Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960

Volume VI

Cuba

United States Government Publishing Office
Washington

U.S. Department of State

This ebook was generated on September 6, 2022.
Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates.

About the Electronic Edition

The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State has embarked on a program to release an ebook edition of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which was established in 1861. Far lighter and more portable than printed editions of FRUS, the ebook edition offers the full content of each volume and makes use of the full-text search and other reading features of most ebook devices and applications, including bookmarking and note-taking. Unlike the web-based edition of FRUS, the ebook edition, once downloaded, can be accessed even without internet connectivity.

In creating the FRUS ebook edition, we endeavored to maintain fidelity with the original printed edition. One challenge in this respect is representing original page numbers from printed editions in ebooks. For readers who need to cite material in this ebook, we recommend citing document numbers instead of page numbers, since document numbers are persistent, media-neutral identifiers. In older FRUS volumes (before the subseries covering the Johnson administration), where cross references use page numbers rather than document numbers, we append to each page number a bracketed list of the document numbers that correspond to it.

The Office of the Historian has worked to ensure that this ebook is error-free and works on a broad range of devices. Please email history_ebooks@state.gov with any feedback.

To learn about updates to this ebook, other ebooks, and the ebook initiative in general, visit our ebooks homepage, and follow us on Twitter at @HistoryAtState and Tumblr at HistoryAtState.

Office of the Historian
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State
September 2022

Preface

The publication Foreign Relations of the United States constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925:

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.

b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification: in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume VI

Documents were selected for inclusion in this volume in 1985–1986. The process of selection focused on two general areas:

(1) Ongoing efforts by the U.S. Government, both before and after Fidel Castro’s assumption of power, to appraise his motives and objectives as well as those of his close advisers. Included are numerous reports from the Embassy in Havana and the Consulate in Santiago, memoranda of conversations with Cubans and Americans, and assessments by the U.S. intelligence community related to this issue. Nearly all these documents deal with the question of whether Castro and/or his advisers were either Communists themselves or were under Communist influence.

(2) Formulation of U.S. Government policy in Washington. The emphasis is on policymaking at the National Security Council level, in the White House, and in the Department of State. Documents were also selected to illustrate the views and recommendations of mid-level officials in the Department of State. The editor was concerned with the issue of whether the attitudes or sympathies of U.S. officials facilitated the rise to power of Castro and his followers. Attention was given to interagency coordination involving the Department of Defense, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Navy, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The roles of Congress, American business interests, and the press are documented only to the extent that pertinent correspondence was found at the Eisenhower Library and in Department of State files.

The primary documentary source for this volume was the extensive files of the Department of State pertaining to Cuba. In addition to the decimal files, the editor relied heavily on the retired files of various components of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and of the Embassy in Havana.

The Department of State documentation, however, is not complete. At the time the editor conducted research for this volume in the Department’s files (1985–1986), documents had been withdrawn from the Department’s central archives and not returned. These withdrawals were in response to Freedom of Information requests, congressional inquiries, or for other investigative purposes. Other copies of these missing documents could not always be found. The absent documents, however, do not appear to compromise the accuracy of the record presented in this volume.

Second, the Department of State often communicated with the Embassy in Havana by telephone. Although some records of these conversations have been found and are printed, there are references to other telephone conversations for which no records have been located. Presumably, there are still others not even alluded to.

Third, although Department of State officers frequently visited Cuba and Embassy officials often came to Washington for consultations, records of the conversations or recommendations made during these visits have not always been located. In such cases, the editors have provided editorial notes in an attempt to reconstruct from a variety of sources what transpired.

Finally, the telegraphic communications between the Department of State and the Embassy in Havana seem to have contained an unusually high incidence of garbles, misspellings, and delayed transmissions. The editors have sought to identify such problems and to provide explanatory notes where appropriate.

The records of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense were not systematically researched for this volume. The role of these agencies in the events documented here was marginal.

The Arleigh Burke Papers at the Naval Historical Center and various records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense supplemented Department of State files and the Eisenhower Library material. The memoirs of Ambassadors Earl Smith and Philip Bonsal and of various Cuban officials proved helpful in clarifying and amplifying the documentary record. Also helpful were several documentary publications, such as the Declassified Documents collection. The editors did not attempt to supplement the existing record further by interviews with surviving participants. For a complete listing of sources consulted, see page XI [Pg. XI is part of List of Sources].

Nearly all the material selected by the editors for inclusion has been declassified. Deleted material consists primarily of brief references to intelligence activities. The editors consider only a few of the deletions to be of significance, but the omission even of this material does not, in their opinion, compromise the integrity of the volume.

Editorial Methodology

The documents in the volume are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversations are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted. If applicable, incoming telegrams from U.S. missions are placed according to the time of receipt in the Department of State, rather than the time of transmission.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the Editor in Chief and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an omission in roman type. Brackets are also used to indicate text that has been omitted because it deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or because it remained classified after the declassification review process (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document’s source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or Secretary of State read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in this volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs of participants and other first-hand accounts has been used where applicable to supplement the official record.

Declassification Review Procedures

Declassification review of the documents selected for publication was conducted by the Division of Historical Documents Review, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State. The review was made in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the criteria established in Executive Order 12356 regarding:

1) military plans, weapons, or operations;

2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;

3) foreign government information;

4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;

5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;

6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;

7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

8) cryptology; and

9) a confidential source.

Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and appropriate foreign governments regarding documents of those governments. The British and Canadian Governments concurred in the declassification of their documents printed in this volume. The principle guiding declassification review is to release as much information as is consistent with contemporary requirements of national security and sound foreign relations.

Ronald D. Landa compiled this volume under the supervision of Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Robert McMahon conducted the initial gathering of documents. Suzanne E. Coffman assisted with various research tasks and preparation of the lists of sources, abbreviations, and names. Rita M. Baker performed the technical editing. Barbara A. Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief) oversaw production of the volume. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

List of Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

1. Central Files. The major source of documentation for this volume was the indexed central files, or decimal files, of the Department of State.

2. Lot Files. Documents from the Central Files have been supplemented by materials from decentralized office files, the lot files of the Department of State. A list of the lot files used in compiling this volume follows:

ARA Files: Lot 78 D 287

Historical files on U.S.-Cuban relations, 1948–1965, as maintained by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411

Office files of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (William P. Snow) for the year 1958, as maintained by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 60 D 513

Functional files of the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs for the year 1958, as maintained by the Office of the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24

Office files of the Special Assistants (Frank J. Devine and Park F. Wollam) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs for the years 1959–1961, as maintained by the Office of the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149

Files relating to Cuban political questions, 1957–1958, as maintained by the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

Current Foreign Relations: Lot 64 D 189

Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication Current Foreign Relations for the years 1954–1962, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Daily Summaries: Lot 60 D 530

Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication Daily Secret Summary and Daily Top Secret Summary for the years 1953–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

INR Files: Lot 58 D 776

Country, subject, and administrative files relating to U.S. intelligence organization and activities for the years 1945–1960, as maintained by the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

INR–NIE Files

Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates, retained by the Directorate for Regional Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

REA Files: Lot 61 D 248

Chronological, country, and subject files relating to general economic matters for the years 1955–1959, including sugar and coffee, miscellaneous conference files, and Mutual Security Program estimates, as maintained by the Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs.

Rubottom Files: Lot 60 D 553

Working files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs R. Roy Rubottom, Jr., for the year 1958, as maintained by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Rubottom Files: Lot 61 D 279

Working files of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs R. Roy Rubottom, Jr., for the year 1959, as maintained by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Rubottom-Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418

Country and subject files of Assistant Secretaries of State for Inter-American Affairs R. Roy Rubottom, Jr., for the year 1960, and Thomas C. Mann for the years 1960–1961, as maintained by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, as well as certain correspondence of the Secretary of State, for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State’s memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State’s memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collections of the minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meetings during the years 1952–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject, country, and chronological files; documents; drafts; and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957–1961.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation for the years 1947–1963, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top Secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328

Top Secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1959–1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State

Havana Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677

Unclassified and classified files of the Embassy in Havana for the years 1959–1961.

Havana Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814

Limited Distribution files of the Embassy in Havana for the years 1959–1961.

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803

Subject and country files maintained by Edward G. Lansdale as Deputy Assistant and later Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense for the years 1957–1961.

OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1770

Files of Neil H. McElroy as Secretary of Defense, 1957–1959.

OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2093

Subject files of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Administrative Secretary to the Secretary of Defense for the year 1960.

OSD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698

Country and general files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1958.

OSD/ISA Files: FRC 63 A 1672

Country and general files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1959.

OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170

Country and general files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1960.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Council on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP) Records

Records of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy for the years 1955–1961.

Dulles Papers

Records of John Foster Dulles for the years 1952–1959.

Herter Papers

Records of Christian A. Herter for the years 1957–1961.

President’s Daily Appointments

Daily appointment books of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–1961.

Project “Clean Up” Records

Project “Clean Up” collection. Records of Gordon Gray, Robert Cutler, H. Romer McPhee, and Andrew J. Goodpaster.

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records

Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs for the years 1952–1961, including records of Robert Cutler, Dillon Anderson, and Gordon Gray.

Staff Secretary Files

Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary (Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell), for the years 1952–1961.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower (DDE) Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council (NSC) Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

General Records of the Department of State (Record Group 59)

OSS–State Intelligence Reports

National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Taylor Papers

Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1955–1959; Military Adviser to the President, 1961–1962.

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Arleigh Burke Papers

Papers of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, 1955–1961.

Published Sources

Documentary Collections and Periodicals

Aguilar, Luis. Operation ZAPATA: The “Ultrasensitive” Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983.

Bonachea, Rolando, and Valdes, Nelson P., eds. Selected Works of Fidel Castro. Vol. I: Revolutionary Struggle, 1947–1958. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972.

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XII (1960).

The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog and microfiche. Vols. V (1979)–VII (1981). Washington: Carrollton Press, 1979–1981.

The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog and microfiche. Vols. VII (1981)–XII (1986). Woodbridge, CT: Research Publications, 1981–1986.

U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955. 2 vols. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

———. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.

———. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

———. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.

———. A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949. Rev. Ed. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

———. Department of State Bulletin, 1958–1960.

———. Inter-American Efforts To Relieve Tension in the Western Hemisphere, 1959–1960. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959.

———. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.

———. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961.

U.S. Senate. Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary. Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959.

———. Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary. Eighty-Sixth Congress, Second Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.

———. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). Vol. X. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960.

———. State Department Security: Testimony of William Wieland. Hearings before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary. Eighty-Seventh Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.

Memoirs, Diaries, Reminiscences

Note: The following publications were consulted at the time this volume was prepared in 1985–1986. The Department of State takes no responsibility for their accuracy nor endorses their interpretation of the events.

Batista, Fulgencio. Cuba Betrayed. New York: Vantage Press, 1962.

Bonsal, Philip W. Cuba, Castro, and the United States. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.

Casuso, Teresa. Cuba and Castro. New York: Random House, 1961.

Dubois, Jules. Fidel Castro: Rebel-Liberator or Dictator? Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1959.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1959–1961. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.

Farrell, Robert H., ed. The Eisenhower Diaries. New York: WW. Norton & Company, 1981.

Lazo, Mario. Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968.

López Fresquet, Rufo. My 14 Months With Castro. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1966. Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978.

Smith, Earl E.T. The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution. New York: Random House, 1962.

Urrutia, Manuel Lleó. Fidel Castro & Company, Inc. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

List of Abbreviations

A, airgram

AAA, Asociación de Amigos de Aureliano, Association of Aureliano’s Friends

ACA, Acción Civica Anti-Communista, Anti-Communist Civic Action

ACSI, Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence)

AEC, Atomic Energy Commission

AF, Air Force

AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations

ALUSNA, United States Naval Attaché

Amb, Ambassador

AP, Associated Press

ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

ARA/EX, Executive Office, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

ARA/MID, Office of Middle American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

ARA/P, Office of the Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

ARA/REA, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

ASNE, American Society of Newspaper Editors

ASTA, American Society of Travel Agents

BAC, Business Advisory Council

BANDES, Banco de Dessarrollo Economicoy Social, Bank for Economy and Social Development

BANFAIC, National Bank for Agrarian and Industrial Development

BOAC, Bloque de Organizaciones Anti-Communistas Cubano, Bloc of Cuban Anti-Communist Organizations

C, Office of the Counselor, Department of State

CA, circular airgram; Central America

CAA, Civil Aeronautics Administration

CAAF, Cuban Army Air Force

CARE, Cooperative for American Remittances

CCA, Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation

CFEP, Council on Foreign Economic Policy

CG, Consultative Group of nations working to control the export of strategic material to Communist nations

ChiCom, Chinese Communist

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCARIB, Commander in Chief, Caribbean

CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic

CINCLANTFLT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet

CMA, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Department of State

CMA/C, Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Department of State

CMC, Commandant of the United States Marine Corps

CMQ, radio station in Cuba

COA, union group in Cuba

COAS, Council of the Organization of the American States

COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of Nations

COMCARIBSEAFRON, Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier

COMNAVB, Commander Naval Base

CP, Communist Party

CPR, Chinese People’s Republic

CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CPT, Commercial Policy and Treaties Division, Office of International Trade, Department of State

CSD, Commodities Division, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

CTC, Confederación de Trabajadores Cubaños, Confederation of Cuban Workers

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

DCSOPS, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army

Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram

Deptel, Department of State telegram

desp, despatch

DIER, Directorio de Investigaciónes del Ejercito Rebelde, Directorate of Investigations of the Rebel Army

DOD, Department of Defense

DR, Directorio Revolucionario, Revolutionary Directorate

DR, Dominican Republic

DRA, Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Department of State

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

E and E, emergency and evacuation

ECLA, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America

Emb, Embassy

Embdes, Embassy despatch

Embtel, Embassy telegram

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Exim Bank, Export-Import Bank of Washington

FAA, Federal Aviation Agency

FAR, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Cuba, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCC, Federal Communications Commission

FCR, Frente Civico Revolucionaro, Civic Revolutionary Front

FEN, Frente Estudiantil Nacional, National Students Front

FEU, Federación Estudiantil Universitaria, Federation of University Students

FLN, Front de Liberatión Nationale (Algeria)

fnu, first name unknown

FON, Frente de Obreros Nacionales, National Workers Front; Federación Obrera Nacional, National Labor Federation

FonOff, Foreign Office

FONU, United Nationalist Labor Front

FRC, Federal Records Center

FRD, Frente Revolucionario Democratico, Democratic Revolutionary Front

FSO, Foreign Service officer

FYI, for your information

G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

GA, United Nations General Assembly

GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GOA, Government of Argentina

GOC, Government of Cuba

GOCR, Government of Costa Rica

GODR, Government of the Dominican Republic

GOH, Government of Honduras

GSA, General Services Administration

GTMO, Guantanamo

GUS, Government of the United States

H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

HQS, Headquarters

H.R., House Resolution

IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee

IADB, Inter-American Defense Board

IA–ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council

IAPC, Inter-American Peace Committee

ICA, International Cooperation Administration

ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

ICJ, International Court of Justice

IMF, International Monetary Fund

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INRA, Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, National Institute for Agrarian Reform

INR/RAR, Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service

INVU, Instituto Nacional Vivienda Urbanización, National Institute for Housing and Urban Development (Costa Rica)

ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

IT&T, International Telephone and Telegraph

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum

JOC, Juventud Obrera Católica, Young Catholic Workers

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/ARA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

L/C, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims, Department of State

L/MSA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State

LA, Latin America

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAP, Military Assistance Program

MC, Office of Munitions Control, Department of State

MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance

MDAA, Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement

MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program

MDC, Movimiento Democrático Cristiano, Christian Democratic Movement

MFM, Meeting of Foreign Ministers

MID, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State

MID/C, Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, Department of State

MRC, Movimiento de Resistencia Cívica, Civic Resistance Movement

MRP, Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, People’s Revolutionary Movement

MRR, Movimiento de Rescate [Recuperación] Revolución, Movement for the Rescue [Recovery] of the Revolution

MSP, Mutual Security Program

NACOIAA, National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFTC, National Foreign Trade Council

Niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

noforn, no foreign dissemination

NSC, National Security Council

OA, Organización Auténtica, Authentic Organization

OAS, Organization of American States

OCB, Operations Coordinating Board

OCDM, Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization

ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization

OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

OIT, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

OR, Organización Revolucionaria, Revolutionary Organization

OR, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

OR/CSD, Commodities Division, Office of International Resource, Department of State

ORIT, Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores, Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

OSS, Office of Strategic Services

OT/TA, Trade Agreements Divison, Office of International Trade, Department of State

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

PAA, Pan-American Airways

PAO, Public Affairs Officer

PER, Office of Personnel, Department of State

PL, Public Law

PNR, Partido National Revolucionario, Party of National Revolution

POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants

PRC, Partido Revolucionario Cubaño, Cuban Revolutionary Party

PSP, Partido Socialista Popular, Popular Socialist Party

PUC, Partido Unidad Cubaño, Party of Cuban Unity

reftel, reference telegram

RG, Record Group

RPA, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

S, Office of the Secretary of State

SA, South America

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

SAR, Sociedad de los Amigos de la República, Society of Friends of the Republic

SC, United Nations Security Council

SCA, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State

SIM, Servicio de Inteligencia Militar, Military Intelligence Service

sitrep, situation report

SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate

S/P, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Stat., United States Statutes at Large

telcon, telephone conversation

TIAS, Treaties and Other International Agreements Series

Tousi, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Information Agency from its posts abroad

TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State

UAR, United Arab Republic

UCL, Unidad Cubaña de Liberación, Cuban Union for Liberation

UK, United Kingdom

U/MSC, Office of the Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs

UN, United Nations

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNTS, United Nations Treaty Series

UPI, United Press International

U/PR, Chief of Protocol, Department of State

USA, United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USARLANT, United States Army Forces, Atlantic

USC, United States Code

USCARIB, United States Forces, Caribbean

USG, United States Government

USGTMO, United States Naval Base, Guantanamo

USIA, United States Information Agency

USIA/IAL, Office of the Assistant Director (Latin America), United States Information Agency

USIA/IOP, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency

USIB, United States Intelligence Board

USIS, United States Information Service

USMC, United States Marine Corps

USN, United States Navy

USOM, United States Operations Mission

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UST, United States Treaties

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

W, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

WFDY, World Federation of Democratic Youth

W/MSC, Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination, Department of State

WPA, Works Progress Administration

List of Persons

Editor’s Note: This list is designed to provide identification of those persons mentioned most frequently in this volume. The list generally covers only the years 1958–1960. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Where no dates are given, the person usually held the position throughout the period. In some cases, it has not been possible to determine all positions and titles held.

Achilles, Theodore C., Ambassador to Peru; Counselor of the Department of State from March 18, 1960

Agramonte Pichado, Roberto, Cuban Minister of State (Foreign Minister), January–June 1959

Allen, George V., Director, United States Information Agency Amoedo, Julio, Argentine Ambassador to Cuba

Anderson, Orville C., Special Assistant for Public Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, until January 1960

Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Treasury

Arneson, R. Gordon, Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until November 1959

Arroyo y Marquéz, Nicolás, Cuban Ambassador to the United States, April 1958–February 1959

Asbjornson, Mildred, Personal Secretary to Secretary of State Herter

Baird, Julian B., Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs, Department of the Treasury

Barnes, Robert G., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Coordination

Barquín, Colonel Ramón, supporter of 1952 Batista coup

Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio, President of Cuba until January 1, 1959

Beale, W. T. M., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until February 1960

Bell, John O., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Coordination

Belt, Guillermo, Cuban Ambassador to the United States, 1944–1949

Berding, Andrew H., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Bernau, Phyllis D., Personal Secretary to Secretary of State Dulles

Betancourt, Ernesto, Registered Agent in the United States for the 26th of July Movement until January 1959

Betancourt, Rómulo, President of Venezuela from February 1959

Bethel, Paul D., Public Affairs Officer and Attaché at the Embassy in Cuba

Bissell, Richard M., Jr., Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

Boggs, Marion W., Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from 1959

Bohlen, Charles E., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from December 1959

Bonesteel, Major General Charles H., USA, Secretary of the General Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff

Bonsal, Philip W., Ambassador to Bolivia until February 1959; Ambassador to Cuba, March 1959–October 1960

Boti Leon, Regino, Cuban Minister of National Economy from January 1959

Bowdler, William B., Second Secretary of the Embassy in Cub

Braddock, Daniel M., Counselor of the Embassy in Cuba

Buch, Luis M., Secretary to the Cabinet in the Cuban Government formed in January 1959

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., USN, Chief of Naval Operations

Cabell, General C. P., USAF, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Caccia, Sir Harold A., British Ambassador to the United States

Calhoun, John A., Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until September 1958; Director, September 1958–September 1960

Campa y Caraveda, Miguel Angel de la, Cuban Ambassador to the United States until March 1958

Cantillo y Porras, Eulogio, Commander, Cuban Government forces in Santiago, September–December 1958

Carrillo, Justo, leader of the Montecristi Group

Castro Ruz, Fidel, Commander in Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces, January–February 1959; thereafter Prime Minister of Cuba

Castro Ruz, Raúl, Commander in Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces from February 1959; also Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces from October 1959

Centoz, Monsignor Luigi, Papal Nuncio in Cuba

Cepero Bonilla, Raúl, Cuban Minister of Commerce, January 1958–September 1959

Chibas, Raúl, exile leader of the Ortodoxo party

Chomón, Fauré, leader of the Directorio Revolucionario; Cuban Ambassador to the Soviet Union after the restoration of relations in May 1960

Cienfuegos, Camilo, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Armed Forces, January–October 1959

Cienfuegos, Osmani, Cuban Minister of Public Works from November 26, 1959

Coerr, Wymberly DeR., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from October 1960

Cofiño, Angel, leader of the Cuban Electrical Workers’ Union and the Confederación de Trabajadores; subsequently Cuban exile leader

Conte Aguërro, Luis, Cuban journalist; First Secretary of the Cuban People’s Party (Ortodoxo) in 1947; subsequently Secretary-General

Cooley, Harold D., Democratic Representative from North Carolina; Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee

Cramer, William B., Republican Senator from Florida

Crosby, Lawrence, President, Cuban-American Sugar Council; Vice Chairman, Atlantica del Golfo Sugar Company

Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Cushing, Richard G., Director, Office of Public Information, United States Information Agency, February 1958–January 1960; detailed to the Office of the Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, January–May 1960; thereafter Deputy Public Affairs Officer at the Embassy in Mexico

Da Cunha, Leitao, Brazilian Ambassador to Cuba

Decker, General George H., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1959–1960; Chief of Staff, 1960

Dennison, Admiral Robert L., USN, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

DeSeabra, A. José, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Devine, Frank J., Office of South American Affairs, Department of State, until March 9, 1958; Staff Assistant, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, March 9, 1958–August 21, 1960; thereafter Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Diaz Lanz, Pedro Luis, Chief of the Cuban Air Force, January–June 1959

Diaz Tamayo, General Martin, Commander of Batista’s forces in Oriente Province; dismissed in 1957

Dihigo, Ernesto, Cuban Ambassador to the United States, March–December 1959

Dillon, C. Douglas, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, July 1958–June 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State

Dirksen, Everett M., Republican Senator from Illinois

Dodd, Thomas J., Democratic Senator from Connecticut

Donhauser, Robert, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, March 1958–August 1959; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August 1959–August 1960

Dorticós Torrado, Osvaldo, Cuban Minister Charged with Drafting and Study of Revolutionary Laws, January–July 1959; thereafter President of Cuba

Douglas, James H., Jr., Secretary of the Air Force until December 1959; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense

Dreier, John C., Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State, and U.S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States until September 1960

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State until April 1959

Eastland, James O., Democratic Senator from Mississippi

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States

Eisenhower, Major John S.D., Assistant Staff Secretary to the President from October 1958

Eisenhower, Milton S., President of John Hopkins University

Erskine, General Graves B., USA, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Farland, Joseph S., Ambassador to the Dominican Republic until May 1960

Fenno, Rear Admiral Frank W., Jr. (Mike), Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo

Figueres Ferrer, José, President of Costa Rica until February 1958

Fisk, Bradley, Assistant Secretary of Commerce

Font, Marcelo Fernandez, Acting Cuban Foreign Minister

Franqui, Carlos, Editor of the Cuban newspaper Revolución until January 1959

Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Gates, Thomas S., Jr., Secretary of the Navy until June 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 1959; thereafter Secretary of Defense

Gilmore, Eugene A., Jr., Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Cuba

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J., USA, White House Staff Secretary

Grau San Martin, Ramón, President of Cuba, 1944–1948

Gray, George O., First Secretary of the Embassy in Cuba from December 1959

Gray, Gordon, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Green, Howard C., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1959

Greene, Joseph N., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Güell, Gonzalo, Cuban Minister of State (Foreign Minister) until January 1959; also Prime Minister of Cuba, March 1958–January 1959

Guerra, Oscar H., Consul at Santiago de Cuba

Guevara Serna, Ernesto (Che), President of the Cuban National Bank from November 1959

Hager, Eric H., Legal Adviser, Department of State, from August 1959

Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to the President

Hall, Carlos, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Department of State, from February 1959

Hanes, John W., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until January 1959; thereafter Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

Harr, Karl G., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, until March 1958; thereafter Special Assistant to the President and Vice Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board

Hart Daválos, Armando, Cuban Minister of Education from January 1959

Henderson, Loy W., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

Herfurt, Jack A., Deputy Executive Director, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, until August 1959; Executive Director until August 1960

Herter, Christian A., Under Secretary of State until April 1959; thereafter Secretary of State

Hill, John C., Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, July 1958–August 1960

Hood, Viscount, Minister of the British Embassy in the United States

Hoover, J. Edgar, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Howe, Walter, Ambassador to Chile from June 1958

Hoyt, Henry A., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until August 1958

Irwin, John N., II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Javits, Jacob A., Republican Senator from New York

Johnson, Robert H., member, National Security Council Staff, until 1959; Director, Planning Board Secretariat, National Security Council, from 1959

Kennedy, John F., Democratic Senator from Massachusetts; President-elect of the United States from November 1960

Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Central Committee of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Krebs, Max V., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State

Kubitschek de Oliveira, Juscelino, President of Brazil

Lansdale, Edward G., Deputy Assistant for Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army, July 1959–September 1960; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Leonhardy, Terrence G., Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, Department of State, until December 1958

Lightner, E. Allan, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until January 1959

Little, Edward S., Officer in Charge of Caribbean Affairs, Department of State, until September 1958; Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, September 1958–September 1959

Lloyd, Selwyn, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

López Fresquet, Rufo, Cuban Minister of Finance, January 1959–March 1960

López Mateos, Adolfo, President of Mexico

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister

Macomber, William B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs

Mallory, Lester D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Mann, Thomas C, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, until August 28, 1960; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana; member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Marinello, Juan, President of the Cuban Partido Socialista Popular

Marquéz Sterling, Carlos, Cuban Ortodoxo party leader; defeated candidate in the 1958 Cuban Presidential election

Martin, Edwin M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, January–August 1960; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Martinez Paez, Julio, Cuban Minister of Health

Masferrer, Rodolfo, member of the Cuban Senate until January 1959

Matos, Huber, Military Governer of Camagüey Province, January–October 1959

Mau, Frank A., Executive Secretariat, Department of State

McCone, John A., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from July 1958

McElhiney, Thomas W., Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State

McElroy, Neil H., Secretary of Defense, October 1957–December 1959

Merchant, Livingston T., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Merriam, Robert E., Deputy Assistant to the President for Interdepartmental Affairs from September 1958

Meyer, Joaquin, Financial Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in the United States

Mikoyan, Anastas I., First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Minnich, L. Arthur, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President until August 1960

Miró Cardona, José, Prime Minister of Cuba, January–February 1959

Morgan, George A., member, Policy Planning Staff, April 1958–August 1959; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Morgan, Gerald D., Deputy Assistant to the President

Morse, True D., Under Secretary of Agriculture

Morse, Wayne, Democratic Senator from Oregon

Mueller, Frederick H., Under Secretary of Commerce, November 1958–August 1959; thereafter Secretary of Commerce

Mujal, Eusebio, Secretary-General of the Cuban Confederation of Labor

Muñoz Marín, Luis, Governor of Puerto Rico

Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959

Neidle, A.F., Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

Nuñez Jiménez, Antonio, Director of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute from June 1959

Nuñez Portuondo, Emilio, Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations until January 1959

Oltuski Ozacki, Enriquez, Cuban Minister of Communications, January 1959–July 1960

Owen, Henry D., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Owen, Richard B., Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Department of State

Paarlberg, Donald, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, until October 1958; thereafter Special Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs

Pardo Llada, José, Cuban radio commentator

Pazos, Felipe, President of the Cuban National Bank, January–November 1959

Pérez Serrente, Cardinal Enrique, Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba

Persons, General Wilton B., Assistant to the President from October 1958

Piad, Carlos, Cuban exile leader

Piedra y Piedra, Carlos Manuel, Cuban Supreme Court judge designated Provisional President on the resignation of Batista

Porter, Charles O., Democratic Representative from Oregon

Portuondo, see Nuñez Portuondo

Powell, Adam Clayton, Democratic Senator from New York

Prio Socorrás, Carlos, President of Cuba, 1948–1952

Pujol, Guillermo Alonso, Vice President in Prío Socarrás government

Quarles, Donald A., Deputy Secretary of Defense until May 1959

Ramsey, Henry C., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Ray, Manuel Antonio, Cuban Minister of Public Works, January–November 1959

Redington, Robert J., Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State

Reed, Henry C., Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State

Rehm, John B., Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Counselor of the Department of State

Rey, Santiago, Cuban Minister of Interior

Rice, Edward C., member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Rivero Agüero, Andrés, President-elect of Cuba, November–December 1958

Roa, Raúl, Cuban Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, January–June 1959; thereafter Cuban Minister of State (Foreign Minister)

Rogers, William B., Attorney General of the United States

Ross, Robert W., Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Rubottom, R. Roy, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until August 1960; thereafter Ambassador in Argentina

Salvador, David, Secretary-General of the Cuban Confederation of Workers, January–November 1959

Sanchez Arango, Aureliano, Foreign Minister in Prío Socarrás government

Schow, Major General Robert A., Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army

Scribner, Fred C., Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury

Smathers, George A., Democratic Senator from Florida

Smith, Earl E. T., Ambassador to Cuba until January 1959

Smith, Gerard C., Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Smith, Wayne S., Third Secretary of the Embassy in Cuba from July 1958

Snow, William P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until November 1959

Somoza Debayle, Luis, President of Nicaragua

Sorí Marín, Humberto, Cuban Minister of Agriculture, January–November 1959

Spencer, George O., Officer in Charge of Inter-American Security and Military Assistance, Department of State

Stans, Maurice, Director, Bureau of the Budget

Stephansky, Benjamin, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State

Stevenson, Robert A., Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Department of State, until December 1958; Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, December 1958–October 1960; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs

Stewart, C. Allan, Deputy Director, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State, until September 1958; Director, Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs, September 1958–March 1960

Swing, General Joseph, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service

Topping, John L., Second Secretary of the Embassy in Cuba until February 1958; thereafter First Secretary

Trujillo y Molina, Generalissimo Rafael B., Commander in Chief of the Dominican Republic Armed Forces

Turkel, Harry R., Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Department of State

Twining, General Nathan F., USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 1960

Urrutia Lleó, Manuel, President of Cuba, January–July 1959

Vaky, Viron P., Office of South American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until July 1959; thereafter Second Secretary of the Embassy in Colombia

Vallon, Edwin E., Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Department of State, October 1959–September 1960; thereafter Director

Varona, Manuel Antonio de, Coordinator of Frente Revolucionario Democratico

Wadsworth, James J., Representative at the United Nations from September 1960

Wardlaw, Andrew B., Chief, Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Department of State, July 1958–February 1959

Washburn, Abbott M., Deputy Director, United States Information Agency

Wellman, Harvey R., Counselor for Political Affairs of the Embassy in Cuba from September 1960

White, Lincoln P., Chief of the News Division, Department of State

Whiteman, Marjorie M., Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Whitman, Ann C., Personal Secretary to President Eisenhower

Wiecha, Robert D., Vice Consul at Santiago de Cuba until June 1959; Attaché at the Embassy in Cuba, June 1959–October 1960

Wieland, William A., Director, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State, until September 1958; Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, September 1958–October 1960

Wigglesworth, Richard B., Ambassador to Canada, December 1958–October 1960

Willauer, Whiting, Ambassador to Honduras until March 1958; Ambassador to Costa Rica, May 1958–December 1960; thereafter Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Wilson, James M., Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Coordination

Wollam, Park F., Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until February 1958; Consul at Santiago de Cuba, February 1958–August 1960

Wright, Admiral Jerauld, USN, Commander in Chief, Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, until February 1960

Young, John Parke, Chairman of the Working Group on the Cuban Economic Situation

Cuba

Contents

U.S. interest in the Cuban revolution, the overthrow of the Batista government, and the consolidation of power by Fidel Castro, reevaluation by the U.S. Government of the policy of shipping arms to the Batista government, January–June 1958¹

¹ For additional documentation on political developments in the Central American and Caribbean area and on the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held at Santiago, August 12–18, 1959, during which Cuba and the Caribbean area was extensively discussed, see volume V.

1. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and the Cuban Ambassador (Campa), Department of State, Washington, January 9, 1958

Washington, January 9, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–958. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

2. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 10, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.413/1–1058. Secret. Drafted by Topping.

3. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, January 10, 1958.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Arms. Confidential. Drafted by Little. A copy was also sent to Turkel.

4. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 11, 1958—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1158. Secret.

5. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, January 17, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1957. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Little, cleared with Wieland, and initialed by Rubottom.

6. Editorial Note

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, January 22, 1958—7:48 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1158. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy, cleared with Little and Wieland, and approved by Rubottom who signed for Herter.

8. Editorial Note

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 31, 1958—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/1–3158. Secret; Priority.

10. Letter From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith)

Washington, February 3, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1258. Confidential; Official-Informal. No drafting information is given on the source text.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 7, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/2–758. Confidential. Sent by pouch and received on February 9 at 10:37 a.m.

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 10, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1058. Confidential. Sent by pouch and received on February 11 at 4:06 p.m.

13. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith)

Washington, February 14, 1958.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Arms. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Leonhardy.

14. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 18, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1858. Confidential.

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 20, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2058. Confidential; Priority.

16. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 20, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2058. Confidential. Sent by pouch and received on February 22 at 1:06 p.m.

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 20, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2058. Confidential. Sent by pouch and received on February 22 at 1:06 p.m.

18. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State

Santiago de Cuba, February 21, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.52/2–2158. Confidential. Drafted by Guerra.

19. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, February 21, 1958—8:31 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2158. Secret. Drafted by Wieland and Leonhardy, cleared with Snow and Rubottom, and approved by Wieland who signed for Dulles.

20. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 26, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2658. Secret; Priority.

21. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 28, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2858. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, February 28, 1958—1:51 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/2–758. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart and Wieland; cleared with Snow, Barnes, John B. Rehm (L), Dillon, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Wieland who signed for Dulles.

23. Editorial Note

24. Editorial Note

25. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 3, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–558. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

26. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 3, 1958—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–358. Secret; Priority.

27. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Cuban Ambassador (Campa) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow), Department of State, Washington, March 3, 1958

Washington, March 3, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/3–358. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland and initialed by Wieland and Snow.

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 4, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–458. Secret; Niact.

29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, March 5, 1958—6:38 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–458. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy and cleared with Wieland and Snow who signed for Dulles.

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 11, 1958—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1158. Secret; Priority.

31. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 12, 1958—11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1258. Secret; Niact.

32. Editorial Note

33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, March 12, 1958—8:11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1258. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Rubottom who signed for Herter.

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 14, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1458. Secret; Niact.

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 14, 1958—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1458. Secret; Priority.

36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, March 14, 1958—8:19 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/3–1458. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy, cleared in draft with L/ARA, and approved by Snow who signed for Herter.

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 16, 1958—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/3–1658. Secret; Priority.

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 16, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1658. Secret; Priority.

39. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 17, 1958

Washington, March 17, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1758. Official Use Only. Drafted by Stewart.

40. Editorial Note

41. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Secretary of State

Washington, March 24, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2458. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy and Snow. Wieland and Little obtained clearances from H, P, MC, and W/MSC. G was also informed of the memorandum. Earlier drafts of the memorandum, dated March 19 and 20, are ibid., 737.00/3–1958 and 737.00/3–2058, respectively.

42. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)

Washington, March 24, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2458. Official Use Only and Secret. Drafted by Stewart and sent through Wieland. Initialed by Wieland and Snow.

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, March 26, 1958—4:34 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2658. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy and Wieland and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.

44. Editorial Note

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, March 31, 1958—6:56 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–3158. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wieland and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.

46. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 1, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–158. Confidential; Priority.

47. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 2, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–158. Official Use Only. Initialed by Arneson. Copies were sent to G, C, S/P, ARA, P, and SCA.

48. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) in Washington and Herbert Matthews of The New York Times in New York, April 3, 1958

New York, April 3, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–358. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart.

49. Editorial Note

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 13, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/4–1358. Secret; Priority.

51. Editorial Note

52. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 22, 1958

Washington, April 22, 1958

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba Jan.–June 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy on April 23. Ambassador Arroyo presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 16. In a memorandum of April 21 to Rubottom, Wieland listed five topics that Rubottom might wish to discuss with Arroyo. Rubottom marked the memorandum, requesting background information prepared on two of the topics. He wrote a question mark next to two other topics and crossed out the fifth, which read: “State that Department would consider renewing shipments combat equipment when there was evidence that Cuban Government was taking steps toward peaceful solution acceptable to Cuban people”. In a memorandum of April 22 to Rubottom, Wieland provided background on the two topics selected by Rubottom: “U.S. Interest in a Peaceful Solution in Cuba” and “New Emergency Law—Decree No. 5 Announcing Penalties for Press for Reporting News Unfavorable to the Government”. Both memoranda are ibid., Ambassador Arroyo.

53. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hoyt) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)

Washington, April 24, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2458. Drafted and initialed by Hoyt. Snow, to whom the memorandum was also addressed, wrote the following note to Hoyt on May 1: “A very interesting paper. Please confer with MID & we can talk about it when I return from Texas”.

54. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, May 2, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

Pentagon, Washington, May 2, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, May 1958. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated, but the source text bears the following notation: “State draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense”. A cover sheet lists 28 attendees at the meeting, including representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

55. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, May 6, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5612/5–658. Secret. Drafted by Little, cleared with Dreier, initialed by Wieland and Snow, and concurred in by H, P, W/MSC, and Murphy. In giving H’s concurrence, Assistant Secretary Macomber wrote on the source text: “Concur with recommendations 1 & 3. Recommendation #2 will cause considerable Congressional difficulty”.

56. Editorial Note

57. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State

Santiago de Cuba, May 21, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/5–2158. Confidential. Copies were sent to ARA/MID, the Embassy in Havana, and the U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer, Guantanamo.

58. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and the Cuban Ambassador (Arroyo), Department of State, Washington, May 22, 1958

Washington, May 22, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/5–2258. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy.

59. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, June 3, 1958—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–358. Confidential.

60. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) in Havana and the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) in Washington, June 3, 1958

Washington, June 3, 1958

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 60 D 553, Cuba. Official Use Only. Drafted by Leonhardy.

61. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) in Havana and the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) in Washington, June 4, 1958

Washington, June 4, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–458. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

62. Letter From the Consul at Santiago de Cuba (Wollam) to the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy)

Santiago de Cuba, June 4, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–458. Confidential; Official-Informal. a copy was also sent to Topping.

63. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hoyt) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, June 5, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00–558. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Hoyt. Also addressed to Wieland and Snow.

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, June 13, 1958—11:34 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–1358. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Little and Wieland; cleared in draft with Rehm (L/MSA) and Spencer (RPA) and in substance with Hanford of the Department of Defense; and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, June 16, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–1659. Secret; Niact.

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, June 16, 1958—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 437.1182–Jonas Aircraft And Arms Co. Inc. Secret; Priority.

67. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) and the Officer in Charge of Inter-American Security and Military Assistance (Spencer) to the Deputy Legal Adviser (Raymond)

Washington, June 19, 1958.

Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958. Secret. Drafted by Wieland and Spencer. Copies were sent to Rubottom’s office, Leonhardy, and Rehm.

68. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)

Washington, June 26, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–2658. Secret. Drafted by Leonhardy, cleared in substance with Spencer and Stewart, and initialed by Rubottom. Also sent to Gerard C. Smith and G. Frederick Reinhardt.

1. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and the Cuban Ambassador (Campa), Department of State, Washington, January 9, 1958²

Washington, January 9, 1958

Ambassador Campa paid a courtesy call on Mr. Rubottom this afternoon, the first, subsequent to his return from the Christmas holidays in Cuba.

Mr. Rubottom inquired about the health of President Batista, the crop damage from recent storms, the general political atmosphere and prospects for elections. The Ambassador replied that the President was in good health, that the tobacco and banana crops were severely damaged by the recent storms and losses ran into millions of pesos. With respect to the political climate, he said everything was quiet in the Habana area and he heard no talk of rebel activities in eastern Cuba. He said that plans were going ahead for elections and that the Government coalition parties would hold their nation-wide assembly to choose their candidate for President on January 22 indicating that censorship would be lifted by then. It was not clear yet according to the Ambassador just who the Government candidate would be, but three names had been mentioned as having a good chance of obtaining the nomination. These three were Dr. Gaston Godoy, speaker of the House of Representatives; Dr. Anselmo Alliegro, leader of the Senate; and Eng. Amadeo Lopez Castro. According to the Ambassador, he was with Lopez Castro on a number of occasions while visiting in Cuba and the latter indicated that he did not wish to be a candidate. The Ambassador thought, however, that he would be a candidate if Batista so indicated. Both Mr. Rubottom and the Ambassador expressed the hope that a well respected person would be selected by the Government. With respect to opposition candidates, the Ambassador stated that Dr. Grau San Martin and Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling would be the likely candidates of their respective parties.

After this general discussion, the Ambassador said that while he was not on a business visit, there were two matters he would like to take up with Mr. Rubottom. One was the question of our delay in approving certain small orders for arms. He said that President Batista had inquired of him while he was in Habana on this matter and indicated he could not understand why they had not been approved. Mr. Rubottom said that while he was not aware of the reason for this delay, this matter would have his personal and immediate attention. He informed the Ambassador that sometimes when other Departments were involved, delays unfortunately were unavoidable. The other matter he wished to mention was the question of recent articles in the New York Daily News and the Washington Post relative to gambling in Habana where inferences were made to Batista’s possible connection with this pursuit. He said that while he was not making a protest on these articles, he wanted to point out that there was nothing to the statements about Batista’s connection with gambling. He left a brief memorandum on the subject and copies of said articles for the Department’s information.³

² Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–958. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

³ Neither the memorandum nor the copies of the articles has been found.

2. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 539 Havana, January 10, 1958.

SUBJECT

Attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in the Present Political Situation in Cuba

There is enclosed a memorandum of recent conversations² between an officer of the Embassy and an American resident in Habana, concerning the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in the present political situation in Cuba. The source feels on the basis of recent events in which he has participated, and the conversations he has had with prominent members of the Catholic hierarchy in Cuba, that the Catholic Church is opposed to the present Government of Cuba and approves of the revolutionary activity of groups such as the “26th of July” Movement of Fidel Castro Ruz. The source is disturbed by the information, advised the Catholic officials with whom he is in contact that he felt obliged to inform the Embassy, and says that he was told that those officials wanted him to do so.

If the Catholic Church has indeed taken a stand such as that outlined by the source, it is a development of great importance which will heavily influence future developments in this country. However, without rejecting the possibility of such a happening, the Embassy is not prepared to accept it as a fact on the basis of the information now available. There seems no reason to question the accuracy of the basic points of the story, covering such things as the injuries of De Blanck,³ his protection by the Catholic Church, his treatment by the source, and the names of those Catholic officials the source has spoken with. But we feel that the conclusions reached by the source do not necessarily follow from his experience as recounted to the Embassy. It seems entirely possible that the Catholic officials involved have been motivated solely by humanitarian considerations, and that their actions are not based on any position which the Catholic Church has taken in the present political situation in Cuba. Among the considerations which would support that conclusion are the following:

Father Spiralli⁴ is well known to several officers of the Embassy. If he wished word of a position taken by the Catholic Church to reach the Embassy, it seems reasonable to assume that he would speak directly to one of his friends on the staff, rather than use an intermediary. Father Spiralli has been the driving force behind the establishment and growth of the Catholic University of Villaneuva in Habana. He and those associated with him have made strenuous efforts to keep the University and its students disassociated from the current political agitation, fearing that otherwise the University might be closed. They have been successful to date, and the University is the only one of any standing in the country which has remained open. For Father Spiralli now to actively support oppositionist activities would mean a complete reversal of his long-standing and firmly held position. Finally, Father Spiralli is an American citizen by naturalization, and presumably well aware of the risks to retention of that citizenship he would incur by participation in the political life of Cuba.

The previous attitude of the Catholic Church and its principal officials also causes the Embassy to doubt that the Catholic Church as a unit has now decided to support or encourage revolutionary activities. The Catholic Church has remained apart from the recent turmoil in Cuba. This of course reflects the traditional attitude of the Church, but may also be in some degree due to the character of the leading Catholic churchmen here. The Archbishop of Habana, Cardinal Arteaga, is elderly, partly senile, and noted for a peaceful and retiring disposition. He would find the idea of political involvement, with the consequent agitation and tension, personally most disagreeable. The other leading Catholic churchman in the country is the Archbishop of Santiago, Cardinal Perez Serrante. Opposition circles have frequently alleged to the Embassy that he strongly supports them. The Embassy has been inclined to feel that that was a mistaken interpretation of the Cardinal’s actions. He appears to have acted not from political conviction, but from a desire to avoid bloodshed and to restore tranquillity in Oriente Province. He has been careful to maintain contacts with top governmental figures, and has evinced no hostility toward them.

On the other hand, individual Catholic officials and certain Catholic lay organizations are actively supporting revolutionary activities. At least one priest is serving with the forces of the “26th of July” Movement in the Sierra Maestra. Others are active in clandestine organizations such as the Movimiento de Resistencia Civica. (MRC—Civic Resistance Movement) Father Bez Chabebe, a top official of the Youth Section of the Catholic Action organization in the Provinces of Oriente and Camaguey, has told officers of the Embassy that nearly the entire membership of his organization is actively participating in revolutionary affairs, and that he assists them. The Knight Commander of the Chapter of the Knights of Columbus in Santiago showed an officer of the Embassy an appeal which his Chapter had adopted directly against his wishes, which in effect asked the Catholic Church in North America to directly intervene in the situation in Cuba for the purpose of removing Batista. A [less than 1 line not declassified] has received information from various sources indicating that the membership and leaders of the Juventud Obrera Católica (JOC—Catholic Young Workers) support and are engaged in revolutionary activities. Recently [less than 1 line not declassified] the JOC may officially approve such a position. The JOC is understood to have a membership of around 8,000 concentrated in and around Habana, and such a development would be of considerable assistance to the revolutionary movement.

The Embassy is endeavoring to develop further information to confirm or deny the statement that the Catholic Church is opposed to the present Cuban Government and approves of revolutionary activities, and will advise the Department of the results.

Daniel M. Braddock
Chargé d’Affaires ad interim

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.413/1–1058. Secret. Drafted by Topping.

² Not printed. It described Topping’s conversations on December 31, 1957, and January 3, 1958, with Dr. Thomas C. Wilson, an American citizen practicing medicine in Havana.

³ In the enclosed memorandum, Wilson is reported to have tentatively given De Blanck’s first name as Hugo.

⁴ Father Lorenzo Spiralli.

3. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, January 10, 1958.

SUBJECT

Arms Shipments to Cuba

You will recall that in my memorandum to you of December 19, 1957, entitled “Policy Recommendations for Restoration of Normalcy in Cuba”,² it was proposed, on page 4 [Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2], that “sales of arms to Cuba will continue . . .”³ This proposed course of action was tied to discussions the Ambassador would hold with Batista regarding the creation of a favorable political atmosphere in Cuba, and it was expected that our attitude on arms sales would be used as one of the primary inducements for Batista to take ameliorating steps in this respect.

Attached to this memorandum is a statement⁴ reviewing the action taken during calendar year 1957 on Cuban requests to purchase arms in the United States. In summary, eleven requests were approved and seven were pending at the close of the year. Of the seven pending cases, four have been recommended favorably by the Embassy and no recommendations have yet been received on the remaining three. In the memorandum it is recommended that three of the four requests which have been favorably recommended by the Embassy be approved. These three requests are for:

1. 100,000 rounds of 20 mm. ammunition for the Cuban Navy. This ammunition would be useful in controlling movements of small boats which are suspected of carrying arms to rebel groups, including that of Fidel Castro.

2. 10,000 hand grenades. It would be expected that these would be largely used in Oriente Province, including combating attempts to burn the cane fields.

3. 3,000–75 mm. howitzer shells and two aiming devices. It is possible that these might be used in Oriente Province.

It is recommended that the above three requests now be approved. It is further recommended that the Department of Defense be advised of these approvals but that the Department of Defense be requested to clear with the Department of State prior to scheduling delivery of these items. It is possible that it would be desirable to space deliveries of these items over a period of time rather than making almost simultaneous shipment of them. Further, clearance of delivery schedules with the Department would permit us to delay or cancel shipments if it later seemed desirable in the light of Batista’s response to the Ambassador’s discussions relating to improvement of the political atmosphere in Cuba. Alternatively, it is recommended that the first two above-indicated requests be now approved and that the third request be approved within a reasonable period of time, say three to four weeks; the same arrangements would be made with Defense covering shipping schedules.

Ambassador Smith will be in the Department for consultation next week. It is suggested that this proposal be discussed with him and, if he concurs, that he be given authorization to use the fact of these approvals as he wishes on his return in discussions with Batista, as factors in achieving the objectives set out in the memorandum of December 19. Ambassador Campa’s comments on the matter of arms sales during his call on you yesterday⁵ reflect the keen interest of the Cuban Government in this question.

Further recommendations will be made to you on the three remaining pending requests for purchase of arms, on receipt of the recommendations from the Embassy.

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Arms. Confidential. Drafted by Little. A copy was also sent to Turkel.

² Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VI, p. 870.

³ Ellipsis in the source text.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ See Document 1.

4. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 11, 1958—6 p.m.

369. For Rubottom. Guell reports Felipe Pazos claims Department will cooperate with opposition by holding back on delivery of arms to GOC.

GOC anxious for prompt delivery of 20 armored cars. See previous cables. Batista states he does not want to embarrass US. So if delivery is to be deferred he will cancel order rather than suffer delay and request refund money on deposit.

Reference Embtel 368.²

Because I have obtained definite assurances from Batista that he will not continue suspension guarantees after January 27, I urgently request that we make delivery of armored cars on schedule. If GOC is forced to cancel this order because of our deferring delivery, it may seriously damage my overall objectives. Therefore I earnestly hope you will support me in this request.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1158. Secret.

² In telegram 368, January 11, Smith reported that he had obtained assurances that day that Batista would restore constitutional guarantees on January 27, on condition that no unforeseen violence would break out prior to that time. Smith said he obtained this promise without offering any U.S. Government commitments, only his “personal assurance” that the Cuban Government could rely on the full cooperation of the United States. (Ibid.)

5. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 17, 1958.

SUBJECT

Sale of Arms to Cuba

Discussion:

Ambassador Smith ended several days’ consultation in the Department yesterday and will be returning to Habana next week. (Tab A). You will recall that the Cuban Presidential elections are scheduled for June 1 and that opposition to the regime of President Batista has been strong over the past year, including the presence of an armed band in eastern Cuba under Fidel Castro and support to revolutionary activities being given by Cuban exiles here in the United States. Batista has suspended constitutional guarantees in Cuba six times in the past year. However, he has told Ambassador Smith that he will not renew this suspension at the time of expiration of the current 45-day period on January 27. This assurance was given to Ambassador Smith on January 5² and resulted from the Ambassador’s many conversations with Batista in which Ambassador Smith has stated that the United States regards the present government as the duly constituted government of Cuba, has pointed out the strong feelings in the United States on the part of both public and Congressional groups regarding developments in Cuba, and has kept Batista generally informed of the steps being taken by our Department of Justice against illegal activities of Cuban exiles in the United States.

On his return to Habana, Ambassador Smith wishes to continue this general position, and in order to make the lifting of suspension of the constitutional guarantees effective and to be in a position to suggest further steps that might be taken by Batista to assure acceptable elections next spring, he wishes to be able to meet certain requests made by the Cubans to purchase military equipment in this country. Just prior to his departure Ambassador Smith was asked by the Foreign Minister³ regarding the status of 20 armored cars (described in Tab B).⁴ These cars were ordered in June 1957, and delivery was promised by the Department of Defense between March 4 and June 4, 1958. In addition seven other Cuban requests to purchase arms in this country are pending, the current status of which is described in Tab C.⁵

In considering this problem a number of factors have been weighed. ARA believes that there is no alternative to dealing with the presently constituted government in Cuba, however much we may disapprove of certain acts of that regime. American investments in Cuba amount to $774 million and there are some 5,000 Americans residing in that country. The security of these people and of this property would certainly be in jeopardy if we took any other course. Furthermore we believe that if we work with the present regime, while holding a tight rein on the manifestations of cooperation with it, we stand the best chance of encouraging acceptable elections and an orderly transfer of the government to a successor to Batista. This course of action, if it includes delivery of the armored cars, will most likely be subject to criticism by certain groups in the United States. We feel that we must face up to such criticism if it develops in view of the considerations mentioned above.

Recommendation:

That Ambassador Smith on his return be authorized to continue his efforts and that he be authorized, if he deems it appropriate, to tell Batista that the original schedule for delivery of the armored cars is still in effect and that delivery can be expected between March 4 and June 4. If later developments lead us to conclude that it would be unwise to make this delivery, the physical transfer of the cars could, of course, be stopped. It is also recommended that the Ambassador be authorized, if he finds it advantageous, to advise Batista that other requests to purchase arms in the United States are being approved.⁶

Tab A

Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)⁷

Washington, January 17, 1958.

SUBJECT

Conversations With Ambassador Smith Regarding Cuban Situation

Ambassador Smith arrived on January 14 for consultation principally to discuss the appropriate steps already taken and to be taken in an effort to influence President Batista to hold elections acceptable to the Cuban people on June 1.

The Ambassador reported that President Batista promised him early this month (January 12),⁸ that he would restore constitutional guarantees around January 27, when the present 45-day period of suspension terminates. Ambassador Smith and the Department share the feeling that restoration of guarantees is a necessary step before other moves can be made to induce the Batista regime to hold proper elections.

Assuming that President Batista will restore guarantees and not suspend them until after the elections, Ambassador Smith felt that the United States should give him additional bargaining power in his discussions with Batista by authorizing the sale of 20 armored cars to the Cuban Government. The Cubans have shown particular interest in acquiring this equipment. It was agreed that excessive brutalities by certain Cuban officials should be curtailed, some of the more violent and sadistic officials of the army and police be removed, and/or a strict order come from the President calling upon the armed forces to apply the law impartially and in a strictly legal manner. A general amnesty would be desirable, to include political prisoners and possibly the bulk of the forces fighting with Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra mountains. The opposition, of course, would have to respond to these moves with a high degree of responsibility since the revolutionary forces therein are also partly responsible for the violence which today besets the country.

At all times during the various discussions, the extreme difficulty of reaching the desired objectives was recognized, but it was felt that the only logical solution of the Cuban crisis would be achieved by an orderly transition of power based on elections, the conduct thereof and results being acceptable to a majority of the Cuban people.

In discussions, in which you participated, it was recognized that a powerful bargaining point would be removed if the United States told Batista at this time that he could have unconditionally 20 armored cars. The United States already has cooperated with the Cuban Government by launching an investigation into the activities of ex-President Carlos Prio at Batista’s request, and indictment is said to be in the offing. However, public and congressional opinion against sale of arms, especially heavy equipment, to a dictatorship is strong. The first anniversary of the delivery of a number of tanks to the Batista regime is nearing, and armored cars resemble tanks so greatly that announcement of their sale would immediately recall the previous sale.

It was agreed that Ambassador Smith is to have authority, subject to the Secretary’s approval, to advise President Batista that the schedule of delivery of the armored cars is being adhered to. On May 29, 1957, a letter of offer⁹ was sent to the Cubans and on June 4 they advised us of acceptance. At that time they were told that delivery would be effected between nine and 12 months after their acceptance of the sale offer. Earliest delivery, then, would be March 4, 1958.

However, delivery will not be made until the Department has reevaluated the situation at the time the shipment is ready, or before, if developments make such a move necessary. Sale of equipment such as armored cars would not be feasible if President Batista had not restored and left in effect constitutional guarantees, taken additional steps toward ending violence in the country, and otherwise generally created conditions conducive to an acceptable election on June 1. If these conditions were not met to our satisfaction we would cancel the sale.

Thus, at the conclusion of the discussions with Ambassador Smith, it is decided that when he returns to Cuba he may tell President Batista that we are proceeding on schedule with the delivery of the armored cars and other less controversial arms. Our hopes concerning the President’s cooperation with us to provide conditions facilitating the delivery and concerning acceptable elections will be expressed to the President by Ambassador Smith. Should President Batista fulfill our hopes appropriate cognizance would be made by the Department in a public statement. When the time arrives for the delivery of the armored cars we shall review the situation and, on the basis of the Cuban Government’s record in returning the country to some semblance of normalcy and holding acceptable elections, decide whether to make the armored cars available to Cuba. We already have an agreement with the Department of Defense calling for such a review, and it is applied in the case of all arms shipments to Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1957. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Little, cleared with Wieland, and initialed by Rubottom.

² These assurances were given on January 11; see footnote 2, supra.

³ See supra.

⁴ Tab B, not printed, is a memorandum of conversations held on January 16 by Weldon Litsey (ARA/REA) with Department of Defense officials regarding the proposed sale of the 20 armored cars to Cuba.

⁵ Tab C, not printed, is a an unsigned memorandum of January 7 discussing the seven pending requests for sale of military equipment to Cuba.

⁶ The memorandum was sent to Murphy, Macomber, and Berding for concurrence. Murphy neither initialed nor commented on it. Macomber initialed his concurrence and added the following comment: “This will cause some adverse comment on the Hill. However if it is thought necessary H will not object, provided we can notify the committees in advance”. Berding initialed his concurrence and remarked, “There are, of course, certain adverse public relations possibilities in connection with this action, but P concurs with the recommendation in the belief that, if care is taken, these possible effects can be minimized or overcome”. Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation on January 21.

⁷ Secret. Drafted by Stewart. Copies were sent to the Embassy in Havana, to S/S, and to MID/C.

⁸ See footnote 2 above.

⁹ Not found.

6. Editorial Note

On the afternoon of January 16, prior to leaving Washington, Ambassador Smith issued the following statement to the press:

“The purpose of my visit to Washington was to make a full report on all aspects of the political and economic situation in Cuba. After six months as Chief of Mission in Habana, it was felt by both the Department and myself that there were many phases or the political and economic situation in Cuba which should be discussed in person, and I therefore returned here for a routine consultation.

“The United States recognizes the present Government of Cuba and deals with it as a constituted government of a friendly sister American Republic. We maintain a policy of objectivity and nonintervention in the internal affairs of Cuba. The United States Embassy strictly adheres to that policy.

“I am now convinced that both the Government of Cuba and the opposition are fully cognizant of this policy and respect it.

“Our next hope is that the Government of Cuba will restore full Constitutional guarantees. On December 14 the Government of Cuba did publicly announce that it was its intention to lift the suspension of Constitutional guarantees at the end of this new forty-five day period. This period will terminate January 27. After that we hope that elections will be held which will be acceptable to the people of Cuba.

“Four opposition parties have fulfilled their legal requirements and have taken the necessary steps to be prepared for the national elections scheduled for June 1, 1958”. (Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Nov.–Dec. 1958)

In his memoirs Smith discusses the consultations in Washington and the aftermath of the issuance of the press statement:

“After reading the statement, I was asked, off the record, whether I thought the United States government would be able to do business with Fidel Castro. My reply was that I did not believe the United States would ever be able to do business with Fidel Castro. Then I was asked the reasons for my statement. I replied that the United States Government can only do business with a government that will honor its international obligations and that can maintain law and order. In my opinion, Castro would do neither”. (Earl E.T. Smith, The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution (New York: Random House, 1962), pages 59–60)

On January 17, the Cuban Minister of the Interior, Santiago Rey, issued a prepared statement in response to Ambassador Smith’s press release noting that constitutional guarantees would be reestablished “as soon as possible when circumstances so counsel”. Chargé d’Affaires Daniel Braddock asked Foreign Minister Guell on January 18 whether the Cuban Government had been disappointed or embarrassed by Smith’s statement. Guell said neither, but pointed out that no date had been set for the restoration of the guarantees. From the tone of Rey’s public statement and of Guell’s remarks to him, Braddock gathered that the Cuban Government was “most anxious not to appear as objecting” to Smith’s statement, but that it would have been “happier had he not made it”. (Telegram 387 from Havana, January 19; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1958) The full text of Rey’s statement, plus an analysis of Havana press treatment of Ambassador Smith’s statement, is included in despatch 559 from Havana, January 20. (Ibid., 737.00/1–2058)

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, January 22, 1958—7:48 p.m.

384. Embtel 369.² Ambassador from Rubottom. Action proposed re delivery GOC 20 armored cars and other arms requests in my memorandum January 17 to Secretary³ (copy forwarded Embassy Jan 17) approved.

Your discretion you may inform Batista cars “on schedule” and delivery may be expected within period March 4 to June 4 stated original offer by Department of Defense. Suggest you emphasize it necessary he cooperate in creating conditions that would minimize adverse reaction in US and elsewhere against US Government as well as his own. Your emphasis might stress mutual nature problem resulting from adverse criticism US Congress and public and on this basis appeal for his cooperation reduce effect to minimum by such action as (1) restricting official publicity arrival shipment, and (2) limiting use to training and other inconspicuous tasks. If you think appropriate you should also indicate to Batista that reaction in Congress and other influential sectors of US to use this equipment will perforce be important factor governing approval future requests for equipment purchases.

FYI shipment cars will be contingent upon our prior review positive steps taken by GOC create favorable conditions for June elections, i.e., restoration constitutional guarantees, etc. Approval of memorandum by Secretary subject condition that foreign affairs committees Congress would be informed prior any shipments.

Re pending requests small arms suggest you defer informing Batista now our decision to approve in favor staggered approval and later notification GOC on basis priorities established on three most pressing items in following suggested order: (a) 10,000 hand grenades (Emb. Desp. 410);⁴ (b) 100,000 projectiles (Embtel 222)⁵ and (c) 3,000 75 mm. shells (Embtel 216).⁶ Desire your comments this procedure including suggestions on spacing these approvals. End FYI.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1158. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy, cleared with Little and Wieland, and approved by Rubottom who signed for Herter.

² Document 4.

³ Document 5.

⁴ Dated November 19, 1957. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.5614/ 11–1957)

⁵ Dated October 16, 1957. (Ibid., 737.561/10–1657)

⁶ Dated October 16, 1957. (Ibid.)

8. Editorial Note

On January 23, Ambassador Smith informed the Department of State that he was planning to meet with President Batista that evening. Smith believed that because he had mentioned at his Washington press conference that constitutional guarantees would be restored on January 27, Batista would probably change the date “to regain the psychological advantage”. Smith thought it possible that the suspension of guarantees might be lifted in all provinces, except Oriente, sometime after his meeting with Batista. Smith also noted his understanding that if Batista agreed to announce publicly, when guarantees were restored, that he would take other conciliatory measures, the Secretary of State “will publicly signify approval of Batista’s attempt to restore normalcy”. (Telegram 397 from Havana, January 23; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2358)

Later that day, Edward S. Little, Officer in Charge of Caribbean Affairs, telephoned Ambassador Smith in response to this telegram. Asking Smith to refer to the record of his recent conversations in Washington (see Document 5), Little passed on Assistant Secretary Rubottom’s view that if “sufficient conciliatory measures” were taken to warrant Smith’s recommending the issuance of a public statement in Washington, “we would do the necessary here”. Little said the Secretary of State would not make the statement, but that it would be handled in the way described in the memorandum regarding his conversations in Washington. Smith replied that his question was answered and said that he did not want to issue any statement in Havana “since the people there might think he was no longer impartial”. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Little, January 23, 6:40 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2358)

When Smith met with Batista that evening, Batista said he would restore full constitutional guarantees, except in Oriente province, on January 25. He planned to include in a speech to be given to a convention of his own political party on January 24 a number of points suggested to him by Smith aimed at restoring conditions to permit free and open elections on June 1. In reporting this conversation to the Department of State, Smith did not specify which suggestions he had made, but he told Batista that if these points were included in the speech, “appropriate cognizance would be taken by the Department in a public statement”. (Telegram 402 from Havana, January 24; ibid., 737.00/1–2456)

On January 26, Smith reported that Batista had restored guarantees, except for Oriente province, and had publicly announced that the Cuban Government would enforce the law of the land. According to Smith, Batista also stated publicly that he would turn over the presidency to whomever the people elected. Smith remarked:

“I hope Department will take cognizance these important actions by promptly issuing statement welcoming such actions. Apart from their great significance for coming elections, they are of utmost importance to restoration of normal conditions in Cuba”. (Telegram 410 from Havana, January 26; ibid., 737.00/1–2658)

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 31, 1958—3 p.m.

424. Reference Deptel 394 [384?].² Deptel 384 not received here until January 30. I will inform Batista through Guell as instructed second paragraph 384.³ Re procedure suggested final paragraph 384 I recommend approval these three requests and delivery when ready unless situation significantly changed in meantime. As general policy I believe US should honor reasonable requests recommended by Military mission as long as GOC proceeds along lines acceptable to US. Holding back on each request to force GOC step by step seems petty and as likely to thwart our objective as to attain it.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/1–3158. Secret; Priority.

² Document 7.

³ In telegram 431 from Havana, February 4, Smith reported that he had informed Batista through Guell as instructed in the second paragraph of telegram 384. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/2–458)

10. Letter From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith)¹

Washington, February 3, 1958.

Dear Earl: In the Embassy’s telegram No. 402 of January 24² you mentioned that you had stressed certain points with President Batista in your discussion with him on January 23 which he was to have incorporated in his speech of January 24 to the National Convention of the four coalition parties supporting him. On reading over his speech, however (Embassy’s despatch No. 573 of January 27),³ I gathered that he decided to bide his time before indicating what further steps he may plan to create a climate conducive to acceptable elections other than the partial restoration of constitutional guarantees. Until some further steps are taken by the President, such as a partial amnesty, we here feel we should go no further than the action which we planned together when you were here on the armored cars which is summarized in Deptel 384.⁴ However, I realize that you may have other views following your talk with Batista, the outcome of which we have not yet received here. So I eagerly await your summary of the situation and your recommendations.

With respect to the Department’s taking public cognizance of the partial restoration of constitutional guarantees, we were prepared to express our satisfaction with such action if we had been queried by the press. Unfortunately, the members of the press did not choose to make an inquiry on this question. However, we had concluded together, such a statement would be much more effective if some other constructive steps are taken by Batista. If he does so, we’ll push the statement to the press. We hope you advise us on this point when opportune.

I note that an opposition Senator has asked for amnesty in the Cuban Senate. While we do not have the details on this proposed amnesty, it might serve as a basis for at least a partial compromise by the Government.

We continue to be hopeful that the Government will be able to weather the test of the next few weeks and make further concessions during this period. In our recent discussions with revolutionaries here such as Dr. Pazos and General Garcia Tunon, they sound more conciliatory in their attitude towards elections. I think this is significant.

The off-the-record remarks which you made at your press conference here on January 16⁵ seem to be a matter of public knowledge. Where the leak occurred, we do not yet know and are investigating. I am enclosing a copy of a letter of January 24 and enclosure from Herb Matthews in this respect and a copy of a résumé of that portion of your conference which is supposed to have been transmitted to Castro himself.⁶ We have heard that the latter may be printed verbatim in Bohemia.

With respect to Castro, I am still hopeful that some effective way can be found to get the other side of the Castro story to the United States press as well as to Congress. You will recall that I suggested to you while you were in Washington that American businessmen in Cuba might be told when they expound their views to you on Castro that maybe they should get their views to their respective representatives in Congress. At the present time the correspondence we are getting from the Hill is very one sided. Any suggestions you might have on this point will be appreciated.⁷

Sincerely yours,

William A. Wieland⁸

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1258. Confidential; Official-Informal. No drafting information is given on the source text.

² See Document 8.

³ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2758)

⁴ Document 7.

⁵ See Document 6.

⁶ None of the enclosures has been found.

⁷ 

In a February 12 letter to Wieland, Smith noted that he had expressed his ideas and recommendations in telegram 443 (Document 12), and remarked:

“As you said, American business men in Cuba are very quiet until they are personally affected; then they do not hesitate to express their views. As a result, the correspondence which you consistently receive from the Hill is very one-sided.

“Although I have hesitated to make any suggestions at a meeting of the Board of the Chamber of Commerce, I think it may be possible for me discreetly to point out to the president of the Chamber (Paul Heilman) that the State Department is continually under pressure from sympathizers of the Opposition and that members of Congress very rarely ever receive any expressions regarding the political situation from American business men in Cuba. Heilman may be able to get the idea across to Americans in Cuba and obtain some result”. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1258)

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 7, 1958.

442. Reference: Deptel 413.² One company of slightly less than 200 men of MAP-supported battalion (First Battalion, First Infantry Regiment) of Cuban Army was transferred to Oriente Province few days after landing there on December 2, 1956 of group led by Fidel Castro. That company remained there until April 1957 when returned to Camp Columbia. In late May 1957 entire battalion of approximately 800 men moved to Oriente and is still there.

This is the crack force of the infantry. From 75 to 90 percent of its officers have received MAP training. Perhaps 3 percent of enlisted personnel have received MAP training as communications specialists, etc. Balance of personnel is trained by Cuban officers. At time of transfer to Oriente about half of equipment of battalion was MAP grant aid. Balance was largely MAP reimburseable aid. Since then most of remaining MAP grant equipment for battalion has been received but has not been sent to battalion. Maintenance and replacement items for battalion have been supplied largely from both MAP grant and reimburseable aid. Precise information concerning duty stations of this battalion and actions in which engaged not available. However, it is generally assumed here that battalion has been actively engaged in fighting with armed rebels led by Castro in Sierra Maestra mountains. Officers of US Army Mission state this it probable, and that in doing so battalion would be engaged in tasks for which it was trained.

There have been unconfirmed reports from time to time that aircraft of Cuban Army Air Force have engaged in operations including bombing and strafing in Sierra Maestra area. Opposition sources maintain that there have been several incidents of indiscriminate attacks by Air Force which have resulted in death and injury to non-belligerent inhabitants of region. Embassy does not have evidence to confirm such allegations. Aircraft engaged in such operations are said to have included B–26 bombers. Officers of US Air Mission say that is possible, but that they cannot state it as fact. They point out that they are not furnished precise information concerning missions performed by Cuban Air Force. However, they add that most, if not all, of the aircraft of the B–26 squadron have been based continuously at Camp Columbia and feel that there could have been few if any occasions on which they could have operated in the Sierra Maestra.

US Air Force Mission points out that many Cuban Air Force planes, particularly transport squadron, have a mixture of MAP grant and reimburseable parts such as engines. The Mission adds that approximately 70 percent of all officers of Cuban Air Force have received MAP training of some sort. Transport squadron is frequently engaged in activities in support of Sierra Maestra operations.

Foregoing information obtained from officers of US Army and US Air Force Missions. They request emphatically that source not be divulged, pointing out that if GOC became aware of the fact their personal effectiveness would be lessened and the future of the missions jeopardized. Embassy concurs in this view.

The Embassy is of the opinion that the activities of the Cuban Military forces in the Sierra Maestra and elsewhere in Cuba as in the Cienfuegos uprising participated in by the naval garrison in that city, constitute legitimate defense of the legally constituted government of Cuba, which has been duly recognized by the United States, against armed and organized rebellion. Whether excesses may have been committed does not alter the basic fact. The laws and other unclassified documents of the US under which both grant and reimburseable MAP aid have been made available to Cuba state that such equipment is intended, among other things for maintenance of internal security.

Those documents do not limit use of such equipment only to maintenance of security against Communist aggression or the like. Consequently if criticized or queried concerning use of MAP equipment against Castro forces, GOC will undoubtedly firmly maintain that such use is completely proper.

Embassy feels it would be unrealistic to expect GOC, or any other government receiving MAP assistance, to refrain from using that equipment against armed and organized rebellion. Attempt by US to force local government to do so would expose us to charge of open intervention in internal affairs of other country. If we feel that such use of MAP equipment is improper, only way to be sure of avoiding it is to refuse to supply equipment in first place. We are fortunate that GOC has refrained from requesting our permission to use MAP equipment against rebellious groups, since whatever answer we gave would be heavily criticized by one or another group in Cuba as well as portions of US press.

Criticism by any agency of US Government of use made by Cuba of MAP equipment will be interpreted locally as evidence our displeasure with GOC. If made public and accompanied by termination of MAP assistance, or threats of such termination, action will weaken GOC and encourage revolutionary opposition. Such action appears incompatible with recent decisions of Department concerning our policies and objectives in Cuba. (See Department’s telegram 384.³ )

Embassy feels that US Government should continue to approve reasonable requests from GOC for MAP military equipment when recommended by our military missions as long as GOC proceeds along lines acceptable to us. In addition, we should not raise with GOC question of use such equipment to date in operations against armed and organized rebellious groups.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/2–758. Confidential. Sent by pouch and received on February 9 at 10:37 a.m.

² Telegram 413, February 4, noted recent congressional inquiries and requested current information regarding the Cuban Government’s use against the rebels in Oriente province of not only MAP equipment, but also MAP-trained manpower, and what the Embassy’s recommendations were in light of this information. (Ibid., 737.5–MSP/ 2–458)

³ Document 7.

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 10, 1958.

443. For Rubottom. In all six provinces of Cuba press censorship has been lifted. In all but Oriente full constitutional guarantees have been restored. The reaction of the opposition press has been moderate since the lifting of the ban on news. The campaign waged by the revolutionary elements to overthrow Batista by attempting to destroy the economy has failed. The economy is good and general conditions are closer to normalcy than at any time since August 1 when guarantees were last in effect prior to the recent restoration.

Fidel Castro is losing prestige. More and more Cubans doubt the possibility of a successful 26th of July Movement. Although political exiles and refugees in the US continue to be vociferous, the revolutionary elements are disorganized, splintered and lack a program with public appeal. If Batista were assassinated, there is no responsible group able to take over the government. Vandalism, chaos and bloodshed would surely ensue.

Although the political opposition is also disorganized and up to the present is not known to have made any significant progress in uniting, interest in the election since the restoration of full constitutional guarantees is steadily mounting.

Some opposition leaders are planning a new political front. Pardo Llada and Suarez Fernandez² are prepared to offer the presidential candidacy to Alfonso Pujol as standard bearer of a new political alliance of opposition parties and groupings.

There is also a plan to nominate Jose Pepin Bosch as presidential candidate of a new opposition movement known as the Fourth Political Front—which is to unite all opposition parties and groupings under the candidacy of Bosch.

One of the three principal leaders of the fourth front—Porfirio Pendas—has discussed these plans with me. Although they are doubtful of honest elections, they believe—as we do—that there is no other solution.

If the nucleus of a united front can be obtained, it would attract other opposition groups into joining with them.

I believe our present objective is for free and open elections. It is my intention to impress upon Batista at every opportunity our hope that the GOC will conduct free and open elections.

If we can engender the thought amongst the political opposition that Cuba will have free and open elections on June 1, it will stimulate the responsible opposition forces to unite.

Andres Rivero Aguero will be the GOC candidate with Rafael Guas Inclan as his running mate, supported by the four coalition parties. At present the two leading opposition candidates are Dr. Grau San Martin and Carlos Marquez Sterling. Dr. Grau has the main support from the people. He is 75, recently broke his hip, and is not expected to live long.

Unless there is a new political alliance of opposition parties, the GOC has little to risk in holding free and open elections and could expect to elect their candidate, weak as he may be.

Two steps which I believe would be helpful in convincing the Cuban people of the President’s genuine determination to hold free and open elections would be for him publicly to invite the world press to send reporters to observe the elections or for him formally to invite the Organization of American States and the United Nations to send observers to Cuba for the same purpose. If the Department agrees, I would like to put this suggestion before the President now. If he is willing to extend this invitation, I hope the Department will do what it can to see that both invitations are accepted.

For the present I believe we should not try to persuade Batista to offer wider amnesty. He has already amnestied a number of political prisoners on his own, and will probably release others. The opposition is pressing him in this direction. It seems unlikely that Batista could be persuaded to offer amnesty to elements which are in open, declared rebellion against the Government, and it might be contrary to our own interests for him to do so.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1058. Confidential. Sent by pouch and received on February 11 at 4:06 p.m.

² José Pardo Llada and Miguel Suárez Fernández.

13. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith)¹

Washington, February 14, 1958.

Dear Earl: We are giving priority consideration to your telegrams Nos. 442 and 443² relative to your suggestions on our future course of action in Cuba and hope to incorporate our reply into a single instruction. We here appreciate the ability and hard work you are dedicating to this knotty problem, and the remarkable degree of progress apparent as a result. We feel, therefore that before completing this instruction we should have a résumé from you of just what steps you have taken since your return to Habana to implement the policy paper on Cuba of January 17³ which, as you know, had the Secretary’s approval. This should bring us well up to date, so that our thinking here can be guided accordingly.

In this respect, I note that in your telegram 402⁴ you mentioned that President Batista would incorporate in an address he was to make on January 24 certain suggestions you made to him the previous day. It would be most helpful to get from you a record of your conversation with the President with your views on your suggestions to him and the extent to which they were followed. To formulate a reply to the above-mentioned Embassy communications, I should appreciate receiving your comments on what has been accomplished thus far in carrying out the policy approved last month, in order for us to have a clear picture here of the situation.

The Department’s telegram No. 384 of January 22⁵ was meant to give you the green light on the memorandum of January 17 and I consider it most unfortunate that this communication was delayed some eight days in getting to you. I understand that steps have been taken to insure that the Embassy’s communications center will not permit such a delay to occur again.

It is my understanding that since January 23 you have not seen Batista and that the question of the delivery of the armored cars was not discussed with him personally but with Minister Guell. Do you consider that the message we really wanted to get across to the President on the mutual problem confronting both countries in our sale of arms to Cuba may have been dissipated in transmission?

The policy towards Cuba which we agreed upon during your recent visit has been somewhat complicated by the recent question which has risen relative to the use of MAP equipment and units by the Cuban armed forces. We feel that this matter could be treated in the context of our original policy paper with some modifications but, of course, we will first have to get the concurrence of the Department of Defense.

It would be extremely helpful to us, of course, if we could have the opportunity of discussing these matters with you personally but I believe there would be many an eyebrow raised both here and in Cuba if you were to come to Washington on consultation at this time. I should like your thoughts on the possibility of Dan Braddock’s coming up immediately for a couple of days instead, to give us the benefit of your views on the progress you are making on the policy instruction and to discuss the fast developing Cuban situation.

I would appreciate having your personal views on the progress being made on the January 17 policy paper and the advisability of Dan’s coming to Washington.⁶ There seems to be an increasing amount of violence throughout Cuba which, no doubt, is an attempt by the militant opposition to force Batista to suspend constitutional guarantees. I hope he does not have to do so, as this might have disastrous consequences. For this reason, I feel that we must act quickly.

Sincerely yours,

R.R. Rubottom, Jr.⁷

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Arms. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Leonhardy.

² Document 11 and supra.

³ Document 5.

⁴ See Document 8.

⁵ Document 7.

⁶ No reply by Smith has been found.

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

14. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 656 Havana, February 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

Revolutionary Activity in Western Oriente Province

During the past two months there have been frequent reports and rumors of activities of revolutionary forces in the area in western Oriente Province in which the cities of Manzanillo, Bayamo and Niquero are located. Some representatives in Cuba of American wire services and newspapers have filed reports at various times that the rebel forces have attacked or occupied Manzanillo. The stories have been erroneous. But since they were carried in the press in the United States, and were not subsequently corrected, they have caused some difficulty for the Embassy, and doubtless for the Department as well.

The true situation, as nearly as the Embassy can determine it, is as follows: Manzanillo, Bayamo and Niquero are the nearest cities of any consequence to that portion of the Sierra Maestra range most strongly controlled by the “26th of July” Movement forces led by Fidel Castro. There is a considerable extension of agricultural land between them and the hills. The rebels have for some time past been carrying out raids and excursions by small parties throughout the area. These movements are conducted both to obtain provisions and in connection with the rebel campaign of burning fields of sugar cane and rice. They are performed in “hit and run” fashion.

The Cuban army has found that it is unable to maintain sufficient forces in the area to prevent these raids. It has therefore decided to establish fairly strong posts in the principal villages and towns and in the sugar centrals. The rebels occasionally come close to such places, but have so far not attacked one successfully when it was properly guarded.

As a result the area in question is a sort of no man’s land. The Army holds what it considers the key points, and the rebel forces are able to operate in the rest of the area with relative impunity, so long as they keep moving. The rebels rely on mobility and surprise. The Army keeps hoping to pin them down and force a fight.

Such roads as there are in the area are generally just dirt tracks, frequently passable only with difficulty. Communication by telephone and telegraph is also difficult, except for some of the sugar centrals and the cities of Manzanillo, Bayamo and Niquero. News of clashes in the area tends to come from those places and is difficult to verify. The reports put out by the Army are incomplete and frequently inaccurate. Accurate information can be obtained only from people who live in the area, and the occasional visitor.

The rebel forces have been active during the past two months—more so than in the past. There have been a number of skirmishes with the Army, which have resulted in casualties on both sides. There have also been occasional acts of violence in the cities. But persons from the area state flatly that at no time has a body of the rebel forces entered or held any of the cities. Small commando-type groups of the rebels have carried out specific assignments which have caused them to be briefly present in the cities, such as the recent burning in Niquero of a yacht belonging to Senator Rolando Masferrer. But they do not appear ever to have attempted to take over an entire city, even briefly.

A typical example of rebel activity and subsequent erroneous reporting is the events around Manzanillo on December 24 and 25, and the resultant accounts. A considerable group of the rebels came down from the hills to engage in sugar cane burning in the area to the southeast of Manzanillo. Contrary to usual practice, the group remained out of the hills overnight. Members of the group were finally operating within some five miles of Manzanillo. Some of them appeared at the local airport, which is about that far from the city. They were in considerably greater strength than the small army garrison at the airport, which apparently prudently withdrew. The rebels went no closer to the city, and themselves withdrew fairly promptly. However, for an hour or so air traffic with the city was disrupted.

The next day Habana was full of “reliable reports” that a force of more than 200 rebel troops had seized and held Manzanillo, had liquidated the local garrison and had fought off a relief column, and had performed various other feats of derring-do. The wire services carried some of the rumors, and ended up reporting them as fact. The same rumors were fanned into flame several times during the next two weeks, and were reported at least once again as fact. Actually they were all false, and were all based on the one incident recounted above.

The rebel forces are giving an impression of increasing boldness and aggressiveness. This may be due to increased strength and skill as some claim, or to increasing desperation as others maintain. The campaign to destroy the sugar crop by burning the cane has been an almost complete failure to date. It has probably caused the “26th of July” Movement to lose both prestige and following throughout the country. It has been successful only in the area near the Sierra Maestra—particularly the area between the hills and the aforementioned cities. Reports from the area indicate that it has caused resentment among the local inhabitants, who were formerly inclined to favor the rebels. Castro and his followers have been in open, armed rebellion for 15 months now. They have succeeded in maintaining themselves in the Sierra Maestra and in carrying out sporadic acts of terrorism and sabotage throughout the country. Castro and his advisors may well feel that unless they become more aggressive and successful their following will rapidly wane, and hence may be operating more from desperation than strength.

Sooner or later, as the rebel forces become bolder and the Army more skilled and familiar with the terrain, there will probably be one or more fairly large-scale engagements between them. As this is written there are reports of such an affair which is said to have been going on for three days, at a remote location known as Pino del Agua between Bayamo and the Sierra Maestra. As usual, the reports state that several hundred rebels are involved and that the Army is using planes, tanks and artillery. It may be that these reports are basically accurate. If past experience holds true they will turn out to be considerably exaggerated. No information has been released by the Government. The papers are playing the affair in banner headlines, but state in the body of the story that the accounts are based entirely on reports of a few inhabitants of the area who have visited Bayamo and Manzanillo. The story has been filed by the wire services, and will undoubtedly be given prominent treatment by some American papers.

Regardless of the size of the engagement at Pino del Agua, the situation in the area of Oriente Province around the Sierra Maestra will probably continue to be confused and fluid for some time. The Embassy will report promptly such information as appears reliable, but sensationalist and sometimes inaccurate accounts will undoubtedly continue to appear in the press both in Cuba and in the United States.

For the Ambassador:
Daniel M. Braddock²
Counselor of Embassy

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1858. Confidential.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

15. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 20, 1958—2 p.m.

474. At my meeting with President Batista last night Batista reiterated he was determined hold honest elections. Believes Government candidate can win and plans do everything their power to honestly elect their candidate. Batista stated terrorists have stepped up activities to try prevent elections. Many opposition candidates have received threatening letters and have been told they and their families will be killed if they take part elections.

Batista also believes terrorist activities stepped up to force GOC again suspend constitutional guarantees. However I do not believe any consideration has been given to renewing such action.

I said US public hoped for free and open elections and I suggested (a) he invite world press to witness elections and (b) he ask OAS send representatives Cuba to witness elections. Batista receptive. He pointed out timing such moves very important; Government parties presently busy filing slates and any action would have follow completion slates.

Tompkins² and I impressed by both attitude and sincerity of Batista this occasion.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2058. Confidential; Priority.

² Assistant Attorney General William Tompkins was in Havana to discuss with the Cuban Government action which the Department of Justice was contemplating against Carlos Prio Socorras, former President of Cuba and a resident of Miami, for his involvement in the illegal shipment of arms to the Cuban rebels. See Document 17.

16. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 20, 1958.

476. President Batista appeared convinced at meeting February 19 that Communists actively supporting Castro. I said if he could obtain any proofs such beliefs he should turn it over to US; that if he could substantiate those charges it would destroy effectiveness Castro and his sympathizers in US. Batista stated he was trying obtain evidence from Mexico as he was fairly sure support being supplied Castro through Communists in Mexico. Said GOC presently possesses Communist literature which has been distributed by Castro people and emanates from Mexico.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2058. Confidential. Sent by pouch and received on February 22 at 1:06 p.m.

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 20, 1958.

477. At meeting with President Batista February 19 William Tompkins discussed various aspects Prio case. Question possible conviction came up. Tompkins stated Prio second offender and Justice intended make every effort convict. Yet he could not promise anything. I questioned advisability having ex-President Cuba go to jail and become martyr and wondered if it would not be in best interests US for him to leave country. Much of Prio’s effectiveness would then be lost through losing support of large Cuban colony Miami. Also, Prio would then no longer be embarrassment to US. Batista agreed. Tompkins said Justice would have this under consideration and would be guided great extent by wishes State Department. I hope State Department will follow up on this suggestion with Justice.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2058. Confidential. Sent by pouch and received on February 22 at 1:06 p.m.

18. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 54 Santiago de Cuba, February 21, 1958.

REF

CA–6192, January 21, 1958 on the same subject²

SUBJECT

Fidel Castro, 26 of July Movement

The following comments on the Cuban rebel leader, Fidel Castro and his 26 of July Movement are forwarded to the Department on the basis of an on-the-spot observation of conditions and events in the Province of Oriente during the past three years and conversations with numerous persons in all walks of life in this area. The reporting officer desires to emphasize that he does not know Fidel Castro or any member of his family personally.

Conditions and events in this country are dominated by two Cubans, bitter enemies, each apparently consumed by the desire to eliminate the other in a death struggle if necessary. These two men are President Fulgencio Batista and Fidel Castro, the subject of this despatch. Castro is, at the same time, the most loved, the most hated and the most controversial person on the Cuban political scene at the present time, depending on how the individual Cuban feels about him. Both men come from Banes, a small town on the north coast of Oriente Province which depends on [for] its existence on the United Fruit Sugar Company, an extensive subsidiary of the United Fruit Company.

President Batista acquired fame and fortune after he left Banes and he is a famous graduate of the school of experience. His life history is already well known to the Department.

Fidel Castro came from a family which was much higher on the social scale than Batista’s relatives. His father is reported to have been a sugar plantation owner who was originally a manual laborer. He developed a personal fortune by hard work and good luck. According to an American citizen residing in Banes, Castro was a “bum and a ne’er-do-well” who married a nice girl belonging to the Diaz Balart family and then left her. He attended the University of Habana. The Embassy will provide information on Castro’s activities while there. Castro is regarded locally as having wild ideas and varying from radical to liberal in his political philosophy. Present adherents are inclined to credit him with having reached political maturity and to having sobered up as he attained stature.

Fidel Castro first made local history when he and a band of young hotheads made a frontal assault on the heavily fortified Moncada Barracks in this city on July 26, 1953. He took the garrison by surprise and he nearly succeeded in capturing the fortress but the important thing now is that he failed then. He and the survivors were taken prisoners. His career would have ended there because the local populace regarded the attack on Moncada Barracks as something that only a fool would have attempted. The Castro legend started only through what is regarded by local residents as an act of brutality by the commanders and forces of the Barracks in slaughtering most of the survivors. Fidel Castro survived and was released in due course in a political amnesty.

Eventually Castro left Cuba to spend most of his time in Mexico.

Throughout most of 1956, the Castro legend grew as a series of abortive incidents attributed to his movement took place. Throughout the year, his supporters kept his flame alive locally with a promise that he would return to deliver Cuba from the “evils of the Batista regime”. As the year’s end approached, it was obvious to all Santiagueros that Castro would have to make good his boast of returning or they would lose faith in what was the only active and militant opposition to the Batista government. The reporting officer recalls that there was waning interest in his movement as December 1956 approached and Castro was now being regarded also as a braggart.

On November 30, 1956 the city of Santiago almost fell to a small band of young rebels held to be a local nucleus of the 26 of July Movement because of the identifying armbands. They could not have totaled more than 200 in number but their boldness almost carried the day and in fact the city was controlled by the rebels for about two hours that morning for the simple reason that the troops were garrisoned at Moncada Barracks when caught off-guard by the rashness of the young rebels.

This activity in Santiago de Cuba on November 30 must have been either poor timing or else it could have been a diversionary move to draw away Army strength from the landing that Fidel Castro and a band of some 80 men made on the isolated and rugged coastline on the western tip of the Sierra Maestra range two days later. Here again Fidel Castro appears to have been lucky because only a few of those men survived the landing but they fought their way up the unfriendly slopes of the Sierra. The survivors warded off half-hearted attempts by the Cuban Army to draw them out into more favorable terrain.

From this point on Fidel Castro skyrocketed to fame and it became increasingly evident that the Batista Government would not be able or willing to stamp him and his followers out. As this became obvious, his exploits were considered to be those of a latter-day Robin Hood. His successful defiance of the Cuban Army became the source of great delight and satisfaction to less daring Santiagueros.

While he became a symbol of resistance to the Batista Government, he became a hero to teenagers and young Cubans. His exploits provided vicarious pleasure to older and less daring Santiagueros and, as was inevitable, they became a headache eventually as Cuban youngsters began to disappear from their homes with the later knowledge that they had gone to the Sierra to join the Castro forces. As supplies and recruits began to filter through the porous Cuban Army lines, Castro’s forces grew in strength and equipment. They began to make attacks and forays on isolated Army outposts and unarmed areas. They expanded their area of operations but always within the shadows of the Sierra Maestra. They knew that they could not defeat the Cuban Army in a pitched battle without artillery and motorized equipment, but they also knew that they were safe from annihilation so long as they remained within the shelter of the mountains where the terrain factor favored them.

At year’s end, the Castro forces were reported to number between 500 and 1,000 well-armed, well-trained and rugged troops. They had not defeated the Cuban Army or toppled the Batista Government but they had harassed it and had seriously undermined its morale. In the eyes of the Santiagueros, the Castro forces were the one hope that remained for removing what they referred to as the “Batista yoke”.

Enthusiasm for the Castro cause waned and wavered at the end of 1957 as the famous leader failed to make good on his boast to destroy the Cuban sugar crop by burning the canefields. Psychologically this was a bad move because it alienated many of his more effective supporters in the peasant and laboring classes who saw burning of canefields as removal of their livelihood. These were the people who had hidden his men, provided primitive transportation, fresh food and, of paramount importance, loyal guides to traverse the unfriendly terrain of the Sierra. In the cities and particularly in Santiago de Cuba the citizenry began to lose faith again as the attempt on the canefields failed and no successful militant activity was taking place. Santiago de Cuba returned to it most normal pace in two years. On paper the Castro group had disowned the Junta de Liberacion Cubana which had earlier formed a united front in a meeting in Miami. This was followed by the arrest of three rebel leaders, Dr. Santos Buch, Javier Pazos and Dr. Armando Hart while returning to Santiago from the Sierra during January 1958. All of these incidents contributed to the fortunes of the Castro movement reaching the lowest point of the past year.

During the past two weeks the combined militant opposition groups have returned to the fight with renewed vigor and strength, with numerous acts of terrorism and sabotage a daily occurrence. The Castro forces have returned to their tactics of wearing the Cuban Army down with the hope of having the enlisted men turn against the officers or causing such a split among the officer corps that a military junta will emerge upon removal of the Batista Government. In their campaign of destruction the rebels don’t seem to discriminate and their recent targets have included a storage tank belonging to Sinclair Oil company which contained about 135,000 gallons of fuel. Two days ago a local branch factory of Cuban Air Products Corporation, an American owned company, was destroyed by flames. At the local level, the railroads and bus lines have sustained heavy losses through derailments, rolling equipment fires, etc.

The rebels’ aim seems to be to cause enough destruction and enough damage to the Cuban economy to force a change of government.

Although apparently helpless to deal a death blow to the Batista Government, the Castro Movement and other opposition forces are far from discouraged and continue to nibble away at the Armed Forces. They have managed to maintain a steady pressure on Batista and the man on the street might well wonder how long the bloodshed will continue on both sides. As of this writing, acts of violence have increased throughout the island and there seems to be evidence of greater unity and determination of purpose than ever before by the opposition. It might appear that the Batista Government can only hope for a containing operation in order to survive.

Fidel Castro and his 26 of July Movement appear to have grown from an annoying thorn in the side of the Batista Government to a slowly spreading cancerous tumor. Through persistence and the benevolent attitude of several American reporters and the American press, this man and his movement have managed to become sentimental favorites in the United States to such an extent that the Batista Government is now on the defensive. The Government has made no attempt at the local level to curry favor with the Cuban public, choosing the more direct expedient of recourse to force to maintain itself in power, a move which has only strengthened the opposition’s charges of dictatorship. The Fidelistas, too, have resorted to force but, in the main, they have confined their violence to the Armed Forces and the “chivato”, a term applied to an informer in the pay of the Government. The Government, instead of apprehending these obvious lawbreakers and submitting them to due process and trial in Cuban courts, applies its own system of justice which is swift, effective and without appeal. As a daily occurrence bodies of young men are found hanged or lying along the roadside with as many as 40 bullet holes.

In Santiago de Cuba, Fidel Castro and his 26 of July Movement are anything and everything to anyone and everyone. The reporting officer has seen a Catholic priest intimately connected with the local youth movement of the Church go into a nervous rapture when the discussion switches to Fidel Castro. Castro, he will say, represents the thwarted aspirations of Cuban youth and he can do no wrong. He will provide Cuban youth with a better and safer Cuba where every Cuban can look at his fellow citizen straight in the eye. Is Castro a dangerous radical or communist? No, this priest will say, Fidel has one or more priests in the Sierra now and more may be on the way. This priest has blessed a number of medallions which were forwarded to the men with Castro.

The reporting officer has seen Army officers go into a blazing rage when Fidel is mentioned. To them Castro is the vilest, lowest form of humanity. They report that Castro and his brother, Raul, are either communists or the nearest thing to it.

The Castro movement has an unusual appeal to all sectors of Cuban society, either legitimate or convenient. Monetary support for Castro and his movement comes from the wealthier classes of this city, many Santiagueros having been quite generous with their pocket-books. Many of them have hidden newspapermen and free lance writers in their homes while arrangements were being made for completion of their journey to or from the Sierra.

To the youth of Oriente Province, Fidel Castro is not unlike a Pied Piper beckoning to them. He has provided a continuing headache for sober minded parents in this area because their youngsters either want to go to the Sierra with Fidel or want to contribute to the cause at the local level through sabotage, arson, etc. The Consulate is accosted daily by frantic parents who want to get their youngsters to the United States because the local authorities are looking for them or else think that they are.

Perhaps of equal importance to the Department and its observers in evaluating the ultimate outcome in this deadly struggle between Fidel Castro and President Batista, is the future status of the youth of this country. This may well turn out to be the lost decade for Cuban youth in one sense although Cuban youth may argue that their’s is a righteous cause. Those youngsters who desire to remain aloof from the present strife cannot remain in this country. Where they or their parents can afford it, they have gone to Europe or the United States. Others have had to flee and are scattered throughout the United States and Latin America biding their time and waiting. The Cuban Universities have been closed or inoperative for the past two years thereby affecting all sectors of Cuban society willfully or otherwise. In some cases the losses arising from this academic paralysis may be irreparable.

Because of an apparent lack of centralized control over these youthful groups, they have not been organized into effective brigades which could strike at the Army. Instead they have struck out blindly and futilely with the result that they are cut down singly with mounting losses as the days go by. Many of these youngsters have been killed as a result of actions and deeds that were pure stupidity.

These youngsters will present another problem which is long range in nature. Many of them have grown accustomed to violence, to hit and run tactics, and to the effective use of weapons and firearms. They may be hard to keep in line when the present civil strife comes to an end and many of them are potential criminals.

It is a foregone conclusion that the average Cuban is remarkably naive when it comes to politics and he prefers to be guided by his emotions than by reasoning. Most of the Cubans that the reporting officer has talked to will not own up to the possibility that the Castro movement might be infiltrated with communists. They will say that such a thing is unthinkable and preposterous. They will state that Castro is Cuban to the nth degree and that he would never allow this to happen. The reporting officer has asked Cubans to comment on allegations that one of Castro’s trusted lieutenants, Dr. Ernesto Guevara, an Argentine, is a communist or a sympathizer. Invariably they will counter with vehement denials but will admit that they know nothing of his background and will prefer to dismiss the conversation with suggestions that Dr. Guevara is an idealistic adventurer.

The presence of an estimated one thousand men in the Sierra is a natural opportunity for communist infiltration. Fidel Castro’s men must be tired, lonely, living close to nature and facing death at every turn. As such, they must have become bitter against society and with such a frame of mind they could conceivably provide ready reception to Russian agents. This is one of the dangers of the continuing struggle between Fidel Castro and the Batista Government.

While many of the Santiagueros revere Fidel Castro and his Movement, some of them have begun to experience sobering reflections about the rebel leader. They have detected a recent tendency on Fidel Castro’s part to behave and to issue instructions with a definite autocratic attitude. With certain misgivings, they are beginning to wonder whether he will be willing to settle for his role as the so-called liberator of Cuba in the final settlement of accounts. Many of them are beginning to fear that Fidel Castro might emerge as the new strong man of Cuba. Many of them are beginning to think that Cuba faces a grim and uncertain future with no political peace in sight.

Oscar H. Guerra

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.52/2–2158. Confidential. Drafted by Guerra.

² 

This circular airgram, sent to Santiago de Cuba, Havana, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Guatemala City, Mexico City, San Jose, and San Salvador, reads in part as follows:

“In order to assist the Department in arriving at an objective and positive evaluation of Fidel Castro and his 26th of July movement it would be greatly appreciated if the addressees would make a special effort to provide information regarding this man and his party. The information now available is contradictory, inconclusive and of inadequate detail. More knowledge concerning Castro’s past associations, past activities and anything which might shed light on his ideology and that of those closest to him is needed. It is suggested that [less than 1 line not declassified] be utilized whenever appropriate”. (ibid., 737.52/1–2158)

19. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, February 21, 1958—8:31 p.m.

442. Department concerned over reports from the press and other sources indicating increasing opposition to electoral solution in Cuba. These include among others (1) recent statements opposition leaders in U.S. that fair elections under Batista impossible due (a) fraud in registering voters and Government control of carnets; (b) suspension guarantees during reorganization parties; (c) increasing violence; (d) GOC failure grant at least partial amnesty political prisoners; (e) continued suspension guarantees in Oriente; and (f) rearrest or refusal release political prisoners despite writs habeas corpus; (2) withdrawal Pardo Llada’s PNR from elections and pressure being placed on Grau by Autenticos in Oriente to withdraw; (3) recent declarations Civic Institutions and Juventud Catolica adverse to GOC and elections; (4) indications religious hierarchy becoming active against Government and not supporting elections; (5) lack of Batista initiative to reassure prospective voters by meeting challenge of opponents through clear definition of what Government considers fair assurances of honest elections and inviting bona fide counter proposals as basis for conferences seeking compromise either by direct talks or through intermediaries; (6) inviting exiles’ return with guarantees on their pledge abstain from revolutionary activities while campaigning politically.

In view above Department desires Embassy’s appraisal soonest present popular support in Cuba for elections and steps GOC could be encouraged to take to stem apparent rising tide against electoral solution. NY Times editorial today states GOC has taken no steps insure free elections thus they offer no solution. Department inclined to believe immediate announcement by Batista of invitation to neutrals to observe elections (Embtel 474² ) followed by other positive steps might stem such adverse reaction US press and encourage popular participation.

Department would be interested in Embassy’s considered opinion on what both Government and pro-election opposition conceivably might do to promote reasonable election and diminish growing violence.

FYI Reference Embtel 474, Item b, third paragraph, OAS has shown reluctance supply observers whereas UN has done so previous occasions including recent Costa Rican elections. Figueres subsequently praised this procedure.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2158. Secret. Drafted by Wieland and Leonhardy, cleared with Snow and Rubottom, and approved by Wieland who signed for Dulles.

² Document 15.

20. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 26, 1958—2 p.m.

490. Deptel 442, February 21.² Although political opposition has maintained free and open elections only solution political problems, they discouraged for following reasons:

(A) They still doubtful Batista will hold honest elections.

(B) Opposition divided.

(C) No new strong leadership.

Because of basic US foreign policy of non-intervention I do not see how we can do anything be helpful regarding points (B) (C). On point (A) Batista and GOC have assured me will hold free open elections and I am trying not only obtain free open elections but actions on part GOC engender hope in people such elections possible (Embtel 474³ ). If Department believes advisable and so instructs I will pressure Batista not to wait completion filing of slates (Embtel 474) but take part or all following actions soonest:

(A) Make public announcement will invite world press witness coming elections.

(B) Ask OAS send representatives Cuba witness elections.

(C) Invite UN supply observers witness elections.

(D Invite opposition party leaders appear on TV, press to discuss steps ensure free elections.

(E Invite leaders responsible civic groups confer GOC on means create atmosphere favorable to elections.

(F) Give publicity provisions elections laws and statement GOC emphasizing will abide by those laws.

Department should bear in mind revolutionary groups determined do all possible prevent elections. These groups hope achieve power by force or conspiracy and are responsible stepped-up campaign terrorism, sabotage. Further, revolutionary opposition leaders abroad—with exception representatives 26 July movement—have insignificant following in Cuba. For these reasons Embassy believes it is doubtful that revolutionary opposition could be reincorporated into political scene now and undesirable for US to advocate this.

Department should also bear in mind GOC determined win elections and appears confident.

We do not maintain that coming elections will solve underlying political problems. Yet we believe that continuing efforts to achieve free and open elections, in as favorable atmosphere as possible, is only course open to us.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2658. Secret; Priority.

² Supra.

³ Document 15.

21. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 686 Havana, February 28, 1958.

SUBJECT

Information concerning Fidel Castro’s “26th of July” Movement: Events at Pino del Agua

Homer Bigart, well-known American newsman now with the New York Times, returned to Habana on February 23 from two weeks spent in the Sierra Maestra with Fidel Castro and his forces there. He has since furnished an officer of the Embassy with the following information and impressions.

Bigart was impressed with the ease and comparative freedom of travel into and within the Sierra Maestra. His group had no trouble in evading the few army patrols in the area. The headquarters at which he spent the time appears to be fairly near Manzanillo—Bigart said the route of access led up the Yara River. The area is not heavily forested in accordance with the usual concept of “jungle”, but rather is covered mainly with scrub growth, with many clearings. The country is very rough. The headquarters appeared to be at least semi-permanent, and was not moved while he was there. Living conditions were primitive. Food was plentiful but of fairly poor quality and monotonous—Bigart says he never wants to see a “malanga” again. He met an excellent surgeon and physician there who was caring for most of the troops—Dr. Julio Martinez Paez. Dr. Martinez said that health conditions were fairly good except for the fact that most of the men have intestinal parasites—a condition he described as common in Cuban rural areas. Bathing was a luxury most of the men had apparently decided to forego for the duration. As a whole, the group was definitely dirty and sloppy in appearance. The dirtiest of the bunch was the one Roman Catholic priest Bigart met—Father Sardiñas. He was thoroughly unprepossessing. [1 sentence (less than 1 line) not declassified] He was the only religious Bigart saw or heard of. There was no indication that there were other Catholic priests or Protestant ministers with the group, as spokesmen of the group have frequently alleged.

Castro and others of the group stated that the political and economic program of the “26th of July” Movement does not exist yet in other than informal and nebulous form. Bigart was told that the program is now being drafted by “a group of professors of the University of Oriente”. From other sources the Embassy has heard in the past that this group is headed by Dr. Regino Boti, and that Dr. Rafael Font probably works with him. Both are said to be sound economists, though relatively unknown. Boti studied at one time at Columbia University and Font, who is also a public accountant, has taken courses in the United States.

A young lawyer named Humberto Sori Marin is acting as legal advisor and sort of one-man judicial system for the Movement in the Sierra Maestra. Bigart was favorably impressed by him. Sori said he had drawn up the legal code which the movement had imposed on the area under its control. A total of 60 persons had been tried under the code. Twenty-eight had been convicted, and 8 executed by firing squad. Crimes punishable by death were murder, rape, banditry and espionage.

Bigart reported that there was no evidence of an anti-American bias among the people he talked to. Castro and the others said that once they obtained power it would be necessary to re-examine the contracts which had been negotiated by the Batista regime, but that only obviously bad or corrupt ones would be canceled. “Badly run” public utilities would have to be nationalized—but none were specifically mentioned. They did not think it would be necessary to nationalize or expropriate land in order to obtain a more equitable distribution. This could be accomplished by distribution of land now owned by the government and by revised taxation aimed at discouraging the holding of idle lands. Castro personally thought the practice of 50–50 distribution of profits from petroleum operations was unfair to the government, and that in the event oil was discovered in Cuba some other ratio of distribution of profits should be adopted.

As was to be expected, Castro and his associates complained bitterly of grants and sales by the United States of military equipment to the Batista Government. They said that such aid was the fundamental reason that Batista was able to remain in power. Castro felt that a secret agreement probably existed between the Untied States and Batista covering such aid.

Bigart was frankly puzzled by confused comments from Castro and others concerning a treaty with the United States under which Cuba had received $600 million, one article of which they held was unconstitutional. They felt that the treaty imposed unfair treatment on Cuban companies. This may be an example of immature and inaccurate thinking by Castro and many of his leaders. The only possible explanation the Embassy can work out for such obscure remarks is that some of Castro’s advisers have seen references in any of several publications which mentioned the size of private United States investments in Cuba a few years ago as around $600 million. To this they may have added some mistaken reasoning in connection with the Investment Guaranty Agreement.² However, this is merely speculation on our part.

The National Directorate of the movement now consists of ten members. Bigart met Lucas Moran and Vilma Espin in the hills, both of whom may be members of the Directorate. These people spoke of Castro as merely the military commander for the movement, subject to the will of the Directorate. In contrast, Castro spoke and acted as an absolute ruler, and appeared to be obeyed as such.

Bigart found Castro willing to discuss terms for ceasing his armed rebellion—but these terms would certainly be unacceptable to the Cuban Government. Castro laid down as his first condition withdrawal of the Cuban Army from all of Oriente Province. The civilian officials of the Government could remain, but the “26th of July” Movement would take over military control. The Government would also have to declare a general amnesty, postpone elections, and permit the Castro movement to organize a political party and run Dr. Manuel Urrutia Lleó for the Presidency.

Castro said that he could put four hundred well-armed men into any one action. That would be an all out effort. He had a few hundred additional men, but some had to be held in reserve for possible attacks from other quarters, some had to perform housekeeping duties, and there were not enough weapons to arm others. The men were armed with M–1 rifles, shotguns, and revolvers. They got very little military equipment from abroad or elsewhere in Cuba. Most of the rifles had been captured from the Cuban Army. Some of the ammunition had been captured, and some had been stolen by sympathizers. Castro said they had some .30 caliber machine guns, a few bazookas, and some mortars. Bigart saw them practicing with a rifle which had been modified into a “grenade launcher”, capable of throwing a grenade somewhat more than a hundred yards. He had the impression that this was what the Castro forces called a mortar.

Bigart was struck by the confident, aggressive tone of Castro’s conversation. Castro spoke of dominating most of Oriente Province and of being able to defeat the detachments of the Cuban Army stationed there. Bigart asked how he could expect to defeat around 4,000 well-armed men, when by Castro’s own admission the most he could muster for action were 400 lightly armed fighters. Castro’s reply, as Bigart noted it down, was that “one has to have faith”. Castro also spoke confidently of a spontaneous uprising of the Cuban people in support of his Movement. Bigart felt that Castro had an exaggerated impression of the strength of his Movement elsewhere in Cuba, and particularly in the cities.

The action around Pino del Agua, near Bayamo in Oriente Province, took place just as Bigart was entering the Sierra Maestra. Castro told him that the Movement had assembled a force of 300 men for what was intended to be a raid followed by ambush, led by himself, Guevara, and Raul Castro. One small force raided the installations at Pino del Agua, and decimated the small military detachment there. Other groups were concealed in the hills above the locality. Still another group, much the strongest, was concealed along the road leading to Pino del Agua from Bayamo. The reasoning was that the Army detachment at Pino del Agua would manage to get off word of the attack and request reinforcements, as indeed they did. The attacking force of the group was to hang around, giving the impression that they were relatively weak and could be caught. The Army was expected to rush in heavy reinforcements. These would be permitted to reach Pino del Agua, whereupon they would be attacked by the forces of the movement concealed along the road and in the surrounding hills—the force along the road also holding off any further reinforcements.

What happened was that by chance there was a fairly large patrol on the road between Bayamo and Pino del Agua at the time of the first attack and appeal for reinforcements. That patrol was at once ordered to investigate what the Army thought was a raid by a small force. It was almost completely wiped out by the Castro forces—Castro said two soldiers got away. But it apparently radioed out word of the situation before being over-run, and subsequent Army reinforcements did not fall into the trap. Bigart was shown papers belonging to a Lt. Pedro L. Suarez Lorenzo, who Castro said was killed in the engagement, and spoke with a Lt. Evelio Laferte, who said he had led the reinforcing patrol which was trapped. Castro said he lost 3 men killed and an unspecified number wounded. Bigart got the impression that the Army had lost some 40 men in killed and wounded. Castro insisted that the engagement had been a great victory. He said his forces had lost three machine guns, but had captured five machine guns and several rifles, plus considerable ammunition and several prisoners. Castro said that his forces had formerly given prisoners a choice of joining the movement or leaving the hills on promise to go into hiding and not rejoin the Army, but that lately they were keeping all prisoners.

For the Ambassador:
Eugene A. Gilmore, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2858. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

² For text of the agreement providing guarantees against inconvertibility of investment receipts, as effected by an exchange of notes at Havana on February 4, 1957, and entered into force on November 29, 1957, see 8 UST 2375.

22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, February 28, 1958—1:51 p.m.

462. Embtel 442.² Department has carefully reviewed recommendations contained final paragraph Embtel 442 but considers it necessary call formally to attention Cuban Government reported use these units in contravention Article I paragraph two of Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of March 7, 1952.³ Congressional interest in how MAP assistance is used by other Governments is particularly keen now due Ifni and Tunisian developments. Furthermore reference is made to previous representations to GOC pursuant Deptel 175.⁴

Department planning send Cuban Ambassador note stating in essential part “United States Government has received reports Government of Cuba may be disregarding provisions Article I paragraph 2 this Agreement. United States Government would appreciate being informed whether such reports true and if such is case requests Government of Cuba make every effort comply with terms of this paragraph of Agreement”.

Department points out that paragraph two, article one, MDA agreement stipulates Government of Cuba will not without prior agreement of Government of US devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished. Department prefers leave decision regarding alternative courses of action foreseen in agreement to Cuban Government. The alternatives are (1) to request prior US agreement to use of MAP assistance for internal security or (2) not to use it for other than missions important to hemisphere defense.

FYI In event Cuban Government elects request US prior agreement Department would take such request under consideration. End FYI

Additional instruction in this connection now being prepared in light Embtel 442 and other communications.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/2–758. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart and Wieland; cleared with Snow, Barnes, John B. Rehm (L), Dillon, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Wieland who signed for Dulles.

² Document 11.

³ For text, see 3 UST 2901.

⁴ Dated September 19, 1957. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–1857)

23. Editorial Note

On February 28, the Episcopate of the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba issued a public appeal to “all those militating in antagonistic camps to cease in their use of violence” and to work for the establishment of “a government of national unity capable of leading our homeland back to a political life of peace and normalcy”. On March 1 and March 3, President Batista, responding to the Episcopate’s appeal, released statements similarly calling for an end to the violence but avoiding any reference to the Episcopate’s call for a government of national unity. Translations of the Episcopate’s appeal and of Batista’s statements were enclosed with despatch 701 from Havana, March 6.

In this despatch, drafted by Topping, the Embassy analyzed the significance of the Episcopate’s appeal:

“The point of greatest interest in the Episcopate’s appeal is that calling for a ‘government of national unity’. Just what is meant is not clear from the statement. In attempts to clarify it, the Ambassador has spoken with the Papal Nuncio, and officers of the Embassy have spoken with other contacts including Julio Morales Gomez, a principal leader in the Catholic Action movement. The Nuncio is intimately acquainted with the background of the statement, and attended the meeting of the Catholic bishops at which the final version of the statement was approved. From those conversations it is apparent that the Catholic Church believes that the Government and the various opposition parties and groups, including the revolutionary movements, are at present so far apart that it is not possible to hold free elections. The Church believes that to correct that situation a “government of national unity” should be formed, which would include members of the various opposition parties in the Cabinet. The Church feels that representatives of Fidel Castro’s ’26th of July’ Movement should be included, or at a minimum that that Movement should approve of the new Government. Some sources have said that it would be necessary to appoint opposition or ‘non-political’ figures to top positions in various governmental agencies in addition to the Cabinet. They say that what they have in mind is something like a coalition government, to include representatives of all the opposing factions in the Cuban political scene as well as non-political forces such as the civic institutions. The Church representatives said that the statement of the Episcopate is intended as a ‘bridge of understanding’ between the various groups. They add that the Church is not prepared to act as mediator between those groups, but would lend its support to mediation efforts.

“On the key question of whether Batista could remain as President, and head the ‘national unity government’, the Church representatives hedge. They give the impression that the Church has reached no conclusion on that point, and feels that the answer would be developed during the period of mediation.

“The action of the Catholic Episcopate in issuing the statement appears to have been taken in response to two pressures. The first is a deep concern over the existing situation, characterized by continuing violence and bloodshed. The Church feels that the opposing forces are in an impasse, with neither able to overcome the other and unwilling to compromise. The other pressure has been engendered within the Church itself, and is a combination of strongly anti-Government and pro-revolutionary feelings among Church figures, plus a drift to an anti-Government position on the part of a large number of parochial priests, who are the Church group most intimately aware of the toll of the continuing violence in terms of human suffering and tragedy and of the rising tide of hatred”.

The Embassy believed that the appeal was “neither anti-Government nor anti-Batista except in the sense that it indicates that the government is unable to handle the existing situation and should make concessions”. Nevertheless, the government was “obviously unhappy over it, feeling that it weakens their position”. On the other hand, the revolutionary opposition claimed that the appeal represented “outright support for them, which of course it is not”. A number of Catholic lay organizations, civic groups, and the Cuban Confederation of Labor endorsed the appeal, as did the outlawed and clandestine Cuban Communist party, the Popular Socialist Party. The Embassy concluded:

“The statement of the Catholic Episcopate has aroused great interest. It is a serious and considered effort by the Church to attempt to arrange a peaceful solution of the present tense and violent situation in Cuba. It is a grave step for the Church to take, since it injects the Church into the political situation. It also poses a delicate problem for the Government, which apparently hopes to respond to the appeal sympathetically without surrendering control and without forming a ‘government of national unity’. A negative or hostile response by the Government could well cause the Church to become oppositionist”. (Department of State, Central Files, 837.413/3–658)

24. Editorial Note

On March 3, Daniel Braddock, Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in Havana, returned to Washington for consultations in the Department of State regarding progress being made on the course of action taken since Ambassador Smith’s visit to Washington in mid-January. In a memorandum of March 7 to Deputy Assistant Secretary Snow, William A. Wieland discussed subsequent developments in Cuba, noting that, as a result of the discussions in the Department with Braddock, “it was agreed that about the most effective suggestion that Ambassador Smith could reasonably make to President Batista at this time which might be helpful in bringing about public acceptance of the forthcoming elections would be that of inviting representatives of various Cuban civic, labor, press, and church organizations, etc., to discuss ways and means of assuring these organizations that the elections will be acceptable”. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/ 3–758)

25. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 687 Havana, March 3, 1958.

REF

Emb. Desp. No. 599, February 5, 1958²

Emb Desp. No. 663, February 20, 1958³

SUBJECT

Ernesto Guevara Serna: Information Concerning His Political Orientation and Activities with the “26th of July” Movement

Homer Bigart, well-known American newsman now with the New York Times, returned to Habana on February 23, 1958 from two weeks in the Sierra Maestra with Fidel Castro and his forces there. He had an extended conversation with an officer of the Embassy the following day, during which he furnished the following information concerning Ernesto Guevara Serna.

Mr. Bigart had had several fairly lengthy conversations with Guevara. He had been handicapped by lack of a common language, and the necessity to use an interpreter, but had learned a good deal during the meetings. Guevara said he had not been educated in France, as some allege. He had never been out of the Western hemisphere. All his education had been obtained in Argentina, and he had been graduated as a doctor of medicine from the University of Buenos Aires. Guevara said he was not a communist. He was a leftist and liberal. He had joined the Arbenz government in Guatemala only four days before its downfall, as a physician. He had been completely in favor of the Arbenz government. That government had not been communist, or under communist influence. Rather, it had represented the true expression of the freely expressed will of the Guatemalan people. Its overthrow had been engineered by the United States.

Guevara had expressed rather strong anti-American sentiments. He felt that the United States constantly meddled in Latin American affairs, was imperialistic, supported dictatorial regimes, and frequently attempted to act contrary to the will of the citizens of Latin American nations. He had no convincing reply to a question from Bigart as to what he, an Argentine, was doing in Cuba if not meddling in the affairs of other nations.

Bigart says that Guevara appeared to be in good health, and showed no signs of any injuries.

Bigart asked Fidel Castro why he had accepted Guevara’s services in the first place; why he kept him; and, why Guevara had a position of importance in the forces in the Sierra. He pointed out to Castro that Guevara was by his own words an extreme leftist, that there were allegations that he was a Communist, and that it appeared somewhat strange for Castro to rely so heavily on an Argentine, while claiming that his movement was a true expression of the desires of the majority of the Cuban people. Castro said that he had originally taken on Guevara since he was the only medical doctor he could find in Mexico willing to join with him. He said that Guevara had turned out to be a highly capable fighter and military leader, and had naturally been used in that capacity. He stated flatly that he, Castro, was the supreme commander of the movement. Hence, he added, it really made little difference what Guevara’s political beliefs were, since Castro determined policy.

Bigart added that Castro’s complacency concerning Guevara was not shared by several other members of the leading group of the “26th of July” Movement with whom he spoke. He felt that they were worried and sensitive about the charge that there is Communist influence in their movement. One of those leaders stated that Castro was only the military or field commander, and that party policy was determined by the National Directorate, of which Castro was only one among equals. Bigart felt that regardless of protestations to the contrary, it appeared clear that Castro was really running the show, and that all others simply took orders from him, at least in the Sierra Maestra.

From other sources, the Embassy has learned that the full name of Guevara’s father, mentioned in the despatch under reference, is Ernesto Guevara Lynch. He is a first cousin of the present Argentine Ambassador to Cuba, Rear Admiral Raul A. Lynch. The father apparently has little use for Ambassador Lynch. He is reported to have inquired of the Ambassador several months ago if he would grant asylum in the Argentine Embassy here to Guevara Serna, and to have received a flat refusal. Interestingly, officers of the Argentine Embassy here who are normally frank and outspoken in their relations with the Embassy have denied that there is any relationship between the Guevaras and Ambassador Lynch.

For the Ambassador:
Eugene A. Gilmore
Counselor of Embassy

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–558. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

² In despatch 599, the Embassy provided biographical information on Ernesto Guevara Serna. (ibid., 735.521/2–558)

³ In despatch 663, the Embassy provided biographical information on Ernesto Guevara Serna’s wife, Hilda Gadea, and an assessment of his political orientation. (ibid., 723.52/2–2058)

26. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 3, 1958—4 p.m.

498. If steps planned in Deptel 462² should become public knowledge, situation in Cuba now such that result might be downfall Batista before elections.

Prior to taking formal steps outlined in Deptel 462 recommend Department consider authorizing me inform Batista such steps will be taken unless he agrees to take immediately part or all actions outlined in Embtel 490.³

It has been our hope that such actions (Embtel 490) will lead Cuban people to believe that solution of present situation can be obtained peacefully through elections rather than by violence.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–358. Secret; Priority.

² Document 22.

³ Document 20.

27. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Cuban Ambassador (Campa) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow), Department of State, Washington, March 3, 1958¹

Washington, March 3, 1958

SUBJECT

Arms to Cuba

Ambassador Campa, at the invitation of Mr. Snow, called on the latter today and, after a brief exchange of pleasantries, was handed a note² concerning reports of use by the Cuban government of grant military assistance in violation of the terms of the MDA agreement.

Ambassador Campa asked if this action represented a change in U.S. Government policy toward the Cuban situation. Mr. Snow assured him that it did not.

Ambassador Campa said that in view of the attacks by armed insurrectionists against Cuban authorities, the Cuban Government naturally would utilize the means available to it to combat such attacks. Mr. Snow explained that Ambassador Campa would undoubtedly wish to understand that the Department of State was making no reference to any arms or other resources at the disposal of the Cuban Government except those included in grant assistance supplied to Cuba under the terms of the 1952 MDA agreement.

Ambassador Campa contended that when a revolt such as that which took place in Cienfuegos in September occurs, the United States could hardly expect the Cuban Government to delay its action against such revolt until it requests U.S. consent for use of the grant military assistance.

It was explained to the Ambassador that the United States in its note had in mind recurring reports of protracted use by the Cuban Government of grant assistance and that the note did not refer specifically to the incident at Cienfuegos.

Ambassador Campa sought reassurance that the United States was distinguishing between grant assistance and purchased material. Mr. Snow confirmed this. Ambassador Campa thereupon said that in view of the small amount of assistance received under the grant, the problem presented by the U.S. note would probably not be of major proportions.

The Ambassador said that he would forward the note to his Government and would not discuss it with anyone. He asked if the Department of State intended to give information concerning the note to the press. Mr. Snow said that the Department did not intend to do so, “at least for the moment”.

(Subsequently, at Mr. Snow’s request, I informed Ambassador Campa that Mr. Rubottom would probably be interrogated on the subject of arms to Cuba during his appearance before a Senate committee and might have some remarks on the subject of arms to Cuba. I said, however, that Mr. Rubottom would give careful consideration to whatever statements he made on the subject.)

On leaving Mr. Snow’s office, Ambassador Campa remarked that the note “will certainly not be of any help to the Government of Cuba”. It was explained to the Ambassador that it was unfortunate that the alleged violations of the agreement left us no recourse but to make it the subject of the note that we had handed him which indeed was couched in the friendliest terms possible under the circumstances. He agreed and made his farewells.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/3–358. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland and initialed by Wieland and Snow.

² In this note, dated March 3, the U.S. Government inquired whether the reports were true that the Cuban Government was disregarding the provisions of the 1952 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. (ibid., 737.5–MSP/3–358)

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 4, 1958—2 p.m.

500. Guell informed me today:

1. GOC determined to preserve law and order, as best they can, and to have honest elections.

2. New Cabinet to make public announcement that GOC will conduct “pure” elections with guarantee that everyone will have opportunity to vote.

3. Although not yet definite, Guell states he thinks new Cabinet will make public announcement:

(A) That GOC will invite world press to witness elections.

(B) That UN will be asked to send representatives Cuba to observe elections.²

Above is in accordance with suggestions Embtel 474³ except GOC to invite UN observers instead of OAS representatives. Such actions will be helpful in indicating GOC effort to hold honest elections in favorable atmosphere.

GOC not yet informed by Campa of steps taken as outlined in Deptel 462.⁴

I asked Guell to tell Batista action necessitated by consistent pressure from Congress and that basic friendly attitude of US to GOC had not changed.

Guell stated publicity this action could be very damaging to GOC effort preserve law and order and that Batista would probably desire to have personal exchange of views within next week.⁵

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–458. Secret; Niact.

² In telegram 501 from Havana, March 4, Smith reported Batista’s request that the plans to invite U.N. observers to witness the elections “be kept completely secret”. (ibid.)

³ Document 15.

⁴ Document 22.

⁵ In telegram 502 from Havana, March 4, Smith said he had subsequently been informed by Guell that Batista “fully understands the situation” and if the shipment of arms was embarrassing to the United States, he was prepared, with the concurrence of the U.S. Government, to purchase arms from private sources in the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–458)

29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, March 5, 1958—6:38 p.m.

470. Embtel 490.² Department pleased learn steps contemplated GOC create favorable election climate (Embtel 500³ ) as suggested points (A) and (C) second paragraph Embtel, and feels you should express these sentiments to Batista. At same time you may, without using pressure, and if you feel your remarks will not be regarded as intervention, suggest steps (D), (E) with some modification, and (F).

Department feels step (E) should be enlarged in scope to include leaders Church, labor unions, press and political opposition, etc., who would meet with Batista to discuss ways and means assuring their respective organizations honest elections will be held.

Timing of approach to Batista left your discretion.

With further regard point (C), please note discussion this point in separate message being sent reporting Rubottom’s testimony before Senate Committee today.⁴ He did not oppose Cuba’s requesting UN observers but did consider inappropriate for US govt to make such proposal to UN.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–458. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy and cleared with Wieland and Snow who signed for Dulles.

² Document 20.

³ Supra.

⁴ Rubottom’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that day was summarized in telegram 469 to Havana, March 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/3–558)

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 11, 1958—noon.

524. Catholic Church now openly and actively sponsoring same objective as ours—a peaceful solution.

Papal Nuncio² informed me eve March 10:

(A) If present Harmony Commission is unable to make progress Church may suggest present Commission retire.

(B) Then Church may appoint committee of Bishops consisting of Archbishops of Oriente, Matanzas, and Las Villas.

(C) Castro’s life was saved by Perez Serrante, Archbishop of Oriente, some years ago. Church hopes Castro still has sense of obligation.

(D) Archbishop of Oriente will exert full pressure persuade Castro agree to peaceful solution.

Two factors in situation are disturbing:

(1) Efforts of Harmony Commission do not yet have full confidence and support from all principal non-revolutionary groups. We believe Commission should have concentrated on obtaining such support.

(2) Influence of 26 July movement appears to have increased alarmingly within recent weeks. This renders more difficult reaching of any understanding with Batista.

Castro rejected peace negotiations through non-political Harmony Commission (Embtel 523, March 11³ ). Castro repeated demand that GOC allow Cuban newspaperman visit Sierra Maestra doubt [re-doubt?].

Present political situation is delicate, difficult and unpredictable.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1158. Secret; Priority.

² Monsignor Luigi Centoz.

³ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1158)

31. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 12, 1958—11 a.m.

525. For Rubottom. Guell visited residence last night for preparatory exchange of views before my meeting with Batista. Guell advised

(A) Situation in Cuba very serious.

(B) Batista believes it will be necessary again suspend constitutional guarantees to preserve order until GOC can hold honest elections.

(C) Batista had advanced elections to June 1 at request of opposition and he is now prepared to postpone elections at request of opposition.

I told Guell

(A) US earnestly hopes for peaceful solution.

(B) US would be disappointed to hear that guarantees may again be suspended.

(C) US foreign policy is one of strict non-intervention and we will continue to adhere to that policy.

(D) US press will probably criticize GOC strongly for again taking such action.

I asked if GOC before suspending guarantees would discuss this step with new Committee of Bishops now planned (Embtel 524² ) Guell said GOC welcomed efforts of church to obtain peaceful settlement. However he said there exist discord and differences of opinion within church ranks. GOC believes Accion Catolica, JOC and other segments of church are anti-Batista.

Meeting ended with understanding that I would advise Department fully of our conversation and be prepared to inform Batista of Washington’s reaction.

After Castro refused to meet with Harmony Commission members resigned (Embtel 523³ ). Am reliably informed church is going ahead with plans to appoint Committee of Bishops (Embtel 524).

Situation in Cuba critical. Fear is spreading rapidly. It is my recommendation that I inform Batista

(A) US Government will not intervene or inject itself in affairs of Cuba.

(B) We are most anxious for a peaceful solution.

(C) We hope that Batista will explore every possibility of a peaceful solution before again suspending guarantees.

If new Committee of Bishops is formed, we believe it will have to obtain the full confidence and support of all peaceful non-revolutionary groups and should concentrate on obtaining such support.⁴

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1258. Secret; Niact.

² Supra.

³ Dated March 10, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1058)

⁴ In telegram 528, March 12, Smith informed the Department as follows: “Guell has informed me that the government will suspend constitutional guarantees, probably this eve, and that it will announce at the same time the postponement of elections, but that honest elections will be held at a later date”. (Ibid., 737.00/3–1258)

32. Editorial Note

On March 12, Fidel Castro issued an ultimatum, which included a 22-point program of action, calling for a general strike in April to coincide with stepped-up rebel activity against the Batista government. Beginning April 1, rail and highway transportation was to be forbidden in Oriente province. Rebel forces after that date would fire on vehicles without notice. The population throughout the country was also asked to stop payment of taxes. Moreover, officials who remained in the government or who continued to serve in the armed forces after April 5 would be considered traitors. For text of the manifesto, see Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson R Valdes, eds., Selected Works of Fidel Castro, vol. I: Revolutionary Struggle, 1947–1958 (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1972), pages 373–378.

A summary of the ultimatum was attached to a memorandum of March 24 from Wieland to Snow. In the memorandum, Wieland stated that the ultimatum, which he considered Castro’s response to the Batista government’s refusal to permit the Cuban press to visit rebel forces in the mountains, was “a virtual declaration of war” against the Batista government. Wieland concluded:

“The success of this program hinges to a large extent on the outcome of the general strike which, in turn, is contingent upon (1) the continuance of the policy previously endorsed by the hierarchy of the CTC in opposition to a general strike and (2) the ability of the CTC officials to hold the union members in line. The Department has received reports that the CTC has begun to waiver in its support of Batista and that the Castro labor underground, the F.O.N., has substantially increased its influence amongst the rank and file of labor.

“If the 26th of July Movement and affiliated civic resistance groups fail to realize this ambitious and daring program, it will be damaging to Castro’s growing prestige and at least a temporary boon to the present Government. On the other hand, if it has a fair degree of success, it could result in the sudden exit of the Batista regime. This event would likely come about through a military coup engineered by influential groups in Cuba, including respected officers of the armed forces, which hold Batista and Castro in almost equal disdain”. (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958)

On March 12, President Batista announced that in view of the continuing unrest in Cuba, he was again suspending constitutional guarantees.

33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, March 12, 1958—8:11 p.m.

484. From Rubottom. Re Embtel 525² and Telecon with Ambassador.³ Agreed Batista be informed along lines your three recommendations included reftel. You may also wish consider asking him whether in view necessity reimpose constitutional restrictions he believes Government capable protecting American lives and property.

Your attention invited to Emergency and Evacuation Plan for Cuba dated February 15, 1956.⁴ Am sure you aware Embassy responsibilities this connection and leave your discretion timing any action required.

Your tel raises serious doubts in Dept. whether Batista regime can survive. While true that US does not desire intervene Cuban internal affairs, believe US special relationship to Cuba requires that we seek by every means possible use our constructive influence with Government and Opposition to help find peaceful solution to problem.

From here appears that Batista regime has utterly failed to convince Cuban people and certainly US public of its intention carry out free elections. Example is statement of March 10⁵ expressing confidence in election Government candidate which in eyes public tended to negate promise hold free elections.

Would it be possible for Batista, notwithstanding real risks involved for himself, to decide and somehow convincingly convey through Church or other impartial group that elections will in fact be free and that all candidates will have equal chance win at polls? Recognize that problem is how achieve this but if Batista can be convinced that this decision is vital not only to his continuance in office but to his and Cuba’s good name and as means avoiding possible chaos, believe he knows his own people well enough to evolve an electoral plan. If this feasible, postponing elections might be advantageous and could conceivably provide time for tempers to cool.

Realize above may be impossible of execution but Department would appreciate soonest your estimate Batista regime’s ability survive present crisis and for how long. Also need your best estimate whether military junta, mixed military-civilian group, or individual might emerge as head of Government in event Batista abdicates or otherwise removed from scene. Especially important is role Castro would play in any changed political situation. Has he achieved sufficient personal prestige, if not respect, to be dominant factor in Cuban political scene if Batista removed?

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1258. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Rubottom who signed for Herter.

² Document 31.

³ No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Not further identified.

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 14, 1958—2 p.m.

536. Had meeting with Batista March 13. He said it was too bad national harmony commission had made grave mistakes, because he was ready to cooperate with the commission and all groups in order to discuss best possible methods to have free and open elections. He was prepared accede to all reasonable requests, not [only] from harmony commission but also from political opposition, business organizations, doctors, church, et cetera. It was his understanding that after agreement was reached between himself and these groups, committee would then appeal to revolutionaries. Unfortunately they contacted Castro too soon. The result was rejection by Castro and dissolution of committee. Batista is keenly disappointed with actions of harmony committee and attributes seriousness of present situation to their mistakes. As a result, increases in sabotage, terrorism, and general tenseness created conditions which forced him again to suspend constitutional guarantees.

Batista said he was confident he could control situation and was increasing size of army in order to give proper protection to people of Cuba and also to American lives and property. Increases in armed services would require additional arms and he inquired whether he could expect delivery of arms already negotiated for with the US. I said I knew of no change of policy in this regard except what was stipulated in note to Campo March 3.²

I told Batista police brutalities were doing GOC much harm and inquired as to whether he intended to take appropriate action against offenders. He said he would and that he was grieved and shocked to hear the allegations against Captain Sosa regarding certain alleged brutalities. He said that if they were true they were the actions of a “monster” and that he instructed police chief to make investigation. If investigation substantiated charges he would most certainly take action.

According to Batista communism is spreading and gaining in the surrounding countries—Mexico, Guatemala, Venezuela, et cetera—and that GOC is absolutely certain that Communists are aiding and abetting attempted overthrow of Cuban Government.

Batista said that in accordance with request of opposition, elections will be postponed. Date must be determined by electoral tribunal and acted upon according to due process of law. When dates of new elections have been set by electoral tribunal he made [will make] a public pledge that elections will be completely honest. He stated that he will accede to all reasonable requests of the opposition such as

(A) Asking world press to witness elections.

(B) Asking US or UN or OAS to send observers.

He is also prepared to grant general amnesty in the coming elections so that revolutionaries will go to polls. However, they must pledge to leave their guns behind. He said, “we want their votes but not their guns at voting booths”. I suggested for his consideration.

(A) Invite leaders of responsible civic groups (medical, legal, educational), labor, church, press, and political opposition to discuss best possible means of creating favorable atmosphere for elections.

(B) Give full publicity to provisions of election laws and statement that GOC will abide by these laws.

He was receptive to the suggestions and repeated he will accede to all reasonable requests to guarantee that coming elections are honest.

I mentioned to Batista that had elections been held on June 1 he probably could have elected his candidate in free and open elections because of division and lack of interest of opposition. However I stated that with postponement of elections, and if he convinced people of Cuba elections were to be honest, he could very likely lose coming elections. He said he was prepared for this and was willing to turn over GOC to successor government in honest elections.

“If I were to step down now from office, as many people want, my country would be torn apart in bloodshed. The solution is honest elections, and I give my word we will have honest elections. I gave Cuba honest elections in 1944 and Cuba will have honest elections again in 1958”.

Batista feels strongly GOC must remain in office until February 24, 1959, when his term expires. This will give new president time to set up his administration to carry on. It is GOC responsibility to preserve law and order to prevent possible retaliations against his government between election day and February 59.

Although he says he does not want to upset the many families who live in Oriente through mass movement, he feels the time has now come when it is necessary to take such action to eliminate Castro.

I told Batista I was gratified and impressed by his sincerity, his desire to be fair, and his willingness to cooperate and that I would so report to my government.

It is my reaction that Batista would welcome an honorable retirement. This he may have through honest elections. Such elections would also receive the support of the political opposition. On the other hand, the revolutionaries do not want elections under any conditions and will violently oppose any action that will give Batista an aura of respectability.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1458. Secret; Niact.

² See footnote 2, Document 27.

35. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 14, 1958—7 p.m.

541. Department telegram 484.² Batista told Ambassador³ he confident can survive present crisis. Embassy inclined share his view. Current crisis built up by talk and agitation for general strike and by small acts of terrorism and violence. Sources among revolutionary groups are telling Embassy, as in past crises, their plans and action groups not ready, coordination difficult, and no date set for strike. Also as in past they accompany such statements with particularly vehement criticism US for “keeping Batista in office against wishes of Cuban people”. Embassy believes strike accompanied by violence may still be attempted. Intimidation rather than personal conviction will be basic factor influencing many participants. Government’s chances of success in handling situation will thereby be increased.

Batista has no intention abdicate. On contrary he informed Ambassador he now preparing take all-out measures against Castro. If Batista were assassinated, military junta would probably take control government. This junta could possibly merge into combined military-civilian group. As yet Castro has given no indication any disposition cooperate with other groups. Any new government would be faced with serious problem of controlling Fidel Castro.

Embassy considers present support of Castro by revolutionary groups basically more for him as figurehead than as personal leader. Reservations concerning him and reluctance follow him blindly noticeable even in 26 July movement. He apparently regarded with antipathy by armed forces. Embassy therefore considers Castro important but probably not dominant factor political scene if Batista removed. The 26 July movement would lose in cohesiveness and momentum with Batista gone.

Embassy believes Cuban picture will be characterized by fluctuating tension as long as Batista in office. Provided armed forces remain loyal, leadership organized labor remains pro-Batista, and he escapes assassination, Batista will probably remain in control until end his term February 1959.

Situation changes daily and above appraisal subject modification in light of events.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1458. Secret; Priority.

² Document 33.

³ An apparent reference to the conversation of March 13 described supra.

36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, March 14, 1958—8:19 p.m.

492. Department has requested Customs to suspend export license for 1950 M–1 rifles for Cuban Army now in New York awaiting shipment.

In taking this action² Department considered failure of GOC to create conditions for fair elections and deteriorating political situation. Department feels long range US interests served by suspending action on all Cuban arms requests and shipments, in accordance instructions to Embassy on this subject and outlined Rubottom’s January 17 memorandum to Secretary³ pouched to Embassy.

Officers in L express opinion that act does not constitute implied recognition of state of belligerency.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/3–1458. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy, cleared in draft with L/ARA, and approved by Snow who signed for Herter.

² A discussion of the pros and cons of stopping the shipment of rifles was included in a March 14 memorandum from Snow to Herter. (ibid., 737.00/3–1458)

³ Document 5.

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 16, 1958—1 p.m.

543. Guell informed us night March 15:

(A) GOC greatly concerned over steps taken Deptel 492.²

(B) If GOC had been forewarned that MAP equipment was to be held back, they would have purchased such equipment from other countries.

(C) Present GOC equipment is obsolete and worn. As GOC is increasing size of army, it is especially anxious to receive rifles (Deptel 492).

(D) Guell will as soon as possible prepare note from GOC to US for presentation.

(E) It will be impossible to avoid publicity regarding steps taken Deptel 492.

(F) Reaffirmed that elections will be postponed and when held will be completely honest (Embtel 536³ ).

I conveyed assurances that there was no change in friendly attitude of US to GOC and again pointed out embarrassing position of US due to overwhelming criticism from Congress and press.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/3–1658. Secret; Priority.

² Supra.

³ Document 34.

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 16, 1958—2 p.m.

544. When Church decided to mediate in political problems Cuba, I was hopeful and relieved. Hopeful Church could obtain peaceful solution because of its tremendous prestige and influence. Relieved because Church and not US would take blame if Batista were overthrown.

After rejection of Harmony Commission peace gesture by Castro, conditions were such that GOC might have fallen. Church was consistently reminded that it would be blamed for ensuing bloodbath and chaos, which would surely prevail if Batista fell. Church realized it would be blamed by GOC, sympathizers of GOC, and by many who suffered from the consequences.

The Cardinal’s fear of this was confirmed to me by the Papal Nuncio. Realization of this may have been deciding factor in Church decision to withdraw from active political participation.

Psychological effect of steps US is taking may bring about overthrow of Batista. (Reference note to Campa March 3² and Deptels 492³ –493.⁴ )

If Batista falls after such steps have become public knowledge, I am now concerned that US and not Church will be blamed for overthrow of GOC with resulting chaos and bloodshed.

Unfortunately there is yet no individual or group in sight strong enough to preserve law and order. If Batista falls, present top command of army cannot survive. Before any military junta could take over, army might be fighting amongst themselves. Fidel Castro has publicly stated that he intends to control army; that he, Castro, will be dominant figure.

US will be blamed, even though unjustly, whether Batista survives or whether Batista falls (unless Church should again take steps to relieve us of such responsibility).

In my opinion we should continue use our influence to bring about favorable atmosphere for elections—postponement of elections will make this possible—and to ensure elections are free and open. This we may continue to do without giving either side opportunity to accuse us of intervening.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1658. Secret; Priority.

² See footnote 2, Document 27.

³ Document 36.

⁴ Dated March 15, telegram 493 informed the Embassy in Havana that the Department planned, only if necessary, to release a statement to the press that day indicating that a small shipment of rifles purchased by the Cuban Government had been temporarily held up in New York. The statement was to note that this temporary suspension was in accordance with the “normal U.S. practice” to study carefully such shipments when conditions became tense in any area of the world. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.5614/3–1558)

39. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 17, 1958¹

Washington, March 17, 1958

SUBJECT

Visit of Manuel Urrutia, Castro Candidate for Provisional President of Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Senor Manuel Urrutia, exiled 26th of July leader

Senor Raul Chibas, member of Ortodoxo Party in exile

Senor Angel Santos Buch, exiled 26th of July member

Mr. William A. Wieland, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs

Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Deputy Director, Office of Middle American Affairs

Having arranged an appointment in advance, Messrs. Urrutia, Chibas and Santos were received on March 17 in Mr. Wieland’s office. All three men are supporters-in-exile of the Fidel Castro 26th of July movement.

The group announced that a number of Cuban revolutionary movements had agreed to support Mr. Urrutia for provisional president when and if Batista were overthrown. They identified the groups as the Bisbé–Chibás branch of the Ortodoxo Party; Resistencia Civica; Organización Revolucionaria; Frente de Obreros Nacionales; the Federation de Estudiantes Universitarios and a group of military leaders headed by Colonel Ramón Barquín, now in prison on the Isle of Pines. The civic resistance group, which originated in Santiago, now operates throughout the island and believes in the armed overthrow of the Batista regime. The OR is a student group, as is the FEU, and both are bent on causing the downfall of the present Government. The FON is the newly created pro-Castro labor group. Some of the Barquin military followers are in Cuba while others are in the United States, it was explained.

With Mr. Chibás beginning as spokesman, the group urged the United States to cease all arms shipments to the Batista regime, asserting that all sorts of equipment is being sent regularly to Cuba. When asked to be more specific, Chibás said that several hundred cases of rifles were recently shipped from New York on the SS Villanueva. He mentioned also that jet planes were being used to bombard the Castro forces in the Sierra Maestra. Mr. Wieland replied that the Department was receiving many reports of arms shipments but that no one was able to state definitely what or how much had been shipped from the United States. As for the jet bombers, he pointed out that we had sent to Cuba only very few jet trainers and they could not be adapted for bombing. Mr. Chibás said he was in the Sierra Maestra when they were used for a bombing mission but after further questioning backed down on this point, maintaining, however, that some types of planes had carried out bombing missions while he was in the hills with Castro. Mr. Wieland called to the attention of the group the fact that the exiles were making many claims of arms shipments and unauthorized use of United States-supplied military equipment by Batista’s forces without taking the trouble to verify the charges.

Mr. Chibás said that the supplying of arms and the use of United States military advisers to train Cuban forces were creating ill will for the United States, with such stories being circulated that our aviation mission had advised the Cuban Government to bomb the city of Cienfuegos during the revolt last year. Mr. Wieland said this charge was untrue, to which the trio agreed. However, they said, stories of this type were bound to recur as long as we helped Batista, and we should withdraw our armed forces missions to prevent such allegations. Mr. Wieland said this was like asking a farmer to kill his cow to prevent accusations it was stealing fish.

Mr. Urrutia said that Batista was violating the United States-Cuban military assistance agreement by using arms which had been supplied only for hemispheric defense.

Mr. Stewart asked Mr. Urrutia whether the agreement of the revolutionary forces to support his candidacy had been formally concluded and he responded that this was about to be done. Mr. Santos said a public announcement would be made in a few days. It was pointed out that Fidel Castro does not know Mr. Urrutia personally but admires his anti-Batista background.

There ensued a general discussion on our policy toward dictatorial governments and Mr. Urrutia declared that he had been questioned closely by reporters during his recent visit to Caracas about the Cuban opposition’s attitude toward the State Department policies. It was gathered that he did not uphold them when he replied.

Mr. Stewart pointed out that the Colombian and Venezuelan people overthrew their strong-man Governments despite the fact the latter were well supplied with arms. Mr. Urrutia said the Cuban military forces differed from the Venezuelan because the former were made up of low elements who would not hesitate to fire on civilians in event of an uprising. The opposition in Cuba, therefore, would need weapons to fight back. Mr. Stewart reminded Mr. Urrutia that the State Department had publicly declared its satisfaction when a people chose a democratic form of government, Mr. Wieland adding that Mr. Rubottom had testified in the same vein before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.² It appeared, Mr. Stewart added, that such positive acts favoring democracies were not publicized as such by the Castro movement but [who] continued to level a barrage of criticism against our policies.

The group urged the United States to withdraw its military missions from Cuba and when this brought up the matter of non-intervention Mr. Urrutia and Mr. Chibás expressed the view that an act of this kind would not be intervention. This led Mr. Wieland to observe that interpretations are put on non-intervention on the basis of whether the act harms or helps the cause of the particular group.

The visitors mentioned that a new front had been opened in the Sierra Escambray, with Prio, Castro, FEU and OR youth working together. This force is the one that was formerly identified as being in the Sierra de Trinidad near Trinidad and Sancti Spiritus.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1758. Official Use Only. Drafted by Stewart.

² See footnote 4, Document 29.

40. Editorial Note

On March 17, the Cuban Government presented to the Embassy in Havana a note formally protesting the delay in the shipment of the M–1 rifles for the Cuban Army. The Embassy transmitted the text of the note to the Department of State under cover of despatch 740, March 18. The despatch reads in part as follows:

“The Embassy feels that, as the memorandum points out, the news of the ‘delay’ in the shipments will encourage the rebels, and will have unfavorable results for the Cuban Government. Continued suspension of arms shipments at this critical juncture in Cuban affairs would weaken the Cuban Government and possibly lead to its downfall, probably with attendant violence and risk to American lives and property. The Embassy is not aware of the details of the legal questions involved in the suspension of the shipments. However, the position of the Cuban Government that the purchases constitute firm contractual obligations on which payment has already been made seems to us to merit serious consideration by the Department”. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/3–1858)

On March 18, Ambassador Miguel Angel Campa met with William P. Snow and William Wieland to protest the suspension of the shipment of the rifles. A memorandum of that conversation, drafted by Wieland, is ibid., CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Arms.

41. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

Sales of Arms to Cuba

Discussion:

The question of sales and shipments of arms to Cuba was referred to you for decision on January 17 (Tab A² ). At that time you concurred in ARA’s recommendation that Ambassador Smith, in his discretion, inform President Batista that certain pending Cuban requests for the purchase of arms were being approved, but that delivery would depend on conditions in Cuba at the time the equipment was ready for shipment. The Ambassador was also authorized to suggest certain measures to President Batista which might help to create an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful solution through elections. In line with these suggestions, President Batista restored constitutional guarantees throughout most of Cuba on January 25.

Although this temporarily brought an improvement in the Cuban atmosphere the Government failed to take further constructive steps, and intransigent revolutionaries began a new campaign of terrorism. Efforts by the Catholic Episcopate and a subsequent National Harmony Committee to mediate in search of a peaceful solution were unsuccessful and President Batista suddenly announced on March 12 that constitutional guarantees were again being suspended. Simultaneously, he ordered a 35 percent increase in the armed forces and told our Ambassador of his plan to move masses of people out of areas of combat in Oriente Province in a major effort to wipe out the rebels. (A similar mass movement early last year having unfortunate consequences for the rural population of that province failed to enable the Government to overcome the Castro forces.)

The inability of the Batista Government to convince the Cuban people of its intent to hold a fair election with adequate guarantees, and its recourse to intensified police measures have considerably darkened the prospect of a peaceful solution. A period of armed conflict as well as terrorism on both sides seems likely to ensue. ARA considers that the continued shipment of combat arms to Cuba at this time would bring sharp criticism from both houses of Congress which presently are considering an extension of the Mutual Security Program and might increase bloodshed in Cuba resulting in adverse criticism from both the U.S. and Cuban public and press.

Factors entering into this opinion are enumerated in Tab B.³

The Department already (March 14) has suspended temporarily a shipment of 1,950 Garand rifles which had been purchased by the Cuban Government (Tab C⁴ ), and requested the Defense Department to prevent any further arms shipments from moving forward for the present. Neither of these actions has been made public but some press elements are expected to publish the story, despite our precautions, and certain members of Congress are apt to praise us but the unintended effect upon Cuba may be to accelerate the downfall of the Batista regime.⁵ Despite this last possibility, we have taken the position described on a temporary basis and so notified the Cuban Ambassador on March 18.

Recommendation:

Your approval is requested of ARA’s decision, made after consultation with other interested offices of the Department and the Department of Defense, that further shipments of combat arms to Cuba not be authorized until Cuban conditions improve to the point where arms furnished will be dependably used for hemispheric defense and not used up internal strife.⁶

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2458. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy and Snow. Wieland and Little obtained clearances from H, P, MC, and W/MSC. G was also informed of the memorandum. Earlier drafts of the memorandum, dated March 19 and 20, are ibid., 737.00/3–1958 and 737.00/3–2058, respectively.

² None of the tabs was attached to the source text. Tab A is printed as Document 5.

³ See footnote 2, Document 36.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ This sentence was revised in an unidentified hand. It originally read: “Neither of these actions has been made public but Time Magazine is expected to publish the story this Wednesday, despite our precautions, in which event the U.S. press and certain members of Congress are apt to praise us but the unintended effect upon Cuba may be to accelerate the downfall of the Batista regime”.

⁶ 

The last part of this sentence was revised in an unidentified hand. It originally read: “to the point where arms furnished can be considered to be within the U.S. public interest and will not jeopardize our Mutual Defense Program in Latin America which has been given increasing Congressional attention because of the Cuban imbroglio”.

Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation on the source text. In a note to Snow dated March 26 and attached to the source text, however, Joseph N. Greene wrote:

“The Secretary does not approve relating the decision to suspend shipments of arms to Cuba to the Congressional progress of the Mutual Security legislation. In the Secretary’s view the suspension should remain in effect until we can be sure arms furnished the Cuban Government will be dependably used as provided in our agreement with the Cubans, that is for hemispheric defense, and not used in internal strife.

“The Secretary suggests that if there are other elements in the situation which would tend to invalidate this decision, you resubmit a new study and recommendations”.

42. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, March 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

Dr. Varona’s Views on Civilian-Military Junta Membership

Begin Official Use Only

On March 22 I received a special delivery letter² from Dr. Carlos Piad, a Cuban exile who moved recently from Washington to Miami. He is known to favor as a solution to the present situation in Cuba the overthrow of President Batista’s regime by a military coup. He has frequently said that his solution would work out best for United States interests in Cuba.

Piad belongs to the Prio opposition group and is against the assumption of power by Fidel Castro and his movement. For some time, the Castro and Prio forces have not worked together.

However, in his letter, dated March 21, he indicated that there might be a relaxing of the anti-Castro feeling by the Prio forces when he sent me the names of eight persons who would be acceptable to the latter as a civilian-military junta following any overthrow of Batista. This list was sent, he wrote, “in compliance with instructions from Dr. (Antonio) Varona,” who is the No. 2 man in the Prio movement.

This list, according to Piad’s letter, would represent all other sectors of the opposition. He added that his group had no axes to grind since the Prio group is not represented on the proposed junta. It would be, he observed, a real solution which would prevent thousands of unnecessary deaths.

The civilian-military junta which Varona authorized Piad to suggest (it is to be assumed Prio is aware of and approves the names):

1.

General Eulogio Cantillo

One of the few officers in the Cuban Army who has retained a relatively unbesmirched reputation. He is on the Cuban General Staff and recently was assigned to command the garrison at Matanzas. He is in a good position there to take energetic action if a military coup were undertaken.

2.

General Díraz Tamayo

General Diaz Tamayo has been suspected of lukewarm sympathies for Batista. While commanding the armed forces in Oriente province he is believed to have maintained a rather porous cordon around the Castro forces in the Sierra Maestra and thus permitted rather easy contact by the insurgent forces with the outside world. He has a command in Habana at present.

3.

Colonel Ramón Barquín

A leader in the April 1956 army revolt against Batista. The move was suppressed and Colonel Barquin is now in prison in the Isle of Pines. He is highly regarded for his character and professional competence. He was Cuba’s representative on the IADB for several years. He is a close friend of General Cantillo.

4.

Colonel Borbonet

He was considered the “brains” of the unsuccessful April 1956 move against Batista. Highly regarded as a soldier.

5.

Dr. Gustavo Cuervo Rúbio

Dr. Cuervo was vice-president during the Batista regime 1940–44. Recently he was named a member of the Harmony Committee which failed to obtain opposition support. A medical doctor, he is considered to be an honest man.

6.

Dr. J. Miró Cardona

President of the Habana Bar Association and a leading member of the loose-knit Civic Association, which numbers some 60 professional, civic and lay religious societies in Habana.

7.

Dr. Raúl Velazco

Head of the Habana Medical Association and another prominent member of the Civic Association. He was spokesman, according to Jules Dubois of the Chicago Tribune, of the Association when some 42 groups of its membership called for Batista’s resignation a few days ago.

8.

Dr. Manuel Urrutia

Dr. Urrutia, a Santiago judge, is the choice of Castro for provisional president in event Batista is ousted. He is also supported by the Bisbé–Chibás Ortodoxos, and, according to Chibás and himself, the choice of the revolutionary student groups such as FEU and Organization Revolucionaria, and the Civic Resistance movement.

End Official Use Only

Begin Secret

Comment:

The information contained in Piad’s letter calls for no action by the Department. From an information viewpoint, the makeup of Varona’s approved civilian-military junta is interesting, since it reveals for the first time willingness on the part of the Prio forces to join with the Castro–Ortodoxo movement in setting up a provisional government.

Presumably, this junta would not come into existence until an armed forces coup had unseated Batista in lieu of a Castro-directed movement headed by a general strike.

Either type of attempt would result in bloodshed but the Castro plan would be likely to result in much more killing of civilians than a military coup. If Batista is sincere in setting up an honest election and can induce the opposition to meet with him to lay the groundwork for such an election in November, our policies would best be served by seeing this course followed. If it is too late to carry out this course of action, and Batista were overthrown, the least objectionable method in our view would be by a military coup followed by the establishment of a civilian or civilian-military junta, which in turn would name a provisional president, preferably along Constitutional lines. The suggested list of members of a civilian-military junta is a good one and this or one similar including possibly a labor representative might be named if Castro were unsuccessful in imposing his plan of installing a Government controlled entirely by his forces. It is possible that if Batista fell, some of Castro’s support would abandon him for a junta type government, provided, of course, that the military showed signs of sticking together once the Batista followers were purged. One element in favor of this development would be fear by the military leaders of Castro’s control of the armed forces.³

End Secret

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2458. Official Use Only and Secret. Drafted by Stewart and sent through Wieland. Initialed by Wieland and Snow.

² A copy of the letter was attached to the source text, but is not printed.

³ Wieland wrote the following comment at the end of the memorandum: “It is true that a junta might have some value in cushioning the impact of violence if Batista should be overthrown. It is a mechanism foreign to Cuban tradition, however, and unless it operated with greater statesmanship and skill than now seems likely, it will probably induce a continued or renewed revolutionary period after a short provisional reign”.

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, March 26, 1958—4:34 p.m.

526. Department has carefully studied question arms shipments to Cuba in light Embtels 543 and 544² and continues feel decision Deptel 492³ necessary in view recent GOC suspension constitutional guarantees, announced strengthening armed forces and indications of strong measures to come such as another mass movement Oriente population (Embtel 536⁴ ). As result, elections even though postponed appear impossible realize unless GOC takes effective measures soon convince people they will be fair.

Department has considered possibility its action could have adverse psychological effect GOC and could unintentionally contribute to or accelerate eventual Batista downfall. On other hand, shipment US combat arms at this time would probably invite increased resentment against US and associate it with Batista strong arm methods, especially following so closely on heels of following developments:

1) Government publicly desisted from peace efforts.

2) Government suspended guarantees again.

3) Batista expressed confidence Government will win elections with his candidate and insists they will be held despite suspension guarantees but has made no real effort satisfy public opinion on their fairness and effectiveness as possible means achieve fair and acceptable solution.

4) Batista announced would increase size army and informed you he would again undertake mass population shift Oriente, and otherwise acted in manner to discourage those who supported or could be brought to support peaceful settlement by constructive negotiations.

Moreover, shipment of combat arms at this time might jeopardize our entire Latin American MAP program, already under fire by press and in Congress, and might invite rebel retaliation against US citizens and property.

Department agrees Embassy should continue efforts with its usual discretion to attain fair elections though possibility now seems remote. Mere statements by GOC that elections will be fair have proved ineffective, although public opinion in US and elsewhere was being favorably influenced by US and Cuban press comment on Batista’s restoration guarantees in January until again disillusioned by GOC’s latest decision abandon peaceful means and resort to increased repressive measures.

Department believes postponement elections plus steps (A, B and amnesty para 6 Embtel 536) that Batista told you confidentially he had in mind, if he carries them out, should help toward constructive solution of impasse which if continues or worsens threatens cause his downfall. Also, concurs that your suggestions (A) and (B) to him (Embtel 536), if he adopts them, should go far in right direction. Other constructive steps which Batista might take following in order those he has proposed and those you suggested could be:

(1) Investigation Milanes Dantin case and appropriate prosecution Captain Sosa and others implicated (Embtel 536) and public announcement he will not tolerate such acts by his officials.

(2) Restoration of guarantees and, if possible, an amnesty.

(3) Gradual replacement officials responsible for brutality.

Embassy will recall that January 17 memorandum to Secretary⁵ recommended approval requests purchase arms as means to encourage acceptable elections in Cuba, but decision on actual shipments would be made on basis conditions in Cuba at time shipments ready. If satisfactory headway made toward realization points enumerated above, resultant improved situation there would put Department in position to reconsider suspension on arms shipments.⁶

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2658. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy and Wieland and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.

² Documents 37 and 38.

³ Document 36.

⁴ Document 34.

⁵ Document 5.

⁶ In telegram 606 from Havana, March 28, Smith reported that he met with Guell and informed him of the developments mentioned in the second paragraph of telegram 526 as well as the three constructive steps proposed in the telegram. Guell requested that the Ambassador submit these points in writing and that he repeat the following statement to the Department: “GOC is fighting against armed aggression, armed rebellion, and armed insurrection under active support of Communists. GOC is attempting to preserve law and order, which includes protection American life and property. We are gravely concerned over change of policy by US.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2858)

44. Editorial Note

On March 28, The New York Times published a story on Cuba which, among other things, noted that the U.S. Government had recently embargoed a shipment of rifles to the Cuban Government. (March 28, 1958, page 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5]) For Wieland’s recollection of how The New York Times obtained the information, see his testimony of February 2, 1962, before a Senate subcommittee. (State Department Security: Testimony of William Wieland, Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 87th Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), page 659)

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, March 31, 1958—6:56 p.m.

536. As your suggestions to GOC (Embtel 606² ) are in nature purely informal advice short of intervention you should not comply Guell’s request you submit them in writing (Leonhardy’s telecon with Amb March 29³ ), but should again summarize verbally points Deptel 526,⁴ emphasizing friendly advice character your conversations.

You should also make clear to Guell that there no change in US policy toward GOC. Reiterate that our continuing policy requires careful consideration arms shipments to any part of world where unusual tensions occur. In Cuban instance our actions, implementing policy, are dictated in large part by Cuban developments resulting in GOC’s new resort March 12 to strong [arm] methods and sudden abandonment constructive steps toward negotiations that would explore at least possibilities for peaceful formula. GOC’s actions following Castro’s declarations almost eliminate prospect for time being of alternative to widespread disorder. This view also is illustrated by Church’s discouragement (Embtel 610⁵ ) as result of GOC’s apparent inability make any effective effort convince influential sectors Cuban public opinion it sincerely seeking constructive solution by such steps as Embassy and Department has proposed, some of which GOC seemed to have accepted (Embtel 536⁶ ), or to find any other workable formula.

It would seem from here that if Castro won’t negotiate, GOC could at least partially isolate violent rebels and strengthen peace possibilities by clear cut declaration of its objective to establish propitious climate for constructive solution, including elections satisfactory to majority of people (as distinct from apparently sterile repetition of determination to hold honest elections which GOC obviously bound to win with opposition hamstrung by conditions it considers prevent it from participating). Such declaration could include for example hopes for truce from violence to enable GOC carry out negotiations with representatives of responsible institutions and opposition elements to define such climate and how achieve it (Deptel 526). It is realized of course decision on such move and appropriate timing is entirely up to President Batista.

FYI Any other suggestions for feasible formula even at this late date to prevent needless bloodshed, protect US interests and future relations with Cuba, and in which we may properly assist, would also be welcome for study here. End FYI

Within long-established US policy and under terms of MSP legislation, as long as only prospect now in sight is one of force, we must continue to give careful consideration to all arms exports to that country. This fully accords with Department’s understandings with Embassy, set forth in Tab A of Memorandum to Secretary of January 17⁷ outlining your instructions concerning conditions in Cuba which would permit arms shipments.

In light of above suggest continuing consultations with GOC on possibility it may yet create such conditions, and advise Dept for consideration of appropriate reply to Cuban memo (Embdes 740⁸ ).

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–3158. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wieland and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.

² See footnote 6, Document 43.

³ No record of this conversation has been found.

⁴ Document 43.

⁵ In telegram 610, March 28, Smith stated that the Embassy had learned that members of the Church hierarchy decided it “would be useless to do anything at this time, as they are convinced Castro will not accept conciliation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2858)

⁶ Document 34.

⁷ Document 5.

⁸ See Document 40.

46. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 1, 1958—5 p.m.

629. Today I conveyed to Guell full content of Department telegram 536.² We had lengthy and cordial exchange of views. GOC believes guarantees were restored too soon. “Because of the violent activities of the rebels,” Guell said, “we were forced to again suspend guarantees. Our responsibility is to preserve law and order. This includes protection of US lives and property.” “At the request of the opposition,” Guell continued, “we advanced date of elections because opposition wished to make certain changes in electoral code. We have postponed date of elections in accordance with opposition’s request. The opposition is completely divided and each one asks for different points. GOC is attempting to harmonize and comply with requests as much as possible.” Guell added, “The rebels are not amenable to any solution. If we isolate them (Department telegram 536) they are always there. Our soldiers are on the defensive. It is necessary for us to reinforce our position and then negotiate. Either we must go there or they will come here. It would be a mistake for us to negotiate from a weak position.” I expressed to Guell our hopes of a peaceful solution and I was hopeful that church would be able to attain this. Guell said, “GOC will welcome truce after GOC’s position is reinforced. GOC believes that the rebels would not keep a truce. They would continue with acts of sabotage and violence and then accuse GOC of violating truce.” According to Guell, the rebels do not want a truce; they want to become the GOC. Guell pointed out the fact that many of the leading rebels, even after killing Cubans, had been and were still being released by GOC, i.e., Castro, Agramonte, Varona, Pazos, Chibas, et al.

Guell continued, “It is true and unfortunate that police at times are over-zealous—I am against any sort of violence—I am against dictatorship—I believe in democracy. Batista would like a democratic policy. If Castro succeeds, Cuba will have a real dictatorship. With Castro’s Communistic projected program, situation in Cuba will be worse than in any other Latin American country—and that includes Guatemala”.

Guell continued, “No matter who is elected in the coming elections, Castro will continue to fight. We must weaken Castro to make him play ball. Castro will not accept military junta or any government that is not ‘stained’ for him. All you have to do is read Castro’s platform (22 points)³ and his letter to junta in Florida⁴ and then draw your own conclusions. Batista wants to leave power on February 24, 1959, and leave a government headed by a president elected by the people, whether the candidate be from the government party or the opposition party. Batista wants to guarantee a normal and democratic development of the country.”

I suggested to Guell that Batista make this statement publicly. I said, “It is one thing to tell me this and yet another to convince the people of Cuba.” Guell said he would take the matter up with Batista. He believed Batista would comply. Procedure will be to have four government coalition parties make statement. Batista will then back it up publicly.

Guell added, “GOC knew the US 1950 rifles were on docks and ready for shipment. However, GOC had given me advance notice of their intention to suspend guarantees and did not wait for such arms to leave the port before announcing their intention.”

I made it clear to Guell that there was no change in friendly US policy toward GOC. I further reiterated embarrassing position of Department due to criticism of press and Congress and pointed out that I expected Department would shortly again be called before Congress to explain shipment of arms. I feel sure that Guell now understands US position fully. Guell assured me GOC will do everything in its power to restore normal conditions and to create a favorable atmosphere for elections. However, GOC thinks it is necessary for it to reinforce its position before negotiating with rebels.

My comments to Department follow:

The objective and hope of the Embassy is for a peaceful solution, which I believe the majority of the people of Cuba also want. There is no gainsaying the fact that it is relatively easy to change dictators but very hard to get rid of dictatorship. It is the people of Cuba who are “riding the tiger.” Exchanging tigers is no solution.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–158. Confidential; Priority.

² Supra.

³ See Document 32.

⁴ Dated December 14, 1957. For text, see Bonachea and Valdes, Selected Works of Fidel Castro, vol. I, pp. 351–363.

47. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 2, 1958.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Showdown Near in Cuba

The chances for a peaceful solution to the Cuban political crisis appear to have vanished. On March 10, 1958, the 26 of July Movement of Fidel Castro, the dominant revolutionary group, rejected Catholic Church mediation efforts and two days later issued a manifesto to the Cuban people declaring all-out war on the government and warning that beginning April 1 all transportation in Oriente Province and the payment of taxes must cease; that on April 5 a campaign of extermination of all persons serving the Batista regime will begin; and that a call for a general strike is to be expected as the ultimate act which will overthrow the government. In reply to this challenge Batista has again suspended constitutional guarantees and apparently intends to ask congress for emergency powers.

With these developments the situation has become more rigid. Most opposition opinion seems to have crystallized on the demand that “Batista must go,” leaving no room for compromise. Moderate middle elements have either withdrawn from political activity or aligned themselves with the opposition, and a showdown involving violence and blood shed appears inevitable. Batista is dependent on the armed forces and organized labor, whose leaders remain loyal, to maintain his position. His support among the rank and file of these organizations is much less certain.

Should the 26 of July Movement be successful in its attempt to overthrow the Batista government, there is little about its top leadership to inspire confidence that it would show the qualities of integrity, moderation, and responsibility which will be needed to restore order and tranquility to Cuba. Although the evidence available to the Department does not confirm the Cuban government’s charge that Castro is a communist, it does suggest that he is immature and irresponsible. His chief lieutenant in the Sierra Maestra, the Argentine Dr. Ernesto Guevara, makes no secret of his anti-American feelings and shows definite indications that he has been subject to Marxist influence.

From this contest for power, a possible third alternative to a continuation of Batista, or the installation of a revolutionary regime dominated by Castro, could be the emergence of a military-civilian junta which would oust Batista but not permit Castro a dominant position.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Under Secretary.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–158. Official Use Only. Initialed by Arneson. Copies were sent to G, C, S/P, ARA, P, and SCA.

² At a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee on April 2, recent developments regarding Cuba were discussed. According to the notes of that meeting drafted by William McAfee of INR: “General Schow noted that the embargo on shipments to Batista had given the impression that this government was supporting Castro. Mr. Arneson pointed out that the action had been taken sometime ago and the hope was that its suspension would not become public information. He stated that the embargo did not imply that the Department favored Castro, that the Department continued to be deeply worried over his orientation and over what he stands for; Mr. Arneson commented in this connection on the suprisingly favorable press which Castro has enjoyed in this country. The Navy called attention to arrangements which are being made for the protection, by United States Marines, of the water supply at Guantanamo Bay.” (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, IAC Meetings)

48. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) in Washington and Herbert Matthews of The New York Times in New York, April 3, 1958¹

New York, April 3, 1958

SUBJECT

Report on Situation in Cuba

Mr. Matthews informed me over the telephone that the Times was planning to publish an editorial in tomorrow’s issue relating to the suspension of arms sales to the Batista regime. He wanted to clarify the differences between grant aid equipment and that sold on a reimbursable basis as well as the agreements under which our arms program operated. I took the occasion after making these explanations to point out to Mr. Matthews that the Times’ use of the word embargo was not strictly accurate and I referred him to the text of the Department’s statement.² He had some misapprehensions concerning the amount of military equipment that had been sent to the Batista regime in recent months and I told him that the quantity had been relatively small. I corrected his impression that we had sent a shipment of tanks to Cuba in October.

He referred to his recent trip to Cuba and said he had lunched with Ambassador and Mrs. Smith; had had a two-hour talk with the Ambassador³ in addition and also had spoken to John Topping. He said that Ambassador Smith was in a most difficult job and was under great pressure at this time. He spoke of the criticism being leveled at the United States Government for its policy of arms sales to Batista and our policy of supporting elections in June. This presented me with the opportunity of reviewing our policy on elections and our feeling that were it possible for the Cubans to have balloting acceptable to the majority of the people a show down such as one apparently in the offing would be avoided. As he had stated often in the past, Mr. Matthews said it would be impossible for Batista to allow the kind of elections that would be acceptable to the Cuban people. He said the Cubans were critical of the United States policy but he did not detect any strong feeling against Americans personally. Mr. Matthews said it was a “shame” that our policy should result in being branded pro-Batista. I again reiterated that our policy, if presented accurately to the Cuban people, could not be construed as favoring the Batista regime.

Mr. Matthews declared that Castro undoubtedly had gone out on a limb in his recent statements threatening the overthrow of Batista if the latter did not resign. However, Mr. Matthews said he was convinced after seeing the principal leaders of the opposition revolutionary movements that the coming attempt against the Batista Government was better organized than ever before. He said the attempt to overthrow the regime has been delayed while awaiting shipments of arms for the revolutionary forces in Habana. The capture of the arms shipment at Brownsville dealt a serious blow to the rebel movement and a discussion of this seizure brought up the subject of our policies of knocking off shipments of armament leaving the United States. While admitting readily that we were legally correct in stopping contraband shipments, he said in this case it was too bad we could not occasionally turn our backs. Mr. Matthews did say, however, that a recent shipment of arms was successfully sent from Mexico and he presumes they have already been landed somewhere in Cuba.

The revolutionary leaders are fully aware of the necessity of succeeding in Habana and Mr. Matthews said careful plans have been made to take the city. A militia has been set up to control the city once the Batista forces are defeated there, and they would presumably maintain order until a government could be set up. I asked him about the possibility of military intervention in the overthrow attempt and he said that he had heard that this might be possible. However, the military junta or any type of military government set up would be controlled by Castro, as he understood it, but would include military leaders like Colonel Barquin, now in prison on the Isle of Pines.

Mr. Matthews said it was heart-rending to have to contemplate the killing that would occur once the revolution got under way. He said that the revolutionary movements fully realized this but the fact would not be altered that most of the revolutionaries who might be killed would be youths in their teens. These young boys are willing to be killed if that is necessary to overthrow Batista.

The leaders who are to handle the fighting in Habana are fearful particularly of Batista’s tanks and his radio patrol cars. They were hopeful of getting bazookas and heavy machine guns for use against the tanks but if the arms do not arrive they will use classic implements such as Molotov cocktails, dynamite charges, and other makeshift implements.

Mr. Matthews did not hazard a guess as to when the overthrow attempt would get under way in earnest.

While Mr. Matthews did not go into any details on the slanting of his editorial, I gathered from the general tone of the conversation that the Department would be commended for having taken action that the newspaper considered was long overdue.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–358. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart.

² Stewart was apparently referring to the story published in The New York Times on March 28 (see Document 44) and to the text of the Department of State’s statement that was prepared but never formally released (see footnote 4, Document 38).

³ For Smith’s recollection of his conversations with Matthews, see The Fourth Floor, pp. 93–95.

49. Editorial Note

On April 9 at 11 a.m., rebel forces in Cuba made an unsuccessful attempt to launch a general strike. Leaflets issued in the name of the 26th of July Movement calling for a strike were distributed in Havana. Some shots were fired in downtown Havana, and bus service and the telephone system were partially disrupted. During the day Ambassador Smith kept the Department of State informed of the situation by telephone. One conversation, which took place shortly before noon, was described in a memorandum of April 9 from Rubottom to Secretary of State Dulles. (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958) Another telephone conversation with Smith, which took place shortly before 5 p.m., was described by Wieland in a memorandum of April 9. (Ibid., CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba Jan.–June 1958) Telegrams from the Embassy in Havana, as well as from the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba, reporting on the day’s developments are ibid., Central Files, 837.062/4–958.

In telegram 676 sent at 6 p.m. that day, the Embassy reported that there was little visible evidence that the strike had been a success. All traffic appeared normal. Although some employees, particularly those in banks, had left their jobs, the Embassy stated that the walkout “has not as yet reached any significant proportion.” A rebel attempt to seize an arms store in downtown Havana had been frustrated by police. While sabotage of electric conduits had blacked out most of old Havana and part of Vedado, the Embassy believed that service would be restored the next day. (Ibid.) The events surrounding the attempted strike were summarized in despatch 844 from Havana, April 21. (Ibid., 837.062/4–2158)

The reasons for the failure of the general strike were analyzed in despatch 898 from Havana, May 5. Based on information from a variety of sources, the Embassy concluded that the complete failure of the strike was due to the fact that the 26th of July Movement “made just about every error it could make, while the Government made none.” The Embassy also noted that “the lack of strength and general ineptitude displayed in the attempt, as well as the comparative efficiency and determination of the police, surprised all observers.” The Embassy gave the following reasons, not necessarily in order of importance, for the strike’s failure:

“1. Prior announcement. Fidel Castro’s bombastic announcement of ‘all out war’ against the regime after April 1–5 gave the Government ample time to prepare for the general strike. During the four weeks which elapsed from the issuance of Castro’s March 12 Manifesto to the strike date, Batista moved swiftly and surely. He organized the police and army. He declared a state of national emergency and issued a series of stiff decree-laws aimed at dissuading labor and management, the civil service and the judiciary from lending their support to the strike effort. He also enlisted the complete backing of the directorate of the Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos (CYC—Cuban Confederation of Labor).

“2. Government determination. The Government was obviously seriously concerned, but also determined. There were some evidences of panic within the Government in the preceding days, but the military and police forces in general held firm and made what turned out to be adequate and efficient preparations. In Habana the police handled the entire affair, and needed no help from the army.

“3. Lack of organization. Everyone in Habana seemed to know that the bank workers, transportation workers, public utility workers, and dock workers were the key to a successful strike. Some bank workers went home and stayed there. Most were back at work the following morning. One bus was burned, but there was little if any reduction in bus service. The Movement managed to put a bomb down a manhole on the Prado, in downtown Habana, which blew out a cable supplying electricity to a small section of the city and started a spectacular fire from a ruptured gas main. But conditions at the electrical plants remained normal. Telephone service became irregular for an hour or so, but by mid-afternoon was normal within the city. The dock workers simply aid not participate in the attempt.

“It seems clear that at least some of the so-called ‘action groups’ in Habana were not given assignments, or were not told of the timing. Marcelo Salado, one of the principal action leaders, was killed by police who spotted him apparently peacefully going about his private business a half-hour after the strike attempt started. Caches of gasoline had been placed in some locations for use in attacking buses, but the men who were supposed to use it did not show up—they apparently got no word of the strike until too late.

“4. Inadequate communications. It seems incredible, but the Movement apparently relied almost exclusively on broadcasts from radio stations it expected to seize for communications with the various groups. What appear to have been rather half-hearted attempts were made to seize at least two stations. Both failed, though some people have reported hearing a few seconds of rebel broadcast from one station before it went off the air, to return with its normal program within a few minutes.

“It was said that the Movement and the Young Men’s Group of Catholic Action had arranged for the strike to be signaled by continuous ringing of the church bells. This was done, and the Embassy has received one report that the police had learned of the plan and frustrated it—just how is not known.

“5. Poor timing. The Movement may not have been able to help this. But it is clear that the time of greatest tension and expectation among the people as a whole was reached around the middle of March. The strike attempt would have had greater chances of success if undertaken then. The peak of tension had been passed by the time the attempt was made.

“6. Poor planning. It seems probable that not all of the forces available to the ′26th of July’ Movement were committed to the attempt on April 9. In any Cuban revolutionary movement, a considerable number of faint-hearts appear at the moment of action, and undoubtedly many who had been counted on failed to show up. However, after taking that factor into consideration, it still looks as though a considerable portion of the available forces were not called out.

“A story was current on April 10 that the attempt was planned to coincide with a move by a number of younger army officers in Camp Columbia. According to this, the army group agreed to move if the disturbances started by the ′26th of July’ Movement reached such a level that the army was called out. The leaders of the Movement in Habana thereupon undertook a sort of token uprising, aimed at protecting most of their own forces while still alarming the Government sufficiently to cause the army to be called out. Their calculations were off, and the police handled the affair so promptly and efficiently that the army was not needed—thus frustrating any plans the group of rebellious officers may have had. The Embassy has no direct information concerning the existence of such a plot within the Army.

