 Budget. The total add-on programs suggested by Secretary Douglas involved supplemental appropriations for the Air Force for FY 1958 of 349.4 million as well as an additional appropriation for FY 1959 of 1.97 billion dollars.

Secretary Douglas was followed by General White who emphasized the highlights of the Air Force FY 1959 Budget which in summary he said would cut out all the fat and quite a bit of muscle as well.

(At this point Secretary Dulles joined the meeting. 11:05 am)

When General White had concluded his remarks, the President inquired about the current status of the procurement of B–58 jet bombers and why we were continuing to procure B–52’s while also procuring the improved B–58’s. General White replied to the President by stating that we were giving these new bombers full and complete tests but that no B–58’s had yet been put into operational units and would not be until we knew more about them.

In his concluding remarks on the Defense Department presentation Secretary McElroy noted the intention of the Department of Defense to review all the several priority add-on programs suggested during the presentation. A final Budget for the Department of Defense would be presented at the next Council meeting on the 21st or the 25th of the month.[7]

The President then stated that he rather doubted the worth of the Council’s digging into all these matters before the next meeting on the subject but he did have one or two points to make. He was troubled that none of the statements made in the course of the presentation indicated that the implementation of the Cordiner Report would result in a reduction in the total level of military personnel. The President also inquired as to what changes were being made in the atomic submarine Sea Wolf which the President understood was a first class vessel. Secretary Gates indicated that the power plant of the Sea Wolf was considered to be dangerous and that it was proposed to change the type of atomic power plant in that submarine.

The President said that he kept hearing in the course of the presentation that the Defense Department was going to continue with both the Titan and the Atlas ICBM programs and also continue both the Thor and the Jupiter IRBM programs. The President said that it was his understanding that these ICBM and IRBM programs were only to be developed to a point which would enable us to choose the most effective of the ICBM and IRBM missiles. Secretary McElroy replied that we would indeed choose one or another of these missile programs or possibly both if both proved successful. The President warned that he did not wish large numbers of these missiles to be procured until they had been proved out in tests.

The President likewise stressed his conviction of the need for greater centralization of research and development in the Defense Department. This, he believed, would effect great savings of money and of the time and energy of our scientists. Secretary McElroy indicated that the Defense Department would soon be gaining valuable experience as to the desirability of the President’s view as a result of the Department’s experience with its centralized outer space research programs.

The President then observed philosophically that the presentation indicated that we were facing a very tough situation. The problem sometimes seemed to be almost insoluble. The Council would remember that only 2 ½ years ago the Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone off to Puerto Rico and had come up with the statement that 38 billion dollars a year would do what was necessary, at least as a minimum. Now, here we are only 2 ½ years later with a minimum well beyond the 38 billion dollar figure and beyond the additional resources which we could anticipate from the annual increment of our Gross National Product. Accordingly, the President expressed his satisfaction that the Department of Defense would now go over carefully the service estimates of additional funds which they felt were required.

At General Cutler’s suggestion, Secretary Herter expressed the keen interest of the Department of State in the problems of maintaining our overseas deployments and the high level of equipment and the high quality of equipment of these forces. He believed that if we could maintain our existing deployment for approximately an additional 200 million dollars, this was a highly desirable course of action. Cutting our overseas deployment would have a great impact on our Allies and on our foreign policy. The President expressed the opinion that the interest of the Department of State was generally limited to assurance that mobile U.S. forces could be sent overseas promptly to meet critical situations. The President then asked Mr. Harold Vance, who was sitting for Admiral Strauss, if he had any comments on what he had listened to this morning. Mr. Vance expressed the opinion that the President was quite right in his belief that we could save considerable amount of money if there were greater centralization of research in the Department of Defense.

General Cutler said that he and Secretary Anderson had been totaling up informally the total cost of the add-on programs which had been mentioned in the course of the presentation. Their total amounted to approximately 4 billion 800 million in new obligational authority. The President commented wryly that the trouble with new obligational authority levels was that these levels soon became formed into expenditure levels.

In response to a suggestion from General Cutler, Secretary Anderson made a brief comment on the implications of all these figures for the financial and economic well-being of the country. Up to recently we had been saying that if all our plans work out we would end up the fiscal year with a surplus of approximately 1.8 billion. At the present moment, however, the economy of the U.S. was certainly not in the course of an upward movement. Indeed if the economy stays at present levels or drops, we might for the first time in the present Administration be contemplating an unbalanced budget. While nobody could really foretell the size of the Treasury’s income, it may now be nearer 72 billion than the 76 billion we had previously estimated. It is of extreme importance to realize the possibility of an unbalanced budget.

Again at the suggestion of General Cutler, Mr. Saulnier said that he merely wanted to make it clear to all concerned that any hopes for Treasury receipts in the range of 76 billion dollars were quite unrealistic at the present time. He said he believed that at the rate the economy was moving the Treasury receipts for FY 1958 would be around 72.8 billion. If this indeed proved to be the case there would be no significant surplus at the end of FY 1958 and possibly even a small deficit. This change in the budgetary outlook was due in general to a falling off of economic activity. This falling off was related to the fact of less expenditure. While Dr. Saulnier described himself as no deficit-expenditure theorist, we should bear in mind that our troubles do come in part from reduction in levels of expenditures, both government and private. This trend could be reversed either by balancing the budget and providing a tax cut which would stimulate the economy or it might be met by increased government expenditure which would stimulate economic activity.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he had been much impressed with statements as to the date when our missiles were going to begin to come in which he understood was 1960. With a stepped-up effort Mr. Dulles understood that this goal could be achieved in 1959. [1 sentence (16 words) not declassified]

Asked to comment by General Cutler, Director Brundage pointed out that he and his associates had been working very hard on the civilian side of the FY 1959 Budget. However, acts of Congress made it practically impossible to reduce civilian expenditures without new legislation. This meant serious political problems were going to face us in the future.

The President said that he wanted to repeat what he had said many times before. He was not so concerned about achieving a balanced budget in any one year but he did believe that you could not have a repeated unbalanced budget year after year and at the same time maintain the nation’s security.

We must keep a very close watch on the relationship between expenditures and our Gross National Product. We must somehow try to achieve the right balance between a desirable defense program and our available resources. We could not take any risks to our national security but we would certainly have to make some very hard decisions.

(A copy of the Defense Department presentation given at this meeting[8] is filed in the official Minutes of the Meeting.)

The National Security Council:[9]

Noted and discussed an oral presentation of the current status of the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1959 as developed to date within the Department of Defense and presented at the meeting by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the respective Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff of the three Military Departments.

Noted that the Secretary of Defense, after further review in the light of the discussion, would present at the next Council meeting his recommendations as to the U.S. Military Programs of FY 1959.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 15.

[2] See Document 166.

[3] Cutler’s introductory remarks are filed in the minutes.

[4] None of the charts is filed in the minutes.

[5] The Gaither Report was circulated as NSC 5724, Document 158.

[6] See Document 156.

[7] The budget for the Department of Defense was presented at the NSC meeting on November 22; see Document 166.

[8] The presentation is filed in the minutes.

[9] The paragraphs and Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1816, approved by the President on November 14. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

165. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 22, 1957[1]

Washington, November 22, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary McElroy

Secretary Quarles

Dr. Killian

General Goodpaster

Immediately following the Cabinet meeting,[2] the President met with the group to consider a few points on the military budget. He said that he wanted to approach these proposals not on the basis of “can we do it in response to public outcry,” but “should we do it.” The matter is not one of justification, but rather of need. He mentioned that the psychology of the business community will be of the utmost importance in our financial affairs next year, and alluded to a letter[3] which indicated that confidence would be impaired, businessmen would be cautious, and a drop off in the economy would occur, if we went in for a high budget this year.

He said he was not trying to set himself up as knowing the exact amounts that should be scheduled, and under what arrangements with regard to the proposed additional $573 million for guided missiles. He said he did want to have things that are well proven before we commit ourselves to procurement. If we are not reasonably sure, we could put them into our request if we desire, but must bring out that we might place contracts of only $200 million, but might go to the full $573 million if technology justifies it. He said that the same end could probably be accomplished by coming back to Congress for a supplemental after January 1, 1959.

Mr. Quarles reviewed the schedule on which these funds were based. Initially we had planned to put an emergency force in the UK in mid-1958, with one squadron established in 1959. Later we thought we would omit the emergency force and work for one squadron in 1959, rising to four squadrons in 1960. Within the last few weeks we have studied programs going beyond the four-squadron plan, and now propose to move toward sixteen squadrons in 1963. If we are willing to take some chances, with considerable confidence, but not with certainty, we could go to a program of one squadron in the United Kingdom by the end of calendar year 1958, and another squadron—this one capable of “quick reaction time”—by July 1959.

The President asked why we had changed from the idea that we would select as between Thor and Jupiter at an early date. Mr. Quarles said there was not enough evidence that either would become a satisfactorily proven weapon. He thought Mr. Holaday was about to recommend proceeding with the United Kingdom commitments on the basis of Thor. If we wished to have continental deployments before the end of 1959, we should also use Jupiter for that purpose. By accelerations we could get the first squadron by the first quarter of 1959. The President acknowledged that the production of both would probably be faster than the production of one, since the technicians are in being and functioning now.

He then reverted to his view that we should not spend money simply because of public pressure, but should do what is based on real need. He stressed that the whole arms question is relative and that Soviet ICBMs will not overmatch our bomber power in the next few years. He thought we should go forward simply as fast as our good sense and the probabilities of the situation seem to warrant.

Mr. McElroy said it would cost money at an earlier date to move toward the accelerated deployments. He stressed, however, the psychological impact of the first units for initial deployments. He thought we need not race to conclude further agreements and said we would work with the State Department not to press us too hard. Mr. Quarles added that missile deployments are really the crux of the forthcoming NATO meeting.[4] The ability to carry these out is most important.

The President recalled that we thought we had a pretty fine budget at $38 billion. He was agreeable to adding $700 million for improved pay, and would agree to the $573 million additional for acceleration of missiles, when the funds are in fact required. He then discussed briefly the question as to where the $140 million for additional research is to go.

Mr. McElroy concluded by saying that we will be up approximately $700 million in expenditures above FY–58, and this is just the amount of the pay increase proposed. He thought we should be somewhere between $39 billion and $40 billion in NOA.

G

Brigadier General, USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 23.

[2] The Cabinet meeting was held 8:50–9 a.m. (Ibid., Eisenhower Records, Appointment Book for 1957) No summary of the meeting has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[3] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[4] For documentation on the NATO heads of government meeting in Paris, December 16–19, see vol. IV, pp. 1  ff.

166. Memorandum of Discussion at the 346th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 22, 1957[1]

Washington, November 22, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Military Programs for FY 1959 (NSC Action No. 1816)[2]

General Cutler introduced the subject and called upon Secretary McElroy. Secretary McElroy informed the Council of what had transpired since the last NSC meeting when the Defense Department had indicated to the National Security Council how it was tentatively proposing to allocate funds to the several military programs in accordance with the 38 billion dollar limit on New Obligational Authority and on Expenditures.[3] He reminded the Council that at last week’s meeting the heads of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of Staff of the Services had gone on to indicate what each of the Military Departments believed to be required by way of additional programs (add-ons) over and above the 38 billion dollar limit. In the days following last week’s meeting, Secretary McElroy indicated that after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries and other officials of the Defense Department, a selection had been made among the add-on programs of those which represented the highest urgency and need. Subsequent to this selection, these high priority add-on programs had been discussed with the President himself.[4] Thereafter, these agreed add-on programs had been incorporated in the recommendations which would be presented today by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil. Secretary McElroy also pointed out that, as the President and the Council would have expected, the Department of Defense had tried to fund as many of these add-on programs as possible within the 38 billion dollar limit of the Defense Department Budget. This had not proved entirely possible and the Budget which would be presented today for FY 1959 would be higher than the Defense Department Budget for FY 1958. He then called on Secretary McNeil. (A copy of Secretary McNeil’s presentation will be found in the official Minutes of the meeting.)[5]

Secretary McNeil made use of two charts.[6] One was entitled “FY 1959 Budget Summary”; the second was entitled “FY 1958 Augmentation.” Referring to these charts Secretary McNeil produced the following information with respect to the proposed revision of the FY 1959 Military Budget.

1.

The revised presentation for FY 1959 Military Budget:

Direct

NOA

Obligation

Expenditures

$38 billion basis

38.60

Adjustments

.61

Transfers

.33

.94

37.66

Agreed “add-ons”

2.14

39.80

40.98

39.5

NOTES:

1. About $450 million is left in stock funds.

2. At the end of FY 1958 there will be no free funds to carry over—all $7 billion, though not “obligated,” will have been committed.

2. Detail of agreed “add-ons”:

Total

Army

Navy

A.F.

DOD

Pay increases for military & civilian personnel

.70

.25

.19

.23

.04

Increased SAC alert and dispersal

.18

.18

Ballistic missile detection

.10

.10

Ballistic missile acceleration

.57

.26

.31

Increased research & development

.14

.04

.01

.08

Force levels

.07

.03

.04

Satellite & Outer Space Program

.10

.10

Anti-submarine warfare

.15

.15

Pentomic Divisions

.13

.13

2.14

.45

.65

.90

.14

3. End strengths for Services at the end of FY 1959:

Army

870,000

Navy

630,000

Marine Corps

175,000

Air Force

850,000

These strengths will permit the retention of 2 Divisions in Korea and 5 Divisions in NATO, and the minimum Air Force requirements of Norstad through CY 1959. Note that there will be reduction in the National Guard and Reserves.

The present agreed expenditure allocation for FY 1958 is $38.670 billion. To carry out several augmentation programs now scheduled, it will be necessary to make approximately $411 million more NOA available during FY 1958. Possibly one-half of this amount could be met by transfers of existing funds. The other half will have to be met either by a supplemental appropriation request or deferring certain FY 1958 programs so as to utilize the funds thus made available. The total NOA of $411 million would increase the present FY 1958 expenditure allocation of $38.670 billion by $91 million.

Secretary McElroy pointed out at the conclusion of Secretary McNeil’s presentation that it was going to be very difficult to come to a definite decision with respect to acceleration of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Program. The 570 million dollars for IRBM acceleration would permit 16 squadrons of Jupiter or Thor by 1963. Before deciding on further acceleration, Secretary McElroy thought he needed more discussion with Secretary Dulles. He suggested that if a decision to accelerate were made immediately, one squadron of IRBM’s could be made operational by the end of 1958. While this would involve additional funds, such a course of action would help the morale of our Allies and assist the United States in the forthcoming NATO meeting. Secretary McElroy said he could not be more definite at the moment on this subject.

When Secretary McElroy had finished his comments, the President asked Secretary Dulles if he had any questions. Secretary Dulles said that he had had a talk just prior to this Council meeting with Secretary Quarles and Mr. Killian. He had informed them of his belief that it would be important to say at the NATO meeting that we were capable of making available to NATO (in addition to our commitment to the United Kingdom) one squadron of IRBM’s by the end of Calendar 1959. This date was probably the earliest when NATO would be in a position of readiness, with respect to bases, training, etc., to receive such squadrons. But if we could make such a statement as this, the effect would be very reassuring.

The President inquired whether the countries receiving IRBM squadrons would undertake to build the necessary ground installations. Secretary Dulles said that this question had not been settled. The President said he supposed that ground installations for IRBM squadrons would be very expensive. Secretary Quarles confirmed the President’s supposition by stating that the ground installation would prove almost as expensive as the IRBM itself. The cost might amount to somewhere in the neighborhood of 50 million dollars if all the equipment, etc. were included. The President commented that the elaborate character of such a ground installation suggested to him that such installations would be prime targets for an enemy attack.

In order to avoid requesting New Obligational Authority without precise foreknowledge of the need for appropriated funds for missile production (when operational capability is ascertained), Secretary Anderson asked whether we should seek authority for the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, to make transfers among appropriated funds or alternatively should authority be sought for the Secretary of Defense, likewise with Presidential approval, to contract for the purchase of missiles in addition to appropriated funds, at a time when Congress was not in session.

Secretary McNeil thought that such a part-appropriation and part-contract authority would lead to difficulties except on a one-time basis. The President, however, seemed to prefer Secretary Anderson’s idea for seeking contract authority over and above appropriations—for use when Congress was not in session—on a missile break-through.

With respect to the Outer Space Program, the President expressed satisfaction that the Department of Defense was to have 100 million dollars for this program. On the other hand, the President said he did not believe the Air Force as such should have one cent for this program. Secretary McElroy explained that the Air Force was not going to proceed with its own Outer Space Program (apart from the Department of Defense Program) but at the appropriate time would transfer Air Force funds into the Department of Defense Budget for the Outer Space Program. The President stated with great firmness that he thought this was Secretary McElroy’s business and not the business of the Air Force. Secretary McElroy again explained that the appearance of a figure in the Air Force Budget for an Outer Space Program simply indicated that he, Secretary McElroy, did not wish to interrupt progress on the Air Force Outer Space Program until such time as the Department of Defense was ready to take over the Outer Space Program.

The President said that there was another part of his question with respect to the Outer Space Program. Did Secretary McElroy and Mr. Killian believe that as much as 200 million dollars would be necessary for the Outer Space Program in FY 1959? Mr. Killian said that he was not in a position to give a firm answer to the President’s question as yet but he thought that the 200 million dollars was necessary.

The President indicated that he was not so sure and he pointed out that he had that morning received a very gloomy letter from one of the NSC’s “old associates” complaining about the growing lack of confidence by U.S. business in the Administration and warning that we were going to go to Hell as a result of our large Government expenditures.[7]

Secretary Anderson then raised the question of the use of certain stockpile materials for military production. This suggestion seemed to have merit in the eyes of Secretary Anderson but it was pointed out by Mr. Gordon Gray and others that such use of stockpile materials would not prevent the suppliers from continuing to put into the Government stockpile materials under their contracts. The only advantage to be gained by using stockpile materials for military purposes would be to avoid continuing to carry a surplus of materials in the stockpile.

The President asked Mr. Gray whether it was not a fact that the contracts for stockpile materials were originally entered into so that the Government could supply materials like aluminum to the aircraft companies under certain circumstances. Mr. Gray replied that the primary motive was to achieve expansion of productive capacity.

Referring to forthcoming Congressional hearings, the Vice President predicted that strenuous efforts would be made by members of Congress to find areas where certain defense programs could move faster even on a crash basis. Congressmen might argue for more rapid production of operational missiles even if they were not as good quality as we could wish. The Vice President believed that if these hearings brought out the point that we had the capability to put a squadron of IRBM’s in Europe by the end of Calendar 1958, even if these missiles were not fully proved out, there would be strong Congressional pressure to take the risk and place the squadron in Europe for psychological reasons.

Secretary McElroy expressed his general agreement with the Vice President’s comment but pointed out that there was a difference between putting squadrons in the United Kingdom and in NATO. IRBM’s would be in the United Kingdom late in Calendar Year 1958.

Secretary Dulles expressed doubt whether the NATO nations in Western Europe would actually be ready to receive IRBM’s prior to Mid-1959. Accordingly, he would counsel against accelerating this program in order to be able to send an imperfect IRBM to NATO before our European Allies were ready to use it. Secretary Douglas of the Air Force indicated that our IRBM program vis-è-vis the United Kingdom contemplated that the first IRBM squadron in the United Kingdom would be U.S.-manned.

The Vice President repeated that from information and rumor available to him, he judged that there would be heavy Congressional pressure to go ahead on a crash program to achieve operational IRBM’s by the end of the Calendar Year 1958. With a smile the President asked the Vice President which of the two parties was likely to propose a big tax increase in order to mount a crash program. The President indicated, however, that he had no objection to going forward with this program for the United Kingdom. Secretary McElroy added a warning that there would be need for additional money if this acceleration of the IRBM program was decided on.

Director Brundage asked several questions, notably about the possibility that Congress might decide to cut out Defense Department carry-over funds, about another attack carrier, and about the possibility of saving money by slowing up the process of promotion in the armed forces. This last suggestion produced a brief discussion of the recommendations of the Cordiner Report. Secretary Quarles and Secretary Douglas expressed the opinion that implementation of the Cordiner Report would ultimately result in a savings but not in the first year.

Mr. Brundage then inquired whether the FY 1959 Defense Department program contemplated restricting construction to the high priority needs of the Department of Defense and further whether it was possible to close down some military installations.

Secretary McElroy replied that the Defense Department did indeed hope to find some military facilities which could be closed down.

By way of suggesting a consensus, General Cutler asked whether the Council action on this agenda item should state that the National Security Council found that the FY 1959 Defense Department Budget and programs were consistent with the requirements of our national security policies. The President seemed to find General Cutler’s suggestion desirable but added that he wished Mr. Killian and Secretary McElroy to go over the figures which had been presented to the Council at this meeting with a view to seeing just how much of this money must be placed in the New Obligational Authority column for the FY 1959. Should the total figure be presented for NOA or should it be partly presented for NOA and partly for Contingent Contract Authority in addition to NOA? The President went on to remind the members of the Council that when the Council had first become involved directly in the ballistic missiles programs he had expressed the opinion that the effect of ballistic missiles would be more important in the psychological area than in the area of military weapons. He still felt that as a weapon the manned bomber was superior to the missile. We were now, however, in a transitional period but it was still a question how much money we are justified in asking for on behalf of these missiles programs. In conclusion the President again directed Secretary McElroy to provide Mr. Killian with the crystallized views of the Department of Defense after which he wished these views to be considered at a restricted meeting.

The National Security Council:[8]

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1816, of the recommendations by the Secretary of Defense as to the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1959 and augmentations for FY 1958, as presented at the meeting by the Secretary of Defense and Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil.

b. Agreed that, subject to normal budgetary review and final action by the President, the U.S. Military Programs for FY 1959 and the augmentations for FY 1958, as recommended by the Secretary of Defense at this meeting, were generally consistent with national security policy objectives.

c. Noted the President’s desire that the Secretary of Defense assure himself that the amounts for the U.S. military programs for FY 1959 and the augmentations for FY 1958, to be recommended for final action by the President, represent what is necessary for the national security without reflecting excessive concern.

d. Noted the President’s request that the Secretary of Defense review with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology the amount of new funds that should be requested for each FY 1959 “augmentation program” (other than the Cordiner recommendations and the civilian pay increase) presented at this meeting.[9]

e. Noted that the President, based on the review in d above, would subsequently meet with a selected group of officials to discuss the best method to be presented to the Congress for financing such FY 1959 “augmentation programs” (including consideration of a request for Presidential contract authority in lieu of appropriations for some portion of such “augmentation programs”).[10]

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows discussion on the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 25.