“7. Lack of support. Clearly, the people of Habana did not rally to the support of the attempt once it was launched. In addition, there was division among the various revolutionary groups. The attempt of April 9 appears to nave been entirely a ′26tn of July’ affair. There are conflicting stories about the reason for that. One version, current at the time of the attempt, was that the Movement was over-confident and arrogant, and rejected support from both the Directorio Revolucionario (DR—The Revolutionary Directorate, an action organization of students) and the Organización Autentica (OA—Authentic Organization, the action organization of the revolutionary or Prío wing of the Auténtico Party). This is in marked contrast to the March 12 manifesto, in which Castro and Faustino Perez specified that various revolutionary organizations would have tasks in the final moves against the Government. The Frente Obrero Nacional (FON—National Workers’ Front) was to be in charge of the labor sector. The Movimiento de Resistencia Civica (MRC—Civic Resistance Movement) was to handle the professional, commercial and industrial sectors. The Frente Estudiantil Nacional (FEN—National Students’ Front) was to handle the students’ strike. These organizations are close to the ′26th of July’ Movement, and sometimes considered as branches of the Movement rather than separate entities. But in addition the Manifesto stated that the ′26th of July’ Movement and all other revolutionary organizations which support it would be responsible for armed action.

“Since April 9 a story has become current that both DR and OA sabotaged the attempt. This version is particularly prevalent among Cuban exile groups in the United States. In view of the divisions among the revolutionary groups and the selfish motivations of many of the leaders, this is entirely possible.” (Ibid., 737.00/5–558)

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 13, 1958—5 p.m.

693. For Rubottom. I sincerely am trying to be objective in my attitude toward the affairs of Cuba, yet I feel it my duty to point out certain facts.

With issuance public statement by Department² declaring US was not furnishing arms to either side in Cuba impression was created that US was placing rebels on same plane as GOC.

GOC has been friendly to and cooperative with US at all times. Whenever US has requested cooperation and assistance in our stand against world Communism GOC has never been found wanting. Requests for protection American property from rebels—even though GOC may now not even purchase arms in US—have always been complied with. GOC has responded no matter what requests US has made.

In suspending shipment of arms to Cuba and then publicizing same, Department has opened doors to oppositionists in US. Department will therefore continue be pressured by oppositionists for more and more spiritual aid to encourage rebels. Withholding of the previous commitment—delivery of 20 armored cars—represented aid to rebels.

Department must be aware that as long as oppositionists are given encouragement they will continue to pressure Department until GOC refuses to cooperate further or US has brought about downfall of GOC.

So soon after complete failure of highly advertised and long-promised revolution and general strike it is difficult to believe rebels capable of capturing cities. Past program of rebel unfilled promises is still too vivid in people’s minds.

I believe Cuba may still find peaceful solution which is desired by great majority Cubans and is in best interest US. Said peaceful solution is possibly in offing. I have been informed by Papal Nuncio and Bishop Muller that they have plans to try to obtain an indefinite truce.

I will discuss with appropriate officials the bad world reaction toward US which would ensue from indiscriminate bombing of cities from MAP bombers. However I strongly recommend against publicizing any GOC assurances we may receive. Such publicity would only encourage rebels and hurt GOC without benefiting US.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/4–1358. Secret; Priority.

² See Document 44.

51. Editorial Note

On April 14, at the 362d meeting of the National Security Council, Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles briefly discussed developments in Cuba during the course of his intelligence briefing:

“Mr. Dulles indicated that he had had [1 line not declassified] a report on the situation there. The attempt by the Castro forces to launch a general strike in Cuba had fizzled out. Castro will now be obliged to revert to guerrilla warfare from his strongholds in Oriente Province from which it would be very difficult to dislodge him. He has a hard core of about 1200 men, and his failure to mount a successful movement against Batista derives from the fact that the Cuban Army remains loyal to Batista. No evidence has been uncovered of direct Communist inspiration or support for the Castro revolt. The government has the situation in hand at the moment, and Castro will now have to start on a new tack”. (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, April 15; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

52. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 22, 1958¹

Washington, April 22, 1958

SUBJECT

Visit of New Cuban Ambassador, Nicolás Arroyo

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Nicolás Arroyo, Cuban Embassy

Mr. Mario Nuñez, Minister Counselor, Cuban Embassy

ARA—Mr. Rubottom

MID—Mr. Leonhardy

Ambassador Arroyo recalled his last visit with Mr. Rubottom last fall in connection with his trip to Washington to consult with the Army Map Service. He reviewed briefly the fruits which his efforts at that time have since borne. He stated that a good portion of Cuba had now been mapped photographically and that the entire project would be finished sometime next year. He said that Cuba will be the first Latin American country to be entirely mapped by aerial photographs and this will be a tremendous boon to economic development especially in the fields of mining and petroleum. The maps will also serve to help the Cuban treasury collect land taxes.

Mr. Rubottom asked the Ambassador how he viewed the political situation in Cuba and the Ambassador replied that he personally was not nearly as alarmed during the last few weeks as the U.S. press on the situation in Cuba. He said he thought that the press in this country had exaggerated considerably the situation there but apparently it is beginning to realize that the Castro threat was not as ominous as depicted by its reporting staff. He said that those that advocated terrorism in Cuba constituted a very small minority and that the Government was offering free elections with every type of guarantee the political opposition wanted and he thought Cuba would now be able to go ahead with preparations for elections. He said that the opposition would have a chance to show whether it had a majority of popular support or not at the polls. He referred to the support for elections by Dr. Grau San Martín and Dr. Marquéz Sterling and commented that those who opposed the elections know that they cannot win, otherwise they would take the easy road to success.

Mr. Rubottom said he was certain that the vast majority of the Cuban people wanted a peaceful solution in Cuba. He said that in our own country—while he did not support and condone many of the things that have been said about Cuba in recent months in the U.S. press—the fact had to be faced that the American public was not convinced that the Government intended to hold free elections in Cuba. He added that some Cubans apparently were not convinced either of this fact. He said that he felt that the Ambassador had two major functions to perform here: one being to try to gain acceptance in the eyes of the American public, press and Congress of his Government’s intentions to hold elections which would be acceptable to a majority of the Cubans, and two, to keep his Government apprized of the attitudes within the United States towards Cuba. He remarked that this was certainly a difficult task, he realized, but he thought that the Ambassador with his ability and his knowledge of English could be successful. Mr. Rubottom opined and the Ambassador concurred, that any attempt to criticize the U.S. press for its statements on Cuba would be counter-productive. With respect to U.S. Congressional opinion on the Cuban situation, Mr. Rubottom referred to his recent testimony before several Congressional Committees in which the Department came in for heavy criticism on U.S. policy towards Cuba. The Ambassador said he was very much aware of this testimony and had read all the releases on the subject even before he was named Ambassador.

The matter of Cuban exile activities in this country, particularly in Florida, came up for discussion. The Ambassador said that it was not safe for a Cuban who was not opposed to the Government to visit the Miami area because of the gangster-type activities of the many irresponsible Cuban elements who repeatedly violate our laws. He remarked that he advised his wife to cancel her plans to visit friends in Miami for the present. He referred, in this connection, to the case of the attack on Congressman Rolando Masferrer. Mr. Rubottom said that the Cuban exile activities the Ambassador referred to were a matter of serious concern to the Department and that we have taken the matter up with the state and local Florida authorities. He also mentioned his personal conversation with the Governor of Florida on this subject.

With respect to the assault on Congressman Masferrer, he asked Mr. Leonhardy to summarize the latest information the Department received on this case and said that the Department had immediately gotten in touch with the Miami police officials on learning of this matter and they were doing everything possible to apprehend and prosecute those responsible. He added that he hoped that once peace reigned again in Cuba these exiles might return to their country and then end such abuses of our laws. He referred to our constant surveillance of illegal arms traffic by Cuban exiles and said this would continue. The Ambassador said that Cuban exiles historically had behaved themselves very well in the U.S. but not this new group. He mentioned that President Batista and his followers when they were here never were accused of violating our laws and respected the asylum we had given them.

Mr. Rubottom mentioned the recent emergency law decree passed by the Cuban Government relating to activities of the press and expressed the hope that in the administration of this law the Government would not suppress the activities of the U.S. press. The Ambassador replied that his Government was alert to adverse publicity which could result from curbing activities of the U.S. press and he was certain that the new legislation would be administered with this in mind and that no harm would come to our press representatives.

On the subject of arms shipments to Cuba, the Ambassador said that he was reluctant to bring this matter up in the personal visit but thought he ought to mention that the Cuban Government was encountering difficulty in obtaining reimbursement for the 1,950 rifles on which shipment had been suspended and the order cancelled. Mr. Rubottom promised to take this matter up with the Department of Defense immediately with the hope of obtaining reimbursement or a credit which could be used in the purchase of other items. He mentioned in this connection that we had approved recently for export to Cuba, a number of non-combat items. The Ambassador then mentioned the Cuban desire to purchase some unarmed light naval craft in the sub-chaser category which the U.S. Navy had available for sale. The Ambassador said that these craft would later be armed, of course, but were being also purchased by private individuals for non-combat purposes. Mr. Rubottom mentioned that in keeping with the Cuban Government’s desire not to purchase any materials from us now which could cause any controversy, he was suggesting that this order be dropped and expressed the hope that later conditions in Cuba would improve and thus permit a reconsideration of the entire matter of arms shipments. The Ambassador was in agreement and said that Cuba would drop its discussion with the Navy on these vessels. He said he was sure that within several months conditions in Cuba would return to a state of normalcy which would permit a renewal of shipments of this type.

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba Jan.–June 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy on April 23. Ambassador Arroyo presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 16. In a memorandum of April 21 to Rubottom, Wieland listed five topics that Rubottom might wish to discuss with Arroyo. Rubottom marked the memorandum, requesting background information prepared on two of the topics. He wrote a question mark next to two other topics and crossed out the fifth, which read: “State that Department would consider renewing shipments combat equipment when there was evidence that Cuban Government was taking steps toward peaceful solution acceptable to Cuban people”. In a memorandum of April 22 to Rubottom, Wieland provided background on the two topics selected by Rubottom: “U.S. Interest in a Peaceful Solution in Cuba” and “New Emergency Law—Decree No. 5 Announcing Penalties for Press for Reporting News Unfavorable to the Government”. Both memoranda are ibid., Ambassador Arroyo.

53. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hoyt) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, April 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

Thoughts on Cuban Situation

It seems to me that with the apparent recent failure of the Castro movement to oust Batista we have entered into a new phase in the situation in Cuba. It seems possible to me that Batista might now be receptive to another approach for reaching a formula which would provide for free, honest elections and Batista withdrawing from the scene following those elections.

I believe, however, that there are certain factors which must be developed in making an approach to Batista:

(1) The approach must be kept out of a Batista–Castro context. I don’t believe that either Batista or Castro is going to be willing to negotiate with each other.

(2)

An attempt should be made to appeal to Batista on the basis of patriotism. I have long felt that Batista really wanted to govern Cuba this time as a respected elder statesman rather than as the sergeant of yore. He has never been able to achieve this, but I still believe that is what he would have liked to have done.

It may be that by pointing out to Batista that strong-arm types of government are becoming more and more passé in Latin America; that sooner or later this type of government will go in Cuba and that the best chance he has to go down in Cuban history honored rather than discredited is to really establish an effective climate for free, honest elections in which there can be no doubt that he will be out of the picture entirely following the elections and that he will respect the will of the voters. I think Batista might listen to such an appeal.

(3) In line with keeping this out of a Batista–Castro context, an appeal should be made also to the better elements in Batista’s Government and to the better elements of the Cuban public and the opposition to really get together on developing the proper climate and safeguards for elections. In my opinion, political leaders such as Prio, Varona, Marquez Sterling and Grau are just as much discredited as is Batista and therefore the appeal must be made outside of these established but discredited opposition leaders. The whole thing must be gotten on a higher plane.

I think the approach should be made and made soon. I feel that with the pressure of Castro now off Batista, the latter could not be accused of succumbing to Castro’s pressure in taking any salutary steps leading to free elections. I believe the onus is now enough on Castro that Batista is in a position to be more receptive to suggestions and approaches from responsible groups.

Undoubtedly, in this picture there is the group around Batista who have been counseling him (very badly) to take some of the measures he has. I do feel, however, that there are good elements in the Batista Government who are now pretty much fed up with the strife, bloodshed, etc., and who could be brought into play on a really healthy, sound approach.

The key of course is to get Batista to really prove his sincerity to the responsible people and the general public of Cuba. There are not very many who are going to believe that there will really be free elections unless Batista gives assurances and proof that he will retire from the scene (best thing would be for him to leave Cuba) and not remain a strong man behind a Batista-elected candidate.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2458. Drafted and initialed by Hoyt. Snow, to whom the memorandum was also addressed, wrote the following note to Hoyt on May 1: “A very interesting paper. Please confer with MID & we can talk about it when I return from Texas”.

54. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, May 2, 1958, 11:30 a.m.¹

Pentagon, Washington, May 2, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Suspension of Arms Shipments to Cuba

Admiral Burke stated that Defense is concerned over two aspects of the decision to suspend arms shipments to Cuba. First, Defense had not been informed in advance of this decision, and second, the U.S. had cancelled valid contracts with a free government.

Mr. Stewart said that Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague’s office had been advised. Mr. Irwin (Mr. Sprague’s deputy) said he had not known about the suspension until May 1.

Admiral Burke said that Admiral Calderon, Cuban Chief of Navy General Staff, had written him a personal letter² saying that the U.S. suspension did not affect official relations between the governments but that Calderon personally thought it was a terrible thing for the U.S. to do. Admiral Burke said that the Cubans are extremely eager to buy PT boats and that the ones they are now planning to purchase are simply a pile of junk.

Mr. Stewart noted that the only shipment affected by the suspension is the delivery of 1,950 Garand rifles, the remaining portion of a 5,000 rifle contract entered into several years ago. Shipment of spare parts of non-combat material, although first suspended, has been resumed.

Mr. Stewart described some of the political considerations involved in the U.S. decision. There is considerable opposition within Cuba to Batista, who obtained power through a military coup and rigged elections. Batista probably does not command the support of a majority of the Cuban people today. He promised free elections in June but had not convinced the people that they would in fact be free and has recently imposed very severe restrictions and abrogations of civil rights. In addition to internal problems in Cuba, there is considerable Congressional and public sentiment in the U.S. opposed to shipment of arms to Batista. Assistant Secretary Rubottom met this opposition during recent testimony on the Hill³ about Latin American policy and in connection with the Mutual Security Program. Senators Morse, Mansfield and Fulbright were particularly outspoken in their criticism of U.S. aid to Latin American dictators. In view of all these considerations, Mr. Stewart said, the State Department had decided to apply rigidly a policy of non-intervention in Cuba. He noted that members of both of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Congress, after briefings by Departmental officers, had indicated that the Department had no alternative but take the action it did on the suspension of arms shipments.

Admiral Burke commented that there are a number of dictators in Latin America and said that there might be considerable difficulty if Latin American countries felt they could not rely on the U.S. to carry out valid contracts for shipment of arms. These countries would only look elsewhere for military equipment. Mr. Stewart said that there has recently been a trend in Latin America away from dictatorships starting with the overthrow of Peron. He also said that continued shipment of arms to Batista was gaining considerable bad will for the U.S. in Cuba.

Mr. Murphy inquired as to the terms of the contract for sale of arms to Cuba, asking specifically whether there was not some kind of escape clause. Admiral Burke said that he thought it was a straight contract for sale and that our suspension was in violation of the terms of the contract. Mr. Stewart said the Department, through MC, had final authority in deciding whether a shipment of arms should be sent. Admiral Burke said in reply to Mr. Murphy’s question that his recommendation would be to carry out the contract, since it was a valid contract and even though certain hopes which we entertained at the time we entered into the contract had not been borne out. Admiral Burke said that if 1,950 rifles were the only problem it was probably not a serious problem, but he still felt we should carry out our agreement. It was pointed out that Cuba has cancelled all its orders with the U.S. for combat weapons. Admiral Burke thought this changed the situation somewhat.

Regarding future prospects in Cuba, Mr. Stewart said that the country is in a state of great instability with terrorism and brutality being practiced by both sides. If Castro obtains power, he has said that for 18 months he will impose a dictatorship and this might well be as bad as the present regime. On the other hand, there is the prospect that the pattern of Argentina might eventually be followed and that a democratic regime would ultimately emerge.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, May 1958. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated, but the source text bears the following notation: “State draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense”. A cover sheet lists 28 attendees at the meeting, including representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

² No such message has been found in the Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Incoming Letters—Calderon.

³ Apparently a reference to Rubottom’s testimony cited in footnote 4, Document 29.

55. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 6, 1958.

SUBJECT

Sales of Arms to Cuba

Discussion:

In the Secretary’s approval of ARA’s memorandum of March 24, 1958, on the above subject (Tab A),² he indicated that he wished no arms to be furnished to Cuba until conditions there improved to the point where this equipment “will be dependably used for hemispheric defense and not used up in internal strife”. He also indicated that he wished to be informed of any other elements which might alter that decision.

In preparing the recommendations in its March 24 memorandum, ARA took into account that there are three different bases on which arms have been supplied to Cuba: (1) grant aid under the bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, (2) sales arranged through the Department of Defense under authority of Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act (Tab B)³ and (3) sales by private American firms. A primary factor in our recommendation to suspend arms shipments to Cuba last month was our desire to be sure that military equipment provided Cuba under the MDA Agreement would be used in accordance with the terms of that agreement. While there is no legal or contractual prohibition on the use for internal security purposes of arms sold under methods (2) and (3) above, the export of such equipment from the United States is controlled by the Executive Branch under its munitions control procedures in “furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States” (Tab C). It is in our interest to preserve flexibility in the exercise of such control. If the Cuban Government takes effective steps toward a peaceful and constructive solution of the disturbed internal situation, we should be in a position, when appropriate, to encourage further progress along these lines by approving selected sales of military equipment to Cuba by the Department of Defense or by private American firms, should such requests be made.

The Cuban Government has cancelled all outstanding requests to purchase combat equipment in the United States (Tab D) and has turned to other sources of supply (e.g., the Dominican Republic). Following the abortive attempt by Fidel Castro to overthrow the Government of Cuba in early April, the situation is now quiet in Cuba. National elections are scheduled for November 3, 1958.

Recommendation:

1. That, in keeping with the Secretary’s desire, shipments of combat equipment for Cuba under the grant Military Assistance Program continue to be withheld until there is assurance that such equipment will be used only in defense of the hemisphere.

2. That sales of combat equipment to Cuba by the Department of Defense or by private American firms be selectively approved whenever in the judgment of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs or the Acting Assistant Secretary such approval would further our foreign-policy objectives as set forth above.

3. That shipment of non-combat items, such as certain communications equipment, furnished to Cuba as a grant under the Military Assistance Program or sold to the Cuban Government by the Department of Defense or by private American companies, be approved. (Some requests for purchase of non-combat items were recently approved. See Tab E).⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5612/5–658. Secret. Drafted by Little, cleared with Dreier, initialed by Wieland and Snow, and concurred in by H, P, W/MSC, and Murphy. In giving H’s concurrence, Assistant Secretary Macomber wrote on the source text: “Concur with recommendations 1 & 3. Recommendation #2 will cause considerable Congressional difficulty”.

² Document 41.

³ Tabs B, C, D, and E, not attached to the source text, have not been further identified.

⁴ Herter initialed his approval of each of the three recommendations.

56. Editorial Note

During the second week of May 1958, Ambassador Smith returned to Washington for consultations. The precise dates of his visit have not been determined, nor have any records of his conversations been found.

Smith apparently met with Department of State officials on May 9. In a memorandum of May 9 to Deputy Assistant Secretary Snow, Wieland suggested that Snow mention two subjects in his meeting scheduled that afternoon with Smith: (1) the need for U.S. Embassy officials in Havana to avoid engaging in activities that could be utilized by either side in the Cuban conflict to its advantage, and (2) the renewal of combat arms shipments to Cuba. Among the points he made with regard to the latter subject, Wieland said:

“This is a matter the Ambassador has indicated he wishes to discuss in the Department. His thesis, as he explained it to Mr. Leonhardy the other day, is that he can make no headway in getting Batista to grant concessions in Cuba conducive to peace until the U.S. makes some move to resume arms shipments. It was apparent in his conversation with Mr. Leonhardy on this subject that he still may not understand the reasons for our having taken the suspension action and for our continuance of the suspension. He cited, for example, Rep. Charles Porter (Oregon) as being our only real Congressional critic on this issue, which, of course, is not the case”.

Wieland concluded:

“In rebuttal to the Ambassador’s argument favoring the ‘carrot’ technique it should be emphasized that the opinion in this country of the public, press and Congress on this issue is such that a renewal of combat arms shipments at this time even on a selective basis, would be damaging to overall hemispheric defense objectives. Until such time as the GOC gives concrete evidence that it has convinced the majority of the Cuban people through positive steps of its intention to work out a peaceful solution, there probably will be no justifiable basis on which to reconsider the suspension of combat arms shipments from this country to Cuba”. (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958)

Sometime on May 9 Smith was also shown a copy of Snow’s memorandum of May 6 to Herter (supra). In telegram 772 from Havana, May 16, Smith asked that he be sent a copy of this memorandum “which was shown me during my visit to Department May 9”. In telegram 654 to Havana, May 19, the Department said that it was sending by pouch that day a copy of the memorandum. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/5–1658)

57. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 101 Santiago de Cuba, May 21, 1958.

SUBJECT

Agitation Against Americans at Guantanamo and other Cuban Issues Connected with Nixon Visit²

Local Communists are attempting to connect the recent events involving Vice President Nixon with agitation against the U.S. Naval Operating Base at Guantanamo and local issues. On May 16 the Provincial Committee of the Partido Socialista Popular issued a mimeographed circular³ calling for the “Yankees” to leave Caimanera, which was listed as one of the bases where troops were readied to “invade” friendly countries.

The communist circular stated that the Vice President’s trip had been to the accompaniment of a symphony of whistles and insults as an expression of the deep resentment for the U.S. having imposed dictators, increased tariffs, and impeded free trade. It says that the mobilization of troops for invasion of Venezuela was hypocritically disguised as an offer to collaborate with Venezuela which had not been requested by Venezuela. Now we know, it says, what inspires the releases of the (Cuban) General Staff when it lies in each line it publishes. “Like father, like son” is the comparison drawn between the U.S. Armed Forces and the Cuban Armed Forces.

It also blames the Yankees for perpetuating Batista in power because they prevent the unity necessary in Cuba in order to throw him out. It calls on the Cubans to imitate sister states in uniting even against the “imperialist will”.

The only other editorial comment on the Vice President’s visit was that of Libertad, owned by the notorious Senator Rolando Masferrer. It also followed the line that a mistake had been made in alerting U.S. troops. The editorial expressed the hope that the United States would become more aware of the dangers of communism in Latin America as a result of the regrettable incident. The very pro-government Masferrer publication is the only one which currently carries editorial material. All newspapers have, however, carried wire service accounts and comments from Washington.

A number of individuals have expressed regret that such a terrible thing should happen on the basis that it reflects on all of Latin America. While the pro-government comments are entirely on the basis of the menace of communism, the anti-Batista groups are hopeful that the incidents will bring about a new policy toward Latin American dictators and Batista in particular, according to the voluntary comments so far.

The Communist comment on the lack of unity in getting rid of Batista and the call for Cuban unity despite imperialist efforts to prevent it might be interpreted as an indication that the Communists or at least the PSP on the Oriente Provincial level have not had their cooperation fully accepted by other opposition groups.

Park F. Wollam

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/5–2158. Confidential. Copies were sent to ARA/MID, the Embassy in Havana, and the U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer, Guantanamo.

² Documentation on Vice President Nixon’s trip to several South American countries is scheduled for publication in volume V.

³ Attached but not printed.

58. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and the Cuban Ambassador (Arroyo), Department of State, Washington, May 22, 1958¹

Washington, May 22, 1958

SUBJECT

Use by Cuban Army of MAP Equipment for Internal Security and other Subjects

The Cuban Ambassador called on Mr. Rubottom today at the latter’s suggestion. Mr. Rubottom informed him of the pending investigations of the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs for Latin America and said that our whole arms policy in Latin America, as well as in Cuba will certainly come under careful scrutiny. He described the attitudes of the various Senators in the Subcommittee and added that if a strong defense of our policy were not made, our whole Hemispheric Defense Program might be modified to the detriment of Cuba and other aid recipient countries. Mr. Rubottom stated that in view of these pending investigations it was important that the Department have a reply to its note of March 3, 1958,² on the subject of the reported use by the Cuban armed forces of MAP-supplied equipment for internal security purposes. He mentioned that Minister Guell had told Ambassador Smith in early April³ that a reply would be forthcoming shortly.

The Ambassador said he was not familiar with the note and was then shown a copy by Mr. Rubottom. After reading it he commented at length on the Cuban political scene and on Communist influences at work in Latin America as evidenced during the recent trip of the Vice President to South America. He described the demonstrations during the Vice President’s tour as an integral part of a hemisphere-wide Communist plan. He cited the need for promoting internal stability in these countries and without strong internal security measures democracy could not flourish. In particular reference to Cuba, he stated that President Batista had promised free elections and had agreed to invite outside observers, including UN observers, to witness the elections if the opposition so requested. Against the Government’s program for free elections and the orderly transition of administrations are the revolutionists who wish to obstruct the process of democracy. Internal security measures have had to be taken to meet this threat. He remarked that each country in Latin America had its peculiar concept of democracy and that in Cuba they had one of the purest concepts. He contrasted this to Mexico’s one-party concept.

In commenting on our note of March 3, the Ambassador said that he would immediately look into the matter of obtaining an early reply. He said he could definitely state that army tanks had not been used in the campaign against rebel forces but had remained in Habana. The only instance when they were used was following the Palace raid of March 13, 1957, when they were brought there following the abortive rebel attempt.

Mr. Rubottom in referring to the Ambassador’s remarks relative to elections in Cuba, said that while he had no reason to doubt President Batista’s intentions of holding free elections, most of the people of the United States appeared not to be convinced of the President’s intentions and asked what the Ambassador intended to do to try to change this impression. The Ambassador said he was speaking before the Pan American Society (Spruille Braden’s organization) next week and planned to make a forthright statement in support of his Government’s policy. Mr. Rubottom remarked that this should help and he hoped that the Ambassador would accept other such invitations where he could make known his Government’s views.

Continuing on this same theme Mr. Rubottom said he thought the Ambassador might wish to have his Government consider announcing soon that it would invite UN observers to witness elections. The Ambassador said he appreciated Mr. Rubottom’s thought and would seriously consider it but inferred that Batista might find it difficult to make such a statement unless the political opposition first made the request. Mr. Rubottom mentioned a second point which might be considered by the Government and that would be to emphasize that if the opposition won the elections, Batista would turn the Government over to the newly-elected President. The Ambassador replied that President Batista had made this point very clear in his speech before the newsmen of the press in March of this year.⁴ Mr. Rubottom remarked that he had not seen this speech but was happy to hear the President had made this point clear and expressed to the Ambassador the thought that he could make good use of it in his talks before U.S. audiences.

Mr. Rubottom mentioned during the conversations the general feeling which seemed apparent in this country and in Cuba that the Batista Government having come into office through a military coup had no legitimacy. The Ambassador replied that without dwelling on the circumstances surrounding the coup, which was necessary, the fact remained that the Batista Government immediately made preparations for elections and was duly elected to office in November 1954. He said 56% of the electorate voted in the elections and that the withdrawal of Grau within 48 hours of the elections stemmed from the latter’s knowledge that he was doomed to defeat.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/5–2258. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy.

² See footnote 2, Document 27.

³ Guell made this statement to Smith on April 9, as reported in telegram 675 from Havana that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/4–958)

⁴ Not further identified.

59. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, June 3, 1958—6 p.m.

810. Monday² night had 90 minute exchange of view with President. Guell attending.

World press, UN, OAS observers will be invited witness elections November 3. Batista still intends give general amnesty over period elections if rebels agree lay down their arms. In February 1959 he will retire from office and turn over GOC to candidate winning on November 3, just as he did in 1944.

Regarding creating atmosphere conducive favorable elections Batista intends wait for proper timing before taking necessary steps such as restoring guarantees, as he believes for the present existing emergency status is in best interests Cuba and that present laws in effect work normal [abnormal] hardship on law-abiding citizens in Cuba. Batista states GOC has situation under full control. His orders are capture Castro alive and expects within next two months be successful but anxious accomplish this without disrupting lives Cubans in area. In Batista’s opinion people of Cuba consider Castro irresponsible and dangerous as result his repeated and unrestrained threats; revolutionaries will try prevent elections under any conditions.

When I asked Batista if he could restore guarantees after eliminating Castro he replied that he would then still have to cope with Prio, ex-President Costa Rica (Figueres) and Venezuela.

In my opinion Batista believes guarantees were restored too soon January 25. I am under impression that Batista will be less receptive now than before to suggestions of liberalization of his regime, although our relations continue completely cordial and friendly.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–358. Confidential.

² June 2.

60. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) in Havana and the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) in Washington, June 3, 1958¹

Washington, June 3, 1958

SUBJECT

Washington Post Article on use of MAP Unit in Oriente Province

Mr. Leonhardy called Ambassador Smith this morning and read to him the significant portion of the UPI article appearing in the Washington Post this morning² to the effect that the United States-equipped battalion of the Cuban army was taking part in the large-scale offensive being launched by the Cuban Armed Forces in Oriente Province. He told the Ambassador that the Department felt that it was important to obtain from the Cuban Ministry of State a statement relative to this report as soon as possible today in view of the Amendment which had been offered by Senator Proxmire to the Mutual Security legislation which would, if voted on favorably, terminate both military and economic assistance to Cuba. He also mentioned to the Ambassador that Mr. Rubottom was testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning on our policy towards Latin America and that it was possible that the matter of Cuban use of “grant” equipment would come up for discussion. He suggested to the Ambassador that in his discussions with Minister Guell he remind him that we had not received a reply to our note of March 3³ on this same subject. The Ambassador stated he thought that the question of a reply to the note was a dead issue in view of our suspension of arms shipments to Cuba. Mr. Leonhardy reminded the Ambassador of Mr. Rubottom’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March⁴ in which this subject was discussed and the Committee was informed that we had made inquiry of the Cuban Government on this reported use of this equipment in violation of the bilateral agreement. Also, Mr. Leonhardy called to the Ambassador’s attention Mr. Rubottom’s discussion with Ambassador Arroyo on this same subject. Ambassador Smith said he understood and would immediately take the matter up with Minister Guell in an attempt to get a denial of the press report.

A short while later Ambassador Smith called Mr. Leonhardy to get a rereading of the UPI article and at that time Mr. Leonhardy suggested that in his discussions with Minister Guell he might suggest to him that in view of the relatively small amount of the equipment supplied to Cuba under “grant” aid that it would be to the advantage of both Governments if the GOC could announce publicly that neither the U.S.-trained battalion or the equipment supplied to it were being used or would be used in the Sierra Maestra campaign.

After the Ambassador had consulted with members of our Military and Air Missions in Habana and had called Minister Guell he called Mr. Leonhardy again to report that the Minister was bringing this matter to the attention of the President but that meanwhile he had learned from our Army Mission Chief, Col. Lynn, that 750 out of 800 men in the U.S.-trained battalion in question presently were in Oriente along with MAP-supplied equipment. He indicated that he thought that he might obtain the removal of this unit from active combat if he had something to offer in exchange. Mr. Leonhardy pointed out that the whole fate of our aid program to Cuba could easily hinge on what action was taken to remove this unit and its equipment from use in internal hostilities and that he suggested that this be emphasized to the GOC in his talks with the Minister. Mr. Leonhardy also implied that the use of this battalion in Oriente could place the continuance of our military missions in jeopardy.

With respect to a reply to the Department’s note of March 3 on this subject, the Ambassador said he was informed by Minister Guell that the Embassy had received the instructions on which to base the reply several weeks ago and could not understand why the Department had not received it. Mr. Leonhardy expressed some surprise at this statement and remarked that he had talked to Dr. Nunez within the last three days on this matter and he had answered that no instructions had yet arrived from Habana.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 60 D 553, Cuba. Official Use Only. Drafted by Leonhardy.

² Washington Post, June 3, 1958, p. 1.

³ See footnote 2, Document 27.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 29.

61. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) in Havana and the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) in Washington, June 4, 1958¹

Washington, June 4, 1958

SUBJECT

Use of MAP Equipment in Oriente Province

Mr. Leonhardy called Ambassador Smith to determine whether he had received a reply from Minister Guell to his oral inquiry of yesterday regarding the use of the MAP-equipped battalion in Oriente Province. The Ambassador replied that he inquired of Minister Guell several times yesterday about this matter but the latter had been unable to see President Batista because he was meeting with a number of Cuban politicians who were in Habana. He said he would keep pushing for an answer, however, and would inform the Department as soon as he had received one.

Mr. Leonhardy explained to the Ambassador that a reply² had been received last evening to the Department’s Note of March 3,³ on this subject and that the GOC considered that it had not violated the Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement of March 7, 1952. He said the Department was giving consideration to informing the Cuban Government of the definite evidence now available of a violation. The Ambassador asked that this action be withheld until he had an opportunity to obtain an official reply to his latest request. Ambassador Smith called later in the morning to inform Mr. Leonhardy that he had had a brief conversation with Minister Guell who had not been in touch yet with the President on this matter. The Minister indicated his willingness to get out a statement that the Cuban Army was using equipment purchased not only from the U.S. but from other areas also. The Ambassador told him that such a statement would be of no use and that he suggested to the Minister that the GOC should take some action to sterilize the battalion in question. The Ambassador told Mr. Leonhardy he would keep pressing for this type of solution but was not too hopeful.

During the afternoon Ambassador Smith called Mr. Leonhardy to state that he still had no answer from Minister Guell but that he had learned, apparently from our Army Mission,⁴ that the MAP-equipped battalion was not fighting as a unit but had been dispersed and had been integrated into other units. He said that it would be almost a physical impossibility to reorganize and separate this unit from the others in the area. He mentioned also that it would be difficult to segregate “grant” aid from purchased military equipment. In response to this latter statement Mr. Leonhardy suggested that if an identical number of like units were confined to hemispheric defense training purposes it would probably not be important whether they were originally obtained under grant or reimbursable aid.

Ambassador Smith in this last conversation pointed out, as he had previously, that the MAP-trained soldiers are the best Cuba has and that withdrawing them even though the number may be small (750) would result in a serious handicap to the fighting forces and a psychological set-back. The Ambassador suggested that we might compromise by not sending any more “grant” aid equipment to Cuba but permit that already forwarded to be used in Oriente.⁵ Mr. Leonhardy reiterated his previous explanation that a treaty violation had occurred and could not be overlooked.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–458. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

² No copy of this reply has been found.

³ See footnote 2, Document 27.

⁴ The question of the end use of MAP units and equipment in Cuba was analyzed in depth in a memorandum of June 4 from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Cuba, Colonel Leonard D. Dysinger, to Ambassador Smith, which was prepared in response to the Ambassador’s request. The memorandum was sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 1012 from Havana, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–558)

⁵ In telegram 818 from Havana, June 5, Smith summarized his recent conversations with Guell and elaborated on a possible compromise solution:

“(A) GOC to give US assurance that they will sterilize MAP battalion.

“(B) GOC to accept without objection that all sales of arms to Cuba will be suspended during any period of active domestic hostilities. This would mean placing private sale of arms in same category as MAP.

“(C) US then either to offer to eliminate unworkable provision of bilateral agreement or refrain from trying to invoke it.” (Ibid.)

62. Letter From the Consul at Santiago de Cuba (Wollam) to the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy)¹

Santiago de Cuba, June 4, 1958.

Dear Terry: Your letter of May 1² arrived on May 28, which is bad even for our usual poor courier connections. We do not have any copies of Skelly’s publicity in Libertad, but we will get some from the newspaper. Incidently, Libertad was attacked the other day. Masferrer’s people seem up to their usual tricks of recent, if we can believe any of what we hear, and his “army” is still in the field, despite some rumors of conflicts between his group and the Cuban Armed Forces and also rumor of disagreements with the local general.

Gerardo Abascal returned here Thursday and was most complimentary about you and the opportunity of talking with you. I do not know if I remembered to warn you that he was coming, but he had indicated a desire to talk to someone in the Department when he visited Washington. I have no idea what he told you since I have not become too well acquainted with him, although he is a pleasant next door neighbor as well as a prominent citizen whose viewpoint is generally well known.

As far as Oriente is concerned, I agree with your statement that the Castro movement lost face in April when the strike movement failed. The people here would, I believe, blame it on the relative indifference in Habana. Had anything occurred there to keep things stirred up for a day or so, I am certain that there would have been a more determined effort here. Castro’s war of nerves and propaganda effort was very effective, and much more so than the actual happenings.

It is my strictly personal feeling, however, that this thing is far from being over, and the next month or two should prove or disprove this theory. This feeling is hard to document, but I think that there is a hard core which will resist as long as possible, as, in fact, Castro himself has stated.

It is too early to tell the effect of the military campaign, but the Army has announced no outstanding victories, and all we hear of locally is about “heavy” Army losses. Some of this must be discounted as wishful thinking, but I believe that in a relative manner the Army is losing a lot for this type of skirmishing action. The Army has the man power and the equipment but the rebels have the terrain and a much better reason for fighting, for their lives if nothing else.

Without any very definite knowledge, I can not find that the Army has been able to hold on to any extensive Sierra Maestra real estate and the same is true in the Sierra Cristal area as well as north and east of Baracoa. The Army can move in with force and air support but it seems like the rebels can usually move right back. At the moment there are supposedly heavy skirmishes going on near Sagua de Tanamo, Guantanamo and at two or three places in the Sierra Maestra. The little bits and pieces of information and rumor which do not mean much in themselves tend to give a picture of Army difficulties all over, but this is undoubtedly influenced by the local atmosphere.

On the other hand, the Army has the men, the equipment, and the overwhelming superiority of forces to be able to slowly grind away at Castro on all fronts, but they seem to have trouble concentrating much fire power. The rebels can inflict disproportionate casualties with ambushes and hit and run tactics. The rebels must be suffering too, however.

An interesting local theory is that Batista is kept from knowing the true state of things in Oriente by his military advisers. I do not know where this propaganda started, but the story is that as a native of Oriente, Batista would be doing differently somehow if he know the full story.

In Santiago things were seemingly returning to more normal with more people out at night instead of the completely deserted look to the streets. My impression is, however, that it is going backward a bit again as a result of a number of shootings by SIM, Masferrer, and the rebels over the weekend. At the moment there is a large sugar warehouse on fire on the waterfront, with everybody immediately assuming it is sabotage. A local pastor had a funeral Monday, and says he counted 19 unidentified bodies at the cemetery. We had a figure of 14, and Bob Wiecha has gotten names for about this many. Trains are being attacked again.

This situation is a new one to me, as my revolutionary experience in three countries³ has ordinarily been with one-shot, succeed-or-fail operations quickly over. Here, however, there is no doubt that there is a real war in progress, albeit small scale.

Some local people will talk about the likeness of the present situation to the end of the Machado regime, as did Ambassador Blanck. That was not pleasant around here and such conditions would probably again mean violence but with greater attending problems.

This all tends to paint a rather dim picture; at the moment it is certainly pure speculation on my part and probably out of proportion. It seems to apply only to Oriente. I do feel that the next several weeks will be somewhat crucial. If the Army can not meet its alleged time table of finishing things off by the end of July at the latest, new estimates of the situation will definitely be needed in a hurry. This is still a very big if at the present time, however.

I wish we could get more, definite information on these things, but you probably have other sources to go on with which to balance out our admittedly narrow, worms-eye view. I am hopeful that we can gradually develop more fact-finding ability along with more valid assessments of the local situation with time and experience. The Navy has had some interesting material recently about the fighting in Guantanamo. Much of it is admittedly “raw” material and subject to evaluation. They have “raw” reports of very heavy government casualties.

Please let me know if there is anything you want more or less of in our reporting attempts.

Best wishes, and I will look forward to seeing Ed Little here.

Sincerely,

P.S. This is merely “off the top of the head” stuff FYI.⁴

Park

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–458. Confidential; Official-Informal. a copy was also sent to Topping.

² Not found.

³ It is not clear which countries Wollam had in mind. He had served in Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Italy.

⁴ The postscript is handwritten by Wollam.

63. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hoyt) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, June 5, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cuban Elections

In connection with Embassy Habana’s telegram 810 of June 3² in which it is stated that UN and OAS observers will be invited to witness elections and Batista will retire from office in February 1959, there is still in my opinion one important point which has not been covered: will Batista leave Cuba rather than stay and remain the power behind the scenes.

I refer to my memo of April 24 (attached).³ I still believe that we should appeal to Batista on the basis of patriotism and along the lines of paragraph 2 of my memo. I feel this is even a more likely approach now that there is apparently less danger from Castro than heretofore.

In a recent conversation which Bill Wieland, Terry Leonhardy and I had with Joaquin Meyer,⁴ the latter expressed the opinion that one of the hardest things would be to get Batista actually to leave. Nevertheless, I still do not believe that anyone is going to really feel that there are chances for honest elections in Cuba unless Batista gives sufficient assurances to remove himself from the scene. As long as he remains in Cuba (this is presuming that his man can win an election), the Batista onus will be there. I think if Batista could be persuaded to announce that he intends to take a trip to Europe for six months after February 1959 with his family to “take a rest from his arduous duties,” etc., there would be a very salutary effect on the current Cuban situation.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00–558. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Hoyt. Also addressed to Wieland and Snow.

² Document 59.

³ Document 53.

⁴ The date of this conversation has not been determined.

⁵ Wieland wrote in the margin at this point: “I agree on the desirability but doubt it’s possible now.”

64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, June 13, 1958—11:34 a.m.

715. Following are instructions for use Ambassador in discussion with Batista or Guell re compliance MDA Agreement in accordance with conversations in Department June 11.²

Interested offices State and Defense today fully agreed on four following principles involved Cuban compliance Agreement:

1. Basic premise is that designated MAP-supported units must be capable of performing agreed missions in defense of hemisphere.

2. Highly desirable MAP-supported Army unit be stationed in Habana area where MAAG Chief could observe its readiness participate hemisphere defense missions. FYI From strictly legal point of view unit could be stationed anywhere in Cuba but this could materially hamper carrying out observation aspects Agreement. End FYI.

3. While maintenance of Army unit in integrated form much preferable, unit could be broken down to company size. Maintenance of smaller units than company size would impair efficiency battalion to carry out mission.

4. MAP-trained men and MAP-supplied equipment not to be used for purposes other than implementation hemispheric defense missions without prior agreement U.S.

In your discussion with Batista or Guell, you should request that GOC

1. Disengage from combat activities (a) men trained specifically under MAP and (b) MAP-supplied equipment. Department emphasizes only MAP-trained men involved and that men trained by Missions not covered by this request. Re equipment it is quantities and types with which we are concerned rather than specific items previously furnished under MAP.

2. Reconstitute the MAP-supported unit with its equipment. Ambassador should also mention that compliance with MDA Agreement requires that MAP-supplied aircraft and MAP-trained aviation personnel, as well as assistance provided Cuban Navy, not be used for other than hemispheric defense purposes without prior U.S. agreement.

While it is realized above steps may be bitter pill GOC these are consideratons involved in compliance with MDA Agreement. In his discretion Ambassador may state that in two other instances apparent use MAP units for internal security purposes by countries of hemisphere similar requests were promptly complied with by other country. FYI: Two countries involved were Colombia and Honduras. End FYI. Ambassador should state that, if appropriate steps cannot be taken on basis of his informal and friendly suggestion, Department will be obliged to deliver note along these lines to Cuban Embassy Washington.³

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–1358. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Little and Wieland; cleared in draft with Rehm (L/MSA) and Spencer (RPA) and in substance with Hanford of the Department of Defense; and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.

² No memoranda of these conversations have been found, but they are briefly summarized in paragraph I (c), Document 68.

³ In telegram 843 from Havana, June 15, Smith indicated that he had discussed with Guell the previous day Cuba’s compliance with the MDA agreement in accordance with telegram 715. Smith reported that Guell was understanding, but that he preferred not to comment until he could confer with Batista and military officials. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–1558) In telegram 844 from Havana, June 16, Smith said that he had asked Guell to arrange a meeting with Batista so Smith could carry out the instructions in Department telegram 715. Smith noted that the information that Colombia and Honduras complied under similar circumstances would probably help. (ibid., 737.5–MSP/6–1658)

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, June 16, 1958—2 p.m.

846. For Rubottom. I feel it duty of Embassy point out that, under present US arms policy toward Cuba, relationships between Cuba and US becoming more and more strained and that the only beneficiaries of this policy in the end may turn out to be the Communists.

Re Deptel 715² under which I have asked Cubans withdraw all MAP-trained personnel, equipment from use against rebels Oriente. Already evident that GOC extremely reluctant take such action. They feel it would result in decimation Air and Navy forces capability as they are now constituted and severe weakening of ground forces. 75 percent pilots in Cuban AF have received MAP training in US schools of one type or another and virtually all AF technicians and key support personnel, both officers and enlisted men, have received MAP training in US schools, as have Deputy Chief of AF and most unit commanders. Practically total combat power Cuban Navy is MAP supported. In Army percentage with [is] relatively small but individuals occupy key positions and are indispensable.

It has been policy of missions tour assimilation of MAP-trained personnel throughout respective services in order that training they have received be passed on for general improvement of services, [sic]

Line of action proposed Deptel 715 (if carried to final conclusion) could not help eventually destroying existing US-Cuban military relationships—current status of which leaves much to be desired in that

(A) Cuban Government has been obliged purchase non-standard arms equipment from sources other than US.

(B) Cuban AF is presently negotiating for purchase some 20 “Sea Furies” presumably from Great Britain.

(C) For first time since current mission establishment has been in operation, key Cuban military personnel have spoken in manner to indicate cancellation of mission contract is receiving active discussion. Cuban Army liaison officer recently stated that only reason mission contract has not already been cancelled was propaganda value to rebel organizations.

(D) We have received indications that Cuban AF will decline training spaces offered in US for immediate future, largely as manifestation of its resentment toward current arms policy.

In brief Deptel 715 requires GOC accept requirement that MAP-trained Cubans may not fight in defense their own country to which these personnel have sworn allegiance but may only fight in “hemispheric defense”. It is extremely doubtful that this position will be acceptable to the GOC now or ever.

In conclusion believe requirements set forth in 715 cannot be accepted by GOC and predictable results of trying obtain GOC concurrence will be:

(A) Refusal of GOC accept propositions laid out in 714 [715] or similar propositions given GOC informal note.

(B) GOC will be forced continue buying military equipment from countries other than US with resulting decrease US influence over period of years.

(C) Weakening of goodwill between US and GOC.

(D) Possible cancellation of US mission contracts by GOC.

Suggest I be granted authority recommend to GOC their sending supplementary note stating they have not violated intent of agreement because they consider current actions as contribution to hemisphere defense since they are (1) combatting elements in league with communism (2) protecting lives and public and private property—including US-owned (3) attempting prevent violent overthrow GOC rather than change GOC through free and open elections.³

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–1659. Secret; Niact.

² Supra.

³ No reply to this message has been found.

66. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, June 16, 1958—3 p.m.

847. Department pass Air Force. Embassy understands Department now will not clear export application T–28 trainers purchased from Jonas Aircraft. The facts regarding T–28s follow:

(A) Cuban AF has urgent requirement for T–28s to be used in training student pilots. Their acquisition will further a program of self-sufficiency in pilot training. This is goal advocated by US. These aircraft needed to replace obsolete T–6 trainers which no longer supportable.

(B) T–28 was designed specifically as trainer rather than combat aircraft.

(C) As customary with training aircraft, T–28 can be used to train pilots in combat-type maneuvers and thus has provisions for carrying practice rockets and bombs.

(D) It is conceivable that Cubans will use some to [of] T–28s in action against rebels if circumstances warrant.

(E) If the Cubans cannot obtain these aircraft from US they will obtain similar type from some other country.

Strongly urge favorable reconsideration of export license. Decision should be expedited as Cuban letter of credit expires June 30.²

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 437.1182–Jonas Aircraft And Arms Co. Inc. Secret; Priority.

² In telegram 728 to Havana, June 19, the Department informed the Embassy that the export application for the T–28 trainers had been approved. (ibid.)

67. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) and the Officer in Charge of Inter-American Security and Military Assistance (Spencer) to the Deputy Legal Adviser (Raymond)¹

Washington, June 19, 1958.

SUBJECT

Mutual Defense Agreement with Cuba

On the basis of reports we have received from U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in Habana, it seems clear that the Cuban Government has dispersed and is utilizing against rebel forces in various parts of the country, the men and equipment of the hemisphere defense units which we are supporting under our Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed with the Cuban Government in March, 1952.² It is considered that the Government of Cuba, by so doing, is violating Articles I and II of that agreement.

We consider that we must insist that the Cuban Government take the necessary steps to bring itself into compliance with this agreement. It is desirable that a formula of compliance be worked out that will take into account the practical difficulties likely to be encountered by the Cubans in re-activating the units that they have dispersed. Our failure to develop such a formula may seriously embarrass, even endanger, the present Cuban Government and result in seriously adverse Cuban Government reaction. This we desire to avoid.

The agreement provides that the Cuban Government will not devote “such assistance to purposes other than those for which it is furnished” without “the prior agreement of the Government of the United States”. It is highly undesirable politically to place ourselves in a position of being forced to consider giving such prior agreement thus permitting the Cuban Government unrestricted use of our grant assistance. However, on the basis of our interpretation of commitments which the U.S. and Cuba have assumed in the unclassified agreement of 1952, and in the secret bilateral military plan which supplements that agreement, we submit to your consideration the following formula which, if agreed to by the Cubans, we believe would constitute compliance:

1. In view of representations we have made to the Cuban Government on the measures necessary to comply with the agreement and the Cuban Government’s disagreement with our position, Article XI, paragraph 2, should be invoked. You may recall that this paragraph states “the two governments shall, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application or amendment of this agreement”.

2. Such consultation might have the purpose of seeking a satisfactory formula based on the last sentence of Article I of the agreement. This sentence, referring to “such equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance as the government furnishing such assistance may authorize” in accordance with “such terms and conditions as may be agreed” to promote defense of the Western Hemisphere in accordance with hemisphere defense plans in which both governments participate, states “the two governments will from time to time negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph”.

3. We believe that the consultation referred to above should have the purpose of obtaining Cuban agreement to comply with its commitments in the following terms:

(a) An absolute interpretation of the agreement would indicate that we call upon the Cuban Government to re-integrate the hemisphere defense units with all U.S. grant equipment and supplies, all Cuban equipment and materiel serviced or supplied with MDAP facilities or parts, as well as all MDAP trained military personnel serving the unit designated by the Government of Cuba as its hemisphere defense unit under the terms of the 1952 agreement. We realize, however, that there is considerable justification for the Cuban contention that such action would seriously cripple that government’s capabilities to combat rebel forces, thus seriously impairing its internal security. For example, most of the pilots in the Cuban Air Force have received MAP training in the United States, and most of the planes of the Cuban Air Force are assigned to the hemisphere defense role and are served with MAP parts. The Cubans also describe the MAP trained troops as the most effective of their fighting force.

(b) However, it seems clear that the purpose of the agreement is to establish a Cuban unit dedicated to hemisphere defense and certainly not to prevent all Cubans who ever received MAP training from thereafter complying with their constitutional obligation to defend the Constitution of the Republic and accept combat assignment in the nation’s armed forces. It therefore appears to follow that the obligations of each government under the agreement pertain to the hemisphere defense unit and particularly to the grant assistance supplied to that unit by the United States.

(c) We consider that in the light of the above, the Cubans retain the right to transfer men and matériel to and out of such units, provided that it maintains that unit as a reasonably effective fighting force.

(d) In re-establishing the unit as a reasonably effective fighting force, it would seem that the Cubans could comply with their commitments by either returning U.S. provided equipment to the hemisphere defense units or by replacing or agreeing to replace it within a reasonable period of time; and by reintegrating in the unit a sufficient number of MAP trained troops to maintain the unit’s personnel to normal strength. With respect to aircraft, the terms of the agreement preclude the use of planes or parts thereof which are supplied by U.S. grant. The Cuban Government, however, has also assigned most of the military aircraft it has purchased to the hemisphere defense unit established under the agreement. It would appear that the Cuban Government can, under the terms of Article I, withdraw such aircraft provided (1) it maintains a sufficient number of aircraft within the unit to comply with the objectives of the agreement, and (2) agrees to return to [or] replace as soon as feasible such parts or equipment as have been supplied by U.S. grant. It would seem that details on amounts, eventual disposition, etc., involved in such actions necessary to comply with the agreement, would be points to be settled in discussion and would be part of the “detailed arrangements” provided for in the last sentence of Article I.

We would appreciate your views as to whether the bilateral agreement and the supplementary secret plan provide us the flexibility necessary to consult with the Cuban Government along the lines discussed above. In view of the urgent need for reaching an understanding on this matter we would appreciate receiving your views as soon as possible.³

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958. Secret. Drafted by Wieland and Spencer. Copies were sent to Rubottom’s office, Leonhardy, and Rehm.

² Signed at Havana, March 7, 1952. (3 UST 2901)

³ No reply by Raymond has been found.

68. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, June 26, 1958.

SUBJECT

State–JCS Meeting on June 27: Use of MAP Equipment and Trained Personnel by Cuba for Internal Security and Continued Suspension of Combat Arms to Cuba

ARA understands that the JCS wish to discuss at this meeting, (1) the question of our approach to the Government of Cuba on the use of MAP equipment and MAP-trained personnel for internal security purposes in disregard of the provisions of Article I, Paragraph 2, of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed with Cuba on March 7, 1952,² and (2) the continued suspension of arms shipments to Cuba.

In considering these two matters it should be pointed out that we are faced with a serious dilemma in our relations with Cuba, particularly as they concern our military assistance program in that country. On the one hand, there is increasing evidence that the Batista regime, through more restrictive controls on freedoms and increasing military and police repression is becoming more disliked while, on the other hand, there is every likelihood the present Government, which has a record of friendly cooperation with the U.S., will continue in power and hold elections in November to establish a successor. The Government is engaged in an all-out offensive against the forces of rebel leader Fidel Castro in the mountains of Eastern Cuba. The fact that U.S.-supplied equipment and U.S.-trained men are being used in this offensive against the rebels has brought us under heavy adverse criticism from Cubans opposed to the present Government as well as from segments of the U.S. press, public, and Congress. This criticism was alleviated somewhat by the Department’s decision to suspend combat arms shipments to Cuba in March of this year. Yet we now have evidence that this latter decision and our recent pressure on the Batista regime on the matter of its use of MAP equipment for internal security purposes has engendered some ill will toward the U.S. in Cuban Government circles, especially amongst the Cuban Army and, if further pressure is exerted, we may endanger the continuance of our military missions in that country. The Cuban Government has charged that the Castro movement is Communist-dominated. We have no evidence to support this contention but the movement has received recent Communist support and there has been some evidence of late of its becoming anti-U.S. in its attitude and actions.

For use in your discussions you may use the following talking points:

I. Use of MAP Equipment and Personnel

(a) We have had incontrovertible evidence for some time that Cuba has been using MAP air and infantry units together with their equipment for internal security purposes in violation of our bilateral MAP Agreement. Beginning in September 1957, we expressed to the Cubans on an informal basis our knowledge of this misuse and on March 3, 1958, we asked the Cubans in a formal note³ if the reports we had received to this effect were true. This question arose in the Senate hearings on the Mutual Security Act and Senator Morse was informed that the Department was consulting with the Cuban Government on the matter. After considerable prodding we received a formal reply⁴ to the effect that Cuba considered that it was adhering to the Agreement.

(b) A UPI report carried in the U.S. press on June 3, stated in connection with the Cuban Army offensive against the rebel forces in Eastern Cuba that the MAP-equipped and trained infantry battalion was being used. An inquiry of our Embassy revealed that 750 out of 800 men in this battalion were in Oriente Province and had been dispersed with their equipment amongst various infantry units fighting rebels in the mountains and presumed to be engaged in actual hostilities. Also, the Embassy indicated that the identification and segregation of this unit would be virtually impossible and that while its numbers were small (800) in comparison with the total number of infantry soldiers in the area (10,000 to 12,000) they did constitute the backbone of fighting forces and could not be pulled out without seriously weakening the Army offensive.⁵

(c) It was ARA’s view after consulting with L/MSA and Colonel Hanford of the Pentagon that there was incontrovertible evidence that Cuba had failed to adhere to the MAP Agreement and that this view should be expressed to the Government of Cuba together with a request that MAP equipment and personnel be disengaged from combat activities. The manner of accomplishing this was to be left to the Cubans. The matter was discussed with Ambassador Smith in Washington on June 11, and he asked that any formal written communication to the Cubans on the subject be delayed until he could discuss it orally with the Cuban Minister of State and President Batista. The Department acceded to the Ambassador’s wish and agreed to instruct him on the subject.

(d) Following oral consultations between ARA, L/MSA and Defense (Col. Hanford) the Department forwarded instructions to Ambassador Smith (Deptel 715 of June 13, 1958—Tab A⁶ ) outlining the principles agreed upon for Cuban compliance with the MAP Agreement for use in his discussions with the Minister of State and President. The Ambassador was to indicate to the Cuban Government that if it did not comply, we would be obliged to deliver a formal note on the matter.

(e) Ambassador Smith made an oral request of the Cuban Minister of State for the withdrawal of all MAP equipment and trained personnel from internal combat. He then expressed in his telegram 846 of June 16, 1958 (Tab B⁷ ), the Cuban reluctance to comply and pointed out that our insistence on strict compliance, especially with respect to the withdrawal from combat of MAP-trained personnel, would seriously jeopardize our whole posture in Cuba and might result in a Cuban request for the withdrawal of our military missions. The Ambassador asked that he be authorized to inform the Cubans by note that we did not consider Cuba had violated the agreement because (1) it was fighting elements allied with Communists; (2) protecting lives and public and private property (including U.S.-owned) and (3) attempting to prevent overthrow of a legitimate government.

(f) Since the receipt of the Ambassador’s communication he has been instructed⁸ not to discuss the matter with President Batista and to await further instructions. While ARA is not prepared to accede to the approach to the Cubans proposed by the Ambassador it recognizes that a reappraisal of this entire matter is necessary before proceeding further. It now has under study a plan⁹ whereby we would ask the Cuban Government to consult with us formally under Article XI, Paragraph 2, of the Agreement with a view to arriving at an equitable solution on Cuban compliance.

(g) It is ARA’s opinion that the withdrawal of MAP equipment, or its equivalent, from internal security functions will not constitute a serious obstacle for the Cubans but that the removal of MAP-trained personnel will. Thus, any solution arrived at through consultations would have to take these factors into account.

II. Suspension of Arms Shipments to Cuba

Since the Secretary’s decision suspending shipments of combat arms to Cuba there has been no change in the internal political situation which would warrant a reconsideration of this decision. The Department’s recent approval of the export of ten T–28 training aircraft¹⁰ is consistent with the Secretary’s decision as the Department considered these to be in the category of “non-combat” equipment.

The observations made on this subject in Mr. Snow’s memorandum to you of May 1, 1958,¹¹ remain substantially unchanged.

Mr. C. Allan Stewart, Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs will be present at the preliminary briefing in your office this afternoon at 5:00 p.m. and will be available for the JCS meeting tomorrow should you desire that he be present.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/6–2658. Secret. Drafted by Leonhardy, cleared in substance with Spencer and Stewart, and initialed by Rubottom. Also sent to Gerard C. Smith and G. Frederick Reinhardt.

² For text, see 3 UST 2901.

³ See footnote 2, Document 27.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 61.

⁵ See Document 61.

⁶ Document 64.

⁷ Document 65.

⁸ Not further identified.

⁹ See supra.

¹⁰ The date of this decision has not been determined, but see footnote 2, Document 66.

¹¹ Not further identified, but see Document 55.

Kidnapping of U.S. citizens by Cuban rebels, June–July 1958

69. Editorial Note

70. Memorandum of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, June 27, 1958, 10 a.m.

Pentagon, Washington, June 27, 1958, 10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, June 1958. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated, but the source text bears the following notation: “State Draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense.” A cover sheet lists 32 attendees at the meeting, including representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.

71. Editorial Note

72. Telegram From the Commander of the Naval Base at Guantanamo (Ellis) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

Guantanamo, June 30, 1958—12:45 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–858. Confidential. Repeated to CINCLANTFLT, CMC, COMCARIBSEAFRON, and ALUSNA Havana.

73. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 1, 1958—1 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–158. Official Use Only; Niact.

74. Editorial Note

75. Editorial Note

76. Editorial Note

77. Instruction From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, July 2, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.001/7–258. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy, cleared with Hill, and approved by Wieland who initialed for Dulles.

78. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 3, 1958—9 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358. Official Use Only; Niact.

79. Editorial Note

80. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 3, 1958—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358. Official Use Only; Niact.

81. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 3, 1958—8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358. Secret; Niact. Pouched to Santiago de Cuba.

82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, July 3, 1958—7:49 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Wieland, cleared in substance with Whiteman, and approved by Rubottom who signed for Dulles.

83. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) in Havana and the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) in Washington, July 4, 1958

Washington, July 4, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–458. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

84. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) in Havana and the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) in Washington, July 6, 1958

Washington, July 6, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–658. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart.

85. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)

Washington, July 8, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–858. Secret. Initialed by both Murphy and Herter. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

86. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 9, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–958. Confidential; Niact.

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, July 9, 1958—7:46 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–958. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Rubottom, cleared with Wieland and Snow, and approved by Snow who signed for Herter.

88. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Dreier) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)

Washington, July 9, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–958. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Dreier. Also sent to Marjorie Whiteman.

89. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Dr. Carlos Piad and the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland), Department of State, Washington, July 10, 1958

Washington, July 10, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1058. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart.

90. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, July 10, 1958.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Cuba. Top Secret. Copies were also sent to the Department of State, the Secretary of the Navy, and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Stamped on the source text, which is the last-mentioned of these three copies, are the words: “Noted by Mr. Sprague.” In a memorandum of July 10 to Under Secretary Murphy, Richard Finn wrote that Admiral Burke had called that morning and in Murphy’s absence had talked with Finn. Burke summarized the memorandum he was sending to the Joint Chiefs regarding the Cuban situation and explained that “we are being humiliated and that positive measures must be taken.” Burke also stated that “of course people would get hurt.” When Finn mentioned that Ambassador Smith had sent a message that morning regarding additional measures that might be taken (infra), Burke said that “these do not go far enough and that forceful measures are now required.” (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958)

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 10, 1958—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1058. Confidential; Niact.

92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, July 10, 1958—9:29 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1058. Confidential; Niact. Drafted and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter; cleared with Rubottom.

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 11, 1958—2 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1158. Confidential; Priority.

94. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 11, 1958—2 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/7–1158. Secret; Priority.

95. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McElroy)

Washington, July 11, 1958.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 63 A 1770, McElroy Letters. Top Secret.

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 11, 1958—10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1158. Confidential; Niact.

97. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 11, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1158. Secret; Niact.

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 11, 1958—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1158. Confidental; Niact.

99. Editorial Note

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 12, 1958–1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1258. Confidential; Niact.

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 12, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1258. Confidential.

102. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 13, 1958—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1358. Confidential; Priority.

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 16, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1658. Confidential; Priority.

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 17, 1958—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1758. Secret; Niact.

105. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) and Carlos Piad, Washington, July 17, 1958

Washington, July 17, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1758. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Wieland.

106. Editorial Note

69. Editorial Note

During the evening of June 26, Cuban rebel forces of the 26th of July Movement attacked the facilities of the Moa Bay Mining Company, seized 11 Americans working there, and retreated into the hills. In telegram 867 from Havana, June 27, Ambassador Smith reported that, according to the manager of the Moa Bay Mining Company, the rebels had said the raid was a protest against the Americans “using gasoline supplied from Moa Naval Base.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–2758) This was an apparent garble, which Smith seemed to rectify in telegram 869 sent later that day, when he reported that the rebels had seized the Americans as a protest against “Cuban planes they claim gassing at Guantanamo Naval Base.” Smith said that Consul Park Wollam was flying from Santiago to Moa Bay “with instructions to keep Embassy fully advised but not to deal directly with rebels for release.” Noting that he had informed Foreign Minister Guell of these developments, Smith suggested that the kidnappings might be a publicity stunt. (ibid.)

For Ambassador Smith’s recollection of the kidnappings and the U.S. Government’s response, see The Fourth Floor, pages 140–146.

70. Memorandum of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, June 27, 1958, 10 a.m.¹

Pentagon, Washington, June 27, 1958, 10 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of a matter unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Cuba

Admiral Burke said that we have suspended export of all arms except for some T–28’s. He noted that the State Department was discussing with Ambassador Smith the desirability of insisting that Cuba use MAP equipment and MAP-trained personnel only for hemispheric defense. Admiral Burke said that this was [went] pretty far and that we were trying to tell a sovereign nation what to do. He expressed the opinion that other nations receiving MAP assistance might resent our position toward Cuba.

Mr. Murphy asked whether Admiral Burke thought the MAP agreement should be revised. Admiral Burke said that we are interpreting the agreement too rigidly. He noted that France, despite our protest, continues to use MAP equipment on a large scale in Algeria.

Mr. Murphy said that he had certain problems about Cuba. The question of what is hemispheric defense is important. If the security of the nation is destroyed or an avenue is opened up for leftist exploitation, this would certainly weaken the nation’s stability and affect hemispheric defense.

Admiral Burke said that in effect we are aiding the rebels and that Ambassador Smith was entirely right in saying that the Cuban Army is fighting elements allied with communism.

Mr. Stewart said that according to State Department lawyers we can, under the agreement, discuss with the Cuban Government the implementation of the agreement and the use made of MAP assistance. This provision might be the best approach at the present time.

General Taylor said that he was surprised at the position we were taking. Internal stability is one of the major objectives of the Mutual Security Program and is one of the purposes we stress with the Congress. Mr. Murphy repeated that a clear definition of hemispheric defense is desirable.

Mr. Stewart noted that a difficult domestic problem is involved since Senator Morse will be investigating this matter and the State Department will have problems in explaining the use of MAP equipment by Cuba. He noted that Castro has apparently just seized a group of American engineers in Cuba. Mr. Stewart expressed the view that this action will hurt Castro with many Cuban sympathizers and with American opinion.

Admiral Burke said that the State Department message to Ambassador Smith² should have been cleared at a high level at the Pentagon.

Mr. Stewart noted that it had been cleared at the working level.

It was agreed that the State Department, in consultation with Defense, would restudy the position taken in regard to Cuban use of MAP assistance.

(Mr. Murphy and General Twining left the meeting during the discussion of this item.)

[Here follows discussion matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, June 1958. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated, but the source text bears the following notation: “State Draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense.” A cover sheet lists 32 attendees at the meeting, including representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.

² Not further identified.

71. Editorial Note

On the evening of July 27, Cuban rebel forces abducted 24 U.S. Naval personnel attached to the U.S. base at Guantanamo, including 11 Marines, while they were traveling by bus from Guantanamo City to the base. Situation reports on the abductions, prepared for the Chief of Naval Operations, beginning with Sitrep No. 1 as of 0800 EST, June 29, through Sitrep No. 4 as of 0800 July 4, are published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 171A–171C.

72. Telegram From the Commander of the Naval Base at Guantanamo (Ellis) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)¹

Guantanamo, June 30, 1958—12:45 p.m.

7136. Amb Smith intends issue ultimatum am 1 July to effect that if Moa and Base personnel are not returned US custody within 48 hours (by Thursday² am) he would be forced to request permission from Cuban Govt to use whatever means were practicable to obtain release. COMNAVB concurs.

Consider that safe return Naval personnel is paramount at this stage and direct military force ruled out. Also consider threat to use military force will carry little weight while hostages, families in Cuba and water supply remain vulnerable to retaliation. Prior Thursday, to strengthen bargaining position, intend withdraw all 113 Base families to base followed up by pressure on Cuban Army to maintain strong force at Jayeras. Subsequent possible threats could include:

A. Airlift approx 200 Marines to base accompanied by full fanfare.

B. Apprehend Base employees known to be active rebel sympathizers and threaten to reveal names or turn over to Cuban Army unless Base personnel are returned promptly.

C. Threaten that full logistic support Cuban Armed Forces will be provided by Base in support operations against rebels.

D. Threaten bar all Cuban employees from Base until hostages returned.

If progress is not made in obtaining release as initial step request approval to issue following statement locally Thursday am: “COMNAVBASE GTMO has endeavored to maintain strict neutrality during the unrest in Cuba in compliance with international law and customs of civilized nations. However, the outrageous action of Fidel Castro forces in abducting innocent Naval personnel may force the Naval Base to depart from its position of neutrality and join Cuban Govt forces in action against a common enemy. Unless Base personnel are returned promptly unharmed, the Base commander intends to request authority from Washington to render logistic support to Cuban Govt forces in its campaign to wipe out all opposition. To insure success in this operation it will be necessary to bar all employees from the Base who are Castro sympathizers. Unfortunately, these sympathizers are not all known and it may be necessary to replace all Cuban employees with Naval personnel. These drastic actions would inflict severe hardship and pain on many innocent people and COMNAVBASE hopes that they will not be necessary. He appeals to all decent Cuban citizens to use their influence to speed the early return of Base personnel who have been abducted.”

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–858. Confidential. Repeated to CINCLANTFLT, CMC, COMCARIBSEAFRON, and ALUSNA Havana.

² July 3.

73. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 1, 1958—1 a.m.

1. Following is latest information based on reports from Bowdler and Moa Bay Company representatives tonight, June 30.

Total 43 Americans, 3 Canadians now missing and known or presumed held by Cuban rebels.

Last word from Wollam is message that approximately 11 a.m. yesterday Cuban Army aircraft strafed and bombed rebel encampment at which he and two persons seized at Moa Bay were. Reported no casualties and requested urgent action avoid repetition. I immediately consulted Guell and assured appropriate orders had been issued.

No further from Wollam.

No word from Vice Consul Wiecha who departed GTMO Naval Base approximately 2:45 p.m. yesterday June 29 to attempt contact rebel group holding Naval personnel.

I have seen text of letter dated June 28² addressed to me by four persons taken by rebels at Moa Bay. Original not received. Text indicates rebels require our agreement cessation US military aid to GOC and cessation use GTMO Base for refueling and arming Cuban aircraft before releasing persons abducted. In note to wife of same date Schissler of Moa Bay Company indicates group separated and he not yet seen Wollam. Also said appeared he and others would be held indefinitely and that if rebel requirements not met other Americans would be captured. General del Rio Chaviano commanding Southern Oriente Province arrived at Moa Bay today at head army force which will apparently total 300. Indicated would take no aggressive action for present.

Bowdler reports some American families Oriente Province becoming anxious and considering departure.

Bowdler instructed endeavor inform Wollam include White and Poll in any arrangement for release of captured persons.

Understand sizeable group US press representatives arriving GTMO Base from US tomorrow. Trust they aware of personal risk if they leave base and endeavor contact rebel forces.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–158. Official Use Only; Niact.

² Not found.

74. Editorial Note

At the Intelligence Advisory Committee meeting on July 1, the following discussion, according to notes prepared by Theodore C. Nelson, took place:

“Mr. [Allen] Dulles commented that the kidnapping of Americans in Cuba appeared to be an effort to gain American intervention, and he suggested that [less than 1 line not declassified] efforts might be made to gain release of the kidnapped Americans. Admiral Frost expressed the view that the Cuban rebels’ action was designed to embarrass the United States. Mr. Cumming commented that one approach to the problem being considered in the Department of State is the apprehension of Cuban rebel sympathizers in the United States in order to bring pressure to gain the release of Americans held in Cuba.” (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, July 1958)

75. Editorial Note

At his press conference on July 1, Secretary Dulles was asked whether he contemplated “any new actions to try to obtain the release of a number of citizens held in Cuba.” The Secretary replied:

“I believe that certain efforts are being made on an informal basis to obtain the release of Americans; also, some Canadians are included among those who have been kidnapped. We hope that those efforts will be successful. It is hard to understand exactly why these kidnappings are taking place or what gain can be expected from such conduct, and we hope very much that it will be reversed.”

Dulles later was asked whether there was any connection between the kidnapping of Americans in Cuba and similar incidents that had occurred elsewhere in the world. He said that there was no relationship among the incidents and observed further:

“The effort to get political advantage out of these things is, I think, a very improper course of action. I believe that it is going to be counterproductive for those who try it. I think, as soon as they realize that it is counterproductive, that then they will act accordingly. I can’t think of anything that would be worse than, in effect, to pay blackmail to get people out. We are willing to use any proper methods to get them out, short of paying blackmail. If we started doing that, then that would only encourage further efforts to use Americans as hostages.

“I believe that we will obtain the release of those now held, whether they be in Cuba or East Germany or the Soviet Union, as soon as it is apparent that it is not possible to make political gains out of it.”

When asked what he meant by the term “blackmail”, the Secretary answered that, with regard to Cuba, the only inference that could be drawn was that the rebels wanted “to bring about United States intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba, which we do not intend to do.” When asked to comment on the rebels’ claim that the United States was intervening in the internal affairs of Cuba by supplying the Cuban Government aircraft and allowing them the use of Guantanamo as a base and that the kidnappings were retaliation for these actions, Dulles replied: “That allegation about the use of our base is totally unfounded.” (Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1958, pages 104–111)

76. Editorial Note

On July 2, the Department of State decided to suspend the shipment of the T–28 aircraft to Cuba. The following day Rear Admiral Robert B. Stroh of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations called William Wieland to inquire whether the suspension had taken place. According to a memorandum for the files, July 3, Wieland confirmed the suspension. Their conversation proceeded as follows:

“He [Stroh] expressed considerable concern at this development and asked what had happened. I told him that the action was taken yesterday. He inquired why. I asked if he wanted to see the Americans in the hands of the rebels killed. He said ‘no’ and, in fact, the Navy is following the matter closely.

“He added that he assumed that as soon as the people had been delivered the transaction would be resumed. I said that the entire question would have to undergo very careful study.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358)

In telegram 13 from Havana, July 2, Ambassador Smith pointed out that if there were any significant delay in resuming the shipment of the T–28 aircraft once the American hostages had been freed, the Cuban Government’s cooperation with the United States would decrease because it had “considerable money tied up in the aircraft” and it would have to pay the expenses of “ferry crews standing by to make deliveries.” Smith also said that Batista had a “personal interest” in the matter and urged that the United States stand by its original commitment. (ibid., 737.00/7–258)

Later that day, Smith reported in telegram 17 that Guell had informed him that Batista was “very much disturbed” at the suspension. Smith further noted:

“I have explained delivery was postponed because our main concern is now obtaining release of all kidnapped Americans and Canadians and that it was our duty not to take any steps which might have hindered or delayed such release.

“I have informed GOC their delivery will again be considered after all individuals have been released.

“I concur with GOC in their opinion that if the news of this action should leak it will be damaging. Strongly recommend that Department prohibit any leak.” (ibid.)

77. Instruction From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

A–1 Washington, July 2, 1958.

SUBJECT

Increase of Communist Influence in Cuba

The Department is becoming increasingly concerned over reports that communists and other anti-U.S. elements are mobilizing to assume a major role in Cuba in whatever government succeeds that of President Batista. These anti-U.S. forces are seeking to entrench themselves particularly in positions of potential leadership in revolutionary movements, political parties, student and intellectual circles, the labor movement and communications media.

The prime target of these elements appears to be the 26th of July Movement and its affiliates, collaborators and sympathizers. The recent kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Cuba by rebel forces, the anti-U.S. tone of recent Radio Rebelde radio broadcasts and the increasing disregard by the Castro forces for U.S. property in Cuba would indicate that they have made considerable progress in their attempt to influence the pro-Castro groups.

The Department requests the Embassy to make a special study of this situation and its potentials so far as can be determined at the present time and, in consultation with appropriate U.S. agencies in Cuba, to prepare its recommendations for a counter-program at the earliest possible date in order to enhance United States prestige and influence among the Cuban people and particularly among the population segments mentioned above.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.001/7–258. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy, cleared with Hill, and approved by Wieland who initialed for Dulles.

78. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 3, 1958—9 a.m.

18. Briefly these are facts. Consul Wollam believes everybody well. Conditions for release are:

(A) No more shipment of arms.

(B) Complete assurance that naval base will not be used for supplying arms and munitions.

(C) An observer to assure compliance with MDAP agreement.

Wollam states that these people are fanatics with blind spots and determined. Wollam says he is sure there are Communists in the group but mixed up in thinking.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358. Official Use Only; Niact.

79. Editorial Note

At the 371st meeting of the National Security Council on July 3, Allen W. Dulles briefly commented on the situation in Cuba. According to the memorandum of discussion, Dulles expressed his view that the news from Cuba was “a good deal better, and that the Americans captured by the rebel forces would be gradually freed in groups until all had been released.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

80. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 3, 1958—noon.

19. For Rubottom. Following is expansion of point (C) in Embtel 18.² Department of State to designate delegate to consider with national directorate of 26 July movement in territory of free Cuba control of supply and use US arms in Cuba.

Consul Wollam says these terms in point (C) possibly flexible and they are not specific.

Following are the suggestions which we believe Wollam can use to obtain release of all captured individuals.

(1) Reiteration that the US Government has suspended shipment of arms under MAP.

(2) Reiteration of statement that the facilities of the GTMO Naval base are available to all aircraft in distress, or on official visits to the base. However, in compliance with the US policy of nonintervention in Cuban internal affairs, the base does not refuel or in other ways service Cuban military aircraft engaged in combat activities.

We do not believe we can meet terms of (C) because it would imply recognition. But as an alternative when Consul Wollam returns that he inform the rebels that he will make a full report to the Embassy on everything that he has observed.

Wollam says that on point (C) he believes rebels want some assurance the US will attempt to exercise control of MAP equipment now in Cuba.

When Wollam last had contact with Raul Castro on July 2, rebels appeared in no hurry to release further hostages.

We have no further word from Wiecha, who was expected to arrive at rebel headquarters July 3 or 4.

Wollam plans to return to hills July 4 if possible.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358. Official Use Only; Niact.

² Document 78.

81. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 3, 1958—8 p.m.

23. Re Embassy telegram 18.² Following report from Consul Wollam:

“Rebels of ‘second front’ under Raul Castro were by own declaration acting without consultation any other rebel groups or boss Fidel Castro in picking up Americans for which carefully prepared justification and order issued June 22.³

It seemed that four men were responsible, although Raul Castro said he assumed all responsibility and would have to answer to national directorate. Castro is the final authority for all decisions. The others, according to Mr. Anthony Chamberlain, who had more contact with the group at first, were Dr. Lucas Moran a Santiago lawyer, Commander Hannibal (real name not known) and a Cuban whose name was never obtained but who had come recently from Spain and Hungary. According Chamberlain he is a Communist and was indoctrinated in Communism.

Believe that kidnapping plan was partly caused by bombing, strafing activities of Cuban Army. This affects mainly civilian population. Rebels themselves have lost few men by this but claim that many civilians have suffered. This has effect on rebel position since their presence responsible for bombing. Populace generally afraid of planes and I can realize why after being subject similar incident in vicinity of a small church.

Rebels blame United States for ‘providing arms and support to Batista’ and are trying to make most of situation publicitywise. They also have alleged evidence use MAP equipment against them some of which I saw. They have been blind to Stateside adverse reaction but I think they beginning receive some pressure. They would have preferred to make some deal or obtain something implying implicit recognition.

They are fanatic on subject Batista as result own propaganda and many incidents involving themselves or relatives. Army has been its own worst enemy throughout region and has to date been ineffective in controlling rebel activities.

Castro group crossed to second front area in March. It was difficult for me to estimate numbers, as they are divided in small groups, but have increased in size since inception. They have also the support of most country people in area whether it be voluntary or not. They claim control about 80 percent of Oriente east of line approximate latitude 76, in addition to Sierra Maestra and columns now operating other areas Oriente and Camaguey. This probably true in hills.

Americans are being well-treated and given everything possible in rough circumstances. Rebels maintain fiction that they are ‘great’ and that they will be freed when they have observed effects of bombing. Some Americans feel that they being held hostage against further bombings. Fact that bombings have stopped make conditions much better for rebels, but fear renewal when Americans leave.

Americans widely scattered in groups of two or three over unknown area of rebel territory. Would be most difficult to find or move without local rebel assistance. Communications very slow because of poor trails useable only by jeeps and horses and hindered by rainy season mud.

Rebel military force this area and possibly elsewhere has probably been underestimated. I do not see how Army can make inroads in area on basis past record and they have been driven back on each trial so far. Rebels appear indifferently armed but have sufficient weapons for hit and run raids or ambushes in prepared positions. They seem to be short on ammunition. Rebels appear well-organized considering limitations and terrain.

Rebels claim program based on Jose Marti but it is not clearly defined and they mainly have fanatic determination get rid of Batista. Believe probably some Communist influence although Castro volunteered at length that the movement was not. Chamberlain was told that they had people of all stripes. Do not think at this moment that movement is definitely Communist but probably subject infiltration. Most persons seemed very young and somewhat naive and this augmented by isolation and hardships. Naivete evident in this plan and failure to estimate reaction.

Believe my visit unexpected and that it was useful. My role limited to that of consular official interested in welfare citizens and they fully informed that I would not ‘negotiate.’ They took down all said in discussion and may attempt use it but agreed that attempting make propaganda from my visit would be hampering to all. They insisted I honored guest but delayed my meeting Castro.

Think reaction now setting in to unfavorable press and probably receipt notices of alarm from elsewhere. This somewhat nullified by fact some Americans taken accepted rebels stories in total. Think possibly they want principally some very minor face-saving device and would accept statement of previously expressed policy on points mentioned. They were vague on third point (point C) and may not insist. They endeavored not use word ‘conditions’ but would slip.

Results from above cannot be guaranteed as rebels unpredictable and some have martyr complexes. It will probably take several days at best to achieve departure all because of scattering over large area and poor communications.

I prepared do all possible this basis as consular officer arranging departure as protection activity. If this does not work other plans must be considered.

When this accomplished, I still feel concern our future. The Cuban air and ground forces will probably make all-out offensive which may be linked to United States by same propaganda. Rebels suspect there may be offensive. This will not happen while Americans are prisoners. Kidnappings and attacks on Americans might be renewed under these circumstances.”

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358. Secret; Niact. Pouched to Santiago de Cuba.

² Document 78.

³ “Military Order No. 30,” text of which, possibly in an expurgated version, was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 19 from Havana, July 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–458)

82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, July 3, 1958—7:49 p.m.

13. Embtels 18 and 19.² Points raised items (A) and (B) Embtel 18, and (1) and (2) Embtel 19 considered adequately covered Department’s press release July 3³ which transmitted wireless file. While true GTMO Naval Base facilities available aircraft in distress it should be pointed out facilities also been available for humanitarian purposes such as succoring wounded and fleeing rebels. Item (2) Restraint from fueling or otherwise servicing or supplying Cuban military craft or personnel from GTMO is in compliance US policy non-involvement Cuban internal affairs and does not necessarily relate to legal question of non-intervention.

In your discretion Wollam may be authorized communicate above in informal discussions rebel leaders. Attention also called to Department position which unchanged Department announcement on March 14⁴ suspension of arms shipments.

FYI Department agrees we should not bow to rebel condition of observer to assure compliance MDAP Agreement by working with rebel directorate. End FYI

Any comments Embassy has on above will be welcomed.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–358. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Wieland, cleared in substance with Whiteman, and approved by Rubottom who signed for Dulles.

² Documents 78 and 80.

³ Department of State press release 383, which dealt with the “erroneous reports of arms deliveries to Cuba.” For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 28, 1958, p. 153.

⁴ See Document 36.

83. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) in Havana and the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) in Washington, July 4, 1958¹

Washington, July 4, 1958

When I telephoned Ambassador Smith about 10 a.m. today, he told me that Consul Park Wollam is scheduled to leave Habana at noon today (1 p.m. EDT) and resume contact with the rebels concerning the kidnapped American citizens.

He said he had instructed Wollam to take careful notes of all conversations, fully aware of the fact that “the world” will want to know later what conditions the rebels demanded for the release of their prisoners and what conditions were met by the United States. He remarked that the rebels will certainly try to “make face” by twisting facts and presenting distorted versions of developments seeking maximum advantages for their cause. He said all possible precautions must be taken to prevent this.

I agreed, commenting that while there certainly should be no objection to explaining the U.S. position clearly so that the rebels could understand it, under no circumstance should we appear to be making concessions or complying with rebel-imposed conditions. I added that in drafting the telegram which the Department sent last night,² we had considered calling attention to Mr. Rubottom’s testimony in recent congressional hearings concerning our discussions “with certain people concerning their responsibilities” but had ruled this out, at least for the time being. I commented that material of this nature should not be used except under severe pressure, and then only after careful consideration. Ambassador Smith said he understood the reference (concerning talks with the Cuban Government on violation of the MDAA) and agreed completely with our decision.

He said the Department’s press release of July 3,³ concerning our policy on arms shipments and the non-use of Guantanamo Naval Base by Cuban forces would be most helpful.

Other points the Ambassador mentioned are:

a) Wollam is worried by the types of persons he encountered in the rebel forces— “kids who don’t realize’ what they are doing, who can be “soaked up” and “taken over” by communists. The group Wollam contacted, (Raul’s forces) are anti-U.S.

b) Prime Minister Guell told the Ambassador that information received “through sources gave reason to believe Fidel Castro’s forces may soon follow Raul’s example and kidnap more Americans”. He said Fidel’s men are impressed by the effectiveness of this step in causing a cessation of bombing, and that Fidel’s forces are “not doing well on the ground”.

c) The Ambassador and Wollam are optimistic over the chances of obtaining the release of the Americans, but the optimism is tempered with reservations. For instance, the rebels have enjoyed a respite from bombings and probably will be reluctant to forego this protection; new conditions for release may be concocted; the rebels are isolated, young, irresponsible, emotionally and intellectually unstable and liable to sudden changes of decision.

d) Even if release is obtained, a resumption of a military offensive against them may lead to new kidnappings.

e) The Embassy has obtained walkie-talkie equipment from another U.S. agency and Wollam will be equipped with this equipment, for use if necessary in making new contact with the rebels.

In closing, the Ambassador again emphasized the need to avoid giving the appearance of granting conditions in response to rebel demands, especially in view of subsequent inquiries concerning the Government’s attitude toward the kidnappers’ demands. I fully concurred.

Wollam spoke briefly at the end of the phone call, commenting it may take “a while” to effect the release. He apparently had no doubt, however, of relatively early success.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–458. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

² Supra.

³ See footnote 3, supra.

84. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) in Havana and the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) in Washington, July 6, 1958¹

Washington, July 6, 1958

A helicopter from the Guantanamo Naval Base has left for the headquarters of Raul Castro and possibly may return this afternoon with five more persons abducted by the rebels, Ambassador Smith disclosed. There also is a possibility the helicopter, or helicopters, may make another trip and return four more persons.

After bringing three United Fruit Company people in late yesterday the helicopter returned to pick up more persons but upon arrival at Castro’s headquarters the pilot reported there was a big powwow going on and he was told to return to the Base empty and go back today.

Consul Wollam stayed at Raul Castro’s headquarters, the Ambassador said. Vice Consul Wiecha is with him there, the Ambassador added.

The Ambassador further revealed that the kidnapped people are being well cared for, eating adequately and sleeping in houses. There is evidence, the Ambassador said, that the Castro forces are going all out to “brainwash” the sailors and Marines.

The Ambassador said no attempt was made to contact Fidel Castro’s radio station in line with suggestions contained in Caracas telegram No. 8.² It was not thought necessary to do so, since arrangements for the return of the kidnapped people seemed to be progressing satisfactorily with Raul Castro’s forces. I told the Ambassador that if necessary contact could be made with Fidel Castro without such a course involving the question of recognition. I pointed out that Fidel might get miffed if he were left out of the negotiations.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–658. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart.

² In telegram 8, July 5 repeated to Havana as telegram 1, the Embassy in Caracas reported that the Air Force Attaché had been informed by a Cuban rebel source, who was in daily radio contact with Fidel Castro’s headquarters, that Castro was anxious to arrange the immediate release of all prisoners and that he desired radio contact with the U.S. base at Guantanamo for helicopter and other arrangements. The source indicated the frequency on which the rebel radio transmitted and said that it would stand by for a message at midnight on July 5 and at 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. on July 6. (ibid., 737.00/7–558)

85. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, July 8, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cuba

With representatives of ARA and INR we have reviewed the situation regarding the kidnapped American nationals in Cuba.

ARA has been exploring several ideas of how to proceed. One involves sending a qualified officer to speak forcibly to Fidel Castro personally. The idea of having Ambassador Smith do this was rejected as unwise. Another idea of exploring the possibility of OAS usefully intervening is being studied.

Admiral Ellis, commanding at Guantanamo, has transmitted the attached message making several suggestions. (Tab A² )

Of the fifty Americans kidnapped, sixteen civilians have been released leaving thirty military personnel and four civilians still held, presumably by the Raul Castro element. According to the Cuban rebel radio today, the negotiations for the release of the remaining Americans and one Canadian are “proceeding satisfactorily”. The radio said that hostages would be released “shortly”.

A CIA status report of July 7 is attached. (Tab B³ )

I also discussed the present status with Admiral Burke. He informs me that there is no plan of military intervention under active consideration. He is naturally unhappy over the continued retention of the Naval personnel, but he does not urge military intervention. I reviewed with him and with our own people the various aspects of that problem. The area where the Americans are held is large and the mountainous terrain very difficult. A substantial force would be required. Our people firmly believe that military intervention should be a very last resort and of course only undertaken with the invitation of the Cuban Government.

It is my understanding that CIA has reported in the past no evidence of Communist infiltration. Reports of the last 48 hours however indicate a strong possibility that there are Communist influences operating in the rebel group, especially in the younger element headed by Fidel Castro’s brother, Raul Castro, who is 27 and politically immature.

We will be making a specific recommendation to you regarding the plan of sending an emissary to Fidel Castro.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–858. Secret. Initialed by both Murphy and Herter. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

² Document 72.

³ Not printed.

⁴ No record of such a recommendation has been found.

86. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 9, 1958—2 p.m.

39. The latest information from Wollam indicates Raul Castro plans to hold hostages.

Wollam has brought letter signed by Raul Castro² stating “the US reply makes reference to statements of the Department issued on various dates, all of which were previous to the development of the present problem and that US reply brought nothing new to the debate; that the US statements implicitly admit that the US has been making military aid available to the GOC up to March of this year in spite of the fact that serious political disturbances have existed within the Republic since December 1956; that with a view to preventing a continuation of this situation Raul Castro firmly demands that the Department of State declare publicly, making reference to the detention of North Americans in rebel territory, that the US (A) will not supply war materials to the GOC; (B) will not permit the use of the GTMO Naval base by the Cuban Air Force for the supply of war material, gasoline, or technical assistance.”

Raul Castro further states that in order to confirm his desires to reach a reasonable agreement they will maintain in suspense the military order number 30/58² which originally put in effect the seizure of Americans.

The Embassy further understands that the Marine and Naval personnel are being held incommunicado presumably for purposes of brain-washing. Neither reporters nor Consuls have been permitted to see them. We believe their area of detention is in the vicinity of Sierra Puriol at considerable distance from rebel headquarters at Calabasas. Embassy recommends Department issue strong press release including statement that unless the hostages are released within seventy-two hours the US will be forced to take following actions:

(1) Announce that consultations will be initiated with GOC on concerted actions to effect release.

(2) Suspend all visas to sympathizers of the 26 of July movement.

(3) Ask Navy to instruct Admiral Ellis to immediately take over control of the Yateras Aqueduct. (This has already been requested by GOC.)

(4) Ask Navy to instruct Admiral Ellis to withdraw from Caminerra and GTMO City American dependents of base personnel.

Recommend that Department work into statement reiteration that US has suspended shipment combat arms to GOC and Naval base GTMO is not resupplying CAAF planes. This would sugar coat pill for rebels in that it appears to satisfy their demand in Raul Castro’s July 7 letter and gives Wollam additional talking point.

Reference Deptel 31,³ we believe control Fidel Castro over actions on second front tenuous. Only feasible fast method would be for US Navy helicopter to arrange meeting between Castro brothers. Resulting publicity would only irk GOC and benefit rebels. GOC has already indicated to me its serious concern of such a move and Army General Staff has announced that only CAAF planes may fly over Sierra Maestra.

As regards (2) consider Fidel’s ability to effect immediate release doubtful. Furthermore consider it inadvisable to give him this recognition.

Helicopter returned without passengers at 1130 a.m.

Recommend that implementation of the foregoing recommendations be subject to no further release of hostages today, or no further word from Wollam indicating a change of present status.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–958. Confidential; Niact.

² See footnote 3, Document 81.

² See footnote 3, Document 81.

³ In telegram 31, July 8, the Department suggested to Smith that if Raul Castro’s letter indicated that the rebels intended to hold the remainder of the U.S. captives in order to prevent bombings, he should instruct Wollam to try either to arrange a direct contact between Raúl and Fidel Castro with Wollam present, or to contact Fidel directly and urge that he follow through on a promise to release the prisoners. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–858)

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, July 9, 1958—7:46 p.m.

32. Embtel 39.² Dept has no intention accede to Raul Castro’s proposed demands as reported in Wollam letter. Dept feels would be premature issue any type ultimatum calling for concerted action with GOC and that such action might at this time preclude any possibility obtaining release sailors and marines without threat to their lives.

Ambassador instructed urgently consult with GOC and to exert all possible effort obtain its concurrence in plan outlined Deptel 31.³ This should not necessarily result in publicity for Castros if normal precautions taken by GOC and U.S. Naval personnel involved. Dept does not consider that direct contact with Fidel in effort obtain release kidnapped Americans constitutes or implies recognition. Wollam as U.S. Consul carrying out internationally recognized protective functions of his position. Utmost importance attached to having direct report from Wollam on relationship Raul and Fidel Castro and ability Fidel Castro enforce orders on other elements within territory his operations. If Wollam unable arrange promptly for meeting of Castro brothers, he should make immediate effort contact Fidel Castro.

Also evaluate urgently seriousness of Raul Castro implied threat effect further seizures of Americans and what steps Embassy envisages taking to guard against this.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–958. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Rubottom, cleared with Wieland and Snow, and approved by Snow who signed for Herter.

² Supra.

³ See footnote 3, supra.

88. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Dreier) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, July 9, 1958.

SUBJECT

Possible Resort to OAS re Prisoners Held by Cuban Insurrectionists

If our present efforts to negotiate the release of the remaining U.S. prisoners held by the Castro forces in Cuba fail, there will of course be considerable pressure for outright U.S. intervention in the Cuban picture to liberate these hostages. Before considering any such step, I believe we should put the matter up to the OAS in some form so that we at least demonstrate our desire to call in the organized inter-American community before taking the law into our own hands.

The Council of the OAS does not have authority to deal with any such situation. Nor would it be possible, in my opinion, for us to invoke the Rio Treaty since in order to do so we must demonstrate that the political independence or territorial integrity of the United States is threatened by an act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America—a condition which cannot be said to exist. Review of the whole OAS structure indicates to me only one possibility of calling upon that organization; namely, the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC). The IAPC is governed by a statute approved by the Council of the OAS in May 1956,² which supplants previous statutes going back as far as 1940. Under the present statute, the competence of the IAPC is described as follows:

Article 1. The Inter-American Peace Committee shall keep constant vigilance, within the scope of its authority, to ensure that states between which any dispute or controversy exists will solve it as quickly as possible, to which end it shall suggest measures and steps conducive to a settlement, and it shall at all times respect the methods or procedures agreed upon by the Parties.

Article 2. Any state directly concerned in a dispute or controversy with another American state may request the Committee to take action, but the Committee, once the provisions of Articles 15 and 16 of these Statutes have been complied with, shall take up the case only with the prior consent of the Parties and when no other procedure for its pacific settlement is in progress.

The two major conditions that must be met to enable the IAPC to deal with a problem are that there must be a controversy or dispute between the two governments and that both governments must agree to have the Committee intervene therein. It would, therefore, be necessary to obtain the agreement of the Cuban Government to bring a “dispute” to the Committee and ask the Committee’s suggestions as to how this problem might be resolved. The Committee could then recommend that the two governments designate one or more emissaries to Castro in order to request the liberation of these prisoners in the interest of preventing the development of a serious dispute involving two American governments. It could be emphasized that the United States was bringing this matter up in this way because of its desire to avoid any unilateral intervention in the internal situation of Cuba. It would have to be emphasized to the Committee that the matter being brought to their consideration was entirely the matter of the release of U.S. citizens held by Cuban forces, and did not in any way involve the Committee in the civil conflict between the Cuban Government and insurrectionists.

If a delegation of the IAPC went to Cuba and appealed directly to Castro, it would be widely recognized as a step involving the prestige and moral force of the OAS. If it succeeded, all well and good. If not, it would at least have demonstrated the U.S. desire to work through the OAS and would place Castro in a very unfavorable light before the Latin American countries.

While there are several problems connected with this idea which would have to be explored carefully in detail, I believe they could be overcome. One difficulty is meeting the requirement that there should be a “dispute” or “controversy” between the United States and Cuba. Perhaps the greatest difficulty would be to get the Cuban Government to agree to this procedure which would imply public admission of their inability to control events in their own country. In any event, no step towards bringing the matter before the IAPC should be taken until a pretty thorough understanding had been reached through diplomatic consultations as to how it would work out.

The first step would be to consult informally and discreetly with members of the Committee which I should be glad to do whenever you and Mr. Rubottom think the time is right.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–958. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Dreier. Also sent to Marjorie Whiteman.

² For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 323–326.

89. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Dr. Carlos Piad and the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland), Department of State, Washington, July 10, 1958¹

Washington, July 10, 1958

SUBJECT

Unification of Cuban Opposition

Dr. Piad reported receiving a telephone call last night from Dr. Antonio Varona stating that a unity pact among the entire Cuban opposition was about to be signed. Dr. Varona, who resides in Miami, had just returned from Caracas where he had a 30-minute radio conversation with Fidel Castro. The signing will take place in a few days,² with Castro signing for the 26th of July; Dr. Varona for Prio’s PRC (Autentico); Dr. Jose Miro Cardona for the Civil Institutions, and Lincoln Rodon for the Democrats, among others.

Dr. Piad said the re-unification of Castro’s group with the other opposition elements was effected without the knowledge of the so-called 26th of July leaders in the United States. He opined that Mario Llerena, Ernesto Betancourt or any other 26th of July leaders in the United States were not invested with any real authority in the movement.

Asked what would be the next move, Dr. Piad said it was his personal opinion that the united opposition would be forced to get behind a stronger person than Judge Urrutia for provisional President. Urrutia is a Santiago judge selected by Castro to be his candidate when he broke with the Cuban Liberation Junta last December. Piad said he considered only three persons worthy of being considered for the provisional presidency, namely, Felipe Pazos, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, or Dr. Varona.

Dr. Piad said that rumors were current in Habana that the Embassy was involved in a plot to stage a coup in which there would be a change in power but without anybody getting hurt, i.e., a “staged” affair which would put Fidel Castro on the sidelines. He expressed the opinion that if Fidel Castro had heard this rumor he would be reluctant to forfeit an advantage he had in holding the Americans.

He also said that a Col. Gajate, highly respected Navy leader, who was forced to resign from his post by Batista, was scheduled to visit the Embassy within the next few days. He did not know for what reason.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1058. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart.

² The signing of a preliminary declaration of unity took place in Caracas on July 20. The groups signing the declaration formed the Frente Civico Revolucionario (FCR). See Document 107.

90. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Washington, July 10, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cuba

1. During the period 26 June to 30 June, nineteen American and Canadian civilians and thirty enlisted personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps were kidnapped and held as hostages by the Cuban rebel Raul Castro. As of 9 July, all civilians except one Canadian had been released but not a single U.S. enlisted man has been released.

2. From the time of the first incident on 26 June, the Government of Cuba has suspended ground and air action against the insurgents in an effort to insure the safety of the hostages and in the hope such action would expedite their release. This action has not accomplished its purpose, but instead has granted the insurgents a much needed respite from the pressure of the government forces.

3. It is my opinion that so long as the hostages provide the insurgents protection from air attack, they will not be released, or released one or two at a time over a protracted period during which Raul Castro will demand increased concessions from the U.S. The prestige of the U.S. throughout Latin America has been seriously damaged by the events of the last two weeks. I consider that the damage will be almost irreparable if strong measures are not taken now to secure the release of our personnel.

4. Accordingly, I recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward the enclosure² to the Secretary of Defense as a matter of urgency.

5. I recommend that this paper not be distributed to the commanders of unified and specified commands.

Arleigh Burke³

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Cuba. Top Secret. Copies were also sent to the Department of State, the Secretary of the Navy, and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Stamped on the source text, which is the last-mentioned of these three copies, are the words: “Noted by Mr. Sprague.” In a memorandum of July 10 to Under Secretary Murphy, Richard Finn wrote that Admiral Burke had called that morning and in Murphy’s absence had talked with Finn. Burke summarized the memorandum he was sending to the Joint Chiefs regarding the Cuban situation and explained that “we are being humiliated and that positive measures must be taken.” Burke also stated that “of course people would get hurt.” When Finn mentioned that Ambassador Smith had sent a message that morning regarding additional measures that might be taken (infra), Burke said that “these do not go far enough and that forceful measures are now required.” (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958)

² The enclosure was a draft of Document 95.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 10, 1958—1 p.m.

44. Reference: Embtel 39 and Deptel 32.² I have asked for appointment with President Batista today and have sent instructions to Wollam to return to base.

Re Deptel 31³ and 32 Embassy understands Department’s first preference is for Wollam to endeavor to arrange a meeting between the Castro brothers by fastest means. This would be by helicopter lift. GOC has already indicated strong disapproval of this step. Publicity would be unavoidable as there are 16 American reporters on base and six American reporters with Raul Castro. In my opinion GOC will not agree to a proposal, but I plan to bring it up as a first alternative in conversation with President Batista.

With reference to the second alternative outlined in Deptel 31, for Wollam to go by land to Fidel Castro will require several days and would necessitate safe-conduct by both GOC and rebels. It may be possible for me to arrange with Batista for Wollam alone to contact Fidel Castro by using helicopter from Guantanamo base. If such a plan were carried out, Wollam should endeavor to obtain written instructions from Fidel to Raul. This would assist in obtaining prompt return of captives. If Batista agrees, Embassy will endeavor through radio channel at Guantanamo to make suitable arrangements for such contact with Fidel Castro.

The only other contact is possibly for Wollam to talk to Fidel Castro by radio through Guantanamo or to attempt to establish radio contact through channel mentioned in Niact 1 from Caracas.⁴ Communications by radio and phone are monitored by GOC. Fidel Castro obviously will be cautious in any radio converstions.

With reference Embtel 43⁵ Wollam message was sent exactly as received. We understand that rebels still prefer to return naval personnel by helicopter, against receipt given by Consul, though Wollam aware Admiral Ellis would prefer they come out by bus as they went in.

We believe transportation difficulties mentioned by Wollam refers to problem of assembling widely scattered naval personnel and moving them within hills to pick-up point.

FYI: In phone conversations W–l W–2 are Wollam and Wiecha.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1058. Confidential; Niact.

² Documents 86 and 87.

³ See footnote 3, Document 86.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 84.

⁵ In telegram 43, July 9, Smith indicated that he had received a report that afternoon from Wollam relayed through the U.S. base at Guantanamo that the rebels were still insisting that the Naval personnel were in the process of being released but there were “transportation difficulties.” Wollam also reported that these difficulties were holding up the release of the Canadian citizen, who was the only remaining civilian being held. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–958)

92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, July 10, 1958—9:29 p.m.

38. Embtel 44 and Deptels 31 and 32.² Department considers essential Wollam see Fidel most expeditious possible means and if possible arrange for brother Raul be present. Judging from Embassy’s previous communications it would appear helicopter transportation most feasible and considers Cuban Government should be willing give necessary assent in interest seeking most expeditious possible release American captives. While this not intended to be publicity stunt but geniune strong effort obtain definitive decision rebel leaders’ release captives, Department agrees natural resultant publicity unavoidable and in fact probably helpful both US and GOC.

Department confident you will obtain Batista’s assent all necessary measures as it obviously impossible for Cuban Government evade share responsibility for mass kidnappings effected in that country. This telegram also confirms Ambassador’s telephone conversation Wieland³ that Wollam, not Embassy will endeavor make suitable arrangements Guantanamo for contact Castro, re last sentence paragraph 3 Embtel 44.

Department naturally expects successful results Wollam’s approach to Fidel. As required he can reiterate Department’s position as outlined Department’s press release July 3⁴ and its announcement on March 14⁵ suspension of arms shipments (Deptel 13 July 3⁶ ). He should also recall Fidel’s statement as broadcast over Radio Rebelde⁷ transmitting orders purporting to come from Fidel to release captives and stress to rebel leader that American patience wearing thin and increasing pressures building up for adoption strong measures against kidnappers. It difficult to exaggerate seriousness these pressures which can be relieved only by prompt release captives and assurance no further abductions nor other criminal attacks on our citizens in Cuba.

Above confirmed today’s telephone conversation Ambassador and Wieland.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1058. Confidential; Niact. Drafted and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter; cleared with Rubottom.

² Telegram 44 is supra. Regarding telegram 31 to Havana, see footnote 3, Document 86. Telegram 32 is Document 87.

³ Wieland’s memorandum of a telephone conversation with Smith on July 10, time unspecified, is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1058. The agreement between Smith and Wieland mentioned here, however, is not included in the memorandum.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 82.

⁵ See Document 36.

⁶ Document 82.

⁷ For text of this statement made on July 3, see Bonachea and Valdes, Selected Works of Fidel Castro, vol. I, pp. 383–384.

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 11, 1958—2 a.m.

48. Re Deptel 31 and 32.² I had 2-hour exchange of views with Batista July 10. I stressed US Government anxiety to bring about release of all US captives and that we understood Fidel Castro had issued orders for their release. In our opinion, if we could arrange a meeting between Castro brothers in the presence of Consul Wollam, or alternatively a meeting between Consul Wollam and Fidel Castro alone, we hoped to bring about immediate release of captives. Such meeting would also determine whether Raul Castro would comply with instructions of Fidel Castro.

After full discussion of possibilities of arranging such meetings as outlined in Deptels 31 and 32, Batista’s reaction was firmly negative on all points. He said as head of the nation he could not authorize such steps. Those individuals who have contacted the Castros, in the past, have done so at their own risk.

Batista maintains that Fidel is surrounded and that GOC troops are in close contact with rebels. If Wollam were to contact Fidel Castro with GOC approval, latter could then pinpoint his whereabouts. This would give GOC opportunity to kill Fidel Castro. Batista further stated that US Government and GOC would then be accused of having acted in collusion in causing death of Fidel Castro.

Troops in San Cristobal have been withdrawn, according to Batista, because of US captives, and rebels have gained much territory. Hence, after release of hostages GOC task of eliminating Raul Castro will be that much more difficult.

Batista further said GOC was not only suffering from lack of arms but US was also depriving GOC of communications equipment.

Batista stated Fidel Castro has already called upon Raul Castro to release prisoners over Caracas radio, and he saw no objection to Consul Wollam making appeal through that channel. I made no mention of possibility US attempting contact through Guantanamo radio.

In answer to my query as to best method for obtaining quick release, Batista said US must be firm. Otherwise, rebels will surely stall on release. He suggested a statement calling for release of all prisoners in one week or US would take action. In his opinion “action” should not be defined. Uncertainty will have desired psychological effect.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1158. Confidential; Priority.

² See footnote 3, Document 86, and Document 87.

94. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 11, 1958—2 a.m.

49. For Snow ARA. During conference with Batista July 10 he stated he understood US suspension of shipment of combat arms and our desire for non-involvement in Cuban internal affairs. However, he was deeply concerned over what GOC considers as US intervention in Cuban affairs. He has been informed by his Ambassadors in England and Canada that these nations declined to sell arms to Cuba because US allegedly refused to give clearance. He added that if GOC does not receive arms it could bring about overthrow of Cuban Government.

I said I was unaware of the foregoing and would advise my government of his concern.

Request information concerning validity of above.²

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/7–1158. Secret; Priority.

² See footnote 3, Document 102.

95. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McElroy)¹

Washington, July 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cuba

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned with the current status of negotiations for the recovery of U.S. Servicemen kidnapped in Cuba and urge that the following courses of action be undertaken at once:

a. Remove the restrictions which have been placed on military assistance to the Cuban Government.

b. Formally request the Cuban Government to effect the recovery within 72 hours of the American citizens and service personnel being held hostage by the Castro insurgents.

c. Inform the Cuban Government that the United States Government is prepared to offer whatever assistance may be required. The Cuban Government should also be informed that should the Cuban Government be unable to effect the release of the American hostages within the time specified that the United States Government desires the concurrence of the Cuban Government to initiate operations with U.S. forces to recover the American hostages.

d. Concurrent with a, b, and c above, notify the Castro rebels that, unless the hostages are released within 72 hours, the United States is prepared to intervene.

e. Concurrent with the above, commence transfer of a U.S. Marine Regimental Landing Team (RLT) to the Guantanamo Naval Base.

2. It is recommended that you forward a memorandum substantially the same as that contained in the Appendix hereto to the Secretary of State.²

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining
Chairman

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 63 A 1770, McElroy Letters. Top Secret.

² Not printed. No record has been found that such a memorandum was sent to the Secretary of State.

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 11, 1958—10 a.m.

50. During my exchange of views with Batista on July 10, he stated that if the overthrow of the GOC were brought about by US intervention, as described in Embtel 49,² only chaos and a complete breakdown of law and order would ensue in Cuba.

These are the conditions the Communists are striving for.

He further stated that Raul Castro spent three years behind the Iron Curtain and obviously has been fully indoctrinated.

I stressed the fact that the US had no such intentions and that we appreciated the support of the friendly GOC as often displayed in all international matters. I further stated that I would make inquiries regarding the allegations in Embtel 49.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1158. Confidential; Niact.

² Document 94.

97. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 11, 1958—5 p.m.

56. Following from Wollam and Wiecha in reply penultimate sentence, paragraph 2 of Deptel 32:²

Raul Castro believed be final authority second front altho subject influence advisors. Believed have complete control as far as poor communications permit. Raul respects Fidel’s authority altho he aware his zone now larger and more populous. He claims had done this operation on spur of moment because necessity without consultation. This possibly indicated by Fidel’s radio message³ on release Americans. This not entirely clear and some feel Raul had at least tacit approval. I suspect but cannot prove that Raul has now received official message from Fidel and that this has had effect. Carrying out of plans for release of other Americans as promised today might be evidence of this especially after delays to date. This is big question. Will discuss at Embassy Friday [Saturday]⁴ morning.

The following was received in a message from Vice Consul Wiecha: In regard question of any rift between Fidel and Raul, most observers here, newspapermen and myself, believe that the only evidence of such disagreement is the widespread belief of all 26 members that their zone is “1000 percent” more important than the Sierra Maestra. In addition, there is a belief—probably true—that this zone is more democratic than the zone of Fidel. His is more of a one man operation while here Raul uses more of a general staff concept and he consults with commanders. In this respect at least there is a difference between the zones.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1158. Secret; Niact.

² Document 87.

³ See footnote 7, Document 92.

⁴ The next day was Saturday, July 12, suggesting that Wollam’s and Wiecha’s message was sent on Thursday, July 10.

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 11, 1958—6 p.m.

57. Embtel 56² and GTMO’s 1100202.³ Wollam returned GTMO and will re-enter rebel zone tomorrow. Will have radio operator with key set which permits direct contact Habana. Wollam says there is always possibility Raul’s group will inject last minute demands but reasonably hopeful evacuation setup may be ready and even operating by Sunday. Every reason believe Navy men held in small groups considerable distance from present helicopter pick up point Calabasas in Sierra Del Cristal. Navy men estimated be near Palanque in Sierra De Purial. Wollam has volunteered set up more than one pick up point in their area if it will hasten deliveries.

In debriefing Wollam it evident he proceeding with utmost caution in avoiding commitments but using nearly all arguments Department has had in mind. Briefed him on worry of Cuban exiles in US over continued detention of Americans and discarded any mention taking matter OAS since Raul Castro’s group anxious get Cuban situation into OAS. Wollam cleverly used US newpapermen and hostages to debate questions with Raul’s men which not prudent for him to discuss. As expected, most hostages sympathized with rebels because of good treatment, camaraderie, earlier troubles with Cuban army or because they had to continue living in rebel infested area. Should be recalled Wollam never has made contact with Navy group. Wiecha attempted join them but prevented from doing so.

Wollam stressed that some of Raul Castro’s forces completely fanatical, emotional and disregard logical arguments. Have philosophy that they are going to die anyway so why should they fear any consequences their acts. Wollam hopes this type does not exert too much influence. As result, he has been forced play pretty much by ear his meetings with Castro people.

In discussions on freeing of men Wollam has been reasonable in approach but firm in rejecting impractical demands such as request for observer or use MAP arms, written replies demands, et cetera.

When he returns now he will attempt obtain early and definite release date. If he has no luck will point out US becoming irritated at long delay and is being forced into position of taking firm action by rebel attitude. If and when release all Americans obtained he will carefully point out that repetition kidnappings will result in immediate and firm action by US and that rebels may not count on any favorable publicity.

Released hostages with whom Wollam conversed doubt military action by US to recover kidnapped people would be successful.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1158. Confidental; Niact.

² Supra.

³ Not found.

99. Editorial Note

On July 12, the Deputy Director for Intelligence of The Joint Staff, Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, transmitted a memorandum entitled “United States Prestige” to the Director of The Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Oliver S. Picher. In the memorandum, Breitweiser distinguished between “prestige” and “popularity”, and noted that U.S. military or political intervention in Latin America, despite its unpopularity, would not necessarily impair U.S. prestige.

In fact, Breitweiser wrote: “the continued failure of U.S. efforts to secure the freedom of the abducted Navy and Marine personnel on Cuba is unspectacularly but seriously eroding our national prestige not only in Latin America but also in other areas of the world.” Any decision to undertake military action to secure the release of the kidnapped Americans should take into account the certainty that the Soviet Union would exploit such a move with propaganda “designed to destroy the world image of the United States as a peaceful and noncolonial power”, and the necessity of using sufficient force to ensure success.

The memorandum concludes: “it is our belief that, with good political and psychological preparation and the employment of adequate forces, U.S. military action to recover the American captives could, although unpopular, actually enhance U.S. prestige. However, we believe that the military problem itself is difficult, and a major miscalculation in the political and psychological build-up could cause the operation to boomerang.”

The full text of the memorandum is published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 150A.

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 12, 1958–1 p.m.

58. For William Snow. If Consul Wollam is unable to obtain a definite date for release hostages, I believe the US will be required to take a firm position. If he is successful in obtaining a definite release date, I still believe firm stand on the part of US will be required.

There is no guarantee the kidnappers will abide by their agreement. There is no guarantee that rebels will discontinue kidnapping Americans. The present military order for seizing Americans has only been suspended.

It has been mentioned by some sources that the US would be required to remove all of its citizens from Oriente province. Oriente does not have a monopoly on kidnappings. This can be done anywhere. So far the kidnappers have accomplished their immediate objectives: (A) Gained publicity (B) Being able to deal directly with the US (C) Suspend air and military action on part of GOC.

In the US we have learned from experience that the only effective deterrent to kidnappings is to make the penalty sufficiently severe.

As to the overall foreign policy of the US, the Department knows best whether it is advisable to bring this matter to the OAS. From a purely local point of view the kidnappers would welcome such news. They could consider this as giving them additional prominence in the world spotlight.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1258. Confidential; Niact.

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 12, 1958—2 p.m.

59. Re Embtel 57.² Evening Star story of July 11, reported by AP, published Habana papers along with Admiral Wright’s statement and announcement release of last civilian hostage. Local handling kidnapping story been perfunctory. FYI Wollam before departure yesterday expressed hope any attempt link Raul Castro with communism be avoided until he could obtain release hostages. He was also apprehensive that appearance in next few days of stories that US beginning adopt tough line might obstruct his immediate objective outlined first sentence penultimate paragraph Embtel 57. End FYI.

Further re Castro movement based on debriefing Wollam and questioning at Guantanamo of released Americans: Buffalo Bill referred to by hostage Chamberlain as possible Communist been identified as Arlundo Torre, in early twenties, native Camaguey who studied in Paris. Claims went Vienna when 1956 Hungarian revolution underway, aided evacuation Hungarians, entered Hungary clandestinely in November 1956 for 17 days and then returned Vienna. Claims saw Figueres when latter in Germany 1956. He Lieutenant in Raul Castro organization but appears not have more authority than usually accorded one of his ranking group wherein captain highest designation. Raul Castro; Dr. Lucas Moran, Santiago lawyer; Anibal Castilla, further identification unknown; and Torre claim have engineered kidnapping Americans and Canadians.

Torre said if Communists wanted join as soldiers would be permitted do so. Wiecha seemed feel most of soldiers would not know Communist if saw one. By inference Wiecha indicated no known Communists be allowed as officers in movement. Wiecha is strongly against US arms policy as represented by Castro line. He added that if Marines come in to rescue kidnapped Americans the Fidelistas would fight them and publicly request Russian arms to do so. Claims Castro forces already have turned down offer Russian arms.

Neither Wollam nor Wiecha have been able pin Communist label on any person in Raul Castro movement although they think there are some. Anthony Chamberlain, who spent three days with Raul Castro, claims one possibly two of the four leaders are Communists. Wiecha he believes is one and possibly Castilla. Wollam says Raul’s group is well organized, has political indoctrinator in each of various units, which might be likened political commissar. As result, officers and soldiers well indoctrinated with 26 July line. It is difficult convince some of them that US not guilty charges supplying arms Batista and permitting use base for Cuban armed forces operations. Wollam says anti-US propaganda used prior kidnappings followed Communist line. Arthur Ross and John Best, two of released Americans, describe Raul Castro’s men as extremely religious, anti-Communist and ultra super-nationalist.

Wollam gathered impression Raul Castro going through motions organizing free territory government in his area and asked him what kind of recognition his group would receive from Consulate in Santiago if 26 July movement took over that city. Wollam told him none.

Further re last paragraph Embtel 57. Hostages been moved all over Raul’s area, know wild terrain crisscrossed innumerable trails, and believe rebels could successfully elude any forces sent in to rescue Americans. On basis of what Batista forces have done thus far, those captives who have lived in Oriente province think they can not clear out Castro forces.

Before departure Wollam expressed some concern over report rebels had appeared again at Nicaro asking for gasoline supplies. He said that Raul Castro had assured him earlier that nothing more would be taken from Moa Bay or Nicaro and that Guantanamo water supply installations at Yateras would not be molested. FYI debriefings American hostages been extensive at Guantanamo and Wollam and Wiecha likewise have talked to them. Guantanamo and Wiecha reports are being forwarded as soon as processed through proper channels. End FYI.

[Paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1258. Confidential.

² Document 98.

102. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 13, 1958—7 p.m.

63. Reference Embassy telegram 48.² I believe further amplification of my talk with President Batista on July 10 would be of interest to Department.

I stressed US felt it was highly desirable for a meeting of the two brothers in order that Fidel could give direct orders for release of prisoners, and we would establish whether Raul would adhere to an order from Fidel. I also stressed that US had much to gain by this meeting and that I thought GOC would have little to lose. At this point he produced an article from Miami Daily News written by Jay Mallin on July 9. Many lines were underscored in red pencil. Batista was particularly annoyed at statement that former US Marine was in the hills training the rebels and irritated at statements about the favorable treatment received by prisoners and the general comraderie.

I gathered impression Batista believes actions of US (since suspension of guarantees March 12) have been helpful to the rebels. He mentioned all the scare headlines of US press re conditions in Habana. He spoke of our allegedly intervening in the affairs of Cuba by interfering with the purchasing [of] arms from outside nations as covered in Embassy telegram 49.³ Then he went on to report that he understood Trujillo’s son could not buy a plane in US unless sufficient guarantee were given that it would not be resold to the GOC.

He also brought up again the cancellation of the T–28 trainers, although I pointed out to him at great length the necessity for postponing this delivery with the American hostages still in the hills.

I have had pleasant relationship with Batista, and he has always tried to accede to my requests. At this time I find that he is disturbed due to the many acts, which he considers to have been unfriendly, on our part. I understand there is a possibility that Department may wish me to renew request for meeting of brothers if hostages are not released. If this is necessary, I hope we can show some act of good faith before we press him again—such as delivery of T–28 trainers after release.

Batista is well aware of the fact that the longer the hostages are held the more the 26 of July Movement loses sympathizers in the US.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1358. Confidential; Priority.

² Document 93.

³ See Document 94. In telegram 51 to Havana, July 18, the Department requested Smith to assure Batista and/or Guell that the Department had not interceded with any other governments to prevent the sale of arms to Cuba. Smith was also authorized to say that the sale of arms by the U.K. and Canadian Governments was not subject to clearance by the U.S. Government. The telegram noted that Batista may have had in mind the Department’s refusal in May 1958 of a British request to transfer to Cuba rifles and ammunition of U.S. Lend-Lease origin. This had been done in accordance with the general policy of not approving transfers of U.S. Lend-Lease materials to “disturbed areas.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/7–1158)

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 16, 1958—2 p.m.

79. Delivery of T–28 trainers will come up again as soon as all hostages have been released.

I believe it is incumbent upon us to review our arms policy program with Cuba. Since March 12 of this year, I fear GOC believes US responds instantly to the complaints and desires of revolutionary factions to the exclusion of any GOC feelings. Relationships between Cuba and the US are becoming more and more strained under the present US arms policy towards Cuba Embtel 486 [846].²

I have pointed out in Embtel 63³ that Batista is under impression that actions of US (since suspension of guarantees March 12) have been helpful to rebels. Batista spoke of our allegedly intervening in the affairs of Cuba by interfering with their purchasing arms from outside nations Embtel 49.⁴

The Army, Air Force and Navy missions are encountering antipathy from their Cuban counterparts. Our military service mission chiefs give following examples of unilateral actions which they believe are fostering anti-US feeling:

[Here follows a list of examples furnished by Colonel Lynn, Captain Williamson, and Colonel Dysinger.]

In a memo to me from Dr. Marquez Sterling, leading opposition presidential candidate, he states the political situation is perhaps the most dangerous one through which the island of Cuba has passed. He goes on to say that the disunited groups of the insurrection, incapable of victory for the time being, are sufficiently well organized to throw the country into disorder until it is led into anarchy under which they believe they could impose themselves. He goes on to say, and I quote: “If this occurred there would be an elimination contest between the several revolutionary sectors for predominance and power. The arms struggle would not cease but would become worse. The country would be at mercy of most criminal elements and its economy assaulted. It is possible that what occurred in 1933 would occur again.“⁵

I do not believe that we should take any further steps which will assist the 26 July movement for only beneficiaries of such policy in the end could well turn out to be the Communists.

Since suspension of guarantees on March 12 Department has been opposed in [to] selling to GOC, and as a result has been an encouragement to 26 July movement. Because we do not approve of dictators, let us not unwittingly give aid to those in league with communism. I am deeply concerned over the evidence of communism in the Raul Castro group.

I recommend (A) we make immediate delivery of all communications equipment (B) that the T–28s be delivered immediately upon release all hostages (C) that our arms policy program be reviewed and be reconsidered in the light of events as they exist as of this time.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1658. Confidential; Priority.

² Document 65.

³ Supra.

⁴ Document 94.

⁵ Text of Marquez Sterling’s June 30, 1958, memorandum was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 68 from Havana, July 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1858)

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 17, 1958—noon.

86. Department pass CIA, FBI, Defense, Navy, Air, crypto State pass crypto Army for ACSI, CINCARIB, USACARIB, USARANT. Following is summary of letter from Consul Wollam to Admiral Ellis at Guantanamo Base and Ambassador received afternoon July 16 [less than 1 line not declassified].

1. Rebels state delay in release military personnel necessary to protect local civilians from army retaliation. Regret inconvenience to USG but says it minor compared necessity protect civilian population. I doubt much can be done to expedite release but am trying everything possible.

2. I believe publicity on delay would spur Cuban Army action. Army not capable of cleaning out hills, but Cuban Air Force can scorch towns. I think we have underestimated size and extent of rebel movement. New pick-up site is in another major area full of armed men. It is completely controlled by rebels and has independent government set-up.

3. Letter from Raul Castro dated July 14 apologizes inconvenience caused USG, but gives no assurances action will not be repeated. Says rebels confident that reasons which make kidnapping necessary will not be repeated.

[Paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

1. Rebel units have received orders commence offensive 15 July with objective seize all Oriente Province by 4 September. Rebels attacked Guantanamo City airport night 15 July but repulsed. Then attacked nearby sugar mill and killed two soldiers. Source of information is American newsmen considered to have good contacts with rebels.

2. At 11:30 local time July 15 rebels seized car belonging to Guantanamo base employee two miles north of base. At 1430 local time July 15 rebels overpowered Navy sentry at base and took his weapons.² Source foregoing is Naval intelligence officer at base who comments it obvious that all of adjacent areas with exception of base and Guantanamo City controlled by rebels.

Embassy comment: It would appear rebels are holding kidnapped Americans to give them time for preparation for offensive action. On basis these and other reports (Embtel 81³ ) there is considerable possibility increased armed disturbance Oriente Province at early date.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1758. Secret; Niact.

² In telegram 54 to Havana, July 18, the Department asked that Wollam be instructed to inform the rebels of “serious U.S. concern” over the rebel attack on the Guantanamo base sentry and that sentries were being instructed to “use weapons, if necessary, to protect life and property on base.” (ibid.) In telegram 111 from Havana, July 19, the Embassy reported that Wollam had delivered this message to the rebels. (ibid., 737.00/7–1958)

³ Dated July 16, telegram 81 reported that the Cuban Army commander in the Guantanamo area had requested reinforcements in expectation of a major rebel attack on July 20 or sometime after August 1. The Embassy noted that several sources indicated that there would be intense rebel activity in Oriente province on July 26, the anniversary of the July 26 Movement. (ibid., 737.00/7–1685)

105. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) and Carlos Piad, Washington, July 17, 1958¹

Washington, July 17, 1958

During a conversation with Carlos Piad concerning the recent arrest in Habana of a revolutionary student leader who is closely related to Piad, I took occasion to suggest to him that, without invoking the name of the State Department or any other U.S. agency, he ask Dr. Antonio Varona to urge Fidel Castro to push for a speedup in the release of the American servicemen still detained by Raúl Castro.

Piad told me he would do so on his own initiative, without using the name of any U.S. agency. He told me that as the result of his previous conversations with Varona, the latter had, on Friday, July 11, again talked by radio from Caracas to Fidel Castro, urging the latter to take immediate steps to return the Americans.

He said that Varona told Castro that Raúl’s kidnapping of the Americans had created a bad situation for the 26th of July movement in the United States and elsewhere and that continued detention of the prisoners was only worsening matters. He also told Castro that he felt so strongly about this matter that he was considering going to Cuba to go into the hills to discuss with Fidel personally more fully than he could by radio. Varona told Piad, in a letter which I saw, that Fidel had assured him that it would not be necessary for Varona to return to Cuba at the risk of his life. He assured Varona that he had given categoric orders for the release of the Americans and thought he could assure Varona that they would be freed promptly.

[Here follows Wieland’s description of a subsequent conversation with Ernesto Betancourt, registered representative of the 26th of July Movement, during which he was told by Betancourt that Castro and Varona had been having “frequent conversations, principally concerning present negotiations for a unity pact among the revolutionary groups.” Wieland wrote that he had been informed during these discussions that “Dr. Varona had told Fidel Castro of the harm being done to the revolutionary movement by the continued detention of the kidnapped Americans.”]

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1758. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Wieland.

106. Editorial Note

On July 17, Ambassador Smith met with Foreign Minister Guell, who conveyed to him the irritation caused by the delay in the release of the American hostages. Guell said that his government would soon like to discuss various preventive measures to avoid the repetition of such acts. Smith told the Department of State that he anticipated a Cuban Government proposal for joint action. In order to avoid this, and because the Embassy believed that the U.S. Government should take a firm stand to deter the future kidnapping of Americans, Smith recommended that the Department issue a warning to the rebels that the United States would “not again countenance such acts.” Smith believed that a strong statement, issued immediately upon the release of the last hostages, might suffice. (Telegram 95 from Havana, July 18; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1858) No reply by the Department of State has been found.

That evening Consul Park Wollam reported by radio to the U.S. base at Guantanamo that Raúl Castro had apparently approved a decision to release four captives a day and that all would be released by July 21. Wollam also said that the local population was frightened by the prospect of government forces’ retaliation and wanted the rebels to slow down the release of the captives. Wollam expressed his belief that Chicago Tribune newsman Jules Dubois, who had gone into the hills to tell Raúl Castro to “stop this nonsense”, had little chance of success. (Telegram 97 from Havana, July 18; ibid.)

On July 18, the rebel forces unexpectedly released the remaining 14 American hostages, who were taken by helicopter to the Guantanamo base. Raúl Castro sent a letter to Admiral Ellis, Commander of the Base, informing him that in view of the “international situation” (presumably a reference to the Lebanon crisis), he felt that all U.S. servicemen should be at their posts. (Telegram 105 from Havana, July 18; ibid.) However, the released hostages reported that four men had recently arrived at their place of detention after traveling for 8 days from the Sierra Maestra. Wollam speculated that they may have been couriers and that this might have been the real reason for the release of the last hostages. (Telegram 109 from Havana, July 19; ibid., 737.00/7–1958)

On July 19, Wollam, Wiecha, their radio operator, Dubois, and a CBS newsman who was in the hills with the rebels all returned to the U.S. base at Guantanamo. For Dubois’ recollections of these events, see Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro: Rebel-Liberator or Dictator? (Indianapolis: Bobbs–Merrill Co., 1959), pages 269–279.

Continuing violence during the Cuban electoral campaign and reappraisal by the U.S. Government of its support of the Batista government, July–November 1958

107. Editorial Note

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 20, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5622/7–2058. Confidential; Priority.

109. Editorial Note

110. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 24, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2458. Confidential. Drafted by Smith.

111. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)

Washington, July 24, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2458. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Stewart; also initialed by Snow.

112. Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Middle American Affairs

Washington, July 25, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2158. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which was attached to a brief covering memorandum of July 25 from Wieland to Leonhardy and Stewart that reads as follows: “The attached memorandum includes some of the considerations which should go into the policy paper we are preparing in MID on the Cuban situation. It should be considered in the light of all available existing reports and the considerations in it taken into account in the drafting of the policy recommendations we are preparing in connection with Cuba.”

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 25, 1958—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2558. Secret; Priority.

114. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)

Washington, July 30, 1958.

Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart and Snow and cleared with Whiteman and G.

115. Editorial Note

116. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)

Washington, July 31, 1958.

Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart and Snow and concurred in by L/ARA.

117. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, August 1, 1958—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–158. Confidential; Priority.

118. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 1, 1958, 2 p.m.

Washington, August 1, 1958, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba July–Dec. 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

119. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) to the Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Anderson)

Washington, August 5, 1958.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba July–Dec. 1958. Drafted by Stewart. Copies were sent to ARA, the Embassy in Havana, MID/C, and to Spencer for Captain Kefauver.

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, August 7, 1958—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–758. Confidential; Priority.

121. Paper Prepared by the Embassy in Cuba

Havana, August 8, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–858. Confidential. Drafted by Smith, Bowdler, and Gilmore, and sent as an enclosure to despatch 141 from Havana, August 8.

122. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, August 11, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom Files: Lot 60 D 553, Cuba. Secret. Drafted by Little on July 31, with H, P, MC, W/MSC, and G indicated for concurrence. The source text bears no initials or signatures and may not have been forwarded to other offices for concurrence or to the Secretary of State for action, since the memorandum was held for Ambassador Smith’s concurrence during his visit to Washington the following week. (See Document 125)

123. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) and Foreign Minister Guell, Havana, August 15, 1958

Havana, August 15, 1958

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba-Political. Confidential. Drafted by Smith.

124. Report Prepared by the Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Washington, August 15, 1958.

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS-State Intelligence Reports. Secret. The cover sheet for the report reads: “This is an intelligence report and not a statement of Departmental policy.” Another note indicates that the report was based on information available through August 14. The full text of the report is published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 71 B.

125. Editorial Note

126. Letter From the Consul at Santiago de Cuba (Wollam) to the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy)

Santiago de Cuba, August 25, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–2558. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bowdler.

127. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)

Washington, August 29, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–2958. Confidential. Drafted by Little. Initialed by Wieland and Snow.

128. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 4, 1958

Washington, September 4, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–458. Confidential. Drafted by Gutierrez and initialed by Rubottom.

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 11, 1958—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.118/9–1158. Confidential.

130. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) and Ernesto Betancourt, Department of State, Washington, September 19, 1958

Washington, September 19, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–1958. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy. Betancourt was a Registered Agent for the 26th of July Movement.

131. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 22, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2258. Secret; Priority.

132. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Former Prime Minister Varona and the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland), Department of State, Washington, September 23, 1958

Washington, September 23, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2358. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy.

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 24, 1958—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 437.558/9–2458. Confidential; Priority.

134. Editorial Note

135. Memorandum From the Chief of the Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics (Wardlaw) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill)

Washington, September 25, 1958.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 60 D 513, Cuba 1958. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Wardlaw.

136. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 26, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2658. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler.

137. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1958

Washington, September 26, 1958

Source: Department of State, Rubottom Files: Lot 60 D 553, Cuba. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, September 27, 1958—1:01 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2558. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy; cleared with Snow and Rubottom; cleared in draft with Whiteman, Vaky, Murphy, DOD, P, SCA; and approved by Rubottom who signed for Herter. Repeated to Santiago de Cuba.

139. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State

Santiago de Cuba, September 29, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2958. Confidential. Drafted by Wollam. Copies were sent to the Embassy in Havana and the Office of Naval Intelligence at Guantanamo.

140. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith)

Washington, September 29, 1958.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba July–Dec. 1958. Confidential; Official–Informal. Drafted by Little and cleared with Whiteman, who also contributed to the draft.

141. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State

Santiago de Cuba, September 30, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–3058. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Copies were sent to the Embassy in Havana.

142. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) and Ernesto Betancourt, Department of State, Washington, September 30, 1958

Washington, September 30, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–3058. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy.

143. Editorial Note

144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, October 7, 1958—8:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–758. Confidential. Drafted by Little and Leonhardy; cleared with Wieland, Snow, Rubottom, Whiteman, McKelvey, and Murphy; approved by Rubottom; and signed for Dulles by Murphy. Repeated to Santiago de Cuba.

145. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) and Ernesto Betancourt, Washington, October 8, 1958

Washington, October 8, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–858. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

146. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, October 10, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–1058. Confidential. Drafted by Little, cleared with Dreier and Vaky, and initialed by Wieland and Rubottom.

147. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 22, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2258. Secret; Priority.

148. Editorial Note

149. Memorandum of Discussion at the 384th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 30, 1958

Washington, October 30, 1958

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 31.

150. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 31, 1958

Washington, October 31, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–3158. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy and cleared in draft with Whiteman.

151. Editorial Note

107. Editorial Note

On July 20, representatives of various revolutionary groups opposed to the Batista government established the Frente Civico Revolucionario and issued a unity declaration in Caracas, Venezuela. It was signed by Fidel Castro, Carlos Prio Socarrás for the Organization Auténtica, Enrique Rodríguez Loeches for the Directorio Revolucionario, Justo Carillo for the Agrupación Montecristi, Manuel Antonio Varona for the Partído Revolucionario Cubano Insureccional, Angel Santos Buch for the Resistencia Civica, Lincoln Rodón for the Partido Democráta Independiente, David Salvador, Angel Cofiño, Pascasio Linares, Lauro Blanco, José Aguilera for the Universidad Obrera, José Puente and Omar Fernández for the Federación Estudiantil Universitaría, and José Miró Cardona as secretary to the various political groups.

The text of the declaration in Spanish and an English translation were sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 109 from Havana, July 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2958) For an English translation, see also Bonichea and Valdes, Selected Works of Fidel Castro, volume I, pages 386–389.

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 20, 1958—5 p.m.

113. For William Snow ARA. Re Embtels 79,² 847,³ 63 (paragraph 3)⁴ and Deptel 728.⁵ Today (July 20) Minister State inquired regarding delivery T–28 trainers. I said I would advise Department of inquiry by GOC.

Delivery of T–28 trainers was promised to GOC by me in accordance with Deptel 728.

When GOC was about to accept delivery of T–28 (to be used in training student pilots), delivery was postponed by Department because of kidnapped Americans.

Now that all Americans have been released I again recommend (Embtel 79) that Department fulfill commitment. For US to do otherwise could be interpreted in Cuba that US had been intimidated by kidnappers.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5622/7–2058. Confidential; Priority.

² Document 103.

³ Document 66.

⁴ Document 102.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 66.

109. Editorial Note

On July 22, William Wieland, in a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Rubottom, recalled the major developments in the U.S. Government’s policy of cutting back on arms shipments to the Batista government and pointed out that the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Havana had asked the Department of State to approve the sale to Cuba of two items it defined as noncombat equipment. The two items were both aircraft parts, which Wieland argued could not be considered as noncombat items. In response to Wieland’s request for his views, Rubottom wrote in the margin: “Agree.”

Wieland recommended that the Department approve only those pending items that clearly fell within the definition of “noncombat equipment,” such as a fire truck, a 2½–ton trailer, communications equipment, telescopes, and spare parts for a C–47 cargo aircraft. He emphasized that spare parts for military aircraft should not be approved. Wieland said that if Rubottom accepted his recommendation, he would take the necessary steps to approve the items for shipment. In the margin Rubottom wrote: “Approve. RRR.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/7–2258)

110. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 90 Havana, July 24, 1958.

REF

A–l, July 2, 1958² and Embassy Despatch No. 68 dated 7/18/58³

SUBJECT

Increase of Communist Influence in Cuba

I have had a résumé made of the strength of the Communist Party in Cuba and am enclosing comments from the Attaché entitled “Strength of Cuban Communist Party”, dated July 9, 1958, and one dated July 24, 1958; memorandum from Legal Attaché “Partido Socialista Popular”, dated July 18, 1958; memorandum on “Communism in Cuba”, prepared by “Diario de la Marina” (oldest newspaper in Cuba—126 years).⁴

On July 10, 1958, President Fulgencio Batista told me personally he estimated the strength of the Communist Party in Cuba as being in excess of 100,000. When I asked if he recalled making a statement to an American newsman, in February 1957, that there were approximately 6,000 sympathizers, the President stated that he did not remember giving such a low figure. However, he did believe that the fellow-travelers numbered less than 10,000.

At a private luncheon at the Embassy Residence, on June 18, 1958, Eusebio Mujal (Secretary General of the Cuban Confederation of Workers) made the following comments concerning Communism in Cuba (Embassy Despatch No. 1072⁵ ): (a) that a conservative estimate of the number of Communists in Cuba was in excess of 50,000 card carrying members, with an additional 100,000 sympathizers; (b) that there were between 25,000 and 30,000 Communists in the organized labor movement; (c) out of 1,833 unions in the country, the Communists control around 30.

It will be noted that the estimates given by Mujal and President Batista correspond very closely with the Communist strength shown in recent elections. In 1948 the PSP obtained 56,000 registrations prior to elections, and obtained 151,000 votes in the elections. In the preparation for the 1952 elections, the PSP obtained 60,000 registrations. The elections were not held, but on the basis of the ratio between registration and votes as shown in previous elections, the Party would have polled around 160,000 votes (based on 60,000 registrations). It should be remembered that Mujal is a self-confessed former Communist, with long experience in the field of organized labor, and has been in almost daily contact with both open and crypto Communists for many years. Eusebio Mujal and Fulgencio Batista are two persons better qualified than any one to speak on the approximate strength of the PSP.

Opposition Presidential candidate Dr. Marquez Sterling, at lunch at the American Embassy Residence, on the 27th of June, stated that the Communist Party in Cuba exceeds 120,000 (Embtel 874⁶ ) and that the Communists are in league with the 26th of July Movement.

The recent kidnappings have brought to light the Communist influence and penetration in the Raul Castro group. The Communists and the 26th of July Movement have the same prime objective—the overthrow of Batista.

Because the Communists in Cuba are underground their leaders are not known, but their leaders are intelligent men of action. The Communists continue to publish “Carta Semanal”, “Mensajes” and “Respuestas”. Carta Semanal, the leading Communist weekly newspaper, has openly endorsed and is openly supporting the objectives and actions of the 26th of July Movement.

In my opinion, the present estimated Communist strength in Cuba (approximately 12,000 card-carrying members, supported by 25,000 sympathizers) should be revised upwards. However, the strength of the Communist Party in Cuba is not reflected in their numbers but in their organization. The Communists are a well-organized and dedicated group. They are prepared to be effective as the occasion arises.

This report was instigated before we received A–l, of July 2, 1958. In response to Department’s request, contained in the reference instruction, a special study of the situation and its potentials is in preparation.⁷

Earl E.T. Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2458. Confidential. Drafted by Smith.

² Document 77.

³ See footnote 5, Document 103.

⁴ None printed.

⁵ Dated June 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–2458)

⁶ Dated June 28. (ibid., 737.00/6–2858)

⁷ In telegram 139 from Havana, July 24, the Embassy asked the Embassies in Caracas and Mexico City for certain information to complete the study: (a) on the organization, composition, and strength of Cuban exile groups in each country, and (b) on the means and degree of support provided by the exiles to the rebel movement in Cuba. (ibid., 737.00/7–2458) This request, in which the Department concurred, was sent by the Department in telegram 175 to Mexico City (sent also as telegram 63 to Caracas), July 25. (ibid., 737.00/7–2558) In telegram 263 from Mexico City, July 30, the Embassy provided information on three rebel groups in Mexico, indicating that it had no proof that any were dominated by Communists. The Embassy pointed out, however, that it was known that the Soviet Union had directed “all Communist parties in area to support anti-Batista activities of Cubans.” (ibid., 737.00/7–3058) No response by the Embassy in Caracas has been found.

111. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, July 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cuban Situation

The writer was in Habana from July 11 to 16 and spent most of the working days in the Embassy. During this period long discussions were held with Ambassador Smith, Attachés of the Armed Services, heads of our military missions and officers of of the Embassy. Conversations with a number of American and Cuban friends of long-standing were held outside the Embassy. Separate conversations with Consul Park Wollam and Vice Consul Richard [Robert] Wiecha of Santiago were held in the Embassy.

My impression is that the situation has deteriorated in Cuba since two weeks spent there on vacation last year. Among American friends there was a feeling of pessimism about the future, different from the earlier viewpoint that their best interests would be served by supporting the Batista regime. They now feel that an eruption is inevitable, either in November, when elections are scheduled to be held, or in February, when Batista is supposed to leave office.

One friend, a top leader in the American community who has lived in Cuba for more than 20 years, was most pessimistic. He anticipated a violent uprising in February and saw no possibility of anything changing the course of events. Asked for his opinion on our present policy toward the Batista regime, he responded that, of course, we had to maintain such a position because of hemispheric sentiment and the hopeless local situation. Asked whether a revolution would reveal an economic situation that prevailed in Argentina after Peron’s downfall he said it was hard to say, since accurate statistics on the Cuban financial situation were hard to obtain. He complained that his bank was being forced to buy Government short-term bonds. He confirmed that Senor Joaquin Martinez Saenz, head of the Central Bank, was violently anti-American.

Another American friend, whose salesmen travel all over the island, reported that assassinations both by rebel and Government forces are occurring every day. This activity, details of which are not publicly known because of the tight censorship, extends to all provinces.

A doctor, taxi driver and airline employee, questioned about the possibility of elections in November, were pessimistic. If held, they will be in favor of Batista’s candidate, the three said, and they all expressed the opinion that elections could not even be staged under the present conditions.

Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling of the Free People’s Party, is still a candidate in opposition to Andrés Rivero Agüero, Batista’s choice. He prepared a long memorandum for Ambassador Smith² in which he defended the holding of elections in November and urged financial support by foreign companies (i.e., American) of his campaign. He also guardedly advanced the thought that Batista may be permitting Fidel Castro’s movement to continue in order to have a readily available excuse for maintaining firm control of the country. This may have been Batista’s idea in the beginning but he has permitted the development of a Frankenstein which he is powerless to crush today.

Dr. Ramón Grau San Martin, ex-President, announced he would participate in the November elections but Cubans adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward this statement. Grau is old, ill and unpredictable. It will be recalled he withdrew from the 1954 campaign shortly before elections with the charge they were “rigged.”

It has been abundantly demonstrated over the past year that the majority of the Cuban people are against Batista. The stand taken by the Catholic Church hierarchy in March; the Civic Institutions movement; the Civic Resistance movement and the special opposition of the professional class are evidences. All these organizations are not opposing Batista with violence. This is being carried out by the 26th of July movement; the Revolutionary Directorate and the Federation of University Students, both of which are made up of university and secondary school students, and smaller groups which are coming into being. The writer cannot speak for the labor movement, which is controlled by the pro-Batista labor leader Eusebio Mujal.

The tragedy of Cuba is that its youth is fighting and dying against Batista. If an Army officer or soldier is killed, three, four or more youths are found shot to death the next morning beside a road outside the locality where the attack against the soldiers occurred. This has become standard procedure. Consul Wollam says that the youth of Santiago have taken to the hills to fight with Raúl Castro. In other parts of the island, particularly in Las Villas and Pinar del Rio Provinces, youths are either fighting actively against the regime or have arms available to take up the fight whenever needed. Some young men are reported to have left Habana, Camaguey, Trinidad and other cities to join the rebel fighting forces.

The University of Habana has been closed for two years and other institutions of higher learning have been shut down for almost that long. A whole generation of Cuban youth has been sidetracked from normal pursuits to plotting and killing. Their parents are sending them out of the country because they fear they will become involved in the the unequal strife or may become innocent victims of slaying by the secret police or armed forces. There are many instances on record of this occurring.

Under the exceedingly repressive decrees in force until August 7, at least, the workers, journalists, in fact anyone, can be arrested and imprisoned for opposing the regime. Nine judges were dismissed in June because they protested against police interference in administering justice. Another judge is in exile because his life was threatened when he prepared to issue warrants charging two high officers of the armed forces with murder. He signed the complaints at the airport just before leaving for the United States.

Under the present suspension of guarantees and the repressive decrees, the Batista regime rules with an iron hand. The ruthlessness by which the Government forces suppressed the widely advertised general strike in April was manifest proof to most Cubans, especially those in Habana, that any overt opposition to the regime would result in being shot, jailed or tortured. The editor of the respected daily El Mundo reported to the Inter-American Press Association that during the abortive general strike attempt in April, he and his associates heard an order given over police radio by General Pilar García, head of the National Police of Cuba, that no prisoners were to be taken in the roundup of suspects. This remark was in response to a report from a squad car that two suspects had been killed in a fight and a third wounded person was in their custody. All newspaper offices have on the city desk a radio set tuned in on the police shortwave frequency to enable the editors to assign reporters quickly to major crime stories.

The Castro Movement

The kidnapping of the 47 American and three Canadian citizens served to reveal one significant and, to me, alarming fact. Castro’s military strength is increasing everyday. Raúl Castro broke out of the Sierra Maestra with 150 men and he now has a force estimated to number between 2,000 and 3,000 men. Consuls Wollam and Wiecha describe his forces as made up of peasants and city youth, fanatical, fatalistic and thoroughly indoctrinated with 26th of July propaganda. The latter preaches bitter hatred against Batista and a nebulous better future under a Castro-dominated Government. Many of the members of the forces have been embittered by killings or torturing against members of their families.

Raúl Castro’s force is one of three main fighting groups. Fidel Castro is in the Sierra Maestra, some 100 miles to the southwest, with an undetermined number of soldiers, probably around 1,000. In Las Villa Province, in the Sierra de Escambray, north of Trinidad, the Revolutionary Directorate has a fighting force. It started as a small group but has grown to a force with an estimated maximum strength of 600 with the joining of 26th of July supporters. This figure may be excessive.

Raúl Castro told Wollam and Wiecha that the 26th of July movement had small forces operating in the plains around Victoria de las Tunas and Holguin in Oriente Province and Camaguey, capital of the Province of the same name.

The Castro forces in Oriente are opposed by a force of Army troops estimated at between 10,000 and 12,000. Most of the soldiers are stationed in cities. Consul Wollam and those kidnapped Americans who live in Oriente Province, seriously doubt that the Cuban Army can ever dislodge the rebels. Raúl told Wollam that his forces could take the cities whenever they so desired but would then lay themselves and the urban population open to aerial bombing. There is a feeling that the Cuban soldier did not enlist to be shot and has no stomach for fighting the rebels. This is probably true, although many soldiers share the hatred of the opposition because they have suffered tragedies in their families.

There is a sort of unwritten understanding in the Castro-held territory that the rebel forces will range freely over the land in return for which they will not molest the small garrisons stationed at sugar centrals, etc. Both sides fear any incident which would disturb this arrangement. A Cuban sugar central owner told me he flew his plane to his holdings between Bayamo and Manzanillo a few days before our conversation. The rebel leader of the area told him to have the plane flown to a city immediately because he feared two pilots in his group might steal the craft. The Commander of an Army garrison of 12 told him to move the plane right away because he could not protect it and if a fight developed over its possession his whole post would be wiped out. The plane left immediately. This same Cuban said the next sugar harvest could be a disaster, as the rebels already are threatening to destroy the mills and not merely burn the crops. He thought, however, that if the Castros set up a Free Territory in Oriente Province (as Wollam heard from Raúl) they will permit the mills to operate if they pay enough tribute to the new Government. United States owners of property in the rebel-held area will also be faced with this problem.

Many of Castro’s supporters in Habana, according to one of the leaders, are alarmed about the growth of Fidel’s movement. They say they have created a Frankenstein which may, with the passage of time, take over the control of the country. The person with whom I talked pleaded that the United States get behind the moderate opposition elements immediately to make possible a coup which will head off the growing strength of Castro. He was genuinely worried but has not desisted from getting financial help for Fidel because he hates Batista too much to abandon the 26th of July movement. He said Fidel Castro had instructed him to see about printing money for the Free Territory and drawing up a tax plan. He has been stalling on these requests.

This source mentioned also that if the Batista forces are unsuccessful in any drive to defeat the Castro armies in Oriente Province it is likely that whole Army units may defect to the rebel movement. I do not consider this a remote possibility at all, given the Cuban Army’s general aversion to fighting a bushwacking war in strange territory with the majority of the populace against them.

Wollam is of the opinion that the Castros are getting arms regularly from the outside and opposition leaders in Cuba and the United States smile knowingly when Venezuela is mentioned as the source. The Castros appear able to find recruits to use as many arms as they receive.

The rebels fear and respect the Cuban Air Force, although they claim the principal victims have been innocent villagers in their territory. The Naval Intelligence unit at Guantanamo and Wollam have seen planes being armed at Santiago and the Los Caños airfields. The latter is near Guantanamo. Not only are the Cubans using their grant aid-supported P–47s but they have armed the Canada-purchased Beavers, Piper Cubs and grant aid B–26s. Col. Dysinger, chief of the United States Air Mission, told me 14 of the B–26s were kept at the Campo Columbia air field in Habana. Some of the B–26s have been observed preparing for bombing missions, however.

Sale of Arms to Batista

The rebels are particularly touchy about planes. Whoever sells more planes to the Cubans must consider the possibility that they will be utilized by the Batista regime in bombing and strafing the rebels. Wollam, after his experience with Raúl Castro’s group and his general knowledge of Oriente Province, feels that if we sell any planes to Batista we should anticipate possible reprisals against Americans and should consider the evacuation of all our people from the area and perhaps from other areas in Cuba. Canadian or British citizens might run the same risk if their governments sold planes to Batista. President Batista was bitter toward us for allegedly influencing the Canadians to withhold sale of a lot of planes described as “Furies.” The Ambassador was informed that this charge had no substance. The Canadians may be aware of danger to their nationals and. are placing the blame on the United States for withholding sale of the planes to Batista.

Ambassador Smith invited the writer to meet with the service attachés and the chiefs of the Air, Navy and Army missions. Col. Dysinger, as senior head of the missions, said the failure of the United States to go through with the sale of the T–28s would just about finish the effectiveness of the missions. A detailed explanation of the political aspects of the problem was made but none of the group was convinced. Some of them expressed the view that reports of Batista’s repression and killings were false. The feeling was gathered that the officers are attempting to carry out their instructions faithfully but are loathe to consider the political aspects of the situation. It is understood that Col. Treadway, the Army Attaché who departed for a new assignment recently, was more politically aware than the other officers. It is not known whether this was reflected in his reports. In any event, the officers with whom the writer met were not convinced by the presentation and met with Ambassador Smith on the following day to urge his support in holding the line on the T–28s. Embtel 79 of July 16³ was the result.

The writer is firmly convinced that sale of the T–28s would get us into deep trouble with the Cuban opposition, liberal elements in the hemisphere and the United States, and those Senators and Congressmen who have been making much ado of our policy toward dictatorial governments. On the other hand, failure to go through with the sale may well cancel out any further effectiveness of our military missions in Cuba as long as Batista is in power, and make life uncomfortable for our military personnel.

Conclusion

1. Batista’s regime is unpopular and he has not succeeded in convincing the public that he will provide honest elections.

2. The armed insurrection led by Fidel Castro is gaining strength at an alarming pace.

3. While still suspect, our policy of withholding combat equipment from Batista is generally approved by the forces in opposition to Batista.

4. A change in arms sales policy could lead to further kidnappings in Oriente Province or reprisals against American citizens, property, or both, not only in Oriente but elsewhere.

5. Failure to sell the ten T–28 trainers, which has become a cause célèbre with Batista and the Cuban military, will greatly decrease the effectiveness of our military missions. In fact, it may lead the Cuban military to shun our mission personnel. It is possible that Batista might cancel his military agreements with the United States and order the missions to leave but the political repercussions that would result seem to make this too great a risk.

6. If there is no improvement in the situation the opposition to Batista will continue and as time drags on Castro will become stronger and stronger.

7. All-out support to Batista would only prolong the eventual showdown and it would be an unpopular move not only with the majority of the Cuban people but also would draw strong criticism from other quarters.

8. Serious thought should be given to alternative courses of action not hitherto considered in order to resolve the Cuban situation before Castro becomes so strong he can dictate the type of government that will rule when the showdown eventually comes. Frankly, we do not know what Castro has in mind, although his letter of December 1957⁴ which announced his break with the other Cuban opposition groups contained some proposals which, in effect, would make him as much of a dictator as Batista.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2458. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Stewart; also initialed by Snow.

² See footnote 5, Document 103.

³ Document 103.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 46.

112. Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Middle American Affairs¹

Washington, July 25, 1958.

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ON CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CUBA

I.

The Cuban Government has publicly announced that elections would be held on November 3 after having been postponed from last June. President Batista’s term of office ends February________, 1959.

Militating against successful holding of elections are:

(a) A revolutionary movement substantially controls Oriente Province outside the principal cities and towns. Other rebel strongholds have spread in recent months to the broad area comprised by the Sierra del Escambray in Las Villas Province. Within this area, rebel forces under leadership of the Revolutionary Directorate (student movement) recently reinforced by 26th of July rebel troops are threatening Cuban Government control of the central region of the area. Rebel troops here have grown from about 100 to 800 or 900 within the past six to seven months. Embassy reports also indicate that relatively well armed rebel forces have recently penetrated Pinar del Rio Province at the extreme western end of the island. Under such circumstances it is difficult to see how anything approaching even reasonably acceptable electoral conditions can be established in Cuba.

Elections were originally intended to be held in June 1958. They were postponed by the Government in March after political parties willing to participate in the elections had complained that due to the previous suspension of guarantees, the parties would be hampered in making adequate preparations for the election. With the increased intensity of violence by both rebels and Government, the latter this week again declared further extension of the suspension of constitutional guarantees. The new suspension is due to expire at the end of the first week in September, slightly less than two months before November 3, the date set for the elections. This does not seem to warrant any optimism concerning the possibility of “adequate” preparations for Presidential or congressional elections. Furthermore, various revolutionary movements already have announced they would take steps to prevent elections. Efforts have been reported by pro-administration forces to postpone or suspend the elections again. Among the latter are reports emanating from Cuba that the present governmental candidate, Andres Rivero Aguero, may be replaced by either Eusebio Mujal, present Secretary General of the Cuban Labor Confederation and who, with Government support, has eliminated, insofar as possible, labor opposition to the Batista Government, or Rolando Masferrer, pro-Batista Senator from Oriente, presently chief of the so-called “Tigres”, a Batista-supported private army organized to employ unorthodox combat tactics against the revolutionary movement. Mujal is also reported in the press to be attempting to persuade Batista to announce a two-year postponement of the elections in order to retain the present regime during that period. None of this is calculated to increase optimism concerning the possibility for elections in Cuba.²

II.

Present Conditions in Cuba

Constitutional guarantees have been suspended almost continuously since December 1956 when Fidel Castro landed with a handful of men near Niquero, in Oriente Province, and fought his way through government troops into the Sierra Maestra. Since that time, there has been consistent violence to greater or lesser degree in the Republic. There has been terrorism by revolutionary groups, including the Castro forces, and terrorism exercised by the armed forces, including the police with feared SIM. Cuban universities have been closed during the almost two-year reign of violence, and practically all educational activities have ceased in Oriente and have existed only intermittently in other parts of Cuba except the City of Habana. In recent months, judicial procedures have been practically nonexistent with numerous judges and lawyers forced into hiding or exile under threats of violence from armed forces and police (various examples, including Miro Cardona, etc.)

As matters stand at present, there thus appears to be little possibility for anything resembling an acceptable election in Cuba. On the one hand, is the recognized Government of President Fulgencio Batista which has resorted to increasing measures of brutality, and on the other, according to best indications, a majority of the Cuban people bitterly opposed to the present regime and various unorganized, uncohesive oppositionist forces reporting professional and civic groups, and the majority of the Cuban people [sic], with a militant force numbering approximately 6,000 men engaged in active armed combat against the Government and an undetermined number throughout the country actively plotting against the regime or resorting to sabotage.

It appears to be the general consensus of informed opinion on Cuban matters that whether or not elections are held, the Batista Government will terminate, by peaceful or violent means, probably the latter, sometime between now and February 1959. The only possibility apparent at this moment of minimizing a violent transition in Cuba is that of effecting a compromise arrangement between the Batista Government and responsible leaders of an organized opposition. During this past week, the various opposition elements have entered into a so-called “unity pact” intended to effect a responsible leadership of a unified revolutionary movement. There is no indication as yet that this effort will succeed.

Thus, the major danger insofar as U.S. position in Cuba is concerned would appear to be a successful revolution by the forces of the 26th of July movement which, so far, has given no indication of political or moral responsibility although it has been gaining greatly in military strength following a severe setback when it failed completely in a general revolutionary strike called in April this year. In fact, following a government announcement in March that it would crush the 26th of July forces by December, one rebel group under the leadership of Raúl Castro, Fidel Castro’s younger brother and second in command, broke through a military encirclement. The Raúl Castro forces, which in March numbered approximately 150 men, have since grown to an estimated force of more than 2500. This force controls a rich rural area of Oriente Province and exercises almost unchallenged control over a district including numerous American residents and large American interests.

III.

Recommended U.S. Course of Action

Continued non-intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba. To throw our support at this time in favor of the expiring Batista regime would, it is believed, destroy the last remaining faith which the majority of the Cuban people have in U.S. protestations of support for the cause of democracy in a free world. It is also believed that to support the Batista regime would probably undermine the support in the UN, OAS and elsewhere, that this country now receives from some of the other democratic governments in the Western Hemisphere as well as elsewhere (in this connection see memorandum prepared by Honduran President Villeda Morales³ and any other available official Venezuela statements). Editorial opinion in the United States and the rest of the Hemisphere would also be overwhelmingly critical of the United States should it decide to throw its support to Batista. Such a position would be interpreted as active intervention in favor of inspired dictatorship which has been accused of excessive brutalities and of failure to convince the Cuban people of any serious intent to seek a democratic transition of power.

IV.

Maintenance of the present policy of suspending all arms shipments to Cuba for serious consideration in view of the existing high political tensions in that country. Seeking appropriate ways and means of attempting to establish, insofar as possible, responsible leadership for the restoration of democratic processes in Cuba by persuading both government and opposition to seek a solution consistent with the best interests of the Cuban people and of American interests in that regard.

Resumption of arms shipments or otherwise indicating support of the present regime in Cuba should not be undertaken without previous careful preparation for evacuation of Americans and otherwise taking all possible steps for protection of American interests in that island. It appears practically certain that any departure from the present position of non-intervention would cause immediate reprisals against American citizens and interests in Oriente Province and would almost certainly lead to further extended reprisals against other American citizens and interests in other areas of the Republic. These reprisals may be anticipated not only from the forces controlled by the Castro brothers, but also from the other revolutionary movements existing in Cuba. In connection with any consideration of possible consequences of revolutionary reprisals against the United States and [in] Cuba, careful consideration should be given to the fact that the next sugar harvest is expected to begin around the end of this year and that numerous important American establishments are completely vulnerable to sabotage and it is impossible to expect the Cuban Government to afford sufficient protection to all of the several thousand American citizens in Cuba. Any large-scale disruptions of sugar production would have considerable effect on the U.S. sugar market.

It is recalled that the prominent Argentine automobile racer, (Fengir?) [Fangio] was kidnapped despite elaborate police precautions in the City of Habana a few months ago with complete impunity.

(See accompanying memorandum on arms policy with respect to Cuba.)⁴

V. In view of the obvious inability of the Cuban military to prevent further rebel acts against American citizens and interests in Oriente and in at least some other parts of the Republic, the Consulate at Santiago should be strengthened and Consul Wollam instructed to take whatever measures he deems appropriate to protect American interests in that area. In this connection see attached memorandum of Recommendation concerning the Consulate.⁴

VI. The present outlook from the U.S. viewpoint is not a satisfactory one by any means. The more time that passes, the more likelihood there is that the 26th of July movement under the apparently immature Castro brothers will emerge as the next dominant force in Cuba, at least for a short time. Against this there is the posibility that the united forces of the revolution who recently signed the abovementioned unity pact in Caracas will attempt to exert a degree of civic, moral and political leadership over the revolutionary movement. Insofar as possible, this development of this type of responsibility should be encouraged. This would put the United States in the position of being able to analyze the respective merits of two polarized forces and their effect on U.S. interest in and relationships with Cuba. This would be a large improvement over the present unhappy outlook of weighing the alternative of dealing with an expiring unpopular regime on the one hand, and an incoherent cluster of revolutionary groups whose total uncoordinated efforts add up to nothing but a vacuum on the other.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2158. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which was attached to a brief covering memorandum of July 25 from Wieland to Leonhardy and Stewart that reads as follows:

“The attached memorandum includes some of the considerations which should go into the policy paper we are preparing in MID on the Cuban situation. It should be considered in the light of all available existing reports and the considerations in it taken into account in the drafting of the policy recommendations we are preparing in connection with Cuba.”

² The following is written at this point: “(comparison with Perez Jimenez plebiscite)”.

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 25, 1958—3 p.m.

144. Alternatives confronting US policy in Cuba are:

1. To allow situation to drift, which in Embassy judgment will result in sharper polarization of centers of power represented by Batista regime and revolutionary opposition. Consequences of this alternative are that US gets blamed by all sides; there is increase in danger of extreme violence in Cuba and anti-US feeling when and if reaction sets in; and loss of opportunity for peaceful solution through elections.

2. To do everything possible to promote free and open elections and to discreetly encourage political opposition to unite behind one candidate.

With regard to second alternative it is my firm conviction that US interests coincide with desire of majority people of Cuba to have a new government elected, not committed to either extreme, capable with US support of restoring normalcy to Cuba.

I have recently had luncheon meetings with all of the principal presidential candidates for an exchange of views. In each instance I have made it clear to all candidates and every one concerned that US will not endorse any particular candidate. However, US is hopeful for a proper atmosphere under which free and open elections may be held.

On the basis of my conversations with opposition party leaders, I find the following:

The supporters of Autentico and Free Peoples Party are anxious to consolidate, although the two leaders are somewhat antagonistic toward each other. If two principal opposition parties succeed in unifying behind one ticket, they will publicly announce that they will go to elections with the following program: A. Political amnesty; B. Cabinet of national unity; C. Promise that elections will shortly be held for a Constitutional Assembly which will have power to call for new national elections within two years; D. Revisions of “censor electoral”.

The important factor is to have an atmosphere conducive to holding proper elections. In order to obtain this atmosphere, it is essential that constitutional guarantees be restored at least 60 days prior to elections. It is also essential that press censorship be lifted at that time. I believe that I may obtain the cooperation of President Batista to take these steps 60 days prior to elections if the US will follow the recommendations outlined in Embtel 79.² This would mean a reversal of US policy in effect since the middle of March. When Batista last lifted suspension of guarantees on January 25, he did so in the belief that US would curtail prior activities and that the 20 armored cars would be delivered. Contrary to his expectations Department has followed a policy since mid–March, which GOC considers helpful to rebels.

If Batista is again to assume the risk of lifting the ban on constitutional guarantees and suspending press censorship, it is essential that I be in a position to offer him concrete assurances that our present policy will be modified.

Furthermore, modification of our present policy is, in my opinion, necessary to enable Batista to step up his offensive against the Communist infiltrated rebel elements in Oriente Province, whose elimination is essential for the restoration of normalcy in Cuba.

I recommend Department urgently consider foregoing two alternatives and advise me soonest of its approval of recommendations Embtel 79 for use in proceeding along lines of second alternative.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2558. Secret; Priority.

² Document 103.

114. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, July 30, 1958.

SUBJECT

Protection of Guantanamo Naval Base Water System

Problem:

On July 25 the Cuban Army notified the Commandant of our Naval Base at Guantanamo that its troops would be removed from duty guarding the Yateras water supply system for the Base. Admiral Ellis, Commandant of the Base, agreed to take over the protection of the water supply at 8:00 a.m. on July 28. The Secretary agreed on April 1, 1958, that if the Cuban Army guards were withdrawn, United States Marines could be used to protect this vital installation (Deptel 43 of April 1 to Embassy Havana—Tab A² ). With some modifications, the Department reluctantly cleared a press release³ to be used by Admiral Ellis at the time of the takeover but indicated clearly that the action of the Cuban Army seemed unnecessary and that it might well cause strong resentment in Cuba, particularly on the part of the forces controlled by Raúl Castro. Castro’s forces are operating in, and have a large measure of control over, the area around the Base.

Discussion:

Reaction on the part of the Cuban opposition has been violent. An officer of the Department received telephone calls⁴ on the evening of July 28 from exiles residing in Washington and Miami declaring that the placing of United States Marines on Cuban soil was creating immediate resentment among the opposition groups in those cities. The representative of the 26th of July movement in Washington said it was not necessary to station Marine guards at the water works because he could obtain a categorical guarantee from Raúl Castro that his rebel forces would not molest the plant or the pipe line if they were left unguarded or in the care of private Cuban guards. On July 29 additional telephone calls were received from Miami and Washington exiles and it was learned that the Cuban company owning the water works would place private guards at the Yateras plant if the Department wished to make this arrangement. The rebel groups have stated that they will launch a widespread propaganda campaign against the United States if the Marines continue on guard duty.

A [less than 1 line not declassified] report received yesterday from Caracas, where the Cuban opposition is maintaining a headquarters, also indicated that strong protests and manifestations by students and 26th of July supporters all over Latin America could be expected if the Marines continued to guard an installation on Cuban soil (Tab B⁵ ).

A discussion was held with Department of Defense officials on July 29. They upheld the right of the Navy to use guards but agreed to consider any alternate plan if it seemed workable (Tab C⁶ ).

Because of the adverse reaction which is already beginning to show itself, the continued occupation of the Yateras water installation is bound to touch off a propaganda campaign against use of United States Marines on foreign soil.

President Batista needs the troops that were withdrawn for duty elsewhere and it appears useless to appeal to him for their return. We would advise the Government beforehand of any new arrangements made for the security of the system.

Recommendations:

1. That the Department urgently reach an agreement with the Department of Defense on a practical plan of action that would permit removal of the Marines from Cuban soil without causing a loss of face. The best plan would be for the water company to hire private Cuban guards, as mentioned above.

2. Once agreement is obtained, seek assurances that the Guantanamo water supply system will not be molested. We would deal with forces that control the area around the Naval Base in such a manner as not to involve recognition. If assurances are obtained that the installation will not be attacked, discuss with the Cuban owners of the water system the possibility of their providing private guards to watch it.

3. Urge the Department of Defense in any case to develop forthwith an alternate source of water for the Base, which will remain far too vulnerable without it.⁷

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart and Snow and cleared with Whiteman and G.

² Tab A is an undated, unsigned memorandum entitled, “Background on Use of Marines to Guard Yateras Water System,” not printed. The reference to telegram 43 to Havana is an apparent error. The memorandum at Tab A refers to telegram 529 to Havana, March 27.

³ Text of the cleared press release is in telegram 73 to Havana, July 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2658)

⁴ No record of the July 28 or 29 telephone calls has been found.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ This memorandum of conversation among Stewart; Little; Captain Russell Kefauver, Head of the Western Hemisphere Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and Rear Admiral Robert Stroh, Director of the Politico-Military Policy Division of that office, is not printed.

⁷ The source text bears no indication that the recommendations were approved or disapproved.

115. Editorial Note

On July 31, at 10:10 a.m., Under Secretary of State Christian Herter telephoned Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John Irwin to express the Department of State’s view that the Marine guards at Yateras should be replaced by civilian guards hired by the company. Irwin said he would look into the matter and call Herter back. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

At 11:35 a.m. that day, Irwin telephoned Herter. According to a memorandum of their conversation:

“Jack Irwin telephoned to say there were 6 officers and 139 men Marines on Guantanamo and that of those 15 were guarding the water supply which is located 4 miles outside the Naval Base. Said water supply was formerly guarded by Cuban military but they withdrew and Navy supplies Marines at Government’s request. The Commandant had been hesitant but the Amb. thought it was a good idea. Irwin said Adm. Burke whose principal concern this problem was thinks it would be impossible to have civilian guards. Such civilians would either have to be Government oriented and the rebels would attack them, or they would have to hire rebels which would be dealing with the rebels. Felt only choice was no guard at all or the Marines. Irwin said Adm. Burke would be glad to come over and discuss it and CAH said he would arrange a time with Adm. Burke direct.” (ibid.)

At 11:40 a.m., Herter called Admiral Burke who agreed to meet Herter in the latter’s office at 1 p.m. that afternoon. (ibid.)

116. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, July 31, 1958.

SUBJECT:

Proposed Withdrawal of U.S. Marine Guards from the Yateras Water Plant Near the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, Cuba

Problem:

Whether to withdraw the detachment of U.S. Marines from the Yateras water plant which they have been guarding since Monday morning (July 28), and if so, whether to leave the plant unguarded or to accede to the private Cuban water company’s suggestion that it establish a guard of private local police (guarda jurados).

Discussion:

In my memorandum to you of July 30 entitled “Protection of Guantanamo Naval Base Water System”,² I outlined the problem created by the withdrawal as of 8:00 a.m. last Monday of the Cuban Army troops which have been guarding the Yateras plant for some time. The present memorandum summarizes very briefly the discussion we have just had in your office with Admiral Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary Irwin and Captain Kefauver,³ and recommends a further course of action.

The discussion just referred to brought out certain facts, questions, and assumptions, as follows:

1. The Naval Base has a storage capacity for only one day’s normal supply of water. Some twenty thousand people inhabit the Base. No alternative water supply exists except as provided by small distillation facilities and the shipping in of water by sea from Florida or Haiti.

2. The Frente Civico Revolucionario, which is the newly unified Cuban political Opposition, including the movement led by Fidel Castro and with headquarters in Caracas, has offered to declare the area around the water plant “neutral territory” insofar as the Cuban Opposition is concerned as a means of enabling us to withdraw the Marines. This Opposition coalition contains many responsible Cuban citizens, as well as various other types.

3. The U.S. Government should not and would not make any commitments to such a group but might choose to be guided in some measure by any assurances the group decided to make.

4. Admiral Burke was inclined to doubt whether it would be wise to withdraw the Marines, thereby eliminating protection for the plant and, in his view, visibly giving in to pressure from the Castro movement in Oriente Province as well as other Cuban Opposition pressures. This might simply encourage further pressures of the sort in Cuba and elsewhere.

5. Mr. Irwin asked what action we would recommend in the event that after withdrawal of the Marines the plant or the pipelines were sabotaged one or more times. We said we could not prognosticate.

6. Admiral Burke, in response to our portrayal of the serious political problem raised by the presence of the Marines on Cuban territory outside the Base, agreed to withdraw them if requested by the Department of State. He is opposed, however, to the idea of having private guards because of their cost, their probable inability to perform any useful service, the likelihood that once they are engaged they cannot be gotten rid of, our inability to select or identify them, etc.

It is my view that even the most friendly segments of Latin American public opinion, including Cubans in general whether or not members of the Opposition, will react against our guarding of the plant because Latin Americans are particularly sensitive to the entry of U.S. armed forces into the territory of any Latin American country even when our legal position seems sound and logical to us and even when the recognized government of the country permits our troops to enter. I believe that the communists in particular and our critics throughout the hemisphere in general will not fail to capitalize strongly on the presence of these Marines on Cuban territory. We stand to lose far more by keeping them there than by withdrawing them even if the water supply should be disrupted in their absence. Moreover, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the plant will not be damaged by the Castros, especially since we consider that the more responsible elements of the combined Opposition will oppose such action.

I favor the use of private Cuban guards because: (a) it would furnish us with a plausible reason for removing the Marines; (b) the plant probably needs some form of protection, however imperfect, against non-Castro attempts, such as by cranks or communists or even government provocateurs; (c) the private guards might give us a slightly better chance of identifying those who might attempt sabotage.

Recommendations:

I therefore recommend that the Navy Department be requested to withdraw the Marine guards on the following basis:

1. A statement by the combined Opposition (Frente Civico Revolucionario), without any commitment from us or public acknowledgement by us, to the effect that no element of the Opposition, including the Castro forces, will disturb the water supply.

2. The Cuban Government in Habana to be notified of what we are doing, but without any reference to the Opposition’s statement or to any informal contact we may have had with Opposition representatives.

3. Replacement of our Marines with private Cuban guards hired by the Cuban company which owns and operates the plant.⁴

If this recommendation is not adopted, I believe we should request withdrawal as above but without requiring the private Cuban guards, in deference to Admiral Burke’s expressed preference.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart and Snow and concurred in by L/ARA.

² Document 114.

³ This is presumably the meeting whose scheduling is described supra.

⁴ The source text bears the following typewritten notation: “No—CAH”.

⁵ On the approval line is the typewritten notation: “U—CAH”. In a letter of July 31 to Admiral Burke, Herter said he was confirming, after consultation with Secretary Dulles, “the tentative request I made to you this afternoon that the Marine detachment be withdrawn at your earliest convenience and returned to the Guantanamo Base. As I know you will realize, this request on our part stems wholly from policy considerations of a high order.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)

117. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, August 1, 1958—6 p.m.

169. Had two hour meeting with Batista July 31. He was friendly and anxious to be cooperative. Re lifting of suspension of constitutional guarantees, Batista said he was anxious to do this but did not know when it would be possible because of revolutionary activities.

He said he would put 1000 men at Moa Bay and 1000 men at Nicaro to defend these properties if US will supply 2000 rifles and some other supporting equipment.

Upon inquiry re the T–28’s I said delivery was still under consideration. Batista said he would again open negotiations with Great Britain and Canada after my reiteration paragraph 2 Deptel 51.² Batista then said he hoped we realized we were giving aid and comfort to revolutionaries and Communists by withdrawing support from GOC. He expressed concern about stationing Marines at Yateras, stating both US and GOC would have to watch this carefully as rebels may try to cause an incident to place US in embarrassing position.

He again assured me: (A) that honest elections would he held on November 3; (B) that he has already invited the world press to witness the elections; (C) that interest in elections would mount as November 3 drew near; (D) he has no objections to a unified opposition and (E) is still awaiting request from opposition parties to invite UN or OAS to send observers.

No matter who is elected, he believes they will have to keep the leaders of armed forces and police intact to preserve law and order; otherwise anarchy will ensue. When I asked Batista whether revolutionaries would cease activities upon election of either Grau or Sterling, he replied that revolutionaries would not call off their activities after the election of Rivero Aguero, Grau, or Sterling.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–158. Confidential; Priority.

² See footnote 3, Document 102.

118. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 1, 1958, 2 p.m.¹

Washington, August 1, 1958, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

Protection of Guantanamo Naval Base Water System

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Miro Cardona, President, Cuban Bar Association (exile)

Dr. Carlos Piad

MID—Mr. Stewart, Mr. Leonhardy

Dr. Miro Cardona, who was the prime motivator behind the “Caracas Pact” recently signed by Cuban revolutionary opposition groups, visited Mr. Stewart’s office by appointment to discuss the matter of the presence of U.S. Marines guarding the water plant and pipe lines outside of the Guantanamo Naval Base.

Mr. Stewart began the conversation by stating to Dr. Miro Cardona that the matter of the use of our Marines to guard the water plant and pipe lines has been under careful study by high officials of the Department ever since the step was taken early on the morning of July 28. He added that the Department had announced on July 30,² that this was a temporary measure and that now that the matter had been studied by high authorities of our Government, he thought a decision was about to be made to withdraw the Marines from the area and return them to the Base.

Dr. Miro Cardona showed Messrs. Stewart and Leonhardy a press statement he issued on behalf of the new opposition unity movement, the Frente Civico Revolucionario, announcing in effect that the use of the Marines had been brought about by the Batista Government which was not able to give the desired protection in the area and that the FCR hoped that steps would soon be taken to remove them from Cuban sovereignty. Dr. Cardona explained that being a lawyer, he was a firm believer in working out such problems as this in a conciliatory manner and that the FCR in accord with his suggestion was delivering a petition to the Secretary³ through our Ambassador in Caracas making a “unilateral” appeal for a satisfactory solution. A summary of this appeal which had been sent to Dr. Miro Cardona from Caracas by cable was read by Mr. Stewart who politely informed him that he could not accept it officially as it might complicate our relations with the GOC. Dr. Miro Cardona said he understood perfectly. By way of explanation Dr. Cardona pointed out that the appeal was a unilateral declaration calling for the establishment of a neutral zone in the area of the water plant. Further, the statement said that the U.S. Government had recourse to the OAS to call for a solution of the situation in which the U.S. found itself in view of the fact that the Cuban Government could not provide the necessary protection within its sovereignty. Mr. Stewart did not comment on the declaration other than to reiterate that he expected that a decision to pull out the Marines had almost been decided upon and that it remained to be seen whether the area would be left unmolested. Dr. Miro Cardona said that he had the authority to state to the Department that there would be no effort by the rebels to disrupt the supply of water to the Base. He added that he had to intention of informing the press of his discussions with Mr. Stewart, that they would be kept completely confidential and that the FCR had no intention of using the withdrawal of our Marines from the area as a propaganda weapon. He said that he understood why the Admiral had to take the step he did resulting from the withdrawal of the troops in the area but that the continuance of the Marines there would only work to the advantage of the Batista Government and to the disadvantage of the U.S. Government and the revolutionary opposition to Batista.

During the course of the conversation, Dr. Miro Cardona referred to the very difficult task he had had in inducing the various revolutionary opposition elements to unify. The kidnapping of the Americans in Cuba delayed the unification and he purposely held off signing of the Pact until the last American was returned. He emphasized that the last statement was “off the record” but that if the dates were checked the statement would be found to be true.

Mr. Leonhardy briefly mentioned to Dr. Miro Cardona before his departure the difficult situation the U.S. Government was encountering in continuing normal operations at Nicaro because of rebel incursions. He replied that he appreciated having this information and would try to exert his influence to reduce the difficulties but cautioned that this was a strife torn area where matters sometimes became uncontrollable.

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba July–Dec. 1958. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

² Text of the announcement has not been found.

³ Not found.

119. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Stewart) to the Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Anderson)¹

Washington, August 5, 1958.

SUBJECT

Conflicting Press Statements on Removal of United States Marines from Yateras Water Works in Cuba

On Friday morning, August 1, Admiral Burke was requested by the Department² to withdraw back to the Guantanamo Navy Base the detachment of United States Marines which had been guarding the Yateras water works since July 28. Shortly after 1:00 p.m. this order was transmitted to the Commandant of the Navy Base by the Navy Department and at 4:15 p.m. the Marines had been retired from guard duty.

Late Friday, the Navy received press inquiries about the retirement of the Marines and the spokesman confirmed this fact, adding that further details should come from the Department of State. As far as the Department is aware, Reuters and the AP, at least, had the story.

Ambassador Smith informed the Cuban Minister of State at 7:00 p.m. on August 1 that the United States planned to withdraw the Marines from the Yateras installation. The Ambassador had been instructed on July 31³ to convey this message to the Cubans but because of a communications mix-up the priority telegram was not available to the Embassy until 2:00 p.m. on August 1. After Ambassador Smith informed the Cuban Government of our decision, he was called some hours later by the Minister of State who told him that the Cuban Government planned to reassign Cuban Army guards to the water works, and he read the Ambassador the copy of a proposed press announcement. Ambassador Smith called Mr. Rubottom around 2:30 a.m. to advise him of this move by the Cubans. Mr. Rubottom, who had just returned from the Central American trip with Milton Eisenhower the afternoon before, was unfamiliar with the case and Ambassador Smith was advised to get in touch with Mr. Snow. This he did. On the morning of August 2 the Department prepared a press announcement concerning the withdrawal of the Marines in the light of the proposed Cuban release. As we received it from Ambassador Smith the Cuban Government was to announce that it had taken over again the protection of the water installation, indicating that the United States Government had sent Marines to protect it while the Cuban Government was making a change of its own detachment of troops there. As far as the Department of State is aware, the reason for the withdrawal of Cuban Army troops from the protection of the water installation was based on the necessity of using those forces for another purpose. The decision to withdraw the Cuban troops was made by the local commander in the Guantanamo area and the decision was conveyed to Admiral Robert B. Ellis, Guantanamo Naval Base Commandant, on July 25. After notification the Commandant decided to place Marines at the Yateras installation, in accordance with previous authority given by State, in consultation with the Department of Defense. Apparently the Cuban Army commander received orders from his superiors in Habana to remove the guards.

The Department press release⁴ on the withdrawal of the Marines was read to newspapermen shortly after 1:00 p.m. by the Departmental press officer on duty on August 2. A background paper⁵ accompanying the press announcement was prepared but was not used in view of the fact that newspapermen did not request further information. Ambassador Arroyo of Cuba, who had been scheduled to go to Habana on August 1, was instructed to remain in Washington until August 2 so that the Cuban Government announcement of its take-over of guard duty at Yateras could be made here. This announcement was made on August 2⁶ and apparently was the basis for the news stories written on the withdrawal of the Marines and the reassumption of guard duty by the Cuban Army. The Cuban Embassy announcement stated that the Cuban Army would continue its usual protection of the Yateras installation, adding that the custody undertaken by the Marines was done only while the Cuban unit which was carrying out its duties there was being relieved by a new one. The statement went on to say that the Cuban Government desires to lend all possible protection of the water installation in view of the importance of that source of supply to the Base, especially in these moments of acute international crisis.

The statement went on to say that the changing of the military unit having been carried out, the Government of Cuba has notified the Naval Base through the usual channels that it should retire its detachment from the water installation in order that the Cuban forces could continue carrying out this service. The Cuban Army resumed guard duty at 11:30 a.m. on August 3.

The Cuban statement is at variance with our understanding of the whole question of the retirement of the Marines. The United States Government did not discuss with the Cuban Government anything about the Yateras installation after Admiral Ellis agreed on July 25 to replace Cuban Army guards with Marine personnel on July 28. At least, the Department has no indication that any discussions of this nature were held. It is our understanding that when Ambassador Smith notified the Cuban Government that the Marines were being withdrawn the Cuban Government, some hours later, notified him that it had decided that the Cuban Army guards would be reinstalled at the water works. Furthermore, the Cuban release stated that the Marines assumed the protection of the Yateras installation only during the period that the Cuban Army unit was being relieved by a new one. Our records indicate no such reason advanced by the local Army Commander, who solely conducted negotiations with Admiral Ellis. As far as we know, the only reason given for removing the Cuban Army guards was that of the Army Commander that the troops were needed elsewhere.

As for the final part of the Cuban Embassy press release, the Department is unaware that the Cuban Government ever indicated to Naval Base authorities that the Marines should be retired from the Yateras installation “in order that the Cuban forces might continue carrying out this Service.” Copies of the Cuban Embassy press release, the Department press release and background paper are attached.

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba July–Dec. 1958. Drafted by Stewart. Copies were sent to ARA, the Embassy in Havana, MID/C, and to Spencer for Captain Kefauver.

² See footnote 5, Document 116.

³ This message has not been found.

⁴ For text of this press release, see Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1958, p. 282.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ An English translation of the Cuban press statement is attached but not printed.

120. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, August 7, 1958—1 p.m.

182. Embassy understands from CAS that Miro Cardona was requested by Department official to ask rebels to guarantee they would not again attack Moa and Nicaro properties. Cardona agreed to comply with request.² [less than 1 line not declassified] reports 26 July contact is in process of informing Raul Castro but final approval is subject to Fidel Castro.

If the foregoing is true, it would appear to be based on an assumption by Department that GOC is likely to fall and that there is strong possibility of 26 of July succeeding GOC. Embassy does not concur. In our opinion 26 of July lacks support of majority people of Cuba. We believe that before Batista regime were to fall, army elements will move in to forestall victory of 26 July elements. Embassy believes these preliminary negotiations are not in the best interests of US.

Request Department advise Embassy whether reported negotiations with Cardona imply new policy decision toward Cuba.³

Embassy is preparing position paper⁴ on current political situation and before final policy decision is reached we would appreciate paper being reviewed and considered.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–758. Confidential; Priority.

² See Document 118.

³ Telegram 108 to Havana, August 8, replied that a copy of the memorandum of conversation with Miro Cardona (Document 118) had been forwarded, and that no mention had been made of rebel attacks on Moa Bay, only on Nicaro. It had been subsequently learned that Miro Cardona was advising Castro through Caracas radio to stop further raids on Nicaro. Department officials considered the discussions with Miro Cardona did not constitute negotiations or a request for action. There had been only an expression of hope that further raids on Nicaro might be avoided. The telegram did not directly respond to Smith’s query as to whether the talks with Miro Cardona implied a shift in policy toward Cuba. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–858)

⁴ Infra.

121. Paper Prepared by the Embassy in Cuba¹

Havana, August 8, 1958.

POLICY PAPER ON CUBA

Statement of Problem:

To determine what policy would best serve the overall interests of the United States in its relations with Cuba during the critical period through which the island is passing.

Discussion:

The political-military situation in Cuba shows an increasing polarization of the centers of power represented by the Batista regime on the one hand and the revolutionary opposition, principally the “26th of July” Movement, on the other. In between these poles is a large majority of the Cuban people who have no effective leadership or power mechanism.

There is at present a military stalemate between the Cuban Armed Forces and the rebel forces of Fidel Castro in Oriente Province. This situation is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The Army, which is relatively well armed, lacks the discipline and spirit required to mount the offensive and sustain the losses required to flush the rebels out of their mountain hideouts. The attempts which the Army has made in the Sierra Maestra region during the past three weeks to defeat Fidel Castro appear to have resulted in heavy losses for the Army forces and their withdrawal to the lowlands. Because of concentration on the Sierra Maestra front, the Army has given indifferent attention to date against Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristal area.

The “26th of July” troops appear to have the zeal but for the present lack the arms to challenge the Army for control of urban areas in Oriente. They have considerable support in Oriente among the local population. Throughout the island they have the sympathy of a substantial percentage of the people as a symbol of opposition to the Batista regime. But the “26th of July” Movement does not enjoy the confidence of the population as an alternative to the present government. The degree of communist infiltration in the “26th of July” Movement is definitely an element of growing concern. The Communist Party has the same objective as the “26th of July” Movement, i.e., the overthrow of the Batista Government and capitalization on the ensuing chaos and bloodshed.

A build-up in strength of the two opposing forces is not likely to alter the balance of power. There may be reason to believe that some Army leaders, who are profiting personally from the present military situation, are not particularly anxious to see it altered.

On the political front the prospects are for the Batista regime to continue in power. Batista is determined to hold honest elections on November 3 and to elect Andrés Rivero Agüero. Given his experience with the restoration of guarantees earlier this year (January 25–March 12), Batista is not disposed to lift the ban until the eve of the elections. This means no climate conducive for elections will exist because of the limitation on free speech and freedom of assembly. A low voter turnout favors a victory by the Government candidate.

Furthermore, the political opposition is splintered. Dr. Ramón Grau San Martin, leader of the PRC Auténtico Party, is 76 years old and physically ailing. Yet he refuses to step down and is recalcitrant about merging forces with other opposition groups. Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling, head of the Free Peoples Party, lacks party organization and national standing. Thus, the political opposition in its present state of disarray does not offer much of a rallying point for the voters who would use the electoral process to terminate the Batista regime.

A victory for Rivero Agüero for all practical purposes means a continuation of the Batista regime. His past record is one of complete loyalty to Batista. He has personally declared in his campaign that his program is one of “continuism”. The opposition, political as well as revolutionary, consider him as nothing more than a front man for Batista. Hence, if Rivero Agüero is elected and assumes office, he cannot expect any abatement in the existing revolutionary opposition to the Government. If he does not prove strong enough to cope with the situation, Batista may find it necessary to assume the position of General-in-Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces from where he can exercise effective control of the administration.

The outlook, therefore, is for a continuation of existing revolutionary conditions, with a likely increase in their scope and intensity but without conclusive results unless there is a major shift away from the Government in such power elements as organized labor and the armed forces. It is a truism that the prolongation of this situation only serves to favor extremist elements in both groups and to work to the advantage of the communists. The clandestine Communist Party is believed to maintain a well organized, disciplined and dedicated cadre, capable of exploiting to a maximum any power vacuum or situation of instability.

As the conflict in Cuba has become more acute, the course of the United States policy has been to refrain from acts which would be taken as favoring either side. Instead of winning us friends in Cuba, the next [net?] result of our neutral position is to please no one. The Government considers our arms embargo policy as unfriendly to it and as providing aid, assistance, and moral support to the rebels. The rebels claim we profess neutrality but do not practice it, otherwise we would stop furnishing arms, withdraw our military missions, and insist upon GOC compliance with the MAP agreement. The thinking public, who are equally disenchanted with Batista and Fidel Castro, complains that we sit idly by when we should be using our influence to help bring about a solution to the problem. Yet neither side wants U.S. intervention.

The criticism translates itself into specific acts of antagonism against American interests. The kidnapping of American citizens in Oriente during June is an eloquent case in point. Admiral Ellis has reported an erosion in the good will which the Naval Base has traditionally held among the local population in the Guantanamo area. As a result the Base in the future may become a domestic political whipping boy. Between the MAAG and the respective services there is an increasing coolness which is seriously limiting the MAAG’s effectiveness. As the conflict in Cuba sharpens, the billion dollar American investment in the island can be expected to be caught in a squeeze between the opposing forces.

The Communists are using every opportunity to exploit the turbulence. Their attack on the offices of the Havana Post is symbolic of how they would translate anti-American feelings into action. The longer the present situation continues, the better are the Communist chances to penetrate the ranks of the revolutionary opposition.

Alternatives for Policy

The United States has the following alternatives for action in Cuba:

1. Adhere to a policy of strict neutrality.

2. Work toward unification of the opposition political parties and an atmosphere conducive to the holding of free elections in an effort to replace the Batista Government through constitutional means.

3. Encourage moderate elements within the Armed Forces and the legal opposition to overthrow Batista and establish a provisional government.

4. Support the Batista Government to the extent of complying with our commitments and contractual agreements and not give moral support to the revolutionary opposition.

5. Encourage the revolutionary opposition with moral and material assistance.

The first alternative clearly meets our inter-American treaty obligation of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another American Republic. In terms of our hemispheric relations it places us in the strongest position to meet any charges that we are intervening in Cuba. It has certain disadvantages, however, as far as United States interests in Cuba are concerned. It is a drifting policy under which we would not use our influence to direct the course of events in Cuba. The longer the existing situation lasts, the more violent will the ensuing reaction be if the government is overthrown, and the more advantageous it will be for the Communists. United States citizens and property will suffer in any upheaval.

The second alternative provides the ideal solution if the obstacles were not so overwhelming. The revolutionary opposition will do everything possible to disrupt the elections. Unification of the opposition political parties is a remote possibility, due mainly to the intransigence of Dr. Grau San Martin. The electoral climate is not propitious, largely as a result of the suspension of constitutional guarantees, the state of national emergency, and the terroristic and counter-terroristic activities. Without the proper conditions the United States should not become identified with the elections as the solution to Cuba’s difficulties.

The third alternative has much to commend it from the standpoint of the end result, but it presents major difficulties in its implementation. United States interests would be best served by having moderate elements in the Armed Forces and the legal opposition, capable of maintaining law and order, establish a provisional government. Under such a government a general amnesty would be called, a constitutional asembly would be convoked if the 1940 Constitution is considered deficient, and general elections would be set for the earliest feasible date. This would bring to an end the present civil strife, avoid the uncertainties resulting from a victory by the revolutionary opposition, and offer the best hope of curbing the infiltration of the Communists. In this way there could be an orderly transition from the Batista regime to a restoration of constitutional government, much along the lines of how it was achieved in Argentina. How far the United States can go about promoting a change of government by this means is hazardous. Such steps would mean direct intervention for the overthrow of the Government of Cuba, and the possibilities of success are problematical. Therefore, it is too risky to attempt.

Although No. 4 may not be regarded as the best of the alternatives it does mean the continuance of our moral obligations with a friendly government recognized by the United States. It would mean the delivery of non-combat military equipment and the discontinuation of giving moral support to the revolutionaries. The Batista government is dictatorial, and we do not believe that it has the support of the majority of the people of Cuba. On the other hand, the GOC has been a friendly government to the United States and has followed for the most part sound economic policies which have benefited American investments. It has been a staunch supporter of United States policies in international forums. The GOC has outlawed the Communist Party in Cuba and does not maintain diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, or any of the nations behind the Iron Curtain. The overthrow of the GOC is an objective of international communism. To choose Alternative No. 4 means the Department must be prepared to continue to receive adverse criticism from the same sources as in the past. In addition, there is a good possibility that the Batista regime, as continued by Rivero Agüero assuming his election, may not survive for any lengthy period after February 24, 1959.

Alternative No. 5 is definitely not in the best interests of the United States. To support the 26th of July Movement would be flagrantly inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention. Communism has infiltrated this Movement. The Movement is composed of heterogeneous elements—most of them undesirable. The second front under Raul Castro is definitely anti-American and both fronts have the support of the Communists. The various groups which comprise the revolutionary opposition are held together by the common desire to overthrow the Batista regime. Once he is removed the centrifugal forces of selfish interests may be expected to result in a complete disintegration of the opposition. A period of chaos will surely follow with bloodshed, vandalism, and needless destruction of innocent lives and property. Even if the revolutionaries were to pull together, the political, economic and social policies which they would follow are too much of an unknown quantity.

Recommended course of action. While there is any possibility of (1) the political opposition uniting behind a single ticket on a platform of serving as an interim government and (2) establishing an atmosphere conducive to holding free and open elections, the United States should not rule out the electoral method as a possible solution. It is recognized that the possibilities of the above two events materialising are slight.

The stated intention of the revolutionary opposition is to disrupt the elections. There is at present an absence of a proper electoral climate which we fear may be too late to correct.

If for the foregoing reasons the alternative of supporting the November 3rd elections is ruled out, the United States should adhere to a policy of strict neutrality (Alternative No. 1). On the one hand, this means that we will continue to do business with the recognized Government of Cuba, living up to our moral obligations and making it clear as to what they may expect in the way of military equipment from the United States and what the United States attitude will be toward efforts to purchase military equipment from third countries. On the other hand, to adhere to a policy of strict neutrality means that the United States will not give aid and comfort through moral support, directly or indirectly, to those associated with the revolutionary opposition and to those representing the revolutionary opposition. The United States should also intensify its efforts to deter these elements from using the United States as a base from which to forward arms and military equipment to the rebels.

It is recognized that the policy of strict neutrality recommended above, may not be an ideal solution of the problems confronting the United States in Cuba at present. However, it is believed that it best serves the over-all interests of the United States. It is consistent with our obligations under the principle of non-intervention. It places the United States in a safe position from which to counter criticism of our policy toward the Cuban domestic struggle. It does not commit the United States to any group or faction, thereby providing freedom of action for the United States to support or oppose whatever elements might emerge as a substitute government if, as and when the fall of the Batista regime takes place. This alternative avoids potentially controversial and disruptive issues which may further complicate achievement of our United States objectives with other nations—especially the Latin American Republics.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–858. Confidential. Drafted by Smith, Bowdler, and Gilmore, and sent as an enclosure to despatch 141 from Havana, August 8.

122. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

Arms Policy with Respect to Cuba

Problem:

Should the United States resume the sale of arms to Cuba, now that all the Americans kidnapped by the rebel forces have been released?

Discussion:

At the time of the kidnapping of American citizens in Eastern Cuba in late June, the Department’s policy regarding supplying arms to the Government of Cuba was not to authorize shipment of grant combat military equipment to Cuba but to approve selective sales of such equipment whenever it was considered that such a course of action would encourage the Government of Cuba to take effective steps toward a peaceful and constructive solution to their internal political problem. This policy was approved by the Acting Secretary on May 9, 1958 (Tab A² ) but no such sales have been authorized to date. A related question is the use by the Cuban Government for internal security purposes of grant military equipment contrary to the terms of the bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement which specifies that such equipment may be used only for defense of the hemisphere unless the U.S. gives its prior consent to other uses. On June 14, the Government of Cuba was requested to comply with the provisions of the agreement (Tab B³ ). A third problem is the question of authorizing the shipment of 10 training aircraft to Cuba. Our Embassy at Habana has recommended that the policy on arms shipments to Cuba be reviewed in the light of the kidnappings and of our position with the Government of Cuba. The Ambassador, the service attachés at Habana and the chiefs of our armed services missions in Cuba believe that we should permit the Cuban Government to purchase arms in the United States to enable that Government to take military action to crush the Castro revolt or as an inducement to Batista to hold acceptable elections.

The arguments for and against a resumption of sale of arms to Cuba are indicated at Tab C.⁴ The principal reasons favoring such a change in policy are that refusal to sell arms weakens the constituted Government of Cuba and that reports from our consuls who negotiated the release of the Americans in Oriente Province indicate possible communist influence in the forces of Raúl Castro. The reasons against permitting sales of arms to Cuba include the considerations that arms shipped to the Batista Government in the past have not permitted the Government to deal effectively with forces weaker than those the 26th of July group can now muster, the bulk of the Cuban people are disaffected from the present regime and Batista is scheduled to leave the office of President next February unless he retains power by force, and open support to the present Government as evidenced by sales of arms would likely harm the United States position in most of the other American republics. On balance, ARA believes that the reasons against resuming arms shipments outweigh those favoring such a course of action.

The question of Cuban Government compliance with the provisions of the MDA Agreement is a difficult one. The fact that MAP matériel has been used in the fight against the rebels is known both in the United States and Cuba and the charge has been made that the Cuban Government is violating the terms of the Agreement. Current policy agreed by the Departments of State and Defense is that use of MAP-supplied equipment for internal security purposes will not be permitted by the United States unless there is clear indication of communist involvement in the opposition forces. The experiences of our consuls in obtaining the release of the servicemen in Oriente Province at least raises the possibility of communist influence in this instance. Owing to this possibility and in order not to further lessen our position in the eyes of the Government of Cuba and our influence with that Government in dealing with such matters as world issues being considered in the United Nations, it is believed that the U.S. should take no further steps at this time to require compliance by Cuba with the provisions of the MDA Agreement.

The sale of ten training aircraft (T–28’s) was promised the Government of Cuba one week before the first kidnappings took place, but shipment was suspended after the American citizens were captured when it was learned that the seizures were staged largely as a protest against the U.S. providing arms to the Batista Government. These aircraft, while intended for training purposes, could be used in combat and the rebel forces would most likely interpret the sale as evidence of our renewing military support to the Batista Government.

Recommendation:

In view of the considerations mentioned above, it is recommended that:

(1) There be no change in policy respecting shipment of arms to Cuba as stated in the policy paper of May 6, 1958; approved by the Acting Secretary;

(2) The United States take no further action at this time to ensure compliance by the Government of Cuba with the MDA Agreement regarding the use of grant aid equipment previously furnished to that Government; and

(3) The shipment of the ten training aircraft not be authorized until such time as their delivery would not be a disturbing factor in the internal political situation in Cuba.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom Files: Lot 60 D 553, Cuba. Secret. Drafted by Little on July 31, with H, P, MC, W/MSC, and G indicated for concurrence. The source text bears no initials or signatures and may not have been forwarded to other offices for concurrence or to the Secretary of State for action, since the memorandum was held for Ambassador Smith’s concurrence during his visit to Washington the following week. (See Document 125)

² Tab A is not attached to the source text, but reference is to Herter’s approval of the recommendations in Snow’s memorandum of May 6 (Document 55).

³ Tab B is not attached to the source text, but regarding the notification of the Cuban Government on June 14, see footnote 3, Document 64.

⁴ This undated memorandum drafted by Little is not printed.

⁵ There is no indication that any of the recommendations were approved or disapproved.

123. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) and Foreign Minister Guell, Havana, August 15, 1958¹

Havana, August 15, 1958

SUBJECT

General Political Situation

In a conversation with Dr. Guell today I attempted to give a tentative estimate of possible developments in Cuba within the next few months. In my opinion President Batista will hold honest elections (free access to the polls and fair counting of the ballots) and that Rivero Aguero would be elected. However, at present it appears that the elections will not resolve the political problems confronting Cuba for lack of a favorable atmosphere. I then said that it would probably be necessary for the newly elected President to try to remove Fidel Castro as the center of active opposition. This might entail giving Castro a large sum of money and making him a Senator. Another crucial period could well be after February 24, 1959 when Batista leaves office. The big question is will President Batista choose to remain in Cuba, or will he leave the country? If he decides to leave Cuba, it will be most difficult for the newly elected President to survive, unless he has the complete support of the armed services and the police. Dr Guell chose to make no comment.

I further remarked to the Prime Minister that it was my earnest hope, for the past year, that the political problems in Cuba would be resolved through elections. Such elections would not only have to be honest but would have to held in a proper atmosphere. Under present conditions the possibilities of bringing about such an atmosphere are slight. In my last meeting with President Batista, on July 31,² I saw no point in suggesting the early restoration of constitutional guarantees, because it is obvious that such a step is not feasible for the GOC under present political conditions.

Dr. Guell replied that it was his impresssion that President Batista had intended to restore constitutional guarantees 45 days before the elections. However, President Batista had expected, by this time, the GOC would be much further advanced in their aim to eliminate the 26th of July Movement in Oriente. Dr. Guell further stated that in Batista’s opinion the tardiness of the GOC effort in eliminating the 26th of July Movement is due to the failure of the GOC to receive the necessary arms from the United States.

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba-Political. Confidential. Drafted by Smith.

² See Document 117.

124. Report Prepared by the Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

No. 7780 Washington, August 15, 1958.

THE 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT SINCE THE ABORTIVE GENERAL STRIKE OF APRIL 9, 1958

Abstract

On March 12, 1958, Fidel Castro Ruz, as commander in chief of the rebel forces of the 26th of July Movement, announced, and widely publicized, a forthcoming decisive effort against the Government of Cuba headed by Fulgencio Batista. A general strike was attempted on April 9, but did not receive nation-wide popular support and was quickly frustrated by strong government counter actions. Following the strike attempt, the rebels appeared to lose strength and prestige, and a number of sources reported schisms within the movement. In fact, however, only minor figures abandoned the rebel cause and the reverse proved only temporary. At the present time the 26th of July Movement is stronger than it has ever been, and its chances for success in overthrowing the Batista regime have increased.

Factors which have enabled the rebels to recover from their April defeat and to arrive at their present advantageous position include the opening of a second front by Fidel Castro’s younger brother, Raul, which has approximately doubled the guerilla forces (now about 4,000 strong) and the territory they control in Oriente Province; a broadening of the movement’s ideological base which has widened its appeal to nonrevolutionary segments of the population; improved organization; sustained high morale and discipline; continued support from local organizations and exile and other groups based abroad; and a new emphasis on the value of propaganda. In addition, Fidel Castro has recently entered into a unity pact with all of the revolutionary forces opposing the Batista regime, a reversal of his position on December 14, 1957, when he repudiated a similar pact chiefly on the grounds that it did not expressly reject 1) foreign intervention in Cuban internal affairs, and 2) replacement of Batista by a military junta. Factors which have tended to limit rebel successes during the past four months have included poor planning; seemingly ineffectual appeal to and penetration of the armed forces and organized labor; insufficient arms; and a poor communications system.

The rebels have generally taken an anti-U.S. line on the basis of charges that the United States is supplying the Batista forces with war matériel. Late in June, in protest against alleged U.S. policies, the Raul Castro forces kidnapped 47 U.S. citizens and held them captive for a number of weeks; the rebels have since threatened to take additional revenge on Americans in Cuba unless our foreign policies are changed. Although the Cuban Government has consistently charged that 26th of July Movement is penetrated and influenced by communism, little evidence exists to prove these allegations, although there are continuing reports that some communists have entered the lower ranks of the rebel forces.

The chances for the overthrow of the Batista government continue to be contingent upon the government’s ability to maintain the support of the armed forces and organized labor, and to sustain a relatively high level of national economic prosperity. The majority of the Cuban population, although opposed to Batista in principle, is not willing to take up arms against him, is apathetic to his rule, and only desires a return to stable political conditions.

Should the revolutionists displace the present Cuban Government, their ability to operate a successor government would depend upon the cooperation and unity of the various revolutionary groups and their success in dealing with the military and organized labor. If the diverse factions were to cooperate, a comparatively stable left-of-center government can be envisaged. However, the dominant role achieved by the 26th of July Movement and the irresponsibility and youthful ambitions of its leadership lend serious doubt to the prospect of its continued cooperation with these groups. Should the 26th of July Movement try to “go it alone”, without the restraining influence of the more moderate members from other opposition groups, continued civil strife and violence would be expected.

[Here follow the body of the report and a map of Oriente Province. The report comprises 15 pages and is divided into three main sections: the present status of the 26th of July Movement, its relationship with other groups, and its attitude toward the United States.]

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OSS-State Intelligence Reports. Secret. The cover sheet for the report reads: “This is an intelligence report and not a statement of Departmental policy.” Another note indicates that the report was based on information available through August 14. The full text of the report is published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 71 B.

125. Editorial Note

In telegram 117 to Havana, August 14, the Department approved Ambassador Smith’s home leave and asked him to come to the Department for consultations on August 18. The telegram noted a decision on arms policy was delayed pending discussion with the Ambassador. It also noted that authorization had been given for the shipment of pending noncombat items sold or provided on a grant basis. Finally, it said that a reply to the Embassy’s paper regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba (Document 121) had been drafted and would be held for the Ambassador’s comments. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/8–1458)

According to an undated, unsigned note attached to Rubottom’s memorandum of August 11 to Dulles (Document 122), that memorandum was shown to Smith during his consultations in the Department:

“Ambassador Smith read this paper while on consultation in the Department on August 18 and 19. He concurred in the recommendations except for number (3), expressing his hope that the ten T–28’s would be shipped. The Ambasador was, however, satisfied with Mr. Rubottom’s statement that the Department would try to find some middle ground in dealing with the question of the training aircraft.” (Department of State, Rubottom Files: Lot 60 D 553, Cuba)

126. Letter From the Consul at Santiago de Cuba (Wollam) to the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy)¹

Santiago de Cuba, August 25, 1958.

Dear Terry: The following contains some thoughts on the local situation. If you think this should be developed in despatch form, please let me know.

It had been previously noted that there seems to be an increasing amount of anti-Americanism in Oriente. This has been commented on by Cubans and Americans. Some of the comment is for propaganda effect, but it is believed that some of it is valid. It is new to most.

The anti-American feeling is principally from the opposition elements and is stirred up by the Communists who have found common ground. Not all of it is Communist, however, and it is difficult to draw a line on where the responsibility lies.

It is to be expected that in a civil war situation all sides will attempt to make the most of propaganda. With a large majority of the local people at least emotionally linked to the opposition, the Consulate receives principally one side of this picture, namely that of condemnation of the United States for “supporting” the government of President Batista and other so-called dictatorships. The number of persons affected, however, is cause for concern. On the positive side, the traditional close ties between the United States and Oriente probably do something to keep the impact from being as heavy as it might be in other areas under the same circumstances.

United States “support of the government” is deduced from various things in the emotional thinking of many opposition elements. These include the supplying of arms (there is no distinction made on MAP or sale), the rockethead transaction, the use of the Naval Base at Guantanamo to fuel and arm combat missions, various military missions to Cuba, protocolary military functions in Habana, the decoration of Cuban military leaders by the United States, apprehension of arms shipments to the rebels, and from other imagined evidences of “support”.

The United States is blamed for being ignorant of or condoning the excesses for which the opposition condemns Cuban military and police authorities.

There is no doubt but that the United States policy is generally unknown or misunderstood in Oriente, a fact that gives the Communists an additional opportunity. Because of censorship the majority of the people see only:

(1) What they deduce as evidences of U.S. support to Batista, since the government gives ample publicity to any official Cuban-American associations. Most of this is based on emotional reaction rather than the facts of the case.

(2) The second field of information for many is the clandestine publications of the 26th of July and, to a lesser extent, that of the Communists. The type of anti-American propaganda circulated with the kidnapping effort is an example of this. Communists have apparently eagerly grabbed on to this ready-made opportunity to “cooperate”.

In the present atmosphere of Oriente these two types of information have a double impact and serve to complement one another in the eyes of the opposition.

Under censorship, the United States has little means of defending or advancing its policy locally except in a limited manner through discreet personal contact. Relations with a friendly host government could easily be jeopardized by any indiscreet effort to publicize what is common knowledge in interested United States circles.

At the same time the Government of Cuba is undoubtedly irritated since efforts at non-involvement have in effect aided the opposition. In Oriente, the United States appears to receive no credit from either side.

Many Americans both here and also apparently in the United States are not informed on where and how the United States stands with respect to efforts at non-involvement in Cuban internal affairs. In the highly emotional local atmosphere they are inclined to side with the opposition in being critical of their concept of U.S. policy. This again is partially because of censorship which limits information received here. Most Americans are aware, however, of the necessity of remaining aloof from local politics.

With increasing unrest and the possibility that the political situation could possibly be subject to change either through elections or otherwise, any increase in anti-American feeling becomes a subject of more concern. In many minds the United States will automatically be linked with Batista as was the case to some extent in Venezuela.

There appears to be no easy solution to this delicate local problem. Consular officials and informed Americans can accomplish a little on a discreet personal basis, but there is not much else that can be done within the limits of consular functions.

It would seem, however, that the possibility of the Communists advancing their position through the anti-Americanism should be a source of concern to opposition leaders. One thing that might be suggested would be an effort to enlighten and inform opposition leaders in the United States as well as exiles and Cuban residents in general of the United States position. It is not known whether this is feasible, or in what form this might be done. If this could be accomplished it is possible that some of it might come through to local elements. Selected opposition leaders might be shown Communist anti-American propaganda regarding Cuba and other countries.

Perhaps something more for the record regarding U.S. efforts at non-involvement could be prepared for use should the occasion arise or for publishing in some magazine. The questions and answers which were prepared in MID for interested parties in the United States² would provide most of the material and it could always be brought up to the minute.

There may be other ways of getting the favorable aspects of our policy across, although it is a delicate proposition in a situation such as this.

This may pertain only to Oriente, but it is a problem here. Any suggestions you have would be helpful.³

Sincerely,

Park

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–2558. Confidential. A copy was sent to Bowdler.

² Not further identified.

³ No reply by Leonhardy has been found. Leonhardy showed the letter to Smith, who wrote the following comment in the margin of the first page: “TGL: This is a tough one. If USIS were to try to give out pamphlets regarding our impartiality in Cuban domestic politics, the GOC would undoubtedly object, especially in view of arms policy. EBS”

127. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, August 29, 1958.

SUBJECT:

Shipment of ten T–28 Airplanes to Cuba

You will recall the discussion in Mr. Rubottom’s office on August 18 with Ambassador Smith² during which the matter of the release of the T–28’s was raised by Ambassador Smith. Mr. Rubottom introduced the possibility of some alternative to the shipment of these planes and asked MID to look into the prospects of working out some arrangement other than release of them which would meet the Cubans’ desire for aircraft for pilot training.

Background:

1. Need for training aircraft. The Cubans desire to begin a course of basic pilot training for 25 pupils on September 10, utilizing these planes. They wish these to substitute for the six T–6 planes they now have; the T–6’s are no longer supportable through MAP since the USAF has no stocks of spare parts for these aircraft and they will soon become unserviceable. The Cubans desire the T–28’s since they could be MAP-supported.

2. Nature of the T–28’s. The T–28 (photograph attached³ ) is a propeller-driven single-engine basic trainer. Defense states that, while it is possible to install two so-called “package”50 cal. machine guns on the T–28’s, these guns are available only from U.S. Air Force stocks and none would, of course, be made available to Cuba under current directives. In lieu of the installation of the guns, the planes can be equipped to carry two 100-lb. practice bombs or 6 2.25” rockets.

Possible Alternative to the T–28’s:

1. Purchase in Canada. The only similar aircraft available in Canada are Harvards, Mark 6 (modeled after T–6’s), which are not supportable with respect to spare parts, as indicated above. Availabilities in Canada then moves to the T–33 jet. [sic]

2. Purchase of other types of aircraft in the United States. Used T–6’s might be purchased on the commercial market, but the same problem of supportability arises. A lighter, slightly smaller plane suitable for training is manufactured by Beechcraft (model B–45), but these are not readily available owing to high domestic demand for these planes.

Discussion:

From the above, it must be concluded that there is no suitable alternative aircraft to the T–28, either in the U.S. or Canada, which might be suggested to the Cuban Government as a substitute for the T–28’s. (Mr. Little mentioned this to Ambassador Smith who telephoned the Department to keep abreast of developments on August 27.⁴ ) The problem therefore resolves itself once again to the release of the T–28’s. Ambassador Smith has proposed before and reiterated in the call on August 27 that a possible solution was to obtain from the Cuban Government a promise to use the aircraft only for training purposes.

Recommendation:

In view of the fact that release of the T–28’s, regardless of their nature, would most likely be used by the Government of Cuba to demonstrate renewed support for that government on the part of the United States and in view of the negative reaction toward such a decision here in the United States and among opposition groups, it is believed that any such “middle ground” as exacting a promise from the Government of Cuba covering the use of these aircraft would not be satisfactory. It is therefore recommended that the Cuban Government be informed that the T–28’s cannot be released in the immediate future.

September 2, 1958.

Since the preparation of this memorandum, the Department has received telegram No. 246 of August 29 from Habana⁵ stating that the Chief of the Air Force Mission had received a communication from the Chief of the Cuban Air Force to the effect that the Cubans had started negotiations for the sale of the T–28’s to the highest bidder in the United States in view of the fact that the export license had not been approved.⁶

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–2958. Confidential. Drafted by Little. Initialed by Wieland and Snow.

² See Document 125.

³ Not found.

⁴ No record of this conversation has been found.

⁵ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–2958)

⁶ Snow wrote the following comment to Rubottom, September 3, at the top of the source text: “I suppose this is the only conclusion we could arrive at, although it makes me less than happy, especially since I believe the Cubans stand to lose money on the deal which we cannot legally reimburse them for.”

128. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 4, 1958¹

Washington, September 4, 1958

SUBJECT

Activities in U.S. of Cuban exiles; Cuban Political Situation; Pending export licenses for military equipment for Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

ARA—Mr. Rubottom

MID—Mr. Gutierrez

Dr. Nicolas Arroyo, Cuban Ambassador

Ambassador Arroyo called on Mr. Rubottom by appointment at 4 p.m. today. The Ambassador brought up the incident of Mr. William Hormel, saying that while Hormel had admitted to a Time correspondent in Habana that he had made at least 28 flights from Florida to Cuba carrying arms for the rebels an article appearing in Time magazine for September 8 (which the Ambassador showed Mr. Rubottom) indicates that upon being arrested in Miami Hormel claimed that he was not on the Aero Commander plane that crash-landed in the water within the confines of the base on August 16. The Ambassador added that since Hormel’s passport was found in the plane wreckage he will have a hard time proving that he was not on the plane when it crash-landed. Mr. Rubottom explained that the U.S. Government takes its responsibilities seriously in trying to prevent illegal departures from our shores to Cuba; that just this morning Mr. Snow had a meeting here in the Department on the subject,² that efforts are being made to prevent such illegal activities and that some reports of planned expeditions which the Department has received have been passed on to the Minister of State by our Embassy in Habana.

The Ambassador then mentioned that a Cuban pilot by the name of Guillermo Verdaguer, who was on the plane with Hormel and whose name had been brought to the attention of the Department by his Embassy a few months ago, had been issued an identification pass by the Guantanamo Base authorities which permitted him to leave the base under an assumed name. He added that this information had been given to our Embassy in Habana by the Minister of State. With respect to the information that the Cuban Embassy had given the Department regarding Verdaguer’s activities in Miami, Mr. Gutierrez informed the Ambassador that the data had been given to our investigative authorities by the Department and that as of July 14, 1958 Verdaguer was in jail in Miami under custody of the immigration service; that we do not have information as to the circumstances of his release. As for the pass given by the base authorities to Verdaguer, Mr. Gutierrez explained that at the request of a construction company, the personnel of which are Cuban, the base authorities issued a pass to the man under the name of Vazquez; that the base authorities were acting in good faith and that the circumstances of the issuance of the pass were mentioned to Minister Guell by our Chargé in Habana. Dr. Arroyo said that he was pleased that the data were given to the Minister of State, but that whoever issued the pass to Verdaguer at the base must have responsibility for it as precautions must be taken by the base authorities to prevent such occurrences, especially in the light of existing political conditions in Cuba. Mr. Gutierrez replied that the base is taking appropriate action against those in the construction company that requested the pass fraudulently and that the base authorities are taking steps to prevent this sort of thing.

The Ambassador then mentioned the statement of President Eisenhower, announced in the press today,³ that the U.S. Government looks with favor upon the progress being made in Venezuela toward attaining a democratic form of government through the electoral process. He added that a similar statement with reference to Cuba would be most beneficial at a time when the Cuban Government is making efforts to have elections; that Cuban revolutionary groups would take note of such a statement on the part of the U.S. Government. Mr. Rubottom said that the Ambassador is, of course, aware that we are especially careful to avoid any actions that might be interpreted as intervention in the internal affairs of other countries but that he would consider the Ambassador’s suggestion. Mr. Rubottom asked the Ambassador whether the Cuban Government has taken any steps toward inviting foreign observers to Cuba for the elections. The Ambassador replied that his Government has announced that it is willing to invite such observers if the opposition parties request it; that no such request has been made. He added that the fact that political opposition groups in Cuba have been holding political meetings is an indication that his Government plans to conduct proper elections. He mentioned that his Government has had to take extraordinary measures, such as the suspension of constitutional guarantees, to meet the extraordinary conditions created by those advocating the overthrow of his Government by force. He said that if such groups want Batista out they should go to the polls; that his Government has scheduled elections when due according to the constitution; that at one time it even advanced the date of the elections as a concession to revolutionary groups but that it was later forced to re-schedule them for November 3.

Mr. Rubottom asked whether the Cuban representation at the UN has taken opinions from other Latin American Governments with respect to the present Cuban Government, that Mr. Rubottom has recently visited 15 or 16 countries in this hemisphere and has found that the majority of the rank and file in those countries criticize the United States for its alleged support of Batista. Ambassador Arroyo asked what support they might be referring to and Mr. Rubottom said that that is what we would like to know. The Ambassador said it would be a good idea to try to eliminate these misconceptions. Mr. Rubottom said we are trying to do just that.

Dr. Arroyo said that he felt that most Governments in Latin America feel that the United States is against the Cuban Government. Mr. Rubottom said the he disagrees with this as we are generally criticized for alleged support of the Cuban Government.

Mr. Rubottom then mentioned that the lack of publicity in the United States favorable to the Cuban Government has hurt that Government and in turn it has also hurt the U.S. Government. The Ambassador said that this was true; that in recent months the Cuban Government has done more in this respect; that not long ago Mr O’Rourke had an editorial in the Washington Daily News against Fidel Castro. Mr. Rubottom said that he had not seen it but that Mr. Gutierrez would get it for him.

Ambassador Arroyo then said that there is no reason for revolution to exist in Cuba; that it is occurring only due to outside help and influences; that revolutions occur due to poor economies, social or political conditions and that Cuba has virtually the best economic situation of all the Latin American countries; that social conditions are not such as to bring on revolution and that elections are scheduled as due. He said that he does not agree that it is entirely a Cuban problem and that he hates to think of what might happen if the Communists were given the opportunity they are seeking there. He referred to the situation in Lebanon as presenting an analogous situation with Cuba and that the U.S. Government has taken a different stand there. Mr. Rubottom agreed that there are probably some outside influences in Cuba.

Dr. Arroyo on leaving asked whether any action has been taken on the pending export license applications for military equipment requested by his Government. Mr. Rubottom replied that they are still being considered and that a decision will probably be made soon. In reply to his inquiry, Mr. Gutierrez told Dr. Arroyo that the Department will send a reply to his Embassy’s note of August 27, 1958.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–458. Confidential. Drafted by Gutierrez and initialed by Rubottom.

² A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Ambassador Arroyo.

³ Apparently a reference to the President’s remarks to the new Venezuelan Ambassador upon the presentation of his credentials on August 14. The text was released in Department of State Press Release No. 466. The President’s statement was quoted in The New York Times, August 17, 1958, p. 19. The press account to which Ambassador Arroyo is referring has not been identified.

⁴ The Cuban Embassy’s note protested the activities in the United States of anti-Batista émigrés, particularly the flight from Florida to Cuba on August 16 of a plane piloted by American citizen, William Hormel, carrying arms to the Cuban rebels. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–2758) The plane made a forced landing near the Guantanamo Naval Base, and Hormel was taken into custody by the U.S. authorities there. A memorandum of a conversation, August 19, between Hormel and William Bowdler of the Embassy in Havana was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 180, August 22. (ibid., 737.00/8–2258)

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, September 11, 1958—1 p.m.

276. For Rubottom. Embtel 246.² At our first talk following my return Guell again brought up subject of T–28 training planes and asked whether we had reached a decision. As I had no information of any progress on possible compromise that US assist Cuba obtain planes from Canada, I asked whether GOC intended use planes for anything other than training. Guell said he was sure not but would consult with President. After talking with Batista, Guell has now given me the pledge of GOC that requested trainers, if supplied by US will be used exclusively for training.

In view this pledge I urge that Department now reach speedy and favorable decision to permit delivery of these planes, taking into consideration following pertinent facts:

1. As planes will be used only for training their delivery clearly falls outside US policy not to ship combat equipment to GOC at present.

2. If we fail to comply with our promise to deliver T–28 trainers, it will be the second failure on the part of US to fulfill a definite commitment to the GOC. The first commitment was the twenty armored cars.

3. Reasons given for deferment was adverse effect delivery could have on possibility of release of Americans kidnapped by rebels; this release has now long been completed.

4. For lack of training planes opening of pilot training schools scheduled for September 10 had to be cancelled. It is in US as well as Cuban interests that this school be opened, since through it Cuban pilots who go later to service schools in US are assured of flight experience so useful as preparation for training in US.

5. If GOC is forced to turn elsewhere for purchase of trainers, our policy of assistance through military missions and of obtaining standardization on US equipment will receive setback. Such effects will continue long after the present political unrest is a matter of history.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.118/9–1158. Confidential.

² See footnote 5, Document 127.

130. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) and Ernesto Betancourt, Department of State, Washington, September 19, 1958¹

Washington, September 19, 1958

Mr. Betancourt visited Mr. Leonhardy today by previous appointment to present his views on the Cuban political situation. He touched upon the following subjects:

Communism and Anti-US Elements in the Castro Movement

Mr. Leonhardy prompted Mr. Betancourt’s discussion of this by referring to continuing anti-US articles being circulated by the 26th of July Movement in Cuba. He briefly described the nature of these circulars and showed him one² that had been addressed to the youth of Cuba which almost followed the communist line and which had been reprinted by the communists in their propaganda in Cuba. Mr. Betancourt said he was seriously concerned about anti-US views exhibited by some people in the 26th of July Movement in Cuba and that he had recently forwarded a memorandum to Fidel Castro pointing out the measures the United States Government had taken to embargo arms shipments from this country to the Cuban Government. He said he indicated in his memorandum that Castro should consider pursuing a propaganda line expressing appreciation for such US action and indicating that this represented lack of support rather than US support for the Batista regime. Recently Mr. Betancourt received a communication from Luis Buch of Caracas, presently propaganda Chief in exile for the Movement, indicating his approval of the propaganda line suggested by Betancourt.

In response to a query by Mr. Leonhardy about Fidel Castro not publicly disavowing communists, Mr. Bentacourt replied that this was difficult for Castro because (1) his Movement had often been accused of being rightist because of its middle and higher class support, (2) the Movement had no acceptable social program to sell to the Cuban masses, (3) communist strength in the Movement must recognize the Cuban labor movement, and Castro was not anxious to incur the wrath of the communist labor leaders even though he had refused to accept their support in the April 9 strike.

Mr. Betancourt referred to his previous warnings to the Department that some of our actions were playing into the hands of the anti-US elements in the Castro movement and mentioned specifically our present visa policy toward the more conservative elements in the opposition, such as Dr. Miró Cardona, Dr. Antonio Varona, Dr. Lincoln Rodon, and others. Mr. Leonhardy informed Mr. Betancourt that with constant violations of our laws by Cuban exiles sometimes it was not easy to differentiate between those who were conducting themselves well and those who were not while in this country. He also pointed out that Dr. Miró Cardona, for example, had neglected to approach our immigration authorities before his stay in this country had expired and had placed himself in the position of being illegally here. Mr. Betancourt said that Dr. Miró Cardona might be here next week and would have an opportunity to discuss his parole status with the appropriate US authorities. Mr. Leonhardy replied he would be pleased to discuss his case with him.

Communists in the Labor Movement

Mr. Betancourt said that he was not particularly worried about leftist thinking in the Castro movement as a number of the members were immature and it was typical of Latin youth to be radical. He was confident that they would become more conservative as they matured. His real concern he said was the future of the Cuban labor movement as that movement still has a number of able communists who have had leadership experience. He feels a vacuum will result in the labor movement with the fall of the Batista regime and that there will be no one with organizational ability to fill that vacuum in many of the unions other than communists. The Mujal crowd he claims will be summarily thrown out and most laborers will be reluctant to accept Cofino, Hirogoyen and the like as their replacements as the latter have no better reputations than the former. On the other hand the communist leaders in labor have a reputation for honesty which might give them a general acceptance. The Castro movement has no real experienced labor leaders and must depend on the JOC (Catholic Youth Labor Movement) to try to fill the gap. In some few unions this might be possible Mr. Betancourt thinks.

Withdrawal of Military Missions

Mr. Betancourt said he understood the overriding hemispheric defense aspects of US policy in maintaining military missions in Cuba. He realized how difficult it would be for the US to terminate mission agreements with Cuba and withdraw its missions. Nevertheless, he said he thought that the US should consider that through the controlled Cuban press Batista was taking advantage of the presence of our missions to indicate US support for his regime. By so doing he has built up a tremendous antipathy towards the missions by the Cuban populace. This antipathy is getting to the point that Betancourt feels that we must expect a public clamor in Cuba following the downfall of Batista for a complete removal of our missions in that country. Betancourt feels this would be unfortunate and a blow to hemispheric defense in the area. He also feels we might avoid such an adverse move if we were now to take steps to de-emphasize the role of our missions and through attrition or otherwise gradually reduce the number of personnel serving at the missions. This he concluded might be taken by those in the opposition as a sign of gradual withdrawal of US military support for Batista.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–1958. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy. Betancourt was a Registered Agent for the 26th of July Movement.

² Not further identified.

131. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, September 22, 1958—2 p.m.

304. On September 20 I had two hour exchange of views with President Batista. Guell present. To avoid any publicity we met as usual at his country place (Kuquine). The conversation was comprehensive, frank, cordial, and friendly.

Batista’s opinion regarding elections:

(A) Honest elections will be held November 3.

(B) A total of 60 percent of electorate will vote.

(C) Rivero Aguero will win because of organizational strength of the four Government coalition parties.

(D) Regrets that revolutionaries have forced him give his people elections under suspension of guarantees.

(I did not bring up subject of constitutional guarantees because Guell had previously informed me² elections would be held under suspensions of guarantees.)

Regarding the rebel column, in Camaguey, under “Che” Guevara, who were attempting establish new rebel front in Las Villas province:

(A) There were two columns totaling approximately 230 men.

(B) “Che” Guevara and followers have been defeated.

(C) They were disbanded into small groups of five, six and seven in a group.

(D) Army seized weapons and many paper records of “Che” Guevara.

(E) These papers called on revolutionary youth movement to turn over propaganda campaign to PSP (Cuban Communist Party).

(F) The seized papers prove Communist ties with 26 July movement, and he will furnish me photostatic copies.³

Regarding post elections:

(A) I asked Batista if he would remain in Cuba after new President elect assumed office. He replied he would remain in Cuba and hoped to lead retired life. Yet, if needed, would be available. Batista stated that he would remain loyal to his supporters and would not go to any Embassy to seek asylum but would die fighting, if necessary. He will not desert his followers, the people of his country, and permit Cuba to be turned into a holocaust.

(B) No President elect can survive in Cuba without support of army. The rebels distrust each other. If Castro were to gain power, Prio knows that his large investments and holdings in Cuba would be confiscated.

Regarding world conditions, Batista said the following:

(A) Khrushchev is a snake who is out to destroy US and Western powers.

(B) In the Soviets US and GOC have a common enemy.

(C) The pattern of Communist influence and penetration is the same worldwide, including Latin America. Many countries in Latin America are being infiltrated with Communism. (At this point Batista reviewed the Communist influence in numerous LA countries.)

(D) In Cuba Communists are using revolutionaries to further their own aims, to inflame the opposition and undermine GOC by breeding more and more hatred and violence.

Regarding arms:

(A) He made strong plea for continuation of shipment of arms. I told him that present policy of US was not to ship combat arms while active hostilities in Cuba were in progress.

I told him Secretary Dulles was most appreciative of the support we received from Nunez Portuondo. Yet the shipment of combat arms would make US vulnerable to accusation that we were attempting perpetuate the present regime.

Batista asked about T–28 trainers and pointed out it was in the best interest of US that these boys receive their preliminary training before entering US schools to prove their qualification.

I said I had telegraphed the Department urging their delivery and had assured Department that Batista stated the T–28s would be used only as trainers (Embtel 276⁴ ). I told him as yet I had received no reply from Department.

His reply was “we are your friends” and smilingly suggested the US worry more about Khrushchev and Peiping and less about Castro.

I mentioned tax on coffee of $4 by the rebels and one dollar for the army in Oriente, and informed the President the rebels had approached American corporations for tribute.⁵ He said he had notified the Sugar Institute he would double taxation on any corporation that paid tribute. He said he would not permit companies to donate monies to rebels to be used to kill GOC soldiers sent to protect these same companies.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2258. Secret; Priority.

² The date that Guell so informed Smith has not been determined.

³ In telegram 313 from Havana, September 23, Smith said the Embassy had obtained the photostatic copies of the documents seized from Ché Guevara’s forces. Smith said that although it was not possible to confirm that all the documents were in fact taken from Guevara, the Embassy believed the papers were “authentic Communist documents.” Two of the papers were unrelated to communism, but were identifiable with the 26th of July Movement. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2358)

⁴ Document 129.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 137.

132. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Former Prime Minister Varona and the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland), Department of State, Washington, September 23, 1958¹

Washington, September 23, 1958

SUBJECT

Cuban Political Situation and Other Matters

Dr. Varona visited Mr. Wieland’s office by previous appointment this morning and he expounded at length on various phases of the Cuban political situation. Below is a résumé of his comments by subjects:

Concern Over Lack of Direction and Organization in Castro Movement

Dr. Varona expressed his increasing concern over the direction in which the Castro Movement is going. He said that Fidel has once again indicated his unwillingness to accept a military junta which in Dr. Varona’s opinion is the only manner in which a relatively peaceful transition from Batista to democracy can take place. He feels that Castro has again indicated his lack of stability by his vacillation on this all important point. Also Castro once again has indicated his antipathy towards experienced politicians in the opposition and apparently feels that his organization is strong enough to hold Cuba together once the present regime falls. Dr. Varona plans to leave shortly for a Central American country (more probably for Venezuela) and from there will go to the Sierra Maestra to talk to Castro personally. Castro, he feels, appears to be receiving bad advice and Dr. Varona thinks he can convince him of the error of his ways. When Dr. Varona talked to Castro from Caracas during the deliberations leading up to the Caracas Unity Pact, he found Castro understanding and reasonable and still feels that he can be reasoned with. Dr. Varona believes that if Castro does not utilize men who have had experience in Cuban politics and Government such as himself, Dr. Felipe Pazos and Dr. Agramonte, Dr. Bisbe, etc., Cuba will be in a state of chaos for many many years after Batista’s fall. Dr. Varona thinks that if Castro would be willing to accept a military civilian Junta such as Venezuela now has, the transition could be a healthy one. He described the news stories of six columns of rebels marching into Camaguey as pure hyperbole.

Withdrawal of U.S. Military Missions

Dr. Varona discussed this matter again reiterating his views and Mr. Wieland explained the Department’s position that the missions were present in Cuba for hemispheric defense purposes and the United States must consider the long range aspects despite internal changes in governments which might take place in the hemisphere.

Proposed OAS Condemnation of Batista Regime

Dr. Varona mentioned his efforts to try to get the OAS to take action against the Batista Government in Cuba and said he recognized that despite the noble wording of the various OAS pacts there was in reality no teeth in the organization which could enforce the lofty desires espoused in the Charter of the Organization. He said he had not pursued this matter with the hope of getting any present action but to bring to the attention of member Governments the need for future Inter-American pacts to pursue more vigorously the matter of outlawing dictatorships. He left with Mr. Wieland a copy of a petition² which the FRC was presenting to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Washington.

Visa Problems of Cuban Exiles

Dr. Varona said that he himself had been treated with the utmost courtesy by our Immigration Service and had had no difficulties but that some of the esteemed members of the opposition in this country such as Dr. Miro Cardona were having problems and he hoped that we would realize that our treatment of these people might have an adverse reaction for the United States in Cuba and the rest of Latin America. Mr. Leonhardy explained the problems that some of these persons he mentioned were having and particularly referred to the fact that Dr. Miro Cardona had actually been illegally in this country for some time as he had failed to extend his period of stay prior to its expiration.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2358. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy.

² Not found.

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, September 24, 1958—3 p.m.

316. For Rubottom. When the Belgian Embassy approached Department for US views re advisability of Belgium supplying light arms to GOC, Department officer stated that if such shipments took place Belgium might well receive unfavorable publicity in the Cuban press.² (Embassy considers this unlikely under current press censorship.) Belgian Embassy was further requested to keep Department informed of any arrangements which might be made re arms shipments. When Department was approached by British and Canadian Embassies with similar inquiries, attitude of former likewise discouraged sales. I consider this to be intervening against the GOC through “innuendo” and contrary to our best interests.

It is patently in interests of Communism for GOC to be violently overthrown and for madness of the crowd to prevail. The Communists are openly advocating this and are openly aiding and abetting the revolutionaries. If Batista falls, for a time no individual or group in Cuba will be able to preserve law and order except possibly a military junta. Opposition is united only in their desire to overthrow Batista. If military junta took over, it would still have Castro elements to deal with.

Believe it is in best interests of US that present GOC remain in power until February 24, 1959. Then it may be possible for new president to install cabinet of able and respected citizens to attempt to gain confidence of Cuban people. There will be a critical period for many months. Yet with support of army, declaration to call general elections within two years, and support of the US, new administration may survive and Cuba may be spared a holocaust, much to chagrin of Communists. I see no other solution which is in best interests of US.

As it is our policy to be impartial and not to intervene in internal affairs of Cuba, I recommend that we do not through innuendo attempt to discourage other nations from selling arms to GOC. I further recommend that a more sincere effort be made to enforce our neutrality laws and to prohibit the air drops, originating in Florida, which appear to be successfully supplying rebels with arms.

I am in hopes violent overthrow of GOC can be avoided not only because of danger to American life and property but also because out of chaos Communists may emerge greatly strengthened if not actual victors.³

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 437.558/9–2458. Confidential; Priority.

² The source of Smith’s account of the Belgian approach to the Department is not clear.

³ In telegram 174 to Havana, September 26, the Department indicated that, although it understood that the Cuban Government was receiving arms from various European sources, the Belgian inquiry was the only one received by the Department since British and Canadian inquiries of the previous year. The telegram noted that Belgian officials were told that the U.S. Government had no objection, but that for their background they were told of the “adverse reaction which could be expected from Cuban opposition.” This was done in a “spirit of cooperation with friendly NATO power and not meant to discourage arms sales” to the Cuban Government. If similar inquiries were received in the future, Department officials would state simply that the U.S. Government “has no objections to transactions of this kind.” (Department of State, Central Files, 437.558/9–2458)

134. Editorial Note

At the 380th meeting of the National Security Council on September 25, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence C. P. Cabell briefed the Council on significant world developments affecting U.S. security. Cabell briefly referred to Cuba, noting that Castro’s rebel movement “was in a stronger position than ever before.” There was no other discussion of the Cuban situation. (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

135. Memorandum From the Chief of the Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics (Wardlaw) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill)¹

Washington, September 25, 1958.

SUBJECT

Need for Information on Character of Leadership of Cuban July 26 Movement

We in DRA are greatly concerned about the character of the leadership of the July 26 Movement in Cuba. It is essential that we make an accurate appraisal of that movement because of the great importance of Cuban developments to the United States. It would indeed be serious if our Government assumed that the movement was not Communist dominated and later it proved to be so, and it would also be most unfortunate for it to assume that the movement was Communist dominated if such an assumption was incorrect.

The best information which we have at hand supports the belief that Fidel Castro is not Communist and that Communists do not play a dominant role in the leadership of the July 26 Movement. However, our information is not as conclusive as we would like. We are even more concerned about our lack of real information on the whole complex of the July 26 leadership. We feel a need for a great deal more information, not only about possible identifiable Communists who may participate in the direction of the uprising or are privy to its leaders, but also we need to know something about the general prevalence of anti-US and pro-Marxist, even though not necessarily Communist, sentiment among those forming the headquarters of the movement. The general atmosphere of that headquarters, the idealisms and opportunisms current there, and the degrees of political maturity of the leaders are all matters on which we do not really have conclusive information but which will have great influence on the character of any Government of Cuba which may be brought into being by the movement.

In seeking to appraise this movement we have searched our files thoroughly, kept in contact with the Cuban desk in ARA and consulted with other intelligence agencies in Washington. We have also written to the field for data on the past of the leaders. Despite these efforts our information is at best sketchy. Under the circumstances we would be most grateful for any information which should come your way on these important subjects.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 60 D 513, Cuba 1958. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Wardlaw.

136. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 320 Havana, September 26, 1958.

REF

Emb Despatch No. 287, October 3, 1957²

SUBJECT

1958 Elections: Electoral Outlook Six Weeks Prior to Elections

In the reference despatch the Embassy reviewed the outlook for the elections, then scheduled for June 1, 1958, at the outset of the electoral process. Since that time the date for general elections has been postponed to November 3, 1958, the revolutionary opposition has made an unsuccessful bid to overthrow the Batista regime (April 9, 1958) and now appears to be preparing for another attempt, and the Government has assumed extraordinary powers in a general effort to maintain order and liquidate the centers of insurrectionary opposition. During the past three weeks factors bearing on the elections have crystalized sufficiently to permit a more accurate analysis and evaluation of what is likely to be the outcome at the polls.

The Electoral Climate.

Without attempting to assign responsibility, it can be said that at no time since the opening of the electoral process last fall has the political climate been conducive to the holding of free and open elections. The revolutionary opposition does not want elections under Batista. They charge that the balloting would be fraudulent. They are probably fearful that a change in administration will predispose the people to give the President-elect a chance to resolve the national problem, thus weakening public toleration of rebel activity. It has announced that it will do everything within its power to prevent them from taking place. Ironically, the Government, which desires elections, has been confronted with an insurrectionary situation which threatens its very existence, and as a result it has resorted to a series of exceptional measures which work aginst the auspicious atmosphere which it seeks to establish.

The preliminary phases of the electoral process from all outward appearances seemed to move along fairly satisfactorily up to the end of January as political parties completed their reorganization and selected their national candidates. It was hoped that the restoration of constitutional guarantees, on January 25, 1958 would be the initial move in the establishment of a proper climate for elections, to be followed by such other steps as inviting the world press and UN or OAS observers to witness the elections. It had, however, the opposite effect. The lifting of censorship and the reinstitution of legal process through the civil courts gave the general public the first insight in six months into the scope of insurrectionary activity and the measures employed by the Government to cope with it. As a result criticism of the Government mounted and the rebels seized the opportunity to foment public unrest. A growing abstentionist trend within certain opposition parties manifested itself late in February. With the publication early in March of Fidel Castro’s manifesto³ calling for an all-out offensive against the Government in April, public apprehension grew to the point where the Government felt they had no choice but to suspend constitutional guarantees again and to declare a state of national emergency. Coming so close to the June 1 election date, it was to be expected that a postponement would be forthcoming. The Congress at the request of the Cabinet took this action on March 26 as it passed a law fixing the new date for elections for November 3, 1958.

On April 9, 1958 the revolutionary opposition launched their general strike to overthrow the Batista Government. It was a dismal failure. The people failed to respond to the strike call, thereby demonstrating that the rebels did not have the popular support which they mistakenly claimed. The Batista regime then decided to launch an all out military offensive against Fidel Castro in an effort to destroy him. With him out of the way, the Government reasoned, the principal obstacle to holding elections under a proper climate would be removed.

The build-up for the military offensive got under way in May. By July the Army was moving up from the lowlands into the foothills of the Sierra Maestra. In a series of engagements in late July and early August the rebels forced the Army to withdraw back into its garrison positions, and the offensive came to a halt. Following this setback, the Prime Minister, in a conversation with the Ambassador about the prospects for the restoration of guarantees, commented significantly that Batista had intended to restore guarantees 45 days prior to elections but had also expected that the campaign to eliminate the “26th of July” Movement would be much further advanced than it was.

In retrospect the lack of a proper climate for elections is due primarily to three factors:

1. The continued suspension of constitutional guarantees and other exceptional measures taken by the Government under state of national emergency.

2. The stated purpose and potential of the rebels to disrupt elections in certain areas.

3. Lack of public confidence in any of the presidential candidates running in the elections.

Continued Suspension of Guarantees: Except for a six-week period from January 25 to March 12, 1958 constitutional guarantees have been in abeyance continuously since August 1, 1957. Among these guarantees are freedom of expression, the right of assembly, and freedom of movement—indispensable elements for the establishment of a proper climate for uninhibited political campaigning. Under the two periods of national emergency the Government assumed exceptional powers—extension of controls over expression and means of communication, labor and management, education, and the judiciary—which further detracted from the electoral climate. The Government has now confirmed to the Ambassador that elections will be held on November 3, 1958 under a continued suspension of constiutional guarantees.

Potential of the Rebels to Disrupt Elections: As indicated above the revolutionary opposition has announced its purpose to disrupt the elections. It is difficult to estimate its potential to do so, but psychologically it is already having an important effect. This is reflected in the fact that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) is now considering measures which can be taken in the six provinces to minimize the risk of rebel interference. In Oriente, Camaguey and parts of Las Villas, which have more than one half of the total electorate, the danger is greatest. In Camaguey and Habana Provinces the TSE has already approved the concentration of rural polling places in the seats of the 35 municipal districts. It will probably follow this same pattern in the other provinces. By this device the Government plans to use what military forces are available for election security duty to provide maximum protection to the polling places in the major towns where garrison forces are maintained. Otherwise, with more than 8,000 polling places the Government would have to tie up some 16,000 soldiers for the purpose. Voters, of course, will presumably have to travel to the municipal seats to cast their ballots. It remains to be seen how much of a deterrent to voting this will be. The Embassy has received reports, as yet unconfirmed, that certain candidates (such as Masferrer in Oriente) are sending representatives into the countryside to collect the voting carnets of the rural population.

Lack of Public Confidence in Candidates: Regrettably, none of the four presidential candidates are of such national stature as to inspire much enthusiasm in the elections. Rivero Agüero, the Governmental Coalition candidate and former Prime Minister, is a devoted follower of Batista. He is campaigning on a platform of “continuism” of the regime. Former President Grau San Martin, the nominee of the Auténticos, is advanced in years and a semi-invalid. Furthermore, he has behind him the tarnished record of his previous (1944–1948) government. Marquez Sterling, the candidate of the Free Peoples Party, has a good record centered on his presidency of the 1940 Constitutional Convention, but does not have good party organization. He is working under the handicap of being regarded in some quarters as a “straw” opposition candidate backed by the Government. Salas Amaro, leader of the Party of Cuban Unity, is a small-time politician with virtually no public following.

[Here follow sections entitled “The Government’s Position” and “The Situation of the Opposition”, outlining the candidates’ programs and qualifications.]

The Public Attitude.

The gauging of public opinion on the elections is a difficult and hazardous task under ideal conditions. In a country where strict censorship has been in effect for the better part of two years, it is virtually impossible to fix public attitudes with any degree of accuracy. No polls have been taken to the Embassy’s best knowledge. The press, which could give at least a clue to public reactions, has not been free to speculate on this aspect. Nevertheless, the Embassy, on the basis of a limited number of conversations with a fairly representative cross section of people, continues to believe that the bulk of the Cuban electorate, which is not committed to either extreme, regards the elections with an understandable attitude of cynicism and apathy.

Underlying this attitude are a series of considerations:

(1) The lack of an electoral climate.

(2) The weakness of the candidates.

(3) The determination of the revolutionary opposition to interfere with the elections.

(4) The unpopularity of the regime and distrust over how it will handle the elections.

The lack of a proper climate for elections has been discussed in a previous section. This factor will further confirm the general attitude as it becomes known that the government will hold the elections under a suspension of civil liberties.

The presidential candidates do not inspire confidence in the elections. Batista in selecting the Government candidate did not pick a man, such as Amadeo Lopez Castro or Jorge Garcia Montes, with a reputation for integrity, competence, and independence. Instead, Batista selected a candidate considered to be a “yes man” with a record of unswerving personal loyalty to him. The divided opposition offers candidates which clearly pose the problem of whether any of them, if elected, can count with [on] sufficient public and military support to govern the country for any length of time after Batista steps down.

The determination and ability of the revolutionary opposition to disrupt the elections in certain areas tends to undermine public confidence in the elections. The unacceptability of the elections to the rebels means that their efforts to overthrow the Government will continue, and hence that the elections offer little hope of resolving this immediate problem. The rebel threat to interfere with the balloting has led the Government to take measures which will make it more difficult for the voter in the rural areas to get to the polls. This in turn may encourage fraudulent practices with the rural vote.

The lack of civil liberties over so long a period and the repression which has accompanied it, regardless of its justification in terms of meeting the provocation of rebel terrorism, has caused the Batista Government to lose popularity. This unpopularity in turn undermines confidence in the sincerity of the Government to abide by its promises of free access to the polls and honesty in the tabulation of the ballots.

The Embassy’s Assessment.

The Embassy believes at this juncture that elections will be held, with constitutional guarantees in suspense, on November 3, 1958 as scheduled, that they will be honest in the sense that intimidation will not be practiced at the polls and the votes will be counted fairly, and that they will not be fully representative since a substantial part of those eligible to vote, because of their lack of faith in the elections or because of reasons beyond their control, will not vote. Under existing conditions—the abstentions or inability to vote of a substantial part of the electorate, the absence of a proper electoral climate, the division of the political opposition, the lack of commanding appeal of the opposition candidates, the organization strength of the four parties comprising the Governmental Coalition, the support of Government employees, the backing of a majority of the leaders of organized labor, strong support among the colored population, and good economic conditions —Rivero Agüero will win. Batista stated to the Ambassador that he believed that 60% of the electorate would cast their ballots: the Embassy believes the President is over-optimistic in this estimate if the President was referring to the total number of persons of voting age in Cuba.

Though the coming Cuban elections will not meet all the standards of an ideal democratic election, they are the best that can be had under the circumstances now prevailing. They are in the Embassy’s view infinitely better than a violent overthrow of Batista and far better than no elections at all. It is therefore in the interest of the United States to encourage them.

Looking beyond the elections the Embassy believes that it is in the best interests of the United States for the present administration to remain in power until February 24, 1959. With the inauguration of the new President it is hoped that the groundwork for a peaceful solution can be laid. The first step might be to select a Cabinet of able and respected citizens capable of changing some of the more undesirable features of the present regime and gaining the confidence and support of the Cuban people.

The first few months will be critical ones for the new Government. However, with the support of the armed forces, a declaration promising elections within two years (which a source very close to Rivero Agüero has assured the Ambassador will be done if the United States will give concrete evidence of support and encouragement to the new Government), and the support of the United States, the new administration may be able to survive and lead Cuba out of the present impasse. This would avert the holocaust which would undoubtedly follow a violent overthrow of the Government, avoid the uncertainties inherent in the political, social and economic orientation of the revolutionary opposition, and block the gains which the Communists expect to make through an extension of the existing stalemate or the overthrow of the government.

For the Ambassador:
Daniel M. Braddock
Minister-Counselor

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2658. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler.

² Not printed. (ibid., 737.00/10–357)

³ See Document 32.

137. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1958¹

Washington, September 26, 1958

SUBJECT

Cuban Rebel Demands of Tribute on United Fruit Company²

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Bump, Vice President, United Fruit Company, Boston

Mr. Baker, Vice President, United Fruit Company, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Raines, Vice President, United Fruit Company, Operations in Cuba

ARA—Mr. Rubottom

CMA—Mr. Leonhardy

Messrs. Bump, Baker and Raines visited Mr. Rubottom this afternoon by previous appointment. Mr. Bump referred to the request the Company had received in Cuba to pay tribute to the rebel movement. Tribute was being assessed on the basis of the Company’s sugar production of last year and amounted to approximately $186,000. The rebels indicated that they wanted $10,000 paid immediately so they could buy some mobile equipment in possession of the United Fruit Company. The rebels under Raul Castro demanded that payment be made by October 1.

Mr. Raines who has just come up from Cuba explained briefly the Company’s vulnerable situation there. They have lost to the rebels in the past year close to $50,000 worth of equipment and livestock. The people in the area are generally sympathetic with the rebels although they were, he said, a bit perturbed with Castro during the cane-burning attempts of last year. He had received indications from these people that if the U.S. were to come out with a strong statement opposing tribute payments, the rebels would rescind their demand. Mr. Bump said the company was considerably concerned over the general lawlessness of some of the Castro elements in the area, communist infiltration into the Movement and lack of control by Fidel over his errant brother, Raul. Mr. Raines described the Cuban Army in the area as being completely ineffectual. He referred to his recent conversation with Ambassador Smith and the Company’s hope that the Department or Embassy could come out with some statement in support of the Company’s refusal to pay tribute to the rebels which had our Embassy’s concurrence, [sic] Mr. Rubottom informed these officials that the Department had received a communication this morning from the Embassy on this subject³ and that a reply was about to be forwarded in which the Department was suggesting a public announcement by the Embassy of the United States attitude toward forced contributions of this nature. He said that the Department looked upon the Company’s problem with sympathetic concern and hoped that the Embassy’s announcement would discourage the rebels from requesting tribute. He added, however, that the decision as to whether American companies operating in Cuba would pay tribute under these circumstances must in the final analysis be left to them.

In response to a query from Mr. Rubottom relative to the Company’s views on the general unstable political situation, Mr. Raines said he could see no solution in the immediate future as the rebels controlled large areas in Eastern Cuba and the Army appears unwilling or unable to cope with the situation.

After discussing the Cuban matter, Mr. Bump left with Mr. Rubottom copies of pertinent correspondence with the company officials in Cuba relative to the rebels’ demands for tribute. These documents included photostatic copies of letters from Raul Castro assessing taxes and his order Number 39 providing for such assessment. There was also amongst these documents a photostatic copy of a handwritten instruction from Fidel authorizing such collections.⁴ Mr. Bump asked that Mr. Baker be kept informed of any developments in this matter, and Mr. Leonhardy said he would do so.

Mr. Bump then mentioned certain labor problems the Company was having in Guatemala, and read passages of a letter received from their manager in that country relative to this situation. He left a copy of the letter with Mr. Rubottom who expressed his interest in reviewing it personally.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom Files: Lot 60 D 553, Cuba. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy.

² In telegram 303 from Havana, September 22, Smith reported that Raines and another United Fruit Company representative had informed him that day of Raul Castro’s demand for tribute. Smith advised them to pay “not one cent of tribute” and recommended that the Embassy issue a statement indicating the U.S. Government’s disapproval of any U.S. corporation paying tribute and of any such demands. (ibid., Central Files, 737.00/9–2258)

³ In telegram 320 from Havana, September 25, Smith noted that he planned to issue a statement on September 29 unless otherwise instructed. (ibid.)

⁴ None of these documents has been found.

⁵ Not found.

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, September 27, 1958—1:01 p.m.

175. Embtel 320.² Department disturbed over recent requests made of American firms by rebels and GOC coalition parties for financial contributions or tribute. While Department generally approves Embassy’s advice to these firms, the actual decision and responsibility therefor on action to be taken does not lie with Department or Embassy but with individual companies. This should be made clear to inquiring companies. In lieu of proposed public statement your 320, following statement authorized:

“A number of American companies operating in Cuba recently have been approached by representatives of various Cuban political parties and revolutionary groups for financial contributions, Some of these requests have been accompanied by threats of retaliation if contributions are not forthcoming by a certain date.

“The US Government is opposed to American nationals involving themselves in the internal political affairs of any foreign country. Accordingly, the United States disapproves of contributions, whether forced or voluntary, by American citizens or firms, to any political party or faction within Cuba which would violate that principle.”³

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2558. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Leonhardy; cleared with Snow and Rubottom; cleared in draft with Whiteman, Vaky, Murphy, DOD, P, SCA; and approved by Rubottom who signed for Herter. Repeated to Santiago de Cuba.

² See footnote 3, supra.

³ In telegram 323 from Havana, September 29, Smith recommended that only one public statement be issued which would refer only to extortion and threats of reprisal on the part of the rebels. He said that if the Department considered it necessary, a separate statement could be issued to cover financial contributions to legally-established political parties. He pointed out that the Embassy had heard of only one suggestion for a political contribution and this had been made in good faith with no thought of retribution. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2958)

139. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 29 Santiago de Cuba, September 29, 1958.

SUBJECT

Remarks of General Eulogio Cantillo y Porras

On September 25 I made a courtesy call on General Eulogio Cantillo y Porras, the new commanding officer of the Moncada Barracks in Santiago as well as of military operations in Oriente. I had not met him previously because of being out of town during the change of command ceremonies last week. The general was ostensibly most friendly and he volunteered a number of remarks extending the conversation to beyond the limits of such a call. He spoke English most of the time. The remarks thought to be of interest are briefly summarized.

Negotiations between Army and Rebels

Possibly of greatest interest was an unsolicited statement concerning negotiations between General Cantillo and Fidel Castro, although it is not believed that anywhere near the full story was told.

Following the “defeat” of the rebels in August, and because of it, Fidel Castro sent messages to Gen. Cantillo asking him to meet him for a conference on how the situation could be resolved. Gen. Cantillo, after receiving three or four messages, finally sent a “colonel” to the Sierra Maestra to talk to Fidel. The colonel “talked” to Fidel for three days or so but nothing resulted from this. The rebels had nothing to offer, and they wanted the impossible (not clearly stated). He said that the talks must have been as wearing as the prolonged negotiations at Panmunjom in Korea.

The colonel returned and Castro sent further messages down with the “Red Cross commission” but there was nothing that could be discussed further. The general also said that he continued to receive messages from Fidel Castro from time to time even “via some townspeople in Santiago?”, but there was no basis for negotiation. He started looking through some papers for a recent example, but did not “find” it on his desk.

Rebel Tactics and Strength

General Cantillo said that the rebels were in a weakened position at the present time, although some of his statements were somewhat equivocal. When the Army made a frontal assault against Fidel Castro in the Sierra last month, the Army killed “three hundred” rebels. Fidel found it impossible to keep the city troops up in the hills after this, and, for this reason, he has now sent a lot of them down in small groups to harass the countryside. These groups can not compete with the Army out of the mountains and are being chopped up as fast as the Army can catch up with them.

This calls for new tactics, however. Previously the Army was working on the basis of containing the rebels in the mountains and gradually moving in on them. Now it is necessary to split up and fight over a considerable territory. The rebels hope to prevent elections by terrorist tactics directed at communications and utilities. Guerrilla warfare is hard to fight, especially since the Cuban Army has never had a war on its hands and has been mostly a garrison or police army. The Army has to learn and fight at the same time.

Where Fidel Castro formerly had 2,000 men in the Sierra Maestra, he now has only two small groups composed mostly of Goajiros.²

Whenever the rebels feel strong, according to the General’s remarks, they come out of the mountains and in the cities and plains they can accomplish nothing of significance. This statement is somewhat contradictory in comparison with other remarks here quoted. At the same time, however, it might have been deduced from his remarks that it was a tactic of the Army to permit the rebels to become bold so that they could be defeated more easily.

Gen. Cantillo volunteered the information that the rebels had made excellent propaganda but that the falsity of this became evident during the April attempts at strikes. The military force of the Castros is decreasing, he said. I asked him if the rebels are as strong or stronger than in April. The General replied that he did not think they are as strong. He hinted that he expected significant developments in ten days or two weeks, and that these would presumably be favorable to the Army.

Situation in Santiago

General Cantillo stated that he had found Santiago unusually quiet, and he repeated this statement. He then said that it seemed almost too quiet and he implied that he was suspicious of or did not care for this situation. He gave the impression in his remarks that the city might not remain quiet and that he was trying to be prepared for anything, although it was difficult to deduce exactly what he had in mind.

Stay in Santiago

Gen. Cantillo, when asked about his family, said that he had not brought his wife and daughter to Santiago, because he did not know how long he would be here. The length of his assignment is very indefinite and there would be no use in displacing his family until it is determined that he will be here for a long period. He said that under the present circumstances he preferred the freedom of action that having his family elsewhere permitted. The general gave the impression that he did not expect to remain here for any length of time.

Comment:

I do not know General Cantillo’s personality nor how to assess his remarks. While his English seemed generally good, I received the impression that his choice of words was occasionally faulty so that statements might have been subject to some misinterpretation.

General Cantillo adhered to the official Cuban Army line on the subject of the rebels and their weakness. Some remarks seemed somewhat contradictory, however. He was vague about the future developments which he seemed to expect, although this was probably on purpose.

While the rebels are presumed to be suffering some losses, the general’s statements do not fit in with apparently augmented rebel strength and increased activities in Oriente and elsewhere. He did not offer any explanation of why Fidel Castro’s force was not eliminated if it had suffered so heavily in the August fighting.

While the total of Gen. Cantillo’s statements pointed to rebel weakness and early defeat, I somehow received the impression that he might not have been fully confident of this.

Park F. Wollam

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2958. Confidential. Drafted by Wollam. Copies were sent to the Embassy in Havana and the Office of Naval Intelligence at Guantanamo.

² Peasants of the Sierra Maestra.

140. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith)¹

Washington, September 29, 1958.

Dear Earl: I was sorry not to have been able to give you on the telephone² a fill-in on some of the background surrounding the drafting of the proposed public statement included in our telegram 175³ but the considerations are quite delicate and I thought it best to give you that background in this form so that we would not have to revert to double-talk which would have made it difficult to make the points clearly.

There are three primary reasons why we thought it best to make a general statement in which we refer both to the demands of the rebels and to contributions to political parties rather than dealing only with the matter of rebel demands.

First, the United States Government position on any type of such contributions during electoral campaigns or on tribute, which can be a form of the same thing, is that we do not believe that such payments should be made by U.S. nationals since making them would not be consistent with our policy of non-involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. We take this position with respect to American firms which receive requests from any political parties during election campaigns abroad and as a matter of fact we sent out a message to this effect to Tegucigalpa⁴ prior to the elections in Honduras which took place just a year ago.

Secondly, while we stated in the proposed announcement that the United States Government disapproves of contributions, we did not feel that we could go further than expressing this general disapproval since, in fact, we have very little control over whether payments are exacted and made, or retribution taken if payments are not made. The rebel forces in most areas of Oriente obviously have the capability of taking reprisals if payments are not made, and there is little more we can do other than express our disapproval. If, for instance, we went further and gave any direct or indirect advice to American firms that they not make these payments, we might later be in a difficult position with these companies if the rebels later took retaliatory action. These companies might fall back on the fact that they refused to make payments on the advice of their Government (and might later attempt to obtain indemnification on such basis). Accordingly, since the United States is limited in what it can do so far as rebel demands are concerned, the Department considered it wise to let the question of payments to rebels rest on the broader base.

Finally, we thought that a public statement dealing with application of the principle would offer a face-saving opportunity for the rebels to withdraw their demands on the American companies, if they are of a mind to do so.

These are considerations we had in mind in preparing the proposed statement. We certainly understand your reasons for believing that the issue of the rebel demands should be met head-on, but hope that you will now agree that it was best to prepare the statement as we did.

Sincerely yours,

William P. Snow⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba July–Dec. 1958. Confidential; Official–Informal. Drafted by Little and cleared with Whiteman, who also contributed to the draft.

² No record of this telephone conversation has been found, but in telegram 324 from Havana, September 29 (sent at 11 a.m.), Smith wrote that after his telephone conversation with Snow, he was now recommending that the Embassy make no public statement. (ibid., Central Files, 737.00/9–2958)

³ Document 138.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

141. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 31 Santiago de Cuba, September 30, 1958.

SUBJECT

Situation in Oriente as it affects American interests

It is believed necessary to assess the current situation in Oriente in an effort to determine the degree of danger to American citizens and American property in this area during the next several weeks.

Intentions of 26th of July Movement

The 26th of July Movement is inalterably opposed to the coming elections, and will do all in its power to prevent them from taking place. The Movement claims that candidates Grau San Martin and Marquez Sterling are playing into the hands of the government and that especially the Free Peoples Party is subsidized by President Batista in order to provide a semblance of opposition.

The opposition of the 26th to elections and its determination to block them where possible is now constantly announced by the clandestine rebel radio and press. The government’s determination to hold elections receives even better coverage. Oriente where the rebels have most of their power is the likely place for the most bitter contest. The city of Santiago, and to a lesser extent Guantanamo, Holguin, Bayamo and Manzanillo should present the greatest challenges to both sides in the struggle.

Strength of 26th of July Movement

At the present time, barring unforeseen developments of a dramatic nature, it can be assumed that the rebels will attempt to block elections. The question is how much force and power they have to accomplish this.

Despite statements by government sources, most persons feel that the 26th of July Movement and its allies are growing in power, although it is not possible to make an accurate estimate of the rebel strength and potential.

It will be recalled that in April, 1958 after an extensive propaganda campaign and a “war of nerves” which was rather successful in Oriente Province, the strike effort to be coordinated with a civic uprising failed miserably. While there was a partial strike in Santiago proper coupled with a number of terroristic attacks and one small scale “military attack” (Boniato, April 9), Army and police forces handled the potential menace with comparative ease. The rebels were able to cut land communications in Oriente for several days, however, and there were a number of casualties on both sides. No Americans were injured during this period although some spent uncomfortable moments.

Following a period of relative quiet (but certainly not complete calm) the rebel movement has again become increasingly aggressive in areas outside the mountain strongholds.

This period has also seen the build-up of the “Second Front”. This did not begin until late March when Raul Castro and a reported 150 men broke out of the Sierra Maestra and established themselves in the Sierra Cristal. While their condition was precarious for a while, they now exercise varying degrees of control over approximately 80% of Cuba east of longitude 76. From 150 men the force has grown to perhaps 2,000 or more and rebel leaders claimed double that figure in July during the kidnapping incidents. Arms and weapons were improved and considerable transport has been stolen. Rebel activities take place throughout Oriente.

Small groups from the Sierra Maestra command as well as from the Second Front have recently been harassing the Army and communications on all sides of Santiago. They have attacked or staged raids within a few miles of the city itself. There has been a slow but constant pattern of terrorist attacks within the city itself, although these appear to have almost stopped in the two weeks since General Cantillo took command of the Moncada Barracks as well as of military operations in Oriente.

Reports [less than 1 line not declassified] from a variety of cources are somewhat indefinite concerning rebel tactics for dealing with the elections. There have been several which seem to indicate that stronger rebel forces will push as close as possible to Santiago, so that they can harass and raid perhaps into the city itself.

Guantanamo would presumably be subject to the same circumstances. At present most of the territory surrounding Guantanamo is in rebel hands and there have been reports of small rebel groups entering the town in raids. Other major cities of Oriente will presumably be subject to the same tactics especially where hilly or mountainous terrain favor approach by guerrilla groups as it does in Santiago and Guantanamo.

The object of rebel pressure would be to prevent citizens from voting by disturbing conditions as much as possible. Organized rebel troops outside of the cities would probably be joined by rebel militants within the cities using the familiar hit and run terrorist tactics.

The Consulate believes that the rebel movement is much stronger in Oriente now than it was in April, and that its potential for creating disturbances is greatly increased. Unless the Cuban Armed Forces under the new leadership of General Cantillo or his possible successors are able to counteract the rebels more effectively than they have to date, the 26th of July and its allies can probably carry out much more of a disruptive program during elections than they did in April.

Conditions That Might Be Expected

As in April, a number of Cubans are worried about the possibility of trouble during elections and will probably leave town; many have remained out of town. They expect disruption of utilities as well as communications and violence in various forms from the rebel troops and terrorists and in counter-measures by the Army and other government forces.

The “April feeling” has been slow in developing in the American colony, possibly because there has been less violence within the city recently. It is expected to increase, however, on all sides, and it will be fanned by rebel propaganda.

While the exercise of careful prudence by Americans might be sufficient for protection under the circumstances, it appears likely that there is a possibility for greatly increased violence which will make protection more of a problem. If rebel forces in their present positions encircling Santiago have the power to close in, it is not inconceivable that the city would be completely surrounded and cut off in addition to local action making protection most difficult.

It is hoped that the Consulate will have further information regarding the tactics of the rebels and their abilities prior to the crucial period so that further estimates can be made.

The Consulate is revising its emergency plans in an effort to take the changing conditions into consideration.

Park F. Wollam

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–3058. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Copies were sent to the Embassy in Havana.

142. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Leonhardy) and Ernesto Betancourt, Department of State, Washington, September 30, 1958¹

Washington, September 30, 1958

SUBJECT

Sabotage of American Properties and Threats and Rebel Demands for Tribute from American Companies and Sabotage against their properties

Mr. Leonhardy expressed to Mr. Betancourt the serious concern of the Department over the demands for tax payments which the Castro movement has made of American Sugar Companies operating in eastern Cuba and recent acts of sabotage, looting and killing carried out by Castro elements on the premises of American companies in that area including Nicaro. He mentioned in particular the incidents which occurred at the Chaparra sugar mill of the Cuban-American Sugar Company and at Nicaro. He warned Mr. Betancourt that such activities could have devastating effects on American public opinion toward the rebel movement which could be even more harmful to their cause than the effects of the kidnappings in July. He also mentioned that continued depredations on Nicaro could force the closing of the plant which would result in the dismissal of nearly 3,000 workers who could easily react against the Castro movement as a result. Mr. Leonhardy pointed to the efforts the Department had gone to in order to remain impartial in the present Cuban conflict and that it was our hope that after the reverberations which followed the kidnappings that the Castro movement would refrain from singling out Americans and American property for molestation and destruction. He showed Mr. Betancourt copies of Raul Castro’s Order No. 39² prescribing the collection of taxes from sugar companies in Cuba as well as other pertinent documents in the case.

Mr. Betancourt said that he was disturbed by this news and that subsequent to Mr. Leonhardy’s telephone call to him of last Friday³ about the rebel demand for tribute he had passed his concern on to the Castro leaders in Miami and said he would again reiterate his feelings to them. He then launched into an extensive apology for the actions of the Castro movement and said that while he could not defend its every act, the U.S. must realize that it controls vast areas of eastern Cuba and, in order to exist, must levy taxes on an indiscriminate basis as between Cuba and foreign firms. He believed that the individual American companies must realize this and certainly should be able to arrange some modus vivendi with the controlling rebel elements.

With respect to sabotage and loss of lives, Mr. Betancourt said he had no indication that American companies were being singled out for this purpose. The killing at Nicaro yesterday he explained could have been a matter of personal vengeance or a case of a “chivato” (informer). In response to a query from Mr. Leonhardy as to how the local commander could allow his men to take justice in their own hands while preaching against the atrocities of Batista, Mr. Betancourt explained that Fidel actually frowned on these actions and had had his own men shot for murder of this kind. However, the U.S. must remember, he said, that the Castro movement is not doctrinaire and encompasses people of all walks of society and convictions and certainly amongst them there are extreme nationalists and anti-U.S. elements.

Mr. Betancourt said that he considered he had failed in his efforts to bring about friendlier relations between the Castro movement and the U.S. Government. He said he recognized the difficulties raised by international law because of our recognition of the Batista Government but that we must understand sooner or later that the Castro Movement is the dominant force in the revolutionary opposition, that it will eventually prevail in Cuba and that the Cuban revolution will establish a pattern for revolutions in other countries of the hemisphere which have dictatorial governments. He said that within the Movement there is a distinct feeling that it is frowned upon by the Department of State, that the U.S. Government is hopeful that other revolutionary opposition groups will hold the balance of power in a new Government in Cuba and direct the fortunes of the revolutionary government. He emphasized the latter point by stating that we have spurned Dr. Urrutia who will without a doubt be the provisional president of Cuba while at the same time we have coddled such oppositionists as Dr. de Varona. He said that he thought the U.S. ought to make more effort to cultivate Dr. Urrutia who could be of immense assistance during these trying times as he has Castro’s confidence. If for instance we were to discuss our present problems with Dr. Urrutia instead of with him (Mr. Betancourt), he felt we would have a much better chance of success. He described Dr. Urrutia in glowing terms and said that he would not be a lackey of Castro’s but would conduct a respectable provisional government which would lead Cuba back to democracy.

Several times during the conversation when Mr. Betancourt referred to the respectability and democratic base of the Castro Movement, Mr. Leonhardy reminded him of the anti-American literature circulated by the Movement, the general lawlessness of many of the rebel elements associated with Castro including the kidnappings of last June and July, and the numerous dictatorial pronouncements made by Fidel such as his famous December 14 manifesto of last year.⁴ He implied that if Castro is desirous of inspiring U.S. and free world public confidence in his Movement these actions would appear to be counterproductive. Mr. Betancourt attributed many of these acts to the open hostility exhibited by the U.S. Government toward the Castro Movement and particularly by our Ambassador in Habana who constantly refers to the rebels as “bandits”.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–3058. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy.

² See footnote 4, Document 137.

³ September 26. No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 46.

143. Editorial Note

The text of the statement to be released by the Embassy in Havana regarding tribute demanded by the rebels of American businesses was revised slightly in telegram 180 to Havana, October 1 (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2958), and as a result of further telephone conversations between the Embassy and the Department of State (telegram 184 to Havana, October 2; ibid., 737.00/ 10–258).

In the evening of October 2, the Embassy released the amended statement to the press. (Telegram 337 from Havana, October 2; ibid.) On the morning of October 3, Foreign Minister Guell telephoned Ambassador Smith to relay President Batista’s request that the first paragraph of the statement be deleted since Batista objected to the Cuban Government being “listed as extortionist in the same category with rebels.” Smith and Guell agreed to discuss the matter later in the day, with Smith assuming that the Cuban Government in the meanwhile would curtail dissemination of the statement.

Early in the afternoon, Guell again called Smith to say that he had been summoned by Batista who had heard the full text on the radio and was greatly upset. Batista authorized publication in Havana newspapers of only the last two paragraphs of the statement. Smith, however, recommended that the U.S. Government make no issue about the censorship since the abbreviated statement “still accomplishes our primary purpose and since it seems to Embassy to reflect no bias.” Smith said he would await Departmental approval before mailing the statement to American firms in Cuba. (Telegram 338 from Havana, October 3; ibid., 737.00/10–358)

On the evening of October 3, the Department informed the Embassy that it released to the press in Washington the full text of the Embassy statement and concurred in the Embassy’s delivery of the complete statement to American firms. (Telegram 187 to Havana, October 3; ibid.)

144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, October 7, 1958—8:30 p.m.

191. Deptel 175.² Department seriously concerned over possible implications recent rebel demands for financial contributions and any increased violence this may portend American properties and persons in Cuba particularly in eastern provinces. Recent depredations against Nicaro plant indicate some rebel moves may be unrelated to rebels’ announced objective to raise funds for purchase arms. While recent Embassy and Consulate reports these questions have been very useful hope both will keep alert in assessment any future rebel moves for indications concerted attack American interests or other manifestations anti-U.S. point of view.

At moment Department believes best available course of action is to impress on rebel representatives serious view U.S. Government takes of any violence against American property interests and pointing out to these persons that any such activities are contrary lofty purposes rebels so often enunciate in explaining their case in the U.S. or in such documents as Caracas Pact, and could again cause anti-rebel reaction by U.S. press and public similar to that which occurred after June kidnappings. Department has already made these points to 26th July agent in Washington (see memo of conversation Betancourt September 30³ ). As next step Department proposes Consulate Santiago get above message to rebels through local representatives Santiago. It should be pointed out that American companies, as is customary and in keeping with guidance offered by U.S. Government, are trying to maintain complete impartiality in internal Cuban conflict, are minding own business, and are abiding by Cuban laws. It could also be pointed out that if any U.S. companies in rebel controlled territory are forced to suspend operations because of rebel activities, the necessary resulting unemployment would certainly react negatively to the rebel cause.

If Embassy Habana agrees with this proposal request it so advise Consulate Santiago which should then make approach.⁴

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–758. Confidential. Drafted by Little and Leonhardy; cleared with Wieland, Snow, Rubottom, Whiteman, McKelvey, and Murphy; approved by Rubottom; and signed for Dulles by Murphy. Repeated to Santiago de Cuba.

² Document 138.

³ Document 142.

⁴ In telegram 348 from Havana and repeated to Santiago de Cuba, October 8, Ambassador Smith indicated that the Embassy agreed with this proposal. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–858) In telegram 349 from Havana, October 9, Smith recommended that Wollam be firm when he approached the rebel representatives in Santiago because the Cubans “only respect firmness.” (ibid., 737.00/10–958) In telegram 8 from Santiago, repeated to Havana, October 10, Wollam referred to indications that Embassy statements, among other things, were having some effect on the rebels and advised delay in approaching the rebel representatives. (ibid., 737.00/10–1058) In telegram 353 to Santiago, repeated to the Department of State, October 11, Smith continued to recommend that Wollam carry out the instructions using a “firm tone.” (ibid., 737.00/10–1158) No further instructions from the Department have been found, but in telegram 201 to Havana, repeated to Santiago, October 14, the Department indicated that various rebel leaders in Miami, such as Urrutia, Cardona, and Varona, had reportedly informed Castro of the U.S. Government’s views and those of other influential segments in the United States regarding the violence against American property in Cuba, as outlined in telegram 191 to Havana, and had urged Castro to stop this activity. (ibid., 737.00/10–1458)

145. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) and Ernesto Betancourt, Washington, October 8, 1958¹

Washington, October 8, 1958

Mr. Betancourt telephoned today to say that he had passed on to the Castro Movement Mr. Leonhardy’s concern² over the 26th of July Movement’s attempts to collect “taxes” from American Companies operating in eastern Cuba and the Movement’s recent activities of sabotage and killings in that area. He said Mr. Leonhardy had mentioned the possibility of increased restrictions on Cuban exiles in the United States and of possible resumption of arms shipments to the Batista Government, etc. He said he had been told to inquire whether Mr. Leonhardy was expressing the official position of the Department or was “speculating” on possibilities.

I replied that I was not present during Mr. Leonhardy’s conversation with him but that I assumed that Mr. Leonhardy was doing the same thing that I would have done and that is simply in a frank informal conversation to admit to him the increasing concern felt generally by persons following Cuban developments over the recent attitude and acts of the 26th of July Movement. I said that the result was increasing pressures from many quarters for protection of U.S. interests against these unwarranted rebel activities. I commented that such activities are not calculated to increase the confidence in the leadership of the 26th of July Movement.

He attempted to justify the 26th of July project by explaining that the Batista Government was not exercising any real control in eastern Cuba and the rebel movement simply had taken it over and was levying taxes for the revolutionists as the real authority in that part of the country. I replied that no matter how he attempted to define it, the acts boiled down simply to extort money from American business firms under threat.

He commented that the rebels in Oriente do not look on things of this kind with the same broad knowledge of repercussions abroad as do others who are not facing the same dangers. I answered that I realized this but understood that that was why they utilized the services of representatives in foreign countries including the United States who were supposed to keep the 26th of July Movement informed of such repercussions. I said the question is whether such representatives keep the rebel movement properly advised and if so, whether the rebel movement intends to utilize the services of its representatives. He mentioned that after all the Batista Government is now attempting to increase taxes on sugar and the rebels have a similar right in the area under their control. I asked if this meant that the 26th of July Movement was trying to imitate the Batista Government.

He then began speculating on what would be our attitude if the rebels proclaimed a provisional government in eastern Cuba. I replied that I would not discuss this point but must adhere to the present fact that the 26th of July Movement is attempting to extort money and other things from American companies which the movement both threatens and sabotages and I felt constrained to tell him that if this tendency continued, I did not know how heavy the pressures would be brought to bear on the United States Government nor could I predict the consequences. I told him I thought it very ill-advised of the rebel movement to attempt to use threats and extortions against American companies in Cuba who are attempting to give jobs to Cubans and at the same time to avoid any involvement in Cuban politics. I reminded him of the statement recently issued by the American Embassy³ and which had the full authorization and concurrence by the Department of State. I pointed out that it made it clear that the United States Government disapproves of contributions to any political faction whether pro or anti-government and recalled in this connection that the representatives of the Cuban revolutionary group had only recently complained to me⁴ that the Batista Government had been pressuring American companies to contribute to pro-Government political parties in Cuba. I pointed out to him that the Embassy’s statement made clear that the United States Government disapproves of any such attempts at forced contributions to any political movement, but wants the company to follow a policy of complete impartiality.

Mr. Betancourt said that he would transmit these comments to the 26th of July Movement.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–858. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

² See Document 130.

³ See Documents 138 and 143.

⁴ This conversation has not been further identified.

146. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, October 10, 1958.

SUBJECT

Property Losses Suffered by U.S. Firms in Cuba From Rebel Activities

You mentioned in the ARA Staff Meeting on October 3 that you would be interested in the preparation of a list of incidents involving damage and other types of losses suffered by American firms in Cuba attributable to the rebel forces. DRA has prepared such a summary, including estimates of the money value of these losses where possible, covering the first nine months of this year. This summary is attached along with a detailed report of the Cuban-American Sugar Company of their losses over the past two years.²

The key conclusions to be drawn from this information are as follows:

1. Losses sustained by U.S. firms in Cuba for the first nine months of 1958 were well over $2¼ million.

2. The largest single loss was by the destruction of sugar, totaling over $1.5 million, which took place last spring.

3. Losses sustained in the past three months have been felt principally by the Nicaro plant and the Cuban-American Sugar Company and involve deliberate interruptions of electric service, theft of equipment, and arson.

4. Frequency of damage to property of those two companies has increased in recent months.

The prognosis for the future is that the losses will probably increase because of (a) the rebel interest in disrupting economic activity, particularly transportation and communications, in Cuba as the November 3 election date approaches, and (b) the announced intention and capability of inflicting serious damage on the sugar crop, harvesting of which will begin in about six weeks.

Comment:

We have already taken steps to impress upon the rebels the seriousness with which the United States Government views destruction of property of U.S. business concerns in Cuba. This may have some tempering effect on the Castros but their known attention to the effect of their actions on the U.S. press and public, as distinguished from the Government, would indicate that adverse reaction in the U.S. press to their apparent intentions to destroy U.S. property in Cuba would possibly be a more decisive deterrent. It is, therefore, suggested that information on losses already sustained such as contained in the DRA summary be made available to selected U.S. newsmen who have interested themselves in Cuban affairs in order to provide them with the facts to include in stories should they wish to do so. In making any such information available, it would be made clear that there would be no attribution to the source.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–1058. Confidential. Drafted by Little, cleared with Dreier and Vaky, and initialed by Wieland and Rubottom.

² Neither printed.

³ At the end of the source text, Rubottom wrote the following comment: “I do not expect the U.S. press will find this information very newsworthy.”

147. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 22, 1958—5 p.m.

394. Had lengthy conference with Marquez Sterling, PPL Presidential [candidate] in Chancery at his request. He made following interesting comments on his candidacy.

Re 26 of July movement

(A) Between 80 and 85% of 26 July movement are Communists.

(B) Raul and Fidel Castro were pupils of Sterling when he was a professor at Havana University. In Sterling’s opinion both Fidel and Raul are mentally unbalanced. When Raul was attending Havana University there was talk that he was homosexual.

(C) That many of lawless element are joining and seeking sanctuary with 26 of July movement.

Re the elections

(A) GOC has guaranteed to Sterling that elections will be honest in all places where 26 of July movement do not have complete control.

(B) That both Sterling and Grau have requested Batista to cancel elections in southern Oriente and 3 of 32 municipalities in Las Villas, where 26 of July movement has complete control. Batista is giving this serious consideration. If done such announcement will only be made day before election.

(C) Sterling believes he will win if elections are honest.

(D) The atmosphere for elections has improved considerably in the last two weeks because of (1) GOC invitation to UN to send observers; (2) Batista’s instructions to top officers as reported in Embtel 371.²

(E) That he has campaigned in all provinces except Oriente and has been well received and well treated by army on these appearances.

(F) Sterling believes honest elections can be held under present conditions with constitutional guarantees suspended.

(G) He has on 2 occasions tried to obtain consent of Fidel Castro to participate in elections. This has been definitely refused and Sterling has letter from Castro to that effect.

(H) At meeting of a cell in Havana (attended by PPL senatorial candidate) it was decided that if general strike on October 27 is failure, word will be disseminated for 26 of July movement to support Sterling in general elections.

(I) It has been agreed with GOC that there will be 9-man boards at each polling place. Four will be representatives of four government coalition parties. Majority vote to decide all issues.

(J) Sterling inquired, if elected, if he would receive recognition of US. I said, in my opinion, US would recognize any lawful candidate who is duly elected in free and open election.

(K) Sterling thinks total vote will between 1,600,000 and 1,700,000 out of maximum possible vote of 2,800,000.

(L) That 2,200,00 carnets have been picked up out of maximum of 2,800,000. In reply to my question re GOC having picked up numerous carnets, Sterling said that in Las Villas province more than 100,000 had been returned to individual voters. All carnets have a photo of individual and should provide sufficient insurance against fraudulent vote.

(M) That government candidate Rivero Aguero expects to win elections by carrying Oriente and Havana, plus one small province.

(N) In reply to direct question as to his belief re honesty of coming general elections, Sterling replied that he thought would be honest in provinces of Pinar del Rio, Camaguey and Las Villas.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2258. Secret; Priority.

² In telegram 371, October 19, the Embassy reported that Batista had officially invited the United Nations to send observers to the general elections and had told the chiefs of the armed forces that they must ensure “equal guarantees” for all candidates and parties. (ibid., 737.00/10–1858)

148. Editorial Note

On October 20, two Texaco employees were kidnapped by rebel forces near Santiago. (Telegram 197 from Santiago de Cuba to the Embassy in Havana, repeated to the Department of State, October 20; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2058)

Ambassador Smith asked Consul Park Wollam to advise the rebels through his contacts that Smith would recommend the sale of arms to the Cuban Government unless the Americans were released without delay. (Telegram 119 from Havana to Santiago de Cuba, repeated to the Department of State, October 21; ibid., 737.00/10–2158)

Wollam observed that it was difficult to estimate the rebels’ reaction to such a threat since they were “not realistic” regarding international opinion. Wollam pointed out, however, that the rebels had the power to do largely what they pleased with American businesses in Oriente province. Wollam said that his own approaches to rebel contacts had probably not been successful in the past and suggested that other channels of contact might be utilized. He agreed that the threat should probably be issued, but not until the anticipated rebel messages were received which would establish a different channel of communication. (Telegram 205 from Santiago, October 22; ibid., 737.00/10–2258) The Department had meanwhile informed both the Embassy in Havana and the Consulate at Santiago that it did not approve issuing such a threat at that time. This message was apparently not received in Santiago until after telegram 205 had been sent. (ibid.)

On October 23, the rebels released the two Americans, with the only condition being that the local manager for Texaco had to meet with rebel representatives. (Telegram 21 from Santiago, October 23; ibid., 737.00/10–2358) In despatch 41 from Santiago, October 29, Wollam summarized the two Americans’ report of their experience, the Consulate’s contacts with General Cantillo through local authorities, and the demands made by the rebels in their meeting on October 25 with the Texaco representative for either $500,000 in cash or $300,000 worth of arms. Wollam also commented as follows on the Consulate’s contacts with rebel representatives:

“On verifying the kidnapping, and when the men did not return by night, the Consulate took the opportunity of informing various persons closely connected with rebel causes of its extreme concern. It was pointed out that the concern was not only for the persons kidnapped but for the reaction which was bound to follow in the United States which would undoubtedly be felt through the Department of State.

“Upon receipt of the Department’s Niact telegram No. 22, which was first relayed by voice radio from Habana, the message was also delivered to contacts of the Consulate [less than 1 line not declassified]. These persons in Santiago professed to have no knowledge of the kidnapping and generally considered it foolish but not serious, since they did not feel that the men were in danger. The urgency of the matter was stressed by the Consulate.

“This type of procedure could, however, be very detrimental to the Consulate. With various forms of clear radio and telegraphic instructions to contact rebels it is felt that both the Consulate and any possible contacts were placed in an undesirable spotlight. It is realized that the Department and the Embassy wished to give all possible publicity to this instruction, but the Consulate and any contacts should be protected if relationships are to be maintained. It is suggested that the Department could have given the Consulate several hours of advance notice in code in order to make contact before sending clear telegraphic messages which were in this case repeated over voice radio, or that specific instructions of this nature should have been left classified.

“Local authorities could well take umbrage at the fact that the Consulate is openly and publicly instructed to get in touch with representatives of an illegal movement in revolution against the government.” (ibid., 737.00/10–2958)

On October 23, two United Fruit Company employees were kidnapped by rebel forces and held for a day in the area near Preston. The two, who were released unharmed, were among the Americans who had been kidnapped in June. Smith briefly reported on this kidnapping in telegram 412 from Havana, October 24. (ibid., 737.00/ 10–2458)

149. Memorandum of Discussion at the 384th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 30, 1958¹

Washington, October 30, 1958

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that national elections in Cuba were scheduled for next Monday.² He believed that the Council should realize that no elections could probably be held in the Oriente Province and in certain portions of other provinces under the control of Castro’s military forces. Indeed, Castro had threatened to kill all candidates for political office who had not withdrawn from the electoral race prior to the election day.

Secretary Dulles commented facetiously that this could provide President Eisenhower with a good idea. After the laughter had subsided, Mr. Allen Dulles predicted that the government forces would win the election, but that Castro’s forces would not accept the result. He also pointed out that despite the efforts of the Batista government, Castro’s forces were estimated to include at least four to five thousand men. Thanks to his tactics, American interests in Cuba are having a rough time.

The President inquired why Batista had apparently never really made a genuine effort to quash this rebellion. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that Batista had tried, but had simply been unable to achieve success. Mr. McCone commented that a recent visit to Cuba had indicated to him wide popular support for Castro. The President asked whether Batista had any kind of a Navy, and if he did, why he could not blockade the Oriente Province. Mr. Dulles replied that certainly the Cuban Navy was not adequate to blockade the Oriente Province, and that munitions were smuggled in in large numbers of small boats.³

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 31.

² November 3.

³ In an undated memorandum to the President, Allen Dulles, referring to the NSC meeting of October 30, discussed the organization of the Cuban Navy and the sources of supply for the Cuban rebels. (Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary)

150. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 31, 1958¹

Washington, October 31, 1958

SUBJECT

Cuban Political Situation and Possible Effects on American Interests Operating in Eastern Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

ARA—Mr. Rubottom, Mr. Snow

CMA—Mr. Wieland, Mr. Little, Mr. Leonhardy

L/ARA—Miss Whiteman

Mr. Kenneth H. Redmond—President of the United Fruit Company

Mr. Hummel—Director of the American Foreign Power and also connected with the Lone Star Cement Co.

Mr. J.C. Carrington—Freeport Sulphur Co.

Mr. Harris F. Dodge—Texas Company

Mr. Robert J. Kleberg—President, King Ranch

Mr. Michael Malone—King Ranch representative in Cuba

Mr. J.S. Baker—Assistant Vice President, United Fruit Company

Mr. Redmond of the United Fruit Company began by stating that the gentlemen with him represented American companies with properties and personnel in Eastern Cuba and that they had come to Washington following a meeting in New York on Tuesday² of officials of the interested companies in order to obtain the Department’s views on the present and future political situation in Cuba and the nature of any course of action and policy the United States might take towards the newly elected government in that country. Mr. Redmond briefly referred to the increasing difficulties his company was having in Oriente Province and said that others in the group were or would be faced with a similar situation. Mr. Redmond then asked what the Department’s views were on the prospects of elections being held, the possibility of their acceptability by the Cuban people, and whether a lull could be expected in hostilities following the elections.

Mr. Rubottom referred briefly to the attempts by the Castro Movement to disrupt the elections by violence. He said he thought that elections would be held but it remained to be seen whether the people would accept the mandate and thereby exert a calming effect on the over-all tense situation. If Castro fails in his attempt to disrupt the elections it could reduce, for a while at least, his effectiveness. He said that we are hopeful that the menace of the Castro forces would be reduced after elections if the elections had wide acceptability but that this may be an optimistic view. He deferred to Mr. Wieland and Mr. Leonhardy on the question of whether any significant reduction in Castro’s activities would take place after the elections. Mr. Wieland explained that Castro is banking heavily on frustrating the elections and if his attempts were not successful it would be a blow to his cause but that it was unlikely that there would be much diminution of Castro’s military activity in Oriente as result. Mr. Leonhardy explained that the Army apparently had no use for Castro and could be expected to put up resistance in the more populated areas and away from Castro’s mountain strongholds. While it would appear that Castro would have little chance of taking over Cuba militarily, the Army at the same time probably would not be able to defeat or reduce the Castro forces by any significant number and therefore a continuation after elections of the same type of hostilities in Oriente and other isolated areas as we have seen in the past several months could be expected.

Various of the company representatives present asked the question of what the U.S. policy would be towards the newly-elected government and whether or not we would give it assistance and encouragement. Mr. Rubottom referred to the limitations imposed upon the United States by our various inter-American agreements and said these and our non-intervention policy ruled out the use of our troops to assist governments in the hemisphere. He said that there were a number of months intervening between the elections and the actual inauguration of the new government and that this would give our Government an opportunity to assess the prospects of the new regime so that we could determine what, if any, steps we could and should take short of intervention to lend our moral support to it. He advised those present that our arms policy was constantly under review but that the export of U.S. arms to Cuba was really not the answer as from the time of Castro’s landing in Cuba in December 1956, to March of this year the Batista Government was receiving arms from this country but could not, despite this, subdue the Castro forces. Mr. Redmond suggested the possibility of getting out some kind of public announcement which might be of assistance to the new Government and Mr. Rubottom said that if the new Government showed signs of bringing about a peaceful solution in Cuba we would seriously consider giving it this type of support.

Mr. Hummel of American Foreign Power mentioned the recent statement made by the Embassy in Habana relative to American firms paying tribute to any of the factions in the political struggle in Cuba³ and suggested that this was the same type of statement made by Ambassador Braden back in 1942⁴ but with the deletion of the final sentence which indicated such cooperating American firms would be given U.S. protection. He asked why this last sentence was deleted. Mr. Rubottom explained that the Embassy’s statement was carefully phrased and was designed to be of assistance to the American companies in Cuba who were under threat. Such statements he said, have been made under similar circumstances in other countries in recent years and the Braden statement to which Mr. Hummel referred was not used as a model and no deletion from it was involved. Mr. Hummel raised the point that if they resisted paying tribute as the Embassy has indicated they should do, how much protection could they expect from the United States Government and what recourse would they have against present and future Cuban governments for damages incurred. Mr. Rubottom said this raised certain legal points and he wished to defer to Miss Whiteman. Miss Whiteman explained that American firms, when they invested abroad, did so with the knowledge that they would have to incur certain risks. She explained that our Government endeavored to extend such protection to Americans and their properties abroad as was possible within the sovereignty and jurisdiction of another Government, but that in this particular case large areas of Eastern Cuba are under control of rebels who have no status recognized by this country. So far as the Cuban Government is concerned, they are not acting within its authority. Thus, we are unable to look to the legitimate government or to the rebels to provide protection. With respect to property damages she said there was ample legal precedent of governments refusing to pay damages incurred under such circumstances. If the rebel opposition responsible for such damages were to come into power, a claim for such damages could be made against the new government. Whether or not such a claim would be paid would be purely conjecture.

Mr. Rubottom explained the Department’s concern for the plight of American interests in this area of Cuba and said that the Secretary was vitally interested in this matter.

Mr. Redmond said that the group was not only interested in determining what the Department’s future course of action would be in Cuba but wanted to express its willingness to cooperate in any efforts it might wish to make to bring about a peaceful solution in Cuba. Mr. Rubottom said that we had been giving the Cuban situation priority consideration for many months and were thinking of ways and means short of intervention which might bring about a solution. He mentioned the good offices of the Organization of American States as a possibility. He also mentioned, as did Mr. Snow, the important role which the American press had and could play in this respect. Mr. Snow mentioned the definite evidences we had that the Castro Movement was particularly sensitive to editorial comment in the United States press during the July kidnappings and recent editorials condemning their activities probably would have a deterring effect on their depredations against U.S. properties. Mr. Rubottom stated that the Department definitely could not look with approval on the tactics being used by the Castro Movement to gain its ends in Cuba.

Mr. Redmond also raised the issue of U.S. recognition of the newly-elected government in Cuba. Mr. Rubottom replied that a government which succeeded another through the ordinary electoral process is usually accorded recognition automatically. He said he realized Cuba was a special case and the Department would probably have to weigh the various factors ordinarily involved in recognition.

Mr. Kleberg raised the question of Communism in the Castro Movement and Mr. Rubottom replied that, although there is no doubt the Communists are exploiting the opportunity provided by the rebellion, the Department had no conclusive evidence that the Movement is Communist-inspired or dominated. He pointed out that if we had had conclusive information to this effect, our attitude towards the Cuban situation would have been altered considerably. He asked the representatives present if they had any information which they had not already revealed to our Embassy indicating possible Communist connections with the Movement. Mr. Redmond indicated that such information as they had, already had been available.

Mr. Rubottom thanked the American business representatives for their visit and willingness to cooperate under these very difficult circumstances and said the Department would carefully consider their comments.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–3158. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Leonhardy and cleared in draft with Whiteman.

² October 28.

³ See Documents 138 and 143.

⁴ Not further identified.

151. Editorial Note

Prior to the Cuban national elections scheduled for November 3, the Public Affairs Adviser in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Orville Anderson, prepared an information memorandum, dated October 29, regarding the elections (ARA Series No. 163) for the U.S. Information Agency. After providing background, a list of parties and candidates, and a description of the rebel groups, Anderson offered the following guidance on the U.S. Government’s position:

“The continued suspension of constitutional guarantees—freedom of expression, right of assembly, and freedom of movement—is hardly a proper climate for the elections. The stated purpose and potential of the rebels to disrupt elections in certain areas is another damper on the elections. In addition, the weakness of the presidential candidates and the unpopularity of the regime and distrust over how it will handle the elections all combine to produce an apathetic and cynical Cuban electorate.

“The US position both public and otherwise, is one of complete hands-off, the election being an internal matter to be decided by the people of Cuba. It is suggested that only such factual coverage as may be required for credibility be given the election results.” (Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 60 D 513, Cuba 1958)

On November 3, the day of the elections, the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba reported through the Embassy in Havana that it was doubtful if 5 percent of the electorate voted in that city. It had been widely rumored that party caucuses had determined the winning provincial and local candidates the previous day. Wollam said that, although there had been shooting forays in the city the previous two nights, the city had been extraordinarily quiet that day. (Telegram 463 from Havana, November 4; ibid., Central Files, 737.00/11–458)

On November 4, Ambassador Smith reported that early returns indicated that Rivero Agüero had been elected President by a wide majority, and that the elections in Havana had been held in a notably peaceful and calm atmosphere. Smith said that charges of fraud would undoubtedly soon be forthcoming. (ibid.) For Smith’s recollections concerning the elections, including his election-night telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Guell, see The Fourth Floor, pages 152–157.

In telegram 247 to Havana, November 6, the Department asked for, as soon as there was a basis for judgment, the Embassy’s “evaluation of election results, their acceptability to Cuban people, and prospects of Rivero Aguero’s assuming real control and success in intention to ameliorate present strife.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–658)

Fall of the Batista government, November–December 1958

152. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 4, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 121.373/11–458. Top Secret; Transmittal designation not declassified.

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 6, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–658. Confidential; Priority.

154. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) and President-Elect Rivero Agüero, Havana, November 15, 1958

Havana, November 15, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.11/11–1758. Confidential. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 515, November 17. Drafted by Gilmore. In telegram 503 from Havana, November 14, Smith asked the Department for guidance in his conversations with Rivero Agüero and Batista planned for the following day. He asked: “If President Elect Rivero Agüero is willing to compromise and is willing to take whatever steps necessary to bring about a peaceful solution in Cuba, will the Department support the new administration?” (ibid., 611.37/11–1458) In telegram 264 to Havana, November 14, the Department said that Smith in his conversation with Rivero Agüero should not go beyond referring to Rivero Agüero’s stated willingness to seek a peaceful solution and asking him for details as to how he planned to achieve this. The Department concluded: “We believe we should know what these concrete plans are and chances for success in ending internal strife in order be able determine desirability any possible revision current policies.” (ibid.) The Department apparently furnished no instructions as to what Smith should say to Batista.

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 16, 1958—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1658. Confidential; Priority.

156. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 16, 1958—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–1658. Confidential; Priority.

157. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 17, 1958—10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 437.1183/11–1758. Confidential.

158. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) and Ricardo Artigas, Department of State, Washington, November 18, 1958

Washington, November 18, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1858. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland. Artigas was a close associate of exiled General García Tuñón.

159. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) to the Deputy Director of the Office (Little)

Washington, November 20, 1958.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Rivero Aguero. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland and addressed also to Leonhardy.

160. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 22, 1958

Washington, November 22, 1958

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Pending Statements. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson. In his memoirs, Smith indicates that he went to Washington on November 23 for consultations. He describes in particular a meeting, whose date is unspecified, in the office of Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. (The Fourth Floor, pp. 160-161) No record of such a meeting in Murphy’s office has been found. Ambassador Smith left Havana on November 17 and returned on November 23.

161. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, November 24, 1958.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and was concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on November 24. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. Published in full in Declassified Documents, 1984,1510.

162. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) and President-Elect Rivero Agüero, Havana, November 25, 1958

Havana, November 25, 1958

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.11/11–2658. Confidential. Drafted by Gilmore. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 558 from Havana, November 26.

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, November 26, 1958—11:45 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–2658. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy and Snow and cleared with Wieland who signed for Dulles.

164. Editorial Note

165. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Washington, November 28, 1958.

Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Cuba Situation 1957–1959. Secret; Sensitive Situation. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

166. Editorial Note

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 30, 1958—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56337/11–3058. Confidential; Niact. Passed to the Commander of the U.S. base at Guantanamo.

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, December 2, 1958—7:34 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56337/11–2958. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Little and cleared in draft with Hill and in substance with Kefauver and Snow.

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 2, 1958—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–258. Secret; Priority.

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 5, 1958—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–558. Confidential; Priority. Ambassador Smith had left Havana on December 4 to return to Washington for consultations. (Telegram 578 from Havana, December 4; ibid., Central Files, PER)

171. Editorial Note

172. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics

Washington, December 8, 1958—5:29 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/12–858. Confidential. Drafted by Little, cleared with Wieland and in draft with Ambassador Smith and Reed (RPA), and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter. Sent to all diplomatic missions in the American Republics except Cuba. Pouched to Havana.

173. Editorial Note

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 11, 1958—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1158. Confidential; Niact. A note on the source text indicates that Smith read the telegram at 3:20 p.m. on December 11.

175. Editorial Note

176. Editorial Note

177. Diary Entry by Senator Allen J. Ellender

Havana, December 14, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–EL/3–2459. Senator Ellender visited Cuba December 9–14, during which time he met with high-ranking Cuban Government officials, including Foreign Minister Guell on December 10. Ellender also addressed the Directors of the American Chamber of Commerce, visited the Moa Bay Mining Company, and on December 12 gave a press conference in Havana. His conversation with Guell was reported in despatch 608 from Havana, December 11. (ibid., 033.1100–EL/12–1158) A schedule of and brief report on Ellender’s activities is in despatch 636 from Havana, December 17. (ibid., 033.1100–EL/12–1758) A transcript of Ellender’s press conference was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 633 from Havana, December 16. The Embassy noted that Ellender had been prodded by certain correspondents “into statements critical of U.S. Government policy toward Cuba, questioning the existence of a civil war in Cuba, and referring to the revolutionary elements as ‘bandit groups’.” The Embassy discussed the varied reactions to Ellender’s comments and concluded: “In the rapidly moving Cuban scene it is probable that Senator Ellender’s press interview will have no great or lasting effect. That he spoke out so openly for the Administration and against the rebels at a time when the United States Government was trying to maintain a policy of non-intervention and when the rebels held much of eastern Cuba in their control must be viewed from the Embassy’s standpoint as regrettable.” (ibid., 033.1100–EL/12–1658) Text of a public statement, issued by the “Civic Resistance Movement” and highly critical of Ellender’s remarks, was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 642 from Havana, December 18. (ibid., 033.1100–EL/12–1858)

178. Editorial Note

179. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 15, 1958

Washington, December 15, 1958

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba—Political. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson.

180. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Ciudad Trujillo, December 15, 1958—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1558. Confidential.

181. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 16, 1958—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1658. Secret; Priority.

182. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, December 16, 1958.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and was concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on December 16. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Agency Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Published also in Declassified Documents, 1984, 1511.

183. Editorial Note

184. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, December 17, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/12–1758. Secret. Repeated to Havana.

185. Editorial Note

186. Memorandum of Discussion at the 391st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 18, 1958

Washington, December 18, 1958

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason.

187. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 19, 1958—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1958. Secret; Priority.

188. Memorandum of Discussion at the 392d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 23, 1958

Washington, December 23, 1958

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason.

189. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, December 23, 1958.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. Initialed by the President. Another copy indicates that it was drafted by Rubottom and Snow. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America)

190. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 23, 1958

Washington, December 23, 1958

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba—Political. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson on December 30 and revised on January 8, 1959.

191. Editorial Note

192. Editorial Note

193. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, December 29, 1958

Washington, December 29, 1958

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, December 1958. Secret. Prepared by Thomas McElhiney. An attendance list for the meeting, which was chaired by Herter, is attached to the source text.

194. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Ciudad Trujillo, December 29, 1958—11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2958. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Havana.

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State

Quito, December 29, 1958—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2958. Confidential; Priority.

196. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 29, 1958—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2958. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

197. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs (Stewart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, December 29, 1958.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Testimony. Secret. Drafted by Stewart. Also addressed to Wieland who initialed the source text.

198. Editorial Note

199. Editorial Note

200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, December 30, 1958—8:04 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3058. Official Use Only. Drafted by Wieland and cleared with Snow.

201. Memorandum of a Conference, Under Secretary of State Herter’s Office, Department of State, Washington, December 31, 1958, 4 p.m.

Washington, December 31, 1958, 4 p.m.

Source: Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator’s File. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated on the source text, but it was apparently Rear Admiral Hayward. The source text is attached to a summary of the conference prepared by Hayward which was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs under cover of a brief memorandum from Admiral Dennison, January 8.

202. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 31, 1958—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3158. Confidential; Priority.

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, December 31, 1958—9:41 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1358. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland, Little, and Stevenson; cleared in draft by Hill and Snow; and cleared with Murphy and Rubottom.

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador

Washington, December 31, 1958—10:42 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3158. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dreier, cleared with Snow, approved by Little, and signed by Rubottom for Herter. Repeated to Havana.

205. Editorial Note

206. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 1, 1958—6 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Niact.

152. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 4, 1958—5 p.m.

466. It is essential in my judgment, for sound US policy determination re Cuba, that our Government learn beyond any doubt whether and to what extent Castro movement is penetrated, supported, influenced or directed by international Communism. Our information on this subject to date is dangerously inconclusive.

[2 paragraphs (6 lines) not declassified]

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 121.373/11–458. Top Secret; Transmittal designation not declassified.

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 6, 1958—5 p.m.

478. Marquez Sterling, defeated Presidential candidate, has sent us following personal message through Mario Lazo and Dr. Jorge Cubas. If elections had been honest instead of fraudulent, Sterling believes he would have won. Now Sterling thinks many disillusioned youths may join 26th July movement. To stop such additional recruitments for Castro and for good of Cuba, Sterling recommends US support GOC and renew sale of arms.

If Department at this time is not willing to go that far, I do feel time has definitely come when US must make sincere effort to stop air drops of arms from Florida to rebel territory; to enforce our neutrality laws; and to give no moral aid and comfort to 26th July movement.

Press releases from Washington reporting conversations with Betancourt and other representatives give impression in Cuba that US is giving unofficial recognition to 26th July movement activities.

When and if Department is willing to show moral support for the administration against rebels, I believe President-elect Rivero Aguero will in turn be willing to shorten his mandate and call for general elections within two years.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–658. Confidential; Priority.

154. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) and President-Elect Rivero Agüero, Havana, November 15, 1958¹

Havana, November 15, 1958

Subject:

Plans of President-Elect Andrés Rivero Agüero

This luncheon meeting was arranged at the Ambassador’s request at the Embassy Residence to afford an opportunity to discuss with Dr. Rivero Agüero certain aspects of the present political situation.

The principal topics touched upon in the three-hour meeting were Dr. Rivero Agüero’s plans for a solution of the present revolutionary situation, the possibility that Dr. Rivero Agüero may make an unofficial visit to the United States, GOC military capability, and his general attitude toward the United States.

1. Dr. Rivero Agüero’s Plans for a Solution of the Present Revolutionary Situation.

In response to the Ambassador’s questions Dr. Rivero Agüero stated that in the very near future he intends to announce publicly the intention of his government to call a constitutional assembly to consider the steps which should be taken to restore full constitutional government to Cuba. He said that ever since the coup d’etat of March 10, 1952, the legitimacy of the present regime has been questioned by the political opposition, and that the elections of 1954 did not serve to terminate this debate because they were considered to have been held under the auspices of a regime which had not come into power by constitutional means. He drew a parallel between the present situation and that which prevailed following the overthrow of President Machado in 1933. In the latter case full constitutional government was not restored until the constitutional assembly of 1940. In his opinion Cuba must follow the same course at this time. He said he would hope to call such an assembly within the first year of his term and at that time it would be decided whether to hold new elections and whether to shorten his four-year term of office. He said this plan has the support of Dr. Márquez Sterling and of Dr. Carlos Prío, but that the attitude of Dr. Grau is uncertain. The latter made an unexpectedly poor showing in the elections and because of his advanced age is subject to vagaries which make his reactions unpredictable. However, it is probable that a majority of Grau’s supporters will favor the plan.

The Ambassador commented that were the political and legal oppostion to give their full support to the plan to hold a constitutional assembly, it would appear that the revolutionary oppostion would be very much weakened. He explained that in his view the distinction between the “political” and the “legal” opposition is that the former actively supports a constituted opposition party, whereas the latter represents a mass of voters who, while desirous of a peaceful change in administration, are not active participants in the existing opposition parties. Dr. Rivero Agüero replied that in his opinion 90 percent of the people of Cuba desire a peaceful solution and would support his plan. The remaining 10 percent comprise subversive elements linked with communists, plain bandits, and other groups who thrive on disorder. The Government must redouble its efforts to eliminate this disruptive minority. Otherwise it may interfere with the plan to convene a constitutional assembly and, through intimidation of prospective participants, may have the effect of diminishing its national standing. Dr. Rivero Agüero went on to stress the impossibility of reaching any negotiated settlement with Fidel Castro, whom he characterized as a sick man (he mentioned that he has a syphilitic inheritance) consumed by an overwhelming ambition to overthrow the Government by force. Castro, he said, realizes that for him to join in any negotiated settlement would amount to his political suicide, since he has no following among the moderate elements in the country. The outcome of the elections has redounded to Castro’s benefit because he can now say that Rivero Agüero represents a mere continuation of the Batista regime and that the rebels are thus justified in continuing their violent resistance. If Dr. Márquez Sterling, or another opposition candidate, had won, Castro would have been considerably embarrassed because, while he would have insisted upon continuing his present violent course, many of his supporters would then have favored a negotiated settlement. He stated that Fidel Castro must be either killed or captured.

Dr. Rivero Agüero emphasized that he has no particular interest in serving his full term and that his primary objective is to restore peace and full constitutional government to Cuba.

The Ambassador said the Department is interested in being informed as to whether Dr. Rivero Agüero had made any pre-election announcement of his plans to hold a constitutional assembly. He replied that he had made such an announcement during the course of the campaign, stressing two main points, (1) the desirability of taking all possible steps to encourage investment, primarily from the United States, and economic development in Cuba, and (2) the desirability of convening a constitutional assembly at an early date. He had also announced that if elected his government would give sympathetic consideration to any alternative solutions for the present impasse which might be suggested by the political oppostion. He emphasized again, however, that the only means of restoring full constitutional government is through a new constitutional assembly.

2. Possibility that Dr. Rivero Agüero May Make an Unofficial Visit to the United States.

Dr. Rivero Agüero explained that he has traveled widely in the United States and that it has been his custom for the past few years to spend the Christmas holidays and New Year’s in New York. He said that since his election he has been discussing with President Batista the feasibility of making such a visit prior to his inauguration. He feels there would be a number of advantages in such a visit. As a former publicist he believes that he understands the conduct of press relations better than does General Batista and he would welcome an opportunity to have face-to-face discussions with the editors of some of the influential dailies and magazines. He mentioned the New York Times, the Washington Star, the Washington Post, and Time Magazine. He would not visit the United States in his capacity as President-elect and would not expect to be extended an official invitation. However, he feels that it would be useful to have an opportunity to explore problems of common concern to the Governments of the United States and Cuba in direct informal conversations with the appropriate officials of the Department of State. He emphasized the strong mutuality of interest that Cuba and the United States have in finding a solution to the present situation. American investments in Cuba are very substantial; there is a large American resident community; incidents such as that recently at Nicaro² and the seizure in the air of the Viscount belonging to Cubana with resultant loss of American lives, must be prevented. In his view these are examples of the importance of seeking mutual solutions for Cuba’s present problems. He added, however, that he was not inviting intervention in Cuba’s internal affairs.

President Batista, on the other hand, has reservations concerning the advisability of such a visit at this time. He feels that the possibility exists that there would be hostile demonstrations by Cuban exiles, and certain other groups in the United States, which might create possible problems of police protection which would be of embarrassment to the United States Government. He prefers not to be in a position therefore of asking us to take steps, such as protection, which might be construed as endorsement by the United States of Dr. Rivero Agüero.

The Ambassador commented that he believed General Batista’s fears concerning the possibility of hostile demonstrations may be justified (he mentioned that threats of picketing the forthcoming Charity Ball at the Waldorf Astoria, which he and Mrs. Smith are sponsoring,³ have been received), and that it would be difficult for Dr. Rivero Agüero to disassociate himself from the fact that he is President-Elect of Cuba. Dr. Rivero Agüero said that no definite decision had been taken but that he had wished to explore the possibilities of such a visit tentatively with the Ambassador and that he would inform the Ambassador later whether he desired to pursue the matter further. The Ambassador replied that upon hearing from Dr. Rivero Agüero he would informally obtain a reaction from the Department. With reference to Dr. Rivero Agüero’s suggestion that he might during the course of such a visit have discussions with Departmental officials concerning mutual problems, the Ambassador said he is personally in sympathy with the aims which Dr. Rivero Agüero had expressed; that he believed that the Department at this time is primarily interested in knowing Dr. Rivero Agüero’s plans for a peaceful solution of the present impasse and the methods he proposes to pursue in order to achieve it; that the Embassy would of course report fully to the Department the views which had been expressed in this conversation; and that he hoped it would be possible to have a further discussion with Dr. Rivero Agüero on this subject in the near future.

3. GOC Military Capacity.

The Ambassador inquired whether Dr. Rivero Agüero considered that GOC can eliminate the revolutionary forces of Fidel Castro before the inauguration in February. Dr. Rivero Agüero replied that with the present equipment of the Cuban Army he did not think this would be possible. He then referred to a press report of November 15 to the effect that the United States Department of Defense is requesting a 15 billion-dollar special appropriation to re-equip with advanced weapons U.S. military and NATO forces overseas. He said if this plan is to be carried through, he would like to suggest that if Cuba could purchase some small part of the arms to be discarded in the process, it could then eliminate the rebel forces. The Ambassador repeated, as he had said before, that at this time he believed the Department is mainly interested in being informed of the plans which the new Cuban Government will follow for a peaceful solution of the impasse and the methods it proposes to employ in this connection.

4. General Attitude Toward the United States.

At various points in the conversation Dr. Rivero Agüero talked at length of his past contacts with American officials and expressed great admiration for the United States and for Americans. He said because of the sincerity and good-will of most Americans, he had no fear in attempting to explain Cuba’s situation to American public opinion.

In closing the interview Dr. Rivero Agüero reiterated that as far as he is personally concerned, his main and only aim is to restore peace and constitutional government to Cuba. He is indifferent as to whether his term of office shall be long or short. He will return to his law offices gladly when these objectives have been accomplished, and the thing that he values most is that when he returns to private life, people will regard him as having been a “good public servant.”

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.11/11–1758. Confidential. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 515, November 17. Drafted by Gilmore. In telegram 503 from Havana, November 14, Smith asked the Department for guidance in his conversations with Rivero Agüero and Batista planned for the following day. He asked: “If President Elect Rivero Agüero is willing to compromise and is willing to take whatever steps necessary to bring about a peaceful solution in Cuba, will the Department support the new administration?” (ibid., 611.37/11–1458) In telegram 264 to Havana, November 14, the Department said that Smith in his conversation with Rivero Agüero should not go beyond referring to Rivero Agüero’s stated willingness to seek a peaceful solution and asking him for details as to how he planned to achieve this. The Department concluded: “We believe we should know what these concrete plans are and chances for success in ending internal strife in order be able determine desirability any possible revision current policies.” (ibid.) The Department apparently furnished no instructions as to what Smith should say to Batista.

² Reference is to the temporary seizure by Cuban rebels in late October of the Nicaro nickel plant and evacuation by U.S. transport ship, which began on October 24, of 55 dependents of Americans employed there.

³ In telegram 495 from Havana, November 12, Smith said that if the Department had no objection, he was planning to leave Havana for New York on November 17 to be present at a ball given there to raise money for scholarships for Cuban students. He planned to stay in New York for 5 days. (Department of State, Central Files, PER)

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 16, 1958—1 p.m.

507. For Rubottom. At conference with President Batista November 15 he stated approximately 100 ill-equipped soldiers are guarding the isolated aquaduct at Yateras and are bait for rebels who would like to capture aquaduct for propaganda purposes.

Batista suggests following alternatives:

1. US sell adequate arms to GOC troops for defense of aquaduct at Yateras.

2. GOC withdraw troops, leaving civilian personnel. But aquaduct must be provided with radio communication to naval base and to army headquarters at Guantanamo City. There are many GOC troops in surrounding area subject to emergency summons.

3. If US will not agree to numbers one and two above, GOC will leave the soldiers for protection even though they are poorly equipped and are a [?] sacrifice.

In the light of recent events which include loss of American lives, sabotage of American property, extortion of Americans, kidnapping of Americans, and the fact that the GOC is the only recourse for protection, please advise what reply I am to give the President.²

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1658. Confidential; Priority.

² In telegram 267 to Havana, November 17, the Department indicated that alternatives 1 and 2 were unacceptable and instructed the Ambassador to inform President Batista that the U.S. Government desired the third alternative. (ibid., 737.00/11–1758) In telegram 517 from Havana, November 18, Smith reported that he had so informed Guell. (ibid., 737.00/11–1858)

156. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 16, 1958—1 p.m.

508. At conference with Batista November 15, he said members of GOC believe US is intervening in Cuban internal affairs on behalf of rebels because:

A. US not permitting friendly GOC to purchase arms while not officially recognizing a state of civil war or insurgency.

B. Apparent ease with which rebels obtain American arms and ammunition from the US.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–1658. Confidential; Priority.

157. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 17, 1958—10 a.m.

509. At conference with Batista November 15, he stated GOC was offered by two American firms large quantities of automatic arms and ammunition. Batista has turned down offers, because he does not want to smuggle arms from US. Batista further believes these arms will now be offered to rebels.

Although I realize Department is much concerned over flagrant violation of our neutrality laws through consistent supplying of arms and ammunition to rebels from Florida, I again urge that US make every effort in prohibiting this illicit traffic.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 437.1183/11–1758. Confidential.

158. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) and Ricardo Artigas, Department of State, Washington, November 18, 1958¹

Washington, November 18, 1958

SUBJECT:

Cuban Exile Comments

Mr. Artigas called by appointment today to tell me that General Garcia was in touch with a number of Cuban armed forces officers and wished to emphasize that he and they shared the opinion that the only solution to Cuba’s political crisis is for the United States to encourage a military coup with civilian support in Cuba.

He emphasized that the Castro forces are growing stronger almost daily and that a Castro victory would result in a chaotic situation in Cuba for many years to come with serious adverse consequences for the United States. He said that the recent election has worsened instead of improving the Cuban problem. He added that if either Batista remained in office or was succeeded by Rivero Aguero, the present revolution would increase in intensity.

He said that the only solution which now appears possible is for some of the still “unstained” officers in the armed forces to revolt to throw out Batista and at the same time to circumvent Castro. In this connection, he told me that the General Garcia was planning to return to Cuba regardless of the possible personal consequences. He said that the General would contact some of the better elements in the army, but in order to succeed should have some “slight moral support” from the United States.

I asked him to explain what he meant by “slight moral support”. He replied that what the United States would be expected to do would be to pass the word “discreetly and informally” to our Military Mission in Havana to inform Cuban officers at Campo Columbia that there should be a change in government.

He said that several members of the United States Armed Forces Mission have been discussing the political situation in Cuba with some of the military who have indicated their desire to stage a revolt to end the present undesirable situtation.

I told Artigas that this Government had no intention of intervening in Cuba’s struggle; that any solution reached would have to be one worked out by the Cubans themselves; and that the United States had no intention whatever of violating its international commitments by even considering any scheme to impose any formula for changing the Government of Cuba.

Artigas attempted to insist that the United States act, remarking that any indication by us of a desire for change would “solve Cuba’s problem in seven minutes”. I replied that any situation which would result from United States violation of its obligations would result in a situtation that would take more than a century to solve.

Artigas again painted the Cuban picture in the darkest possible terms and asked if we could give him no hope to take back to General Garcia. I replied that his best hope was to use whatever influence he and his principals could mobilize to secure a constructive solution by the Cubans themselves.

He then told me that General Cantillo (commander of Government troops in Oriente Province) had told General Garcia that he had been weighing the various alternatives with emissaries of the 26th of July movement, as well as other revolutionary groups, but had refrained from making any decision to turn against the Government and would act immediately in any foreseeable future only if he got “word from the United States Government”. I told Artigas to tell General Garcia that we certainly were not considering sending any such order to groups in Cuba or anywhere else.

Artigas concluded the conversation by telling me that General Garcia wanted me to know that while it was impossible for him to regard complacently any effort by Batista to remain in power, he was also carefully refraining from involving himself in any revolutionary activities in this country. He said General Garcia wanted me to know that he was not even communicating with any political elements, but was limiting his activities here to correspondence with fellow officers in the Cuban armed forces.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1858. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland. Artigas was a close associate of exiled General García Tuñón.

159. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) to the Deputy Director of the Office (Little)¹

Washington, November 20, 1958.

SUBJECT

Rivero Aguero

I would like your view on the following:

Considering that Rivero Aguero may be sincere in suggesting to Ambassador Smith² that he plans to announce publicly soon his intention to call a constituent assembly in Cuba, what do you think of suggesting to him the following alternative?

Rivero Aguero might be persuaded to address a letter to Batista, to be made public, requesting Batista to convoke an election for delegates to such an assembly for 30 or 60 days following Rivero’s inauguration.

In such a letter Rivero could authorize Batista to draw up a decree with the concurrence of Batista’s successor. This would give Rivero Aguero a chance to determine whether he could assure constitutional guarantees, etc., prior to such an election. An assembly so elected could be convoked to meet within 30 days after the election and provisions could be made for the assembly to draft a new constitution within a 90-day period.

I note that Rivero Aguero told the Ambassador that he was not interested in remaining in office for any long period. If so, there may be a possibility that he can become the key to a peaceful solution if he would be willing to take the suggested step. Of course, no matter how willing he might be to do this, he would undoubtedly want to sound out responsible opinion in advance, even if action of this kind might have some pacifying effect. I don’t see much chance for his remaining in office for even a year, as he appears to imply in his talk with the Ambassador, unless he converts himself into a public hope by some such means as I am suggesting here. I notice also that Rivero Aguero says he may visit the United States around the end of the year. It might be that prior to coming, he could sound out some opinion on this idea and send a letter from here to Batista, accompanied by a public announcement of his action.³

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Rivero Aguero. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland and addressed also to Leonhardy.

² See Document 154.

³ No reply to this suggestion by Little has been found.

160. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 22, 1958¹

Washington, November 22, 1958

SUBJECT

The Situation in Cuba and the Possibility that the New President-elect will Endeavor to Form a Government of Reconciliation

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith

Assistant Secretary R.R. Rubottom, Jr.

Deputy Assistant Secretary William P. Snow

Director of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, William A. Wieland

Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Edward S. Little

Mr. Terrance G. Leonhardy, Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs

Mr. Robert A. Stevenson, DRA

Ambassador Smith began the conversation with a brief review of the situation in Cuba which he described as essentially a political and military impasse, with the army unable to put down the rebels and the rebels unable to inflict a major defeat upon the army. Between the contending forces, he feels, are the vast majority of Cubans who are generally anti-Batista but not pro-Castro and desire, above all, the reestablishment of peace and order. For the first time he has heard reports of economic difficulties, stemming from the rebel activities in the Oriente and elsewhere, which promise to become a major problem for the new Rivero Aguero administration. Furthermore, American business interests are likely to suffer increasing economic and physical harm from the continued unrest and rebel depredations.

With the above situation mutually in mind, Ambassador Smith and Rivero Aguero held a recent conversation (November 15, 1958)² in which the latter declared to Ambassador Smith his sincere desire to bring about a return of peace and order to Cuba. To that end, upon his inauguration or soon thereafter, he said he is willing to call for elections to a constituent assembly and to go along with plans for a new presidential election at the discretion of such assembly. Batista, he states, upon the completion of his term, would retire completely from public and political life. If Rivero Aguero moves ahead along these lines he wonders what support he might expect from the United States, particularly whether the United States would make at least a token shipment of arms to his administration as a gesture of support for his efforts. Ambassador Smith mentioned that in addition to Rivero, he has also discussed the above matter with Rivero’s confidant, former Cuban prime minister Jorgé García Montes,³ who is presently in Spain but willing to return immediately if the United States will indicate support for the above course of action.

Mr. Rubottom asked a few general questions regarding the newly reported clouds on the economic horizon and then addressed himself to the above proposition as follows:

The United States is sincerely sympathetic to Rivero Aguero in all constructive efforts which he may make designed to bring peace to Cuba. Nevertheless, we view the problem as a Cuban internal matter for which only the Cubans, in the end, can provide the solution. The initiative must be theirs. If Batista should retire completely from the political scene, if Rivero makes approaches to various civic groups and wins their support, if the non-revolutionary opposition agrees to go along with the plan, if the Church will support it, if the military agrees—in short, if the country at large, and not necessarily including Castro and the 26th of July Movement, shows itself to be behind Rivero’s efforts, the U.S. Government would be disposed to show its good will and support for him. This it could do in a variety of ways other than by a resumption of the shipment of arms. Admittedly this single step might have the most effect psychologically with the Cuban government, but not necessarily so, and it could be a problem with regard to public opinion in the United States and in Latin America. If Rivero hopes to have any success in his efforts, it would seem that he should begin now a series of steps designed to lead to results such as those mentioned above so that by the time of his inauguration on February 24th the way might be prepared for the establishment of a government of reconciliation.

The question of Batista’s future role was then thoroughly discussed. Ambassador Smith said that Batista had told him⁴ that he does not plan to leave the country because he does not want to give even the appearance of having deserted his loyal supporters; but that he will retire completely from politics. Mr. Snow and Mr. Wieland were both firm in their stated belief that it would be essential for Batista to leave the country, even if only for a few months, if Rivero’s plan were to have any chance of success. Mr. Rubottom supported their opinion on this point and asked if Rivero had cleared his ideas with Batista. Amb. Smith said that he had thought it unsuitable to query Batista directly on this point, but that in view of Rivero’s close association with Batista, he could only assume that Rivero’s efforts have Batista’s blessing. Mr. Wieland cautioned that the Rivero administration must act on its own and not by direction from us and that our future policy can only be guided by the results obtained and not by hypothesis.

Regarding Rivero’s character, Amb. Smith commented that he finds him a pleasant and sincere man, although seemingly not a strong character, particularly in comparison to Batista. Nevertheless, he believes him to be intelligent and able and suggests that once inaugurated he may prove stronger and more resolute than he now appears to be.

Later, at lunch, Mr. Wieland suggested to Amb. Smith the advisability of keeping in close touch with his Latin American colleagues in Habana regarding their views on a possible solution to the Cuba dilemma. He stressed the importance of Latin American acceptance of any solution (in addition to that of the United States) from the standpoint of hemispheric public opinion.

Following lunch Mr. Rubottom was able to review again with Amb. Smith the situation in Cuba. He reiterated the points he had made in the earlier discussion and assured Amb. Smith that the Department would be very dismayed at the prospect of a 26th of July take-over in Cuba. Nevertheless, he could see no prospect of change in our present policy regarding Cuba unless the government there is able to bring about developments within Cuba which would make changes possible and merited.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Pending Statements. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson. In his memoirs, Smith indicates that he went to Washington on November 23 for consultations. He describes in particular a meeting, whose date is unspecified, in the office of Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. (The Fourth Floor, pp. 160-161) No record of such a meeting in Murphy’s office has been found. Ambassador Smith left Havana on November 17 and returned on November 23.

² See Document 154.

³ Smith was apparently referring to conversations which Braddock had with Jorge Garcia Montes on November 8 and 11. Memoranda of these conversations were sent to the Department as enclosures to despatch 500 from Havana, November 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1258)

⁴ See Document 131.

⁵ In telegram 539 from Havana, November 24, Smith wrote that when he talked with Rubottom on November 22 he did not have the opportunity to mention that the “carefully planned sabotage program of the railroads and hiways, which has recently been instituted to disrupt economy of Cuba, is the most significant development in rebel strategy.” Smith further remarked that “this new tactic leads one to believe that they are now receiving professional direction along these lines.” (Department of State, Central Files, 837.00/11–2458)

161. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 85–58 Washington, November 24, 1958.

THE SITUATION IN CUBA²

The Problem

To analyze the present situation in Cuba and to estimate probable developments for the next few months.

Conclusions

1. The 3 November national elections and the prospective inauguration of Rivero Aguero on 24 February have had little effect on the political and military impasse in Cuba. Rebel leader Fidel Castro is continuing his guerrilla warfare campaign, but his movement, in combination with other existing opposition groups, probably cannot overthrow the government in the next few months. On the other hand, the Cuban armed forces cannot suppress the guerrilla movement unless they become better trained, supplied, and equipped, and more strongly motivated, and unless the rebel forces are effectively isolated from external supply sources.

2. The Cuban armed forces remain, however, the most important element capable of breaking the political deadlock, by deposing the regime and establishing a junta. A group within the military would be likely to take such action if there were a sharp increase in popular or labor opposition to the regime. A military-dominated junta almost certainly could not restore peace to Cuba within the period of this estimate unless its membership and actions were such as to convince the revolutionary opposition that it was prepared to accord it a significant influence in the provisional government.³

[Here follows a detailed discussion of the subject, under the following headings: (A) The Strengths and Weaknesses of Fidel Castro’s “26th of July Movement”, (B) The Role of the Cuban Communists, (C) The Role of the Cuban Military, (D) The 3 November National Elections, and (E) The Outlook for the Next Few Months.]

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and was concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on November 24. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. Published in full in Declassified Documents, 1984,1510.

² Title of this estimate when used alone should be “For Official Use Only.” [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, would have conclusion 2 read:

“The Cuban military remains the most important element capable of breaking the political and military deadlock and restoring order in Cuba. Politically this might require deposing the regime and establishing a junta. A group within the military would be likely to take such action if there were a sharp increase in popular or labor opposition to the regime. Except through military operations, which would require early receipt of extensive military aid and assistance, a military-dominated junta almost certainly could not restore peace to Cuba within the period of this estimate unless its membership and actions were such as to convince the revolutionary opposition that it was prepared to accord it a significant influence in the provisional government.”

They would further add a third conclusion to read:

“We are unable to identify any prospective leadership in the Cuban Army competent to overthrow the Batista regime within the period of this estimate.” [Footnote in the source text.]

162. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith) and President-Elect Rivero Agüero, Havana, November 25, 1958¹

Havana, November 25, 1958

SUBJECT

Further Discussion with President-Elect Rivero Agüero Concerning his Plans for the New Administration

This luncheon meeting was arranged at the Ambassador’s request at the Embassy Residence to inform Dr. Rivero Agüero of the results of the Ambassador’s consultations in Washington on matters discussed with Dr. Rivero Agüero on November 15, 1958 (see Embdes No. 515 of November 17, 1958).²

The Ambassador informed Dr. Rivero Agüero that he had had conversations both in New York³ and in Washington concerning the latter’s plans for a peaceful solution of the present revolutionary situation and the possibility that Dr. Rivero Agüero might make an informal visit to the United States prior to his inauguration. With respect to the latter point, the Ambassador stated the Department would welcome the visit of Dr. Rivero Agüero once he had been inaugurated as President of Cuba, but that there would be certain difficulties in an informal visit prior to his inauguration. Dr. Rivero Agüero replied that obviously he would not wish to make an informal visit unless it would be welcomed by the Department and that his thought in putting forward the suggestion had been that something useful might be accomplished in promoting even better relations than already existed between Cuba and the United States and in collaborating more closely on problems of importance to both governments.

The Ambassador said that as a purely personal suggestion he believed it would be useful if Dr. Rivero Agüero were to send a personal emissary, in whom he had complete confidence, to Washington to explain to Departmental officials his plans to bring about a peaceful solution of the present impasse.

Dr. Rivero Agüero replied he would consider this suggestion.

The Ambassador then said he had told the Department that for the first time since coming to Cuba he is seriously concerned that the rebel forces may be able to disrupt the Cuban economy through paralyzing transportation and communications to a point where there is danger that the Batista Government may be unable to maintain itself until the inauguration in February. He had further expressed the view that the 26th of July Movement must at length be receiving expert advice on revolutionary tactics, and he had warned the Department of the dangers inherent in a victory of this communist-oriented movement. He said he had also outlined to officials of the Department the plans which had been the subject of their last conversation and that the Department’s reaction had been as follows:

If the new administration were to take steps which would demonstrate its desire to reach an agreement with the civil opposition (in contrast to the revolutionary opposition) and it became apparent that these steps had the result of winning over the civil opposition, then the Department would be in a position to give the new administration meaningful support, However, the Department cannot take the initiative in this matter; it must wait to see how successfully the new regime can compose existing political differences. Hence, the initiative must be taken by Dr. Rivero Agüero and by his associates.

The Ambassador went on to say that certain important Cubans who are friendly to General Batista and to Dr. Rivero Agüero had asked him to make a suggestion concerning what might be necessary to win over the civil opposition. He emphasized that in making this suggestion he was acting solely as an intermediary. He said the Cubans to whom he referred believed that if assurances could be given that President Batista would not form a part of the new regime, the passive support which is being given to the 26th of July Movement by many sectors would cease, and the revolutionary movement would tend to become confined to the comparatively small group of fanatical terrorist followers of Fidel Castro.

Dr. Rivero Agüero said the question of President Batista’s future role depends entirely upon the circumstances with which the government will be confronted when the presidential term ends in February 1959. The civil opposition, including Dr. Márquez Sterling, Dr. Grau San Martín, Dr. Carlos Prío, and the professional groups, are more afraid of the revolutionary opposition than is the Batista Government itself. If between now and February 24 the Army succeeds in eliminating, or at least reducing, the threat of a military victory by the rebels, it will be comparatively simple to reach a negotiated settlement with the civil opposition. If, on the other hand, the military threat from the rebels remains as strong as it is at present, there will be no alternative but to continue the civil war, and the attitude of the civil opposition will obviously be affected by that fact. In such an event also the continued role of the Army will be of paramount importance, and Batista, as leader of the Army, will have to continue to play an active role in the government. This would be contrary to Batista’s desires, since he wishes to retire to private life, but the circumstances mentioned may make this impossible.

Dr. Rivero Agüero went on to say that his own plans for a peaceful solution of the present impasse are contingent upon successful military operations to reduce the rebel threat between now and his inauguration. He said the Army does not yet have sufficient “fire power” and arms to control the situation in Oriente. Recent operations in Camagüey and Las Villas Provinces seemed to him less serious. He expressed the hope that the United States would assist not only with arms but with moral support, since the latter would have a far-reaching psychological impact in Cuba. He said there are some 38,000 communists in Oriente Province, of whom 15,000 to 18,000 are actively collaborating with Fidel Castro, and the balance are lending passive support. In response to the Ambassador’s question as to whether he meant that 15,000 to 18,000 armed communists are supporting Fidel Castro, he said he did not mean to imply armed supporters. He estimated the latter at not more than 2,000 to 3,000. He said a victory for the 26th of July Movement would be the worst thing that could possibly happen to Cuba or to United States interests in Cuba.

The Ambassador remarked that the impression he had gained from his previous conversation with Dr. Rivero Agüero had been that the latter gave first priority to the composition of differences with the civil opposition through the calling of a constitutional assembly, or some other legal device, which might be acceptable to them, but that now he had the impression that Dr. Rivero Agüero is giving first order of priority to a military defeat of the insurrectionists. Dr. Rivero Agüero replied that military action against the insurrectionists has nothing to do with his own plans. This is a matter which General Batista and the outgoing administration must solve. His own order of priority remains as outlined, but he wished to emphasize that unless current military operations are substantially successful, the plans of his government to restore constitutional normality may be seriously obstructed.

Reverting to the suggestion that he send an emissary to the United States, he inquired whether in the Ambassador’s opinion it would be appropriate to do so under the present circumstances. The Ambassador replied that the Department, as he had mentioned earlier, will wish to observe how the situation develops. He said his own attitude is sympathetic to the problems of the new administration and that he would endeavor to report Dr. Rivero Agüero’s views to the Department in as complete and persuasive a form as possible. He believed that it might be useful to reinforce such reports as the Embassy would send by having a personal emissary of Dr. Rivero Agüero present his thinking directly to Department officials in informal conversation. He suggested that Dr. Rivero Agüero might wish to have the Cuban Ambassador in Washington arrange such an informal interview for whomever he designated.

Dr. Rivero Agüero inquired whether in the Ambassador’s opinion Dr. Jorge García Montes would be a suitable emissary. The Ambassador replied he considered Dr. Jorge García Montes eminently qualified because of his known sympathy for General Batista and Dr. Rivero Agüero, because he is well and favorably known to the Department, and finally because of his recognized ability as an advocate. Dr. Rivero Agüero then said that he would recall Dr. García Montes from his vacation in Spain for consultation in Cuba and then make the necessary arrangements for the latter’s early visit to Washington. He added that he would keep the Ambassador fully informed concerning this matter through Dr. Güell.

Dr. Rivero Agüero said in conclusion that he intended to make every effort to restore constitutional normality to Cuba, that he is a civilian, and that his greatest desire is to re-establish peace, but that the Department and the American Embassy in Cuba should realize clearly that there is a distinct possibility that the military operations against the Fidel Castro forces will have to continue.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.11/11–2658. Confidential. Drafted by Gilmore. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 558 from Havana, November 26.

² See Document 154.

³ No record has been found of Smith’s conversations in New York.

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, November 26, 1958—11:45 a.m.

292. Following is summary of understanding reached during Ambassador’s visit to Department November 22² re possible future US support for Rivero Aguero Government.

USG would not commit self on support unless and until Rivero has taken positive steps to restore peace in Cuba and there is evidence that his program has support of major segments Cuban populace (exclusive if necessary of Castro movement) including civic organizations, the Church and the Armed Forces.

To determine US attitude toward GOC Batista’s future role will be key factor in Rivero’s obtaining such support and unless Batista agrees to absent himself from country after February and remain completely aloof political scene prospects for Rivero’s success would be remote. Other factors will be Rivero’s willingness shorten mandate, call constituent assembly and take other measures to gain public confidence.

Nature and extent US support would have to be studied in light Rivero’s accomplishments. This could take various forms possibly including opportunity resumption arms shipments if indicated. While apparent GOC feels [source text illegible] necessary pave way peaceful advent Rivero regime, Department feels sending US arms now would only solidify opposition to GOC, aggravate internal strife, invite reprisals against US and US citizens and interests in Cuba, and have other serious domestic and hemisphere repercussions.

In formulating US policy toward Cuba opinions of other LA countries important. Suggested Ambassador discreetly discuss internal Cuban situation with members LA Diplomatic Corps Habana and report their views.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–2658. Confidential. Drafted by Leonhardy and Snow and cleared with Wieland who signed for Dulles.

² See Document 160.

164. Editorial Note

Late in November, a plan was adopted to send the former Ambassador to Peru and Brazil, William D. Pawley, as a secret emissary to President Batista. According to Pawley, at a meeting held toward the end of November at his home in Miami, the subject of “this Cuban problem” came up. Present at the meeting were Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William P. Snow; former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland, and J.C. King of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pawley expressed his belief that “everything we were doing was wrong.” Pawley made the following suggestion:

“I told them that we should now, to try to save the place, see if we can go down there to get Batista to capitulate to a caretaker government unfriendly to him, but satisfactory to us, whom we could immediately recognize and give military assistance to in order that Fidel Castro not come to power, and they thought it had sufficient merit to justify my coming up with them the next day and have meetings in the State Department and in Central Intelligence Agency.

“Foster Dulles was then sick but he was still available to the telephone. I was selected to go to Cuba to talk to Batista to see if I could convince him to capitulate”. (Communist Threat to the Caribbean, Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), Part 10, pages 738–739)

Also in late November, Mario Lazo, a Cuban lawyer and adviser to Marquez Sterling, learned from “a responsible and confidential source” in the United States that the U.S. Government was planning to send Pawley to negotiate with Batista. Lazo had been told that Pawley would offer Batista a chance to live with his family in Florida if he would appoint a caretaker government consisting of five of his political opponents. Lazo also learned that Ambassador Smith would be recalled to Washington, but would not be informed of the plan.

On November 27, Lazo told Smith of the plan and gave the Ambassador the names of the persons to be suggested for the caretaker government. According to Lazo, Smith was surprised by this information and made no comment. (Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart: American Policy Failures in Cuba (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), pages 157–158) For Smith’s recollections of the conversation and the plan to send Pawley to Cuba, see The Fourth Floor, pages 164–165.

165. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, November 28, 1958.

CUBAN REBELS’ INTERRUPTION OF WATER SUPPLY TO GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE

Cuban rebels directed operators of plant supplying water to U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo to shut down water for varying periods on November 23, 25, and 27. If rebels continue present pattern, Naval Base expects a 6 to 8 hour shutdown by Saturday, November 29. Reasons for the rebel action are not clear. It may well be an effort to force the U.S. to recognize and negotiate with the rebels as a belligerent force, and possibly an attempt to cause the Cuban Army to move troops from major cities in Oriente Province into territory where the rebels can attack them. The Navy Department feels that U.S. Marines should be sent to the water plant to protect it, and our Embassy in Habana has recommended such action in the event of a further stoppage.

The rebels occupy the area in which the water plant is located and can at will cut off the supply for the U.S. Naval Base. The Department, through various channels, is attempting to communicate with Fidel Castro, the leader of the Cuban rebels, to point out our concern about the interruption of the supply. Should Castro guarantee that the water supply will not be interrupted in the future, he would be repeating a guarantee made last August. While the arrival of the Marines might insure a peaceful continuation of the water supply, we cannot be certain that such would be the case. In any event the use of Marines on Cuban territory, even with the consent of the Cuban Government, would produce a strong, unfavorable reaction from the Cuban populace and throughout most of Latin America.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Cuba Situation 1957–1959. Secret; Sensitive Situation. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

166. Editorial Note

At the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting held at 9:15 a.m. on November 28, the question of the water supply for Guantanamo was discussed. According to the notes on the meeting,

“Mr. Snow said that the Castro Rebels were interfering with the water supply for Guantanamo. He said that the Commander at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo wanted to send Marines to protect the pumping station and the pipeline and that we may have to accede to the request although he thought it would be bad propaganda. The Secretary asked Mr. Snow about the Cuban economic situation which Mr. Snow described as ‘deteriorating’. The Secretary asked Mr. Murphy to look into the general situation in Cuba with Mr. Snow and subsequently with Mr. Rubottom with a view to recommending what action, if any, the US might take.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, November 1958)

On November 29, Ambassador Smith reported to the Department that President Batista wanted to send a company of Cuban naval forces within the next week to defend the Yateras aquaduct. Batista had four requests: (A) permission to have the troops land at Guantanamo, (B) that they be “guided to Yateras,” (C) that they be supplied with food from the base, and (D) that they be furnished U.S. radio communication equipment for installation at Yateras. Smith observed that the first three points “definitely involve complications unless US is finally prepared to support recognized GOC.” Smith, however, urged the Department to approve the Cuban Government’s purchase of the radio equipment. (Telegram 564 from Havana, November 29; ibid., Central Files, 711.56337/11–2958)

Also on November 29, the Department released a statement regarding the situation at Guantanamo. The statement referred to the various incidents that had occurred at the base during the year, focusing on those which had occurred in late November. The statement concluded: “The United States Government has been exercising patience and forebearance while making it known in the affected area as well as to the Cuban Government the gravity with wish it views the events of the past week. The United States Government expects that these irresponsible acts will stop and will not be repeated.” (Telegram 308 to Havana, November 29; ibid.)

The Department explained to the Embassy in Havana, which did not have an opportunity to clear the statement, that its purpose was to lay the groundwork for a subsequent dispatch of the Marines if that proved necessary. The Department anticipated that orders for such a move would be issued if there was another stoppage of the water supply, but emphasized that the Marines were not to be sent until the Department of State authorized the move. Smith was instructed to seek from the Cuban Government a clear agreement that the Marines could assume the defense of the aquaduct if that proved necessary, irrespective of the timing or manner of Cuban troops resuming that responsibility at a later date. (Telegram 307 to Havana, November 29; ibid.)

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 30, 1958—1 p.m.

565. Deptel 307, Embtel 564.² Dispatching Cuban Navy personnel to protect aquaduct is not contingent upon points (A) (B) (C) but GOC will require cooperation USG.

Point (D) is essential. I hope State Department has already asked Navy Department make available necessary radio communication equipment to afford communication between aquaduct, GOC, local military HQs and USGTMO navy base.

Cuban Navy troops at aquaduct will be isolated and GOC will have trouble supplying food. Batista asks US cooperation by supplying food for personnel, which GOC will pay for.

I recommend that I be authorized to discreetly discourage Batista soonest from dispatching Cuban troops to protect aquaduct for following reasons:

(1) Troops will be bait for rebels to attack.

(2) It is questionable whether designated troops are sufficient to protect aquaduct.

(3) Plant may be severely damaged during fighting.

If plant remains unprotected and rebels again shut off water supply, I concur with Admiral Fenno that US Marines be dispatched to guard aquaduct.

I have obtained from GOC clear agreement Marines may assume guard if necessary as is in accordance with Deptel 307 (subject only that base notify local military commander).

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56337/11–3058. Confidential; Niact. Passed to the Commander of the U.S. base at Guantanamo.

² Regarding both telegrams, see supra.

168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, December 2, 1958—7:34 p.m.

314. Embtels 564² and 565.³ Department agrees recommendation Embtel 565 that GOC be discreetly discouraged sending Cuban troops guard aquaduct. This will require especially careful handling since we cannot leave impression that U.S. does not look and has not been looking first to GOC for protection, particularly in event it later becomes necessary for Marines to undertake protection. In discussing this with GOC suggest that Ambassador refer to momentary lull in activities around pumping station, and mention tha in any event it had not been determined whether U.S. could supply food and radio equipment. After acknowledging that decision must be theirs, Ambassador might comment (without actually suggesting that Cuban troops not be sent) that in apparently confused situation it might be advisable to let matters stand as they are for moment and avoid actions which might cause further difficulties at Yateras. FYI if GOC decides not send its troops to guard aquaduct at this time and if Batista or Guell states to Ambassador that under circumstances GOC cannot be responsible security of pumping plant and other facilities in absence GOC troops, Ambassador may reply that he had addressed himself only to apparent realities of situation and had not considered this point, which he would refer immediately to his government. FYI

FYI while Department and Navy concur that permission cannot be granted Cuban troops land at base, Department would prefer that this question not be dealt with in discussion with GOC at this time. If GOC troops make their way to water plant we cannot of course object. Re provision food and radio equipment, Department concerned at possible implication to future status of Base if logistical support furnished Cuban troops from Base itself. Re Embtel 523⁴ Department sending Embassy today by pouch Department Army report status these two cases.⁵ Suggest that lists be revised to determine whether radio equipment already delivered or awaiting shipping instructions from Cubans could meet communications requirements at water plant. FYI.⁶

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56337/11–2958. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Little and cleared in draft with Hill and in substance with Kefauver and Snow.

² See Document 166.

³ Supra.

⁴ In telegram 523 from Havana, November 19, the Embassy recommended that the U.S. Government expedite the shipment of communications equipment to the Yateras water plant, which it understood had already been approved and which did not fall under the arms suspension. (ibid., 737.00/11–1958)

⁵ Not further identified.

⁶ In telegram 574 from Havana, December 3, Smith, without giving details, said that the Guantanamo question had been “discreetly handled.” He said that the Cuban Government was “relieved” not to have to send Navy forces to Yateras and it would not do so in the future unless requested by the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56337/12–358)

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 2, 1958—6 p.m.

570. Today at meeting members of my consultative group from local American community (see despatch 880, April 28² ) question of US policy toward Cuba came up for discussion.

Consensus of views expressed by American businessmen follows:

1. Cuban situation deteriorating very rapidly. Unless strongly supported by US, Batista cannot last until February 24, and maybe not beyond January 1. Even with such support, it doubtful he could hold out to end of his term.

2. Castro movement is Communist-inspired and dominated. (Unanimous agreement but no new evidence produced; Potts said a recent 26 July Movement statement extraordinarily similar to statement issued by Arbenz government in Guatemala, where Potts was ESSO manager at the time.)

3. Triumph of Castro movement will be followed by bloodshed that will dwarf bloody aftermath of Machado’s overthrow. US, in own interests and those of Cubans in general, who look to US for help, should not stand by silently and let this occur.

4. Since inconceivable that US assist Castro and since probably too late to help Batista, US should promote and give full and actual support including arms to a military civilian junta. Group generally felt junta would be more likely to enlist wide popular support and would weaken Castro, if it incuded some of best elements of present GOC, of political opposition, and of civic groups now supporting Castro. Batista should have no role in government.

Present at meeting were:

Scott Thompson, President, Portland Cement Company, Habana.

Richard Colligan, Vice President, Moa Bay Mining Company.

William Caswell, Vice President First National Bank of Boston.

G.W. Potts, ESSO Standard Oil.

J.N. French, Cuban-American Metals Distributors, Inc.

Alvin Kline, President, Viveres, SA

Other members of group were out of town.

While Embassy does not necessarily concur in all these views, and in particular, believes still too soon be sure about point 1, it believes these views of responsible American businessmen should be taken into account. It also believes US should not be silent spectator but should if possible infuence events toward peaceful solution that would also keep Communist influence from developing.

Without entirely rejecting promotion of military junta as possible solution, Embassy considers this course dangerous (exposes US to serious charges of intervention), uncertain of success (how persuade Batista or other top military leaders not included in junta to accept), non-peaceful (Castro group would still have to be dealt with), and unconstitutional (disregards results of elections). Embassy accordingly proposes following as perferable alternative, to be put into effect when we are surer about point 1 above:

1. Batista to be persuaded to turn over Presidency to Rivero Aguero soonest.

2. US to give full support to Rivero Aguero upon our being satisfied he has support of military and upon his announcement of conciliatory program including:

(A) Formation of national union government embracing respected elements from political and civic opposition.

(B) Calling Constituent Assembly.

(C) Shortening of his own mandate by calling for general elections within two years.

(D) Restoration of constitutional guarantees as soon as feasible.

It is my opinion if US strictly adheres to non-intervention policy, Communists will be the only ones to profit from resulting chaos and US may have to intervene later for humanitarian reasons.³

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–258. Secret; Priority.

² In despatch 880, Smith announced that that he was setting up a consultative group of local American businessmen and listed its members. (ibid., 437.1172/4–2858)

³ In telegram 571 from Havana, December 3, Smith said that the Business Advisory Group felt strongly that he should go to Washington to present its views. Smith discouraged this because it was so soon after his trip to the United States in mid-November. He asked Rubottom, however, because of the urgency and importance of the situation, to bring telegram 570 to the attention of Secretary Dulles and Under Seceretary Herter. (ibid., 737.00/12–358)

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 5, 1958—2 p.m.

584. Source which has furnished reliable information in past told First Secretary Topping December 4 that 26 July Movement now has executive committee consisting of Fidel Castro, Manuel Antonio Fay Rivero (cover name Campa), Dr. Faustino Perez, Aldo Santamaria, and Marcelo Fernandez (cover name Eloy). Fernandez said to be head of Frente Obrero Nacional, and entire name may possibly be pseudonym.

Source added foregoing committee has decided to legalize communism in Cuba when revolution successful. Said two principal arguments justifying action were (1) communism easier to control when operating openly and (2) Communist Party legal in US.

Source has been closely identified with conspiratorial and revolutionary activities for past 3 years, and is member Agrupacion Montecristi. He has repeatedly spoken of need to control 26 July Movement, and of danger to Cuba and US if Movement becomes dominant force in Cuban political life. His information may be biased, and possibly inaccurate. But he is believed sincere, and fully aware of importance which GUS would attach to the information.

Embassy [less than 1 line not declassified] endeavoring to check accuracy of report, and Consulate Santiago requested do likewise.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–558. Confidential; Priority. Ambassador Smith had left Havana on December 4 to return to Washington for consultations. (Telegram 578 from Havana, December 4; ibid., Central Files, PER)

171. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 389th meeting of the National Security Council on December 6, Allen Dulles made the following remarks about the situation in Cuba:

“Mr. Dulles believed that the revolutionary situation in Cuba was rapidly becoming more critical. The Batista Government was consistently losing ground in its struggle with Castro’s rebels. Business firms were now seriously impeded and many operations were closing down altogether. In sum, it was increasingly unlikely that Batista would be able to regain control of this situation.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

172. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics¹

Washington, December 8, 1958—5:29 p.m.

751. Ref: Department’s CA–9724 May 7.² In the period since referenced information statement was circulated internal situation in Cuba has further deteriorated. Castro forces now have effective control of most areas of Oriente Province with exception cities and armed rebels are active in limited areas Camaguey and Las Villas Provinces. As result this control exercised by rebels they have effectively hampered or severed transportation and communications in eastern half island, one consequence of which is growing shortage food and other essential commodities in urban areas this part of Cuba. While Cuban people are ones who have suffered most in spreading civil disturbances, US interests in Cuba have also suffered considerably. US citizens were kidnapped on two occasions by rebels, once at end of June and again in early November, and depredations against private property in Oriente Province by both sides, principally by rebels, have resulted in losses valued conservatively at more than $2.5 million so far during calendar year 1958. Planes in international flights have been pirated with accompanying fatalities and other casualties. More than 20,000 Cuban exiles in American republics create additional problems for hemisphere countries.

Water supply for Guantanamo Naval Base threatened on two occasions, most recently during November when rebel forces cut off water for three short periods. In view essential nature of water supply to operation Guantanamo Naval Base, last week Department obliged again consider stationing Marines protect this facility as was done for five-day period in July. On November 29 Department issued background statement³ concerning Base and threat to its water supply which was intended to warn rebels against shutting off water in future. Recently rebels have also cut off water from [for] United Fruit Company’s installation at Preston on northern coast Oriente Province. In view threat to its water and food supplies at Preston, United Fruit Company considering possibility evacuating its people. Dependents of American employees US Government’s nickel processing plant at Nicaro were evacuated in late October and company’s mines located 10 miles from plant were bombed recently, reportedly by Cuban Government aircraft.

Meanwhile Cubans went through motions of national election on November 3, 1958 and Government candidate Andres Rivero Aguero was declared winner in presidential race. President Batista’s term of office is scheduled terminate February 24, 1959 but it is not yet known if Rivero will be able or willing take basic conciliatory measures necessary to get broad support required to end internal strife.

US Government has watched deteriorating situation in Cuba with increasing concern but has been mindful of its obligations to maintain policy of non-intervention. While US intends to adhere to this policy in future, consideration being given to what can be done within limits of this policy to assist Cuban Government and people to bring their internal disturbances to an end. Greater tranquility would of course also mean that US property and US citizens in Cuba would not be subject to dangers to which open in present situation. A major consideration in making any evaluation of Cuban problem with view to possible future actions of US Government is attitude and reaction in other countries of hemisphere respecting Cuban problem. To assist in this evaluation Embassy requested seek out informally views of leading members of Government to which you are accredited, asking for any comments they care make on current situation in Cuba, on attitudes toward opposing groups in conflict, and their prognosis for future. Views should especially be sought whether in light US non-intervention policy there is any feeling of hemispheric responsiblity in dealing with deteriorating Cuban situation which has created humanitarian problems and international complications. These views should be reported Department soon as possible along with summary of recent press comment on situation in Cuba. If asked what action US might take in future with respect this situation, including possible use of Marines to guard Guantanamo Base water supply, it should be stated that you have no information on this point.⁴

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/12–858. Confidential. Drafted by Little, cleared with Wieland and in draft with Ambassador Smith and Reed (RPA), and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter. Sent to all diplomatic missions in the American Republics except Cuba. Pouched to Havana.

² This circular airgram, sent to posts in the American Republics, included a Policy Information Statement (ARA–293) entitled “United States Position Regarding Present Cuban Situation.” (ibid., 511.00/5–758)

³ See Document 166.

⁴ Telegraphic responses from the various Embassies in the American Republics are in Department of State, Central File 737.00. For the response of the Embassy in the Dominican Republic reporting the views of Generalissimo Trujillo, see Document 180. A memorandum, dated December 30 and drafted by Reed and Redington, which summarized the various responses, is in Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1958. For a brief summary, see Document 201.

173. Editorial Note

On December 9, special emissary William Pawley met with President Batista. No memorandum of this conversation has been found, but Pawley later recalled that he spent 3 hours with Batista that evening. According to Pawley:

“I offered him an opportunity to live at Daytona Beach with his family, that his friends and family would not be molested; that we would make an effort to stop Fidel Castro from coming into power as a Communist, but that the caretaker government would be men who were enemies of his, otherwise it would not work anyway, and Fidel Castro would otherwise have to lay down his arms or admit he was a revolutionary fighting against anybody only because he wanted power, not because he was against Batista.”(Communist Threat to the Caribbean, Part 10, page 739)

The five men whom the U.S. Government had approved for the caretaker government were Ramón Barquin, Enrique Borbonet, General Martín Diaz Tamayo, José Pepin Bosch, and one other whose name Pawley could not recall. Batista did not accept the offer. Pawley believed that Batista might have accepted if he had been authorized to tell Batista that the plan had the approval of the U.S. Government. But Rubottom had not authorized him to say even that the plan had the “tacit approval” of the U.S. Government. (ibid.)

On December 12, President Eisenhower was given the following information:

“Sensitive reports from Havana indicate certain of the friends of Batista have urged him to make way for a junta to pave the way for a peaceful solution of the situation. So far Batista has resisted these efforts on the basis of constitutional responsibility and moral responsibility to turn the government over to Rivero Aguero, [less than 1 line not declassified] contacts are unhappy at Batista’s reluctance to leave power.” (Memorandum by John S.D. Eisenhower, “Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President,” December 12; Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries)

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 11, 1958—noon.

596. Bring immediate attention Ambassador Smith. Yesterday morning Guell outlined to Senator Ellender² his views on situation. Memo of conversation follows but reveals nothing new except admission by Guell that there was ground for questioning honesty of elections for some of the offices below Presidency and Vice Presidency.

Last night I asked Guell whether, in referring to Rivero Aguero’s intention to bring representatives of political opposition into new government, he included responsible elements now supporting Castro such as civic organs. He said, yes provided they were willing to negotiate. I said that while authoritative US views on such matters must await return of Ambassador, it seemed to me personally as very important that government win back these elements.

Guell said that to consolidate new government and especially to retain support of military forces and police, it was indispensable that Batista remain in active role “for three to six months” after new administration takes over. He said without Batista, even if there should be a military junta, there would be a break-down of internal order accompanied by much bloodshed. Castro would then come into Habana “hailed by populace as victor since nothing succeeds like success”. He again spoke of US support, including renewed arms shipments, as also essential to success of Rivero Aguero.