[2] See footnote 9, Document 164.

[3] See Document 164.

[4] See the memorandum of conference, supra.

[5] McNeil’s presentation is filed in the minutes.

[6] The charts are filed in the minutes.

[7] Reference is presumably to the letter the President mentioned in his meeting earlier in the day; see footnote 3, supra.

[8] Paragraphs a–e and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1817, approved by the President on November 23. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[9] A note from Killian to Quarles, dated November 30, which enclosed a sheet listing “some of the principal questions which we discussed this morning and which bear upon augmentation items in the Department of Defense Budget”, is in the Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Sci. and Tech. Records.

[10] The only record of such a meeting was between the President and McElroy on December 5; see Document 170.

167. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President[1]

Washington, November 25, 1957.

SUBJECT

Legislative Program for National Security Suggested for Congressional Leadership Meeting December 3

I know you are concerned, as I am, that the very considerable public and congressional interest in missiles may lead to congressional emphasis on programs of this nature at the expense of other essential but less dramatic and less popular programs such as mutual security and our information program. However, if this aroused public and congressional opinion can be properly channeled, it will help obtain favorable action on these more difficult programs.

In order to accomplish this I would like to suggest that for your meeting with the leadership on December 3 and in your State of the Union Message,[2] you bring together the major pieces of legislation closely related to national security and present them as a single balanced “Program for National Security.” I have in mind that this program would include not only such items as (i) strengthening our own nuclear capabilities through missile development, and (ii) maintaining strong ground, naval and tactical air forces, but also (iii) amendments of the atomic energy act to strengthen our NATO position, (iv) the Mutual Security Program, (v) trade agreements, and (vi) the U.S. Information Program. Any other items as closely related to national security might properly be included.

Combining these items into a single program of six (or seven) specific points would help to focus public and congressional attention on each item as important to the entire effort and would perhaps gain increased support for items which are currently less attractive to the public but are equally important to our national security.

If you agree, I will ask Departmental officers to work out with members of your staff an outline for the December 3 meeting and to undertake an appropriate drafting[3] of the State of the Union Message.

JFD

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Harlow Records, Leadership Meetings (Bi-Partisan). A draft of this memorandum, identical to the text printed here except for the change noted in footnote 3 below, was drafted by Philander P. Claxton, Jr., Legislative Management Officer, Congressional Relations. It was enclosed with a memorandum from Macomber to Harlow, dated November 25, containing a suggested outline for the Congressional leadership meeting on December 3. (Eisenhower Library, Harlow Records, Leadership Meetings (Bi-Partisan))

[2] The President’s State of the Union message on January 9, 1958, included extensive discussion of eight items in the area of U.S. security and peace. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 2–15.

[3] The original word was “redrafting”, but the first two letters have been crossed out on the source text.

168. Memorandum of a Conversation, Governor Adams’ Office, White House, Washington, November 27, 1957, 9:45 a.m.[1]

Washington, November 27, 1957, 9:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

Governor Adams

Deputy Secretary Quarles

Mr. Percival Brundage

Mr. Mansfield Sprague

(and others)

There was a long discussion about accelerating the intermediate missiles program. I said that from a foreign policy standpoint I thought that the need could be met if, in addition to meeting our UK commitment, we were in a position to deliver one or two squadrons of missiles to the continent by the end of 1959. I said that getting ready to receive these would involve a series of measures, strategic, political, fiscal, and so forth, quite apart from the actual construction work which I understood would take about a year. Also there would be training required, etc. I felt therefore that a NATO program looking toward reception would probably take about two years from the present date. However it seemed to be the consensus that the program should be somewhat accelerated beyond that, largely for psychological reasons, and it was tentatively agreed to try to have the British missiles ready by the end of 1958 and the others for the continent by the middle of 1959. Mr. McElroy said that they would probably go into production with both Jupiter and Thor if they had to go now. I inclined toward a more conservative program, delaying the production until a choice could be made. However, it seemed to be felt that other factors were controlling and there was an irresistible pressure to accelerate the program and demonstrate our capacity as rapidly as possible.

I emphasized that an accelerated program would on net balance be very serious if the cost of acceleration were, directly or indirectly, taken out of the Mutual Security Program. I said this program represented the struggle we were actually fighting on a daily basis and that our resources were stretched very thin. I referred to the fact that I understood the Bureau of the Budget was proposing to cut our figure by about $1 billion and that I said would be disastrous. Mr. Brundage said the figure of $1 billion was an exaggeration. Mr. Sprague said that it was at least $700 million.

JFD

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

169. Minutes of a Bipartisan Congressional Meeting, Washington, December 3, 1957, 9:05 a.m.–2 p.m.[1]

Washington, December 3, 1957, 9:05 a.m.–2 p.m.

THE FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT

President Eisenhower

Vice President Nixon

Sen. Bridges

Sen. Dirksen

Sen. Knowland

Sen. Ed Martin

Sen. Saltonstall

Sen. Alexander Smith

Sen. Wiley

Sen. Anderson

Sen. Byrd

Sen. Fulbright

Sen. Hayden

Sen. Hennings

Sen. Lyndon Johnson

Sen. Russell

Rep. Allen

Rep. Arends

Rep. Chiperfield

Rep. Halleck

Rep. Joseph Martin

Rep. Reed

Rep. Taber

Rep. Van Zandt

Rep. Vorys

Rep. Albert

Rep. Cannon

Rep. Cooper

Rep. Durham

Rep. McCormack

Rep. Morgan

Rep. Rayburn

Rep. Vinson

Sec. Dulles, State

Mr. Christian Herter

Mr. C. Douglas Dillon

Mr. Wm. B. Macomber

Mr. George Allen, USIA

Sec. McElroy, Defense

Mr. Donald A. Quarles

Mr. John Sprague

Mr. William Francis

Mr. W.J. McNeil

Mr. William Holaday

Sec. Weeks

Mr. Brundage, BoB

Gen. Twining, JCS

Adm. Strauss, AEC

Mr. Adlai Stevenson

Gen. Persons

Mr. Harlow

Mr. Martin

Dr. Killian

Mr. Hagerty

Gen. Goodpaster

Mr. Minnich

The President opened the meeting by commenting that while he apparently had no physical defects as the result of his most recent illness,[2] he still had a little difficulty articulating; hence he would leave the discussion mostly to others.

[Here follows discussion on unrelated subjects.]

Defense Program—(The President rejoined the meeting for this item.)

Mr. McElroy introduced his presentation with a personal statement of his own desire to Cooperate closely with the Congress, especially as he looked upon investigating committees as being desirable and essential to an informed public opinion.

Mr. McElroy recounted how the FY ’59 program was reassessed late in the year in the light of Sputnik, and how a number of high priority projects were added to the program previously developed. Coordinately, the program was reviewed for marginal items that could be dropped, but its total cost for the future is somewhat higher than this year’s program. He noted that the reductions made would inevitably result in complaints from those affected, but Defense would endeavor to handle them in such a way as to minimize the impact. He noted especially that the new, more powerful, complex weapons were very expensive but would lead to a declining force level though improvement in quality.

Mr. McElroy said he was not asking the Leadership to concur in all of these, but rather to think about the problem along the lines that Defense had to consider and to remember that our defense posture is not based on force levels alone.

General Twining, with the aid of charts,[3] went over the proposed arrangements for the various forces noting such things as the reduction of one division in the Army, the increase of missile battalions, the reduction of four tactical combat wings from the Air Force, etc. He pointed out the projected strength of the various services for the end of FY ’59, showing particularly a 30,000 reduction for the Army. He then went over the proposed geographical location of forces, noting particularly that the number of Air Force squadrons earmarked for NATO would be maintained at 75 but more would be held in place in the United States than was originally programmed.

Mr. Quarles recounted the procedures followed in developing this budget. Starting with a $38 billion “guidelines” target, an exercise was conducted to see what could best be done at that level. The programs set forth by the Services were then reviewed both by DoD and JCS, with a resultant feeling that the “guidelines” budget was a close approximation to the best possible at that level. Then the departments were asked to submit lists of augmentations they would welcome, and these became—naturally—very long and expensive. The JCS unanimously recommended that Defense emphasize eight of them: SAC alert and dispersal, ballistic missile detection, ballistic missile acceleration, satellite and outer space programs, anti-submarine warfare, research and development, Pentomic division modernization, and implementation of the Cordiner Report in part.

Speaker Rayburn was interested in progress made in ballistic missile detection. Mr. Quarles said that the principles have been established and that we have an experimental unit already developed substantially like what would be achieved by the budget item for three of the new type installations.

Re ballistic missiles, Mr. Quarles said that five long range ones were under development—2 intermediate, 2 intercontinental, and 1 shipbased (Polaris). Sen. Anderson asked about the Snark and was informed that it was not a ballistic-type; it would be discussed later. Mr. Quarles said that Titan was not being accelerated at present because its development was more remote, but Polaris would be accelerated and the submarines were expected to be operational at the end of FY ’61, two years earlier than heretofore expected.

Mr. Quarles pointed out that the Secretary of Defense intends to set up a development agency within DoD for satellite and outer space programs.

Sen. Anderson inquired about a report, perhaps unfounded, that the new submarine would have less speed than the Nautilus. Mr. Quarles promised to check that out.

Mr. Quarles commented briefly on the increased funds for research and development, particularly for fundamental research activities. On the Cordiner Report, Mr. Quarles emphasized the importance of improving the technical ability of personnel, hence legislation would be proposed for some if not all of the most important specific recommendations. Sen. Russell[4] commented at length on the need for going very carefully over any pay bill and recognizing the new character of the Armed Services. He thought it desirable to develop new ranks bearing new names, and to oppose any across-the-board increase.

In response to a query, Mr. Quarles pointed out that the eight augmentation items would require an additional $2 billion or more in authorizations for FY ’59 and ’60.

Rep. Cannon[5] asked about activities dropped out. Mr. Quarles pointed to the reduction of the force level from 2.8 million to 2.5, also to the cutback in logistical support (bases, camps, posts, warehouses, etc.) made possible as the number of divisions and wings goes down.

Sen. Anderson thought it would be very difficult to drop posts and bases. He then returned to the subject of missiles and expressed a strong view that there were too many different kinds, involving much duplication, as witness the failure to make use in a new missile, like Polaris, of what had been done in connection with Thor and Jupiter. Mr. McElroy believed it not possible to use the same propellant in a submarine missile. He saw a possibility that Polaris might lead to having a successor type to the Thor and Jupiter. Sen. Anderson referred to what Sen. Byrd[6] might be expected to say about this program which would require an increase in the debt limit; then he went on to cite Navajo as a perfect example of wasted effort, as was Falcon which has been under revision for three years, he said, with nothing but a little change in the paint job. Then he referred to an anti-tank missile which would probably never be needed. He thought perhaps a committee ought to survey the whole business and drastically eliminate duplicating items.

Mr. McElroy said he was in general agreement with the basic purpose of the Senator’s argument though he could not agree on each of the specifics. Sen. Anderson thought that the cost of changing from Corporal to Sergeant went way beyond anything that could be tolerated in a business undertaking. The President turned to “Clinton” and said that he had had at least 30 full dress briefings on all of this and that the whole trouble lay in finding what made something truly effective tactically. He said that the development effort was going ahead on a dozen different tangents, something on which he had spoken with some bitterness, frankly, to Mr. Guy Holaday. The experts had argued however, that another $40 or $45 million might be just the difference needed to make Redstone a magnificent weapon. But, the President agreed, the matter of spending $5.2 billion without putting a single weapon in the arsenals seemed terrible—yet the experts were of a different view and the question of what to take out was virtually insoluble; so the Administration policy had been to concentrate on those that looked the most likely and to go slow with those that seemed least likely to succeed. He invited Sen. Anderson to go over to the Defense Department where they would brief him for two solid days—and leave him thoroughly confused!

Mr. McElroy again noted the evolutionary stage of missile development, something that would not go on indefinitely. He mentioned that the Sergeant is a solid propellant missile, thus completely different from the Corporal. He said that Defense had cut out some of the missiles under study and more would be cut as time goes on.

Rep. McCormack[7] noted the President’s appointment of Dr. Killian, a man who commanded great admiration among Democrats as well as Republicans. Mr. McCormack hoped that the President would give him great support. The President responded that he would not otherwise have appointed Dr. Killian! He went on to say that Killian should be able to do a lot in straightening out these puzzles. Even though operating responsibility was delegated from the President to the Secretary of Defense and Killian had none of it, nevertheless he would be in a position to be very helpful to both.

[Here follows discussion on mutual security.]

LAM

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich.

[2] The President suffered a slight occlusion of the cerebral artery on November 25 and was indisposed for a few days.

[3] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

[4] Senator Richard B. Russell (D–Ga.).

[5] Representative Clarence Cannon (D–Mo.).

[6] Senator Harry Flood Byrd (D–Va.).

[7] Representative John W. McCormack (D–Mass.).

170. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, December 5, 1957[1]

Washington, December 5, 1957

PRESENT

Secretary McElroy

General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said he would like to have the President’s concurrence in the over-all figure for the Defense budget, and in the split between FY 58 and 59. After discussion with Secretary Anderson, he felt that he should go in for an additional $1260 million NOA in FY 58 (he had tried to put as large an amount as seemed solid and well justified into a request for the current year.) This would cover acceleration and augmentation relating to Polaris, to SAC dispersal, to ballistic missile detection, to procurement of the ICBM, and to procurement of Thor and Jupiter.

The President said he thought he gathered from Dr. Killian that the latter felt a decision should be made as between Thor and Jupiter. Mr. McElroy said that after the NATO and other conferences we should have an indication of the speed at which the IRBM’s are desired, and could then make a decision. He added that we need to have a number of successful flights of complete missiles before we make the decision. He also said that the JCS think there would be value in putting the IRBM in Turkey, Okinawa, and Alaska.

For FY 59, Mr. McElroy said he would like a gross total of $39.153 billion in NOA—taking account of a reduction through stock fund liquidation, the net NOA figure would be $38.828. Thus the over-all NOA pattern would be $36.6 billion in FY 58 and $38.8 billion in FY 59—thus showing a step-up of about $2 billion.

Mr. McElroy said he had dropped out of his budget $300 million for the “6%” increase for military and civilian pay. This was based on yesterday’s decision reported to him to limit proposals to the Cordiner proposals, and hold back with regard to other pay until pressures required some Administration action. The President asked whether the $430 million figure remaining included a 6% increase for some military people (those not benefiting from the Cordiner proposals). Mr. McElroy said it did not—that would add $150 million. The President said he did not feel we should raise the pay of people in their first enlistment, and Mr. McElroy said the $150 million would not include any increase for a man fulfilling his period of obligated service.

Mr. McElroy said that, second, he needed to tell the services what force levels for FY 60 and FY 61 they should use for their planning. He wanted to say that they should continue to use the 2,525,000 figure, with a further proviso that this figure would probably not change more than 5%. The President indicated general assent to this proposal.

The President said he still sticks a little on the proposed $140 million add-on for research. He recalled that Dr. Killian said he could justify these figures, but his interest is really to know whether they are necessary. After further discussion on this point, Mr. McElroy said he would keep an eye on this matter, but no change or reconsideration was definitely agreed upon.

The President said what he is really giving a lot of thought to is what is the figure that will create confidence. He thought that a feeling of greater confidence in the security sphere might go over into economic confidence as well, and thus help the economic picture. The President said that he thought that about two-thirds of the supplementary funds are more to stabilize public opinion than to meet the real need for acceleration, and Mr. McElroy agreed. Mr. McElroy said that expenditures for FY 58 are now set for $38.61 billion, and for FY 59 at $39.441 billion, and added that there is no panic in that kind of a program.

G

Brigadier General USA

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. A note on the source text indicates the meeting took place following We NSC meeting.

171. Memorandum of Discussion at the 348th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 12, 1957[1]

Washington, December 12, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Report by the Secretary of State on the NATO Meeting.” For text, see volume XXIV, page 214.]

2. U.S. Security Effort Overseas, FY 1958 and FY 1959 (NSC Action No. 1812; NSC 5707/8; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Security Effort Overseas, FY 1957”, dated November 29, 1957; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Security Effort Overseas, FY 1958 and FY 1959”, dated December 9, 1957)[2]

Mr. Cutler delivered a report on the U.S. Security Effort Overseas, FY 1958 and FY 1959, following an outline (copy of which is attached to this memorandum).[3] When Mr. Cutler had reached his discussion of trends which could be perceived after analysis of the charts and data[4] which he had presented, the President expressed surprise that we were apparently asking for less money for the mutual security programs in FY 1959 than we had earlier agreed that we needed.

With respect to Mr. Cutler’s comments on the development loan fund, the Vice President inquired whether we had not previously argued, in defense of this development loan fund, that it involved an increased trend toward loans for foreign assistance coupled with a decrease in grant assistance.

(At this point the President temporarily left the meeting.)

The Vice President continued by pointing out that we must make this point clear to the Congress because the totals for our military and economic assistance remained about the same, and this would require explanation to the Congress.

Mr. James Smith, the Director of ICA, predicted that loans would probably be down in the next fiscal year, and that grants would remain about the same.

(At this point Secretary Dulles also left the meeting.)

Mr. Cutler then said that Mr. Smith wished to make a statement at this point. Mr. Smith explained that he wished to speak to the economic rather than the military side of the mutual security program. He pointed out Khrushchev’s challenge to the United States some three Weeks ago, and Khrushchev’s statement that the Soviet Union would soon surpass the United States in competition in the field of peaceful production.[5] There was clear evidence, continued Mr. Smith, that Khrushchev has put this program to work. After citing various instances of Soviet assistance and activities in the underdeveloped countries, Mr. Smith also pointed out the role of Communist China and the Satellites. He also listed briefly what assistance was being given by the Soviet Union to non-Satellite nations in terms of credits or other forms of assistance. He believed that this economic competition from the Soviet Bloc posed a very serious challenge to the United States and the Free World. He accordingly said he strongly supported the figures just presented by Mr. Cutler for this Mutual Security Program for FYs 1957, 1958 and 1959. Beyond this, Mr. Smith recommended that the United States call for the establishment of a long-term international economic corps for peace, whose function would be to assist the less-developed nations. The National Security Council must respond to the challenge offered by Khrushchev.

When Mr. Smith had finished his statement, Mr. Cutler reverted to the question he had posed at the end of his presentation—namely, the desirability of asking the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake a study with respect to our military assistance programs in the period 1960–65. He first asked Secretary Quarles to comment on the desirability of such a study.

Secretary Quarles replied that the United States must certainly look ahead, but that there were very great uncertainties in so doing. For example, we do not know what the Soviets will be doing in the period 1960–65, although whatever they did would obviously affect what we do. Another factor was the progressive improvement in the economies of our allies and, accordingly, of the portion of the burden which these allies could take over from the United States. Perhaps the best way to approach such a study as that proposed by Mr. Cutler would be to do it in terms of a probable range. In any event, the Department of Defense would do its best in what would certainly be a very complicated task.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that of course he did not expect complete accuracy in a study covering future years, but was seeking only general orders of magnitude. He then asked Admiral Burke, as Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for his views on the feasibility of the proposed study.

Admiral Burke pointed out that it would be very hard for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to produce anything very meaningful. The assumptions chosen for such a study would almost certainly provide the answer to the problem. In order to make a meaningful study we would have to know more than we possibly could know about a great many factors.

In view of Admiral Burke’s comments, Mr. Cutler wondered whether, instead of calling for the study he proposed, the Council could ask the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to tell the Council what might be accomplished in the way of a useful study.

The Vice President expressed doubts that anything useful could be anticipated from the study proposed, and went on to state that it had occurred to him, in looking at the charts and the data which Mr. Cutler had used, that the matter of greatest concern to the United States in the future was where emphasis should be placed as between military and economic assistance. In the first place, said the Vice President, it seemed clear to him that the Soviet Union was now placing much more emphasis on economic programs than it had previously done. From our own standpoint, we must not allow ourselves to be so obsessed with the patterns of the past that we were incapable of changing the pattern and changing the emphasis. The Vice President believed that we must give much more thought and attention to economic assistance and, wherever possible, less to military assistance. He added that of course in certain countries, like Korea and other areas where the Chiefs of Staff felt that military aid was needed at a high level, we could not change this emphasis. On the other hand, there seemed to be areas where we could increase our economic assistance, and in general economic assistance was less costly than military assistance.

Admiral Burke commented that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would agree with the point made by the Vice President. The latter went on to observe that if we were not very careful in our analysis of the facts and figures which had been presented today, there was danger that we would continue in our old ruts and be unwilling to try out any new paths. The economic side, he said, was the wave of the future.

Mr. Allen Dulles confirmed the view that the Soviets were shifting emphasis to economic from military assistance. He added that in many underdeveloped countries—such as Egypt and Syria—the receipt of armament had reached, so to speak, the saturation point. Such countries had already received larger armaments than they could effectively support or use.

Secretary Quarles commented that, along the lines suggested by the Vice President, and as one analyzed our military assistance programs, one finds that a large part of the pressure for military assistance from foreign countries derived from local tensions and local conditions rather than as a response to our great problem of containing Communism. To Secretary Quarles this meant that the United States should make a greater effort to quiet down local tensions. If we succeeded in doing this we would be able to cut down on our military assistance programs and increase the amounts available for economic assistance.

The Vice President commented that another factor which had always tended to emphasize our military assistance programs over our economic assistance programs, was the comparative ease of selling our policy of military assistance to the American people and the Congress, and the difficulty of selling our program of economic aid.

At this point Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council request the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to see what they could suggest in the way of a study and report to the Council before they actually undertake any study.

Secretary Herter pointed out that in the UN today the United States was going to propose a greatly expanded technical assistance fund for economic development.