I mentioned there appeared to be a basic difficulty here: Batista was the bone of contention and as long as he remained in position of power it seemed unlikely that responsible elements now adhering to 26 July could be won over to Rivero Aguero. I said I did not know what decisions would be made re US arms policy but it seemed to me that as long as Cuban people were so greatly divided and government was opposed by some of major responsible groups, it would be hard for us to assist GOC with arms without departing from its non-intervention policy. Guell recognized dilemma but suggested no solution other than to say Rivero Aguero was ready to negotiate with opposition starting now. I mentioned as one possibility worth exploring that any possible active support of Rivero Aguero by us begin simultaneously with departure of Batista from scene, but emphasized again I was only expressing a personal thought and not speaking for US.

Guell recognized that Cuban problem presented difficulties for us but felt that if we could regard it as simply two alternatives, Rivero Aguero or Castro, we must decide in favor of former.

I told Guell our information indicated situation was becoming serious and inquired whether in his opinion present administration could last out until February 24. He replied affirmatively, but said he would welcome any information we could contribute on situation.

Guell appeared to welcome this informal interchange. He said views he expressed were also personal and that they were perhaps colored or blurred by fact he was “loyal Batista man” but that he always tried to keep Cuba’s interests foremost.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1158. Confidential; Niact. A note on the source text indicates that Smith read the telegram at 3:20 p.m. on December 11.

² Regarding Senator Ellender’s visit to Cuba, see Document 177.

175. Editorial Note

Ambassador Smith, who had returned to Washington on December 4 for consultations, recalled that he attended a meeting on December 10 in Murphy’s office. Also attending the meeting were Rubottom, Snow, Wieland, and the CIA liaison with the Department of State. According to Smith, the following discussion took place:

“At this meeting I was informed by Deputy-Under-Secretary Murphy that Batista was to be approached by someone with no official connection with the government, with the suggestion that he (Batista) absent himself from Cuba and appoint a military junta. Possible suggestions for the junta were General Cantillo, Colonel Barquin, General Sosa, and one other. My opinion was asked and I agreed that I had been convinced for some time that Batista should leave the country to avoid more and more bloodshed and, further, that I agreed to the plan in the hope that a military junta would be successful in setting up a provisional government excluding Castro, and later would hold general elections.” (Smith, The Fourth Floor, pages 165–166)

No other record of this conversation has been found.

While Smith was apparently en route to Havana, Rubottom sent him a telegram with the following instructions: “If questioned by Batista or Guell on any aspect of your consultation in Washington, you should confine yourself in reply to saying that you reported on and fully discussed the Cuban situation with officials of the U.S. Govt, all of whom shared considerable concern over what they judged to be the deteriorating political situation of the country with its attendant disorders, loss of life and destruction of property.” (Telegram 336 to Havana, December 11; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1158)

Smith returned to Havana and resumed charge of the Embassy on the morning of December 12. (Telegram 660 from Havana, December 12; ibid., PER)

176. Editorial Note

At a press briefing on December 11, the Department of State spokesman made the following statement:

“The Department has noted reports in the press to the effect that Fidel Castro is seeking talks with a confidential representative of the United States Government on the Cuban political situation. We have no knowledge of this beyond what has been reported in the press. We have never considered such a step and we are not considering it now.”

The text of the statement was sent to Havana in telegram 340 and repeated to Santiago de Cuba, December 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1258)

Regarding two subsequent approaches made to the U.S. Government by persons attempting to arrange confidential talks between Castro and U.S. officials, see Documents 181 and 195.

177. Diary Entry by Senator Allen J. Ellender¹

Havana, December 14, 1958.

[Here follows an account of Ellender’s activities in Cuba following his arrival on December 9.]

Most Americans here in Havana fear that they are in danger. Little can be done by them politically and they are entirely dependent on the Government in power. They cannot openly choose sides for fear of reprisals. Here in Havana, and the surrounding areas, Batista is very strong, although despised by many, I was informed. I was also told that those who profess to be “with” Castro would not necessarily support him to head the Government—that Castro is being used as a tool, in the hope that sufficient sentiment can be created against Batista so as to force him to quit.

The trouble here has been brewing for quite some time and quite a few Americans I spoke with seemed to feel that about all that our Government has been doing is standing on the sidelines and letting the situation worsen. It was the hope of some that the situation might adjust itself.

Much blame is put for some of the trouble at the doorstep of two of our leading American newspapers. I heard it said more than once that Herbert L. Matthews, a writer for the New York Times, made a hero of Fidel Castro, and that he was assisted by Jules DuBois of the Chicago Tribune who, it was said “elbows around” with Castro. I was told that DuBois wrote some very complimentary articles about Castro DuBois, I was informed, is head of the International Press Association. Quite a few persons said he hates Batista to such an extent that he wrote very irresponsible articles about conditions in Cuba. Much of the information was distorted, I was told.

Most of the Americans I spoke to here, as well as many leading Cubans, feel that both the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune acted in utter disregard of the truth when they printed stories favoring Castro, that both newspapers cast their responsibility to the winds and printed unwarranted articles about the situation here.

These articles, I was told, had the effect of making Castro a hero, and thus able to gather more and more strength.

As I mentioned earlier, I believe that few people would choose Castro as a leader; he is used as a symbol of the hate that the Cubans bear against Batista. I was told that Castro has been riding high because of the favorable publicity he received from the American press, but few would trust him to be President and successor of Batista.

I asked about the recent election held for a successor to Batista. Few people, except Batista partisans, would say that the election reflected the will of the people. President-elect Andres Rivero Aguero is pictured as a stooge of Batista. On the other hand, I was told that Castro caused many voters to stay away from the polls. He threatened all eligible voters with trouble if they should participate in the election. There were quite a few riots all over Cuba and no doubt many people were put in fear to such an extent that they did not vote.

If Castro were the only contender, there might be some merit in the contention that he would do more for the country than Batista, if given a chance. The trouble is that Castro does not have the field to himself. While Castro heads the 26th of July movement, he is being opposed by two other factions—one headed by Carlos Prio’s Authentic Organization and another, the Revolutionary Directory headed by Foure Chamount [Fauré Chomón]. All three are vying for power, and I fear more trouble will ensue if any one faction wins out, through a coup d’etat, or otherwise.

Prio is a former President of Cuba and is operating out of Florida, I was told. He is one of the strong men of the day.

What makes it difficult for Batista is, of course, his unpopularity. He is despised to the point where some people would do almost anything for a change. From all I heard about Batista, he has doubtless ruled—particularly in the last two years—with an iron hand. There are many charges of corruption leveled against his government, particularly in Army circles, yet no one is in a position to prosecute the offenders as long as Batista is in power.

Most people I talked with take the position that a change from Batista to Castro, or anyone else, will not result in peace. They feel that corruption will be rampant, as in the past.

I know nothing of the situation of my own knowledge, but the consensus of opinion seems to be that the Cuban treasury has lost much at the hands of some greedy high Government officials, who took advantage of their positions to make themselves rich. If that is true, it will be rather difficult for any one person to restore dignity and honesty to the Government overnight. It will require time, patience, and honesty of purpose.

Many stated to me that Batista has done a good job, even if there were graft. There is much physical evidence of an improving economy over the last four or five years. It is contended by some, and I am inclined to agree, that Cuba has never been so prosperous as she now is. Cuba had a balanced budget until this year, when arms were purchased at a very high price to maintain internal security.

I asked why it was necessary for such high prices to be paid.

I was informed that the high prices were due to the United States refusal to sell arms to Cuba. Other sellers simply charged as much as the traffic would bear.

A U.S. embargo was placed on armaments early in the year. Why that was done, I could not find out except that we were afraid of siding with the recognized government against factions opposed to Batista, and thus incur criticism from the Russians for interfering with the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

Whatever happened to make us stop, we did stop.

In the meantime, as I previously stated, Cuba has been paying high prices for a variety of inferior weapons from France, Great Britain, Switzerland, and even Israel.

I am not prepared now to say what we should have done, because I do not have access to all the facts, but it strikes me that so long as there was no real civil war prevailing, there was no reason why we should not have sold military equipment to Cuba to maintain internal security.

I was told that if we had lived up to our promise to deliver arms on order, Cuba would not be in the trouble she now finds herself. Many persons were emphatic in stating that the fact the Batista government did not have sufficient arms to restore law and order caused Castro to expand his operations, and with the favorable publicity given to him by the American press, he captured the attention of the people and was thereby able to get more and more followers.

Today I am told, Castro will not permit sugar to move out of Oriente Province, unless he is paid so much “tribute” per bag by the growers. Batista’s government (which is recognized by us) is not able to stop these unlawful acts. Some of the cane growers are willing to comply because of fear of reprisal. I was told that much military hardware is being smuggled from the States to those who oppose Batista. There is no doubt a move to throw Batista out no matter what the consequences may be.

I personally believe that it is risky for us to merely stand by and let these things happen. It is certain that conditions will get worse, and I doubt that a successor to Batista, chosen in the heat of battle, will be any improvement in the long run. If the civil strife now prevailing should be maintained, it may develop into a full-fledged civil war, which would be a tragedy for all parties concerned, including the United States. We cannot afford to merely stand on the side lines.

Now, what to do is the question.

Certainly, since we have recognized the present regime, we should not hesitate to take such steps as are necessary to at least permit that regime to restore law and order and maintain internal security. If a fair amount of equipment, to be used for that purpose, is necessary, we should not hesitate to sell it. No one would expect us to take sides in case of bona fide civil war, and we should not.

I repeat, it would be a tragedy for civil war to break out in our backyard. Since Batista is held in disfavor in so many quarters, it may be possible to persuade him to quit, provided that the Government of Cuba is placed in the hands of a competent and independent provisional commission.

Since it is the objective of the factions that are opposing Batista to oust him and make an effort to restore law and order, all might agree to the selection of a competent commission to govern Cuba for the next few years, until tempers cool. Should that course be pursued, then those opposed to Batista would have won their point by causing him to agree to resign. Castro’s main objective, I was told, is to rid Cuba of Batista, period.

Also, if such a suggestion were accepted it would be a Godsend, in that it would doubtless end the strife that is now going on, and avert an all-out civil war.

Unless such a course is pursued, Cuba’s now thriving economy may be set back for many years. Private capital may cease to flow into the country because of instability.

From all that I have heard, I doubt that peace will come if the President-elect takes office in February. The Batista-haters will by no means be satisfied and strife will unquestionably persist for some time.

The Cubans are good people. They are very sensitive and easily aroused, but I have a feeling that they would listen to reason. The Cubans look upon us as big brothers. The masses would welcome actual intervention by us, but of course that is out of the question. Since conditions have been allowed to deteriorate to such an extent, all that we can now do is to offer reasonable suggestions along the lines I have submitted, so that the Government can keep on functioning for the good of Cuba and not for the benefit of a chosen few.

Cuba should be “sold” to Cubans. They should be instilled with the great benefits that will accrue to all the people if only stability can be restored to their Government.

Emphasis should be placed on the damage and losses that confront her should all-out war occur. We should appeal to the patriotism of all leaders to end the current strife, avert nationwide civil war, and enter into a cooling off-period so that order can be restored.

A commission, composed of good, honest men should take charge for at least two years. The military should be removed from the picture, except as may be necessary to assure internal security. Once this were done, then free elections could be scheduled and an effort made to elect honest, patriotic, and worthy servants to carry on for the people.

My fear is that if Castro is successful, strife will continue and the military will remain all powerful and will actually rule the country—that one dictator will merely be replaced by another.

[Here follows Ellender’s description of his departure from Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–EL/3–2459. Senator Ellender visited Cuba December 9–14, during which time he met with high-ranking Cuban Government officials, including Foreign Minister Guell on December 10. Ellender also addressed the Directors of the American Chamber of Commerce, visited the Moa Bay Mining Company, and on December 12 gave a press conference in Havana. His conversation with Guell was reported in despatch 608 from Havana, December 11. (ibid., 033.1100–EL/12–1158) A schedule of and brief report on Ellender’s activities is in despatch 636 from Havana, December 17. (ibid., 033.1100–EL/12–1758) A transcript of Ellender’s press conference was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 633 from Havana, December 16. The Embassy noted that Ellender had been prodded by certain correspondents “into statements critical of U.S. Government policy toward Cuba, questioning the existence of a civil war in Cuba, and referring to the revolutionary elements as ‘bandit groups’.” The Embassy discussed the varied reactions to Ellender’s comments and concluded:

“In the rapidly moving Cuban scene it is probable that Senator Ellender’s press interview will have no great or lasting effect. That he spoke out so openly for the Administration and against the rebels at a time when the United States Government was trying to maintain a policy of non-intervention and when the rebels held much of eastern Cuba in their control must be viewed from the Embassy’s standpoint as regrettable.” (ibid., 033.1100–EL/12–1658)

Text of a public statement, issued by the “Civic Resistance Movement” and highly critical of Ellender’s remarks, was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 642 from Havana, December 18. (ibid., 033.1100–EL/12–1858)

178. Editorial Note

On December 10, when Ambassador Christian Ravndal approached Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Tobar, in accordance with Document 172, Tobar proposed that he sound out Batista, strictly on a confidential basis, on the possibility of a conciliatory approach by the American Republics. Fidel Castro was not to be contacted unless Batista approved. Tobar told Ravndal that he was thinking of asking two other countries to join in this effort. (Telegram 177 from Quito, December 10; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1058)

The Department told Ravndal that it favored Tobar’s proposal and that former Panamanian President Arias, who was serving in Washington as Panama’s Ambassador to the Organization of American States, had expressed views similar to Tobar’s. The Department suggested that Panama be one of the other two countries associated with Tobar’s approach. (Telegram 122 to Quito, December 11; ibid., 737.00/ 12–1158)

On December 15, Tobar said that his government was sounding out Batista through the Cuban Ambassador in Quito. (Telegram 185 from Quito, December 15; ibid., 737.00/12–1558)

179. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 15, 1958¹

Washington, December 15, 1958

SUBJECT

Visit of Cuban Ambassador Nicolas Arroyo

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Arroyo, Embassy of Cuba

Mr. Rubottom, ARA

Mr. Snow, ARA

Mr. Wieland, CMA

Mr. Stevenson, CMA/C

Ambassador Arroyo had returned on December 13 from an eight day visit to Cuba and requested an appointment with Mr. Rubottom without specifying a topic to be discussed. Mr. Wieland told Ambassador Arroyo that he was sorry that the Department had not been notified of his return from Cuba in order that he might have been met at the airport. The Ambassador replied that he did not wish to put any one in the Department to this trouble.

Mr. Rubottom inquired regarding the Ambassador’s trip and his impressions of conditions in Cuba. The Ambassador replied that he had found the Government to be strong and confident but that civilian elements in and around Habana seemed nervous and worried about the economic outlook. He said that he thinks that this is in part due to speculators who desire an increase in sugar prices and are spreading stories of a possible serious drop in the sugar harvest. He emphasized that this will not be the case. He said that there may be a slight reduction in the overall harvest and a delay in getting the sugar to market; that it is not in the Cuban tradition to destroy the National patrimony, implying that even in the rebel areas sugar will be exported. In any case he is confident that Cuba will be able to fulfill her United States quota.

Mr. Rubottom remarked that even a ten or fifteen percent reduction in the overall sugar exports would be serious for the Cuban economy. Ambassador Arroyo agreed that this would indeed be true but he is hopeful that when Batista finishes his term on February 24, tensions will relax and that Rivero Aguero will have a good chance of bringing about a return of peace to the country.

The Ambassador then turned to the recent visit to Cuba of Senator Ellender whom he had met at a reception given by Ambassador Smith in Habana. He expressed great admiration for the Senator and voiced amazement at his many travels. He said that Senator Ellender had been very favorably impressed with the present administration in Cuba and that the Senator could not understand why it was that the United States had refused to continue the shipment of arms to a friendly government when such arms are needed to put down bandits. He added that the Cuban Government was very pleased to have such a powerful, independent, and influential man to represent these views to the American Government. Mr. Rubottom commented that he has known Senator Ellender a good many years and that he is a remarkable and well traveled man.

Mr. Rubottom returned again to the economic situation and asked if transportation difficulties might not prove a real obstacle to the sugar crop, asking specifically about port facilities. The Ambassador replied that there are many ports through which sugar can be shipped and that almost every important sugar company has its own port. He admitted that many railroad bridges have been destroyed but reiterated that he could foresee only a delay in the marketing of the sugar crop.

Mr. Rubottom told the Ambassador that from the many reports the Department has received it appears that Castro pretty well controls the countryside in Oriente and wondered what the Ambassador thought of Castro’s prospects for taking over the cities. The Ambassador replied that he had had a long talk with his old friend General Cantillo in whom he has the utmost confidence, believing him to be the best of the Generals and a true professional, and that Cantillo told him that he expects an attack on Santiago and perhaps some of the other cities on December 24; that he is preparing for such an eventuality and feels he can dispose of the rebels rapidly once they attack the city. Cantillo said he would welcome such an attack as it would give him a good opportunity to inflict a serious defeat on the rebels. Mr. Wieland remarked to the Ambassador that should the rebels not attack Santiago what would then be General Cantillo’s strategy? To this the Ambassador said he could make no answer.

Mr. Rubottom observed that the situation in Cuba is, of course, one hundred percent an internal problem for the Cubans to settle. However, he said that because of our traditional relations with Cuba and the special importance which Cuba has for the United States, we naturally are following developments there with grave concern. He asked the Ambassador if, in his opinion, the President-elect will endeavor to form a “national” administration, including in it elements from the loyal opposition and making other efforts to obtain the backing of the general public for a peaceful solution to the Cuban conflict. The Ambassador replied that he believes that Rivero Aguero is indeed thinking of a solution along these lines and that he has a good chance of success. He said that Rivero Aguero is a very good man, well educated and intelligent although faced with the difficulty that he is not a well-known public figure. Mr. Rubottom remarked that it would seem to him that Rivero Aguero must soon take steps indicating he intends to follow the above course of action if he is to have any hope of success. The Ambassador agreed and said that Rivero Aguero is now working on his cabinet and that he might possibly announce some names in January. In this connection he remarked that Vice-President-elect, Gaston Godoy, is a man of ability and possessed of a fine general reputation with all elements in Cuba, which should prove helpful to Rivero. He did not rule out the possibility of a change in administration prior to February 24, but said that this would be very difficult as President Batista, although he wants very badly to get out of office and take a long rest of two to three years, will not take any shameful or secret way out. Mr. Wieland asked the Ambassador if he had discussed the above ideas with President Batista to which the Ambassador replied that he had not, as he has always been a non-political technican, even as a Minister, and that he has, therefore, refrained from discussing such highly political matters. He added that Batista is still confident and determined; that English arms are now arriving so that some two thousand recruits who have been drilling with sticks may now be equipped with rifles. Mr. Rubottom said that he hoped with the greatest sincerity that a peaceful solution to the Cuban difficulties may soon be found. He pointed out to the Ambassador that among other things there is still the question of public opinion in the U.S. (which the Department must consider) with regard to arms shipments. The Ambassador commented that he thinks public opinion in the U.S. is now changing and is not so unfavorable to his government as formerly. In this connection Mr. Rubottom complimented the Ambassador for the fine work he has done on behalf of his government.

Comment: It seemed that the Ambassador’s call was not the result of instructions he may have received from his government during his recent visit to Cuba. His very positive expressions of admiration and respect for General Cantillo are of interest in view of several recent reports that General Cantillo may soon be removed from his command because of possible implication in a recent military plot against Batista. It may be noted that in his several references to Batista’s desire to get out of office and take a rest the Ambassador made no mention of any possibility that General Batista might leave Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba—Political. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson.

180. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Ciudad Trujillo, December 15, 1958—4 p.m.

225. Embtel 222² and Department Circular telegram 751.³ On subject of Cuba which I mentioned during meeting today with Generalissimo, President, Vice President and Foreign Minister, Generalissimo stated he believed it imperative US should support constitutional Government of Cuba as only means preventing take over by Castro. He stated that the information he had conveyed to me months ago has been proven correct and it now should be well recognized that Castro has among his chief Lieutenants known Communists and is receiving financial support from Soviet Union. He added that a recent rumor reflected that Soviet Union has assisted Castro to extent $9 million. He indicated it was not too late to save what otherwise would be debacle but US must act promptly, adding that if for any reason US wished pass this aid indirectly GODR would be glad to act as conduit.

Comment: Confidential informants advise me Cuban situation is of extreme concern to GODR and that Castro’s avowed intention of turning next on Dominican Republic has served to heighten tension. Also consensus view well informed US businessmen operating in Cuba is that US should assist formation junta and back same to prevent Castro seizing Government which would give rise to Government dominated by Communists. Preferential sugar market represents most effective weapon in US hands.

Farland

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1558. Confidential.

² In telegram 751, December 11, Ambassador Farland described a conversation with the Dominican Foreign Minister who criticized the U.S. embargo of arms shipments to the Batista government. He claimed that the Castro forces were “thoroughly infiltrated with militant Communists” and were receiving support from the “international Communist movement.” The U.S. arms embargo had forced the Dominican Government into the position of “supplying small arms” to the Batista government, not only because of its interest in the Cuban Government but also because of the larger picture of the Communist effort in the Caribbean. (ibid., 737.00/12–1158)

³ Document 172.

181. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 16, 1958—7 p.m.

614. Andres Carrillo Mendoza who is personally known to me came to the chancery today to see me as an emissary from Haydee Santamaria Hart, who claims to be very close to Fidel Castro. She is presently in Miami. Mrs. Hart feels that I am the only one who could persuade President Batista at this time to agree to a meeting between a group from the 26th of July Movement and a group representing the GOC. Carillo on behalf of Mrs. Hart requested that I approach Batista to bring about such a meeting and that I, as Ambassador, act as mediator between the two groups.

I informed Andres Carrillo that I would not act as mediator and that I did not believe that US Government wished to intervene through mediation. I added that in view of the seriousness of conditions in Cuba I felt I had no right to turn down any possible avenue for a peaceful solution.

Therefore, I told Mr. Carillo to inform Mrs. Hart as follows: That the US Government was thoroughly cognizant of the situation in Cuba and was deeply concerned. It was my suggestion that either Betancourt, a registered representative, or Mrs. Hart, if she is a resistance representative, approach the State Department directly. When asked by Carillo as to who should be contacted in the State Department, I suggested William Wieland because it is my understanding that Betancourt has had previous conversations with Wieland.

Andres Carillo is returning to Miami on December 17 to convey the message to Mrs. Hart.

When I asked Carillo if this approach to me was made with the knowledge of Castro, Carillo said he did not believe it was.²

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1658. Secret; Priority.

² In telegram 626 from Havana, December 22, the Embassy indicated that Carillo, after returning from a meeting in Miami with Haydee Santamaria Hart, again expressed his group’s interest in helping arrange a meeting between Batista and Castro representatives to discuss a truce. The Embassy noted that since Hart was allegedly close to Castro, the “peace overtures may be significant.” (ibid., 737.00/12–2258) No reply by the Department to either telegram 614 or 626 has been found.

182. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 85/1–58 Washington, December 16, 1958.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA SINCE MID–NOVEMBER

1. The position of the Batista regime has deteriorated even more rapidly than was anticipated in SNIE 85–58, “The Situation in Cuba,” 24 November 1958.² The rebels now dominate Oriente Province outside the city of Santiago and a few other beleaguered towns, and are increasingly active in the provinces of Camaguey, Las Villas, and Pinar del Rio. Dr. Manuel Urrutia Lleo, Fidel Castro’s choice for provisional president, is now present in Oriente, apparently for the purpose of setting up a provisional government and claiming belligerent rights. The Cuban Government’s armed forces show increasing signs of demoralization. There is mounting apprehension that Castro may soon come to power with bloody and disastrous consequences for Cuba because of the anarchic conditions which would be likely to prevail for sometime thereafter.

2. On 27 November considerable numbers of Cuban army officers were arrested for complicity in a military conspiracy against the government or for cowardice in refusing to continue the fight against the Castro rebellion. The respected General Martin Diaz Tamayo was retired for suspected involvement in this plot, and has recently been arrested. General Eulogio Cantillo Porras is still in command of the Santiago military district, but is under suspicion and close surveillance, as are several other senior officers. It is likely that there was in fact such a conspiracy to depose the regime and establish a military junta. Although it has been checked, it is symptomatic of the existence of dissatisfaction and disaffection within the armed forces. The possibly intended appointment of General Francisco Tabernilla to replace General Diaz Tamayo would have a further demoralizing effect upon the Cuban Army.

3. The rebel drive is endangering Cuba’s hitherto prosperous economy and will probably hinder the sugar harvest, due to commence in January. At the same time, the heavy government expenditures necessary to support antirebel operations constitute a drain on the economy, and prolonged political instability is having an adverse effect on business activity.

4. To meet this situation, the Batista government has newly extended the suspension of constitutional guarantees and, in addition, has declared a state of national emergency. Plans are proceeding to inaugurate President-elect Rivero Aguero on 24 February. The latter, although a Batista man, has given evidence that he will at least consider some compromise to return peace to Cuba. He has stated that he does not rule out the possibility of a constitutional assembly as a means of reaching a national solution to the Cuban problem. Nevertheless, neither Rivero Aguero nor Batista has shown any sign of taking the steps required to resolve the present chaotic internal situation.

5. In these circumstances, there is considerable sentiment in Cuba, especially in business circles, for the establishment of a military junta to dispose of Batista and to head off Castro. The armed forces are probably in the mood to support such a move, but, with the retirement of Diaz Tamayo and the close check kept on Cantillo Porras, it is not apparent where the requisite leadership would come from.

6. As was estimated in SNIE 85–58, a military junta would be the most effective means of breaking the existing political impasse, but would not of itself restore peace and stability, in that it would still have to cope with the 26 of July Movement. If the personnel and program of the junta were such as to inspire confidence in its intention and ability to restore democratic government, the 26 of July Movement might lose some of its momentum, although the time is growing late for that. To suppress the Castro movement by force, the junta would require, on a large scale, military equipment and supplies such as have been denied to Batista, and the issue would remain from some time in doubt. To accomplish a quick pacification of Cuba, the junta would have to offer a political solution satisfactory to Fidel Castro.

7. On the other hand, should high political or military leadership fail to take some drastic action to stem the momentum of the Castro operation, such as the removal of Batista, the civil war would be likely to spread at an ever increasing rate. In this situation, the possibility cannot be excluded that the army in the field, tired of the civil war, might turn against the government, either piecemeal, by going over to the rebels, or in an organized way. In either case, the strength of Castro’s political position would be enhanced.

8. Should the demoralization of the army reach such a point that even a military junta would be unable to control the situation, or should Castro eventually win the civil war, a prolonged period of instability and disorder, like that which followed the fall of the Machado regime in 1933, would almost certainly ensue, with consequent peril to American and other lives and property in Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and was concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on December 16. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Agency Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Published also in Declassified Documents, 1984, 1511.

² Document 161.

183. Editorial Note

On December 17, Allan L. Reed, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, circulated a paper, identified as Op–922N3W/ml and Ser. 002172P92, to various officers in the Department of the Navy. The paper, the subject of which was “Short-Term trends in Cuba of possible US Naval interest,” summarized the current situation in Cuba since the November 3 elections, concluding that the 26th of July Movement under Fidel Castro’s leadership “seems even more determined to topple the present government.” The movement’s ability to “operate a successor government would depend upon the continued cooperation of the various revolutionary groups, who are now joined together in a loose unity pact, together with its success in dealing with the military and organized labor over which the government has maintained a strong control.” The paper also noted that “the prospect for continued cooperation of opposition groups is poor.” Whatever government emerged in Cuba, however, would attempt to maintain friendly relations with the United States. The paper concluded that Castro was “aware of the strategic importance of the US Naval Base, Guantanamo, and of US desire to avoid political eruptions in its own ‘backyard.’ Castro would probably demand an increase in rental for the base and may even request a status of forces agreement. Thus the cost of the American defense effort, in both monetary and political terms, would almost certainly rise.”

The full text of the paper is published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 171D.

184. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, December 17, 1958—5 p.m.

3237. During question period Commons December 15, opposition claiming Cuban rebels being killed by arms supplied by UK, badgered Minister State Foreign Affairs (Noble) into giving assurance “no further weapons of any sort will be sent (to Cuban Government) without informing Commons.”

Assistant head American Department Foreign Office (Hildyard) informed Embassy officer December 16 it not yet decided whether this assurance will include arms already loaded on ships, or contracted for, or only to new orders.

Foreign Office said assurance given primarily as concession UK public opinion and not indication HMG foresees rebel victory. This possibility not overlooked by Foreign Office, however, particularly if Cuban economic situation deteriorates.

Whitney

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56/12–1758. Secret. Repeated to Havana.

185. Editorial Note

On the evening of December 17, Ambassador Smith held a long conversation with Foreign Minister Guell and President Batista.

The approach was apparently made under instructions from the Department of State. On the evening of December 12, the day he returned to Havana, Smith talked by telephone with Deputy Assistant Secretary Snow. No record of that conversation has been found, but in telegram 604 from Havana, December 13, Smith alluded to the conversation and noted that since his talk with Snow he had received no telegraphic instructions from the Department. Smith said that because it would appear odd for him to wait any longer before contacting Guell, he planned to do so that afternoon to set up an appointment, presumably with Guell and Batista, for December 14 or 15. Smith also noted: “The danger, which we must always bear in mind, is that any action taken on our part to weaken Batista—without setting up a strong replacement backed by US—would automatically strengthen Castro in the reverse ratio and thereby benefit the Communists.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1358)

In his memoirs, Smith recalls that he received instructions from Rubottom in the early morning hours of December 14. According to Smith, he was told to disabuse Batista of the notion that the U.S. Government would support Rivero Agüero. Smith indicates that he immediately met with Guell and requested an appointment with Batista. He told Guell: “It is my unpleasant duty to inform the President of the Republic that the United States will no longer support the present Government of Cuba and that my government believes that the President is losing effective control.”

In his conversation with Batista and Guell on December 17, Smith elaborated on the U.S. position. In particular, Smith noted:

“The State Department’s estimate of the situation was that a crisis was impending which most likely would create prolonged civil disorders with much loss of life. If he would act promptly, the State Department still believed that there were Cuban elements which could salvage the rapidly deteriorating situation. It would be necessary to obtain their support and co-operation for a broadly based government, which would be capable of carrying out constructive measures for a national solution.”

Smith urged that Batista not remain in Cuba “beyond the time necessary for an orderly transition of power” and suggested that Batista and his family take up residence in Spain. In their discussion of the possible formation of a junta, Smith stressed that he had not been permitted to discuss specific solutions or personalities. Batista asked whether the U.S. Government was willing to stop the fighting. According to Smith, “When I replied that the American government could not intercede or mediate, he told me I was now mediating on behalf of the Castros.” (Smith, The Fourth Floor, pages 169–174) For Batista’s recollection of the December 17 conversation with Smith, see Fulgencio Batista, Cuba Betrayed (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), pages 96, 138–139. No record has been found in Department of State files of Rubottom’s instructions to Smith, Smith’s subsequent approach to Guell, or the December 17 meeting.

186. Memorandum of Discussion at the 391st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 18, 1958¹

Washington, December 18, 1958

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. [Allen] Dulles then turned to Cuba, characterizing the situation there as one of continued deterioration. The Government had reinforced Santiago after a series of Castro victories in the vicinity. The Intelligence Community believed that Batista would be unable to muster enough strength to save himself and that Castro would probably emerge the victor in what had now become Civil war. Batista is considering turning over power to a successor, but the latter would also probably lose to Castro. A military junta assuming power under a guarantee of early elections might change the trend toward the rebels. In view of unrest in the Army, the desertion of Batista by business, and rebel victories, the situation is critical.

The President said that at a diplomatic dinner² his Latin American friends had told him that as soon as Castro achieved power, another Castro would probably come along; and that Cuba would become a problem with Castro in control. The President suggested that perhaps Batista should be induced to turn power over to his successor. Mr. Dulles said such a move should be made to look like a coup against Batista. The President agreed.

Secretary Herter said it was difficult to convince Batista that he could not achieve a military victory. Our Ambassador has been trying to see him but has been stalled off.³ The President remarked that he found it difficult to understand how the rebel forces gained strength so rapidly. Mr. McCone reported that during his recent trip to Cuba he was told 95% of the people supported Castro.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason.

² Reference is presumably to the White House dinner the previous evening attended by various members of the Diplomatic Corps, including the Ambassadors of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Bolivia. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

³ Apparently Smith’s report of his conversation with Batista the previous evening (see supra) had not yet reached Washington.

187. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 19, 1958—5 p.m.

624. For Rubottom. At opportune occasion I was able to confirm from Papal Nuncio that church is still very much interested in obtaining peaceful solution.

I recommend that I be granted authority to approach the Papal Nuncio with the following suggested thoughts:

That the Cardinal call for truce and present to the people of Cuba a plan for a peaceful solution incorporating following ideas:

(A) Setting up a provisional government to take over the administration on February 24.

(B) Calling for general elections within six months thereafter.

(C) Present GOC ask OAS to appoint committee of 3 or 5 to supervise the truce and to supervise the electoral process.

(D) US to give tangible moral support.

Above plan would enable Batista to complete his term of office. Timing of announcement should be before February 24. Such a plan would not only be welcomed by the great majority of the people of Cuba, but also it would be most difficult for Castros to turn down. This solution would have the great advantage of not implicating too deeply US.²

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1958. Secret; Priority.

² In telegram 364 to Havana, December 23, the Department instructed Smith to discuss the situation with the Papal Nuncio and if the opportunity arose suggest that a Chirstmas-time appeal by the Church for a peaceful solution would be beneficial. Smith was instructed not to indicate that the United States favored or would be willing to support any specific solution, and he was to make clear that the United States considered itself obligated to avoid any intervention in Cuba’s internal affairs. (ibid.) No further documentation regarding Smith’s suggestion to approach the Papal Nuncio has been found in Department of State files. Smith recalls in his memoirs, however, that he was advised by Rubottom that the Department did not want to go along with any effort by the Church to stop the fighting because “there were doubts as to whether the Church hierarchy would be effective in such an undertaking.” (Smith, The Fourth Floor, p. 175)

188. Memorandum of Discussion at the 392d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 23, 1958¹

Washington, December 23, 1958

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

In Mr. [Allen] Dulles’ view, the situation in Cuba was worsening. Batista was unlikely to take any action to remedy conditions, short of a desperate military move for which the Army does not appear to have the stomach. The Communists appear to have penetrated the Castro movement, despite some effort by Fidel to keep them out. If Castro takes over in Cuba, Communist elements can be expected to participate in the government.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

The President asked whether the Department of State had requested the Department of Defense to study military action which might be necessary in Cuba. Secretary Herter said State-Defense conversations were centering on the possibility of evacuation;³ he did not know of any study of military action. Mr. Quarles believed Castro was the greater of the two evils represented by Castro and Batista. The U.S. should support the lesser of the evils and therefore should move against the bases in the U.S. which support Castro. The Attorney General reported that arrests of Castro partisans in the U.S. were being made when the statutes were violated. The Vice President wondered whether criminal prosecution of persons in the U.S. financing Castro was possible. The Attorney General observed that Castro partisans could be prosecuted more vigorously, if this was desirable from the policy standpoint. [1 sentence (2½ lines) not declassified]

Mr. Quarles felt we should decide what faction we wish to support in Cuba. The Vice President said we would need to follow the law carefully because of the tendency of the U.S. press to favor Castro. The President wondered whether there was any Cuban aspirant for power whom we could support [2 lines not declassified]. Mr. Dulles added that we ought to prevent a Castro victory. The President believed this was the first time that statement had been made in the National Security Council. The Vice President said that on the other hand we could not support Batista in order to defeat Castro. [1 sentence (1½ lines) not declassified]

Mr. Allen wondered why the U.S. should attempt to prevent a Castro victory. Mr. Dulles said there was a feeling Castro was backed by extremely radical elements. The Vice President pointed out it would be undesirable to take a chance on Communist domination of Cuba, which had one of the largest Communist parties in the hemisphere in proportion to population. Secretary Herter observed that opinion as to the undesirability of a Castro regime appeared to be unanimous.

The President believed the U.S. should take a position progressives could support. Mr. Quarles thought there was no “third force” (i.e. a force other than Batista or Castro) to support. The President saw hope of a “third force” growing in strength and influence if it were organized around an able man and provided with money and arms. Secretary Herter felt a contingency paper was needed. In reply to a question from the Vice President, Mr. Dulles said [1½ lines not declassified].⁴

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason.

² This meeting may be the occasion which President Eisenhower recalled in his memoirs. He refers to a conversation with Allen Dulles at the end of 1958, during which the latter said, “Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement. ... If Castro takes over, they will probably participate in the Government.” Eisenhower recalls, “When I heard this estimate, I was provoked that such a conclusion had not been given earlier.” (Waging Peace, p. 521)

³ No memorandum of these conversations has been found, but Herter and Rubottom discussed the issue on the telephone at 5:55 p.m. on December 18. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

⁴ 

This discussion produced the following record of action (NSC Action No. 2029–b):

“Noted that the responsible departments and agencies, particularly the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency, are keeping the situation in Cuba under continuing scrutiny with a view to taking appropriate actions in U.S. security interests, and to making necessary contingency plans on the initiative of the Secretary of State.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

189. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, December 23, 1958.

SUBJECT

Cuba

With the advent of the sugar harvest, and the rapidly deteriorating position of the Batista Government, which has lost control of the Eastern third of Cuba, except for three or four relatively large cities, the Department has been giving increased attention to the Cuban problem and what, if anything, this Government might appropriately do to encourage a solution short of the blood bath which could result there. We are consulting regularly with the Director of CIA and his staff in an effort to develop courses of action which might lead to a viable solution.

Batista seized power by a bloodless coup in 1952 and, despite his having been elected (without opposition) to a regular presidential term in 1954, the Cuban people seem not to have forgiven him his interruption of democratic processes there, despite the bad reputation of the Prio Government which he overturned. Notwithstanding Batista’s strongly entrenched position and his control of the Cuban military forces, he was unable to snuff out the Fidel Castro-led rebellion following a landing in which only twelve rebels survived in November 1956. At the same time, Castro has been unsuccessful so far in his efforts to overthrow Batista, despite his increasing control of the Eastern third of the island. Two general strikes announced by Castro were failures and, up to the present, the Cuban Confederation of Labor continues to support Batista.

Both the Government and the rebels have used harshly repressive measures against the public, with resultant hatreds against both, but more especially against the Government. Last summer the Castro forces kidnapped 30 U.S. seamen assigned to our naval base at Guantanamo plus some U.S. civilians, and held them for three weeks; in late November they interrupted the water supply at the base several times; and there are other clear indications that irresponsibility and a degree of anti-American sentiment are characteristics of the Castro movement.

We also know that the Communists are utilizing the Castro movement to some extent, as would be expected, but there is insufficient evidence on which to base a charge that the rebels are communist-dominated. Hence there seems to be no basis for invoking the Caracas Resolution of 1954,² which would call the OAS into action. However, we have consulted with the other American Republics regarding the Cuban problem. They have expressed interest in the matter, but except for Ecuador, none of them has expressed willingness to take any initiative. In fact, the Organization of American States does not have clear-cut authority to move into an internal problem like that in Cuba, although it has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity for effective action in disputes involving two or more countries.

On March 29th of this year, sixteen months after the rebellion started, we suspended the shipment of combat arms to the Cuban Government,³ in accordance with our policy not to ship arms to countries beset by such political tension as that existing in Cuba. In our best judgment, we could not continue to supply weapons to a government which was resorting to such repressive measures of internal security as to have alienated some 80 percent of the Cuban people, by all reports, as well as public and official opinion in most of the other American Republics, not to mention important elements of press and congressional opinion in the U.S. However, we have retained our Army, Navy, and Air Force Missions in the country, and have shipped some non-combat equipment, such as communications items.

On November 4 [3] elections were held in Cuba under a state of siege, in which the Batista-backed candidate, Rivero Aguero, was elected President by an overwhelming majority. He is generally considered a puppet of Batista and great concern is felt as to whether he could maintain himself in power without strong military support following his inauguration now scheduled for February 24. Any hopes that the elections might ease the tensions in Cuba were dashed by the circumstances under which they were held.

Throughout the past two years this Government has had to contend with a very difficult public relations problem in so far as Cuba is concerned. The U.S. press and the Latin American press have been overwhelmingly anti-Batista and have been critical of any evidence adducing U.S. support of him. Some of the papers, particularly in Latin America, are pro-Castro, but this is not a uniform pattern. Ambassador Gardner was widely considered to be overly friendly to Batista, and his successor, Ambassador Smith, after being almost declared persona non grata following an incident in Santiago shortly after his arrival in Cuba, which evoked a public statement from him deploring brutality, has gradually become a target of criticism for any dealings he has with the Batista Government. It must be recognized that any U.S. representative would find it virtually impossible to avoid criticism under present conditions in Cuba. The Congress has manifested widespread interest in the Cuban problem and, during the hearings while it was considering the Mutual Security Bill early last session, the questioning revealed strong feeling against U.S. arms shipments to that country. In fact, it was the Cuban situation, along with our somewhat strained relations with the Dominican Republic, which led to the so-called Morse Amendment,⁴ calling for an annual determination by you as to whether arms may be granted to Latin American Governments.

For the past five years and more, the Department has been in frequent touch with the Department of Justice at all levels in connection with the persistent illegal activities of Cuban political exiles in this country. One result has been the indictment twice (in 1954 and 1958) of ex-President Prio Socarras for violation of the neutrality laws, as well as a number of seizures of arms and arrests of men destined for Cuba. Former Attorney General Brownell presided at one large conference with our officers just a fortnight before his resignation.⁵ We have repeatedly urged all U.S. enforcement agencies to make a maximum effort to curb violations of the neutrality statutes, with special reference to Cuban violators.

The Department has concluded that any solution in Cuba requires that Batista must relinquish power whether as Chief of State or as the force behind a puppet successor. He probably should also leave the country. Many responsible Cubans share this view. The Department clearly does not want to see Castro succeed to the leadership of the Government. It believes that the majority of Cubans likewise share that view. [1 sentence (4 lines) not declassified] We hope that Batista can be made to see the desirability of this course of action, and Ambassador Smith has held one discussion with the President toward this end.⁶ In addition, we sent an American private citizen of high standing who has known President Batista well for 30 years, to Havana earlier this month, where he spent several hours, without attribution to the U.S. Government, pleading with Batista to adopt a constructive political solution to the current crisis.⁷ It is too early to see how these approaches will work out but Batista may have been moved slightly away from his present firm posture to stay on until the bitter end. Batista’s well-known qualities of personal courage and intense loyalty to his friends and cronies is a dominant factor which has to be reckoned with in this situation.

The Papal Nuncio in Havana has sent word to Ambassador Smith of his continuing desire to see peace restored. We have instructed Ambassador Smith to talk to the Nuncio and to indicate our interest in the possibility of a Christmas Day appeal to all Cubans by the Church.⁸

Ex-President Arias of Panama, presently Ambassador to the United States and to the OAS, is in touch with ex-President Galo Plaza of Ecuador to see whether the latter would be interested in joining him, and possibly a third ex-President from Latin America, in an offer of good offices to the Cuban people. We prompted Arias to consider such a move as this.⁹

In sum, we do not believe that Batista can possibly establish his successor firmly and peacefully in office on February 24, 1959. We are therefore seeking, by all available means short of outright intervention, to bring about a political solution in Cuba which will [less than 1 line not declassified] see the hated elements of the Batista regime effectively removed from power, will enable President Batista and his family to withdraw safely from the Cuban scene, and will result in a government broadly based on popular consent and support. Above all else, we want to help avoid the appalling mob violence which attended the fall of Machado in 1933, and which Cubans fatalistically expect to occur again.

Christian A. Herter

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. Initialed by the President. Another copy indicates that it was drafted by Rubottom and Snow. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America)

² Adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference, March 28, 1954. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, vol. I, pp. 1299–1300.

³ The suspension occurred on March 14. News of the suspension appeared in the press on March 28. See Documents 36 and 44.

⁴ This amendment was incorporated in Sec. 103 of the Mutual Security Act of 1958 (P.L. 85–477) enacted June 30, 1958. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1566–1583.

⁵ Presumably a reference to a meeting held on October 14, 1957; see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VI, p. 858.

⁶ Presumably a reference to Smith’s conversation with Batista on December 17; see Document 185.

⁷ See Document 173.

⁸ See Document 187 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁹ See Document 178.

190. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 23, 1958¹

Washington, December 23, 1958

SUBJECT

Visit of Senator Javits for the Purpose of Discussing the Cuban Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Senator Javits

ARA—Mr. R.R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary

CMA—Mr. William A. Wieland, Director

CMA—Mr. Robert A. Stevenson, Officer-in-Charge, Cuban Affairs

Senator Javits had requested an appointment with Mr. Rubottom to “discuss the Cuban situation.” He opened the conversation by stating that several months ago his friend, Herb Matthews, had tried to interest him in Cuban developments and at that time he had made rather a searching inquiry among businessmen and other knowledgeable persons concerning the Cuban scene. One person had told him that probably 90% of the people were anti-Batista but that perhaps 75% to 80% were anti-Castro. This, and other information, had led him to the conclusion that the issues there were not well-defined and that he would not, therefore, attempt to bring the Hill into the matter.

In recent weeks, however, Senator Javits had again become concerned with Cuba and the possibility of a general breakdown of the government there with accompanying bloodshed and misery and loss to U.S. interests. He now feels that perhaps he will have to take up the question on the Hill, but before doing so he desired to discuss it with the State Department. He said he appreciated the fact that the matter is very sensitive and complicated and that he does not want to do anything which might further complicate it or make a solution more difficult.

Mr. Rubottom told Senator Javits that the Cuban situation is indeed most delicate and complicated and thanked him for coming to the Department to discuss it. He assured him that State desires to cooperate with him and the Congress in every way that it can and that we share with him the serious concern with regard to Cuba.

The basic trouble in Cuba, “Batista’s Achilles heel,” Mr. Rubottom said, is the fact that Batista seized power illegally in 1952 and has not been able to cleanse himself of that stigma by any subsequent actions. Through overconfidence or by design he ignored the Castro rebellion when it was insignificant militarily, and at the same time he refused to take steps which might have broadened his base of support or at least have created support and hope among the non-revolutionary opposition for a solution at the polls with a concomitant isolation of Castro. During all these months the U.S. has subtly but persistently sought to persuade him to seek a constructive solution which might bring peace to the island. It has had to be extremely careful to avoid any appearance of intervention because a charge of U.S. intervention would be damaging to us throughout the hemisphere and particularly in Cuba in view of our past relationship. As Batista continued to ignore our suggestions and as public opinion in the U.S. and Latin America became more hostile to him, it was deemed necessary in March of this year to suspend temporarily a shipment of rifles destined for Cuba under the reimbursable aid program and which had been paid for by the Cubans.

At this point Senator Javits interjected a question, asking how the question of arms now stands. Mr. Wieland answered stating that the U.S. has continued its suspension and has made it applicable to all combat arms and equipment, although it did not extend to non-combat items.

Mr. Rubottom said that Batista’s response to our suggestions continued to be disappointing and that the elections when finally carried out as they were, with constitutional guarantees suspended, seem to offer little hope of a solution. Nevertheless the President-elect, Rivero Aguero, has said that his first concern will be to seek a way to bring peace to the island and has indicated an awareness of the need to form a “national administration”. The U.S. continues to encourage him in these efforts and only recently Ambassador Smith was in the Department to discuss and consider additional steps which the U.S. might take.²

Senator Javits thanked Mr. Rubottom for his summation of U.S. policy and said that he had three questions to ask, the first one being: “Why have we dealt with the rebels at all?”

Mr. Rubottom replied that we have not treated or dealt officially with the rebels; that our Consul in Santiago de Cuba, in accordance with his duty to seek protection for American citizens abroad, had sought out the rebels in order to obtain the release of American citizens who had been kidnapped by them. However, he refused to discuss any subject except the return of the kidnappers and he was eventually successful in obtaining their release with no conditions discussed or accepted. He added that the Department has been concerned with the rebel lack of responsibility and occasional anti-American statements and the possibility of communist infiltration and influence. In fact, he said that for more than a year he had followed closely the reports of the intelligence community on this subject but that he has seen nothing which would lead him to conclude that the Castro Movement is communist controlled. Mr. Wieland confirmed this point and added that although we have reports that Raul Castro visited behind the Iron Curtain and is accused of communist sympathies, we also have reports that he went there not as a delegate but as an anti-Communist private citizen, at his own expense, and while there made a speech critical of communism.

Senator Javits then asked if the Department has considered using the OAS as a vehicle by which meaningful mediation in Cuba might be attempted. Mr. Rubottom replied that the Department has indeed been exploring this very possibility but that the charter does not seem to offer any avenue by which this might be done unless, of course, OAS assistance might be requested by the Cuban Government. Nevertheless we are continuing to consider what the OAS might do and are seeking the views of the other members.

Thirdly, Senator Javits asked what plan does the U.S. have in the event the USSR recognizes the rebels thus creating a state of belligerency in Cuba under international law. He amplified his question by stating that business interests in New York were very much concerned by this possibility as it would void all their insurance; also, that it might just suit the USSR as it would create an awkward situation for the U.S. and would be another case where the Russians had seized the initiative.

Mr. Rubottom replied that he considers this to be a rather remote possibility, but that it is a question to which he will have to give more thought. He doubted very much that Castro would want USSR recognition as it might very well cost him the majority of his present supporters.

Senator Javits said that he would continue to study the Cuban situation and will particularly look into the possibility of using the OAS; that he thinks something will have to be done on the Hill. He added that as a liberal he has no use for Batista, but that he does not want to see him replaced by something as bad or worse. Mr. Rubottom mentioned that he had talked with Senator Morse regarding Cuba and that Mr. Snow and Mr. Wieland had made an appearance before informal executive sessions of both Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees.³

Before leaving, Senator Javits, with a smile, said that he would make two suggestions, namely; that much as he loves the New York Times the Department should not let it run or influence our policy on Cuba; and, that the Department should consider publishing a White Paper on Cuba as soon as possible, and before the situation collapses there. With regard to the latter suggestion he said that he intended to speak about it with Secretary Dulles and with Mr. Herter.⁴

Mr. Rubottom assured him that we have not been guided by the New York Times and that he would give serious consideration to the Senator’s suggestion regarding a White Paper. He said that the Department would like to cooperate with Senator Javits in every way that it can on the Cuban question and that he hoped Senator Javits would continue to give us the benefit of his views.

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba—Political. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson on December 30 and revised on January 8, 1959.

² See Document 175.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ No record has been found of a conversation on this subject involving Rubottom and either Dulles or Herter. On December 29, however, Herter directed that a White Paper on Cuba be prepared. See Document 193.

191. Editorial Note

On December 26, the President met at the White House from 9:03 to 9:55 a.m. with Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, John S.D. Eisenhower, Andrew Goodpaster, and Gordon Gray. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments) According to a memorandum of the conference prepared by Gray on December 30, the President “expressed a feeling that for one reason or another the main elements of the Cuban situation had not been presented to him.” Eisenhower said he planned to speak with Secretary Dulles “about better coordination.” The President also indicated that “he did not wish the specifics of covert operations to be presented to the NSC.” (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean-Up” Records, Meetings with the President) The memorandum is published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 1342.

192. Editorial Note

On December 15, the Consul at Santiago de Cuba, Park Wollam, reported to the Department that Jorge Bez Chabebe, a priest on the staff of the Archbishop of Santiago, had suggested that the United States could establish a better relationship with the 26th of July Movement by sending a secret emissary to deal directly with Fidel Castro. The priest had implied that the emissary would be well-received. Wollam observed that the suggestion might simply be an effort on the part of the 26th of July Movement to obtain informal U.S. recognition which could then be exploited. Wollam also remarked that the Cuban Army had been steadily losing ground and he did not see any way that it could regain control of the situation. Under the circumstances, Wollam inquired whether the United States should not make some gesture to improve relations with the 26th of July Movement and to obtain better information. He acknowledged that if the United States did so, it might be a tacit admission that the rebels were winning. (Telegram 37 from Santiago de Cuba, December 15; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1558; and despatch 65 from Santiago de Cuba, December 16; ibid., 737.00/12–1658)

The Department did not respond until December 29. It indicated that, through the priest, Wollam might be able to state clearly the U.S. Government’s views on the internal situation in Cuba without compromising the official statement that the United States had no intention of entering into negotiations or discussions with the Castro forces. The Department did want to convey to Castro the “uncompromising nonintervention policy” which it felt Castro had never appreciated. Wollam was instructed to meet with Bez Chabebe and impress him with the impartiality of the United States, except in the matter of Communism. Wollam was to make known that the U.S. Government had received many reports of Communist influence in the 26th of July Movement, but that it had made no judgment that the reports were true. Wollam was to stress, however, that the reports were of concern “as world experience has shown the Communists to be adept at infiltrating revolutionary movements and in masking behind the spirit of nationalism.” (Circular Airgram 5512 to Havana and Santiago de Cuba, December 29; ibid., 737.00/12–2958)

Regarding the reasons why Wollam did not make the approach to Bez Chabebe as instructed, see Document 234.

193. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, December 29, 1958¹

Washington, December 29, 1958

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Situation in Cuba

Mr. Rubottom said that the Cuban situation was moving rapidly and that Batista’s position was deteriorating. He said that the main problem now seemed to be how to secure as orderly a transfer of power as possible with a minimum of bloodshed and a minimum of economic disruption. He thought that it was highly conceivable that Batista would not last until February 24 when his successor is due to take over. He said it was not clear whether a rebel provisional government had already been formed or whether, if formed, it had been recognized by some Latin American countries. He said that Ambassador Dreier was trying to arouse interest in the situation among Members of the OAS on humanitarian grounds. The Acting Secretary asked if it were true that Batista was weak because the U.S. had denied him arms as he (Batista) had said. Mr. Rubottom said that this was not the basic reason for Batista’s weakness. The Acting Secretary asked that a white paper be prepared on the Cuban situation to cover inter alia this point.

Action: ARA

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, December 1958. Secret. Prepared by Thomas McElhiney. An attendance list for the meeting, which was chaired by Herter, is attached to the source text.

194. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Ciudad Trujillo, December 29, 1958—11 a.m.

239. Re: Deptel 193.² Presence Prime Minister of Cuba and others reported Embtel 236.³ At Cuban Embassy reception last night Guell advised me that by now the most casual political observers should be aware of fact that Castro forces clearly infiltrated with Communist agents and Castro receiving support from international Communist movement. He stated that situation in Cuba presently most precarious since GOC has been unable to secure sufficient arms to mount adequate counter-offensive and that should GOC fall the difficulties within Cuba and the effect upon all of its neighbors would be more serious and of greater magnitude than Guatemalan take-over.

Prime Minister Guell further advised me that GOC was prepared to “do anything necessary” to assure continuation of constitutional government looking towards development full democratic regime and prepared to discuss problem along this line, presumably with influential representative Cubans and with US.

Concluded by stressing point that present situation can be salvaged only if US will do 2 things immediately: (1) supply arms to constituted government GOC and (2) give public support to GOC for psychological reason on basis aforesaid discussions.

No public announcement as yet made regarding reason for trip and business undertaken and due to fact Embassy requested make no inquiry I have as yet been unable to ascertain this information.

Farland

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2958. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Havana.

² In telegram 193, December 27, the Department indicated that it had learned that Guell might be paying a brief visit to the Dominican Republic. It asked the Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo not to make inquiries, but to transmit any information it might obtain regarding Guell’s visit. (ibid., 033.3739/12–2758)

³ In telegram 236, December 27, the Embassy listed the members of Guell’s party, which had arrived on December 26 and planned to stay until December 29. Guell had reportedly met with Trujillo on December 26, and the Embassy speculated that a secret agreement regarding aid to Batista was possible. (ibid.)

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State¹

Quito, December 29, 1958—4 p.m.

203. My telegram 200.² Tobar received Batista’s reply this morning. Batista expresses thanks and suggests Tobar confer with Panamanian and Cuban Ambassadors Washington. Tobar is telegraphing appropriate instructions to Chiriboga. Believes you should have representative present informal discussions. Thinks that these discussions might produce decision 3 or 4 friendly countries send covert emissaries confer with Batista and Castro. Some of latter’s agents in United States have been trying establish contact with Tobar here Ecuador. He hitherto has ignored overtures. Now however feels free to make contact. Is anxious to receive whatever suggestions you may offer. Desires be kept up to date and said he would promptly pass to US news of all developments.

Ravndal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2958. Confidential; Priority.

² Telegram 200, December 24, in response to a Department of State inquiry, indicated that Tobar was still awaiting Batista’s reply. (ibid., 737.00/12–2458) In telegram 135 to Quito, December 24, the Department had inquired about the present status of the Tobar initiative in view of its “active study” of the Cuban situation and the “possibility of other initiatives.” (ibid., 737.00/12–1558)

196. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 29, 1958—7 p.m.

640. For Rubottom. Guillermo Belt, former Ambassador to the US, came to the residence and suggested following salvation for Cuba: (1) Papal Nuncio and I should go to Batista and tell him to leave the country. (2) Papal Nuncio to submit following junta to Batista, consisting of Gustavo Cuervo Rubio (former Vice President of Cuba), Luis Machado (former Ambassador to the US), Jose Antonio Rubio Padillo (doctor of medicine, prominent Catholic leader, Minister of Public Works under Prio), Guillermo Belt (former Ambassador to the US), Ernesto Dihigo (professor University of Habana, former Chief Delegate UN under Prio), General Cantillo.² (3) General Cantillo to become Chief of the Joint Staff. (4) US to give full support—including shipment of arms. (5) Junta to appoint a national unity cabinet (of people representing the better elements of opposition). A. Declare elections null and void. B. Dissolve all political parties. C. Call general elections within six months. Negotiate peace with Castro. D. Political amnesty. E. Punish through the courts all the people in Batista regime [responsible?] for violation of rights. F. No member of new provisional government, cabinet, Junta or present GOC to run in new elections. G. Junta will ask OAS to appoint commission to help negotiate peace with rebels and supervise the election process.

I said I would be glad to pass this on to Washington.

According to Belt, the above candidates for Junta all firmly believe: (1) If Castros come into power the blood bath in Cuba will be much worse than after the fall of Machado. (2) That a social revolution will take place in Cuba. (3) That the Communists will control the GOC.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2958. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² In a memorandum to Snow, December 29, Little provided further background information on the persons Belt had recommended form a junta. Of General Cantillo, Little observed: “Although he is reported to be unpopular with his fellow officers, he may take a major role in any Army attempt to depose Batista. Our military in Cuba have stated that he has an engaging personality, but that they question his sincerity and trustworthiness.” (ibid., CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Pending Statements)

197. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs (Stewart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, December 29, 1958.

SUBJECT

Plan for Settlement of Cuban Civil Strife

Problem

For the past two years Cuba has been the victim of a civil war that daily grows worse. The rebel forces of Fidel Castro, which have been carrying the brunt of the fighting, are gaining strength. Other opposition groups, disorganized, have aided Castro but now, with possible victory in sight, they fear that Castro wishes to overthrow President Batista’s Government on his own and set up a regime controlled entirely by his 26th of July movement. Cubans do not entirely trust Castro’s motives, nor do we, and the desirable course of events, if Batista is to be overthrown, is the formation of a Government of National Conciliation made up of representatives of all anti-Batista sectors. If there is a possibility that Batista’s hand-picked President, Andres Rivero Aguero, has the support of the population, this fact should be ascertained and Rivero given a chance to assume power when Batista’s term ends in February, 1959.

Discussion

Fidel Castro’s success in starting with a group of 13 men and building his forces to their present size indicates that a large part of the Cuban population supports him, or is anti-Batista. In the past few days the 26th of July forces claim sensational successes in Oriente and Camaguey provinces, while Fidelista and Organizacion Revolucionaria armed bands are threatening to cut the island in half by capturing Santa Clara, the capital of Las Villas Province. If the rebel forces are successful in all they claim they are doing, the Batista regime may fall. If it does not topple, the stalemate will continue with more killings, which number every day in the scores, or maybe hundreds. If the regime does fall, a struggle for power among the opposition factions may result, thus postponing a return to any semblance of normality.

Should Batista successfully resist immediate overthrow, or bickering results among opposition forces if the regime falls, the following described plan could be inaugurated at any time:

1. Encourage the formation of a small informal group of Latin American OAS Ambassadors to study the Cuban situation.

2. After a brief time to allow discussion, encourage the group to ask Batista to invite it to visit Cuba for a first-hand study.

3. If this permission is granted, interview Batista and submit to him this plan:

a. If his Government and the Castro and other opposition forces were agreeable, an immediate truce would be called. Order would be maintained by the Cuban armed forces, commanded by officers not involved in any brutalities under the surveillance of United Nations observers.

b. Once a truce were called, the United Nations would supervise a plebiscite of all Cuban citizens of voting age.

c. This plebiscite would call on the people to vote on two propositions, to wit:

1. Are you satisfied with the results of the election of November 3, in which Andres Rivero Aguero was elected President and do you favor his taking power on February 24, 1959? If the majority favors his taking power, the other candidates elected in November will take office.

2. If you do not favor the election of Dr. Rivero, would you favor the formation of a Government of National Conciliation, made up of representatives of the 26th of July Movement, the traditional political parties which opposed Batista (Communists excluded), civic organizations, Accion Catolica, students and other qualified groups? If the majority favors this alternative, the Government of National Conciliation will call general elections for President, etc., before the end of 1959. The United Nations will supervise or observe the elections to assure their honesty and impartiality.

d. If Batista agreed to this procedure, the committee would immediately seek the agreement of Castro’s movement and other organizations mentioned in c (2). Overturns, in fact, might be under way while Batista’s approval was being sought.

4. If there was general agreement for a truce and the procedure outlined, the committee would seek Batista’s consent and then ask the President of the Council of the Organization of American States to call a meeting. The Cuban representative might receive instructions to ask for the meeting.

5. At the meeting, the committee would justify its action on humanitarian grounds and urge the Council to request the United Nations to be seized of the Cuban problem, suggesting the solution described above.

Regarding Point 1, it is believed that Ambassador Arias of Panama, Foreign Minister Andrade of Bolivia, and others are in favor of trying to solve the Cuban dispute through mediation or some other means. As an ex-President, Ambassador Arias would act with considerable authority as a member of a committee and might be the person who should chair the group. Ambassador Arias did not do badly as chairman of the OAS special committee that effected the Nicaragua-Honduras cease-fire. Parenthetically, his chances of being the next President of Panama would be greatly enhanced if the committee was successful and our feeling toward this eventuality would have to be considered in considering him for an important role. The United States, in my opinion, should not be a member of the committee.

Concerning Point 2, a brief lapse of time would allow members of the committee to think out loud, and to explore reactions of the various Latin American countries, the United Nations Secretariat and non-American nations toward a solution of the type envisaged. The committee would leak details of the settlement so that it would gain publicity everywhere, including Cuba. If asked, the United States would be able to state that it favored the plan as a means of settling the Cuban problem, with the people of the country having a direct say in the method of solution. The way would thus be prepared for requesting Batista’s permission for the committee to enter Cuba and study the situation.

If Batista refused it seems likely that his position would be greatly weakened, because the great majority of his people want to see the present chaotic and bloody situation come to a speedy end. It is evident that Batista cannot dominate the rebels and he does not appear to have enough control over the situation to enable Rivero Aguero to begin his term with prospects of peace. On the other hand, if Batista sees the handwriting, this method gives him a dignified out: he will permit the Cuban people to decide again what kind of a government they want. He can always say Castro prevented all the voters from having their say in November.

If Batista permits the committee to visit the island and accepts its proposal, he will probably do so believing Castro will turn it down. The remaining opposition groups, with the possible exception of the Ortodoxos, logically would be expected to favor the plan. The proposition of the Catholic Church in March had widespread appeal and it will be recalled that its overtures for a peaceful solution were torpedoed by Castro and a then much-stronger Batista.

Should Castro spurn the proposal, he would turn a large segment of the Cuban population against him and if he triumphed in the end over Batista and imposed his government on his people, he would have serious troubles eventually.

As for Cuban aversion to outside interference in the affairs of the country, it will be recalled that Antonio Varona, the leader of the Autenticos (the largest party in Cuba) has insistently been calling for OAS intervention in the Cuban tragedy.

As for a truce, this presents the most serious deterrent to the success of the plan. It would be absolutely necessary that Batista’s commanders be removed and I envisage that they, along with Batista, would have to leave the country under the protection of committee or UN observers, under ideal circumstances, or as best they could within a period of say 24 hours. It would be difficult to work out a plan acceptable to the Fidelistas, but again, the other opposition groups might assist the committee in establishing a procedure in order to put an end to the confusion and bloodshed. It is inevitable that some of Batista’s more brutal commanders would be killed but this should not deter the plan. Their fate will be worse if Castro overthrows Batista.

Men such as Colonel Barquin, etc., could be released from prison to take over commands in the Army. They would take these commands with the understanding that they would maintain order, avoid widespread slaughter and generally create a situation propitious for Cubans of voting age to go to the polls anywhere on the island, be it in the Sierra Maestra or in Habana, and ballot freely.

No registration of voters would be necessary, each person’s carnet de identidad establishing the age. Multiple voting by an individual could be avoided by marking each voter’s hand with a stamp using indelible ink.

The role of the United Nations as supervisor of elections is not new; it played this part successfully in Greece and in colonial Africa. Thousands of observers were used in Greece and several hundred persons would be needed in Cuba. The Latin American diplomatic corps and volunteers from nearby countries could be pressed into service, their expenses to be paid by the Cuban Government. It would probably be advisable to keep the Army’s role as minor as possible, retaining the bulk of the troops in barracks, subject only to call in event of disorder. If the 26th of July Movement attempted to sabotage the election this action would bring down on Castro’s head the wrathful public censure of most of the democratic world.

As for Point 4, it seems unlikely that many countries would oppose the plan in the Council of the OAS, since Batista would be a party to it. The Dominican Republic might oppose the plan for fear of setting a precedent. Once taken before the UN, it would undoubtedly gain the support of most of the democratic countries. Opposition might develop from the Soviet bloc, the UAR, Iraq, Sudan and other countries ruled by military dictators. But they would be outvoted handily and probably might consider it politic to go along with the majority.

Some of the advantages of this plan are:

1. The danger would be reduced of the United States becoming involved alone in the settlement of the Cuban problem.

2. The danger of a complete Castro takeover would be minimized.

3. If the plan were successful there is a possibility that most of the 1959 sugar crop could be harvested, thus eliminating the possibility of a shortage which would increase prices in the United States with inevitable political overtones.

4. While we would let the investigating committee, the OAS and the UN take the credit for effecting the solution, it would inevitably become known that we first proposed the plan. If it failed, the repercussions would be shared equally by all.

5. The solution of the Cuban problem would set a precedent for the settlement of similar situations throughout the world by an ideal method, i.e., by the votes of the people of the country involved under the aegis of the United Nations. Future failure of a dictator to accede to such a plan would probably hasten his downfall.

6. The United States would be lauded for contributing to the humanitarian solution of a difficult hemispheric problem.

The disadvantages:

1. The plan would be inaugurated by an informal committee operating within the framework of the OAS but without specific authorization of the Council of the OAS.

2. If any one step in the plan could not be implemented it would fail. However, public disclosure of the attempt and a detailed description of the plan might still have an indirect effect in settling the Cuban problem.

3. Since certain Latin American individuals would be vital for the success of the attempt, their failure to come through might tempt them to place the blame on the United States.

4. The United States would be accused of indirect intervention no matter what the results obtained.

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Testimony. Secret. Drafted by Stewart. Also addressed to Wieland who initialed the source text.

198. Editorial Note

A December 30 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy set forth the effects of the embargo on the transfer of U.S. military equipment to Cuba on Cuban-U.S. military relationships as follows: 1) Cuban purchase of military equipment from other sources; 2) weakening of Cuban good will toward the United States; 3) loss of effectiveness of U.S. military missions in Cuba; and 4) inability of the Cuban armed forces to combat rebel troops and protect U.S. lives and property. The memorandum briefly reviewed U.S. policy objectives in Latin America and the Military Planning Guidance for Latin America and Western Hemisphere defense. In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs recommended that the Secretary of Defense forward their views to the Secretary of State “with a view to:

“a. Terminating the embargo on transfer of U.S. military equipment to Cuba,

“b. Re-emphasizing the importance of adhering to agreed U.S. policy toward Latin America, and

“c. Strengthening U.S.-Cuban relationships and goodwill.”

Copies of the memorandum, which was designated JCS 1976/ 259, were distributed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DCSOPS, the Secretary to the Chief of Naval Operations, DIR/Plans (AF), and Marine Corps L/O. The memorandum is published in full in Declassified Documents, 1981, 150B.

199. Editorial Note

On December 30 at 9:05 a.m., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Irwin telephone Under Secretary Herter regarding the record of action at the National Security Council meeting of December 23 (see footnote 4, Document 188). According to a memorandum of the telephone conversation:

“Irwin said some of the military contacted State’s working level but can’t seem to determine just what planning is going on. Irwin said however State wants to handle going ahead with the contingency plans, Defense will cooperate; that Defense would be happy to take the initiative or react to State’s initiative, but would appreciate knowing our wishes.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

Later that morning, at 10:27 a.m., Herter called Murphy and mentioned that “Defense is getting nervous about Cuba.” Herter asked what Murphy thought about getting Irwin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Cabell together to “go over” the Cuban situation. Murphy replied that he thought this was a good idea and that he would arrange the meeting. (ibid.) This is presumably the meeting described in Document 201.

200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, December 30, 1958—8:04 p.m.

399. Col. John Kieffer, registered representative Cuban Government, told Department today that latest information from his sources was:

(1) In Las Villas Province Government still controlled Santa Clara, Cienfuegos and Sagua de Grand, but rest of territory in rebel hands.

(2) Rebels commanded by Camilo Cienfuegos in North and Che Guevara in South, were only ostensibly under direction Fidel Castro, actually taking orders directly from Juan Marinello and other Communist leaders. Communist cells were being quickly organized in villages, Communist pamphlets and literature distributed and other methods typical of Communist guerrilla occupation were being seen.

(3) Although Government can hold cities for moment, US will find “Communist Cuba on its doorstep” unless it quickly lifts arms embargo.

(4) Embassy Habana has been apprised of above and has sent people into area.

Department would appreciate Embassy comment, particularly re alleged Communist operations in rebel-held territory in Las Villas Province and statement Embassy has sent people into that area.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3058. Official Use Only. Drafted by Wieland and cleared with Snow.

201. Memorandum of a Conference, Under Secretary of State Herter’s Office, Department of State, Washington, December 31, 1958, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, December 31, 1958, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cuba

The following attended:

State Department—Under Secretary Christian Herter, Mr. Robert Murphy, and Mr. Roy R. Rubottom

Assistant to the President—Mr. Gordon Gray

Department of Defense—Mr. John Irwin and Mr. Robert H. Knight

Joint Chiefs of Staff—Admiral Arleigh Burke

CIA—General Cabell and Mr. J.C. King

Navy Department—Rear Admiral A.S. Hayward, Jr.

The conference began with a briefing by Mr. Rubottom of the questioning to which he had been subjected at the meeting with Senators Mansfield, Morse, Sparkman, Humphrey, Aiken, and Smith.²

The subject of this meeting also had been Cuba and the questions had been well put (most of them from previously prepared memoranda), and the questions clearly indicted a heavy bias in favor of ousting Batista and implications that Communists were backing Batista [Castro].

In general, they wanted to know what the U.S. was doing about the Cuban situation. Mr. Rubottom, among other things, explained to them the plan by which State sent a circular³ to the U.S. ambassador to each of the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) to determine the interest of those states in intervening in Cuba in a peaceable manner, to prevent bloodshed. All members of the OAS except Mexico indicated that they were in favor of such an approach and several prominent individuals, such as former President of Panama, Mr. Arias, are working on this OAS approach. State hopes that there may be some beneficial result from this. There are no concrete plans for the approach as yet, but the purpose is to get general backing from the Organization of the American States for peaceable intervention in Cuba to prevent heavy bloodshed.

The Congressional group also asked about arms which had been furnished to Cuba, and were told by Mr. Rubottom of the March 29 decision to ship no more arms to the Batista Government.

The Dominican Republic is reportedly working to send arms to Batista and a large shipment is reported as being contemplated at the present time. Senator Humphrey and Senator Mansfield questioned that such a shipment could not erase [create?] a situation in Cuba, which could not be considered as purely internal. Mr. Rubottom explained to them that he thought such would not be the case, but that at least more interest would be created in the Cuba situation by such a shipment.

Background of Raul Castro and Che Guevara were discussed. Che is an Argentine doctor who is a good fighter and is a Communist organizer. Much of this movement is dominated by Communists.

Senator Mansfield kept asking questions to show that the men around Batista [Castro] are Communist, although Rubottom explained that this was not the case. Senator Aiken said the real backers of Castro are businessmen and industrialists in Oriente Province. For an example, Mr. Busch [Bosch], who has given financial support to the 26 July movement. This concluded Mr. Rubottom’s discussion of the senatorial conference.

Mr. Rubottom does not think that it will be possible to pin a Communist label on the Castro movement.

Admiral Burke pointed out that a State Department message of today (31 Dec)⁴ indicated that in addition to Che Guevara, a Cuban Communist Juan Marinello also is reported as Communist and as being identified with Castro forces, and actually directing them.

Mr. Rubottom agreed that this might be true, but that he could not confirm it.

Mr. Gray stated that in the last National Security Council meeting⁵ the President had said that this is the first time he, the President, had heard that our government is united against Fidel Castro. He had mentioned the same thing to Mr. Murphy and Mr. Dulles of CIA last Friday morning.⁶ Mr. Gray inquired if this actually is our government position.

Mr. Rubottom stated that the U.S. has been trying to get Batista to recognize that he, Batista, cannot defeat Castro as such, but that a third force is needed to defeat Castro politically.

Mr. Irwin asked that if it isn’t true that though we haven’t helped Castro as a government, we have succeeded in running Batista down.

Admiral Burke agreed that many individuals in the Cuban Army apparently think that since we are not helping Batista, we must be helping Castro. Mr. Rubottom explained that this is not quite so simple. Up to fifteen months ago, Batista had been getting support with military equipment, and had had no success in running Castro forces out. At one time, they were down to twelve individuals. State Department considered that Batista and his forces had put on a disgraceful performance with the arms given them, and in fact the rebels actually had gotten arms by buying them from the Cuban Army.

Mr. Rubottom said State had considered the problem of getting arms to help another rebel group in the Las Villas area.

This is a force primarily under ex-President Prio, although not solely under his control. Prio had not been a very admirable character himself when he was President and when he had left the country he had been able to take some five million dollars to the United States with him. With this money, he and his ex-Prime Minister Varona had financed the movement.

In addition to the Prio/Varona group, there is a large city group made up from the professional people such as doctors and lawyers. These have organized and sent a man to help Varona organize the movement. This man’s name is Cardona and at the present time he is operating in Miami. State had thought that it would be possible that a representative of this group could be gotten to a conference table with representatives of other groups of Cuba, some good might come of it.

There followed a general discussion of Varona, who is considered to be stout-hearted and patriotic, and who had bought a plane of his own in which to fly back to Cuba. Although he is still a Prio man, there is a general feeling that the group with which he is working includes other influences, particularly in view of the assistance which Miro Cardona is giving. Cardona is a former Justice of the Supreme Court.

A Cuban rebel radio station yesterday said that Prio is returning to Las Villas area to lead his people. He is not yet reported to have left the United States. However, Varona has and is reported to have arrived in Las Villas area today. His brother⁷ is conferring in Miami with Prio and Varona.

General Cabell stated that the chances are that Prio, Varona, and Cardona all have relations with the Castro or other rebel movements, but that they are not a United Force as yet.

Admiral Burke inquired if this is not just what the Communists would like. That even though we grant that Castro is not a Communist the situation appears to be very good for a Communist take-over.

Mr. Rubottom stated that Batista is trying to hold out only until the 24th of February at the latest, when the new President is supposed to take office. What worries State Department—what happens then?

Mr. Gray inquired if it were not significant that Batista is reported to have moved his family to New York today, to which all State Department representatives answered, “Yes.”

Mr. Herter inquired if we have arms which we can get to a strong man or a strong movement if identified. There was a general discussion of the problem of first identifying a strong man who is as yet not known, and of whether it were possible indeed to get arms to him.

General Cabell stated [2 lines not declassified].

Mr. Gray inquired if it were accurate to say that the State Department would try to prevent Fidel Castro from getting to power.

Mr. Herter answered that, no, this was not the case.

Admiral Burke stated that Castro is so far along now that he has enough control and enough power to win; he will grab the power and continue pushing to the top, after which there will probably be a big blood bath. He feels that Cubans support Castro as individuals and indirectly now, because they are anti-Batista and that this is true of many groups in Cuba. But if Castro pushes to the top this support will fall away; that people will talk and they will spend money, but that they won’t fight. Castro will fight and has the organization and will be able to take over fully.

Mr. Gray felt that whether this was true or not depends on what the U.S. Government will do to prevent Castro from taking over full power.

General Cabell stressed again that the problem facing the U.S. is identifying the third force, because once identified it will serve as a rallying point, and that there must be some capability to hold Castro in check while the strength of this third force is built up.

Admiral Burke stressed that any revolution to be successful must have a small hard core of people who are dedicated and have confidence in each other.

Mr. Herter inquired about the third force in Santa Clara-Las Villas.

Mr. Rubottom stated that from what the press reports today are saying this force is not making out well and that the Cuban Army is making considerable progress against them.

Mr. Irwin said he shared Mr. Gray’s opinion that the President thought we would not support Castro, but stated his concern that if we do put in a third force might we not alienate Castro too much. No matter how anti-Castro we might be, shouldn’t we be careful not to completely alienate him?

There followed a general discussion of Batista and why he is hated as he is. Mr. Rubottom pointed out that there were two primary reasons: first, because he took constitutional processes away from the people, and second, because of recent repression and some brutal treatment of the people. Because of these two reasons he has lost a great deal of support he formerly had in the lower classes. Admiral Burke felt that Batista’s private interests had gotten in the way of his public interests and that therefore he had lost much of his previous support. Mr. Rubottom felt that Batista could have salvaged the situation as late as November, with a relatively free (but still controlled election) rather than the thoroughly controlled one which he actually had and which resulted in the election of the Batista puppet.

Mr. Gray inquired about the possibility of stopping the flow of arms from the United States to the rebels.

Mr. Herter stated that our own revenue agents and the Coast Guard have done the most in the way of slowing down this flow of arms.

Mr. Gray stated that maybe we don’t want now to stop such shipment to Prio and his force.

Mr. Rubottom discussed the support for Castro within South America which was seen during Mr. Milton Eisenhower’s trip and Vice President Nixon’s trip. There is an evident and growing opposition to support of dictators throughout South America. On both of these trips, students repeatedly asked why the United States supports dictators. Mr. Rubottom feels that it is because of the growth of this anti-dictator feeling that Latin America supports Castro.

Admiral Burke stated that if Castro gets into power, if he is cautious he may want to slow down, but may then be a prisoner, so to speak, and the Communists then might be able to get in.

Mr. Rubottom said that although he respected Admiral Burke’s views there were several officers in State who say that Castro cannot stick it out if he tries to take over, and that the Communist threat can be whipped. Cuba is only one of many where State is having a tough time with the Communists and Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay are others.

There followed a discussion of steps which might be taken by the Navy in so far as the Department of Defense is concerned. Admiral Burke mentioned the forces, such as the Boxer with the embarked Marines, which will be moving to the Caribbean area in early January for routine training. He stated that the Marines will be embarked in the Boxer somewhat earlier than anticipated, just to have them ready in case they are required.

Mr. Herter inquired as to the situation in Havana in anticipation of the evacuation requirements. In Havana the “warning stage” of evacuation is in effect (which is simply required advice to U.S. citizens of the situation). There is no emergency in this area at the present time. In Santiago, “Phase One” of the evacuation is in effect (which requires that dependents should be advised to return to the United States at their own expense).

Admiral Burke then tabled a draft message to be sent to CINCLANT⁸ advising him of the situation in Cuba, which might require evacuation of U.S. nationals and directing him to consider what he should do, but that there is no requirement at the present time for any immediate movement of forces. The original draft of the message indicated that CINCLANT should be prepared to intervene to protect U.S. nationals and U.S. property if this should be required. Mr. Herter asked that all mention of intervening be removed from the message. All agreed that the message as modified was satisfactory to send to CINCLANT.

Mr. Herter then summed up the purpose of the meeting which had been to discuss the Cuban situation in general; to exchange ideas; and to insure that everyone was working along the same lines and knew what every other Department was doing. He stressed that we should all keep in close touch with each other to insure that this exchange of information will continue. He also stressed that the problem in discussing these things is to keep leaks from occurring and that all members present should be careful that this did not happen.

As the meeting was breaking up, further information was received from Ambassador Smith in Cuba⁹ to the effect that Batista stated that he would be willing to step down and let the President of the Senate take over and call a junta to govern Cuba until an election can be held.

Ambassador Smith inquired as to what individuals State Department would want on the junta.

Admiral Burke’s feeling is that the U.S. Government should not try to designate who these individuals should be, since this would probably cause them to be killed.

There was some discussion as to whether Castro should be a member of the junta and the general conclusion was that, because of his power, he must be a member of it.

Batista is said to have a plane ready to leave the country and that he will probably go to the Dominican Republic.

Admiral Burke estimated that Batista would leave the country within 48 hours, with which General Cabell agreed.

¹ Source: Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator’s File. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated on the source text, but it was apparently Rear Admiral Hayward. The source text is attached to a summary of the conference prepared by Hayward which was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs under cover of a brief memorandum from Admiral Dennison, January 8.

² Rubottom, along with Little and Macomber, had appeared in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 10 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. that day. For a transcript of the testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), vol. X, pp. 767–800.

³ Document 172.

⁴ Apparently a reference to telegram 399, supra.

⁵ See Document 188.

⁶ December 26. This may be a reference to the meeting described in Document 191.

⁷ Reference is unclear.

⁸ Neither the draft nor the final message has been found.

⁹ The manner by which this information was received has not been determined.

202. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 31, 1958—6 p.m.

663. Reference: Deptel 399.² Following Embassy comments numbered to correspond with Department’s telegram.

(1) Government believed in control more of province than Kieffer indicated. Army offensive has recovered number of small towns and cities in past three days. Rebels still control much of province, particularly mountainous areas, and capable causing disturbances in all but principal cities.

(2) As Department aware, Guevara is extreme leftist and anti-American, and sometimes reported to be Communist. Cienfuegos background questionable, with considerable evidence he Communist much of which supplied by Kieffer. American newsmen who interviewed Cienfuegos [less than 1 line not declassified] he not Communist. No evidence rebel forces Las Villas operating under Communist orders. DR and Segundo Frente troops believe not Communist influenced. Marinello in hiding and whereabouts unknown, [less than 1 line not declassified] DR source stating Guevara attempting to install local Communist leaders as civilian heads of towns occupied by rebels and DR hard pressed to offset such activities. Difficult to assess allegations accurately, since GOC attempting to discredit revolutionary movement with charges it Communist. As example, police in plainclothes today distributing pamphlets in Habana allegedly from Communist youth calling on people to support general strike.

(3) Communists undoubtedly profiting by disturbed and unsettled situation and endeavoring infiltrate opposition groups with some success.

(4) Embassy had not been advised of any Kieffer allegations, has not sent anyone into area, and does not plan to do so.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3158. Confidential; Priority.

² Document 200.

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, December 31, 1958—9:41 p.m.

404. Your 604.² Department shares Embassy’s apprehensions respecting implications weakening of ability Batista Government continue exercise authority in Cuba. Department has watched with growing concern steady deterioration of Batista administration’s political and military position and views with gravest misgivings any possibility of full scale civil war, destruction of established institutions of Cuba, and potential revival of Communist strength there.

This deep concern is reason US has for many months been urging GOC take steps to strengthen and broaden its political support and thus improve chances for amelioration of internal strife and permit US give greater support to GOC’s course of action. Even conditional offer armored cars last January (Deptel 284³ ) was based on expectation that GOC would adopt constructive political measures so that this and other US military equipment, if it were used, would contribute to resolution Cuban internal problem. Otherwise US position at home and abroad would have suffered severe damage, particularly with reference to hemisphere position, relations to other small countries and to Mutual Defense Program.

It will be recalled that GOC did not take active measures eliminate Castro challenge when it was a minor political and military factor and when GOC possessed ample military equipment to deal with it. After initial failure take adequate steps suppress rebellion, GOC has seemed determined concentrate its efforts on military and police measures to suppress revolutionary opposition while ignoring juridical, civic and political institutions of country which still appear to offer various possibilities of constructive compromise solution. This course of action has made it more difficult for US to extend more aid than it has to evidence its good will and support for GOC because basic policy considerations require us to withhold more support of military nature, at least until there is some fairly conclusive prospect of a solution which has substantial support from Cuban people. US meanwhile has continued cooperation in other spheres, e.g., atomic energy agreement, EXIM Bank credits, and negotiation double taxation agreement, inter alia. In short, US most certainly has not set out to weaken Batista but regretfully forced to conclusion that sapping of his remaining bases of strength due his own decision limit latitude of means available to US to cooperate with him.

In present circumstances any material increase in military support of present GOC action would expose US Government to widespread charges within and without hemisphere of intervention in Cuba’s internal dispute, expose its citizens and interests in Cuba to reprisals from opposition elements, and damage long-range US position in Cuba by alienating many Cubans, as well as constituting policy error extremely detrimental to hemisphere relationships which are of basic importance to US. Nor does Dept believe such support would solve basic GOC problem of inducing broader national support for present regime.

Department has given most careful study to all reports coming to its attention regarding Communist infiltration of sympathy within Castro movement. Current judgment of intelligence community is that infiltration has taken place but extent and degree of influence not yet determined from evidence available. It is also clear that 26th of July Movement has shown little sense of responsibility or ability needed to govern Cuba satisfactorily and its nationalistic line is horse which Communists know well how to ride.

Department reiterates hope it has expressed frequently in past that GOC may still obtain collaboration influential and respectable elements representing majority national sectors of society in order achieve constructive political solution acceptable people of Cuba, facilitating orderly transition in order end present grave threat to Cuban economy and political stability.

Embassy’s efforts in and evaluation of growing Cuban crisis deeply appreciated here.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1358. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland, Little, and Stevenson; cleared in draft by Hill and Snow; and cleared with Murphy and Rubottom.

² See Document 185.

³ Document 7.

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador¹

Washington, December 31, 1958—10:42 p.m.

143. Embtel 207.² Tobar has presumably by now heard from Chiriboga re latter’s conversation with Arias December 30th and Arias plan to invite five ex-presidents, including Galo Plaza, to meet in Panama and discuss steps in nature of good offices they might take in purely private capacity help bring about cessation fighting in Cuba and aid various parties resolve political situation. Dept is giving sympathetic backing such move without being directly involved. Bolivian Foreign Minister Andrade, currently in US, has given Arias assurances that Paz Estenssoro would accept.

Presently unclear as to what attitude of either side in Cuba would be toward such initiative, beyond indications received from Tobar Embtel 203,³ nor what possible formulas might be found useful for political solution.

Dept understands Cuban exiles in Miami and elsewhere are actively addressing messages to officials and organizations in various countries urging actions to support their cause, especially through OAS. Dept is of course maintaining its position of non-intervention and doubts that action through OAS would be appropriate or politically possible beyond expression of humanitarian desire see end of bloodshed and strife. On this basis, however, we still hope effective steps can be taken. You may convey appreciation to Tobar for his initiative.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3158. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dreier, cleared with Snow, approved by Little, and signed by Rubottom for Herter. Repeated to Havana.

² In telegram 207, December 31, the Embassy in Quito reported that Tobar had received a further cable from persons in Miami claiming to be Castro representatives and wanted the Department of State’s guidance before replying. According to the Embassy, Tobar was anxious not only to stop the bloodshed, but also to obtain Batista’s and Castro’s acceptance of an interim government. Tobar was prepared to designate a qualified person with the rank of Ambassador to conduct negotiations, but that person would function covertly. (ibid.)

³ Document 195.

205. Editorial Note

In a memorandum entitled “Synopsis of Intelligence and State Material Reported to the President,” December 31, John S.D. Eisenhower included the following section on Cuba:

“Reports favorable to the rebels continue. General Cantillo, commander in Oriente, has pulled garrisons back to Santiago. His passive performance suggests he may be planning to bargain with the rebels. Meanwhile, our Embassy Havana and Consulate Santiago have been authorized to effect the warning phase of their evacuation plans. In warning Americans, the Consulate is attempting to avoid undue publicity.

“Trujillo has denied sending any aid to the Cuban government. It is reported that Castro [Batista?] will accept help only from the U.S. and needs 5 thousand M–1 rifles and 3 million rounds.”

The memorandum indicates that the information was not reported to the President until January 2, 1959. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series)

206. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 1, 1958—6 a.m.

665. General Batista departed for Santo Domingo with his family approximately 4 a.m. this morning. He was accompanied by Guell and Rivero Agüero. Many top members of GOC have also departed for New Orleans and Daytona Beach.

General Eulogio Cantillo has taken command of Armed Forces. He has requested Supreme Court Justice Carlos M. Piedra y Piedra to assume control civilian elements of government and has appealed to archbishop of Santiago Perez Serrente for support.

Habana very quiet and no sign of disturbances. Embassy watching situation closely.

General Cantillo told me he will make peace effort with Castros.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Niact.

Fidel Castro’s assumption of power, January–April 1959

207. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 1, 1959—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Priority. Received at 6:46 p.m.

208. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 1, 1959—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Priority. Received at 7:03 p.m.

209. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 1, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Official Use Only; Priority. Received on January 2 at 1:29 a.m.

210. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 1, 1959—8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Priority. Received on January 2 at 4:03 a.m.

211. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 1, 1959—9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Priority. Received on January 2 at 4:27 a.m.

212. Editorial Note

213. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, January 2, 1959

Washington, January 2, 1959

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, January 1959. Secret. Prepared by McElhiney. The meeting was chaired by Acting Secretary Herter. The time of the meeting is not indicated.

214. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba

Havana, January 3, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–359. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to the Department as telegram 703, which is the source text.

215. Editorial Note

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 6, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–659. Confidential; Niact. Received at 9 p.m. A note on the source text indicates that Stevenson was “informed” at 10 p.m.

217. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, January 7, 1959.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. Confidential. The source text bears the handwritten note, “1/7/59. DE.” Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 248.

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 8, 1959—10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Bonsal Philip W. Secret; Niact. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 915.

219. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, January 9, 1959, 2:56 p.m.

Washington, January 9, 1959, 2:56 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations. Prepared by Bernau. The source text also bears Herter’s initials and the notation by Macomber: “WBM saw & ret’d.”

220. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 9, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–959. The time of transmission is not given on the source text. Received at 7:27 p.m.

221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, January 9, 1959—9:23 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Smith Earl E.T. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom, cleared with the Secretary in draft, and approved by Herter who signed for Dulles.

222. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Little) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, January 10, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1059. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Little; also initialed by Rubottom.

223. Editorial Note

224. White House Special Staff Note

Washington, January 13, 1959.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which bears the handwritten initials “DE”.

225. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State

Santiago de Cuba, January 14, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1459. Confidential; Air Priority; Urgent. Drafted by Wollam.

226. Memorandum From the Chief of the Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics (Wardlaw) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)

Washington, January 14, 1959.

Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Cuban Situation 1957–1959. Secret. Drafted by Wardlaw.

227. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts in the American Republics

Washington, January 15, 1959—8:23 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1559. Official Use Only. Drafted by Little and approved by Wieland who signed for Dulles. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Havana and repeated to Havana and Santiago de Cuba.

228. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 15, 1959—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–1559. Secret; Priority.

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, January 17, 1959—1:06 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–1559. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wieland, cleared with Murphy and Irwin, and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.

230. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 19, 1959—10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1959. Confidential; Niact.

231. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 19, 1959—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–1959. Secret; Niact.

232. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, January 19, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan–Apr.) 1959. Official Use Only. Drafted by Little.

233. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 19, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/1–1959. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

234. Letter From the Consul at Santiago de Cuba (Wollam) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Little)

Santiago de Cuba, January 19, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–1958. Confidential; Official-Informal.

235. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, January 20, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Bonsal Philip W. Official Use Only. Drafted and initialed by Rubottom; concurred in and initialed by Murphy, Macomber, and Henderson.

236. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 20, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–2059. Secret; Niact.

237. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 20, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2059. Confidential; Priority. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1982, 2470.

238. Editorial Note

239. Editorial Note

240. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 23, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2359. Confidential; Priority.

241. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Ciudad Trujillo, January 27, 1959—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2759. Confidential.

242. Letter From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

San Jose, January 27, 1959.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Letters 1959. Confidential; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Herter, Murphy, Wieland, Stewart, and Dreier. The source text was attached to a brief covering letter of January 27 from Willauer to Herter.

243. Editorial Note

244. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, January 30, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

Pentagon, Washington, January 30, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, vol. VII. Top Secret. Drafted by Dwight J. Porter. A note on the source text indicates that it was not cleared with the Department of Defense. A cover sheet lists the participants, which included Generals Twining, Lemnitzer, and White and Admiral Burke and members of the Joint Staff; representatives of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council Staff; and Under Secretary of State Murphy and other Department of State officials.

245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic

Washington, February 3, 1959—4:37 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2759. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Snow, Stevenson, Neidle, and Whiteman; cleared with VO, SCA, and H; and approved by Wieland who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Havana, Buenos Aires, Panama, and Santiago de Cuba and pouched to Kingston and Nassau.

246. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State

Ciudad Trujillo, February 4, 1959—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–459. Confidential. Repeated to Havana.

247. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chargé in Cuba (Braddock) and Carlos Piad, American Embassy, Havana, February 4, 1959

Havana, February 4, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–459. Confidential. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 839 from Havana, February 4, in which Braddock remarked: “While the Cuban situation certainly has many disturbing aspects, I feel that Dr. Piad’s appraisal is gloomier than warranted by the facts so far as we can see them. His view is probably influenced to some extent by the scant recognition accorded by the 26th of July Movement, the dominating element in the scene, to the faction or individuals with whom he personally is most closely associated.”

248. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 5, 1959—11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–559. Confidential; Priority.

249. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill)

Washington, February 6, 1959.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Hill.

250. Memorandum of Discussion at the 396th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 12, 1959

Washington, February 12, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason. This discussion of Cuba was part of larger discussion by the NSC of Latin America, which is scheduled for publication in volume V.

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 14, 1959—1 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/2–1459. Confidential; Niact.

252. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 17, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.10/2–1759. Confidential; Priority.

253. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 18, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/2–1859. Confidential. Drafted by Braddock.

254. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Mexican and Caribbean Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, February 19, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1959. Confidential. Drafted by Hill and Wieland.

255. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)

Washington, February 20, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.13/2–2059. Official Use Only. Drafted by Stevenson; cleared with Wieland; concurred in by Beale, Harry Conover, Albert Post, J. Parke Young, and Murphy; and initialed by Snow.

256. Editorial Note

257. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 25, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2559. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

258. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 5, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–559. Confidential.

259. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 9, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/3–959. Confidential. Drafted by Braddock.

260. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, March 12, 1959

Washington, March 12, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1259. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson. Initialed by Stevenson and Wieland. The place of the meeting is not indicated on the source text, but it may have been Powell’s office.

261. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, March 12, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Apr.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Little and concurred in by G, U/PR, and Lightner.

262. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Calhoun) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, March 13, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1359. Confidential. A handwritten note in the margin reads: “See also attached telegram from Havana.” No telegram is attached to the source text, but the reference may be to telegram 1049 from Havana, March 12, summarized in footnote 2, Document 260.

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 17, 1959—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/3–1759. Confidential; Priority.

264. Letter From Senator Wayne Morse to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, March 20, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/3–2059.

265. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 23, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2359. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

266. Memorandum of Discussion at the 400th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 26, 1959

Washington, March 26, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State

San José, March 30, 1959—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–3059. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bogota, Caracas, Ciudad Trujillo, Guatemala City, Havana, Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, Port-au-Prince, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa as circular telegram 1128, March 31. (ibid., 737.00/3–3159)

268. Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Wright)

Washington, March 30, 1959.

Source: Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Personal File (Wright). Confidential; Personal.

269. Editorial Note

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 3, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–359. Official Use Only; Priority.

271. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 4, 1959

Washington, April 4, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–459. Drafted and initialed by Stevenson.

272. Memorandum From the President of the Cuban National Bank (Pazos) to the Embassy in Cuba

Havana, April 7, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–959. Official Use Only. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1140 from Havana, April 9. Also summarized in telegram 1158 from Havana, April 8. (ibid., 033.3711/4–859)

207. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 1, 1959—1 p.m.

674. All Ambassadors met today at residence of Papal Nuncio. A committee was formed of the following Ambassadors: Papal Nuncio, Brazilian, Argentine, Chilean, Spanish and US.

We called on General Cantillo and asked that he give safe conduct to all asylees as soon as possible. General Cantillo agreed. Cantillo has instructed Colonel Martinez Mora at Campo Columbia to fly all asylees out as soon as possible.

It is General Cantillo’s intention to try and preserve law and order until the provisional government is ready to turn over authority to whoever should have it.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Priority. Received at 6:46 p.m.

208. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 1, 1959—4 p.m.

675. Met at 10 a.m. with my American community committee. Present were: Amoss, electric company; Brewer, Esso; Colligan, Moa Bay; French, Cuban American metals; Heilman, American Chamber of Commerce; Heagney, Bank of Boston; Pine, PAA; Steward, Woolworth Company; Thompson, Portland Cement.

It was consensus of group that Junta to be picked by provisional President Piedra would have no chance of success unless it contained adequate representation of revolutionary movement. Some of those present felt that nothing less than control of Junta would be acceptable to revolutionaries, although all present recognized also that anti-Batista tie that bound revolutionaries together was weakened by Batista’s departure. This view subsequently fortified by increasing indications that revolutionaries will not desist from general strike unless Urrutia recognized as provisional President.

Embassy outlined nature of cooperation desired from community committee if implementation of E and E plan became necessary. Members present indicated full cooperation, and named persons in their organizations to constitute special task force in Embassy plan and be responsible primarily for standfast arrangements. Embassy outlined use of property protection posters and in accordance with expressed wishes of committee made immediate distribution through them of protection posters.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Priority. Received at 7:03 p.m.

209. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 1, 1959—6 p.m.

679. Dr. Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, former VP of Cuba, told Economic Counselor that meeting at Campo Columbia this morning was called at invitation of Dr. Piedra y Piedra and General Cantillo, and was attended by: Dr. Nunez Portuondo, Dr. Jesus Coll [garble] Nunez, Dr. Alberto Blanco, Dr. Raul de Cardenas, Dr. Evelio Alvarez Tabio, and Dr. Morobenito and himself. General Loynaz de Castillo also participated but left meeting before it adjourned.

After lengthy, inconclusive discussion of possibilities of forming a Provisional Junta, group adjourned to accompany Dr. Piedra y Piedra and General Cantillo to presidential palace. Meanwhile there had arisen an erroneous report above-named group would be the new Cabinet and that Cuervo Rubio would be Prime Minister. The fact was that all had taken position that Piedra y Piedra should make the selections himself after further consideration. However, he subsequently declined to accept the post of Provisional President on advice of the Supreme Court that in view of the revolutionary situation which had brought about downfall of Batista, the Supreme Court should not assume the power. At the present moment, therefore, Dr. Cuervo Rubio stated, General Cantillo is the sole provisional authority.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Official Use Only; Priority. Received on January 2 at 1:29 a.m.

210. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 1, 1959—8 p.m.

680. Department pass Navy, Air, CIA, FBI, Army for ACSI, CINCARIB, USARCARIB, USARANT. Following is roundup of conditions 7 p.m. January 1. Undisciplined groups engaging in destruction, sacking and looting, principally in downtown Habana and in town of Marianao. Plant of Masferrer paper Tiempo destroyed. Buildings of two Ministries reported looted. Several casinos wrecked with consequent damage to some hotels. Several stores and bars wrecked and looted.

Secretary of Presidency Andres Domingo arrested when attempting seek asylum. Former Minister and Senator Santiago Rey in Chilean Embassy. Their homes looted. CTC Secretary General Mujal in Agentine Embassy.

Spokesmen for 26th July Movement and Directorio Revolucionario appearing constantly on radio and television strongly condemn such actions and order people to maintain order. Several reports that rebel militia and rebel columns arriving to maintain order, but no signs such forces.

Mob of several thousand forced open Principe prison and freed all prisoners, both political and criminals.

Mauretania arrived 6 a.m. Some 300 passengers permitted to go ashore. They all were located and returned to ship, which sailed 6 p.m.

General strike slowly spreading. All transportation except private cars paralyzed. Domestic and international airline operations suspended. More than 200 American tourists stranded.

26th July Movement demanding unconditional surrender of army and installation Urrutia as Provisional President. Whereabouts Castro and Urrutia not known. They not in Habana.

After consulting Supreme Court, Justice Carlos Piedra refused designation as Provisional President. Government appears entirely in hands of Cantillo, no civilian members of junta.

Santiago reports rebel radio has called for complete strike, except for power facilities. Rebels began entering city shortly before 6 p.m. One hour later they were in control of city hall, military district headquarters, airport, and all principal installations. Wollam reports press statement just released by acting military commander in Santiago states majority of armed forces cooperating with rebels and complying their instructions. Wollam describes situation as one of tension and expectancy, with quiet at present, but future developments unpredictable. Nicaro reports rebels entered plant and village early this morning, but have not interfered with operation. Adds there is some tension, but that general atmosphere is quiet and no immediate danger to foreigners apparent.

Moa Bay Company reports operation shut down when workers left at 8 a.m. to celebrate. Adds all foreigners are on the job, and there is no danger for them at present.

Situation Las Villas and Camaguey provinces unclear. No indication army and rebels fighting, but army apparently not accepting rebel surrender terms.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Priority. Received on January 2 at 4:03 a.m.

211. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 1, 1959—9 p.m.

681. Reliably informed Colonel Ramon Barquin has been released from prison on Isle of Pines, is now in Habana and has assumed control of armed forces from Cantillo with latter’s approval. Military vehicles now patrolling disturbed areas city with military police to maintain order. Barquin said to have sent word to Fidel Castro and Urrutia to come to Habana where he will deliver control of government to them.

Comment: This is encouraging development, increasing possibility of early accord between armed forces and rebel movements. Also strengthens position of military vis-à-vis rebels.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–159. Confidential; Priority. Received on January 2 at 4:27 a.m.

212. Editorial Note

On January 1, 1959, the Embassy in Havana asked the Department to dispatch either a commercial or naval vessel to evacuate more than 200 Americans, mostly tourists in downtown hotels, who had appealed to the Embassy for assistance in returning to the United States. (Telegram 676 from Havana, January 1; Department of State, Central Files, 237.1122/1–159) The Department replied that it was trying to arrange for the City of Habana, which had recently visited Havana, to return there to aid in the evacuation of Americans. The Department confirmed a suggestion which it had earlier given by telephone to the Embassy that contact should be established with rebel representatives or the provisional authorities to facilitate the protection and evacuation of Americans. (Telegram 416 to Havana, January 1, 8:35 p.m.; ibid.) Later that evening, the Department informed the Embassy that the City of Habana was departing Key West at daybreak and would arrive in Havana about noon. (Telegram 419 to Havana, January 1, 11:15 p.m.; ibid.)

The Department and the Embassy remained in telephone contact through the early morning hours of January 2 regarding the evacuation. In a telephone conversation at 5:15 a.m., the Embassy indicated that 26th of July Movement representatives had given assurances that the City of Habana would be allowed to dock and that Pan American Airways could use the airport for evacuation purposes. Later that morning, the rebel representatives changed their minds, as the Embassy informed the Department in two separate conversations:

“January 2, 1959, 7:50 a.m.: Telephone conversation between Embassy and Department concerning 26th of July’s number-two-man’s difficulty in getting word through to other people in the Movement to get decisions to dock City of Habana. Number-two man stated Movement wanted to help but should be understood in Washington that it takes time to find out who does what. During conversation Braddock got word movement had denied request on airport and dock. Braddock suggested Department put heat on Betancourt in United States and have him put the heat on the Cubans to assist in the evacuation.

“January 2, 1959 [between 7:50 and 10:05 a.m.]: In telephone conversation between Ambassador Smith and Mr. Rubottom, Ambassador informed Mr. Rubottom of Movement’s denial of request on airport and dock. Mr. Rubottom told Ambassador to keep right after it and point out to 26th of July people that it would be a black strike against them. Mr. Rubottom told Mr. Braddock there have been constant inquiries from members of Congress and Senate as to the well-being of the Americans. Mr. Rubottom had informed them that permission had been granted for evacuation, and now he would have to tell them that it had been reversed. He said that the evacuation has nothing to do with general strike. Mr. Rubottom said the Embassy could also inform them that this will be interpreted as holding tourists as hostage as the price for something they have not made known. We have no intention of trying to break the strike, but only to evacuate men, women, and children who are stranded in a foreign country and are unable to get food. It should be pointed out that it is in their interest to get action.” (Memorandum for the files by Gerald O. Jones (ARA/EX), January 13; ibid., ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1959)

The Department also informed the Embassy by telegram during the afternoon of January 2 that it could not comprehend why rebel representatives would not want to facilitate the evacuation of American tourists. The Department added:

“All of United States hourly watching developments Cuba and is concerned over status Americans there. We hope Castro representatives will understand that their every action being watched closely in this country and that any misstep their part could permanently jeopardize feelings toward them on part all Americans. Department cannot stress too strongly unanimity of feeling on part U.S. public opinion, press, and congressional leaders in their concern for safety and well-being U.S. citizens who found themselves in Cuba at this critical moment.”

The Embassy was asked to “immediately point out above considerations in most forceful manner.” (Telegram 420 to Havana, January 2; ibid., Central Files, 237.1122/1–259)

The City of Habana arrived in Havana on the afternoon of January 2 and, after taking aboard 508 Americans, returned to Key West that evening. (Memorandum by Jones, January 13; ibid., ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1959)

Also on the night of January 1–2, the U.S. Navy sent two submarine tenders and three destroyer escorts from Key West to waters near Havana to be in a position to help evacuate Americans if necessary. This action grew out of conversations Admiral Burke held early in the evening with Herter and Murphy, during which the possibility was also discussed of having U.S. Marines aboard these ships in case the evacuees had to be protected. In the end it was decided not to send the Marines because their movement to Key West and subsequent embarkation would have become public knowledge and the cause of undesirable press speculation. It was also decided that the ships would remain out of sight of land and there would be no publicity. These conversations, as well as the controversy created by the conflicting information given by the White House and the Department of Defense to the press on January 2 about the dispatch of the vessels, was described in Burke’s memorandum of January 3 to Quarles and Burke’s attached chronology of events. (Declassified Documents, 1979, 156*) Burke’s memorandum and chronology were forwarded to the President as attachments to Quarles’ memorandum of January 6, in which he outlined a modification of procedures that would be in line with the new military command structure. (ibid., 1981, 144*)

The problem of how to maintain secrecy about preliminary movement of forces in times of tension, as was pointed up by the Cuban crisis, was discussed in Burke’s letters of January 3 and February 5 to Admiral Jerauld Wright, Commander in Chief, Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and Wright’s letter of January 15 to Burke. (Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Personal File—Wright)

On January 4, all the ships, except for two destroyer escorts, returned to Key West. The Department of State requested that the two destroyer escorts remain for an additional 24 hours because of the uncertainty of what would happen in Cuba. None of the Navy ships became involved in the evacuation of Americans from Havana. The return of the Naval ships, and the conversations Admiral Burke had with the White House, the Department of State, and Quarles on January 4 about this action, were described in Burke’s memorandum for the record which he sent as an enclosure to his letter of January 4 to Admiral Wright. (ibid.)

213. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, January 2, 1959¹

Washington, January 2, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Cuban Situation

Mr. Rubottom reported on the situation in Cuba. He said that evacuation of non-official Americans was proceeding satisfactorily. As of late last night, he said, there were about 500 Americans interested in leaving. He said that Colonel Barquin, who is the military authority to whom the Batista regime’s power was turned over, was not obstructing the evacuation activities and had approved the use of a chartered plane and a ferry to move Americans. There is no evacuation of American officials in progress. In response to a subsequent question from Mr. Lightner, Mr. Rubottom said that public use of the word “evacuation” should be avoided and he (Mr. Rubottom) felt that an appropriate term would be “transportation arrangements”.

Mr. Rubottom reported that Urrutia had been named the provisional president and Santiago the provisional capital. It was possible that Urrutia and Castro would go to Habana this afternoon and that Colonel Barquin would turn over authority without resistance. Mr. Rubottom said Habana was quiet, that looting and disorder had never gotten completely out of hand or become general. Looting had been concentrated on the casinos, the big hotels, and the homes of important Batista officials. Mr. Rubottom said that not all the Batista cabinet members had gotten out of Cuba; some had sought asylum in foreign embassies and some had been arrested. Castro supporters had taken charge of the Cuban Embassy in Washington.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, January 1959. Secret. Prepared by McElhiney. The meeting was chaired by Acting Secretary Herter. The time of the meeting is not indicated.

214. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba¹

Havana, January 3, 1959—5 p.m.

263. Re your inquiry² about maintenance normal consular functions. Refrain from any formal action which would imply recognition of a government of Cuba or its officials until existence and recognition of such a government. Provisional government not functioning in Habana as yet. Actions would include for example authentications of signatures on documents dated after December 31. Adjust general consular services to what is feasible and practical. Embassy handling no visa matters since Cubans not permitted at present to leave Cuba. See also Deptel 52 to Santiago.³

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–359. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to the Department as telegram 703, which is the source text.

² Not further identified.

³ In telegram 52, January 2, the Department indicated that the Consulate could contact and deal with any persons it deemed necessary for the purpose of the protection and welfare of American citizens and their property, or other essential consular duties, on a strictly informal basis. In case of any doubt, the Consulate was instructed to make clear that any particular action was not intended to constitute recognition. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–259)

215. Editorial Note

On the evening of January 4, the Department instructed Ambassador Smith to come immediately to Washington for consultations. (Telegram 440 to Havana, January 4, 6:05 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 123–Smith Earl E.T.)

That evening Smith learned that the rebel forces in control of Camp Columbia were planning to execute General Cantillo. Together with Brazilian Ambassador da Cunha, Smith went to Camp Columbia the following morning and persuaded rebel commander Cienfuegos to postpone Cantillo’s execution. No documentation has been found regarding Smith’s intercession on behalf of Cantillo, but for Smith’s reminiscences, see The Fourth Floor, pages 200–203. Cantillo was later tried and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

At the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting at 9:15 a.m. on January 5, Rubottom made the following report:

“Mr. Rubottom reported that 1972 Americans had been evacuated by Sunday evening [January 4] and the Embassy had handled the entire matter extremely well. The general strike is ended and regular air and ship service should resume shortly. Urrutia is flying to Havana today and Fidel Castro will proceed by land. The provisional Cabinet is drawn largely from the 26 July movement, which is causing dissatisfaction among other anti-Batista elements, but it seems to be of reasonably good composition from our viewpoint. Mr. Rubottom said that a telegraphic request to the Secretary from an official acting on behalf of Urrutia requested US recognition of the Rebel regime.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, January 1959)

The message to the Secretary of State has not been further identified.

On the evening of January 5, a committee of Ambassadors, consisting of the Papal Nuncio; Ambassador Smith; and the Ambassadors of Spain, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, called on Foreign Minister Agramonte to protest attacks that had occurred the previous evening on the Colombian and Portuguese Embassies. Agramonte, along with President Urrutia and Prime Minister Miro Cardona who were also present, promised to provide the necessary protection to all diplomatic missions. Although there were many photographs taken of the group and Urrutia, Smith reported to the Department that he had been obliged to attend only to lend his moral authority and everyone present had made it clear that the visit had nothing to do with recognition. (Telegram 749 from Havana, January 5, 11 p.m.; ibid., Central Files, 601.0037/1–559)

Also on the evening of January 5, Rubottom telephoned Acting Secretary Herter to report that Smith was remaining in Havana for a day and would “take another look” the next day before deciding about returning to Washington. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 5, 5:50 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) Smith left Havana on January 6 at 9:45 a.m. and was scheduled to arrive in Washington that afternoon. (Telegram 751 from Havana, January 6; Department of State, Central Files, PER)

On January 6 at 2:25 p.m., Herter called Presidential Assistant Wilton B. Persons to discuss Smith’s return to Washington. According to a memorandum of their conversation:

“CAH phoned Mr. Persons re Cuba. The Ambassador there will be in Washington this evening and the Secretary has agreed that he ought not go back to Cuba permanently as Ambassador. The Secretary would like CAH to tell the Ambassador to return to Cuba and, if the Government agrees to fulfill the third condition of recognition, viz., fulfillment of international obligations, he should submit his resignation. We are afraid if he does not do this the Cuban Government will declare him persona non grata. Mr. Persons asked who he was. CAH told him his name is Earl Smith; that he is a thoroughly nice fellow—not what you would call a skilled diplomat. He has done an excellent job of getting Americans back. Mr. Persons asked if we had a replacement in mind for him. CAH said we were thinking of a career man, who is presently our Ambassador to Bolivia, Philip Bonsal. He served in Colombia and was thought of as a great man. He speaks Spanish and knows Cuba well. This is such an explosive situation that we should not get someone new to go there. Mr. Persons asked if we had thought of a successor to Bonsal. CAH said we had not. He suggested that Mr. Persons talk to the President about this. He said the Secretary has agreed to all this and would welcome a call from the President at home if he cared to discuss it with him. Mr. Persons said he would take this up with the President. He also asked CAH to let him know the outcome of his talk with Ambassador Smith.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

Within an hour, Persons called Herter back about the Cuban situation. According to Herter’s own memorandum of their conversation, which took place at 3:10 p.m.;

“In response to my earlier request, General Persons telephoned to say he had spoken to the President about our requesting Ambassador Earl Smith to resign his post in Cuba, and our appointing Philip Bonsal as Ambassador there. General Persons said the President raised the question of why it wouldn’t be better to ask the new Government whether Ambassador Smith would be acceptable, and General Persons had told the President we wished to avoid possible embarrassment for all concerned should the new government say no. The President said he would accept the State Department’s judgment on this and that the proposed shift was all right. The President does, however, want to be sure it is done in such a way that it will not cast reflections on Ambassador Smith. I told General Persons we shared this desire; that Ambassador Smith had done a good job and a wire of commendation had been sent to him. In addition, we want Ambassador Smith himself to say to this new Government that he is asking to be relieved so there can be no interpretation that he is being removed. General Persons said this was good and that, if Ambassador Smith wanted something else, he felt we should try to get it for him. I told General Persons we would discuss this whole situation very frankly with Ambassador Smith this afternoon and that I would keep General Persons advised.” (ibid., Miscellaneous Memos)

The message of commendation referred to is telegram 451 to Havana, January 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.13/1–659) The text of the message is printed in Smith, The Fourth Floor, page 193.

At 6 p.m. on January 6, President Eisenhower telephoned Herter. According to Herter’s memorandum of their conversation:

“The President telephoned to say he was concerned still about the situation with Ambassador Earl Smith. The President said he feels Smith has always done a very good job and the President would hate to have it look like we were firing him. The President asked why we couldn’t keep Smith around on some temporary assignment for a couple of months while we try to find something else for him. I agreed that Ambassador Smith had clone a creditable job despite a couple of ‘bloopers’ which were not too surprising in view of the complexities. The President said Smith had certainly done his job with a calm temper. I explained we had had to do this same thing in Iraq when a new government took over and that we have a similar situation in Cuba. The President said he realized this, but reiterated the suggestion that we bring Smith back on temporary duty, leaving a Chargé in Havana, while we see if something can’t be worked out for Smith.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

When Smith returned to Washington that evening, he met at an undetermined time with Herter and Rubottom. No memorandum of their conversation has been found, but Smith recalls that Herter told him that the U.S. Government wanted to recognize the new Cuban Government immediately. He was to return that night or the next morning and deliver a formal note of recognition. Smith was also told that he was being replaced as Ambassador. After Rubottom and apparently others had left, Herter told Smith that the President had authorized him to offer Smith another Ambassadorial post, which Smith refused. (Smith, The Fourth Floor, pages 195–196) Herter later told Persons that Smith had been “extremely understanding & nice about this whole matter and plans to tell the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister he is giving thought to his own personal plans and hopes to discuss it further in the next day or so.” Herter also said that he had told Smith “we would try to find another place for him but he didn’t seem to want anything else now.” (Memorandum of Herter’s telephone conversation with Persons, January 7, 10:55 a.m.; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 6, 1959—6 p.m.

762. I called meeting this afternoon of Ambassador’s businessmen’s consultative committee in order ascertain their views re question of recognition of provisional government, for forwarding to Department and Ambassador Smith. Present were: Amoss, Electric Company; Heagney, Bank of Boston; Brewer, Esso; Thompson, Portland Cement; Pine, PAA; Duys, Duys Company (tobacco); Steward, Woolworth Company, Viveres, SA; Colligan, Moa Bay; French, Cuban American Metals.

Every man present expressed individually and emphatically the view that it would be in interest of US and of American business in Cuba for US to recognize provisional government as quickly as possible and preferably before arrival of Castro in Habana, which is now expected sometime Thursday, January 8.

They were unanimously of view that present government was much better than they had dared hope for, and that it has broad base of popular support (one previously strong Batista supporter said this was most popular government he had seen in Cuba in his sojourn of more than 30 years). They felt that 26th July had shown intelligence and discipline in handling situation to date, and that Castro was unquestionably boss in Cuba. They considered that prompt recognition was necessary to establish most favorable possible climate in which to carry on business, and said that without recognition by US they would be unable to deal satisfactorily at all on the many problems confronting them. (This view shared by Amoss of Cubana de Electricidad, whose special labor problem outlined in Embtel 756² ). Group felt that early recognition would assist in strengthening 26th against more radical elements in revolutionary movement, and would also assist in curbing possible growth of Communist strength. Embassy officers have discussed same subject and likewise hold view that earliest possible recognition in best interest of US. Before meeting, Gilmore felt it would be prudent to await further indications of government’s attitude toward US trade and investment, but after hearing businessmen say they needed benefits of prompt recognition, he also favors prompt affirmative action.

Please pass to Ambassador Smith this recommendation of his staff.³

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–659. Confidential; Niact. Received at 9 p.m. A note on the source text indicates that Stevenson was “informed” at 10 p.m.

² In telegram 756, January 6, the Embassy reported that a self-constituted committee of employees at the Cuban Electric Company, with the backing of 26th of July armed guards, had taken control of President Amoss’ office and made sweeping demands, including an immediate 20 percent wage increase and the dismissal of certain Cuban personnel. (ibid., 837.2614/1–659)

³ In telegram 765 from Havana, January 6, received at 10:50 p.m., Braddock said that Guillermo Belt had called on him to express his view that the present situation was “one of the miracles of America.” Belt had expected that chaos and bloodshed would follow the overthrow of Batista, but the revolution was bringing “unity and stability” and Castro was behaving in a “statesmanlike manner.” Belt urged that the United States, for its own interests and those of Cuba, immediately recognize the new government. (ibid., 737.00/1–659) In telegram 775 from Havana, January 7, the Embassy noted that Marquez Sterling had told an Embassy official that morning that the revolution was completely different from previous ones in that from it was emerging “a well-organized and strong group with authority concentrated in one man” who “unquestionably” had behind him the support of the “whole Cuban people.” Marquez Sterling thought the Cabinet was “good”, particularly Prime Minister Miro Cardona and National Bank head Pazos. (ibid., 737.00/1–759)

217. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, January 7, 1959.

SUBJECT

Recognition of the New Government of Cuba

In the early morning hours of January 1, 1959, President Batista of Cuba fled the country in the face of general deterioration of his position and recent military successes of the revolutionary movement led by Fidel Castro. On January 2, Castro announced the designation of Dr. Manuel Urrutia Lleo as Provisional President of Cuba, and Dr. Urrutia arrived in Habana on January 5, where he established himself in the presidential palace.

On January 6, 1959, our Embassy at Habana received a note from the Ministry of State² to the effect that a government headed by Dr. Urrutia had been constituted. This note adds that the Provisional Government has complete control of the Republic, that peaceful conditions have returned to Cuba, and that all the Republic’s international commitments and agreements in force will be fulfilled.

I believe that the statements of intention of the new government have been made in good faith and that it is in our national interest to recognize the Provisional Government of Cuba without delay. The Provisional Government appears free from Communist taint and there are indications that it intends to pursue friendly relations with the United States.

I request your authorization to take the necessary steps to recognize the present Provisional Government of Cuba.³

John Foster Dulles⁴

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. Confidential. The source text bears the handwritten note, “1/7/59. DE.” Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 248.

² Text of the note, which the Embassy received on the morning of January 6, was transmitted to the Department in telegram 755 from Havana, January 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–659)

³ Ambassador Smith returned to Havana in the morning of January 7. Telegram 453 to Havana, January 7, transmitted the text of a note, which Smith was instructed to deliver to Minister of State Agramonte, in which the United States extended recognition to the new government. In his memoirs, Smith recalls that immediately upon his arrival in Havana, he arranged an appointment to deliver the note to Agramonte. Smith wrote that the Department “held an open telephone line with the Embassy, so that they could at once release the news.” (Smith, The Fourth Floor, p. 196) In circular telegram 831 to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Havana, January 7, the Department reported that recognition had been accorded at 5 p.m. that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–759)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 8, 1959—10 a.m.

783. Eyes only Herter. When I delivered note² to Foreign Minister, Agramonte, we had cordial friendly exchange of views. When I informed him of my intentions to resign, he expressed concern and attempted to dissuade me from such action. Agramonte stated his feelings towards me were the same as when he wrote laudatory editorials after my statement at Santiago³ condemning police brutality. He may have been just polite, but I was impressed by his sincerity.

Embassy has been informed by reliable 26 of July contact that President Urrutia stated GOC had no intention of requesting my recall.

Precipitate resignation could be interpreted as acknowledgement that US policy in Cuba has not been correct and that US had been favoring one side. This is not the case and we should avoid giving any appearance of such acknowledgement.

I believe I can have favorable relations with new government, but if it appears from my early contacts that any feeling is so deep against me as to affect my usefulness, I could resign immediately.

It is generally believed in Havana that Batista’s sudden decision to leave was due to my suggestion. Leak must have occurred from GOC; it certainly did not come from us. In any case this shortened war and saved many lives.

I could make an informal courtesy call on President. At that time I could find out first-hand what his feelings are.

In light of above I suggest Department review whole matter. I am prepared to immediately follow out whatever Department considers in best interests of US.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Bonsal Philip W. Secret; Niact. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 915.

² See footnote 3, supra.

³ Regarding Smith’s statement in Santiago on July 31, 1957, in which he expressed abhorrence at “any form of excessive police action,” see The Fourth Floor, pp. 18–23.

219. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, January 9, 1959, 2:56 p.m.¹

Washington, January 9, 1959, 2:56 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

The Sec said he thinks we should make a shift of ambs in Cuba. The Pres said apparently Smith sent a message to Herter² which they told him of last night and referred to the gist of it—a reflection on us etc. The Sec said a good strong letter from the Pres would take care of any reflection on him. The Sec said, after the Pres said he can’t evaluate it, that the fact is it will be extremely difficult to carry on relations with a new govt without a new amb. No reflection on the amb. The Pres said the Sec will have to do it on his own judgment. The Pres can’t figure it—he was impressed with his idea of not admitting we were wrong and no other amb being changed. The Sec did not know this latter and will check. The Pres said the Sec has a day or two to look it over. Tell him frankly we are thinking only of our relations and himself. Tell him the Pres personally has stated how pleased he is with his efficiency and devotion to job. The Sec agreed. The Pres was impressed with the statement we would be the only ones changing.³

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations. Prepared by Bernau. The source text also bears Herter’s initials and the notation by Macomber: “WBM saw & ret’d.”

² Supra.

³ In a note of January 9 to Secretary Dulles, Bernau wrote: “The President wanted you to know: He got the information about no other changes in ambs in Cuba from Ann [Whitman]. She got it during a phone call from Earl Smith, whom she knows.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations) In an undated memorandum for the record, Whitman described her telephone conversation with Smith at 1 p.m., presumably on January 8. (ibid., Dulles–Herter Series)

220. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 9, 1959.

802. Castro given triumphant hero’s welcome yesterday by people of Habana. Hundreds of thousands lined route to cheer him. Day climaxed by one and a half hour speech delivered at Camp Columbia to throng estimated 40,000. Speech was sincere, rambling, forceful, received with great enthusiasm.

Highlights were:

1. Struggle was won by Cuban people, and revolution belongs to them.

2. Cuban people now have peace without dictatorship, without crime, or censorship—peace without limitations.

3. 26 July Movement has support of overwhelming majority Cubans. Other revolutionary groups have helped earnestly and effectively, but in minor capacity.

4. Greatest crime now would be crime against the peace. A person who plots or attempts to break the peace is a criminal and traitor.

5. Most dangerous potential enemies of the successful revolution are the revolutionaries themselves. Castro here discussed the fall of Machado and the proliferation of revolutionary groups, many of whom thought they were entitled to live at the expense of the people from then on.

6. A part of one revolutionary group is now smuggling and concealing arms. There is no acceptable excuse for this, since there is now nothing in Cuba for a true revolutionary to fight against. The arms should be stored in the arsenals and barracks, as the 26th July Movement does. This was an obvious reference to actions of last two days by Revolutionary Directorate. Castro was exceptionally energetic and repetitious in condemning it, and clearly implied that his movement would use force if necessary to stop such practices.

7. Greatest desires of Cuban people are for liberty, human rights, peace and honest government. They now have a firm start toward these objectives, but both the people and the revolutionary group have a long and arduous task ahead of them, in which all must help.

8. No danger of a dictatorship since a government becomes dictatorial only when it lacks the support of the people, and this govt has support of all Cubans.

9. Castro will not accept a ministerial position. He has been designated by the President to handle the reorganization of the armed forces, including rebel forces, and will undertake other tasks when that is done.

10. Carlos Prio has worked wholeheartedly for the revolution, has agreed to support it, and agreed not to accept or run for public office. This statement was not fully reported in all accounts of the speech.

11. This government, and the revolutionary movement, will be honest. They will never defraud the Cuban people.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–959. The time of transmission is not given on the source text. Received at 7:27 p.m.

221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, January 9, 1959—9:23 p.m.

474. For Ambassador only from Secretary and Herter. Pleased have information urtel 783.² Have never doubted that your spontaneous reaction at time of Santiago incident must have conveyed to all Cubans, including Batista, the extent of U.S. devotion to fundamental principles, including humane treatment of individuals and freedom with justice.

As Herter informed you Tuesday evening,³ President deeply appreciates your splendid performance under very difficult circumstances. Unfortunately, as experience has proven time and again, U.S. interest is best served by changing Ambassadors following governmental upheaval as explosive as that which has just occurred in Cuba. This in no way reflects adversely on you but would apply to any Ambassador in such a situation due to conditions over which he has no control. Your assignment required that you maintain satisfactory relations with the Batista Government, and this you did to the time of his departure, notwithstanding the many problems created for you in carrying out our own policies.

Our conviction that you should leave Cuba soon is not due to fact that 26th of July group may or may not desire a change. It is independent judgment based on long Departmental experience. Agramonte’s statement to you and the information regarding Urrutia’s attitude pave the way to carry out gracefully a decision which we have reluctantly concluded needs be taken in US interest. We suggest that you seek an appointment with Agramonte on Monday or Tuesday of next week⁴ to tell him of your firm plans. Also, you will undoubtedly want to send President Eisenhower a letter stating your desire return to private life at this juncture which provides a natural occasion, and to which feel sure he would make appropriate reply. Letters could be published simultaneously.

Do not believe you should attempt discussion your personal situation with Urrutia, but Department will be glad to have your observations regarding him.

We send this message with deep personal regret, but know you will share our feeling that national interest is paramount.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Smith Earl E.T. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom, cleared with the Secretary in draft, and approved by Herter who signed for Dulles.

² Document 218.

³ January 6; see Document 215.

⁴ January 12 or 13.

222. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Little) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, January 10, 1959.

SUBJECT

Meeting on Cuba with Mr. Murphy

At 11:10 a.m. this morning Mr. Devine asked me if I would attend a meeting in Mr. Murphy’s office at 11:30 to brief Mr. Murphy principally on the emerging labor picture in Cuba, he having read and been interested in Habana’s telegram no. 793 of January 8 (attached).² Mr. Devine said that both yourself and Mr. Snow were at a meeting with the Draper Committee and that Mr. Porter had said that a representative of CMA, with Mr. Stephansky, would be suitable in view of your being in the other meeting.

At the meeting it developed that Mr. Murphy was interested in all phases of events in Cuba in the past week, ARA’s evaluation of those developments, and our prognosis for the future. The discussion ranged over such matters as the makeup of the government, Castro’s control over future policy decisions, the program of the government, the likelihood of further executions, the government’s anticipated attitude to foreign investment, and the future status of the U.S. military missions to Cuba. Mr. Stephansky also discussed in some detail the labor picture and the significance of the communists being allocated five of the twenty-two places on the new executive committee of the United Nationalist Labor Front (FONU).

Prior to the discussion of the above matters, however, Mr. Murphy expressed dissatisfaction over the information which had been furnished in the past to him, the Under Secretary, and the Secretary respecting the activities in the United States of Cuban rebel movements. He referred in this connection to rebel contacts with Members of Congress, conspiratorial activities, and illegal export of arms and ammunition to Cuba. In response to my comment that it was my impression that information on these activities had been available to him, Mr. Murphy said that neither he nor the Under Secretary had been sufficiently informed, adding that the sort of thing he would have wished to have, for example, were periodic reviews of these activities. I stated at this point that those of us concerned (I was thinking of SCA but did not specifically refer to that Bureau) with these matters had had many discussions and meetings on these illegal activities with the responsible law enforcement agencies of the U.S. Government. I mentioned specifically Justice, Immigration and Naturalization, Customs and the CAA. In response to his question whether our liaison included the FBI, I said that it did.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1059. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Little; also initialed by Rubottom.

² Not found attached. Telegram 793, which summarized recent developments in the labor field, is ibid., 737.00/1–859.

223. Editorial Note

On January 10, Ambassador Smith submitted his resignation to the President. The text of his letter was sent to the Department of State for forwarding to the President in telegram 806 from Havana, January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 123–Smith Earl E.T.) The President’s reply, also dated January 10, is in Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Files. Both letters are printed in Smith, The Fourth Floor, page 204.

On January 12, the President telephoned Secretary Dulles and approved the appointment of Philip Bonsal as Ambassador to Cuba. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations)

Later that day, Secretary Dulles received a telephone call from Henry Luce, publisher of Time-Life, who said that his wife, Clare Boothe Luce, “would be inclined to take on Cuba. The Sec said to let him think about it—he just spoke about an FSO which the Pres approved this p.m. It never occurred to him as a possibility.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, 6:01 p.m., January 12; ibid.)

On January 13, Herter conducted several telephone conversations regarding the Ambassadorial appointment to Cuba. At 12:15 p.m. Herter called Dulles about a conversation he had with Rubottom and Loy Henderson regarding the appointment of Clare Boothe Luce as Ambassador to Cuba. According to the memorandum of the telephone conversation, all three agreed that “she is not the one for Cuba.” Dulles and Herter were agreeable, however, to offering her the appointment as Ambassador to Brazil. At 2 p.m. Congressman William B. Cramer called Herter. Their conversation went as follows:

“Congressman Cramer phoned regarding the resignation of Ambassador Smith. He said the people of Florida were proud of this appointment, since Amb. Smith is from Florida, and they would be equally proud if someone from Florida might be considered to replace him. CAH said the individual being considered is a trained FSO who is bilingual in Spanish. He added that we do not want to send anyone there who is unfamiliar with the general pattern of things. When asked his name, CAH said it was Ambassador Bonsal but that this information should be kept in strictest confidence. Mr. Cramer said he would regard it as confidential. He added that he represented the Tampa area where some 45,000 were behind de Castro [sic], and even raised money for him. He wondered what he could do to get a little mileage out of the new appointment. He had no one in mind. CAH said we are always looking for first-rate people and would welcome any names he might send in the future.”

At 3:40 p.m., Persons called Herter to say that Clare Booth Luce was interested in the appointment. Persons said that Henry Luce had apparently seen the President and Secretary Dulles and wanted someone to contact him about the appointment that day while he was still in Washington. Herter told Persons that Luce was being considered for Brazil. At 5:45 p.m. Herter called Dulles regarding Luce. Dulles said he would immediately call the President. Memoranda of all these conversations are in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

Secretary Dulles and the President spoke on the telephone immediately afterward: “The Sec said he checked further about the Luce business and there is a strong feeling here which he tends to support that we need in Cuba a trained FSO. What we do have in mind is we might offer her Brazil which in many ways is a far more important appt etc. If the Pres approves the Sec would call Harry and tell him that. The Pres said o.k.—but don’t offer until it is agreed.” The memorandum of the conversation continued: “The Sec said the pressure is mounting. There are a number of people who are almost trying to purchase it and we concluded we would need an FSO and we had made the decision—this last by the Pres.” (ibid., Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations)

Dulles then telephoned Herter to report that the President had approved Bonsal for Cuba and Luce for Brazil and that he would inform Henry Luce. (ibid., Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

Smith paid a farewell call on Prime Minister Miro Cardona on January 17 (see Document 231) and left Havana on January 19.

In a January 27 letter to Dulles, which was apparently routed first to Herter, Smith said that President Eisenhower had asked him the previous day whether there had been any discussion of his taking another post. Smith indicated that he told the President that this possibility had not been mentioned. Smith told Dulles, however, that if there were a vacancy, “I hope the Department will consider my availability and my willingness to serve—even though it be for a short period of time.” In forwarding Smith’s letter to Dulles under cover of a memorandum of January 28, Herter recalled that when he had talked with Smith on January 6, the question of another assignment had been raised and Smith declined. Herter then noted, “My embarrassment with regard to the attached letter is that the President may well think that I neglected to carry out his wishes, and I am somewhat at a loss as to how to answer Smith. It is my strong feeling, however, that during the present session of Congress it would be very difficult to get Smith confirmed for any other post, and it would be a great mistake for the President to make any such attempt.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers) No reply to Smith has been found.

224. White House Special Staff Note¹

Washington, January 13, 1959.

From State:

Background of Cuban Revolutionary Leader.—Fidel Castro’s past history indicates that, while motivated by certain ideals, he also has a predilection for violence, relentlessness, and direct independent action to attain his ends. He had participated in several riots and abortive invasions prior to his landing in Oriente Province a year ago. Castro had contacts with Communist-front groups during his university days and there have been continuing reports of possible Communist affiliations on the part of some of his top leaders. However, there is no present firm indication that Castro is a Communist-sympathizer or that the Communists hold a dominant position in his organization. Castro seems to be nationalistic and somewhat socialistic; and although he has criticized alleged US support for Batista, he cannot be said to be personally hostile to the US. Whether this is through conviction or expediency remains to be seen. Castro says he wants only to return Cuba to the path of democracy. It is difficult to believe, however, that he will be satisfied with any political solution in Cuba which does not assign him a prominent position.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which bears the handwritten initials “DE”.

225. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 77 Santiago de Cuba, January 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

Events in Oriente—Reaction (Jan. 6–14, 1959)

Revolutionary Justice

Following consolidation of the provisional government in Santiago the new authorities began an immediate roundup of persons believed to have been responsible for deaths and other crimes during the former regime. The names of nearly three hundred persons arrested have appeared in the newspapers and the total probably exceeds this although many have been released. Seventy were reported shot in Santiago (one of the 71 was supposedly freed). While rebels had long announced that they would take drastic action against “criminals”, the action has left some doubt in a few minds. Despite second thoughts and minor disapproval, the general public feels that those responsible for murders should be eliminated.

Those arrested seemed to have been classified into two groups besides the persons released fairly promptly for lack of evidence. The first group is composed of those who will be tried for lesser crimes by special civil courts. The second group is that which faced military court martial. Boards of 26th of July officers with occasional civilian participation were constituted to judge the grave offenders. It is understood that most local civilian lawyers declined to join in the proceedings. Boards as announced consist of a president, two associate judges or vocales, a prosecutor or fiscal, a defense attorney and a secretary. Some of the sessions have been public while others have been semiprivate, although it is understood that the findings and results will be made public. Trials are conducted under the “Revolutionary Code of Justice of the Second Front” (Raul Castro).

The fact that the courts were working was brought forcefully to the people of Santiago and the world when it was announced that seventy had been shot on January 12. Those executed were for the greatest part members of military organizations connected with repressive activities such as SIM, SIR, the personnel from radio patrol cars, and from the Masferrer group.

There are stories that not all persons received a full dress court martial, and that in some cases the formalities were fairly much limited to sentencing. This was supposedly protested to President Urrutia by some members of the bar association. All of those executed were supposedly persons about whom there was “no doubt” as to guilt. It is generally stated that they were all participants in murders or tortures or responsible for them.

Announcements state that the cases were investigated between January 2 and 12. There are stories to the effect that not all of these persons received what might be called full-dress courts martial, and that some probably saw the court only long enough to receive sentence. There is a rumor to the effect that members of the local bar association have protested to the President because of this, but this is not verified.

This hurried “justice” and the possible slighting of judicial procedures is usually blamed on Raul Castro, who is the command figure here. As a result, possibly of local protests as well as the world attention, the trials and executions are reported to be suspended at least temporarily, pending new instructions.

Many of those executed were well-known to the populace as thugs and assassins of the worst type. There is little doubt but that a number would have faced the possibility of capital punishment in any state having this or war crimes trials under different circumstances. [sic] There were, however, names which brought suprise in some circles as did the large number executed with such rapidity.

These included Commandante Bonifacio Haza Grasso, local chief of the National Police, who presumably helped deliver the police over to the revolutionists, and who has always been considered a moderate if not a rebel sympathizer. Fidel Castro mentioned him gratefully in his January 2 address here. Rumor has it that Haza was accused by a SIM man, who was also executed, as well as by a civilian of ordering killings.

The verdicts presumably followed hurried investigation of many alleged killings and tortures by agents of the government. Details of crimes are being brought to light, and the bodies of persons long missing are supposedly being recovered from wells, sewers, military installations and isolated spots throughout the province. The newspapers have carried pictures of torture devices and the accounts of those admitting to have used them.

On January 13 Revolucion announced that the remaining prisoners would be turned over to special civil courts for trial. It is thought that this means revolutionary courts. The official organ also undertook to reassure the populace that innocent persons had nothing to fear, but that the course of justice would not be stayed. People are urged to denounce those guilty of crimes and bring in the evidence.

While there are probably more that will receive the death sentence, it is thought that the main part of the retribution has been accomplished in this respect. Approximately seventeen persons have been executed at Guantanamo according to reports, as well as several at Manzanillo and Holguin. Numbers continue to be released. While a few are concerned for the processes, the majority solidly support the idea that the justice was warranted, although they may seem to have private reservations on some individuals. The startling quantity of people executed at once has undoubtedly left a bad taste with a few, but none will admit that there are not others who need to be treated the same.

Protests from the press of the United States and elsewhere seem to be disregarded with the rationalization that the United States took no notice whatsoever of the crimes and atrocities committed under the previous regime when there was not even a pretense of legal formalities. This applies also to the United Nations and Organization of American States which also failed to take interest in the protests of revolutionaries over previous alleged atrocities. Local people are also proud of the fact that the occupation of Santiago was accomplished with none of the frequent attributes of such upheavals. There were no lynchings, little or no sacking, and no mob justice of the type frequently seen, and they consider the action by the revolutionary tribunals as something completely different. A certain amount of “eye for an eye” justice has been forecast throughout the months, especially from the Second Front. The situation in general seems to bear out the estimate presented in the Consulate’s despatch no. 10 of August 22, 1958,² in which the “culpability” of the United States as seen by many local people is described. As has previously been described, many local people can rationalize almost any action, and do so in rejecting press protests. It is thought, however, that they have been felt, and it is hoped that this coupled with other local and national reaction will temper future “justice”, despite strong desires for revenge on many sides. Santiago presumably had more oppressive tactics employed on it longer because of its long revolutionary history, and there is probably more resentment here than in some other sections.

In this connection it is rumored that a segment still feels some sympathy for General Eulogio Cantillo on the basis that under his command here there were few of the former types of treatment, and that the guilty ones were usually caught and turned over to the courts.

Evidences of Anti-Americanism

As has been otherwise reported, there are many persons who are now openly criticizing the United States for “aiding” the Batista government and the pronouncements of Fidel Castro on the subject of the military mission as well as on revolutionary justice have fanned this a bit. His statements in turn echo majority sentiment. Members of the Consulate have received a number of comments, although they have not been violent nor unfriendly on a personal basis. More of this can be expected.

It was with some suprise, therefore, that on January 9 a request was received from an underground militant officer for USIS films to be shown at the Hunting Club where some 300 troops have been quartered. The request was granted and preparations were made to show the sport and travel pictures selected. At the last moment a soldier, who appeared to have been well educated, rose and harangued the crowd on United States oppression of the Cuban people. He was joined by a few others and they worked the group into stopping the showing. There was no violence and they assisted the USIS employee to pack up and leave.

The following day the militant officer apologized for the incident, and reported that four “communist agitators” had been arrested and others investigated for causing the disorder. It is not confirmed that this action was actually taken.

Comment:

This is probably typical of the problems that USIS will have in renewing its programs. This may also be true in the small communities where there has been bombing with what has been described as “U.S.” equipment. It will be necessary to proceed slowly and cautiously in order not to cause reverse effects.

Communist Activities

Communists of the PSP are now considered to constitute a legal party according to newsaper interpretation of statements of Fidel Castro. The old PSP newspaper Hoy reappeared promptly in Santiago with a small one page edition. Most of the issues have been devoted to celebrating the revolutionary victory and it is now trying to claim credit for the communists.

[less than 1 line not declassified] a communist meeting with an attendance of three hundred was held in the dock area on January 10, and a PSP office has now been set up there.

Several persons with PSP backgrounds of varying degrees, [less than 1 line not declassified] have been appointed to public offices under the new administration. These include a Dr. Miguel A. d’Alessandro who has been put in charge of the reorganization of public hospitals in Oriente. He has also been Raul Castro’s doctor, according to reports. They also include a Castro assistant by the name of Cot Lesmus, and Miguel Angel Betancourt, who is listed as Secretario de Actas of the Executive Commission of the Comite Regional Campesino del Segundo Frente, Frank Pais, an agricultural organization. There are presumably others of a similar stripe in public office.

The Consulate does not yet know the pattern of Communist activity with the revolutionary government or the extent of the movement. It is not known if the present local authorities know of the communist affiliations alleged, or if they care, or if they are encouraged. To date, the proportion would not seem very large, although the key positions mentioned would appear to give considerable influence in some segments.

Changes in Administration

Comandante Huber Matos formerly of the Third Front has been sent to take command of the 26th of July military forces in Camaguey Province. He has been replaced in Santiago by Comandante Belarmino Castilla, better known as “Anibal”.

This makes Santiago almost entirely “Second Front” in aspect. Raul Castro and his principal officers and advisors from the Second Front have control of all important posts in the city. There is some discussion that Raul Castro is taking little if any advice from the civic leaders of the resistance movement, and that he keeps them waiting on his word, [less than 1 line not declassified].

So far there has been very good order in the city and the shooting incidents have almost completely stopped, although the hunt is still on for certain “chivatos” who have escaped detention so far. Up until now there has seemed to have been a considerable difference between the Second Front and other areas of the movement. Santiago will be a proving ground to see if these differences were real or fancied.

Spirit of Optimism

Despite the events of the past week, there is still a considerable spirit of optimism concerning the future. Many former residents are returning and the atmosphere is generally more relaxed than it was a few weeks ago. Business men are also optimistic. One banker informed Vice Consul Eberhardt that he had approved ninety credit applications in one week whereas the former monthly average was about one hundred.

American business men share the optimism generally. The latter anticipate new demands on the part of labor during the coming months and possibly renegotiations on any contracts with the government. They feel, however, that business prospects are bright in Oriente.

Park F. Wollam

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1459. Confidential; Air Priority; Urgent. Drafted by Wollam.

² In despatch 10, the Consulate analyzed the effect in Oriente province of Cuban Army and police excesses. It concluded that, “while the cases can not be assumed to be the rule, instances of brutality and the negative propaganda resulting from them are an important factor in the bitterness and intransigence of the opposition in Oriente.” (ibid., 738.00/8–2258)

226. Memorandum From the Chief of the Division of Research and Analysis for American Republics (Wardlaw) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)¹

Washington, January 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

Recent Estimative Work on Cuba

The USIB on November 24, 1958, approved SNIE 85–58 entitled “The Situation in Cuba”.² This document was prepared in the normal manner, having been drafted in the CIA, discussed by representatives of the working levels of various intelligence agencies, and finally approved by the USIB. The document was a good survey of the situation and outlook at the time, although in the light of subsequent events it has proved at fault in stating that it was unlikely that Castro would be able to overthrow the Batista regime within the next few months. This estimate was made at a time when it was evident that Castro’s strength was increasing and that the Batista Government was finding it increasingly difficult to retain power, but also at a time when the situation in Cuba appeared to be essentially the same as it had been for several months.

The Supplement to SNIE 85–58, dated December 16, 1958,³ was prepared by the CIA and approved by the USIB without prior submission to the lower levels of the intelligence agencies. The document was basically sound in that it recognized that the Castro forces were gaining strength, that the position of the Cuban Government was deteriorating rapidly, and that neither Batista nor the President-elect, Rivero Aguero, were taking steps to avert a crisis. The Supplement was inadequate in the following regards:

1. It emphasized that a period of great and prolonged disorder in Cuba would follow the assumption of power by the Castro forces. Such a period of disorder may yet occur, but does not seem to be now developing.

2. It attached too much weight to the possibility that the Cuban Army would oust Batista and establish a military junta.

3. While recognizing that any Cuban Army attempting to suppress Castro would need large amounts of military equipment and supplies, it did not mention that the Cuban Army’s greatest deficiency was its lack of will to fight. DRA believes that this latter deficiency was the primary cause for the downfall of Batista.

4. The Supplement cites the removal of Batista from power as an example of a drastic action which would stem the momentum of the Castro operation. Actually, when Batista fled, the momentum of the Castro operation increased.

I believe that the shortcomings of the Supplement were primarily the result of the way in which it was prepared and approved. Had it been handled in the normal manner on the working levels of the intelligence agencies before submission to the USIB, a better thought-out paper would undoubtedly have resulted. That most of the shortcomings of the paper were evident at the time to persons in DRA working closely with Cuba is shown by my memorandum to you of December 19, 1958, regarding the Supplement. A copy of this memorandum is attached.⁴

It is possible that had we received additional information over the last six months on the amount of military equipment Castro was receiving from the United States, we might have had a somewhat different appreciation of his strength. We still do not have anything conclusive on this point and our impression remains that the bulk of Castro’s equipment was obtained through capture or purchase from Cuban soldiers. We have received no INS or Customs Service reports on their activities against arms smuggling to Castro. We did receive some FBI reports on this subject but not all that the FBI prepared. Between September 1 and December 16, the date the Supplement was approved, only 43 of the 196 FBI reports sent the Cuban desk in ARA were routed to DRA. The FBI reports received in DRA did not reflect a large traffic in arms from the United States to the Castro forces.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Cuban Situation 1957–1959. Secret. Drafted by Wardlaw.

² Document 161.

³ Document 182.

⁴ Not found.

227. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts in the American Republics¹

Washington, January 15, 1959—8:23 p.m.

859. Much interest in US press and Congress past few days over executions Batista supporters in Cuba. Department’s position has been to deplore these activities on humanitarian basis, refer fact that this fundamentally internal Cuban matter, but express hope that persons accused of crimes will be accorded trails under appropriate legal procedures consistent with ideals of justice to which all countries this hemisphere dedicated and that Cuban people will achieve their aspirations of freedom, justice and law.

Request urgently report official, private, and press reactions to current executions in Cuba.² Habana, Santiago also take appropriate action in their discretion.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1559. Official Use Only. Drafted by Little and approved by Wieland who signed for Dulles. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Havana and repeated to Havana and Santiago de Cuba.

² Telegraphic replies are in Department of State, Central File 737.00. For a summary description of the official and unofficial reaction in Latin America to the executions, see Document 232.

228. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 15, 1959—3 p.m.

833. Presence of US military missions has come under increasing attack within past few days. Castro himself said, in press conference with American correspondents a few days ago, that while new Cuban Government did not intend to request recall of the missions, it would be “courtesy” for US to withdraw them. On January 14 in answering questions at a meeting of Lions Club, he said he felt missions should “pack up and leave” and, according to press reports, stated that military missions “might be spying”.

Statement proposed in Embtel 830² if released to press should result in some lessening of pressure on missions, but Embassy has slight hope they can be retained, at least in present form. Missions and Embassy had felt it preferable to defer tackling issue at government level or with Castro until emotions had somewhat subsided, but Castro’s increasing attention to subject may force our hand. If this occurs, Embassy should have authority to discuss subject fully. Line it would propose to take, subject to Department and DOD approval, would be:

1. Missions have done nothing to warrant their recall. Go into origin, functions, actions, etc.

2. Missions are needed. Go into organization of new cuban armed forces, access to US equipment and training, hemispheric defense.

Although Castro publicly has made no distinction between the three missions, Naval mission Chief has informed Embassy that Castro has allegedly informed Cuban Navy that US Naval Mission may remain provided it moves out of Estado Major. Mission Chief will meet with Chief of Staff, Cuban Navy this afternoon on this matter. This information extremely sensitive at this point. Will report developments. While Embassy believes every effort should be made to retain all three missions, it considers that even one is better than none.

Request instructions.

Smith

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–1559. Secret; Priority.

² In telegram 830, January 14, the Embassy transmitted the text of a statement it suggested that the Department release in order to counter a charge made by newspaper columnist Ed Sullivan that the U.S. military missions had assisted the Cuban Air Force under Batista in its bombing attacks against the Cuban rebels. The Embassy suggested that the statement be general, so that it could also reply to criticisms raised in other quarters, such as Bohemia magazine, “without dignifying any of them with individual attention.” (ibid., 611.37/1–1459) On January 15, the Department released a statement virtually the same as the one suggested by the Embassy. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 2, 1959, pp. 162–163.

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, January 17, 1959—1:06 p.m.

505. Your 833.² In view latest Castro outbursts concerning military missions and conditions fixed by Cuban Navy with Castro’s approval (your 838³ ), consider we should no longer defer approaching Cuban authorities at high level, preferably President or Prime Minister soonest, along following lines:

1. Outline clearly our position concerning past and present conduct of missions as suggested numbered item 1 your 833 and Department’s statement no. 35 of January 15⁴ transmitted to you teletype same date.

2. After brief exposition, state that in view recent public attacks by Castro and other officials of new regime against our mission personnel which have not been rebutted by President or any of Cabinet, we are assuming missions can serve no useful purpose by remaining and we, therefore, wish to discuss appropriate dates and terms for their withdrawal in accordance with pertinent clauses of mission agreements.

3. If the immediate response to your approach is that the GOC agrees that the missions should be withdrawn, you should state that (1) you will report this to Washington immediately and (2) you would like the GOC to indicate which official(s) should be dealt with to arrange specific details of the withdrawal under the terms of the agreements.

4. Withdrawal would include all missions including naval.

5. Notify Department promptly of results of this consultation with view to taking all appropriate action which would be accompanied by public statement.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–1559. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wieland, cleared with Murphy and Irwin, and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.

² Supra.

³ Dated January 15, telegram 838 reported that the Cuban Navy Chief of Staff had now confirmed, with Castro’s approval, that the U.S. Naval Mission could remain and continue its normal functions, but in offices outside the Estado Major building. (ibid., 737.58/1–1558)

⁴ See footnote 2, supra.

230. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 19, 1959—10 a.m.

851. Miro Cardona has submitted letter of resignation alleging ill health. He is actually sick with severe sore throat, possibly including abcess. However basic reasons for resignation understood to be: (1) Irritation and frustration over lack capacity and decision President Urrutia. This leads to constant deferral decisions until opinion Fidel Castro known. Since Castro generally engaged in public appearance and speechifying, in which he obviously taking great pleasure, work of government progresses with extreme slowness. (2) Miro Cardona also extremely angered at anti-American campaign unleashed by Castro as result criticism from abroad of summary trials and executions. This campaign being pushed by 26 July daily paper Revolucion of which director is Carlos Franqui.

Several influential persons both in and outstanding of government are endeavoring to convince Miro Cardona to withdraw resignation, but as of this morning uncertain whether they will be successful. Matter still confidential.

Reliable sources indicate Armando Hart also seriously considering resignation, apparently mainly because of frustrations over governmental delays and machinations of Franqui, who endeavoring obtain creation Ministry Culture to be headed by himself.

An air of frustration and increasing disillusionment is apparent among several responsible people either associated with government or originally favorably disposed to it. If this trend continues, and if these and other resignations take place public confidence in government will be seriously shaken and period instability may result. Anti-Americanism would then probably continue and possibly increase.

Ambassador leaving in few hours and not possible clear this message with him prior to sending.

Smith²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–1959. Confidential; Niact.

² The telegram bears Smith’s signature, but it is clear from the text that he did not see it before his departure from Havana. In telegram 852 from Havana, January 19, the Embassy noted it had received a note from the Cuban Government that morning approving Bonsal’s designation as Ambassador. The Embassy recommended, in view of the “delicate and tense situation here,” that Bonsal be confirmed as quickly as possible and that he come directly from Bolivia to Cuba to present his credentials. (ibid., 123–Bonsal Phillip W.) In telegram 513 to Havana, January 19, the Department indicated that the situation required that Bonsal first report to Washington for brief consultations and give the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, if it wished, an opportunity to interview him. (ibid.)

231. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 19, 1959—3 p.m.

856. Deptel 505.² Ambassador broached subject of reference telegram to President at 7 p.m. January 17 on a goodbye visit. Urrutia stated he was not familiar with subject and did not wish to discuss it until he had taken it up with Agramonte. In Ambassador’s opinion Urrutia plans to discuss it not with Minister of State but with Fidel Castro.

Since the upsurge of emotions during last few days over criticism from United States and elsewhere of trials and executions of war criminals, matter of US military missions has temporarily dropped out of news. I believe it can probably now wait for Bonsal’s arrival before being discussed formally, and that this would be best course. Nevertheless, in calling on Agramonte either this evening or tomorrow I intend mentioning subject, stating that we will be glad to discuss it at his convenience and convenience of President or Prime Minister. I intend also calling his attention to Department’s press release of January 15³ copies of which supplied Ministry in our note No. 11 of January 16,⁴ and to suggest that pending formal discussions GOC inform themselves in detail on functions and actions of military missions since much misinformation has been passed about. Mission chiefs themselves would welcome opportunity to enlighten Cuban officials on this subject. I think it advisable to mention subject to Agramonte because it may be used in mass rally called for January 21 in which case our initiative in bringing it up may diminish some of its potential inflammatory effect.

Embassy assumes Deptel 833 [505] refers to both military missions and MAAG since personnel is same and Cubans do not know the difference.

Please instruct if any objection to this procedure.⁵

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–1959. Secret; Niact.

² Document 229.

³ See footnote 2, Document 228.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ The Department apparently telephoned instructions to the Embassy. See Document 236.

232. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

Reaction in Latin America to Cuban Executions

With minor exceptions, official reaction and commentary in the press and by private citizens respecting the executions in Cuba have been uniformly unfavorable in Latin America. Reactions have varied from dismay and concern over the lack of proper judicial procedure in carrying out the trials to horror and repugnance at the wholesale killings. Reports from a number of the Latin American countries indicate that the Castro victory was received with gratification but he and his government are losing sympathy as a result of the executions. Some of the critics question whether Castro can establish a responsible government in the light of having inaugurated his regime with excesses, while others deplore the executions as a violation of democratic principles. Some churchmen have spoken out against the executions.

Reports from several Latin American countries state that the Communist press condones the executions on the ground that they are justified by the killings of the Batista regime. A similar line is taken by a few non-Communist commentators.

Two Governments have officially expressed their distaste over the recent executions. The Argentine Government last week delivered a note to the new Government in Habana expressing that country’s preoccupation over the summary courts-martial and expressing the hope that trials will be conducted in accordance with recognized juridical procedures. The Uruguayan Government, through its delegate in New York, presented a note to the Cuban United Nations delegation calling for a cessation of the executions. In addition, the president of the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies and a group of his colleagues sent a telegram to the Cuban Government asking that the executions be ended.

Copies of this memorandum are being furnished to Governor Herter and to Mr. Murphy.

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan–Apr.) 1959. Official Use Only. Drafted by Little.

233. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 748 Havana, January 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

New Cuban Cabinet; Individual Affiliations and Backgrounds; Groups Represented

For the assistance and guidance of the Department, there follows a listing of the members of the Cabinet (Council of Ministers) of the Revolutionary Government, with brief indications of their party or group affiliations and general reputation and background. The names are capitalized in accordance with individual usage.

Prime Minister: José Miro Cardona. One of the country’s most respected lawyers, noted for honesty and sincerity. President of the Habana Bar Association. Non-political. He was the principal assistant of Cosmé De la Torriente, Cuba’s elder statesman, in the latter’s efforts to work out a peaceful settlement between the Batista Government and the opposition in 1955 and 1956, by means of a group called “Society of Friends of the Republic” (SAR), and continued the work of the group briefly after De la Torriente’s death. From that work, he moved naturally into the formation of the “Group of Institutions” (frequently and erroneously referred to as “Group of Civic Institutions”), which became influential in mid–1957. He was variously styled “Secretary-General” and “Coordinator” of the Revolutionary Civic Front, sometimes referred to as the “Pact of Caracas”. He is not a member of either the “26 of July” Movement or the Civic Resistance Movement, though greatly respected by both.

Minister of State: Roberto Agramonte Pichado. An Ortodoxo. Presidential candidate of that party in 1952. Not originally notably active as an oppositionist, he remained in Cuba until July, 1957. He was appointed more as a symbol than for outstanding ability or promise. Opinion among both friends and opponents is unanimous: Far from brilliant, pleasant, amenable, greatly influenced by those around him.

Minister of Justice: Angel Fernandez Rodriguez. Formerly Acting Fiscal (District Attorney, which in the Cuban legal system is an integral part of the judicial structure, and an appointive office) of the District Court of Oriente Province. He was charged with presentation of the case against several members of the “26 of July” Movement in 1957, at which Urrutia was one of the presiding justices. His presentation was not aggressive, and favored the rebels. He resisted pressure from the Government, and remained in that post until the overthrow of Batista. He was highly regarded by the “26 of July” Movement, and possibly a member of it. Considered capable, but there is some question whether he can measure up to the requirements of his new position.

Minister of Interior, Charged With National Defense: Luis Orlando Rodriguez Rodriguez. One of the older members of the Cabinet. As a youth, fought against Machado. An Autentico for many years, and briefly Director of Sports under Grau. Resigned after falling out with Grau, and associated with Eduardo “Eddy” Chibas in formation of the Ortodoxo party in 1947. At that time founded the daily paper La Calle. Ortodoxo candidate (unsuccessful) for Governor of Habana Province in 1948, successful candidate for Representative for the party in 1950. Strongly opposed to Batista and consistently attacked the regime in his paper. The paper was closed in May, 1955, after publication of an editorial by Rodriguez critical of public statements by Ambassador Gardner. The editorial used the statements to indirectly attack the Batista regime. Rodriguez has told associates that he is certain that the paper was closed because the Ambassador took strong exception to the article, and discussed the matter with Batista.

Rodriguez was closely associated with Fidel Castro for a time after the latter’s release from prison by amnesty in 1955, and apparently joined his Movement at that time. Little is known of his activities, until he showed up in the Sierra Maestra as one of the principal speakers and propagandists for the Movement over Radio Rebelde, under the name of “Capt. Luis Rodriguez”. He is a good speaker in the Latin tradition, fiery and loquacious. He has recently stated that the Communist party should be free to organize and participate in elections like any other party in a democracy.

[Here follows a listing of the rest of the Cabinet Ministers: Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Minister of Treasury; Manuel Ray Rivero, Minister of Public Works; Manuel Fernandez Garcia, Minister of Labor; Raul Cepero Bonilla, Minister of Commerce; Humberto Sori Marin, Minister of Agriculture; Armando Hart Davalos, Minister of Education; Julio Martinez Paez, Minister of Health; Enrique Oltuski Ozacki, Minister of Communications; Faustino Perez Hernandez, Minister for Recovery of Misappropriated Funds; Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, Minister Charged with Drafting and Study of Revolutionary Laws; and Luis M. Buch Rodriguez, Minister Secretary of the Presidency and the Cabinet.]

Significantly, the Cabinet includes only persons associated with the “26 of July” Movement, the Montecristi groups, and the Ortodoxo party. The Prio group, the Organizacion Autentica, the Directorio Revolucionario (identical with the Directorio Estudiantil Revolucionario, the original and perhaps still technically correct name), the Federacion Estudiantil Revolucionario (FEU—Federation of University Students), and the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray (National Second Front of the Escambray) have no representation. The Second Front of the Escambray announced from its formation that it had no political ambitions, and would disband with the defeat of Batista. All the others, however, have strong political ambitions, and their exclusion from the Cabinet may cause future friction. Among the possible causes are: (1) Fidel Castro and the leaders of his Movement feel that they played by far the most important part in the defeat of Batista, and that they are entitled to run the country now—in addition to having the strength and enormous popular support. (2) The “26 of July” Movement is dedicated to governmental reform, including particularly the establishment of high standards of honesty. The corruption they condemn did not start with Batista, and in the past Castro and others have had harsh things to say about the performance of Prio and his supporters during Prio’s presidency. The FEU, of which the DR is an offshoot, has also been corrupt in the past. Significantly, only “pure” and “oppositionist” Ortodoxos, who opposed any negotiated settlement with Batista, are represented in the Cabinet.

Daniel M. Braddock Chargé d’Affaires ad interim

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/1–1959. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

234. Letter From the Consul at Santiago de Cuba (Wollam) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Little)¹

Santiago de Cuba, January 19, 1959.²

Dear Ed: Reference is made to my despatch No. 10 of August 22, 1958³ and to my official-informal letter to Terry Leonhardy on August 25⁴ concerning the progress of the anti-American feeling in Oriente.

Oriente is now run by Raul Castro’s Second Front crowd which pushed most of the previous propaganda. This combined with the fact that Oriente has been in this war for over two years tends to lend a more emotional and less critical approach by most of the people. Fidel had done nothing to stop this and seems to be doing considerable whisker pulling himself.

The results of the revolution with respect to our relations have been worse in some respects than I would have thought, but there are some aspects which are better than might have been imagined.

Despite the feeling that is being whipped up, there is still a reservoir of good will in many segments of the population. While we have received considerable criticism here, there have been no untoward incidents and it has been done in a fairly friendly manner as far as personal relations are concerned. This could change if any campaign continues.

Some of this is undoubtedly the natural proud reaction to a successful revolution. I think that many Cubans have always had an inferiority complex with respect to the United States, and the feeling about the Piatt Amendment is not yet dead. One frequently hears that this is the first time that Cuba has actually been free, and by its own efforts despite “opposition” from the United States. The danger is, of course, that the small communist minority and/or other anti-American elements will let this get out of hand.

The United States and its representatives are currently taking the blame for everything that has happened. They are still connecting us with the bombing of towns and with the atrocities through what seems to me to be an unwarranted “guilt by association” with largely an emotional base.

I do not see why we should take the rap for all of this when much of it is the result of Batista’s censorship, as pointed out in previous communications. The general public here is unaware of the positive steps taken in pursuit of our (difficult to achieve) ideal of non-intervention.

It seems that we do not need so much a defense of our policy as we need to have people informed on our policy. Unfortunately it is too late to utilize the services of Father Bez Chabebe or others to get this across discreetly. That instruction⁵ arrived after the overthrow.

It might still be useful to have something for the record as suggested in August either through a speech or an article which might be reprinted should it seem feasible. As previously stated this should certainly not be a defense or an apology but the record presented as deemed prudent. This would have to be considered most carefully both for content and timing since there would be nothing served in merely starting further debate. It must also be considered that what we consider very correct action may not be so considered by many here, on the basis that if we were not for them we were against them.

I may be uninformed on many aspects of the situation, but my understanding is that we started a slowdown of shipments of arms to the GOC early in 1957, and that the last actual shipment (except for the unfortunate rocket head replacement) was in October 1957. If I am correct, our prohibiting even the sale of combat equipment to Batista was the first time in history that this has been done to a friendly nation. Certainly this unusual measure was in direct response to the Cuban internal situation.

Because of Batista’s censorship this is certainly not known, nor is it known that the United States deplored the violence reported, although we did not spell it out.

The second major emotional point in the province is concerning the use of “U.S.” bombs and napalm on Oriente and other towns. This is still being blamed on the United States. I think that we should, if possible, develop evidence that napalm did not come from the United States, and that bomb shipments ended a long time ago. The papers state that a Spaniard making bombs for the air force in Habana has been captured by the government. Perhaps there are other clues which might be used in discretion. This can not [be] disregarded in Oriente as the people have felt the impact of the bombs and there is a lot of visible evidence in many of the towns in addition to our own mine at Nicaro.

We have undoubtedly made protests to the GOC about the use of MAP equipment and that might also be put on the record, with the blame placed where it belongs, the GOC and censorship.

There were undoubtedly many atrocities previously, the details of which are just coming to light. The U.S. should certainly not share the guilt for what one Cuban did to another.

Points listed in your instruction re Father Bez Chabebe are also possibly worth repeating, as are others if properly developed. Inasmuch as the people here have made much of repetition to get points across, we might have to do the same.

I am hopeful that a lot of the present shouting will die a natural death as every one gets back to work. Perhaps, however, we can calculate some way to give this a push.

Locally, if you can find some way to return Masferrer it would be helpful, although I do not know the legal concepts. He represents the worst in local minds, but I am not certain what can be proven against him. If he remains in the U.S. they probably will not let us forget it.

These are mere thoughts on the local situation and you are probably way ahead of us.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Park

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–1958. Confidential; Official-Informal.

² The source text is incorrectly dated January 19, 1958.

³ See footnote 2, Document 225.

⁴ Document 126.

⁵ See Document 192.

235. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 20, 1959.

SUBJECT

Arrival of Ambassador Bonsal in Cuba

Mr. David Lawrence called me yesterday afternoon² to discuss the matter of delaying our new Ambassador’s arrival in Habana, and mentioned that he had talked to the Secretary about this matter.³ He recalled a Nicaraguan page of history, circa 1904, and then President Wilson’s experience in México. I promptly informed him that the latter experience had set us back seventy years in our dealings with México, and that we had not yet regained the ground that we lost. Mr. Lawrence was also mistaken in his differentiation between de facto and de jure recognition, inasmuch as we have already recognized the new Cuban Government and would be dealing with it formally either through a Chargé d’Affaires or through the Ambassador.

I recommend against any studied delay in the arrival of Ambassador Bonsal. This could very quickly be interpreted as intervention, as we found out in our 1947 experience with President Somoza in Nicaragua, which we eventually had to acknowledge had been a mistake. Actually, Ambassador Bonsal will not arrive until some time early in February and we will have ample opportunity to study the situation between now and then.

The American business community and other informed observers have urged us to get our Ambassador to Cuba as fast as possible. Ambassador Bonsal’s special qualifications are such that he may be able to wield influence of the kind we would like to see placed on the Cuban Government. Unfortunately, this instrument of diplomacy, the most effective of all in the long run, has not been available to us to the degree desirable for a long time there.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123–Bonsal Philip W. Official Use Only. Drafted and initialed by Rubottom; concurred in and initialed by Murphy, Macomber, and Henderson.

² A memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Elizabeth Beers, is ibid., Rubottom-Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Apr.) 1959. Lawrence was the editor of U.S. News and World Report.

³ Lawrence called Dulles at 4:21 p.m. on January 19 to express views similar to those he gave to Rubottom. A memorandum by Bernau of this conversation is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.

⁴ Henderson wrote the following in the margin: “I can see nothing except inconvenience to be derived from delaying the submission of Bonsal’s name to the Senate.” Another handwritten notation reads, “Sec saw.” Rubottom wrote the following notation in the margin, “Night of 1/20 the Sec’y told me he agreed. RRR”. Bonsal’s name was submitted to the Senate for confirmation on January 22.

236. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 20, 1959—5 p.m.

863. Deptel 505 and Embtel 856.² Pursuant to Deptel 505 and phoned instruction from Snow,³ I took up matter of military missions today with Minister of State Agramonte and expressed desire to do likewise with President or Prime Minister if possible. I spoke of missions’ origin and functions and stated that in our view missions had conformed to non-intervention policy followed by US and had done nothing to warrant their withdrawal. I gave him copy of Department’s statement No. 35 of January 15⁴ which he had not previously read. I said that at time of arms suspension last March US had considered withdrawing missions but decided, after due consideration, interests of US, any future Cuban Government best served by retaining them as an organization, even though from that time they ceased to carry on normal advisory functions to Batista Government. I urged GOC consider impartially acts of missions in light of Department’s statement, but otherwise made no plea for their retention.

Agramonte agreed that missions entitled to an impartial judgment, and said careful consideration would be given. He said main criticism of missions was that they had “trained” Batista’s forces.

I told Minister that in view of attacks on missions by Castro and other officials, we were prepared to discuss dates and terms for their withdrawal, in accordance with mission agreements, if this was what Cuban Government wished. Dr. Agramonte said he would have to consult the President before making any answer on this matter.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–2059. Secret; Niact.

² Documents 229 and 231.

³ No record of this conversation has been found.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 228.

237. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 20, 1959—5 p.m.

864. In forty minute talk with Minister of State Agramonte today I expressed desire of US Government to establish as quickly as possible close, friendly relations with new government. He said this also his desire and appeared mean it. I said I was anxious at misunderstandings that had occurred over trials and executions of war criminals, and suggested GOC carefully distinguish between unofficial statements in US and those of US Government. In reply to question I said Congressmen did not speak for government. I said Embassy was doing what it could to ease situation and showed him Embassy unclassified telegram 853.² He read it carefully, and said it completely accurate, including statement great majority Cuban people not anti-American and asked if he might show it to President. I gave him copy, requesting it not be publicized.

I directed Minister’s attention to Department’s press release of January 15³ re US policy toward Cuba and military missions. He said Cubans had no complaints against American people or US government, but did have against Ambassador Smith, American press, and military missions. Only specific things he mentioned against Smith, other than general friendship with Batista, were Smith’s statement to US press last January,⁴ his acceptance of Batista’s suppression of human rights, and his advocacy of the November elections as solution to Cuban conflict. I said Minister apparently unaware that it had been as result Ambassador’s insistent appeal to Batista that constitutional guarantees were restored in January 1958; moreover, that while Ambassador had hoped elections might provide solution he himself recognized after elections this not the case and had so reported. Agramonte said GOC was greatly pleased at nomination of career officer as new Ambassador and felt that normal good relations would be quickly reestablished.

Minister stated $100 million is being spent by Batista to discredit revolutionary government in American press. He referred to this several times and evidently is most anxious about it.

Re military missions, which I said was a primary purpose of my call, see Embtel 863.⁵

I told Minister I had been invited as member diplomatic corps to attend mass rally at Presidential Palace tomorrow afternoon and was concerned lest anti-American statement be made, not so much because of embarrassment to us as because of harmful effects on US-Cuban relations. He said he believed this would not occur, but that he would check with President and let me know. I said my fear was that Castro in unguarded moment might say something inflammatory. Agramonte did not offer to speak to Castro, and I had feeling he has practically no direct contact with Castro.

Last subject I discussed was CARE shipment of food packages for relief of people in Oriente. He was genuinely pleased to hear about this and said cabinet would publicize gift, which was timely and acceptable.

As I was leaving, Agramonte showed me list of prominent Americans whom GOC intends to invite to visit Cuba for purpose of forming their own impressions. List included Senator Morse, Ed Murrow, Marquis Childs, Milton Eisenhower and others.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2059. Confidential; Priority. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1982, 2470.

² Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 820.181/1–1959)

³ See footnote 2, Document 228.

⁴ See Document 6.

⁵ Supra.

238. Editorial Note

In mid-January in response to public and congressional criticism of the execution of former Batista supporters, the Cuban Government invited certain Congressman, including Adam Clayton Powell and Charles O. Porter, to visit Cuba to witness the trials firsthand.

On January 20, Congressman Powell called Rubottom to inform him that the Cuban Government was sending a plane to Miami to transport the Congressmen to Cuba and to ask what the Department’s reaction was to the Congressmen accepting the invitations. Rubottom replied that Powell “would be the best judge of how this would affect him personally, but that the Department of State has been very careful to conduct its activities with regard to the Cuban situation with dignity and understanding of the emotion-charged situation, and that he did not think the presence of American congressmen at the trials was quite in keeping with that attitude.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Beers, January 20; Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100/1–2059)

Also on January 20, Congressman Porter called Wieland to indicate that he was planning to accept the invitation to visit Cuba. Porter said that he planned to witness a trial in Havana and to visit other parts of the country, including Oriente province, but he did not intend to go to the rally which Castro had scheduled for January 21 to show support for the government’s trials of the “war criminals.” Porter said that such rallies prove nothing and “the country would be far better advised to allow people to return to work.” Wieland pointed out that there had been a slowdown in the number of executions coincident with the invitations to the Congressmen and the American press to come to Cuba, which Porter said he had noticed. When Wieland asked Porter if he could “risk his present position” by accepting the invitation:

“He replied that he had been surprised by it, but felt that he was more or less bound to accept inasmuch as he had not only criticized the executions but had sent a special personal telegram to President Urrutia urging more objective procedures be observed in the Cuban courts. He said he, therefore, did not feel he could decline the invitation but intended to utilize his visit to continue to urge the Cuban Government to start now to give serious attention to more constructive measures in the Republic in order not to undermine still further the prestige of the revolution.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Wieland, January 20; ibid., 033.100–PO/1–2059)

On the morning of January 21, Porter arrived at the Embassy in Havana just as a meeting of Chargé Daniel Braddock and other senior officers was ending. Braddock invited Porter into the meeting, gave him a brief analysis of the situation in Cuba, and asked others present to respond to questions that Porter raised. According to Braddock’s report to the Department of State:

“The Congressman asked my advice as to whether he should attend the mass rally to which he said he had been invited by Castro. I told him that I too had been invited and that I had not yet made up my mind whether to go inasmuch as there was a strong possibility that the rally might be turned into an anti-American demonstration. I said I was trying to obtain some kind of satisfactory assurance that this would not occur and if I were successful I intended to go. Mr. Porter said he felt exactly the same way; that he had come to Cuba for the purpose of showing ‘friendliness’; and that he could not attend a meeting which was going to turn into a demonstration against the United States. He said he was going to try to see both Castro and Urrutia before the meeting.” (Despatch 772 from Havana, January 22; ibid., 033.1100–PO/1–2259)

At 12:05 p.m. on January 21, Snow called Braddock and asked that he urge Congressman Porter to stay away from the rally. Snow said he did not expect Porter to heed this advice, but he “wanted to be on record as having thus advised the Congressman.” Snow also said that Porter, prior to his departure, had told the press he wanted to shake Fidel Castro’s hand and he felt the U.S. Government should show a warmer attitude toward the new Cuban Government. Snow wanted Braddock to make sure that Porter could not say later on that he had obtained the Embassy’s approval to attend the rally. Braddock told Snow that Foreign Minister Agramonte, in response to the Embassy’s inquiry, had sent word that no statement unfriendly to the United States would be made at the meeting and that Fidel Castro and President Urrutia had been informed of this commitment. In light of these assurances, Braddock felt he could go to the reception before the rally, which the entire Diplomatic Corps would attend, and then stay for the rally if the Diplomatic Corps decided to remain. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 21; ibid., ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1959)

Apparently following this conversation, Braddock talked by telephone with Rubottom and told him that he was going to the Presidential Palace at 1:15 p.m. along with the Diplomatic Corps for champagne and from there they would go to the mass rally. President Urrutia would speak at the rally, which Rubottom felt would give the affair more “of the stamp of the Government” than he had first realized. Rubottom then checked with William B. Macomber who said “he did not think we would suffer too much on the Hill” if Braddock went to the rally, especially since he could “use his own judgement about walking out if he had to.” In a telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles that day, Rubottom described these conversations with Braddock and Macomber and the Secretary agreed that Braddock should attend the rally. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Beers, January 21; ibid., Central Files, 737.00/1–2159)

The rally, held in front of the Presidential Palace and attended by approximately 500,000 people, lasted 5 hours. The main speaker was Fidel Castro, who spoke for nearly 4½ hours. Present were many foreign press correspondents, mostly from the United States and Latin America. Of the various U.S. Congressmen invited, only Powell and Porter were present. According to the Embassy’s summary of Castro’s speech, Castro asked the crowd, in the name of “revolutionary justice,” to vote by a show of hands whether they approved the “shooting of the assassins.” All the hands were raised to the accompaniment of a “vengeful roar.” Castro also criticized the unfair press treatment of the Cuban revolution and said Cuba would demand the return of “war criminals” who had taken refuge in the United States. Castro’s only direct criticism of the United States, according to the Embassy, was the following:

“Great crimes have been committed in the name of peace, and I could address this question to the Congressmen who attack us: What did the United States do? What was done at Hiroshima and Nagasaki? In the name of peace two cities were bombed and more than three hundred thousand human beings killed. We have shot no child, we have shot no woman, we have shot no old people. Nevertheless, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, three hundred thousand members of the civil population died. In the name of what? Well, they said it was done to achieve peace and also to keep many American combatants from being killed. Well then, I say to those Congressmen, apart from the fact that they have no reason to interfere in Cuban problems, that we are shooting the assassins so that they will not kin our children tomorrow. And when all is said and done the total of assassins we shoot will not be more than four hundred, which is about one assassin for every thousand men, women and children assassinated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” (Telegram 874 from Havana, January 22; ibid., 737.00/1–2259)

A full report on the rally and the various speeches was sent to the Department in despatch 779 from Havana, January 23. (ibid., 737.00/1–2359)

After the rally, Castro received the members of the Diplomatic Corps at the Hilton Hotel. When he was presented to Castro, Braddock said: “I listened intently to your speech this afternoon but could not make it all out and therefore won’t know until I read it whether you hurt us very much or just a little. In any event, with all our heart, we want cordial, friendly relations with the Cuban Government and to get down to business as soon as possible.” According to Braddock, “Castro replied in sincere manner that he hoped we had received no hurt as he had intended none and that it was necessary in a public rally of that sort to express certain points of view. He said something to the effect that the two countries would of course work together.” Braddock also reported that Miro Cardona had told him that he was glad that Braddock had spoken to Castro as he did. (Telegram 869 from Havana, January 22; ibid., 737.00/1–2259)

Braddock had been unable to reach Congressman Porter by telephone prior to the rally to convey the Department’s strong desire that he not attend, so he sent a note to Porter’s hotel. At the reception following the rally, Porter told Braddock that he had received the note just before leaving for the rally, which had caused him some “soul-searching,” but he had been able to see both Castro and Urrutia before the rally and as a result had decided to attend. (Despatch 772 from Havana, January 22; ibid., 033.1100/1–2259)

239. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 394th meeting of the National Security Council, January 22, Allen Dulles made the following remarks about the Cuban situation during his briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security:

“As for Cuba, Mr. Allen Dulles said that we must recognize that as the Cubans proceed with their revolution, the executions will go on. Moreover, we can anticipate pressure on the U.S. for the extradition of some of the Batista refugees who have found asylum in the U.S. This may become a major issue in U.S. relations with the new Castro Government.”