(The President returned to the meeting at this time, 10:30 a.m.)

Mr. George Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, said he felt that many people in the world believe that all our answers to world problems are military answers. This was a mistaken view which we must nevertheless correct. At present we give too many opportunities to Soviet propaganda describing us as warmongers. To illustrate his point, Mr. Allen read excerpts from a speech which was being made today by the Secretary of Labor. Mr. Allen pointed out that he was far from insisting that the public relations factor was the governing factor; but it was certainly an important factor.

The President commented that in terms of our setting forth our military capabilities before the world, we were damned if we did and damned if we didn’t. He was not sure that Mr. Allen’s point was correct. The problem was how to inform our own people in a logical way of our military capabilities, without at the same time scaring our allies to death.

Mr. Allen replied that there was even an unfortunate impression going around abroad that the President was going to the forthcoming NATO meeting in order to beg our allies to permit us to station atomic weapons on their soil. The President answered that this, of course, was completely erroneous. We were only trying to assure our allies of our support if they were attacked.

The Vice President, addressing the President, said that the President could give assurance on the score of our strength in very short order at the NATO meeting. But it also seemed to the Vice President that the great appeal that the President exerts in the world today is that he was considered to be a man of peace. Accordingly, the Vice President thought that the President’s greatest contribution would consist in a re-affirmation of the peaceful objectives and purposes of the United States. Mr. Allen said that he could not agree more.

The National Security Council:[6]

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; in the light of the enclosures to the reference memoranda of November 29 and December 9, 1957, and of the statement of issues regarding the Mutual Security Program which had been raised by Mr. Hollister, copies of which were distributed at the meeting.[7]

b. Noted that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would consider and report to the Council on the feasibility of making a study along the lines suggested at the meeting by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Taking into account the tremendous changes in weapons technology and the resulting problem of modernization and provision of advanced weapons, the suggested study would (on the assumption of a continuation of present basic policy) review the missions, force levels and equipment programs for the nations receiving U.S. military assistance in the period 1960–65, and estimate the general order of magnitude of the probable costs thereof.

c. Noted an oral statement by the Director/International Cooperation Administration, on the need for the United States to respond to the Khrushchev challenge in “the peaceful field of trade”, and the Director’s proposal to call on all of the nations of the world to establish a substantially more effective international economic corps for peace. (This proposal will subsequently be submitted in writing tor appropriate consideration.)

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Director, ICA, for submission of a written proposal.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4. For item 4, “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy”, see volume XX, page 764.]

S. Everett Gleason

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on December 13.

[2] NSC Action No. 1812, approved by the President on October 31, is not printed. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action of the National Security Council) NSC 5707/8 is printed as Document 120. The November 29 and December 9 memoranda are not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records and Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 543, Review of Basic National Security Policy, respectively)

[3] Not printed.

[4] Reference is presumably to charts attached to the November 29 memorandum from the Executive Secretary and tables attached to the December 9 memorandum from the Executive Secretary, both cited in footnote 2 above.

[5] Khrushchev addressed the Supreme Soviet on November 6.

[6] Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1828, approved by the President on December 13. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

[7] Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

172. Editorial Note

In December 1957 Frank C. Nash, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, completed a study entitled “United States Overseas Military Bases: Report to the President.” This 93-page report was undertaken in response to President Eisenhower’s letter to Nash, dated October 15, 1956, asking him “to carry out a study of and make recommendations with respect to our system of overseas military bases and operating facilities.” Eisenhower’s letter further stated that the “preservation of our overseas military bases and facilities is a vital element in deterring aggression and in the security of our country and that of our allies and friends,” and he hoped that Nash’s study would be “a wide-ranging examination of all elements of the problem of how to obtain and preserve essential overseas military facilities.” The President urged Nash “to explore anything which is relevant to this general problem” and made several suggestions, including “a case-by-case analysis of each of the local situations where we have military bases, operating rights, and facilities.”

Eisenhower’s letter to Nash is attached as Annex A to Nash’s report. Annex B, entitled “Negotiations for Base Facilities or Arrangements in Process or Prospect as of November 1, 1957,” is also attached.

Nash’s report contained a discussion of his research strategy, including questionnaires addressed to United States diplomatic and military personnel, interviews with high-ranking officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and four field trips covering the Caribbean (April 1957), Far East (May), Europe and North Africa (June–July), and Canada (July), the historical pattern of United States base development since World War II, future considerations, regional and country analyses, major common problems, operational and administrative policies, and internal United States Government organization for base matters. Interspersed at various points in the report were recommendations calling for maximum coordination between United States military and diplomatic representatives abroad as well as between all concerned agencies, especially the Departments of State and Defense, the United States Information Agency, and the intelligence community.

A separate Appendix of 191 pages, entitled “Country Studies,” dated November 1957, provided a breakdown of United States facilities in 29 foreign nations. Each of these country studies contained statistical data on major U.S. facilities and installations, total acreage used by U.S. forces, number of U.S. military and civilian personnel (including dependents), and foreign employees of U.S. forces as well as a short discussion of the mission of U.S. forces, governing agreements, local forces, general orientation, problems, and recommendations.

Regarding the origin of Nash’s appointment to perform this study, see footnote 2, Document 83. The undated draft letter from the President to Nash cited in that footnote was identical, with one very minor stylistic change, to Eisenhower’s October 15, 1956, letter to Nash, described above. A progress report on the base survey is contained in a memorandum from Nash to Secretary Dulles, dated March 22, 1957. (Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File) Copies of Nash’s report and the separate Appendix are in Department of State, EUR/RPM Files: Lot 64 D 444, Nash Report, and ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Overseas Bases.

Nash died suddenly on December 10, 1957. According to a letter from G. Frederick Reinhardt to William W. Walker, political adviser, SACLANT, dated May 23, 1958, prior to Nash’s untimely death “he had to all intents and purposes completed his work. His staff assembled the Report, and on December 24, his principal assistant forwarded it to the President. After reviewing this document, the President referred it to the National Security Council for consideration.” (Ibid., EUR/RPM Files: Lot 64 D 444, Nash Report)

173. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)[1]

Washington, December 24, 1957.

1. I have carefully reviewed the Gaither report from the point of view of consistency between the statements with respect to Soviet capabilities contained therein and the statements which my associates and I made on the same subject before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on 26 and 27 November 1957.[2]

2. Except as noted below, the Gaither report contains no significant statement with respect to Soviet capabilities that was not contained in my presentation to the Subcommittee.

a. [remainder of paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

b. The Gaither report also contains a reference to the estimated number of radars currently deployed in the Soviet Union [number not declassified] and certain long-range predictions as to the Soviets availability [capability?] to develop defenses against ICBM attack which were not included in the testimony given to the Subcommittee.

3. The Gaither report differs from my presentation in that it contains numerous net estimates of U.S. military strengths relative to those of the USSR and, in an annex, a Time Table of relative capabilities, whereas I limited myself to Soviet gross capabilities in various military fields with estimates as to the time when certain significant weapons would be available. [1 sentence (28 words) not declassified]

4. The intelligence presented to the Subcommittee was far more detailed than that contained in the Gaither report itself, [26 words not declassified].

Allen W. Dulles[3]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up. Top Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Lay to Killian, dated December 26, which reads in part: “In accordance with the understanding in the meeting last Monday [December 23] in General Persons’ office, I requested the Defense Department and CIA to advise as to the extent to which the factual information contained in the so-called Gaither Report (as distinguished from opinions and conclusions, etc. which constitute advice to the President) had been provided to the Senate Preparedness Committee in the course of testimony before that Committee.” The Department of Defense reply, unsigned and undated, is also attached to Lay’s memorandum.

[2] Allen Dulles’ closed session testimony on these days has not been published. The Gaither report was circulated as NSC 5724, Document 158.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

174. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, December 26, 1957[1]

Washington, December 26, 1957

(1) We spoke of the Gaither Report. I reported on my telephone conversation with Senator Johnson.[2] The President said he was in favor of a sanitized version. He said, however, that this experience had proved, he thought definitively, the unwisdom of calling in outside groups. I pointed out that one of the troubles was that they seldom took a rounded view of the total situation. There were many things which were themselves good to do but where the benefit of seeking the wherewithal to do them involved conflicts with other things perhaps of more importance. We had to avoid inflation which might have serious consequences throughout the free world. We had to get money for economic warfare, and so forth. I did not feel the Gaither Committee had adequately explored such problems. The President said he was opposed to the spending of billions for shelters. He felt it would have an adverse effect in many respects. I said that these matters were, I assumed, largely a matter of temperament, and that I was temperamentally unsympathetic to such defensive measures. I felt that they colored one’s outlook in many other respects. I felt that a strong offensive capability as a deterrent was more effective in many ways.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret-Personal and Private.

[2] A memorandum of Dulles’ telephone conversation with Senator Johnson on December 23 at 3:45 p.m., reads in part:

“He [Johnson] wishes the Sec could use his influence to make them [?] submit the secret material—the Gaither report. J said he said he would work out a plan to get the needed facts. The Sec said it is new to him. J told of his position which held temporarily but he does not think it will. J thinks the Sec should try to find some formula to answer these folks. Puncture the balloon by taking the Top Secret stuff out and say here it is and show it to the Chairman and Ranking Men. The Sec will tell the Pres this evening as J requested. J said the Sec has his complete Cooperation.” (Ibid., General Telephone Conversations)

Index

Adams, Sherman, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168]

Adenauer, Konrad, 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 86], 500 [Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 119], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 119]

Ad Hoc Working Group on Publicity in Connection with the Launching of Ballistic Missiles, 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98]

Afghanistan, 144 [Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 39]

Africa (See also specific countries), 143 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39], 144 [Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 39], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 61], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 66], 263–265 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66], 267 [Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 66], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 71], 433 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110], 439 [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 110], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 122], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 161]

Afro-Asian Conference, 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39]

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, 1954 (P.L. 480), 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141]

Agriculture, Department of, 628 [Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

Airborne Early Warning system, 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30]

Airborne Instruments Laboratories, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Aircraft (see also Air Force, Department of the; Strategic Air Command):

Atomic-powered, 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117]

B-36 bombers, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67]

B-52 bombers, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23], 82–83 [Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 28], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 308n [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 79], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 101], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164]

B-56 bombers, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

B-58 bombers, 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164]

Bison bombers, 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40]

F-86s, 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78]

F-100s, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24]

F-110s, 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69]

F-125s, 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69]

Intercontinental bombers, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67]

Jet tankers, 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Losses of, cost, 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 65]

Manned, 529–530 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 123], 658–659 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 158]

Nuclear-powered bombers, 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86]

Numerical strength, 550 [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 131]

Seaplane nuclear bombers, 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 9]

Type 37 bombers, Soviet, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24]

Air Force, Department of the (see also Strategic Air Command):

Air Force Ballistics Missiles Committee, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44]

Anti-missile missile program, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145]

Army, support for, 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71]

Atomic weapons capabilities, 292–293 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 73]

Budget, 387–388 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 101], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 101], 395–396 [Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 102], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 541 [Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 129], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133], 576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 136], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 166]

Capabilities of, Congressional investigation, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67]

Civilian personnel, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67], 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 129]

Continental defense program, elements, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28]

Contracts, bidding on, 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118]

Deployment, 699–700 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Early warning system, 342–343 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 118n [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 162–164 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 44], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69], 401–403 [Pgs. 401–403 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 570–572 [Pgs. 570–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Intelligence organization of, 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 442n [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161]

Mobility of, 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133]

Navaho missile program, 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138]

Other armed forces, comparison with, 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 613–614 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150]

Outer Space Program, 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166]

Pacific-Far East, deployment in, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Ploesti fields, attacks during World War II, 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 28]

Quantico Panel reports, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43]

Reconnaissance satellite program, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 160], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164]

SAC, vulnerability of, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 338–341 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85]

Size limitations, 9n [Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 20], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 129], 543 [Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 129], 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 129], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 131], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 131], 576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 136], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 143], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 166], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Special Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 9]

Western Development Division, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44]

Western Europe, deployment in, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Air Force Ballistics Missiles Committee, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44]

Air Force Missile Test Center, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44]

Alaska, 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 73 [Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 19], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Albert, Carl, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Aleutian Islands, 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9]

Aleutians-Midway line, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30]

Algeria, 440 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110]

Allen, George, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Allen, Leo E., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Alsop, Joseph and Stewart, 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 51]

American Assembly, 373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 95], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134]

Amory, Robert, Jr., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 140n [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 39]

Anderson, Clinton P., 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15], 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Anderson, Dillon, 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 87 [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 90–93 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28], 95–97 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 98n [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 109n [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 34], 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 34], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 38], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 40], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 188–191 [Pgs. 188–191 include portions of Doc. 53, Doc. 54, and Doc. 55], 201–219 [Pgs. 201–219 include portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 226–229 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 62], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 82], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 82], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 86], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 86], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88]

Anderson, Maj. Gen. Frederick L., 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Anderson, Robert B., 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 142], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 149], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156], 685 [Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 164], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166]

Anderson, Gen. Samuel E., 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 123]

Anti-missile missile program, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Anti-submarine program, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160]

Arab-Israeli conflict, 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39], 143–144 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39]

Arctic, 55 [Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 9]

Arends, Leslie C., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Argentia, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85]

Armaments regulation policy (see also Atomic energy policy; Defense, Department of):

Armed forces, size limitations, 3–4 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 5–6 [Pgs. 5–6 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4], 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 6], 57–58 [Pgs. 57–58 include portions of Doc. 10, Doc. 11, and Doc. 12], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 67], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 86], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 112], 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 125], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 535 [Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128], 542–544 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 129], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130], 551–554 [Pgs. 551–554 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132], 557–559 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133], 577 [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 136], 595–597 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Bacteriological weapons, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 206–208 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 66], 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 66], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 66], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119], 511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120]

Chemical weapons, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 206–208 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 66], 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 66], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119], 511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120]

Disarmament, 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 39], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 61], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 66], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 82], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 110], 481–482 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117], 518–519 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 120], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 558–559 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

General war, 14–16 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 5], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 66], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 66], 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 66], 419–421 [Pgs. 419–421 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 421–423 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 109], 467 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 116], 470 [Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 116], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119], 511–512 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120]

Limited wars, 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30], 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 54], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 54], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 61], 210–211 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 420–421 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 109], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 116], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116], 493–495 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 119], 497 [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119], 499–500 [Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 119], 502–506 [Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 119], 512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 120]

Military equipment, allocation of, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

Mobilization program, 37–38 [Pgs. 37–38 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 20], 178–179 [Pgs. 178–179 include portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 182–186 [Pgs. 182–186 include portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 224–227 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 62], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86], 467–469 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116], 490–492 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119], 501 [Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 119], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 153]

Radiological weapons, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 207–208 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62]

War games, 127–128 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 38], 189–190 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 54], 379–380 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162]

Armed forces (see also Air Force, Department of the; Army, Department of the; Defense, Department of; Marine Corps; Military program; Navy, Department of the):

Comparison, 613–614 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150]

Deployment, 75–77 [Pgs. 75–77 include portions of Doc. 19, Doc. 20, and Doc. 21], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 80], 549–550 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 131], 699–700 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Europe, withdrawal of troops from, 483–484 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117]

Europe-Middle East area, deployment, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Future improvements, 292–293 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 73]

Mobility and deployment of, 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 57]

Modernization of, 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]

Pacific-Far East area, deployment, 678–679 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164]

Readiness, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 5], 94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 234–238 [Pgs. 234–238 include portions of Doc. 63, Doc. 64, and Doc. 65], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 66], 257 [Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 66], 290–293 [Pgs. 290–293 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91], 493–494 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 119], 512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 120], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150]

Redeployment, 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 133], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145]

Reorganization of, 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]

Reserve forces, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 129], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 131], 576–577 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 136], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166]

Rivalry among, 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 285–288 [Pgs. 285–288 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 135], 588 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 140], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 146], 618–619 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 624–625 [Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 154], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 156]

Size limitations, 3–6 [Pgs. 3–6 include portions of Doc. 2, Doc. 3, and Doc. 4], 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 6], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57–58 [Pgs. 57–58 include portions of Doc. 10, Doc. 11, and Doc. 12], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 67], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 86], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 112], 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 533–535 [Pgs. 533–535 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128], 542–544 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 129], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130], 551–554 [Pgs. 551–554 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132], 557–559 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133], 577 [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 136], 595–597 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Armed Forces Policy Council, 199 [Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 72], 575 [Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 136], 578 [Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143]

Army, Department of the:

Anti-missile missile program, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145]

Atomic weapons capabilities, 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 73]

Budget, 386–389 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 101], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 102], 532 [Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 124], 541 [Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 129], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 136], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 166]

Capability assessment, 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20]

Civilian personnel, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67], 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 129]

Continental defense program, elements of, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28]

Future wars, role in, 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 54], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 61], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80]

Intelligence organization of, 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 442n [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161]

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles program, 162–163 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 44], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 135], 583–586 [Pgs. 583–586 include portions of Doc. 138, Doc. 139, and Doc. 140]

Joint Army-Navy Ballistic Missiles Committee, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44]

Korea, withdrawal of forces from, 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164]

Missile program, 283–284 [Pgs. 283–284 include portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 138], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 588–589 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 140], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 149], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Mobility of, 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133]

Other armed forces, comparison with, 286–287 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 613–614 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150]

Pacific-Far East area, deployment in, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164]

Redeployment, 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Role of, 564n [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133]

Size limitations, 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 65], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 77], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 129], 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 129], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 131], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 131], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133], 576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 136], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 143], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 166], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Western Europe, deployment in, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Western Europe-Middle East area, deployment in, 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164]

Asia (see also specific countries and areas), 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 6], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 61], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 66], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66], 264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 66], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 66], 267 [Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 66], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 86], 439 [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 110], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 122], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 161]

Assassination attempts:

Key civil and military authorities, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19]

President Eisenhower, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 18]

Atomic Energy Act, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 497n [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119]

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 48], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114]

Atomic energy program projection, 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]

Atomic weapons stockpile, vulnerability of, 341 [Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 85]

Budget, 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 617 [Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 628 [Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

Civil defense, informing the public about, 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30]

Intelligence organization of, 87n [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 442n [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161]

Missile testing, 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151]

Shelter program, study of, 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114]

Soviet nuclear tests announcement, 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116]

Technological Capabilities Panel recommendations, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17]

Atomic energy policy (see also Atomic weapons; Nuclear weapons):

Allies, sharing information with, 59–60 [Pgs. 59–60 include portions of Doc. 12, Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 41]

Atomic-powered aircraft, 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117]

Atomic submarines, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164]

Budget for, 350–351 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86], 617 [Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152]

Effects on public attitudes and national policies, 85–87 [Pgs. 85–87 include portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28]

Mobilization program, 521–522 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 120]

Peaceful uses, 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 120]

Atomic weapons (see also Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Missile systems; Nuclear weapons):

Allies, supplying to, 474–475 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 496 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 119], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 119], 506 [Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 119]

Anti-missile missiles, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Asians’ attitude toward, 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 122]

Conventional use of, 60–61 [Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15]

Dispersal of, 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97]

Future wars, use in, 274n [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 302–303 [Pgs. 302–303 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80]

General war, use in, 311–315 [Pgs. 311–315 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 109], 421–422 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 109]

Policy directive, 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116]

Soviet Union:

Capabilities of, 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5]–12, 25–26 [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 66], 316 [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82], 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

Knowledge of U.S. capabilities, 128–129 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 38]

Specific use for, 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 121]

Stockpiles, 341 [Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 85], 501 [Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 119], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152]

Technological capabilities, 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63–67 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39], 145–150 [Pgs. 145–150 include portions of Doc. 39, Doc. 40, and Doc. 41], 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 45], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 361–363 [Pgs. 361–363 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101]

Testing, 64–65 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 122]

Austin, Vice Adm. Bernard L., 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 154], 627n [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 154]

Australia, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19]

Austria, 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39], 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39]

Azores, 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 9], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85]

Bacteriological weapons, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 206–208 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 66], 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 66], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 66], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119], 511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120]

Baghdad Pact, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 73], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 79]

Bandung Conference. See Afro-Asian Conference.

Baruch, Bernard, 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 68], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 72], 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74]

Baxter, James Phinney, III, 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Beach, Cdr. Edward L., 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15]

Beam, Jacob D., 1–2 [Pgs. 1–2 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 19]

Beckler, Dr. David Z., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Bell Laboratories, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Belmont, Alan H., 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 19]

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 410–412 [Pgs. 410–412 include portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107]

Benson, Ezra Taft, 3–4 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2]

Berkner, Dr. Lloyd V., 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Berlin blockade, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83]

Bernau, Phyllis D., 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164]

Bethe, Dr. Hans A., 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Biological weapons. See Bacteriological weapons.

Blast shelters. See Shelter program.

Boeing Corporation, 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 149]

Boggs, Marion W., 338–347 [Pgs. 338–347 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86], 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 553–565 [Pgs. 553–565 include portions of Doc. 131, Doc. 132, Doc. 133, and Doc. 134]

Bohr, Niels H. D., 617 [Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152]

Bolte, Lt. Gen. Charles L., 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139]

Bonesteel, Brig. Gen. Charles H., III, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 173n [Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]

Bothwell, Col., 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28]

Bowie, Robert R., 1n [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1], 6–9 [Pgs. 6–9 include portions of Doc. 3, Doc. 4, and Doc. 5], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 79n [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23], 88n [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 110–111 [Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 123n [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 36], 173 [Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48], 205n [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61], 316–317 [Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 90], 363–366 [Pgs. 363–366 include portions of Doc. 90, Doc. 91, and Doc. 92], 501n [Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 119], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137]

Boyer, Cdr. W. G., 342–343 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

Bragdon, Maj. Gen. John S., 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114]

Brazil, 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]

Bridges, H. Styles, 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Bronk, Dr. Detlev W., 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Brookings Institution, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 155n [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 161n [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 108], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 108], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

Brucker, Wilber M., 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44], 181 [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 51], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 369 [Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 94], 388–389 [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 101], 395 [Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 102], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 136], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139], 595n [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164]

Brundage, Percival F., 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 34], 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 224–226 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 323–324 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 82], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 86], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 103], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 105], 451–453 [Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 112], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 116], 470 [Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 116], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 491 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 120], 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 123], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134], 586 [Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 149], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 156], 686 [Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 164], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Brussels Pact, 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41]

Budget, Bureau of the, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 61], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 61], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 62], 227 [Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 269n [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 86], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 105], 409 [Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106], 440–441 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110], 520n [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 120], 566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134]

Budget, U.S. (see also Economy, U.S.), 23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 5], 180–182 [Pgs. 180–182 include portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61], 255 [Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 66], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 287–289 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 72], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 79], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 405–409 [Pgs. 405–409 include portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106], 440–441 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110], 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 451 [Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 112], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156]

Burgess, W. Randolph, 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 114]

Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 387 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 101], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 102], 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 154], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 154], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 171], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

Burma, 18 [Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 5]

Burns, Arthur F., 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 5], 20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 5], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 120], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156]

Byrd, Harry Flood, 589–590 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Cabinet papers:

No. 56–32/1, 459 [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]

“Caesar” Lofar system, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30]

Calkins, Dr. Robert D., 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Campbell, John C., 11n [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 79n [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23]

Canada:

Defense relationship with U.S., 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 9], 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 9], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 9], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85]

Nuclear weapons, supplying to, 496–498 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 119]

U.S.-Canada air defense system, 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116]

Canine, Lt. Gen. R. J., 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17]

Cannon, Clarence, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Carnegie Corporation, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Carnegie Institute, 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

Carney, Adm. Robert B., 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5], 16 [Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Central Europe, 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 28], 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 108 [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 48], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 442n [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137], 630–631 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 639 [Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 158], 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Ceylon, 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83]

Chase Manhattan Bank, 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153]

Chemical weapons, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 206–208 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 66], 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 66], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119], 511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120]

Chesney, Earle, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

China, People’s Republic of:

Afro-Asian Conference, 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39]

Bombing, possibility of, 431 [Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 110]

Communist bloc, influence within, 136 [Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 39], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Economic and military growth, 436–438 [Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 110]

Hostile intent, evaluation of, 28–35 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 6], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 66], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112]

Industrialization, 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82]

Influence, 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 66]

Military capabilities, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4], 9 [Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66]

Non-recognition of, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 6], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 66], 519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 120]

Soviet Union, relations with, 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 6], 80 [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 137 [Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 39], 261–262 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 66], 436 [Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 110], 519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 120]

Trade with, international, 141 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 39]

U.N. membership, 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 66], 436 [Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 110], 437 [Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 110]

Underdeveloped countries, role in, 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171]

China, Republic of, 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 6], 29n [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 6], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39], 138 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 64], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 66], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 79], 308n [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 79], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91], 430 [Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 110], 438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 110], 503 [Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 119], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133]

Chiperfield, Robert B., 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Chrysler Corporation, 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 606n [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147]

Churchill, Sir Winston L. S., 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 41], 430 [Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 110]

Civil defense (see also Continental defense; Mobilization program):

Active defense, 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Cost of, 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82], 351–352 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 100], 442 [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 647–649 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 158], 654–655 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 158], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 158]

Defense resources, management of, 644–646 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 158]

Deterrent power, securing and augmenting, 642–643 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158]

Drills, 104n [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30]

Economic consequences of, 648–649 [Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 158]

Evacuation program, 382–383 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 100], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 114], 653n [Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 158]

Federal role, 326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 82]

Foreign policy, integration with, 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 158]

Funding for, 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 317 [Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]

Legislative recommendations, 382–384 [Pgs. 382–384 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 459n [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]

Nuclear weapons development, human effects of, 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 108n [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 372–375 [Pgs. 372–375 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 413–419 [Pgs. 413–419 include portions of Doc. 107, Doc. 108, and Doc. 109]

Objectives, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 6], 255 [Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 66], 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 120]

Operation Alert 1955, 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28]

Operation Alert 1956, 91n [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 28]

Organization and management of, 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156]

Post-attack survival considerations, 655–656 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 158]

Presentation on, 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86]

Public, informing, 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 158]

Radar, vulnerability of, 644 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 158]

Radar early warning system, 642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158]

Relocation, emergency, 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28]

Security Resources Panel report, 620–624 [Pgs. 620–624 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154]

Shelter program, 326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 82], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86], 382–383 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 100], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 108], 442–445 [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 459–464 [Pgs. 459–464 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 153], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153], 628–634 [Pgs. 628–634 include portions of Doc. 154, Doc. 155, and Doc. 156], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 158], 653–655 [Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 158], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 158], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Soviet Union, attack capability, 649–650 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 158]

State and local government responsibility for, 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 28]

Strategic Air Command, 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 9], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 9], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 88–90 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 96 [Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 30], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 30], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 43], 171–172 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 188 [Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 73], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 82], 338–342 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 105], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 108], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116], 528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 129], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150], 642–643 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 158], 651 [Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 158], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158], 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Strategic warning and hard intelligence, 646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 158]

Timetable for, 650–653 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 158]

Weaknesses in, 643–644 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158]

Claxton, Philander P., Jr., 696n [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 167]

Cline, Dr. Ray S., 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 19]

Coast Guard, U.S., 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 9]

Columbia Broadcasting System, 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153]

Columbia University, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42], 373n [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 95], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

Commander in Chief, Atlantic, 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 9], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30]

Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30]

Commander in Chief, Pacific, 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 9], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30]

Commerce, Department of, 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74]

Commodity Credit Corporation, 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119]

Communications systems, 54–55 [Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 9], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30], 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 233–234 [Pgs. 233–234 include portions of Doc. 62, Doc. 63, and Doc. 64], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150]

Communications zone indicator system (COZI), 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 9]

Communist bloc (see also Soviet Union):

Atomic weapons capabilities, 25–28 [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 27], 141–142 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 39]

Changes in, encouraging, 435–436 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110], 513 [Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 120], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 120]

Character of regimes, changing, 13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 5], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 6]

Coexistence policy, 29–30 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 6]

Diplomatic pouches, immunity for, 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63]

Economy, 135–136 [Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 39], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171]

Expanding contacts with, 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37]

Expansion, 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 66], 267–268 [Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 73], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 109]

Free world:

Conflict with, 10–16 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 30–35 [Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 6], 131–145 [Pgs. 131–145 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]

Contacts with, 231 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

Relative capabilities, 258–265 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 66]

General war, policy, 421–423 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 109]

Hostile intent, evaluation of, 266–267 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 66]

Limited war, possibility of, 138 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39]

Military capabilities, 134–135 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39], 259–260 [Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 66]

Negotiations and exploitation of vulnerabilities, 252–254 [Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 66]

Nuclear capabilities, effects on public attitudes and national policies, 85–87 [Pgs. 85–87 include portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28]

Policy shift, 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 133–134 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39]

Political strategy against, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 6], 517–519 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 120]

Port security policy, 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141]

Racial problems in U.S., portrayal of, 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 122]

Solidarity of, 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Soviet aid and support, dependence on, 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Stability of, 136–137 [Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 39]

Conference of the National Women’s Advisory Committee on Civil Defense, 415n [Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 108]

Congress, U.S. (see also Taxes):

Acts of:

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, 1954 (P.L. 480), 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141]

Atomic Energy Act, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 497n [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119]

Defense Production Act, 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119]

Federal Civil Defense Act, 1950, 383 [Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 100], 383n [Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 100]

National Security Act, 1947, 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 78]

Public Law 520, 522 [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 120]

Atomic information, barring United Kingdom from, 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148]

Defense budget, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 51], 181 [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 51], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 64], 288–289 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 72], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 79], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 388 [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 101], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 102], 470 [Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 116], 486 [Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 540 [Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129], 541 [Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 129], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 129], 547–548 [Pgs. 547–548 include portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 133], 575 [Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 136], 587 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 598–599 [Pgs. 598–599 include portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 166]

Economic assistance programs, 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 61]

Economy drive in, 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112]

Foote confirmation procedures, 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

House Armed Services Committee, 39n [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56]

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151]

Long-Range Minerals Program, 491 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 119]

McElroy confirmation procedures, 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Mutual Security Program, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82]

National Security Council, relations with, 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 64]

Retaliatory striking power of U.S., 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82]

Senate Armed Services Committee, 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69], 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]

Senate Preparedness Committee, 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Soviet aircraft, faulty intelligence estimates of, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23]

Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles program, 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56]

Tax reduction, 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 110]

Trade, international, 218 [Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62]

U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117]

Congressional Record, 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 9], 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 9], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 85]

Continental defense (see also Civil defense; Defense, Department of; Technological Capabilities Panel):

Adequacy of, 316–317 [Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]

Aircraft development, 315 [Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 80]

Anti-missile missile program, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152]

Ballistic missiles, defense against, 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158]

“Caesar” Lofar system, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30]

Canada, agreements with, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 9], 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 9], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 9], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90]

Continental Air Defense Command, 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 9], 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 9], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 85]

Cost of, 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 82], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 82], 341–342 [Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 85], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 86], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 86], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117]

Early warning system, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 9], 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 9], 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 9], 103–104 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 30], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38], 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 85], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 85], 342–343 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 105], 478–479 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 116], 550 [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 131]

Funding for, 88n [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 28]

Improvements in, 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66]

Infrared detection system, 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158]

Intercontinental ballistic missiles, 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 9], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 9], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 9], 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 9], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 100–103 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30], 110–111 [Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38], 154–170 [Pgs. 154–170 include portions of Doc. 42, Doc. 43, Doc. 44, and Doc. 45], 174–175 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 48], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 68], 279–281 [Pgs. 279–281 include portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 85], 341 [Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 85], 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 401–405 [Pgs. 401–405 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 454–455 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 528–530 [Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 534–538 [Pgs. 534–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127], 569–572 [Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 601–605 [Pgs. 601–605 include portions of Doc. 145, Doc. 146, and Doc. 147], 657–658 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 158], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, 161–170 [Pgs. 161–170 include portions of Doc. 43, Doc. 44, and Doc. 45], 174–175 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 48], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 68], 279–281 [Pgs. 279–281 include portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70], 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 401–405 [Pgs. 401–405 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 454–455 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 528–530 [Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 534–538 [Pgs. 534–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127], 569–573 [Pgs. 569–573 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 580–583 [Pgs. 580–583 include portions of Doc. 137, Doc. 138, and Doc. 139], 583–589 [Pgs. 583–589 include portions of Doc. 138, Doc. 139, and Doc. 140], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140], 599–605 [Pgs. 599–605 include portions of Doc. 145, Doc. 146, and Doc. 147], 657–658 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158], 662–664 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166], 697–698 [Pgs. 697–698 include portions of Doc. 167, Doc. 168, and Doc. 169], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Joint Chiefs of Staff, views on, 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82]

Maintaining, 246–247 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 66], 511–512 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120]

Manned bombers, defense against, 658–659 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 158]

Progress report, 87–94 [Pgs. 87–94 include portions of Doc. 27, Doc. 28, and Doc. 29]

Public education and participation, 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82]

Radar, early warning network, 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 158]

Retaliatory striking power of U.S., 327–328 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82]

Shelter program, 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 116]

Status report, 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88]

Strategic Air Command, 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 9], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 9], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 88–90 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 96 [Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 30], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 30], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 43], 171–172 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 188 [Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 73], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 82], 338–342 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 105], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 108], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116], 528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 129], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150], 615–616 [Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 620–622 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 156], 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 156], 642–643 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 158], 651 [Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 158], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158], 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Strengthening, 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101], 835n

Support for, public, 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 9]

Target systems, U.S. and Soviet Union comparison, 105–107 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30]

Three-mile limit, extension of, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 9], 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 9], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30]

Timetable for, 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 145–150 [Pgs. 145–150 include portions of Doc. 39, Doc. 40, and Doc. 41], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 82], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 650–653 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 158]

U.S.-Canada air defense, 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116]

Weaknesses in, 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91]

Cooper, Jere, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Cordiner, Ralph J., 599n [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145]

Cordiner Committee, 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 164], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 166], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Corson, John J., 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Council of Economic Advisors, 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 520n [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 120], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148]

Coyne, J. Patrick, 63n [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 171n [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 379–384 [Pgs. 379–384 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 382–384 [Pgs. 382–384 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101]

Criss, Col. George W., 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 38], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 38]

Cutler, Robert, 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3], 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 24n [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 399–401 [Pgs. 399–401 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 105], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 105], 409 [Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106], 413–417 [Pgs. 413–417 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110], 428–430 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 110], 432–434 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110], 436–441 [Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 110], 446–451 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 112], 459 [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 114], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 114], 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116], 467–469 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116], 474–476 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 116], 480–485 [Pgs. 480–485 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 489–493 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119], 496–499 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 119], 501 [Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 119], 503–505 [Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 119], 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 123], 533–535 [Pgs. 533–535 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 538–540 [Pgs. 538–540 include portions of Doc. 126, Doc. 127, Doc. 128, and Doc. 129], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132], 554 [Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 132], 556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133], 564n [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 566–569 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 134], 578–580 [Pgs. 578–580 include portions of Doc. 136, Doc. 137, and Doc. 138], 589n [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 596n [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 143], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 146], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 613–617 [Pgs. 613–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152], 630–632 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 156], 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 162], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 678n [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164], 684–686 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 689 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 166], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166], 704–707 [Pgs. 704–707 include portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171]

Cyprus, 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 39], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 83], 440 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110]

Czechoslovakia, 217–218 [Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62]

Dearborn, Frederick M., Jr., 580n [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138]

Defense, Department of (see also Air Force, Department of the; Armed forces; Army, Department of the; Civil defense; Continental defense; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Marine Corps; Military program; Navy, Department of the), 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 87 [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30], 108 [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Air vehicles, defense against, 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82]

Anti-missile missile program, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Anti-submarine program, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160]

Atomic weapons capability, 410–411 [Pgs. 410–411 include portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107]

Budget, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 34], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 40], 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 151–152 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 41], 171–172 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 180–181 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 51], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 61], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 62], 234n [Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 64], 268–272 [Pgs. 268–272 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 276–279 [Pgs. 276–279 include portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 287–289 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 72], 308n [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 79], 309–311 [Pgs. 309–311 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 314–315 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 322–323 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 329–330 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 82], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 86], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 86], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 94], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 384–396 [Pgs. 384–396 include portions of Doc. 100, Doc. 101, and Doc. 102], 405–409 [Pgs. 405–409 include portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106], 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 114], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 116], 470 [Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 116], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116], 482–488 [Pgs. 482–488 include portions of Doc. 117, Doc. 118, and Doc. 119], 502 [Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 119], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 120], 528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 125], 538–549 [Pgs. 538–549 include portions of Doc. 126, Doc. 127, Doc. 128, Doc. 129, Doc. 130, and Doc. 131], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 131], 554–556 [Pgs. 554–556 include portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133], 574–578 [Pgs. 574–578 include portions of Doc. 135, Doc. 136, and Doc. 137], 586–587 [Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 143], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 611–612 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 160], 677–686 [Pgs. 677–686 include portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 683n [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164], 687–695 [Pgs. 687–695 include portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 702–704 [Pgs. 702–704 include portions of Doc. 169, Doc. 170, and Doc. 171]

Civilian personnel, 269n [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112]

Communications systems, 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30]

Cooperation with regional defense organization, authorization for, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13]

Educational program, 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 232n [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

Future wars, 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61]

Hard goods, production of, 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 118n [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 119–121 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34], 161–170 [Pgs. 161–170 include portions of Doc. 43, Doc. 44, and Doc. 45], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 48], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 90], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 401–405 [Pgs. 401–405 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 454–456 [Pgs. 454–456 include portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 528–530 [Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 534–538 [Pgs. 534–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127], 569–572 [Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 580–588 [Pgs. 580–588 include portions of Doc. 137, Doc. 138, Doc. 139, and Doc. 140], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140], 599–605 [Pgs. 599–605 include portions of Doc. 145, Doc. 146, and Doc. 147], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153], 657–660 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158], 662–664 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691–693 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 697–698 [Pgs. 697–698 include portions of Doc. 167, Doc. 168, and Doc. 169], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Limited wars, 104n [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137]

Military assistance program, 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 595–597 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143], 689–695 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 166], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 171], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Military bases, overseas, 336–337 [Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84], 411–412 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107], 495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 119], 512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 120], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 122], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 709–710 [Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]

Mobilization program, 182n [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 183n [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 467–469 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116]

Mutual Security Program, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 354–355 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86], 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 133], 704–705 [Pgs. 704–705 include portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Non-ballistic missiles program, 535–538 [Pgs. 535–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127]

NSC 5501 Committee, 207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61]

Nuclear weapons:

Policy on, 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61]

Use of, 207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116]

Office of the Division of Guided Missiles, creation of, 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Organization of, 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153]

Overseas internal security program, 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116]

Reorganization of, 645–646 [Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 158], 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Research and development programs, 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 61], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 129]

SAC, vulnerability of, 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46]

Satellite and Outer Space Programs, 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169]

Seaplane nuclear bomber, feasibility study, 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 9]

Search and rescue operations, international agreements, 363 [Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91]

Secretaries’ Conference, 526 [Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122]

Shelter programs, 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114]

Soviet attack, action in event of, 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 76]

Soviet Union, military strength of, 202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 61]

Strategic materials stockpile, 492 [Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 119], 493 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 119]

Technological Capabilities Panel recommendations for, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17]

Three-mile limit, extension of, 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30]

Trade, international, 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74]

Unification Act, 1947, 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 78]

U.S. military capabilities, assessment of, 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 57]

Vietnam:

Preventing aggression in, 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61]

Report on, 231–232 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

Weapons System Evaluation Group, 529–530 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 123]

Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147]

Defense Mobilization Board, 179 [Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51]

Defense Production Act, 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119]

Dickson, Sir William, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 282n [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70]

Dillon, C. Douglas, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Dirksen, Everett, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Disarmament. See Armaments regulation policy.

Distant Early Warning line, 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 9], 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38], 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 85], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 85], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116]

Dodge, Joseph M., 130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 216 [Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 61], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 61], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

Doolittle, Gen. James H., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Douglas, James H., Jr., 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 136], 595n [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166]

Dryden, Dr. Hugh L., 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

DuBridge, Dr. L. A., 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]

Duff, James H., 285n [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]

Dulles, Allen W., 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 18 [Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 5], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 155n [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 161n [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82], 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 110], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 110], 433 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 110], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 156], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162]

Chinese People’s Republic industrial potential, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82]

Communist bloc, influencing, 13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5]

Delegations, exchange of, 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 62], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 62], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 62]

Foreign intelligence program presentation, 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 685 [Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 164]

Intelligence system, adequacy of, 20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 5]

National Intelligence Estimates, comments on, 438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 110], 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 110]

Newly-developing nations, subversion of, 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116], 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116]

Nuclear war, implications of, 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27]

Planning Coordination Group, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16]

Preventive war, 16 [Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5]

Security Resources Panel, 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Soviet Union:

Aircraft, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 28]

Capabilities, 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 38], 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38], 317 [Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]

Civil defense, 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86]

Emphasis shift from military to economic assistance, 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

Fissionable material, availability, 317–318 [Pgs. 317–318 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]

General war, possibility of, 431 [Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 110]

Guided missiles program, 409–410 [Pgs. 409–410 include portions of Doc. 105, Doc. 106, and Doc. 107], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 123]

Intentions and capabilities, intelligence estimate, 202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 61]

Intercontinental ballistic missiles program, 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 134], 593–594 [Pgs. 593–594 include portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

Nuclear testing, 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116], 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 121]

Power reactors, 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 82]

Radar capability, 344 [Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 85]

Subversive war, necessity of reviewing, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 101]

Dulles, John Foster, 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 6–9 [Pgs. 6–9 include portions of Doc. 3, Doc. 4, and Doc. 5], 79n [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23], 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 154n [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43], 202–203 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 61], 205n [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 229n [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 65], 268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 73], 338n [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 399n [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 104], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 533n [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 125], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 156], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Armed forces, 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 133], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 143]

Atomic weapons, 60–61 [Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 41], 499 [Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 119]

Budget, 451 [Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 112]

China, People’s Republic of, 437 [Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 110], 438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 110]

Civil defense, 633–634 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 156]

Collective security program, 526 [Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122]

Congress, relations with, 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 217–218 [Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62]

Continental defense, 316–317 [Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 407–408 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 105]

Defense budget, 391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 101]

Economic and military assistance programs, 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 61]

European integration, 433 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110]

Foreign policy concerns, briefing, 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]

Free world, strengthening, 526 [Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122]

Geneva Summit Conference, 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37]

Germany, future of, 484–485 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166], 697–698 [Pgs. 697–698 include portions of Doc. 167, Doc. 168, and Doc. 169]

Limited wars, 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 54]

Military and foreign policies, interdependence, 343–344 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85]

Military bases, overseas, 333–337 [Pgs. 333–337 include portions of Doc. 82, Doc. 83, and Doc. 84], 344 [Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 85], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 112], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 122], 710 [Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 172]

Military program, 363–366 [Pgs. 363–366 include portions of Doc. 90, Doc. 91, and Doc. 92], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133]

Minerals, stockpiling, 492 [Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 119]

Missile testing, 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151], 617 [Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152]

National security policy, revision of, 489–507 [Pgs. 489–507 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

NATO and the United Kingdom, supplying IRBMs to, 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166]

North Atlantic Council ministerial meetings, 435n [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110]

NSC status reports, 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

Nuclear capabilities, security consequences of, 427–431 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 110]

Nuclear weapons:

Acceptance of by Allies, 503–504 [Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 119]

Allies, supplying to, 497n [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119]

Conventional use of, 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116], 499 [Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 119]

Destructive capability of, 526 [Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122]

Development, human effects of, 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 108], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 108]

General war, use in, 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 61]

Limited wars, use in, 500–504 [Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 119]

Stockpiles, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117]

Use of against Asians, 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61]

Retaliation policy, 173 [Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]

Security commitments, overseas, 447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 112]

Security Resources Panel report, 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174], 712n [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Shelter program, 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 114], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 114]

Soviet Union:

Cold war with, 634 [Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 156]

Delegations, visits to U.S. by, 219–222 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 62]

Diplomatic activity, speech outline, 79–81 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23]

Hostile intent of, 11–23 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75]

Negotiating with, 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 117]

Nuclear testing, 148n [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40]

Satellites, influence over, 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 101]

State of the Union message for 1958, 696–697 [Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168]

Strategic Air Command, 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156]

Suez crisis, 435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110]

Surprise attack, possibility of, 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

Technological capabilities, report on, 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 90]

United Nations, 440 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110], 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