Secretary of State Dulles observed that “we have an extradition treaty with Cuba and if evidence of crimes is produced, we would be legally obliged to consent to the extradition of such criminals.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

240. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 23, 1959—5 p.m.

880. Re Embtel 879.² Since January 21 Castro made several remarks, both public and private, that he aware need more restraint his part and closer cooperation with government. He told one American newsman [he] expected withdraw from limelight soon. Nevertheless, he still unquestionably dominant figure local scene and center attraction, and enjoying it. There strong tendency identify him with success revolution and look to him as final arbiter all matters. Indications his power, and his feeling its permanancy are: (1) situation command armed forces clarified January 21 with announcement he supreme commander all Cuban armed forces since January 2, by designation Urrutia. (2) In speech January 21 he designated brother Raul his successor as leader 26 July movement in event he killed. (3) At press conference January 22 said everyone knew he had rejected Presidency, and had picked Urrutia for position. Clearly, Castro now considers his movement permanent one, and himself its permanent leader.

Becoming more apparent Castro not anti-American but also not friendly. He has now publicly taken position that “campaign of calumny” against Cuban revolution fomented by “monopolistic” international news services. Blames them for misinformation spread both in US and Latin America, and excuses criticism new regime by Latin American Governments on grounds that hostile campaign promoted by large economic interests friendly to dictators. By innuendo and occasionally by direct reference, indicates those interests US origin. At various time has mentioned electrical, telephone, and nickel interests, and United Fruit and Cuban American companies specifically. At press conference January 22 he said Puerto Rico should be independent. When reminded people had voted for present status, expressed view vote not free. Roundly upbraided for that by Puerto Rican newsmen present.

Castro also irresponsible in remarks concerning other countries. At press conference said Nicaraguans should take to the mountains and fight for their freedom as Cubans had done, and could count beforehand on complete support of Cuban people. He has stated publicly that Cuba wants no relations of any kind with Dominican Republic. On January 22 he said other LA Governments should force UN or OAS to hold free elections Nicaragua, and said he sure relations between Cuba and dictatorial Governments would worsen.

As exultation caused by sudden complete success and international prominence wears off, Castro may modify present erratic and unfortunate behavior, but only time will tell.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2359. Confidential; Priority.

² In telegram 879, January 23, Braddock reported that Miro Cardona had withdrawn his resignation of January 20 and had told Topping that he would remain indefinitely as Prime Minister. Miro Cardona said that a number of influential people had urged him to stay in the government and that Fidel Castro, who also had paid him a call, insisted that he continue in the government and promised his closest possible coordination with the government. Miro Cardona said, however, that the decisive factor had been the Embassy’s approach. (ibid.)

241. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Ciudad Trujillo, January 27, 1959—4 p.m.

286. Former Cuban Prime Minister Gonzalo Guell called on me this morning at request of General Batista to inquire about possibility immigration visas for Batista and 20 of his group.

Guell reviewed Batista’s record cooperation with US and mentioned Cuban assistance in World War II and Batista’s stand against communism. Referring Castro propaganda regarding atrocities of Batista government, Guell stated that he believed there were more atrocities on Castro side, violence breeds violence, it was impossible to control all individuals but what atrocities there may have been were not government policy.

Guell affirmed that in his presence Ambassador Smith had assured Batista that visas would in an emergency be given him and persons he named. Guell had worked on the details with Ambassador Smith but events overcame final arrangements. Guell stated that Ambassador Smith had said Florida would be an undesirable place for Batista to reside and Batista was willing to reside in any state US Government might designate. Smith also suggested an intermediate stay in another country. Guell said Batista had intended to stay here three to four months but this was now impossible because of the attitude of Dominican Government. He said Dominican Foreign Minister had asked Guell to inform Batista that, because of “delicate” relations between present Cuban and Dominican Governments, it necessary to ask Batista to leave Dominican Republic.

I inquired whether Batista and group had applied for visas for any other country. Guell replied that preliminary soundings had unfavorable results but he was seeing Spanish Ambassador this afternoon. He referred to reported recent admission of certain Cuban refugees including Masferrer on Texas border. Expressed his hope that Batista group could qualify for asylum as political exiles as Batista group is in desperate predicament.

Although Batista hopes to take with him about 20 persons, of primary importance are Batista, his son, his wife (who plans to return to Dominican Republic from the States), Guell, Ambassador Andres Rivero Agüero, Ambassador to the Dominican Republic Baguer y Marty and wives. Guell requested I inform my government of the foregoing and communicate with him promptly when a reply is received, to which I agreed.

Spalding

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2759. Confidential.

242. Letter From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

San Jose, January 27, 1959.

Dear Dick: Because of the great interest of Figueres and his party in the success of Fidel Castro, we are getting a wealth of information about Cuba which is being reported separately.

There is one item, however, which I would like to call particularly to your attention and to the attention of the persons to whom I have sent copies of this letter. Yesterday, at a social occasion I had a long talk with ex-president Figueres. I opened by asking him what he thought of Fidel Castro. He replied that Castro was a question mark. I stated that it would be a tremendous blow to Latin American prestige and to the cause of democracy in the hemisphere if either Communism or a new dictatorship emerged in Cuba. I asked Figueres what he thought the chances were. He replied that he hoped things would go along well but if they went badly he believed they would go in the direction of another dictatorship rather than in the direction of Communism. He pointed out that from the anarchy after the overthrow of Machado a dictatorship resulted in Cuba. He admitted quite candidly that there a tremendous vacuum in Cuba, particularly in the labor field, and that the Communists were certainly being very active in that field. (Luis Alberto Monge, former head of ORIT and close advisor to Figueres, has just returned from an investigation of what is happening in labor in Cuba and we are forwarding a copy of his confidential report² which states that Communism has made great inroads in labor, although he believes the eyes of the 26th of July movement are being opened.)

At this point I stated, “It seems to me that those of you such as Munoz Marin, Romulo Betancourt, yourself and others who have been supporting and sponsoring the Fidel Castro movement, have a tremendous moral responsibility to see that things come out right in Cuba.” I also added that for obvious reasons there was little that the United States could do at this point.³ Figueres replied, “I agree with you and I think we are going to be able to do something. I personally am going to visit Cuba after the inauguration of Betancourt on February 13th.”

I also remarked to Figueres that I felt that the success of Fidel Castro demonstrated very strongly the falseness of the commonly stated accusation against the United States that we keep dictatorships in power because we furnish them with arms. Since Batista had “the works” by way of arms and yet was overthrown, I said that from now on I felt that we in the United States were entitled to consider that dictatorships continued because of lack of action by the peoples of the countries concerned rather than by the furnishing of arms by the United States. I took the occasion to point out to him that one of the basic motives for furnishing arms was to avoid a vacuum into which the Iron Curtain countries might move.

I do not know whether my ideas, as expressed to Figueres, are original but since they seemed to make a big impression on Figueres and in view of his importance as part of the anti-dictatorship team, I suggest that the Department consider how these ideas can be put to further use. For instance, I do think that Munoz Marin, Figueres, Betancourt, etc., are in a position to do something about the future of Cuba and since they purport to be anti-Communist I think it should be made abundantly clear to them that their own reputations are at stake if things go in the direction of Communism or dictatorship in Cuba, and that everything possible be done to continue to imbue them with a sense of responsibility for the situation.

Best personal regards.⁴

Whiting Willauer⁵

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Letters 1959. Confidential; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Herter, Murphy, Wieland, Stewart, and Dreier. The source text was attached to a brief covering letter of January 27 from Willauer to Herter.

² Not found.

³ I am sure you fully understand that I do not really feel there is nothing the United States can do. Very much to the contrary! I was talking in the sense of “direct” pressure or persuasion of the kind I feel lies within the power of Figueres, Betancourt, etc. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ No reply to Willauer by Rubottom has been found. In a letter to Willauer, January 29, Herter thanked him for sending a copy of the letter he had written to Rubottom. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Letters 1959)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

243. Editorial Note

From January 23 to 27, Fidel Castro made an unofficial visit to Venezuela. The Embassy in Caracas submitted a 17–page report on the visit, dated January 30, the summary of which reads:

“Fidel Castro arrived in Caracas on Friday, January 23, the anniversary of the fall of Perez Jimenez. Originally invited by the Federación de Centros Universitarios, he at once assumed the character of a national guest, being greeted at the airport by Rear Admiral Larrazabal and other prominent persons. He was received by a variety of citizens from the acting head of the Junta on down. He made numerous speeches; his speeches invariably emphasized that his regime in Cuba was a regime of justice; that there had been an organized plot by foreign news agencies, particularly those of the United States to slander himself and the revolution and that Latin American unity was essential. As a footnote to this he emphasized also Caribbean solidarity, revealing Nasser-like ambition towards this area. He gave a great deal of attention to the strong bonds uniting Venezuela and Cuba and expressed his deep thanks to Venezuela for the assistance it had given to the 26 of July Movement. His words, particularly those relating to criticism of the U.S. and the need for continental unity, fell on responsive ears. He, as well as his bearded companions, was received everywhere with wild acclaim. Those more sober heads which may have questioned various of his statements and attitudes kept discreetly quiet in public. This whirlwind visit ended on Tuesday, January 27, when he returned to Cuba.” (Department of State, Central Files, 033.3731/1–3059)

On January 29, the Embassy in Havana reported to the Department that Castro had not been seen in public since returning from Caracas. The Embassy had learned from sources within the 26th of July Movement that Castro was planning to be much less accessible than in the past and to limit his public appearances. The Embassy speculated that Castro might have finally realized “he had been talking too freely and irresponsibly.” (Telegram 903 from Havana, January 29; ibid., 737.00/1–2959)

244. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, January 30, 1959, 11:30 a.m.¹

Pentagon, Washington, January 30, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

1. Cuba—Military Missions

Mr. Murphy asked that we take up first the matter of the U.S. military missions to Cuba. He indicated that State and Defense were in full agreement that it was desirable to retain the missions but that we were faced with the situation created by the public remarks made by Castro which were derogatory to the missions, down-graded the efficacy of U.S. equipment and stated categorically that the missions were unwelcome in Cuba. He referred to the chronology of events in this regard and indicated that the Department now felt that we must maintain the psychological initiative by ostensibly moving to abolish the missions so that Castro will not feel that we are begging for their retention. He added that we were aware that the Cuban military by and large desire the missions to remain but that their views had at the moment little effect on government policy.

Mr. Snow then described the nature of the Department’s proposal. He indicated that this had been cleared with the Defense lawyers but there had not been time to get Defense policy clearance which was the purpose of raising the subject at this meeting. He indicated that we wished to send instructions to our Embassy to transmit a note to the Cuban Government proposing the immediate withdrawal of their members of the three missions, excepting a representative of each of the three who would remain behind ostensibly to close out the missions and complete all administrative arrangements. Mr. Snow pointed out that complete withdrawal of the missions would automatically effect termination of the US-Cuban military agreements under the provisions of Article 4(b).² The second sentence of Article 2 of the agreements, however, allows for recall of members of the mission. The proposal would be, therefore to withdraw 27 of the 30 U.S. mission personnel under the provisions of Article 2, and to leave behind one member of each mission so that there would not be an automatic termination of the agreements. This would accomplish the psychological effect of indicating our response to Castro’s public utterances and our public indifference to the retention of the missions, but at the same time would leave a loophole to allow for their reestablishment some time in the near future (if this became feasible) without the requirement for renegotiation of new agreements. He admitted that our legal position was not a strong one but the plan was worth a try, there being no acceptable alternative. We felt that pressure would begin to build up on Castro to reconsider his hasty decisions, and a move of this nature would leave the door open for return of the missions with a minimum of confusion.

Admiral Burke expressed concern over the termination of the U.S. Naval mission. For one thing, he pointed out that all of the Naval training pamphlets for Latin America are processed in the Spanish language in Cuba. He wondered if supplies could be sent in to continue this operation. He asked if any supplies were being sent to Cuba now. Mr. Murphy replied in the negative to both questions indicating that the significance of our proposal was to create an effect which could only be diluted by the continuation of any type of U.S. mission activity.

Mr. Snow commented that our missions were particularly important in Cuba because they wear two hats. They are MAAGs as well as military missions. Admiral Burke said that in the case of the Naval mission, it is even more than that. The U.S. Naval mission runs the entire supply operation for the Cuban Navy. This effort, which had been tediously built up over the years, would fold completely if the personnel were withdrawn. He commented, however, that this also might be a good thing (presumably in terms of forcing a reversal of the Cuban position). He added that the Naval mission in Cuba had a special stature since it had not been involved in the rebellion and had the respect of both sides. There followed a general discussion on the U.S. position in the event Castro did not change his thinking with regard to the recall of the missions and it was generally agreed that we would have no alternative but to withdraw the remaining three members.

Admiral Burke returned to the point of the special prestige of Naval mission. He indicated that the U.S. Army mission was the main cause of friction because of its identity with the land fighting during the rebellion. He wondered if the Naval mission might not be retained. Mr. Murphy’s response was to the effect that the psychological effect of our proposed plan would be lost if one of the U.S. missions was to be left behind. We must use all of our assets to change Castro’s attitude. Mr. Snow added that Cuban public opinion was not as aware as the Cuban military of the distinction between the Naval and other U.S. missions. There was additional discussion, largely sparked by Admiral Burke, over the desirability of retaining the good will built up by specific individuals in the Naval mission which he felt would be irretrievably lost if they were to be withdrawn. Mr. Murphy wondered why, to avoid such a loss, the Naval mission could not be held intact in the U.S. for a short time pending a decision as to its return. He did not feel there were insuperable administrative difficulties in this regard. Admiral Burke concluded his remarks by saying that in the last analysis this was not his decision and he had no official interest in the Cuban Navy (presumably from the point of view of U.S. strategic interests). He acquiesced to the removal of U.S. Naval mission personnel under the conditions outlined by Mr. Snow. Mr. Murphy reiterated in closing that the State Department had no desire to pull out the missions but wished them instead to remain, but under respectable circumstances. This was the purpose of our psychological approach. He felt that the Cuban Government might well change its mind. Admiral Burke wondered whether the Ensign now heading the Cuban Navy would have much influence on the governmental leaders. There was general agreement expressed by Generals Twining, White and Lemnitzer to the State Department approach, although they did not feel that the mission personnel, once withdrawn, should be kept on tenterhooks awaiting a possible return to Cuba.

Mr. Knight asked about the timetable. Mr. Snow responded that we intended to move immediately. The subsequent discussion developed that there would, of course, be a lapse of time between the receipt of the note by the Cuban Government and its response. At this point Mr. Snow read the copy of the proposed note as follows:

“I have the honor to refer to the Air Force Mission Agreement of December 22, 1950, as extended, and the Army and Naval Mission Agreements of August 28, 1951, as extended, and to propose that, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 2 of those Agreements, members of the the three Missions shall be promptly recalled by my Government, excepting a representative of each of the three Missions who would temporarily remain in Cuba to make the necessary detailed arrangements attendant upon such recall in consultation with such representative or representatives of Your Excellency’s Government as may be designated. It is understood that no replacements will be required for the personnel recalled.

“I have the honor to propose that if the above is acceptable to Your Excellency’s Government, this note and Your Excellency’s note in reply concurring therein shall constitute such mutual agreement to the recall of members of the three Missions without replacement as is provided for in the second sentence of Article 2 of the Air Force, Army and Naval Mission Agreements.”

General Twining said that in his opinion the faster the action we took the better off we would be.³

Admiral Burke then asked about the Department’s views on threatened invasions of Haiti or Santo Domingo which his intelligence anticipated, particularly in Haiti, within the next two months, if not earlier. Mr. Murphy added that there was also a like possibility in Nicaragua in the near future. Admiral Burke discussed the contingent actions open to the U.S. Navy in the area in the event that our ships intercepted a seaborne invasion force bound for Haiti. Mr. Murphy indicated that this was an important matter and should be the subject of a separate State–JCS meeting since State would have to consider it further. Mr. Snow added that it is not our policy to favor the overthrow of the Haitian Government. There was a concluding discussion in this connection on the subject of our neutrality laws and the actions of former President Dejoie of Haiti who has been very active in revolutionary planning in the U.S. and has just gone to Havana. [Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417, vol. VII. Top Secret. Drafted by Dwight J. Porter. A note on the source text indicates that it was not cleared with the Department of Defense. A cover sheet lists the participants, which included Generals Twining, Lemnitzer, and White and Admiral Burke and members of the Joint Staff; representatives of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council Staff; and Under Secretary of State Murphy and other Department of State officials.

² Reference is to the Air Force Mission Agreement of December 22, 1950, and the Army and Naval Mission Agreements of August 28, 1951. For text of the Air Force Mission Agreement, see 1 UST 887; the Army Mission Agreement, 2 UST 1677; and the Naval Mission Agreement, 2 UST 1689.

³ In telegram 545 to Havana, January 30, sent at 7:47 p.m., the Department instructed the Embassy to deliver a note to the Foreign Minister indicating that the U.S. Government was ordering the immediate recall of its military missions. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.58/1–2459) Text of the note to be delivered to the Foreign Minister, which was identical to that read by Snow at this meeting, was transmitted in telegram 546 to Havana, January 30. (ibid., 737.58/1–3059)

245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic¹

Washington, February 3, 1959—4:37 p.m.

246. Embtel 286.² Department is of opinion it is not in their interest or that of the United States for Batista, and other Cubans now residing abroad who were prominent in his regime, to come to the United States at this time. Department would hope and prefer that it will not be necessary for US Consul to consider formal visa applications from these persons and that informally they may be dissuaded from applying at this time. Possible that formal application might be considered at some later date on a case by case basis.

In your discretion you may explain to Guell informally Department’s general view and specifically with regard to Batista you may tell him we would not in any case be in a position to give an immediate affirmative answer should he make formal application. For example the legal problem raised by Sec. 212, A27 of the Act³ would be a definite obstacle which could possibly not be surmounted at present, especially in view of the rumors going around, the recent activities of various other former Latin American chiefs of state now in exile in the US and elsewhere, etc. Furthermore, once he has requested a visa public attention would focus on any determination being made. The resulting publicity and emotional atmosphere would be embarrassing to Batista, particularly if final decision were negative. All concerned would be in a far better position if we could simply assert when questioned that Batista and his group had not formally applied for visas.

Keep Department fully informed on developments in this matter.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2759. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Snow, Stevenson, Neidle, and Whiteman; cleared with VO, SCA, and H; and approved by Wieland who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Havana, Buenos Aires, Panama, and Santiago de Cuba and pouched to Kingston and Nassau.

² Document 241.

³ The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. (8 USC 1182)

246. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Ciudad Trujillo, February 4, 1959—2 p.m.

306. Deptel 246 February 3.² Department’s position explained to and understood by Guell. No formal application will be made. Guell however said Batista would be very disappointed in view of the assurances of Ambassador Smith which Batista had considered to be official.

Replying to question Guell said little progress had been made in obtaining visas for other countries but Batista had some hope for Spain or Portugal. Although Trujillo has been very courteous, Guell said, Batista group realizes that they are not wanted here and Batista would not like to be alleged reason for any attack on the Dominican Republic by Castro.

Referring to case of Mrs. Batista, Guell asked me on behalf of Batista to request extension beyond period of one month be given to enable her to stay longer in the US. He also requested that I ascertain whether it would be possible for her to obtain multiple entry visa so she could go back and forth in the event Batista was compelled to remain here.

Guell inquired whether it would be possible for visa to be issued Andres Domingo, former President Cuba and recently secretary of the presidency with cabinet rank, who has a heart condition and has been treated by Dr. White.

Remarking that he is a member of the International Court of Arbitration and that his wife is in the US Guell asked about possibility visa for himself if Batista should want him to go US. Said he plans remain with Batista and go with him if possible to Spain or Portugal, but would like know that he could visit US should necessity arise.

Spalding

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–459. Confidential. Repeated to Havana.

² Supra.

247. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chargé in Cuba (Braddock) and Carlos Piad, American Embassy, Havana, February 4, 1959¹

Havana, February 4, 1959

Dr. Piad came into the Embassy today to give me his views on the current situation in Cuba. He was pessimistic. He felt that the Government was not functioning well, largely because of the inability or unwillingness of President Urrutia to take any decisions without prior consultation with Castro, who was often unavailable.

Dr. Piad described the economy as paralyzed but did not offer any facts to support this statement other than the tight control of the banks over financial transactions. I suggested that labor disturbances were hampering production, to which he readily agreed.

Dr. Piad was particularly concerned over the situation in the Armed Forces. He said that nothing had been done with respect to the reorganization of the Army. He said that the officers of the old army who were not under arrest were continuing to draw their pay but were completely ignored by the revolutionary leaders, while the men were not even being paid and were becoming increasingly discontented. He added that the revolutionary soldiers were likewise not being paid and were becoming restive and critical. This situation was responsible for widespread dissatisfaction at Camp Columbia and nervousness on the part of the 26th of July Movement. At Camp Columbia, he said, there were 2,000 soldiers of the old army, unarmed, and 1200 revolutionary soldiers with arms. He was informed, he said, that a good many arms had been taken into Camp Columbia recently. Most of the tanks which are normally kept there, he said, had recently been transferred to San Antonio de los Baños. He said that Raul Castro was in charge at Camp Columbia and General Diaz Tamayo’s house there was being made ready for his occupancy. He said Raul Castro had no use for the regular army and was viewed with distrust by the latter.

Dr. Piad said that the situation in the Navy was somewhat similar. He said there were no Fidelistas among the naval officers except for the Chief of Staff, Commander Castañeras. He said the Navy was practically in a state of mutiny.

Many of the important persons who had contributed to and supported the revolution had been disregarded and brushed aside by the 26th of July, according to Dr. Piad. He mentioned particularly Antonio de Varona in this connection. He said that yesterday Comandante Aldo Vera, the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation, had been himself picked up by the police and taken away from his office. He could throw no light on the reason for this.²

The Communists were increasingly active, Mr. Piad thought, and he referred to the fact that Communist “bonds” of all denominations were being openly sold in the city. He felt that some progress was being made by the Communist newspaper Hoy. I remarked that the Communists were nevertheless encountering considerable difficulties on the labor front and in the Government, and he agreed that this was so.

With respect to the Minister of State, Dr. Piad said that Dr. Agramonte, for whom he appeared to have very little regard, was currying favor with Castro because he viewed himself as possibly a presidential candidate in the eventual elections. Agramonte, he added, had got Dr. Manuel Bisbe out of his way by appointing him as Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Dr. Piad indicated that Dr. Bisbe himself was aware of the motivation of this appointment and did not welcome the appointment but felt that under present circumstances he should accept it. The only two persons in the Ministry of State whom Dr. Piad believed had any real influence were Dr. D’Acosta, Chief of the Immigration Service, and Dr. Huete(?).

Above all Dr. Piad was deeply concerned over the actions and statements of Fidel Castro. He felt that Castro’s anti-American bias, as reflected in his public statements, was due mainly to the bad intelligence and bad advice he had been receiving over the past year or more, particularly from Felipe Pazos and Ernesto Betancourt. Piad believes that Pazos is not friendly to the United States and Betancourt is hostile.

I asked Dr. Piad whether in his judgment it would be desirable or not for Fidel Castro to be invited to the United States. I made clear that this was purely an exploratory question and that nothing concrete was under consideration. He replied that such a visit could be most beneficial in opening Castro’s eyes to the fact that the United States had no unfriendly feeling for him or for Cuba.

I ventured the observation that Cuba was still in a state of transition, with which he completely agreed.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–459. Confidential. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 839 from Havana, February 4, in which Braddock remarked: “While the Cuban situation certainly has many disturbing aspects, I feel that Dr. Piad’s appraisal is gloomier than warranted by the facts so far as we can see them. His view is probably influenced to some extent by the scant recognition accorded by the 26th of July Movement, the dominating element in the scene, to the faction or individuals with whom he personally is most closely associated.”

² When the Embassy checked this story on February 4, Commander Vera was still functioning as usual. [Footnote in the source text.]

248. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 5, 1959—11 a.m.

930. Castro in speech at Guantanamo February 3 is reported as attributing Cuba’s perennial economic troubles to dictation by US Ambassadors.

Embassy is informed by two different reliable sources that Castro is obsessed these days with keeping his personal popularity coefficient high, which partly explains his appeals to latent anti-Americanism of uninformed masses.

Department has undoubtedly been considering, like Embassy, whether visit of Castro to US would be beneficial to US-Cuba relations and to stabilization of Cuban situation. Assuming he accepted, I believe visit could dispel much of his suspicion and prejudice. Invitation might best come from Army. If Department agrees Castro visit in our interest, I suggest invitation be conveyed by Bonsal soon after arrival.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–559. Confidential; Priority.

249. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill)¹

Washington, February 6, 1959.

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM—CUBA

(1) Domestic Situation

In the six weeks since the flight of President Batista and the emergence of Fidel Castro as the victor in the civil war, a fully stable, organized and responsible government has not emerged in Cuba. On the one hand the Cabinet and Government of President Urrutia contain a number of moderate and respected men, generally friendly to the United States. They are handicapped by lack of liaison and understanding with Castro as well as a considerable breakdown of the government machinery, particularly in the public safety forces and civil administration, attendant on the flight and purge of Batista functionaries. On the other hand, Castro has principally occupied himself with triumphal appearances to the neglect of government affairs while his lieutenants and men have moved in to take over Cuba’s military and police establishments and other functions without apparent coordination with the titular government. Some anti-Batista groups—notably DR, the fighting force of the students’ organization—are somewhat disaffected by Castro’s failure to allow them to share in the spoils and there is some unrest and grumbling about the Government’s failure to come to grips with Cuba’s problems.²

(2) Foreign Relations

The new regime’s attitudes and intentions towards the United States are still in the formative stage. There is no question that Castro and especially some of his rebel lieutenants bitterly resent what they consider to have been the hostile attitude of the US Government, and they have publicly attacked this Government and fomented anti-American feeling. On the other hand, Castro professes an admiration for the American “people” and a desire for good relations, a line followed by the titular government with perhaps greater sincerity and consistency. To date no concrete action has been taken or formally proposed against the US or its interests (we took the first official steps with respect to the withdrawal of the military missions), and the Cuban rebels who have taken over have generally been cooperative with our representatives in Cuba.

A major problem emerging is reflected in the mounting number of reports that certain elements in the Castro Government—especially the Argentine Communist-liner Major “Che” Guevara—are contemplating and planning active support to revolutionary activities against Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay. Exiles from all over the Caribbean have flocked into Habana in hope of help. It is, however, difficult to tell whether anything concrete has yet been worked out and what the attitude of the Cuban Government and Castro will eventually be toward these activities.

Likewise, the Cuban Government’s and Castro’s attitude towards Communist activities is still in the formative stage. On the one hand, the technically illegal Communist Party has come into the open and is working actively in the field of labor, press and propaganda, etc. and Guevara and a few other Castro leaders have given them help. On the other hand, Castro followers have moved to exclude Communists from the national labor leadership while the Government of Cuba has taken the position it does not intend to recognize the Communist countries.

US Objectives in Cuba, for the present, may be summarized as strengthening the moderating and stabilizing influences on Castro and the Cuban Government. Diplomatic and other US Government operations in support of this objective are in a particularly delicate stage since intimation of US official pressures in the present atmosphere would tend to play into the hands of the anti-American elements.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Hill.

² Another assessment of developments in Cuba since the fall of Batista was contained in a report to the Director of Central Intelligence, February 4, 1959. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles–Herter Series) Text of the report, which among other things described the situation in Cuba as tense and “far from stable,” is published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 270B.

250. Memorandum of Discussion at the 396th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 12, 1959¹

Washington, February 12, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Gray requested the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the Council now with that portion of his regular intelligence briefing which dealt with Latin America.

Mr. Allen Dulles in agreeing with this suggestion pointed out to the President that his run-down of developments in Latin America would naturally tend to be gloomy since he would be touching upon trouble spots rather than upon those areas of Latin America where conditions were favorable from the point of view of the United States. Of these trouble spots Mr. Dulles indicated that Cuba was the most worrisome. In Cuba, he pointed out, we were threatened with a partial breakdown of the machinery of government. Thanks to the thoroughness of Castro’s recent revolution, there were very few trained government personnel remaining to undertake the routine tasks of administration. While President Urrutia was a good man, he was indecisive. Accordingly, Castro who was only thirty-two years old and had no previous experience in government, was obliged to make all the important decisions. Meanwhile labor unrest in Cuba was spreading and this might affect the current sugar harvest. There were also evidences of growing unemployment, a fact which the Communist Party, which was not in the open, would seek to take advantage of. Finally, Castro considers himself the man on horseback, destined not only to liberate Cuba but to liberate all the other dictatorships in Latin America, including Puerto Rico. However Betancourt in Venezuela and Munoz Marin apparently exerted considerable influence on Castro.

Secretary Anderson interrupted at this point to state that a group of officials from the new Cuban Government were coming to the Treasury Department this afternoon to talk with him about a stabilization fund. These officials apparently wanted $100 million for this purpose from the United States. Secretary Anderson said that he and his associates merely proposed to listen to the Cuban delegation at this afternoon’s meeting but he pointed out that a decision would have to be made in the next few days as to how far the U.S. Government was going to go in support of the Castro Government.

The President commented that he found it difficult to comprehend how we could do anything to stabilize the Cuban currency until the government of Cuba itself had become stabilized. Secretary Anderson replied that as far as we knew in the Treasury Department, Cuban finances were not in particularly bad shape if we could rely on their figures. On the other hand, he felt that the President was right as to the requirement for a stabilized government prior to a stabilized currency.

Secretary Dillon expressed the opinion that such matters as Secretary Anderson had brought up could not be decided quickly. They must be gone into very thoroughly. He warned that a financial blowup in Cuba could very well lead to a blow-up of the new Cuban Government. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the new Cuban officials had to be treated more or less like children. They had to be led rather than rebuffed. If they were rebuffed, like children, they were capable of doing almost anything.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason. This discussion of Cuba was part of larger discussion by the NSC of Latin America, which is scheduled for publication in volume V.

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 14, 1959—1 a.m.

981. Prime Minister Miro Cardona announced to press this evening (February 13) his resignation and those of all cabinet members. Added Fidel Castro would become Prime Minister Monday, February 16.

Embassy informed confidentially resignation due to continuing feeling frustration Miro Cardona caused by Castro’s irresponsible public statements coupled with personality clash with Urrutia.

Castro met with cabinet later this evening and agreed become Prime Minister. Cabinet resignations had been submitted by Miro without consultation or approval. Castro said he expected to retain entire cabinet. Added they would work 22 hours daily, and first order business Monday would be 50% cut in ministerial salaries.

With Castro’s approval new fundamental law has been altered to give Prime Minister increased power. He will “dictate policy of government” and “despatch administrative matters” with President. President expected not to attend cabinet meetings. Announcement this alteration will be made after assumption office by Castro February 16. Until then, country has no Prime Minister or cabinet.²

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/2–1459. Confidential; Niact.

² In his synopsis of Department of State and intelligence material from February 14 and 16, which he reported to the President on February 16, John S.D. Eisenhower noted that Miro Cardona’s resignation and Fidel Castro’s assumption of the Prime Minister’s position “will probably sharpen the latent conflict” between the 26th of July Movement and other groups that opposed Batista. Eisenhower noted, too, that the move could be Castro’s first step toward the Presidency. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries) Text is published in Declassified Documents, 1982, 2471.

252. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 17, 1959—6 p.m.

986. Deptel 595.² While Castro’s assumption premiership removes one obstacle to effective government policy formulation and action, his speech last night at swearing-in ceremony gave no further clues on Cuban policy toward US. In absence of opportunity for further personal contact with him Embassy can add little to evaluation his attitudes previously reported. For views of other key Cabinet figures, which may or may not be influential in policy information, see Embdes 885, 895, and 897.³

Embassy inclined to believe Castro’s public pronouncements on economic policy and apparent personal anti-American bias likely to be tempered in action by cooler and better-informed Cabinet officers such as Boti and Cepero Bonilla, if latter remains. Felipe Pazos is also a moderating influence.

Embassy considers we have following alternatives in face Cuba’s request:

1. To withhold assistance pending clarification of Cuban policy toward US;

2. To provide exchange stabilization assistance but hold back on economic development credits;

3. To grant both exchange stabilization and economic development assistance, as requested.

Embassy favors second alternative for following reasons:

1. Although Embassy informed Cuba’s reserve position has improved slightly during past few weeks and adoption import controls gives strong weapon to prevent future exchange losses, internal economic situation may possibly deteriorate if exchange stabilization assistance is not promptly available. Withholding this assistance will be widely interpreted as “reactionary” attack on revolution and will strengthen anti-American sentiment and play into hands of Communists. Castro anti-Americanism not yet sufficiently proved to justify conclusion we should allow his regime to collapse under growing economic problems.

2. Longer range economic development assistance is not immediate necessity, and our withholding thereof would be salutary warning that GOC attitude toward US must take constructive turn before full cooperation will be forthcoming.

Embassy believes one condition for exchange stabilization assistance should be full public acknowledgement by key figures of help given.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.10/2–1759. Confidential; Priority.

² In telegram 595, February 16, the Department noted that three Cuban Government officials were in Washington requesting economic and financial assistance from certain U.S. Government agencies and the International Monetary Fund. The Department said that while it was inclined to regard such request favorably, it had told the Cuban delegation that U.S. assistance was “made difficult” by the anti-American statements of some Cuban political leaders and uncertainty as to the “near future trend of Cuban policy toward U.S.” The Department asked for the Embassy’s comments, particularly in light of Castro’s becoming Prime Minister, and its evaluation of the trend of Cuban policy toward the United States. (ibid., 033.3711/2–1059)

³ None printed. (ibid., 837.131/2–1159, 837.00/2–1359, 737.00/2–1359, respectively)

253. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 923 Havana, February 18, 1959.

SUBJECT

Cuban Attitude toward U.S., Outlook, and Recommendation

Summary:

Castro has led the new Cuba into a critical attitude toward the United States. This feeling is not deep-seated, and will give way in time to a general desire based largely on self-interest, for good relations with the United States. We should hasten this process by showing patience, goodwill, and cooperation toward Cuba.

Castro’s Attitude and Its Effect

Fidel Castro has set the general pattern for Cuba’s current attitude toward the United States by his public speeches since January 1 and by his replies to questions put by press representatives. This attitude may be described as critical in specific respects but not generally unfriendly. It has long been clear that Castro felt that the United States gave moral support to the Batista Government when it should have been giving moral support to the revolutionary movement, and that it should have ceased arms shipments to Batista much sooner than it did and withdrawn at the same time its Military Missions.

Castro’s feeling toward the United States became one of indignation after January 1 [when] the conduct of the revolutionary trials and executions of war criminals called forth some sharp criticism in the United States. At that time he made his much-publicized remark to an American reporter that if the Untied States tried to intervene by sending Marines to Cuba, there would be “200,000 dead gringos” in the streets—a remark he promptly regretted and attempted to soften by making another one almost equally unfortunate, that if the United States intervened in Cuba, it would have to kill six million Cubans first.

Castro is impetuous and emotional, and his worst enemy is his tongue, which he himself often acknowledges and then promptly forgets. There has not been a single public speech by Castro since the triumph of the revolution in which he has not shown some feeling against the United States, the American press or big American business concerns in Cuba, but he has also had a few kind words for the American public as a whole, for the United States Government, and for specific individuals. The Cuban press and people have for the most part followed blindly where Castro has led.

There is some reason to believe that Castro is not as anti-American as he sounds in his public pronouncements, and that he often resorts to this kind of nationalistic demagoguery because of its popular appeal. He has shown he is sensitive to criticism in the United States and wants a good press, and, busy and harried as he is, he can always find time to talk with an American reporter. Moreover, most responsible Cubans, including Castro himself, and probably the majority of the masses as well, recognize that good relations with the United States are a political and economic necessity for Cuba.

Cooperation at the Working Level

At the Ministerial and other working levels the Revolutionary Government shows signs of wanting good relations with the United States. The Minister of State, Dr. Agramonte, has been most cooperative and friendly. In every matter in which his assistance has been sought by the Embassy he has taken an active personal interest. The Minister of Agriculture has shown definite interest in a Point IV program in agriculture, and the Minister of Education has expressed interest in the educational exchange program. A financial mission is presently in the United States to explore the possibility of financial assistance from the United States as well as from international lending institutions. The President of the Banco Nacional and the Minister of National Economy recently informed Embassy officers that the Revolutionary Government would welcome new American investment. The Legal Attaché has found the new police force, disorganized and inexperienced as it is, eager to assist in the apprehension of criminals wanted in the United States.

The same spirit of cooperation has not been generally evident in the Cuban military organization. It is in the Revolutionary Army that the prejudice against the United States Military Missions has been strongest; the Cuban Navy, which is comprised almost entirely of young officers of the former Navy, is an exception and has continued to show goodwill toward members of the U.S. Naval Mission. Raul Castro who since Fidel Castro’s designation as Prime Minister is now the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, has at no time to the Embassy’s knowledge shown any noticeable friendliness toward the United States. He is generally credited with more leftist sympathies than Fidel. It may prove possible in time to establish good relations with Raul Castro, but for the moment the prospect is not promising. It is still less promising as regards “Che” Guevara, Commander of La Cabana fortress. Guevara is believed to be definitely anti-American and is acting like a Communist. It is not clear whether Guevara now follows directly after Raul Castro or after Camilo Cienfuegos in the military hierarchy of the revolution, but in either case he seems to have considerable freedom of action and to be growing in influence.

Outlook

I believe that we can expect the resentment of Fidel Castro against the United States to take a while to cool off, but that in time a fully friendly relationship can be established between the United States and the new Cuba. The Revolutionary Government may seek to develop closer ties with countries of Latin America. While unobjectionable in itself, this would tend to draw Cuba somewhat away from the United States. I believe we can even now count on continued good support from Cuba in issues between the free world and the Communist world, even though at home the Revolutionary Government will probably not take as strong action against the local Communists as we might like to see.

On the economic front, I see no reason why the American companies now in Cuba will not be able, with possibly one or two exceptions, to adjust themselves to the new situation, and I believe we can look forward to an increase in opportunities for business investment. United States exports to Cuba will in all probability be hurt in some respects by the higher protective tariffs which the Government means to adopt, but any growth of the Cuban economy should benefit United States trade in other respects. In the long run the United States should be far more comfortable in dealing with a government which advocates and is genuinely trying to carry out democratic procedure than it was with the Batista dictatorship.

Recommendations

In view of the attitude and outlook as evaluated above, I recommend that the United States show a friendly and conciliatory disposition toward the Revolutionary Government; that it be patient with the latter’s mistakes and, to a reasonable degree, with its nationalistic gestures, even when these are directed at us; and that the United States respond promptly to any reasonable, specific request from Cuba for assistance.

Daniel M. Braddock
Chargé d’Affaires a.i.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/2–1859. Confidential. Drafted by Braddock.

254. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Mexican and Caribbean Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, February 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

Short-Range Position toward Government of Cuba

(1) Principal Political Forces

Three main groupings appear to have come into being in the time since the new regime was established. These are:

(A) The “radical” element of the 26th of July Movement, apparently led by “Che” Guevara and Raul Castro. This group appears to contain both elements which are pro-Communist and elements which, without any discernible sympathy for the Communists are filled with revolutionary fervor for the overthrow of dictatorships in the area and carrying on the revolution within Cuba itself. The Communists apparently look primarily to this group for acceptance and support.

(B) Fidel Castro and what might be described as the elements within the 26th of July Movement and their allies who are oriented primarily towards moderation and the establishment of a prosperous democratic Cuba with honest government. This group has shown some signs of disassociating itself from the radical wing of the 26th of July Movement on both the Communist and anti-dictatorship issues (e.g. Castro’s moves in the labor field which have been directed at cutting down Communist influence). Whether Castro and his more moderate followers will eventually align themselves with the more mature, moderate group described below or with the “radical” element remains to be seen.

(C) A more mature, moderate group consisting of technicians and persons with political experience largely moderate in outlook who hope to stabilize the situation, the majority of whom realize that it is to Cuba’s advantage to work with the United States. In general, this group has the backing of the professional and middle classes of Cuba. It includes a number of influential, responsible Cubans who realize the dangers of Cuba’s going off under the leadership of Castro should he become fully aligned with the “radicals” on a Nasserist or neutralist tangent. These elements also reflect the anti-Communist attitude of the majority of Cubans.

Of these elements, Fidel Castro is by far the most important at the moment because of the general idolization which surrounds him in Cuba and the hemisphere and restrains criticism of his failures. This attitude is likely to continue for the immediate future since public opinion will probably be slow in blaming Castro directly for the economic and other troubles confronting Cuba which he and his associates will probably do their best to lay at the doors of the Batista regime and of the United States.

(2) Problems Confronting the New Cuban Government

Cuba faces a critical social, economic and political situation. Literally tens of thousands of Cubans are unemployed and many thousands have been conditioned to guerilla warfare and other forms of violence. Thousands of young Cubans have gone without university training for periods of up to four and more years. Business is generally at a standstill although there has been stirring of activity in the sugar centrals. These difficulties, just to cite a few of the problems, would tax the governing abilities of any of the best leaders, at least in this hemisphere. Should the new government fail to stabilize conditions in Cuba, there would appear to be serious danger of a radical social upheaval and a long period of political unrest in Cuba which once had the strongest Communist Party in the American republics.

(3) Guidelines for United States Policy

The above factors seem to indicate that our planning should be oriented towards:

(A) Strengthening the mature, moderate group in Cuba, giving sympathetic consideration to their requirements for short-term assistance to stabilize the situation.

(B) Seeking to influence Fidel Castro and his more moderate supporters to make common cause with the moderate group described above and to devote his energies primarily to stabilizing and improving the Cuban internal situation. This will require forebearance in the face of ill-considered statements and policies which Castro is likely to continue to make in the present euphoria which surrounds him, as well as persuading him by friendly and sympathetic contacts that the rancors which either events or anti-US persons have induced Castro to feel against the United States are no longer justified, if they ever were.

(C) Seeking to isolate and reduce the influence of the “radical” element of the 26th of July forces and the Communists. This will require maneuvering them into untenable anti-national positions and particularly maneuvering them into positions where they will be seen to be undercutting Castro’s program. It also would require getting the facts before Castro and the Cuban public of the disadvantages to Cuba of tolerating Communist activities, of insisting on withdrawal from the OAS and similar irresponsible acts in the field of diplomacy, and of becoming involved in Caribbean filibusters in association with various undesirable and anti-democratic elements.

With respect to the question of United States assistance to Cuba, we should follow a cautious and restrained policy. On the one hand, we should sympathetically and expeditiously consider requests directed at stabilizing the immediate situation, such as possible IMF and U.S. Treasury standby credits, etc., and requests for technical assistance in such sound programs as the new government may develop which are in accord with our general policies and outlook for economic development in Latin America. On the other hand, we should be extremely cautious about giving any impression that we are so anxious to help Castro in the face of his anti-American statements that we are willing to help subsidize programs and policies in Cuba which we are unwilling to do in countries which may need them more. We should avoid any impression likely to build up the feeling in Latin America as a whole that the way to obtain assistance from the United States is to take an anti-American position.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–1959. Confidential. Drafted by Hill and Wieland.

255. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)¹

Washington, February 20, 1959.

SUBJECT

Desirability of assisting the Cuban Government to maintain the stability of the Cuban peso

Background:

A mission from the National Bank of Cuba is presently in Washington to discuss with the IMF and the U.S. Government the serious threat to the stability of the Cuban peso which results from the fact that following the departure of the Batista administration it was determined that the currency reserve of the country is depleted and $60 million below the legal requirement. The Cuban Government has introduced certain temporary emergency controls on dollar payments and other measures designed to conserve dollar exchange, but considers that assistance from the IMF and from the U.S. is required to restore confidence and to maintain the parity and free convertibility of the peso.

The mission has placed its total need at $100 million. It has requested the maximum standby credit possible from the IMF which is $50 million ($25 million new money, and $25 million renewal) and hopes also to obtain a Treasury stabilization credit. In addition it has indicated its intent to try to borrow from the commercial banks in New York and reschedule short maturities. It is the opinion of the mission that the financial help, if received, will largely serve a psychological purpose and not be drawn upon and that exchange earnings from the current sugar crop will enable the reserves to be replenished.

The possibility that the ExImBank might assist with the reconstruction of the transportation system in eastern Cuba has been raised by the Cuban representatives and an inquiry was made regarding the possibility of obtaining surplus agricultural commodities for food needs. The mission has now had several discussions with the IMF, Treasury, ExImBank, Agriculture, and State, and expects to return to Cuba in a few days.

The members of this Cuban mission are well known to various U.S. officials and are regarded as men of integrity and competency, friendly to the U.S. and moderate in their political and economic viewpoints. They are representative of a group of technicians who have been given many posts of responsibility in the new Cuban Government and who are genuinely concerned that anti-American feeling in Cuba might grow. They frankly deplore many of the statements made by certain of the revolutionary leaders and ask for patience and help in order to strengthen the position of the moderates in the present administration.

Considerations of U.S. Interest:

U.S. private investment in Cuba totals over $800 million and a devaluation of the Cuban peso or the necessity of rigid control measures such as the establishment of exchange restrictions, multiple exchange rates and surrender of dollar exchange could seriously affect its operations including the remittance of earnings plans for further investment.

Historically the Cuban peso has been a free currency at parity with the U.S. dollar since Cuban independence. A devaluation at this time would therefore have an unusual negative psychological impact on the people of Cuba aside from any economic considerations. Furthermore in the present revolutionary-nationalistic atmosphere a devaluation or the fear of it would bring with it real danger of increased social unrest, capital flight and lack of confidence of investors. In such circumstances the position of anti-US elements would be reinforced.

There are many sound and influential elements in Cuba whose hands would be strengthened if the present Cuban mission can return with an indication that the assistance needed will be forthcoming. Conversely there are prominent demagogical elements who will find support for their charges that the U.S. supports dictatorships and is the enemy of the revolution if the mission returns empty-handed and the peso must be devalued.

Recommendation:

The Treasury Department has requested the Department of State to indicate its views with respect to the advisability on political terms of according balance of payments assistance to Cuba at this time.

I recommend that you authorize me to communicate to the Treasury Department on behalf of the Department of State the foregoing considerations which led us to endorse prompt and effective action looking towards an exchange standby agreement between the Treasury Department and the Cuban Government in an amount appropriate to Cuba’s current requirements. Subject to your approval I would also propose to urge the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF to support efforts of the Cuban Financial Mission promptly to obtain from the IMF $25 million of new money and a renewal for one year of the $25 million standby agreement which otherwise expires in March 1959.

With regard to the longer range projects of economic development and the desire for surplus food commodities, we are making further studies, considering both the need for detailed planning and economic data and the trend of political developments in the country.

Our recommended course of action with regard to the IMF and Treasury is based on the assumption that the Cuban Government meets the requirements of these bodies for such transactions.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.13/2–2059. Official Use Only. Drafted by Stevenson; cleared with Wieland; concurred in by Beale, Harry Conover, Albert Post, J. Parke Young, and Murphy; and initialed by Snow.

² Dillon initialed his approval on February 20.

256. Editorial Note

On February 16, newly-appointed Ambassador Philip Bonsal met with President Eisenhower at the White House from 10:50 to 11 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments) No record of the conversation has been found, nor does Bonsal describe the meeting in his memoirs.

Bonsal’s meeting with the President had been recommended in a memorandum of February 13 from Acting Secretary Dillon to the President, in which Dillon stated:

“Ambassador Bonsal believes it would be most useful to be received by you as it would underscore your personal interest and support of his mission to Cuba. He considers that this would have a particular importance at this time in view of the fact that a new administration, whose leaders have been openly critical of past United States policy and other important factors in U.S.-Cuban relations, has recently taken office in that country.” (Department of State, Central Files, 123–Bonsal, Philip W.)

Bonsal flew to Cuba on February 19 to take up his new position. The Embassy reported as follows on the reception accorded Bonsal and his wife:

“They were greeted at the Habana airport on February 19, 1959 by a sizable contingent of press representatives, including international wire services and television. The Ambassador, speaking in Spanish, was cordial and pleasant. He left an impression of sincere friendliness and interest in the Cuban Government and people. His arrival, and remarks to the press, were carried on television within hours, and covered in all local papers the following day. The fact that the Ambassador speaks flawless Spanish was and has continued to be the subject of much favorable comment both by the press and the public.” (Despatch 997 from Havana, March 11; ibid.)

For Bonsal’s recollection of his arrival, see Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro, and the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), page 38.

On February 21, Bonsal paid an official call on Minister of State Agramonte. Bonsal described their conversation as follows:

“I was received most cordially. After the initial courtesies and some discussion of mutual friends in Spain and elsewhere, the conversation turned to the Minister’s warm and cordial sentiments for the United States. He described his father’s years in the United States as a political exile prior to Cuban independence and spoke at great length regarding the hospitality granted him and the friendship which the Minister had in consequence always felt for our country, I contributed some reminiscences of the active interest of my own parents in the Cuban cause. Our conversation became quite warm and emotional on this theme.”

“At this point, I took the opportunity to refer to Fidel Castro’s recent television program in which he advanced a conception of United States-Cuban relations over the last 60 years quite at variance with the one on which the Foreign Minister and I seemed to be in agreement. I said that I thought our conception was the one which corresponded most closely to historical facts. The Minister did not comment on this observation except to say that he looked forward to my first meeting with Fidel Castro, that he was sure I would find him ‘very simpatico’ and that we would have much to discuss.

“The remainder of our conversation dealt with conventional topics and was most cordial”. (Despatch 939 from Havana, February 25; Department of State, Central Files, 123–Bonsal, Philip W.)

On March 3, Bonsal presented his credentials to President Urrutia. The texts of the exchange of remarks on that occasion were sent to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch 970 from Havana, March 4. (ibid.)

257. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 941 Havana, February 25, 1959.

SUBJECT

Political Conditions in Cuba

Summary

Since the fall of Batista and the installation of the provisional government on January 1–2, 1959 no open opposition to the new rulers has appeared. A duality of authority had developed, with the officials and employees of the provisional government in nominal authority, and actual authority and decision frequently exercised by the local head of the “26 of July” Movement. This duality should lessen with the assumption of the Prime Ministership by Fidel Castro. Certain civil liberties are curtailed. The press is exercising voluntary censorship. Confusion at all levels of public administration is gradually lessening, but is still great. Regionalism is a principal issue in the eastern provinces. Labor is restless and demanding. Confusion, failure to solve long-standing problems, later disappointment over excessive promises, and thwarted aspirations of some revolutionary groups will contribute to the formation of opposition forces. The Communists are attempting to obtain positions of influence if not domination within the government and the labor movement.

This despatch is based on the experiences and observations of the writer² in Habana since the fall of the Batista regime and the creation of the provisional government on January 1–2, 1959, reinforced by information collected on a ten-day, 1,500 mile trip through the Provinces of Habana, Matanzas, Las Villas, Camaguey and Oriente. The easternmost place visited was Santiago and the surrounding small towns. Stops were made at Contramaestre, Bayamo, Holguin, Camaguey, Sancti Spiritus, Santa Clara, Trinidad, Cienfuegos and Matanzas among others.

Public Support for the “26 of July” Movement, and the Provisional Government

With the flight of Batista in the early hours of January 1 1959, the “26 of July” Movement moved rapidly and effectively to seize power and consolidate its hold throughout Cuba. It was aided in this by the stand of General Eulogio Cantillo in refusing to oppose the Movement, the attitude of the armed forces in deciding to discontinue fighting and to permit the Movement to take over all armed forces installations, and the nearly universal support of the people. Armed militia of the Movement were on the streets of Habana before noon, had established a headquarters and were rapidly successful in occupying or neutralizing all military strong points throughout the city. The authority of the Movement was never seriously challenged. Considering the situation, the population was remarkably orderly and well-behaved. There was some rioting and looting in downtown Habana, directed principally at gambling casinos, but otherwise the city was surprisingly quiet and within a few days conditions were nearly normal. Comparable developments took place in all principal cities of the country, in many of which there were no disorders of any significance.

Leaders of the “26 of July” Movement credit the general strike which was called on January 1 with being the principal cause of their success in overthrowing the group represented by Cantillo and obtaining their own triumph. Actually, Cantillo seems to have been motivated entirely by a desire to arrange for an orderly assumption of power by the revolutionary groups and avoid further fratricidal strife and violence. He might have preferred to see the victory of the “26 of July” Movement be somewhat less complete, but there is nothing to show that he attempted to establish a government which would oppose the revolutionary movement. His attempts to create some sort of governmental apparatus appear to have been undertaken with a view to maintaining at least a semblance of governmental machinery and activity, rather than from any continuing hostility to the revolutionary movement.

The principal cause of the rapid and complete triumph of the Movement was the tremendous popular support it enjoyed. With Batista gone, the Cuban people were unwilling to accept anything short of a complete rebel victory. In the provinces, the general strike was over almost as soon as it began. It continued for several days in Habana, apparently because of a desire by the revolutionaries to “see Habana suffer”, and their wish to have the forces of Camilo Cienfuegos and Ernesto “Che” Guevara in the city before calling it off. It does not appear to have served any significant purpose, either in Habana or the provinces.

The key factor in the successful take-over by the “26 of July” Movement was the support of the people, and the self-discipline which they maintained. It is literally impossible to find anyone who will publicly criticize the Movement, or express a preference for some other government. That feeling still exists, though perhaps not as intensely as during the first days. It is responsible for the continuing quiet and order in the country. The Cubans have what they want, and are being tolerant and patient while the new rulers attempt to establish new governmental machinery. The bloom is already fading on some of the flowers but Fidel Castro and his Movement are still enjoying a wondrously prolonged honeymoon with the Cuban people.

Duality of Authority

A provisional government was established by the “26 of July” Movement beginning on January 2. The principal figures have reputations for honesty and opposition to the Batista regime. Some are of proven ability, others are of doubtful ability, and some are unknown. The same holds true in the provincial and local governments. Nearly all officers are of good reputation locally. To date, the basic requirement for a top job has been proven opposition to the former regime. Almost without exception, the new provincial and local officials are inexperienced. Many of the best look on their present assignments as temporary, and are anxious to return to their private pursuits as soon as the emergency is over. Those who intend to make a career of governmental service tend to be the less competent. There is great confusion in government, especially at the provincial and local levels. In some cities visited this reached the level of uncertainty as to who was acting as Mayor, or “Comisionado”, as this official is now designated. In theory, each municipality was to be governed by three “comisionados”, appointed by the Minister of the Interior. In practice, a municipality was lucky if there was one “comisionado” actually in office and working, and the system has now been abandoned in favor of a single “comisionado” appointed by the Minister of the Interior.

Actual final authority at all levels is vested in the officer in command of the “26 of July” Movement. In almost all cases, this means the uniformed officer in command of the local detachment of the armed revolutionary troops, or “barbudos” (bearded ones). In Cienfuegos, the 23 year-old Captain in command of the local troops, Armando Fleitas Diaz, was appealed to in order to resolve a labor dispute in nearby sugar centrals. His refusal to involve himself in the matter was roundly criticized, even while his critics recognized that he had no experience in such matters. The one “comisionado” then functioning in that city, Dr. José Antonio Frias, found nothing exceptional in such an attitude, though he himself is a capable lawyer with a national reputation, versed in labor controversies. In Camaguey, the provincial government slowed to a crawl when the commanding officer, Comandante Huber Matos, left to visit Santiago. One of the “comisionados”, Dr. Fernando Martinez Lamo, considered it prudent not to receive Faure Chomon, head of the Directorio Revolucionario, in the absence of instructions from Matos. Chomon is from Camaguey, and had come to the city to attend a celebration in his honor. Dr. Martinez’ qualifications for his position, incidentally, are confined to the operation of a successful medical laboratory.

This attitude of considering the local leader of the “26 of July” forces as the final, and in many cases the only real, authority is a spontaneous reaction by the people. It was fostered by the Movement by its insistence in controlling governmental appointments, and many of the leaders undoubtedly enjoy the prestige and power. Its sources probably go back to the Latin traditions of loyalty to an individual leader in politics, often referred to as “caudillismo”. It extends to the highest levels. The final loyalty of the Cuban people at present is to Fidel Castro, rather than to Provisional President Urrutia or his Government, or to any particular concept of government. Everyone speaks of democracy, but what now exists in Cuba is “Government by Castro”—a situation partly inevitable, but also thrust upon him by the people themselves. With his assumption of the Prime Ministership on February 16, the difficulties created by this duality of authority should lessen. Castro remains the unquestioned leader of the country, but he will now be directly responsible for the actions of the government.

Some Civil Liberties Curtailed; Censorship

The Constitution of 1940, with its extensive list and safeguards of civil liberties, has been replaced by a “Fundamental Law”, under which the provisional government will operate. This law weakens some of the liberties so loudly clamored for under the Batista regime, principally the right of habeas corpus. Some prisoners now may be, and are, held indefinitely without charge. In their zeal to eradicate all traces of the corruption and repression of the previous regime, the authorities are engaging in some of the practices they most objected to. In Camaguey on February 11, local persons estimated that there were about 1,000 persons in jail, under extremely crowded conditions, most of whom were being held without charge. This more than doubled the highest figure recorded under Batista. An American citizen has been held in prison by the “26 of July” Movement and the new government since December 26, 1958, without charge. The civilian courts are being purged, and are only partly functioning. Revolutionary Courts, operating under the “Rebel Code of Justice”, are conducting summary courts-martial of persons both civilian and military accused of a wide variety of crimes committed under the previous regime. Trials, particularly in the provinces, are often mere formalities. The accused is sometimes given the right of appeal. In Habana, appeals are heard by the same judge and prosecutor who conducted the original trial.

The press is exercising self-censorship. No paper dares to appear to criticize the Government or the leading figures of the new regime. Fidel Castro has displayed a very thin skin and deep resentment of criticism. He recently publicly objected to a cartoon in a weekly humorous publication. The staff of the publication waited on him in a body, explained in detail that no disrespect was intended, and published a deeply apologetic statement in the next issue—all this over a cartoon whose criticism was directed not at Castro, but rather at those who have been busily jumping on the revolutionary bandwagon since the first of the year. Castro also publicly objected to an article in Revolución, the official organ of his own Movement, which listed 20 points the editors felt Castro would give particular attention to. He got an immediate printed apology, but somewhat surprisingly coupled with it was a statement that the paper reserved the right of editorial independence. Castro’s resentment and irritation over criticism in the foreign press, particularly in connection with the trials of “war criminals”, and his resultant blasts at what he calls deliberate distortion by the international wire services and some foreign press, have been noted by the local periodicals as well as radio and television chains. The result has been self-censorship and extreme care to avoid anything which Castro might take exception to. As far as the international press is concerned, in Castro’s eyes there are only two categories: The “good” press, which views him and the revolution favorably; and the “evil” press, which criticizes him.

Any expression of independent or divergent views has also disappeared from the press in the provinces. Several formerly prominent papers in towns such as Cienfuegos, Camaguey and Santiago either have disappeared or are being watched closely and with a certain air of hostility by the local “26 of July” representatives. The plants of those that have disappeared have been taken over by groups which publish the local “official” organs of the Movement. In some cases, papers which are still publishing are required to make their plant and staff available at other times of the day for the publication of the “official” organ.

Regionalism

Regionalism, and the determination to realize long-standing local desires, has become a dominant issue in the provinces. This is particularly so in Oriente, where a feeling of resentment against discriminatory treatment by the central government has long existed. The demands are in general reasonable: increased local autonomy in the administration of local governmental agencies and institutions, including the expenditures of funds; and a larger share in the public works programs of the central government. The thought of further development of local resources and the formation of local industry seems to have only secondary appeal, at least at present. In Santiago, an excellent talk on that subject by Dr. Soto Tio, Acting Dean of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Oriente, fell on largely uncomprehending and disinterested ears. The burning issues were clear, and in actuality minor: local control of the Santiago water-works (but with financing still coming from the central government); independent local administration of the local public hospital; and local control of the Santiago airport. Why this last should be a matter of first importance was not clear. There was some talk of the fact that there had once been direct international flights to Santiago, which might somehow be resumed if Santiago had control of its airport and could develop its own tourist attractions. It was clear that the central government would be expected to continue to carry the financial burden of these operations. Indeed, there was strong demand for increased expenditures by the central government. The point that a significant shift in expenditures, or the installation of additional governmental offices in Santiago might cause hardship to people living in the Habana region, was regarded with indifference. In Santiago, as throughout the provinces, there is a noticeable air of vindictiveness toward the capital and its inhabitants. It is generally maintained that the people of Habana have had a disproportionate share of the good things of life in the past, and that they did not participate in the revolution to the extent they should have. Accordingly, if they now suffer in comparison with the provinces, they are only getting their just desserts.

Restlessness of Labor

The Embassy has pointed out in a number of despatches the restlessness of labor sine the revolution and the lack of firm control and dominant influence in that field by the “26 of July” Movement. This has led to confused and often excessive demands by labor, local strikes, wildcat strikes and lockouts. The confusion becomes even clearer when travelling through the provinces. Labor problems and labor demands, and the resultant settlements, varied widely from one sugar central to another. The only basic pattern was one based on a struggle for control by rival local leaders and groups, and a generalized demand for increased wages. The union leadership during the Batista regime has been almost universally discredited, with the individual leaders either in jail, in hiding, or divested of their union rights. As I spoke with people throughout the country, I found one common thought—that only Fidel Castro could bring order out of the confused labor situation and get everybody working again. Unresolved labor demands could be settled later. The most important, and really basic, necessity was to get the economy going again as rapidly as possible, and produce a full sugar crop. The assumption that only Fidel could bring about order proved correct. He later made a public statement³ urging workers to buckle down and leave their just demands for later settlement, and rapid progress was promptly apparent.

Possible Sources of Opposition

There is no active, open opposition to the provisional government, or to the “26 of July” Movement, at present. There are several sources of potential opposition. Causes of the development of opposition, not necessarily in order of importance, are: confusion (which is apparent on all sides); failure to solve long-standing problems such as chronic unemployment and underemployment and the distortions caused by an essentially single crop economy; resentments and fears created by excessive promises of a demagogic nature; and thwarted political aspirations of some significant groups, mainly revolutionary.

The principal source of potential opposition within the revolutionary groups is the complex formed by the groups most directly associated with and supported by former President Carlos Prio, including the Organizacion Auténtica, the Directorio Revolucionario, and the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU—Federation of University Students). These groups were largely, if not completely ignored by the “26 of July” Movement in the formation of the provisional government. There has already been one period of tension between them and the “26 of July” Movement, and it seems certain that there will be others in the future. Revolutionary Law Eleven, denying validity to course credits and degrees received in Cuba during the past two years, was approved principally in an effort to satisfy demands of the FEU. It is probably the most controversial action in Cuban eyes taken to date by the provisional government, and is opposed by the Catholic Church among others—at least partly because the Catholic University of Villanueva was the most reputable and prominent private center of higher learning which remained open during the last years of the Batista regime. These groups, and other peripheral groups such as the Triple A of Aureliano Sanchez Arango, can be expected to form the nucleus of a political opposition group, which will probably take definite form only when preparations for general elections finally get underway.

Another potential opposition group is found within the intellectuals and middle class people who formed the stimulus behind the revolutionary opposition throughout the struggle against the Batista regime. These people kept the revolutionary movement going during the lean, difficult years, and gave it the idealistic character and appeal which came to characterize the “26 of July” Movement. Originally separate in organizations such as the Movimiento de Resistencia Cívica (Civic Resistance Movement) and the Grupo de Instituciones Civicas (Group of Civic Institutions), they tended during the last months of the struggle to lose their identity within the framework of the “26 of July” Movement. As Castro has moved since the success of the revolution to establish a broad popular base of support by appealing to the rural class (campesinos) with promises of land reform, schools and roads, and by promises to the working classes of future rewards, the intellectuals and middle class supporters have begun to have private doubts and reservations concerning him and his Movement. The writer has been surprised at the openness with which those doubts have been expressed to him in private conversation, both in Habana and in the provinces. That feeling has not progressed to the point at which there is any possibility of an early break between those groups and Castro, but it clearly exists. If Castro shifts from the present leftist and somewhat irresponsible attitude which he is displaying in public, the feeling could disappear. But if he continues as at present, the groups which originally supported him from idealistic and reformist motivations may well seek another leader.

The Catholic Church should also be mentioned among possible oppositionist groups. Publicly, the Church has consistently maintained that there could be no doubt of the essentially moderate, Catholic and anti-Communist orientation of Castro and the “26 of July” Movement. Privately, the Church has not been so sure, and has made strong efforts, mainly through Catholic Action, Catholic Youth and the Young Catholic Workers (JOC—Juventud Obrera Católica) to insure Church influence and an anti-Communist attitude. Many Catholic leaders are strong and undeviating supporters of the provisional government and the “26 of July” Movement. Yet within the Catholic laity sufficient uneasiness has developed so that there is already underway a project to form a Christian Democrat Party in preparation for the general elections expected in two years. The group proposing this step assumes that the “26 of July” Movement will become a political party—an assumption almost universally held—and expects to run in opposition to it.

Another source of opposition is found in the political groups which opposed Batista, but preferred to seek a peaceful solution. These include the Auténtico forces led by Ramon Grau San Martin, and the followers of Carlos Marquez Sterling. These groups, particularly the followers of Marquez Sterling, may not be capable of forming a separate party, but they will certainly look for a political home. There is no indication to date that they would be in any way welcome within the political forces supporting the provisional government, and they may well organize into an opposition political force.

The remnants of the political structure created by the Batista regime must also be considered as a potential source of opposition. The individuals who formed the membership of the Governmental Coalition were in many cases sincere in their support of Batista, and their political leaders experienced and capable. Those people are now homeless, in the political sense, and must be reckoned with when general elections are held. If the revolutionary groups still consider them political pariahs at that time, they will nevertheless endeavor in one way or another to make their weight felt politically. The revolutionary groups maintain that persons who sought or held elective office under Batista are enjoined from voting or running for office for a period of years. This is an unrealistic stand, and the political supporters of the Batista regime represent a ready-made following for the leaders or group who first indicate the possibility of altering it.

Another source of opposition, probably minor but possibly violent, is found in the relatives and friends of those who are now being punished by the Revolutionary Courts for alleged crimes committed under the previous government. Over 300 persons have been executed by sentence of those courts, as well as an indeterminate number sentenced to long imprisonment, and the trials are continuing. The relatives and friends of the condemned cannot be expected to regard the revolutionary movement with favor, and at least some of them may undertake to practise the same “eye for an eye” type of justice.

Finally, there is the Communist Party. It now has a public posture of collaboration with the revolutionary movement. It will probably not succeed in identifying itself fully with the movement, and hence will exist as a separate, opposition force.

Position of the Communist Party

By mid–1958, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP—Popular Socialist Party, the Cuban Communist Party) had developed a line of reasoning by which it was able to come out in support of the revolutionary activities of the “26 of July” Movement, even without the existence of a United Front. The party then followed a policy of encouraging revolutionary activities and disorders, and of claiming credit for revolutionary successes, without jeopardizing the Party apparatus. With the success of the revolution, the Party (which had been illegal and clandestine) at once came into the open, and resumed publication of Party publications and literature. It is the only group in Cuba now functioning as an organized political party. It is acting basically as though a United Front existed, complaining bitterly when rebuffed or thwarted, but persisting in its efforts. It is endeavoring to achieve positions of influence, if not dominance, within the government and in the organized labor movement. While the “26 of July” Movement is professedly anti-Communist, it has not been aggressively so and some of its leaders are perhaps receptive to Communist ideology. Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who has much influence within the “26 of July” Movement, is considered an extreme leftist and has been talking and acting like a Communist since the fall of the Batista regime. In addition, Raul Castro, second to his brother in the Movement and head of the Armed Forces, is believed to have a far leftist political orientation. Nevertheless, the Communists do not appear to have achieved any appreciable success to date in infiltrating either the “26 of July” Movement or the provisional government, which the Movement controls. In the labor field the picture is far from clear, though it appears as though the Communists have achieved some degree of success in obtaining positions of influence at the lower levels. It is difficult to obtain an accurate picture because of (1) the pronounced tendency of the Batista regime to label all oppositionists as Communists, and (2) the loose manner in which the word is used locally. Management and the conservative classes tend to describe aggressive labor leaders, particularly those who are disposed to operate independently, as Communists. The picture is further confused because most of the former labor leaders have lost power or disappeared from the labor scene, and the new figures are largely unknown. Even such a person as David Salvador, the “26 of July” Movement leader in the labor field, is a subject of debate. He is generally regarded as having formerly had Communist associations, and now being anti-Communist. However, in Camaguey two reliable sources in addition to our Consular Agent said that in that Province he was definitely considered to be still a Communist. Another person, also considered reliable, said he was not a Communist, and that his behavior at Central Stewart, source of his local labor support, was only what should be expected from a labor leader with union elections less than three months away. All that can be said with certainty is that in Habana, and throughout the area I visited, the situation in organized labor is still greatly confused and fluid, and that the Communists have probably had some success in obtaining positions of influence, at least temporarily.

For the Ambassador:
Daniel M. Braddock
Minister-Counselor

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2559. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

² Topping.

³ Not further identified.

258. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 5, 1959—6 p.m.

1036. Paid official call on Fidel Castro this afternoon. Interview lasted 90 minutes. Minister State Agramonte was present.

Castro in cordial, effusive mood devoted much time explanation his plans agrarian reform, industrialization, reduction rentals, financing low cost housing et cetera describing them as vital elements revolution. He failed present precise details and scheduling but I gather decree on reduction of rentals together with decree for easy financing low cost housing imminent.

I endeavored get across following ideas:

(1) US is proud its achievements in democracy, economic progress and human rights; US people equally devoted these as Cuban and equally sensitive misinterpretations.

(2) American interests in Cuba have made contribution to Cuban economic progress and can continue to do so.

(3) American private enterprise can be attracted to contribute further developments here.

(4) It is my hope maintain frank cordial relationship with Castro even on matters on which there may be disagreement.

Interview while hardly conclusive was useful and atmosphere was cordial and I believe promising.

Castro expressed hope his acceptance ASNE invitation had not embarrassed White House or Department. I followed line of Department’s statement yesterday.²

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–559. Confidential.

² Not further identified. Sometime toward the end of February, the American Society of Newspaper Editors invited Fidel Castro to address its annual meeting in Washington scheduled for April 16–18. At a press conference held in Havana on February 28 for a visiting delegation from that society, Castro said he hoped he could accept the invitation, but he was concerned about his inadequate command of English. (Telegram 1024 from Havana, March 2; ibid., 737.00/3–259) Bonsal learned from a reliable source that Castro accepted the invitation on March 3. (Telegram 1031 from Havana, March 4; ibid., 737.00/3–459)

259. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 986 Havana, March 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

Call on Minister of State

The Ambassador, accompanied by the Deputy Chief of Mission made his first business call on the Minister of State on March 7.

Appreciation for Courtesies.

The Ambassador thanked the Minister for the very kind reception he had had from the Cuban Government, and expressed special appreciation for the presentation of credentials ceremony² and the arrangement of the talk with Dr. Fidel Castro.³ Both of these occasions had gone off well, he thought, and he felt optimistic regarding the cultivation of close friendly relations between the two countries. He noted, with satisfaction, that the Communist paper had referred to his speech at the presentation of credentials as “insidious” and the President’s reply as “unacceptable”. Dr. Agramonte smiled and said that he too had been attacked by the Communists soon after taking office and had regarded it as a sign he was getting off on the right foot.

The Ambassador said that at this, his first business call on the Minister, there were two or three things he would like to mention. He remarked that as normal in relations between countries there would from time to time be matters on which there would be different points of view, but that he was confident that these matters could always be discussed and dealt with in a friendly manner. The Minister agreed.

Wheat, Flour, and Rice.

The Ambassador mentioned briefly our concern at the import restrictions on wheat and flour concerning which we had made written representations last December. He said we are still very much interested in this problem and would appreciate hearing from the Government in reply to our note.⁴ Of more recent concern, the Ambassador said, were the regulations adopted last week with respect to imports of rice.⁵ These regulations, he thought, might also be found to detract from certain rights which the United States enjoyed under international agreements, and he thought it only proper to put the Minister on notice that we might be talking with him further on this subject.

Dr. Agramonte suggested that after the Ambassador had talked individually with the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Commerce, and National Economy, he would be glad to arrange a meeting, perhaps a luncheon, for the purpose of discussing as a group the rice and wheat questions. The Ambassador welcomed this suggestion, and thanked the Minister for it.

Purchase of Arms by Batista Followers in Florida.

The Ambassador said he believed that relations between the two countries could ordinarily be conducted more satisfactorily through normal governmental channels than through public statements. He referred to a statement reported in the press to have been made by Dr. Castro the night before to the effect that Batista followers in Florida were purchasing arms in violation of United States laws, and that our authorities were not enforcing these laws. He stressed the point that the newspaper accounts of what Dr. Castro had said varied considerably, and that he therefore did not know exactly what the Prime Minister had said. It was our desire fully to enforce our laws, he said, and if the Cuban Government had knowledge of any violations, we would appreciate its bringing them officially to our attention.

Dr. Agramonte said he believed that the story of the arms purchases were probably based on nothing more than rumors, and mentioned that a Miami newspaper this morning reported a U.S. customs official there as having denied that any such purchases of arms had taken place.

Food Contribution by Catholic Welfare Council

The Ambassador said that he had been informed that during the course of the next three months the Catholic Welfare Council of the United States would undertake the distribution of over one million pounds of milk and two million pounds of corn meal to needy persons in Oriente. He said that these products were provided to the Council, for distribution in Cuba, from surplus agricultural stocks of the United States Government, and were the gift of the American people. Dr. Agramonte was pleased at this information and expressed interest in receiving any details the Embassy might have, which the Ambassador promised to send him.

Visit of Dr. Castro to the United States.

The Ambassador said that Dr. Castro had accepted the invitation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors to visit the United States in April and that a State Department spokesman had announced that this unofficial visit would be welcome to the United States.⁶ The Government would of course wish to show Dr. Castro appropriate courtesies, he said, and he asked that we be provided as soon as possible with details concerning Dr. Castro’s plans and desires concerning this trip, as to dates, itinerary, persons accompanying him, etc., in view of the long forward planning required in Washington. He spoke of the interest of Acting Secretary Herter in Dr. Castro’s visit. Dr. Agramonte said that Dr. Castro would be pleased to know of the Ambassador’s inquiry, and promised to send us the desired information as soon as he could.

Extradition of Masferrer and Laurent, and Clemency for Cubans under Indictment in United States.

In reply to the Ambassador’s inquiry whether there were any matters the Minister wished to take up with him, Dr. Agramonte mentioned the Government’s desire for the extradition of Masferrer and Laurent and its hope for generous treatment in the case of the Cubans held in the United States for violations of the U.S. Neutrality Law. Both these matters, he said, had been under discussion with us for some time, and he seemed satisfied they were receiving proper consideration. The Minister stated that the necessary papers regarding Masferrer’s extradition were being submitted by the Cuban Embassy in Washington.

For the Ambassador:
Daniel M. Braddock
Minister-Counselor

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/3–959. Confidential. Drafted by Braddock.

² See Document 256.

³ See supra.

⁴ Apparently a reference to the Embassy’s note no. 9, January 15, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 759, January 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.2311/1–2059)

⁵ Not further identified.

⁶ See footnote 2, supra.

260. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, March 12, 1959¹

Washington, March 12, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

Congressman Adam Clayton Powell

Mr. William A. Wieland—Director, CMA

Mr. Robert A. Stevenson—Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs, CMA

Congressman Powell returned from Cuba today² and called Mr. Rubottom stating that he would like to talk with someone from the Department regarding Cuba. Mr. Wieland and Mr. Stevenson were warmly received by Congressman Powell who served them coffee which he was in the process of brewing upon their arrival and upon being seated he brought out a box of fine Puerto Rican cigars. He opened the conversation by remarking that things are very bad in Cuba and that trouble could break out there at any time. Fidel Castro is getting only two or three hours of sleep each night and keeps going on benzedrine. Furthermore, [7 lines not declassified]. The women make no bones about their annoyance with their leader. (Note: The Congressman mentioned this situation several times in the course of the conversation and clearly he felt able to judge the seriousness of this development). Recently, too, Fidel made a three-hour speech concerning the re-trial of the aviators³ in which he was often incoherent—so much so that Lopez Fresquet had tears in his eyes at the conclusion and remarked upon Fidel’s condition. The Congressman has concluded that Fidel is very close to a nervous breakdown or crack-up of some sort. “He has gone haywire.” Many friends and staunch supporters of Fidel reported to him this same concern. Also, Mr. Powell believes that the Communists are taking advantage of the chaotic conditions to move in to positions of strength wherever they can and with disturbing success so far. He said that Lopez Fresquet has tried twice to resign in disgust over Fidel’s countermanding of his measures of which he learned “only by reading of it in the papers the next day”. Faustino Perez of the Ministry for the Recovery of Misappropriated Assets is completely disgusted and does not report for work in his office; Ray, the Minister of Public Works, is disillusioned. Castro’s Ministers asked Powell to speak with him and try to make him see into what a state the country is getting—telling Powell that they are not able to arrange a meeting with him. Oscar Gans,⁴ former Ambassador to Washington and “an old friend” of Mr. Powell told him that conditions are very bad and that the decent, anti-communist elements in the country are beginning to prepare for a show-down with the leftist extremists—even to the extent of house-to-house fighting. The Communists have gotten control of the 26th of July paper, “Revolucion”, and continue to increase their power as the middle class and other anti-Communists remain disunited and demoralized. However, the Congressman feels that the mature structure of Cuban society and the really strong feeling for democracy will not permit the Communists to take over without a fight. A sense of fear prevails throughout the island—Mrs. Gans wanted to accompany Mr. Powell when he left and his Puerto Rican secretary told him that she would not go back with him if conditions remained as they are. His taxi driver told him that he had been a 26th of July fighter and since Castro had come into power his pay had been cut from $180 to $80.00 and, recognizing Mr. Powell, he asked him to tell “that SOB Castro” that he didn’t like it.

The Congressman said that Castro has cut all rents in half; and that he has done the same to the price of all land and real estate. These measures have caused great resentment among the middle class. He cited the case of one former strong Castro supporter who was recently elected head of a group of landowners who have organized to fight these Castro measures. Mr. Wieland asked Powell if he had discussed all this with Castro to which he replied that he had managed to see him and had talked with him for over three hours, but that he hadn’t yet learned just how bad things are when he had talked with Castro. However, he had read to him Herb Matthews’ article from the “New York Times Magazine” of March 8 (partly in English and partly in Spanish with the aid of Powell’s secretary-interpreter), but it seemed to make no impression—just didn’t get to him. He told Castro that Castro didn’t know anything about economics (he mentioned that he tried to explain to him Gresham’s Law with no success whatsoever) and that the economy is going to the devil and the peso being sold at a great discount; that he should let his ministers run their ministries without interference, and if he felt the need of an advisor and didn’t trust a non-Latino he should try to get Dr. Pico from Puerto Rico to come over and help him for a while. He said that Castro seemed to accept his arguments, but he is convinced that under present conditions nothing will be done to implement his suggestions.

Raul Castro, Mr. Powell believes, is a Communist or should be one, and is a very bad influence. He holds him responsible for the retrial of the aviators in Santiago de Cuba. However, he has no real support on his own and wouldn’t last long if he should try to take Fidel’s place, even temporarily. Faure Chomon, the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), told Powell that the DR would not accept Raul for a minute; also that the DR members are armed and ready (Dr. Gans told him that almost everyone has a weapon of some sort in the house) should the leftist extremists gain control. Che Guevara is a Communist according to Mr. Powell, who declared that none other than Louis Dejoie had told him this saying, “Adam, I like Che very much but he is without any doubt a Communist.” Also, Dejoie reportedly said that Che has been sick with pneumonia and is believed to have tuberculosis. Asked about Fignole, Powell replied that he is not in Cuba but in New York. From there he had sent down a tape-recording which had been broadcast. Camilo Cienfuegos is a likeable fellow but a woman chaser without any influence or real ability; Juan Almeida is smart and well-regarded by the small group around him, but has little influence. He commented also on William Morgan, the American DR commander, describing him as “a sweet guy but very tough”, who recently has frequently criticized Castro openly.

Mr. Wieland asked Mr. Powell what he would recommend that the Department should do in this situation. He pointed out to Mr. Powell that the Department’s attitude has been conciliatory and cooperative since the 26th of July came into power and that at no time has the Department criticized the Movement as such, but that Castro has not reciprocated in any way so far and has made it very difficult for us to do anything to help him—Mr. Powell would recognize the difficulties Castro has created with our own Congress.

Mr. Powell seemed hard put to come up with any suggestions pointing out that the responsible elements have no spokesman, no rallying point or party. He said that the way things are going Castro may not even last until April 17th. He added that Ambassador Bonsal is very popular and is cheered when he walks on the street; perhaps he will be able to do something. (He also said at one point that Marinello [the PSP leader]⁵ is cheered when he appears in public.) He mentioned that Augustin Batista of the Trust Company of Cuba is the most powerful man in the financial-business world—a man with guts. (Note: Also with large real estate holdings in New York City). He glanced approvingly at a Trust Company of Cuba financial statement to which he referred to obtain Batista’s name, reading off the total assets figure with a certain seeming satisfaction and approval. Felipe Pazos, head of the National Bank, has no guts—an able economist perhaps—but no guts. He remarked that Castro has recently gotten a competent secretary in the person of Dr. Juan A. Orta which might help.

On the subject of international adventuring, Congressman Powell said that Castro definitely has something cooking against the Dominican Republic and that it is under the direction of Captain Jimenez, a man of doubtful ideology. He said that he had remonstrated with Castro about the foolishness of supporting such endeavors when there is so much to be done in Cuba—750,000 unemployed right now and hunger and discontent everywhere. Castro told him that he still has the support of 75–80% of the people, but Powell feels that even if this is true he can lose most of it very quickly if things go on as they are at present. Mr. Wieland remarked about the cost to the Cuban economy of any attempt to equip and stage an invasion from Cuba pointing out the cost in loss of confidence which would be reflected in business investment. Mr. Powell agreed and remarked that if he “were an American businessman in Cuba right now he would pull out as fast as he could”.

In closing Mr. Wieland told Mr. Powell that knowing of Mr. Powell’s close association with Fidel Castro and his Movement he particularly appreciated the Congressman’s frankness in his appraisal of the situation in Cuba. Mr. Powell thanked him graciously and said that he, of course, feels that his first concern is always for United States interests.

Comment: Mr. Powell was most cordial throughout the conversation and disarmingly frank—admitting that he had been misled and previously misjudged several aspects of the current Cuban scene. One can speculate that he is about to change horses—among other things.

Addendum:

In connection with his comments on “Che” Guevara Mr. Powell pointed to Mr. Wieland and said, “Luis Munoz about a month ago sat right there where you are sitting and told me that he did not believe Guevara to be a communist”. He added the remark that Munoz is his good friend but that he misled him on Guevara and if he thinks Guevara is just a nice guy with odd ideas he is badly mistaken. “I don’t know if he carries a card or not”, he said, “but he [Guevara]⁶ appears like a communist to me.”

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1259. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson. Initialed by Stevenson and Wieland. The place of the meeting is not indicated on the source text, but it may have been Powell’s office.

² Prior to leaving Cuba, Congressman Powell told an Embassy official that Castro, in a talk with Powell on March 10, had been “incoherent” and Powell was convinced he was a sick man due for a breakdown at any moment. From his conversations with many Cubans, Powell had also become convinced that the Communists were gaining control of the situation. Powell said that within 2 weeks “violent changes” would take place led by elements that Powell refused to identify; the results would be contrary to U.S. interests. Powell also believed that Treasury Minister Lopez-Fresquet and others of ministerial rank would soon resign. (Telegram 1049 from Havana, March 12; ibid.)

³ On March 3, 44 airmen who had served in Batista’s air force were found innocent by a court in Santiago of charges that they had committed war crimes. In a television address, Castro said that the acquittal had been an error and ordered a new trial. At the second trial, with a new prosecutor and members of the court, all the airmen were found guilty and given prison terms of from 2 to 30 years.

⁴ Oscar Gans is 56 years old; former Ambassador to the United States (1949–50); presidential candidate in 1952; member Prio’s cabinet; Prime Minister briefly in 1952. Described as unreliable opportunist. Founded Cuban Stainless Co. with aid of Mr. Jones, a building contractor from Miami. Agitated for U.S. to sell nickel sinter to this company from Nicaro production. U.S. sold company 10,000 lbs. which it made up into anodes but could not sell as cost too great. Jones allegedly dropped $100,000 in the deal. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ Brackets in the source text.

⁶ Brackets in the source text.

261. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 12, 1959.

SUBJECT

Visit to Washington of Fidel Castro

Problem:

What courtesies should be shown by the United States Government to Fidel Castro during his visit to Washington in mid-April?

Background:

Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba has accepted an invitation from the American Society of Newspaper Editors to speak at its annual meeting in Washington on April 17. It is customary for an invitation to be extended to the President to address this meeting but it is understood that no date has been set for any address by President Eisenhower.

It is not believed necessary or desirable that the United States Government extend an official invitation for Castro to visit Washington or other parts of the United States in connection with the appearance which has been arranged by this private group. There is considerable precedent for informal visits to the United States by foreign Chiefs of Government without the United States Government issuing an invitation. Castro’s formal status is that of senior cabinet member rather than Chief of Government, which would make an invitation by our Government even less of a requirement. Nor would it appear a polite gesture to superimpose an official invitation on the private arrangement which has already been worked out between the ASNE and Castro.

The question remains, however, as to what courtesies or other attentions should be paid to Castro while he is in this country. Arguing in favor of certain gestures being made is the dominant position that he holds not only in the Government but as leader of the successful Cuban revolutionary movement. There is every expectation that he will be a key force in U.S.-Cuban relations for some time to come. Extending Castro courtesies might pay dividends in the future; ignoring him would certainly antagonize him as well as opinion elsewhere in the hemisphere, and would probably harden his evident anti-American feeling.

On the negative side, Castro has made numerous statements since the overthrow of the Batista administration critical of the United States Government and its policies toward Cuba. He has continued to make this type of statement since he became Prime Minister on February 16. Furthermore, there is no assurance that Castro is sufficiently well versed in or inclined to observe the usual protocolary amenities in responding to any initiative we took to demonstrate good-will or show respect for the office he holds.

Recommendation:

We believe that we are obliged to keep foremost in our minds the long-range aspects of our relationships with Cuba despite the negative considerations mentioned above, particularly the harm that might be caused if we did not extend courtesies to Castro which would be expected for any leader of a Latin American country. It is, therefore, recommended that:

(1) You authorize an invitation to Castro for a luncheon at Blair House, to be given by you. If you approve, a proposed guest list will be submitted to you for your consideration.

(2) Your desire to extend this invitation be brought to Castro’s attention through Ambassador Bonsal, so that if the Ambassador senses that Castro would not be responsive to this proposal he would not proceed to suggest the luncheon.²

This recommendation has been taken up with Ambassador Bonsal who is in accord with it. ARA is also considering recommending that the President receive Castro briefly but this matter will be held in abeyance pending further developments.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Apr.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Little and concurred in by G, U/PR, and Lightner.

² Herter’s stamped signature of approval of recommendations (1) and (2), March 13, appears on the source text.

³ In a note to Devine, March 13, which is attached to the source text, Robert H. Miller, Duty Officer in S/S, pointed out that Herter had approved the memorandum but that he wanted ARA to ask the Embassy in Havana “to investigate urgently and independently whether there is any basis in fact for Congressman Powell’s story as reported in Havana’s 1049” (see footnote 2, supra). This investigation was to be carried out before Bonsal issued any invitation to Castro.

262. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Calhoun) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 13, 1959.

PRESIDENTIAL PARTICIPATION IN Castro VISIT

ARA is reluctant to recommend at this time on Presidential participation in the Castro visit. Yesterday, for example, Prime Minister Castro let out another blast at the US,² while on other occasions he has seemed more mellow. The Bureau would prefer to wait, therefore, until perhaps a week or so before April 17 when Castro is due to address the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

In view of the widespread domestic American interest in Castro, however, you may think it desirable to apprise the President of your plans with respect to Castro’s visit and to tell him that we will furnish recommendations regarding possible Presidential participation at a date closer to Castro’s arrival, unless the President has some definite ideas of his own at this time.

John A. Calhoun³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1359. Confidential. A handwritten note in the margin reads: “See also attached telegram from Havana.” No telegram is attached to the source text, but the reference may be to telegram 1049 from Havana, March 12, summarized in footnote 2, Document 260.

² Not further identified.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 17, 1959—1 p.m.

1073. Reference: Deptel 686.² Generally speaking, Embassy has had little confirmation from other sources of specifics contained Congressman Powell’s report and feels that if they were accurate he would not be only source. Embassy understands that persons close to Castro have told him Powell is not among more influential members Congress, and tenor their recent conversations may have been affected by those remarks.

Embassy has noted little change in Castro’s behavior since he came Habana other than signs strains and irritation. He is voluble, garrulous and impatient. Irritated by delays and counsels of caution, and notably sensitive to criticism, he has shown tendency label all who disagree in any way with his proposals as counter-revolutionary. Castro has seemed incoherent and confused during some public appearances, and some persons have expressed view he definitely ill. It seems more probable that he occasionally suffering from exhaustion and emotional strain. There are no clear signs of illness or early breakdown, but he is carrying tremendous load of responsibilities and heavy schedule, and may be forced to slow down.

By his actions, promises and threats Castro is rapidly creating opposition within middle and upper classes, many of whom were among his earliest supporters. Though it is growing rapidly, this opposition has not coalesced and is not open. It is not now prepared or capable to bring about any sudden change in government. Embassy has no information from sources other than Powell to support prediction early violent changes. Castro has publicly mentioned possibility attempt do away with him, and security measures for his protection have been heavily increased, but Embassy unaware any specific cause of such feeling.

There are rumors of Cabinet changes, but nothing definite. Officers of Embassy know most ministers and persons close to them well and have heard nothing to confirm rumors.

Communists are making determined effort to increase influence, and have had some success in Revolutionary Army and 26 July Movement apparently due principally to influence Che Guevara. Communists also active in cultural and informational fields but this is return to situation existing prior Batista.

I hope that final decision on any official hospitality extended to Castro can be delayed as long as possible.

Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified] follow developments closely and will report changes promptly.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/3–1759. Confidential; Priority.

² In telegram 686, March 14, the Department informed the Embassy that Herter had approved the recommendation that he give a luncheon for Castro during his visit to the United States. Before taking any further action, however, the Department wanted the Embassy to provide the “fullest possible evaluation” of Congressman Powell’s views and to investigate the bases for his statements. (ibid., 033.3711/3–1459)

264. Letter From Senator Wayne Morse to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, March 20, 1959.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am concerned about inquiries my office is receiving concerning Castro’s visit to the United States. Some of the inquiries, such as one today from Congressman Davis of Georgia,² are exceedingly critical of the State Department. He alleges that the State Department is looking for a way to turn Castro’s visit into an official White House and State Department visit although everyone knows that the President of the ASNE circumvented all protocol by issuing the invitation directly to Castro without clearance either with the State Department or the White House.

Congressman Porter has also issued an invitation to Castro to come to the United States and attend the Oregon Centennial in my State.

It seems to me that this matter can develop into a rather delicate situation if the State Department and the White House after the fact set a precedent that will encourage Members of Congress or the heads of various organizations in the United States to invite heads of foreign states to come to the United States for this or that purpose and then once the invitation is accepted call upon the White House and the State Department to turn the invitation into an official governmental invitation.

I am inclined to think that the ASNE and Porter’s invitations to Castro call for an unequivocal statement of policy on the part of the State Department in regard to this problem. Further, I don’t think any statement of policy by the State Department and the White House should take the form of saying in effect, “It is all right this time but don’t do it again.”

Some of the calls I have been receiving about this matter have taken on rather ugly connotations. Some of them have expressed the view that Castro is being rather gingerly handled by the State Department because of his reported threats to take over this or that American investment in Cuba unless our Government follows what one critic described as a kowtowing policy to Castro.

I think now is the time for the State Department to reach a few firm decisions in regard to the Cuban situation and our official relations with Castro.³

Sincerely yours,

Wayne Morse

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/3–2059.

² Not further identified.

³ 

In a reply of April 2 to Senator Morse, Rubottom made the following comments:

“I am unable to understand the allegation referred to in your letter that ‘the State Department is looking for a way to turn Castro’s visit into an official White House and State Department visit’. I assure you that, to my knowledge, no one in the Department of State has made such a suggestion or has such an intention. Faced with a situation where this particular foreign dignitary will come to the nation’s capital under private auspices, it is incumbent on the Department to try to see to it that he is received and treated in a manner befitting his position.”

Rubottom further commented that private citizens and organizations were not required to consult with the government before issuing invitations to foreign dignitaries. (ibid.)

265. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1060 Havana, March 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Military Causes for the Collapse of the Batista Regime

Summary:

By the end of December, 1958 the military situation of the Batista regime was on the point of collapse in the three eastern provinces of Oriente, Camaguey and Las Villas. The Army had no reserve strength to reverse that trend. Transportation by land had been severed in Las Villas Province. The economy of those provinces was nearly paralyzed. Censorship and lack of communications and transportation prevented the public from knowing the situation. The revolutionary forces were better informed, but their communications were deficient and they were not aware of the magnitude of the victories within their grasp. Batista knew the situation, and realized that his regime would soon collapse. He left rather than attempt a hopeless defense.

The precipitate departure of Fulgencio Batista and the resultant collapse of his regime on January 1, 1959 have since been themes of conjecture and speculation. The opinion most generally held among observers of the Cuban scene had been that the tide was running strongly in favor of the revolutionaries, and that it was probable that the Batista regime would fall in the fairly near future. It had also been felt that Batista would make every effort to stay in power until the completion of his presidential term on February 24, 1959. Most observers thought that he had a fairly good chance of doing so, and that the critical period, probably including the disappearance of his regime, would occur in the days immediately following the inauguration of his successor, Andres Rivero Aguero. The collapse of the regime was expected and predicted, but the timing and rapidity of the event came as something of a surprise. The reasons which impelled Batista to act when he did were not then clear. Since then, the writer² has developed information bearing on this question from a number of sources, both in Habana and on an extended trip throughout the country, and has formed the following conclusions:

1)

The true situation existing in Cuba during the last months of 1958, particularly as it developed rapidly during December, was not clearly known either inside or outside the country. Batista himself may not have been fully aware of it until the last, because of erroneous reports from local military commanders. The various revolutionary forces, operating on widely dispersed fronts, were only incompletely informed concerning developments in areas other than their own. The general population was largely unaware of the actual situation other than the fairly accurate picture they could form of events in their immediate locality from word-of-mouth reports.

Basic cause of this situation was the strict censorship maintained by Batista, and the resultant difficulty in obtaining accurate information. Contributing causes, which assumed increasing importance as the situation worsened, were the deterioration of the normal means of communication and transportation within the country. The Army had its own system of radio communications, which apparently functioned efficiently throughout. The system of radio communications and broadcasting stations established by the revolutionary forces was of course of great assistance to them, but was far from efficient or reliable.

2) By the end of December 1958 the military situation confronting the Government of Batista had deteriorated to the point where the collapse of the position of the Government in the Provinces of Las Villas, Camaguey and Oriente was imminent. There were increasing disturbances in Pinar del Rio. The Government would shortly have been reduced to control of Habana and the surrounding area, with defeat inevitable. Morale in the Army was low and declining. Batista could expect no help from abroad. Faced with that situation, he decided to depart. The decision was hasty due to the rapidity with which his position had worsened.

The developments leading up to the events of late December 1958 are already known to the Department. Those events themselves have not heretofore been presented in one picture, and many of them were not known with accuracy. The following account, as they have since become apparent, is submitted as of possible interest and value.

The Army’s offensive of July 1958 finally ended in failure. It came much closer to success than was known at the time. Members of the revolutionary troops who were with Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra say that his force was finally reduced to 280 men, fighting on two fronts separated at the narrowest by only three kilometers. Fortunately for them, the Army offensive lacked sufficient drive, and the force attacking from the south surrendered when supplies and reinforcements were not forthcoming. Raul Castro’s forces on the “Second Front” had a somewhat similar narrow squeak in a series of engagements inland from Guantanamo. These would not have destroyed the entire Second Front operation, but they were of sufficient danger for Raul Castro to attempt to hold at all costs. Able defensive fighting, coupled with a lack of drive by the Army, stopped the offensive when rebel ammunition is now said to have reached a critically low point.

There was then a period which might best be described as regrouping, with little pressure on the revolutionaries by the Army. At some time during this period, Fidel Castro decided that his forces were sufficiently strong to enable him to undertake offensive actions. He sent columns under the command of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos from the western region of the Sierra Maestra, through Camaguey Province and into Las Villas Province. According to eye-witnesses and participants, these columns were quite small. Guevara had 150 men, Cienfuegos about 120. Guevara’s group reached the mountains in west-central Las Villas virtually intact. Cienfuegos, operating in more open country in that area of the Province to the north of the Central Highway, had a harder time, but still got through with nearly all his men. He and his men displayed exceptional endurance and mobility.

In early November Castro moved down from the Sierra Maestra in the general direction of Bayamo with a force which appears to have been somewhat more than a thousand men. The Army met this force in and around the town of Guisa, the road head, with approximately similar numbers (a Cuban battalion of 600 men, with reinforcements), plus aircraft and tanks. There were skirmishes and fairly heavy engagements over a period of eleven days. Army casualties appear to have been lighter than rebel, but the Army was unable to achieve victory, disengaged and withdrew on [to] Bayamo on November 26.

Castro then shifted his forces eastward, and made his headquarters at the sugar central “America”, near Contramaestre. By December 6 his forces had succeeded in surrounding a Cuban battalion at the small town of Maffo, some six kilometers south of Contramaestre, and beseiged it. In this engagement the revolutionaries used captured mortars, fifty-caliber machine guns, and one tank. They also improvised armored trucks from equipment at Central “America”. The Army apparently made no determined effort to relieve the beleaguered garrison, which was supplied for a while by parachute drop. The Army strong-point was in the center of the town, which was heavily damaged by both Army and revolutionary fire and by Air Force bombing directed at rebel positions. The Army garrison surrendered on December 26. There is a story, firmly believed by the rebels, that the final surrender came after the rebels brought a fire truck from Palma Soriano, hauled it up toward the Army defenses, and announced that it was loaded with gasoline which they would spray on the Army positions and then set afire unless there was immediate surrender. The town appears to have about 250 families, and some 15 to 20 houses were damaged or destroyed in the engagement. There are craters which appear to have been made by 500–pound bombs.

By mid-November, Castro had ordered the other forces under his command to take the offensive. Juan Almeida commanding the “Third Front” forces holding the eastern Sierra Maestra, cleaned out what remained of Army forces in the area. His men were principally responsible for taking Palma Soriano. The Army barracks, held by some 240 men, were outside the town. It appears that a commando-type operation drove the military forces from the town around December 20–22, and the garrison itself fell the 27th. Further to the east, at the small village of Dos Palmas, there was a hard fight. The garrison of some sixty men stuck it out to the end, aided by the Air Force. The rebel attack was pressed with determination for several days, and the garrison was over-run on December 22. During the fight the village of some 70 families was almost totally destroyed. Percentage of destruction was as high or higher than that suffered by any other town in the country.

Raul Castro, commanding the Second Front, had been ordered to undertake an offensive on all fronts, directed principally at Mayari on the north, San Luis on the south-west, and Guantanamo on the south-east. The northerly offensive was obviously the least important, and failed to achieve success. Mayari held, the town of Sagua de Tánamo further eastward was severely damaged and apparently remained in Army hands until the end, and Holguin to the west was not threatened. It is possible that at the end the Army was mounting a local counter-offensive along that line, but this is not clear.

Some of the hardest fighting of the entire rebellion took place along the southern perimeter of the Second Front. At the extreme eastern end, the Castro forces isolated and eventually captured the garrison at Baracoa. The garrison at Imias was captured on November 14, after a rather sharp fight. The small garrisons at the outlying sugar centrals fell or were abandoned fairly readily. The revolutionaries apparently never attempted to take the city of Guantanamo, which was heavily garrisoned. There were hard fights at La Maya and Alto Songo, both of which changed hands more than once during November and early December, and were very heavily damaged. San Luis was left to the last, and was taken fairly easily.

Thus, at the end of December the Batista Government faced the following situation in Oriente: The forces based on Holguin were intact, had beaten off or seriously damaged rebel offensives, and were capable of offensive action themselves. Bayamo was held by the remnants of forces which had been unsuccessful at Guisa and defeated at Maffo, and were not capable of offensive action. From there eastward, everything was in rebel hands except the cities of Santiago and Guantanamo. The commander at Guantanamo was begging for reinforcements, fearing an imminent rebel attack in overwhelming force. Santiago, the key city of the Province, was surrounded by rebels on line running roughly from El Cobre through Puerto Boniato and the foothills above El Caney and Siboney. The strong Army forces in the city had been unable to break through the encirclement for several weeks. An all-out attack on the isolated Batista military forces in the city was clearly imminent, and Batista apparently could not spare additional reinforcements.

What of the situation confronting Batista elsewhere in the country? In Camaguey, the next westward Province, the capital city of the same name was firmly held by the Army, but there were rebel columns moving with increasing freedom in the countryside, and rapidly gaining in strength. Commander Jaime Vega Saturnino had followed behind Cienfuegos with 90 men, intended to strengthen the forces in the Cubitas hills north of Camaguey. He had disobeyed orders and been ambushed by the Army at Macareño, losing over thirty killed or later shot. He had been courtmartialed and temporarily reduced in rank and relieved. His place had been taken by Commander Rolando Orozco Basuto, who had a force of over 200 men by the end of the month. Commander Victor Mora was operating in the southern part of the Province, increasingly close to Camaguey. His forces occupied the city when the Army surrendered on January 1. Rebel forces had set up a partially successful road block near Victoria de las Tunas, utilizing the Jobabo River on the border between Oriente and Camaguey, which was seriously interfering with all traffic, even military convoys, on the Central Highway. Rail traffic eastward of the junction of Marti had long since ceased.

In Las Villas Province, the Batista Government had launched what local people state was announced as a major offensive on December 2–3, based on Santa Clara and driving south from the Central Highway at Esperanza. It was apparently aimed at the forces of the “Second National Front of the Escambray”. Local inhabitants state that the offensive was heralded as containing at least two battalions—some 1,200 men. However, less than half of that force actually moved out, and this broke and retreated rapidly when it encountered ambush and sniper fire between Ranchuelo and Potrerillo. The Minister of State repeatedly told the Ambassador that a government offensive was imminent in Las Villas, and toward the end of December that it was successfully under way. Careful inquiry of local inhabitants throughout Las Villas just over a month later revealed no knowledge of any such offensive. The opposite appears to have been true, with the revolutionary forces advancing steadily throughout the Province.

On December 25–26 the forces of the “Second National Front of Escambray” occupied Central “Soledad”, about 1,200 strong. This central is approximately eight miles from Cienfuegos, over paved road. A similar force moved into the nearby town of Caonao. Rail transportation to Cienfuegos had been sporadic at best for some time past, and was then definitely severed by destruction of bridges. At the same time the one remaining highway link with the rest of the country was broken, by a series of bulldozed ditches and burning of two bridges. The garrison in Cienfuegos had been reduced to a few hundred and the revolutionary forces thus were able to take the city when they wished. They planned to attack on January 1, 1959, and were actually moving out when word of Batista’s flight was received.

Trinidad had been invaded by a combined operation of Directorio Revolucionario and Escambray forces as early as December 3, and held by them for several hours. That force, reinforced, took and held the city December 28. Sancti Spiritus had been raided sporadically by a combined force of 26 of July, Escambray, and Directorio Revolucionario men from about December 15. On December 23 the force stayed, and only a handful of the original Army garrison was still holding out, beseiged but not under heavy attack, at the end of the month. The Central Highway had been thoroughly severed at that point, with four large bridges to the east of the city and another large one to the west destroyed. One month later it was still necessary to make a forty kilometer detour to travel either way. The destruction of a railroad bridge at Zaza del Medio had stopped all east-west rail transportation. Thus, land transportation had been effectively and permanently severed on a line across eastern Las Villas.

Developments in and around the city of Santa Clara had a decisive effect. The only action which might be considered to form part of the offensive by the Batista Government mentioned earlier, of which the Minister of State told the Ambassador, was the despatch of an armored train from Habana, through Cruces to Santa Clara, with several hundred men. The route through Cruces was round about, since the main line had been broken by destruction of a bridge at Santo Domingo, west of Santa Clara. The train had trouble near Cruces, and was delayed for a day or so, but eventually got through to Santa Clara. It was derailed there by the revolutionaries, less than a mile from the garrison fort, and the soldiers took refuge in the fort with the force already there. Santa Clara was attacked by a combined force of 26 of July and Escambray men beginning December 27. The defenders based themselves on the fort, on the outskirts of the city, and fought a delaying action through the city. The Air Force attempted to attack the revolutionary forces as they advanced, and finally bombed the armored train when the revolutionaries began using it as a strong point. The aircraft strafed and bombed, but contrary to the widely-published statements of the revolutionaries, damage to the city was slight. By count, three bombs fell in the built-up sections of the city. One destroyed a garage alongside the train, and two destroyed several small houses about four blocks from the train. The revolutionary force was poised for an attack on the garrison, by then forced back within the fort, on January 1, 1959.

And this was not to be the end of the westward push. Santo Domingo was clearly the next objective of the revolutionaries, and people in the countryside as far westward as Colon had reported meetings with revolutionary patrols.

From talking with people throughout the country it has become clear that the revolutionaries knew that things were going well for them but did not realize the scope of the successes they were on the point of achieving in Oriente, Camaguey and Las Villas Provinces. Because of the strict censorship, the public was also unaware of the true situation. But Batista knew. The military situation of his forces in those areas was on the point of complete collapse. In addition, the disturbances throughout the country, and the dislocation of transportation, were having increasingly serious effects on the economy which was then rapidly declining. It was time to go, and he went.

For the Ambassador:
Daniel M. Braddock
Minister-Counselor

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2359. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

² Topping.

266. Memorandum of Discussion at the 400th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 26, 1959¹

Washington, March 26, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Turning to the situation in Cuba, Mr. Allen Dulles described himself as disturbed over recent developments. The Castro regime is moving toward dictatorship and Castro already has practically all power in his own hands.² Having no administrative experience whatever, Castro is compelled to resort consistently to demagoguery in order to whip up popular support. Cuban business interests are very concerned about his actions, his wild statements continue, and there is even some talk of a counter-coup. Nevertheless, Castro still has great popular support at the grass roots. He has adopted a strong anti-dictatorship attitude and has alienated more moderate Left-Wing rulers like Figueres who are likewise opposed to dictatorships in Latin America.

The President interrupted to say that he knew from personal experience that Figueres loved to hear himself talk. Admitting this was the case, Mr. Dulles nevertheless praised highly a speech recently delivered by Figueres³ attacking demagogues in Latin America.

Mr. Dulles went on to state that Communists were now operating openly and legally in Cuba. While the Castro regime could not be described as Communist-dominated, it was nevertheless true that the Communists have penetrated into various organizations such as labor unions, the armed forces, and others. They have a potential for even greater penetration in the future.

While Castro had given great encouragement to plots against the remaining dictators in Latin America, Mr. Dulles doubted whether he had available a capability for mounting invasions of Nicaragua or the Dominican Republic. He could, however, perhaps do something in the way of a small operation against Haiti.

The President inquired about the attitude of the Organization of American States (OAS). Could not the OAS take some action against Castro? Secretary Herter replied in the negative and pointed out that the Organization of American States must strictly avoid interference in the internal affairs of any member state. Mr. Herter also reminded the Council that Castro had accepted an invitation to make a speech to American newspaper editors. Indeed he had accepted the invitation without even informing the State Department. This was singularly bad behavior.

The President said that in that case could we not refuse to give Castro a visa? Mr. Herter indicated certain difficulties in such a course but Secretary Quarles said he thought that Castro had already behaved badly enough to provide us with very good reasons for refusing him admission to the U.S. After all, said Secretary Quarles, Castro is holding up so-called U.S. imperialism as the greatest enemy of Cuba and as the great obstacle to all the reforms which Castro desired to put into effect in Cuba. Secretary Quarles repeated that he could see no reason why we should invite him to this country. Mr. Allen Dulles warned that if Castro continued in his present courses, it was quite possible that the U.S. Congress would do something which would affect the sale of Cuban sugar in the U.S. If this happened Castro would indeed be in the soup. The President commented that the trouble in such a contingency would be that the Soviet Union would offer to take from Cuba all the sugar which the U.S. refused to buy.

Mr. Gray wondered whether there had been any suggestions to the newspaper editors that they should cancel their invitation to Castro to address them. Secretary Herter replied in the negative. Mr. George Allen then pointed out that contrary to Secretary Herter’s understanding, Castro’s speech was not to be delivered in New York but was to be made in Washington before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. This statement was confirmed by General Persons. Secretary Herter then indicated that he would look further into the matter. Mr. Allen Dulles said that in view of his belief that there was a slow-growing movement against Castro in Cuba, we must be careful not to do anything which would tend to discourage the growth of this movement. He inferred that cancellation of the Castro speech might be such an action.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² This is probably the occasion recalled by President Eisenhower in his memoirs when he learned from the Central Intelligence Agency that Castro was moving toward “outright dictatorship.” (Waging Peace, p. 523)

³ On March 22, while visiting Havana, former Costa Rican President José Figueres made a speech at a labor rally in which he discussed some of the problems facing the Cuban revolution, including the possibility that the leaders of the revolution, because of selfish and dishonest motives, might become demagogues and tyrants. When Figueres said that in the event of war Cuba should stand with the United States and the West, David Salvador interrupted to say that Cuba was now sovereign and there was no need to support the United States. Fidel Castro then followed with a lengthy address in which he sharply disagreed with many of the points made by Figueres. The various speeches at the rally were summarized in telegram 1096 from Havana, March 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2359)

267. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State¹

San José, March 30, 1959—7 p.m.

366. Department pass interested posts. From Ambassador and Stewart. Substance all day conversations first Facio alone, then Figueres verifies with more detail report of Bonsal Department telegram 303.² However definitely no fundamental reconciliation between Figueres and Castro accomplished as reported Habana’s 1110.³ Figueres and Castro did meet just prior departure and superficially parted friends because Figueres anxious not lose contact and hopes influence Castro through close friends and relatives, although believes Castro “off his rocker” and impossible influence directly at this point.

Large part Figueres story evolved around convincing details Castro either now a mental case or shortly will so become. Figueres emphasized lack of sleep, use of barbituates, constant repetition in six-hour speeches, general irrationality and impracticality of Castro utterances. Figueres’ attitude seemed to us convincingly not one of pique or anger, rather sadness towards Castro.

Re prior clearance speech with Castro Figueres tried from moment arrival do so. However Castro too busy only few words [sic] on rostrum just prior Figueres address, in which Castro requested Figueres not mention Puerto Rico and soft pedal “international situation” which understood by Figueres [to mean] revolutionary problems of Caribbean. Figueres accordingly surprised at angry reaction Castro. However Figueres pleased by numerous private contacts thereafter evidencing large volume support his thesis re Cuban relationship with US, problem of Russia, et cetera, in circles close to Castro as well as others. Both Figueres and Facio emphasized, nevertheless, widespread almost unreasoning anti-Americanism even in most intelligent Cuban circles.

Betancourt has been fully informed Figueres’ views by personal emissary Rodrigo Carazo, Costa Rican head INVU who was in Figueres’ party. Figueres expects word from Betancourt tonight and Ambassador will follow up. Figueres clearly feels that Betancourt, Munoz Marin and he are now in a bloc opposed by Castro and his close advisors, particularly those of Communist tinge who are accusing Figueres of siding with “imperialists.”

Figueres convinced Sunday labor parade Habana organized and managed by Communists who “alone could have produced such a show with type of people involved.” Facio reiterated conviction strong Communist domination in army, labor and some circles close to Castro, and considers Raul Castro at least a Marxist and “Che” Guevara an out-and-out Communist. Figueres suspects strongly that there exists in Cuba a dedicated nucleus of Communists with mission to cause a Latin American “Hungary in reverse” by attempting create situation requiring American armed intervention, which he considers would result in many Cubans resisting and cause great bloodshed and worldwide repercussions.

As to revolutionary movements, Facio felt little likelihood any present support from Cuban sources, Communist or otherwise, whereas Figueres claimed some information more recent than Facio’s pointed to additional revolutionary strength against Nicaragua based in Cuba and representing a real potential except for lack of general efficiency organizing any expedition. Figueres definitely left us with impression that he expects to see a revolutionary movement against Nicaragua with an excellent chance success in near future, unless the Somozas immediately leave country, which is solution he recommends. Claims that for first time his long experience Nicaraguan non-Communist anti-Somoza forces all united around Lacayo Farfan, Nicaraguan refugee in Costa Rica who now agreed provisional president, not Pedro Joaquin Chamorro as previously reported Embassy telegram 354.⁴ Figueres feels Guardia loyalty Somozas very doubtful especially because of Cuban executions of military, and claims likelihood Guardia deal with revolutionaries any real show Somoza weakness. We pointed out at considerable length US and other countries treaty obligations to assist Nicaragua in event revolution took on nature foreign intervention, to which Figueres’ only reply was to urge US put pressure on Somozas leave country. We of course gave him no encouragement any such pressure and in fact generally tried discourage any further revolutionary activity, particularly by trying stimulate his thinking toward possibilities dictatorship solution through OAS or moral suasion.

As to Figueres personal involvement, Stewart and I sensed that his experiences in Cuba have thrown cold water on his desires since previous talk with me, although there is no doubt about his hatred of Somozas, desire see them overthrown and we would guess he would participate if he saw good opportunity. However we do not believe that he now visualizes himself as the actual active leader and in newspaper interview today he publicly denied “he was axis of revolutionary movement.”

As to Dominican situation, Figueres not deeply interested and believes that nothing effective can be done to shake Trujillo regime present time.

Both Figueres and Facio extremely pessimistic future outlook Cuba and both look to serious deterioration of situation after which “anything might happen” meaning dictatorship or Communism.

Willauer

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–3059. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bogota, Caracas, Ciudad Trujillo, Guatemala City, Havana, Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, Port-au-Prince, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa as circular telegram 1128, March 31. (ibid., 737.00/3–3159)

² In telegram 303 from Havana to San José, March 25, sent also as telegram 1105 to the Department, Bonsal described a conversation the previous day with Gonzalo Facio, former Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States, who had accompanied Figueres to Cuba. Facio made it clear that he was passing on Figueres’ view that the only policies discerned in the Castro government were “extreme, unreasoning nationalism including anti-Americanism and communism.” Bonsal told the Department that he felt, while the evidence and developments did not warrant these conclusions, they were “cause for serious concern.” (ibid., 737.00/3–2559)

³ In telegram 1110, March 26, the Embassy reported that it had learned that the break between Castro and Figueres was complete and that Castro was convinced that Figueres was an instrument of the United States. Bonsal had been told, however, by Agramonte that Castro telephoned Figueres before his departure from Cuba and also visited him briefly at his hotel. Agramonte gave Bonsal the impression that relations between Figueres and Castro were “now cordial.” (ibid., 737.00/3–2659)

⁴ Not printed. (ibid., 713.00/3–1859)

268. Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Wright)¹

Washington, March 30, 1959.

Dear Jerry: I thank you very much for your letter of 26 March enclosing your correspondence with Mike Fenno² in regard to the Naval Base at Guantanamo. Such data helps us a great deal in our business because with this kind of background we can deal effectively with the problems before they get too serious, perhaps.

I think some of the people in the State Department are also a little bit disenchanted with the Castro boys. As you know, just before Fidel Castro took over, they had a meeting in State³ which I attended and in which I made a very brash statement that I thought Castro would take over. There would be a blood bath. We would find Castro even worse than Batista and there would be a lot of American businessmen who would lose their businesses. And that it was just a question of time before there was another revolution to get rid of Castro. This revolution would come fast because Castro and his followers were not in the business for the good of Cuba, but for Castro.

There was great objection to this brash statement which ended finally in a bet between Bob Murphy and myself. I don’t think it will be long before I collect a very excellent lunch from Bob Murphy.

However, with the new system in operation in Washington, I would not now be privy to a meeting such as occurred then. Instead, there would be some Department of Defense representative there. Hence, it is more important than ever that we be as informed as possible in order that the best interests of the United States be looked after as well as we can do it.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

Arleigh Burke⁴

¹ Source: Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Personal File (Wright). Confidential; Personal.

² None of this correspondence, including Admiral Fenno’s letter of March 24 to Wright and Wright’s reply of March 26, is printed. Fenno had written, among other things, that the general situation in Cuba had not changed much: “Fidel Castro is still making speeches to the masses and it looks as if the more intelligent and upper class are getting disgusted with the lack of progress.” Wright had remarked to Fenno that it seemed to him “the Castro brothers have bitten off considerably more than they can chew and we could only hope that the controlling regime will keep itself clean of Communist domination.” (ibid.)

³ Apparently a reference to the meeting described in Document 201.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

269. Editorial Note

On March 31, from 8:44 to 9:30 a.m., President Eisenhower met at the White House with Acting Secretary Herter, Under Secretary Dillon, and General Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments) According to Goodpaster’s memorandum, April 3, the following exchange took place regarding Prime Minister Castro’s planned visit to the United States:

“The President said that he is planning to be away from approximately April 6 until approximately April 19. Mr. Herter said he welcomed this news, since the President would then be away when Fidel Castro is here from Cuba, and no problem will arise as to the President’s seeing him. The President said that, disagreeable as it might be, he would, if here, see him at his office. He added he could not understand why the editors of American newspapers, who are supposed to have American interests at least somewhat at heart, should issue such an invitation.” (ibid., Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

In telegram 742 to Havana, sent during the afternoon of March 31, the Department requested that Bonsal extend on behalf of Acting Secretary Herter an invitation to Castro for an official luncheon at 1 p.m. on April 16. If Bonsal were asked whether Castro might meet with the President, the Ambassador was to reply that the President planned to be away from Washington during Castro’s visit. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/3–2459)

On April 1, Bonsal informed the Department that he had a 4–hour session that day with Prime Minister Castro, Agramonte, Dihigo, and Bisbe. Bonsal said the conversation covered a wide variety of topics and was “moderately constructive.” Castro accepted with pleasure Herter’s invitation for lunch on April 16. Bonsal also said that on the basis of “recent press stories,” Castro had expressed interest in paying a call on Vice President Nixon. Bonsal urged that such a visit occur early during Castro’s stay “as this would be most constructive.” (Telegram 1127 from Havana, April 1; ibid., 033.3711/4–159)

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 3, 1959—6 p.m.

1141. Department pass interested posts. Re Embtel 1131.² Fidel Castro devoted about half hour of four hour TV appearance night April 2 to violent attack on Figueres and his statements which he said were unacceptable. Furiously denied he took pills. Said Figueres not invited by him but by Ministry of State and that he had treated Figueres courteously to extent of going to airport at 6 a.m. to see him off after being up until 2. Said Figueres had behaved badly here, attempting to lecture Cubans about their own affairs like a professor of revolutions. Castro compared this with his own behavior in Venezuela where he claimed he had avoided comment on local political scene and had said only what he felt would be acceptable.

Castro said Figueres should have supported small Cuba in its just defense of its own interests against US. Instead Figueres had suggested that US was tolerating irresponsibility and possible danger in Cuba, and had even incited US to be more vigilant.

Castro said Figueres was intriguing against Cuba in his comment that Cuban attitude toward US was largely due to Communist influence. Said no true democrat or revolutionary would make such charge which only serves to promote and encourage aggressions against a sister people. Castro did not deny charge and in spite of prodding by moderator of program likewise avoided discussion of “third position” limiting himself to saying Figueres was imprudent to bring up question of international relations.

Castro charged that Figueres was not true revolutionary but an idol with clay feet and pseudo-democrat who had lost recent elections because people had realized his real nature. Said no true revolutionary would have left large estates and specific interests untouched and even have increased size his own holdings.

Castro concluded his blast saying “I wish to record here my protest against the words of Mr. Figueres and I hope that no one regrets this little incident because I have lost nothing since Figueres will not come to our defense when we have to defend the revolution and it is more probably that we will have to defend, not him, but the Costa Rican people”. Continued that it did not matter whether people took exception to his words or not, that Figueres had been of little help during revolution and that while revolutionary forces were fighting hard Figueres was enjoying the good life on his coffee plantation.

Embassy comment: Attack was violent, passionate, rude and personally insulting. Represents complete and definitive break between Castro and Figueres.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–359. Official Use Only; Priority.

² In telegram 1131, April 2, the Embassy reported that local press treatment of Figueres’ March 31 broadcast indicated that he had made a harsher judgment regarding Communist influence in Cuba than reported by the Embassy in San José. The Embassy also reported that the Communist daily Hoy on April 2 had again attacked Figueres as the tool of the “Yankee imperialists.” (ibid., 737.00/4–259)

271. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 4, 1959¹

Washington, April 4, 1959

SUBJECT

Forthcoming Visit of Fidel Castro

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Ernesto Dihigo, Embassy of Cuba

Dr. Emilio Pando, Counselor, Embassy of Cuba

ARA—R.R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary

CMA—William A. Wieland, Director

CMA—Robert A. Stevenson, Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs

(Note: In accordance with a message from Embassy, Habana² to the effect that Ambassador Dihigo would like to speak with Mr. Rubottom as soon as possible after the former’s return from Cuba, an appointment was arranged for 10 a.m. on this date.)

Ambassador Dihigo opened the conversation by stating that he wanted to inform Mr. Rubottom immediately with regard to Dr. Castro’s plans for his visit to the United States. He confirmed that Castro will arrive on April 16 and that he had accepted with great pleasure the invitation to have luncheon with Acting Secretary Herter. The Ambassador thereupon reviewed the schedule for the Castro visit which was the same as that reported by Embassy Habana in its telegram 1133 dated April 2.³ He added that the schedule is not yet entirely firm. He will immediately inform the Department as soon as it is definite and also with regard to the final composition of the group which will accompany Castro. With regard to arrangements yet to be handled by the Embassy he said that it is only necessary for him to work out the program for laying wreaths at the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, which he would discuss with Protocol.

After recapitulating briefly Castro’s tentative schedule the Ambassador remarked that there was one other matter which he would like to bring up. He said that we had probably seen the stories with respect to a possible call by Dr. Castro on Vice President Nixon and that Castro would like very much to make this call if it might be possible. Mr. Rubottom reflected on this for a moment before replying and commented that the Vice President is not now in Washington but that he will presumably will be back next week. He asked Ambassador Dihigo if he had understood him to say that Dr. Castro had expressed a desire to call upon Vice President Nixon. The Ambassador answered affirmatively and Mr. Rubottom said that although he could not, of course, answer for the Vice President, he would be happy to transmit this request to the Vice President to see if it might be arranged. He added that we would inform Ambassador Dihigo as soon as possible on this question.

Ambassador Dihigo also mentioned briefly the application for an export license for a DC–4 aircraft consigned to the Cuban military headquarters. He said that he hopes an approval may be quickly obtained as Dr. Castro wishes to use this plane for making his visit to the United States. Mr. Rubottom said that he was aware of this request and that he would see that it received immediate attention.

With regard to security measures for Dr. Castro while here on his visit, Ambassador Dihigo said that he had suggested that Castro send his Aide, Captain Yanes, to the United States a few days prior to Castro’s arrival in order that he might talk the matter over with U.S. authorities and be informed in advance of the measures planned. He mentioned that he has heard that General Tabernilla or one of his sons is now trying to arrange for a demonstration or other protest against Castro in New York City. Mr. Rubottom replied that this is very much in order and that we will be happy to put Captain Yanes in touch with our Security personnel.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–459. Drafted and initialed by Stevenson.

² Telegram 1137 from Havana, April 3. (ibid., 033.3711/4–359)

³ The tentative schedule indicated that Castro would depart Havana on April 15 and would, among other things, attend a luncheon given by Herter on April 16 and speak before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at 12:30 p.m. on April 17. Castro was scheduled to depart Washington on April 20 for New York, with an overnight stop at Princeton University. He was scheduled to leave New York City on April 25 for a visit to Canada, stopping overnight at Harvard University. The program for his stay in Canada had not been set. Castro would probably be accompanied by Ernesto Betancourt; Felipe Pazos; Regino Boti Leon; Rufo Lopez Fresquet and his wife; Celia Sanchez; Conchita Fernandez and her husband; and Teresa Casuso; as well as by guards and newsmen. (Telegram 1133 from Havana, April 2; ibid., 033.3711/4–259)

272. Memorandum From the President of the Cuban National Bank (Pazos) to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Havana, April 7, 1959.

1. —Around the middle of February three officials of Banco Nacional de Cuba visited Washington for several days and held exploratory talks in the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and various Departments and Agencies of the United States Government. The visit took place at the initiative of Banco Nacional de Cuba with the knowledge of the Cuban Government and had as its purpose to explore the possibilities of obtaining financial assistance to restore and strengthen confidence in the Cuban peso, which had been undermined by the severe depletion of our international reserves [which] occurred during the Batista régime. The financial support sought was mainly in the form of currency stabilization agreements with the International Monetary Fund and the United States Treasury Department.

2. —Our officials found in Washington a most warm and sympathetic reception, and returned to Cuba deeply impressed with the sincere spirit of understanding and cooperation they found in every quarter. But the talks were not pursued for two reasons: first, because the lack of confidence in the currency which was the concern which prompted our request did not increase, but rather subsided, [sic] And second, because at the time of our talks in Washington, we were not prepared to commit ourselves to the specific economic and financial policies and measures required by the International Monetary Fund, to whose action the United States Treasury Department had tied its own assistance.

3. —The circumstances and the conditions in the light of which we made our approach have changed since then. On the one hand, world demand for sugar has declined, and, on the other, domestic unemployment has increased. The resumption of public works will, in the next few months, reduce the current amount of unemployment, but before the 1957–58 levels of employment are attained our balance of payments may be seriously strained. Even with the best economic, financial and fiscal policies, we cannot achieve the necessary rate of expansion out of our own savings and at the same time maintain full convertibility of the currency.

4. —The explanations given above of the change in conditions since our officials visited Washington last February are designed to indicate that, should the occasion of the visit of Prime Minister Castro to Washington this month give opportunity for the resumption of talks regarding financial assistance and cooperation from the United States, such assistance should not be contemplated now as designed to provide a psychological support for our currency with stabilization funds not to be used, but rather as assistance for allowing our economy to recover its gear and to develop on a sound basis at a reasonable rate.

Should the opportunity for such discussions present itself during the coming visit of Prime Minister Castro, they could usefully cover, among other subjects, the following possibilities:

a) A balance of payments loan which would make possible a certain degree of deficit financing to alleviate the immediate unemployment problem.

b) A credit line to finance development projects as they are prepared and presented for approval to the financing agency.

c) A long-term loan to increase the capital of the Agricultural and Industrial Development Banks which will emerge from the separation of the two branches of Banfaic.

d) A long-term loan for improving sanitary conditions through the construction of sewers and aquaducts.

e) A long-term loan for improving agricultural productivity and standards of living (agricultural machinery, seed and varieties, research and development, agricultural extension service, storage and refrigeration facilities, agricultural schools and medical and sanitary stations).

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–959. Official Use Only. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1140 from Havana, April 9. Also summarized in telegram 1158 from Havana, April 8. (ibid., 033.3711/4–859)

Visit to the United States by Prime Minister Castro, April 1959

273. Memorandum From the Asssistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Staff Assistant (Devine) to Certain Officers in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

Washington, April 8, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan–Apr.) 1959. Drafted by Devine and addressed to Snow, Wieland, Little, Stevenson, Richard B. Owen, and Orville Anderson. A note on the source text indicates that separate copies were sent to the addressees and that a copy was also furnished Rubottom.

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 9, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–959. Confidential.

275. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination (Bell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, April 10, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.11–CA/4–1059. Confidential. Drafted by James M. Wilson (W/MSC). A copy was sent to Eliot (W).

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 14, 1959—11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–1459. Confidential; Niact.

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 14, 1959—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–1459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

278. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 14, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.001/4–1459. Confidential. Drafted by Braddock, James A. Noel, Francis J. Donahue, and Bethel.

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 15, 1959—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–1559. Confidential; Priority.

280. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, April 15, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Apr.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson and concurred in by Murphy.

281. Editorial Note

282. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)

Washington, April 16, 1959.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Castro Visit. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hill. Also addressed to Snow.

283. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 16, 1959

Washington, April 16, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–1659. Confidential. Drafted by Rubottom.

284. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 17, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4–1759. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 17, 1959—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–1759. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received on April 18 at 12:48 p.m.

286. Memorandum of a Conference Between the President and the Acting Secretary of State, Augusta, Georgia, April 18, 1959

Augusta, Georgia, April 18, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 22. The President had left Washington for Augusta, Georgia, on April 14. The time of the meeting is uncertain. According to the President’s Appointment Book, at 9:04 a.m. Herter arrived by helicopter at the Augusta National Golf Club and met with the President. Although Goodpaster’s presence is not mentioned, that is apparently the conference described here. At 9:40 the President met briefly with the press, then returned to his office to announce the appointment of Herter as Secretary of State. (ibid., President’s Appointment Book)

287. Editorial Note

288. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Mexican and Caribbean Affairs (Wieland)

Washington, April 21, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–2159. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 21, 1959—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2159. Official Use Only; Priority.

290. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 21, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–2159. Official Use Only.

291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, April 22, 1959—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–2259. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson, cleared with Little and Anderson, and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter.

292. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, April 23, 1959.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series, April 1959. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which was attached to a brief covering memorandum of April 23 from Herter to the President. On the source text the President wrote, “File. We will check in a year!! DE”.

293. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and Lawrence Crosby of the Cuban-American Sugar Council, Department of State, Washington, April 23, 1959

Washington, April 23, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.235/4–2359. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Stevenson.

294. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, April 23, 1959

Washington, April 23, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2359. Official Use Only. Drafted by Little and Wieland.

295. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)

Washington, April 24, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2459. Drafted and initialed by Hill. Also sent to Snow and Wieland. Rubottom wrote the following on the source text: “Thanks. An excellent report. Should be provided G”.

296. Editorial Note

297. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs (Stewart) and Herbert L. Matthews of The New York Times, Department of State, Washington, April 28, 1959

Washington, April 28, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–2859. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart.

298. Letter From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

San José, April 30, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.001/4–3059. Secret. Willauer also sent copies to Herter, Loy Henderson, Dreier, Stewart, and Wieland.

299. Memorandum From Benjamin Stephansky of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)

Washington, April 30, 1959.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Stephansky.

300. Editorial Note

301. Memorandum of a Conversation, Buenos Aires, May 2, 1959

Buenos Aires, May 2, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–259. Drafted by Rubottom, although a handwritten note at the end of the source text indicates that the memorandum was “dictated but not read by Mr. Rubottom.”

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, May 6, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–659. Confidential; Priority.

303. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, May 6, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–659. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stevenson, concurred in by Robert Donhauser (G) and William Dale (EUR), and initialed by Snow.

304. Summary of Remarks by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) at the Latin American Chiefs of Mission Meeting, Santiago, Chile, May 7, 1959

Santiago, Chile, May 7, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 363/5–959. Secret.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, May 11, 1959—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–1159. Official Use Only; Priority.

273. Memorandum From the Asssistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Staff Assistant (Devine) to Certain Officers in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs¹

Washington, April 8, 1959.

SUBJECT

Preparation for Visit of Fidel Castro

This memorandum is to pass along to each of you certain views and requests which Mr. Rubottom made very hurriedly to me today enroute to the Pan American Union.

Mr. Rubottom requested that CMA commence the compilation of a card index designed to provide the fastest and easiest immediate reference to all of the public statements and allegations which have been made by Fidel Castro. He said that we must be prepared on a moment’s notice to comment on or refute any such statements which Castro might repeat while in the United States. Mr. Rubottom doubted that during his visit here Castro would come up with any entirely new statements and that therefore it was particularly incumbent upon us to catalogue all of his past ones and have appropriate responses immediately ready.

Mr. Rubottom said that our representatives present at the ASNE (April 17)² luncheon for Castro should be prepared to rise and respond as the occasion might warrant. He said that he had discussed this and found agreement therewith on the 5th floor.

I told Mr. Rubottom that in accordance with instructions furnished me I had communicated to Mr. Corrigan of U/PR that Departmental officials at the luncheon would include Mr. Snow, Mr. Wieland, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Lincoln White.³ (When I told this to Mr. Corrigan, he answered that there was a fifth place available and that he would on his own submit the name of Mr. Stevenson as the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs.) In the light of Mr. Rubottom’s remarks, I asked if he personally planned to attend the luncheon. He said that he did not know, but that should he decide to do so he felt sure that necessary arrangements could be made. He seemed to be thinking in terms of either Mr. Snow or Mr. Wieland being the one to rise and respond to any remarks of Dr. Castro which might call for such a reply.

I told Mr. Rubottom that a preliminary report from S/S indicated that Vice President Nixon was now planning to receive Fidel Castro at his home for drinks. Mr. Rubottom did not comment directly on this. He said however that the question of entertainment for Castro would certainly be related to the public utterances which the latter might make. Should these be moderate and reasonable, there would probably be little objection to any entertainment offered, particularly in the light of other recent visits and the fact that everyone seems to be ready and anxious to make comparisons between and draw conclusions from the similarities or dissimilarities in entertainment afforded various visitors.

In concluding the conversation and leaving the car, Mr. Rubottom said that it seemed to him the time had come when we could no longer passively accept irresponsible statements about the United States by Fidel Castro. He said that we were now practically at the point where every such statement should receive our immediate response. Our replies should be reasoned, moderate, and should show our comprehension and understanding of the Cuban revolution, but they should also be firmly in defense of what we consider to be right.

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan–Apr.) 1959. Drafted by Devine and addressed to Snow, Wieland, Little, Stevenson, Richard B. Owen, and Orville Anderson. A note on the source text indicates that separate copies were sent to the addressees and that a copy was also furnished Rubottom.

² The date in parentheses was added by hand.

³ A handwritten note in the margin at this point reads, “Correction. This is for the Natl. Press Club on 4/20.”

274. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 9, 1959—6 p.m.

1176. Reference: Embtel 1158 to Department, repeated San Salvador 5² re desire GOC for foreign financial assistance.

Considerable number Cuban contacts have approached Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified] recently to express concern over possibility Castro might receive commitments financial assistance during his trip to US. These people were opposed to Batista and most were and are supporters of revolution. Their concern based (1) political orientation of government both in terms Communist penetration and influence and unfriendly attitude of Castro and others toward US and (2) critical economic situation facing country resulting from irresponsible, unsound measures taken by GOC in last six weeks.

These people say would be mistake for US extend assistance until GOC (1) displays more friendly attitude toward US, (2) shows signs of eliminating or greatly reducing Communist influence, (3) modifies radical socio-economic measures which are ruining a basically healthy economy (except for low foreign exchange reserves) which it inherited. They express belief US assistance now would postpone date for showdown on economic situation. Longer GOC is able to get along without mending its ways, better opportunities Communists have consolidate their position. Some add that if US extends help under present circumstances, it will lose further prestige internationally, since act would be interpreted in Cuba and elsewhere that way to get help from US is to be hostile rather than friendly.

Embassy’s own views on reponse to possible Cuban approaches for financial assistance will be forwarded on Ambassador’s return.³

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–959. Confidential.

² See footnote 1, Document 272.

³ Bonsal left Havana on April 8 to attend a meeting in San Salvador of Chiefs of Mission in Central America and the Caribbean. Documentation regarding the discussions at this meeting is scheduled for publication in volume V. No record has been found that the Embassy, following Bonsal’s return to Havana, submitted its recommendations regarding financial assistance to Cuba.

275. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination (Bell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, April 10, 1959.

SUBJECT

Castro Visit

I was somewhat disturbed by the item in this morning’s Staff Summary² reporting representations made to the Embassy in Havana on the subject of possible requests by Castro for U.S. assistance during his forthcoming unofficial visit. We understand from Bill Snow that the likelihood of their being any definitive discussions on this subject is slight, but that no determination has been made in ARA that assistance will not be given Castro. We also understand that no position papers have been prepared on this subject in anticipation of the visit.

I would appreciate being kept informed as to any positive indications that U.S. assistance will be requested during the Castro visit and, of course, would wish to talk to you if it appears likely that even sympathetic consideration would be given such request.³

JOB

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.11–CA/4–1059. Confidential. Drafted by James M. Wilson (W/MSC). A copy was sent to Eliot (W).

² Apparently a reference to a brief description of telegram 1176 from Havana (supra) in the Daily Secret Summary. (ibid., Daily Summaries: Lot 60 D 530, April 1959)

³ A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Castro Visit Briefing Material sent to Mr. Bell 4/17/59 by CMA/C.” Regarding the Department’s position on possible requests from the Cuban delegation for financial and economic assistance, see footnote 2, Document 280.

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 14, 1959—11 a.m.

1191. Last night I met with Castro. Agramonte, Cepero Bonilla and Boti were with him and Braddock and Gilmore with me. I told Castro we considered his coming visit very important and offered to help in any way required. He said trip was even more important to Cuba than to United States since Cuba needed US more than US needed Cuba, and added that if he did not believe trip would be constructive, he would not be going. Castro has apparently not yet consulted with his advisers re economic relations with US.

I reminded Prime Minister of critical time through which US was living and of sacrifices it was making to preserve for itself and free world against attacks of international communism the same values as those for which Cuban revolution waged. I mentioned sensitivity of US to neutralism in this situation and said that just as we were trying to understand his problems, I hoped he would try to understand ours. He said he would. I stressed importance of defining Cuban position.

Castro expressed annoyance with misleading press reporting, mentioning UPI and said press freedom seemed to mean “freedom to lie”. He mentioned yesterday’s story out of Wasington to effect he had told me Cuba would support US in East-West conflict, to which I commented story had not originated with me. (This story attracting much local attention and Embassy receiving many requests for confirmation or denial to which it making no reply. Department is of course aware I have made no report on which it could be based. May have originated with Ambassador Dihigo who was present at my April 1 lunch with Castro² and who together with Agramonte took optimistic view of Castro’s statements on democracy and human rights.)

Castro was cynical re basic goodness of man and re effectiveness of constitutions in achieving good democratic government and attributed success of United States in latter field to education of people rather than US political forms.

He asked if I were going to be in Washington at time of his trip and expressed disappointment at learning I was not. (I do not think it would be appropriate for me to go to Washington in view nature of visit but wish confirm suggestion made Rubottom that someone from Department in agreement with Dihigo be assigned to party as liaison.)

Castro said composition of his party not finally determined. I understand it will include, in addition to names previously supplied (Embtel 1133³ ), Pepin Bosch, Ernesto Betancourt, Raul Gutierrez Serrano, and Luis Sangenes.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–1459. Confidential; Niact.

² See Document 269.

³ See footnote 3, Document 271.

277. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 14, 1959—7 p.m.

1197. For Rubottom. In appraising Castro’s prospects and possible means influencing his words and actions believe following are major factors:

1. Castro continues to enjoy wide popularity here not limited to lower classes.

2. Communists are working hard to consolidate positions they have achieved and to make further gains but are encountering increased awareness in many Cuban circles including elements of press.

3. I am increasingly impressed “bourgeois mentality” here and vast number constructive vested interests. I believe that effective resistance to Communists among Cubans can be expected to grow rapidly as initial revolutionary fervor decreases.

4. If Castro is to fail and be eliminated as factor here, as some people here, in US and elsewhere believe probable, it seems most important to me that failure or elimination not be ascribed to words or actions of US Government (this, of course, subject alteration if Castro’s actions as distinct from words appear threat our vital interests. We are not unaware Castro’s speeches themselves have harmful effect).

5. If on other hand Castro remains in power and carries on his “revolution”, we will have many opportunities of discreetly influencing choice of courses of actions and of bringing him to a closer understanding of political and economic conditions to which he is subjected. I respectfully submit that some slight progress has already been made and am convinced that Castro can recognize and be guided by facts, although his temperament and sensitivity to criticism will probably lead to further unfortunate utterances.

6. Condemnation of Castro for these utterances alone will be taken as US opposition to Cuban revolution which still has very considerable support and was justified on many counts.

My conclusion is that we should give the Cubans themselves as much opportunity as possible to straighten themselves and Castro out before unlimbering our artillery against Castro.

The above represent my personal views which I have discussed with Braddock and Topping who agree but with no one else in Embassy due to shortness of time.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–1459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

278. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1159 Havana, April 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

Growth of Communism in Cuba

Summary

Under the benevolent tolerance of Fidel Castro and sheltered by his unfriendly attitude toward the United States and his drastic program of social and economic reform, Communism is growing in Cuba and sucessfully infiltrating various sectors of public life. The Communist Party (PSP) is functioning openly, and a number of publications and radio-TV programs are carrying its message. Main centers of Communist strength are in the Revolutionary Army and the labor unions. Various courses are suggested which the United States Government might usefully take in order to win the confidence of the Revolutionary Government, strengthen the anti-Communist elements in the country, and weaken the Communist influences.

1.

Communist Party

The Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, Cuban Communist Party) was founded in 1925 and registered as a political party in 1939. It was deliberately encouraged by the first Batista Government. The Party probably reached its peak in 1948 when 150,000 voters registered their preference for it. In 1953, when it was declared illegal upon Batista’s return to power, its probable voting strength was about 70,000. During its years of clandestinity the Communist Party was reduced to a hard core of from eight to twelve thousand disciplined members. The Batista government made perfunctory efforts to suppress these, but very few Communists were ever arrested and the Party propaganda mechanisms operated efficiently. Communist leaders such as Juan Marinello, the president, Blas Roca, the secretary-general, and Luis Fajardo, the financial secretary, went into hiding but probably never left the city of Habana. Other leaders such as Joaquin Ordoqui, Lazaro Peña, and Nicolas Guillen operated from abroad.

With the fall of the Batista Government on New Year’s Day 1959, the PSP emerged from hiding to achieve a semi-legal status which will probably become fully legal as soon as political parties register. The Party has increased its membership during these past three months by at least 3,000 and still growing. Offices have been opened in every section of Habana and in most of the towns in the interior.

2.

Infiltrations in Armed Forces

Much of the strength of the Communist effort in Cuba is directed toward infiltration of the Armed Forces. La Cabaña appears to be the main Communist center, and its Commander, Che Guevara, is the most important figure whose name is linked with Communism. Guevara is definitely a Marxist if not a Communist. He is a frequent guest speaker before the Communist front organizations. Political indoctrination courses have been instituted among the soldiers under his command at La Cabaña. Material used in these courses, some of which the Embassy has seen, definitely follows the Communist line. Guevara enjoys great influence with Fidel Castro and even more with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Revolution, Commander Raul Castro, who is believed to share the same political views as Che Guevara.

The Communist infiltration at La Cabaña is aided by such highly placed Communists as Captain Antonio (Dr.) Nuñez Jimenez, Major Armando Acosta Cordero, and Captain Pablo Ribalta Perez. Two other Communists charged by the PSP with infiltrating the military are Luis Fajardo Escalona and Fidel Domenech Benites.

3.

Communist Infiltration in the Government

Fidel Castro, undisputed head of the Revolutionary Government, has shown a benevolent tolerance toward Communism. In the early days of January Castro said that he would not deliver the Revolution into the hands of the Communists, but in recent speeches he has taken a more liberal attitude toward them, comparing them to such non-political groups as the Masons and the Catholics, and stating that he would not “persecute” them. The question of recognition of the Soviet Union has not been directly confronted by the Government yet, but such statements as have been made by responsible leaders indicate that recognition is likely to come about in due course. The Communists are allowed to operate openly, and it seems probable that whenever political activities are resumed, preparatory to elections, the Communist Party will be permitted to campaign like any other political party.

There are no Communists in the Cabinet although two or three of the Ministers, notably the Minister of Education, Dr. Armando Hart Davalos, are believed to have extreme socialistic tendencies. The party is attempting to place some members in each department who will be able to seize control of their offices if a state of political chaos should occur.

A number of drastic economic and social measures have been promulgated which could be the result of Communist influence but are more probably the product of revolutionary fervor. The similarity of Communist and revolutionary objectives at this juncture favors Communist efforts, and in the tolerant atmosphere prevailing, the Communist movement is growing in strength and influence.

Perhaps the most serious Communist gain to date is reflected in the tendency of the top revolutionary leadership to adopt an intermediate or neutral position in the East-West conflict. Ex-President Figueres posed the issue in his speech in Habana on March 22, when he urged on the Cuban Revolutionary Government the need to place itself firmly on the side of the United States and the free world. This position was rejected by Fidel Castro, who angrily took issue with Figueres, and by David Salvador, acting secretary general of the Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos (CTC), who interrupted Figueres to interject that the struggle of the United States with the Communist world was no concern of Cuba’s. Salvador’s rude conduct and remarks on this occasion were heartily commended by Raul Castro.

4.

Infiltration of Labor Movement

The labor movement was the Communists’ first target, and the one in which they have probably achieved their most substantial success thus far. In the first reorganization of the CTC after January 1, the Communists gained 5 out of the 22 positions in the top directorate. In the revision of the directorate which followed soon afterwards they lost these positions, and their presence is now felt more at the lower and middle levels than at the top. They are particularly strong in Las Villas and Oriente Provinces and control the labor organizations in many companies, including a number of the sugar centrals. Since there are over 1,800 unions in Cuba, it is difficult to determine the exact number which are Communist controlled. The new Government deposed all the former union leaders and replaced them, supposedly, by 26th of July adherents; but the 26th of July Movement did not have many trained labor leaders; so, many Communists masquerading as 26th of July members were able to assume control of unions. Union and federation elections are to be held in the next few months, and it can be expected that the Communists will retain and possibly increase their present strength in this sector. Because the current Party tactic is complete support for the measures of the new Government, the Communists will obtain many votes from naive persons unable to distinguish between the Communist candidates and the true revolutionaries.

In Habana the Communist labor representatives are resisted by the Catholic labor youth organization (JOC) but outside Habana this organization has little strength. ORIT and ICFTU have made no progress with the revolutionary Cuban labor movement, and there are no ties presently between the CTC and the AFL–CIO.

David Salvador, head of the Cuban labor movement, was formerly a member of the Communist Party and may still be one. As already mentioned, he has publicly advocated a neutral position for Cuba in the cold war. The CTC is reported to be purging its ranks of any members who had associations with the United States Embassy.

5.

Influence of Communism in Public Information Media

The Government appears to be moving in the direction of a takeover in the key area of public information, and there is considerable evidence of Communist infiltration. The Communist newspaper Hoy went into publication immediately after January 1. Revolucion, the new newspaper which appears to reflect Government policy more than any other and which has the best access to Government thinking and official releases, shows a disturbing similarity to Hoy at times, even using identical photostats to those of Hoy. Revolucion’s Monday magazine of April 6, which was devoted to the history of revolution, strongly emphasized Communist writings and included the Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx. Carlos Franqui, editor of Revolucion, has been suspected at times of being a Communist, and in any event seems definitely to share many Communist ideas.

Other Commmunist publications such as Mella, the Communist magazine, and Fundamentos are being distributed, and in new and larger editions. Carta Semanal, the clandestine weekly during the Batista days, has not been suspended as was announced in Hoy, but is still published. Carta Semanal is now, however, an internal party organ rather than a propaganda vehicle. The Communists now have two daily radio programs in Habana and are said to be trying to purchase a radio station.

The linotype operators, the press shops, the press rooms, and the administration departments of the newspapers have been controlled by Sindicato Artes Graficas, a Communist-directed organization. Elections are presently going on which will determine whether the Communists will continue in the saddle or the 26th of July people will take over. The financial base of the papers can be threatened at any time by walkouts or by exorbitant wage demands.

Most of the responsible press is unsympathetic to Communism, but anti-Communism has been so successfully identified with pro-Americanism, which at the moment is unpopular because of Fidel Castro’s continued attacks on the United States, that even anti-Communist writers hesitate at taking a strong stand on Communism. Moreover, because of many similarities between the Communist program and the revolutionary program, critics of Communism risk being called counter-revolutionaries and thrown into prison, and few of them wish to be heroes. Carlos Franqui exercises a kind of unofficial censorship over the press. On recent occasions when some newspaper has published an article against Communism it has been taken to task therefor by Franqui and by Revolucion, as well as by Hoy. Franqui is reported also to be calling the turn on wages and salaries to be paid to writers. The going wage for writers will be $300 per month, with a renewed promise from the Government to increase Government advertising to cover the deficit.

Radio and TV stations are also shying away from strongly anti-Communist or pro-U.S. programs. Channel 12, a Government station, is run by a reported Communist, Paco Alfonso. There is a fear among other stations that since frequency allocations are at the mercy of the Ministry of Communications, they may be intimidated to tie-in to specified programs over Channel 12, Radio COCO, Radio CNC (which is Radio Rebelde), and Radio Union (controlled by David Salvador). This could be ruinous to shows which have been the biggest money-earners.

There are definite indications that leaders in the information field, Bohemia, and stations CMQ and Telemundo, would come out flatly against Communist infiltration and Government-imposed self-censorship if given sufficient moral support. They look particularly to the American Embassy for assurances that our anti-Communist position is made clear to leaders of the GOC.

6.

Communist Activities in the Cultural Field

The Communists have been traditionally strong in the field of cultural activities, and were not eliminated therefrom even during the time of Batista. The major national cultural group in Cuba—the Instituto Nacional de Cultura—is headed by Dra. Vincentina Antuña, who is considered a fellow traveller. The Governing Board of the Institute has not yet been selected. Its composition will presumably indicate the political coloration of this organization.

The Cuban Minister of Education has appointed a Commission to rewrite Cuban history texts. On this 9-man commission are Dr. Antonio Nuñez Jimenez, generally reported to be pro-Communist, and Dr. Elias Entralgo, considered in the fellow traveller category.

The Communist-front cultural organization “Nuestro Tiempo,” which was underground in the 1957–58 period, has become active since January 1, 1959. Among its first speakers was Comandante Ernesto “Che” Guevara.

Cultural programs at La Cabaña Fortress have included literacy education and an injection of Marxism, as well as poetry readings by Nicolas Guillén, noted Cuban Communist poet. Before the troops Guillén read his poem on Little Rock concerning racial discrimination in the United States.

Evidence of Communist activity among University of Habana students is still sparse. At a student mass meeting some eight weeks ago, a Communist-line speech was delivered by one of the students. The extent of Communist activity at the University may become clear when students return to the campus and when, presumably in the next few months, the Student Federation (FEU) holds elections.

There are two new film groups in Cuba: 1) the Cine Club-Vision, which, to our knowledge, has had only one meeting and at which the pro-Communist Cuban geographer Dr. Antonio Nuñez Jimenez spoke; and 2) the Cine-Debate program, which consists of the screening of a film followed by a discussion of the film by the public. Admission is usually twenty cents. One of the first programs was held in the Santos Suarez workers section of Habana. While no evidence of Communist activity has been reported in the Cine-Debate, it is understood that this technique is one sometimes used by Communists.

Dr. Juan Marinello, intellectual leader of the Cuban Communists, was authorized to return to his position as a teacher in the Habana Normal School in January. Shortly thereafter he flew to Moscow, where, among other things, he is reported to have given a talk about José Marti.

Two recent television shows have been devoted to debates between Communists and Catholics—additional evidence of the respectability of the Communist doctrine as doctrine today.

More tenuous than the foregoing points is the general atmosphere among intellectuals of reluctance to express anti-Communist sentiments; for fear that they may be accused of being counterrevolutionary. The theme of anti-Communism as part and parcel of the Batista line and as a counterrevolutionary element was sounded by Juan Marinello in an editorial in Hoy early in January.

7.

Attitude of Minor Revolutionary Groups

In the smaller revolutionary groups Communism has made less headway than in the 26th of July Movement. The Directorio Revolucionario is traditionally anti-Communist, but Faure Chomon in his March 13 speech stated that he favored recognition of the Communist countries. The Organizacion Auténtica has also been strongly anti-Communist in the past, and it does not lack members experienced in dealing with Communism; but this Party at present commands no positions of importance in the Government, is short on funds, and is biding its time. Gutierrez Menoyo, leader of the Segundo Frente de Escambray, publicly assumed an anti-Communist position not long ago, but this has not been followed up in any practical way so far as known, and the Segundo Frente is a relatively small military and non-political organization, with little following in the general public.

8.

Attitude of the Church

The Catholic Church has taken an active interest in resisting the spread of Communism, but except where the JOC is concerned, has not been particularly effective. This is due principally to the difficulty of separating the Communist activities from the genuine revolutionary activities, and the unwillingness of important elements in the Church to challenge the revolutionary program. A Church program of religious instruction in various Army camps was recently terminated by order of Raul Castro.

9.

Reasons for Communist Successes

It seems clear that in the present situation Communism has made alarming headway in Cuba in many fields. This seems to be due to a number of reasons, among which the following are important: (1) the Communists did cooperate to some extent with other revolutionary groups in overthrowing the Batista regime and thereby won the right to exist openly after January 1; (2) the Communists have not had to oppose the Castro regime on any fundamental issue to date; Castro has attacked the United States as much as even they could have wished, and his radical social and economic program parallels Communist objectives in many respects; (3) the Communists were ready with trained people to move into many of the vacuums created by the overthrow of Batista, especially the labor field.

10.

Suggestions for Combatting Communism in Cuba

1. The U.S. Government should take a positive, friendly line toward Cuba, Castro, and the objectives of the revolution, but an unyielding attitude toward Communism in Cuba as elsewhere. The Communists are trying to drive a wedge between the revolution and the United States.

2. Embassy officers and leaders of the American business community should make a concerted effort to develop friends within the Government ministries and agencies. Sympathy could be expressed with the basic aims of the Government, such as the agrarian program, elimination of corruption, industrialization, etc., but at the same time politely but firmly getting over the idea that the growth of Communism is something that should not be tolerated since in the end it will destroy the revolution and bring untold grief on the Cuban people.

3. Try to isolate Castro from Communistic influences around him. A press campaign could be stimulated which would throw the spotlight on Communists in positions of importance.

4. Expose local Communist activities in the press of Cuba, the United States and the free world.

5. Strengthen existing anti-Communist elements in their efforts against Communism. Targets:

Government

Armed Forces

Labor unions

Press, and individual writers; radio and TV, political parties and action groups

Church

Students

6. Study Communism and 26th of July objectives and methods for the purpose of discovering any important differences between them. For example, the efforts of the 26th of July to capture all important labor positions to the exclusion of other groups is a particularly sore point with the Communists. This and other differences could be played up and magnified.

7. Try through unattributed methods to build up local and international esteem and prestige for responsible non-Communist figures such as Felipe Pazos, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Justo Carrillo, Ramon Barquin, and others, in an effort to increase their influence in Cuban Government policy and with Fidel Castro.

8. Provide background material of an attributed and unattributed nature on the international Communist conspiracy to friendly editors and editorialists, with emphasis on recent Communist plots in Mexico and Argentina.

9. Have prepared, to give to Castro at a suitable time, a relation of Communistic developments in Cuba and of known Communists and fellow travelers. Prepare also a collection of Castro’s own sayings on Communism and contrast with his attacks on United States.

10. Try, through OAS, local Latin American diplomats, and discreet publicity, to get Cuban Government to confirm its adherence to the Bogota, Washington, and Caracas Resolutions on Communism.²

11. The trip to Washington, if it goes off well, may take some of the sting out of Castro’s anti-Americanism. If he comes back a little less anti-American and a little more disposed to see more realistically Cuba’s place in the international scheme of things, this may well create a point of friction with the Communists, a situation of which we should take full advantage.

12. Expand greatly the program of leader grants in order to provide some of the new leaders with a more accurate picture of the United States than that portrayed by the Communists and fellow travelers.

13. Help anti-Communists to get U.S. visas.

14. Individual officers of the Embassy should try to place USIS literature and books on the subject of Communism in the hands of key officials of the ministries who may be otherwise only superficially concerned with the threat of Communism.

15. Expand USIS efforts in provinces by establishing a reading-room at Santa Clara and by improving the reading-room at Santiago. In both instances work toward the eventual establishment of bi-national centers in each city.

16. Bring down anti-Communist specialists to study the analogy of GOC actions to the Communist line and to brief anti-Communist groups.

For the Ambassador:
Daniel M. Braddock
Minister-Counselor

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.001/4–1459. Confidential. Drafted by Braddock, James A. Noel, Francis J. Donahue, and Bethel.

² Resolution XXXII, “The Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America,” adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948 (Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States (Washington: Pan American Union, 1948), pp. 46–47); Resolution III, “Inter-American Military Cooperation,” adopted at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1951 (American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1294–1295; “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention,” adopted at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, March 28, 1954 (ibid., pp. 1300–1302).

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 15, 1959—noon.

1199. Castro’s trip to United States has assumed increasing importance in minds Cubans during past several days and now generally regarded as one of crucial events of his regime. More revolutionary-minded members of group around Castro look upon trip as historical precedent, considering it first time a Cuban ruler has visited United States representing fully sovereign and equal nation, free from any domination or control. They obviously expect Castro to be firm and independent but there is no indication they expect or wish him to adopt an anti-American attitude. This view is reflected in Revolucion and Diario Nacional, two papers most closely identified with thinking of regime. As to be expected, Commie paper Hoy goes beyond that stand stating there is no need for Castro Kowtow to American imperialists.

Foregoing attitude of confidence and assured independence is not shared by more moderate members of government including cabinet members accompanying Castro. Those people are disturbed over recent public statements by Castro showing anti-Americanism and desire to be neutral in East-West struggle. They are most careful to avoid any appearance of concern or reservation in public statements but their worry is apparent in private conversation. Their concern is at least partly due to their realization of shaky financial prospects of government. They hope to obtain at least promises of financial assistance, but do not appear particularly confident. Their attitude of cautious and discreet concern is shared by most of Habana press.

View of general Cuban public is that visit can make or break Castro. All circles seem aware of nature and importance relations between two countries. Those who are friendly to Castro hope visit will be uneventful and that Castro will behave well. But there are great many, including former ardent supporters now disenchanted or wavering, who appear to hope visit will lead to definite break between United States and Castro. A number of such people, including persons now in government, have privately expressed to Embassy officers hope that United States will be firm in handling Castro, and either force him to reverse his present trends of irresponsibility and radicalism internally and neutrality internationally or break with him.

All circles, both public and private, seem deeply aware of importance of trip both to Cuban internal developments and to Cuban-United States relations and are waiting for show to start with bated breath. This in line with traditional and continuing Cuban tendency to blame all their troubles and problems on United States as well as to look to United States for solutions. That tendency has not altered significantly since beginning year. All statements and actions by United States public figures in connection with trip will be given great significance and exhaustively interpreted and analyzed in Cuba.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–1559. Confidential; Priority.

280. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 15, 1959.

SUBJECT

Briefing Material for the Castro Visit

Under cover of this memorandum I am transmitting to you sixteen briefing papers (Tab A)² on various subjects, some of which may come up in your conversations with Prime Minister Castro at tomorrow’s luncheon. I would think that the principal substantive topics which he may raise are the Cuban sugar quota and the possibility of securing financial aid from the United States. Among your guests will be Mr. Lawrence Myers from the United States Department of Agriculture who is a well-known authority in matters pertaining to sugar and Mr. John Parke Young, Chief of the Department’s International Finance Division, who, incidentally, is personally acquainted with Felipe Pazos, the President of the National Bank of Cuba. The Biographic Intelligence Division has furnished us with sketches of all the Cubans who will attend your luncheon which are also attached.³

Various agencies of the U.S. Government which might possibly become substantively concerned with this visit have been advised that they may receive requests to discuss problems relating to Cuba from Castro or from the members of his official party and are being supplied with suitable briefing material. We have not attempted to make any definitive appointments because we have not been asked to do so by the Cubans.

Although I personally have grave doubts concerning the character and motivation of Prime Minister Castro, I agree with Ambassador Bonsal’s thought expressed in his telegram today (Tab B)⁴ that we should hear Castro out with patience and be willing to discuss with him any matter which he may care to bring up. Dr. Castro is being subjected to pressure from members of his own government (including, I believe, the Ministers who are accompanying him on this trip) to abandon his anti-U.S. stand and to recognize the economic facts of life with regard to the U.S.-Cuba relationship. I feel that our opportunity to talk with Castro during your luncheon and his visit with Vice President Nixon may be our last opportunities to influence favorably his current thinking and deter him from leading Cuba into a position of nationalistic neutralism, which the communists will exploit to the fullest.

It is my thought that we should answer Castro frankly even at the risk of offending him. I do not say this without misgivings, since should he return to Cuba in a hostile mood, I believe that he would not hesitate to attempt reprisals against the many American interests there, including our important Guantanamo Naval Base. Nevertheless, I do not believe that any long-run end will be served by any attempt at appeasement.

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Apr.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson and concurred in by Murphy.

² Not attached to the source text, but see the editorial note, infra. A set of the briefing papers is in Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Briefing Book for Castro Visit.

³ Not attached to the source text, but the biographic sketches are ibid.

⁴ Not attached to the source text, but reference is presumably to Document 277.

281. Editorial Note

On April 15, Fidel Castro arrived at Washington National Airport where he was met by Assistant Secretary Rubottom. Among those in Castro’s party were Minister of Finance Rufo Lopez Fresquet and Castro’s adviser, Teresa Casuso. For their recollections of the visit to Washington, see Rufo Lopez Fresquet, My 14 Months With Castro (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1966), pages 105–112; and Teresa Casuso, Cuba and Castro (New York: Random House, 1961), pages 207–216.

Sixteen briefing papers were prepared in advance of Castro’s visit; see supra. They dealt with the following subjects: “Present Political Situation in Cuba,” “Communist Activities in Cuba Under the Castro Regime,” “Authorization of Arms Shipments to Cuba,” “Extradition to Cuba from the U.S. of Alleged ‘War Criminals’,” “Organized Labor in Cuba,” “Cuba and the OAS,” “Cuban Economic and Financial Situation,” “Sugar,” “Trade Relations and Tariff,” “Problem of Rice,” “Problem of Flour,” “American Investments in Cuba,” “Summary of the Present Status of Cuban Armed Forces,” “Guantanamo Naval Base,” “Nicaro,” and “U.S.-Cuban History & Piatt Amendment.” The briefing paper on the “Cuban Economic and Financial Situation,” dated April 13, discussed Pazos’ memorandum of April 7 (Document 272) requesting economic assistance and set forth the following recommendations:

“It is suggested that we reply to a request for a balance of payments loan with a statement that we cannot consider such loans until a satisfactory stabilization agreement has been arranged with the IMF.

We should make it clear that this is in accordance with our Latin American financial policy that balance of payments loans are made only after the best technical and professional advice of the IMF has been fully utilized. All Latin American countries receiving balance of payments loans have entered into such commitments with the IMF prior to obtaining loans from official U.S. sources.

“As for the need for economic development loans, we should be prepared to express a willingness to study such loans on a case by case basis taking into account the availability of private capital for these projects. We may wish to point out that policies which reduce the inflow of private capital for investment do not necessarily assure that official capital is prepared to enter its place. Also it may be suggested that Government rate-fixing authority where used will need to be exercised in such a manner as to assure the repayment of any development loans.”

A set of the briefing papers is in Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Briefing Book for Castro Visit.

282. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, April 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

Possible Line to Take in Replying to Castro

In my discussions in Habana² I learned that the most popular sport among Americans and Cubans was making suggestions as to how we should treat Castro during his visit here.

Among the suggestions which commend themselves most to the Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified] was a suggestion we take a line at an appropriate time something as follows:

(1) The US Government and people have always been sympathetic to the development of representative democracy and economic and social progress in Cuba ever since the US aided Cuba to gain its independence. They realize that the Cuban people supported the revolution to attain these objectives.

(2) The Cuban revolution, however, was originally neither anti-American nor favorable to Communism, and we are sure that the Cuban people, with their traditional friendship for the US, did not support the revolution for these reasons.

(3) The US desires to maintain the closest and most cordial of relations with Cuba and is sure that this will be possible within the framework of the mutual interests of the Cuban and American people and their devotion to freedom.

The central theme of this, which I heard several times in Habana, is that our response should, with dignity, appeal over the head of Castro to the Cuban people.

It is possible that the Vice President’s speech or some similar occasion would be appropriate to use something along the foregoing lines.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Castro Visit. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hill. Also addressed to Snow.

² In Document 295, Hill mistakenly indicated that he visited Havana April 19–22. The dates of his visit may have been April 9–12 or March 19–22. In a memorandum of April 16 to Orville Anderson, Hill also listed several questions that had been suggested to him by “people in and out of the Embassy” during his visit to Cuba that might be put to Fidel Castro during his meetings with the news media while in the United States. (Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Castro Visit)

283. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 16, 1959¹

Washington, April 16, 1959

SUBJECT

United States-Cuban Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Felipe Pazos, President of the Cuban Central Bank

Dr. Joaquín Meyer, Financial Counselor, Cuban Embassy

ARA—Mr. Rubottom

Dr. Pazos, whom I had not known before, and Dr. Meyer, an old friend, were at my side during the luncheon offered today by Governor Herter for Dr. Fidel Castro.² Dr. Meyer seemed to be somewhat discouraged about the possibilities of Castro’s trip straightening out the misunderstandings which have arisen between Cuba and the United States over the past few months. He said that he was slightly more discouraged today (after speaking to Castro this morning) than he was yesterday prior to the Prime Minister’s arrival.

Dr. Pazos at first seemed uncertain of himself and did not take the initiative in our conversation. I started off by pointing out to him the widespread sympathy and affection which Dr. Castro had evoked from the American people; that the American people had a great capacity for admiration, and even affection, and that much of this had been directed toward Fidel Castro, even before his victory in the Revolution. I said that, notwithstanding the many facets of the U.S. image, there were certain basic loyalties which all sectors of the U.S. hold dear, and that there had gradually developed an attitude of questioning, and perhaps even a feeling of hurt, on the part of many Americans at some of the statements made by Dr. Castro during the past two or three months. It would be a great misfortune to lose such an opportunity and it was my hope that Dr. Castro’s trip would overcome some of these misunderstandings and that he would be able to see the true nature and character of the United States.

Dr. Pazos fully recognized the opportunity that existed and said that he shared my hope, although stating that there was practically nothing that he could do to steer the course of events. Once he said, “I am only a small god, and it is the big gods who have the power in their hands”.

I referred to the presence of three outstanding economic leaders in the present Cuban Government and the impression that their inclusion in Dr. Castro’s party had made here. He admitted that this might lead someone to the conclusion that they were interested in talking about economic and financial matters. I said that the United States had a great capacity for cooperation, one that had been enhanced in the past year even, and that if he and his colleagues wanted to talk about economic matters, certainly an opportunity would be provided. I said that, irrespective of what the United States itself might do, or the private banks or the international institutions, private capital would still have to do the biggest part of the job in Cuba. Therefore, we were interested in the treatment of private investors who had already established themselves in Cuba and the climate that might await any future investors. He seemed to get the point. At the end of the luncheon, he cautiously suggested that it might be helpful if he could talk with Assistant Secretary Upton and me. I asked him whether he would be joined by the Minister of Economy (Dr. Boti) and Minister of Finance (Dr. López Fresquet), and he indicated probably so. A moment later he seemed to back away from this and said that he would telephone me this afternoon.

Dr. Pazos remarked that one way the United States might help Cuba was with its sugar policy. He recalled that the 1948 sugar legislation had worked quite well from Cuba’s standpoint (only impliedly drawing an invidious comparison of the 1956 legislation to the 1948 legislation). I said that, in the present atmosphere here and elsewhere in the world, I could see practically no chance of any better arrangement for Cuba regarding sugar than that under the 1956 legislation under which she had increased her shipments to the United States about 10% already. Dr. Meyer chimed in with an assent. Nevertheless, Dr. Pazos stuck to his guns with the argument that the United States should permit more Cuban sugar to be sold in this country and that it was not living up to its stature as the great champion of liberal trade unless this was permitted. I concluded this period of our discussions by saying that the United States certainly had championed free trade and that it was too bad that more countries did not join in this effort. Dr. Pazos said that “if things go well” he might stay in Washington longer than Castro himself.

Quotable Quotes

The Cuban Army is divided about fifty-fifty between the old Batista Army and the 26th of July members; therefore it is like the old story of the horse and the rabbit, it being about 50% horse and 50% rabbit.

The Cuban Navy is 100% rabbit.

Washington has probably never seen Latin American military people like the Cubans who have come with the Prime Minister—these soldiers have actually engaged in fighting and not a single one has received a decoration.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–1659. Confidential. Drafted by Rubottom.

² See Document 286.

284. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 17, 1959.

G–115

Opposition source² with good contacts in 26 July Movement informed Embassy April 15 that Castro’s close advisers have agreed that he should base his “campaign of agitation and propaganda in U.S. on strategy of exploiting political conflicts between Republican and Democratic parties, using aspirations and desires of Democrats to denounce and attack the Republican administration and its international policies, particularly respecting Latin America”. Source adds that on foregoing basis Castro can allege that Republican administration does not have popular support or sympathy of people, and that when Democratic policy of good neighbor restored GOC will support U.S.

Source says was told foregoing strategy has been worked out in conjunction various Democratic figures, including two unnamed Senators.

Embassy comment. Castro has record of appealing to foreign peoples over heads their governments. Possible he may take such line in some public statements in U.S. However, Embassy considers it more probable foregoing constitutes recommendations some extremists among advisors and not agreed plan action.

Embassy strongly doubts that any United States public figures would lend themselves to this sort of activity, though the ingenuity of some newsmen and pulic relations advisers might be sufficient to cause it to be considered.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4–1759. Confidential. Drafted by Topping.

² Not identified.

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 17, 1959—3 p.m.

1220. For Rubottom. In conversation yesterday Minister Agriculture Sori Marin told me he believed Castro firmly anti-Communist and that this belief basis Sori Marin’s staying in government. He believes that Castro will take on fight against Communists at proper time but that, following tactics so successful in military operations of only taking on one opponent at a time, Castro desires make further progress his “revolution” for which he needs maximum popular support including that of Communists. Sori Marin attrubutes Castro’s recent racial equality statements to this same desire of “uniting people.” I am sure that Sori Marin, for whom I have respect and liking, believes the above.

Sori Marin added that he has been successful in delaying issuance of agrarian reform decree which Castro had promised for April 15 in order that it may be more carefully considered in all its aspects. Sori Marin states that in this and other matters he has been heavily attacked by Communists but adds “I am fighting hard.”

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–1759. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received on April 18 at 12:48 p.m.

286. Memorandum of a Conference Between the President and the Acting Secretary of State, Augusta, Georgia, April 18, 1959¹

Augusta, Georgia, April 18, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Herter then said he was sorry in a way that the President had missed meeting Castro. He described him as a most interesting individual, very much like a child in many ways, quite immature regarding problems of government, and puzzled and confused by some of the practical difficulties now facing him. In English he spoke with restraint and considerable personal appeal. In Spanish, however, he became voluble, excited, and somewhat “wild.” Castro made a plea for patience while his government tries to deal with the situation in Cuba. He acknowledges that he has no knowledge of administration. Mr. Herter added that Castro’s bearded “wild eyed” bodyguard was one of the most startling sights seen in a long time—although they seemed to be quite unskilled in really providing any degree of personal safety. The President recalled a comment that Nehru had made concerning the Arabs and their leaders. When they begin to speak, a kind of accumulated emotional frenzy develops, with the speaker exciting the mob and the mob exciting the speaker.

After a brief further discussion, the President indicated he would like to escort Mr. Herter in to meet the press and have photographs taken, and to present him as his nominee for the great post he was about to assume. Mr. Herter expressed his deep gratitude to the President for the confidence the President was according to him.

G
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 22. The President had left Washington for Augusta, Georgia, on April 14. The time of the meeting is uncertain. According to the President’s Appointment Book, at 9:04 a.m. Herter arrived by helicopter at the Augusta National Golf Club and met with the President. Although Goodpaster’s presence is not mentioned, that is apparently the conference described here. At 9:40 the President met briefly with the press, then returned to his office to announce the appointment of Herter as Secretary of State. (ibid., President’s Appointment Book)

287. Editorial Note

On April 19, Vice President Nixon met in the Vice President’s formal office in the Capitol with Fidel Castro during Castro’s visit to Washington. Nixon concluded his draft summary of the conversation as follows:

“My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere. He is either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline—my guess is the former, and as I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries.

“But because he has the power to lead to which I have referred, we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.12/4–2459)

The draft summary is attached to an April 24 memorandum from Nixon to John Foster Dulles that reads: “Particularly since you were so helpful with suggestions for my talk with Castro, I thought you might like to see the enclosed copy of a memorandum I drafted of our conversation.”

The full text of the draft summary is printed in Diplomatic History, IV, 4 (Fall 1980), pages 426–431. For Nixon’s recollection of the conversation and a portion of the text of the draft summary, see Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) pages 201–203.

At the Acting Secretary’s Staff Meeting on April 20, Rubottom reported that Castro’s talk with Nixon had been “useful” and that Nixon had been “impressed by the force of Castro’s personality.”

Rubottom also noted that there had as yet been no requests for loans from the Cubans. (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, April 1959)

288. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Mexican and Caribbean Affairs (Wieland)¹

Washington, April 21, 1959.

A Latin American newspaperman who has had close relations in the past with Prime Minister Castro and some members of his Government told me today that the Prime Minister met with him at 1:00 am April 20 at the Cuban Embassy. He summarized that meeting as follows:

Castro told him that Vice President Nixon had reprimanded him for recent revolutionary activities against the Nicaraguan and Panamanian governments. Castro said that Nixon had devoted much of his conversation to defending the Somoza government of Nicaragua explaining that the United States considers that President Luis Somoza is trying to lead his government through a transition from the previous dictatorship of the Nicaraguan President’s father to a democracy. Castro remarked that anyone interested in unseating the dictators need not look to the United States for assistance.

At about this point in the conversation in which Castro and my informant were alone they were joined by Carlos Franqui, editor of the newspaper “Revolucion”, and one of Castro’s principal public relations advisers. Franqui told Castro he had to consult him urgently and Castro told Franqui to speak freely in the presence of my informant. Castro asked Franqui what had been the reaction in Cuba to his statement that elections probably would not be held for about four years. (Castro previously had indicated there would be elections in about two years.) Castro commented that he felt he had made a serious blunder in mentioning the four-year period at this time instead of waiting until later. Franqui replied that reaction on this subject so far was not particularly disturbing but that Castro’s remarks that his government would adhere to the inter-American principle of non-intervention and would not support revolutionary expeditions against dictatorships had landed like a bombshell among Castro’s followers. Castro thereupon instructed Franqui to emphasize to the Castro press apparatus that he had carefully limited his reply to questioning on this subject to stating that he had not denounced any commitments and was not sufficiently a fatalist to accept the inevitability of war. (This was in reference to questioning whether he would stand with the west or adopt a neutralist position in a showdown with the Soviet bloc.) Castro said he would clarify this situation further when he addressed a labor rally in Cuba on May 1. Castro told my informant that he intended to proceed fairly rapidly with land expropriation as part of the government’s agrarian reform program. My informant got the impression that the first target of the Castro government would be the United Fruit Company properties in Cuba.

At this point Castro told my informant that he wanted to contract him with a substantial fee to send reports back to Cuba that the American press had distorted Castro’s answers in his various meetings with the press in the United States. My informant here raised some questions whereupon Castro replied that he would continue the discussions on this subject in Miami if Castro decides to spend some time there before returning to Habana, or in the Cuban capital if Miami were cut off the schedule.

At this juncture, Finance Minister Lopez Fresquet joined the group and Castro informed him of the offer he had just made the newspaperman. Lopez Fresquet concurred immediately and told my informant that in weighing the offer he should bear in mind that the Castro government would be in power for a long time because there is no effective opposition to it “nor will there be as long as we have the Ministry for Recovery of Stolen Assests”. Lopez Fresquet said that this Ministry was empowered to investigate and punish “everybody from Prío Socarras up and from Prío Socarras down”.

My informant then told me that he had the impression that Castro is deeply concerned that in his efforts to confuse American public opinion on the real objectives of the Cuban revolution, he has also, by his public statements, caused confusion and uncertainty among his own people in Cuba. Castro will therefore seek to correct this situation on his return and will revert to the attitude he had demonstrated before coming to the United States shortly after returning to Habana. My informant also commented that Castro would be even more dangerous on his return than at present.

My informant also told me that his inquiries among various Latin American elements, both in Washington and in Miami, indicated that Latin Americans generally are opposed to Castro and what he stands for and have been “amazed” at the skill with which the United States Government dealt with the Castro visit. He said that while the naivete displayed by the U.S. press and public had dismayed him the United States Government, according to his observations so far, had gained substantially in the opinion of most Latin Americans as a result of the Castro visit. Castro, on the other hand, he said, had suffered a genuine set back in both Cuba and Latin America but the United States must not lose sight for the moment that there are potential Fidel Castros in every country of Latin America.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–2159. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 21, 1959—4 p.m.

1240. In public ceremony at Habana University last night Raul Castro said political exiles would find refuge and livelihood in Cuba but could not use the country as base for expedition against other nations. He said all groups preparing to depart on expeditions for other regions of LA would be arrested. Said each people must gain its own freedom and expressed hope that those peoples now suffering under dictatorship would rebel but with only moral support from Cuba.

Foregoing remarks contained in speech which was essentially unrestrained and savage attack on various “enemies of Cuban revolution.” Specifically mentioned were Figueres, Cuban writer and intellectual Portell Vila (leading figure in Cuban-American cultural institute, whom Raul accused of being a traitor and in pay of US Government), international press and United States. Castro maintained that American aid to Batista only lessened when rebel army kidnapped half hundred Americans and showed them the barbarities being committed against the Cuban people. He said after kidnapping aid became more indirect though it continued until the fall of Batista. Raul said that charges of communism were really a weapon being used by enemies of revolution. Said he was a principal target and that charge was stylish at moment. Did not define his political orientation. He also said that charges that expeditions against other countries were being organized in Cuba came from enemies and might be used as pretext for attempted invasion or overthrow of Cuban revolution. Implied that international police proposed by Smathers was maneuver directed against Cuba in which Figueres involved. Claimed it was significant that an expedition preparing to invade Nicaragua from Cuba detained by Cuban army, including two Nicaraguans, 28 Cubans and one American who would be presented press within few hours. American not otherwise identified. Warned Cuban armed forces not to be tricked by these maneuvers which were really intended to create pretext for international police force to act against Cuba. Said Cubans would fight any such force which attempted to enter country. Said Cuba was not Guatemala and first person like Castillo Armas who landed here would be annihilated. In conclusion said revolutionary government had firm policy non-intervention in other countries, would permit no intervention in Cuban internal affairs and would carry out revolution regardless any attempted interference.

This may signal ending or considerable lessening of invasion activities within Cuba. It is also further indication of strong anti-American feeling of many of Fidel Castro’s closest associates including Raul. Though the speech obviously handicaps Fidel Castro’s current efforts to explain revolution to American people and to improve Cuban-American relationships, Raul stated it was not impromptu and had been carefully considered.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2159. Official Use Only; Priority.

290. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 21, 1959—6 p.m.