U.S.S. Saratoga meeting, 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121]

Vietnam, 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61]

West Berlin, blockade of, 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61]

Western European integration, 433–435 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110]

Duncan, Adm. Donald B., 181 [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 51]

Dunn, Dr. Frederick, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26]

Durham, Carl T., 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Early Warning line, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 9], 103–104 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 30]

Eastern Europe (see also specific countries), 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Economic and military assistance programs, U.S., 16–18 [Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5], 23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 5], 33 [Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 6], 34–35 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 6], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 214–216 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 235–236 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 64], 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 67], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 293–295 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 73], 306–311 [Pgs. 306–311 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 329–330 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 82], 385–386 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101], 388 [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 101], 397–398 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 475–476 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116], 515–516 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 120], 705–707 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171]

Economic corps for peace, 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171], 709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]

Economy, U.S. (see also Taxes), 19–21 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 5], 36–37 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 6], 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37], 136 [Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 39], 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 181 [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 51], 234n [Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65], 255 [Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 66], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 66], 271–272 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 67], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 70], 308–309 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 79], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 82], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 86], 408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 105], 440–441 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110], 449–450 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112], 520–521 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 120], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 133], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 648–649 [Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 158], 685 [Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 164], 692–693 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166]

Egypt, 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39], 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 73], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 18], 108n [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 125], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Aircraft industry, wage rates in, 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145]

Allies, scientific collaboration with, 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 148]

Anti-missile missile program, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145]

Armed forces:

Airlifting, 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86]

Deployment, 76–77 [Pgs. 76–77 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 80], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117]

Redeployment, 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 133], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Reorganization of, 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]

Rivalry among, 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 287–288 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 72], 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 135], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139], 588 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 140], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 618–619 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 624–625 [Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 154], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 156]

Size limitations, 3–4 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 5–6 [Pgs. 5–6 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4], 57–58 [Pgs. 57–58 include portions of Doc. 10, Doc. 11, and Doc. 12], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 94], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 125], 565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160]

Army, role of, 564n [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133]

Army missile program, 283–284 [Pgs. 283–284 include portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71], 583–586 [Pgs. 583–586 include portions of Doc. 138, Doc. 139, and Doc. 140], 588–589 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 140], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Atomic energy policy, 63–67 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 229n [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62]

Atomic missile submarines, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160]

Atomic submarine Sea Wolf, status of, 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164]

Atomic weapons, conventional use of, 60–61 [Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 70], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 80], 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 80], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116]

B-52 bombers, production of, 82–83 [Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67]

B-58, status of, 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164]

Budget, U.S., 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41], 171–172 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 110], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156]

Cabinet, regular meetings with, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]

Chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons, 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 61], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119]

Civil defense program, 91n [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 28], 383 [Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 100], 631–632 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 156], 638–661 [Pgs. 638–661 include portions of Doc. 157, Doc. 158, and Doc. 159]

Civilian personnel, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67], 269n [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67]

Communications systems, 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150]

Congress, relations with, 217–218 [Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62], 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 77], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 628 [Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

Continental defense, 87–94 [Pgs. 87–94 include portions of Doc. 27, Doc. 28, and Doc. 29], 147–148 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 171–172 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 346–347 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 86], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 108], 620–624 [Pgs. 620–624 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153]

Cooperation with regional defense organization, authorization, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13]

Cordiner Committee report, 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164]

Cutler, appointment of, 399n [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 104]

Defense budget, 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 65], 268–269 [Pgs. 268–269 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 276–279 [Pgs. 276–279 include portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 72], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 308n [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 79], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 79], 347–349 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 86], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 388–396 [Pgs. 388–396 include portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102], 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 470–471 [Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 116], 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 485–488 [Pgs. 485–488 include portions of Doc. 117, Doc. 118, and Doc. 119], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 119], 531–532 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 540–546 [Pgs. 540–546 include portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129], 547–548 [Pgs. 547–548 include portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 133], 563–565 [Pgs. 563–565 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 586–587 [Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140], 596n [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 143], 605–606 [Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 611–612 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 160], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164], 683–684 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164], 686–689 [Pgs. 686–689 include portions of Doc. 164, Doc. 165, and Doc. 166], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 166], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Defense Department, organization of, 631–632 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Diplomatic pouches, immunity for, 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88]

Disarmament, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133]

Economic assistance programs, 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 215–216 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 61], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65]

Economy, U.S., 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 70], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 692–693 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166]

Educational program, 227 [Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 62], 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 62], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62]

English Speaking Union speech, 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 41]

Fortress America strategy, 447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 112]

Free world, assistance to, 33 [Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 6], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30], 307–308 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 79]

Fuchs case, 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148]

Future wars, 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 184 [Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 52], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 61], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61], 302–303 [Pgs. 302–303 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86]

General war, 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 80], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 110], 431 [Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 110]

Geneva Summit Conference, 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37]

Health, 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 181 [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 51], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 100–103 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 118n [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 161 [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 166–170 [Pgs. 166–170 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45], 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 196–198 [Pgs. 196–198 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 65], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 275–281 [Pgs. 275–281 include portions of Doc. 68, Doc. 69, and Doc. 70], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 401–405 [Pgs. 401–405 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 454–455 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 529–530 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 123], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 570–574 [Pgs. 570–574 include portions of Doc. 134, Doc. 135, and Doc. 136], 580–583 [Pgs. 580–583 include portions of Doc. 137, Doc. 138, and Doc. 139], 587–588 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140], 602–604 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 616–618 [Pgs. 616–618 include portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 621–623 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 153], 663–664 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166], 701–702 [Pgs. 701–702 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

Information leaks, 438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 110]

Jeweled bearings, stockpiling, 490–491 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119]

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 65], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 70], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 301–302 [Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 78], 305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 618–619 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 625–628 [Pgs. 625–628 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

Korean conflict, 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55]

Limited initial resistance, definition of, 397–398 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103]

Limited wars, 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30], 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 61], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 210–211 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 429 [Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 110], 432 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110], 502–503 [Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 119]

McElroy, meeting with, 695n [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 166]

Macmillan, meeting with, 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140]

Middle East, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70]

Military bases, overseas, 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 334n [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 112], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 119], 709–710 [Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]

Military equipment, allocation of, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

Military program, 238–241 [Pgs. 238–241 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 67], 285n [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]–286n, 302–304 [Pgs. 302–304 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 355–357 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 393n [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 101]–394n, 511–513 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120], 540–546 [Pgs. 540–546 include portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129], 549–553 [Pgs. 549–553 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132], 553–556 [Pgs. 553–556 include portions of Doc. 131, Doc. 132, and Doc. 133], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133], 564–565 [Pgs. 564–565 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134]

Minerals, stockpiling, 492 [Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 119], 493 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 119]

Missiles, authority for purchase of, 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166]

Mobilization program, 177–178 [Pgs. 177–178 include portions of Doc. 48, Doc. 49, and Doc. 50], 182n [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 183–186 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 225–227 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 62], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 419–421 [Pgs. 419–421 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 468–469 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 116], 566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134]

Mutual Security Program, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 354–355 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 704–705 [Pgs. 704–705 include portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

National security, radio and television address, 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164]

National security policy:

Basic, 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 348–349 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 86]

Revision of, 489–508 [Pgs. 489–508 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

National security programs, status reports, 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82]

Net Evaluation Subcommittee reports, 123–130 [Pgs. 123–130 include portions of Doc. 36, Doc. 37, and Doc. 38], 379–382 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 101], 672–676 [Pgs. 672–676 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

Neutrality, use of, 201–202 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 150–153 [Pgs. 150–153 include portions of Doc. 40, Doc. 41, and Doc. 42], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 79], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133]

Nuclear capabilities, effects on public attitudes and national policies, 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27]

Nuclear war, evaluation of damage to U.S., 187–191 [Pgs. 187–191 include portions of Doc. 53, Doc. 54, and Doc. 55]

Nuclear weapons:

Conventional use, 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61]

Development, human effects of, 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 108n [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 372–375 [Pgs. 372–375 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 413–419 [Pgs. 413–419 include portions of Doc. 107, Doc. 108, and Doc. 109], 568–569 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134]

Dispersal of, 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97]

Friendly countries, development by, 446–447 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112]

General war, use in, 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 61]

Joint Chiefs of Staff study, 207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61]

Reliance on, 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116]

Research and development of, 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 61]

Stockpiles, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117]

Use of, 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 503 [Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 119], 506 [Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 119]

Operations Coordinating Board, establishment of, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5]

Outer Space Program, 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166]

Overseas internal security program, 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116]

Planning Coordination Group, establishment of, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16]

Public, informing, 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Quantico II Panel, 153–154 [Pgs. 153–154 include portions of Doc. 41, Doc. 42, and Doc. 43]

Reconnaissance satellite program, 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 160]

Regulus missile, 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92]

Research and development programs, 456–459 [Pgs. 456–459 include portions of Doc. 112, Doc. 113, and Doc. 114], 607–610 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Ridgway testimony, response to, 39–40 [Pgs. 39–40 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]

Satellite program, 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164]

Science, importance of, 608–610 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 148], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 153]

Science adviser, 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 148], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148], 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Science Advisory Committee, transfer to White House of, 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Science and national security, radio and television address, 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Security Resources Panel report, 620–624 [Pgs. 620–624 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 628–629 [Pgs. 628–629 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155], 638–661 [Pgs. 638–661 include portions of Doc. 157, Doc. 158, and Doc. 159], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Shelter program, 459–464 [Pgs. 459–464 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 156], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Soviet Union:

Aircraft, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23]

Attack by, U.S. action in event of, 301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77]

Delegations, visits to U.S. by, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 62], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62]

Negotiating with, 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 117]

U.S.-Soviet stalemate, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117]

Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, creation of, 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Sputnik I earth satellite, 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

State of the Union messages, 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 77], 696–697 [Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168]

Stockpiled materials, use of for military production, 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166]

Strategic Air Command, 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156]

Surprise attack, possibility of, 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 28], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 100], 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

Technological Capabilities Panel report, 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63–67 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30]

Trade, international, 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 74]––298, 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112]

United Kingdom, relations with, 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 110]

United Nations, permanent military force for, 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

U.S.S. Saratoga meeting, 524–526 [Pgs. 524–526 include portions of Doc. 120, Doc. 121, and Doc. 122]

Vietnam, 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61]

War by miscalculation, danger of, 201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61]

Western Europe, unity with, 150–153 [Pgs. 150–153 include portions of Doc. 40, Doc. 41, and Doc. 42]

Eisenhower, John S. D., 583–591 [Pgs. 583–591 include portions of Doc. 138, Doc. 139, and Doc. 140]

Elbrick, C. Burke, 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89]

Elliott, Dr. William Y., 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 61], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 82], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137]

Europe (see also specific countries), 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 71], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145]

European Coal and Steel Community, 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41]

European Defense Community, 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 110]

Executive branch, emergency relocation, 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28]

Fallout shelters. See Shelter program.

Far East (see also specific countries), 18 [Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 5], 61 [Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 15], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 138–139 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39], 143 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 64], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66], 268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91], 543 [Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 129]

Faroe Islands, 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90]

Farrell, Lt. Gen. Francis W., 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137], 580n [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138]

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 62], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88]

Federal Civil Defense Act, 1950, 383 [Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 100]

Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), 50–51 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 9], 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 87n [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 28], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 108 [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 95], 413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 108], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108], 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 114], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 158]

Finland, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39]

Finucane, Charles C., 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72]

Fisk, Dr. James B., 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Flemming, Dr. Arthur S., 18 [Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 5], 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 5], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 20], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30], 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 38], 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 61], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 62], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 82], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 108]

Chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons, 207–208 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61]

Communications systems, 96–97 [Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 30]

Continental defense, 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82]

George Committee report, 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 113 [Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 34], 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 119–121 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34]

Mobilization program, 185–186 [Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 52], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 62], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86]

National security policy, status reports, 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 82], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 82]

Nuclear weapons, use of, 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61]

Operation Alert 1955, 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28]

Sciences, education program for, 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 62]

Shelter program, 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86]

Soviet Union:

Military strength of, 202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 61]

Threat, timetable for, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5]

Stockpile, 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 178 [Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50], 179 [Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51]

Technological Capabilities Panel recommendations, 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 147–148 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 46], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 82]

Technological Capabilities Panel report, 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28]

Western Europe, future of, 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 110]

Foote, Dr. Paul D., 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 589n [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Ford, Lt. Col. Vincent, 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]

Ford Foundation, 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114]

Foreign Affairs, 440 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110]

Foreign information program, 254 [Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 66], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 120]

Foreign Ministers Conference, 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]

Foreign Policy Association, 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134]

Formosa. See China, Republic of.

Fortress America policy, 447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 112], 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 158]

Foster, Adm. Paul F., 130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38]

Foster, William C., 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 623–624 [Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156]

France, 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23]

Geneva Summit Conference, 94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37], 132n [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39]

North Africa, diversion of forces to, 142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 39], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91]

Soviet Union, influence on, 268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67]

Suez crisis, 432–435 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110]

U.N. permanent military force, 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

Francis, William, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Franke, W. B., 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 136], 595n [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143]

Fremont-Smith, Dr. Frank, 372–374 [Pgs. 372–374 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96]

Fuchs, Klaus, 609n [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148]

Fulbright, J. William, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Funston, George Keith, 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 611n [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149]

Furnas, Dr. Clifford C., 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92]

Future wars, 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 184 [Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 52], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 54], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61], 208–211 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 61], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 302–303 [Pgs. 302–303 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86], 468–470 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 116]

Gaither, Horace Rowan, Jr., 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 628 [Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Gaither Committee, 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 620–624 [Pgs. 620–624 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 628–634 [Pgs. 628–634 include portions of Doc. 154, Doc. 155, and Doc. 156], 636–661 [Pgs. 636–661 include portions of Doc. 156, Doc. 157, Doc. 158, and Doc. 159], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 164], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Gallagher, Gerald R., 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 100]

Gardner, Trevor, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 169n [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 58]

Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164]

General Electric Company, 599n [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145]

General Motors Corporation, 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52]

General war, 14–16 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 5], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 66], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 66], 419–423 [Pgs. 419–423 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 426–429 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 110], 467 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119], 511–512 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120]

Geneva Summit Conference, 1955, 94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39], 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 220–222 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 62]

George, Lt. Gen. Harold L., 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 38], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 38], 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 53], 189–191 [Pgs. 189–191 include portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82]

George Committee, 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30]

Gerhart, Maj. Gen. John K., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28]

German reunification, 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Germany, Democratic Republic of, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 23], 138 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39], 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 43], 267 [Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 66], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 117]

Germany, Federal Republic of, 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 6], 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 6], 80 [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23], 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 36], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39], 137 [Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 39], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 39], 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 105], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 117], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 133]

Gleason, S. Everett, 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 18], 75n [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 82–83 [Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 111–122 [Pgs. 111–122 include portions of Doc. 33, Doc. 34, and Doc. 35], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 145–150 [Pgs. 145–150 include portions of Doc. 39, Doc. 40, and Doc. 41], 148n [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 166–172 [Pgs. 166–172 include portions of Doc. 44, Doc. 45, and Doc. 46], 179–186 [Pgs. 179–186 include portions of Doc. 50, Doc. 51, and Doc. 52], 193n [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 57], 199n [Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59], 201–233 [Pgs. 201–233 include portions of Doc. 61, Doc. 62, and Doc. 63], 305–311 [Pgs. 305–311 include portions of Doc. 78, Doc. 79, and Doc. 80], 317n [Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 317–333 [Pgs. 317–333 include portions of Doc. 81, Doc. 82, and Doc. 83], 366–369 [Pgs. 366–369 include portions of Doc. 91, Doc. 92, and Doc. 93], 384–394 [Pgs. 384–394 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 397–398 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 401–409 [Pgs. 401–409 include portions of Doc. 104, Doc. 105, and Doc. 106], 413–419 [Pgs. 413–419 include portions of Doc. 107, Doc. 108, and Doc. 109], 425–441 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110], 446–455 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 459–486 [Pgs. 459–486 include portions of Doc. 113, Doc. 114, Doc. 115, Doc. 116, Doc. 117, and Doc. 118], 488–507 [Pgs. 488–507 include portions of Doc. 118, Doc. 119, and Doc. 120], 524–526 [Pgs. 524–526 include portions of Doc. 120, Doc. 121, and Doc. 122], 528–530 [Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 535–538 [Pgs. 535–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127], 601–605 [Pgs. 601–605 include portions of Doc. 145, Doc. 146, and Doc. 147], 613–615 [Pgs. 613–615 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 630–635 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 672–686 [Pgs. 672–686 include portions of Doc. 161, Doc. 162, Doc. 163, and Doc. 164], 689–695 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 166], 704–709 [Pgs. 704–709 include portions of Doc. 170, Doc. 171, and Doc. 172]

Glenn L. Martin Company, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44]

Goa, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85]

Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 238 [Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 241n [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 283–290 [Pgs. 283–290 include portions of Doc. 70, Doc. 71, Doc. 72, and Doc. 73], 296–298 [Pgs. 296–298 include portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74], 301–305 [Pgs. 301–305 include portions of Doc. 76, Doc. 77, Doc. 78, and Doc. 79], 311–315 [Pgs. 311–315 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 372n [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 95], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 393n [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 101]–394n, 395–396 [Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 102], 456–459 [Pgs. 456–459 include portions of Doc. 112, Doc. 113, and Doc. 114], 486–488 [Pgs. 486–488 include portions of Doc. 117, Doc. 118, and Doc. 119], 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 531–532 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 547–548 [Pgs. 547–548 include portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130], 598–601 [Pgs. 598–601 include portions of Doc. 144, Doc. 145, and Doc. 146], 605–612 [Pgs. 605–612 include portions of Doc. 146, Doc. 147, Doc. 148, and Doc. 149], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152], 617–624 [Pgs. 617–624 include portions of Doc. 151, Doc. 152, Doc. 153, and Doc. 154], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 662–664 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 687–688 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169], 702–704 [Pgs. 702–704 include portions of Doc. 169, Doc. 170, and Doc. 171]

Gray, Gordon, 91n [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 28], 300n [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 76], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 107], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 488n [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 119], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 120], 615 [Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162]

Chemical and bacteriological weapons, 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119]

Future wars, 469–470 [Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 116]

Military assistance program budget, 388 [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 101], 391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 101], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101]

Mobilization base, definition, 566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134]

Overseas internal security program, 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 116]

Shelter program, 460 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 114]

Stockpile program, 490–492 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166]

Urban redevelopment, 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114]

U.S.S. Saratoga conference, 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121]

Gray, Robert K., 580n [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138]

Greece, 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86]

Greene, Jack, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 100]

Greenland, 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 9], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92]

Greenland-Azores warning line, 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 9]

Greenland-Iceland-Europe line, 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 9]

Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M., 4 [Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2], 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 65], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 79], 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 80], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 93]

Gruenther, Homer, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

Guam, 55 [Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 9]

Guatemala, 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

Guided missiles. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Missile systems.