1248. Cuban press and radio coverage of Fidel Castro’s trip to US continued voluminous through April 21. Two general trends becoming evident in handling: (1) Anti-America group such as Communist paper Hoy, 26 July organ Revolucion and Diario Nacional and radio commentator Pardo Llada taking line Castro has confronted essentially hostile audiences but nevertheless getting true picture nature and aims of revolution across to American people without cowering before colossus of north (2) balance of press taking attitude Castro making excellent impression and successfully removing remaining doubts in US re Cuban situation. Nationalistic press playing up Castro statements he seeking no financial assistance, but undertone apparent in many press comments they hope such aid forthcoming.

Castro’s declaration he views all dictatorships including communism harshly given top treatment. His statements concerning elections given delicate and circumspect handling. Wire services stories saying he favors massive US aid program in LA received wide play.

Castro trip correspondent for Revolucion Guillermo Cabrera Infante dedicated his Tuesday² report to systematic depreciation US institutions starting with doubts about valor of US servicemen buried Arlington and ending with confidence Castro will win battle public opinion in NY in spite gangsters, Time, Life and their like.

Communist daily Hoy, Revolucion and Diario Nacional went to great lengths to discredit Castro’s questioners on TV program Meet The Press seen live in Cuba. Hoy showed concern for Castro’s anti-Communist statements. Asking Fidel to “clarify” his statements, Hoy suggested Castro’s words were twisted by translators and cited “international Yankee press conspiracy against Cuba” as real source such statements.

At meeting night April 20 honoring students killed after abortive April 1958 strike Raul Castro made violent anti-America speech very much out of character with Fidel’s pronouncements in US (Embtel 1240³ ). July 26 organ Revolucion gave speech small play with details omitted, apparently recognizing conflict. Other papers, notably Diario de la Marina and Informacion, give speech frontpage treatment with full text.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–2159. Official Use Only.

² April 21.

³ Supra.

291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, April 22, 1959—7 p.m.

822. Castro visit here considered very successful by Dihigo and attitude and remarks of accompanying officials would indicate they share this view. Castro cordially received on all sides and visit followed with much interest by press and general public. Dept gave all possible assistance when asked and pleased there were no untoward incidents. Offer was made to Dihigo to furnish liaison officer to accompany official party as suggested by Amb. Bonsal but was declined with thanks. Castro not particularly enthusiastic or expansive in his statements re Cuban alignment with U.S. in cold war and against communism and sidestepped other questions. Preliminary evaluation² visit pouched today.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–2259. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson, cleared with Little and Anderson, and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter.

² Presumably the memorandum infra.

292. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, April 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Unofficial Visit of Prime Minister Castro of Cuba to Washington—A Tentative Evaluation

In the Department’s opinion the Castro who came to Washington was a man on his best behavior who carefully followed the advice of his accompanying Ministers and accepted the direction of an American public relations expert. The result achieved by Castro in terms of a favorable reception by the public and the information media may therefore be considered as contrived. At the same time, we should not underestimate the effect on Castro of the friendliness and openness of the American people and officials and their willingness to hear his plea for understanding of the Cuban revolution. When he departed from Washington for Princeton on April 20 he was certainly warmer in manner toward the Department officials who bade him farewell than he was in his greeting to them upon his arrival.

A preliminary analysis of the result of his Washington visit indicates that:

(a) By his apparent frankness and sincerity he succeeded in allaying much of the criticism which had arisen against him in the general press and public.

(b) With regard to his position on communism and the cold war struggle Castro cautiously indicated that Cuba would remain in the western camp. However his position here must still be regarded as uncertain. He did [not] go sufficiently far in his declarations to be vulnerable to the criticism of the radicals among his supporters, and his future course may be indicated by the manner in which he handles them upon his return to Cuba.

(c) There is a possibility that the land reform program which Castro considers to be the essential key to the future well-being of the Cuban people may adversely affect certain American-owned properties in Cuba. We may also have increased difficulties with regard to the United States Government-owned Nicaro Nickel Plant. Castro made it clear, however, that he has no desire to create any issue with regard to our Guantanamo Naval Base.

(d) From his speeches and statements it is evident that Castro is much more concerned with ends than means and that he does not have the same idea of law and legality as we have in the United States. He appears to confuse the roar of mass audiences with the rule of the majority in his concept of democracy.

On balance, despite Castro’s apparent simplicity, sincerity and eagerness to reassure the United States public, there is little probability that Castro has altered the essentially radical course of his revolution. From his experience here he has gained a valuable knowledge of American public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to deal with on his return to Cuba. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate this man. With all his appearance of naiveté, unsophistication and ignorance on many matters, he is clearly a strong personality and a born leader of great personal courage and conviction. While we certainly know him better than before, Castro remains an enigma and we should await his decisions on specific matters before assuming a more optimistic view than heretofore about the possibility of developing a constructive relationship with him and his government.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series, April 1959. Confidential. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which was attached to a brief covering memorandum of April 23 from Herter to the President. On the source text the President wrote, “File. We will check in a year!! DE”.

293. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and Lawrence Crosby of the Cuban-American Sugar Council, Department of State, Washington, April 23, 1959¹

Washington, April 23, 1959

SUBJECT

Mr. Crosby’s Conversation with Fidel Castro in New York on the Evening of April 22

Mr. Larry Crosby, representative of the Cuban-American Sugar Council called today to tell Mr. Mann about the conversation which he and Mr. David Kaiser of the Cuban-American Sugar Company had with Fidel Castro last night. Mr. Crosby said that he reviewed for Dr. Castro the history of Cuban-American sugar relations over the past 25 years and explained to him the essential points of the Sugar Act of 1956.² Castro evidenced some knowledge of the sugar question, apparently having been briefed on this subject recently. The provision of the 1956 Act which allocates any deficits by domestic suppliers in meeting their quota entirely to other segments of the domestic industry (described by Mr. Crosby as harmful and unfair to Cuba particularly in the light of past practice), was explained to Dr. Castro as something which Cuba might seek to have modified when the Act comes up for renewal. At the same time it was pointed out to him that there is almost no chance that Cuba can receive any increase in her quota in the United States market which must be obtained at the expense of the U.S. producers (including Hawaii and Puerto Rico). Mr. Crosby found Castro to be much more reasonable and realistic in private, in contrast to his public statements, with regard to the practical possibilities of any improvement in the Cuban share of the United States sugar market.

The Minister of Economy, Boti, took part in this conversation and Mr. Crosby got the impression that he is well-informed on the Cuban sugar situation and would be perfectly contented if the present Sugar Act could be extended unchanged. He was advised by Mr. Crosby that this is also his opinion except for a possible modification of the domestic deficit arrangement as mentioned above. Mr. Crosby said that he urged Dr. Castro to have Cuba ratify the International Sugar Agreement and was supported in this position by Minister Boti but received no answer from Dr. Castro on this point.

Mr. Mann explained to Mr. Crosby that he had discussed the question of the renewal of the Sugar Act with Mr. Kemp and a group from the domestic beet-sugar industry and had told them that he is strongly opposed to the introduction of new sugar legislation at this time and prefers to wait until the Cuban political situation has clarified before taking up this matter. Mr. Crosby said that he is fully in accord with Mr. Mann’s thinking on this point and that he will endeavor to make his views known to Congressman Sam Rayburn within the next few days.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.235/4–2359. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Stevenson.

² The Sugar Act of 1956, approved on May 17, 1956. (70 Stat. 217)

294. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, April 23, 1959¹

Washington, April 23, 1959

SUBJECT

Cuban Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Joaquín Meyer, Financial Counselor, Cuban Embassy; Representative of the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute

Mr. William A. Wieland—Director, CMA

Mr. Edward S. Little—Deputy Director, CMA

In the course of a luncheon today, Dr. Meyer raised the following points:

1. Dr. Meyer thought that the Castro visit had gone off very well and was successful. He expressed his view that, following the return to Cuba of Castro, the United States should assess his direction in terms of United States-Cuban relations and should make up its mind whether it wished, on the basis of Castro’s performance, to get behind him or to part ways with him. He thought that the United States should assay the situation after Castro’s return, then determine its course of action. He warned against an indecisive, “wobbly” position.

2. Commenting on the three economic advisers accompanying Castro, Dr. Meyer said that he regards Minister Boti and Felipe Pazos as very able but with very little influence. Minister Lopez Fresquet, he thought, is close to Castro but spoke disparagingly of his motives.

3. Dr. Meyer said that he had heard that Assistant Secretary Mann has recommended that the Congress take no action on the extension of the Sugar Act until 1960. He commented that some members of the U.S. sugar industry were disturbed by this position. Dr. Meyer said that he thought that this would be a great mistake because of the political repercussions of not having this issue resolved at this time. He thought that leaving the issue unresolved would give Castro the opportunity to use it for the next year whenever he wished to divert attention from domestic problems and that this would result in deterioration of United States-Cuban political relations. He expressed concern that Communists and others would also exploit the error throughout the hemisphere. Dr. Meyer believes that simple extension, even though it does not meet Castro’s current public position, would mean that the question of the sugar quota, as an issue, would be eliminated, at least for this critical period. On the other hand, he thought, to recommend suspended action at this time would result in a far worsened situation, and he predicted an even more critical problem for the United States when the issue comes up again before the next session of Congress. He emphasized that he was speaking personally, and not in any official capacity. He said he wished to make this clear because be expects the Cuban Government will soon officially request better treatment for Cuban sugar. Dr. Meyer thought he might want to discuss his views on the matter with Mr. Mann or Mr. Turkel.

[Here follows discussion of visa matters.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2359. Official Use Only. Drafted by Little and Wieland.

295. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, April 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Cuban Situation

The following is a summary of impressions and conclusions which I obtained in Habana on April [March?] 19–22² as a result of my detailed consultation with the Embassy, [less than 1 line not declassified], USIS, and the Service Attachés as well as my own observations. It is important to remember that this was before Castro’s visit to the US.

Public Attitudes. All American observers were agreed that Castro had lost the support of most of the propertied classes but retained the support of the masses. The point was made by several that the latter was ephemeral—probably 400,000 of the 600,000 Habaneros who demonstrated for Castro in January were the same persons who demonstrated for Batista after the 1957 students’ attempt to assassinate him—and that much of this support would evaporate as Castro’s actions tended to aggravate the already difficult economic and unemployment problems looming in the next several months.

My impression, however, is that Castro retains a very strong following among the less privileged people and that the propertied and disaffected elements are guilty of some degree of wishful thinking in counting on a rapid growth of popular opposition to him. Added to the natural attraction of the victor and strong man, Castro is a colorful figure and appears to have been remarkably successful in projecting among the populace the image of a leader sincerely dedicated to solution of Cuba’s problems and to asserting Cuba’s national dignity. One saw on the streets groups still raptly listening to his broadcasts and, on questioning people one finds, particularly, admiration for his “honest” government and hope for his promised reforms. Disillusionment may come slowly, especially as the regime with Communist support may be expected to heap blame for difficulties on the rich, counter-revolutionaries, the US, etc.

Among the propertied classes and even among “bourgeois” journalists and intellectuals, opposition to Castro was startlingly pronounced and there was an atmosphere of concern amounting to fear. The symptoms were many: a number of wealthy people—I met one myself—were leaving Cuba with their families in expectation of more troubled times later; money for anti-government activities is said to be even more available than in Batista’s time; letters were being smuggled abroad for mailing for fear that there was censorship and any critical remarks would lead to trouble; there was constant talk of a “crisis” in, variously, June, July, August; Americans in the Embassy reported that Cuban friends felt unsafe being seen with them and while I was there practically none of the Cuban guests showed up at a party given by our Assistant Naval Attaché.

Communism. Among the propertied classes, there appeared to be very real concern about the mushrooming of Communism, and all officers of our Embassy are very alert to this problem. Specific instances were widely known in Habana of Communists in labor, in the armed forces and in public information media. Less well known, perhaps, is the rapid progress Communists were making in infiltrating the educational system and in organizing characteristic “mass” organizations. A reputed Communist has been included in the commission to revise school texts, and Communists were said to be behind a current wave of difficulties affecting secular and religious private schools. A Communist-front women’s organization was being formed while I was there. In the Armed Forces, persons who are at least pro-Communists feature prominently in “G–6”, the Army indoctrination section at Camp Libertad and at Cabaña Fortress. Everyone is agreed that Castro and his advisers had made it impossible to speak up firmly against Communism without being charged as a counter-revolutionary.

Graft. Although in public the regime still emphasized “honest” government, there were signs of deterioration. A reputable businessman swears that Haydee Santamaria de Hart, wife of the Minister of Education, personally called him to demand $300,000 for the July 26 Movement—she became very angry when he asked if there would be a receipt and legalization of the collection—and there were numerous reports of similar extortions under the pretext of continuation of July 26 “taxes”. There was no accounting of these funds, and general acceptance that they were at least in part being diverted to personal use by the new elite. On a lower scale, there were reports that unemployed “barbudos” are beginning to put the squeeze on shopkeepers, etc.

Political Organization. Although Castro has announced that the July 26 Movement would be transformed into a political movement, this has not been done. He has no organized political support of his own. The “spontaneous” crowds—as at the March 22 rally attended by Figueres—are turned out by the labor movement. Only the Communists have an active organization.

Security and Armed Forces. The evaluation of our Service Attachés, generally concurred in by the Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified], was that there were only three units with any sort of discipline and organization:

(A) The Navy—which although cleaned out of senior officers has retained its professional junior officers and non-coms;

(B) The Marines, which are outside of Habana and

(C) The “Paratroops,” now undergoing basic training south of Habana under Major Borbonet.

The Army in Habana was most often described as a “rabble in arms” although the state of discipline in Guevara’s La Cabaña is somewhat better than at Camp Libertad. The discipline evident in January had disintegrated as veterans have dispersed, and no effort is made to maintain and train the remaining “barbudos” in unit strength. There are apparently no formations, drills or even morning strength reports, and individual groups simply live in various houses around the city. All but ten percent of the former Cuban officers and non-coms and the bulk of the enlisted men had been dismissed or simply drifted off. The civil police had been somewhat improved over the weeks immediately prior to my arrival, but the consensus was that there was no force in existence to maintain public order in Habana in the event of serious disturbances.

Opposition Elements. There was agreement among all observers that, despite increased middle and upper-class discontent and the willingness of some wealthy elements to finance opposition to Castro, there was in fact only embryonic opposition activity. The reasons said to be usually given by Cubans for this was that “it is still too early” or “too dangerous”. The principal nuclei of opposition appeared to be as follows:

Catholic Groups. A number were organizing specifically to counter Communism and generally to oppose Castro’s program and, if necessary and feasible, Castro himself.

Autenticos. Although Varona and Prio are kept under close surveillance, the former was staying in the limelight by TV appearances and quietly seeking to reorganize and build up the OA while keeping his lines out with other opposition elements. He is being very cautious at this stage.

Ex-Army Personnel. This group, for whom no economic provision has been made, were greatly discontented and there was a good deal of plotting—in the planning stage—going on among various handfuls of them, but they were not organized. Barquin, who had been on a two-day leave, was being cautious. Cantillo was in the hospital following an ulcer operation and was no longer considered a factor.

Businessmen. Several businessmen’s groups were discussing possible ways to counter the trend if not more directly to oppose or overthrow Castro.

Second Front. Gutierrez Menoyo still had a considerable number of men under arms in Las Villas province and was generally considered to be anti-Communist. However, there was some speculation that he was acting with the full knowledge and concurrence of Castro who wanted to preserve his people in the hills as a counter to any possible counter-revolution.

Directorio Revolucionario. There were reports that there was dissatisfaction within this students’ organization with Faure Chomon’s statements favorable to Communism and Chomon himself was reportedly recently arrested.

There was agreement that a unified opposition, made up of these disparate elements, was not a likelihood for at least some months.

Basic Questions. During my visit, I asked all observers for their personal estimates on four questions, as follows:

(A) What would happen if Castro were killed or otherwise was incapacitated. There was general agreement that the situation would disintegrate, probably dangerously. Although Raul Castro might temporarily succeed to the leadership, he would not be generally accepted even within the July 26 Movement. There was no force capable of resisting any mass hysteria which might ensue.

(B) Assuming that Castro did not modify the trend of anti-Americanism, pro-Communism and economic reforms what could be expected to happen. (This was before his US visit.) The consensus, with two exceptions, was that matters would head for a crisis sometime between July and December 1959 and that there would be no leadership prepared to take over. The two exceptions inclined to the view that a crisis would take somewhat longer to mature, one of them citing the bourgeois mentality of Cuba as a factor which would tend to slow Castro down from a precipitous course.

(C) The growth of Communism. There was general agreement that the Party would be allowed to operate freely and would increase its capacity to influence Cuban national life. I strongly emphasized to all concerned the importance of having detailed documentation and evaluation.

(D) Intervention by Castro in the other Caribbean countries. There was, at the time, a large number of reports of planning and preparation for revolutionary activities, but our observers, taking into account discussion and disorganization, tended to discount the possibility of any immediate expeditions backed by Castro and Company.

Special Problems. In my discussions I found: (a) USIS was anxious to develop a strong program but was unable to do so because of insufficient staff and guidance; and (b) the political section was seriously handicapped by lack of stenographic help. I am taking up the details with the appropriate people in Washington. It appears particularly important to me that the Mission be equipped to undertake a strong program among students, for which it does not now have the personnel.

It also appears to me that there is an urgent need for the Embassy and the agencies in Washington to focus more carefully on what we would do if: (a) Castro were assassinated; (b) we were to conclude he endangered our vital interests; or (c) the situation in Cuba disintegrates. Particularly, we should examine how we might, as the situation matures, identify and develop an alternative acceptable to us.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–2459. Drafted and initialed by Hill. Also sent to Snow and Wieland. Rubottom wrote the following on the source text: “Thanks. An excellent report. Should be provided G”.

² See footnote 2, Document 282.

296. Editorial Note

On April 25, a boatload of about 90 armed people, mostly Cubans, landed on the isthmus of Panama and began a march through the jungle toward Colon. The Council of the Organization of American States met in emergency session in Washington and decided to send an investigating committee to Panama, consisting of representatives from Brazil, the United States, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Paraguay. The committee held discussions with representatives of the invading group and secured their unconditional surrender on May 1. In a broadcast on April 28 from Trinidad, where he was en route to Buenos Aires, Castro denounced the invasion as irresponsible. The leaders of the group subsequently said that they had surrendered so as not to embarrass Castro. Documentation on the invasion attempt is scheduled for publication in volume V.

In a memorandum of May 5 to Snow, John Dreier, U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States and a member of the OAS investigating committee sent to Panama, described his impressions of the invasion leaders:

“In talking with these people, I gained the impression that their outstanding motivation was an instinctive desire to join in any revolutionary activity that they encountered—much as Castro’s own record would indicate that he had done. Several people were veterans of the Cayo Confites expedition against the Dominican Republic of 10 years ago in which Castro participated. The people we talked to seemed genuinely enthused over their revolutionary mission. Most of them were uneducated and had no ideas of what a democracy was and had been given to believe that the Panamanian people were suffering under a Batista-like dictatorship and would rise and overthrow the government with their help. On their arrival in Panama, they found this to be far from the case”.

The memorandum continued:

“This revolutionary enthusiasm was centered about a fantastic idealization of Fidel Castro. On more than one occasion they said that their fundamental credo was ‘After God—Fidel Castro.’ The reason they decided to give up was unquestionably that Fidel Castro told them to—the OAS giving them an additional dignified way out and some implied assurances of decent treatment by Panama. However, the leaders had no illusions as to the trouble they might get into when they returned to Cuba in view of Castro’s remarks”. (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1959)

297. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs (Stewart) and Herbert L. Matthews of The New York Times, Department of State, Washington, April 28, 1959¹

Washington, April 28, 1959

SUBJECT

Aftermath of Fidel Castro Visit to United States

Mr. Matthews called for information on Panama but in view of the fluid situation he said his newspaper would refrain from editorial comment for another day at least. I commented favorably upon Cuba’s attitude in the OAS and Mr. Matthews replied that the following information he had just received should be of interest to the Department:

1. Fidel Castro sent an emissary to tell Mr. Matthews that Castro decided to attend the Committee of 21 meeting in Buenos Aires² so that he would have an excuse to be absent from Cuba on May 1. The reason, his emissary explained, is that Castro does not want to be associated with any communistic maneuvers that may take place on that day.

2. The same emissary was instructed to tell Mr. Matthews that Castro plans when he returns to Cuba to clean out all communists from official positions in the Cuban Government, specifically including the armed forces.

Mr. Matthews expressed the belief that Castro laid down this line to Raúl Castro in Houston and during their flight yesterday to Trinidad. In discussing Fidel’s trip to the United States, Mr. Matthews said it was generally beneficial but was particularly helpful in that Castro’s United States friends were able to point out the dangers of communism in a more effective way than in a Latin American country, where the menace is regarded more lightly. Mr. Matthews said that he felt that Castro’s message to him was the result of his visit to the United States.

As for Castro’s attitude toward the invasion of Panama by a Cuban-based group, as reflected by Ambassador Roa’s speech in the OAS today, Mr. Matthews said that the Premier’s thinking evolved gradually from the attitude that if he had staged his movement from Mexico why shouldn’t other revolutionists use Cuba to one of recognizing the responsibility of his country in maintaining the integrity of the inter-American system.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/4–2859. Confidential. Drafted by Stewart.

² Castro cut short his visit to Canada and flew to Houston, Texas, on April 26, where he conferred with his brother, Raul. From there they proceeded to Buenos Aires to attend a meeting of the Special Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States to Study the Formulation of New Measures for Economic Cooperation (Committee of 21).

298. Letter From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

San José, April 30, 1959.

Dear Dick: Thank you for your letter of April 24th in reply to mine of April 16th² in which I discussed the problem as to whether there is Communist domination in Cuba of a kind which would require invocation of the Caracas Resolution.³ Your letter is most interesting and particularly so in the light of events in Panama since it was written.

Much of the basis of your feeling that action under the Caracas Resolution should not be considered at this time seems to stem from the statements of Fidel and Raul Castro that the Cuban Government would not permit the organization of expeditions to invade other countries, especially since “they have backed up these words by breaking up a Nicaraguan revolutionary group and stopped another group headed for Haiti”. If the official statements of the Government of Panama and the reports in the press are to be given credence it now appears that despite these assurances the present attacking forces in Panama originated in Cuba. Unless there is some excellent explanation to the contrary I find it difficult to believe that this could have happened without the connivance, to say the very least, of high officials in the Cuban Government, particularly in the army. This conclusion seems even more plausible in view of the fact that it is known that the army is riddled with Communists and that it is generally believed that “Che” Guevara, among others, holds a very strong position of control. I am only reflecting the worries of such experienced observers of Communist tactics as Serafino Romualdi, with whom I conversed yesterday, when I point this out to you. It seems to Mr. Romualdi and to me, admittedly viewing the matter from a distance, that the Castro visit to the United States was very probably one of the most blatant soft-soap jobs in recent Communist history. (I gather from your own letter and from a communication from Allan Stewart⁴ that the Department is still preserving a certain amount of skepticism about Castro.) I wish to add that in my talk with Romualdi yesterday he feels that the United States is in extreme danger of “adopting appeasement methods in Cuba and that we should politely but firmly refuse anything by way of assistance to Cuba until action has been taken to clean out Communist elements in key power spots”. So far as I myself am concerned I will begin to believe some of the statements that Fidel Castro has made that neither he nor his movement are Communist when, and only when “Che” Guevara and the other top Communists are given a one way ticket out of the country.

Assuming, as I do, that the Department has kept us informed of all pertinent information about the attack on Panama, it is practically impossible to believe that any one would have started it, and that Cuban army personnel could be involved except under one theory, i.e., that the Cuban part of the affair is Communist. I say this because all concerned in the attack must have realized that it was inconceivable that the United States would tolerate a direct threat to the Panama Canal and, as has proved to be the case, equally inconceivable that the Organization of American States would sit by quietly in such a situation. Therefore, from the point of view of those leading the invasion it would seem that they should have known better than to even undertake it. Viewed, however, from the point of view of the Communists, the attack on Panama makes great sense. In this connection I recall the remark of Pepe Figueres, reported to you in my cable No. 387 of April 7, 1959⁵ to the effect that he felt that Communist strategy in Cuba might well prove to be aimed towards creating a situation so intolerable to the United States that we would have to intervene and thus set the stage for a Western Hemisphere “Hungary in Reverse”. In this connection I feel that all of us can be quite sure that in view of this attack on Panama our military will be urging strongly in high level deliberations the inadvisability of tolerating the current situation in Cuba any longer.

Additionally, there is the obvious advantage to the Communists of keeping up the ferment in the Caribbean, particularly at a time of crisis in Europe and other parts of the world.

In short, while you state in your letter that “considerable progress is being made in calming down this phase of Caribbean tensions” I unfortunately find myself in complete disagreement. I feel that the situation in the Caribbean today is worse than it ever has been and that it is going to get much worse very rapidly unless the Communist beachhead in Cuba is liquidated. This has been my consistent position for a long time now and I am sorry that I find it difficult to feel otherwise.

I was extremely interested in the statements in the second paragraph of the first page of your letter discussing the possibility of using the Caracas Resolution against Cuban Communism, that “even in the earlier case of Guatemala it was felt that to prove that such a situation existed as the basis for international intervention would be extremely difficult” and “the present situation in the Caribbean gives far less of a justification for invoking this clause”. Since the Guatemalan situation arose when you were not in the Department and since I was intimately involved in this whole problem both in the field and in constant and frequent consultations on the highest levels in Washington, I think my comments would be helpful. Your predecessor, Henry Holland, in a meeting involving most of the top interested people in the government and chaired by Bedell Smith,⁶ took the firm position that the Caracas Resolution had been tailor made by Secretary Dulles and himself to suit the Guatemalan situation. He went on to say that if arrangements could be made to stop the impending Castillo Armas revolution he was confident that Communism could be uprooted from Guatemala by a Meeting of Consultation under the Resolution. He was so persuasive in his arguments in certain quarters that twice steps to prevent the revolution were taken and as a result it got postponed so long that it very nearly failed. In view of the fact that Henry Holland’s views were ultimately overruled you are perhaps literally correct in your statement that you made about the feeling as to whether the proper basis for using the Resolution existed in the Guatemalan case. Actually I can assure you that the reason that Holland was overruled was not because there was any fear that ultimately a sound case proving international Communism in control of Guatemala could not be made. The Guatemala decision was based upon two other factors: 1) that the procedure would take too long, during which time irreparable damage might be done by Guatemalan based Communists in the rest of the Caribbean, and 2) doubt as to the effectiveness of the action which the OAS might take, even though they found that Communism was in control of Guatemala.

As to your statement that there is less justification for the Caracas Resolution now than in the Guatemalan situation, here again I find myself in complete disagreement. Strategically Cuba is obviously much more important than Guatemala, sitting as it does astride the sea lanes from our own Southwest [Southeast] and of all Latin America. Secondly the question of whether the degree of domination of the political institutions of Cuba is greater or less awaits the official intelligence appraisal I advocated in my letter of April 16th. However, several excellent observers such as Romualdi, Figueres and Betancourt seem to think there is a thorough Communist grip there in most of the vital areas and much of our own intelligence bears this out. Finally, and this seems to be the guts of the situation, it is generally agreed that the Communists have a very strong position of command and control in the army. This they never achieved in any effective manner in the Guatemalan situation. Indeed, as I pointed out in my letter, to the extent the Communists control the Cuban army, they control the “political institutions” of Cuba. It was probably in large measure due to the stabilizing force of the military in Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia that the Communists did not emerge further. This certainly was true in Honduras during the upsets I witnessed in my four years as Ambassador there.⁷

You also discuss in your letter my recommendation that the Intelligence community be asked for an “official evaluation of the degree of control of the political institutions of Cuba by international Communism”. Naturally, as you state, you are keeping very closely in touch with all sources of intelligence with a view to evaluating exactly what the influence of Communism is upon the present Cuban Government. This is not what I meant by my suggestion. It is one thing to keep watching intelligence material as it comes across one’s desk. It is an entirely different thing to pose a specific question, such as the one I have suggested, to the Intelligence community, and ask them to come up with an answer. For instance, if Allen Dulles were required to answer “to what extent is the Cuban army dominated by Communism” he would have to reply either that it was wholly so, “X” percent so, not so, or that he did not know. I think in this situation we need hard and realistic answers such as the one I am suggesting we get.

I wish to refer again to my ideas about invoking the Caracas Resolution. For years now I have been suggesting that we have permitted the Caracas Resolution to be a dead letter. The only action that I know that has ever been taken under the Caracas Resolution is to establish liaision offices to exchange information—a process which was already going on less formally. Perhaps other action has been taken in areas of Latin America with which I am unfamiliar but certainly nothing has happened in Central America. In this connection I have advocated that attempts should be made to persuade our neighbors to pass legislation requiring that Communists and any other persons receiving assistance from abroad register this fact and the details of such assistance. This, as I pointed out to you in my letter of June 3, 1958⁸ would, in my opinion, be the basis thereafter for sound and documented publicity of the Communist intervention in local affairs. I also suggested while I was in Honduras, in commenting upon a draft OCB directive, that it should be a part of our policy and known to be such, that the degree of our aid to any country would be weighed in accordance with its attitude and actions concerning the Communist international conspiracy. I know that there is a considerable body of thought that feels that there should be no strings attached to aid. Personally I find myself in total disagreement with this philosophy so far as this area is concerned.

In conclusion I reiterate my view that the concrete foundation for a possible ultimate submission of the threat of Communism in Cuba and the Caribbean to the OAS should now be laid by asking the Intelligence community to answer the specific question above quoted. Assuming that the answer indicates a high degree of control by Communism in Cuba I then submit that it would be a very healthy thing to put the matter before the OAS to accomplish two objectives:

1) To give due publicity to the facts through an appropriate Inter-American forum.

2) To make each country stand up and be officially counted on its attitude towards international Communism.

In support of this view I submit that we have been avoiding a showdown with our neighbors too long. I know that many feel that such a showdown would lose us friends but I feel that the opposite result would follow. I assure you that I have the greatest respect for your own firmness on Communist matters, but I am constantly worried by remarks and attitudes of others who seem at the very least to have succumbed to a sense of defeatism. All too often I hear it said, “Latin Americans think of Communism only as another political party” or “The Latin American leaders, as politicians, have to accept support wherever they can” or “such and such a leader is not a Communist because he accepts Communist support and he will get rid of the Communists later on”. It is true that there are many Latins who speak and feel this way. But I refuse to believe that they are in the majority, in the sense of the amount of control they exercise.

This much is certain—that what I am suggesting is pretty tough medicine and it may very well have far reaching repercussions in Latin American relations. However, it is equally certain that Communism has gained rapidly in Latin America in the last five years and every indication favors greater gains. I submit that we can no longer put aside a headlong attack on this problem in the hope that by avoiding it we will somehow or other save ourselves from the risk of disputes with our neighbors and thus, somehow or other, increase the strength of the hemisphere. We must either, as the admitted leaders of the hemisphere, come openly to grips with the international Communist conspiracy, or run serious risks that Latin America will at the very least be neutralized as a source of strength to us. Looked at another way, I fear the situation as to Communism in the Caribbean (at least) will deteriorate so badly if we do not do something drastic soon, that we will later be forced to directly intervene for our own self preservation.⁹

Sincerely yours,

Whiting Willauer

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.001/4–3059. Secret. Willauer also sent copies to Herter, Loy Henderson, Dreier, Stewart, and Wieland.

² Neither letter has been found.

³ The “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention,” adopted at the Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, March 28, 1954. (American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, vol. I, pp. 1300–1302)

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 713.00/4–759)

⁶ Records of meetings in Washington beginning in May 1954 are printed in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IV, pp. 1102 ff. There is no indication, however, that Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith took part in the meetings.

⁷ Willauer served as Ambassador in Honduras from February 1954 to March 1958.

⁸ Not found.

⁹ In an attached note dated July 14, Frank Devine told Hill that it was his understanding that because of the elapsed time, the various letters that Dreier had prepared on this subject, and the fact that Willauer had recently returned to the United States, no reply was needed or intended to Willauer’s letter.

299. Memorandum From Benjamin Stephansky of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow)¹

Washington, April 30, 1959.

SUBJECT

May Day in Cuba

It is no occasion for rejoicing that Fidel Castro will not celebrate May Day in Havana.

From various sources we have pieced together the following components of the May 1 pageant planned by the CTC in Havana:

1. The CTC May Day planning committee is reportedly a seven-man committee, two of whom are prominent Communists—Lazaro Peña and Ursinio Rojas.

2. The speakers program consisted of six pieces of oratory before Fidel bowed out: Fidel, three 26 of July labor leaders, one Autentico and one Communist.

3. Organizations from all ideological persuasions from all of Latin America have been invited to send representatives. Communist organizations have been invited and will be represented; and there may well be some prominent Communist labor figures from Europe and other areas.

4. This morning’s Times and Post carry a most disturbing piece on a “workers militia” which will parade on May Day—a militia, according to Che Guevara (as reported in the Times), designed “to defend the revolution so that the enemies of the revolution will know that when they wish to come here they will not only find the Army but also the workers armed to defend this revolution of the people”.

Che Guevara, on the same TV program on which he explained the nature of the workers’ militia, also was reported as stating that he believed the Communists “were capable of working honorably with other groups for national unity”. He called them “revolutionists”, implying, of course, a blood relationship, therefore, with the 26 of July revolutionists. Guevara also reportedly stated he favored diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. His reasoning, reportedly, was that if Cuba maintained diplomatic relations with such of its “enemies” as the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, it was logical to have diplomatic relations with a country that combats these enemies.

The May Day show in Havana, thus, promises to have a real Communist flavor—by its planning, its invitees, its oratory and the workers militia. It offers a most respectable forum—a July 26 revolutionary forum—for the Communists to peddle their “national unity,” “friends of the people,” “friends of the revolution,” and “friends of labor” line.

To return to Fidel Castro, now, and the possible significance of his missing this May Day show. There are one of two possible interpretations:

1. If Fidel means what he said here about Communism and intends to do something about it, an appearance on May 1 would (a) tend to lend his prestige to a show which is friendly to Communism; or (b) place him in the position of risking his popularity at a show rigged against any anti-Communist declaration. He could feel, perhaps rightly, that this was not the time or place to take on the Communists.

2. Another interpretation is, however, that Fidel didn’t mean what he said here and that he is building, or permitting that there be built in Cuba an Arbenz-type regime, but avoiding Arbenz’s mistakes of too open a relationship with Communism because of Cuba’s geographic proximity to the U.S. and its economic dependence on the U.S. If Fidel doesn’t want, this soon after his U.S. visit, to be placed in the position of showing his real colors, then it is wise to avoid an appearance at the kind of May 1 demonstration at which he would have to say things which would contradict the things he stated here.

You pays your money and takes your choice. The whole business smells bad. Continent-wise, there will be a labor show in Cuba demonstrating the harmonious coexistence between 26 of July labor and Communist labor; and witnessing this show will be a hodge-podge of Communist and non-Communist labor leaders to “take the hint”.

Addendum: Latest dope received by ’phone: There may be no oratory at the May 1 shindig. Net result: Suspicions unchanged.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Stephansky.

300. Editorial Note

On May 1, a parade and mass meeting was held in Havana under the auspices of the Cuban Confederation of Workers and with a large number of foreign guests in attendance. Summaries and analyses of the major addresses given, a list of the foreign guests, and a discussion of Communist participation in the event were included in despatch 1265 from Havana, May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00–MAY DAY/5–759) The Embassy summarized the event as follows:

“The mammoth May Day parade ending in a mass meeting of the workers at the Civic Center where addresses were made by Government officials, officers of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC), and invited guests representing the trade unions of Europe and Latin America, was characterized by a holiday atmosphere among the participants and unmarred by any incidents. An intensive publicity campaign in the press and on radio and television brought large crowds to the streets although not to the extent of the million claimed. As a result of poor organization however the parade of the unions to the Civic Center dragged on for about twelve hours. As a consequence most of the spectators drifted away and the crowd at the Civic Center when the speeches were made was relatively small. The officials and guests, most of whom had been in the reviewing stand for more than twelve hours, were obviously tired and at times bored. The absence of the dominant figure in the local scene, Fidel Castro, also had a somewhat dampening effect.

“The principal speakers for the occasion were Raul Castro speaking for Fidel Castro, Minister of Labor Fernandez Garcia, Secretary General of the CTC David Salvador, and President Urrutia. The basic themes of these talks were loyalty to the leader, Fidel Castro, and unity in support of the Revolutionary Government and its programs.

“The representatives of the foreign trade union groups, about 35 in number were introduced from the speakers platform. Most of these made fairly brief remarks limited largely to congratulations to the CTC and expressions of good wishes to the Revolution. In a few instances the talks were highly emotional and expressed some anti-American sentiment. The most notable instance was perhaps that of Santiago Tortosa of Venezuela, who spoke heatedly and at considerable length emphasizing the ‘emancipation’ of Cuba and comparing the United States ownership of the Cuban sugar industry with the United States ownership of the Venezuelan oil industry. The fact that this foreign representation included Communist as well as Christian and democratic trade unions was emphasized by several of the official speakers as well as in the publicity preceding and following the event.”

301. Memorandum of a Conversation, Buenos Aires, May 2, 1959¹

Buenos Aires, May 2, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba

Dr. Boti, Minister of Economy

Mr. Rubottom

During the plane trip from Washington to Buenos Aires, I told Ambassador Enrique Perez Cisneros, Cuban Representative to IA–ECOSOC, that Mr. Mann and I would like to take Fidel Castro to lunch or dinner or have an opportunity in some way to talk with him when we were in Buenos Aires. He said he would inform Minister of Economy Boti, head of the Cuban Delegation to the Committee of 21 Meeting. Due to the thrice-postponed arrival of Fidel Castro and his shortened stay in Buenos Aires, I had concluded that it would not be possible to talk with him privately.

During the Venezuelan reception tonight, Dr. Boti brought Fidel Castro, and a coterie of followers, to the place where I was standing with Mrs. San Santa Maria, wife of the Colombian Ambassador to Brazil. Dr. Castro and I conversed for two or three minutes while photographers were taking pictures from in front of us and on both sides of us, and while several people were leaning over the heads of the crowd to try to overhear what we were saying. After I had bid the Prime Minister good-by, Dr. Boti came back to me to say that the Prime Minister wanted to talk to me alone and handed me the keys to his room at the Alvear Palace, saying that they would meet me there in five minutes.

Drs. Castro and Boti arrived on time. I made a statement along the following lines to the Cuban Prime Minister:

The United States desires to be friendly with the new Cuban Government, in keeping with its traditional friendship with the Cuban people. The United States has an understanding of some of the revolutionary objectives of the Castro Government, and applauds their efforts to bring about honesty in government and to restore to the people their voice in the affairs of government.

Friendship and cooperation between governments and peoples must be a two-way street. If the Cuban Government wants the good will of the United States Government, the United States will not be found lacking.

I had heard with great interest several of the declarations made by the Prime Minister while he was in the United States. I had heard his speech before the Committee of 21 today.² I agreed with several of the points that he had made, but felt that he had been unduly critical of the United States. The United States can supply only a small part of what is needed for the economic development of a country. The people of Cuba, like any other country, through hard work and even sacrifice and through increased productivity, joined by their government which must follow sound policies, are principally responsible for economic development. The United States stands ready to offer its part to Cuba, or any other country in Latin America, and there are several examples, like Argentina and Colombia, where this joint effort is moving forward. Without hard work by the people and sound policies on the part of the government, any United states assistance is short-lived and simply adds to the debt burden of future generations and also quickens the inflationary spiral which is present in so many countries.

The United States takes strong exception to his statement that foreign investment creates problems for the host governments. Many years ago there were cases of irresponsible investors, but hard lessons have been learned through the years, and practically all of the companies operating abroad today recognize that they must be responsible citizens of the host countries. I recalled his reference to “climate” in his speech this morning, and then told Dr. Boti that it reminded me of my conversation with him in Washington.³ I said that the climate for business, while important to foreign investors is even more important to domestic investors and that no country can hope to achieve economic development without a satisfactory business climate. In the case of labor disputes, to which he had alluded in his speech, these companies do not ask for special treatment, nor does the United States Government make any claims on their behalf. All they want is fair treatment like that given to the domestic industries.

The United States, more than 25 years ago, voluntarily forsook its special status in Cuba, and embarked upon the policy of non-intervention in all of Latin America. This policy has paid rich dividends for the entire hemisphere. We do not want to be a country isolated from our Latin American friends, nor do we want to see twenty Latin American countries united in a bloc against the United States. This would be a tragic thing.

Castro listened carefully, with Boti nodding over his shoulder most of the time, and he interrupted only occasionally. He seemed to be slightly injured that I interpreted his speech as critical of the United States, saying that he had striven mightily to avoid criticizing the United States. He declared that frankness was called for, and I fully agreed. I said that some of our policies could very well be criticized, and that we hoped that the criticisms would be constructive. I said that we would probably find grounds to criticize some of the things done in Cuba, and might make a statement during this conference, replying to some of his own.

Boti said that he was sure that we would be able to find mutually agreeable solutions to our problems, although there might be some cat-and-dog fights in the search for them. (He told me the same thing in Washington.)

I inquired of Castro whether he was satisfied with developments in Panama. He looked rather crestfallen and answered affirmatively, adding that this had been a real stab in the back which he had stood up to in the strongest possible way. I said that the United States stood firmly on all the principles of the inter-American system, none of which were more important than juridical equality of states, nonintervention, consultation on problems, and mutual security as expressed in the Rio Treaty. He nodded agreement with these principles.

Castro said that he was tired, and he looked it. He said that he still had to stop in Montevideo and Rio de Janeiro before returning to Habana. He had many problems at home and he was anxious to get back to them. I suggested that he rest whenever he could and commented that many people had expressed admiration for his team of economic advisers who should be a great source of strength to him.

He dwelt at length on the problems faced by the people in Latin America, just as he did in the speeches in the United States and his speech before the Committee today. He thinks that the United States must help find solutions to the problems of the people. I said that we agreed with his statement that some new ideas are needed to solve old problems, but that we could not discard all of the old ideas which are based on experience and trial and error in the past.

He commented on the weakness of the Argentine Government and his desire to get away fast in order not to be held responsible for any incident that might occur while he is here. He said that the Argentine Government’s policy on oil was widely criticized and harmful to the Government. I asked him whether he knew anything about the new policy on oil which had actually been completely nationalized but which, under a new formula in the form of a contract, permitted outside capital to help Argentina develop her oil resources much faster than otherwise could have been done. I pointed out that the problems which the Argentine Government was facing were the problems which any government would have to face if it hoped to overcome more than a decade of mismanagement. He seemed seriously preoccupied about the possibility of a military coup d’état in Argentina, and predicted that this would produce a bloody civil war, if it should happen. (There is no question but that he had Argentina in mind in his speech before the Committee today when he spoke about the instability of many of the new constitutional governments where there still exists the lurking danger of military dictatorship.)

Dr. Castro asked me when I was coming to Cuba. I said that I hoped to come some time during the next few months but that I had no definite plans. He expressed the hope that I come, so that we could continue our conversation.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–259. Drafted by Rubottom, although a handwritten note at the end of the source text indicates that the memorandum was “dictated but not read by Mr. Rubottom.”

² A summary of Castro’s speech, in which he urged that the United States launch a program of $30 billion in economic assistance to Latin America over a 10–year period, was sent to the Department in telegram 1658 from Buenos Aires, May 5. (ibid., Central Files, 363/5–559)

³ Not further identified.

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, May 6, 1959—5 p.m.

1327. Embassy has received from varied sources including some well-connected with GOC that there will be significant changes made in top governmental positions when Castro returns. Predicted moves revolve around two separate but related postulates:

(1) Castro increasingly disturbed over Communist activities.

(2) There is tension between Castro and brother Raul over assistance extended to revolutionary groups planning invasions of other Caribbean countries, and over Raul’s extreme leftist orientation, coupled with his move to place loyal personal followers in all key positions in the armed forces.

According to reports Castro’s mother, sister Juana, and elder brother Ramon are all opposed to activities of Raul and his wife Vilma Espin. There is also persistent report that Raul and Camilo Cienfuegos had a heated argument ending in blows over position and power of “Che” Guevara, and support being given to expeditionary groups.

Among predicted changes are Urrutia’s designation to a position on Supreme Court, and his replacement as President by Miro Cardona. It is frequently rumored that Foreign Minister Agramonte will be dropped, for variety of reasons, including lack of competence and drive. However, this may be reflection of consistent and violent Communist campaign against him. It is also said that several Cabinet Ministers with notably leftist tendencies will be dropped, but names are not mentioned.

One source, with apparently good knowledge of trouble within Castro family, has reported that Raul and “Che” Guevara may both be assigned abroad as military attachés, with Guevara going to Argentina, and that Fidel might resign as Prime Minister and assume command of armed forces.

Embassy considers it possible some changes may be forthcoming in fairly near future. Cubans opposed to communism, both in and out of government, are beginning to take more firm and outspoken stands. However, exaggerated stories from US re influence and strength of communism within the GOC like Novins CBS broadcast² do not help this trend in highly nationalistic atmosphere here. Much better that initiative for correction come from within Cuba and I am hopeful it will.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–659. Confidential; Priority.

² Reference is to Stuart Novins’ May 3 television broadcast entitled “Is Cuba Going Red?”

303. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

Situation Respecting Haven for Former President Batista

You will recall that an attorney for former President Batista of Cuba, Mr. Lawrence Berenson, has been interested in finding a haven for General Batista to which he can go from the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Government has indicated that it wishes him to leave and we believe that his departure from the Dominican Republic would contribute to lessening tensions in the Caribbean area.

On March 9, 1959, Mr. Berenson called on both Mr. Murphy and Mr. Rubottom, concerning Batista’s residence problem. Following this visit Mr. Murphy assisted Mr. Berenson in sounding out the Swiss (with regard to Liechtenstein) and the French (with regard to Monaco) through their Ambassadors here, but with negative results. Mr. Berenson recently traveled to Europe to inquire of a number of governments and principalities regarding the likelihood that they would permit Batista to enter their territories if he were to apply. All of these approaches met with negative results.

The Department’s position has been one of informing our Ambassadors in countries where Mr. Berenson was making an approach that he is seeking a haven for Batista. In several cases the Department also sent messages to the Ambassadors asking them to make informal representations indicating only that the Department believed that it would be beneficial if Batista were to leave the Dominican Republic for the reason mentioned above. The last effort made by Mr. Berenson and the Department was with regard to Ireland and in this case I discussed the matter with the Irish Ambassador John Hearne on April 27.

The latest word from Mr. Berenson indicates that for the moment he is uncertain as to what further steps he might take. He has asked the Department to consider an approach to Belgium and Holland and has shown an interest in considering the Canaries or the Azores possibly with a condition that former President Batista would agree for a stipulated period not to leave either of these places should he be admitted.

Despite the discouraging results to date ARA is continuing its efforts to be of assistance in this matter, and I will keep you informed on future developments.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–659. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stevenson, concurred in by Robert Donhauser (G) and William Dale (EUR), and initialed by Snow.

304. Summary of Remarks by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) at the Latin American Chiefs of Mission Meeting, Santiago, Chile, May 7, 1959¹

Santiago, Chile, May 7, 1959

[Here follow comments unrelated to Cuba.]

Addressing himself particularly to the problems growing out of the Cuban revolution, Mr. Rubottom referred to the early wave of optimism which had been felt in Cuba and among certain elements of the press and public throughout the hemisphere in the first days of the Castro victory. This feeling had been based on the general quality of Castro’s initial Government appointments in key positions and the relative self restraint exercised by the “barbudos” during the early days. However, the flushes of optimism soon faded when it became painfully evident that Castro lacked any real understanding of the problems with which he must cope in governing Cuba. The emergence of Communists in key Governmental, labor and educational posts provides continuing cause for concern regarding the future of the Castro Government.

Castro’s trip to the United States, while undoubtedly a real success from Castro’s standpoint, was not such a clear cut gain from the point of view of the United States. Castro’s performance was variable. He responded satisfactorily to questions regarding responsible recognition of international commitments, treatment of American business interests, respect for international treaties, etc. However, his replies to questions relating to Communism, elections and democratic practices left much to be desired.

Castro’s other trips have been notably less satisfactory from the United States standpoint. His statements in Venezuela were downright harmful. In Buenos Aires he was kept sufficiently under wraps by the Argentine Government to avoid any seriously irresponsible statements outside of the “Committee of 21” forum. In general, Castro’s trips to other countries have clearly revealed his tendency to intervene in the internal affairs of the countries which he visits and his proclivity for going over the heads of the responsible Governments to the people in his appeal to rise up virtually in a class warfare.

In summary, Mr. Rubottom concluded that Castro remains an enigma. His is a complex personality which must still be considered largely in the realm of the unknown. The United States had to avoid building him up as a martyr as would certainly occur if we were to launch serious attacks against him or if he were to be assassinated by political opportunists in Cuba or elsewhere.

[Here follow comments unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 363/5–959. Secret.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, May 11, 1959—noon.

1345. Fidel Castro met by large jubilant crowds upon return May 8. Spoke to estimated 5 or 600,000 people for nearly four hours at Plaza Civica. Obviously tired. Principal points were:

(1) Left country to defend and explain revolution abroad. Had great success speaking to 6,000 newsmen, 100 million people. Emphasized contact with people and never mentioned foreign governments.

(2) Cuban revolution unique and pure, is great event of hemisphere. Watched closely by other countries, most of whom have grave problems. Cuban revolution must not fail since would set back cause freedom and economic development throughout hemisphere.

(3) Cuban revolution: Four things which make it unique: People, army, doctrine and truly revolutionary laws.

(4) Criticism of revolution, including concern over communism, comes from enemies abroad. Cuban Government is most honest, liberal and democratic in world and will not suppress any ideas nor any expression of opinion. No one should fear the revolution, which inspired by highest motivations. No one has right to interfere in Cuba, to give counsel, to examine conscience of revolution.

(5) Revolution neither capitalist, Communist nor center, but rather step in advance of all. Said current world conflict was between concept which offered people democracy and starved them to death, and concept which offered food but suppressed liberties. Cuban solution was to promote all rights of mankind, including “social rights”. Only ideas which satisfy both material and spiritual needs of mankind will prosper.

(6) Revolution and leaders not divided on any ideological grounds. Rather all leaders closely united and loyal. Revolution had one supreme leader, whose authority never questioned.

(7) Revolution supported by vast majority people, including peasants, workers, intellectuals, professional civil servants, youth, middle class and nationalistic industrialists.

(8) Two principal questions abroad were executions and elections. He had satisfactorily explained both and obtained approval of foreign public opinion. Executions would taper off. Whenever elections were held another revolutionary government would take power. No dates mentioned.

(9) Destructive phase of revolution ending, constructive phase beginning. All Cubans must now work and he must be left alone to concentrate on problems.

Comment: General attitude of enormous crowds best described as nearly hysterical adulation of “greatest man of hemisphere” and personal leader of country and embodiment of revolution. This is one man rule with full approval of “masses”.²

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–1159. Official Use Only; Priority.

² On May 10, Castro gave a 6-hour talk on television in which he discussed further his trip to North and South America. The principal points of the talk were discussed in telegram 1368 from Havana, May 14. (ibid., Central Files, 737.00/5–1459) In telegram 1371 from Havana, May 14, the Embassy reported that the general reaction of both Cubans and Americans to Castro’s comments of May 8 and 10 were that they marked a “definite improvement.” There was little sign of anti-Americanism and Castro was obviously trying to be reasonable. Although the Embassy felt that he was still naive with regard to the threat of Communism, it said that his “humanistic” doctrine of “freedom with food, food with freedom” was laudable and not Communistic. The Embassy believed, however, that Castro displayed during his television appearance a “messianic attitude,” repeatedly indicating that only he and his advisers had the solutions to Cuba’s problems. (ibid., 033.3711/5–1459)

The Cuban Government’s promulgation of an agrarian reform law, and the question of asylum for Batista, May–October 1959

306. Editorial Note

307. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, May 19, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–1959. Confidential; Priority.

308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, May 22, 1959—6:01 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–2259. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Stevenson; cleared with Mann, Jack Herfurt (ARA/EX), Rubottom, and Harry Conover (ARA/REA); and approved by Wieland who signed for Dillon.

309. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, May 23, 1959—11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–2359. Official Use Only; Priority.

310. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 27, 1959

Washington, May 27, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–2759. Official Use Only. Drafted by Stevenson.

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, June 1, 1959—8:45 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–159. Drafted by Stevenson; cleared with Mann, Turkel, Whiteman, and Ruth Gold (OFD); and approved by Rubottom who signed for Murphy.

312. Editorial Note

313. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, June 1, 1959

Washington, June 1, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–159. Official Use Only. Drafted by Mulliken. The place and time of the meeting are not indicated.

314. Editorial Note

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, June 6, 1959—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–659. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

316. Editorial Note

317. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, June 10, 1959

Washington, June 10, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–1059. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

318. Editorial Note

319. Memorandum of a Conversation, National Airport, Washington, June 12, 1959

Washington, June 12, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–1259. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland and Reed.

320. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, June 12, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–1259. Confidential; Priority.

321. Note From Minister of State Roa to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)

Havana, June 15, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/6–2259. a typewritten notation on the source text indicates it is a translation from Spanish.

322. Telegram From the Department of State to All Missions in the American Republics

Washington, June 18, 1959—9:52 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 636.39/6–1859. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hill, cleared with Snow, and approved by Rubottom who signed for Dillon. Sent to Asuncion, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Guatemala City, La Paz, Lima, Managua, Mexico City, Montevideo, Panama City, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, San Salvador, Santiago, and Tegucigalpa. Sent to Ciudad Trujillo and Havana for information only.

323. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 22, 1959

Washington, June 22, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–2259. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson and approved by Robert C. Brewster, Dillon’s Special Assistant, on June 29.

324. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 24, 1959, 2:40–3 p.m.

Washington, June 24, 1959, 2:40–3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Snow.

325. Memorandum of Discussion at the 411th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 25, 1959

Washington, June 25, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason.

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, June 25, 1959—8:09 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–2559. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson; cleared with Little, Rubottom, and in draft with L/C; and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter.

327. Editorial Note

328. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs (Turkel)

Washington, July 1, 1959.

Source: Department of State, REA Files: Lot 61 D 248, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Turkel. Attached to a brief covering memorandum of July 1 from Turkel to Rubottom, in which Turkel wrote that whether or not Rubottom approved the memorandum as representing ARA’s position, he recommended sending it to the Embassy in Havana to obtain its views. Also attached was a note from Devine to Turkel, August 28, in which Devine said that the memorandum had been kept in Rubottom’s in-basket since July 2. Devine said he was returning it to Turkel “for your reconsideration as to whether it is still current and correct. You are the best judge as to whether resubmission is or is not appropriate.”

329. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, July 7, 1959.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which bears the initials “DE.”

330. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 7, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–759. Secret. Repeated to Mexico City.

331. Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 9, 1959

Washington, July 9, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 13, 1959—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1359. Confidential; Priority.

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 14, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1459. Official Use Only; Priority.

334. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) in Washington and Tad Szulc of The New York Times in Miami, July 15, 1959

Miami, July 15, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/7–1559. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

335. Memorandum of Discussion at the 413th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 16, 1959

Washington, July 16, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs. The portion of the discussion printed here is from Allen Dulles’ intelligence briefing.

336. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 16, 1959—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00./7–1659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

337. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, July 18, 1959—3:35 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–1659. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Stevenson, cleared with Hill and Snow, and approved by Wieland who signed for Dillon.

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 18, 1959—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1859. Official Use Only; Niact.

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 18, 1959—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1859. Confidential; Niact.

340. Memorandum of the President’s Briefing Before His Press Conference, July 22, 1959

July 22, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. The time of the briefing and those present is not indicated on the source text, but it probably took place from 9:55 to 10:28 a.m. immediately preceding the 10:30 press conference. Attending this meeting with the President, were, among others, Persons, Hagerty, Gerald Morgan, Merriam, John Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and Harlow. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. (ibid., President’s Appointment Book)

341. Memorandum of Discussion at the 414th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 23, 1959

Washington, July 23, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

342. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) and Minister of State Roa, Havana, July 23, 1959

Havana, July 23, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–2559. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 135 from Havana, July 25. A summary of the conversation was sent in telegram 213 from Havana, July 23. (ibid., 611.37/7–2359)

343. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 24, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/7–2459. Limited Official Use; Priority.

344. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, July 27, 1959.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which bears the handwritten initials “E” and “G[oodpaster]”.

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 27, 1959—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2759. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ciudad Trujillo.

346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal

Washington, July 28, 1959—9:33 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2859. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stevenson and Raymond Valliere; cleared with Rubottom, Ivan B. White, and Murphy; and approved by McElhiney who signed for Dillon. Repeated to Ciudad Trujillo and Havana.

347. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 31, 1959—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–3159. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

348. Editorial Note

349. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, August 2, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–259. Secret. Drafted by Brad-dock. Received on August 4 at 2:07 p.m.

350. Memorandum for the Record by the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, August 4, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–459. Confidential. A copy was sent to Rubottom.

351. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)

Washington, August 6, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–659. Drafted and initialed by Hill and addressed also to Snow. There is no indication on the source text that Snow saw the memorandum, but Rubottom wrote the following comment in the margin: “Very thoughtful. Show to Hank Ramsey—copy to Emb. Habana for comment.”

352. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, August 10, 1959—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–1059. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

353. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Embassy in Cuba

Santiago, August 12, 1959—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–1259. Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department as Secto 5, which is the source text.

354. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador Howe’s Residence, Santiago, August 15, 1959, 5:30 p.m.

Santiago, August 15, 1959, 5:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, American Republics 1957–1959. Confidential. Drafted by DeSeabra and concurred in by Rubottom.

355. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, August 19, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3700/8–1959. Secret. Initialed by Arneson. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

356. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Calhoun) to the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)

Washington, August 19, 1959.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. Confidential. John Eisenhower’s handwritten notation indicates that the President saw the memorandum on August 20. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 231.

357. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, August 31, 1959—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.2614/8–3159. Confidential; Priority.

358. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Havana, September 2, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–259. Confidential; Official-Informal. In the margin Devine wrote the following note on September 4: “No reply necessary in view of Ambassador’s imminent arrival.”

359. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 4, 1959.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Habana Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, 350, Political Affairs. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal. The time of transmission is not given on the source text.

360. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, September 14, 1959—10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–1459. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

361. Instruction From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts in the American Republics

Washington, September 15, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–1559. Secret. Drafted by Hill; cleared in draft with Snow, Orville Anderson, Stevenson, Philip Burns, Katherine Keany (USIA/IAL), and James Halsema (USIA/IOP); and approved by Richard Phillips. Sent to Havana for information only.

362. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 18, 1959

Washington, September 18, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–1859. Confidential. Drafted by Owen. Bonsal returned to the United States on September 14. (Telegram 623 from Havana, September 14; ibid., PER)

363. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 24, 1959

Washington, September 24, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.235/9–2459. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stevenson and cleared with Wieland and Rubottom.

364. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, September 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2559. Confidential.

365. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 1, 1959

Washington, October 1, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–159. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson. Copies were sent to each participant and to Turkel. In a memorandum to Rubottom, October 1, Wieland summarized a conversation that he, Hill, Stevenson, and Alexander M. Rosenson had with Bonsal the previous day regarding Bonsal’s informal memorandum concerning Cuban-American relations. The conversation covered many of the same points as the one on October 1. (ibid., ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba Special Meeting 1960)

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 6, 1959.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Havana Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, 350, Political Affairs. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. The time of transmission is not given on the source text. Bonsal had returned to Cuba on October 2. (Telegram 748 from Havana, October 2; Department of State, Central Files, PER)

367. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 13, 1959—11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–1359. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, October 14, 1959—7:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5621/10–1459. Confidential. Drafted by Owen and Vallon, cleared in substance with James D. Moffett (BNA) and C. Arnold Freshman (SCA/MC), and approved by Vallon who signed for Herter. Repeated to Havana and Ciudad Trujillo.

369. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, October 15, 1959—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5621/10–1559. Confidential. Repeated to Havana and Ciudad Trujillo.

306. Editorial Note

On May 17, the Cuban Cabinet promulgated an Agrarian Reform Law. The law called for the expropriation of land in excess of certain limits, with the expropriated land to be either turned into agricultural cooperatives to be run by the new Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) or to be distributed as individual holdings of 67 acres. The law also provided that the sugar companies, following the 1960 harvest, could continue to operate the sugar plantations only if the shares in the companies were registered to and owned by Cubans. Finally, in the future, land could be purchased only by Cubans. The principal points of the Agrarian Reform Law were summarized in telegram 1399 from Havana, May 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–1959) Regarding the discussions within the Cabinet with respect to the law, see López Fresquet, My 14 Months With Castro, pages 114–115.

307. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, May 19, 1959—5 p.m.

1400. Following is Embassy’s comment on Agrarian Reform Law report in Embtel 1399.² Law will cause radical change in land tenure system of Cuba. Like Agrarian Reform programs in other countries it will probably be substantially modified as practical problems are met in its implementation. Official version not yet available, but alleged true text published newspaper Revolucion. This understood be version desired by radical group, by “Che” Guevara and opposed by Minister of Agriculture Sori Marin. Sori did not attend ceremonies ratification in Sierra Maestra and now rumored will resign. Communists can be expected make big effort infiltrate Agrarian Reform Institute. Designation Antonio Nunez Jimenez Executive Director disturbing.

He has long record Communist associations and may be member Cuban Communist Party. Victor Bordon, formerly second command La Cabana Fortress, told reliable Embassy source that Fidel Castro designated him commander fortress, saying Guevara will take over Agrarian Reform.

Both Cuban and American sugar and other agrarian interests generally fear that Cuba lacks technological and administrative skills to implement program this magnitude without serious disruption economy of country. Several local Cuban and American sources other than sugar interests, feel that in long run program may be of great benefit to Cuba. Knowledgable sugar sources feel law will diminish sugar cane acreage for next two or three years. This may not cause crop reduction since existing acreage available for harvest in neighborhood 7 million tons.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–1959. Confidential; Priority.

² See supra.

308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, May 22, 1959—6:01 p.m.

940. For Amb. Bonsal. Agrarian reform law causing great consternation in U.S. Government and American sugar circles. Castro’s reported statement on TV last night that law will not be changed one iota and that distribution 50,000 caballerias American-owned land will not affect relations with U.S. have added to dismay.

Crosby of Cuban-American Sugar Council called on Assistant Secretary Mann today² declaring law confiscatory and as stands will be disastrous to sugar industry of Cuba. Mann has arranged meeting with Under Secretary Murphy at 4:30 p.m. on Monday afternoon May 25 for Crosby and other representatives American-owned sugar interests to discuss this problem and the question of sugar legislation.

Understand from Crosby that you have had extensive conversations with various representatives American-owned centrals.

Would be possible for you to come to Washington immediately so as to be present for meeting on Monday? Your observations would be great value and significance your departure would not be lost on Cubans, indicating we do have interest in the potential destruction facing large American investments. There also many other items affecting our present relations with Cuba on which consultation with you at this time would be greatly appreciated. Please cable or phone your views and recommendations.³

Dillon

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–2259. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Stevenson; cleared with Mann, Jack Herfurt (ARA/EX), Rubottom, and Harry Conover (ARA/REA); and approved by Wieland who signed for Dillon.

² No record of this conversation has been found.

³ No response by Bonsal has been found, but in telegram 1427 from Havana, May 24, the Embassy reported that he had left that afternoon for Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, PER)

309. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, May 23, 1959—11 a.m.

1425. Representatives of 30 of the 34 US sugar mills in Cuba and representing 34.68 percent of 1958 Cuban sugar crop, have visited Embassy discuss effects Agrarian reform law on their individual companies. While all agree effect will vary company to company, all deeply concerned (1) about alleged adverse effect law will have on their interests and on Cuba’s overall economy; (2) that net result will be a substantial loss production sugar next few years; (3) that above is certain without stand-by administration cases to meet increased demand for sugar or to compensate for failure in Colono productions; (4) gloomy outlook for a prompt, just and cash compensation as previously provided in Cuba’s constitution of 1940; (5) general feeling that Cuban mill-owners and Colono current protest to Castro will be useless; (6) real fear that in addition to provisions present law future regulations and interpretations thereof by present Leftist Directorate may become so onerous as to be real confiscation rather than a just expropriation; (7) what effects drastic application of law here will have on US sugar legislation. Each individual presenting case in writing which when received will be forwarded Department.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–2359. Official Use Only; Priority.

310. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 27, 1959¹

Washington, May 27, 1959

SUBJECT

U.S. Misgivings With Regard to Cuban Agrarian Reform Law

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Dihigo, Cuban Embassy

ARA—Mr. Rubottom, Assistant Secretary

Ambassador Bonsal

CMA—Mr. Stevenson, Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs

(Note: On May 26, 1959 Ambassador Dihigo was Ambassador Bonsal’s guest for luncheon and on this occasion Ambassador Bonsal talked with him informally about the various concerns which have been aroused in the United States by the Agrarian Reform Law. Ambassador Dihigo said that he welcomed an opportunity to discuss this subject and would be pleased to come to the Department to receive the Department’s formal views on this matter in order that he might communicate them to his government. With this thought in mind Ambassador Dihigo was asked to come in to talk with Assistant Secretary Rubottom on this date.)

Mr. Rubottom opened the conversation by referring briefly to the course of the revolution to date. He pointed out to Ambassador Dihigo that there has been great interest in events in Cuba in the past months both on the part of the American public and the American Government and Congress. In past weeks he has appeared on various occasions before congressional committees and other groups, many of whose members were critical of developments in Cuba, and on each occasion he has tried to point out that the Cuban revolution is a social revolution which is a very deep and meaningful thing to the Cuban people and that its eventual course is a matter for their decision. However, the recent issuance of the Agrarian Reform Law in Cuba has raised serious questions and affects many interests. The U.S. well understands the desire and need for land reform in many parts of the world. In fact, we have supported sound land reform in various countries, for example, in Japan, India, Korea, and Formosa. In these instances we believe it has contributed to economic growth and political stability. The nature of the proposed law in Cuba, nevertheless, has introduced a question which the United States Government cannot avoid considering; namely, what will be the effect of this law on the heretofore dependable and important supply of sugar from Cuba? Mr. Rubottom said that he understands that an official text of the law has not yet been issued but that from a study of the preliminary version it has seemed to many important figures in the United States Government and in sugar circles that the Agrarian Reform Law, in its present form, raises a doubt that Cuba in future years can supply the sugar which the United States will need.

Ambassador Dihigo commented that an official text of the law had not as yet been issued, but that he is confident that this measure will in no way endanger the ability of Cuba to supply its quota in the United States sugar market. He asked Mr. Rubottom if he had received his questioning reports from technical sources or from other sources. Mr. Rubottom replied that he has received reports from both sources and he added that it is the duty of the Secretary of Agriculture to look several years ahead in order that he may assure the American people of a reliable supply of sugar adequate to meet the American demand. He referred to the recent statement by Fidel Castro² that the distribution of 50,000 caballerías of American-owned land would not affect Cuban-U.S. relations (indicating his understanding that this remark by the Prime Minister had been drawn from him by the pressing questions of reporters) and commented that the United States must be concerned for the reason above indicated and also with regard to the question of compensation for the properties to be expropriated.

Ambassador Dihigo said that he would report the U.S. concern on this score to his government immediately and that he would appreciate it if we would furnish him with any reports or observations by technically competent persons on this subject. With regard to the question of compensation he said that he cannot comment as yet because the law is not in final form. Also it is his feeling that it will not be implemented all at once and that in the course of its administration and in the implementing regulations there will be undoubtedly important changes and modifications. He asked if Mr. Rubottom wished to say that the Agrarian Reform Law will affect United States sugar legislation; also, whether sugar legislation might be introduced this year.

Mr. Rubottom replied that he could not comment at this time on the Department’s position on the question of sugar legislation. It has been difficult for him to understand, however, certain criticisms of the present Government of Cuba with regard to United States sugar legislation and the Cuban share of the U.S. market. For many years he has supported the privileged position which Cuba has in the U.S. market and he does not understand the apparent feeling in Cuba that the present act is prejudicial or unfair to Cuban interests. As a result of the recent Cuban critical attitude numerous Ambassadors representing other Latin American countries have called on him urging that their countries be given a quota in the United States sugar market. In Mr. Rubottom’s opinion it is to Cuba’s advantage to defend its present position in the U.S. market and that this consideration should be an important one as far as any laws which the Government of Cuba may pass which could possibly affect it.

Ambassador Dihigo remarked that he is sure that his Government is aware of the importance of its present preferred position but that Cuba in recent years has suffered cuts in its share of the market. Also, it has not been a one-sided question of a privilege granted to Cuba; Cuba has been a special and reliable source of sugar to the United States in critical times of war and has refrained from gouging the United States on prices during these periods. Mr. Rubottom said that the Department is well aware of Cuba’s special contributions on this score but that there are many sugar producers, both domestic and foreign, who are continually pressing for a share of the U.S. market-also that public opinion working through our Congress plays an important part in influencing the eventual legislative action which may be taken.

Ambassador Bonsal asked if he might bring to Ambassador Dihigo’s attention another fact of importance with regard to the present tentative land reform law. He reviewed briefly the points which Mr. Rubottom had made with regard to the future of Cuba as a secure and certain source of supply and the doubts raised with regard to compensation and suggested that a third important factor is that important and reliable American firms in Cuba who have continued to operate there in good times and bad, and have effectively cooperated in defending the Cuban position in the U.S. market, feel that the present legislation threatens to destroy the value of investments built up over many years; and that it will seriously curtail their production. Also these firms believe that they should be permitted an opportunity to present their case, to have a hearing, before they are faced with, in their opinion, an extremely drastic measure. Consideration should be given to the probability that their reaction in this case may well have an adverse effect on the plans for private foreign investment in Cuba in many fields other than agriculture.

Ambassador Dihigo said that he would immediately inform his Government of the substance of this conversation and that he hopes Mr. Rubottom will feel free to call upon him at any time to discuss any matters which are of concern to the U.S. in its relations with Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–2759. Official Use Only. Drafted by Stevenson.

² See Document 308.

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, June 1, 1959—8:45 p.m.

970. Considering fact that land reform law has not been officially promulgated and understanding that Cuban groups whose interests unfavorably affected by it are protesting to GOC, Department does not plan issue public statement at this time. However, as agreed during your consultation you should call on Prime Minister as soon as possible unless you perceive objection to express along following lines concern aroused in United States with respect proposed law.

United States Government is not opposed to sound land reform. On contrary it has been our policy support and give technical and other appropriate assistance constructive programs land reform.

At same time, in practical sense, we recognize that a contribution by land reform to attainment higher living standard for Cuban people can be achieved only by measures which will contribute to economic growth of nation. A system of land reform should be designed and carried out so as not to impair or reduce but rather increase present levels of productivity. This requires that implications and consequences each step taken in connection with land reform program should be carefully studied.

U.S. and Cuba have mutual interest in assuring stable and adequate supply sugar and it would be advantageous to both if consideration were given to effect proposed reform on character and likely yields all agricultural crops. Consultation between U.S. and Cuba in past has been productive in finding solutions sugar problems and might be helpful also in present situation. An early determination on this matter is important because U.S. Gov’t, on behalf its citizens, must give careful study possible necessity for action looking to an uninterrupted supply of sugar. Such action would of course have to be taken many months before possible short-fall in sugar supply might occur.

United States also wishes bring to attention GOC fact that American private business having investments and interests in Cuba is greatly concerned and disturbed by proposed law in its present form. In addition seemingly unanimous opinion that overall effects law will be detrimental Cuban economy and tend discourage desirable private investment both domestic and foreign, there is opinion compensation provisions present measure are inadequate both as to question valuation and as to method payment. United States recognizes sovereign right every state, in absence applicable treaty provisions providing otherwise, to take property within its jurisdiction for public purposes, provided that such a taking is accompanied by payment prompt, adequate and effective compensation for property taken, [sic]

It is hoped GOC will consider these informal observations of United States in same friendly spirit with which they are made, and we are confident that it will give careful consideration to various factors involved and prospective results to be expected from a land reform measure of magnitude that contemplated by proposed law.

Murphy

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–159. Drafted by Stevenson; cleared with Mann, Turkel, Whiteman, and Ruth Gold (OFD); and approved by Rubottom who signed for Murphy.

312. Editorial Note

On June 1, Bonsal, who had returned to Havana the day before, met with Minister of State Agramonte and spoke with him along the lines of the “talking paper” as he had been instructed. During their conversation Agramonte offered little comment except to say that he was arranging for Bonsal to see Castro at the earliest possible moment, since it was important for Bonsal to discuss with Castro these “fundamental issues.” (Telegram 1468 from Havana, June 1; Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–159)

On June 3, Bonsal received a message from Castro through Agramonte apologizing for the delay in receiving Bonsal and promising that a meeting would be arranged for that day or the next. Bonsal told the Department that he was convinced that the agrarian reform law as published was “unworkable in practice.” He speculated that because Castro was concerned about “saving face” and not appearing to yield to American pressure regarding the law, the Prime Minister was reluctant to see him. (Telegram 1492 from Havana, June 3; ibid., 837.16/6–359)

313. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, June 1, 1959¹

Washington, June 1, 1959

SUBJECT

Sugar Legislation

PARTICIPANTS

Donald Paarlberg, White House Staff

Phillip Areeda, White House Staff

True Morse, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Marvin McLain, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

Lawrence Myers, Chief, Sugar Division, Department of Agriculture

Roy Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

Thomas Mann, Department of State

Harry Turkel, Director, Regional Economic Affairs, Department of State

Jean Mulliken, Office of Regional Economic Affairs, Department of State

Jack Button, Commodities Division, Department of State

Colonel Paul Cullen, Secretary, Committee [Council] on Foreign Economic Policy

Agriculture officials took the position that the Administration should support extension of the Sugar Act during the current session of Congress, in accordance with the President’s recommended legislative program, despite recent developments in Cuba. They had learned with surprise that the State Department favored deferral of action until next year since, in their opinion, Cuban developments strengthened the case for prompt action. Cuba’s land reform law, if placed in effect, they said, might reduce sugar production to such an extent that Cuba will be unable to meet its quota for the U.S. market after 1960. Plans should therefore be made now to meet such a contingency by amending the Sugar Act to give the Administrator discretionary authority to adjust quotas when necessary to assure an adequate supply for the U.S. market.

There is little flexibility in the present law. Although sugar legislation does not expire until January 1, 1961 it has been customary to extend the law with a year’s lead time, since the production cycle for sugar cane is 18 months at a minimum. Another consideration is Agriculture’s desire to avoid Congressional debate on the Sugar Act in a presidential election year. They expressed doubt that the Cuban situation would be any clearer next year than now, and therefore doubt that benefits from the standpoint of foreign policy would counterbalance the disadvantages from the standpoint of domestic agricultural policy of deferring action.

Mr. Rubottom took the reverse position, stating that little would be lost by waiting until next year and much might be gained. He did not wish to see the Act extended without change at the present time since it would be interpreted by Castro as vindication of his statement that the U.S. would never reduce Cuba’s sugar quota in retaliation for expropriation of U.S. properties under the Land Reform Law. Mr. Rubottom said he wished to keep the question open in order to provide leverage in obtaining amendments to the land reform proposals. He was well aware of the need for protecting U.S. sugar consumers and had called in the Cuban Ambassador² and informed him that if the land reform measures impaired Cuba’s ability to fill its quota this Government would be obliged to obtain sugar elsewhere. He had also called Ambassador Bonsal up from Cuba to meet with representatives of American sugar interests facing expropriation in Cuba, who were urging the Government to take a public stand on the issue.³ After careful consideration of all aspects of the problem, State could not recommend action this year on the Sugar Act.

There is strong anti-Castro sentiment on the part of some members of Congress. If the question were debated now, with expropriation of American property threatened, it might lead to unwarranted reductions in the Cuban quota and antagonize moderate forces in Cuba which are supporting U.S. efforts to obtain amelioration of provisions of the land reform bill which are detrimental to U.S. interests. He commented that public criticism of Castro is likely to be counter-productive, and urged that any implication that the U.S. will take punitive action against Cuba be avoided until all other remedies have been exhausted.

Mr. Morse said Agriculture, and the domestic industry as well, favored extension of the bill without change in quotas and had usually been able to obtain passage of legislation in the form they recommended. Only the provision for added authority to adjust quotas to meet a prospective shortage of sugar would be new, and he thought such an amendment would not be controversial.

Mr. Rubottom and Mr. Paarlberg considered it unlikely that the bill could clear Congress at this time without debate, even if the domestic sugar industry is in complete accord on the bill. Mr. Rubottom also foresaw problems in the future with many countries which have requested an increase in their sugar quotas if quotas are subject to adjustment by the Administration instead of being fixed by legislative action.

Mr. Mann said he could not support a bill which would assure Cuba 70% of all U.S. sugar imports for a period of years at a time when $800 million of U.S. investments in Cuba are threatened. The Administration would lay itself open to charges that it is “soft on communism” and is not adequately protecting American interests abroad. The U.S. has investments totaling $9 billion in Latin America, and every country in the hemisphere is watching to see what U.S. reaction to Cuba’s expropriation will be. The Administration needs to maintain a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis Cuba and sugar is the point at which Cuba is most vulnerable. He saw little merit in the argument that the Sugar Act would become a partisan issue if put forward to next year. Political lines are as sharply drawn in this Congress as they are likely to be in the next. He strongly opposed any action at the present time.

Mr. Morse said Agriculture merely wanted the question faced realistically, and if action were to be deferred he wanted it recognized that the decision rested on foreign policy considerations.

Mr. Paarlberg said he found the State Department’s arguments persuasive but thought the issue should be brought before the Committee [Council] on Foreign Economic Policy, where Treasury and other agencies which have an interest are represented and can express their views. Mr. Morse questioned whether the CFEP was the proper forum, since domestic as well as foreign policy issues are at stake. Mr. Paarlberg said he had raised the question informally at a meeting of White House staff and the initial reaction was to wait. Any recommendation of the CFEP would be reviewed by the White House from the standpoint of overall policy. He asked Mr. Cullen to place the item on the agenda for the CFEP meeting on Thursday, June 4,⁴ and asked State to report at that time on the outcome of Ambassador Bonsal’s discussions with Castro (an appointment had presumably been arranged for June 1), regarding the status of the land reform law and the reported one year deferral of expropriation of sugar lands.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–159. Official Use Only. Drafted by Mulliken. The place and time of the meeting are not indicated.

² See Document 310.

³ The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/5–2559)

⁴ The meeting was postponed to June 5. See infra.

314. Editorial Note

At the 90th meeting of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy on June 5, the Council reached a consensus that “the Administration should not go forward at this time with a request to the Congress to renew the Sugar Act, but that the matter would be subject to reconsideration by the CFEP within the next 30–60 days if conditions warranted.” The meeting, which was presided over by the Council’s Chairman, Clarence B. Randall, Special Assistant to the President, was held in the Executive Office Building and was attended by, among others, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon and Under Secretary of Agriculture True D. Morse. (Minutes of the 90th Meeting; Eisenhower Library, CFEP Records)

A briefing paper prepared by the Department of Agriculture, dated June 3 and designated CFEP 584/1, discussed that Department’s recommendation that the Sugar Act should be extended at the current session of the Congress to give the growers sufficient time to plan their operations and also because it would be more difficult to secure passage of an appropriate act during the subsequent election year. (ibid.) In a memorandum to Dillon, June 4, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs W.T.M. Beale, Jr., discussed the Department of State’s position that the Act should not be considered until the effect of the agrarian reform law on Cuban sugar producers was clarified. Beale wrote that the following considerations supported postponement of consideration of the Act until early in 1960:

“a) It is still too early to evaluate accurately the impact of all the measures the Castro regime may undertake.

“(i) We should seek to avoid any action which could be interpreted in Cuba and throughout Latin America as indicating United States approval of the steps taken in Cuba.

“(ii) We should also seek to avoid the situation in which domestic sugar groups or foreign countries might exploit the present uncertain situation as regards Cuba to push through legislation which would worsen Cuba’s present position, or which would contain provisions which Castro would interpret as a threat of U.S. intervention.

“b) It can be anticipated that there would be a sharp domestic reaction to any action which appeared not to take cognizance of the actions of a Government which had just threatened to expropriate American property in several fields without adequate compensation. The effect on U.S. investors who might be contemplating investment abroad should also be considered.” (Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149)

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, June 6, 1959—noon.

1519. For Rubottom. Yesterday evening I told Agramonte that while I was deeply appreciative of cordial constructive relationship he had permitted me establish with him, I believe he would agree under present circumstances essential I have access to Prime Minister Castro. I pointed out that decisions currently being taken by Castro have profound bearing on US-Cuban relations and on interests American citizens here. I said that I had been endeavoring to see Castro since his return from US on May 8, had made specific requests on May 13, 28² and June 1, had been promised on June 3³ that Castro would receive me June 3 or 4. This promise unfulfilled. I concluded that under these circumstances I believed I was not carrying out my mission here.

Agramonte expressed regrets and considerable embarrassment. He said he would continue to press for interview. He added that he himself had been unable reach Castro all day in order discuss serious crisis in Cuban-Dominican relations.

I intend press this point energetically using other channels to reach Castro.

For Department’s information press states Castro’s program today included pitching three innings with Camilo Cienfuegos as catcher in exhibition baseball game part of Agrarian reform festival. Castro’s team will consist of Barbudos and catcher will be Camilo Cienfuegos. Following game Castro will make speech.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–659. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² Bonsal’s meeting with Agramonte on May 13, during which he requested an early meeting with Prime Minister Castro, was described in despatch 1291 from Havana, May 14. (ibid.) No record of a May 28 request has been found. This was presumably made by Bonsal to the Cuban Embassy in Washington before the Ambassador returned to Cuba.

³ Regarding Bonsal’s meetings with Agramonte on June 1 and 3, see Document 312.

316. Editorial Note

On June 5, Prime Minister Castro sent a cablegram to the Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, which reads:

“In answer to fears expressed by your Department in regard to the consequence of agrarian reform concerning sugar production of Cuba, we inform your Government that we are in position to sell to the United States of America 8 million tons of sugar at 4¢ of a dollar per pound in 1961. It is unnecessary to liberate restrictions of area of your domestic production. Cuba can produce total sugar consumption of United States thus saving to the American consumer about $300 million. We need your answer before the 15th of June of the present year.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–559)

The text of a reply by Benson, drafted in the Department of Agriculture and concurred in by the Department of State, was transmitted to Bonsal in telegram 1007 to Havana, June 9. (ibid., 837.2351/6–959) The substance of the reply is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1959, page 959. The reply pointed out that the Cuban sugar quota for the current year was approximately 3 million tons and that the majority of the sugar obtained by the United States was produced by American growers. In any event, the procurement of sugar was made through private, not governmental channels, and the U.S. Government did not know whether private enterprises would want to make commitments far in advance for sugar not yet produced. Agramonte told Bonsal that when Castro received the reply on June 10, he was “somewhat embarrassed at having gone out of normal diplomatic channels in this matter.” Bonsal replied that the major concern was “not so much one of form as of substance.” (Despatch 1399 from Havana, June 15; Department of State, Central Files, 837.2351/6–1559)

317. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, June 10, 1959¹

Washington, June 10, 1959

SUBJECT

DuBois Expects Castro Crackdown on Communists in Cuban Army

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. John O’Rourke—Washington Daily News

Mr. Jules DuBois—Chicago Tribune

Mr. William A. Wieland—Director, CMA

At the invitation of Mr. O’Rourke, I lunched with him and Jules DuBois on June 10.

Jules did most of the talking. He said that he had told persons close to Castro that if Castro continued on his present path, his revolution would be doomed to failure. He referred especially to irresponsible and ill-advised steps such as agrarian reform, rent laws, property devaluation, and various other measures which tend only to increase unemployment and hinder a strengthening of the Cuban economy and social structure. He also warned against Communist activities. Jules told me that he was genuinely impressed with the success of the non-Communist or anti-Communist forces in the recent union elections and laughingly deprecated a couple of caveats that I entered on this point.

Jules said that, however, his main concern is Communist infiltration in the army. On this subject, he said he had been given assurances that Castro had become convinced that there was Communist indoctrination of some parts of the Army, notably at La Cabana Fortress and some Communist or pro-Communist officers had been given key positions. He said that he had also been assured that Castro was aiming to correct this situation immediately and that as a first step he would send Che Guevara out of the country. He said that Castro had decided to utilize for this purpose the invitation which President Nasser of the UAR had sent to Castro. The latter, according to Jules, replied by naming Guevara to represent him thus getting Guevara away from Cuba while Castro personally supervised the army clean-up. I registered skepticism and Jules said that despite the assurances he did not believe that Castro would clean up the army unless Guevara actually left Cuba. He said that he regards this fact in itself as the key to the sincerity of the assurances which some of Castro’s closest associates had given him of the impending army clean up.

Jules laughingly remarked that Guevara may get a protracted, severe case of asthma which might prevent him from returning to Cuba some time during his tour of the mid-East.

As the luncheon broke up, Jules commented to me he thought that if Guevara were gotten out of the way, Fidel Castro would have little trouble in bringing Raul Castro to order. He said that he considers Guevara the evil genius behind Raul who, when away from the influence of Guevara, is completely submissive to Fidel’s wishes. I told Jules that I had seen no evidence of this and Jules promptly challenged me to point out “one single case” in which Raul had disobeyed Fidel since the latter’s visit to the United States. I could not recall any offhand but pointed out to Jules I did not consider this conclusive. Jules radiated utter confidence that Guevara’s departure form Cuba would signify a campaign by Fidel to eradicate Communism from any influential parts of the Cuban army, beginning with abolition of the Communist indoctrination class at Cabana Fortress.

I reminded Jules he had been wrong before on his predictions on Castro. Although he professed indignation, he did say that he was somewhat disappointed in recent developments. (Jules dined with Cuban Ambassador to the OAS Raul Roa that same night. The following day Roa told me that Castro had remarked to him that he felt that the entire prestige and future of both himself [DuBois, and Herbert Matthews of the New York Times]² had become completely identified with the success or failure of the Castro revolution. Roa said that Jules confessed his serious concern over growing indications that Castro’s errors may lead to failure and have serious adverse effects on both newspapermen who have been the principal champions of the Castro cause among the American press.)

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–1059. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

² Brackets in the source text.

318. Editorial Note

On June 11, Ambassador Bonsal delivered a note to Minister of State Agramonte containing the views of the U.S. Government regarding the Agrarian Reform Law. The note was prepared pursuant to the publication on June 4 of the revised text of the Agrarian Reform Law in Revolucion. The Embassy’s preliminary study of the text failed to reveal any significant changes from the earlier text except for a new provision that improvements and cultivations on appropriated lands would be indemnified. (Telegram 1495 from Havana, June 4; Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–459)

In a subsequent analysis, the Embassy noted that the law took little account of the views expressed by the Sugar Mill Owners Association, the National Cattle Growers Association, the Rice Growers Association, and the small tobacco growers of Pinar del Rio. The Embassy had heard that it was a rising tide of opposition to the law that had persuaded Castro to push it through at this point rather than wait until it might be impossible to do so. The Embassy saw no reason to expect that implementing regulations would soften the effect of the law, particularly in view of the fact that the top three figures in the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) were Fidel Castro, Nuñez Jimenez, and Piño Santos. According to the Embassy there was mixed feeling about the law within the Cuban Government:

“Several Ministers, including Lopez Fresquet and Sori Marin, are known to have opposed law but to have gone along with it rather than be counted out altogether. According to Embassy’s information, matter was never put to Cabinet vote. Some, like Buch, Minister of Presidency, feel that in spite of possibly undesirable features, law can be made to work but that transition will require five to ten years. Lopez Fresquet thinks ruinous economic effects will force modification within six months. Carillo of Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, talking to Embassy officers last night, played down bad features and enthusiastically acclaimed law as beginning of new era for Cuba. Carillo thinks that creation of thousands of new small landholders will be strongest bulwark against communism.” (Telegram 1500 from Havana, June 4; ibid.)

On June 5, the Embassy suggested that the Department urgently prepare a note to the Cuban Government commenting on the law and that the note should be made public. The Embassy also offered suggestions as to the content of the note. (Telegram 1509 from Havana, June 5; ibid., 837.16/6–559) Further telegraphic correspondence between the Embassy and the Department regarding the wording of the note and the manner of its presentation and release is ibid., 837.16.

The note was delivered simultaneously by the Department of State to Ambassador Dihigo in Washington. The text of the note is in telegram 1016 to Havana, June 10. (ibid., 837.16/6–959) On June 11, the Department released the text as Press Release 417. It is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1959, pages 958–959.

319. Memorandum of a Conversation, National Airport, Washington, June 12, 1959¹

Washington, June 12, 1959

SUBJECT

Raul Roa Discusses Communism, Agrarian Reform and Other Matters in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Raul Roa—Cuban Ambassador to the OAS

Mr. Henry C. Reed—Deputy Director, RPA

Mr. William A. Wieland—Director, CMA

Shortly after noon today Francisco Aguirre of the Diario los Americas called me from the airport to inform me that Dr. Raul Roa, Cuban Ambassador to the OAS, was at the airport en route to Habana where he had been summoned to become Minister of Foreign Affairs.² The Cuban Embassy had replied to our inquiry shortly before that Ambassador Roa had already departed.

I notified Mr. Snow and Mr. Reed of RPA. With Mr. Snow’s approval, I left immediately for the airport accompanied by Mr. Reed to see Ambassador Roa off. The Ambassador appeared sincerely gratified at our presence and referred several times to his appreciation of this courtesy shown him by the State Department. He said that he would see Prime Minister Castro that same night and would make a point of telling the Prime Minister of the understanding which the State Department personnel he had talked with in Washington had of Cuban problems and of the courtesies which had been shown to the Cuban representatives in Washington, and would make specific reference to our being at the airport to bid him farewell as one more example of such courtesies. Ambassador Roa urged Mr. Reed and myself to sit with him despite the presence of approximately a dozen other persons (mostly Cuban) and continued his conversation with us for the next approximately 20 minutes despite my suggesting several times that he might wish to devote some of his time to talking with the other persons present.

Ambassador Roa is an impetuous, almost compulsive speaker. During the course of his staccato remarks, he said the following: He was not anxious to assume the position of Foreign Minister or any other cabinet post. He had been offered various positions in Cuba by Castro before and had refused. He was particularly reluctant to leave Washington at this time because he had made so many friends here and felt that he was gaining extremely valuable experience in his role as Ambassador to the OAS. He has been completely convinced on the imperative need for the OAS and has acquired a new respect for its role in the hemisphere. One of the first things he will propose to Prime Minister Castro is that Cuba authorize the immediate opening of an OAS office in Habana, especially to acquaint the Cuban people with the functions, purpose and effectiveness of the OAS.

He would tell Mr. Castro that the “best bases” for the Cuban revolution were the principles of the OAS.

He considers that his experience here, though brief, would be invaluable to him in carrying out the functions of Foreign Minister in Cuba. He has gained a far greater understanding of international matters and their complexities as a result of his recent activities in Washington and especially as a result of the problems that he has faced here in close consultation with colleagues from the other American countries who, he feels, have become close and highly valued friends.

Speaking from his experience in Washington, he now thoroughly endorses the inter-American principle of non-intervention. He is still a revolutionary and an active opponent of dictatorships whether of right or left but would oppose the utilization of “Cuba as a springboard for a revolution in any other country”. “I think that the dictatorships must be overthrown by the people of each country and they must make their own revolutions if they are to be effective and valid. Cuba should not interfere”.

The cabinet crisis apparently was precipitated by the Government’s need for persons of greater popular prestige in certain key positions. This had been agreed upon at the cabinet meeting of the night before. This problem was discussed “on a very high plane” and Foreign Minister Agramonte, a close personal friend of Roa’s, was himself one of the principal proponents of this position.

Roa’s appointment to the Foreign Ministry would promptly become the subject of acrimonious debate with the Communists in Cuba who would lose no time in attacking him. (In response to Harry Reed’s comment that the Communists may decide to lay low for the present, Roa replied that if they did not attack it would be because he has always been an active antagonist of the Communists. He recalled in fact that this fact had once saved him from arrest during the Batista regime when Major Esteben Ventura, Cuban National Police, with a group of SIM agents, raided Roa’s home, and accused him of pro-Communist activity. The agents found Roa at work on an anti-Communist article and quickly found a number of propaganda attacks by the Communists against Roa in the latter’s possession. Ventura and the police agents thereupon withdrew.)

In response to my question on whether he had read our note to the Government of Cuba on the subject of agrarian reform,³ Roa said he had read it, he considered it dignified, balanced, and constructive. One “saving grace” of the agrarian reform law is that it had not yet been implemented. “I intend to recommend to the Prime Minister immediately that before undertaking to implement the law, the Cuban Government establish a special commission to make a study of the agrarian situation in Cuba and make its recommendations to the Government. The commission should be composed of UN, OAS and Point IV experts.” (Aguirre told me before I saw Roa that he had discussed the agrarian reform program with Roa and suggested that the Cuban Government would do well to listen to United States Point IV technicians. Roa had answered him that he was too much of a practical politician to propose to Castro at this time that he deliver the agrarian program to Point IV but that he would propose that Point IV experts be included with others of the UN and OAS who should be heard by the Government before any rash action is taken that might ruin Cuba’s economy and topple the Castro Government.) Roa said Castro often is impractical and that the agrarian reform law was a crucial issue which could cause the overthrow of the Government and “the downfall of us all”. Roa said he intended to have a talk with Castro before becoming Foreign Minister as “I am not a member of any political party; I owe nobody anything and am nobody’s creature”. “I hope even though I become Foreign Minister I can retain my position in the OAS which I have come to love very dearly. I have told Castro that the OAS is the best sounding board for explaining the Cuban revolution. I hope to lead the Cuban delegation to Quito and meanwhile to maintain my close association with the representatives of the other countries to the OAS, and, when my period of service to this regime is over, to return to the faculty of the University.”

When told that the plane was ready to depart, Roa gave both Reed and myself a typical abrazo and again expressed his appreciation for our presence. He said that he expected to return to Washington to make his farewells at the next meeting of the OAS Council which was scheduled to take place June 17.

Addendum: Two other points made by Ambassador Roa are the following: He was interested in the OAS direct technical assistance program and believed Cuba should take advantage of it. Also, he said he did not believe in distributing land among everyone. He believed that the Communist theory of equal division was a theory of “miseria”. Communism, instead of being the equal division of wealth, was in actual fact the equal distribution of poverty.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–1259. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland and Reed.

² In telegram 1550 from Havana, June 12, the Embassy reported that after the Cabinet meeting the previous evening, Fidel Castro had announced five Cabinet changes, including Agramonte’s replacement as Minister of State by Roa and Sori Marin’s replacement as Minister of Agriculture by Pedro Miret. (ibid., 737’.13/6–1259)

³ See supra.

320. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, June 12, 1959—6 p.m.

1555. I saw Castro for an hour and a quarter this afternoon. He was relaxed and friendly and showed no signs of being upset at our note.² We had a discussion ranging over effects of Agrarian Reform Law on American interests and on the role of private enterprise, especially American enterprise, in new Cuba.

On Agrarian Reform I mentioned that our two sources of concern were (1) possible decline in sugar production affecting supplies to American market and (2) compensation for expropriated properties.

Castro gave strong assurances Cuba would not fail to meet US sugar quota but admitted a slight drop in production possible. I expressed appreciation for assurances but suggested best course here was perhaps to await developments to which he agreed. He said distribution of land into very small parcels would be ruinous to production and government aimed rather at establishment of cooperatives of reasonable economic size. Re his message to Secretary Benson, Castro regretted going out of channels but said he had to reassure public in Cuba and in US on this important matter. I gave him background on reasons for lifting restrictions on cane plantings in US, at which he expressed surprise, having previously understood this action a result of Agrarian Reform Law. I expressed view that private conversations between us might have developed some better way of conveying to US Government this confidence in adequate sugar supplies than through 8 million ton offer to Secretary Benson. He agreed.

Castro found our concern over compensation provisions natural but stressed point that revolutionary government was honest and would fulfill promises to pay. He said difficulty was that government lacked resources to pay promptly in cash unless it could reach some financial arrangement with US. Land reform could not wait, he said, until government able to pay in cash; it had to be undertaken everywhere once it was started. This a matter of life or death, Castro stated. Expropriations would begin next year. Government not disposed to quibble over 20, 30 or 40 million pesos in total amount and he confident difficulties could be negotiated out as they arose. In reply to my doubts concerning adequacy of registered value of lands, he said registered value of American companies relatively high. I stated that American companies already seriously damaged by Agrarian Reform Law in decline of stock values and cited reduction of one company’s stock quotation from 37 to 21. Castro confident values would rise again.

I outlined American belief in private enterprise as basis for economic development and asked what Cuban attitude was toward foreign private investment in Cuba. Castro stated revolutionary government wanted private enterprise; preferred national to foreign where possible, but where impossible was glad to get foreign. Reason for preference: National investment was all in the family, created no internal problems. He said it especially desirable that basic industries like fertilizer be national and that public utilities were also a special case. For this reason government preferred foreign credits to foreign investment but would pass such credits along to national private enterprise. Government favored state industry only where private enterprise would not come in [and?] fill an essential need. I stressed constructive role of American companies in Cuban economy and questioned Castro on his hostility to “intereses creados”. He laughed and said he used this term to apply where interests had been acquired illegally or with special privileges but not to mean legitimate business concerns even though large. He readily recognized that American firms had played constructive role, met taxes and provided good wages and working conditions for industrial workers but said conditions of field workers pitiful. He also asked why American administration cane growers in Cuba had been unable to obtain high yield of planters in US. [sic]

I urged on Castro the importance of my maintaining close relations with him because of geographical proximity of countries and interlocking economies. He was entirely agreeable to this suggestion but suggested that on economic matters it usually more satisfactory for me to see Economic Minister Boti in whom he had great confidence. He apologized repeatedly for delays in seeing me.

In my opinion this meeting was useful and generally satisfactory. Castro recognizes our concern over aspects of Agrarian Reform mentioned. Groundwork has been laid by our note and by this talk for further discussions if and when our legitimate interests begin to be really hurt.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–1259. Confidential; Priority.

² See Document 318.

321. Note From Minister of State Roa to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Havana, June 15, 1959.

Mr. Ambassador: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency’s courteous note² concerning the Agrarian Reform Law which, in the exercise of the powers and prerogatives inherent in every sovereign state, the revolutionary government of Cuba has just promulgated.

Although in a certain sense the tone of the said note indicates the “understanding” and “sympathy” of the Government of the United States of America, with respect to the cardinal objectives of Agrarian Reform, an over-all impression thereof indicates, on the other hand, a balance of reservations, warnings, and observations regarding the method of carrying out this highly important and irrevocable measure. We do not dispute the right of the Government which Your Excellency so worthily represents to set forth its viewpoint on matters which it deems to be of “profound and legitimate interest to United States consumers of Cuban products and to United States investors in Cuba.” What the Revolutionary Government of Cuba does dispute and take exception to is the validity which it is attempting to give to mere presumptions and the implied reluctance to accept the system of payments which it has been compelled to adopt. It is our hope, nevertheless, that the expression of these important points may contribute to a change in the viewpoint held concerning this matter, since apparently the differences between the two Governments are more adjective than substantive.

Although it is an inalienable right of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, in the exercise of its sovereignty and in the light of treaties, conventions and pacts of a universal and regional character, to take whatever measures it may deem most adequate to further and ensure economic development with social progress and the democratic stability of the Cuban people, it is cause for much gratification, nevertheless, to note the express acknowledgment which your Government makes of our Government’s right, from the viewpoint of its internal jurisdiction and in the light of the international juridical system, to expropriate the property of United States citizens for purposes of a public nature and of social usefulness, through appropriate indemnification. Such acknowledgement undoubtedly is a source of moral satisfaction to the Cuban people, so often hindered or fettered in the pursuit of their legitimate aspirations by an adverse combination of national and foreign factors. The efforts of the Revolutionary Government are precisely aimed at gradually fulfilling those aspirations and to that end it has, to begin with, tackled the pressing problem of transforming the system of landholding, which is the indispensable prerequisite in every underdeveloped country for its industrial, political, social, and cultural progress.

Unless large-scale landholding is abolished and a fair redistribution of the land is made, Cuba will continue to suffer economic stagnation and an increasing rate of unemployment. These measures are just as essential to the good of the Cuban people as they would have been for the people of the original thirteen American colonies if they had not had available a huge reserve of land to the West, which enabled them to expand their economy every time the exigencies of their development made it necessary. Furthermore, the semifeudal conditions existing in many countries of the Americas, Asia, and Africa constitute so formidable an obstacle to economic progress and are so much a cause of low agricultural productivity and a low living standard that the UN, the OAS, the ECLA, and the OIT have constantly urged the peoples and governments of those areas to study and carry out as soon as possible a transformation in the system applying to rural property. Only a few days ago, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, meeting in Mexico, repeated this recommendation. The attitude of the Government of the United States of America in international organizations with respect to this question has, in fact, been “consistent and unequivocal.”

The fundamental concern expressed in the note under reference—summary and compendium of the reservations, warnings and objections it contains—is the form of payment adopted by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba to indemnify North American citizens whose properties may be expropriated pursuant to the Agrarian reform law. It is true that the constitution of 1940 and the basic law in force provide that the price of expropriations shall be paid in advance and in cash in the amount fixed by the courts. But it is also no less true that the aforesaid form of indemnification is inexorably imposed by events in the public domain: the chaotic economic and financial situation into which the overthrown tyranny plunged the country, and the marked imbalance in the balance of payments between the United States and Cuba, which for us has meant an unfavorable balance of about a billion dollars during the last ten years. It should be noted that, had these events not occurred the Revolutionary Government would have been able to discharge the aforesaid constitutional obligation. As for the defalcation, full responsibility falls on those who used the resources of the public treasury and the reserves of state credit institutions for their illicit personal enrichment and for the unlawful purchase of war matériel for the inexorable extermination of the Cuban people. Furthermore, if it were possible to recover the huge funds that have been taken from the treasury and deposited in foreign banks, the extinction of large landed estates and [then] the Agrarian reform might be accomplished under conditions kinder to the interests concerned. However, between the constitutional obligation to abolish large-scale landholding and carry out Agrarian reform, and the precept of advance cash payment for expropriated lands, the Revolutionary Government, exercising the constituent power vested in it by the overwhelming support it enjoys—the primal sources of its democratic legitimacy—has elected the form of indemnification which, in the circumstances alluded to, it considers most advisable in the best interests of the nation, which interests it places above any others, however worthy of consideration they may be. In a similar manner, before the insuperable force of circumstances, the United States Government, in promoting Agrarian reform in Japan, ordered the transfer of the properties of landowners to their occupants within a period of four months, establishing as the form of indemnification the issuance of Agrarian bonds earning 3.5 per cent interest and payable in annual installments over a period of twenty-five years. Although it may be objected that Japan was then an occupied country, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba can state in reply that it found itself with empty coffers and is proceeding accordingly.

In the gigantic undertaking which has begun to transform the economic and social bases of Cuban life, with a concept of means and ends imbued with generous human feeling, the Revolutionary Government has not ignored nor does it intend to ignore those who have contributed to the expansion of Cuban economy, and it aspires to win not only their loyal cooperation but also their helpful assistance by offering them an opportunity to share in the plans for industrialization already under way or being considered. Now, as never before, the Cuban people need and are grateful for the contribution and support of all those who in the past have been a factor of positive national progress and have adjusted their conduct to the requirements of our legislation. They would therefore be highly pleased if Your Excellency’s Government would induce United States investors affected by the Agrarian reform to help further the over-all development of the Cuban economy in accordance with the planned policy that is being carried out.

The purpose of this creative policy, the cornerstone of which is Agrarian reform, is to increase productivity, encourage investments, raise the standard of living, and eliminate unemployment, which fully ensures the supplying of Cuban products to American consumers. The manner of execution of the plans in this connection, carefully worked out, must ensure the expansion and progress of the Cuban economy, and their complete implementation will bring with them law and order, social well-being, and the strengthening of the democratic regime. The experience of the past shows that economic underdevelopment is the real reason for political instability, social injustice, administrative corruption, and cultural backwardness.

The Revolutionary Government of Cuba has never refused to enter into discussions, nor has it ever failed to read dissenting opinions. It has always listened with attention and respect to the opinions of all, including the opinions of those who may be affected by its decisions and measures and who have used and are using, without hindrance, the right to express them publicly. In the specific case of the Agrarian reform law, all suggestions and comments are heard in a genuine democratic spirit; the right is retained of deciding what it deems to be most in accord with the vital interests of the Cuban people; and it does not accept and will not accept any suggestion or proposal that might in the least impair the sovereignty and dignity of the nation.

In view of the foregoing and bearing in mind the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation that so closely link our peoples, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba has more than sufficient grounds for feeling confident that the Government of the United States of America understands and appreciates the strong arguments justifying the manner in which the Agrarian law will be enforced with respect to compensation, and will communicate them to the American citizens who might be affected, at the same time using its good offices to strengthen still further our historic and economic ties.

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest and most distinguished consideration.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/6–2259. a typewritten notation on the source text indicates it is a translation from Spanish.

² See Document 318.

³ The source text is not signed.

322. Telegram From the Department of State to All Missions in the American Republics¹

Washington, June 18, 1959—9:52 p.m.

Department is becoming seriously concerned about situation developing between Cuba and Dominican Republic, which is of immediate interest to U.S. not only because it raises possibility of open conflict disturbing peace of Caribbean and hemisphere but because two countries involved are among closest of US neighbors and thus have direct bearing on U.S. security and interests.

Information available to Department strongly indicates that, in specific disregard of Habana Convention² and other international instruments obligating parties to peaceful settlement of disputes, groups have organized, trained and obtained equipment in both Cuba and Dominican Republic for purpose of engaging in expeditions aimed at the overthrow of the other government.

First overt aggression appears to have taken place on June 14 when unidentified plane landed group of revolutionaries at Constanza, Dominican Republic, where clashes with Dominican forces apparently still in progress. Dominican Rebel Radio has identified leader of expedition as Enrique Jimenez, publicly known to have been officer in Castro’s 26th of July movement. Information further indicates that significant forces being prepared and equipped in Cuba with probable intent of reenforcing Jimenez expedition.

On other hand, our information indicates that for some time a force has been gathering in Dominican Republic for purpose of creating counter-revolution under leadership of and consisting largely of elements who fled Cuba following Batista’s downfall although degree of Batista’s involvement, if any, is not clear. This force has attempted to obtain arms from various sources abroad, including this country, and has been reported to have infiltrated agents into Cuba for purpose of organizing internal support for counter-revolution. While U.S. on basis present evidence does not desire to charge either Cuban or Dominican governments as such with complicity, it is evident situation would not have reached present proportions had they both observed international commitments, including especially Habana Convention.

It is evident such situation has explosive potentialities which, if uncontrolled, could lead in stages to open hostilities between two American States and bring into play Rio Treaty and other Inter-American treaties under which all American Republics have responsibilities for peace of hemisphere. Such hostilities would be of particular concern to U.S. not only because of geographical proximity of combatants and possible dangers to American life and property but because of implications for future of inter-American system. For some 30 years U.S. has scrupulously followed policy of non-intervention in Carribbean area and hemisphere as whole, depending on collective action of American States to maintain peace in area. Although OAS has been notably successful to date in dealing with conflicts, U.S. feels American nations as whole must be prepared to deal successfully with more difficult cases such as emerging Cuban-Dominican case if OAS and inter-American system are to retain public support and confidence throughout hemisphere indispensable to its proper functioning.

U.S. objective in present situation is to prevent aggression, whether overt or covert by or from any country against any other country and to promote atmosphere of observance of international law and treaty commitments which is essential to development of democratic institutions and economic progress throughout hemisphere. Record of last 30 years in hemisphere fully demonstrates that it is under such conditions that democracy gains the most ground and that, under conditions of turmoil and non-observance of law and international obligations, result is often strengthening of authoritarian forces.

In dispute now emerging, U.S. does not seek take side with one country or other or one regime or other. Examination of record of recent relations with present Government of Cuba and Government of Dominican Republic will reveal that (1) U.S. has stood firmly behind its non-intervention obligation and other commitments; (2) U.S. has sought to be cooperative and constructive in its relations with both; and (3) U.S. has had very difficult problems in its relations with both countries. It should therefore be clear that U.S. favors neither Castro nor Trujillo régimes as far as they may be involved in present activities but seeks no more than observance by all of principle of non-aggression in this hemisphere at time when all energies of free world must be concentrated on problem of maintaining its security and of strengthening itself politically and economically for long term contest with Communist authoritarianism.

In light foregoing, you are requested promptly to approach the most senior official you deem appropriate in government to which you are accredited and (1) inform him of seriousness with which U.S. Government views situation, using as much of above as you deem suitable and (2) submit views and suggestion of government as to how problem should be dealt with, considering neither country has yet requested assistance OAS nor indicated any intent to do so.

(FYI—Intelligence available to Department indicates that key subordinates of both Castro and Trujillo heavily implicated in training and equipping expeditionary forces and that their principals in all probability personally had knowledge and approval operations. However, in these initial consultations Department does not wish make direct or detailed accusation against them.)

Dillon

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 636.39/6–1859. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hill, cleared with Snow, and approved by Rubottom who signed for Dillon. Sent to Asuncion, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Guatemala City, La Paz, Lima, Managua, Mexico City, Montevideo, Panama City, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, San Salvador, Santiago, and Tegucigalpa. Sent to Ciudad Trujillo and Havana for information only.

² For text of the Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, signed at Havana February 28, 1928, see 46 Stat. (Pt. 2) 2749.

323. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 22, 1959¹

Washington, June 22, 1959

SUBJECT

General Views of the U.S. Government with regard to the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Raul Roa, Cuban Minister of State

Dr. Emilio Pando, Minister-Counselor of Embassy of Cuba

Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon

CMA—William A. Wieland, Director

CMA—Robert A. Stevenson, Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs

The Under Secretary opened the conversation by expressing his pleasure that Dr. Roa’s visit to the United States had afforded him an opportunity to make his acquaintance. He said that he hoped the Minister’s stay here had proven to be profitable and enjoyable. Dr. Roa relied in the same vein and explained that he had returned to Washington only two days after he had assumed his present post as Minister of State in order to take care of matters which had been left pending with regard to his former duties as Cuban Ambassador to the Organization of American States.

The Under Secretary indicated that he was aware of Dr. Roa’s situation and could fully appreciate that as he had not fully entered into his new duties and had no instructions from his government, he would not wish to discuss substantive matters or express an official position on matters presently of interest to our governments. However, the Under Secretary said that he wished to refer to the long tradition of friendly relations and close economic and political ties between the United States and Cuba; to the sincere desire on the part of the United States that Cuba should grow and prosper; and to the hope that this traditional relationship which has been mutually beneficial in the past should continue in the future. Dr. Roa said that he, too, regards the U.S.-Cuban relationship as a special one which has been good for both countries. He recognizes that Cuba will continue to have a special economic and political relationship with the United States.

The Under Secretary said that he wished to make a few general observations with regard to the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law which affects U.S. interests in various ways. The United States is aware of the need for and the benefits to be derived from sound programs of land reform in many areas of the world. It recognizes that in many cases such land reform has increased productivity and greatly benefited the economies of the countries where it has been implemented.

He remarked, however, that there is concern in the United States Government lest a too drastic implementation of the Cuban law might lower Cuban output and slow down economic growth. He added that the U.S. naturally has an interest on behalf of its consumers that Cuba should continue as a source of supply for sugar, since this economic relationship has proved mutually beneficial and satisfactory in the past. Although there are many other sources from which the United States might obtain sugar, there is no disposition or desire on our part to change the U.S.-Cuban relationship in this field.

Mr. Dillon observed that agrarian reform in Cuba is, of course, basically an internal Cuban question and a matter entirely of Cuban sovereignty. With regard to the effect of the reform program on private foreign investment in Cuba, the Under Secretary commented that the manner in which the Government of. Cuba handles the question of compensation for lands expropriated will be extremely important. If American private investors there, whose properties may be affected by the Agrarian Reform Law, receive what they feel to be fair and just treatment, public opinion in the United States will be influenced accordingly. This, of course, is a factor which will have a profound influence on how Cuba may be regarded as an area for private American investment in the future.

Dr. Roa said that he agreed with the views expressed by the Under Secretary and that in his government’s recent note² he had recognized the special relationship which exists between Cuba and the United States and the fact that this relationship has been mutually beneficial. He said his note expressed agreement with the U.S. that American private investors had contributed to the economic development of Cuba, and he expressed the hope that they would continue to invest in Cuba as their help is needed in the development of the Cuban economy. He recognizes that the United States has a legitimate interest in taking up with the Government of Cuba certain problems which are created by the Agrarian Reform Law and hopes that by further conversations and discussions we may find an amicable and mutually agreeable solution to present problems. He added that he has the highest personal and professional regard for Ambassador Bonsal and hopes that future discussions on points of U.S. concern may continue through normal diplomatic channels, both through the Cuban Ambassador in Washington, Dr. Ernesto Dihigo, and through further discussions between himself and Ambassador Bonsal in Habana.

The Under Secretary said that he was gratified to hear the Minister’s kind words regarding Ambassador Bonsal, as the President had taken special care to select one of our finest diplomats for this post in view of the high importance which the United States gives to its relations with Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–2259. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson and approved by Robert C. Brewster, Dillon’s Special Assistant, on June 29.

² Document 321.

324. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 24, 1959, 2:40–3 p.m.¹

Washington, June 24, 1959, 2:40–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cuban Agrarian Reform Program

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Mr. Robert Kleberg, Proprietor of the King Ranch in Texas

Mr. Jack Malone, Manager of Mr. Kleberg’s Cuban Properties

ARA—Mr. William P. Snow

Having recently spoken with the Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Anderson, about the agrarian reform law in Cuba and its probable effect on U.S. private investment in that country, Mr. Kleberg had asked to see Secretary Herter in order to present the subject to him and to offer certain suggestions with regard to U.S. policy toward Cuba. He introduced Mr. Malone as the manager of his Cuban properties, which involve an investment of some three million dollars in the cattle industry in Camaguey Province.

The agrarian reform program, unless very materially changed, he said, would not only cause him to lose virtually his entire investment but would fall with equal weight upon all other American landowners, including the large and well-known American-owned sugar companies. If this were not enough, there was also the clear indication that the Castro land reform movement was Communist-inspired, if not directed, and that its fulfillment could be expected not only to render normal relations impossible between our country and Cuba but might well bring about a Communist-controlled nation close to our shores.

Earlier in the week he had called upon Cardinal Spellman in New York to seek his advice. The Cardinal had expressed deep concern over the Communist trend in Cuba, which appeared to be associated with the rise of Fidel Castro to power. He had described Castro as being insane and therefore impossible to work with. Mr. Kleberg had prepared a memorandum of this conversation with the Cardinal, a copy of which he presented to the Secretary with the request that it be treated very confidentially (attachment No. 1² ).

He then described an interview on June 23 (the following day) with Herbert Matthews of the New York Times staff. He had first approached Arthur Hays Sulzberger, had been referred to the editorial page editor, Charles Merz, and had been introduced by the latter to Herbert Matthews. Mr. Merz sat through the entire conversation, a memorandum of which Mr. Kleberg also gave the Secretary (attachment No. 2). Matthews had acknowledged that Castro was immature and at times irrational. He was going to Cuba early in July to learn for himself in what direction the Government was now moving, and he characterized the agrarian law as being quite unsound as it stood, although not necessarily beyond repair.

A third paper handed to the Secretary (attachment No. 3) contained the text in translation of a statement made in Santiago, Cuba by Archbishop Pérez Serrente on June 17, 1959, bearing on the agrarian reform program and raising the question of possible Communist influence therein as well as of doubt as to the merits of the law in other respects.

Mr. Kleberg emphasized that under the terms of the law no person could own more than 3,300 acres under any conditions. All land expropriated was to be compensated for on the basis of the tax assessment value and in the form of “worthless” bonds. The taxable value would certainly not represent more than 20% of the true worth of the land even if the bonds were at all negotiable. Acreage transferred to the landless class would not be cultivated effectively because the new owners would lack capital, technical knowledge, equipment, marketing arrangements, etc. Some reform might be necessary in the Cuban system of land tenure; a certain degree could under proper conditions be achieved without reducing the country’s productivity too severely. The present program, however, would bring ruin upon the country.

Mr. Kleberg believed that it behooved the U.S. Government to take a very firm position forthwith against the law and its implementation. Moreover, he thought that the best way to achieve the necessary result was by economic pressure. In theory at least, this should not be difficult because of Cuba’s heavy dependence upon the export of sugar in general and its preferred status in the U.S. sugar market in particular. If Cuba were deprived of its quota privilege, the sugar industry would promptly suffer an abrupt decline, causing widespread further unemployment. The large numbers of people thus forced out of work would begin to go hungry. They would then readily perceive the catastrophic nature of Castro’s program, and that would mean the end of Castro politically.

The Secretary asked whether, in Mr. Kleberg’s opinion, such a sequence of events would in fact cause the new government to fall. Mr. Kleberg replied that he was convinced of it. The Secretary commented that measures of economic warfare during wartime were one thing, whereas in peacetime they were quite another. Mr. Kleberg acknowledged this to be so, stating that he was fully aware of the complexity of the problem facing our Government and that he was not the one to decide its policy.

He thanked the Secretary for having given him the opportunity to explain his predicament and that of the other Americans having a similar stake in the Cuban economy.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Snow.

² None of the attachments is printed.

325. Memorandum of Discussion at the 411th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 25, 1959¹

Washington, June 25, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

With respect to the situation in the Caribbean, the Director of Central Intelligence noted that there were several new rebel groups being set up in Honduras in preparation for moving into Nicaragua. There had also been reports of four rebel landings in the Dominican Republic, some of which were still in being while others had been destroyed. Fidel Castro seemed to be determined to get rid of both Trujillo and Somoza in which design he apparently had the secret support of Betancourt of Venezuela and Figueres of Costa Rica. There had been a general mobilization in the Dominican Republic. Our information indicated that these rebel landings in the Dominican Republic had received at least some slight support from the native population but the groups did not seem large enough to pose a serious security problem to Trujillo at the present time. It seems that Castro thinks it is possible to repeat in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua the success of his own movement in Cuba which began with very small forces.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the machinery of the Organization of American States (CAS) had been somewhat hampered in its efforts to maintain the peace because of the general unpopularity throughout Latin America of the dictatorships in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. One could say that the situation would be funny if it were not so serious.

Secretary Herter emphasized how seriously the Caribbean problem appeared to the Department of State. He pointed out that if the U.S. Government sided with the dictatorships, it would find itself in serious trouble with many other Latin American Republics. On the other hand, if we did not do something, the fire would spread very fast. Cuba was the center of the unrest and presented, in itself, the most serious situation. U.S. business interests in Cuba were very frightened and were now clamoring for U.S. economic action against the Castro regime. The OAS was moving in most gingerly fashion instead, as we had hoped, of moving effectively in this grave situation. Nevertheless, Secretary Herter thought we would have to use the OAS machinery rather than to intervene unilaterally.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that “Che” Guevara, one of Castro’s chief Left-Wing lieutenants, had recently gone to see Nasser in Cairo. In meeting with Nasser, he had spoken in bitter terms of the U.S. Nasser reportedly replied that if one dealt with the imperialists, one would suffer a five per cent loss in one’s resources. However, if one dealt with the Communists, one would lose one hundred per cent of his assets.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

The President, reverting to an earlier point, asked Secretary Herter whether he could not put pressure upon the OAS to make that body more effective in preserving peace in the Caribbean area. Secretary Herter replied that we had been urging the OAS to take the desired action but many of the Latin American nations simply did not wish to become involved. Moreover, in order for the OAS to go into action, it is necessary to prove that one of the Latin American Republics is actually interfering in the internal affairs of another Latin American nation. This is not easy to do because many of the outside invaders are being given support by internal elements in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. In any event, Secretary Herter assured the President that the State Department was working closely with the Department of Justice and CIA on these problems especially with respect to activities going on in Miami.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason.

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, June 25, 1959—8:09 p.m.

1081. In view Castro’s latest declarations regarding immediate expropriation cattle lands in Camaguey,² Department requests Ambassador, if he perceives no objection, call immediately on appropriate authorities GOC following up our discussions Roa here, his recent discussion authorities there in line with GOC reply our note³ with its implied willingness to “listen with attention and respect to the opinions of all” and to “all suggestions and comments”. In such discussion you may state that Agrarian Reform Law and GOC note now receiving careful study by legal and other experts USG and that you will expect in near future make detailed observations regarding law and note. You should make every effort persuade GOC avoid precipitate action in carrying out Agrarian Reform Law in its application American properties referring past and present friendly relations two governments, and possibility actions this nature may make more difficult the cooperation desired by both governments in order that problems arising from law may be quickly and amicably settled and our historic political and economic ties thereby strengthened.

Of serious concern Department is report of seizure Kleberg and other U.S. cattle properties plus possibly some sugar lands of U.S. companies including Punta Alegre Sugar Corporation Mill at Baragua. Such seizure would greatly complicate further negotiations with GOC on overall aspects Agrarian Reform Law. You are requested bring this matter attention GOC referring to provisions Article 25 which allows 3 months period for filing of title documents and other information required of owners before land shall be expropriated.

Department will send you further detailed instructions soonest.⁴

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/6–2559. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson; cleared with Little, Rubottom, and in draft with L/C; and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter.

² Castro made this statement in a television appearance the night of June 23; it was briefly summarized in telegram 1610 from Havana, June 24. (ibid., 837.16/6–2459)

³ See Documents 321 and 318.

⁴ Not found.

327. Editorial Note

On July 1, Major Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz, Chief of the Cuban Air Force, arrived at Miami in a small boat accompanied by his wife, his brother, and another Cuban Air Force officer. Diaz Lanz fled Cuba after Castro had replaced him as Chief of the Air Force with Juan Almeida, who had instituted a purge of anti-Communist officers from the Air Force. Diaz Lanz had confronted Castro with the charge that Communists were infiltrating the government and had issued a statement to this effect to the press.

After arriving in Miami, Diaz Lanz was kept in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and was interviewed by officials from various U.S. Government agencies. Diaz Lanz reportedly indicated that he was anxious to be released and to “blast Castro.” He received a subpoena to testify before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, chaired by Senator James Eastland, and on July 7 was brought by a staff member of the subcommittee to Washington. On July 10 and 13, Diaz Lanz testified before the subcommittee in closed session and in open session on July 14.

A detailed chronology of the events in the Diaz Lanz case was attached to a brief covering memorandum of July 16 from Assistant Secretary Rubottom to Under Secretary Murphy. In the introduction to the chronology, Rubottom described the “foreign policy interests” in the case as follows:

“(a) The Diaz Lanz defection was the first major break in Castro’s revolutionary command, which could lead to others and could in any event dramatize in Latin America as well as the United States the divisions caused in the Cuban Revolution by collaboration with the Communists.

“(b) Diaz Lanz was the best placed, and—when restricting himself to matters of which he had personal knowledge—most creditable first hand witness on the issues of Communist infiltration in the Cuban Armed Forces and on Castro’s military support of expeditions to overthrow other governments.

“(c) Diaz Lanz represented an opportunity to present these issues in the light of Cuban objections to the course of the Castro government rather than as a U.S.-Cuban quarrel. It was therefore important not to give versimilitude to Castro efforts to portray him as an agent in the control of the U.S. Government.

“(d) The Diaz Lanz case had an intimate relationship to the U.S. decision to press for and obtain an OAS meeting which would serve to deter Castro from launching further expeditions disturbing the peace of the Caribbean and further identify him in the Latin American mind. The diplomatic problem here was that while many Latin American Governments could be led to support a move to enjoin Castro and others from conducting foreign policies involving further violations of the non-intervention principles, a sizable number might shy away at this stage from participating constructively in such a meeting if they come to think that it was part of a general U.S. plan to discredit Castro and intervene in the internal affairs of Cuba.” (Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959)

For Diaz Lanz’ testimony on July 14, 1959, see Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean: Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959).

At his news conference on July 15, President Eisenhower was asked to comment on Diaz Lanz’ statement the previous day before the subcommittee that Fidel Castro was a willing tool of international communism. The President replied:

“Well, of course, he says that; there is no question that’s what his testimony said.

“Now such things are charged, and they are not always easy to prove. The United States has made no such charges. The United States is watching the whole area. The Caribbean area is in a state of unrest. The OAS has moved in to the extent of asking for a meeting for the foreign ministers to go all through this situation and see what should be done. The United States expects to cooperate with the OAS. That’s our stand today.”

In response to further questioning, the President also said that he did not think that the Diaz Lanz case had been discussed with the head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Joseph Swing, during his visits to the White House in the past few days. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, page 522)

328. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs (Turkel)¹

Washington, July 1, 1959.

CUBAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, 1959 AND PROPOSED U.S. ACTION

I.

Cuban Economic Prospects, 1959

Castro is finishing the first six months since his accession to power with the Cuban economy in relatively fair shape. The important questions are: What will be the course of the economy under Castro in the next six months and what should the U.S. do about it?

Castro has made a great many promises and threats in his first six months in office but took only two important actions in that period. At the beginning of the period he signed the rent law, which resulted in a standstill of the construction industry. Toward the end of the period he signed the Agrarian Reform Law which has not had immediate effects, but which will have serious adverse effects on production in the sugar industry a year or two hence, and on cattle and possibly tobacco production as well.

I have said on earlier occasions that the second half of this year will be the crucial period for Castro. The dead season, which starts about now, is the period when the sugar grinding season terminates and the foreign exchange receipts slacken off greatly. For the rest of the year Cuba must live largely on its $80–85 million of reserves.

The Cuban balance of payments deficit has been running at about $100 million per annum for some years. (Last year it was $180 million which included $80 million of flight capital which is not likely to be repeated.)

To this $100 million deficit must be added a loss of $50 million in sugar income owing to lower prices and also $25 million each for the loss of tourist income and foreign capital investment. Thus, it may be expected that the Cuban balance of payments deficit for 1959, which accumulates in the second half of the year, will be of the order of $200 million. This estimate is very conservative. Castro may, of course decide to finance part of this deficit by throwing in his $80 million of reserves, but if he does this he will be left with a completely empty till.

There are some factors working to reduce the amount of the deficit, but more powerful factors will work to increase it. On the positive side, we find that imports into Cuba have dropped by about ⅓ in the first months of this year. Cuba is living on its inventories and this is a temporary factor working to reduce the deficit. On the other hand, Castro has made many commitments, which if carried out even partially, will tend heavily to increase the deficit. He has promised wage increases; he has promised equipment and credit to small land owners; he has promised $120 million of public works in the second semester.

The time of Castro’s vulnerability this coming semester will depend on the speed with which he acts on these promises. Surprisingly, thus far the budget is being balanced, the public debt presents no problem, and reserves are not too bad. The Batista public works have been stopped and no new ones actually started.

In my view, Castro will begin performing on some of his promises soon and his real difficulties will start in August and increase possibly to a pitch in November. He will not ask for U.S. financial assistance. Even if he asks for IMF assistance and if he could satisfy the Fund, he could get only $25 million on the basis of the present quota.

Castro will probably devalue early in this August–November period and the sharpness of the devaluation will depend largely on his public works policy. He may try to stave this off for a while by adopting exchange and import controls but I do not believe he can avoid the necessity for devaluation. Castro cannot be pressed in the matter of public debt because practically the entire $160 million of debt service owing this year is covered by collateral, as is the smaller amount owing for 1960.

I predict that Castro, in order to survive, will take over the direction of all elements of the national economy, as did Peron. If he does this (and avoids assassination and war) he may survive this year. Unlike Peron, however, he has had the bad luck to take over when: (1) the monetary reserves are exhausted, and (2) the price of the country’s major export is very low.

Accordingly, he will not be able to increase the real wages of labor. Indeed, as unemployment spreads and real wages decline, his popularity will continue to decline. Castro will, I believe, establish all the elements of a police state but that will not save him.

II.

What Should the U.S. Do?

1.

Should the U.S. make a balance of payments loan to Castro? Answer: No. I interpret our policy during the first six months of the Castro regime as being one of giving him a chance to succeed and in the meantime working to strengthen the moderates around him in the hope that the extreme leftists would be discredited or shoved aside. With the signature of the Agrarian Reform Law, it seems clear that our original hope was a vain one; Castro’s Government is not the kind worth saving.

A balance of payments loan could have been considered only while there was still hope of putting the moderates in the ascendancy. That hope is gone. Moreover, considering Castro’s domestic policies, a balance of payments loan would be money lost and the beginning of a never-ending drain.

2.

Should the U.S. seek means of financial pressure? Answer: No, not for the time being. Castro has ample collateral in 1959 and 1960 to cover maturities on pre-existing obligations, hence he will have no trouble in meeting current debts. There are many other weapons in the arsenal of economic warfare: prohibition against public and private loans, discriminatory trade treatment, discouragement of investment and impeding of financial transactions. Some of these are double-edged weapons, others are unnecessary or too harsh. I believe that the use of any of these at this time would be counter-productive.

3.

Should the U.S. seek to withdraw trade agreement concessions and particularly the historic Cuban preference? Answer: No. Late in April the Cubans handed us a list of commodities² on which they wished to modify or withdraw concessions. We are going to enter into negotiations this fall and will propose withdrawing corresponding concessions to Cuba. We ought not to do this in a punitive spirit. U.S. exports to Cuba will be hurt far more than Cuban exports to the U.S. Our effort should be to limit the withdrawals on both sides.

4.

Should the U.S. cut the Cuban sugar quota? Answer: This cannot be given a simple “yes” or “no”. Cutting the sugar quota is the ultimate weapon in relations with Cuba. The U.S. takes 3 million tons or ½ of Cuban production. The U.S. price, however, is extremely profitable and permits a high average price for the whole Cuban crop. This explains, in part, the intense eagerness of other supplying areas to get part of the Cuban quota. To make a quota cut, there would have to be legislative authority and it is not likely that sugar legislation will be passed in this session.

First let me list the general arguments against seeking authority to cut the Cuban quota, and use them to support the firm recommendation that we seek no such authority this year.

(1) It will rally nearly all Cubans behind Castro. Our experience in 1947 with the Sugar Act of 1948 [Sec. 202(e)]³ proves this point.

(2) The step is probably irreversible. If a cut in the Cuban quota is made, it will probably be divided in this order: domestic industry, Philippines, Mexico, Peru and Central America. We must not forget that 6 million Cubans must make a living even after Castro is gone.

(3) The U.S. ought not to be in the position of using the quota systems for economic sanctions; indeed, Article 16 of the OAS Charter⁴ provides that no State may use “coercive measures of an economic character to force the sovereign will of another State”.

Suppose, however, that the political situation continues to deteriorate, and that next year we find the Castro Government even more communist-influenced or intolerably anti-American, what should be the position of the Department with respect to sugar legislation? (The time for legislation will be January or at latest, February 1960.)

There are two possible methods indicated below to accomplish the cut, neither of which ostensibly bases the grounds for action on the communist or anti-American bias of the Cuban Government. The first one, 4A, should be considered, but I do not recommend it because it appears on its face to be coercive.

4A.

This method gears the reduction or suspension of the Cuban quota to failure to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation for expropriated property. It would be pleasing to the interests expropriated, and would appeal to the Congress generally. Adapting somewhat the Wayne Hays proposal in the Mutual Security Act of 1959, HR 7500 (Sec. 503(b)) the language might be:

“In any case in which the Government of any country expropriates or confiscates the property of any U.S. citizen and fails within 6 months of such expropriation or confiscation to take steps determined by the Secretary of State to be appropriate to discharge its obligations under international law, the Secretary of Agriculture may reduce or suspend the quota for such country and the quantities so reduced or suspended shall be allocated to other foreign supplying areas.”

4B.

In addition to the arguments stated earlier against any cut in the Cuban quota, the foregoing provisions may be open to two additional objections: (1) the obligations of an expropriating government under international law are subject to dispute, and (2) action designed to enforce the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation is offensive to Latin Americans generally. A second method of cutting the Cuban quota would relate the Secretary’s authority to his finding that structural changes in a country’s sugar industry tend to make it possible for that country to fail to fill its quota. This puts the Secretary’s action on grounds which may appeal to the other Latin Americans. Castro has set in motion an unwise kind of land reform, which will injure production. To assure a steady source of supply, particularly since it takes time to develop alternative sources, the Cuban quota is reduced and shifted elsewhere.

A proposed provision is as follows:

“Whenever the Secretary of Agriculture finds as a fact that changes have occurred in the structure of the sugar industry of any foreign supplying area which may impair production and thereby jeopardize supplies from that area, he may reduce or suspend the quota for such foreign area and allocate the quantities so reduced or suspended to other foreign supplying areas.“⁵

4C.

Suppose, however, that when we get to January, Cuban relations with the U.S. have deteriorated further, but not to the point where we want to use the sledge hammer of seeking authority to cut the Cuban quota. Sugar legislation must be passed in 1960 and it is generally for 4 years. We would not want an extension for 4 years which would guarantee Castro’s U.S. market for that period; it would be rewarding delinquency. On the other hand, the domestic industry will not go along with a 1 year’s extension. In these circumstances, what we might do next January is to seek to extend the domestic sugar quotas for 4 years and the foreign quotas for 1 year.

Note 1. In connection with cutting the Cuban quota it should be realized that we probably cannot cut the quota more than 500,000 tons the first year since there may not be more than that available elsewhere. By the second year, when other producing countries have had an opportunity to increase production, we ought to be able to cut the Cuban quota a million tons or more and obtain the supply elsewhere.

Note 2. I have given thought to increase in customs duty and increase in the compensatory duty (compensatory for the domestic excise tax on sugar), but these are so bound up with GATT and other treaty provisions that efforts along this line will generate more problems than they can solve.

5.

Does the fact that Soviet Russia is in a position to profit by strained relations between the U.S. and Cuba in any way vary the foregoing recommendations? Answer: No. The Soviets can always choose the initiative and select their target. If Russia actually does take action by way of supporting Castro which we consider intolerable, the U.S. should apply the sanction envisaged for a communist-influenced Cuba in point 4B.

If the Russian action takes place after the passage of sugar legislation in 1960, the sanction envisaged would have to be taken through special legislation.

¹ Source: Department of State, REA Files: Lot 61 D 248, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Turkel. Attached to a brief covering memorandum of July 1 from Turkel to Rubottom, in which Turkel wrote that whether or not Rubottom approved the memorandum as representing ARA’s position, he recommended sending it to the Embassy in Havana to obtain its views. Also attached was a note from Devine to Turkel, August 28, in which Devine said that the memorandum had been kept in Rubottom’s in-basket since July 2. Devine said he was returning it to Turkel “for your reconsideration as to whether it is still current and correct. You are the best judge as to whether resubmission is or is not appropriate.”

² Not further identified.

³ Brackets in the source text. For text of the Sugar Act of 1948 (P.L. 388), approved August 8, 1947, see 61 Stat. 922.

⁴ For text of the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogota on April 30, 1948, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949 (rev. ed.) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 230–242.

⁵ After reading a draft of the memorandum, in which Section 4B was essentially the same as in the final version, Dreier sent a memorandum of July 1 to Turkel expressing his own view that the proposal in Section 4B was “by far the best” and that “the situation in Cuba has got to the point where we should definitely plan on the necessity for some step or steps of this kind.” The draft, dated June 30, as well as Dreier’s memorandum of July 1 to Turkel, are in Department of State, ARA Files: Lot 61 D 248, Cuba 1959.

329. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, July 7, 1959.

SUBJECT

Recommendations of Mr. Robert Kleberg on the Cuban Situation

I read with interest the recommendations of Bob Kleberg concerning the Cuban situation which you enclosed with your letter of June 27, 1959.² He came in to see me on June 24³ for the purpose of discussing the probable expropriation of his large cattle ranch in Cuba under the terms of the Agrarian Reform Law which has been promulgated by Prime Minister Castro’s Government. The situation in which he finds himself is indeed most vexatious and frustrating and I sympathize deeply with him. We are making every possible effort to persuade the Cuban Government to consider the very real contribution which an investment such as Bob’s has made to the benefit of Cuba, in the hope that some amelioration might be obtained in the law’s implementation. Also, we are standing firmly on the principle that such expropriation, if carried out, must provide for adequate, prompt and effective compensation.

I do not believe it is necessary for you to reply to Bob or comment on his recommendations. However, if he should raise the question with you again, I would suggest you simply say that the Department of State is giving every possible consideration to his case. Although they are understandable under the circumstances, I believe that the execution of any one of his recommendations at this time would not achieve his desired objective and would be likely to bring strong criticism upon the United States from most other Latin American countries to the delight of Communist propagandists.

Christian A. Herter

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which bears the initials “DE.”

² 

An unsigned White House staff note, dated June 25, indicated that Kleberg had met with the President for about an hour that day and that he had requested the meeting “on the grounds that he could tell the President (and no one else) certain things.” Attached to the staff note were several documents, including an undated, unsigned memorandum, presumably prepared by Kleberg, which listed the following five “immediate steps available”:

“1. Suspend Cuban Sugar quota as of July 15, 1959 unless properties, now seized, are returned intact before that date.

“2. Immediately seize all Cuban assets in the United States (government and private).

“3. Require passports and visas for Cuba, and issue no tourist visas.

“4. Order fleet on routine Caribbean maneuvers.

“5. Announce that in 1898 we fought to free Cubans from tyranny—we will not stand by now and allow Communism to permanently destroy this freedom.” (ibid., Staff Notes)

In his letter of June 27 to Herter, to which was attached a copy of Kleberg’s memorandum, the President wrote he had “not thought it necessary to comment to Bob or to reply to his communication. If you think there would be any value in my saying anything whatsoever in the matter, I will be glad to do so.” (ibid., DDE Diaries)

³ See Document 324.

330. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 7, 1959—5 p.m.

45. Mexico’s telegram 33 to Department repeated Habana 3.² While opposition in Cuba to Castro Government exists and may be growing, Castro continues to enjoy support of large majority of Cuban people and I believe any armed attempt to overthrow government in near future would both strengthen such support and would fail.

Opposition consists chiefly of (1) adherents of former regime including some displaced military elements (2) members of upper and middle classes whose property interests are gravely threatened by Castro’s revolutionary program although Castro has strong support professional intellectual classes. A potential third opposition force consists of disappointed revolutionary groups who have been left out by the dominant 26 of July movement together with some elements of the movement who are concerned over radical trend of Fidel Castro.

First two of these opposition groups have armed military components both in Cuba and in other countries. The third may also have. In mountains of Pinar del Rio, Las Villas, Camaguey and Oriente armed men (mostly ex-soldiers) are hiding out, waiting out, waiting for opportunity to strike at Castro. According to best information available to us, these armed groups are much smaller than indicated in reference telegram and probably number not over 200 men in any of these provinces at present time. We have no information that there is any integrated command. They do not apparently enjoy peasant support. Government control has not been challenged anywhere.

As Department knows this Embassy has given closest attention to evidences of communist infiltration. These are cause for deep concern. Presence of appreciable number of Communists in armed services is confirmed [less than 1 line not declassified] but they are outnumbered by militant anti-Communists. Relatively little Communist infiltration of regular police, and Communists have not taken over control of security agencies, [less than 1 line not declassified] numerous rumors that Soviet military experts are present, but found no basis therefor. Seven Communist Chinese newspapermen now in Cuba for no good purpose; some may be advisers on land reform though we have had no indications of this. Lavandeyra reported [less than 1 line not declassified] as instructor at Army Cultural School and probably Communism; have no information that he has more important status.

Communist Party exists openly in Cuba and is active in many fields. GOC’s attitude has been one of benevolent tolerance except in few instances where Communist objectives clash with those of 26 of July, when latter has reacted strongly. Castro has not concentrated on this subject to extent desirable.

Of as much concern to Embassy as avowed Communists are revolutionary leaders who while denying they are Communists follow a course which we believe favors Communist objectives and stimulates anti-Americanism.

Embassy believes Fidel Castro, whose authority is supreme, is no Communist, and it is not prepared at this time to submit a finding that revolutionary government is headed in direction of Communism though on this point it is keeping in mind, [sic]

I strongly recommend that for present we continue policy of friendliness toward Castro and GOC, using our influence in every way to guide him towards sounder economic ground, and that we give no encouragement of any kind to movements aimed at overthrowing Castro. Latter is very strong as of now reflecting as he does hopes and aspirations of majority of Cubans rather than any foreign ideology.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–759. Secret. Repeated to Mexico City.

² In this telegram, dated July 3, the Embassy in Mexico City indicated that a “reliable, well-informed Cuban source” had said that an anti-Castro revolution would be carried out sometime prior to the mass rally scheduled later in the month to commemorate July 26. The Embassy noted that opposition to Castro was reportedly gathering “final momentum” as a result of increased Communist infiltration of the armed forces, police, and the security apparatus. (ibid., 737.00/7–359)

331. Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 9, 1959¹

Washington, July 9, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Turning to the situation in the Caribbean, Mr. Dulles indicated that there were further reports in concerning efforts based in Cuba against the Dominican Republic. These reports seemed to indicate that the attack might go through Haiti rather than be launched as a frontal attack on the Dominican territory. He also noted recruitment of Dominicans in Venezuela for an attack on the Dominican Republic. Most such groups appeared to be either Communist-led or Communist-infiltrated. The Organization of American States (OAS) was still in a serious quandary as to what its proper role should be. It seemed likely, however, that the majority of governments in the OAS would be willing to see the convening of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics to deal with the general problem of the situation in the Caribbean, as opposed to a response to the Dominican Republic’s plea that it was being attacked by external enemies. Secretary Herter agreed with this latter estimate and added that steps were already being taken to convene the Foreign Ministers.

Meanwhile, continued Mr. Dulles, Fidel Castro was facing increased domestic unrest in Cuba. He seemed altogether determined to push the application of his agrarian reform law. There were even reports that he might give up the office of Prime Minister for which he regards himself as not very well suited, and concentrate on carrying out the agrarian reform. Mr. Dulles commented that he was strongly inclined to doubt that Castro would take this latter step.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’s briefing, the Attorney General² expressed considerable concern about the possible illegal entry of ex-President Batista of Cuba into the U.S. He pointed out this would be quite difficult to prevent and it would be even harder to oust Batista if he once got into this country. The President suggested that if Batista entered this country illegally, he could at least be put under arrest. With this opinion Mr. Rogers agreed.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² William Rogers.

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 13, 1959—4 p.m.

96. Addressing Cuban civic institutions Saturday night Prime Minister visibly angered over reports Diaz Lanz appearance before Senate Committee. (Embtel 90² ) Also expressed opinion two other critical issues referred Embtel 69.³ No mention Miami incident. Following highlights speech:

1. Fact Diaz Lanz invited appear before US Senate Committee reflects lack respect for Cuba and is interference Cuban internal affairs. Confirms suspicions that there have been many strange circumstances surrounding case. Foreign agents were involved Diaz Lanz case, as facts now clearly indicate.

2. No one has right interfere Cuba’s internal affairs. No one has right show lack respect for Cuba. Believes Diaz Lanz case should be presented OAS.

3. Agrarian reform only injurious foreign masters Cuban land, large land owners, and enemies of revolution. Some obtained land legally but under system at odds with welfare nation as a whole. Agrarian reform necessary and will triumph.

4. Cuban people must not depend on anyone, must sacrifice by saving and investing in industrial development. Cuba will go on knees to no one ask assistance. Cuban people won liberty unaided, now will also win economic liberty without assistance.

5. OAS did not display concern plight Cuban people under Batista tyranny. No one called meeting Foreign Ministers investigate brutal undemocratic system imposed by Batista.

6. Cuba will receive $100 million less from export of sugar this year, but over-all income actually reflects rise due increase in internal consumption Cuban products.

7. Government will invest $200 million during next four years and take other necessary action to stimulate tourist trade.

Comment: Castro’s address of Saturday night marks first occasion since his trip to the United States on which he personally has made a public statement shot through with anti-American overtones.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1359. Confidential; Priority.

² In telegram 90, July 12, the Embassy reported the speech given by Fidel Castro the previous night in which he had sharply criticized Diaz Lanz’ appearance before the Senate subcommittee. (ibid., 737.00/7–1259)

³ In telegram 69, July 9, the Embassy described the four issues bearing on U.S. Cuban relations, including the flight of Diaz Lanz, which had recently been receiving heavy play in the Cuban news media. The others were the recent attack against the Cuban Consul in Miami by pro-Batista elements, the possible amendment of the foreign aid bill to exclude countries that confiscated American property without fair compensation, and the handling by the OAS of the various threats to the security of the Caribbean region. (ibid., 611.37/7–959)

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 14, 1959—6 p.m.

118. Herbert Matthews of the New York Times has had extended conversations with Ambassador and other officers of Embassy on Cuban situation. He has spent many hours with Fidel Castro. He appeared wholly and unswervingly convinced that GOC, its aims and leaders are entirely laudable. He insisted that there are only a few Communists in the government including armed forces, and that their influence is not decisive. He felt that concern on this subject displayed by Embassy and other US governmental agencies was unwarranted, referring to it as “international McCarthyism”. He examined written report on Communist infiltration and influence and was unimpressed. Matthews feels that anti-Cuban attitude and utterances US are much more significant and detrimental to good relations than consistent anti-American attitude and utterances by Cuban officials, which he tends to dismiss as arising from just causes.

He admitted inability appraise evidence forthcoming economic problems. He was deeply concerned over appearance Diaz Lanz before Senate committee as well as remarks attributed to Admiral Burke carried today’s press,² feeling that they would have most unfortunate repercussions on Cuban-American relations.

He stated categorically that GOC would not permit further expedition against Haiti and DR in view failures last month.

I consider Matthews a dedicated, sincere journalist, deeply involved emotionally in the present Cuban situation. Admittedly degree and influence of Communism in Cuba has been exaggerated in some press and public statements in the US. However, I do not share his attitude of tolerance and complacency concerning the situation, and feel that Communist influence is a matter for continuing concern and vigilance, that some principal leaders of GOC are anti-American, and that anti-Americanism has been deliberately encouraged by them for some time past. Matthews furthermore apparently uninterested in degree to which legitimate US private interests here have contributed growth economy and are entitled consideration both GOC and GUS in present and future aspects.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1459. Official Use Only; Priority.

² In his speech to 200 reserve officers at Fort McNair, Washington, Burke said that “the danger is still great” that the Communists would take over Cuba. (The New York Times, July 14, 1959, p. 2)

334. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) in Washington and Tad Szulc of The New York Times in Miami, July 15, 1959¹

Miami, July 15, 1959

Tad Szulc, New York Times correspondent, telephoned me today from Miami. He said the following:

He had just returned from Habana and is en route to Ciudad Trujillo to report further on developments. While in Habana he and Herb Matthews, New York Times editorial writer, had a long interview with Prime Minister Castro. The interview was completely informal and on the clear understanding that nothing discussed would be for publication.

Castro told the Times men that he was through with supporting revolutionary expeditions in the Caribbean area. He felt that he had complied with an commitments that he had assumed with revolutionary groups and from now on they would have to go ahead on their own with no further assistance from Cuba. Castro was disgusted with the performance of the Central Americans particularly. Castro had given special assistance to the anti-Trujillo movement due in part to is hatred of dictators, his long-standing feud with Trujillo and to a “sentimental compulsion because of his close association with Captain Enrico Jimenez Moya”. Jimenez, who apparently was killed in the Constanza invasion, had been a close associate of Castro throughout the Sierra Maestra campaign and had been regarded by Castro as the principal military leader of the invasion of the Dominican Republic, his movement was apparently wiped out and Castro no longer had much hope for the other two expeditions which had landed on the north coast of the Dominican Republic. Castro thought, however, that there was still some chance that the group which had landed at the Estero Hondo might still spark a serious revolt against Trujillo. Be this as it may, the Dominican revolutionaries will have to get along on their own from now on so far as Castro is concerned. With regard to Haitian matters, Castro said that he had no respect whatever for the Haitian plotters who had sought his assistance and “that poor miserable old Duvalier” has enough problems of his own.

In summarizing the attitude on further expeditions, Castro repeated that he was fed up with the adventures of this kind and felt that he and the Cuban Government had already given the expeditionaries far more support and help than any one had given him when he was organizing his revolutionary expeditions to Cuba in 1956.

This is the first time that I can recall that anyone has told me of a direct conversation with Castro in which the latter has frankly admitted his knowledge of and support for the expeditions which left Cuba for the Dominican Republic and Central America. Szulc said, however, that Castro disclaimed any knowledge or support for the Panamanian expedition which, he said, had been embarrassing and annoying to him. At one point Castro told the newsmen that he was not going to get himself further embroiled with the OAS for the sake of revolutionaries of other countires.

I asked Szulc if Herb Matthews had heard Castro admit his responsibility for the expeditions because I believed that he had previously doubted whether Castro himself was involved. Szulc replied that Matthews had been with him the entire time and had heard everything that Castro said.

Szulc then asked me if I could tell him when and where the meeting of Foreign Ministers would take place and whether the United States would attempt to place the blame on Cuba for the recent developments in the Caribbean, such as those which Castro had mentioned to them.

I replied that a Special Committee was now studying when and where the meeting would be held and there was some indication that a number of countries favored Santiago, but I could not tell him what the final decision would be. I said that, furthermore, I could tell him simply that the OAS Council expected that the meeting would be called as quickly as practicable but further than that I could not give him any more information on the date. With regard to the question of blame, I told him that the presentation made by the United States representative to the OAS, as well as the resolution which the Council had approved,² made it clear that there was no intent to bring specific charges against any one but rather constructively to determine the basic cause of the Caribbean unrest and disturbances and to attempt to determine how the inter-American organization could bring about an increasingly effective exercise of representative democracy in the hemisphere.

Szulc told me that Castro had said that the Cuban representatives to the MFM were going to push hard on economic plans. He said Castro remarked that some countries consider the Caribbean problem urgent and Cuba considers economic problems of the hemisphere just as urgent.

He also told me that Castro was literally “livid” when he discussed the Diaz Lanz episode. Szulc said that he hoped that we would notify the Embassy at Ciudad Trujillo that he would be going there tomorrow, especially because he had been informally warned by a friendly Dominican offical that he should not return to the Dominican Republic because of resentment over the articles he had published on the Dominican situation.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/7–1559. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland.

² Reference is presumably to the resolution approved by the Council of the Organization of American States on July 13 to convoke a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Santiago, Chile, was subsequently selected as the site for the meeting.

335. Memorandum of Discussion at the 413th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 16, 1959¹

Washington, July 16, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

As to the Caribbean area, the Diaz Lanz case has greatly disturbed Fidel Castro. One result has been a strong anti-Communist speech by President Urrutia.² Six Chinese Communist newsmen have arrived in Havana to head up a Chinese language newspaper for the Chinese community in Cuba which in fact was the largest Chinese community in any of the Latin American Republics.

Meanwhile Che Guevara has reached India and is in touch with the Indian Communists. He has complained to them that his hands are still tied by U.S. occupation of the Guantanamo Naval Base. He predicted, however, that Cuba would soon get rid of this U.S. base and would then be able to show its true colors in foreign policy.

Mr. Dulles commented that the revolution in Honduras seemed to have no connection with Castro’s machinations elsewhere in the Caribbean.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs. The portion of the discussion printed here is from Allen Dulles’ intelligence briefing.

² In telegram 97 from Havana, July 13, the Embassy reported that in a television appearance that afternoon Urrutia had sharply criticzed Communism. The Embassy noted that Urrutia’s remarks represented the firmest anti-Communist statement yet made by any member of the revolutionary government. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1359)

336. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 16, 1959—1 p.m.

133. For Rubottom. From source which I believe reliable am informed that Castro is concerned over US-Cuban relations and that he has strong belief US probably planning secretly bring about his overthrow. He would like to come to some “terms” with US in order reduce tension without sacrificing Cuba’s sovereignty, without damaging revolution, and without embarrassing Castro. Castro’s belief apparently based on much unfavorable publicity in US, on handling of Diaz Lanz case, on Admiral Burke statement,² et cetera.

According to same source, Castro’s worries increased by report from Sergio Cabro of Prensa Libre of conversation he had with me July 13 in which I told Cabro I was much concerned at continued unjustified attacks on US by prominent Cubans and in Cuban press, particularly press of July 26 Movement. I made similar statements to Felipe Pazos on July 11 and hope that these also reach Castro. Dihigo arrived evening July 14, and may have reported his conversation with you (Deptel 54³ ) which would further emphasize to Castro our mounting displeasure at attacks on US.

Of course, above may be either unreliable or represent only passing mood. I am letting source know that I am prepared discuss US-Cuban relations with Castro at his convenience if conversation eventuates, and [if] you approve, I would like to make following points.

1. There is general sympathy in US offical circles with stated desire Castro government to improve conditions of Cuban people. We believe that only Cuban people have right determine whether Castro is in fact giving them type of government which will achieve these aims and aspirations.

2. Policy of our government toward GOC has been entirely straightforward and correct. We would like to be able to discuss with Castro all matters of mutual concern. We regret degree to which such discussion has been limited in past.

3. US Government believes that Castro non-Communist. US Government is however concerned at evidences Communist influence in important government and armed forces circles. International Communist conspiracy aims at furthering USSR’s ambition of world domination and destruction of human liberties as understood in free world. Therefore US which has made tremendous sacrifices in blood and treasure in fighting Communist designs can hardly be expected take complacent attitude toward government which tolerates and encourages Communists in Cuba or embarks on neutralist course.

4. Castro has alienated much public and official opinion in US by continued anti-American statements which have been echoed by official press and other government officals. We as a government reflect our public opinion to important extent. Handling by newspaper Revolucion of Miami incident as one example indicates a dangerous built-in hostility, which uses any pretext to express itself in venomous and unacceptable terms. Violent, distorted lead editorial that paper July 15 good example attitude in question. (Summary editorial contained Embtel 128.⁴ ) Revolucion is often hardly distinguishable in its anti-American attitude from Communist paper Hoy.

5. US Government has been seriously concerned at GOC supported activities in Caribbean. On one hand, GOC has protested its adherence treaty obligations and doctrine non-intervention. On other hand, GOC has facilitated and equipped expeditions against Panama, Nicaragua and recently against Dominican Republic in violation GOC’s obligations as member OAS. Fact GOC has not been overtly denounced reflects desire permit Castro mend his ways rather than ignorance of facts on part OAS membership.

6. Treatment of legitimate American private interests in Cuba being carefully watched by American Government and public opinion. These private enterprises have made important contribution to economic progress of Cuba. Private enterprises represent means of further cooperation between our two countries and in fact is most important source of foreign capital which Cuba, according to most economists, Cuban and foreign, desperately needs in order improve standard of living. Unbridled, unfounded denunciations of these interests and harassing tactics are definitely prejudicial to good relations between our countries. I would reiterate terms of our note of June 11⁵ regarding adequate compensation of American interests.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00./7–1659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² See footnote 2, Document 333.

³ Telegram 54, July 13, described a conversation which Rubottom had with Dihigo that afternoon to discuss the pending Bridges-Johnston amendment to the Mutual Security Act, the possibility that Batista might be admitted to the United States, and the recent attack on the Cuban Consul in Miami. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5–MSP/7–1359) A memorandum of this conversation is scheduled for publication in volume V.

⁴ Telegram 128, July 15, summarized a “violently anti-American” lead editorial by Carlos Franqui in that day’s issue of Revolucion. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–1559)

⁵ See Document 318.

337. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, July 18, 1959—3:35 p.m.

74. Embtel 133.² Assuming Castro continues hold reins as seems most probable from here, Dept. fully concurs desirability this action and approves talking points you propose make with following suggestions:

Para. 3, we tend feel unnecessary at this time for U.S. take a position concerning Castro’s personal political ideology. Do not disagree first sentence but believe merely saying this tends obscure essential truth U.S. deeply disturbed his attitude toward Communism. Also should statement become publicized would give him certain protection on this point throughout hemisphere. If deemed necessary or desirable at later date such reassurance can be given. Alternate approach might be, “In view Castro’s often expressed disagreement with Communist philosophy U.S. feels he must share our concern at evidence communist influence, etc.” On this subject you may wish to refer Deptel 67.³

Para. 6 would add to comment on compensation desirability that individual interests affected have opportunity discuss their cases with responsible authorities and not be faced with precipitate action which prevents proper planning, further alienates public opinion in U.S. and opinion in potential investment circles. Latter watching most closely treatment afforded American investors under Agrarian Reform Law.

If interview arranged please inform Dept. immediately as possible may have further suggestions.

Dillon

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–1659. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Stevenson, cleared with Hill and Snow, and approved by Wieland who signed for Dillon.

² Supra.

³ In telegram 67, July 17, the Department reported the substance of a despatch by the New China News Agency on July 13 describing a warm official reception Raul Castro afforded visiting Chinese Communist newsmen. (Department of State, Central Files, 993.6237/7–1759)

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 18, 1959—1 p.m.

162. Reference: Embassy telegram 161.² Fidel Castro spoke nearly four hours by radio and television night of July 17 on national hookup all stations. Highlights were:

1. Resignation due to irreconcilable differences of internal, civic, revolutionary, moral nature with President Urrutia.

2. Urrutia refused reduce personal income, still received 100,000 pesos annually like Batista. Purchased house, attempted obtain governmental positions for undesirable persons.

3. Urrutia increasingly hostile to revolutionary objectives, delayed signature necessary laws, attempted delay work of Cabinet. Government becoming paralyzed. Urrutia might soon start vetoing Cabinet actions.

4. Difficulties with Urrutia reached climax when he declared in television appearance July 13³ communism was threat to Cuban revolution, was attempting to open second front against revolution, and true revolutionaries should oppose communism.

5. This bordered on treason, and was same game Diaz Lanz was playing in United States Senate, which was treating him as hero. It was also contrary to stand on communism repeatedly taken by Castro and other revolutionary leaders.

6. Castro quoted several previous statements setting forth correct position on communism. He is not communist, neither is revolution. But revolution neither capitalist nor communist, follows third position between two, and will never become anti-communist in spite of foreign pressure.

7. Diaz Lanz was encouraging foreign intervention in Cuba by charges leaders pro-communist and revolution communist. For unexplained but questionable reasons, Urrutia assisted that anti-revolutionary conspiracy and in effect implied that Castro and others pro-communist.

8. Castro violently attacked United States Senate for behavior in Diaz Lanz case, accusing it of espionage and of treating Cuba like minor United States municipality. Said some Senators in pay Trujillo. However, he twice mentioned the “rectification” on the part of President Eisenhower.

9. Castro could not properly ask Urrutia resign. Only alternative to resign himself. This also enabled him criticize Urrutia, and orient Cuban people as was his right.

10. Urrutia could do anything he wanted: resign, remain in office, stay in country, take asylum. But Urrutia legally in position of treason.

11. Told just before midnight Urrutia had resigned, Castro said affair was a historical incident.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1859. Official Use Only; Niact.

² Dated July 18, telegram 161 reported that Urrutia had resigned the previous evening following a 3–hour denunciation by Fidel Castro and “indications of overwhelming popular support for Castro.” The Cabinet elected Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, Minister of Revolutionary Laws, as the new President. The telegram also reported that Castro, who had earlier announced his own resignation, had apparently agreed to reassume the position of Prime Minister. (ibid.) For Urrutia’s recollection of these events, see Fidel Castro & Company, pp. 57–71.

³ See footnote 2, Document 335.

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 18, 1959—2 p.m.

163. Re Embassy telegram 162.² Castro’s resignation, his denunciation of Urrutia, Urrutia’s resignation, the election of Dorticos as new President, and Castro’s decision to resume his position of Prime Minister all of which occurred in a space of 24 hours, appear to have the following points of significance for the United States:

1. Castro is still smarting at Senate questioning of Diaz Lanz, notwithstanding two references he made in his denunciation speech to the “rectification of the executive”. He characterized hearings as acts of “gangsters” and accused Senate of engaging in “insolent espionage” against Cuba and intervention in Cuban affairs.

2. From his main charge against Urrutia, to effect that Urrutia had on heels of Diaz Lanz treason implied existence of communism in Cuban Government and had taken anti-communist stand not consistent with line laid down by Castro, it appears that Castro is more definitely committed than ever to public position on non-persecution of communists. He quoted extensively from his own pronouncements on subject. At same time he showed almost pathological resentment at any implications of communism in government, which he referred to repeatedly as efforts to “blackmail” him and as infamous calumny.

3. Castro repeatedly stated in his denunciation that principal revolutionary laws had already been established. This may indicate that no further revolutionary reforms are to be expected.

4. Brutal manner in which Castro destroyed Urrutia’s reputation by pinning on him accusations of moral, civic, and revolutionary shortcomings that bordered on treason, although Castro’s position was overwhelmingly endorsed by expressions of groups reflecting all sectors of Cuban population calling for Urrutia’s resignation, and fact that President was given no opportunity to defend himself against such charges, will in the end probably result in some tarnishing of revolution’s and Castro’s own good name.

5. As political maneuver to rid himself of an uncooperative associate, Castro’s tactic was a complete success.

6. Castro and his government have emerged from this affair strengthened by a new overwhelming mandate from the Cuban people. Castro is undisputed master of Cuba today and is likely to be for some time to come, barring accidents or assassination.

7. Absence of any anti-American expressions other than those connected with Diaz Lanz episode gives hope that Castro desires to avoid unnecessary difficulties with United States. However, it will probably be even more difficult henceforth to influence him toward a general anti-communist orientation although we would assume he would be extremely reluctant henceforth to take positive action, such as appointment to key position which would be interpreted as increasing communist influence. His extreme sensitivity to reaction abroad at same time he proclaims intransigent nationalism is interesting.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1859. Confidential; Niact.

² Supra.

340. Memorandum of the President’s Briefing Before His Press Conference, July 22, 1959¹

July 22, 1959

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Cuba. Castro’s “resignation” and firing of the former President. No comment should be made by President. The President laughed and said he might say that “The President (of Cuba)’s job is not a very steady one.”

Batista. His application for admission to this country has now been received here. Mrs. Batista wrote Mrs. Eisenhower asking her to intervene. The President had not known this and said [asked] in no uncertain terms why had he not been told. Also a telegram has come in from Batista’s young son begging the President to intervene.² The President said this whole matter was something that he ought to know about and said he would talk to Dillon about it later. In talking about the matter, the President said “There is one thing we cannot afford—that is, to be known as a haven for displaced dictators who have robbed their countries. We refused to let Peron in.” He also said that personally Batista was a “nice guy” and that the President liked him, but went on to say that he did not, at this moment, believe we should let him into this country, that he did not think the character of Castro had anything to do with letting Batista in or not. “You just can’t make a policy of bringing them (dictators) into this country.“³

[Here follows the remainder of the briefing.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential. The time of the briefing and those present is not indicated on the source text, but it probably took place from 9:55 to 10:28 a.m. immediately preceding the 10:30 press conference. Attending this meeting with the President, were, among others, Persons, Hagerty, Gerald Morgan, Merriam, John Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and Harlow. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. (ibid., President’s Appointment Book)

² References are to a July 20 letter from Martha de Batista to Mamie Eisenhower and a July 21 telegram from Roberto Batista to President Eisenhower. (Eisenhower Library, Central Files, OF–116B)

³ The subject of Cuba, as well as the question of asylum for Batista, did not come up at the President’s press conference. For the transcript, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 536–546.

341. Memorandum of Discussion at the 414th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 23, 1959¹

Washington, July 23, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles said that most of the developments in Cuba had been fully reported in the press. Certainly the Communists had been helped by the removal of President Urrutia. The rally scheduled for this weekend, he predicted, would probably provide the occasion for Castro’s announcement that he was again going to resume his office of Prime Minister.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

The Attorney General referred to Mr. Dulles’s remarks about Cuba and pointed out again the problem which would be occasioned for the U.S. if Batista managed to get into this country. Mr. Rogers inquired whether it would not be a good idea to forestall such a possibility by stating clearly now that we would not let Batista in. He pointed out that Batista had already applied for a visa.

The President commented that the Batista problem was not only political but personal. He had had an anguished appeal from Batista’s eleven year old son and Mrs. Eisenhower had had an appeal from Batista’s wife.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that despite the affinity of dictators for one another, Batista was on very bad terms with Trujillo. Actually, Batista fears for his life while he remains in the Dominican Republic. Secretary Dillon added that the State Department was preparing a paper for the President dealing with the whole problem.

The President asked why we could not send Batista to Spain. Mr. Dulles replied that Spain was rather doubtful about accepting Batista. To make matters worse, a good many people who had worked with Batista or were still working with him, were very good friends of the U.S. and we must avoid estranging them. A notable instance was Portuondo. The President expressed agreement with Mr. Dulles’s point with particular reference to Portuondo and went on to inquire what kind of a dictator Batista had been. Was he a Peron? If not, what variety was he?

Mr. Dulles replied that Batista’s record at the beginning of his dictatorship had been pretty good, but it had turned very bad at the end with notable evidence of corruption. The Attorney General confirmed the point about the corruption, saying that Batista had amassed a fortune amounting to five million dollars through corrupt practices. The President replied that he was certainly opposed to permanent asylum for Batista and Mr. Rogers pointed out that it was extremely hard to get rid of people such as Batista once they had succeeded in getting into this country.

Secretary Dillon suggested that before taking any action, we await the State Department’s study of the Batista problem which would be ready in a few days.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² See Document 344.

342. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) and Minister of State Roa, Havana, July 23, 1959¹

Havana, July 23, 1959

I called on Dr. Roa by arrangement. In the course of the preliminary exchange of courtesies, he was good enough to say that he had heard on all sides favorable expressions about my mission here, and he gave me a friendly personal message from Fidel Castro, with whom he had just been talking. We agreed that in the present state of Cuban-American relations it was extremely important for us to see each other frequently and to talk frankly. I stated that I hoped to have an opportunity, with Dr. Roa, to call on Dr. Castro at an early date. He agreed that he would arrange this. I then said that I would like to go over certain aspects of our current relations. He permitted me to do so and listened carefully, with few or no interruptions, to the statements which I made to him on the following subjects:

1. U.S. Attitude Toward Cuban Revolution. I told the Minister of State that there is general sympathy in the United States for the objectives of the Cuban Revolution as we understand them. After all, honesty in Government, faithful payment of taxes, representative democracy, etc. are goals toward which we have made a great deal of progress. Also, we have consistently favored and contributed to sound programs of agrarian reform. We believe in equality of opportunity in such things as education, health and service to the community. As a working democracy we sympathize with people seeking democratic ends. And we recognize that there have been many conditions and practices in Cuba, political and economic, which can be improved.

2. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. I said to the Minister that I was now going to make a statement which I had never found it necessary to make in my 20 years of diplomatic service. I wished him to know most emphatically that the U.S. Government policy toward Cuba has been entirely correct and faithful to the highest principles of international relations between friendly peoples. I told him that I was making this statement because of the atmosphere which had been created around the Diaz Lanz case by certain Cuban Government officials and by the press of the July 26 Movement. I said that I was also led to make this statement by the words pronounced by Dr. Castro when he appeared on television on July 17² (the evening President Urrutia resigned). At that time, Dr. Castro said that he supposed that if President Urrutia were to try to form a cabinet he could get some “agentes norteamericanos” to serve in that cabinet. The Minister of State commented that he had heard that the U.S. Navy had had something to do with Diaz Lanz’ escape from Cuba. I denied this absolutely.

3.

Communism. I told the Minister of State that there appeared to be two kinds of anti-Communism prevalent at this time. One of these is the anti-Communism of people who consider their interests threatened by social or political change and who for various motives endeavor to attach the Communist label to the advocates of such change. On the other hand, the more extreme advocates of social change, including the Communists, tend to smear the conservative elements with such labels as “exploiters of the people”, “blood suckers,” etc. This sort of thing is familiar to anyone who has witnessed political and social conflicts. It was certainly prevalent during the early days of our New Deal. Objective observers tend to discount it.

On the other hand, I said to the Minister, there is the anti-Communism which reflects the fight of free peoples everywhere against the conspiracy of international Communism directed from the U.S.S.R. It is the cause for which thousands of young Americans died in Korea, immense defense burdens have been assumed by the American people, and our young people devote two or three years of their lives to military service. It is the cause currently symbolized by Berlin and the Soviet Union’s attempt to increase its slave population. I added that ignorance of this cause and indifference to its importance on the part of our friends in Cuba was a source of great concern to us and to U.S. public opinion.

The Minister commented that he personally was strongly opposed to Communism and that he believed there were no Communists in important Government positions. He recalled the fact that Batista had tried to call him a Communist but that he had been able to prove, thereby avoiding arrest, that he had been violently attacked by the Communist press.

I said that, of course there were people in influential positions and I mentioned Raul Castro and Ché Guevara who by their strongly anti-American pronouncements were playing the Communist game. I referred briefly to the alleged interview published by the New China News Agency with Raul Castro (Department’s telegram 67 of July 17³ ) and expressed the hope that this was not a correct rendering of what Major Castro had said but rather just another Communist maneuver.

I expressed awareness of the frequently expressed non-Communist sentiments of Fidel Castro and of other people in Government positions.

4.

Cuban-American Relations. I told the Minister that I was very much concerned at the deterioration in relations between our two peoples. I said that I believed that this had been fundamentally due to the anti-American attitudes taken in public statements by Fidel Castro and other Cuban Government leaders since January 1, with the exception, of course, of the period during which Castro was in the United States and shortly thereafter. I said that we are also a people with pride, “amor propio” and also quite a bit of sentimentality. I said that our pride and “amor propio” had been wounded and our sentiments outraged by these statements. I said that, of course, I understood that some of these statements did not reflect reasoned positions but rather the first exuberance of the early days of the revolution.

I then added, however, that I had been much concerned at the way in which the Diaz Lanz incident as well as the incident involving the Cuban Consul in Miami had been handled in the Party press and by Government leaders. I added that in both cases I had been ready and willing to obtain necessary information and that, of course, the Department of State had been similarly disposed. Instead, however, both Cuban Government officials, including Dr. Hart in the Miami case and Dr. Castro in the Diaz Lanz case, and the Party press in both cases had launched in public versions of these matters such as to incite and stimulate anti-American feelings among the Cuban people.

Speaking of the Miami incident, I said that this had involved certain Cuban elements who had apparently chosen our National holiday to settle some private scores. I said that the incident took place on our territory and under the jurisdiction of our authorities and that I thought that the least that could have been done here was to suspend judgment until a full report of what took place was available. The Miami police had been condemned by Cubans who had shown a strong anti-American predisposition without hearing the evidence in the case.

With regard to the Diaz Lanz case, I said that I was convinced that both Dr. Castro and the writers of Revolucion were fully aware of our system of Government and of the independence of its various branches. Nevertheless, in public statements everything possible had been done to put the U.S. Government in the position of conspiring against the Cuban Government. The Minister agreed with me that President Eisenhower’s press statement⁴ on the Diaz Lanz case had put things back into focus here.

I said that it seemed to me regrettable that the attitude of Revolucion which is the newspaper of the 26th of July Movement should, on many occasions, be scarely distinguishable from that of Hoy, the Communist paper, in dealing with the U.S. Government and people.

5.

Caribbean Situation. I discussed the Caribbean situation along the lines that while Dr. Roa was making a brilliant defense of his country’s position in the OAS and reaffirming the principles of non-intervention and adherence to treaty obligations, there seemed to be a growing belief that recent expeditions against Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic had been organized and equipped in Cuba. Dr. Roa reaffirmed in strong terms that he was convinced that the Cuban Government had not been involved in such expeditions, and that he had been so assured by Dr. Castro himself. (In this connection, I understand that Dr. Castro told Herbert Matthews on about July 7⁵ that, since the recent expeditions against the Dominican Republic had failed so badly, he was not going to lend any further assistance to that cause.) I think that it might be that the Minister is uninformed in these matters.

We discussed at some length how democracy is achieved and maintained. I said that I did not believe that democracy can spring from any other source except the will of a people and the disposition of that people in sufficient numbers to perform the hard work needed to make a democratic system function.

6. American Private Interests in Cuba. I told Dr. Roa that many American private interests in Cuba have made great contributions to the country’s economy in the agricultural field; many of our sugar and cattle enterprises have created employment and wealth where previously there was neither population nor production. These companies are entitled to considerate treatment even though the right of the Cuban Government and people to change existting principles of land tenure is not questioned. I referred also to the public utilities companies and to the importance of finding an arrangement which will permit these companies to continue to obtain the capital which they must have in order to meet the requirements of the expanding Cuban economy. I said that it was unfortunate that in the Cuban Government’s public pronouncements these companies tended to be treated as public enemies, and that as in the case of the recent interventions of cattle ranches, they were pushed around in an arbitrary fashion. I stated that I thought these companies should be heard with regard to matters affecting them before action was taken. I reiterated the general terms of our note on Agrarian Reform.⁶

7. Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Santiago. Dr. Roa assured me that he expects to go to this meeting. He referred in most cordial and friendly terms to Ambassador Dreier and said that he was in full agreement with Ambassador Dreier’s views on the agenda. He appeared to doubt whether Dr. Castro would to [go] to this meeting.

8. Security of American Embassy in Habana. I informed the Minister of State that on about June 26 Acting Minister Hart had told me that Batistianos and Trujillistas were plotting a physical attack on me in order to discredit the Cuban Government. I added that obviously the Communists would be delighted to provoke any kind of incident which would cause friction and misunderstanding between Cuba and the United States. In addition, I referred to recent developments and incidents which have tended to inflame anti-American feelings here. I stated that I was concerned lest the American Embassy Chancery as well as other American installations might be the victims of incidents over the weekend. I said that I was not asking for any special overt protection nor did I plan to give any public indication of alarm of the situation. I asked, however, that the Minister see that adequate measures were taken by Cuban security forces so that if any hostile activities should develop they would be adequately taken care of. I referred particularly to the desirability of alerting the 8th Precinct Police Station which is very near the Chancery building. Dr. Roa stated that he would, that same evening, talk to President Dorticós with regard to this and would see that appropriate measures were taken. He agreed with me that publicity would be undesirable either from our side or from his.

In conclusion, I apologized to the Minister for the length of my presentation and expressed regret that the situation should be one in which I was compelled to take such a critical attitude. His response was cordial and friendly. He reiterated the importance of frequent and open discussion if we are to make any progress in improving relations between our two countries. He said that he would probably be seeing Dr. Castro on July 25 and that he would endeavor at that time to make some sort of an arrangement for an interview at which I would have an opportunity of going over these points with him.

Philip W. Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–2559. Secret; Limit Distribution. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 135 from Havana, July 25. A summary of the conversation was sent in telegram 213 from Havana, July 23. (ibid., 611.37/7–2359)

² See Document 338.

³ See footnote 3, Document 337.

⁴ See Document 327.

⁵ See Document 334.

⁶ See Document 318.

343. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 24, 1959—5 p.m.

222. Joint Embassy–USOM message. Embassy and USOM have deliberated question of appropriate US attitude toward new requests for technical assistance in Cuba under present circumstances, and wish to obtain joint concurrence of Department and ICA on a proposed position.

A. It is believed still in US interest to continue maintain an attitude of helpful cooperation in field of technical assistance for following reasons:

(1) Despite growth of anti-American sentiment, officials of a number of GOC Ministries continue to evince generally warm interest in US technical assistance. Even those officials who are not friendly to US have not taken public position opposing US technical assistance in non-military matters. Minister of Economy, who coordinates foreign aid requests and who appears to be more neutral than unfriendly, has consistently approved requests for US assistance by other Ministries and has recently requested additional US technical advice for his own Ministry.

(2) The economic problems confronting Cuba are now substantially more acute than previously and need for outside technical assistance is correspondingly greater. We should be prepared to furnish such assistance within reasonable limits as an investment in long-run good will of Cuban people irrespective of current attitude of some leaders.

(3) A reversal of our present policy of giving sympathetic consideration to aid requests would be interpreted as part of a campaign to undermine revolution.

B. However, current uncertainties re future Cuban-American relations make it advisable to avoid long-range commitments. From the various requests presented, Embassy and USOM propose to select those activities tending to support and strengthen government organizations under friendly or neutral administrators whose collaboration will tend to extend US influence. Such activities will in general be limited to short-term consultation projects in fields offering best prospects that effective USOM technicians can be recruited. More emphasis will be laid on training grants. As heretofore USOM will take no initiative to stimulate requests for assistance without previously obtaining Department-ICA policy guidance.

Concurrence of Department and ICA is requested.²

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5–MSP/7–2459. Limited Official Use; Priority.

² Concurrence was given in telegram 222 to Havana, August 14. (ibid.)

344. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, July 27, 1959.

SUBJECT

Status of Cuba’s Former President, Fulgencio Batista

In view of the current interest centering upon the status of Cuba’s former President, Fulgencio Batista, now in exile in the Dominican Republic, I enclose for your information a memorandum² which reviews the factors bearing upon his possible admission to the United States.

This memorandum indicates:

(a) That Batista is being subjected to considerable pressure, extortions and threats by Generalissimo Trujillo and that he is desperate to leave the Dominican Republic but has been unable to obtain a visa to any country;

(b) That Batista believes that his lone record of cooperation with the United States entitles him to favorable consideration and that he probably believes that he fled to the Dominican Republic rather than the United States in order to accommodate the United States;

(c) That, nonetheless, Batista’s presence at this time anywhere in the Caribbean area, including the United States, is a disturbing factor and there would be a seriously adverse reaction in Latin America if the United States now were to grant him a visa.

In the circumstances, the Department of State’s position is that no public announcement should be made at this time of a denial of a United States visa to Batista and that the Department will intensify its efforts to obtain his admission to a European or other country outside of the area.

Douglas Dillon³

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text, which bears the handwritten initials “E” and “G[oodpaster]”.

² Not printed.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

345. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 27, 1959—1 p.m.

239. Many local Americans have expressed to Embassy their fear that admission of Batista to US would have seriously harmful repercussions on US relations with Cuba, and would directly affect their own safety and welfare. Recent press stories of appeal by Mrs. Batista on behalf of her husband have aggravated their anxiety that US Government may be seriously thinking of authorizing Batista’s entry.

I can think of nothing that would be more disastrous at this juncture to our interests and prospects here than admission of Batista.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2759. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ciudad Trujillo.

346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal¹

Washington, July 28, 1959—9:33 p.m.

47. Department is increasingly concerned over continued stay Cuban ex-President Batista in Dominican Republic. His presence there contributes to present tension Caribbean, which has reached proportions necessitating OAS meeting Foreign Ministers at Santiago beginning August 12. Personally he is being subjected to severe pressures and harassment by Trujillo and by certain Cuban elements plotting anti-Castro movement. Department feels this might drive him to drastic steps including possible illegal entry US.

Basic US position is that Batista’s presence anywhere in Caribbean basin, including US, at this time is undesirable and runs counter to effort being made by us and other American States to assure peace in area. Possible internal reaction Cuba as described Habana tel. 239² (rptd Lisbon) additional consideration.

Considering above circumstances and probability that one consideration in Batista’s decision flee to DR rather than US was save US and himself embarrassment, Department has for several months been seeking find some country far from area to which Batista might go. These efforts have been unsuccessful to date.

Due urgency situation Department desires approach GOP specifically with regard to possibility admittance Batista Portugal probably Azores or Madeira. What is your estimate of feasibility and probable reaction GOP this request, especially in view recent asylum cases in Lisbon and Portuguese internal political situation? If you consider that there is no serious objection to above action would you recommend that approach be made by you to Foreign Office or by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy to Portuguese Ambassador, Washington? Would appreciate your views soonest.³

Dillon

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2859. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stevenson and Raymond Valliere; cleared with Rubottom, Ivan B. White, and Murphy; and approved by McElhiney who signed for Dillon. Repeated to Ciudad Trujillo and Havana.

² Supra.

³ In telegram 39 from Lisbon, July 29, Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick remarked: “While acceptance Batista would certainly complicate Portuguese relations with Cuba and perhaps other Latin American countries it is possible Portuguese government might agree to admit him. Recommend making approach here.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2959)

347. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 31, 1959—1 p.m.