Gulf Oil Company, 589n [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Hagerty, James C., 3–6 [Pgs. 3–6 include portions of Doc. 2, Doc. 3, and Doc. 4], 39–40 [Pgs. 39–40 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 61 [Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 15], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 400n [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 104], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, 500 [Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 119]

Halleck, Charles A., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Harlow, Bryce, 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Harr, Karl, 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 107], 412n [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 107]

Harvard Center for International Affairs, 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137]

Harvard University, 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Haskins, Dr. C. P., 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Haworth, L. J., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]

Hayden, Carl, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Health, Education and Welfare, Department of, 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 48], 227–228 [Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 148], 628 [Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

Hennings, Thomas C., 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Herbes, Col. Edward, 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 38]

Herter, Christian A., 401n [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 110], 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

Higgins, Frank B., 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17]

Hill, Dr. Albert G., 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 148]

Hilliard, John F., 173n [Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]

Hirsch, Richard, 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98]

Hobby, Oveta Culp, 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 148]

Hoegh, Leo A., 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134], 569 [Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 134], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162]

Holaday, Guy, 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Holaday, William M., 535 [Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 538 [Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 134], 572n [Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 601–603 [Pgs. 601–603 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Hollister, John B., 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 73], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Holloway, H. G., 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]

Hoover, Herbert C., Jr., 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 110–111 [Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 115–117 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 34], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 34], 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40], 154n [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118]

Hoover, J. Edgar, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 62], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88]

Hoover Commission Report on Budget and Accounting, 487n [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118]

Hughes, Rowland R., 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 5], 20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 5], 24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 25n [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 28], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41], 155n [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 161n [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 51], 182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 61], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 61], 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67], 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69]

Hull, Gen. John E., 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Humphrey, George M., 13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5], 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 5], 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 5], 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 5], 24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 155n [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 161n [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 216 [Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 61], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 430–431 [Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 110], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 120]

Armed forces, redeployment of, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133]

Atomic weapons, use of, 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116]

Budget, U.S., 20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 5], 180–182 [Pgs. 180–182 include portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 271–272 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 67], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 79], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 86], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 405–409 [Pgs. 405–409 include portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106], 451 [Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 112], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133]

Continental defense, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 28], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82]

Defense budget, 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 62], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 82], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 82], 391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 101], 470–471 [Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 116], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 119], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133]

Distant Early Warning line, 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38]

Economy, U.S., 308–309 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 79], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 86], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132]

Foreign aid program, 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 61], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 82], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103]

Future wars, 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 61], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 111–116 [Pgs. 111–116 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 118–120 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 112]

Long-Range Minerals Program, 491 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 119]

Military bases, overseas, 308n [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 79]

Mobilization program, 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 62], 227 [Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 62]

Mutual Security Program, 354–355 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86]

Nuclear war, results of, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 108], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108]

Nuclear weapons, number of, 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86]

Preparation for war, costs of, 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61]

Research and development programs, 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86]

SAC, vulnerability of, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28]

Shelter program, 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86]

Soviet Union, threat to U.S., 450 [Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 112]

Stockpiling, 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 116]

U.S.S. Saratoga conference, 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121]

Western European allies, reliance on U.S. by, 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 110], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 110]

Hungary, 435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

ICBM Scientific Advisory Committee, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44]

Iceland, 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 9], 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 74], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90]

Illinois Manufacturers’ Association, 173 [Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]

India, 144 [Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 39], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 65], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66], 264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 66], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 66], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 436 [Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 110], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 111]

Indochina, 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30], 138 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 66], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 83], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 430 [Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 110]

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 274n [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67]

Infrared detection system, 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158]

Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 62], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108], 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161]

Watch Committee, 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 18], 73 [Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 19]

Intelligence program, 523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 120], 646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 158]

Assisting in development of, 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 6]

Improving, 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101]

Objectives, 256–257 [Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 66]

Sources, revealing, 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56]

Intercontinental ballistic missiles:

Acceleration of program, 110–111 [Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]

Achievement of:

After Soviet Union, 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39], 158–160 [Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 43], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158]

Prior to Soviet Union, 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 9]

Simultaneously with Soviet Union, 159 [Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 43], 160 [Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 43]

Administrative arrangements, 162–163 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 44]

Air Force program, 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 118n [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 162–164 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 44], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69], 292–293 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 73], 401–403 [Pgs. 401–403 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 570–572 [Pgs. 570–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Atlas missiles, 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 134], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 134], 572 [Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164]

Bases for, 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 153]

Cost of, 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 34], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 34], 164–166 [Pgs. 164–166 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165]

Defense against attack by, 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 9], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 85], 341 [Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 85], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116]

Development program, 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 9], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 9], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 100–103 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 68], 279–281 [Pgs. 279–281 include portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 90], 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 401–405 [Pgs. 401–405 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 454–455 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Domestic political implications, 114–115 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 34]

Early capability, consequences of, 657–658 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158]

Foreign policy implications, 115–116 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 34], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 34], 167–170 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45]

Interception of, 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 158]

Interservice rivalry and, 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153]

Launch sites, 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107]

Military advantages, relative to non-ballistic missiles and manned aircraft, 528–530 [Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123]

Priorities and organizational programs, 174–175 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 48]

Procurement of, 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Program objectives, 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146]

Relative advantages, 535–538 [Pgs. 535–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127]

Soviet Union:

Achievement of, see above

Development of, foreign policy implications, 154–160 [Pgs. 154–160 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43]

Launching of, 593–594 [Pgs. 593–594 include portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

Status report, 161–166 [Pgs. 161–166 include portions of Doc. 43, Doc. 44, and Doc. 45]

Technological Capabilities Panel recommendations, 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88]

Test launching, 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98]

Titan missiles, 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164]

Titan program, reducing, 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 134], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 134], 572 [Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135]

Usefulness, evaluation of, 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38]

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 87n [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141]

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 87n [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88]

Interior, Department of the, 491 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 119]

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles:

Acceleration of program, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 68], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 697–698 [Pgs. 697–698 include portions of Doc. 167, Doc. 168, and Doc. 169]

Administrative arrangements, 162–163 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 44]

Army missile program, 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 71], 583–586 [Pgs. 583–586 include portions of Doc. 138, Doc. 139, and Doc. 140]

Cost of, 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44], 166 [Pg. 166 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45], 580–583 [Pgs. 580–583 include portions of Doc. 137, Doc. 138, and Doc. 139], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140], 662–664 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165]

Defense Department objectives, 164–165 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44]

Development program, 280–281 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 401–405 [Pgs. 401–405 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 454–455 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Early implementation of, consequences, 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158]

500-mile missile, Army intention of building, 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 135]

Foreign policy implications, 167–170 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45]

Ground installations, cost of, 691–692 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166]

Interservice rivalry and, 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153]

Joint Army-Navy program, 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45]

Jupiter missiles, 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 569–572 [Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 139], 587–588 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Land-based, 162 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 44], 164–165 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44]

Launch sites for, 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107]

Military advantages, relative to non-ballistic missiles and manned aircraft, 528–530 [Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123]

NATO, supplying to, 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166]

Objectives of program, 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146]

Operational capability, increasing, 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158]

Polaris submarine IRBM system, 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158]

Priorities and organizational programs for, 174–175 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 48]

Procurement of, 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Recommended actions, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44]

Relative advantages, 535–538 [Pgs. 535–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127]

Ship-launched, 162–165 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 44]

Soviet achievement of, 154–160 [Pgs. 154–160 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45]

Status report, 161–166 [Pgs. 161–166 include portions of Doc. 43, Doc. 44, and Doc. 45]

Test launching, 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98]

Thor and Jupiter programs, combining, 569–572 [Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 587–588 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146]

Thor missiles, 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 569–572 [Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 139], 587–588 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

United Kingdom:

Bases for, 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105]

IRBM development, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44]

Supplying to, 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 687–688 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166]

Internal security program:

Communist threat, 260–261 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66], 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 120]

Cost of, 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86]

Discussion of, 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86]

Maintaining, 255 [Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 66]

Other nations, internal security of, 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 120]

Overseas internal security program, 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116], 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 116]

Policy for, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 6]

Soviet covert activities, 427n [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 110]

International Business Machines Company (IBM), 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86], 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 401n [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171]

International Geophysical Year, 1957–1958, 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90]

Iran, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 282n [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 79]

Israel, 241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112]

Italy, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 5], 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61], 268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67]

Jackson, C. D., 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Jackson, Henry M., 1n [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1], 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34]

Jackson, William H., 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 62], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88], 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 93], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 95], 373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 95]

Japan, 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 6], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 137 [Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 39], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 39], 143 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39], 155 [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 43], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 105], 436 [Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 110], 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 111], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145]

Johns Hopkins University, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Johnson, Dr. Ellis A., 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174], 712n [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Johnson, Robert, 95n [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30]

Joint Army-Navy Ballistics Missiles Committee, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44]

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28n [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 6], 70n [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 18], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 88n [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 104n [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 140n [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 39], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 397n [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 488n [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

Additional authority for, 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 78]

Ad Hoc Committee on Air Defense of North America, 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 158]

Allies, supplying nuclear weapons to, 496–497 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 119]

Armaments regulation policy:

Atomic weapons, use of, 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 80]

Disarmament, 202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 61], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62]

Armed forces:

Overseas commitments, 385–386 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101]

Readiness, 291–293 [Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 73]

Rivalry among, 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74]

Size limitations, 6–9 [Pgs. 6–9 include portions of Doc. 3, Doc. 4, and Doc. 5], 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 94], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128], 554 [Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 132]

Army missile program, 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139]

Cold war, strategic concept for, 423–424 [Pgs. 423–424 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110]

Conflict short of general war, strategic concept for, 423–424 [Pgs. 423–424 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110]

Continental defense, 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108]

Defense budget, 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 86], 384–396 [Pgs. 384–396 include portions of Doc. 100, Doc. 101, and Doc. 102], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117], 554–556 [Pgs. 554–556 include portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133], 575 [Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 136], 578 [Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164]

Free world, military posture of, 386 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 101]

Future wars, Army and Navy roles in, 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 61], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61]

General war, 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 80], 421–423 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 109]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Intelligence organization of, 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 442n [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161]

Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, 311–315 [Pgs. 311–315 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 546 [Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 129], 549n [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 131], 549–553 [Pgs. 549–553 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132]

Limited initial resistance, definition of, 397–398 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103]

Limited wars, 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 116]

Military assistance programs, 235–236 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 64], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 171], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Military bases, overseas, 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116]

Military strategy, assessment of, 234–238 [Pgs. 234–238 include portions of Doc. 63, Doc. 64, and Doc. 65]

Mission, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 70], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70]

Mobilization program, 185 [Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 52], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52], 224–226 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 419–421 [Pgs. 419–421 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134]

National security, military requirements, 290–296 [Pgs. 290–296 include portions of Doc. 72, Doc. 73, and Doc. 74]

Nuclear weapons:

Allies, supplying to, 497n [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 119]

Appropriate use, 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116]

Development, human effects of, 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134]

Distribution of, 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97]

General war, use in, 26n [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 6], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 61], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61]

Organization of, 301–302 [Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 618–619 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 625–628 [Pgs. 625–628 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

Report, Eisenhower’s suggestions for, 241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65]

Soviet Union:

Latin American policy, 28n [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 6]

Negotiations with, 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62]

Policy shift, 29n [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 6]

Revision of policy toward, 199 [Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59], 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60]

Vietnam, 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61]

War by miscalculation, danger of, 201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61]

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151]

Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 77], 311–315 [Pgs. 311–315 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 546 [Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 129], 549n [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 131], 549–553 [Pgs. 549–553 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132]

Justice, Department of, 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

Keller, Kaufman T., 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 58], 197n [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 58]

Kelly, Dr. Mervin J., 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Kelsey, Col. S. D., 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 162]

Key West agreements, 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72]

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 665 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 161], 669 [Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 161], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Killian, Dr. James R., Jr., 41n [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 9], 63–65 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30], 301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 166], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Killian Committee. See Technological Capabilities Panel.

Kindred, Col. Worth L., 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 38], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100]

Kishi, Nobusuke, 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125]

Kissinger, Dr. Henry A., 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Knowland, William F., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 58], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of, 138 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39]

Korea, Republic of, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 79], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 105], 429 [Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 110], 430 [Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 110], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 131], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 133], 587 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 171]

Korean Armistice Agreement, 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116]

Korean conflict, 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 58], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 77], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 83], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 131], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 133]

Land, Dr. Edwin H., 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 148]

Lanphier, Robert C., Jr., 182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 182n [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]

Laos, 143 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 66], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 101]

Larson, Arthur, 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 146], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164]

Latin America, 144 [Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 39], 216 [Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 61], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66]

Lawrence, Dr. Ernest O., 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Lay, James S., Jr., 1–2 [Pgs. 1–2 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 6n [Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4], 24–25 [Pgs. 24–25 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 95n [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30], 104n [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 105n [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 108n [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 130n [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 155n [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 161n [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 173n [Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48], 186n [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52], 199–200 [Pgs. 199–200 include portions of Doc. 58, Doc. 59, and Doc. 60], 229n [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 242–243 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 300–301 [Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86], 358–359 [Pgs. 358–359 include portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88], 372–374 [Pgs. 372–374 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 418n [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108], 419–421 [Pgs. 419–421 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 112], 459 [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507–508 [Pgs. 507–508 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 566n [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 638–639 [Pgs. 638–639 include portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158], 676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162], 704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Lebanon, 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]

LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 65], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69]

Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman, 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139], 589n [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Leonhart, William, 123n [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 36]

Leverton, Capt., 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28]

Liberia, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 62]

Libya, 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 83], 411 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107], 411n [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107]

Limited wars, 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30], 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 54], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 54], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 61], 210–211 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 420–421 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 109], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 110], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 116], 471–473 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 116], 493–495 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 119], 497 [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119], 499–500 [Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 119], 502–506 [Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 119], 512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 120], 549–550 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 131]

Lincoln, Col. George A., 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Lindsay, Maj. Gen. R. C., 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 171n [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 46], 338–341 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 344 [Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 85]

Linebarger, Dr. Paul, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Lloyd, Selwyn, 435n [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110]

Local aggression. See Limited wars.

Local wars. See Limited wars.

Long-Range Minerals Program, 490–492 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119]

Loper, Maj. Gen. Herbert B., 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97]

Lovett, Robert A., 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Luedecke, Maj. Gen. A. R., 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 376n [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97]

MacArthur, Douglas, II, 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125]

McCloy, John J., 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 156]

McCormack, John W., 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169], 702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

McDonnell, W. Barrett, 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]

McElroy, Neil H., 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 156], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]

Armed forces, 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 154], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 160]

Carrier strength, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160]

Confirmation proceedings, 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 589n [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Defense budget, 605–606 [Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 149], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164], 682–684 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164], 686–689 [Pgs. 686–689 include portions of Doc. 164, Doc. 165, and Doc. 166], 691–695 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169], 702–704 [Pgs. 702–704 include portions of Doc. 169, Doc. 170, and Doc. 171]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

President, regular appointments with, 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]

United Kingdom, supplying IRBMs to, 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166]

McGuire, E. Perkins, 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86]

McKinsey and Company, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Macmillan, Harold, 435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140]

McNeil, W. J., 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 101], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 467 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 164], 686 [Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 164], 689 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 166], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 166], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 166], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Macomber, William B., Jr., 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Magazine Publishers Association, 79n [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23]

Mahon, George H., 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130]

Mancinelli, Gen. Giuseppe, 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61]

Manhattan District, 588 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 140], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146]

Manhattan Project, 116–118 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 34], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 68], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153]

Manpower program, 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 257 [Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 66], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 120]

Manufacturing Chemists Association, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Marine Corps:

Atomic weapons capabilities, 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 73]

Budget, 387 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 101], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160]

Civilian personnel, 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 129]

Mobility of, 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133]

Programs, status of, 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 20]

Size limitations, 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 65], 286–287 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 77], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 543 [Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 129], 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 129], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 131], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 131], 576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 136], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 143], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 166]

Martin, Ed, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Martin, I. Jack, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]

Martin, Joseph W., Jr., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Martin, William McChesney, 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149]

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 457n [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 607n [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156], 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Mathews, Elbert G., 104n [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30]

May, Stacy, 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Medaris, Maj. Gen. John B., 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105]

Mexico, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19]

Mid-Canada line, 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116]

Middle East (see also specific countries), 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 6], 105n [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39], 138–139 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39], 143 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43], 238 [Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66], 267 [Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 66], 268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91], 386 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 101], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 105], 439 [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 110], 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 154], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 161]

Midway Island, 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9]

Military program (see also Defense, Department of; Joint Chiefs of Staff):

Budget for, 540–548 [Pgs. 540–548 include portions of Doc. 128, Doc. 129, and Doc. 130]

Limitations, 564–565 [Pgs. 564–565 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134]

Mobilization program, effect on, 556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133]

Objectives, 75–77 [Pgs. 75–77 include portions of Doc. 19, Doc. 20, and Doc. 21], 238–241 [Pgs. 238–241 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 77], 355–357 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 533–535 [Pgs. 533–535 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 549–553 [Pgs. 549–553 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150], 689–695 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 166]

Secrecy of, 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133]

Service chiefs and JCS, views on, 393n [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 101]–394n

Size limitations, 285n [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]–286n, 554 [Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 132], 595–597 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143]

Status report, 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 363–366 [Pgs. 363–366 include portions of Doc. 90, Doc. 91, and Doc. 92], 366–369 [Pgs. 366–369 include portions of Doc. 91, Doc. 92, and Doc. 93], 384–394 [Pgs. 384–394 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101]

Millikan, Dr. Max F., 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Millikin, Eugene D., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr., 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 698–702 [Pgs. 698–702 include portions of Doc. 168, Doc. 169, and Doc. 170]

Missile systems

Air-to-surface missiles, 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]

Anti-missile missiles, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Atlas missiles, 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 570–572 [Pgs. 570–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164]

Bomarc missiles, 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138]

Corporal missiles, 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

Cost of, 355–356 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139]

Future of, 291–292 [Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 73]

Hawk missiles, 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138]

Hercules missiles, 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 138], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158]

Honest John missiles, 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 315 [Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 80], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107]

Jupiter missiles, 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 569–572 [Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 139], 587–588 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Lacrosse missiles, 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]

Land-based, 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138]

Matador missiles, 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86]

Navaho missiles, 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 138], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Nike missiles, 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 71], 290 [Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 138], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158]

Non-ballistic missiles, 528–530 [Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 535–538 [Pgs. 535–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127]

Polaris missiles, 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 158], 662–663 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Rascal missiles, 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152]

Redstone missiles, 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 135], 583–586 [Pgs. 583–586 include portions of Doc. 138, Doc. 139, and Doc. 140], 588 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 140], 600–601 [Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 148], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

Regulus II missiles, 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]

Sergeant missiles, 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

Ship-launched missiles, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138]

Snark missiles, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169]

Soviet and U.S., comparison, 259 [Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 66]

Submarine-launched missiles, 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 158]

Surface-to-air missiles, 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138]

Surface-to-surface missiles, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]

Talos missiles, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 138], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158]

Tartar missiles, 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138]

Terrier missiles, 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138]

Test firings, 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146]

Thor missiles, 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 569–572 [Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 139], 587–588 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Titan missiles, 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 134], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 134], 572 [Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 158], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169]

Triton missiles, 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 138]

Vanguard missiles, 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 146]

Mobilization base. See Mobilization program.

Mobilization program (see also Defense, Department of; Office of Defense Mobilization):

Cost of, 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86]

Military eventualities, 419–421 [Pgs. 419–421 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109]

Mobilization base, definition of, 566–567 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134]

Objectives, 37–38 [Pgs. 37–38 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 62], 256 [Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 66], 521–522 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 120], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 153]

Presentation on, 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86]

Status reports, 182–186 [Pgs. 182–186 include portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 224–227 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 467–469 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116]

Stockpiling program, 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 20], 178–179 [Pgs. 178–179 include portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 490–492 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119], 493 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 119], 501 [Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 119], 522 [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 120]

Mollet, Guy, 433 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110], 433n [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110], 435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110]

Montague, Dr. Ludwell L., 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 38], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 162]

Montgomery, Lord, 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78]

Morgan, Gerald, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Morocco, 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 411 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107], 411n [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 107], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116]

Morse, Capt., 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137], 580n [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138]

Mosely, Dr. Philip E., 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Murphree, Dr. E. V., 401–405 [Pgs. 401–405 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105]

Murphy, Robert D., 300n [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 76], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 410n [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107]

Mutual Security Act funds, 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 73]

Mutual Security program, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 354–355 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86], 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 133], 704–705 [Pgs. 704–705 include portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Nash, Frank C., 334n [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 119], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 709–710 [Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]

National Academy of Sciences, 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

National Bureau of Standards, 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

National Guard, 577 [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 136], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166]

National Intelligence Estimates (see also Special National Intelligence Estimates), 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 19], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 110]

NIE 11-2-56, 316 [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81], 317n [Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86]

NIE 11-3-55, 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

NIE 11-4-54, 9–24 [Pgs. 9–24 include portions of Doc. 4, Doc. 5, and Doc. 6]

NIE 11-4-56, 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161]

NIE 11-4-57, 665–672 [Pgs. 665–672 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

NIE 11-5-57, 528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 123], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 142]

NIE 11-6-54, 9–24 [Pgs. 9–24 include portions of Doc. 4, Doc. 5, and Doc. 6]

NIE 11-7-55, 89n [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 28], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

NIE 11-13/1-55, 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

NIE 11-13-55, 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

NIE 11-56, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86]

NIE 100-3-57, 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110], 425n [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110], 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 110], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112]

NIE 100-4-57, 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134]

NIE 100-5-55, 85–87 [Pgs. 85–87 include portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

NIE 100-5-57, 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132]

NIE 100-6-57, 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134]

NIE 100-7-55, 131–145 [Pgs. 131–145 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

NIE 11-2A-56, 316n [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81]

National Science Foundation, 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 48], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 57], 213n [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 61], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

National Security Act, 1947, 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 78]

National Security Council:

Actions:

No. 1251, 24n [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6]

No. 1260, 1n [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

No. 1272, 24n [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6]

No. 1273, 87–94 [Pgs. 87–94 include portions of Doc. 27, Doc. 28, and Doc. 29]

No. 1277, 182–186 [Pgs. 182–186 include portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]

No. 1279, 24n [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6]

No. 1286, 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 21n [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 5], 23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 5], 24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6]

No. 1290, 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 24n [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 475–477 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116]

No. 1293, 21–23 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 5], 24n [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 25 [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6]

No. 1314, 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7]

No. 1315, 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7]

No. 1330, 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

No. 1342, 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30]

No. 1355, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 90], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92]

No. 1366, 70n [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 18]

No. 1373, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

No. 1410, 83n [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25]

No. 1417, 94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82]

No. 1430, 95n [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 103n [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 30], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 123n [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 36], 145 [Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 161 [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 171–172 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 372n [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 95], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

No. 1431, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

No. 1433, 121n [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 34], 147n [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43], 161 [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 165–167 [Pgs. 165–167 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 45], 175n [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 48], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 401n [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 105], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 454n [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 112], 569 [Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 134], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 134], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]

No. 1448, 413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134]

No. 1463, 130n [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

No. 1471, 178 [Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50]

No. 1476, 146n [Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 40], 149n [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40]

No. 1480, 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41]

No. 1483, 167n [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45]

No. 1484, 170n [Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 45], 175n [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 48], 401n [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 105], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 112], 569 [Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 134], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146]

No. 1486, 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 79], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116]

No. 1488, 172n [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 46], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 341 [Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 85]

No. 1498, 179 [Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51]

No. 1499, 182n [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]

No. 1502, 413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134]

No. 1503, 186n [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52], 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116]

No. 1522, 230n [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134]

No. 1532, 274n [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67]

No. 1532, 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100]

No. 1547, 301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77]

No. 1560, 310n [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 79]

No. 1566, 232n [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62]

No. 1573, 321n [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82]

No. 1574, 332n [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

No. 1589, 341n [Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 85]

No. 1590, 345n [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86]

No. 1594, 350n [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86]

No. 1595, 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86]

No. 1599, 397n [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103]

No. 1603, 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88]

No. 1614, 367n [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92]

No. 1615, 368n [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 401n [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112]

No. 1641, 381n [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 100], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

No. 1642, 384n [Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 459 [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

No. 1643, 394n [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116], 520n [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 120]

No. 1649, 398n [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 103]

No. 1653, 405n [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 105], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 112]

No. 1665, 418n [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134]

No. 1670, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

No. 1675, 441n [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 110], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 466n [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

No. 1680, 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116]

No. 1687, 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 112]

No. 1688, 454n [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112]

No. 1690, 455n [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 112], 528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 123], 569 [Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 134], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]

No. 1691, 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 156], 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

No. 1699, 477n [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116]

No. 1700, 477n [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116]

No. 1701, 480n [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117]

No. 1704, 486n [Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118]

No. 1728, 505n [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 120], 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 121]

No. 1729, 525n [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 121]

No. 1733, 530n [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 123]

No. 1737, 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132]

No. 1742, 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132]

No. 1743, 538n [Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 569 [Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 134], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146]

No. 1747, 522n [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 120]

No. 1752, 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125]

No. 1754, 556n [Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133]

No. 1755, 564n [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143]

No. 1756, 567n [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134]

No. 1759, 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 134]

No. 1760, 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

No. 1761, 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

No. 1765, 571n [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 134], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146]

No. 1775, 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

No. 1776, 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

No. 1781, 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

No. 1787, 596n [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 143]

No. 1800, 604n [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 146]

No. 1807, 615n [Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]