281. Expect see Castro August 3 or shortly thereafter and would appreciate Department’s guidance particularly on basis conversation with Roa reported Embassy despatch 135.² There is I believe from Roa’s attitude expressed July 30³ anxiety to improve relations and possibly to take initiative to lay basis for discussion of economic cooperation. Formulation our attitude may well affect course of government here. If Castro brings up possibility of economic assistance from US, I suggest I be authorized to state that providing there is effective desire improve relations and providing forecast of Cuban resources and proposed uses thereof warrants, we would be glad at request of Cuban Government study sympathetically possibilities of cooperation within limits our resources and other commitments. Believe initial Cuban approach apt to be for very substantial and probably unrealistic credits running into hundreds of millions with international lending institutions and private banks also involved.

Compensation American land owners obviously pertinent. We should seek in my judgment compromise between demand for cash payment of aid value and Cuban proposal of 20-year bonds based on municipal tax registrations. Such a compromise would involve both valuation aspects and possible delays in expropriation beyond periods contemplated in law. Resolution of utility problems in fair and prompt manner also pertinent.

Emphasis at this time should be on necessity from Cuban point of view of forecasting resources and commitments in coordinated fashion and willingness on our side to give sympathetic consideration Cuban situation provided we can work out fair treatment for our nationals. We can obviously make no commitments at this stage but should be willing to enter upon exchanges of views at request of GOC. Such exchanges would be unpublicized and their course would obviously depend in part on general atmosphere generated by Castro’s words and actions and those of his principal aides.

In understandable event instructions this important matter do not reach me prior conversation with Castro and latter does raise possibility economical talks, I will reply matter one on which I will request instructions. This would not preclude full discussion our concern actual and prospective treatment American interests here.

Please instruct.⁴

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–3159. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² See Document 342.

³ In this conversation, Roa told Bonsal that following the meeting with Castro, which he expected would take place on August 3 or soon thereafter, Roa hoped to arrange a meeting for Bonsal with the Ministers of Economy and Treasury, as well as with the President of the National Bank. (Despatch 169 from Havana, July 31; Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–3159)

⁴ In telegram 144 to Havana, August 1, the Department agreed that Bonsal could take up with Castro any of the points discussed with Roa on July 23 that he considered appropriate. Bonsal was also told that he might wish to express the hope that the protracted intervention of the Cuban Telephone Company could be ended. In the event that Castro raised the possibility of U.S. financial assistance, the Department instructed Bonsal to respond as follows: “you should limit yourself to listening sympathetically and state that you are sure your government will be interested his views and that you will report them immediately.” (ibid.)

348. Editorial Note

In early August, the Cuban Government foiled an attempted coup organized by Cuban exiles in the Dominican Republic. The plotters had enlisted the help of William A. Morgan, an American who had fought with the 26th of July Movement against Batista and who was presently operating a farm in Cuba. Morgan, along with Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo whom the plotters also approached, informed the Cuban Government about the invasion attempt and plans for the coup. The plotters were captured after landing in Cuba and several thousand suspects were imprisoned by the Cuban Government. The attempted overthrow of the Castro government was reported in telegram 360 from Havana, August 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–1159)

The U.S. Government obtained information prior to the coup implicating Morgan in some kind of planned activity against Castro. In telegram 150 to Havana, August 2, the Department transmitted the substance of an FBI report that Morgan was the leader of a group planning to assassinate Fidel Castro the following afternoon. (ibid., 737.00/8–259) In telegram 294 from Havana, August 3, Bonsal reported that he had given the gist of the report to Roa, who expressed appreciation for the information and said it would be conveyed to President Dorticos and to Castro. Bonsal furnished the Department some biographical information on Morgan and said he appeared to be “thoroughly irresponsible and unprincipled” Bonsal said that even an unsuccessful attempt on Castro’s life would be a serious threat to the safety of Americans in Cuba. (ibid., 737.00/8–359)

On August 4 Bonsal called on Roa at the latter’s request. Roa said that he had conveyed the information on Morgan to President Dorticos, who was “highly alarmed.” Apparently Castro had not yet been given the information, according to Roa. Bonsal stressed that the U.S. Government “had no opinion as to the report’s veracity”, and that it might be intended simply “to attempt to sow dissension and suspicion.” (Memorandum for the files by Bonsal, August 4; Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Havana Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, Political Affairs)

For Bonsal’s recollections of the Morgan affair, see Cuba, Castro, and the United States, page 84.

349. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, August 2, 1959.

G–9

The Department’s attention is invited to the fact that with reference to the item “Crucial Months for Castro” in the July 22 issue of the Department’s Secret publication Current Foreign Relations,² the Embassy takes a slightly different and more optimistic view of the Cuban situation than that reflected in this article. Specific points of difference follow:

The Embassy does not feel that there has been a “swing to the left”. The Communist influence has been present in the revolutionary movement from January 1 on. It is sufficiently strong and widespread to be a cause for serious concern. While it is not declining, there is little indication that it is making significant gains at present. It is worthy of note that the leaders who seem to have marked pro-Communist tendencies, notably Raul Castro, “Che” Guevara and Nunez Jimenez, all categorically deny that they are Communists, and that Fidel Castro considers such charges to be calumnies. These men are anti-American, and in many respects they seem Communist in their thinking, but they should not be written off yet as definitively lost to the Communists.

It is certainly true that the PSP has assiduously devoted itself to attempts to infiltrate the Cuban labor movement. It is also true that the Communists have won some offices in the local unions and some in the National Labor Federations in which elections have thus far been held. It is equally true, however, that the PSP has not achieved the results it hoped for and that it has encountered frequent, sometimes forceful, opposition from non-Communist elements within the labor movement. The labor movement is in fact the one sector in which 26th of July spokesmen have openly attacked the Communists as such.

It is in the armed forces rather than in the ranks of labor that the Communists have their strongest infiltrations. Fidel Castro has publicly admitted to the presence of some Communists in the armed forces. He claims to know who they are and to have them under control so that they cannot engage in political activities. This is not altogether reassuring in the light of the pro-Communist tendencies of military leaders Raul and “Che”.

Cuba’s economic outlook is admittedly not promising for the period just ahead; on the other hand, it is not entirely dark. The Embassy doubts that the Government will face an economic crisis as early as November or that it will resort at any time soon to the devaluation of the peso.

With respect to the provisions in the Agrarian Reform Law for payment of expropriated lands, the Embassy does not view these as a sign of anti-Americanism, but is inclined rather to accept as sincere the Cuban Government’s defense of these provisions on the ground that it is not in a financial position now to make just, prompt and effective compensation and that for revolutionary reasons it cannot postpone agrarian reform until its finances improve. This explanation, however sincere, does not of course make the provisions any more satisfactory from our standpoint.

Reference in the last paragraph of the article to the awakening of governmental and public opinion to the “true nature of the Castro regime” is confusing and perhaps misleading. The Embassy, which has been observing the Castro regime with closest attention from the beginning, does not know the true nature of the regime. In many respects it is the most hopeful regime Cuba has ever had; in others, particularly its anti-Americanism and its complacent tolerance of Communism, it is also the most disturbing. The Embassy continues to feel there is a good possibility that in its attitudes toward the United States and toward Communism, time and experience will bring about an improvement.

The Castro regime seems to have sprung from a deep and widespread dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions as they have been heretofore in Cuba and to respond to an overwhelming demand for change and reform. The universal support it has received from the humble and the lower middle classes is a witness to the strength of this compulsion. Similar conditions calling for reform probably exist in many other countries of the hemisphere. If Cuba is any indication, rightist, oligarchic governments in Latin America may be overturned in the not distant future by popular revolutionary movements which in the beginning at least establish extremist, socialistic governments. Under these circumstances the United States should perhaps be looking for a new formula that can win the confidence and support of such governments until they can be guided into more moderate channels. If we turn our back on them we risk pushing them into the arms of the Communists. What seems to be called for rather is forbearance and a resolute and sustained effort to understand and help and influence them. The outstanding accomplishments of the United States in the way of freedom, of representative government, of equality of opportunity, and of success in providing a high standard of living for all, should give us a great advantage over the Communists in appealing to emerging governments that aspire to these same privileges and benefits for their own peoples.

The Embassy realizes that its view may be influenced by its proximity to the Cuban situation, and that the Department is in a much better position for an overall perspective. To the extent that the Department shares the views herein expressed, however, it might be helpful, because of the possible influence of the referenced article on the thinking of U.S. representatives in other countries, if the next article relating to Cuba could bring out a little more the hopeful features of the situation.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–259. Secret. Drafted by Brad-dock. Received on August 4 at 2:07 p.m.

² A copy is in Department of State, Current Foreign Relations: Lot 64 D 189, July 1959.

350. Memorandum for the Record by the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 4, 1959.

SUBJECT

Munoz Marin’s Views on Cuba

While in Puerto Rico² I had the opportunity of talking with Munoz Marin regarding Cuba on several occasions. His attitude is easily summed up as one of belief that there is a great social revolution now under way in Cuba—a revolution which is bringing honest government to Cuba for the first time in its history. On the other hand, he feels that the Cubans are making an incredible number of mistakes in carrying out their revolution. However, he feels it important that the United States not allow its distaste of these mistakes to color its attitude toward the social revolution which is in progress, and in particular toward Fidel Castro. He thinks that these errors will eventually be cured by the Cubans themselves, although he recognizes that this may cost them dearly. He feels that they must be left to learn by experience and that any strong pressures on them should be avoided. He compared the Cuban situation to that in Venezuela where he also feels a broad revolution is under way. In Venezuela he considers that the revolution has been handled in an infinitely more sensible and practical way.

CDD

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–459. Confidential. A copy was sent to Rubottom.

² Dillon was in Puerto Rico to attend the annual conference of the State Governors of the United States.

351. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, August 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

“Social Revolution” in Cuba

Mr. Dillon’s memorandum² on Governor Munoz Marin’s idea that there is a “Social Revolution” going on in Cuba moves me to raise a question in view of the fact that this idea appears to be widely accepted not only in the hemisphere but is widely reflected in certain newspaper articles and books on Cuba in this country. The idea that Cuba is going through a desired and overdue “social revolution” is also not without conscious or subconscious influence within this Government in influencing our attitudes and policies.

This idea of a Cuban desire for “social revolution” appears to me in danger of being accepted as an article of faith without a really hard look at the evidence. Without questioning the fact that application of our American humanitarian standards to the Cuban scene spotlights the need for a richer and more equitable social, political and economic structure or the fact that many thoughtful Cubans of all orientations are aware at least theoretically of the need for change and modernization, what political forces in Cuba are really behind “social revolution”, especially Castro’s experiment?

There are basic political facts that should not be lost sight of. Despite Castro’s pronouncements at Moncada in 1953 and later in the Sierra Maestra about his program, the Cuban support that his Revolution received before Batista’s flight and the welcome that his victory received this January were both extended because of opposition to the elements of dictatorship, dishonesty and atrocities in the Batista regime. There appears to be no evidence that any significant elements of Cuban society were motivated to any important extent by a desire for “social revolution” in rallying to Castro’s cause. This raises a basic question in our orientation towards Cuba: was there in fact any strong desire for “social revolution” in Cuba prior to January 1 and, if one has been whipped up now, how profound is it and how much staying power does it have?

Analyzing this a bit further, one should take the following into account:

*³ Although the distaste left in practically everyone’s mouth by the Batista regime’s conduct, especially in 1957–59, tends to obscure it, there was a considerable though un-ideological “social revolution” in Cuba in the twenty-five years of what may be described as the Batista era. The recognition and growth of labor unions and social legislation gave a new status and outlook to urban labor; the growth of commerce and minor industry and attendant growth of the professions strengthened the Cuban middle classes and middle class mentality to a point perhaps unique in the Caribbean area; the introduction of the income tax and reforms, especially under World War II emergency powers, tended to set Cuba more permanently on the road to social revolution; the expansion of commercialized agriculture expanded opportunity in rural areas and at one stage an agrarian reform was attempted; massive public works projects and building booms during the time of high sugar prices alleviated unemployment. The extent to which Batista can claim credit for this social revolution and the extent to which he may have retarded [it] by political and economic abuses is a matter for historical debate. The fact seems to be that despite the continued prevalence of poverty and unemployment when Castro landed in 1956 there appears to have been no substantial or revolutionary dissatisfaction in Cuba on the score of social reform or desire to take radical measures.

*The almost complete apathy of the Habana working class to Castro until almost the last, its refusal to participate in Castro-sponsored strikes, and its acceptance of Batista tends to indicate that until Castro’s victory there was no deep-seated desire to launch into a “social revolution”. The question now is to what extent does the popularity of the Castro program reflect the natural response to untested demagoguery and promises and to what extent Castro may have appealed to a latent and unarticulated desire for social change.

*The moneyed class of Cuba has certainly showed neither ideological or economic interest in a social revolution under either Batista or Castro.

*As a whole, the middle classes, whose support of Castro was on the basis of middle class democratic political ideology, are giving increasing signs of disenchantment with his social and economic program and the ideology which underlies it. For the moment, of course, the necessary fashion is to attack the methods and endorse the objectives, but one wonders whether at the bottom the real issue is not the ideology which undergirds the whole Castro program.

If there is substance in the above, the question arises: who really wants social revolution in Cuba. The obvious answer is that it is that minority of the middle class constituting young radical students and ex-students and intellectuals, almost always Marxist—Nationalist—and anti-American orientated and sometimes also of Communist coloration. This element, especially in Latin America, tends to be the most articulate and boldest element in the society and its formulation of national goals tends by sheer weight of unchallenged repetition and propaganda to be accepted by uncritical domestic and foreign opinion as the real goals of the society.

The consequences of acceptance by the United States that there is a burning desire in Cuba for social revolution, if this is not really the case, are very serious indeed. In perhaps its most basic sense, the problem confronting us in Latin America is to help the responsible elements of the middle classes emerging from the inevitable processes of social change to establish firmly democratic and economically flexible societies, which necessitates their holding off the doctrinaire statist radical minority and the latter’s Communist allies and inciters.

If, in what would seem a shortsighted and opportunistic effort to ride along with the currents of Castroism, we would give the impression in Latin America that we accepted and wanted to help the Castro Revolution succeed, we would in effect be helping Latin America’s radical student-intellectual element to establish ascendancy over the processes of change at the expense of the elements which are potentially the United States’ best friends.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–659. Drafted and initialed by Hill and addressed also to Snow. There is no indication on the source text that Snow saw the memorandum, but Rubottom wrote the following comment in the margin: “Very thoughtful. Show to Hank Ramsey—copy to Emb. Habana for comment.”

² Supra.

³ The asterisks throughout appear in the source text.

352. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, August 10, 1959—5 p.m.

354. Yesterday evening I had discussion with Minister of State Roa regarding promised interview with Castro. I pointed out that I made my request on July 23, 2 weeks ago (Deptel 144² ). I said that I thought there were only two possible interpretations (A) that Castro uninterested in discussing current aspects Cuban-American relations which give serious cause for concern, (B) did not wish to see me personally. Since I had no reason to believe that (B) was correct, I could only conclude Castro does not share my interest in improvement Cuban-American relations. Roa was apparently embarrassed and made many protestations of friendship, et cetera, stating further that he would try to arrange talk with Castro either last night or this morning. This apparently proved impossible.

Department may wish repeat this message to Santiago. It would be helpful to me if Secretary and Rubottom could indicate to Roa their awareness of Castro’s delay in seeing me.³

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–1059. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² See footnote 4, Document 347.

³ A note on the source text indicates that Richard B. Owen (CMA) was notified at 8:20 p.m. on August 10 and that he authorized repeating the telegram to Santiago. Herter and Rubottom were in Santiago to attend the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. For documentation on this meeting, which included extensive discussion of Cuba and the Caribbean area, see vol. V, pp. 287 ff.

353. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Santiago, August 12, 1959—3 p.m.

83. We cognizant problem Ambassador seeing Castro explained Embtel 354 repeated Santiago.²

Assume this attitude of Castro needs be weighed in light [less than 1 line not declassified] report that Castro peeved because Embassy Havana allegedly knew of Morgan invasion attempt and he Castro, not informed. This seems preposterous in view information furnished Embassy Havana approximately week ago re Morgan and which Ambassador discussed with Foreign Minister Roa.³ Is it correct assume that Roa might not have had opportunity to pass information to Castro?

Is Castro situation so involved that he may publicly denounce US and Ambassador Bonsal for having withheld detailed knowledge invasion attempt (which US did not have as far as Rubottom aware) even though Castro may have been informed by Roa of broad outline reported Morgan effort several days ago.

Please advise re above⁴ since may have important bearing on work of conference and possible attitude Cuban delegation here. Secretary and/or Rubottom will raise subject Ambassador’s inability see Castro with Roa.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–1259. Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department as Secto 5, which is the source text.

² Supra.

³ See Document 348.

⁴ No reply by the Embassy in Havana has been found.

354. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador Howe’s Residence, Santiago, August 15, 1959, 5:30 p.m.¹

US/MC/6 Santiago, August 15, 1959, 5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary

Ambassador Howe

Mr. Rubottom

Mr. DeSeabra (interpreter)

Cuba

Ministor of State Roa

Ambassador Lechuga, Ambassador to Chile

SUBJECT

Cuban-United States Relations

After the opening amenities, Senor Roa expressed great appreciation for the Secretary’s remarks at the luncheon given for Fidel Castro during the latter’s recent visit to the United States.² He went on to praise Ambassador Bonsal enthusiastically, especially his approach to Cuban problems, adding that Cuban Ambassador Dihigo was a perfect counterpart.

The Secretary then said that he was hoping for an early meeting between Bonsal and Castro. The Minister explained how busy Castro had been of late, particularly with the preparations for the July 26 rally, and stated that Bonsal always had direct access to Roa. He emphasized the importance of asking full use of diplomatic channels in considering any problem and stated that he expected to meet with Ambassador Bonsal, together with the President of the Cuban National Bank and the Minister of Economy, as soon as the Cuban Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers returned to Habana. Both the Secretary and Mr. Rubottom agreed that full use should be made of diplomatic channels, adding that in the present Cuban situation many misunderstandings and eventual frictions could be avoided if prompt diplomatic action took place before rigid criteria were adopted.

The Secretary recalled the importance of foreign capital in the early phases of the U.S. growth as an industrial power in pointing out that vital flow of private capital into Cuba was conditioned by the confidence that the regime inspired.

At this point, Senor Roa embarked on a long and repetitious tirade, stating his great concern over the activities of “conspirators” in the Miami area, which were most harmful to Cuban–U.S. relations. He recalled how difficult it was even for the United States to effectively curb such activities and remarked that such developments in Cuba were even more difficult to prevent. He repeatedly said that he was aware that the U.S. Government was not to blame, but he hoped that something could be done. He also expressed concern over the unfavorable public opinion reaction as the result of the Diaz Lanz congressional hearings as well as the attitude of the Time-Life-Fortune group. However, he praised the attitude of President Eisenhower in the Diaz Lanz case.

The Secretary remarked that it was quite difficult to take legal action against those who enjoyed the generous freedom granted under the laws regulating political asylum. He also made clear that the acquisition of arms was strictly controlled, and most of the arms reaching the Caribbean area were smuggled from European sources. As for the “hearing”, the U.S. Government had nothing to do with the case. This, he said, is a good example of the workings of the separation of powers in a democratic government. If the executive had authority commensurate with its responsibilities there would no longer be any democracy.

The meeting ended on assurances of friendship and continued good will in endeavoring to solve problems, present and future.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, American Republics 1957–1959. Confidential. Drafted by DeSeabra and concurred in by Rubottom.

² See Document 287.

355. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

“Chè” Guevara’s Mission to Afro-Asian Countries

Initiating a new phase in Cuban foreign relations, Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba in mid-June dispatched a small mission to visit various Afro-Asian countries. The mission, ostensibly economic, also has the avowed purposes of strengthening the bonds of friendship with those countries and of explaining the policies of the Castro Government. The mission is headed by Fidel Castro’s trusted lieutenant, the controversial Argentine Ernesto “Chè” Guevara, who has displayed strong anti-US and nationalistic views and whose viewpoints in many respects closely parallel the communist ideology. Other members of the mission represent special interest groups in Cuba. Thus far, the mission has visited seven Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia.

During the trip Guevara has discussed a wide range of economic subjects, vigorously defended the Cuban revolution, and often made direct or implied criticisms of the United States. The first country visited by the Cubans was Egypt, where they were received as official guests of the government. In that country, the mission was apparently successful in establishing at least some basis for future trade relations between Cuba and Egypt. No such ties were established during the visit to India, where the Cuban mission met with little success. The Burmese visit was classified as “satisfactory” by Guevara, and according to a Burmese official, an agreement was reached between Cuba and Burma for the exchange of unspecified amounts of rice and sugar. The Guevara group seems to have made a good impression on Japanese officials who initially viewed it with skepticism. Discussions and public statements in Japan were largely confined to economic matters, with no concrete agreements apparently having been reached. During their short visits to Indonesia, Ceylon, and Pakistan the Cubans accomplished little and their efforts were devoted to laying the groundwork for improved diplomatic and trade relations. In Yugoslavia, where he and his mission were guests of the Federal Executive Council, Guevara told news correspondents that Cuba wanted to develop friendly diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Yugoslavia and to apply those Yugoslav experiences which might prove useful to Cuba.

In each country he has visited Guevara has taken the occasion to make public and private statements critical of the United States. In Egypt, he stated that the United States opposes the Castro regime because it fears that if Castro succeeds, Cuba will become a model for all Latin America and this will mean the end of “American imperialism” there. He also referred to the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, stating that its presence would mean Cuba’s total destruction in the event of a third world war. In India, Guevara strongly attacked US policies in Latin America. He condemned what he thought to be the consistent support by the US Government and business interests of Latin American dictators. He charged improper collaboration with Cuban ex-President Batista on the part of the former US Ambassador and military mission to Cuba. Guevara also said he was still suspicious of United States intentions with regard to Cuba, citing as grounds for his suspicion an alleged military build-up at the US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, the precedent of US intervention in Guatemala, and the irresponsibility of the US press in labeling people as Communists. In Indonesia, referring to the testimony of the Cuban Pedro Diaz Lanz before a US senatorial committee,² Guevara accused the United States of “aggression” against Cuba. He further stated that “United Fruit is playing the same role in Cuba as in Guatemala ....³ It is fomenting incidents against us.” In Pakistan, Guevara reportedly accused the United States of inspiring the mid-August counter-revolutionary activities in Cuba. And, in Yugoslavia, obviously referring to the United States, he underscored his government’s fight against “the influence of foreign companies which are now in key positions in the Cuban economy.”

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3700/8–1959. Secret. Initialed by Arneson. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

² See Document 327.

³ Ellipsis in the source text.

356. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Calhoun) to the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)¹

Washington, August 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

Departure of Former Cuban President Batista from the Dominican Republic to the Portuguese Island of Madeira

Because of its continuing concern over tensions and unrest in the Caribbean and its desire to take all steps necessary to alleviate this situation, the Department, through Embassy Lisbon, presented a note on August 11 to the Portuguese Government asking if that Government would consider the issuance of a visa to Batista as “a definite contribution to the maintenance of peaceful relations in the Caribbean”. The Portuguese Government gave immediate verbal assent, stating that it would grant visas to Batista and his immediate entourage for admittance to the Island of Madeira.²

On August 13 Mr. Lawrence Berenson, Batista’s American attorney, flew to the Dominican Republic and returned with Batista’s passport on August 16. The Portuguese Consul General in New York issued the visas on August 17 and on that same date Mr. Berenson arranged with Seaboard & Western Airlines a charter flight to go to the Dominican Republic today to pick up Batista and his group, numbering about twenty persons in all, to fly via the Azores to Lisbon from whence [sic] they will go by boat to Madeira.

On August 18, Ambassador Farland called on Minister De Moya in Ciudad Trujillo, informing him of the arrangements worked out by Mr. Berenson and expressing the hope that Batista and his party would be permitted to leave the country. De Moya indicated that his government had no objection to Batista’s departure and Seaboard & Western Airlines was granted a flight clearance on the evening of August 18.³ If there are no untoward developments, the plane will arrive in Ciudad Trujillo about 1430 today and depart about 1630 for the Azores.⁴

Thomas W. McElhiney for John A. Calhoun

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. Confidential. John Eisenhower’s handwritten notation indicates that the President saw the memorandum on August 20. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 231.

² The presentation of the note and the verbal assent given by the Portuguese Foreign Minister were described in telegram 67 from Lisbon, August 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–1159)

³ This meeting was described in telegram 108 from Ciudad Trujillo, August 18. (ibid., 737.00/8–1859)

⁴ Batista arrived in Lisbon on the afternoon of August 20.

357. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, August 31, 1959—3 p.m.

530. In course brief interview this morning Roa told me Castro would see me probably this week. I was unable to tell Roa and his two young sub-secretaries of our reaction to treatment electric company (Deptel 268² ). Am seeing Roa again morning September 2 and would appreciate any further suggestions from Department. I expect rehearse whole range our relations along lines already set forth to Department and which I understand has Department’s approval. Roa added that he hoped Dihigo would be returning here end of week to participate in talks. I said I hoped to go to Washington about 14th. Roa mentioned possibility including Boti and Pazos in conversations. I shall explore this further.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.2614/8–3159. Confidential; Priority.

² Not printed. (ibid., 837.2614/8–2059)

358. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Havana, September 2, 1959.

Dear Dick: I have lunch with Felipe Pazos every two or three weeks. I was with him today. He is as much concerned as I am about the deterioration of Cuban-American relations. I stressed to him the degree to which I believed this resulted from the words and actions of the Cuban Government. You are familiar with the line on this subject and I will not repeat it.

Pazos appears to believe that Cuba is already running into a severe exchange crisis and that, in the absence of balance of payments credits, it will have to resort to such measures as exchange rate surcharges and other means to cut down imports.

This led to a discussion of the forthcoming tariff negotiations. José Antonio Guerra, who is very knowledgeable on this subject, was present. I stressed the importance of the Cubans letting us have their proposals for the very large number of items they have mentioned as soon as possible in order to permit (a) informal discussion of the situation before formal negotiations begin, and (b) to avoid the long delay to enable our delegation to study the proposals which would be the result of waiting until the beginning of formal negotiations to submit them. I think I made some impression. However, Guerra is very firm. His view is that the ordinary process of reciprocity and compensatory concessions will not be applicable in view of Cuba’s requirements. Those requirements are a blend of protection and balance of payments needs. Guerra believes that as a minimum Cuban duties will have to be put on ad valorem basis to restore the relationship which existed between the present specific duties and the 1935–39 price levels. I asked him what the impact would be if we were to adopt such a procedure with respect, for example, to the duty on Cuban sugar. I said that under the quota system a rise in the duty would probably not affect the price at which sugar is sold in the United States. He was not sure he agreed with me on this.

Guerra then raised the point that the United States quota on Cuban sugar, which is, of course, a major consideration for the customs treatment given to United States exports to Cuba, is not subject to negotiation, and that this is unfair to Cuba. I have heard this before and there may be some theoretical substance to it, but I do not see what can be done about it.

Pazos tells me that Castro still visits the National Bank once a week, usually on Thursdays, and stays for several hours, and that he is intensely interested in his economic education. Nevertheless, we have a long way to go before this becomes anything resembling a coordinated operation. Although Pazos did not mention it to me, I am hopeful that perhaps the World Bank will have an opening soon to bring a study of the Cuban economy, which was made some years ago by the Bank, up to date. As you are perhaps aware, and as we are reporting separately, the Cuban Consolidated Railway has been discussing the possibility of a loan with the Bank. These discussions are in a very preliminary stage but they may prove constructive if the World Bank can get into the picture.

I spoke very strongly to Pazos about the treatment of American utilities here without, of course, going into the specific merits. I am sure that he and the others agree fully as to the disastrous effect on Cuba’s credit standing resulting from these arbitrary actions. I wish that there were some way of reaching an approximation to the truth about these situations. There has been such a long period of non-regulation in the rather loose atmosphere prevailing in Cuba that it is possible that a certain number of abuses have crept into these situations. On the other hand, it is highly probable that the action taken by the Government with respect to the Electric Company was vindictive and far too extreme. But how do you get an approximation to what would be fair?

Pazos is working on a number of minor industrialization projects. There is a possibility, by the way, that Ché Guevara may be given an important role in the country’s industrialization programs, i.e., the channeling of public funds into industry, including basic industry such as steel. This would be very bad.

Pazos expressed the fear that United States policy toward Cuba was based on a conviction that the present Government could not last, that it would “break its neck” and that this would be a good thing. I quickly told him that this was not the case, that I was convinced of the Government’s political strength and of the degree to which it symbolizes the hopes and aspirations of the great majority of the people. I said, however, that the words and actions of Cuban leaders were spreading so strong a sensation of anti-Americanism that an increasingly unfavorable atmosphere was being created in the United States. Pazos agreed with this, but did not seem to have any very constructive ideas. I shall keep after him.

Please forgive this rather rambling letter written under a certain amount of time pressure.

Sincerely yours,

Phil

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–259. Confidential; Official-Informal. In the margin Devine wrote the following note on September 4: “No reply necessary in view of Ambassador’s imminent arrival.”

359. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, September 4, 1959.

571. Embtel 563.² My talk with Fidel Castro and Roa last night. Castro arrived punctually at Roa’s apartment at 8:30. The three of us were together until 2 a.m.

Castro expressed unhappiness about delay in seeing me and annoyance at Jules Dubois story. He promised to see me hereafter with maximum 48-hour delay.

I gave him outline under following headings (see Embdesp 135³ ):

1. General sympathy with objectives of Cuban revolution and similarity with many of our own aims and aspirations;

2. Correctness and straightforwardness US Government’s relations with GOC and our deep resentment at insinuations from Cuban official sources to contrary effect;

3. The struggle against international Communism, its implications and our concern at GOC failure to see these implications (I particularly mentioned Chinese Communist situation);

4. Our deep concern at practically continuous barrage of anti-American statements from Cuban officials and from press, radio of July 26 Movement, and our belief that this attitude was having profound effect on American public opinion;

5. Our concern at contrast between Cuban statements on Caribbean situation and actual developments;

6. Our serious concern at treatment being given American private interests in Cuba both agricultural and utilities.

Castro’s first reaction to my statement was that I was unduly pessimistic about state our relations. Evidently a good deal of what I had said was new to him or had been forgotten or underestimated in importance. He rallied quickly, however, and proceeded to a denunciation of certain American newspapers and press services. He said he was convinced that anti-Cuban campaign of influential organs would eventually turn 90 percent of American people against Cuba. I dissented stating that I believed there was a pretty fair balance in American press regarding Cuba and that, considering anti-American statements which have characterized utterances of GOC leaders since January 1, harvest of unfriendly sentiment in US was rather less than would normally have been expected and that this testified to profound desire of US for friendly relations with Cuba.

Conversation after this jumped around a great deal. Castro is comprehensive rather than consecutive talker. Following were principal points made:

(1) Castro regrets some of his own statements against US Government and tends challenge our logical interpretation thereof. I believe that some progress has been made in his thinking on this subject.

(2) Castro has been to some extent unaware of anti-American activities of July 26 Movement press and has not heretofore endeavored to exercise any particular influence there. I am hopeful that my vigorous statement on this subject will produce some result but only time can tell. He stated he likes and admires Americans especially tourists for whom he is planning great things.

(3) Castro is wholly absorbed in details of Agrarian Reform and of military activities here. He confessed he did not function as “Prime Minister” but rather as expediter of certain projects in which he has particular interest. He stated he intends cut down sharply on public appearances and concentrate more and more on actual work. He is just beginning have concept basic economics and cited per capita cost creating new jobs.

(4) As consequence of 3, Castro has taken no interest in international situation or in threat of international Communism. He accepts support of local Communists because it helps him politically and in labor circles. We had most elementary discussion of Berlin situation and of Khrushchev visit, in course of which he indicated he had heard little or nothing on these subjects and was not much interested. He stated that since Cuba could not influence these situations, and he would not be present, for example, when President Eisenhower talks to Khrushchev, why should he give time to these matters? I tried explain significance of support of all peoples of free world in great struggle between freedom and slavery but do not believe he was particularly impressed. He did repeat what he had told me last March⁴ to effect he hoped people of West Berlin would be able choose own fate and not be subject Soviet domination.

(5) With regard to Chinese Communists and reception here of Chinese newspapermen, he appeared totally unable realize implications from our point of view of this situation. He said Chinese newspapermen had been received with courtesy just as newspapermen of any other country would be received.

(6) Castro’s views on matter of Communism is of course strongly influenced by his stated conviction that Cuba under his leadership is breaking new ground in social and economic theory and does not need involve itself unduly in struggle between ideologies which he evidently considers inferior to his own.

(7) With regard anti-American attitudes of officials and party press here, I believe I made some progress. I mentioned Che Guevara’s statements and Cuban Ambassador’s to Haiti as recent flagrant examples. I hope that he will do something constructive although he will obviously not engage in any overt rectifications. I endeavored leave no doubt his mind importance US public opinion in connection relations between two governments.

(8) In discussing Caribbean situation, Castro was evidently ill at ease. He spoke of Truiillo’s provocations as justifying counter actions which he then somewhat confusedly tended to imply had been carried out without his consent or authority. I got clear impression that he does not, in absence of further provocation from Dominican Republic, intend countenance any more expeditions. He did not say this explicitly. In fact his whole handling this subject was confused and uneasy.

(9)

With regard to American private interests in Cuba, Castro agreed to general proposition these had made important contributions to country’s economy and were entitled to decent treatment. He is, however, definitely determined to continue action against many of these companies.

I do not believe he will personally handle many of these matters. Also I believe practical difficulties of Agrarian Reform will modify many of his present intentions and dispel many illusions he now holds.

(10) With regard to Telephone Company, Castro expressed particular hostility. He referred to abusive rates obtained by Company from Batista at time of heavy bloodshed attendant on Palace assault in March 1957. He expressed unflattering view of Company’s policies. I made clear to him our concern with regard to treatment of Company since intervention, referring to increased expenses, reduced revenues and increased indebtedness.

(11) Castro made no particular comment with reference to Electric Company failing reply my statement that Company had been unfairly treated by having its rates reduced without opportunity to comment on investigating committee’s report.

(12) Castro indicated that other Batista concessions to American private interests would come under review. He referred particularly to the Moa Bay contract. In this connection, I was able to set him straight on the falsity of widely circulated story here to the effect that Batista signed the Moa Bay contract as part of a “deal” following Ambassador Smith’s denunciation in July 1957 of treatment of Santiago women by Cuban police. Castro seemed genuinely impressed by proof I was able to give him that time sequence was in fact reverse of that required to substantiate story. He stated however that Moa Bay contract had been signed by Batista Government against recommendation of National Economic Council and I am sure we will have trouble on this score. I stressed our high concept of Moa Bay interests and our own interest in purchase of nickel.

(13) Castro and Roa ganged up on me with regard need for massive US help to enable Cuba and other Latin American countries to industrialize. They recognized heavy burdens we already bearing in free world defense but stated importance of situation and aspirations Latin American peoples (against whom we have allegedly discriminated in favor Africa and Asia) warranted further sacrifices on our part. They appeared deeply sincerely convinced of correctness their position on this.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Habana Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, 350, Political Affairs. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal. The time of transmission is not given on the source text.

² In telegram 563, September 4, Bonsal briefly summarized his conversation the previous night with Fidel Castro and Roa and promised to send a more complete report. He also noted that they had agreed that the fact the interview took place and its cordial tone, but no other details, would be released to the press. This had already been done. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–459)

³ See footnote 1, Document 342.

⁴ This conversation has not been further identified. Bonsal apparently had only one conversation with Castro in March and that was on March 5. The report of this conversation, Document 258, makes no mention of West Berlin.

360. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, September 14, 1959—10 a.m.

614. At Roa’s suggestion, I called on President Dorticos morning twelfth. Roa also present. In conversation lasting forty minutes, I went over major features current Cuban-American relations in summary fashion. Dorticos was cordial, friendly and obviously concerned at specific items and at cumulative impact my presentation. He had discussed whole situation with Dihigo and Roa couple of days earlier.

Dorticos was interested in and quite responsive to my exposition of world situation.

On agrarian reform he believed discussion of situation very much in order. I told him we were preparing note reaffirming our position on compensation. He seemed imply this situation one in which GOC can show considerable flexibility within “objectives of revolution”.

Regarding telephone company, President said he had agreed receive parent company executives and looked forward constructive discussion.

On electric company situation, Dorticos affected lack information but promised look into matter personally.

Believe conversation was useful although results problematical. But am convinced Dorticos, Roa and others (especially Lopez Fresquet and Boti with whom I discussed situation at length in separate conversations on September 11, and Dihigo, Pazos, J.A. Guerra, Carrillo and others with whom I have had conversations since first of month) are increasingly aware impact of intemperate statements on Cuban-American relations and of ill-considered actions and threatened actions against American interests here on Cuba’s credit abroad and on internal economy. We may be approaching showdown between different groups supporting Castro and struggling for his approval.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–1459. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

361. Instruction From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts in the American Republics¹

CA–2424 Washington, September 15, 1959.

SUBJECT

United States Information Policy Toward the Castro Regime in Cuba

Joint State–USIA.

Background

The Executive Branch of the Government of the United States has, since the present Cuban Government came to power last January, followed a carefully calculated policy of exercising restraint and patience in its public statements and actions regarding Cuba, seeking to avoid any impression that the United States is hostile to the regime of Prime Minister Fidel Castro or unsympathetic to the achievement within Cuba of the proclaimed humanitarian objectives of the Revolution which he heads. The United States Government has, in particular, sought to avoid statements or actions which singly or cumulatively would suggest or imply a systematic campaign against Castro. On the rare occasions that it has been necessary to make statements or or take actions which could be construed as less than sympathetic to Castro or his regime, these invariably have been the result of actions taken by Castro which the United States could not publicly ignore, such as measures affecting American property or interests in Cuba, violations

by the Castro regime of the basic principles of the inter-American system, or damaging misrepresentations by Castro about the United States.

The United States policy of restraint and patience has been designed to achieve a number of objectives. By late 1959, this Government, while recognizing the increasing repugnance of the Cuban public towards the excesses of the Batista Government and the popular desire for the restoration of democratic processes, was also seriously concerned about the anti-Americanism then already evident in Castro’s “26th of July” movement, about indications of Communist leanings among important elements of the movement’s leadership, and about the probability that the coming to power of Castro’s radical revolutionary group would seriously disrupt the social, economic and political stability of Cuba.

When Castro emerged as the victor of the Cuban Revolution, achieving overwhelming popular support among the Cuban people and colorfully capturing the imagination of a large segment of hemisphere opinion, it necessarily became an objective of United States policy to establish a climate free of hostility in which Castro could demonstrate any disposition he might have had to conduct normal and friendly relations with the United States, while at the same time giving a maximum opportunity for moderate elements friendly to the United States to exercise a tempering influence on the Castro Government. It thus became important from the point of view of both Cuban-United States and hemispheric relations that the United States avoid statements or actions which could be interpreted as being unjustifiably hostile to Castro or his Government, thus depriving Castro of any valid excuse for using the mantle of patriotic resistance to United States intervention as a cloak for the imposition of extremist social and economic theories on Cuba, for infiltration of the political and military institutions of Cuba by direct and indirect Communist influences, and for the systematic fomenting of anti-American sentiment among the traditionally friendly people of Cuba. It has been, in short, an important objective of United States policy insofar as public opinion is concerned to establish that any unsatisfactory state of Cuban-United States relations does not derive from the inflexibility and intransigence of the United States but from policies and attitudes which Castro himself adopts.

A corollary objective has been to assure that when disillusionment about Castro and many aspects of his program and government should set in, it should come initially and principally from Cuban, Latin American, and independent sources rather than from any public statements or actions of the United States Government seeming to attack Castro and his Cuban Revolution. It is already evident that in Latin America and even in Cuba the first enthusiasm about the Castro Revolution and its anti-dictatorship claims has waned in important respects, and that public opinion is increasingly focusing on certain adverse aspects of the present Cuban situation, such as:

(a) The Democracy vs. Dictatorship Question: Although Castro achieved power as the most vivid symbol of the anti-dictatorship trend of Latin American opinion and has continued to hold up the anti-dictatorship banner in his domestic and international relationships, his regime has taken on characteristics which are suspiciously like those of a dictatorship itself. Among them are Castro’s evident contempt for electoral and parliamentary processes for expressing and controlling the execution of the popular will; his disregard of independent judicial safeguards for individual liberties and human rights against executive abuse; his use of deliberately induced fear to control the mass media; and his pretensions—similar to those of many modern authoritarian leaders—to embody in himself and his movement all legitimate popular aspirations. These tendencies are illuminated for hemisphere opinion by such episodes as Castro’s overriding of those court acquittals he does not approve, by arbitrary mass arrests and other forms of intimidation of all real or potential opposition, and by demonstrations such as the recent July 26 rally which recall the practice of other 20th Century dictatorships to organize emotional mass support in lieu of submitting to elections based on rational discussion.

(b) Export of the Cuban Revolution: Important segments of Latin American opinion appear at first to have been sympathetic to the carrying out within Cuba of Castro’s revolutionary program and to have applauded the new Cuban Government’s assumption of a role of leadership against the remaining dictatorships. However, there now appears to be a growing realization that Castro and his entourage view themselves as the forerunners of a new type of social revolution which is to sweep the Caribbean and Latin America; that for this purpose they have disregarded and attempted to discredit the OAS and the principles of non-intervention and sought to appeal to Latin American public sentiment over the heads of Government; and that despite denials, they have actively supported revolutionary expeditionary forces in efforts to overthrow other Caribbean Governments.

(c) Communism and the Cuban Revolution: Largely through the efforts of the press, there has been increasing awareness throughout the hemisphere that there exists a real problem in the attitudes of Castro and his Revolutionary leadership towards Communism, in the inter-relationships between the immediate objectives of international Communism in Latin America and Castro’s immediate aims, and in the degree of infiltration and influence of the Cuban Communist Party in the Castro regime. Although interpretations continue to differ widely throughout the hemisphere as to the extent and significance of the influence of the Communist Party in Cuba, there appears to have been some awakening to a realization that the Castro Revolution has adopted a course of at least limited ideological and practical collaboration with Communism for immediate objectives similar to that of Arévalo of Guatemala, Allende of Chile and the like, distinct from the non-Communist Latin American social revolutionary trends represented by Betancourt of Venezuela, Figueres of Costa Rica, the APRA of Peru, and the moderate elements of the Mexican and Bolivian Revolutions. The extravagant and uncritical propaganda support given to Castro by Communist and pro-Communist groups in most Latin American countries may also be a factor in the awakening of moderate opinion to the implications of the spread of Castro’s concepts of revolution and anti-Americanism in terms of the advancement of Communist objectives at the expense of indigenous Latin American social, democratic trends as well as moderate and middle class interests.

Conclusion

It is to the interest of the United States that the tendencies of Latin American opinion to become skeptical of Castro on the issues of dictatorship, intervention, and Communism be intensified and accelerated. Whether the end result of the pressure of Latin American opinion on these issues is to cause Castro to adopt more acceptable attitudes and courses of action or to reduce his public support, the United States objective of isolating and eventually eliminating the undesirable aspects of Castro’s Revolution will be served. It remains important, however, particularly at this stage, that any awakening public skepticism about Castro retain the appearance of being an indigenous Latin American reaction and that the overt statements and actions of the United States singly or cumulatively give no semblance of an effort on the part of this Government to discredit Castro.

USIS Responsibility

There may be exceptional opportunities in which USIS officers, principally the PAO and Information Officer, can help by personal contact or otherwise to achieve the above-outlined objective. In such instances, PAO’s should seek the prior specific approval of the Chief of Mission and coordinate any action with other members of the country team concerned. It is the intention of this Government that any information which may assist in focusing Latin American opinion on the negative aspects of the Castro regime shall not be attributed to any U.S. Government source and that there shall be no evident U.S. Government connection with its origin. PAOs must assure that the utmost caution is used in making such information available to foreign nationals, e.g., individuals controlling mass communication media. The only exception, of course, would be statements or materials publicly issued on the authority of the U.S. Government or its responsible officials.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–1559. Secret. Drafted by Hill; cleared in draft with Snow, Orville Anderson, Stevenson, Philip Burns, Katherine Keany (USIA/IAL), and James Halsema (USIA/IOP); and approved by Richard Phillips. Sent to Havana for information only.

362. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 18, 1959¹

Washington, September 18, 1959

SUBJECT

Our Future Relations with Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

R.R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary

Ambassador Bonsal

CMA—William A. Wieland

ARA—J.C. Hill

CMA—R.A. Stevenson, R.B. Owen

The meeting was called to decide what tactics we should employ in our future relations with Cuba. The following points were raised by the participants.

Mr. Rubottom: We in the Department have hoped that the Cuban revolution would result in changes that would be acceptable and we could continue the same basic relationship with Cuba as previously. We have expressed this view with U.S. business interests and the Congress, but are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of the complete lack of cooperation on the part of the Cubans. The time is coming when we must find out where Cuba stands and what Cuba wants. We are no better off today in our relations with the Cuban Government than we were on January 1, and perhaps we have erred in not striking back earlier in the face of the provocative statements and acts of many Cuban officials, although we have probably gained respect in the hemisphere by not doing so. However, we are coming to the point where our retaliatory instruments, such as GATT and the sugar quota, are likely to be used. The American public is not accustomed to the widespread anti-Americanism that exists today in Latin America and particularly in Cuba and we will be hard put to explain this. Cuba must know that if it follows a confiscatory policy toward American investments that it cannot hope to receive aid from the United States and it also must be aware that aid will be vitally necessary if the economic objectives of the Cuban revolution are to be reached. This fact combined with the cool relationship between Castro and pro-United States revolutionaries in other countries such as Betancourt and Figueres leads one to speculate whether the Cubans expect aid to come from the Soviet Bloc. We cannot assume that the Cuban Government’s allegations concerning IT&T and American & Foreign Power are necessarily correct and that the companies are wrong, and our best course in these cases is to exert pressure on both sides to reach an equitable settlement as we did in a similar case in Argentina.

Ambassador Bonsal: He has tried to explain to the Cubans on a number of occasions the function of the Executive and the Legislative Branches, particularly with regard to setting the sugar quota and has tried to convince them that the United States Government is desirous of protecting the traditional values in our relationship with Cuba but must have help from the Cubans to do so. A number of factors are more readily apparent on the scene in Cuba than they perhaps are in Washington. (1) That the purely Cuban objectives of the revolution have tremendous support and many of the things that worry us in the situation there are very minor as far as the Cubans are concerned and have little support. (2) The basic question about the Cuban revolution is whether it represents a fundamental change or is merely a temporary phenomenon. Probably it is a bit of both, but it is vitally important that if the revolution fails the failure should only be attributable to Cuban causes, and the United States must conduct itself so that no blame can be attached to us. (3) The attitude of many Cubans toward the United States has changed in recent years owing to our changed position in world affairs and the hemisphere. However, he has personally only encountered a feeling of sympathy and friendship in Cuba, even though the typical revolutionist in Cuba today regards everything that took place under Batista as bad and as a consequence is inclined to be anti-United States, anti-U.S. investments and not anti-Communist. Many members of the Cuban Government in their inexperience appear to be convinced that the proper way to be a big league statesman is to say one thing and do another, and Castro partially for this reason believes that United States assurances of friendship for Cuba mask a deep-seated enmity toward himself and the revolution. A showdown appears to be coming between the group around Felipe Pazos and the elements led by Raul Castro and the outcome of this should be a good indicator of the future course the Cuban revolution will take. We must determine what will be our attitude and role in the specific problems in our relations with Cuba such as the controversy between the Cuban Government and American & Foreign Power. We should also come to a decision concerning Soviet intentions and capabilities with regard to Cuba.

Mr. Wieland: The fact of anti-Americanism in Cuba is not really so important as the apparent movement of the Cuban Government toward the left and indications of the influence of international communism. If the strongly neutralist speeches of Guevara and Raul Castro express the feelings of the Cuban Government then our relations with Cuba are certainly deteriorating, and if they do not the Cuban Government should repudiate them. We have all been staunch advocates of extending the hand of friendship to Cuba and adopting a patient, tolerant attitude, but we cannot continue this policy much longer without some positive achievement to show in its justification.

Mr. Hill: There are indications that if the Cuban revolution is successful other countries in Latin America and perhaps elsewhere will use it as a model and we should decide whether or not we wish to have the Cuban revolution succeed.

There was unanimous agreement that the time has come when we must find out from the Cuban Government exactly what their intentions are. It was also decided that another meeting on the subject should be held.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–1859. Confidential. Drafted by Owen. Bonsal returned to the United States on September 14. (Telegram 623 from Havana, September 14; ibid., PER)

363. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 24, 1959¹

Washington, September 24, 1959

SUBJECT

Meeting with American Sugar Interests Regarding the Situation of Their Properties in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

William F. Oliver, President, American Sugar Refining Company

John A. Nichols, President, Cuban American Sugar Company

B. Rionda Braga, President, Francisco Sugar Company

Michael J.P. Malone, Manati Sugar Company

Frank G. Brown, Jr., V.P., Punta Alegre Sugar Corporation

Sam H. Baggett, V.P., United Fruit Company

Philip Rosenberg, President, Vertientes-Camaguey Sugar Company

Warren Lee Pierson, Director, Vertientes-Camaguey Sugar Company

W. Huntington Howell, First V.P., West Indies Sugar Corporation

Lawrence Crosby, Vice-Chairman, Atlantica del Golfo Sugar Company

Mr. Murphy—G

Mr. Mann—E

Mr. Rubottom—ARA

Ambassador Bonsal—Embassy Havana

Mr. Wieland—CMA

Mr. English—L/C

Mr. Kwiatek—L/C

Mrs. Mulliken—REA

Mr. Callanan—CSD

Mr. Stevenson—CMA

In the absence of Mr. Murphy, who was detained at a meeting with the President, Mr. Rubottom opened the meeting. He referred to the useful conversations on this same subject which had been held last May² and said that in view of the many developments since that date it had been agreed with Mr. Crosby that another meeting for the purpose of exchanging views would be mutually beneficial—particularly with the presence of Ambassador Bonsal.

Mr. Crosby, speaking for the American sugar interests in Cuba, expressed his thanks for the earlier meeting and stated that the Department’s note to the GOC² was a very able statement of the American investor’s case. The reply of the GOC³ to this note, on the other hand, he considers to be rather discourteous and not satisfactory. It amounts, in essence to a declaration that “necessity knows no laws.” Until now he has agreed with the Department that a reply to the Cuban note would not have been useful. However, since the Santiago meeting of the Foreign Ministers he has seen signs of an easing of tensions in Cuba and now, as we approach the deadline for sugar quota legislation, the U.S.-Cuban Sugar Council is of the opinion that a reply, in firm language, might be useful. In his view any reply should reiterate the preoccupation of informed and serious-minded persons that the Cuban agrarian law in its present form will have a serious adverse effect on sugar production. Mr. Crosby and his associates are convinced that the law will not work, but will result in a growing paralysis of the Cuban economy. The U.S. should in his opinion be thinking in advance and planning having in mind the contingency of the Castro regime. The American sugar industry considers that the exemption of at least the cane lands from the law is a necessity. Other lands present no real problem—they are not a serious matter. The delay in the application of the Agrarian Law to cane lands is of no real significance and serves only to draw attention from the fact that a fundamental problem remains to be resolved.

Mr. Rubottom thanked Mr. Crosby for his frank presentation and his expressions of confidence in the officials and policies of the Department. He informed the group confidentially, that a further note on agrarian reform is in preparation to be delivered soon. In summary he stated that the policy of the Department with regard to Cuba has been: (1) to seek to convey to the GOC and the Cuban people that the U.S. is sympathetic to many of the goals of the revolution as we understand them to be, i.e. an end to corruption and graft, a higher standard of living and an end to unemployment, more and better education and the abolishment of illiteracy, etc. As Muñoz Marín has said, this Cuban revolution may well contain “elements of greatness”; (2) to seek not to build Castro into heroic proportions until we know with certainty what he is trying to do, and with this thought in mind to avoid denigrating his regime and his person so as not to add a martyr’s halo to his bag of attractions; (3) to do nothing which might seem to Castro to constitute assent or acquiescence to acts harmful to American investment, but rather to indicate clearly and firmly that the U.S. expects reasonable, prompt and effective compensation in case of expropriation.

Ambassador Bonsal next spoke to the group stating that there can be no doubt in the minds of the Cubans of our position on compensation. Prior to his recent departure from Habana he had informed both the Cuban Minister of State and the President⁴ that our position on compensation remained as stated in our note of June 11 and that a further note would be presented upon his return. Referring to Mr. Crosby’s concern about the effects of the agrarian law on production, he noted that this feeling is widely shared also by Cubans and may well prove to be a constructive, positive factor in the picture. He doubts that the Cuban people are developing suicidal tendencies. The agrarian law contains impracticabilities and in the Ambassador’s opinion, Castro’s presently asserted uncompromising course may yet be subject to change. The note which the U.S.G. expects soon to present will not be made public by the Department in the thought that our best hope in this difficult situation is to try to appeal to the more responsible elements around Castro which perhaps we have a better chance of doing in an atmosphere of non-public excitement. In his many conversations with important Cuban officials, including Castro, on the subject of agrarian reform the Ambassador stated that he has emphasized the following points; namely, (1) the necessity for just compensation; (2) the falseness of the notion that there is something inherently wrong in being a big company operating in Cuba; (3) the positive role of American capital in Cuba and what it has done to make jobs and create wealth for Cuba (He noted that this concept is not popular with the “hot-rod” revolutionists, but it will ultimately have the weight which truth always has. In this regard he suggested that the American companies try to develop relationships within the GOC and seek to give a picture of their operations, making use of persons who have a vested interest in their continued operations.); (4) the fact that he is well aware of various things happening to American companies, particularly when there are arbitrary actions without legal basis. (In these cases he expects to take positive actions of protest.) In conclusion the Ambassador observed that a line of thinking is developing in Cuba which takes into account the role of American interests and, hopefully, may ultimately lead to a greater flexibility more adapted to the realities of the situation.

Mr. Oliver said that speaking for his company which is both a producer of raw sugar in Cuba and a refiner in the United States he is faced with long-range problems which may be adversely affected by actions taken in response to the short range problems. Regarding the danger to the supply situation for the American consumer, he feels that sufficient sugar can be obtained from various sources other than Cuba should Congress decide to punish Cuba through the sugar quota. He stated that he had heard that Assistant Secretary Mann had recently agreed with the domestic beet-sugar growers that a weapon should be given to the Executive in the form of authority to revise quotas in the national interest if the need arises. He wished to emphasize that there are no secrets in the sugar business and that Mr. Mann’s point of view will soon be widely known in Cuba. He wonders if the American people will demand something further. In his view the GOC will not modify its law, and this has been confirmed to him by a well-informed Cuban, Mr. Fernandez Grau.

Mr. Rubottom observed that we have not used, nor desire to use, the term “punish” with regard to Cuba. However, the United States may have to consider other sources of supply and new sources cannot be developed overnight. Mr. Mann stated that he concurred with Mr. Rubottom’s remarks. He feels it unwise to talk in terms of punishment or retaliation. However, at this time it is not realistic or desirable to subsidize a Government engaging in extraordinary acts harmful to American interests. When the Executive goes to Congress with its recommendations on sugar legislation a flexible posture will be needed, showing an ability to deal with future circumstances. Mr. Mann knows no reason why the Executive, under these circumstances, should not fix quotas. He asked if anyone there had any better ideas. Mr. Oliver said that he had not meant to question the merits of Mr. Mann’s proposal but wished merely to point out that it will be recognized as being done for a reason—this fact will be known. Mr. Mann remarked that Mr. Shields of the Beet Sugar Growers Association had come to a recent meeting of this group with a suggestion almost identical with his own. However, he wished to state that he is happy to share with Mr. Shields praise or censure as the case may be.

Mr. Baggett expressed his pleasure at Mr. Rubottom’s comments. He considers that the agrarian reform in Cuba will have far reaching effects if it should become a pattern for other countries in Latin America. The low valuation of property and payment in I.O.U.’s, if it spreads, will force the United Fruit Company out of business. This Cuban attitude posses a serious problem for all investors in Latin America. He agreed that we should not make a hero of Castro, but observed that he will be one in any case if he gets away with his agrarian reform as it stands. He is glad that the Ambassador will be presenting another note and approves of the timing and that it is best not to publish it although its contents will soon get out in his opinion. As he sees it Mr. Mann expects fireworks on the Hill, and he needs his special clause to dampen it.

Mr. Mann said in summary of his views (1) that without change the old Sugar Act could not get through Congress; (2) that to encourage Congress to take a bite from Cuba is not desirable; and (3) that we should avoid the above by putting ourselves in a position to reduce the Cuban quota if it is in the national interest. He referred to the growing and rampant nationalism all over the world and said that the United States cannot in his opinion refrain from seizing such means as it has to protect its interests; otherwise we must brace ourselves for attacks of this nature from every quarter. Mr. Nichols queried whether it was contemplated that the new clause might affect the 1960 crop.⁵ Mr. Mann replied that we are in the process of trying to establish a common front with all segments of the industry before going to the Hill and that the question has not been finally determined. Mr. Crosby observed that in order to be prepared to cope with any situation the power should be made available for immediate use. Mr. English remarked that when the Sugar Act came up for renewal in 1952 there was an amount of $900,000 outstanding in old claims against the GOC. Congress on this occasion refused to grant the Cubans a quota until these claims were settled and the Cubans paid up.

Mr. Rosenberg referred to his several conversations with Ambassador Bonsal and the Ambassador’s suggestion that he consider the possibility of developing relations with the more moderate elements in the GOC. His company has tried to do this but it has proved impossible. Those they have talked with have suggested that the American companies suggest some plans for alleviating their own difficulties. In Mr. Rosenberg’s opinion these persons recognize the impracticability of many of the law’s provisions and the difficulty of getting financing, but he questions their good faith. He believes they are merely trying to soothe the fears of the Americans hoping they will continue to invest and maintain production. In his opinion they are merely being kept in the death chamber awaiting execution day. Unless Castro is convinced, there is no hope of change; and these moderates have no rapport with Castro. He said that Cuba will have an ample crop in 1960 but a considerably shorter crop in 1961—probably 20% less for his own company which has 6,000 American stockholders. His company has stopped fertilization and new planting. He sees no reason to support financially a hostile Government and doesn’t want to sit and suffer waiting for the executioner’s sword to drop. Rather he wishes that the U.S. Government would explain to Castro in frank terms just what he is doing and what he may expect as a result. He estimated that the sugar crop in 1961 might drop to 3,800,000 tons.

Messrs. Malone, Rosenberg, Nichols, Braga, and Howell then described in some detail a series of harassments and illegal acts to which their mills and plantations in Cuba have been subject. Mr. Braga reported that his managers feel that hostile forces are closing in on them; that the INRA officials are watching the American firms like a cat watches mice. He said that he is not criticizing the Department but by Cuba we will we judged. If Castro succeeds unchallenged no respect for contracts will follow throughout the area. Mr. Howell agreed with him, declaring that the situation is desperate and that they are being nibbled to pieces. Mr. Nichols declared that agrarian reform is only a part of the gloomy picture and cited the arbitrary wage increases to labor, the decrees affecting utility rates, new tax laws and general arbitrary treatment.

Mr. Rubottom asked if anyone in the group had considered, or tried to initiate, negotiations on his own behalf. Mr. Crosby replied that there is no hope of trying this with Castro or INRA unless Castro is convinced that he cannot get away with his present course. The mill owners need to be in a position of strength before they can negotiate. Public opinion in the United States is highly critical of Castro now which is a keg of dynamite for him—he should be warned. Castro doesn’t believe that the U.S. will cut the Cuban quota to protect the interests of its investors.

Mr. Murphy⁶ noted that there are various factors in addition to sugar which the U.S. Government must consider in its relations with Cuba, e.g. Guantanamo, the utilities companies, Latin American opinion, etc.. He is confident that Ambassador Bonsal is trying to manipulate the situation to our best overall advantage. Castro, of course, seems genuinely to believe the things he says and with a man like this the question of how tough to be is a matter of timing. Castro has his own brain trust it seems—men like “Che” Guevara, and Raul Castro who certainly do not inspire trust on our part.

Mr. Wieland observed that no matter how useless it may seem, the American companies can help us by making such constructive efforts on their own behalf as may be possible. He asked them to consider, “what can you do in the way of constructive, progressive steps within reason?” As the Ambassador makes such approaches to the GOC as he can on behalf of the American companies it might well be important that the GOC not be able to say that the companies have made neither protests or suggestions on their own behalf. Several company representatives indicated that they will give further consideration to this possibility even though heretofore such action has not seemed feasible. Mr. Nichols said that his company had spoken with Minister of State Roa and had told him that unless something is done to improve the situation of the company there is not much the company could do to be of assistance to Cuba in line with Roa’s desires.

Mr. Murphy thanked the representatives of the sugar companies for their patience and cooperative attitude and said that the Department desires to work closely with the group in our mutual interest.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.235/9–2459. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stevenson and cleared with Wieland and Rubottom.

² See footnote 3, Document 313.

² See Document 318.

³ Document 321.

⁴ See Document 360.

⁵ Note: The present Sugar legislation runs through December 31, 1960. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ Mr. Murphy joined the group about 10 minutes before the end of the meeting. [Footnote in the source text.]

364. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, September 1959.²

SUBJECT

Cuban-American Relations

The purpose of this memorandum is to itemize current problems in Cuban-American relations and to define in the form of recommendations and of questions the policy aspects involved from our point of view. Basic to this approach is the belief that we should maintain our attitude of understanding of and sympathy with the broad aspirations of the Cuban Revolution and that such an attitude is consistent with the furthering of American interests both public and private in Cuba. It is also my belief, although this point is beyond the scope of the present memorandum, that our alleged failure during the past five or six years to take a more positive attitude toward the problems of economic development in Latin America is responsible for some of the unhappy aspects of our relations with the Castro Government and with other governments and groups in the hemisphere. The more positive approach we are now taking to these problems has not as yet changed the prevailing negative impression and, of course, the gap between our thinking and that of the Cuban Government on this subject remains very wide.

I. Broad Cuban Government Attitudes Toward U.S. and Free World. These attitudes are summarized in Roa’s address of September 24th to the U.N. General Assembly.³ This is a formal official statement as distinguished from press conferences and television appearances. Should we take issue with the Cuban position and, if so, how? Perhaps a further speech by us in the U.N. or a letter from Secretary Herter to Roa might make the following points:

(a) So far as we are concerned, Cuba has been a fully sovereign nation since repeal of the Piatt Amendment in 1934. Roa says freedom began only on January 1, 1959.

(b) We are unaware of any “campaign of falsehoods” against Cuba in this country. On the other hand, the repeated attacks on the United States by Cuban officials and by the press of the July 26th movement have been deeply resented by official and and public opinion in the United States as constituting willful misinterpretations and misrepresentations of our relations with Cuba. These attacks have built up a dangerous and undesirable reservoir of ill will here.

(c) USG is making every effort to see that our laws against arms traffic, etc. are complied with. We welcome any information GOC can furnish on this score and we have formally requested such information.

(d) Inclusion of Guatemala as an illustration of the use of “compulsive force” with Hungary and Tibet appears shocking to U.S. and surely to other free world opinion. (Perhaps we should suggest, if necessary, that the Guatemalan Government raise this issue with Roa.)

(e) With regard to allegations that small countries were ignored in Eisenhower–Khrushchev talks,⁴ we should recite steps we have taken to keep Cuba and other OAS countries informed.

(f)

With regard to the reiteration of Castro’s thirty billion dollar program, we should express appreciation of the breadth and generosity of Castro’s motivation at the same time explaining again the nature of the burdens being borne by the U.S. on behalf of the free world.

A letter of this kind could be useful in confirming the views expressed orally at different times by different U.S. officials to Castro, Roa, etc.

II.

Possibilities of Economic Cooperation with Cuba. Although the timing will have to depend on developing circumstances, the Department should positively explore the following possibilities:

(a) Assistance from international or U.S. sources to Cuba for balance of payment purposes. Such assistance might be in the form of a stabilization loan to maintain confidence in the peso. Department should discuss this with IMF and Treasury with a view to achieving positive posture as soon as possible.

(b) Assistance from international or U.S. sources for Cuban industrialization and agricultural diversification. It is highly desirable for us to develop a positive approach here even though we may have no applications from Cuban sources. We must make every effort to show a constructive attitude in this matter in which we as a Government and U.S. private interests in Cuba have a vital interest.

(c) Further exploration of a PL–480 agreement. The current exchange crisis would seem to justify some such agreement covering such products as wheat, flour, and corn. The counterpart funds would be helpful in guiding the direction of Cuban investment and perhaps also in insuring cooperation therein of American firms.

We should be ready, under suitable circumstances, to act promptly in response to Cuban requests which we should encourage if and when the general climate of relations between the two countries improves.

III. Tensions in the Caribbean Area. We should reiterate to Castro and to Roa our awareness of the contrast between Cuban actions and Cuban statements in this area and our intentions, in the event of a repetition of Cuban sponsored activities, to join with other countries in denouncing these activities publicly. We should endeavor to get other countries to make similar statements through diplomatic channels, i.e. without publicity. We should, of course, make clear that our policy regarding attempts to invade Cuba would be similar.

IV. Arms Embargo. We should push the current review of this policy which has not prevented the Cuban armed forces from greatly stepping up this capacity for mischief in the area through the purchase of 26,000 semi-automatic rifles and ammunition from Belgium. When this review is completed, we should explain to the Cubans and to other interested governments the policies which we and our NATO partners have agreed upon. The present policy has been misinterpreted by the GOC. Regardless of the broad policy decided upon, we should endeavor to see that the GOC gets the T–28s which it has bought and paid for but which are being held in Miami. (Were the two T–28s recently sabotaged in Miami covered by insurance?)

V. Agrarian Reform. For the moment the following actions are open to us:

(1) A reply to the Cuban note⁵ on this subject in which we would reiterate our position on the international law aspects of compensation and on our governmental responsibility for insuring an adequate flow of products currently imported from Cuba for the benefit of the American consumer, the production of which may be diminished.

(2) While this reiteration of the USG position on compensation may have a salutary effect, all concerned on our side are presumably under no illusions as to the preferability, if at all possible, of finding a reasonable solution of the problem as between the GOC and the interested parties through direct discussion between them rather than of resorting to the time consuming and hazardous diplomatic claim procedure. We should therefore encourage and facilitate, as appropriate, bilateral discussions between the interested parties and the GOC. It seems reasonable to expect that a firm attitude on our part regarding the international law aspects will be a helpful catalyst here though it would be hoped that the lawyers of the American interests would leave their client under no illusions as to the delays and uncertainties of resort to diplomatic claims.

(3) Many American interests are apparently being made the victims of capricious extra-legal activities by agrarian reform authorities especially in the provinces. The Embassy should, as appears desirable in each case, show an awareness of the law and facts involved through aide-mémoires left with the Cuban Ministry of State.

VI.

Telephone Company Case. Pending the outcome of forthcoming conversations between the GOC and the interested parties, there is little we can do in this case. We should, however, follow it closely and, without expressing a view on the merits, we should continue, as appropriate, to state orally to Cuban officials that delay in handling this case and the continued exclusion of the managers representing the owners is prejudicial and should be terminated as soon as possible.

The Department should also:

(1) see whether there are any capabilities within our own Government, i.e. through the Federal communications Commission or through a suitable state regulatory commission, to reach an opinion as to the merits of the current controversy regarding telephone rates, and

(2) see whether there is any suggestion the Department can offer as to an acceptable arbitral procedure for resolving the issues.

VII. The Electric Company Case. The Embassy and the Department should continue to express dissatisfaction with the manner in which the company has been treated by the Cuban Government, i.e. the cut in rates without any opportunity for the company to discuss the government’s investigation report. We should follow current bilateral discussions carefully. And, in addition, the Department should:

(1) see whether there are any capabilities within our own Government, i.e. through the Federal Power Commission or through a suitable state regulatory commission to reach an opinion as to the merits of the current rate controversy, and

(2) explore possible suggestions as to an acceptable arbitral procedure for resolving the issues.

VIII. Nicaro Mine. With regard to this property, owned by the U.S. Government, we have two problems:

(a) The sale of the property to private owners. An announcement of a willingness to receive bids was made on September 15th by the General Services Administration without notifying the Cuban Government. It is my assumption from our talk with Messrs. Floete and Holz that GSA will consider no bid unless the bidders have the approval of the Cuban Government. This understanding should be confirmed and I should be authorized to communicate it to the Cuban Government.

(b) The Housing Problem. I understand GSA has taken the position that it cannot contribute to the solution of this problem but will support a joint State–GSA endeavor to get the necessary three or four hundred thousand dollars out of White House special funds. ARA has not yet expressed a view on this. The matter is one of considerable urgency.

IX. Renewal of the Sugar Act. Under the circumstances and in part because of the issues discussed above, the pressures to revise sugar quotas in a manner unfavorable to Cuba will be very great. Many of the quota areas are most anxious to increase their deliveries. It is obvious that the responsibility of the U.S. authorities to insure an adequate flow of sugar at reasonable prices must be discharged. Although it appears highly unlikely that Agrarian Reform could be operated so as to drive Cuban production below the amount needed to fill Cuba’s U.S. quota, nevertheless there would seem to be no objection to giving our executive discretion to prepare for and to meet such a contingency. But even to contemplate in our legislative the possibility that our executive might cut the Cuban U.S. quota for punitive or retaliatory reasons connected with domestic Cuban legislation would, in my judgment, prove disastrous not only to our relations with Cuba but also to our relations with other Latin American countries. In effect, we would be permanently diminishing the resources of the entire Cuban people and would open a wound which would be a long time in healing. Regardless of how the legislation comes out, it seems to me most important that the Administration strenuously defend the Cuban quota as long as Cuba is able actually to deliver. A traditional relationship involving a broad mutuality of interest is involved here.

X. Tariff Negotiations. The Embassy is urgently in need of further instructions on this subject. We must know to what extent we can accommodate ourselves to the Cuban drive for restored and increased protection for balance of payments, industrialization, and diversification purposes. We should be able to give the Cubans some idea at an early date of the reciprocal impact on our own duties of the broad increase in theirs which they are proposing. Also we need to reach decisions on the date and place of negotiations and on the composition of our negotiating group.

XI. Miscellaneous Matters on Which the Department’s Views Would be Appreciated.

(a) Possible content of a statement to be made by the Ambassador on arrival at Habana.

(b) Resumption of naval visits and of liberty parties from Guantanamo Naval Base.

(c) Possibility of using ASTA conventions as an occasion for expression of broad views on Cuban-American relations. Television appearances by Ambassador?

(d) Possibility that Ambassador Romulo’s forthcoming visit to Cuba where he will present his credentials as Philippine Ambassador in Cuba could be useful to us.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–2559. Confidential.

² Although the source text bears the handwritten date “11/59”, it was probably prepared in late September 1959, and no earlier than September 25, during Bonsal’s visit to Washington.

³ For text, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 806.

⁴ Khrushchev visited the United States September 15–27. Documentation on his visit, including his talks with President Eisenhower, is scheduled for publication in volume X.

⁵ Document 321.

365. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 1, 1959¹

Washington, October 1, 1959

SUBJECT

Discussion based on Ambassador Bonsal’s talking paper on Cuban-American Relations²

PARTICIPANTS

ARA—Mr. Rubottom, Mr. Snow

Ambassador Bonsal

CMA—Mr. Wieland

REA—Mr. Rosenson

ARA—Mr. Hill

CMA—Mr. Stevenson

Mr. Rubottom opened the discussion by commending Ambassador Bonsal for his helpfulness in putting down on paper his thoughts on various aspects of our relations with Cuba. Ambassador Bonsal indicated that he had done this not with the idea that these are his fixed views but rather as a guide for further discussion. Mr. Snow referred to a statement on the first page of Ambassador Bonsal’s memorandum in which he indicated his belief that in our basic approach we should maintain our attitude of understanding of and sympathy with the broad aspirations of the Cuban Revolution. In Mr. Snow’s view this point needs further careful consideration. He feels that what we really mean is “broad legitimate aspirations.” In his opinion the Cuban Revolution is not another Mexican Revolution—not the juggernaut that Fidel Castro and the 26th of July zealots picture it to be.

Ambassador Bonsal stated that the Cuban aspirations as he sees them are: (a) an end to repressive dictatorship of the Batista type; (b) an end to graft; (c) an end to tax evasion; (d) an end to structural unemployment; (e) constructively, various measures done for the improvement of education, health and the good of the community. Mr. Rubottom observed that we do need a basic decision with regard to the “revolution” of Fidel Castro. Mr. Hill felt that the essential question might be phrased, “Can we cooperate with and through this present Cuban regime?” Ambassador Bonsal said that Mr. Hill, in his view, was not talking about the same point that the Ambassador was trying to make. In the Ambassador’s view it is extremely important that the United States should do nothing which could later cause the failure of the revolution to be ascribed to the USG. Mr. Rubottom remarked that this is a laudable objection but a very difficult one to ensure. The United States will probably be blamed in any case. It is up against a fixed proposition in the anti-American attitude of the Castro revolution. Mr. Rubottom and Mr. Snow suggested that we should consider the probability that we should seek to maintain only minimal acceptable relations with the present Cuban regime. Ambassador Bonsal asked that if we do indeed determine that our relations should be at this minimal level that he be so instructed.

Roa—UN Speech³

With regard to a reply to Minister Roa’s speech in the UN, it was agreed that Ambassador Bonsal should talk to him about it and leave him an aide-mémoire summarizing our attitude towards this speech. Ambassador Bonsal was authorized to tell Roa that such an aide-mémoire would be presented if he so desired.

Tensions in the Caribbean Area

Ambassador Bonsal expressed his view that now that revolutionary activities emanating from Cuba seem to have diminished he feels that it might be well for him to speak plainly to Roa on this subject. It was agreed that he should do so along the lines suggested in his memorandum mentioning also other types of intervention in the affairs of other nations such as Armando Hart’s speeches in Chile, Operation Friendship, etc. Mr. Rubottom said that the Cubans blame us for Santiago and it might not be advisable or necessary to make any direct reference to the Conference. It was agreed that Ambassador Bonsal might say, if he desires, that the United States is gratified that the bands have been broken up. At the same time the Department will ask Ambassador Farland to speak to the Dominican Foreign Minister with regard to activities aimed at Cuba which are based in the Dominican Republic. It was also agreed to try to get Justice to step up its enforcement in the Miami area, and, if possible, to send an agent to Cuba for the purpose of seeking information from the GOC with regard to illegal activities based in the United States.

Arms Embargo

Mr. Rubottom said that the Department cannot agree at this time with the Ambassador’s suggestion that we release the T–28’s to Cuba. It was explained to Ambassador Bonsal that the present arms policy is now being relaxed considerably. It was agreed that when an opportunity presents itself, Ambassador Bonsal should feel free to inform Minister Roa of our position with regard to arms shipments to areas where tensions are high.

Agrarian Reform

Everyone was in agreement and Mr. Rubottom instructed Mr. Stevenson to get the note cleared by Messrs. Murphy, Dillon and Herter and that when this might be done to so inform Ambassador Bonsal.

IT&T (Cuban Telephone Company)

It was agreed that the Ambassador could tell President Geneen of IT&T that although the presentation which he has made of the Cuban Telephone Company’s position to the GOC is, in our opinion, generally a very fine one, it is our belief that IT&T may find it advisable to move more in the direction of permitting greater Cuban equity participation.

Nicaro

It was agreed that the Ambassador may assure the GOC that the USG will not sell Nicaro to any buyer who might be unacceptable to the GOC. With regard to the housing problem at Nicaro it was agreed to seek $300,000 from the President’s contingency fund.

Sugar

It was agreed that the State Department should attempt to defend the Cuban quota as far and to the extent that it possibly can—it will depend in some measure on the actions and attitude of the GOC in the intervening period.

Tariffs

There was no action recommended on this subject. It was agreed that Washington is satisfactory as a place to hold discussions.

Naval Visits

It was agreed that the climate in Cuba is not now suitable for Naval visits.

ASTA

It was agreed that the Ambassador might speak to the ASTA if he so desires.

Statement

It was agreed in his own discretion the Ambassador might make a statement upon his arrival in Habana.

TV

Mr. Rubottom said that he would leave the matter up to Ambassador Bonsal as to whether he should appear on a Cuban T.V. “Meet the Press” type program. Mr. Stevenson said that he had verified that there is no regulation against such an appearance.

Romulo Visit

Mr. Rubottom said that, again, he would leave the matter of any possible utilization of the Romulo visit in Ambassador Bonsal’s hands.

Economic Aid

With regard to financial aid from the IMF, Mr. Rosenson observed that the GOC is taking steps in complete opposition to IMF standards. There is no chance at present of IMF help. Such help would require a very sudden and drastic shift in present Cuban policies. Mr. Snow asked if we should be ready to go into immediate action—to go ahead if asked by the GOC for assistance. Ambassador Bonsal expressed the opinion that we should be—assuming an indication on the part of the GOC that it would take steps in our direction. Messrs. Snow and Rubottom expressed the view that we should be most reserved and careful about giving any indication, willingness or encouragement on the matter of economic aid at this time. Ambassador Bonsal said that he believes we should go ahead and be ready with possible courses of action; that we should not turn down any request of the GOC out of hand but should express a willingness to listen and consider any proposition which they may wish to make; that they have the feeling now that the USG is just standing in wait expecting that the GOC will ask for help in order that it may knock it down. Mr. Snow said that he did not suggest that we must give an immediate rude negative but that at the same time we should give no encouragement. Mr. Rubottom observed that he does not now see any possibility of economic assistance from the United States. We must continue our policy of watchful waiting—that’s all. The IT&T case may give us some indication of the course this government is determined to follow. With the present political climate as it is there would be no chance if we even tried to set up possible pending economic assistance—“We would be tossed out.” Ambassador Bonsal queried, “What if Felipe Pazos asks? What should I tell him?” Mr. Rubottom said that he should repeat to him our general line, expressing to him our worries and that in great part whatever the USG might do depends on the over-all attitude of the GOC. Ambassador Bonsal then asked, “What if the Czechs and the Russians then come in?” Mr. Rubottom replied, “We ask only minimal cooperation from the Cubans.” “To me this would mean that the present GOC is not willing to take the slightest move toward the United States and we would revise our policies accordingly.” Ambassador Bonsal stated that it is then his understanding that there should be nothing in the mill with regard to economic aid at the present time. Mr. Rubottom answered that this is not quite the way he sees it. Rather, he feels that we can show a willingness to listen to any position they would like to take without making any commitment. He said that he is almost convinced that the GOC will not submit any request for economic aid unless they are willing to make some adjustments with regard to the United States and that this seems unlikely with the present team in ascendancy. Ambassador Bonsal remarked that he had hoped we might indicate something more positive with regard to economic aid in the thought that this might introduce some ballast into the situation. Mr. Snow said that he agrees with Mr. Rubottom and feels very hesitant on giving the Cubans any encouragement—the timing is wrong. Mr. Wieland voiced support for Ambassador Bonsal, stating that the pressures are building up in Cuba and that he hates to see us not ready. Mr. Rubottom observed that we have to walk a tightrope—while trying to keep up a semblance of good relations with the present regime we must, at the same time, try to keep alive any spark of opposition and to let the opposition know we are aware of its existence and not committed to Castro. Ambassador Bonsal observed that he would rather try to support something growing out of the 26th of July movement itself, and as the discussion broke up, the names of Sori Marin, Pazos and Dorticós were mentioned as possibly being constructive persons not firmly committed to Castro’s radical course.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–159. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson. Copies were sent to each participant and to Turkel. In a memorandum to Rubottom, October 1, Wieland summarized a conversation that he, Hill, Stevenson, and Alexander M. Rosenson had with Bonsal the previous day regarding Bonsal’s informal memorandum concerning Cuban-American relations. The conversation covered many of the same points as the one on October 1. (ibid., ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba Special Meeting 1960)

² Supra.

³ See U.N. doc. A/PV. 806.

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 6, 1959.

774. I have just had one-hour conversation with Minister of State Roa. After reiterating to him that I found general sympathy with stated democratic social objectives Cuban revolution, I also found considerable perplexity and doubt among people with whom I spoke as to Cuban attitudes toward US and free world, I said that I found no evidence of any press or other “campaign” or “conspiracy” against Cuba, adding that attitudes I had found represented harvest of anti-American attitudes, statements and actions by leading representatives of Cuban Government and party press. I urged him to believe present state our relations not due anything other than these attitudes, statements and actions. I said that many people believed hand of friendship we had extended to present GOC had been neglected.

He replied that he believed I was hypersensitive on this score and stated true attitude Cuban people toward US reflected by ovation which I received at local ball park last Saturday night.² (This was indeed heart-warming experience involving expression some 25,000 people all classes of very friendly attitude toward US.)

I repeated nevertheless that there is ample basis for US concern which I have tried to convey to Roa on numerous occasions and to Castro when I saw him Sept 3.³ Roa continued to insist GOC attitude fundamentally friendly in spite activities “small groups.”

I asked Roa whether Cuba would now vote in UN with Afro-Asian bloc as might be interpreted from his recent television appearance.⁴ He replied in negative stating each question would be considered on its merits. In reply to a further question, he said Cuba has not yet decided on Security Council vote.

Speaking of Caribbean tensions, Roa stated GOC has recently arrested number of Dominican, Nicaraguan and Panamanian revolutionaries who were attempting organize illegal activities. He referred to weapons being clandestinely shipped from US to Cuba. I reminded him we had asked for GOC cooperation with our law enforcement agencies on two occasions and had received no reply. (We sent note on Aug 20 referring Castro television allegations this subject and another on Sept 17⁵ asking for Major Morgan’s testimony.) I made clear to Roa that I believed neither USG nor other LA Governments under any illusions as to what had been going on this area during past few months in spite considerate attitude observed in OAS.

At Roa’s suggestion, I agreed to meeting Oct 12 with him, Pazos and Minister Economy Boti to discuss pending matters, presumably including tariff negotiations, Agrarian Reform as it applies US interests, Telephone Company case and Electric Company case. Would appreciate any instructions Department may wish convey.⁶

Bonsal

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Havana Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, 350, Political Affairs. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. The time of transmission is not given on the source text. Bonsal had returned to Cuba on October 2. (Telegram 748 from Havana, October 2; Department of State, Central Files, PER)

² October 3.

³ See Document 359.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Neither of these notes has been found.

⁶ In telegram 775 from Havana, October 6, Bonsal recommended that on the basis of his discussion with Roa, the U.S. Government should deliver to the Cuban Government the note on agrarian reform that had been discussed during Bonsal’s consultations in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/10–659)

367. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 13, 1959—11 a.m.

814. Embtel 774.² Yesterday Braddock, Gilmore and I met with Roa, Boti and Pazos to explore pending questions. I brought up generally tense atmosphere in US-Cuban relations due to statements, actions and attitudes of revolutionary leaders and suggested it was up to Cuba to take initiative in improving situation. Roa felt it should be evident from his speeches and from ovation I received at ball park recently that neither Cuban Government nor Cuban people unfriendly to US. Pazos thought some statement might be made in connection with ASTA meeting assuring US of friendly attitude GOC.

I stated that adequate provision for compensation and expropriated American property continued to be of major concern to US and delivered note as instructed.³ Cuban officials optimistic that evaluations on American properties would be realistic, taking advantage of latitude agrarian reform law offers in compensating for rations and improvements. Pazos stated while payment in bonds necessary, there was legal authority and precedent for paying American owners in dollar bonds.

I said that INRA provincial representatives had taken certain actions against American properties that seemed arbitrary and extralegal. Roa, Boti and Pazos said same thing had been experienced by many Cubans and showed no sympathy for this kind of action by INRA. They urged me submit memoranda setting forth the pertinent facts in these cases, which I am doing today for cases of Cuban American Sugar Mills Co., Francesco Co. and Cuba Colonial Land Co.

On electric and phone company problems, I was assured both companies would be given early opportunity present cases at high level.

Talk was generally friendly and regarded by Cubans as first of series. I was impressed by Roa’s unrealistic appraisal of impact his UN speech and by Pazos constructive attitude.

Detailed report of conversation follows.⁴

Dr. Pazos subsequently phoned Embassy officer to call attention to Law 588 approved October 7 which regulates expropriation procedure and provides judicial review. He expressed opinion this law will result in satisfactory valuations and stressed only difference from preexisting legal procedures is shortening of time of appeals. Embassy transmitting text and analysis law soonest.⁵

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–1359. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² Supra.

³ See footnote 6, supra.

⁴ Airgram G–63 from Havana, October 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–1459)

⁵ Sent in despatch 602 from Havana, October 15. (ibid., 611.37/10–1559)

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, October 14, 1959—7:30 p.m.

3000. AP report datelined London Oct 12 claims UK contemplating sale 15 jet Hawker Hunters to replace piston engine Sea Fury Fighters now in possession Cuban Air Force and matter will come before cabinet in next week or so.

Department has been working on revision Caribbean arms policy in consultation with British Embassy and agreement reached to continue ban export combat aircraft to Cuba and Dominican Republic.

British Embassy today presented justifications for making sale Hunters an exception indicating transaction would be held up until Department has had opportunity present its views.²

Department believes possession of Hunters would significantly increase Cuban military potential, re-open entire question of arms for area, produce a highly unfavorable public reaction in the US and upset the tentative balance in arms between Cuba and D.R. possibly generating arms race between two countries.

In addition transaction could easily be interpreted by other supplier countries as signaling end of British cooperation with US policy on Caribbean arms shipments with result they might relax their restrictions to protect interests own suppliers. Therefore, Department strongly opposes reported transaction.

Department preparing detailed exposition these views for presentation British Embassy here. Meanwhile, Embassy requested bring these preliminary views of Department to attention Foreign Office soonest at appropriately high level.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5621/10–1459. Confidential. Drafted by Owen and Vallon, cleared in substance with James D. Moffett (BNA) and C. Arnold Freshman (SCA/MC), and approved by Vallon who signed for Herter. Repeated to Havana and Ciudad Trujillo.

² A copy of the British Embassy’s note of October 14 on this subject is attached to a memorandum of November 18 from Rubottom to Herter. (ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, November 1959)

369. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, October 15, 1959—7 p.m.

2032. Deptel 3000 sent Havana 411 Ciudad Trujillo 235.² Embassy officer saw Hildyard, acting head American Department Foreign Office, October 15 in absence assistant Under-Secretary Hankey and inquired accuracy AP report reference telegram. Hildyard said absolutely no basis for report. He said UK would do nothing like that without first discussing it fully with US. It was part of pressure campaign by Cubans and others here.

Hildyard went on to review recent US–UK exchanges on embargo, recalling US had proposed relaxation of embargo on sale of light aircraft and aircraft spare parts; and that UK had discussed sale of “little boats” and spare parts for these. Hildyard said UK representative Washington had been somewhat taken aback when Department spokesman had told him when presenting US arguments for sale of aircraft that US “had already decided” on sale of these. However, in end US and UK had agreed that situation in Caribbean somewhat improved and sale of light aircraft, “little boats” and spare parts for these could be permitted. Hildyard said UK had felt all along that embargo to be effective had to be 100 percent; whereas US had indicated it expected embargo to be less than completely effective. UK had felt that US which has primary strategic interest in area should take lead in getting adherence others in West to embargo. UK had urged US to put pressure on Belgians and Italians after which UK could talk to them. US had talked to Belgians and then UK had. UK had talked first to Italians and then US had pressed them. However, Foreign Office still unclear what results of these representations were and rumors weapons sales by these countries to Cuba continued.

Foreign Office also concerned about rumors that Austria may sell Cubans Vampire jets and Foreign Office not sure UK could stop this.

Hildyard listed to Embassy officer arguments for sale Hawker Hunters to Cuba which undoubtedly same as those presented to Department (third paragraph reference telegram). In reply, Embassy officer gave Hildyard substance last three paragraphs reference telegram. Hildyard did not seem surprised. He said that if US reply to UK presentation on Hawker Hunters should be negative, Foreign Office will have to put matter to ministers. As personal opinion, Hildyard expressed doubt that UK would go ahead with sale if US opposed but UK would probably raise matter again in couple of months. He said pressures were heavy for this transaction particularly because of fact it was not export but exchange and because UK had originally made sale to Batista Government.

Hildyard also commented briefly on general relationships US and UK and other Western European countries with countries Latin America. He said Latin American countries did not want to be completely reliant on US however pro-Western they might be. Cuba appeared to have become somewhat cool toward US and was trying to play more of neutralist role. With Dominican Republic possessing some 40 Jet fighters and Cuba 1, Cubans absolutely determined to get Jets and may, as they have threatened, go to Czechoslovakia or elsewhere in Soviet bloc if they are stopped elsewhere. Question is, Hildyard thought, whether it is not best to let them have these Hawker Hunters which would right imbalance between them and Dominicans.

Hildyard also warned that should Austria, Italy or Belgium sell Jet fighters to Cuba, Foreign Office would be in extremely vulnerable position.

Comment: In view of Hildyard’s assurance that UK will not proceed with decision on Hawker Hunters pending full discussion with US, and fact Foreign Office is aware now of our negative reactions to their presentation this case, we judge further representations by us not necessary at this time.

Barbour

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5621/10–1559. Confidential. Repeated to Havana and Ciudad Trujillo.

² Supra.

Adoption by the Department of State and the Eisenhower administration of a revised policy toward Cuba, October 1959–January 1960

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 17, 1959—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/10–1759. Confidential; Priority.

371. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 20, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/10–2059. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal.

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 21, 1959—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2159. Confidential; Niact.

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 21, 1959—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2159. Confidential; Priority.

374. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 22, 1959—10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2259. Confidential; Niact.

375. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 23, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2359. Confidential. Drafted by Vallon, Owen, and Hill, and initialed by Rubottom. Concurred in by Hanes, who wrote the following comment at the end of the source text: “I concur, with the reservation that we should make no public announcement unless we can take some reasonably effective action to halt or prevent or punish violations.” A copy was also sent to Murphy.

376. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)

Washington, October 23, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hill on October 15 and cleared with Wieland, Dreier, and Gerard Smith. Initialed by Rubottom and Murphy.

377. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 23, 1959—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2359. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

378. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 25, 1959—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2559. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

379. Editorial Note

380. Memorandum of Discussion at the 422d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 29, 1959

Washington, October 29, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

381. Letter From the Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter

London, October 30, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, October 1959. Secret and Personal. Attached to a brief covering note from Hood to Herter, dated October 30, explaining that Lloyd had asked him to give Herter the attached personal message. On the covering note, the following notation was written: “Delivered by messenger to Secy’s office—4:45 p.m. 10/30/59”.

382. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, October 30, 1959—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–3059. Confidential; Priority.

383. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)

Washington, October 30, 1959.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hill and cleared with Dreier.

384. Editorial Note

385. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics

Havana, November 4, 1959—6:04 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–459. Confidential. Drafted by Owen; cleared with Wieland, Stewart, Coerr, and Clarence Boonstra (EST); and approved by Vallon who signed for Herter. Sent to Port-au-Prince, Ciudad Trujillo, Mexico City, Guatemala City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Managua, San Jose, Panama, Bogota, Quito, La Paz, Asuncion, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, and Caracas.

386. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Washington, November 4, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, November 1959. Secret; Personal. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

387. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, November 5, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–559. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 356C. Regarding earlier versions of this memorandum, see Documents 376 and 384.

388. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 6, 1959—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

389. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) and the Cuban Minister of Finance (Lopez Fresquet), Havana, November 8, 1959

Havana, November 8, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–959. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bonsal on November 9. Attached to a covering letter of November 9 from Bonsal to Rubottom, in which the Ambassador asked that the memorandum be given very limited distribution. He indicated that he planned to show it to Braddock, Topping, and Noel, and left it up to Rubottom as to who in Washington should see it. A handwritten notation on the covering letter indicates that the memorandum was seen by Rubottom, Hill, Wieland, Stevenson, Turkel, Mallory, and Dreier.

390. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter

London, November 12, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, November 1959. Secret; Personal. Attached to a brief covering note of November 12 from Hood to Herter, in which Hood said that in the Ambassador’s absence he had been asked to transmit the attached message from Lloyd. The covering note bears no indication of date or time of delivery, but it does contain Herter’s handwritten initials.

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 13, 1959—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1359. Official Use Only; Priority.

392. Editorial Note

393. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 16, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–1659. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal.

394. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Washington, November 17, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, November 1959, Secret; Personal. Drafted by Vallon and cleared with Rubottom, Merchant, and Ivan B. White (EUR).

395. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis for American Republics (Hall) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)

Washington, November 18, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1859. Secret.

396. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)

Washington, November 20, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Sept–Dec.) 1959. Secret; Official–Informal; Personal. Drafted by Devine and cleared with Wieland and Vallon. In a memorandum of November 19 to Rubottom, Stevenson said that he heard from Devine that Rubottom would be writing to Bonsal about the new policy statement on Cuba. Stevenson suggested that Rubottom review the memorandum of the conversation with Bonsal on October 1 (Document 365) and particularly called Rubottom’s attention to the last sentence in the second paragraph and to the comments in the section entitled “Economic Aid”. (Ibid.)

397. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 24, 1959

Washington, November 24, 1959

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, November 1959. Official Use Only. Drafted by Turkel and approved by Rubottom.

398. Memorandum From the First Secretary of the Embassy in Cuba (Topping) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)

Havana, undated.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Habana Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, Political Affairs. Secret. Topping’s memorandum was in response to the handwritten note Bonsal made on November 24 on the copy of Hall’s memorandum (Document 395) asking Braddock and Topping for their comments. Underneath Bonsal’s request Braddock wrote: “Mr. Ambassador: Interesting. Some things give a little difficulty from Carlos, but with his summation I am essentially in agreement. DB 11/25”.

399. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 26, 1959—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/11–2659. Confidential; Priority.

400. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Dillon) and the British Ambassador (Caccia), Washington, November 27, 1959

Washington, November 27, 1959

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, November 1959.

401. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 30, 1959—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.413/11–3059. Official Use Only; Priority.

402. Memorandum of Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 1, 1959

Washington, December 1, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on January 26, 1960.

403. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Havana, December 2, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–259. Secret; Eyes Only; Official–Informal.

404. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 4, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/12–459. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal and Braddock.

405. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)

Washington, December 4, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–459. Secret. Drafted by Hill and Devine. The source text bears a drafting date of December 7. Copies were sent to Lester D. Mallory and Wieland. The source text bears the following handwritten marginal note: “A thoughtful analysis—well done. RRR”.

406. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, December 9, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Sept–Dec.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland, Vallon, Stevenson, and A.H. Hood. Also sent to Turkel and Hill for concurrence.

407. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)

Washington, December 10, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1059. Secret. Drafted by Hill. Copies were sent to Mallory and Gerard Smith.

408. Memorandum of Discussion at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 10, 1959

Washington, December 10, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting. The President had left Washington on December 3 for a goodwill mission to Rome, Ankara, Karachi, Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, Athens, Tunis, Toulon, Paris, Madrid, and Casablanca. He returned to Washington on December 22.

409. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Working Group on the Cuban Economic Situation (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)

Washington, December 14, 1959.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Albert Post (ARA/REA) and Benjamin R. Moser (OFD/FN) and cleared with Stevenson, Carl F. Norden (OT/TA), and John P. Rourk (OR/CSD). Also addressed to Rubottom. A handwritten note on the source text by Devine indicates that Rubottom had a copy of the memorandum.

410. Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 16, 1959

Washington, December 16, 1959

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting.

411. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 22, 1959—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2259. Confidential; Priority.

412. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 22, 1959

Washington, December 22, 1959

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, December 1959. Official Use Only. Drafted by Stevenson and George O. Gray.

413. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, December 23, 1958.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Sept.–Dec.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Mann and initialed for him by Acting Assistant Secretary Wilson T.M. Beale.

414. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)

Washington, December 28, 1959.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3059. Confidential. Drafted by Vallon, Leonhardy, and Turkel; concurred in by L, P, and E; and initialed by Rubottom.

415. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 30, 1959

Washington, December 30, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.235/12–3059. Confidential. Drafted by Vallon.

416. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray), White House, Washington, December 31, 1959

Washington, December 31, 1959

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/12–3159. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom.

417. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Beale)

Washington, January 6, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–660. Confidential.

418. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Beale) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, January 8, 1960.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba. Confidential. Drafted by Walter Hollis (L/E), Herbert F. Propps (CPT), and Selma G. Kallis (TA); concurred in by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs John S. Hoghland, Legal Adviser Eric H. Hager, Director of the Office of International Trade Theodore J. Hadraba, and Assistant Chief of the Trade Agreements Division Joe A. Robinson. Attached is a memorandum of January 8 from Rubottom to Dillon, in which Rubottom concurs in the memorandum provided “certain minor amendments and reservations” were taken into consideration. These amendments and reservations were set forth in a memorandum of January 8 from Wieland to Rubottom, also attached. In the memorandum Wieland noted that CMA had not yet had time to review carefully the tabs to the memorandum, except for tabs 1 and 2 on which CMA had no comment. Wieland’s amendments and reservations are noted in footnotes below. Also noted are Dillon’s responses, as described briefly in a memorandum of January 9 from T.J. Dunnigan, Duty Officer in the Executive Secretariat to Devine, also attached.

419. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, January 8, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, January 8, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, January 1960. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated, but it presumably was Donhauser. Donhauser’s handwritten notation of January 13 indicates that Merchant cleared the memorandum in draft. A typewritten note on the cover sheet indicates that the memorandum was not cleared with the Department of Defense. The cover sheet lists 31 attendees at the meeting from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

420. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, January 8, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation. Secret.

421. Memorandum for the Record by Robert F. Packard of the Policy Planning Staff

Washington, January 11, 1960.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba Planning and NSC Briefings. Secret. Drafted by Packard. The source text does not list the participants in the discussion.

422. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 11, 1960—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/1–1160. Confidential; Priority. Bonsal had returned to Havana on January 10.

423. Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 14, 1960, 9 a.m.

Washington, January 14, 1960, 9 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on March 31.

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 17, 1959—4 p.m.

848. Cabinet last night dissolved Ministry National Defense and established Ministry Revolutionary Armed Forces with Major Raul Castro as head. Former Ministry National Defense Augusto Martinez Sanchez appointed Ministry Labor, replacing Manuel Fernandez Garcia. No announcement future role Fernandez Garcia. Embassy understands he would be interested in presidency new Social Security band [board?].

In dissolving Ministry National Defense its various dependencies dealing with non-military matters transferred other agencies. For example, Departments of Technical, Material and Cultural Service to Peasants to INRA; Department of Delinquents, Requisitories and Citizenry transferred Ministry Interior; National Commission Popular Housing transferred Ministry of Labor.

Army, Navy, National Police and Joint Chiefs Staff abolished and reconstituted as Rebel Army, Air Force, Revolutionary Navy and Revolutionary National Police (sic)² under centralized command new Ministry Revolutionary Armed Forces. That Ministry must present organic law for approval within 60 days. Meanwhile personnel serving in former armed forces continued in position.

Comment: This appears to be completion of move for centralization control armed forces mentioned Embassy’s 702.³ Changes significant as indication further expansion of control of extremists at expense moderates. Raul Castro and supporters now confirmed in notably strong position, exercising centralized control all armed forces including police and investigative agencies. New Minister Labor is Raul Castro man who served as his “premier” in second front territory during fight against Batista regime, with control over several “departments” of “government” established by Raul. He was also prosecutor at second trial of pilots of Batista air force in Santiago in March this year after their earlier acquittal and Fidel Castro’s condemnation of verdict. He demanded and obtained conviction. He is extreme leftist, frequently alleged to be Communist. This is disturbing development.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/10–1759. Confidential; Priority.

² As on the source text.

³ In telegram 702, September 24, the Embassy commented on a recently-passed law that abolished the secret police, noting that the law was part of a move “to unify and centralize full investigative and law enforcement organizations” under command of Raul Castro. (ibid., 737.13/9–2459)

371. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 605 Havana, October 20, 1959.

SUBJECT

Fidel and Raul Castro and the ASIA (American Society of Travel Agents) Meeting

Fidel Castro attended the opening meeting of ASIA at the Blanquita theater on the morning of October 19. He was about 40 minutes late. His speech, which he made in English, was very well received. There was not a great deal of substance to it but he projected his personality and his mannerisms in a way that appeared practically irresistible to the immense majority present. That evening Fidel Castro attended a reception given by President and Mrs. Dorticós at the Capitolio. This affair was attended by at least 2000 ASTA delegates plus a great many local people. It was very crowded. President and Mrs. Dorticós, Fidel Castro, as well as the President of ASTA and Mrs. Allen, and Mrs. Bonsal and I, eventually found ourselves at a small table entirely hemmed in by people seeking Dr. Castro’s autograph. While we were being more or less served with food and drink, Dr. Castro sat for 90 minutes signing his name on ASTA badges, visiting cards, dollar and peso bills, etc. etc. He took no food, stating that he was on a diet. He said this experience reminded him of being back at school when he used to be obliged to write out so many lines as punishment. He was cordial and friendly but took no part in any conversation with any of those at the table. He departed at about 10 p.m. for the meeting of bank workers at which he made a television appearance reported elsewhere.²

In the course of the dinner, Raul Castro appeared and sat down next to me. He too was most cordial and friendly. He refused a glass of wine stating that the entire Cuban Army has just been ordered to refrain from any alcoholic beverages for a period of two years. I asked him whether this applied only to persons on duty or in uniform. He replied in the negative, adding that “Habana has been too much for some of my boys who have gotten out of hand.”

Raul Castro expressed an interest in meeting the various military attachés accredited here, including those from the United States. (Such meetings have not hitherto been possible to arrange; perhaps now that Raul is Minister of the Armed Forces they can be set up.) Raul Castro told me that he did not expect to move his offices from Camp Libertad.

He mentioned the “sea furies for jets” matter only in passing and somewhat apologetically, regretting that this should have occurred. He was most cordial, stating that he and I must have a long talk soon and urging that I accept an invitation to go fishing with him at the Laguna del Tesoro in the Ciénaga de Zapata at an early unspecified date.

On leaving the Capitolio both Fidel and Raul were given great ovations by the crowd assembled there. I also received a good deal of favorable notice as I departed. (It is just possible that this particular crowd was pre-arranged.)

Philip W. Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/10–2059. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal.

² In telegram 871 from Havana, October 20, the Embassy characterized Fidel Castro’s television appearance of the previous night as “highly emotional and aggressive.” Castro violently condemned the “enemies” of the revolution, including some elements in the United States. According to certain American correspondents, the speech was the “most violently anti-American performance in some time.” The Embassy observed that the speech appeared “unpremeditated, illogical, unnecessary, and contrary to” the Cuban Government’s desire to have the ASTA convention succeed. (ibid., 737.00/10–2059)

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 21, 1959—noon.

876. Re Embtel 866.² This morning local radio stations began broadcasting reports that Captain Orestes Valera and Captain Jorge Enrique Mendoza Reboredo both in Camaguey had denounced Commandante Huber Matos as “traitor to revolution” and that he had resigned as result.

Consular agent Tate reports by phone that last night bulk of Camaguey population including many civilian officials government and 26 July movement there solidly supported Matos. Civilian officials wished resign in gesture support but Matos dissuaded them saying act would harm revolution. Adds Fidel Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos arrived Camaguey early this morning and immediately took over all radio stations and started appealing to population for support. At 10 local time people were being urged to congregate at local INRA head-quarters and march unarmed on local garrison where Matos understood located. Leaders of labor unions and government officials handling public works projects ordering workers join. Leader of 26 July campesino group calling for campesinos to ride on Camaguey for same purpose. Matos being denounced as “traitor and coward, afraid of Trujillo and North American chancery”.

Tate describes this as unnecessary demagoguery, undoubtedly successful in arousing lower elements population and swinging sentiment away from Matos. Says understands Matos turned in all arms when resigned, and has repeatedly urged followers to continue at posts. Says basic cause appears be Matos belief INRA under Communist control and constitutes threat to correct objectives revolution. However, rumors here that Matos hiding or revolting and troops being sent from Habana. Possible Tate reluctant give precise picture because known censorship telephonic communications.

Tate says Valera a local extremist labor leader. Mendoza is in charge of INRA operations Camaguey province. He added “good will” mission 26 July representatives touring South America early months this year. Reportedly made several anti-American and pro-Communist public remarks at that time. Quoted March 15 by Peking radio as having expressed admiration for CPR and its program at meeting with ChiCom troupe in Santiago de Chile.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2159. Confidential; Niact.

² In telegram 866, dated October 20, Bonsal reported that the U.S. Consular Agent at Camaguey, Paul Tate, had telephoned to report to the Embassy in guarded language that the Military Commander of that province, Huber Matos, had resigned that morning. According to Tate’s source, Matos had resigned because of his conviction that the government was firmly in the control of Guevara and Raul Castro and other Leftists and pro-Communists. Many officers had reportedly resigned in support of Matos and others were expected to. Matos was said to believe that the resignation might be kept quiet for a while so it would not adversely affect the convention in Havana of the American Society of Travel Agents. (ibid., 737.00/10–2059)

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 21, 1959—6 p.m.

886. Re Embtel 876.² In move to head off coalescence public support around Major Huber Matos, Fidel Castro addressed crowd in Camaguey estimated at 4 to 5,000 at 1 p.m. in which he attempted discredit Matos through character assassination in much same way he handled Urrutia and Diaz Lanz. He accused him of being traitor, conspirator, bad revolutionary who tried to spring revolt Camaguey, seize that province, and move on to other provinces. He said Matos had picked this particular time to launch his traitorous move in effort to embarrass government and defeat revolution when thousands of ASTA representatives in Cuba. He declared this is sabotage of government’s economic program. Castro said that Matos, like Diaz Lanz and Urrutia (three musketeers), had failed to understand people firmly behind revolution and will not be turned against it by petty conspirators. He said great conspiracy has been eliminated without firing shot or shedding blood. Tomorrow ASTA activities can continue normal schedule. He told people of Camaguey they could feel easy as situation under control, adding in obvious threat that it had been accomplished even though government had not had time to mobilize peasants with their machetes.

Consular Agent Tate reported 2:35 p.m. there was much excitement but no indication this would be transferred into action. Tate said despite Castro efforts to confine situation to person of Matos, latter’s resignation has had widespread effect upon provincial leaders loyal to him. He said all officers are confined to barracks. Provincial and municipal commissioners and provincial coordinator for 26 July movement had reportedly tried without success to see Castro this morning to persuade him refrain from denouncing Matos. He reported students at public high school continued to display large sign outside school saying “we want this situation clarified—we do not want communism”. Tate reported all private schools closed and I thought public ones too.

Castro said Matos free to travel and speak as he wished. Some reports reaching Embassy indicate Matos under arrest, but no confirmation as yet.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2159. Confidential; Priority.

² Supra.

374. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 22, 1959—10 a.m.

887. Reference: Telcon Topping with Stevenson night October 21.²

Following is account events yesterday eve and night based best information now available Embassy:

Approximately 5 p.m. unidentified aircraft apparently C–47, dark grey with yellow stripes on vertical tail surfaces, appeared over Habana, distributed mimeographed leaflets dated “October 1959” bearing typed name Comandante Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz. Aircraft appeared to be accompanied by B–25 flying cover. Leaflets denied Diaz Lanz traitor, said Fidel Castro knowingly permitting Communists take over revolution, strongly attacked Raul Castro. Said he present when Fidel, Nunez Jimenez, Che Guevara and Celia Sanchez discussed plans for deception Cuban people and introduce “system like that in Russia.”

Aircraft flew widely over city for around half hour, then disappeared. GOC now stating several aircraft involved. This not certain. Approximately 5:30 GOC aircraft appeared over city. These included helicopters, B–26, Sea Fury, T–33 and C–47. Some confusion apparent and aircraft seemed unsure who friend. Approximately 6:15 aircraft apparently B–26 fired burst gunfire over city. Reports are that others and various ground installations fired.

Beginning about 7:00 and continuing until 11 a number of small bombs exploded in widely separated parts city. These apparently hand grenades tossed from passing autos. Several unidentified autos also seen with occupants firing indiscriminately. Press reports two bystanders killed, about 50 injured.

City quiet and orderly last night and this morning. 26 July organ Revolucion headlines “aircraft reported from US” and its articles give impression contrary to official police statements, that city was bombed from air.³

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2259. Confidential; Niact.

² No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

³ As a result of its investigation of the October 21 flight over Havana, the Embassy reported in despatch 712, November 12, its belief that the injuries had not been caused by a plane or planes, but by government fire and grenades thrown from cars. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1259)

375. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Control of Air Incursions over Cuba and Other Exile Activity Directed Against Cuban Government

The recent leaflet “raid” on Habana and the subsequent reaction in Cuba have brought into sharp focus the problem which the activities of Cuban exiles in the Florida area pose for the United States in the conduct of its foreign relations with Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere. The available evidence indicates that the planes which conducted the “raid” on Habana came from the United States. The Cuban government had previously and officially complained on several occasion that light planes coming from the United States have dropped arms and ammunition to anti-Government elements in Cuba. The anti-Castro groups in Florida are numerous, apparently well-financed and their activities have been steadily increasing in recent months.

ARA believes that the activities of these groups in collecting arms, making clandestine flights over Cuba and agitating against the present Cuban regime are highly prejudicial to our relations with Cuba and detrimental to our posture as the protagonist of efforts to ameliorate tensions in the Caribbean area. In particular, the continuation of such activities in Florida is likely to give Castro the one issue which could be sure to rally the Cuban people around him and win the sympathy of other Latin Americans, thus undermining the efforts of all those desiring to bring about in Cuba a more moderate policy and one of increased friendship with the United States. Unless a concerted effort is made to halt such activities, it is probable that they will increase in scope and seriousness and the impression will undoubtedly be gained in Cuba and other quarters that they have the tacit approval of the USG.

The problem of detecting violations of U.S. laws by these groups is undoubtedly a difficult one and the responsibility for enforcement of the pertinent laws is divided among a number of agencies. However, the activities of these groups continue to increase, and ARA believes that a concerted effort by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies must be made not only to investigate reported violations, but where possible, to prevent such violations.

In view of the above considerations, I would recommend that you communicate with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense to point out the importance of this matter from the point of view of our foreign relations and enlist their help in mobilizing all available investigative and law enforcement agencies and personnel, to prevent violations of our Neutrality, Customs and other laws. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs might similarly communicate with the Administrator of the F.A.A. and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I would also strongly recommend that the Department seek the agreement of the agencies concerned for the following proposals or suitable alternatives to them:

Representatives of Justice, Treasury and other appropriate agencies be sent to the Miami area to step up and coordinate investigative and enforcement activities.

Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida be apprised of the situation and that he be requested (a) to instruct state police and county sheriffs to make periodic investigations of air fields in their respective territories to determine the presence of suspicious aircraft, reporting same to appropriate Federal authorities; (b) that as an alternative or complementary measure, elements of the National Guard be posted on a 24-hour watch for the next two weeks at all airports in Florida to discourage the type of flight described above and to report movements of suspicious aircraft; (c) that the Air National Guard of Florida initiate periodic patrols of waters off the coast of Florida to note identification markings of suspicious aircraft particularly unidentified C–46, C–47, B–25 and B–26’s. (The U.S. Air Force may also be able to help—see paragraph 3.) A preliminary contact with the Governor’s office to this end has already been made.

3. The U.S. Air Force alone or in coordination with the Air National Guard of Florida, initiate an air patrol of the coastal waters off Florida in order to identify suspect aircraft. We have already discussed this with the Department of the Air force, which has indicated its desire to cooperate to the fullest and designated General Struthers to draw up plans.

4. The Federal Aviation Agency in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force undertake more intensive monitoring through radar and radio of suspect aircraft movements and review their legislative authority to determine whether legal action can be taken against those responsible for the flights described or for acquiring and registering aircraft for such purposes.

5. That a public announcement of these actions be made as soon as possible.

Recommendations:

1. That you telephone the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense to point out the importance of this matter from the point of view of our foreign relations and to enlist their help in mobilizing all available investigative and law enforcement agencies and personnel, to prevent violations of our Neutrality, Customs and other laws.

2. That you authorize the Under Secretary for Political Affairs to telephone the Administrator of the F.A.A. and the Director of CIA to enlist their assistance along the same lines.

3. That you approve the over-all course of action represented by the five numbered paragraphs on the preceding page and authorize ARA, in conjunction with other appropriate areas of the Department, to take all appropriate steps for its immediate implementation.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2359. Confidential. Drafted by Vallon, Owen, and Hill, and initialed by Rubottom. Concurred in by Hanes, who wrote the following comment at the end of the source text: “I concur, with the reservation that we should make no public announcement unless we can take some reasonably effective action to halt or prevent or punish violations.” A copy was also sent to Murphy.

² Herter initialed his approval of each recommendation on October 24. In a memorandum of October 26 to Herter, Rubottom discussed the various steps that had been taken since October 23 to control activities against the Cuban Government by exiles in the United States. (ibid., 737.00/10–2659)

376. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, October 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Current Basic United States Policy Towards Cuba

Discussion:

At the conclusion of an extensive review here with Ambassador Bonsal of our current relations with Cuba and the situation in that country, I had drawn up and approved a very brief current basic policy statement on Cuba which attempts to provide orientation and guidelines for the Ambassador and for certain key personnel of other government agencies in Washington with respect to our immediate objectives in Cuba. I believe this statement to be fully consistent with the basic United States Policy Towards Latin America developed by the National Security Council and approved by the President on February 12 of this year.²

I would be grateful if you would now review the statement and, if you approve, authorize its transmission by limited distribution letter to Ambassador Bonsal, the Director of the United States Information Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and such others as you may deem appropriate.

In evaluating this statement, you will wish to take note especially of the following points:

1. It is based on an assessment that the policies and programs of the Castro Government which are inconsistent with the minimal requirements of good Cuban–U.S. relations and with U.S. objectives for Cuba and Latin America will not be satisfactorily altered except as a result of Cuban opposition to Castro’s present course and/or a change in the Cuban regime. As you are aware, we have been giving Castro every opportunity to follow a course consistent with good U.S.-Cuban relations and have exercised in public great restraint in order to make it possible for him to modify his attitudes and policies if he had any inclination to maintain the bonds of friendship and common interest which have linked this country to Cuba. To date, he has failed the “test” by which his intentions with respect to maintaining good relations can be judged. Our restraint has generally been answered by continued attacks on the United States by Castro and his lieutenants. Our necessary and well-understood concern about Communist penetration in this vital area has been answered by granting to the Communists and their sympathizers ample scope to carry out their activities in Cuba and to penetrate even at high levels, the armed forces, government, labor unions, and other key national institutions. Our well-known reliance on the support of our Latin American friends on key issues in the UN and elsewhere concerning the struggle with international Communism has been met by an increasingly “neutralist” orientation in Cuba’s foreign policy and apparent efforts by that country to stimulate neutralism elsewhere in Latin America. Our earlier hopes that there was some possibility that moderate, middle-class elements desiring good Cuban–U.S. relations would check and modify the more radical and unacceptable tendencies of the Castro regime have largely evaporated as Castro has moved his more radical, anti-U.S. and pro-Communist lieutenants into key positions. Castro’s economic policies, apart from directly affecting adversely the rights of United States investors in Cuba and thus raising additional problems in U.S.-Cuban relations, have a distinctly statist and nationalist orientation which, if also adopted by other Latin American countries, would seriously undermine our economic policies and objectives with respect to the Latin American region.

2. At the same time, the policy statement is based on an assessment that Castro retains a great popular following in Cuba having tapped and crystallized the more humble Cuban’s aspirations for economic betterment, democratic freedom, and national dignity. Although there has been much disillusionment concerning Castro and his regime elsewhere in Latin America, there remains in certain circles a residual admiration for what he has achieved and sought to achieve, including his posture of defiance of the United States. In these circumstances, and from the great sensitivity of Latin America to United States intervention or open United States pressure, it is of the first importance that we avoid bringing upon ourselves the onus for a forced alteration of Castro’s policies or a change in the Cuban Government.

3. The statement is also based on the assessment that with unstable internal conditions likely to continue in a number of Caribbean countries for the next several years, there is a continuing danger that other regimes responsive to and/or modeled on the Castro regime may arise elsewhere in the region with serious adverse consequences to our security and interests.

4. The statement is intended only for current guidance and could be changed or amplified as the situation develops. In view of the possibility that this statement, if widely distributed, might be misinterpreted and become known with damaging consequences, it is my thought that it be distributed on a strictly “need-to-know” basis.

Recommendation:

1. That you approve the attached statement as current guidance for our policy towards Cuba.³

2. That you authorize its transmission by limited distribution letter to Ambassador Bonsal and the Washington officials indicated above.⁴

Attachment

Washington, October 1959.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

CURRENT BASIC UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS CUBA

(October 1959)

1. The immediate objective of the United States with respect to Cuba is the development of a situation in which, not later than the end of 1960, the Government then in control of Cuba should, in its domestic and foreign policies, meet at least minimally the objectives and standards indicated in the OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America⁶ which sets forth the basic United States policy objectives for Latin American countries.

2. In achieving this objective, the United States and its representatives should avoid giving the impression of direct pressure or intervention directed against the Castro government and its programs, except where defense of legitimate United States interests or defense of the principles of the inter-American system might incidentally create an implication of overt opposition by the United States to individual policies, actions, statements or attitudes of the Castro government.

3. Subject to the caveat of paragraph 2, United States policies, actions and statements should be governed by the following criteria, except where specific tactical considerations dictate otherwise:

a) Actions, policies and statements tending to consolidate the Castro regime, in its present form and with those of its present policies and programs which run counter to United States objectives for Latin America, or tending to increase the chances of success of such programs and policies should be avoided.

b) Actions, policies and statements tending to encourage and coalesce opposition to the Castro regime’s present form and policies by elements presently or potentially acceptable to the Cuban people should be undertaken to the extent possible. Actual or potential opposition elements both within and without the government should be encouraged, but in case of conflict, priority or emphasis should normally be accorded to lines of action, policies or statements tending to encourage opposition by suitable elements presently outside of the Castro regime with a view towards a step-by-step development of coherent opposition.

c) Actions, policies and statements designed to emphasize throughout Latin America the United States concepts of genuine representative democracy, sound economic development, non-intervention, and inter-American solidarity within the free world should be undertaken whenever appropriate, as part of an effort to prevent the spread of the objectionable features of the Castro regime and program to other Latin American countries and to undercut within Cuba the support which Castro’s present program derives from such popularity as it retains elsewhere in Latin America.

d) Avoidance of actions which would fundamentally damage the mutuality of interests of Cuba and the United States and or their respective peoples, and avoidance of actions, policies or statements which would significantly affect adversely the viability of an acceptable Cuban regime, whether a reformed Castro regime or a successor to it.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hill on October 15 and cleared with Wieland, Dreier, and Gerard Smith. Initialed by Rubottom and Murphy.

² Text of NSC 5902/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” approved by the President on February 16, 1959, after it had been adopted as amended at the 396th meeting of the National Security Council on February 12, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume V.

³ Murphy initialed his approval of this recommendation on the source text.

⁴ The source text does not indicate whether this recommendation was approved or disapproved. Regarding the redrafting of and subsequent action on the memorandum, see Document 384.

⁵ Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

⁶ Dated July 1, 1959; text is scheduled for publication in volume V.

377. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 23, 1959—7 p.m.

912. For Rubottom. Situation here has deteriorated considerably past week due (A) publicity re US attempt to prevent British from selling jets, (B) press speculation re possible punitive reduction of Cuba’s sugar quota, stimulated by Washington leak on our latest note,² and (C) alleged air bombings of Habana and other points in Cuba by planes allegedly based in Florida. Intrinsic damaging effect of these developments greatly inflated for present at least by hostile hysterical manner in which Castro has treated them in his TV appearances (see Embtels 870 and 906³ ).

It is my belief that something must be done urgently to set the record straight. I would propose following alternatives (A) President Eisenhower send a public communication to President Dorticos covering these matters (B) similar public communication from Secretary Herter to Minister of State Roa or from me to Roa (C) that I be authorized to ask for time on local TV network (frequently offered me) and that I explain these developments from US point of view.

It would be necessary for Department formulate detailed statement of US position. In my judgment major points to be made would be following:

1. Upon US attitude re arms to Cuba:

(A) Describe the existence of tensions in Caribbean including fact that during past six months several aggressive expeditions from one country to another have taken place resulting in some cases in serious loss of life and property damage. These aggressive expeditions have involved complicity and support of certain governments in area.

(B) Therefore, US has pursued policy of limiting export of combat material to area as contribution to diminishing aggressive potential.

(C) US has discussed this policy with other friendly countries including Great Britain with view to developing coordinated approach to arms shipments and avoiding inconsistencies and situations prejudicial to individual countries involved. These discussions have been friendly as becomes exchanges between sovereign peoples joined by a common desire to contribute to keeping the peace.

(D) Explain recent relaxations in arms embargo policy as it affects Cuba (this may or may not be effective point).

2. US Government attitude toward Cuban sugar quota:

(A) Sugar Act expires at the end of 1960. Congress will have to develop new legislation early in 1960.

(B) Cuban position in US sugar market has been traditionally defended by US Government. There are nevertheless other interests to be taken into account and conditions in sugar producing areas change in manners which Congress must consider.

(C) US Government fully aware of mutual advantage to Cuba and US traditional trade relationships. US believes there is mutuality of interest but points out that US sugar consumer pays over two cents per pound more for sugar coming from Cuba under the Sugar Act than it would have to pay for same sugar purchased in world market.

(D) While US Government sympathizes with stated purposes of Agrarian Reform in Cuba and recognizes Cuban right to expropriate under international law, a disruptive change in the structure of sugar producing units might result in a loss in production which would oblige the pertinent US authorities to take measures to discharge their responsibilities to the American consumer. Stress, however, that such measures would not be taken in absence justifying facts.

3. Alleged air bombings.

(A) Reiteration of Department’s press release of October 22 stating no evidence discovered to date that planes distributing leaflets departed from or returned to Florida and that GOC has furnished no information to support its contentions in that respect or with respect alleged bombings Habana and elsewhere. Add that regardless whether any protest received from Cuba, US would naturally investigate vigorously any incident involving possible violations its laws and international obligations.

(B) Flat, vigorous, indignant rejection allegations by Castro and Cuban Governmental press that US Government or people involved in attempts bomb Cuba. Additional statement that no evidence presented that any bombs dropped on Habana or that any aircraft from outside machine gunned city. Rather, it appears that damages are probably caused by aircraft with Cuban military markings, anti-aircraft fire from various Cuban military and naval installations, and bombs from Cubans on ground. I believe Castro’s implications that US responsible for deaths and injuries (Embtel 906) cannot be permitted pass unchallenged.

(C) Statement re measures taken by US authorities to enforce our laws to avoid unauthorized flights. Explanation of enforcement difficulties due existence in Florida of large number (specify) of airfields and very large number (specify) of private planes and planes available for private hire.

(D) Analyze manner in which this matter has been handled by Dr. Castro and by press of July 26 movement and express deep regret at biased, unfriendly approach.

Please instruct urgently and advise when Department statement will be available.⁴

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2359. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² See Document 367.

³ Dated October 15 and October 22, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–1559 and 737.00/10–2259)

⁴ In telegram 456 to Havana, October 24, the Department indicated that it shared the Embassy’s concern over the recent further deterioration in U.S.-Cuban relations, and agreed that Castro’s charges and anti-American campaign could not go unanswered. The Department included the text of a lengthy statement to be made by Bonsal to President Dorticos or Foreign Minister Roa, preferably not later than October 26, which would then be released to the public. (ibid., 611.37/10–2359)

378. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 25, 1959—1 p.m.

919. Confirming telephone conversation with Rubottom this morning² am highly impressed with excellent presentation contained Department telegram 456.³ 1 believe however presentation should be made by me earliest Tuesday morning 27th so as not to be factor utilizable by Castro, labor unions and other organizations supporting him further to inflame followers in connection monster rally of mobs and general strike planned for 26th. We have obtained assurances which GOC has publicized regarding lives and property of Americans. Our presentation would not in my judgment change nature of meeting in favorable direction and might weaken moderating influences on Castro and others perhaps now developing out of sober second thoughts. Am sure Roa, Dorticos and Castro fully aware our indignant reaction to Castro’s television performance of October 22–23.

Also we need time prepare careful Spanish translation to be left with President or Roa. We can not trust this important document to vagaries local translations of Washington release.

I plan ask Roa probably tomorrow morning 26th for urgent interview with President and himself on Tuesday 27th.

Immediately following telegram contains our proposed drafting changes.⁴

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2559. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

² No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

³ See footnote 4, supra.

⁴ Telegram 920 from Havana, October 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2559) In telegram 461 to Havana, October 25, the Department agreed that the presentation could be delayed until October 27, but authorized Bonsal to advance the time if he thought it advisable. The Department also accepted the revised text as proposed by Bonsal, but noted that it preferred the sixth paragraph to remain as originally drafted. (ibid.)

379. Editorial Note

On October 26, the Cuban Government staged a mass rally in front of the Presidential Palace in Havana.

During the rally the Embassy in Havana submitted to the Department a series of telegraphic situation reports. These reports dealt with the mood of the crowd being assembled, the volume of automobile and truck traffic around the Embassy, the degree of security being provided the Embassy by the Cuban authorities, and the tone and content of the various speeches delivered at the rally. Among the first speakers were David Salvador, former Foreign Minister Roberto Agramonte, and President Dorticos, followed by the Chief of the Army Camilo Cienfuegos, who made a “definitely inflammatory speech.” Che Guevara spoke next. The Embassy considered his speech “not inflammatory,” but “exceptionally provocative toward the United States.” The Embassy called a subsequent speech by Raul Castro “inflammatory” and noted that it had stirred up “considerable feelings.” The final speaker was Fidel Castro, whose speech the Embassy described as follows:

“Speech was highly inflammatory and pro-revolutionary. By same token as strongly anti-American as anything he has ever done. He listed virtually all local American interests as items which were not in the interests of Cuba. He talked of controlling utilities and of new mining and petroleum laws. He got approval From audience for re-establishment of revolutionary tribunals. He got approval of execution of Matos and others. He repeatedly mentioned Cuban people fighting to last man in caves and tunnels if necessary to repel foreign invasion. He worked on theme of unreasoning fear of United States Government and people of communism. He displayed his mastery in speaking and in controlling audience to exceptional degree.

“Crowd was with him to the last man in his exhortations to continue work of revolution, which intended to achieve the good life for all Cubans regardless of opposition and attacks.”

Following the rally, the Embassy reported that there were no signs of crowds near the Embassy building or hostile demonstrations and that it had received reports from Santiago and Guantanamo that all was quiet there. The Embassy forwarded its preliminary estimate that trouble was unlikely. These situation reports were combined into an unnumbered telegram from Havana, October 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2659) In telegram 930 from Havana, October 26, Bonsal briefly summarized the proceedings at the rally and stated that there was no necessity to change either the text of the proposed note to the Cuban Government or his plans for presenting it to Dorticos and Roa the following day. (ibid., 611.37/10–2659)

On October 27 at 12:10 p.m., Secretary Herter telephoned Julian Baird of the Department of the Treasury, in the absence of Secretary of Treasury Anderson and Under Secretary Scribner. According to a memorandum of their conversation:

“Secy said he just wanted to express his personal concern about what is going on from Florida to Cuba. Secy said Treasury people have been most helpful. Baird asked if there was anything further Customs or the Coast Guard could do to be helpful and Secy said he felt they were doing everything they could. Baird said if there was anything further that could be done to just let them know and they will activate the necessary action.”

At 12:30 p.m., Herter called White House Press Secretary Hagerty to say that, with respect to Cuba, “we have taken a good many steps in this country, altho we may have to review our laws to permit tighter controls.” Herter also expressed his hope that in his press conference scheduled for the following day, the President could “go very strong in saying we have mobilized all our resources to stop this.”

At 12:35 p.m., Herter discussed the matter with Attorney General Rogers. A memorandum of their conversation reads:

“[The Secretary] said we certainly ought to use every facility we have to control the situation, and Secy said the President will probably be asked about this in his press conference tomorrow. Secy said he thinks we ought to study our present laws on this. Rogers said from the standpoint of the criminal law now on the books, there is nothing we can do since there was nothing inflammatory in the leaflets. Rogers, said, however, there may be some aviation regulations which he has violated and the FA A could prevent this. Rogers said we could issue a warning statement that any plane used for this purpose would be seized by the Government. Rogers said what he had in mind was a statement worked out between State, FAA, Customs and Justice which would be a warning to anybody else trying this and then President could indicate we have done all we can. Rogers said he was really not enthusiastic about taking legal action for past things, but, if we serve warning and then take action against future infractions we are on solid ground. Rogers said for instance this fellow actually telephoned and asked about regulations which might be violated if he did this and was told there were no regulations which he would violate. Rogers said most criminal law requires that a person willfully violate the law and that he could argue he had inquired about regulations and were told there were none. Rogers suggested State get in touch with Yeagley in his office to work out a warning statement.”

At 12:40 p.m. Herter called Ambassador Dreier and asked that he contact the Department of Justice regarding the flights to Cuba. Their conversation continued as follows:

“Dreier said we are, of course getting out the Bonsal statement. Secy expressed surprise that this was being done automatically since Secy felt it should be reviewed by the President before it is put out. Dreier said Rubottom had told them it was to be released as soon as Bonsal saw the President. Secy said it was probably too late to stop it now, but President should certainly be alerted to this and that the President should have known about it before it was released; Secy said he had only seen it himself last night.”

Fifteen minutes later Dreier called Herter to say that Bonsal was then meeting with President Dorticos. Herter asked for a summary of the statement which he could show to President Eisenhower when he met with him later that afternoon. Memoranda of all these telephone conversations are in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

The text of the statement made by Bonsal to Dorticos and Roa on October 27, which was subsequently released to the public, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 16, 1959, pages 715–718. The statement was summarized in a memorandum of October 27 from Herter to President Eisenhower, which, according to a handwritten marginal notation, Herter himself carried to the White House. According to the memorandum, the purpose of the statement was as follows:

“(a) To clarify for public opinion in the United States, in Cuba, and Latin America that the responsibility for deteriorated Cuban-United States relations lies in a deliberate, concerted effort on the part of the Castro regime to stimulate anti-American feeling despite this Government’s correct and restrained policy.

“(b) To answer charges and distortions which Castro has made vociferously in Cuba, e.g. that United States officials support or countenance clandestine bombing raids over Cuba.

“(c) To encourage and give leadership to the more responsible elements in Cuba who oppose Castro’s extremism.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2759)

Shortly after 3 p.m. on October 27, Herter met at the White House with President Eisenhower, Under Secretary Merchant, and Major John S.D. Eisenhower. According to Major Eisenhower’s memorandum of the conversation, the subject of Cuba was discussed as follows:

“Mr. Herter then brought up the matter of Cuba, which is extremely uncomfortable at this time. Justice, Defense, and State are working together, attempting to stop the activities of counterrevolutionaries working out of Florida. These efforts are handicapped by the fact that private planes fly out of 200 airfields in the State of Florida alone; furthermore, our laws on this subject are weak and it is nearly impossible to obtain convictions. He pointed out that the Air National Guard and Governor Collins of Florida are being very helpful. Collins does not desire that Florida develop a reputation as a hotbed of counterrevolutionaries. The President thought we could take some measure such as stationing inspectors at all major airfields, but admitted it was impossible to police them all. He questioned why the Cubans don’t just shoot the airplanes down. Mr. Herter said the Cubans have been behaving very badly, particularly in connection with the Lanz case. Bonsal is talking to President Dorticos today. Bonsal cannot obtain an audience with Castro who, in the Secretary’s opinion, shows signs of increasing mental instability. Whenever Castro gets into trouble, he solves his problem by holding a violent mass meeting. Mr. Herter showed the President a statement which Bonsal will use in his discussion with Dorticos. The President read the statement and said this matter may come up in press conference tomorrow.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries; the memorandum is also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1981, 2221.)

At his press conference on October 28, President Eisenhower was asked to comment on Fidel Castro’s behavior. The President replied that the history of U.S.-Cuban relations “would seem to make it a puzzling matter to figure out just exactly why the Cubans and the Cuban Government would be so unhappy when, after all, their principal market is right here, their best market. You would think they would want good relationships. I don’t know exactly what the difficulty is.”

Later in the press conference, the President was asked whether he had ordered any Federal agency to try to stop the illegal flights from Florida to Cuba. The President replied: “I’ve gone through the civil angle rather than the military angle. The Attorney General doesn’t just have orders, but he is really using every kind of reinforced means he can to make sure that there is no violation of this kind.” He noted how difficult a task it was to monitor private airfields and airplanes and indicated that the State of Florida was cooperating in the effort. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pages 751 and 753)

380. Memorandum of Discussion at the 422d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 29, 1959¹

Washington, October 29, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles indicated that he had little to add to the press reports on the Cuban situation. Developments of the past week indicated that the threat of extremist control is worse than ever. Only events within Cuba could change the course of present developments; nothing done from outside was likely to do so. He noted that Raul Castro was now in charge of the police and the armed forces and that Guevara was in charge of industrial planning and development. A law had been promulgated on October 27 withdrawing mineral concessions and increasing taxes on mining operations. Tuesday² the Cuban Government had also reinstituted the revolutionary tribunals and had indicated that anyone advocating elections in Cuba was to be considered a counterrevolutionary. The two moderates in the government were being largely ignored. Many Cubans do not sympathize with the current trend of developments but they see no choice but to go along. Mr. Dulles concluded by characterizing the situation as “drab and dangerous.”

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² October 27.

381. Letter From the Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter¹

London, October 30, 1959.

Dear Chris: I want to raise with you personally a matter which is causing my colleagues and me considerable anxiety. The Cuban Government are pressing us very strongly to allow them to exchange their Sea Fury Aircraft for an equivalent number of Hunters.

2. There are the following reasons why we should do this. I set them out fully but not in any order of priority.

(a) Castro has said that he will go behind the iron curtain to get Jet fighters if he cannot get them through us. It is true that some people think it unlikely that he would in fact do that. That was also our opinion about Nasser in 1955, and look where that got us.

(b) Having supplied Batista, it would be very difficult for us to refuse even replacements to Castro.

(c) It would seem unfortunate to treat more harshly a left-wing idealistic programme after we have been willing to do business with Batista. This might have a very important effect in other Latin American countries.

(d) The Cubans maintain that the exchange would not mean any increase in offensive strength: Hunters, although more powerful, have shorter range than Sea Furies and can be said to be more defensive, with the result that exchange would decrease rather then increase Cuba’s offensive power.

(e) Castro is prepared to give an assurance that the Hunters will never be sent over any foreign country, even if Cuba were herself attacked.

(f) The Dominican Republic has a large air force, including a number of military Jets.

(g) In any case the Hunters will not be ready for six or nine months after the transaction has been authorised.

3. I must also tell you quite frankly that there are difficulties about refusing this request in view of actions by the United States Authorities. After advising us against making any sale of helicopters to the Cubans there was an American sale. After saying that there would be no relaxation of present restrictions without consultation with us, we were confronted by a firm United States decision committing you to sell unarmed aircraft. We did reach agreement about unarmed patrol boats which have mitigated that somewhat. Your people also announced publicly that they are opposed to the exchange. We are now put in the position that if we refuse to allow the exchange we shall be considered as having given in to the United States pressure.

4. We do not wish to do anything to influence the present state of United States/Cuban relations. We are anxious to play our part in controlling the supply of arms to the area. Nevertheless, I feel that I must authorise the exchange as soon as the present effervescence and violent feelings have died down. I think the arguments in favour of this particular transaction are strong enough for it to be considered as a special case. If this would cause difficulties with other countries whom you have been restraining you may consider that we should agree to further relaxation of restrictions which would allow limited replacements.

5. This may obviously be a source of friction between us and I have put the arguments very frankly to you. It is distressing that everything cannot run smoothly all the time, and a small matter like this can cause more trouble than much wider matters of policy, where we are at harmony.

With warm regards,

Selwyn²

¹ Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, October 1959. Secret and Personal. Attached to a brief covering note from Hood to Herter, dated October 30, explaining that Lloyd had asked him to give Herter the attached personal message. On the covering note, the following notation was written: “Delivered by messenger to Secy’s office—4:45 p.m. 10/30/59”.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

382. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, October 30, 1959—noon.

977. Following are Embassy impressions of results of recent events, including Huber Matos resignation, Castro appearances on TV October 22² and mass rally October 26 and presentation note October 27.³

(1) Publicly expressed anti-Americanism at new high and continuing. Long-time residents state current level exceeded only in months immediately following downfall Machado in 1933. Campaign continues actively fomented by top governmental figures and press and radio organs associated with government, with latter become aggressive and violent in tone. Consulate Santiago reports similar pattern.

(2) A few cases of molestation and taunts of Americans are being reported. On other hand there have been many cases Cubans making special efforts be courteous and helpful. Embassy of opinion anti-American attitude neither deep-seated nor at alarming level among Cuban people as whole. However, some resident Americans seriously considering sending families out of Cuba, and many with teen-age children are quite concerned. A few resident Americans are making plans to depart themselves. Officials of local schools regarded as “American” worried. Embassy, Consulate Santiago and Consular Agent Camaguey have all received inquires as to plans for protection or evacuation. Habana hotels have had heavy cancellations from intending visitors. Shipping agents report three planned visits by cruise ships canceled.

(3) Generally considered that extremist elements in GOC, headed by Raul Castro and “Che” Guevara, definitely have upper hand, at least for time being, apparently with full approval Fidel Castro.

(4) Moderate elements within government worried and secretly consulting among themselves concerning course to follow. Reports are that some may be on way out, others would like to resign but fear treatment similar that accorded Urrutia and Matos. Moderates apparently feel themselves in weak position. Persistent rumors state several will shortly be out of government. Those most persistently named are Felipe Pazos, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Manuel Ray and Faustino Perez. This would leave extremists in complete control.

(4) [sic] INRA a most powerful civilian agency of government proceeding rapidly and often illegally with land seizure. Numerous reports of considerable confusion and incompetence in its operations. In most cases seized land reportedly not distributed to individuals but operated as “cooperatives”, with management, financing, purchasing and distribution handled by government. This appears to be state socialism at best, commune pattern of Chinese Peoples Republic at worst. Many disaffected Cubans expect INRA, which already handling “industrialization” program to expand into additional fields such as control export-import activities.

(5) Matos incident has seriously shaken government. Firm, ruthless manner in which it handled by Castro and others has probably halted any further immediate defections. However, it has increased sense of uneasiness and worry among governmental circles.

(6) Sources within opposition consider projected “militarization” of people if carried out a dangerous development. They point to armed forces publicly acknowledged total about 35,000 “youth patrols” which receiving some military drill, and decision give military training to public and arms if necessary.

(7) Opposition elements maintain Castro support now confined almost completely to lower classes, which constitute undisciplined, uneducated, extremist, highly volatile majority. Embassy believes this somewhat exaggerated, but that support for Castro among middle and professional classes has significantly lessened.

(8) Opposition leaderless, fearful, without program. Many express hope errors, incompetence and excesses of Castro regime will bring disillusionment and hastening collapse. They also hope US will bring heavy economic pressure, thus hastening collapse. Opposition and potential oppositions state they handicapped by activities members former Batista regime, especially those in US.

Consensus of resident Americans and Cubans not associated with government is that situation will continue deteriorate. Many expect rate deterioration to accelerate.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–3059. Confidential; Priority.

² See Document 377.

³ See Document 379.

383. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, October 30, 1959.

SUBJECT

Contingency Planning for Castro’s Efforts to Recover or Harass Guantanamo

In informal discussions prior to this morning’s opening of the OCB Board Assistants’ Meeting, I was peppered with questions by Bromley K. Smith, OCB Executive Officer, and one or two others about the status of our contingency planning in the event that Castro attempts to recover the Guantanamo base for Cuba by diplomatic demand, by physical occupation, by demonstrators and squatters, or by other means. I sought to reassure the group to the best of my ability that the means of defending our interests could be brought into play rapidly and that the question was a political one which could only be decided in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time of such a crisis.

The foregoing, however, does suggest to me that we ought to make now every effort to maintain contact with the other interested agencies, especially Defense, to obtain their thinking in advance and a clearer picture of the assets which would be available to us in such a contingency. This would be good for the record as well as in helping us come quickly to a correct decision should something happen.

I was thinking that we ought to give thought promptly of the best way in which we might be able to enlist at least some degree of support from other countries on the Caribbean littoral whose security interests would be affected if a serious effort were made by Castro to render Guantanamo inoperable.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hill and cleared with Dreier.

384. Editorial Note

The covering memorandum from Assistant Secretary Rubottom to Under Secretary Murphy of October 23 (Document 376) underwent further revision at the request of Secretary Herter and the President.

In a memorandum of October 27 to Rubottom’s Special Assistant, Frank Devine, Frank A. Mau of the Executive Secretariat indicated that Herter had requested that the memorandum be rewritten for transmission to the President for his approval. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–3159)

Under date of October 31, Herter sent to the President a revised and substantially shortened covering memorandum, along with the policy statement on Cuba that was identical to the one that had accompanied the earlier draft. (ibid.)

On November 2, John A. Calhoun, Director of the Executive Secretariat, sent the following memorandum to the Reports and Operations Staff of the Executive Secretariat regarding the memorandum to the President:

“General Goodpaster telephoned this afternoon regarding the above memorandum. He said that the President in considering the matter had indicated that he had no difficulty with the proposed policy statement as such, but that he would like to have a brief additional statement indicating in concrete terms the facts which require the establishment of such a policy. His assumption is that the extremist attitude of the Cuban Government lies at the base of this policy but he would like to know in what manner this has been manifested, i.e., in propaganda, trade and other fields.

“General Goodpaster stated that he would return the memorandum for the addition of this desired information. He suggested that a few sentences be added to the covering memorandum incorporating the information desired by the President. Please ask ARA to undertake urgently the revision of the memorandum from the Secretary to the President along the above lines.” (ibid., 737.00/11–259)

For the revised memorandum sent to the President on November 5, see Document 387.

Another factor in the revision of the memorandum originally submitted to Murphy may be that the White House announced on October 28 that Murphy was retiring from the Department of State.

385. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics¹

Havana, November 4, 1959—6:04 p.m.

CG–308

Information has reached Department that Dr. Emilio Nunez Portuondo, Cuban Delegate to UN under Batista regime and now prominent figure in Cuban exile anti-Castro movement, has been traveling extensively through Latin America and discussing Cuban situation with prominent people in countries visited.

According to reports Nunez Portuondo has claimed that U.S. is on point of intervening in Cuba because (1) Russians and Chinese Communists active in Cuba; (2) a Communist missile base being constructed in Cuba; (3) GOC has requested U.S. evacuate Guantanamo Naval Base. He may also claim that he has close contact with high USG officials.

If posts receive inquiries from host government officials concerning Nunez Portuondo’s statements they should reply along following lines:

While certain problems evident in U.S. relations with present GOC U.S. wishes continue traditional friendship with Cuban nation and people. As well known in the Hemisphere U.S. believes firmly in non-intervention principle.

With regard to three points Nunez Portuondo has raised in recent past (1) although Cuban Communist influence Castro administration disturbing and some ChiCom interest apparent, no evidence Soviet activity; (2) no evidence missile center exists in Cuba; (3) GOC has not requested evacuation Guantanamo.

Any implication that Nunez Portuondo has close contact with Department officers is false and Department assumes his statements motivated by desire advance own political cause.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–459. Confidential. Drafted by Owen; cleared with Wieland, Stewart, Coerr, and Clarence Boonstra (EST); and approved by Vallon who signed for Herter. Sent to Port-au-Prince, Ciudad Trujillo, Mexico City, Guatemala City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Managua, San Jose, Panama, Bogota, Quito, La Paz, Asuncion, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, and Caracas.

386. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd¹

Washington, November 4, 1959.

Dear Selwyn: I do appreciate your writing me² about your problem regarding the Cuban Government’s request to exchange Sea Fury aircraft for the same number of Hawker Hunters. It is clear that you have cooperated splendidly with us in the handling of this whole problem, difficult as it is, of restricting the shipment of arms to the Caribbean area during the past several months. This makes all the more lamentable the press stories of last month alleging that we had “protested” the aircraft exchange as proposed by the Castro government. We did our best to set the record straight and I assure you that we shall do everything possible to avoid a recurrence. That kind of publicity has, of course, not only made your task more onerous but also unfortunately imposed on us the necessity of dealing with public opinion here on British-United States cooperation in an area in our immediate vicinity.

I also recognize that the inadvertent release of five helicopters to Cuba last June and other matters to which you refer have doubtless added to the difficulties confronting you in this case. However, we are fully convinced that the close consultation which has been going forward between us on this matter has been beneficial in the development of a cooperative approach to this difficult problem and we intend to continue to work closely with you, tightening up on any loopholes which may have existed. There does seem to be some misunderstanding as to the facts in the cases which you cite and we have already sent word to London that we are preparing a memorandum setting forth the facts as we understand them. In any case, I wish to assure you that we will do everything possible to avoid making your position with respect to cooperating with us on this matter more difficult.³

In analyzing the problem of arms for the Caribbean, we realized that the countries persisting in their efforts to buy arms would be able to obtain them somewhere. We decided, however, that some positive advantage would be derived from our own position of having refused to engage in sales (or grants) which might contribute to the build-up of tensions in the area. Presumably you might also see some beneficial result from having the onus placed on somebody else.

Castro’s public statement indicating that he might go behind the Iron Curtain to get jet fighters if you do not approve his deal as requested is the newest element in this situation. We cannot be certain that this is a bluff on Castro’s part, and the Soviets might well be tempted to make a few jets available to the Cubans on favorable terms, directly or through one of the satellites, in order to make trouble in this hemisphere. We are, however, prepared to take this risk. It may be mitigated somewhat by the consideration that the Soviets themselves might hesitate at this time to take such a provocative action close to our shores and by any reluctance on their part openly to taint the Castro government with too close connections with the Soviet bloc.

As general background, I would like to analyze briefly the present Cuban situation as we see it from here:

Castro seems to be burning all of his bridges behind him. Each day the area for possible cooperation between his government and ours, if not indeed between it and the entire free world, is reduced. There is good evidence that his moderate advisers are discouraged and even frightened, with their counsel going unheeded. The worst of the Castro team—his brother Raúl, “Che” Guevara and their ilk—are clearly in the ascendancy. The communists are deeply imbedded in the National Agrarian Reform Institute, other government bodies, the informational media, the universities, and are making progress with organized labor. Their sympathizers are the dominant element in the Armed Forces. While the communists had influence in Cuba in 1933–34 and in 1946, this is the first time they have had such powerful support at or near the top.

Castro’s economic programs are clearly designed to bring about massive state intervention in all sectors. It may be that before long the only way he can postpone the inevitable judgment day, economically speaking, is for the state to buy in virtually all goods produced and attempt to sell at higher prices in the world market. Perón brought his own destruction by this technique.

We do not think that the Cuban people will tolerate Castro indefinitely. Opposition within the country is mounting and his downfall is probably only a question of time. He still has great popular support from the Cuban working class and peasants, but they will be equally susceptible to opposition arguments as unemployment mounts and economic problems begin to press on them, recalling that Cuba has had a relatively high standard of living for Latin America. What among other things we have to take into account is that, while charges of cooperation with the Batista regime are certainly damaging, at some future date it may be equally or even more damaging to be charged with having supported the present regime in that country and having contributed to the acquisition of arms used for civil strife.

We should also make clear that the issue of our cooperation with left-wing governments in Latin America does not arise in this instance. Our record for instance with respect to cooperation with Bolivia and Venezuela makes it clear that leftist orientation is not an obstacle to obtaining sympathy and support for legitimate objectives. We have sought, since Castro came to power, to exercise the greatest restraint in the face of provocation and to take a position as sympathetic as possible to what he claimed were the objectives of his program. We would certainly have been willing, even anxious, to cooperate with him had he set out on a genuine reform program within the framework of good relations with us and the Free World.

I wish I could describe a happier situation in this pleasant land only ninety miles from our southern border. However, as you are aware, Castro’s gratuitous attacks on the United States have alienated opinion in this country and created growing resentment in the press and in the Congress. You can well imagine and may wish to consider the effects of the adverse reaction in this country if the decision is made to deliver modern jet aircraft at this time to his government. Also in this connection, I am sure that you are aware that suppliers in other countries have exhibited a laudable attitude in complying with their governments’ restraints designed to prevent an arms race in the Caribbean which could clearly have serious consequences and which we are doing everything possible to prevent. Available evidence indicates to us that a British agreement to release jet aircraft to Castro at this time would probably seriously weaken, if not altogether remove, this restraint and create a far worse situation than now exists.

I am sure that you will want to make your decision in the light of these considerations, which seem very important to us. We shall try to understand whatever it is. I did think that you should know how we feel about combat arms going to Castro Cuba—such arms are apt to be used by an extreme leftist government which is already deeply penetrated by communists; they might even be used for purposes hostile to the principles for which the Free World stands; they conceivably could postpone the inevitable day when Castro will have to face judgment for the mistakes he has committed.

I repeat that I am most grateful to have your frank exposition of your views on this subject.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, November 1959. Secret; Personal. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

² Document 381.

³ In a memorandum to Secretary Herter, November 4, John A. Calhoun indicated that the second paragraph of the draft reply to Lloyd had been revised by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. ARA believed that this paragraph, which addressed the third paragraph of Lloyd’s letter, was needed because “the statements in the latter paragraph are not entirely accurate and that extensive explanation would be required for purposes of clarification. The bureau believes it is preferable not to contradict Lloyd in the reply.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, November 1959)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

387. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, November 5, 1959.

SUBJECT

Current Basic United States Policy Toward Cuba

There is enclosed,² for your approval, a brief statement designed in the light of our present difficult relations with Cuba to serve as guidance to the Executive Departments and agencies concerned with the implementation of our policy in Cuba, and also to the American Ambassador in Habana.

The gist of the proposed policy guidance is that:

1) all actions and policies of the United States Government should be designed to encourage within Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America opposition to the extremist, anti-American course of the Castro regime, but that

2) in achieving this objective, the United States should avoid giving the impression of direct pressure or intervention against Castro, except where defense of legitimate United States interest is involved.

The Department bases this recommended policy on several conclusions, arrived at by close observation of the Castro regime for the past ten months. These conclusions are (a) that there is no reasonable basis to found our policy on a hope that Castro will voluntarily adopt policies and attitudes consistent with minimum United States security requirements and policy interests; (b) that the prolonged continuation of the Castro regime in Cuba in its present form would have serious adverse effects on the United States position in Latin America and corresponding advantages for international Communism; and (c) that only by the building up within Cuba of a coherent opposition consisting of elements desirous of achieving political and economic progress within a framework of good United States-Cuban relations can the Castro regime be checked or replaced.

In arriving at these conclusions, the Department has in effect applied a series of tests to the Castro regime for the past ten months, meanwhile exercising just restraint in the face of provocations and giving Castro every opportunity to establish Cuban-United States relations on an acceptable basis. He has, instead, on important occasions elected a course inimical to the United States and its interests. Specifically, his deliberate fomenting of anti-American sentiment in Cuba and seeking to do so in other Latin American countries now represents, beyond doubt, the basic policy and orientation of his government. He has veered towards a “neutralist” anti-American foreign policy for Cuba which, if emulated by other Latin American countries, would have serious adverse effects on Free World support of our leadership, especially in the United Nations on such issues as the Chinese representation problem. He has, in fact, given support to Caribbean revolutionary movements designed to bring into power governments modeled on or responsive to his government and by such interventionist activities sought to undermine the Inter-American system. He has tolerated and encouraged the infiltration of Communists and their sympathizers into important positions in key governmental institutions, the armed forces, and organized labor while, dating back to the meeting of Latin American Communist leaders in Moscow last January, the international Communist apparatus has made clear that it sees in the advance of Castroism the best chance of achieving its immediate objectives. On the economic side, Castro’s policies have been drastic and tended increasingly towards statal control of the economic life of Cuba. Not only have our business interests in Cuba been seriously affected, but the United States cannot hope to encourage and support sound economic policies in other Latin American countries and promote necessary private investment in Latin America if it is or appears to be simultaneously cooperating in the Castro program.

In view of the special sensitivity of Latin America to United States “intervention”, I would propose that the existence and substance of this current policy statement be held on a very strict “need-to-know” basis.³

Christian A. Herter⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–559. Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 356C. Regarding earlier versions of this memorandum, see Documents 376 and 384.

² Not printed. Dated December 5, it is identical to the attachment to Document 376. It is also published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 941.

³ In a memorandum of November 9 to Herter, Goodpaster noted that the President “has asked me to let you know that this policy paper and its contents will not be disclosed in this office except to myself, Major Eisenhower and one confidential secretary. The President indicated that should you and he together decide that circumstances make it advisable to release portions of this policy to the public, then this restriction will no longer apply.” (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

388. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 6, 1959—4 p.m.

1043. For Rubottom. Reply to presentation made to President Dorticos on October 27² currently under study by GOC will when received give basis for careful re-examination US policy toward Cuba. Meanwhile following personal reactions to course of events since mid-October may be of interest.

1. Although the Castro magic still sways mobs and his political strength remains great, he has lost much “quality” support even in ranks own party and in government where enthusiasm of several important figures replaced by precarious fear-induced conformity. Doubts of his capacity as ruler becoming more insistent.

2. My previous view of Castro as highly emotional individual yet generally rational and often cold-bloodedly and cynically playing the demagogue replaced by opinion that evident cynicism goes hand in hand with definite mental unbalance at times. His performance of October 26² was not that of sane man.

3. Our efforts, direct and indirect, both here and in Washington to remove Castro’s deep-seated hostility to USA and suspicion of our motives and actions have been unsuccessful. Malevolence and cynicism characterizing handling of so-called “bombing” incident on October 21 was revelation of tremendous perhaps insuperable obstacles in way of establishing relations of good faith and mutual respect with present leaders of GOC.

4. Contrary to our earlier hopes, moderating forces (National Bank group especially) have for present at least lost out in contest for influence over Castro. Our bitter enemies, Raul Castro and Che Guevara are very much in the saddle. They can be counted on to speed up radical agrarian reform as well as measures designed destroy or cripple US mining, petroleum and public utility interests.

5. As indicated above, there has been marked increase here in questioning of sanity and competence of Castro and of soundness of measures advocated by GOC and particularly by his principal followers. It is highly important, as long as our over-riding security interests permit, that this trend be not arrested by actions or attitudes of ours. I believe it can be counted on to grow as further developments occur which bring out characteristics of Castro and his principal aides as well as unsoundness their measures in terms achievement their stated objectives. We must, of course, defend our legitimate interests and those of our citizens in all ways open to us without appearing coerce Cuba’s sovereignty or interposing punitive action or threats which will appear to involve such coercion or unnecessarily arousing easily exacerbated Cuban nationalism.

6. Restraint and patience must continue to characterize our policy. This regime—and I believe there is no doubt as to its nonviability due to its own excesses and deficiencies within a relatively short period (months rather than years)—must not be given “shot in the arm” of positive actions or threats by us (even assuming such actions were open to us). Our presentation of October 27 was right in tone and timing. We must, to extent possible, combat attempt to picture USG in general and Department of State in particular as having no policy other than defense of status quo (including that of all US corporations) in Cuba and we must continue demonstrate sympathy aims aspirations of Cuban people and realization many things can and should be changed here.

7. We have recognized and must continue to recognize that accusations of communism play into hands of communists and extremists here and help them to control and influence Castro. US press handling of this issue unhelpful. There is no real awareness here of the issues of the East-West struggle even on part Minister of State. Anti-communism considered merely a weapon of “US reactionaries” forged in time of McCarthy hysteria. At same time we should also recognize situation not working out entirely to communist satisfaction and that to some extent Washington and Moscow tarred with same brush in eyes of Castro and many of his followers. Although Fidel and Raul Castro and Guevara are playing game highly unpalatable to us and satisfying to Moscow to that extent, their indignant protest at being “smeared” as communists are symptomatic of underlying realities here. The essentially individualistic “bourgeois” nature of aspirations cherished by most Cubans above the very lowest level is a factor of great importance and will, I am confident, exert increasing influence.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² See Document 379

² See Document 379

389. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) and the Cuban Minister of Finance (Lopez Fresquet), Havana, November 8, 1959¹

Havana, November 8, 1959

Rufo Lopez Fresquet and his wife (an American) dropped in unexpectedly at the Residence at about 11 a.m. on Sunday, November 8. After thanking me for the courtesies he had received on his recent trip to Tampa and Bradenton on family business, the Minister made the following comments:

He said that he is increasingly impressed with Fidel Castro’s tendency toward “paranoia”. He said that Castro is in fact weak and easily influenced in spite of his extreme sensitiveness to criticism and his spectacular rages. According to Lopez Fresquet, Castro’s temperament and tactics closely resemble those of Hitler. He referred particularly to Castro’s attitude toward the United States and his attempt to develop hostility toward the United States in the Cuban people.

Lopez Fresquet expressed the view that he and other members of the Government who thought as he did were only being kept on sufferance and would be ruthlessly dismissed when they had served their purpose. He described himself as a technician rather than as a politician. He said that he was sure he was under close observation of the Government’s intelligence services and that his movements and contacts were watched. He said, however, that he had already functioned successfully in the underground against Batista and that he thought he could handle himself under these present conditions. He described an incident the other day in which he arrived at the Palace in his own car, parked the car, walked through the Palace and took a taxi at the other entrance in order to evade observation.

Dr. Lopez Fresquet made the point that what he was telling me was to be considered highly confidential but that he wished it to be made available to the top people in the Department of State.

Lopez Fresquet stated that developments of recent weeks represented a definite triumph for the radical “Sierra” element in the Government (especially Raul Castro and Ché Guevara) over the more moderate “llano” element (represented by such people as Manuel Ray, the Minister of Public Works, Faustino Perez, the Minister of “Recuperación de Bienes Malversados”, and Felipe Pazos. He described the Cabinet meeting held on Thursday, October 29 as an illustration of this victory (see Embassy telegram 998 of November 2, Limit Distribution² ).

At this meeting the following occurred:

(1) Raul Castro spoke for an hour and a half regarding his idea of how the Cuban economy should be organized. Lopez Fresquet described the thesis advanced as being one of “national socialism”. He said that it could not exactly be traced to Communism, that it was rather a sort of Fascist approach with the state in control of basic industries and natural resources. Lopez Fresquet stated that Fidel Castro had told him later that he considered Raul’s speech to have been magnificent. there was apparently no extended discussion at the meeting of this maiden effort by Raul Castro who has only recently become a member of the cabinet as Minister of the Armed Forces.

(2) Castro denounced Minister Faustino Perez for incompetence and inefficiency. Faustino Perez replied in a highly emotional speech, during which he cried profusely.

(3) Fidel Castro asked President Dorticos to describe a recent conversation with Felipe Pazos. Dorticos did so, claiming that Pazos had said that the influence of Communism was leading Cuba into holocaust. Fidel Castro raved and ranted over this. Armando Hart said that Pazos should be shot. Lopez Fresquet, after giving Minister of Economy Boti an opportunity to speak, which the latter did not take advantage of, endeavored to defend Pazos pointing out his valuable services to the revolution, the importance of retaining him in his present position and saying that if Pazos had any weakness, it was that he would sacrifice a good deal for a brilliant phrase. The meeting was suspended in order to enable Castro to keep an appointment with Juan J. Arevalo, the former President of Guatemala. There was some talk of having Pazos come to the meeting in order to defend himself but the idea was abandoned. So far as Lopez Fresquet knows, this issue has not yet come to a head. Pazos has been tipped off by Lopez Fresquet and others regarding developments.

Lopez Fresquet said it had been highly injudicious of Pazos to talk to President Dorticós as if the latter were a friend, such as Lopez Fresquet, with whom he could talk freely and confidentially. Lopez Fresquet expressed the view that Minister of Economy Boti is perhaps in the Raul Castro camp. He based this partly on Boti’s failure to come to Pazos’ defense at the cabinet meeting and partly on the alleged failure of Boti to push matters of interest to private investors. Lopez Fresquet said that he thought Minister of Commerce Cepero Bonilla was a sound man whose views were generally along the lines of those of Pazos and Lopez Fresquet.

Lopez Fresquet said that the way in which Fidel Castro had thrown himself heart and soul in the search for Camilo Cienfuegos and was neglecting practically all other business for this purpose reflected both his profound affection for Cienfuegos and a desire by feverish activity of this kind to avoid grappling with the political and personal problems confronting him. In speaking of Camilo Cienfuego’s disappearance, Lopez Fresquet said that he had heard that shortly after Camilo’s plane took off from Camaguey on the evening of October 28 a Sea Fury took off in pursuit. He added that according to certain peasant witnesses, there was an air battle between two planes near Cruces (this is over half way to Habana from Camaguey), and that a plane resembling Camilo’s fell into the sea south of Cruces. He said that he knew that the crew of a Sea Fury from the Camaguey base was currently in jail. He said that perhaps this had been an attempt by friends of Huber Matos to avenge him.

Speaking of Huber Matos, Lopez Fresquet described a conversation which he had had with him in early September, at which time Huber Matos had stated his conviction that Raul Castro’s ruthless drive for power would perhaps lead him to eliminate Fidel by assassination if necessary.

According to Lopez Fresquet, an important tip-off, in the power struggle now going on within the armed forces, will be the designation of the new Chief of the Army General Staff to replace Camilo Cienfuegos. If Ramiro Valdez gets it, that will be a complete triumph for Raul Castro and the extreme radicals. If, on the other hand, Calixto Garcia is designated, that will be a success for the more moderate elements. (Calixto Garcia is currently military Commander at Santiago; according to Lopez Fresquet, he is a close personal friend of Fidel and was a member of the Ortodoxo party.)

Lopez Fresquet said that he thought that our policy toward Cuba had been generally correct. He said we must do everything possible to make a favorable impression on Cuban public opinion. He had no objection to the presentation we made on October 27 to President Dorticos.³ He said that our willingness to assist in the search for Cienfuegos had been very well received.⁴ He added that we should take every possible initiative to indicate a friendly attitude toward the people of Cuba.

I stated that I had come to the reluctant conclusion that I was now accredited to an unfriendly Cuban Government. I pointed to the malevolent, cynical way in which the so-called “bombardment” over Habana had been handled. I referred to the pamphlet on the subject which has been put out under the auspicies of the Ministry of State.⁵ Lopez Fresquet agreed with my position on this subject.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–959. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bonsal on November 9. Attached to a covering letter of November 9 from Bonsal to Rubottom, in which the Ambassador asked that the memorandum be given very limited distribution. He indicated that he planned to show it to Braddock, Topping, and Noel, and left it up to Rubottom as to who in Washington should see it. A handwritten notation on the covering letter indicates that the memorandum was seen by Rubottom, Hill, Wieland, Stevenson, Turkel, Mallory, and Dreier.

² In telegram 998, Bonsal forwarded to the Department information given to him personally by an American newsman, who had received it from an unidentified member of the Cuban Cabinet, regarding a recent stormy Cabinet meeting and the concern felt by some members of the Cabinet, including Pazos, Ray, Faustino Perez, and Lopez Fresquet, over the trend in the government toward communism. (Ibid., 737.00/11–259)

³ See Document 379.

⁴ A Department of Defense Information Brief, which was enclosed with a covering memorandum of November 1 from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the White House Staff Secretary, described the U.S. Navy’s search operations conducted that day, in response to a request from the Cuban Government on October 31, to look for the missing plane in international waters between Florida and the eastern tip of Cuba. (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation)

⁵ On November 6, the Department of State obtained a copy of an English-language brochure put out by the Cuban Government and entitled “Cuba Denounces Before the World.” The brochure attempted to show U.S. Government responsibility for the October 21 flight over Havana and the alleged machine-gunning and bombing of Cuban citizens. The text of a note of protest regarding the brochure, which Rubottom gave to Ambassador Dihigo on November 9, is in telegram 542 to Havana, November 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.5400/11–659) A brief summary of Rubottom’s conversation with Dihigo on November 9 is in telegram 558 to Havana, November 9. (Ibid., 737.5400/11–959) A statement released by the Department on November 9, which categorically rejected the implication that the U.S. Government was responsible for the October 21 flight, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 30, 1959, pp. 787–788.

390. Letter From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Herter¹

London, November 12, 1959.

Dear Chris: Thank you for your message of November 5 [4]² about the Cuban request to exchange Sea Furies for Hunters. I am most grateful for the thought which you have given to this awkward issue and its difficulties. Your frank exposition of the problem as seen from your end has been most helpful. I can assure you that we fully understand the feelings in the United States after Castro’s gratuitous attacks and that we have every sympathy with you in your present exasperation with the Cuban Government. The last thing we want to do is to make things difficult for you or to give Castro any encouragement to continue his present hostility to the United States. I would like if I may to set out my own reactions to your message again with frankness.

Your people and ours have exchanged views about the stability of Castro’s regime. We in London are inclined to wonder whether Castro’s downfall is really only a question of time. Unlike Argentina under Peron, where the coherence and spirit of the armed forces were never destroyed, the Cuban armed forces seem unlikely to act as the ultimate guardian of the nation’s interest. Moreover, Cuba is not a poor country and now appears to be becoming rapidly less dependent on imports, especially of food. The country may of course just drift into a major economic crisis, but any process of disintegration may take a very long time. I must confess that I feel very uneasy at the prospect of doing nothing and merely waiting for Castro to fall. We tried this before with Nasser with a marked lack of success. In the meantime, if we in the Western world continue to give the impression that we are implacably opposed to the present regime in Cuba and that we will do nothing to help the Cubans so long as Castro is there, we may drive them more and more into the arms of the Communists politically as well as economically. There may be a real risk of the Communists gaining a stranglehold over the country and of the eventual collapse of the Castro regime leading to an even worse state of affairs. We might find ourselves confronted with another Guatemalan situation in a far less favourable climate of opinion.

We ought therefore to consider, distasteful though it may be, whether it would not serve our own long-term interests better to adopt a somewhat more forthcoming attitude towards Castro’s Government. One way in which we could, for our part, take a step in this direction, and perhaps do something to put ourselves in a position to exercise some influence over the Cuban Government, would be not to intervene to prevent the proposed exchange of aircraft. The Cuban Government seem to attach enormous importance to this transaction and, from what we have been told by the Cuban Ambassador here and by Cuban Ministers in Havana, there seems little doubt that they regard this question as the touchstone of the British attitude towards Cuba. There must, I think, be a real risk that, if we block their supply, Castro will get his aircraft from behind the Iron Curtain where, as you probably know, he is already making enquiries. This, of itself, certainly would not be the end of the world; what I fear more is that the Cubans will become convinced that there is no hope for them in the West. If, however, we allow the deal to go ahead we shall do much to encourage the Cubans to look to the West rather than to the East for help and assistance and may thus materially increase the chances of a lowering of the present tension in the Caribbean. This seems to me a valid consideration, whatever the nature of the Cuban Government of the day. Moreover, in the last resort delivery of the aircraft could always be held up later on.

I realise that for us to allow the exchange to proceed would, unless we can effectively present it as a special case, be a strain on the present embargo. In view, however, of the politically beneficial results which might be expected, I think it could well be argued that it should be treated as such.

My colleagues and I must make a decision shortly about this, but I hope that what I have said will help you to present our decision, if it is not to prevent the exchange, as favourably as possible. I would only add that it is not a question of our authorising this transaction, but of whether we decide to intervene to prevent it. There is a difference, not sufficiently understood here and perhaps elsewhere.

With warm regards,

Yours ever,

Selwyn³

¹ Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, November 1959. Secret; Personal. Attached to a brief covering note of November 12 from Hood to Herter, in which Hood said that in the Ambassador’s absence he had been asked to transmit the attached message from Lloyd. The covering note bears no indication of date or time of delivery, but it does contain Herter’s handwritten initials.

² Document 386.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 13, 1959—noon.

1100. Castro spoke last night from 10:45 to 2 a.m. Highlights of speech follow:

1. Camilo Cienfuegos has not been found. Every lead, every possibility, however painful, has been explored. People should resign themselves to thought he is in all probability dead, crashed in the sea north of Cuba. The false report mysteriously originated and spread by American wire services, of Camilo found, which set off public rejoicing of November 3, was despicable and cruelly deceived people. Cienfuegos is a great hero of revolution who died in line duty while fighting treason. Any speculation that he might have deserted, such as has appeared in American press and been reprinted here, does dishonor to Cienfuegos and to Cuba. Important thing to remember is that Cienfuegos, like all other true leaders of revolution, came from humble people, among whom are many more Camilos who will be discovered when country needs them.

2. There is a deliberate campaign in US to discredit the Cuban revolution. Destruction of tourist trade, like calumnies of wire services, is a part of this campaign. US cannot deny that planes from US were responsible for bombings at Niagara and Punta Alegre sugar mills. One of planes found in Anguila—which is disputed territory—has probably bombed Punta Alegre. It is early to say whether measures recently taken by US to control flights from US air fields to Cuba are effective, but any improvement in this respect is more than offset by offensive and calumnious campaign in US press. Proof that US press paid to campaign against Cuban revolution is contained in letter of July 18 from Nunez Portuondo to ex-Cuban Ambassador (This refers to former’s alleged interview with Life2). Recent story in NY Journal American² that Cuba is building rocket bases under Russian direction is ridiculous and offensive. A letter from former Congressman Radio Cremata, addressed to press agent of American and Foreign Power and intended for forwarding to him through Senator Anselmo Allie-gro, reciting many services Cremata had performed for company in past, shows extent to which foreign monopolistic interests were favored by Batista regime.

3. Insults, government threats of economic reprisals and harboring of “war criminals” are not the way to bring about good relations with Cuba. If US treats us honorably, decently, morally, Cuba will respond in kind.

4. Revolution will not take one step backward from course on which it has embarked. Many sacrifices will be necessary. All Cubans uphold slogan “liberty or death”.

Castro made no reference to note which GOC is expected to deliver to US today.³ He did not mention help given by US in search for Camilo, nor information furnished by US re crashed planes on Anguila.

Tone of speech, while anything but cordial, lacked sharpness which has characterized recent utterances and which was generally expected here. It was generally in low key—not Castro at his theatrical best—and contained nothing of such inflammatory nature as to incite populace.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1359. Official Use Only; Priority.

² Not further identified.

³ See infra.

392. Editorial Note

On November 13, the Cuban Government delivered to Ambassador Bonsal a note in reply to the presentation made to President Dorticos and Minister of State Roa by Bonsal on October 27 (see Document 379). A copy of the note, which the Cuban Government released to the public, is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/ 11–1759.

Attached to this copy of the note was a memorandum of November 17 from Rubottom to Secretary Herter which analyzed the note as follows:

“Athough the Cuban note of November 13 (Tab A) is considerably less violent in tone and attitude than we had expected it would be it nevertheless contains beneath its turgid prose a firm reiteration of the Cuban point of view and a rejection of the U.S. position on the various issues with which it treats. As Ambassador Bonsal observed in his cable of November 16 (Tab B) ‘this note will be generally well received in Cuba as an expression of the nationalistic attitudes cherished by the present Government and its supporters as well as by most of its opponents.’ Even former Cuban UN Ambassador Dr. Nuñez Portuondo, presently Castro’s most vocal opponent in the United States, has referred to the note in a private conversation as ‘very clever’ and ‘well written’. I find its cleverness extremely superficial but I believe its propaganda value is such that the U.S. will wish to rebut many of its assertions by a reply note or otherwise.

“Perhaps the most interesting points raised in the note are the request that our sugar trade should be governed by a bilateral trade agreement and the suggestion that it is ‘premature to judge beforehand that such solutions as Cuba may propose [regarding expropriation] will deviate from international law.’ We nave also noted the absence of a reference to ‘the bombing and machine-gunning of Habana citizens’ in connection with the Diaz Lanz incident. We are giving immediate attention as to how best to answer the inaccurate but extremely persuasive argument that the United States has been the ‘favored party’ in the commercial relations between the two countries.” (Ibid. Brackets in the source text. Bonsal’s telegram referred to is telegram 1122 from Havana, November 16; ibid., 611.37/11–1659.)

In telegram 1092 from Havana, November 12, Bonsal had indicated that, because of the “continued tension and uncertainty” of the Cuban political situation, he was instituting the warning phase of the emergency and evacuation plan for the Embassy. Key Embassy officers were on 24-hour standby alert. (Ibid., 737.00/11–1259) In telegram 1114 from Havana, November 14, Bonsal noted the tension was “considerably relieved” by Castro’s relatively mild speech of November 12 and the tone of the Cuban note of November 13. He recommended that the warning phase be discontinued for the present. (Ibid., 737.00/ 11–1459)

393. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 734 Havana, November 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Minister of State Raul Roa on Cuban American Relations on November 16, 1959²

In the course of a conversation with Dr. Roa today, I took occasion to say that I was very much disappointed at the failure of my attempts to establish a basis of mutual confidence and reciprocal good faith in the relations between Cuba and the United States. I said that I had endeavored to be in every way straightforward and clear regarding the position and the intentions of the United States Government. On the other hand, the events which have taken place during the last month led me to wonder whether we can expect any good will and good faith from the Cuban Government. I referred particularly to the so-called “bombing”, to Dr. Castro’s television appearance of October 22 and to the mass meeting on October 26 and to the pamphlet issued by the Ministry of State regarding the “bombing”. I said that I felt very pessimistic.

The Minister tried to smooth me down by referring to my own very good personal position with the Cuban people. He said that no American Ambassador had ever enjoyed such a position. I told him that as Ambassador I considered myself an integral part of the Department of State, which in turn is an integral part of the Government of the United States, which in turn represents the people of the United States, and that it is not possible or even desirable to try to separate these various elements. He acquiesced in this but said he did not feel as pessimistic as I did about Cuban-American relations. He said that he thought we might continue discussing the specific matters which are pending. I agreed that this would be desirable.

I then gave Dr. Roa a couple of clippings from recent issues of Revolución. One of these described “cynical malevolence of the U.S. State Department” and the other was a cartoon showing the Statue of Liberty with a dollar sign on the torch and a wad of green backs on the other arm. I said that this sort of thing in the press of the governing political party confirmed my belief that there is a malevolent predisposition in Cuban Government circles with regard to relations with the United States. Dr. Roa then embarked on a discourse regarding the so-called vicious circle in the press treatment in the United States and in Cuba, of matters of mutual interest. He quoted Herbert Matthews, etc. We did not get very far except that I think he was startled by the virulence of the Revolución article which I showed him.

As a parting shot, I asked Dr. Roa whether he thought the members of ASTA (American Society of Travel Agents) would have available the Ministry of State pamphlet about the “bombings, as in Pearl Harbor.”

Philip W. Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/11–1659. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal.

² In despatch 733 from Havana, November 16, Bonsal discussed other matters that had come up during his conversation with Roa that day: the disappearance and presumed death of Camilo Cienfuegos, U.S. cooperation in the air search for Cienfuegos, the upcoming visit of Senator Frank Carlson to Cuba, the issue of the adequacy of meat inspection in Cuba on meat exported to the United States, and increasing reports of arbitrary actions by INRA officials in implementing the Agrarian Reform Law. (Ibid.)

394. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd¹

Washington, November 17, 1959.

Dear Selwyn: I deeply appreciate, as very evident in your latest message,² the thoughtful and extended consideration you have been giving the difficult problem of the Cuban request to exchange Sea Furies for Hunters. I am sorry to report that since my letter to you of November 4,³ nothing has occurred which we can interpret as being encouraging in the Cuban situation. On the contrary, it has become more evident that the extremist elements of Castro’s 26th of July Movement are rapidly undermining whatever democratic institutions are left in Cuba and replacing them with a violent and radical leftist party dictatorship. Moreover, fear of and hostility to Castro have been growing in Cuba as a result of his more recent arbitrary actions in reinstituting military tribunals which have the power to sentence to the firing squad those who criticize any action of the revolutionary government. I mention this unhappy development to explain in part our thinking that Castro’s eventual downfall may result from political excesses of this kind as much as from the inevitable economic decline which, we feel, his policies will bring about.

Of course, I cannot pretend to know when Castro and his government will fall. I do confess to a feeling of deep concern for the nature of the man himself. In recent months, he has shown an increasing tendency toward instability and rash actions as he is beset by ever greater problems and as the first signs of a splintering and weakening of his revolutionary support become evident. Modern arms and equipment in his hands and under these circumstances are indeed unpleasant to contemplate.

We all very much fear that the situation is past the point where it can be remedied by feeding his demands for arms and munitions. As it is now manifestly impossible for us to succumb to Cuban pressure on this issue, an export from one of our principal allies would certainly be interpreted as a major divergence in what has been until now a highly satisfactory, coordinated approach to this serious problem.

I have given considerable thought to the possibility of Castro’s purchase of jet fighters from behind the iron curtain. It seems to me that this transaction would carry certain disadvantages which Castro could not afford to ignore or, if he did, certain consequences which would be damaging to his interests. If consummated, the deal would certainly bring home to all of Latin America the proximity of Communist intervention and would, in my opinion, serve further to alienate the support which he has enjoyed among certain non-Communist elements in the hemisphere. I reiterate, too, my belief that the Soviets might well give second thought to any such provocative action.

My real concern, however, is the possibility of a breakdown in the control of arms shipments for the entire Caribbean area. As you are aware, with few exceptions, the countries of the free world, including Great Britain, have cooperated magnificently in limiting the shipment of arms in the area. We have recently received disturbing reports of Cubans, as well as third parties acting in their behalf, operating in Central European countries and seeking to make purchases of arms in substantial quantities. These include jet aircraft and other important types of military and naval hardware. I fear that the delivery of the Hawker jets would indeed be construed by some of these countries as signalling an end to this cooperative effort and might well result in an arms race which could seriously jeopardize all efforts made thus far to reduce tensions in the area.

In my letter of November 4, I mentioned that we were preparing a memorandum setting forth the facts surrounding our actions in carrying out the Caribbean arms policy and with a view toward clearing up any misunderstanding which may have occurred regarding its application. I am pleased to enclose the memorandum.⁴ It is also intended to give our views on observations made in a memorandum which your Embassy handed us on October 14.⁵

Regardless of the outcome, I want to express to you my deep gratitude for the sympathetic and thoughtful consideration you have given our views in this matter.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter⁶

¹ Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, November 1959, Secret; Personal. Drafted by Vallon and cleared with Rubottom, Merchant, and Ivan B. White (EUR).

² Document 390.

³ Document 386.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 368.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

395. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis for American Republics (Hall) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)¹

Washington, November 18, 1959.

SUBJECT

Random Observations While on Leave in Cuba October 18–November 8

On this visit I did not seek out contacts—they came to me as soon as they learned I had arrived. No one would believe that I was solely on vacation. Besides interviews, I had the benefit of the views of my host, the Panamanian Ambassador, and viewed the interminable telecasts in which Fidel and Raúl Castro, Dorticós, Cienfuegos, Guevara and Almeida took frenetic part. The hypnotic hold Fidel has over the mob is frightening—he can raise it to a bloodthirsty pitch then cool it to an obedient ardor. Hitler was never as good, although it must be admitted he worked on a better educated element.

On television, Dorticós abused the US in a mild way and Cienfuegos also did not go overboard. Raúl was vicious and, referring to Huber Matos, said “there are other traitors and we will uncover and punish them.” I wonder if he was thinking of Cienfuegos? Fidel gave one the impression of a complete hysteric with a Messianic complex, if not a manic-depressive. Che Guevara did not rave nor rant, spoke in the tone of a man who knows what he wants and how to get it and, as the best educated of the lot, is a truly sinister character. All gave us the devil.