No. 1811, 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

No. 1812, 704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171]

No. 1814, 639 [Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 158]

No. 1815, 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162]

No. 1816, 686n [Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 164], 689–695 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 166]

No. 1817, 695n [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 166]

No. 1828, 708n [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

No. 1838, 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162]

No. 1842, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

No. 1872, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

No. 1900, 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125]

Disaster File, 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 162]

Documents:

NSC 162/2, 7, 8n [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4], 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 5], 24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 25 [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60]

NSC 174, 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 62]

NSC 5408, 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 9], 49n [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 9], 87–94 [Pgs. 87–94 include portions of Doc. 27, Doc. 28, and Doc. 29], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 316 [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 459 [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141], 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

NSC 5414/1, 179 [Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51]

NSC 5422/2, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4], 24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 25 [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6]

NSC 5423, 2n [Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 25n [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10]

NSC 5427, 232n [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

NSC 5429/5, 18 [Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 5], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 76]

NSC 5434/1, 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12]

NSC 5440, 6n [Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4], 7 [Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4], 9n [Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5]

NSC 5440/1, 6–25 [Pgs. 6–25 include portions of Doc. 3, Doc. 4, Doc. 5, and Doc. 6]

NSC 5501, 24–38 [Pgs. 24–38 include portions of Doc. 5, Doc. 6, and Doc. 7], 88n [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 105n [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 123–125 [Pgs. 123–125 include portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40], 179 [Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51], 182n [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 57], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 57], 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60], 201–233 [Pgs. 201–233 include portions of Doc. 61, Doc. 62, and Doc. 63], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 64], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

NSC 5502, 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 95n [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62]

NSC 5502/1, 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16]

NSC 5503, 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125]

NSC 5505, 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 62]

NSC 5505/1, 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16], 219n [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 62]

NSC 5508/1, 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

NSC 5509, 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 75n [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

NSC 5511, 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 98n [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 126n [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 38], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 38], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 379n [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100]

NSC 5513, 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15]

NSC 5513/1, 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15], 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30]

NSC 5515, 69n [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 18], 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 18]

NSC 5515/1, 1n [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1], 70–75 [Pgs. 70–75 include portions of Doc. 18, Doc. 19, and Doc. 20]

NSC 5517, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

NSC 5517/1, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

NSC 5520, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30]

NSC 5522, 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 111n [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 145 [Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 161 [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44]

NSC 5525, 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

NSC 5527, 130n [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88]

NSC 5602, 193–196 [Pgs. 193–196 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 199–233 [Pgs. 199–233 include portions of Doc. 58, Doc. 59, Doc. 60, Doc. 61, Doc. 62, and Doc. 63], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

NSC 5602/1, 123n [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 36], 201n [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61], 229n [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 242–243 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 293n [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 73], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 82], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 86], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 109], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 112], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 493–507 [Pgs. 493–507 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 120]

NSC 5604, 300–301 [Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77]

NSC 5605, 57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 100], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162], 676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162]

NSC 5606, 316 [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 82], 326–328 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 82], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 82], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82], 338n [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 86], 459 [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 459n [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 630n [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 638 [Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

NSC 5609, 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]

NSC 5610, 311n [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 350n [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86]

NSC 5611, 108n [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 90], 363 [Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91], 366–369 [Pgs. 366–369 include portions of Doc. 91, Doc. 92, and Doc. 93], 367n [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92]

NSC 5612/1, 397n [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 103]

NSC 5616/2, 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141], 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

NSC 5617, 397n [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 103]

NSC 5701, 397n [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 103]

NSC 5707, 425–435 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110], 426n [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 110], 435–441 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 112], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

NSC 5707/1, 446–448 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

NSC 5707/2, 448–455 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 112], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

NSC 5707/3, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 467 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 116], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 116], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116], 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116], 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

NSC 5707/4, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 116], 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

NSC 5707/5, 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

NSC 5707/6, 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 486 [Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118], 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

NSC 5707/7, 488–508 [Pgs. 488–508 include portions of Doc. 118, Doc. 119, and Doc. 120]

NSC 5707/8, 472n [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116], 507–508 [Pgs. 507–508 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 131], 565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134], 704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171]

NSC 5709, 459–464 [Pgs. 459–464 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 639 [Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 158]

NSC 5720, 556n [Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150], 615 [Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]

NSC 5724, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 638–661 [Pgs. 638–661 include portions of Doc. 157, Doc. 158, and Doc. 159], 680n [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 164], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

NSC 5724/1, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156]

NSC 5728, 57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162]

NSC 5806, 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

NSC 5808/1, 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

Intelligence Directives:

NSCID 17, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30]

Meetings:

218th, 24n [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6]

222d, 2n [Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 25n [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 379n [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100]

226th, 182n [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]

228th, 9n [Pg. 9 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5]

230th, 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5]

234th, 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7]

236th, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13]

237th, 379n [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100]

239th, 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15]

241st, 63–67 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17]

243d, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 68–70 [Pgs. 68–70 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]

244th, 75–77 [Pgs. 75–77 include portions of Doc. 19, Doc. 20, and Doc. 21]

246th, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13]

247th, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23]

252d, 87–94 [Pgs. 87–94 include portions of Doc. 27, Doc. 28, and Doc. 29], 385n [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101]

257th, 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30]

258th, 111–122 [Pgs. 111–122 include portions of Doc. 33, Doc. 34, and Doc. 35]

259th, 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35]

264th, 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

265th, 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

266th, 145–150 [Pgs. 145–150 include portions of Doc. 39, Doc. 40, and Doc. 41]

267th, 150–153 [Pgs. 150–153 include portions of Doc. 40, Doc. 41, and Doc. 42]

268th, 166 [Pg. 166 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45]

269th, 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 148n [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40]

270th, 171–172 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 341 [Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 85]

272d, 179–182 [Pgs. 179–182 include portions of Doc. 50, Doc. 51, and Doc. 52], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56]

273d, 182–186 [Pgs. 182–186 include portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]

275th, 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56]

277th, 201–218 [Pgs. 201–218 include portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

278th, 218–233 [Pgs. 218–233 include portions of Doc. 61, Doc. 62, and Doc. 63], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

279th, 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63]

280th, 268–274 [Pgs. 268–274 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67]

281st, 379n [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100]

283d, 301–308n [Pgs. 301–308 include portions of Doc. 76, Doc. 77, Doc. 78, and Doc. 79]

285th, 305–311 [Pgs. 305–311 include portions of Doc. 78, Doc. 79, and Doc. 80]

288th, 317–333 [Pgs. 317–333 include portions of Doc. 81, Doc. 82, and Doc. 83]

292d, 338–345 [Pgs. 338–345 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86]

293d, 345–354 [Pgs. 345–354 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86]

294th, 354–357 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86]

297th, 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88]

299th, 366–369 [Pgs. 366–369 include portions of Doc. 91, Doc. 92, and Doc. 93]

306th, 379–384 [Pgs. 379–384 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101]

308th, 397–398 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103]

309th, 455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 112]

310th, 409–410 [Pgs. 409–410 include portions of Doc. 105, Doc. 106, and Doc. 107]

312th, 108n [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30]

314th, 425–441 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110]

317th, 446–455 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112]

318th, 459–464 [Pgs. 459–464 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116]

319th, 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116]

320th, 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117]

325th, 488 [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 507–508 [Pgs. 507–508 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

326th, 524–526 [Pgs. 524–526 include portions of Doc. 120, Doc. 121, and Doc. 122]

327th, 528–530 [Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123]

329th, 535–538 [Pgs. 535–538 include portions of Doc. 125, Doc. 126, and Doc. 127]

331st, 553–556 [Pgs. 553–556 include portions of Doc. 131, Doc. 132, and Doc. 133]

332d, 556–565 [Pgs. 556–565 include portions of Doc. 132, Doc. 133, and Doc. 134], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143]

333d, 565–572 [Pgs. 565–572 include portions of Doc. 133, Doc. 134, and Doc. 135]

339th, 601–605 [Pgs. 601–605 include portions of Doc. 145, Doc. 146, and Doc. 147]

343d, 630–637 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 639 [Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 158]

344th, 672–676 [Pgs. 672–676 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

345th, 677–686 [Pgs. 677–686 include portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164]

346th, 689–695 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 166]

348th, 704–709 [Pgs. 704–709 include portions of Doc. 170, Doc. 171, and Doc. 172]

Net Evaluation Subcommittee, 1–2 [Pgs. 1–2 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 25n [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 123–130 [Pgs. 123–130 include portions of Doc. 36, Doc. 37, and Doc. 38], 187–191 [Pgs. 187–191 include portions of Doc. 53, Doc. 54, and Doc. 55], 316–317 [Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 82], 379–382 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 101], 672–676 [Pgs. 672–676 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

Operations Coordinating Board, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5], 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 104], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 104], 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 146]

Planning Board, 1n [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1], 9–23 [Pgs. 9–23 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 18], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 19], 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 87 [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 110 [Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 33], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 34], 123n [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 36], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 40], 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 193–196 [Pgs. 193–196 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 202–218 [Pgs. 202–218 include portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 76], 316 [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 90], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 104], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 104], 413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 108], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 108], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 110], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 110],N429, 432 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110], 433 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110], 438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 110], 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 110], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 460 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 114], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 114], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 116], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 116], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116], 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 116], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 119], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 119], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 120], 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 125], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 535 [Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128], 566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134], 578 [Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156], 913n

President, serving the, 399–400 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 104]

Special Committee to Coordinate the Implementation of NSC 5513/1, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17]

The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy Making at the Presidential Level, 1n [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1]

National security policy. See:

Aircraft

Armaments regulation policy

Armed forces

Atomic energy policy

Atomic weapons

Civil defense

Continental defense

Defense, Department of

Economic and military assistance programs, U.S.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles

Missile systems

National Security Council

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Nuclear weapons

National War College, 274n [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67]

Navaho project, 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 34], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69]

Naval Radiological Laboratory, 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 114]

Naval Research Laboratory, 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63]

Naval War College, 2n [Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2]

Navy, Department of the:

Anti-submarine effort, 644 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 158]

Armed forces, versatility of, 16 [Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5]

Atomic weapons capabilities, 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 73]

Budget, 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 387 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 101], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 101], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 541 [Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 129], 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 129], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 136], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 149], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 166]

Capability assessment, 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20]

Civilian personnel, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67], 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 129]

Continental defense, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28]

Early warning system, 342–343 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

Future wars, role in, 208–210 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 61]

Intelligence organization of, 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 442n [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161]

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles program, 162–163 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 44], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 105]

Joint Army-Navy Ballistic Missiles Committee, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44]

Missile program, 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145]

Mission of, 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 9]

Mobility of, 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133]

Nuclear weapons capabilities, 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 82]

Other armed forces, comparison with, 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 613–614 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150]

Pacific-Far East, deployment in, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Redeployment, 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Size limitations, 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 20], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 86], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 543 [Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 129], 544 [Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 129], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 131], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 131], 576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 136], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 143], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 166]

Western Europe, deployment in, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Near East (see also specific countries), 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 5]

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 101], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 103]

Nelson, Charles E., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]

Net Evaluation Subcommittee, 1–2 [Pgs. 1–2 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 25n [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 187–191 [Pgs. 187–191 include portions of Doc. 53, Doc. 54, and Doc. 55], 316–317 [Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 82]

1955 report, 123–130 [Pgs. 123–130 include portions of Doc. 36, Doc. 37, and Doc. 38]

1956 report, 379–382 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 101]

1957 report, 672–676 [Pgs. 672–676 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

New England Electric System, 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Newfoundland, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92]

New look policy. See Military program.

The New York Times, 411n [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107], 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 142]

New Zealand, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19]

Nigro, Col., 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Nixon, Richard M., 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Armed forces, rivalry among, 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 146]

Development loan fund, 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171]

Economic and military assistance programs, 706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 171], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

Economy drive in Congress, 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 58]

Missile program, acceleration of, 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166]

National Security Council meetings, presiding at, 111–122 [Pgs. 111–122 include portions of Doc. 33, Doc. 34, and Doc. 35], 128–130 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 38], 317–333 [Pgs. 317–333 include portions of Doc. 81, Doc. 82, and Doc. 83]

Nuclear-capable, definition of, 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150]

Paris heads of government meeting, 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Submarine-launched missiles, 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 105]

Technological Capabilities Panel report, 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40]

Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166]

North Africa (see also specific countries), 142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 39], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 83], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91]

North American Air Defense System, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 6], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 57], 263–264 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66], 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 125], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 148]

Atomic energy agreement, 59–60 [Pgs. 59–60 include portions of Doc. 12, Doc. 13, Doc. 14, and Doc. 15]

Atomic stockpile, 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152]

Atomic weapons, integration into NATO defenses, 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 66]

Changing attitudes toward, 267–268 [Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67]

Communist bloc counter to, organization of, 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23]

Continental defense system, 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92]

Expansion of, 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41]

Force commitments, 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 5], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 6], 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 6], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 73], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 79], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 79], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 86], 364–365 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 93], 386 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 101], 411 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107], 447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 112], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117], 552–554 [Pgs. 552–554 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 160], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166]

Future warning systems, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 9], 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30]

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, supplied by U.S., 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168]

Maintaining cohesion, 80 [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23], 480n [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117]

Military bases, U.S., 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 83]

Mutual defense guarantees, 73 [Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 19]

North Atlantic Council, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 435n [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110]

Nuclear weapons, 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151], 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 158]

Paris heads of government meeting, 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Shelter program, effect of, 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 111], 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 111]

Soviet ultimatum, possibility of, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19]

Soviet Union role, 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 36], 138 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Strength, maintaining, 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 73]

Structural threat to, 142–143 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 39], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 57]

Support for, 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 65], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 119], 512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 120]

Support for U.S. from allies, 247–248 [Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 66]

U.S. contribution to, 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 64]

Weapons program, 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116]

North Canada line, 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 9], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92]

Nuclear weapons (see also Atomic weapons):

Allies:

Acceptance of, 503–504 [Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 119], 512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 120]

Supplying to, 496 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 119], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 119], 506 [Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 119]

Conventional use, 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61], 207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116]

Development, human effects of, 372–375 [Pgs. 372–375 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 567–569 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134]

Dispersal of, 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97]

Free world, supplying to, 512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 120]

Future wars, use in, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67]

General war, use in, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 54], 203–207 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116]

Increase in number of, 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86]

Integration of, 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 116], 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 116], 493 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 119], 496 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 119], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 119]

Legislation relating to, 496 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 119], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 119]

Limited wars, use of in, 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 61], 494–495 [Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 119], 497 [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119], 499 [Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 119], 500 [Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 119], 502–504 [Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 119], 506 [Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 119]

NATO, supplying to, 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 158]

Naval carriers for, 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86]

Presidential authorization for use of, 503 [Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 119], 506 [Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 119], 511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 120]

Striking power, U.S., 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 6]

Testing, 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 121]

Types of, 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 119], 506 [Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 119], 524–526 [Pgs. 524–526 include portions of Doc. 120, Doc. 121, and Doc. 122]

OCB Report on the Department of Defense Recommendations with Respect to ballistic Missile Information Policy, 603n [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 146]

Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 87n [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 30], 108 [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 34], 183n [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 57], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 116], 566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 134], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 158]

Budget, 178–179 [Pgs. 178–179 include portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51]

Defense Working Group report, 173–177 [Pgs. 173–177 include portions of Doc. 47, Doc. 48, and Doc. 49]

Educational program, 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

Mobilization program, 178–179 [Pgs. 178–179 include portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 182n [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

Science Advisory Committee, 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 457n [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 460 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 114], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152], 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 628–629 [Pgs. 628–629 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

Security Resources Panel, 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 620–624 [Pgs. 620–624 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 630–634 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 636–661 [Pgs. 636–661 include portions of Doc. 156, Doc. 157, Doc. 158, and Doc. 159], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 164], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Technological Capabilities Panel, 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63–67 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 145–150 [Pgs. 145–150 include portions of Doc. 39, Doc. 40, and Doc. 41], 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 45], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 82], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 361–363 [Pgs. 361–363 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101]

White House, transfer to, 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

O’Grady, Capt. J. W., 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Okinawa, 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Oliver, Edward P., 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Ollenhauer, Erich, 433 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110], 433n [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110], 435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110]

Operation Alert 1955, 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28]

Operation Alert 1956, 91n [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 28]

Operation Candor, 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 108]

Operation Firm Link, 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 410n [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107]

Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5], 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98], 399n [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 104], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 104], 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 146]

Organization of American States (OAS), 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

Organizing for National Security: Inquiry of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 1n [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1]

OSD Ballistic Missiles Committee, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44]

Outer Space Program, 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 166]

Overseas internal security program, 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116], 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 116]

Owen, Henry D., 154n [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43]

Pacific Trust Territory, 73 [Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 19]

Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, 282n [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70]

Pakistan, 144 [Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 39], 216 [Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 61], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 65], 264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 66], 282n [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103]

Panama Canal Zone, 73 [Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 19]

Panel on the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development, 567n [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134]

Paris Accords, 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39]

Pate, Lt. Gen. Randolph McCall, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 387 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 101], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 102], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]

Pathet Lao, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 101]

Pearson, Drew, 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 51]

Peripheral wars. See Limited wars.

Perkins, James A., 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Persons, Maj. Gen. Wilton B., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 285n [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Pescadores Islands, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19]

Peterson, Val, 24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 91n [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 28], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 108n [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 30], 325–326 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86], 372–375 [Pgs. 372–375 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 382–384 [Pgs. 382–384 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 413 [Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 108], 418n [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108], 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 431 [Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 110], 460–461 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 114], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 134]

Pettee, Dr. George, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Philippine Islands, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 107]

Pike, Thomas P., 182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]

Piore, Dr. E. R., 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

Planning Coordination Group, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16]

Poland, 431 [Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 110], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141], 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Porter, Brig. Gen. R. W., Jr., 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17]

Port security policy, 592–592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 141]

Portugal, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116]

Possoniy, Dr. Stefan T., 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

President’s Committee on Government Organization, 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114]

Prim, Dr. Robert C., 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Prochnow, Herbert V., 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125]

Prochnow Committee, 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 82], 534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125]

Proctor and Gamble, 589n [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Project Clean Up, 98n [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Pyle, Howard, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

Quantico Panels, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43]

Quarles, Donald A., 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 101], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 119], 547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 589n [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Armed forces:

Rivalry among, 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 154]

Size limitations, 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 94]

Defense budget, 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 395 [Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 102], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 102], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 538 [Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 160], 680–682 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 164], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166], 695n [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 166], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 169]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 112–118 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 34], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 34], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 58], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 58], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 112], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 134], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165], 691–692 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 166]

Military assistance program, 705–707 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171]

Radar development program, 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 78]

SAC, dispersal of, 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116]

Weapons, selectivity of, 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 123]

Quemoy, 431 [Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 110]

Rabi, Dr. Isidor Isaac, 456–459 [Pgs. 456–459 include portions of Doc. 112, Doc. 113, and Doc. 114], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 148], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 148], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152]

Raborn, Rear Adm. William F., 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105]

Radar early warning system, 642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 158]

Radford, Adm. Arthur M., 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 70n [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 18], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 155n [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 161n [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60], 207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 238 [Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 241n [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 290 [Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73], 296 [Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74], 301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 363 [Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91], 366–367 [Pgs. 366–367 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 102], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 116], 499 [Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 119], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140]

Aircraft, U.S., 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24]

Allies, military assistance to, 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 65], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65], 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 74], 315 [Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 80], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 116], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 119], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 119]

Armed forces:

Army and Navy, missions of, 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61]

Deployment, 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20]

Redeployment, 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 133]

Reserves, 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 62]

Rivalry among, 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72]

Size limitations, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 67], 484 [Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 117], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128], 549–553 [Pgs. 549–553 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 133]

Atomic weapons:

Dispersal to overseas bases, 376n [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97]

Future wars, use of in, 274n [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80]

Specific use for, 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 121]

Stockpiling, 501 [Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 119]

B-36 bombers, development of, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67]

Chemical and bacteriological weapons, 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119]

Civilian personnel, 269n [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67]

Congress, relations with, 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 77]

Continental defense, 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 322–323 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117]

Defense budget, 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 40], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 41], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 79], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 79], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 86], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116], 527–528 [Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 538–539 [Pgs. 538–539 include portions of Doc. 126, Doc. 127, and Doc. 128], 554–556 [Pgs. 554–556 include portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133]

Europe, economic assistance to, 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61]

Future wars, 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 67], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139]

Joint Chiefs of Staff, functioning of, 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 133], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 152]

Limited wars, 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 116]

Military bases, overseas, 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 119]

Military program, review of, 384–386 [Pgs. 384–386 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101]

Military strategy, outline, 234–238 [Pgs. 234–238 include portions of Doc. 63, Doc. 64, and Doc. 65]

Mobilization program, 224–225 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62]

NATO, force commitments, 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 79]

Net Evaluation Subcommittee report, 126–129 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 38], 380–381 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 100]

Nuclear weapons:

Future wars, use in, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67]

General war, use in, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 54], 203–205 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 61], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116]

Increase in number of, 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86]

Limited wars, use of in, 503 [Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 119]

Naval carriers for, 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86]

Soviet Union:

Aircraft, estimates of, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23]

Attacks by U.S., results of, 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30]

Exchange of visits with, 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 62], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 62]

Military capabilities, 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 105]

Negotiations with, 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62]

Nuclear capabilities, 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82]

Trade, international, 297–298 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 74]

U.N. permanent military force, 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

United Kingdom, defense of, 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114]

Vietnam, U.S. military position in, 232n [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62]

War by miscalculation, danger of, 201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 101]

Radiological weapons, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 61], 206–208 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62]

Rand Corporation, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26]

Randall, Brig. Gen. Carey A., 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 531n [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 133], 586 [Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]

Randall, Clarence, 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

Raney, Col. J. D., 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 162]

Rayburn, Sam T., 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82], 486 [Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118], 487n [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 118], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169]

Reconnaissance satellite program, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 160], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164]

Redstone Arsenal team, 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44]

Reed, Daniel A., 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 710 [Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 172]

Relocation, emergency, 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28]

Report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation. See Cordiner Committee.

Research and development programs, U.S., 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 30], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 61], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 66], 257 [Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 66], 523–524 [Pgs. 523–524 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 129], 607–610 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 160], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Rhee, Syngman, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 274n [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 133], 587 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 140], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5], 39–40 [Pgs. 39–40 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 79]

Robbins, Thomas H., 2 [Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2]

Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34], 167–169 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 58], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 58], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 61], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 61], 216 [Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 61], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62], 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69], 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 300n [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 76], 326–327 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 82], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 82], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 82], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 367–368 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 107], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 114]

Rockefeller, Nelson A., 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5], 18 [Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 5], 20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 5], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 16], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 28], 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 38], 153–154 [Pgs. 153–154 include portions of Doc. 41, Doc. 42, and Doc. 43], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 62]

Rockefeller Committee, 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114]

Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

Rockets. See Missile systems.

Rogers, Maj. Gen. Gordon B., 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 38]

Rose, H. Chapman, 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]

Ross, Col. Richard, 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 38]

Rosson, Col. William B., 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150]

Rostow, W. W., 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26]

Russell, Richard B., 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169]

Ryukyu Islands, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Saar, 142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 39]

SAGE system, 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92]

Saltonstall, Leverett, 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 39 [Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 285n [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Satellite and Outer Space Programs, 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 169]

Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz, King, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70]

Saudi Arabia, 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 83], 411 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107], 411n [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107]

Saulnier, Raymond J., 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 112], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 685 [Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 164]

Savage, Carlton, 79n [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23]

Schriever, Gen. Bernard A., 402–403 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105]

Science Advisory Committee, 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63–67 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 145–150 [Pgs. 145–150 include portions of Doc. 39, Doc. 40, and Doc. 41], 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 45], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 361–363 [Pgs. 361–363 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 457n [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 460 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 114], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 620–624 [Pgs. 620–624 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 156], 631–634 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156], 636–661 [Pgs. 636–661 include portions of Doc. 156, Doc. 157, Doc. 158, and Doc. 159], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 164], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Scoville, Dr. Herbert, Jr., 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 457n [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Sea Monitor line, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 9], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90]

Seaton, Fred A., 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]

Security Resources Panel, 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 620–624 [Pgs. 620–624 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 628–634 [Pgs. 628–634 include portions of Doc. 154, Doc. 155, and Doc. 156], 636–661 [Pgs. 636–661 include portions of Doc. 156, Doc. 157, Doc. 158, and Doc. 159], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 164], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Semi-automatic ground environment (SAGE) system, 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92]

Senate Preparedness Committee, 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 173]

Sheldon, Huntington, 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 19]

Shelter program, 326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 82], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86], 382–383 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 100], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 108], 442–445 [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 459–464 [Pgs. 459–464 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 116], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 153], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 153], 628–634 [Pgs. 628–634 include portions of Doc. 154, Doc. 155, and Doc. 156], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 156], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 158], 653–656 [Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 158], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 174]

Shepherd, Gen. Lemuel C., Jr., 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 20], 305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]

Sides, Vice Adm. John H., 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 105], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 126], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 538 [Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127]

Singapore, 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83]

Skifter, Dr. Hector R., 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Smith, Alexander, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Smith, James H., Jr., 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 171]

Smith, Brig. Gen. W. W., 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 162]

Smith, Col. Weldon H., 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 19]

Snyder, Murray, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

South Asia, 18 [Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 5], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 103]

Southeast Asia, 18 [Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 5], 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 6], 61 [Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 15], 104n [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 105n [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 30], 138 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39], 143 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 91]

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 73], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 112]

Soviet Union (see also Communist bloc):

Aircraft, 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 161]

Air Force, evaluation of U.S. damage to, 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30]

Alienation of Soviet people, overcoming, 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 161]

Armaments regulation policy:

Armaments reduction, 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 6]

Conventional forces reduction, 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 79], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 79]

Disarmament, 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 39], 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Atomic weapons capabilities, 11–12 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 25–26 [Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 6], 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 19], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 27], 96 [Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 30], 119–121 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 38], 134–135 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39], 174–177 [Pgs. 174–177 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 73]

Attack by, hypothetical, 673–675 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162]

Bases, U.S., 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 110]

China, People’s Republic of, relations with, 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 6], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 137 [Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 39], 261–262 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 66], 436 [Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 110], 519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 120]

Cold war, 137 [Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 39], 139–140 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 39], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 156]

Communist Party, role of, 669–670 [Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 161]

Diplomatic activity, recent, 79–81 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23]

Earth satellite, launching of, 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145], 600–601 [Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Eastern Europe, position in, 435–436 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Economy, 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 6], 135–136 [Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 39], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 66], 640–641 [Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 158], 668–670 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 161]

Expansion of influence in free world, 252–253 [Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 66]

Foreign policy, trends in, 665–667 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161]

Free world, expansion of influence in, 193–194 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 57]

Geneva Summit Conference, 94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39]

Hostile intent, evaluation of, 1–2 [Pgs. 1–2 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 7–10 [Pgs. 7–10 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5], 28–35 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 6], 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 69–75 [Pgs. 69–75 include portions of Doc. 18, Doc. 19, and Doc. 20], 123–130 [Pgs. 123–130 include portions of Doc. 36, Doc. 37, and Doc. 38], 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 36], 187–191 [Pgs. 187–191 include portions of Doc. 53, Doc. 54, and Doc. 55], 265–266 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 66], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 82], 379–382 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 426n [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 110], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 112], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 650–653 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 158], 672–676 [Pgs. 672–676 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

Intercontinental ballistic missiles program, 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 593–594 [Pgs. 593–594 include portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142], 615–617 [Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 150, Doc. 151, and Doc. 152], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 153], 641 [Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 158], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158], 651 [Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 158], 652 [Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 158], 670–671 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 161], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 164], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 165]

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles program, 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 58], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 161]

Limited wars, capability for, 497 [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119]

Military capabilities, 193–194 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 57], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67], 316 [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81], 641 [Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 158], 650–653 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 158], 670–672 [Pgs. 670–672 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

NATO, role in, 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Naval program, 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]

Negotiating with, 518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 120]

Nuclear energy, peaceful uses of, 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 82]

Nuclear weapons:

Capabilities, 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 66], 316 [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82], 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

Chemical weapons, integration with, 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66]

Testing, 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40], 465 [Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 114, Doc. 115, and Doc. 116]

Peace offensive, 7 [Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4], 29–30 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 6]

Peaceful coexistence policy, 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 161], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Plutonium production, 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82]

Policy shift, 267 [Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 66], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 83]

Political stability, 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 66]

Radar capability, 344 [Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 85], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86]

Reactor construction program, 320–321 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 82]

Satellites, 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 66], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 101], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Science and technology, progress in, 670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 161]

Scientists and engineers, training of, 176 [Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 48], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 57], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 66]

Shelter program, reaction to, 445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 111]

Stockpile estimates, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 54]

Strategic Air Command, U.S., attack on, 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30]

Strategic materials, stockpiling, 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 82], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 82]

Submarine program, 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 66]

Technological capabilities, 262–263 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 66], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 78], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 478n [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 116]

Troop withdrawals, 483–484 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117]

Type 37 bombers, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24]

U-235 production, 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 82], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 82]

U.N. permanent military force, 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

Underdeveloped countries, policy toward, 194 [Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 57], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 161], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

United States, visits by delegations to, 219–222 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 62]

U.S. atomic weapons capabilities, knowledge of, 128–129 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 38]

Warsaw treaty, 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23], 80 [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23]

West Berlin, blockade of, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83]

Spaak, Paul-Henri, 440 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110], 440n [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110]

Spaatz, Gen. Carl, 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 72]

Space, territorial sovereignty of, 362–363 [Pgs. 362–363 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91]

Spain, 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 250 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 66], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 69], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 107], 412n [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 107], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 515 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 120]

Spear, Ralph E., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 325–326 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 95]

Special Committee on Shelter Programs, 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114], 654n [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 158]

Special National Intelligence Estimates (see also National Intelligence Estimates):

SNIE 11-10-57, 671n [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 161]

SNIE 100-5-57, 418n [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 108], 442–445 [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 459 [Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 460 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 114], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114]

SNIE 100-8-55, 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66]

Special Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 9]

Speier, Dr. Hans, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26]

Sprague, John, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Sprague, Mansfield D., 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Sprague, Robert C., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 87 [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 88n [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 28], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 45], 316 [Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 81], 327–328 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101], 385n [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156], 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156]

Sprague Electric Company, 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153]

Sputnik I earth satellite, 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145], 600–601 [Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Staats, Elmer B., 68 [Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63]

Stalin, Iosif V., 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 6], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 39], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 161]

Stanton, Dr. Frank, 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153], 624 [Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155]

Stassen, Harold E., 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 5], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 96 [Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 30], 155n [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 161n [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 62], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117], 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 121]

Aircraft capabilities, 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 150]

Allies, support from, 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 61]

Armed forces, size limitations, 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 79], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 79]

Civil defense, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 108]

Continental defense, 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82]

Defense budget, 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 82], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 101]

Disarmament, 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 61], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 82], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 130]

Economic assistance program, 216 [Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 61]

Factories, changing locations of, 184–185 [Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 52]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 30], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 34], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 34], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 34], 118–120 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 146], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151]

Intelligence program, importance of, 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28]

Nuclear weapons, use of in general war, 432 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110]

Operations Coordinating Board, functions, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5], 13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 5]

Soviet Union:

Exchange of delegations with, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 62], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 62]

Power reactors, 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 82]

Strategic Air Command, dispersal, 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 46]

U.N. voting procedures, 440 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110]

Weapons, phasing out of, 408–409 [Pgs. 408–409 include portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106]

Western Europe, prospects for, 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 110], 435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110]

State, Department of, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 17], 77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 85n [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 27], 104n [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 34], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 34], 123–125 [Pgs. 123–125 include portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37], 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 39], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40], 154–160 [Pgs. 154–160 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 61], 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 74], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 76], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 88], 362–363 [Pgs. 362–363 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91], 376n [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 105], 442n [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 111], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 116], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 117], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 137], 665n [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 161], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164]

Diplomatic pouches, immunity for, 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64]

Military bases, overseas, 336–337 [Pgs. 336–337 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]

State-Defense-Treasury-ICA Interdepartmental Committee, 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80]

Stelle, Charles C., 338n [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

Stevenson, Adlai E., 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Stockpiling program, 256 [Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 66], 468–469 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 116], 490–492 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 119], 493 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 119], 501 [Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 119], 522 [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 120], 522n [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 120], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166]

Strategic Air Command, 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 9], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 9], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 17], 88–90 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 96 [Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 30], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 30], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 43], 171–172 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 188 [Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 73], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 82], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 82], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 82], 338–342 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342n [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 91], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 105], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 108], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116], 528 [Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 129], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150], 614–616 [Pgs. 614–616 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 620–622 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 156], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 156], 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 156], 642–643 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 158], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 158], 651 [Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 158], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 158], 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Strauss, Adm. Lewis L., 24 [Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 34], 155n [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 161n [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 188 [Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 229n [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 82], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 97], 432 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 507 [Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 615 [Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

AEC budget, 617 [Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152]

Atlas and Titan missile programs, 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 134]

Atomic energy program, presentation of, 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86]

Atomic weapons, 61 [Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 15], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 119]

Civil defense, 383 [Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 100]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 54]

Nuclear war, informing the public about, 415 [Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 108]

Nuclear weapons, 431 [Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 110], 500 [Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 119], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 119], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 162]

Radiological weapons, 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61]

Science education, importance of, 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 62]

Soviet Union:

Fissionable material, stockpile, 318–319 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 82], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 82]

Nuclear weapons, testing, 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 40]

Strategic Air Command, readiness of, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 46]

U.S.S. Saratoga conference, 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121]

Streibert, Theodore C., 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17]

Submarine-launched missiles, 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 158], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 158]

Suez crisis, 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98], 432–435 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 161]

Sullivan, Charles, 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107]

Summerfield, Arthur, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 79]

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (shape), 51 [Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 9], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Sweden, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86]

Symington, W. Stuart, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 67], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 69]

Syria, 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39], 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 160], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 161], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

Taber, John, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Tachen Islands, 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133]

Taiwan. See China, Republic of.

Talbott, Harold E., 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 58]

Taxes (see also Economy, U.S.):

Increases in, 19–20 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 5], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 79], 314–315 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 82], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 86]

Reductions in, 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 110], 449–451 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 112], 470 [Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 116], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 120], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 153]

Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 67], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 283–284 [Pgs. 283–284 include portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 80], 313–314 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 80], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 80], 315 [Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 80], 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 386–387 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 101], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 102], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 572–573 [Pgs. 572–573 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154], 626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 154], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164]

Technological Capabilities Panel, 41–56 [Pgs. 41–56 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 63–67 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 95–108 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 30], 145–150 [Pgs. 145–150 include portions of Doc. 39, Doc. 40, and Doc. 41], 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 45], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 46], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 69], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 85], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 86], 358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 90], 362–363 [Pgs. 362–363 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101]

Teller, Dr. Edward, 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 151]

Thailand, 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]

Thomas, Charles Sparks, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 44], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 72], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 94], 389–390 [Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 101], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133]

Thomas, Gen. Gerald C., 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 100], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 100], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 100], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 162], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 162]

Thomson, Dr. Charles A. H., 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26]

Time, Inc., 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 26], 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Tito, Josip Broz, 150 [Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]

Trade, international, 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 6], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 39], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 249–250 [Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 66], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 297–298 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 74], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 110], 453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 112], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 120]

Treasury, Department of the, 87n [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 62], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 62], 227 [Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 62], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 86], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86], 363 [Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 105], 408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 105], 409 [Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106], 440–441 [Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 110], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 114], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 464n [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 114], 520n [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 120], 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 129]

Treasury Port Security Programs, 593 [Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

Truman, Harry S, 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 67], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 133]

Turkey, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 5], 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 30], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 250 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 66], 282n [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 79], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 86], 429 [Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 110], 515 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 120], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 170]

Turner, Capt. Frank, 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 38]

Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34], 181 [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 51], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 72], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 101], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 589n [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140], 590n [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 150], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 162], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 162], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Allies, supplying weapons to, 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 41]

Armed forces:

Rivalry among, 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 152], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154]

Size limitations, 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 5], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 20], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Attacks on Soviet Air Force, effects of, 98 [Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 30]

B-52 bombers, 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 101]

Defense budget, 387–388 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 101], 395–396 [Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 102], 560–561 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 133], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 164]

Early warning system, 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 30], 111–112 [Pgs. 111–112 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 34]

Information leaks, 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 72]

Joint Chiefs of Staff, organization of, 617 [Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 618–619 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 152]

Manned aircraft, 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72]

Strategic Air Command, readiness of, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 28], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 116]

Underdeveloped countries (see also specific countries and areas):

Colonial areas, 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 66], 264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 66], 439 [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 110], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 120], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 122]

Chinese People’s Republic role in, 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171]

Economic assistance to, 34–35 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 6], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 39], 214–216 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 250–251 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 66], 515–516 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 120]

Economic growth, 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66]

Food for, 16–17 [Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 5]

Instability of, 143–144 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39], 250 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 66], 264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 66]

Limited wars in, 503 [Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 119]

Military assistance to, 397–398 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103]

Non-military competition for, 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37]

Private investment in, 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 6], 250 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 66], 515 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 120]

Shelter program, reaction to, 445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 111]

Soviet policy toward, 138–139 [Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 39], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 57], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 161], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 171], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

U.S. policy toward, 194–195 [Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 57], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66]

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union.

United Kingdom, 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 38], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65]

Atomic information, barring from, 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148]

Baghdad Pact, 282n [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 70]

Balance-of-payments difficulties, 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66]

Geneva Summit Conference, 94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37], 132n [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 39]

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles:

Development of, 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 34], 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 44], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 44]

U.S. supplying to, 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 116], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140], 687–688 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 165], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 166], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 166], 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168]

Military bases, overseas, 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83]

Missile bases, 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 105], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 105]

NATO forces, reductions in, 411 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 107]

Nuclear war, defense of, White Paper, 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 114]

Nuclear weapons, supplying to, 496–498 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 119]

Radar system, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85]

Sea monitor line, 362 [Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 90]

Suez crisis, 432–435 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110]

United Nations, 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

United Nations:

Atomic Energy Commission, 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55]

Collective action, 33 [Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 6], 144 [Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 39], 145 [Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 66], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 66], 495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 119], 512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 120], 516–517 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 120]

Disarmament Subcommittee, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117]

Economic development, technical assistance fund for, 707 [Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 171]

Permanent military force, 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 117]

Suez crisis, 435 [Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 110]

Voting procedures, 439–440 [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 110]

United States Communication Board, 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64]

United States Information Agency (USIA), 58 [Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 86]

United States Military Academy, 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42]

Uruguay, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 62]

U.S.S. Saratoga meeting, 524–526 [Pgs. 524–526 include portions of Doc. 120, Doc. 121, and Doc. 122]

Van Zandt, James E., 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Vance, Harold, 684–685 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 164]

Vietnam, 29n [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 6], 143 [Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 39], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 61], 231–232 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 62], 232n [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 62], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 66], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 66], 264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 66], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 66], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 116], 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 125]

Vinson, Carl, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 169]

Voice of America, 55 [Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 9]

Von Neumann, Dr. John, 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 34], 117 [Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 34], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 34], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 34], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 34], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 58]

Vorys, John M., 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Waggoner, Alvin G., 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 98]

Walker, William W., 710 [Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 172]

War Industries Board, 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55]

Warren, Earl, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 85]

Warsaw Pact, 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Waterman, Dr. Alan T., 213n [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 61], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 30], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 529–530 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 123]

Weart, Lt. Col. George S., 342–343 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 85]

Webster, William, 153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Weeks, Sinclair, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

West Berlin, Soviet blockade of, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83]

Western Europe (see also specific countries), 151–153 [Pgs. 151–153 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42], 155 [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 43], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 66], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 82], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 86], 429 [Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 110], 543 [Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 129], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 164]

Integration of, 433–435 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 110]

Shelter program, reaction to, 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 111]

West Germany. See Germany, Federal Republic of.

Westinghouse Electric Company, 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 153]

White, Gen. Thomas D., 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 133], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 133], 573–574 [Pgs. 573–574 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 139], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 154], 635n [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 156], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 164]

Whitman, Ann, 57n [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 196n [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]

Wiesner, Dr. Jerome B., 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 607n [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 148], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 155], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 156]

Wiley, Alexander, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Wilson, Charles E., 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 17], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 18], 88n [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 30], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 34], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 161 [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 186n [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52], 188 [Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 56], 229n [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 62], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 238 [Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 65], 276n [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 70], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 70], 285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 73], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 75], 300n [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 76], 301n [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78], 305 [Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 322n [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 82], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 334n [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 83], 360n [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 89], 397n [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 103], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 110], 432 [Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 110], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 112], 488n [Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119], 497n [Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 119], 574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 136], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140], 595n [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143]

Aircraft industry, wage rates in, 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145]

Anti-missile missile program, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145]

Appointments with Eisenhower, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140], 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]

Armed forces:

Redeployment, 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 5], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 133], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 145]

Rivalry among, 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 72]

Size limitations, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 67], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 67], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 67], 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 94], 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 117], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 124], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 133], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 133], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 133], 595–597 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 143], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145]

Army missile program, 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 139]

B-52 bombers, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 24], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 28]

Chemical and bacteriological weapons, 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 119]

Continental defense, 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 30], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 30]

Defense budget, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 30], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 40], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 40], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 41], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 41], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 51], 181 [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 51], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 79], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 86], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 86], 353–356 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 86], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 99], 383 [Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 100], 384 [Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 101], 386 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 101], 388 [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 101], 391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 101], 393–396 [Pgs. 393–396 include portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 112], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 117], 486–488 [Pgs. 486–488 include portions of Doc. 117, Doc. 118, and Doc. 119], 532 [Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 124], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 126], 540–549 [Pgs. 540–549 include portions of Doc. 128, Doc. 129, Doc. 130, and Doc. 131], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 132], 557–560 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 133], 562–564 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 133], 574–578 [Pgs. 574–578 include portions of Doc. 135, Doc. 136, and Doc. 137], 586–587 [Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 143], 598–599 [Pgs. 598–599 include portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 164]

Defense Department, organization of, 601 [Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]

Disarmament, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 140]

Future wars, 209n [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 61], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 86]

ICBM and IRBM programs, 110 [Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 33], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 34], 161 [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 45], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 45], 170n [Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 45], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 46], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 72], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 92], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 112], 538 [Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 569–572 [Pgs. 569–572 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 135], 580–583 [Pgs. 580–583 include portions of Doc. 137, Doc. 138, and Doc. 139], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140], 599–600 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 145]

Long-Range Minerals Program, 491–492 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 119]

McElroy and Foote confirmation procedures, 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 140]

Military bases, overseas, 344 [Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 85], 477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 116], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 119]

Mobilization program, 183–184 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 52], 185 [Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 52], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 52], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 62], 419–421 [Pgs. 419–421 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 467–468 [Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 116], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 116], 556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133]

NSC 5602, views on, 199n [Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59], 199–200 [Pgs. 199–200 include portions of Doc. 58, Doc. 59, and Doc. 60], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 61], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 61]

Operation Hardtack, 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 140]

Overseas internal security program, 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 116]

Soviet Union:

Capabilities, intelligence estimates of, 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 78]

Earth satellite launching, 600–601 [Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]

Negotiating with, 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 112], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 117]

Type 37 bombers, 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23]

Technological Capabilities Panel report, 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 28]

U.S.S. Saratoga conference, 524n [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121]

Yeagley, J. Walter, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 17], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 28]

Yugoslavia, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 19], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 23], 80 [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 23], 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 39], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 61], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 62], 250 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 66], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 86], 515 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 120], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 161]

Zacharias, Dr. Jerrold R., 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 113], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 148]

Zeder, James C., 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 147]

Zhukov, Marshal Georgiy Konstantinovich, 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 121]

Errata

The following changes have been made to Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy. Please be aware that printed volumes have not been revised.

1. Footnote 2, Document 30, Page 95 (date of correction: May 8, 2017)

The citation to "footnote 4, Document 17" has been corrected to "footnote 3, Document 17."

2. Footnote 4, Document 90, Page 361 (date of correction: May 8, 2017)

The citation to "footnote 4, Document 17" has been corrected to "footnote 3, Document 17."

2. Footnote 6, Document 92, Page 367 (date of correction: May 8, 2017)

The citation to "footnote 4, Document 17" has been corrected to "footnote 3, Document 17."