At his request, I called on Dr. Luis Botifolls, formerly an editor on “El Mundo” who still appears on television panels, a lawyer and one of Cuba’s leading intellectuals. He was and is anti-Batista and now is even more anti-Castro. Although he has not yet been molested by the present regime, he is so fearsome of the present situation that he is making arrangements to send his family to the US. Botifolls said that former President Prío Socarras wished to see me. This I discouraged, saying that if Prío has anything to impart, he should say it to Ambassador Bonsal. Botifolls said that one of his relatives had visited the restaurant Castillo de Jagua a short time before, just as the lights went out. Two tables away he distinguished Fidel and Raúl sitting alone and heard the latter urging Fidel to intervene in the Moa Bay installations, saying “that would give us an additional eight millions of income a year.“²

Carlos Todd, Cuban publisher of “The Times of Havana” is so outspoken in his newspaper that he is apt to get in trouble. At lunch he advocated to me punitive measures against Castro saying: “It is no use cutting off the sugar quota, Castro will only print money. The only way to bring him to terms is to cut off the Island’s petroleum supplies.”

A Cuban manufacturer of steel sash told me he is being forced to the wall, as are others, by the government. Since private construction is paralyzed, he has only government contracts which are not paid. Yet he is not allowed to close his factory nor dismiss his employees (Fuerza y Luz has 3,000 employees it would like to dismiss). He anticipates that the government will take over his factory for non-compliance of contracts when his own cash runs out.

A rumor is current in Habana that Ambassador Dihigo and President Dorticos will soon be asked to resign—it is more persistent with regard to Dihigo. The wife of Nicolás Rivero, formerly Cuban Economic Counselor in Washington, states that Nicolás is returning to Washington in the immediate future with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. I am reliably informed that Dihigo has said categorically that he will not have Rivero under any circumstances.

Cuba’s tourist trade went to pot after the “bombing” of Habana and Fidel’s subsequent virulent attack on the US by television. It collapsed as a consequence of his next verborrhagic demonstration. Steamship and airplane cancellations, as well as those of cruises, flowed in at once. The Habana Hilton and the Caribe are almost empty, as is the Nacional which has 600 employees, none of which can be dismissed. On November 6 the Havana Riviera, with 750 employees, had 16 guests. The casinos are practically deserted. Mr. Land, manager of the Nacional, says that he must soon close the hotel because of lack of cash with which to operate—he says he cannot pay All America Cables for messages charged on their bills by guests during the ASTA convention.

The Tower Club, atop Havana’s highest building (Focsa) is almost unfrequented. Many of its 400 founding members, each of whom paid $1,000 for entry, have fled the country. The Country Club, one of the most beautiful in the world, has the same difficulty with many of its members abroad not paying dues. It is also threatened with expropriation, either for workers’ housing or the installation of a children’s tubercular hospital.

As a sidelight on Cienfuegos, Land of Hotel Nacional told me that before the former’s disappearance he made a habit of landing in a helicopter on the hotel grounds several times a week, spending several hours with his companion barbudos talking to the girls around the swimming pool, treating all to drinks for which he never even signed a chit.

I met Jules DuBois twice but did not converse with him. Cecil Gee, manager of All America Cables, told me that Jules was asking for trouble when he went to the cable office to file a message—he had an arrangement with Gee whereby a messenger called every 15 minutes at the Hilton to receive DuBois’ “takes.” When threatened and he tried to escape by the back door of the cable office, he was surrounded by a small mob which was quickly quelled by a police lieutenant who shouted “A hundred of you cannot assault one gringo—Fidel would not like it.” That was enough to save Jules’ skin once more.

Scott Thompson, a leader of the American community and one of the oldest residents, reports that the American businessmen are not only fearful of their future but now feel a growing resentment against the regime. He related one recent incident affecting his cement factory at Mariel. Three years ago he discharged a worker for pulling a knife on another. The man fired set up a filling station in Mariel which prospered. Nevertheless, gauging the present atmosphere, the man brought suit against the company for three years’ wages on the grounds that he had been illegally discharged. He won and, before the suit could be appealed, the local judge seized all the office furniture and equipment of the factory, paraded the loaded trucks throughout the town and deposited the goods in the courthouse.

There was a vague suspicion, in our Embassy at Habana and that of Panamá, that the recent events in the latter country had some connection, greater than that of emulation, with those in Cuba. From the Panamanian Ambassador I got the report of another planned invasion of Panama from Cuba, the basis of Habana Embassy’s telegram to the Department.

Fidel has suffered severe blows, to his ego as well as operationally, by the loss of Diaz Lanz, Matos and Cienfuegos. The latter was the idol of the armed forces and served to assure every dubious situation (such as the arrest of Matos at Camaguey), after which Fidel would arrive on the scene to claim the credit. Dozens of rumors were current in Habana “explaining” the disappearance of Camilo—one that he was in the hospital at Camp Libertad with his beard shaven and showing signs of torture, perhaps the origin of the report by some female which appeared last week in the Miami News. The case of Huber Matos proved that, as in Chicago or New York, no one is allowed to quit the gang.

I was told in Habana that former General Martín Diaz Tamayo is hanging about the Pentagon seeking support.

While in Varadero where a friend lent me his beach house, the latter was surrounded by police the first night we were there and all occupants were required to identify themselves. This was at midnight November 2 and was followed a half-hour later by an Army lieutenant with the same mission. This was probably due, as I learned later, to the presence in Varadero of Fidel and Raúl who were “directing the search for Cienfuegos.”

My impressions:

There is an atmosphere of terror prevalent and for all purposes a police state exists in Cuba. People are not only afraid to speak before strangers, but persons disappear as in the time of Batista.

Last March Joaquin Meyer told me he believed Castro was planning to bring the economy of Cuba to the brink of ruin, in order to “save” the country by then instituting state capitalism. I found serious people giving credence to this theory when in Habana six months ago. On this trip more people subscribed to the thought, and there was the additional evidence of the Agrarian Reform Law, the Mining Law, measures taken against the oil companies, and apparent efforts to put companies, foreign and native, out of business.

His hold on the lower class and on at least half of the middle class is complete. The armed forces are loyal to him but this feeling may be weakened by what has happened to Matos, Díaz Lanz and Cienfuegos. The success of a revolution from within is very unlikely at this time.

Unrest will increase with greater unemployment and a critical point may be reached at the end of March when the sugar harvest is over.

The assassination of Fidel would bring about looting and a bloodbath such as Habana has never known.

The stock of Raúl and Che Guevara has gone up with the disappearance one way or another, of the more moderate elements such as Díaz, Matos and Cienfuegos.

I found no evidence of international direction of communism. The Soviets don’t have to give orders since things are going their way anyhow.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–1859. Secret.

² On November 15 Dr. Mario Lazo of Lazo and Cubas, attorneys for Freeport Sulphur, gave as his opinion that Castro would not find intervention of this property advisable, since its concentrates can only be treated at Freeport’s New Orleans plant and intervention would throw 1,500 Cubans out of employment, affecting some 6,000 dependents. While the Germans or Russians could probably devise a process to treat the concentrates, it would take a minimum of two years to build a suitable plant. The $75,000,000 Moa Bay project is due to go into production within a few months. Lazo said that these facts would be communicated tactfully to Fidel this week by his senior partner Dr. Jorge Cubas, if he has not done so already. [Footnote in the source text.]

396. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Washington, November 20, 1959.

Dear Phil: As you are well aware, Cuban problems occupy a primary place in our thinking and planning these days.² All of us are most appreciative of the fine work which you are doing in Habana and are well aware of the peculiar and in many respects unprecedented nature of the problems confronting you.

The most serious consideration has been given at all levels in our Government to the developing situation in Cuba, and it has been widely recognized that some hard decisions must be made. With considerable reluctance we have found ourselves forced closer and closer to the realization and frank recognition of the fact that it may be unduly optimistic and even unrealistic to assume that we shall ever be able to do business with the Castro Government on a basis which could be termed even reasonably satisfactory. This, of course, suggests the most serious type of implications with respect to the general complex of our Latin American relations, none of which, I am sure, are lost upon you.

In the face of this situation, in the light of most recent developments in Cuba, and only after long and serious consideration in the course of which your own excellent reports have been taken fully into account, the enclosed paper³ setting forth the basic elements and criteria to guide an appropriate policy toward Cuba has been drawn up. This has been approved by the Secretary and, in fact, by the President, with the understanding that its content would be used for your own guidance and that of certain other agencies of our Government in future dealing with the Cuban problem. I cannot over-emphasize to you how closely this matter and this paper are being held and must ask you to treat it with the utmost discretion.

My Special Assistant, John Hill, will be visiting you within a week or so. John is very familiar with the enclosed paper and I am sure you will find it worthwhile to discuss it with him during the course of his stay in Habana. John will probably be in a position, incidentally, to answer any questions which may occur to you upon reading the enclosure.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

R.R. Rubottom, Jr.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Sept–Dec.) 1959. Secret; Official–Informal; Personal. Drafted by Devine and cleared with Wieland and Vallon. In a memorandum of November 19 to Rubottom, Stevenson said that he heard from Devine that Rubottom would be writing to Bonsal about the new policy statement on Cuba. Stevenson suggested that Rubottom review the memorandum of the conversation with Bonsal on October 1 (Document 365) and particularly called Rubottom’s attention to the last sentence in the second paragraph and to the comments in the section entitled “Economic Aid”. (Ibid.)

² On November 17, the Department announced that the President had accepted on November 14 the Secretary’s recommendation for the establishment of a small committee to advise the Secretary on inter-American relations. The National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs was established pursuant to the recommendation contained in Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower’s report on his trip to Latin America. The press release is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 7, 1959, p. 823. See also vol. V, pp. 265 and 267. Assistant Secretary Rubottom was a member of the Committee.

³ See the attachment to Document 376.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

397. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 24, 1959¹

Washington, November 24, 1959

SUBJECT

Luncheon Meeting Between Mr. Dillon and Representatives of U.S. Cattle and Sugar Enterprises in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Robert Kleberg, King Ranch; Mr. Lawrence Crosby, Chairman, U.S.-Cuban Sugar Council; Mr. William Oliver, President, American Sugar Refining Company; Mr. George Braga, President, Francisco Sugar Company and partner in Kleberg’s Cuban ranch; Mr. Malone, General Manager, American Sugar Refining Company

Mr. Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; Mr. Eric H. Hager, Legal Adviser; Mr. Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs; Mr. William Wieland, Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs; Mr. Harry Turkel, Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs

At the luncheon by Mr. Dillon for the representatives of large U.S. cattle and sugar enterprises in Cuba, Mr. Kleberg started by saying there was scarcely a day when he was not called by a member of Congress to give his views on Castro. In general, the Congress is angry at Castro’s action. Mr. Kleberg had a letter read from the local representative of a U.S. cattle ranch in Camaguey describing the arbitrary action of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute, and the rapidly deteriorating situation. Mr. Kleberg then stated that the cattle and sugar enterprises had a plan to assure prompt compensation for the impending expropriations and asked Mr. Crosby to explain it.²

In brief, it provided:

1. Extension of Sugar Act for one year only. (Wait until the dust settles philosophy.)

2. Granting President right to change country quotas only for supply reasons. (In contrast to domestic interests who would grant President power to change for any reason.)

3. If any foreign country expropriates property without prompt compensation, levy 1–1/4 cent per pound penalty on importation of its sugar to create a fund which a U.S. Commission will use to make compensation. (This takes from Castro only ½ of the premium on Cuba’s sugar exports to the U.S.)

Mr. Rubottom said that he dissented from any punitive philosophy in our policy toward Castro since this would solidify all Cuban elements behind Castro.

Mr. Mann explained the steps being taken to obtain an Administration position in the near future.

Mr. Dillon stated that the proposal read by Mr. Crosby would be given very careful consideration by the Department.

Ater the meeting broke up, Mr. Turkel handed Mr. Crosby a personal note saying that he felt a penalty on importation of Cuban sugar would be contrary to GATT³ and possibly also to the Charter of the OAS.

Mr. Hager, Mr. Turkel and the sugar companies’ lawyers will meet on this aspect in the near future.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, November 1959. Official Use Only. Drafted by Turkel and approved by Rubottom.

² Having already been apprised of the plan advocated by the American property owners in Cuba, Rubottom, in a November 23 memorandum to Dillon, and Mann, in a November 24 memorandum to Dillon, explained in detail their reasons for opposing the plan. Both memoranda are in Department of State, Central Files, 811.05137/11–2359.

³ 

In a November 24 memorandum to Rubottom, Turkel presented arguments to support his view that GATT prohibited the imposition of penalties on the import of Cuban sugar. Turkel then noted:

“After the luncheon meeting today between Mr. Dillon, Mr. Kleberg and the U.S. sugar producers of Cuba, I informed Mr. Larry Crosby of these objections. I did not add what I recommended to you, that is, to let the measure be introduced. Then the Department can oppose it and say that it would like to have an opportunity to let Castro put a 1-¼ cent export tax on sugar destined for the U.S. with the proceeds committed to U.S. owners of lands to be expropriated.

“This method gets away from the penalty concept to which you objected at the luncheon.” (Ibid., 837.235/11–2459)

⁴ No record of this meeting has been found.

398. Memorandum From the First Secretary of the Embassy in Cuba (Topping) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Havana, undated.

Herewith my comments on Carlos Hall’s Memorandum of Nov. 18.²

Carlos has written in more extreme terms than I feel the situation warrants, but the over-all impression is basically right, though perhaps a little alarmist—not that the situation is not one for the gravest concern. There are some minor inaccuracies.

I have the following comments on Carlos’ summation. Otherwise I agree with it.

I believe that Fidel’s “hold on the lower class and on at least half of the middle class” is no longer complete. At a guess, I would say that only a minority of the “middle class” continues to support him. There are signs that the “lower class” is beginning to waver, but that is still the source of Fidel’s principal support.

It is a serious mistake to speak of “armed forces” and of their “loyalty”. There is a group of some 38,000 young men under arms, almost without exception undisciplined, loyal only to a vague concept of “revolution” plus the various promises which Fidel and his associates have made of a better life to come. They may or may not be loyal to their officers. There are no indications that they are particularly closely unified, or capable of efficient operations. Their communications system is notably deficient.

I believe the next critical point will be reached in June and July—when the sugar harvest is over. Carlos got the termination date too early, for some reason.

I have never heard anyone, in or out of the Government, other than Fidel and his closest associates, say anything good about either Che or Raul. The best reaction is one of reluctant admiration. Their power has recently increased greatly and alarmingly, but “their stock has not gone up”, in the sense of admiration and loyal following. Raul, of course, has his hard core of supporters who are now in key positions within the armed forces.

JLT

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Habana Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 1814, Political Affairs. Secret. Topping’s memorandum was in response to the handwritten note Bonsal made on November 24 on the copy of Hall’s memorandum (Document 395) asking Braddock and Topping for their comments. Underneath Bonsal’s request Braddock wrote: “Mr. Ambassador: Interesting. Some things give a little difficulty from Carlos, but with his summation I am essentially in agreement. DB 11/25”.

² Document 395.

399. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 26, 1959—2 p.m.

1208. Following cabinet changes announced early morning November 26 after extended session. Minister Public Works Manuel Rey replaced by Osmani Cienfuegos. Ray designated President National Institute of Sciences and Technology, to be established. Minister for Recovery Misappropriated Funds Faustino Perez replaced by Lt. Commander Rolando Diaz Asterain, career navy officer, and Perez given unspecified “new revolutionary duties”. In addition, Felipe Pazos designated Ambassador in charge economic matters in Europe. Replaced as President National Bank by Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Not known at this time whether Guevara will continue to hold his position in INRA or who might succeed him there.

Embassy comment: Ray disagreed with Fidel Castro over treatment of Huber Matos, and submitted resignation when decision made to reestablish revolutionary tribunals. Resignation accepted at cabinet meeting November 20. Delay in announcement caused by search for solution which would disguise disagreement. Perez took same position as Ray. Understand they strongly supported by Minister Communications Oltuski and Minister Finance Lopez Fresquet. Predicted by several reliable sources that Oltuski will shortly be dismissed. Dismissal or new assignment for Lopez Fresquet appears virtually certain, since he has recently strongly disagreed with several decisions by Fidel Castro. Reliably informed Castro pressing Jose Llanusa now Habana Municipal Commissioner, take Ministry Finance. Llanusa reluctant partly because ill with ulcers and poor circulation, and secretly entered hospital November 25.

Pazos has been in disagreement with policies GOC for several weeks at least. He has recently complained that his efforts to protect the nation’s financial situation are destroyed by ill conceived actions other sectors of government. About three week ago he reliably reported to have vehemently told President Dorticos that country was headed for economic collapse and attempted Communist take-over. Dorticos brought up charges in cabinet, and decision made oust Pazos. His new assignment is result face-saving maneuvering between Pazos, Fidel Castro and Minister Economy Boti who originally considered as Pazos’ replacement. Resignations of Justo Carrillo, head of National Bank for Agrarian and Industrial Development (BANFAIC), Ernesto Betancourt, member directorate National Bank and in charge monetary stabilization fund, and Jorge Beruff, delegate of President National Bank in charge of Bank for Economy and Social Development (BANDES), are said to be involved.

The aforementioned group constitutes the bulk of the moderate and pro-American elements within GOC. Their replacements to date are extremists with exception Diaz, whose political orientation unknown. Osmani Cienfuegos, brother of disappeared Camilo Cienfuegos former Chief of Staff of Army, studied architecture and worked for several years as draftsman. He long and reliably reported crypto-Communist and reliably reported to have joined Communist Party Cuba recently through influence of wife who is said to be Communist. He was considered brains behind Camilo within army, where he was Director of Cultural Affairs. Considered dedicated and hard-working, without significant qualifications for position.

Guevara needs no introduction. His anti-Americanism, his hositility to US private interests in general, and his extreme leftist position are well-known.

These developments stress that Fidel Castro and GOC are increasingly committed to extreme leftist policies and are increasingly receptive to guidance by Communist oriented elements who are openly hostile to US and our local and international interests. Embassy officers who are in contact with moderate elements both within and outside GOC have all gathered impression those elements recognize they have been losing influence for some time, and now have virtually none. At same time, those elements have no immediate plans and are despondent and disorganized. They show no evidence wanting take united stand to force showdown with Castro. They take the attitude that “the people are still with Fidel”, and that the country is rapidly heading for economic collapse. They hope that they will be able to obtain control after the collapse occurs, but there are few signs that they are attempting to organize for that purpose.

While trend of economic conditions and popular support is now against GOC, whether or when they will lead to fall of that government cannot now be predicted. Factors influencing the situation include (1) continuing emotional attachment to Fidel Castro as national symbol by bulk of Cuban people, (2) continued belief by virtually all Cubans in the need for social and economic changes, embodied to date only in Castro’s revolutionary program, (3) dedication and determination of present leading members GOC, and (4) lack of organized opposition leadership offering equal prospect for desired reforms.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.13/11–2659. Confidential; Priority.

400. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Dillon) and the British Ambassador (Caccia), Washington, November 27, 1959¹

Washington, November 27, 1959

Ambassador Caccia called and said he had a message for Secretary Herter but wondered if he might pass it along to Mr. Dillon. After much reflection on the question of Hunters for Cuba, Ambassador had been asked to tell us his government will postpone the release of the Hunters. This decision was taken even though they know it will create considerable difficulties. The Ambassador said he hoped other countries will attach great importance to the embargo, too.

Mr. Dillon said that we deeply appreciate this decision and he felt certain Secretary Herter will want to send a personal message to Selwyn on this when he gets back to the office on Monday.

Caccia said they are not going to announce anything. If pressed by the Cubans they are going to say they will have to postpone the decision since relations have deteriorated. Caccia wondered if there was any danger of the Italians or anyone else “nipping in” and supplying the planes. Mr. Dillon said he didn’t think so: the only problem might be from the East.

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, November 1959.

401. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, November 30, 1959—7 p.m.

1230. Two-day National Catholic Congress opened night of November 28 with torchlight parade and pontifical mass attended by crowd estimated at close to one million. Center of parade and mass was Director General de la Caridad del Cobre, patron saint of Cuba, brought for purpose from Oriente. Archbishop Perez Serrente officiated mass in presence of high Catholic clergy and leaders of revolutionary government including President Dorticos and Fidel Castro. Following mass special message from Pope John to Cuban people transmitted by Vatican radio. Despite rain and cold turnout was huge.

Closing session of congress held in Tropical Stadium morning November 29. Features this meeting were speeches and election new officers for National Catholic Lay Organizations. Speeches covered subjects of “charity and social justice”, “charity and human brotherhood” and “charity and love for country”. Despite religious orientation of speeches they carried definite political overtones in context present political situation, particularly that of Jose Ignacio Lasaga on social justice. He closed his remarks by saying Catholic social doctrine was against totalitarian state but in favor of social justice and in favor of redemption of worker and peasant but against communism.

Comment: Congress appears to have been highly successful despite notably inclement weather. Hard to assess what impact it will have on local political situation. Basic motivation for congress clearly religious, but many observers consider that Catholic Church attempted make its voice clearly heard on social and political issues confronting country including communism. Impact will be lessened because lack firm leadership and unity among Catholic hierarchy and reluctance take stand on public issues. Catholics certainly marshalled their forces and put on impressive demonstration of religious devotion. Crowd appeared considerably larger than any assembled by Castro since trimphal entry Havana January this year. Unlike Castro’s rallies crowd composed of from wealthiest to poorest. Undoubtedly good portion those present also from bulk of Castro’s mass rallies. Emphasis on charity, brotherhood, and tolerance contrasted markedly with harangues of denunciation, vengeance and class struggle which have increasingly marked the government rallies.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.413/11–3059. Official Use Only; Priority.

402. Memorandum of Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 1, 1959¹

Washington, December 1, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Turning to Cuba, Mr. Dulles said the appointment of “Che” Guevara, an Argentine soldier of fortune, as head of the National Bank was a blow to those who thought the Cuban Government would not move toward the Left. Mr. Dulles thought we must now be prepared for radical moves to seize the financial products of the sugar crop. He noted also that the new Minister of Public Works was probably a Communist. Although Castro had appeared to suffer a mild set-back in a recent meeting of the Cuban Labor Federation, his hand-picked candidate, who in the past had worked closely with the Communists, had been chosen Secretary General of the Federation. Mr. Dulles characterized the situation in Cuba as gloomy.

Secretary McElroy inquired whether Castro was engaged in setting up a Communist government in Cuba. Mr. Dulles said Cuba was drifting toward Communism. Secretary McElroy said that in view of the assistance Castro is getting from the U.S.S.R. and from Communist China, it appeared to him that Cuba was becoming more and more Communistic. Mr. Dulles said the U.S.S.R. was being very clever in not permitting its interest in Cuba to be openly identified. For example, Mikoyan had decided not to go to Cuba. Secretary Herter believed the U.S.S.R. did not want to be identified with any steps tending toward Communism in Cuba because it was convinced we would take action against an identifiable Communist government in Cuba similar to the action we had taken in Guatemala.

Secretary Anderson asked whether the U.S. did not buy most of the Cuban sugar crop. Mr. Dulles said the U.S. bought about half the sugar crop and provided the Cubans with about two-thirds of their income from the sugar crop. Secretary Anderson pointed out that when Mossedegh began to take action contrary to Western interests in Iran, the Western countries ceased to buy oil from Iran. He felt we might consider a similar proposition with respect to Cuban sugar if the Cuban Government appears to be about to go Communist, whether by design or accident, and we want to discourage such a development. At present it appeared that the U.S. was supporting the price of sugar while permitting Cuba to confiscate American-owned property. Secretary Herter said that Congress would be taking up the sugar problem inasmuch as the sugar quota is up for renewal. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Cubans had not yet seized sugar properties. The President did not see how Castro could gain very much by seizing current revenues. Mr. Dulles doubted that the actions which solved the Mossedegh problem in Iran could be applied to Cuba because there was not enough production of sugar world-wide to permit such a solution. Secretary McElroy thought that if the subsidy to sugar ceased, we could buy all the sugar we needed on the world market. The Vice President asked whether the purpose of the subsidy was to obtain sugar or to support Cuba. Mr. Dulles said the purpose was to support Cuba. Secretary Herter said any suggestion by the Administration that the sugar subsidy be stopped would be interpreted as an effort to push Cuba downhill. He felt that any pressure for changing the sugar subsidy should come from Congress. Secretary Dillon said the sugar interests planned to suggest that the President impose a tax on sugar equal to half the subsidy, to be used to pay for seized properties.

Mr. Dulles reported that Guevara’s assumption of his new position was the first step toward a nationalization of the Cuban banks and the issuance of bonds to bank depositors.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on January 26, 1960.

403. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Havana, December 2, 1959.

Dear Dick: I have your letter of November 20² enclosing a copy of the “paper on revised policy”. I will not comment on this until I see you next week. Generally speaking, I fully recognize the critical stage of our relations with Cuba. The efforts of our Government to create an atmosphere of good will and good faith have certainly not found an echo.

The situation is, however, fraught with all sorts of dangers which perhaps we on the spot may tend to exaggerate. I still have a vivid memory, as I am sure you do, of the “Morgan conspiracy” of last August. There is nothing Castro would like better than to get us out on a limb through a double agent of some kind. I am perhaps over suspicious, but I sometimes think that our friend Rufo Lopez Fresquet may be such an agent. I am glad that you use the word “step-by-step” in the paper, as I think that we must avoid getting our Government out in front of developments.

I have decided, on the basis of recent changes, to drop my policy of paying calls on newly appointed Cabinet Ministers and other high officials.

It was a pleasure to see John Hill³ and I found my exchange of views with him most useful. With cordial regards and looking forward to seeing you soon.

Sincerely yours,

Phil

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–259. Secret; Eyes Only; Official–Informal.

² Document 396.

³ The dates of Hill’s visit to Havana have not been determined. For Hill’s report to Rubottom on the visit, see Document 405.

404. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 4, 1959.

G–101

Accompanied by DCM I called today on Minister of National Economy Boti. I reviewed principal events in U.S.-Cuban relations since meeting on October 12 with Roa, Boti and Pazos,² noting deterioration that had occurred. I then referred to offer contained in Cuban note of November 13³ to continue negotiations on pending questions (Deptel 732⁴ ). I asked if Boti disposed to resume these discussions and he indicated assent.

I referred to hostile attitude of Cuban leaders from advent of revolutionary government. He countered with unfriendly attitude of American press toward revolution. I defended our press as perhaps mistaken at times and at others as naturally reacting to anti-American attitudes of Cuban leaders and 26 July press, but nevertheless objective and not directed either by Government or by big business interests. We then proceeded to economic topics.

Boti spoke of very slender exchange reserves of Cuban Government and complained at withdrawal by American banks of normal commercial credits to Cuba amounting to 40–50 million dollars. He said situation required drastic exchange controls and still further controls might be necessary. He said emphatically revolutionary government would not be forced out however by low state of foreign reserves.

Re agrarian reform, I reiterated our concern at provisions for valuation and compensation, particularly in light of financial possibilities of GOC. I suggested that American properties subject to expropriation under law might well come to several hundred million dollars. He said “perhaps”. I referred to our position that prompt, adequate and effective compensation should be made and at his request defined these terms. He said Cuba had never defaulted on its foreign debt yet and indicated he believed it could carry this one. I mentioned also indications of continued arbitrary takeover of property of U.S. citizens. I referred to our memo of October 12⁵ and GOC failure reply. He referred to recent law on expropriation (Law 588 described in despatch 602⁶ ) and said he thought this might give solution.

I went over briefly present difficult situation of electric light company due to 1) reduction of electric rates which seriously hampered Company’s earning capacity and its credit, 2) failure of Banco Nacional to extend ten million peso credit on terms Company had been led to believe were approved, and 3) failure of Bank to authorize $2 million remittance. Boti said Government’s financial situation less good than when this loan first discussed and Bank did not now have $2 million to spare for Company’s dollar obligations. I asked Minister to tell me frankly Government’s intention regarding Company since from Government’s actions it was hard not to believe that it intended to take over Company. Boti denied such intention and stated if this the case Government would not have considered lending Company 10 million pesos. He stated he had appointment to talk with Company officials tomorrow. (Latter have advised they have appointment with Boti and Oltuski tomorrow.) I left with him Aide-Mémoire as authorized by Deptel 686 but omitting unnumbered last paragraph.⁷

I referred to case of telephone company and to fact that “temporary intervention” had now lasted several months and inquired what Government’s intention was. Boti replied intention was for company to operate this utility, but he declined to predict when intervention would cease. I said high level conversations had been requested by Company from last September and asked whether there was any current consideration by GOC to holding these talks. He said this matter not presently under discussion.

I brought up mining law and asked about Government’s objectives in this field. He said purpose was to eliminate concession holders who were unable or unwilling to work their concessions, and to give financial assistance to new small mining enterprises. I asked intention re Moa and Nicaro. He said case of each mining company had to be worked out separately and that a successful arrangement had recently been concluded with Matahambre Copper Company. (This denied by Company official.) In answer my question, he said he knew nothing about recent action by Government authorities to prevent a shipment from Nicaro but he would investigate.

Re new petroleum law, Boti said Government’s intention was to make petroleum exploitation eventually a Government operation. Government monopoly would not extend, he intimated, to petroleum refining.

I brought up Law 647⁸ giving Labor Ministry authority to intervene any enterprise for various causes related to labor problems. He said this simply confirmed authority inherent in GOC and all Governments to intervene in case of dispute between labor and management.

Boti said if U.S. had worries about present situation, Cuba also had plenty of worries which he would be glad to discuss with me. I assured him I would like to do so at his convenience. I suggested that we could make a lot more progress on pending problems if Cuban leaders would stop treating U.S. Government and U.S. private companies as if they were enemies of Cuba and undeserving of fair and considerate treatment. I referred to my own efforts, which he recognized, to create atmosphere good will and good faith and said I felt these had not been reciprocated.

I do not know how much of this Boti will convey to Castro and others in Government. Our problem of communication is a most difficult one.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/12–459. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal and Braddock.

² See Document 367.

³ See Document 392.

⁴ In telegram 732, December 2, the Department instructed Bonsal, before he returned to the United States for consultations, to approach the Cuban Government with reference to its November 13 note and its implied willingness to discuss questions related to the Agrarian Reform Law. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/ 12–259)

⁵ See Document 367.

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 367.

⁷ In telegram 1191 from Havana, November 24, Bonsal provided the text of a memorandum on the situation of the Cuban Electric Company which he proposed to give to the Cuban Government. Telegram 686 to Havana, November 25, approved Bonsal’s proposal and noted that other companies might view this action as a precedent. (Department of State, Central Files, 837.2614/11–2459) The unnumbered last paragraph requested the assistance of the Minister of State “because of the serious damage to credit reputation of the two companies, in which the credit reputation of Cuba itself is also involved”.

⁸ This law, which was published in the Official Gazette on November 25, was summarized in telegram 1214 from Havana, November 27. (Ibid., 837.19/11–2759)

405. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, December 4, 1959.

SUBJECT

Observations Concerning Cuba and Our Current Policy Towards It

During my period of consultation in Habana last week, which included consultation with the various members of the Country Team, I made a number of observations which migh be useful in the implementation of our policy over the next few months.

1.

Attitudes Towards the Castro Regime and the Revolution. Observations and discussions on the ground bring out more clearly than reading or listening in Washington that Cuba is not sharply divided into pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups. Actually, there are three general groupings in Cuba: the first being a diminishing group of elements prepared to follow and support Castro and his clique unreservedly; the second consisting of a large number of people who retain hope in Castro and the stated aims of his Revolution, but are increasingly concerned about the direction it is taking; and a third composed of elements, largely from the processing [propertied?] classes and from the Batista and previous administrations, who are anti-Castro. In the current phase, it is the second rather than the third group which appears to be growing most rapidly, as there appears to be a marked emotional reluctance among many Cubans to face up to the fact that their union with Castro is turning out badly. Perhaps this reaction is most vividly illustrated by a report made to us by an American professor who witnessed the hysterical jubilation which swept over the University and the rest of Habana when a false report was received that Camilo Cienfuegos, the lost Army Chief, was found: the students were not only happy because the moderate and smiling Cienfuegos was popular, but hysterical because for many of them his “discovery” removed momentarily gnawing doubts that something sinister and ugly was going on in the Castro hierarchy. They wanted to believe that the Revolution was still pure and idealistic. If one were to single out factors underlying this tendency to cling to hope in Castro, the more prominent would be (a) the impact that real honesty, courtesy, and idealism in government, especially at the working level, has made on the people; (b) the fact that a great bulk of the Cubans, although increasingly apprehensive about methods, have awakened enthusiastically to the need for social and economic reform; and (c) the absence to date of alternative leadership which could serve as a repository for the new idealism. It is true, of course, that the process of disillusionment already started might greatly accelerate with uncalculable results, especially as so much depends on Castro’s ability to stay on the right side of the thin line between a national symbol of hope and an impractical buffoon.

The policy implications of the foregoing attitudes for the next few months would appear to be these:

(a) Any group, or coalition of groups, which can hope to supplant the present Castro gang can gain acceptance for the movement only on the basis of continuing the Revolution with more practical management and less national, socialist, and Marxist contact. For the present, elements associated with a “conservative” return to the status quo ante are unlikely to have appeal, even if they were not too closely associated with Batista.

(b) If such a group comes to power, the United States will have to be prepared to face up to the necessity of countenancing and even cooperating with a lot of aspects of the Revolution which are not wholly palatable. While a successor regime might be more in line with us on international and Communist issues and somewhat more moderate and free enterprise in outlook, it will continue to operate under a mandate that the government and not private initiative should bring about quickly the desired social transformation. This may mean, for instance, that U.S. investments will still not be handled entirely correctly and that U.S. aid will be expected for projects and programs which we would not ordinarily support.

(c) For the present, the United States must disassociate itself as much as possible from elements which would be considered as rushing to undo the Revolution and, in particular, seek to have the more notorious Batista elements leave Florida.

2. Economic Situation. While, particularly with the last Cabinet shifts, there appears to be growing realization in Habana that the regime is hell-bent on establishing a national-socialist economy, with the State taking over an increasing share of both production and distribution, it would be a mistake to believe that the errors that the Castro regime is making by the standards of classical free-enterprise economics will necessarily bring an early economic collapse. Even superficial observation of activity in Habana reveals the extent to which WPA-like public works cushion and postpone the impact of certain economic measures. One is struck also with the fact that as long as sugar sales hold up and workers directly and indirectly dependent on the sugar industry do not increase consumption, the backbone of the Cuban economy is not too much affected by the Revolutionary program. Further study is required before we would be justified in assuming that the actual economic situation (as distinct from psychological factors) will have a great bearing on the situation in 1960.

3. Actual or Potential Opposition. Despite increasing concern in Cuba about the course that Castro is taking, there is as yet little organized and purposeful opposition to his regime and, in particular, there appears to be no opposition group within the country which has any real hopes or plans to overthrow or take control of the Government in 1960. The principal actual or potential opposition forces of the country may be catalogued as follows:

(a) The Autenticos, under Tony Varona, are quietly but with some effect building up their organization. They have been particularly active in the labor movement, where along with the Catholics, they are credited with successfully resisting Castro’s insistence on a “unity” which would have brought card-carrying Communists into the CTC Executive. Varona, who broke a leg in a car wreck, is concentrating through his newspaper and TV appearances on the election issue. He is said to have definitely broken with Prio, and has direct contacts with other groups. However, he appears to have no “in” with any organized segment of the Armed Forces and no armed underground. He is thus not in a position to seize power if anything happens, or to initiate revolutionary action.

(b) Sanchez Arango has a smaller group than Varona and is apparently in close contact with Betancourt and Figueres. Although his aims and tactics are parallel to those employed by Varona, personal rivalry tends to keep them apart.

(c) Monte Cristi group, including Justo Carillo in Cuba and Col. Barquin in France, has kept together, but apparently is at the present stage largely a directorate without an organized following. Barquin lost prestige with the old professional officers’ corps, now disbanded, by his quick surrender to the Castro forces, but is still in a better position than most to rally this element.

(d) Catholic Labor and Youth organizations are reported to have vigorous, young leadership—many of the classmates of the 26th of July. They have done excellent although not mass-scale work in labor, and are now reportedly organizing a Christian Democratic Party. Their limitation is the limited appeal that denominational movements have in Cuba.

(e) Ex-26 of July. There is a growing body of “moderates” who have been removed in the various purges from responsible Government positions or expelled from the Government altogether. There are indications, although only limited concrete proof, that they have sympathizers still within the “26th of July” movement in the Armed Forces and government, especially in the provinces. This element is as yet apparently not organized, and its political leadership at the moment appears more disheartened than determined to do anything.

(f) Ex-“Batista” Elements, especially discharged officers, soldiers, and government employees constitute numerically probably the largest source of clear-cut opposition to Castro. Some of them have formed small guerrilla-outlaw bands in the provinces. However, the combination of the lack of effective organization and leadership and of the lack of any positive appeal at this time seriously limits their political effectiveness.

In addition to the foregoing, it should be noted that the Castro regime has not established full control of University students and of the labor movement. While these, at this time, cannot be said to be actual or potential opposition elements, their degree of independence from dictatorial control may be said to be an asset to non-Castro forces.

The immediate problems facing the opposition are, basically, (a) how to bring the various actual and potential opposition groups together and (b) how to get adequate support within the Armed Forces and, possibly, also the labor movement by undercutting the Castro leadership. There now appears to be no overall concept among them as to how this should be done although several aspects of the problem are becoming clear:

1. Greater unity, at this stage and probably through much of 1960, can only be brought about on the basis of carrying forward the Revolution; this means that the ex-Batista elements would, at best, have to be in the background.

2. Greater unity can only be brought about, in the immediate future, on the basis of a loose coalition—possibly some sort of “Democratic Revolutionary Directorate” representing the various factions—since the materials and leadership for making a single strong anti-Castro movement are unlikely.

3. No leadership now in exile appears to have the potential for attracting sufficient support to take control of the situation.

4. Initially at least, opposition cannot openly be directed against Castro himself and has to be directed at the failures and excesses of the Revolution and at the extremist elements on whom Castro relies.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–459. Secret. Drafted by Hill and Devine. The source text bears a drafting date of December 7. Copies were sent to Lester D. Mallory and Wieland. The source text bears the following handwritten marginal note: “A thoughtful analysis—well done. RRR”.

406. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Wieland) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, December 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

Suggested Course of Action toward Cuban Expropriation Problem

I agree substantially with much of Mr. Turkel’s memorandum to you to November 24² concerning the use of discretionary authority to change foreign sugar quotas. I commend Mr. Turkel, particularly for his admonition that the authority which it is intended to seek in Congress should not be used promptly, if indeed, it is used at all.

In this connection, I feel strongly that an attempt to use the sugar quota as a weapon against Castro will work what may be irreparable damage to our longe-range relations with Cuba and furthermore would be ineffective as a weapon in the achievement of our own objectives.

Any reduction in the sugar quota, whether “nibbling” or massive, would strike above all at those in Cuba most damaged by the Castro government’s program and whom we count on to restore sense to Cuba if we don’t complete their ruin. It would strengthen his hand with the large mass of Cubans who would be the last to feel the full impact of this device. Roughly 75 percent of the Cuban population, including practically all the urban and rural masses who now support Castro, live on a very low subsistence level. Long after their sugar quota would be damaged, they would continue to live much as now eating their usual diet of rice, beans and yucca, going barefoot or wearing alpagartas, wearing cheap local clothing and living in the shacks or inadequate housing they now occupy. On the other hand, those Cubans who seek, however inadequately at present, to improve relations with the United States as their main hope for Cuba’s future progress, would be the first to suffer.

The consequences of a cut in the United States quota for Cuban sugar could well be disastrous. We would be taking an irrevocable step which would certainly injure and could indeed destroy, the source of Cuba’s livelihood. I feel certain that all of us are satisfied that once any part of the quota has been taken away from Cuba, there would be little hope of ever restoring it. Whatever our original motivation, we would thus be embarked on a one-way voyage of destruction of one of the most advanced economies in Latin America in order to strike at Castro whose regime we have good reason to believe is transitory. At the same time we would very probably destroy politically and economically any possibility that compensation in some degree might be paid to the expropriated American investors who have been following our counsel with commendable patience considering the provocation to which they have been subject.

The political effects of a quota cut would be: (a) to create hatred of the United States in Cuba and elsewhere in the hemisphere; (b) to increase sympathy for Castro, thereby probably prolonging the tenure of his regime; (c) to give what would be, with perhaps some justification, clear evidence of a policy of economic coercion of a country 90 miles from our shores; and (d) to create for ourselves the eventual problem of trying to pull up Cuba’s weakened economy after Castro has gone, with grant aid—in effect, keeping Cuba on a dole from the United States taxpayer for an indefinite period while we try to overcome the antipathy toward the United States among the entire Cuban populace and continue to dig up more grant funds at the expense of the American taxpayer to replace revenues from Cuba’s present sugar exports to the United States.

I suggest that trying to strike at Castro through the sugar quota is economically unfeasible and politically unwise.

I suggest as an alternative for consideration in the Department the following course of action premised in each case on the continued recalcitrance and defiance of Castro:

1. A set of instructions to go forward promptly to Ambassador Bonsal giving him specific advice on the conduct of negotiations for a reasonable settlement of the expropriation question through mutually satisfactory terms of compensation and other pertinent conditions. (Advice on such instructions is being obtained from appropriate areas of the Department and other agencies.)

2. An offer would be made to the Cuban Government for a United States-Cuban Binational Commission, similar to that utilized in the case of the Mexican agrarian reforms, to seek agreement on fair valuation and mutually satisfactory terms of compensation.

3. A proposal to submit the entire question of expropriation and compensation to the the International Court of Justice or to agree to the establishment of an international arbitration commission under the auspices of the Court.

4. In order to prepare for step 7 below, and coincidental with either step 2 or 3 above, depending upon developments in Cuba, the Cuban Government would be told that the United States Government is giving it notice that it wishes to discuss, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of GATT,³ the considerable number of pending contraventions of GATT provisions by former Cuban governments, as well as by the present Cuban Government. (Some of these contraventions are of long standing, one of which, for instance, dates back to January 2, 1948.) Failing a satisfactory adjustment of these contraventions, the United States would refer to the GATT Contracting Parties the matter of the contraventions, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XXIII. (If the contravention matter should be referred to the Contracting Parties, this would partially prepare Cuba and international opinion for the next step described below.)

5. If the Cuban Government should refuse to adjust the GATT contraventions, the Cubans would be told that the United States is very much dissatisfied with the Cuban implementation of the provisions of GATT and that since the Cuban Government considers, as set forth in its note of November 13, 1959,⁴ that it is very much dissatisfied with the results of GATT, the United States would suggest that the two countries mutually agree to terminate the concessions which each has granted the other under GATT. In order to do this, the two Governments would have to ask the Contracting Parties for a waiver of their obligations, in accordance with Article XXV, paragraph 5, of GATT. At such time as the decision would be made by the two Governments to terminate their obligations under GATT, the two Governments would give notice of the termination of the reciprocal trade agreement of 1934,⁵ as amended, and the Convention of Reciprocity of 1902,⁶ between the United States and Cuba, which at present are inoperative and which would come into effect if the obligations under GATT should be terminated. The Cuban note also expressed strong criticism of these two agreements. (Under GATT and these agreements we are committed to refrain from discriminatory practices. In planning our moves ahead, we should constantly bear in mind that we stand out as advocates of respect for international commitments and that by adopting measures which would violate GATT or other agreements, we would open ourselves to severe criticism not only from Latin America but from European and other countries which are co-signatories with the United States of GATT or bilateral trade agreements.)

6. If Cuba should not agree that there would be mutual termination of the GATT concessions, we would unilaterally ask the Contracting Parties for a waiver of our obligations to Cuba. (This would be more difficult of attainment; in fact, we might conceivably be outvoted and be unable to obtain such a waiver.) The United States would also make a unilateral denunciation of the 1934 trade agreement and of the 1902 Convention.

7. With termination of the obligations of the agreements mentioned above, the way would be cleared for a request for legislative authority to submit the question of the valuation of and compensation for expropriated properties to the United States Commission on International Claims plus an additional request for authority to the Executive to impose appropriate taxes on all Cuban imports. The revenues from these taxes would be employed in creating a special fund with which to settle the claims of expropriated United States interests in Cuba according to the findings of the Commission.

The above procedure has the advantage of being clean cut and flexible. If at any stage during the above procedure we obtain satisfactory action from Cuba, the succeeding steps need not be invoked. Furthermore, we are in the position of refraining from punitive action by limiting ourselves simply to appropriate and recognized means for claiming compensation for private American interests expropriated by Cuba—from whose capital investments and enterprise the present Cuban Government is deriving the benefits. We thus limit ourselves to collecting payment clearly due our citizens with no direct burden on the American taxpayer on the one hand and no unduly harsh measures damaging to the Cuban economy on the other. In addition, we establish a basis for dealing with similar cases which (God forbid) may occur in other countries. This would certainly tend to discourage any other country from attempting to follow the present Cuban pattern inasmuch as we would have clearly demonstrated that we have adequate means of obtaining compensation either by mutual agreement, if possible, or by unilateral action, if forced.

Recommendation:

That you approve the course of action set forth in Nos. 1 through 7 above and authorize CMA to advance this position in discussions with E, L, and other interested areas of the Department.⁷

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Sept–Dec.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Wieland, Vallon, Stevenson, and A.H. Hood. Also sent to Turkel and Hill for concurrence.

² See footnote 3, Document 397.

³ The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, concluded at Geneva on October 30, 1947, and entered into force for the United States on January 1, 1948; for text, see TIAS No. 1700 or 62 Stat. (Pts. 5 and 6).

⁴ See Document 392.

⁵ Signed August 24, 1934, and subsequently amended; for text of the original agreement, see 49 Stat. 2559.

⁶ Signed December 11, 1902; for text, see 33 Stat. 2136.

⁷ 

The source text bears no indication that the memorandum was approved or disapproved. An attached, undated typewritten note from Turkel to Rubottom reads:

“I agree with most of the reasoning and nearly all of the action recommendations in Mr. Wieland’s memo on how to handle the agrarian expropriations in Cuba. “I think the order of action should be this:

“1. Propose round table negotiations on all subjects after getting the new authority to set sugar quotas.

“2. If Castro refuses, then go through the various steps recommended by Wieland.

“My major difference with Mr. Mann was this: Mr. Mann would start cutting Cuba’s quota right away. My difference with Wieland is that apparently he would never cut the quota. The most Wieland would ever do would be to impose the 1–1/4 cent penalty.

“My recommendation is: make the maximum good faith effort to negotiate with Cuba. If this fails file suit in the International Court of Justice, etc., but in the last analysis you must be prepared for a massive cut if all efforts to negotiate and resort to judicial means are rejected.”

Appended to Turkel’s comments is the following remark by Wieland:

“This is inaccurate interpretation of what I intended to say. I would cut quota but only as a last resort, after all else had failed and if Castro’s regime should survive that long.

“I would not impose a 1–1/4 cent penalty necessarily. I would tax all Cuban imports, after obtaining appropriate authorization from Congress.”

No comment by Hill on the memorandum has been found.

407. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, December 10, 1959.

SUBJECT

U.S. Military Interest in a Policy Paper on Cuba

Ed Vallon informs me that Mr. Smith (S/P) has been asked by Defense for “a policy paper” on Cuba on the grounds that the military will sooner or later be called upon to help.

This appears to be a further aspect of the phenomenon about which we have talked several times of late: The military’s puzzlement about what they conceive to be the Department’s policy or lack thereof; the tendency of at least some of them to take an overtly tougher, if not interventionist, attitude toward Cuba and Castro, which they equate; and the consequent wish of some military elements to have the NSC and/or OCB go to work on Cuba and the Caribbean to develop with their participation a policy document.²

In part, this phenomenon may be due to the fact that senior Defense and JCS officials do not know either that we have a definite policy or what its nature is. You will recall that when we first put our paper³ up to Mr. Murphy (before it went on to higher realms) we asked not only for approval but for specific authorization to transmit it on a “need-to-know” basis to Ambassador Bonsal, Mr. George Allen, Mr. Allen Dulles, and to Defense. At the time, Mr. Murphy ruled against papers being transmitted but indicated he would take the matter up orally. Since then, Ambassador Bonsal and Mr. Dulles have been given the substance of our aim and position, and Mr. Allen has been cued in on the role USIA could play, but Defense is, so far as I am aware, still not on our current wave length.

It seems probable that we will have continuing difficulty unless we do something to clear up the situation, although we will have to be most careful that the military do not misinterpret or over-interpret our position and keep our basic attitude on a strictly “need-to-know” basis. It is also important that the military be thoroughly impressed with the necessity that the U.S. avoid undoing the rift developing between Castro and Co., on the one hand, and the Cuban people and the rest of Latin America on the other, by actions or words which would transform it into a Cuban-American rift.

My proposals would be:

a) That you ask Mr. Merchant to give the substance of the position to Mr. Gates privately.

b) That you go along with Mr. Merchant and/or Mr. Smith in the near future to the JCS to explain the position and brief them about the current Cuban situation.

c) That Mr. Merchant, Mr. Smith, and you all endeavor to persuade Mr. Gates and the JCS to keep our basic attitude and position to themselves, but that they take steps to get their subordinates to lay off trying to develop papers and policies on Cuba in the NSC–OCB and elsewhere at this time.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1059. Secret. Drafted by Hill. Copies were sent to Mallory and Gerard Smith.

² This was a sentiment shared by some members of the NSC staff. In a memorandum of December 3 to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, Samuel Belk, on behalf of fellow staff members, wrote that a paper on the Cuban problem should be discussed by the Council during the President’s absence. Belk mentioned the Department’s reluctance, expressed at recent Planning Board meetings, to have a policy paper written on Cuba because “the situation at present is too fluid” and “great flexibility is needed to handle U.S.-Cuban relations.” Belk wrote he and his colleagues believed the time had come for high-level decisions on some outstanding issues between the two countries “which will be of continuing importance to the United States regardless of the kind of government we have in Havana,” such as the sugar problem, the Guantanamo base, and the Nicaro facility. (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation)

³ Document 376.

⁴ Written on the source text is the following: “I will do. RRR”. On December 29, Merchant telephoned General Nathan F. Twining and suggested that the Department of State and Joint Chiefs resume their regular Friday morning meetings. Merchant suggested that they meet on January 8 at the Pentagon and that “it might be useful to have a discussion on Cuba and, if they are interested, on other problems in the Caribbean as well.” Twining agreed. (Memorandum of a telephone conversation, December 29; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2959) Regarding the January 8 meeting, see Document 419.

408. Memorandum of Discussion at the 428th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 10, 1959¹

Washington, December 10, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

The Vice President asked what was the Communist line toward Cuba? He gathered that the Russians did not object to a tough line on the part of Cuba. Mr. Bissell said the Soviets encouraged a tough anti-US line in Cuba under the guise of nationalism. Mikoyan had not stopped off in Cuba on his recent trip because he did not wish to give additional credence to the view that the people around Castro had Communist affiliations.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

The Vice President felt that Congress at the next session would make a massive assault on our Latin American policy as a result of incidents in Panama and Cuba. The general line will be that the U.S. is not paying sufficient attention to Latin America. Secretary Herter said he was much concerned about the situation in Panama, where Left-Wingers were using the U.S. as a whipping-boy to get at the government. He was also concerned about the Quito Conference, which is now scheduled to begin February 1 but which might be postponed to February 15. Moreover, Cuba was a first-class headache with Castro going in the same direction as Kassem. The Vice President said it was his impression that Cuba was being driven toward Communism more and more. Mr. Bissell reported that only one top official now in the Cuban Government was without some sort of Communist affiliation. Secretary Anderson asked whether the popularity of Castro had been evaluated recently. Mr. Bissell replied that in the Gallup Poll sense, Castro probably enjoyed enormous popularity, especially in the countryside, although his popularity was not as great in the cities due to the urban unemployment caused by some of his policies. The Vice President inquired whether some of Castro’s early supporters among the opinion-making class in Cuba had now deserted him. He wondered whether there had been a significant loss of support for Castro among the newspapers and the universities. Mr. Bissell said there had been a tremendous loss of following in these groups, although censorship over the press had tended to conceal these defections to some extent. Mr. Gates seemed to recall that our Ambassador had said [5 lines not declassified]. Recently he [Castro] spoke before a Catholic meeting in Havana and after a cool reception felt it necessary to call another meeting of his followers immediately in order to recover the feeling that he had tremendous popular support. The Vice President then inquired about the sugar subsidy and Secretary Herter indicated his belief that this problem would be the subject of a battle royal in the next session of Congress. He hoped, however, that Congress will allow the Administration to make policy on a flexible basis rather than establishing a rigid policy in the law. At present we were paying $180 million in the subsidy. The Vice President wondered whether it would not be worthwhile to call in members of Congress particularly interested in the sugar subsidy problem and discuss it with them off the record. He asked whether he correctly understood that Secretary Herter feels the State Department must have some control over the subsidy. Secretary Herter answered in the affirmative. Secretary Anderson asked whether State now had the authority to take whatever action it wanted to take with respect to the sugar problem. Secretary Herter said the Department of State did not now have the authority and would have to go to Congress to obtain it. The Vice President believed the State Department should have discretion in this field, even though the problems were difficult. At present Castro knows that the U.S. cannot move against him. Secretary Herter remarked that Castro was now selling sugar to the Russians at about half the price paid by the U.S.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting. The President had left Washington on December 3 for a goodwill mission to Rome, Ankara, Karachi, Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, Athens, Tunis, Toulon, Paris, Madrid, and Casablanca. He returned to Washington on December 22.

409. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Working Group on the Cuban Economic Situation (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)¹

Washington, December 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

Estimate of Economic Outlook for Cuba

At the suggestion of Mr. Dillon a working group within the Department considered the economic position of Cuba. This group came to two conclusions:

Conclusions:

1. Although it is possible that economic pressures will build up in the near future which would be sufficient to endanger the Castro government, it is not probable that such will be the case. Despite the substantial decline in Cuban foreign exchange earnings, the extremely low level of official dollar reserves, and the internal economic frictions resulting from government policies aimed at increased state direction of and participation in the economy, the indications are that the Castro government will be able to maintain a viable economy for an indefinite period. This conclusion assumes that the government will be technically competent to deal with its intensified economic problems, and that it will not adopt measures which result in civil unrest of substantial proportions, assumptions which may or may not be valid.

2. Any economic sanctions which are feasible would not have a very serious impact, but would be an irritant and probably counterproductive. A partial reduction of the Cuban sugar quota would be annoying to the Castro government but would have only a slight injurious effect on the Cuban economy. Even the total exclusion of Cuban sugar from the U.S. market—not considered feasible—would reduce Cuban national income by only about 5 per cent.

Discussion:

The Cuban national income for the foreseeable future is likely to decline moderately, or, at best, remain at about the present level. This will result mainly from a reduction in export earnings because of lower sugar prices, the loss of tourist earnings, and the virtual disappearance of foreign capital inflows. It is estimated that for the foreign sector alone Cuba will suffer a decline of about $195 million in total income in 1959 as compared with 1958.

On the other hand, the Cuban government is taking strenuous measures to live within this reduced income. The expected reduction in imports will offset almost all of the above decline of $195 million in foreign exchange receipts. In addition, the government is curtailing foreign payments for services, capital, and financial transactions. It is possible that Cuba can balance its external accounts at a lower level largely by reducing imports from the abnormally high levels of 1956 through 1958. For 1960 and beyond it may be expected that export earnings will be somewhat lower than for 1959. Cuban imports might be reduced even further if necessary to create external balance without an unbearably depressive effect on the economy.

The Cuban government’s plans for ambitious public works programs indicate strongly that inflationary potentials will be generated if the announced plans are implemented by deficit-financing. However, the government has so far evidenced appreciation of the dangers of inflation and of the importance which Cubans of all classes attach to the stability of the Cuban peso. It is therefore probable that serious inflation will not occur in Cuba during the short-run period of a year to 18 months which is considered in this paper.

Cuban national income in 1959 is expected to be about $2 billion, a decline of about 6 per cent from 1958 and 13 per cent below 1957. Over the short run it is probable that there will be further reductions in national income as the disorganizing impact of government policies takes effect. It is not believed, however, that these declines will be of any great magnitude; there may even be some economic expansion later as government spending gets underway, and if the government directs sufficient energies toward agricultural production (to implement the agrarian reform program), and does not starve the agricultural sector in order to promote forced-draft industrialization. In any case, it is estimated that the Cuban national income will fall by perhaps another 5 per cent in 1960 as compared with 1959.

In view of the government’s policy of redistributing income away from foreigners and upper-income groups to the lowest-income groups and the lower middle classes, it is anticipated that the standard of living of the great majority of the population will show no serious decline and may even improve. By such measures as price freezing, arbitrary reductions in rents and utilities, forced wage increases, forced maintenance of employment, transfers of unutilized urban land, agrarian reform, and other pressures on foreign and domestic companies, basic steps in the direction of a redistribution of income have already been taken. In the eleven months that Castro has been in power the standard of living of low-income groups appears, on the basis of available statistics, to have improved. Although such apparent increases in incomes cannot be indefinitely maintained by purely redistributional measures not accompanied by increased overall output, income disparities in Cuba are very wide, and the present trend can probably be maintained for an appreciable period of time.

By the time the Castro government came into power Cuban official dollar reserves had fallen to $111 million net, the lowest level in recent times; in the five years since 1953 Cuba lost gold and dollar reserves amounting to about $379 million. By the end of 1959 it is expected that official reserves will decline to about $75 million or less. This low level of reserves is likely to force the Cuban government to maintain an extremely cautious policy with regard to imports and external payments. While this low level of reserves reduces significantly the Cuban government’s room for maneuver, it is not believed that it will lead to such a large reduction in imports as to further depress the level of economic activity.

Any likely reduction in the Cuban sugar quota to the U.S. would not significantly alter the above analysis. In view of U.S. dependence on Cuban sugar, as well as other considerations, the total cutting off of the Cuban quota is not feasible; if so drastic a sanction were possible, it would result in a significant but tolerable loss to Cuba of around $120 million, or between 4 and 5 per cent of the 1959 national income. Any partial reduction in the sugar quota would, of course, have a proportionately smaller economic impact. A partial reduction would be irritating, rather than materially injurious, to Castro.

The above conclusions assume that the Cuban government will show a reasonable amount of technical competence in handling its economic and financial problems. The recent dismissal of high-ranking relatively moderate Cuban officials and their replacement by technically less competent left-wing officials tend to weaken somewhat an assumption that Cuba’s economic programs will in fact be implemented effeiciently. In addition, the possibility cannot be ruled out that civil unrest could occur to an extent sufficient to upset any economic estimates.²

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Albert Post (ARA/REA) and Benjamin R. Moser (OFD/FN) and cleared with Stevenson, Carl F. Norden (OT/TA), and John P. Rourk (OR/CSD). Also addressed to Rubottom. A handwritten note on the source text by Devine indicates that Rubottom had a copy of the memorandum.

² A copy of this memorandum was sent by Post under cover of a letter of December 16 to Eugene A. Gilmore, Jr., Counselor for Economic Affairs at the Embassy in Havana. Post, noting that Gilmore had seen a preliminary draft of the memorandum while he was in Washington and that Ambassador Bonsal had also seen a draft more recently, asked for Gilmore’s and Braddock’s evaluation of it. (Washington National Records Center RG 84, Habana Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, Economic—Cuba) Since Gilmore was not expected to return to Havana until mid-February, Commercial Attaché Leonard Price replied on December 23 that Braddock and Agricultural Attaché Chester Davis thought the general approach was sound, but offered a number of specific suggestions to correct statements that appeared to have been overtaken by recent events. (Ibid.)

410. Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 16, 1959¹

Washington, December 16, 1959

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

With respect to Cuba, Mr. Dulles said he would deal only with the new stance of that country’s foreign policy and its closer ties with the Afro-Asian Bloc. These closer ties were accented by the return of “Che” Guevara who recently visited Yugoslavia and nine Afro-Asian countries and who felt Cuba could pick up trade and political support among these countries. There were various other indications of a Cuban attempt to establish closer relations with the Afro-Asian Bloc. For example, a recent statement by a Cuban before the United Nations had called the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. twin evils. The UAR was promoting the sale of cotton to Cuba. There were also indications that Cuba was about to suggest a conference of twenty-eight underdeveloped countries. Cuba was also drawing closer to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The Soviet exhibit would soon be moved from Mexico to Havana and Rojas plans to go to Communist China in January.

The Attorney General asked how after Castro had delivered a seven-hour harangue before a court demanding a death sentence for an accused man, the court could give the accused only twenty years.² Mr. Dulles said in his view Castro probably told the court quietly to mitigate the severe penalty which he publicly demanded. [6 sentences (12 lines) not declassified] The Attorney General said it was hard to understand the logic of Castro in asking the court publicly to impose a death penalty and then asking the court privately to mitigate this penalty. He would have thought the Cuban people would have said, “Castro is not as powerful as we thought he was.” Mr. Allen said this procedure permitted Castro to proclaim that the Cuban courts were independent.

Mr. McCone asked whether there was any conservative element left in Cuba. Mr. Dulles said there was still a considerable conservative element in the country, but it did not dare to be vocal and was not well organized. Important opposition leaders were out of the country and there was no organized opposition internally. The only armed force ready to oppose the Castro regime was a foreign legion now in Santo Domingo. Only ten per cent of this force was Cuban; the remainder consisted of soldiers of fortune. Mr. Dulles felt it would be unfortunate if there were an expedition against Cuba originating in the Dominican Republic. There were many anti-Castro groups in Florida and on the Caribbean isles willing to take action against Castro, but they were not organized.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

4. Topics for Future Discussion or Consideration by the National Security Council

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Cuba. Secretary Dillon said the problem of Cuba was extremely complex and delicate, not only because of action taken with respect to Cuba, but also because of the psychological reaction to any actions which might be taken. Since there had been continuing discussions between the President and the Secretary of State with respect to Cuba, Mr. Dillon believed that the Planning Board should not be hasty about taking up Cuban policy until the President and the Secretary of State returned. In any event, the problem of Cuba should be handled under special security precautions. The Vice President did not believe that Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through normal diplomatic channels. Congress was an important element in the situation. The Administration must try to guide Congress and not simply react to proposals which may be made in Congress. He urged that between now and January 6 supplementary studies of U.S. strategy toward Cuba should be undertaken. Mr. Gray said there was disagreement within the Government on the basic approach to the Cuban problem. The Treasury’s suggestion for a paper on Cuba had been deliberately provocative, that is, intended to elicit discussion. Mr. Gray felt that certain elements in the State Department, particularly Assistant Secretary Rubottom, opposed Planning Board work on Cuba. The Vice President said that when Congress reconvened there would be a great assault on the Administration’s Latin American policy. Heavy criticism of that policy was coming from the Republican as well as the Democratic members of Congress. In his view a discussion of Cuba could not be avoided. The problem would soon have far-flung implications beyond the control of the Department of State; and any tendency of State Department officials to attempt to delay action would not be appropriate. Secretary Dillon said he was concerned that a strong attitude which this Government might assume in order to satisfy public opinion would not achieve basic U.S. objectives with respect to Cuba. The Vice President recalled that some State Department officials had earlier taken the position that we would be able to live with Castro. No doubt radical steps with respect to Cuba would create an adverse reaction throughout Latin America, but we needed to find a few dramatic things to do with respect to the Cuban situation in order to indicate that we would not allow ourselves to be kicked around completely. The Attorney General remarked that his Department could be either tough or lenient with respect to anti-Castro elements operating in Florida. He needed policy guidance, however, before specific instructions could be given to FBI agents in the Miami area. Mr. Gray said that a discussion of Cuba by the Council would not mean that the policy would be rewritten in detail, but only that the problem would be discussed on the basis of a paper prepared by the Planning Board, which would be seized of the problem only for the purpose of preparing a discussion outline. Mr. Scribner said Treasury had suggested the question of Cuba not necessarily for the purpose of changing the policy or interfering with State’s conduct of our relations with Cuba, but for the purpose of discussing the problem. Secretary Dillon said he had no objection to a discussion of Cuba, but he thought the matter should be handled as a delicate one without wide dissemination of knowledge that it was being discussed. The Vice President felt that Assistant Secretary Rubottom and the Planning Board could probably agree on what matters it would be appropriate to discuss. He repeated his fear that the problem was getting beyond the normal diplomatic province. Secretary Dillon suggested that the Planning Board might go ahead with the preparation of a Discussion Paper. The Vice President felt this was a good solution and added that we should not advertise the fact that we regard the situation in Cuba as a crisis situation. The Attorney General indicated that from 30 to 40 FBI agents in the Miami area were spending all their time on Cuban affairs, but were having some difficulties because they did not know whether it was our policy to permit anti-Castro activities to continue in Florida or whether such activities should be stopped. Mr. Dulles felt the question of whether anti-Castro activities should be permitted to continue or should be stopped depended on what the anti-Castro forces were planning. We could not, for example, let the Batista-type elements do whatever they wanted to do. However, a number of things in the covert field could be done which might help the situation in Cuba.³

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting.

² Reference is to Fidel Castro’s testimony on December 14 in the trial of Huber Matos, which was summarized in telegram 1391 from Havana, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1559) The Embassy’s evaluation of the trial was contained in telegram 1398 from Havana, December 16. (Ibid., 737.00/12–1659)

³ 

As a result of this discussion, the National Security Council agreed (NSC Action No. 2166–b–(1)) that, subject to consideration by the President, a “Discussion Paper on Cuba should be prepared by the Department of State and discussed in the Planning Board under special security precautions prior to its submission to the NSC.” (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) On December 23, Gordon Gray met with the President to report, among other things, on the discussion that had occurred at the NSC meeting of December 16. (Memorandum of conversation by Gray; Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President)

In a memorandum of December 23 to Secretary Herter, NSC Executive Secretary Lay indicated the President had that day approved NSC Action No. 2166–b–(l). (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5902 Memoranda)

411. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 22, 1959—1 p.m.

1460. Cabinet approved night December 21 alterations to “fundamental law” authorizing seizure all property both real and personal of persons engaging in “counter-revolutionary activities”. Also approved enabling legislation. According to morning press, law authorizes seizure in cases of those found guilty such crimes, those who leave Cuba to avoid action of revolutionary tribunals, and those who engage in “conspiratorial activities” abroad.

Counter-revolutionary crimes are defined in law 425 of July 7, 1959, translation of which forwarded as enclosure to despatch 133 of July 24, 1959² entitled “Certain crimes of counter-revolutionary nature become punishable by death”. List is extremely broad, including war against state; insurrection; attempted violent change of government; interference with government in performance of duties; introduction, publication or propagation of communications belittling national sovereignty or attempting to cause non-observance of existing legislation; incitement to perform any of foregoing; organization, arming, participation in or assistance to groups intending to perform any of foregoing; accessory before or after fact in connection with foregoing.

Embassy comment: These and other recent measures are considered characteristic of openly dictatorial regimes, determined to retain power and employing intimidation, suppression of civil liberties and extreme action against opposition to achieve purposes.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2259. Confidential; Priority.

² Not printed. (Ibid., 737.00/7–759)

412. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 22, 1959¹

Washington, December 22, 1959

SUBJECT

Protection of American interests in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Representatives of National Foreign Trade Council:

Mr. H. Harvey Pike, President, H.H. Pike & Company, Chairman, NFTC Cuba Committee

Mr. G.P. Gardner, Chairman, United Fruit Company Mr. H.B. Sargent, President, American & Foreign Power

Mr. H.W. Balgooyen, Director of Council and Executive Vice President, American & Foreign Power

Mr. Emilio Collado, Treasurer, Standard Oil Co. (ESSO) Mr. John Akin, Secretary of NFTC

Department of State:

Acting Secretary Douglas Dillon

ARA—Lester D. Mallory, Acting Assistant Secretary

L—Eric H. Hager, Legal Adviser

ARA:REA—Harry R. Turkel, Director

ARA:CMA—Edwin E. Vallon, Deputy Director

U—Dixon Donnelley

ARA:CMA—Robert A. Stevenson, Cuban Affairs

ARA:CMA—George O. Gray

E—Carl Norden

Mr. Pike informed the group that the Cuba Committee of the NFTC has held many meetings since Castro’s advent to power in Cuba. He said it is concerned about the loss of liberty to the Cuban people and other abuses, but at this meeting wished to discuss the property rights of Americans. He asked Mr. Balgooyen to present the Cuba Committee’s views.

Mr. Balgooyen said that the Committee felt that if Castro stays in power, all American investments in Cuba are doomed. He is also fearful of the Communist direction of the Government, with agrarian reform, expropriation, taking of private property, and the loss of personal liberties, all of which parallel the pattern followed in China, Czechoslovakia and Poland. He is especially fearful that the example of Cuba might be followed in Latin American, African and other countries throughout the world. There is also a real and growing concern for the welfare and safety of American employees in Cuba.

He said the Committee takes the position that, without evidence that Cuba is going to pay and without any strong evidence that the United States is going to take any actions,

(1) they want to make clear their concern regarding the effect of Cuban events on all Latin America,

(2) they wanted to present a specific resolution adopted by the National Foreign Trade Council last month, and

(3) they hoped after the presentation of their proposal that Acting Secretary Dillon might be able to tell of any plans the Department may have dealing specifically with the Cuban problem.

Mr. Balgooyen said that the Council felt that there is a growing disrespect throughout the world for property rights and contractual obligations. Also they sense that the feeling seems to be growing that there is no disposition on the part of the United States Government to give adequate protection to American investment interests abroad, although the United States Government has encouraged American capital to invest in foreign countries. He said that in addition to a concern for investment the NFTC, in a civic sense, is alarmed at the invasion by Communists of the labor movement in Latin American countries, and the infiltration of Communists in the press and in colleges and universities. He said the Council feels convinced that the Communists have almost complete control in Cuba.

Mr. Balgooyen stated that a proposal of the NFTC at the Forty-Sixth National Foreign Trade Convention held in New York, November 16 to 18, 1959 had been approved by the 2000 delegates of the Council and that the Board of Directors had given its approval to the policy set out in the resolution. Of the $27 billion which Americans have invested abroad, he felt the $19 billion invested in Latin America is endangered. He said there is a broadening concept of the right of eminent domain to include nationalization and redistribution of wealth which constitutes one of the greatest threats of our time. He said the Council feels that it is the responsibility of the United States to take whatever steps it can to ensure that this does not occur without prompt, adequate and effective compensation.

Mr. Balgooyen said the Council feels that a broad statement of policy should be issued by the United States Government, covering, not just Cuba, but the whole field of private investment abroad.

(Mr. Balgooyen then read from the recommendations of the 46th National Foreign Trade Convention, as follows):

That the Government of the United States recognizes the right of any sovereign nation to manage its internal affairs as it sees fit, including the right to take property within its jurisdiction for a well-recognized public purpose; but that it firmly maintains that all rights, sovereign or otherwise, are coupled with reciprocal obligations, and that the right to take private property for a public use is coupled under international law with the corresponding obligation to provide prompt, adequate and effective compensation; that it is therefore the policy of the United States that no agency of the United States Government shall lend, grant or give public funds or economic assistance to any government or to any agency of a government which expropriates, or in any other manner takes possession of the property or property rights of a United States citizen, or of a corporation owned or controlled by citizens of the United States, without payment of prompt, adequate and effective compsensation; or which persists in dishonoring the contractual rights of such citizens or corporations.

Acting Secretary Dillon said the problem has two aspects: (1) what we do about Cuba, and (2) the general effect on other parts of the world. He said the Department has felt, as a basic policy, that in preserving our interests in Cuba we must be careful that we don’t actually strengthen Castro without accomplishing our objectives and that we don’t provide increased sympathy for Castro among other countries, particularly in Latin America. The Department shares with the NFTC the same concern and the same goals with regard to Cuba, and it is only a question of the best means, from the standpoint of overall U.S. interests for achieving them. He expressed a doubt as to the efficacy of a broad statement of the sort recommended by the NFTC and suggested that certain planned actions on our part rather than such a statement might have a much greater effect. He added he does not believe that the Cuban action has reached the point of affecting our interests throughout the world or that there is the feeling that Cuba is getting away unscathed.

Mr. Dillon pointed out that Congress during its last session added to the Mutual Security Act a provision prohibiting the extension of assistance to any country which failed to give suitable compensation for expropriated property. From a practical point of view this policy applies to all government loans except for those of the Export-import Bank. This policy could be played up in speeches being given by Government officials.

Mr. Gardner reported that his Company’s people report many Latin American Governments are completely fed up with Castro and are asking how long the U.S. is going to stand by. Through his appeal to people, he can cause pressures that some governments cannot stand.

Mr. Sargent reported that regarding American & Foreign Power’s claim against the Brazilian state of Rio Grande del Sul, he had called on the Brazilian President (by an appointment worked out with the British Ambassador) but that their claim is still before the court where 23 judges are writing separate opinions on the appraised value of the property.

Mr. Collado reported that there is a gradual erosion of his company’s position in Cuba arising from taxes, currency transfer controls, labor agitation and other extreme demands. The Government is not releasing pesos to pay for their crude imports; the sugar industry is asking for petroleum products on credit; Cubana Airlines hasn’t paid for months. Castro has developed the technique of going over the heads of government to the people and this is a big problem—he has influence with large segments of the people. ECLA has put together a good “facade” with regard to the need for government planning and control of economics and the deficiencies of private foreign investment. Its staff work on government ownership has been very good. A real and vigorous effort is necessary if we are to counteract this trend which did not begin with Castro although he has given it impetus.

It was asked if the United States position would not be supported by some other Latin American countries (and not only with reference to action through the OAS).

It was asked if any consideration is being given to answering the erroneous accusations that are being made by Castro. Mr. Collado said that his company has had recommendations that its stockholders start a ground-swell of grass-roots opinion directed at Congressmen. He said some of the “best written” letters urged a cut in Cuba’s sugar quota. Mr. Balgooyen said this would be a mistake and that we do not want to do permanent damage to the Cuban economy. He added, however, that unless something is done to let stockholders and Congress know that steps are being taken by the Government, it will be difficult to keep Congress from taking undesirable action. Mr. Dillon agreed that this is a real problem to which the Department is giving active thought and expects soon to begin certain careful steps which will make it evident that the U.S. is determined that its investors will be fairly treated. Timing is, of course, a factor which must be considered most carefully.

Mr. Collado said that talking about protection alone would be bad, but that the U.S. position must be put on a higher plane relating to the benefits to be gained from private foreign investment. We should take a positive line—should sell the real good which we know lies in a free, capitalistic economy. He expressed his personal view that there is little the U.S. can do to prevent the situation in Cuba from getting much worse; that it will run its course in two or three years and then maybe a modus vivendi can be worked out.

Mr. Dillon informed the group that the Department will help in every way possible concerning any particular problem individual companies might have. He said that the Department is working on developing a specific program as far as Cuba is concerned. Mr. Pike stated that they would be glad to do anything individually or as a group that they can do.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Mallory informed the group of the visit of the President of the American Chamber of Commerce of Cuba, Mr. Ken Campbell, to inform appropriate officials that the Chamber requested the U.S. Government to take all steps to protect American property rights in Cuba, but recommended against any reduction in the Cuban sugar quota.

Mr. Turkel told the group of the Department’s position with the sugar people. The Department plans to recommend that Section 202 be amended to permit the President to revise the quotas, but in order to prevent doing permanent damage to Cuba and creating permanent rights in other countries, to require the President to fill any reductions by buying sugar at world market prices. It is hoped this can be used in negotiations. A tax idea is a difficult one, but, if every effort to solve the problem by negotiation fails, the United States would have no recourse but to impose a tax from which to pay for expropriated properties.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, December 1959. Official Use Only. Drafted by Stevenson and George O. Gray.

² In a December 22 memorandum to Rubottom and others in ARA, Mallory noted that following this meeting, Dillon asked him to stop in his office for a talk. Dillon praised a paper prepared by Wieland (apparently Document 406) and told Mallory that very soon the timing of the steps recommended by Wieland had to be determined. Dillon referred specifically to the concerns expressed by Vice President Nixon at the last NSC meeting about public and congressional opinion toward U.S. Latin American policy. When Dillon requested his observations, Mallory suggested that either the Secretary of State or the President make a declaration of U.S. “solidarity with and such help as we could give” regarding capital formation within the Latin American countries, and a statement concerning the U.S. attitude toward expropriation. Dillon suggested that it would be “desirable to get on with the thinking and formulation of some program of this sort”. (Memorandum by Mallory; Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files: Lot 61 D 411, Policy 1959)

413. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, December 23, 1958.

SUBJECT

Sugar Legislation

While we have made considerable progress in reaching agreement within the Administration and with the domestic industry for a common front on the Sugar Act, there remain a few unresolved issues which deserve urgent attention:

I

Question: If we request Congress to give the Executive power to change foreign quotas, will we actually use the authority to reduce the Cuban preferential position in our market?

Comment: We seem to be proceeding on the assumption that if we alter the Cuban quota we will automatically stand convicted of applying economic sanctions to bring about the overthrow of Castro. I question this. There are cogent economic reasons for making a reduction in Cuba’s quota.

In the past, account was taken of the fact that Cuba has the lion’s share of the foreign country allocation.² Several other countries whose need for foreign exchange and economic development is no less pressing than Cuba’s have persistently requested a more equitable sharing of our sugar market. So great a degree of preference for Cuba is unnatural, discriminatory, inconsistent with our policy of generalizing trade concessions and inconsistent with our general political policy of treating all American Republics alike.

If these general considerations influenced, as I believe they did, previous reductions in Cuba’s quota, there are even stronger economic reasons for following the same course now.

In the past it could at least be said that Cuba was entitled to a large subsidy because it accumulated and stored at its own expense huge quantities of sugar which it was willing to sell to the United States at fair prices in periods of need. The United States was at least guaranteed an adequate supply of sugar at fair prices.

These advantages are no longer reciprocal. The Cuban agrarian reform program, as well as its plans for diversification and for agricultural cooperatives, promise gradually to reduce sugar production. The development of alternate sources of foreign supply will takes years and should be started now by increasing their share of our market.

Even if production should not decline there can be no assurance that Cuban surplus will continue to be accumulated in quantities adequate for our needs or, indeed, that it will be sold to us at fair prices. Cuban government officials have repeatedly declared their objective to be a reduction of their trade ties with us and an increase of trade with the rest of the world, both free and communist, in order to gain “economic independence” from us.

It is our dependence on Cuban sugar that counsels restraint in the size of any quota cut. But unless one believes that the old order will be permanently re-established soon in Cuba, there is no reason why we should not start now—while there is still time—gradually to transfer some of our eggs to other more reliable baskets. The Department of Agriculture has already warned of the possibility of sugar shortages in the future. What are we to say to the American people if these shortages occur as a result of the deliberate perpetuation of United States dependence on Cuba at precisely the time when Cuba is moving in the opposite direction?

Moreover, Cuba has already violated its obligations to give our products preference in the Cuban market. Are we to say to American exporters that we remain bound while Cuba does not?

The Cuban quota has already been twice reduced by Congress; if a third reduction followed the same pattern and rested on the same reasons it would be difficult to show that our political motives are different now then they were on the two previous occasions when friendly Cuban regimes were in power.

But if it is politically impossible to reduce the quota then we ought to say so now and accept the alternative suggested by Mr. Cooley of extending the Act without changes for a one-year period even though this would mean loss of support of the domestic industry.

II

Question: Do our non-intervention agreements and our obligations under GATT prevent us from making a moderate reduction in the Cuban quota?

Comments: The essence of our non-intervention obligation is not to bring pressure against Cuba with the intention of obliging the Cuban Government to change its policy. The essence of the GATT obligation is not to use quotas as an instrument of political policy—to take historical patterns of trade into account.

It follows from what has already been said that there is adequate economic justification for continuing our policy of gradually reducing the degree of our dependence on Cuban sugar. True, we are obliged to consult with Cuba as Castro has demanded and it is also true that we cannot and should not depart radically and abruptly from the historical pattern; but there is nothing in any of our obligations which requires us to maintain indefinitely a particular level of preference for Cuban sugar. All that is required is to have the legislative history adequately explain the economic reasons for the cut.

III

Question: Should the United States seek some concession from Castro in exchange for an undertaking on our part not to reduce the quota preference?

Comment: Mr. Turkel suggested recently³ that the quota preference should be used to bargain with Castro regarding compensation for the expropriated properties. Mr. Wieland’s memorandum to you of December 9⁴ opposes any changes in the sugar quota but recommends elimination of the sugar tariff preference in order that “the way may be cleared for a request for legislative authority to submit the question of the valuation of and compensation for expropriated properties to the United States Commission on International Claims plus an additional request for authority to the Executive to impose appropriate taxes on all Cuban imports”, the taxes to be used to create a special fund with which to settle the claims of expropriated American interests in Cuba. Of the seven specific recommendations made by Mr. Wieland, all relate directly or indirectly to compensation for expropriated properties.

I suppose all of ARA will agree—certainly I assert—that any attempt on our part, however indirect, to relate our attidude and acts on the quota preference to political policies of the Cuban Government would be folly. I therefore suggest that the question of compensation be handled separate and apart from the quota. There are other and better ways to collect debts.

I do not wish to comment on the political conclusions of Mr. Wieland—some of which appear questionable—but I note in passing that no mention is made in his memorandum of what I should have thought was a much larger political issue than the question of compensation, namely, the infiltration of communists in the Cuban Government and all that this implies. And I am somewhat puzzled by the ease with which Mr. Wieland proposes the elimination of the tariff preference as politically desirable while a third moderate quota reduction is described as “trying to strike at Castro”. What is the political difference between eliminating entirely a tariff preference and taking a third moderate bite in the Cuban quota?

IV

Question: Should we recommend that the Executive be authorized to buy cheap sugar in the world market and sell it for a large profit in the domestic market?

Comment: It seems to me clear that we should oppose this on several grounds: a) it gets the United States Government deep into the sugar business contrary to what I understand is Administration policy; b) this would have the same economic effect as a tariff or an excise tax, namely, the profits would go to the U.S. Treasury instead of to underdeveloped economies which produce sugar; and c) if such a provision were included in the Sugar Act, it would tend to relate the problems of compensation and quota. The question of a tax should be considered separately and subsequently to whatever action we take on quotas and tariffs. They should not be related even in point of time.

V

Question: Is it accurate to say that a third moderate reduction in Cuba’s preference will destroy or even seriously injure the “source of Cuba’s livelihood”?

Comment: This is an exaggeration if the reduction is limited, for the present time to a) provision that Cuba will have only a contingency rather than a certainty of supplying the Puerto Rican deficit; b) a substantial reduction in Cuba’s share of the future growth in the United States market; and c) a moderate reduction in its present level of exports to this market. The actual economic impact would be small compared to any accepted standard of Cuba’s income which one might care to use.

If in the future we should wish to aid another government in a reconstruction program—something which is not certain at this time—why couldn’t we accomplish this in the usual way? Cuba is much wealthier than most other Latin American governments which are also claimants in regard to our sugar market.

It is popular these days to separate Castro completely from the people who supported him, which includes the upper class. Is it really practicable to carry this line of reasoning to the point where we are not free to protect our own national interests? What can we say if by doing so we encourage upper classes in other countries to support other anti-American demagogues in the vain hope they will be so occupied in attacking the United States that they will forget to take measures to bring about a more equitable distribution of national income? The people of Cuba put Castro in power with full knowledge of his plans. Is it too much to expect that they pay at least a part of the bill while we continue to subsidize their economy by keeping Cuban sugar in the place of first preference?

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Sept.–Dec.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Mann and initialed for him by Acting Assistant Secretary Wilson T.M. Beale.

² Not counting that Cuba could not sell more sugar on the world market without seriously disrupting prices, the quota preference alone (difference between world and U.S. prices) amounts to about 100 million dollars annually. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ See footnote 3, Document 397.

⁴ Document 406.

414. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)¹

Washington, December 28, 1959.

SUBJECT

Action Program on Cuba

Discussion:

Agreement was reached in ARA early in December that the United States Government could no longer tolerate the continued harassment of American property owners in Cuba, the failure of that government to respond in a positive way to our repeated efforts to seek a friendly solution to the problem of expropriation, and the vicious, unjustified attacks by the Castro government on the United States.

Although our attitude of patience and forbearance in the conduct of our relations with Cuba has generally won approval in Latin America and in the United States press, it is believed that in the face of these continuous provocations the time has come for the United States Government to assume a more openly critical and challenging posture vis-à-vis Cuba in order that our attitude to date may not be considered a sign of weakness and thus give encouragement to communist-nationalist elements elsewhere in Latin America who are trying to advance programs similar to those of Castro. Such programs, if undertaken, could only result in undermining United States prestige abroad, exposing United States property owners to treatment similar to that being received in Cuba and, in general, prejudicing the program of economic development espoused by the United States for Latin America which relies so heavily on private capital investment.

ARA believes actions can and should be taken, beginning immediately, which would affirmatively undertake to overcome the present impasse in our relations with Cuba. It is, therefore, proposed that the following program in the time sequence indicated be instituted by the Department.

1.

Protection of American Property Owners Against Harassment.

It is proposed that a firmly worded, formal note be delivered early next week to the Cuban Government in effect protesting the continued harassment of American property owners. The note would relate to the occupation of properties, seizure of land, cattle and equipment, intervention in operations and other extra-legal, or quasi-legal activities to which these Americans have been subjected and the fact that in almost all cases they have been deprived of their rights under due process of law.

It is proposed that the substance of the note be widely publicized after its delivery.

Although it is not believed that the note will produce a cessation of these offensive actions, its delivery and publication is considered essential as a first outward step in the change of approach to the Government of Cuba mentioned earlier, and as part of the record which may be needed in an eventual judicial contest under international claims procedures.

2.

Resolution of the Expropriation Problem.

It is proposed that, following his return to Habana on approximately January 11, Ambassador Bonsal be instructed to renew discussions with Cuban officials looking toward a mutually satisfactory settlement of the problem of fair valuation and satisfactory terms of compensation, including a proposal that the Cuban Government voluntarily impose a tax (say 1 or 1–1/2 cent per lb.) on sugar exports to the United States, to create a fund to be used for compensating American owners of expropriated properties.

Upon failure to reach agreement, Ambassador Bonsal would then be authorized to propose the submission of the problem to a Bi-national Commission, to an arbitration commission under the auspices of the International Court of Justice or to the Court itself.

Meanwhile, and on the presumption that the Cuban Government will turn down these proposals, the United States Government would undertake the steps necessary to relieve itself of all contractual obligations of the GATT as they relate to Cuba. This would include the denunciation of the United States-Cuban Trade Agreement of 1934² and the Convention of Reciprocity of 1902.³

These steps are essential and preliminary to ARA’s final proposal which is the unilateral imposition by the United States of an appropriate tax on all Cuban imports, the proceeds of which would be used to create a fund with which to settle claims of expropriated United States interests.

The details of this plan are contained in the Wieland to Rubottom memorandum of December 9, 1959 (Tab A).⁴ The details of the plan are now under consideration by the legal division and have not yet been cleared.

Although this procedure will undoubtedly take time to execute, it is believed that the sequence proposed will help publicly to re-confirm the correct and reasonable posture of the United States in dealing with Cuba and the United States Government’s respect for its international commitments. At the same time, it will permit firm dealing with the recalcitrant Castro government and provide for the eventual compensation of United States property owners.

3.

Publicizing the Program.

It is believed that each proposal made to the Cubans, and each action taken by the United States Government in carrying out the program outlined in 1 and 2 above, should be accompanied by appropriate publicity in order to insure that the position of United States Government is made crystal clear at every step of the way.

As a first move in this direction it is proposed that, upon the departure of Ambassador Bonsal for Cuba on or about January 11, the Secretary publicly announce that he has instructed the Ambassador to seek an immediate resumption of discussions with the Cubans looking toward a friendly and mutually satisfactory resolution of the expropriation and other problems confronting the two governments. The Secretary would state that this effort in no way implies a modification of the traditional United States position favoring reasonable and legitimate agrarian reform intended to improve the economic condition of peoples. He would, however emphasize our firm belief that any expropriation measure carries with it the obligation, long recognized under international law, for prompt, adequate and effective compensation.

It is further proposed that appropriate public pronouncements by the Secretary or other officials of the Department accompany the initiation of the remaining proposals and action measures included in the program.

4.

Sugar Legislation.

Between the tenth and twentieth of January it may be expected that several bills will be introduced into the Congress to modify and extend existing sugar legislation. One of these will certainly be an Administration bill which will include a provision granting the President discretionary authority to revise foreign sugar quotas.

At the time the Administration’s position is made public, there will be an excellent opportunity at a press conference to state the fundamental position of the United States with respect to Cuba. It is, therefore, proposed that at the time the legislation is introduced or shortly thereafter, a presidential pronouncement should be made on this subject, perhaps in the form of questions and answers as suggested in Tab B attached.⁵

5.

Enlisting the Cooperation of Other Latin American Governments.

The Foreign Minister of Brazil recently indicated to Ambassador Cabot⁶ his concern regarding developments in Cuba. Our Ambassador believes that given sufficient encouragement and assurance of support, the Brazilians may be disposed to “point the finger” at events in Cuba.

In order to determine the extent to which this feeling may be shared by other Latin American Govenments, it is proposed that an instruction be sent to all Latin American Missions outlining the position of the United States Government with respect to Cuba and authorizing them to convey these views to the host government. They would, at the same time, be authorized to elicit the reaction of the government to this policy and discreetly inquire as to the government’s own views on developments in Cuba and its relations with the Castro regime. The instruction would have the dual objective of clarifying the United States Government’s change of approach in its policy toward Cuba, including the reasons for such change and sounding out the possibilities for a stiffening of attitudes toward Cuba by the other American Republics. At a subsequent time and depending upon the kind of responses received, further consultations with Latin American Governments may be undertaken looking toward some kind of multilateral action on the Cuban question.

6.

Countering the Castro Propaganda Offensive.

Agreement has been reached with USIA for the full time assignment to ARA of Mr. Richard Cushing. Mr. Cushing will report on January 11. It is proposed that he undertake the coordination of an intensive though discreet campaign to counter the vicious “Hate America” propaganda being spread throughout Latin America and the world by the Castro Government. He will use all available material including “sanitized” intelligence reports in preparing a steady output for all media, not only presenting the United States side of the Cuban question but mounting our own offensive in this particular “cold war”.

7.

Supporting Operations.

A. FSO George Gray, on transfer from Rome and now in the Department for orientation and briefing, will proceed to Habana early in January to work exclusively on problems connected with the Cuban Government’s actions against American property owners. Mr. Gray is a lawyer and has already established close working relations with CMA and the legal division.

B. The legal division has assigned Mr. Fabian A. Kwiatek to work with CMA on the legal aspects of the program described in 1 and 2 above. Mr. Kwiatek will assume responsibility for clearing all steps contemplated in this program with the various branches of the legal division. He will also propose alternative course of action as necessary.

C. Mr. Carlos Hall, Director of RAR, will give priority to all research requests connected with the Cuban problem.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the submission of a firmly worded note to the Cuban Government in effect protesting the continued harassment of American property owners.

2. That you approve the procedures outlined in section 2 above looking toward the resolution of the problem of expropriation of American properties in Cuba.

3. That you approve the proposal that appropriate publicity accompany these actions.

4. That you approve a pronouncement by the President which would set forth the fundamental position of the United States with respect to Cuba, such announcement to be made upon the publication of the Administration’s position on sugar legislation.

5. That you approve an instruction to our Missions in Latin America requesting that they present the United States Government position in regard to Cuba and eliciting the host government’s reaction thereto.

6. That you approve the initiation of a discreet campaign to counter the anti-American propaganda of the Castro government.⁷

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3059. Confidential. Drafted by Vallon, Leonhardy, and Turkel; concurred in by L, P, and E; and initialed by Rubottom.

² Signed August 24, 1934, and subsequently amended; for text of the original agreement, see 49 Stat. 2559.

³ Signed December 11, 1902; for text, see 33 Stat. 2136.

⁴ Document 406.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ This conversation has not been further identified.

⁷ Dillon initialed approval of recommendations 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 on December 30. He neither approved nor disapproved recommendation 2. Regarding his reaction to this recommendation, see footnote 4, infra.

415. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 30, 1959¹

Washington, December 30, 1959

SUBJECT

The Cuban Program

PARTICIPANTS

The Under Secretary

Mr. R. R. Rubottom, Jr.—Assistant Secretary, ARA

Mr. W.T.M. Beale, Jr.—Acting Assistant Secretary, E

Mr. H.R. Turkel—Director, REA

Mr. Edwin E. Vallon—Acting Director, CMA

Mr. Rubottom referred to the forthcoming meeting on January 8 with Mr. True Morse and representatives of the sugar industry and the need for a firm Administration position on sugar legislation by that time. He said we should oppose a cut in the Cuban quota since such action would only increase resentment in Cuba against the United States and would give Castro additional ammunition to rally support around him. He mentioned that elements of the sugar trade were either opposed to such a cut or were not pressing for it.

Mr. Rubottom stated that the Administration position should favor the granting of discretionary authority to the Executive to cut foreign quotas. He believed that we should be prepared to say exactly how such authority would be used. We should also favor a four to five year extension of the Sugar Act which is also favored by the sugar industry itself.

He said that in dealing with compensation for expropriated properties he favored eventual imposition of a tax on Cuban imports. This was supported by the United States-Cuban Sugar Council. He believed that we should not move on the tax at this stage in the game, but that we may have to come to it if our efforts to negotiate a solution with the Cubans are unsuccessful.

A discussion ensued regarding the reallocation of any cuts which might be made in the Cuban quota. Mr. Rubottom and Mr. Turkel favored granting authority to the CCC to purchase such quantities at world market prices. Mr. Beale supported the thesis contained in Mr. Mann’s memorandum² that this would put the Administration into the sugar business and was in opposition to Administration policy. He favored reallocating such quota cuts to other underdeveloped countries who would benefit by the additional income derived from such sales. Mr. Rubottom said that such reallocation of quotas would create difficulties in our relations with other countries, would promote the uneconomic growth of sugar production and probably create unmanageable surpluses.

At this point Mr. Rubottom suggested that Mr. Dillon read the memorandum entitled “Action Program on Cuba”.³ He said that time is running out and that if Cuba gets by with the actions she is taking against American property owners, our whole private enterprise approach abroad would be in serious danger. In discussing Item 2 of the memorandum, which includes a number of steps leading eventually to the imposition of an import tax on Cuban products, Mr. Beale stated that such a tax might set a precedent and bring forth demands for like treatment by Americans whose properties had been expropriated in other countries. Mr. Beale also expressed concern regarding the timing and manner of denouncing our commitments under GATT, feeling that unless this is properly done it might represent a threat to United States-GATT objectives elsewhere in the world. He also pointed out that Cuba might very well withhold its sugar from the United States market, thus blocking the objective we sought in imposing an import tax. On the latter point, Mr. Turkel observed that if such action were taken by Cuba, it would be possible for the United States to pick up between one and one and one-half million tons of sugar on the world market.

Mr. Dillon stated that he did not feel the tax would be looked upon as a precedent but rather would be understood as being directly related to the premium on sugar which Cuba enjoys in its sales to the United States.

Mr. Beale pointed out that the action in denouncing GATT commitments for the purpose of establishing a tax on Cuban imports could be interpreted as an interjection of a political issue in GATT, something which the United States and other members have scrupulously avoided in the past. Mr. Dillon believed, however, that the action could be defended on economic grounds, particularly by pointing out the economic aid which Cuba has received in the form of the premium on sugar.

Mr. Dillon read Mr. Mann’s memorandum on sugar legislation and observed that, in the matter of quota cuts, the problem appeared to be one of timing more than anything else. He said that we urgently needed a program which would lead to the solution of expropriation problems in Cuba. He observed that Mr. Mann’s paper does not solve this problem. Mr. Dillon did agree with Mr. Mann’s suggestion that any quota cuts be reallocated to other countries rather than calling upon the GOC to purchase such differences on the world market. He suggested that a clause in the proposed sugar legislation might be added which would call upon the President to submit in writing his proposals for transferring the quota cuts, these proposals to become effective in 60 days if no objection is raised by Congress. He said nibbling at the Cuban quota will not produce the results we seek, but that we should, however, reduce our dependence on Cuba as a source of supply. This, he believed, was more a question of timing rather than one of principle.

In regard to Item 2 of the action program, Mr. Dillon said that the details of this program should be worked out in a hurry by ARA, E and L and that any eventual tax on Cuban imports should be limited to sugar. He said that the GATT Secretariat should be kept informed of our purposes.

Mr. Dillon approved all items contained in Mr. Rubottom’s memorandum on the Cuban action program with the modifications indicated above on Item 2.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.235/12–3059. Confidential. Drafted by Vallon.

² Document 413.

³ Supra.

⁴ In a December 30 note to Devine, Frank Mau (S/S–RO) briefly described Dillon’s response to the proposed action program and requested, with regard to recommendation 2, that ARA, E, and L submit a coordinated recommendation to Dillon no later than January 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–3059)

416. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray), White House, Washington, December 31, 1959¹

Washington, December 31, 1959

SUBJECT

Current United States Policy Towards Cuba

On the authorization of the Under Secretary I called on Mr. Gordon Gray to provide him a copy of the Cuba policy paper approved by the President.² S/P was informed prior to the call of my intention to do so. Starting with my conversation early last summer with Messrs. Murphy and Dulles,³ I set forth for Mr. Gray some of my own thought processes respecting Cuba including the momentary hopeful period of late summer when some of the largest United States companies in Cuba were attempting to negotiate their differences with the Cuban Government with prospects of settlement. I explained the impact of the October 26–27 events in Cuba, the conclusions drawn from them, and the resulting policy paper drafted for the Secretary which he took up with the President. Mr. Gray read the paper and we discussed for a few minutes the desirability of continuing with our preparation of an outline to be used in a forthcoming meeting of the NSC Planning Board where Cuba will be discussed.

Mr. Gray recalled the NSC meeting⁴ presided over by the Vice President. The latter said that Cuba was no longer just a diplomatic problem for the United States. The problems of business, finance, and defense relating to that country were of such serious proportion that pressures were now impinging on all of the Government. Following some additional discussion, during which the Acting Secretary had explained that the State Department had the over-all Cuban situation very much on its mind and was acting accordingly, the Acting Secretary had agreed that an outline paper would be prepared for the NSC Planning Board. Mr. Gray felt that it was still desirable to have the paper and the discussion. It would remove some of the pressure for information which has been steadily growing on the part of representatives of other departments.

I said that I would talk to Mr. Smith and that we would see if we could prepare the paper as agreed. I said we would also be drawing up an outline for discussion of U.S. problems with the Dominican Republic, based on a paper prepared for the Secretary. He indicated his awareness of this and his desire to have this also move forward.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/12–3159. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom.

² See Document 387.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ See Document 410.

417. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Beale)¹

Washington, January 6, 1960.

Dear Tom: Having read the first draft of the memorandum entitled “Action Program for Cuba”,² perhaps I should make a few comments of a general nature which you are free to ignore or use.

I

In recent years the most difficult and delicate task in our Latin American policy has been to avoid, on the one hand, encouraging irresponsible acts by anti-United States demagogues and, on the other, using our superior strength in such a way as to injure the inter-American system. Sumner Welles, Rockefeller, Braden and Paul Daniels in turn all had to defend themselves against charges, however unfair, of being too “tough” or too “soft”, or of “breaking hemisphere solidarity”, or of “intervening” in the international affairs of weaker states, or of tolerating an erosion of United States prestige in the area. The result was a bewildering inconsistency in our policies over a period of years which cost us dearly in prestige. Only in the last ten years has this debate subsided to manageable proportions so that we have been able to maintain a consistent posture. The Castro problem may well revive this same fruitless and harmful debate unless we handle ourselves with care. Our job is to devise an action program which will, on the one hand, not re-arouse Latin American fears of United States imperialism and “dollar diplomacy” or involve us in violations of various international agreements and, on the other, demonstrate to all of Latin America that we are not powerless to react—that hostility towards the United States does not pay. Our job is to do this in such a way that we will have enough support in public opinion to enable us to carry through an action program to conclusion.

II.

The present situation suggests two measures which can be taken at this time.

The first is a further reduction in the Cuban sugar quota accompanied by inferences that it may be necessary gradually to continue to reduce our dependence on Cuban sugar. We can do this only by permanently allocating the reduction in the Cuban quota to other claimant countries. To take the quota away from Cuba with the intention of returning it later would make us vulnerable to charges of intervention.

The second is termination of the 1902 and 1934 bilateral trade agreements with Cuba; and, unless there are good reasons for merely amending it, the 1947 agreement as well, so that our tariff relations with Cuba will be governed solely by GATT. (I assume that past Cuban violations of these agreements give us a solid basis for doing this.) After these bilaterals are out of the way, we would be in a position to take whatever action is necessary in GATT to completely do away with the tariff preference.

These steps do not involve discrimination against Cuba. They can and should be justified solely on economic grounds entirely separated from any U.S. political objective. They minimize the formidable political risks both at home and abroad inherent in any action we take against Cuba. And they hit at Castro where it hurts the most, his pocketbook, without closing the door to a fair compensation settlement in the future and without foreclosing the possibility of Cuba’s economic reconstruction by a decent, future government.

III.

This leaves the question of compensation and the suggestion of the investors that the United States impose an import tax on sugar.

This presents a tactical question: Is it better, even from the investors’ point of view, for us to go now to Castro with our hats in our hands and attempt to get Castro’s agreement to such a tax? Or is it better to apply pressure in the way I suggest and wait for Castro or his successor to come to us in the realization that Cuba’s long-term interests require a settlement with the United States? I believe the latter is preferable for several reasons:

a) Cuba’s economy is tied to ours and sooner or later Cuba will have to recognize this. Only then will we be in an advantageous bargaining position. The investors lose little by waiting for a reasonable time since the possibility of a satisfactory and immediate settlement is remote.

b) The creation of a compensation fund derived from U.S. import taxes involves a considerable risk of alienating important segments of Latin American and domestic public opinion—a much greater danger in my opinion than the course which I suggested because (i) opprobrium still attaches in the Latin American mind to enforced collection of debts whether by military or economic means, (ii) we do not have sound economic reasons which we can use to explain action of this kind and (iii) the legality of the proposed compensation fund is open to question. All of these problems may well disappear if we have the patience to wait for Cuba to come to us as a result of the indirect type of pressures which I have suggested.

c) To suggest, however indirectly, to Castro that he impose an import tax in order to create a compensation fund is less dangerous than a U.S. import tax. But I think even this would be unwise because there is little prospect of Castro agreeing. We would therefore gain nothing except a turn-down and further loss of prestige.

d) An attempt to make a hasty monetary settlement in the climate which prevails today is likely to lead to another bad debt settlement precedent. The sum of money involved is quite large. There are so many claims on Cuba’s limited income that it might well be politically impossible for any Cuban leader to pay in full in money. Perhaps we ought to be thinking more in terms of a total restoration of industrial properties when another government takes over and (on the assumption that the old system of land tenure will never completely be reestablished) a partial return of land. In this way it might be possible to raise the precentage from the 10 percent we accepted for our Mexican oil claims to 100 percent of value. We need this kind of a precedent not only because the investors are entitled to payment, because of our investment stake in other underdeveloped countries, but because nationalization of the Castro type dries up private investment essential to their progress with all the headaches that this implies for us.

e) If we go too far too fast with Castro and in consequence he becomes a martyr not only will the possibility of Russia exploiting this by large-scale aid be increased, but his ability to lead or influence left wing elements in other American Republics will be enhanced.

IV.

I question whether we should try to obtain the agreement of any other Latin American Government to any program of action which we may undertake. They will not only understand that part of our dispute with Cuba (e.g., compensation for expropriated properties) is bilateral rather than inter-American in character but they will find it politically difficult openly to support us. Some may view it as a sign of indecision on our part and seek to water down our program in the typical Latin American spirit of compromise.

It is of course important that we inform selected Latin American governments in advance of what we are going to do and the reasons for it. It is equally important to explain to public opinion abroad and at home that our motives are non-political.

V.

Likewise, I do not believe we should now think in terms of arbitration or adjudication. Our chances of recovery from the Castro policies are much better if we ourselves control decisions.

Sincerely,

TCM

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–660. Confidential.

² Document 414.

418. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Beale) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 8, 1960.

SUBJECT

Action Program for Cuba: Procedures re Compensation for Expropriation and Consequent Readjustment of Commercial Relations

Mr. Rubottom’s memorandum of December 28, 1959, Tab C,² approved by you on December 30, 1959, outlines various aspects of an action program for resolution of the problem created by the expropriation of American properties by the present Government of Cuba. Certain elements of that program would, if implemented, involve actions contrary to existing legal commitments of this Government under international agreements to which the United States and Cuba are parties.

The program envisages, if discussions regarding a settlement of the expropriation claims should fail, the possibility of: (1) the withdrawal of the existing tariff preferences for Cuban products, (2) the imposition of a fee on sugar imported from Cuba but not on any other sugar or on other Cuban products,³ and (3) appropriate legislation and institutional arrangements for use in the settlement of the expropriation claims of additional revenue derived from these measures. If duties were raised to the most-favored-nation levels and/or⁴ if a discriminatory fee were imposed on sugar imports from Cuba, the additional revenue could be set aside (once the necessary legislation had been obtained) for a fund to be used in the settlement of expropriation claims.

However, the removal of Cuban preference or the imposition of a fee on imports of Cuban sugar would be contrary to our present legal commitments.

Furthermore, in the event that the President were to exercise his authority under the proposed sugar legislation (which is the subject of a separate memorandum) to modify sugar quotas in such a manner as to substantially reduce the Cuban quota without a comparable reduction of other sugar import quotas, the resultant discrimination would be contrary to our existing international commitments.

This memorandum proposes a procedure for negotiations regarding settlement of the claims for compensation as a result of the Cuban expropriation and, if these are unsuccessful, for the modification or termination of existing commitments to Cuba which would free the United States to take the measures proposed above, including the withdrawal of the Cuban preference. If the Contracting Parties were to grant a waiver which would permit the withdrawal of preferences to Cuba by raising of United States duties on Cuban products to the most-favored-nation rates, it is probable that the Contracting Parties would wish this waiver to authorize Cuba to take corresponding action.⁵

An outline of these steps follows: Each of the first six steps is explained more fully in a correspondingly numbered attachment to this memorandum.⁶

1.

Expropriation Compensation Discussions

After appropriate discussions in Washington and in Havana with representatives of the affected U.S. interests, the Department would instruct Ambassador Bonsal to renew discussions looking toward the resolution of the problem of expropriation and other damages inflicted on American properties in Cuba.

2.

Arbitration re Compensation

Ambassador Bonsal would—again after consultations with representatives of affected property owners had been held—discuss with the Cuban Government some form of judicial or semijudicial settlement of expropriation issues.

3.

Trade Discussions

At an appropriate time, should no solution of the compensation issue be achieved by steps 1 and 2 above,⁷ Ambassador Bonsal would inform the Cuban Government of the United States Government’s willingness to accede to Cuba’s urgent request for a review of economic relations. We would hope that the outcome of this review would result in the joint termination of the Convention of Reciprocity of 1902 and the United States-Cuban Trade Agreement of 1934 and revision of the exclusive trade agreement of 1947.

4.

Cuban GATT Violations

Should it appear that efforts (steps 1 and 2 above) to settle the compensation issue are not likely to succeed within a reasonable time, following consultations with GATT leaders, the United States would consider requesting the Contracting Parties to examine its pending complaints of GATT violations by Cuba.

5.

Unilateral Termination of Bilaterals

At the same time, should Cuba not have agreed to terminate the 1902 and 1934 agreements by mutual consent (step 3 above) the United States would give Cuba notice of its termination of them in accordance with their provisions for unilateral termination.

6.

GATT Waiver

In connection with or following the presentation of the complaints against Cuba (step 4), the United States would consider the feasibility of requesting the Contracting Parties to grant it some form of waiver from its obligations to Cuba under GATT, sufficient to permit it to take the action then deemed appropriate. Whether a waiver is requested and, if so, its scope would depend upon the action the United States has in view at the time application is considered and the assessment then made of the probabilities of success in securing a suitable waiver.

7.

Claims Settlement

Should the United States (1) fail to have reached a satisfactory settlement with Cuba and (2) be free of conflicting international commitments as a result of actions taken pursuant to steps 3–6, the Administration would then consider requesting legislation authorizing the executive to

(a) submit to a domestic claims commission the problem of determination of valuation and compensation of expropriated properties of U.S. citizens in Cuba and

(b) impose a tax on Cuban sugar or utilize [several undecipherable handwritten words] and to assign revenue derived from this tax and/or from the elimination of preferences, to a fund to be disbursed by the aforesaid claims commission in the settlement of claims of affected American interests.

Recommendation:

That you approve the course of action set forth in steps 1–7 above.⁸

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba. Confidential. Drafted by Walter Hollis (L/E), Herbert F. Propps (CPT), and Selma G. Kallis (TA); concurred in by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs John S. Hoghland, Legal Adviser Eric H. Hager, Director of the Office of International Trade Theodore J. Hadraba, and Assistant Chief of the Trade Agreements Division Joe A. Robinson. Attached is a memorandum of January 8 from Rubottom to Dillon, in which Rubottom concurs in the memorandum provided “certain minor amendments and reservations” were taken into consideration. These amendments and reservations were set forth in a memorandum of January 8 from Wieland to Rubottom, also attached. In the memorandum Wieland noted that CMA had not yet had time to review carefully the tabs to the memorandum, except for tabs 1 and 2 on which CMA had no comment. Wieland’s amendments and reservations are noted in footnotes below. Also noted are Dillon’s responses, as described briefly in a memorandum of January 9 from T.J. Dunnigan, Duty Officer in the Executive Secretariat to Devine, also attached.

² Document 414.

³ In his January 8 memorandum to Rubottom, Wieland noted that the reference to any other sugar was unnecessary here and the reference to other Cuban products should be eliminated. Wieland argued that its elimination “would permit the imposition of a tax on selected Cuban products in the event the Department should consider this desirable as events develop.” In his memorandum of January 9 to Devine, Dunnigan indicated that Dillon said: “No on other Cuban products.”

⁴ 

In his January 8 memorandum, Wieland argued that “or”, which was in the original text, should be changed to “and”. His reasons were: “This is essential in order to make the sentence consistent with what has gone before. Eliminating the preferences alone would not provide compensation to the affected United States interests.”

In his memorandum of January 9 to Devine, Dunnigan indicated that Dillon had decided it should be “and/or”.

⁵ With regard to this paragraph, Wieland indicated in his January 8 memorandum that there was a difference of opinion as to whether Article I of the GATT required the United States to obtain a waiver from the Contracting Parties to withdraw tariff preferences. Wieland wrote that if it did prove necessary, CMA had no objection. Dillon apparently did not comment on this point.

⁶ None printed.

⁷ In his January 8 memorandum, Wieland suggested the insertion here of the phrase “should no solution of the compensation issue be achieved by steps 1 and 2 above.” In his memorandum of January 9 to Devine, Dunnigan indicated that Dillon had approved this change.

⁸ Dillon initialed his approval of steps 1–7 on January 9.

419. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, January 8, 1960, 11:30 a.m.¹

Washington, January 8, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

I Introduction

At General Twining’s invitation to begin the meeting Mr. Merchant first stated he hoped that the discussions could be continued on a regular weekly basis. He noted the importance which the Department attaches to them and the value of an exchange of views on a variety of subjects between the Department and the Joint Chiefs. General Twining agreed and stated that he and the Chiefs would be happy to meet with Mr. Merchant regularly.

II Cuba (Raised at State initiative)

Mr. Merchant said he would like to give the Joint Chiefs the Department’s assessment of the Cuban situation which he termed extremely grave. He stated he would give a short résumé and then ask Mr. Rubottom to go into further detail. From a military point of view the problem which Castro poses affects us locally because of our base at Guantanamo and strategically because we may find at our doorstep what, to all intents and purposes, amounts to a Soviet satellite. Moreover, there are some 8,000 Americans in Cuba, about one quarter of them outside metropolitan Havana. Their lives, as well as the substantial American investment in the country, are of major concern to the United States. From a political point of view we must reckon with Castro’s effect upon other Latin American countries.

To protect American lives and interests and to remedy the situation which exists poses a delicate operation for various reasons: (1) the precipitous disappearance of Castro might result in worse leadership; (2) we must insure that a successor government comports itself in our interests and therefore we cannot alienate the Cubans themselves or do anything upon which Castro might capitalize and consolidate his position; (3) our actions in Cuba will affect our relations elsewhere in Latin America. In summary, a scalpel is called for; not a meat axe.

In this connection there have been two topical developments: (1) the current intensive efforts of the Cuban Government and the trip of Foreign Minister Roa to promote an economic conference in Havana in April of the underdeveloped countries; the Department has instructed our Ambassadors to impress upon the governments to which they are accredited that it would not be in our interest nor in theirs for them to participate. (2) Ambassador Bonsal has been instructed to deliver a harsh note to the Cuban Government on January 11 protesting the illegality of a series of actions which the Cubans have taken against American interests.²

Mr. Merchant then called on Mr. Rubottom. Mr. Rubottom said that since his landing in Cuba the Department has tried unsuccessfully to pin a definite label on Castro in order to take stronger action against him. For all practical purposes Castro could be in the employ of the Soviet Government and that is the approach the Department must take toward Cuba. Secretary Herter last July³ agreed that we could no longer work with the Cuban Government. (As illustrative of this point Mr. Rubottom read the six NSC criteria or points³ which embodied the ideal characterization of a government in Latin America with which the United States could work. Castro’s regime met none of them.)

The plan to take definitive action against the Castro Government was delayed some three months because important American interests thought there was a change in the climate. The situation, however, crystallized with a firm negative in October. At that time moderates in the government were eliminated and Castro made his vicious all-night speech on October 20.⁴ On October 27 Ambassador Bonsal made a stiff protest to the Cuban Government.⁵

Thereafter, a set of policy decisions were developed which the President approved at the end of November.⁶ Certain operational plans were put into effect: in the communications media which involved propaganda directed against the regime inside Cuba and throughout the hemisphere, and in support of those who might one day take over. In this latter connection some of the forces which might have served a focal point have been a disappointment. There is a group, however, the Monte Cristi, which appears to be determined, creative and imaginative (Mr. Merchant subsequently emphasized the operational nature of our cooperation with this group). We are also working with liberal leaders elsewhere in Latin America, such as Betancourt and Figueres. In other ways we are also progressing: the position of the Administration on sugar is such that we can move in massively; the British decided, at our instance, not to make planes available which the Cubans were seeking; as a result Castro hasn’t got anything like the arms he wants.

In response to Admiral Burke’s question as to whether the Monte Cristi group had a head, Mr. Rubottom replied that there was a head in Cuba and one on the outside.

Admiral Burke asked whether Castro would move on sugar in a few weeks and questioned whether, indeed, Castro’s main programs were not going the way he wanted. Mr. Rubottom stated that he did not think that Castro would move on the sugar until the crop came in in March or even as late as May. He stated that Castro had many economic problems, but that if he took the Peron route he probably would remain in power for some time.

General Lemnitzer commented that the Cubans were shopping around the world for arms, but that they needed money. Mr. Rubottom said money would be their Achilles’ heel untilately [ultimately?]. Admiral Burke said the Cubans could import oil and arms from the Soviet Union. Mr. Rubottom stated he thought it was doubtful whether the Russians would want to move in at this stage.

Admiral Burke commented that the Cubans were in debt with respect to oil in the amount of $30 million. He wondered about this. Mr. Rubottom said that the oil situation had been discussed with representatives of Standard Oil of New Jersey⁷ which had the largest oil holdings in Cuba and that he felt that the companies should decide this question themselves, without the decision being limited to the U.S. Government. He added that the companies are likely to demand stiffer terms, but pointed out that the Cubans could easily obtain oil from the USSR, since Soviet oil is already going to Uruguay and Brazil. He said that he had told the oil companies that we would not object if they decided themselves to take a tough line on payments.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, January 1960. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated, but it presumably was Donhauser. Donhauser’s handwritten notation of January 13 indicates that Merchant cleared the memorandum in draft. A typewritten note on the cover sheet indicates that the memorandum was not cleared with the Department of Defense. The cover sheet lists 31 attendees at the meeting from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

² See Document 422.

³ Not further identified.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Apparently a reference to the October 19 speech; see footnote 2, Document 371.

⁵ See Document 379.

⁶ Approved November 5; see Document 387.

⁷ Apparently a reference to the conversation Rubottom had with Standard Oil officials on December 17, a memorandum of which is in Department of State, Central Files, 837.2553/12–1759.

420. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)¹

Washington, January 8, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuba

The following questions are offered for your possible use in connection with Mr. Rubottom’s briefing of the Planning Board on January 11, 1960. I may submit an additional list before the briefing.

1. How strong is Communist influence in the Castro regime? How accurate are we in differentiating the real Communists from the purely anti-U.S., nationalist factions?

2. The Castro regime has alienated large numbers of its former supporters. What is your estimate of the possibility that the regime may be overthrown? If overthrown, isn’t it possible that a successor regime would be just as unfavorable from the U.S. point of view?

3. What course is the regime likely to follow with respect to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo? What would our reaction be to a request by Castro that the U.S. evacuate the base? (It might be interesting to get the JCS representative to comment on the importance of this Base to the United States’ defense posture in this hemisphere.)

4. Congressman Craig Hosmer (R. Calif.) suggested on January 3 that he intended to introduce a resolution in Congress to the effect that the U.S. should reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine and tell the Communists to keep their hands off Latin America. He also said he had sent a letter to the President² asking for this support. What do you think of this idea?

5. The Sugar Act must be renewed during this session of Congress. Isn’t it possible to use this to the United States’ advantage? Doesn’t it provide the U.S. with an opportunity to introduce a more active policy toward Cuba?

6. With respect to the sugar problem, two members of Congress already have introduced resolutions on behalf of domestic producers.³ Isn’t there now a danger that Congressional action is going to take the problem away from the Executive Branch?

7. With respect to the Sugar Act, what alternatives are there to the present version? Should our subsidies be kept as they are, decreased or increased?

8. Just following Castro’s successful revolution there were a number of moderates in the regime who were the best vehicles for maintaining U.S. interests on the island. It is my impression that these moderate groups have constantly diminished until there are no real moderates left. What does this portend for the remaining U.S. interests on the island? Is there any hope that we can re-establish our close relationship with the Cuban government in the foreseeable future?

9. With reference to the Dominican Republic, it is known that General Trujillo is not as popular or as strong as he once was, but isn’t he still very tightly in control of the Dominican Republic? General Franco is supposed to have been on the downgrade for the past fifteen years, yet he is still very much in control of Spain. It seems to me that in the case of both dictators they have had a decline in their popularity but the decline has not been so great that either man is imminently in danger of slipping from the summit of power. Would you care to comment on this observation?

10. Is the Dominican Republic actually in danger of being invaded by Castro forces? Isn’t Castro far too occupied at home to undertake such a venture in the near future? Does Castro have enough military strength to carry out an invasion of the Dominican Republic without considerable help from the Dominicans themselves?⁴

Samuel E. Belk

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation. Secret.

² Not further identified

³ By Mr. Budge: (R. Idaho)

H.R. 9313. A bill to amend the Sugar Act of 1948 to revise the quotas for 1960 in such a fashion as to increase the quota for domestic sugar-producing areas by 350,000 short tons, with corresponding reductions in the quota for Cuba; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mrs. St. George: (R. N.Y.)

H.R. 9376. A bill to prohibit the importation of Cuban sugar for so long as the price which U.S. importers are required to pay for such sugar is above the world market price; to the Committee on Agriculture. (From Congressional Record, January 6, 1960) [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ 

In a January 11 memorandum to Lay, Belk submitted three additional questions furnished by the NSC staff for the Planning Board’s discussion:

“1. Can you imagine a situation developing in Cuba when it would be in the United States’ interest to intervene militarily?

“2. What attitude should the United States take toward Cuban and Dominican dissident groups operating from the U.S. mainland. For instance, do we wish to close our eyes to anti-Castro activities or should we take stringent prohibitive measures? (I am sure you will recall that Attorney General Rogers posed this question during a discussion of Cuba in the Council.)

“3. Draw the attention of the Planning Board to the paper circulated to them with reference to Cuban nickel. (Bob Amory has some useful information on this subject.) The size of the U.S. nickel stockpile also should be explored.” (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation)

421. Memorandum for the Record by Robert F. Packard of the Policy Planning Staff¹

Washington, January 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

Discussion of the U.S. Policy toward Cuba and the Dominican Republic at the Planning Board on January 11, 1960

CUBA

At the outset Mr. Gray described the conditions under which these subjects were to be discussed at the meeting of the Planning Board and presented by the Acting Secretary at the meeting of the Council to be held on January 14. His description appeared entirely consistent with the arrangements which had been worked out previously between himself, Mr. Merchant and Mr. Smith. In addition, he stated that it should be possible for these subjects to be discussed at subsequent meetings of the [National] Security Council if the presentation and discussion this coming Thursday indicates such further discussion to be desirable.

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs—

1. Mr. Gray inquired whether the reserves and production of nickel in Cuba would, if more freely available to the Soviet Union or Communist China, constitute a problem of sufficient strategic importance to be raised in the Council along with other problems of major interest concerning Cuba. He referred to a “Memorandum on the Importance of Cuban Nickel to the Nation’s Security”, dated January 6,² which had been made available to him by Langbourne Williams of the Freeport Sulphur Corp., and which he in turn had tabled at the meeting of the Planning Board on January 6.³ At the conclusion of the discussion of this matter, and at the suggestion of Mr. Smith, he concluded that this was not such a problem but rather a matter only of additional possible interest.

(a) In commenting on the Williams memo, CIA pointed out that the figures in it appeared to be at least ten years old. CIA’s estimate is that Soviet reserves of nickel ore are adequate to Soviet needs and that the denial of Cuban nickel to the Soviet Union would not have a strategic effect upon the Soviets. In fact, the Soviets appear to be exporting some nickel to their satellites and to Communist China. The Soviet problem is one which arises from the relatively low grade of nickel ore available in the Soviet Union. Cuban ore is of higher quality and its availability to the Soviets would therefore be an asset to them. The Chinese Communists appear to have a greater need than the Soviets. The volume of nickel which may now be sold to the Soviet Union free of COCOM controls would appear to be adequate to meet their needs.

(b) OCDM pointed out that Canada is the major free-world producer of nickel—about 75% of the free-world’s production. Cuba produces around 10%. The United States is now taking only about two-thirds of the Canadian production and the strategic requirements of the U.S. would not be adversely affected by loss of Cuban nickel.

2. Mr. Gray inquired whether there are other strategic U.S. interests (other than psychological and political interests) in Cuba in addition to retention of our Naval base at Guantanamo.

(a) Mr. Irwin of Defense pointed out that our strategic military interests in Cuba are both, (1) far broader than merely the retention of the Naval base, and (2) inseparable from the political and psychological aspects of our situataion vis-à-vis Cuba. All present agreed not only with Mr. Irwin’s response but with the general propositions that Communist control of Cuba—either by the USSR or indirectly—would be intolerable.

3. Mr. Gray asked that the Department’s presentation deal with the question of the point at which indirect Communist control of Cuba, short of Russian intervention, would require U.S. intervention.

4. Mr. Gray noted that Congressman Hosmer of California had announced that he would introduce a Resolution to reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine in the light of the Cuban situation. Mr. Gray was curious as to how the President might respond to inquiries concerning such a Resolution.

JCS—

1. General Campbell requested guidance as to how the military should anticipate the possibility of a Cuban attack on the Naval base at Guantanamo Bay and what military action would be appropriate in response to such an attack. The military are concerned whether they should augment their forces at the Naval base now.

Defense—

1. Mr. Irwin summarized the several questions in his mind concerning possible U.S. intervention in Cuba, i.e., whether to intervene, when, where and how (covertly or overtly).

Bureau of the Budget—

1. Mr. Reid noted that the Mutual Security Act provides that the U.S. may not continue to provide economic assistance in the face of expropriation. He raised the question whether we will be able to continue to apportion aid funds in the absence of a specific Presidential exception within the terms of that legislation.

Justice—

1. Mr. Riley stated that the Attorney General is most anxious to receive guidance as to the extent of his Department’s prosecution of both anti-Castro and anti-Batista groups and individuals who violate U.S. requirements for registration, arms export, etc. He noted that his Department is proceeding impartially under the law and wondered whether this had become, or would become, embarrassing to the Department of State.

Treasury—

1. Mr. Weitzel pointed out that the Customs Bureau faces the same problem as that presented by Justice.

2. In addition, he stated that Treasury hopes that the presentation at the NSC would deal with the questions, (a) what is to be done with respect to our support of Cuban sugar production; (b) should the U.S. attempt to anticipate and prevent further expropriation; (c) should the U.S. attempt to discourage the provision of economic assistance to Cuba from other sources, e.g. international financial institutes, other countries, etc.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

PROBLEMS AFFECTING BOTH CUBA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Special Assistants for National Security Affairs and the OCB—

1. Both Mr. Gray and Mr. Harr hoped that the Department’s presentation at the Council would deal with the entire spectrum of U.S. aid to both countries.

2. In view of the Vice President’s concern that Congress would act quickly concerning the Cuban problem, Mr. Harr inquired as to what manner of legislative queries had been received by the Department so far.

JCS—

1. General Campbell was concerned as to how long the Department estimates it will be possible to restrain the British and others from exporting arms to the Caribbean area.

Robert F. Packard⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba Planning and NSC Briefings. Secret. Drafted by Packard. The source text does not list the participants in the discussion.

² A copy is attached to the source text, but not printed.

³ A copy is attached to the source text, but no record of discussion at this meeting has been found.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

422. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 11, 1960—5 p.m.

1605. I delivered today to acting Foreign Minister Marcelo Fernandez Font note (number 203)² protesting illegal actions and abuses of INRA (Deptel 923 [963]³ et seq.) and gave him copy of our press release (Deptel 964⁴ ). I also handed him copies of five memoranda on specific cases which have been delivered to Ministry in past few weeks and three memos on new cases.⁵

By way of introduction I reviewed situation of American private interests in Cuba which after having contributed substantially to country’s economic development, complied with Cuban laws, and provided employment to many people at pay standards that equalled or exceeded best elsewhere in Cuba, now find themselves divested of their properties and treated as if they were enemies and exploiters. Fernandez interrupted to say that as regarded provisions for compensation, Agrarian Reform Law made no distinctions between Cubans and aliens and that all would be paid in bonds since Cuban Government was unable to pay cash. I replied our position on this question had been set forth in our notes of June 11 and October 12,⁶ to latter of which we had received no reply, and that we had already held certain conversations on this subject with GOC and hoped shortly to resume these discussions. Fernandez said GOC was prepared to resume talks on compensation at any time. This was not however subject of our present protest, I said.

I then read our note, translating it into Spanish. I said this note would not be published by US Government but that a press release on this subject was being published today. I handed him text of release, with Spanish translation. Emphasizing further the extreme importance of protecting American property owners from abuses to which they are being subjected in name of Agrarian Reform, in violation of both Cuban and generally accepted international law, I urged that GOC seek means of preventing recurrences, and suggested as a possibility that a responsible official be named to devote full time to such matters. I told him US official, congressional and public opinion deeply and rightly exercised this matter.

Fernandez said that while government fully defended principles and objectives of Agrarian Reform it did not defend “exceptions” to law and admitted some “errors” might have been made. He said he would bring matter to attention of President Dorticos and send us reply in due course.

Have given out press release here as agreed.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/1–1160. Confidential; Priority. Bonsal had returned to Havana on January 10.

² A copy of this note is ibid., 737.00/1–1060.

³ Telegram 963, January 7, instructed Bonsal to deliver the note. (ibid., 837.16/ 1–760)

⁴ Not printed. (ibid., 737.00/1–1060)

⁵ None of these eight memoranda has been further identified.

⁶ See Documents 318 and 367.

423. Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 14, 1960, 9 a.m.¹

Washington, January 14, 1960, 9 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.] Turning to Cuba, Mr. Dulles reported that Castro and Guevara were continuing their program of seizing lands and assets. Teams of Cuban diplomats were visiting the underdeveloped countries in an effort to organize a Conference of Hungry Nations. Cuban diplomats were interviewing Nasser in an effort to establish closer UAR-Cuban relations and arrange an exchange of visits between Nasser and Castro. The Cuban Workers Confederation had announced that it was inviting Latin American labor organizations to meet in Havana to form a new Latin American labor organization which would freely admit Communists to membership. Mr. Dulles was fearful that any such organization would eventually come under Communist control. Contacts between Cuba and Communist China were increasing, leading to the expectation that Castro would probably recognize Peiping this year. Castro’s policy of discounts to Bloc customers has resulted in his selling sugar to the Bloc below the world price. The Soviet exhibit would be moved from Mexico City to Havana in February and at the same time a strong USSR propaganda effort would be forthcoming. Mr. Langborne Williams had worked out a deal with the Cuban Government whereby a small amount of nickel ore could be shipped out of Cuba without payment of the 25 per cent tax. Mr. Gray said this deal had been possible because of a decision that the material exported was a concentrate, not an ore. He added that he had been shown figures indicating that the known reserves in Cuba of nickel were greater than the total reserves of the Free World producing countries. Mr. Dulles said that while Cuban nickel deposits were rich, he questioned the conclusion presented by Mr. Gray pending further study. The President said he had been told during World War II that Canada was our only reliable source of nickel. Mr. Dulles said there were some reports that the USSR was interested in buying Cuban nickel. It was estimated that Soviet production met the nickel needs of the Soviet Union but not the needs of the entire Bloc. The Soviet Five Year Plan, which provided for doubling nickel production, showed that the USSR felt the need of increasing nickel production. The Sino-Soviet Bloc as a whole was short of nickel. The President said it might be necessary to blockade Cuba yet.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

3. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (NSC Action No. 2166–b–(1);² NSC 5902/1)³

Mr. Gray recalled that the Council at its meeting on December 16, 1959 agreed that the Cuban situation should be brought up for discussion again in the near future. He believed the Department of State was prepared to give the Council an oral briefing on U.S. policy toward Cuba; accordingly, he called on Mr. Merchant.

Mr. Merchant said he would make a few remarks before asking Assistant Secretary Rubottom to give a detailed briefing.⁴ Mr. Merchant characterized the Cuban problem as the most difficult and dangerous in all the history of our relations with Latin America, possibly in all our foreign relations. Some of our principal interests in Cuba were quite apparent; e.g. the strategic importance of the island, our trade and commercial interests, and the safety of U.S. citizens there. The Department of State had been working with CIA on Cuban problems. Our present objective was to adjust all our actions in such a way as to accelerate the development of an opposition in Cuba which would bring about a change in the Cuban Government, resulting in a new government favorable to U.S. interests. Mr. Merchant then called on Mr. Rubottom.

Mr. Rubottom said our policy objectives toward Cuba included friendship, mutual respect, and U.S. support for Cuba as one of the American republics; a sound and growing Cuban economy; receptivity to U.S. and Free World capital and increasing trade; the development of democratic government; a maximum limitation on Communist influence; participation in and support of hemisphere defense; access by the U.S. to essential Cuban resources; and Cuban support of regional cooperation. When Castro first came to power we had to wait for a period of time to see what he would do. The upper classes of Cuba supported Castro because he had been against Batista. The lower classes supported him because of their desire for social advancement. There had also been some support for Castro in the U.S., including such respectable sources as the National Education Association and The New York Times. This kind of support illustrates the difficulty of identifying the menacing nature of the Castro movement before Latin American and U.S. public opinion.

Mr. Rubottom then summarized U.S.-Cuban relations since January. He said the period from January to March might be characterized as the honeymoon period of the Castro Government. In April a downward trend in U.S.-Cuban relations had been evident, partly because of the preparation by Cuba of filibustering expeditions against the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama. In June we had reached the decision that it was not possible to achieve our objectives with Castro in power and had agreed to undertake the program referred to by Mr. Merchant. In July and August we had been busy drawing up a program to replace Castro. However, some U.S. companies reported to us during this time that they were making some progress in negotiations, a factor which caused us to slow the implementation of our program. The hope expressed by these companies did not materialize. October was a period of clarification which included the denigration of Matos and the dissemination of leaflets from airplanes which caused us to be charged with bombing. On October 27 we delivered a statement⁵ of our views to Cuba which had a noticeable effect, even though the propaganda barrage continued. On October 31, in agreement with CIA, the Department had recommended to the President⁶ approval of a program along the lines referred to by Mr. Merchant. The approved program⁷ authorized us to support elements in Cuba opposed to the Castro Government while making Castro’s downfall seem to be the result of his own mistakes.

With respect to arms shipments into Cuba, Mr. Rubottom reported that the U.S. had reasonably effective cooperation from other Free World countries. The British, for example, had held up a shipment of jet aircraft to Cuba.

Mr. Rubottom said our note to Cuba delivered on Monday⁸ was stronger than any of our previous statements and would be followed by additional publicity. He hoped that when the Administration program on the sugar subsidy was ready, the President would make a public statement on the U.S. policy of “firmness but fairness.” This Government was working in the white, gray and black areas to disseminate information showing Castro in his true light. The Santiago Conference had shown other Latin American countries the type of government now in power in Cuba. Cuban efforts to intervene in other countries in Latin America had been slowed down but not stopped. The State Department was cooperating with CIA in action [less than 1 line not declassified] designed to build up an opposition to Castro. Mr. Rubottom felt that the U.S. was dealing with an alert, well-trained and dedicated foe in Cuba. He praised Ambassador Bonsal for performing effectively under difficult and provocative conditions. Mr. Rubottom believed that ultimately the attitude of the church would be extremely important in Cuba. In dealing with the Communist problem in Cuba, we must face the fact that there will be considerable increase in travel and cultural exchange between Cuba and the USSR as a result of a recent cultural agreement. The Soviet exhibit which moved from New York to Mexico will soon move to Cuba. Mr. Rubottom pointed out that Cuba had sold sugar to the Bloc under previous regimes.

Turning to Guantanamo, he expressed doubt that there would be a frontal attack on the base because the Cuban military forces are so weak, with the air force not operative, the navy in difficulties because 70 or 80 of its high officials are in jail, and the army no longer effective. However, he felt we should seek to guarantee the water supply of the Guantanamo Base. Mr. Rubottom reported that Latin America was generally aware of the Cuban problem. If Communism took over the political institutions of Cuba, a meeting of the Latin American Foreign Ministers would probably take place under the Caracas Resolution. He thought action against a Communist Cuba under the Caracas Resolution and the OAS would be preferable to action under the Monroe Doctrine.

The President said if the Cubans attacked Guantanamo we would need support from the rest of Latin America. He felt we should do everything possible through the OAS to educate the Latin American countries on the situation in Cuba. The Vice President believed Latin America was better prepared for what might happen in Cuba than it had been for events in Guatemala. Mr. Rubottom agreed and added that Latin American understanding of what might happen in Cuba could be expedited. Secretary Anderson said the financial situation of Cuba was becoming worse. Mr. Gray inquired about U.S. assistance to Cuba. Mr. Rubottom said no aid was programmed except for a small technical assistance program of $350,000. It had been his intention to recommend an increased assistance program for Cuba, but this idea had now, of course, been withdrawn. No loan assistance was under active consideration by any banks; Cuba was not cooperating with the international lending institutions. He felt we ought to oppose quietly any Cuban loan applications which might be made. The Vice President inquired about the program under the Sugar Act. Mr. Rubottom said the Departments of State and Agriculture had practically agreed to recommend an extension of the Sugar Act for four years, with a provision that the President would have discretionary authority for reduction of the quotas, if such reduction was necessary in the national interest. Such discretionary authority did not exist at the present time. The U.S. will also have to take some action with respect to Cuba’s trade preference under GATT and under trade agreements with the U.S. Indeed, the U.S. would have to take action with respect to all the benefits Cuba now obtains from the U.S. Secretary Anderson asked whether elimination of oil shipments would be feasible, noting, however, that such action would probably result in Castro taking over the refineries in Cuba. Mr. Rubottom said this Government had refrained from urging the oil companies to cut off shipments to Cuba, but had told them there was no objection to their taking such action on their own initiative. The President felt we could take whatever action we needed to take if we first made sure that the rest of Latin America was on our side. In response to a question from the Vice President, Mr. Rubottom said the value of the sugar subsidy to Cuba was around $180 million a year. The Vice President said that in proportion to the population of the country benefited, this was our largest program.

Admiral Burke reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were seriously concerned by the situation in Cuba. He agreed that Castro had very effectively accomplished what he wanted to accomplish. However, in Admiral Burke’s view, Castro was a figurehead, so that his removal from the scene would not help matters much. Most of Castro’s moves so far could eventually help make Cuba Communist. Admiral Burke felt that the Communization of Cuba would most likely proceed rapidly without producing any incident of sufficient gravity to impel the OAS to take action. The President believed that an attack on Guantanamo would be an occasion for action against Cuba. The Vice President felt if was important to get other Latin American countries oriented to possible future developments in the Cuban situation. There had not been enough advance preparation in the case of the Guatemala action. Instead of applying economic pressure against Cuba, we could encourage private investors to be cautious about investing elsewhere in Latin America. If the Latin American countries see that Castro is frightening investment away from Latin America, they will not be favorably inclined toward Castro. If the Latin American opinion leaders were told that our investors are waiting to see what happens in Cuba, they might build up an anti-Castro opinion in Latin America. Secretary Anderson said it might be desirable if the Inter-American Bank was slowed up because of Castro. The President wondered how many would want to buy the bonds of the Bank now, in view of the Cuban situation.

Mr. Rubottom reported that anti-Castro sentiment was becoming evident in Latin America. In this connection, he hoped full advantage would be taken of the President’s trip to Latin America. The President wondered whether it would not be a good idea in the course of his trip to invite all the Latin American ambassadors in any particular capital to a reception and make sure that the subject of Cuba comes up for discussion. Mr. Rubottom said the Santiago meeting made the benefits of this kind of operation clear. The meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Bank might be another opportunity to build up anti-Castro opinion. The President felt it would be desirable if the Latin American countries invited us to be watchful in the Cuban situation. He felt the Latin American countries should take some initiative in this matter. He added that he could visit only four countries on his trip, but wanted by some sort of symbolic meeting to recognize all the other countries of South America. In any such meeting, he wanted the Cuban ambassador to hear what was to be said about Cuba.

Mr. Rubottom said that the State Department was making a frontal attack against the Conference of Hungry Nations that Cuba was trying to arrange. The Vice President believed we should look at Latin America as a single area from an investment point of view, so that anything which hurts investment in one part of Latin American hurts investment throughout the area.

Mr. Gray said the Attorney General had frequently wondered what our policy was with respect to stopping anti-Castro elements preparing some action against Cuba from American territory. The President said it was perhaps better not to discuss this subject. The anti-Castro agents who should be left alone were being indicated.

Mr. Dulles felt we should not stop any measures we might wish to take in Cuba because of what the Soviets might do. From our point of view, it would be desirable for the USSR to show its hand in Cuba; if Soviet activity in Cuba becomes evident, then we will have a weapon against Castro.

Mr. Gray asked whether discussion of this subject should not be treated with the utmost secrecy. At the suggestion of the Vice President, it was agreed that the Planning Board would not be debriefed on the foregoing discussion.

The National Security Council:⁹

Noted and discussed the subject in the light of an oral presentation by the Department of State.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on March 31.

² See footnote 3, Document 410.

³ Text of NSC 5902/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” February 16, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume V.

⁴ A talking paper for Rubottom’s use at the meeting is attached to a covering memorandum of January 13 from Rubottom to Acting Secretary Dillon. (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuban Planning and NSC Briefing)

⁵ See Document 379.

⁶ See Document 384.

⁷ The program was resubmitted to the President on November 5 and subsequently approved; see Document 387.

⁸ See supra.

⁹ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2177. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Records: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

Recall of Ambassador Bonsal and formulation within the U.S. Government of a program of covert action against the Castro government, January–April 1960

424. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 19, 1960—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–1960. Confidential; Priority.

425. Memorandum of Discussion at the 433d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 21, 1960, 9:07–10:55 a.m.

Washington, January 21, 1960, 9:07–10:55 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid.)

426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, January 21, 1960—11:04 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2160. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Vallon, cleared with Mallory, and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter.

427. Draft Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, January 21, 1960.

Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson and initialed by Rubottom. The source text indicates the memorandum was to be sent to L, SCA, and P for concurrence and routed to the Secretary through Merchant, but there is no indication that L, P, or Merchant saw the draft. An undated, marginal notation in an unidentified hand reads: “Not sent. Sec’y rec’d info by other means.”

428. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (Hanes) to the Secretary of State

Washington, January 21, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2160. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hanes.

429. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 21, 1960—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2160. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 1:28 p.m.

430. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 21, 1960—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2160. Official Use Only; Niact. Received at 5:53 p.m.

431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, January 22, 1960—7:22 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2160. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom and Stevenson and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter.

432. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 22, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2260. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal.

433. Editorial Note

434. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, January 23, 1960, 8:27–9:50 a.m.

Washington, January 23, 1960, 8:27–9:50 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on January 25. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) A note on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to Herter on January 25. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1981, 123B.

435. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State

Mexico City, January 24, 1960—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2460. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

436. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, January 25, 1960, 11:15–11:55 a.m.

Washington, January 25, 1960, 11:15–11:55 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on January 26. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 123 C.

437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, January 25, 1960—8:20 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2560. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Bonsal, cleared with Calhoun and Mallory, approved by Rubottom, and signed by Mallory for Herter.

438. Editorial Note

439. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 26, 1960—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2660. Confidential; Niact.

440. Editorial Note

441. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between Senator James O. Eastland and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), Washington, January 28, 1960

Washington, January 28, 1960

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/1–2860. Confidential. Drafted by Rubottom.

442. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Dreier) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, January 28, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/1–2860. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Dreier. Copies were sent to Mallory, Edward A. Jamison, Wieland, and John C. Hill. Rubottom wrote on the source text: “A good paper. Many thanks.”

443. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn) to the Ambassador to Cuba (Bonsal)

Washington, January 29, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Mar.) 1960. Secret. Drafted by Washburn. Attached to a note of February 1 from Washburn to Rubottom, in which Washburn explained that the memorandum was the result of discussions he had the previous week with Bonsal, McKnight, Cushing, and Jack Williams. Washburn noted that USIA Director Allen “approves the concept and approach it presents. “He also noted that the recommendations were “confined strictly to expanded information effort within Cuba to be undertaken by USIA Washington and USIS Cuba with the assistance of your staff here and the Embassy staff in Habana.”

444. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, January 31, 1960—8 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/1–3160. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

445. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 1, 1960—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–160. Confidential; Priority.

446. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 1, 1960—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 5400/2–160. Confidential; Priority.

447. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, February 2, 1960, 2:30–2:39 p.m.

Washington, February 2, 1960, 2:30–2:39 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on February 8. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

448. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, February 2, 1960—9:20 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/1–3160. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stevenson and Bonsal; cleared with Rubottom and in substance with Berding and Whiteman; approved by Herter; and cleared in draft by Herter with President.

449. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 4, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–460. Confidential; Limit Distribution; Niact. The time of transmission and receipt are not given on the source text.

450. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 5, 1960—8 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–560. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Santiago de Cuba.

451. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 8, 1960—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–860. Official Use Only; Priority.

452. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn)

Washington, February 12, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Mar.) 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Cushing and cleared with Wieland and Ross and in draft with the CIA and Hill.

453. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, February 15, 1960, 10:05–10:55 a.m.

Washington, February 15, 1960, 10:05–10:55 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on February 19. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

454. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, February 17, 1960, 3:17–3:55 p.m.

Washington, February 17, 1960, 3:17–3:55 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Prepared by Gray on February 19. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) The source text, however, indicates the meeting began at 3 p.m.

455. Editorial Note

456. Memorandum of Discussion at the 435th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 18, 1960

Washington, February 18, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

457. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, February 18, 1960, 3:10 p.m.

Washington, February 18, 1960, 3:10 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No drafting information is given on the source text.

458. Memorandum From Henry C. Ramsey of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)

Washington, February 18, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Signed by Ramsey who indicated that the memorandum should not be distributed outside S/P. He sent a copy to Morgan and another copy for circulation within S/P.

459. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)

Washington, February 20, 1960.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba January–June 1960. Secret. Drafted by Hill. No initials appear on the source text.

460. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 20, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2060. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson.

461. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Washington, February 21, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5622/2–2160. Confidential. Transmitted to London in telegram 6314 to London, which is the source text.

462. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, February 24, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Cabinet Memos to Secretary. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson, initialed by Mallory, concurred in by Harris H. Huston (SCA), and routed in draft through Merchant who initialed it.

463. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, February 25, 1960–3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.00/2–2560. Confidential; Priority.

464. Memorandum From Edward E. Rice of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)

Washington, February 25, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Rice. Copies were sent to Morgan and Ramsey.

465. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, Washington, February 26, 1960, 9–11 a.m.

Washington, February 26, 1960, 9–11 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series. Confidential. Prepared by Minnich. The Vice President presided at the meeting.

466. Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)

Washington, February 26, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret; Personal.

467. Editorial Note

468. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)

Washington, March 2, 1960.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC64 A 2093, Cuba 091. Secret.

469. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 7, 1960

Washington, March 7, 1960

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, March 1960. Official Use Only. Drafted by Wieland.

470. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 8, 1960—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–860. Secret; Priority.

471. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 8, 1960—8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–860. Official Use Only; Priority.

472. Editorial Note

473. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, March 9, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Top Secret. Drafted by Hill and concurred in by Gerard Smith. The source text is neither signed nor initialed by Rubottom.

474. Memorandum of Discussion at the 436th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 10, 1960

Washington, March 10, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on March 14.

475. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

Washington, March 10, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by Hill and cleared with Mallory and Gerard Smith.

476. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, March 11, 1960, 11: 30 a.m.

Washington, March 11, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, March 1960. Top Secret. Drafted by Edward T. Long, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Merchant. The cover sheet, which contains a list of 29 participants from the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council, indicates that the memorandum was not cleared with the Department of Defense.

477. Editorial Note

478. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 14, 1960—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–1460. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Buenos Aires.

479. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba

Washington, March 15, 1960—9:05 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–1560. Secret, Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal; cleared with Wieland, Stevenson, Kretzmann, and Calhoun; and approved by Rubottom who signed for Herter.

480. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, March 16, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

Washington, March 16, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, March 1960. Prepared by Calhoun. Secret. An attendance list is attached to the source text.

481. Paper Prepared by the 5412 Committee

Washington, March 16, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. An undated, unsigned note attached to the source text reads: “This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the President at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960.” For a record of this meeting, see Document 486. Also published, in part, in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1537.

482. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)

Washington, March 16, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation. Secret. Drafted by Belk.

483. Memorandum of Discussion at the 437th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 17, 1960, 10 a.m.

Washington, March 17, 1960, 10 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs.

484. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 17, 1960, 11 a.m.

Washington, March 17, 1960, 11 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on March 18. The source text indicates that the conversation followed the NSC meeting. The time is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1982.

485. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, March 17, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/3–1760. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that Herter took the memorandum to the White House at 2:30 p.m. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1984, 942.

486. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 17, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

Washington, March 17, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on March 18.

487. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 18, 1960

Washington, March 18, 1960

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 64 D 199, March 1960. Official Use Only. Drafted by Rubottom on March 28 and approved in S on March 30.

488. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, March 19, 1960, 12 p.m.

Washington, March 19, 1960, 12 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. Prepared by Asbjornson.

489. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray), White House, Washington, March 21, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

Washington, March 21, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President. Top Secret.

490. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 21, 1960—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–2160. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Caracas. Bonsal returned to Havana on March 20.

491. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, March 22, 1960.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on March 22. According to a note on the cover sheet, participating in the preparation of the estimate were the Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurring in the estimate were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 1513.

492. Memorandum of Discussion at the 438th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 24, 1960

Washington, March 24, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

493. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, White House, Washington, March 25, 1960, 9 a.m.

Washington, March 25, 1960, 9 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series. Confidential. Prepared by Minnich.

494. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, March 25, 1960—9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110. 11–HE/3–2560. Confidential; Priority.

495. Memorandum of Discussion at the 439th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 1, 1960

Washington, April 1, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs.

496. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and Senator James O. Eastland, Washington, April 1, 1960

Washington, April 1, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (April–June) 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Kruppenbacher. Copies were sent to H, SCA, CMA, and ARA/P.

497. Memorandum From Richard G. Cushing of the Office of the Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn)

Washington, April 5, 1960.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba January–June 1960. Confidential. Also addressed to John P. McKnight (USIA/IAL).

498. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 5, 1960—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110. 11–HE/4–560. Confidential.

424. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 19, 1960—3 p.m.

1684. Prime Minister Fidel Castro appeared unexpectedly on daily radio program of Jose Pardo Liada yesterday from 1330 to 1445. Purpose apparently to excoriate United States and Cuban opposition groups. Tone and attitude arrogant, insolent and provocative. Principal points were:

1. Called remarks of Vice President Nixon at Miami press conference January 17 on Cuban treatment of American private interests and sugar quota “insolent remarks against Cuban people”.

2. Called United States note of January 11² ‘threatening”. Stated it published in press (apparently referring to UPI story) before presentation contrary to usual practice. Criticised Ambassador Bonsal for saying on arrival January 12 he intended to work toward improved relations, telling acting Minister Foreign Relations when requesting appointment he “Merely wished to extend greetings”, (inaccurate) and then presenting note. Said those who “applaud certain Ambassadors” (see point 6 of Embassy telegram 1677)³ display “complete lack of patriotism”.

3. Called Captain Antonio Michel Yabur and Lt. Manuel Artime traitors. (They former officers of FAR and INRA, respectively, who have sought refuge abroad and whose departing letters to Castro accusing him and GOC of Communism were published in Habana daily Avance on January 15.) Said he has some documents which will publish opportunely which show “connections existing between those traitors and certain Embassies and Chanceries and a certain policy”.

4. War which ended in 1898 resulted only in replacement of Spanish domination by United States domination. Three year military occupation of Cuba was only for purpose of economic and political domination of Cuba. As final gesture, United States occupation rigged elections so Bartolome Maso defeated, Estrada Palma elected. Such things not previously taught in Cuba. Only a “series of permanent lies” was taught. Cuban people now for first time in control their own country.

5. Revolutionary government has three main tasks: reorganize the governmental structure; reorganize armed forces with new personnel; and reconstruct economy after 57 years of domination by monopolies, of exploitation by foreign interests and national minorities.

Castro’s basic theme was that revolution is defending Cuban sovereignty. Therefore persons opposed to revolution are traitors and anti-patriotic. Ninety percent of Cuban people support revolution, and opposition therefore has to find support abroad, specifically from United States, where there is “insidious hostile campaign” originating in “international oligarchies and foreign press”. Castro also harped on class struggle theme, saying that supporters of GOC included “peasants, workers, students, young people, untainted professionals, and that sector of middle class which understands the revolution”. He repeatedly said the revolution was supported by the less privileged classes, and in veiled threats added that privileged classes still enjoyed many comforts because of tolerance of GOC, implying that Cuban people might cause a change in that attitude. Said “only hope which counter-revolutionaries have is in support of monopolies which have been injured, of foreign chanceries, of foreign tyrannies, of mercenaries of all sorts”.

Ostensible purpose of appearance was presentation by Pardo Liada of check of 250,000 pesos voluntarily contributed as result his appeal, for purchase of armaments. Castro said money would assuredly be invested in armaments, which were “best investment our people can make at present”. Castro had words of warm praise and affection for Pardo Liada, who has long record as thoroughly unprincipled opportunist currently violently anti-American. In past two months he has been unequalled in viciousness and virulence of his attacks.

Castro appears to be stepping up his policy of attacking United States as traditional and continuing enemy of Cuba and Cuban people.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–1960. Confidential; Priority.

² See Document 422.

³ Telegram 1677, January 18, cited several examples from the January 11 issue of Revolucion to show that the newspaper had become even more extremely anti-American and intransigent. Point 6 of the telegram described the prolonged applause by a movie audience when Ambassador Bonsal appeared in a newsreel. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–1860)

425. Memorandum of Discussion at the 433d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 21, 1960, 9:07–10:55 a.m.¹

Washington, January 21, 1960, 9:07–10:55 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.] Mr. Dulles concluded his briefing by reporting on Cuba. He said the Soviet exhibit would move from Mexico City and open in Havana about January 30. It was believed that Mikoyan would open the Soviet exhibit. In any case a Soviet team of about eighty officials would appear in Havana. The exhibit would be tailored to the Cuban situation; only part of the exhibit as it appeared in New York City and Mexico City would be found in Havana. Mr. Dulles noted that the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City were in close contact, probably laying the groundwork for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In connection with a resumption of diplomatic relations, the Soviet Union would probably extend a credit of $5–6 million to Cuba and would probably press for more trade between the two countries. Mr. Dulles hoped that in the long run the Russian concentration on Cuba would become apparent to the world and that this would be a development favorable to the US. [Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid.)

426. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, January 21, 1960—11:04 a.m.

1043. Department considering on urgent basis your immediate recall for consultation on latest developments unless you have compelling and overriding objections. Mrs. Bonsal expected to accompany you. Will propose that you deliver to Foreign Officer prior to departure firmly worded protest to be released to press simultaneously Havana and Washington. Text of protest will be forwarded later today.² Important that your departure be associated with clear cut issue of communism as well as protest against insults suffered by you, Vice President and U.S.G.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2160. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Vallon, cleared with Mallory, and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter.

² No record has been found that such a text was sent to Bonsal. Regarding the draft of such a text, see infra.

427. Draft Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 21, 1960.

SUBJECT

Recall of Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal from Cuba for Consultation

Discussion

In view of the stepped-up campaign of calumny against the United States Government by the Government of Cuba which has descended to the point of insulting and derogatory public statements by Prime Minister Castro against our Vice President and Ambassador (Tab B² ), I feel that a vigorous action is required in order to maintain the dignity and prestige of the United States Government (which is a particularly important concept in Latin American eyes). It is my belief that Ambassador Bonsal should be instructed, unless he has compelling and overriding objections, to present a sharp formal note of protest to the Government of Cuba in which the Communist menace in Cuba shall be clearly stressed and that following its delivery he should make public the text of this protest to the public, announcing simultaneously that he has been recalled to the United States for immediate consultation. I have alerted Ambassador Bonsal as to this probable course of action by cable (Tab C³ ). A draft of the note of protest is at Tab A.⁴

I realize that Castro’s reaction will probably be angry and irresponsible. However, it is quite evident that his government has already begun a campaign to undermine and discredit Ambassador Bonsal and that his effectiveness would soon be lost in any case. Considering his prestige with the Cuban people and the warm feeling which they have for him, I believe that his recall will make a significant impression on them if the action is taken now at our initiative rather than later, perhaps at the initiative of the Government of Cuba.

Among the negative aspects of the above course of action which I, together with my staff, have carefully weighed is the possibility that Ambassador Bonsal will not be able to return to Habana. It is also possible that a certain risk to the welfare and security of American citizens is involved. However, it is my considered opinion that the protest itself will not generate any spontaneous mob action and that Castro can always find a pretext for fomenting such action should he consider it desirable to do so. This action, too, will postpone indefinitely, if it does not eliminate entirely, the possibility of initiating negotiations in accordance with the initial steps of our recently approved “action program” for Cuba. In view of the recent attitudes expressed by Castro and others and the speed with which events have unfolded, such negotiations are probably impossible in any case and we must now use other means to resolve our problems with the present government of Cuba.

Recommendations

That you approve the recall of Ambassador Bonsal for immediate consultation.

That you approve the text of the note of protest at Tab A. That you call the President and the Vice President to inform them of our intentions.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, CCA Files: Lot 70 D 149, Cuba. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson and initialed by Rubottom. The source text indicates the memorandum was to be sent to L, SCA, and P for concurrence and routed to the Secretary through Merchant, but there is no indication that L, P, or Merchant saw the draft. An undated, marginal notation in an unidentified hand reads: “Not sent. Sec’y rec’d info by other means.”

² Document 424.

³ Supra.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ There is no indication on the source text that any of the recommendations were approved or disapproved.

428. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (Hanes) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 21, 1960.

SUBJECT

Mr. Rubottom’s Memorandum²

I concur in Mr. Rubottom’s memorandum because I agree with the compelling reasons he has advanced for such action.

In making your decision, however, I wish to point out that I also agree with Mr. Rubottom’s statement that a risk to the security of American citizens is involved. There are, very roughly, about 5,000 Americans in the Havana area. Very few of these are tourists, the great majority being long-term residents and business men.

The Embassy as of now does not have any effective plan for the protection and defense of the American community in the event of mob violence. I do not consider that it is feasible to develop any such plan in the immediate future.

I would also point out, however, that because the vast majority of these Americans are residents rather than tourists, they are presumably more aware of the potential dangers to themselves in the present Cuban political situation.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1–2160. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hanes.

² Supra.

429. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 21, 1960—1 p.m.

1708. Deptel 1043.² Although fully understanding and sympathizing with thinking behind proposal recall me for consultation, believe it advisable that I remain here for present. We are getting into increasingly tense and serious situation. I hope that American lives and property will not be endangered but I do not wish to create such an opportunity for extremist action as would be afforded by my presentation of “firmly worded protest” and then follow-up with my own and Mrs. Bonsal’s departure from local scene.

I sympathize with Spanish Ambassador’s action last night. I called on him this morning at his house to say goodbye and was extensively photographed. However, I doubt wisdom his course.

It is my view that we should not dignify Castro’s ravings by formal specific protest through official channels but should rather follow course of making press statement along lines suggested in Embtels 1687 and 1704.³ I appreciate situation in US but urge, from point of view of extremely difficult situation here, that we follow course I have suggested.⁴

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2160. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 1:28 p.m.

² Document 426.

³ In telegram 1687 from Havana, January 19, Bonsal transmitted the text of a statement which he recommended he issue in Havana to answer, “if only for the record,” Castro’s “campaign of hostility and calumny” against the U.S. Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–1960) In telegram 1704 from Havana, January 21, Bonsal provided one additional sentence that he proposed to add. (ibid., 611.37/1–2160)

⁴ In telegram 1045 to Havana, January 21 (sent at 6:01 p.m.), Herter requested that Bonsal return immediately to Washington for consultations, that he bring Mrs. Bonsal, and that he inform the Foreign Ministry of his action. Herter said that Bonsal would be given an explanation when he arrived in Washington. Herter also said that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, before whom he had appeared earlier in the day, had told the press that Bonsal was being recalled. In telegram 1716 from Havana, January 21 (received at 7:49 p.m.), Bonsal replied that he and his wife would leave the morning of January 23 for New York and then Washington. He wanted to avoid leaving Havana the same day as the Spanish Ambassador and also wanted to avoid the possibility of an incident in Miami. Both telegrams are ibid.

430. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 21, 1960—3 p.m.

1712. Prime Minister Castro made five hour television appearance night January 20. Characterized by sustained attack on United States policies and treatment of Cuba. Generally did not mention United States by name, but referred to policies and plots designed and directed in “certain chancery”. Never left audience in doubt as to which chancery meant. General theme was that campaign against revolution was organized and directed by United States interests, which determined to defeat revolution. Said Cuban people now facing gravest threat ever, and will have to fight and sacrifice to retain achievements of revolution. Said United States robbed Cuba of its reserves and exploited country for 57 years. Stated United States had always robbed, killed, and forced concessions in Latin America. United States hostile to Cuban revolution from beginning, and its actions following definite plan for liquidating revolution. United States very powerful, and now attempting to isolate Cuba in hemisphere. GOC would counteract campaign, and would bend every energy to offsetting United States influence. Said current talk of alterations in Cuban sugar quota part of United States campaign. Added United States view that quota constituted subsidy for Cuba inaccurate, since quota system actually designed to protect United States sugar interests. Strongly condemned recent statements by Vice President Nixon and Senator Smathers. Repeatedly stated as fact that “bombardment of Havana October 21 last was by plane based in United States”, also said that flights of incendiary aircraft originated in United States, and strongly implied done with approval GUS. Said GOC had documentary proof of campaigns against GOC “emanating from several chanceries”, which would present at proper moment.

A panelist asked if GOC considering protest to OAS, and Castro said thinking of presenting case to UN.

Panelist inquired why GOC now training and arming Cuban people. Castro replied militia now necessary because of international conspiracy against Cuba, and that decision triggered by “bombing of Habana” October 21, 1959. Said conspiracy had as basic objective physical elimination of principal leaders of revolution, and is encouraged by “notes from certain Embassy, actions certain chancery, statements of Senators, and calumnious campaign in foreign press”. Implied key force within Cuba for counter-revolution was “30 to 40,000 former soldiers”. Said history showed that every revolution had to confront counter-revolution from abroad, and made exceptionally confused and inaccurate references to French revolution as example. Said only correct policy for “certain chancery” was to leave [in?] peace and respect Cuban sovereignty. All other policies would fail.

Asked about proposed conference underdeveloped nations, Castro preferred title under-industrialized nations, explaining other wording had derogatory implications. Said currently planned for Habana in June, but decision must wait return of Minister Foreign Relations Roa. Expected some 50 nations to attend, including many Latin American countries. Decision LA nations attend would depend on whether they had “sufficient self-determination” to do so.

Castro spent large portion of appearance in what Embassy considers inaccurate and exaggerated accounts of achievements of Cuban Agrarian Reform to date. Claimed again, as several times in past, that Cuban Agrarian Reform first in world to achieve immediate increase in total production agricultural products. In contradictory statements, said this caused by GOC decision not break up large production units, but rather form cooperatives. At same time, said great number workers already given title to individual parcels land.

Castro also said GOC not currently considering additional laws affecting urban property or rentals, but might if conditions later warranted, nor contemplating gasoline rationing. Questioned concerning nationalization heavy industry, said matter academic since no such industry in Cuba. Claimed exchange reserves now increasing at rate million dollars daily (this inaccurate).

During program Castro read portions of what he said was “letter from sister-in-law Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz to his brother”, dated December 16. Embassy understands letter was from Eugenia Alvarez Martinez to her brother-in-law, Marcos Diaz Lanz. She was arrested December 17, but told an Air Attaché contact that day that such a letter had been intercepted by GOC. As read by Castro, letter was highly indiscreet report of conspiratorial activities and request for further instructions. Writer stated had good relations with Spanish and American Embassies, which sympathetic their cause. Said Spanish Embassy had been prepared help in getting Lt. Manuel Artimes out of country, but later told her that he had been gotten out by others, through Guantanamo. Castro said this obviously meant United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. (This statement untrue.) Letter said writers group had obtained some arms and printing press, with assistance some monks and nuns, and press now concealed in convent. Castro said he left it to Cuban people to pass judgment on actions Spanish Embassy, and expected hierarchy Catholic Church to correct behavior some its members. Emphasized he felt Church as whole not involved in such actions.

Shortly afterwards Spanish Ambassador Lojendio appeared in studio, pushed way to moderators desk, and demanded right to reply to “insults”. Lojendio clearly furious, Castro said he had no right interrupt program without invitation, Lojendio replied decision up to moderator, whose permission he had requested, and not Castro. Castro lost temper completely, and two engaged in heated verbal exchange. Great confusion in studio, and program went off air. When resumed in few minutes, moderator explained that at request Castro, Ambassador denied permission speak and escorted home by members armed forces. Said Ambassador would be offered facilities to reply immediately after program. (View later developments, this not done.) Castro then launched into savage, deliberately insulting attack on Lojendio personally and on Spanish Government. Remarks greeted by repeated applause by studio audience. Castro said that Lojendio had 24 hours to leave country, subject approval President Dorticos, who in audience. Dorticos approved. Castro added Cuban Ambassador to Spain Miro Cardona would be recalled. Dorticos approved. (Role of Dorticos in this pathetically lacking in dignity. Castro obviously remembered him as complete after-thought.) Castro said relations would not be broken for time being, but continuation relations obviously impossible after his remarks.

Remainder of program, some two hours, was anti-climatic. Included expected character assassinations of Lt. Artimes and Major Antonio Michel Yabur, as well as Jorge Zayas and his newspaper Avance.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2160. Official Use Only; Niact. Received at 5:53 p.m.

431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, January 22, 1960—7:22 p.m.

1052. For Bonsal. Embtel 1708.² Department understands [and] sympathizes fully your feeling akin to that ship captain not wanting leave his vessel in heavy seas but believes your position as Ambassador along with dignity and prestige USG required that you return immediately. Apparent that deliberate smear campaign against you already underway. Department had considered sending you subject your judgment possible formal protest and statement along lines your 1687,³ but in view publicity your return decided best withhold this action at least for time being.

Department fully mindful parlous situation now existing Cuba and heavy strain on US-Cuban relations. It recognizes dangers involved for US nationals and has taken account possibility strong measures could be required to assure their protection.

Department hopes that your recall this manner will clearly demonstrate seriousness with which U.S. views situation and will make profound impression all thinking Cubans including many in Government particularly in view of high esteem with which you are held by most Cubans.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2160. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom and Stevenson and approved by Wieland who signed for Herter.

² Document 429.

³ See footnote 3, Document 429.

432. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1011 Havana, January 22, 1960.

SUBJECT

Call on Acting Foreign Minister Marcelo Fernandez Font

I called this afternoon at 3:30 on the Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Marcelo Fernandez Font, in order to inform him that I had been called to Washington on consultation by the Secretary of State and was departing the following morning. He replied that he hoped my absence would not be a long one and made some complimentary remarks. I said that I did not know how long I would be absent and added that Mrs. Bonsal was accompanying me.

Sr. Fernandez then said that he had been studying the note which I had delivered to him on January 11² with the President and the Prime Minister, that he expected to have a reply shortly. I asked him whether this was “insulting” note which the Government was about “to reject” according to Revolución. He said that he thought that Revolución’s reaction had not been the Government’s reaction and he referred to the statement which he himself had made on the note. I told him that Revolución was generally, and, in my opinion, rightly regarded as the official organ of the Cuban Government.

One thing then led to another and we found ourselves engaged in quite a heated discussion of Cuban-American relations. On the question of the planes which have been dropping inflammable material on the Cuban cane fields, I told him there was no evidence whatever that these had come from the United States and that they might well have originated in Cuba or elsewhere, but that everyone here in the Government, from the Prime Minister down, had accused us. I referred to the “Pearl Harbor” incident and its treatment by the Cuban Government as a further example of a malevolent predisposition on the part of the Cuban Government on matters affecting the United States.

The Minister then turned to the question of tourism and the efforts made by the Cuban Government to attract tourists from the United States as an evidence of affection for the American people. I said that I too favored tourism but did not see how tourists could be attracted if Cuban Government spokesmen spoke almost daily of “invasions” and “Pearl Harbors”. The Minister said that the Government did fear invasions owing to the machinations of its enemies. I rejoined that in that case it should not endeavor to attract Americans here who might be trapped in case of hostility.

I went into a pretty general description of our reaction to the Prime Minister’s public appearances on the subject of the United States and told him that I felt that our Government, its leaders and its institutions had been consistently slandered and insulted. I also said that I felt that my own efforts of an 11-months period to establish a basis of understanding and confidence between our two governments had not been reciprocated. I stated that I had endeavored, not without success, to achieve an understanding of the economic, political and social aims of the Cuban people.

The Acting Foreign Minister then said that he had often heard from President Dorticos and Prime Minister Castro what a high opinion they had of me. I said that, of course, this was gratifying but that they should realize that I was wholly identified with my Government and that my Government represents the people of the United States in a far truer sense than do the governments of many other countries.

The Minister then expressed the hope that I would be returning soon and that there would be an opportunity to negotiate on matters of mutual interest. He added that Minister Roa will be returning on the 27th, having cut short his trip somewhat.

On leaving the Ministry, I was approached by a half dozen press representatives. I told them that I had been called to Washington by the Secretary of State on consultation and had just taken leave of the Minister. In reply to a question, I said that I did not know how long I would be absent. I was asked whether I had any comment to make of Prime Minister Castro’s observations about the American Embassy in his January 20 television appearance.³ I said that if anything were to be taken up regarding the activities of the American Embassy it should be taken up through normal channels.

Philip W. Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2260. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal.

² See Document 422.

³ See Document 430.

433. Editorial Note

In telegram 1050 to Havana, January 22 (5:10 p.m.), the Department noted that in view of the considerable press interest in Ambassador Bonsal’s return and the inadvisability of a “no comment” statement on his part, Bonsal should make a statement upon arrival in the United States along the following lines:

“I have been called back to Washington for consultation at the request of the Department of State. I do not know how long I will be here. My return for consultation is, of course, in connection with an unfortunate steady deterioration of relations between the United States and Cuba. This deterioration has been accelerated by attacks on the United States, on the Vice President, and on myself in recent days by Prime Minister Castro and official Cuban Government organs.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2260)

At 5:55 p.m. on January 22, Secretary Herter called Goodpaster to discuss, among other things, Bonsal’s return. According to a memorandum of their telephone conversation:

“In accordance with the Secretary’s statement to the President that we would make no statements on Cuba without discussion with the President, Secy said Amb. Bonsal is leaving Cuba Saturday morning and flying direct to New York, proceeding Washington directly. Secy said Bonsal is bound to be hit by the press on his arrival, and Secy read proposed statement to be made by Bonsal. Goodpaster said he would get this to the President and call the Secretary back.”

At 6:45 p.m. Goodpaster telephoned Herter. According to a memorandum of their conversation:

“Gen. Goodpaster telephoned to say he had shown the President the proposed statement to be made by Bonsal and the President says the statement is all right. Goodpaster said the President asked if this meant Bonsal’s permanent recall and Goodpaster said he told the President this statement left that open, which the Secretary said was right. Secretary said we would have to wait to see what the Cubans’ next move is; whether they make an apology for their outrageous statements, etc., before we make a definite decision on Bonsal’s return there. Goodpaster said the President was all set on the proposed statement now.” (Both memoranda are in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

In telegram 1736 from Havana, January 23 (sent at 11 a.m.), Bonsal indicated that if required he would make the arrival statement along the lines suggested, but would add the following points: (a) an awareness of the traditional Cuban-American friendship of which he had so much evidence, and (b) a sympathetic awareness of the aspirations and ideals of the Cuban people which were achievable without damage to the legitimate rights of Americans in Cuba. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2360) The text of Bonsal’s oral statement, which incorporated the main elements in the Department of State’s suggested statement as well as the two points proposed by Bonsal, made upon his arrival on January 23 at Idlewild Airport in New York is in Department of State Press Release No. 36, January 25, printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 15, 1960, pages 238–239.

434. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, January 23, 1960, 8:27–9:50 a.m.¹

Washington, January 23, 1960, 8:27–9:50 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

Secretary Herter told the President that the Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs² had favored pulling Ambassador Bonsal out of Cuba. Mr. Herter had spent six hours with the Congress on Thursday and Friday, and there had been a strong Congressional feeling that our Ambassador should be brought back.³ Our difficulty is that, under the non-intervention policy established in 1931, there is not too much we can do that will have immediate effect.

The President said he thought we should get one of our good friends in the OAS to raise the matter in that forum, taking the position that here is a man who is going wild and harming the whole American structure. He added that if we get to a point where we are being pushed too hard, we may have to do something drastic such as blockading the island. He would then be concerned about the safety of our citizens who are there.

Mr. Herter expressed his own concern regarding our citizens. He said there have been indications that many of the other countries of the Americas are seriously disturbed over this “mystique” of heroism Castro is having some success in bringing for [on?] himself, and its possible impact on them. They are also concerned over the fact that Castro is steadily putting more and more Communists into more and more of the major posts of Government. He seems to be moving toward a system of collective farms. There has been no real policy of land distribution. Mr. Herter said he had had a meeting with a number of representatives of the principal U.S. sugar and cattle interests in Cuba.⁴ These would prefer to try to work out their problems individually rather than have an over-all approach made.

The President said he is finding that dictators devoted to fomenting disorder can have a terrible influence on our affairs. Except for the existence of the OAS and its abhorrence of intervention, we would have to be thinking already of building up our force at Guantanamo. Mr. Herter said that he thinks the next call for action in these circumstances will be made by the OAS. The President said he hoped we could avoid making the call on our own.

Mr. Herter said his hearings with the Congress had gone reasonably well, with no indication of hostility or desire to use our foreign relations for political purposes. The President commented that there had been one very adverse circumstance in that Senator Fulbright disclosed the secret information given to him by Mr. Herter. Secretary Herter said he has written a letter of protest on this to Mr. Fulbright.⁵ The President commented that Fulbright is an example of a man of rather great intelligence without good judgment. Mr. Herter commented that he is a man who seems continually frustrated in attitude.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on January 25. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) A note on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to Herter on January 25. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1981, 123B.

² The Inter-American Advisory Committee met at the Department of State January 20–21. Herter attended the January 20 morning session and also hosted a luncheon that day for the committee members. The morning session included a briefing by Wieland on possible courses of action to take with regard to Cuba. An agenda for the meeting and several briefing papers, including one prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on January 12 and entitled “The Present Situation in Cuba and the Outlook thru 1960,” are attached to a memorandum of January 16 from Mallory to Herter. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/1–1660)

³ January 21 and 22. See footnote 4, Document 429.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Not found.

435. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State¹

Mexico City, January 24, 1960—3 p.m.

1772. For Assistant Secretary Rubottom.

My dear Dick: When Dr. Eisenhower was here last August,² Embassy officers and I discussed seriousness Cuban problem with him. At that time he asked if we had any suggestions. Embassy has given considerable thought to difficulties in Cuba. Our relations there have profound impact here and our policies in dealing with Castro are being carefully watched by Mexico. I therefore respectfully submit to you four suggestions that may be helpful:

1. US representative to Cuba should not return unless assurances in writing are given to our government that official statements attacking President Eisenhower, our Ambassador, and the US cease. Resulting speculation on possibility of break of relations by US should not be discouraged.

2. Travel by US citizens to Cuba should be discouraged on grounds hostility to our country and US Government concern for welfare and safety of its citizens. This concern could be raised at high level, for example at President’s or Secretary’s press conference.

3. US should discontinue paying preferential prices for Cuban sugar. Difference between premium price and world market price should be placed in escrow for payment of expropriated properties US citizens in Cuba. As reported to you previously,³ this suggestion came from responsible but controversial Cuban. Understand this suggestion previously made in general terms to former Under Secretary Murphy by same man.

4. Complete current evidence of Communist infiltration in Cuban Government should be indirectly publicized in LA. This logically could lead to invoking Caracas resolution by OAS after careful preparation has been made by US with supporting countries.

Embassy Mexico continues receive daily angry, frustrated, and informed persons, who view deteriorating situation in Cuba as not only wrecking US prestige in LA, but causing serious weakening of OAS system.

Embassy would appreciate reaction to above suggestions.⁴ Please pass Dr. Eisenhower if appropriate.

Hill

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2460. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² Documentation on Milton Eisenhower’s visit to several Latin American countries during the summer of 1959 is scheduled for publication in volume V.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ In telegram 1634 to Mexico City, January 26, Rubottom told Hill that he greatly appreciated his telegram. Regarding point 3 in the telegram, Rubottom noted that draft legislation had been approved by the Department of State to give the Executive power to take whatever steps considered necessary to ensure “proper treatment under international law” of affected U.S. interests. Rubottom felt that this legislation had the general concurrence of the sugar industry. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2460)

436. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, January 25, 1960, 11:15–11:55 a.m.¹

Washington, January 25, 1960, 11:15–11:55 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter, Rubottom, Ambassador Bonsal, Generals Persons and Goodpaster

Mr. Herter said Ambassador Bonsal had not wanted to return from Cuba. He feels that a danger to U.S. citizens there may develop, and did not wish to be away in that event. He was instructed to return, however, because Mr. Herter felt our Ambassador should not be subjected to indignities. The President asked as to the experience of the Spanish Ambassador on his departure, and Ambassador Bonsal said that he was subjected to indignities. Mr. Bonsal said the Cuban Government is trying to link the U.S. to Spain through the President’s visit with Franco.² The President said he had gone to Spain among other reasons as a means of showing a courtesy toward Spanish-speaking people—a courtesy which he thought the Latin Americans would appreciate.

Ambassador Bonsal said there is a great concern among responsible people in Cuba regarding the arming of workers and peasants. He said that Castro’s group think that they have discovered something new called “democratic humanism.” They claim they are not anti-religious, but are trying to carry out agrarian reforms which the church has supported in times past. He added that the church is trying hard not to break with Castro. The President said that Castro begins to look like a mad man. Mr. Bonsal said he is a very conspiratorial individual who tries to create the impression that he and Cuba are beleaguered. He is an extreme Leftist and is strongly anti-American.

The President said his great current problem is to keep the Congress from running out completely on the sugar bill. He thought the best plan is to give the power of decision to the President. Mr. Herter said the press will probably ask what we plan to do regarding the sugar bill. The President thought it was best simply to say that we will be sending something to the Congress on this.

The President said he thought the best course of action in the hemisphere would be if the OAS went down the line for us in trying to put some restraints on Castro. There may be a problem in Venezuela, he recognized.

Mr. Rubottom said Mexico is also a problem—probably the greatest—but commented that Lopez-Mateos has said he deplores the resort to non-constitutional procedures. Mr. Rubottom said it would be hard to get the fourteen votes required in the OAS to support the United States point of view, and that even if they were obtained, the OAS action would not be effective in Cuba. He thought the only solution would come through the development of a moderate and responsible force from within Cuba. This he thought would probably take many months. The President said that supposing the situation gets worse, he would not desert our citizens. If the OAS is not going to support us, they show themselves as fair weather friends and we may have to take other action. Mr. Rubottom said in such circumstances the OAS might act along the lines we suggest. This would not, however, bring a full solution, and it is better to let a moderate native force build up. The President said that, if it comes to such conditions, we could quarantine Cuba. If they (the Cuban people) are hungry, they will throw Castro out. Ambassador Bonsal said we should not punish the whole Cuban people for the acts of one abnormal man. The President said that of course he agreed with this.

Mr. Herter next showed the President a draft of a proposed statement.³ The President edited this and asked that certain further revisions be made, and that it be resubmitted then.

The President asked if there are evident Communist activities in Cuba. Mr. Bonsal said the Communists have a very active newspaper, and that many of the foreigners who hold influential positions in the Cuban Government are under Communist influence. The President asked how Cuba could make a living if it was unable to sell its sugar. Mr. Bonsal said the present government had not thought that problem out. Mr. Rubottom commented that a Cuban emissary is now travelling in Latin America trying to build up support for a meeting of the “underprivileged” countries and is getting a very cold reception. Mr. Bonsal said the Cubans are trying to whittle down the free world and enlarge the number of uncommitted countries.

The President said he was very favorably impressed with President Lopez-Mateos of Mexico and was hopeful he could have some influence in the situation. Mr. Rubottom said that Lopez-Mateos is still on his trip through Latin America.

Secretary Herter commented that Mexico’s voting record in the UN has not been too good from our point of view. They have voted against us on a number of occasions. Mr. Rubottom said this results largely from a single individual, Padilla Nervo. Others such as the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador in Washington are most helpful.

Mr. Herter said he foresaw two questions, the first on sugar. The President said on this he would simply say the matter is being studied and something will be sent to Congress. The President thought it should be stressed that the Cubans will not voluntarily accept Communist dictatorship over their individual lives. Mr. Herter said the second question is whether our Ambassador is going back. The President thought on that [that?] he would say that no decision has been made.

The President asked that Mr. Rubottom inform Senator Fulbright and Congressman Morgan that he plans to make a friendly but firm statement on this matter. With regard to the recall of the Cuban Ambassador, the President said that we would say no decision has yet been made. He asked whether there had been any demonstration against Mr. Bonsal on the latter’s departure. Mr. Bonsal said there had not been. The people were quite friendly. A number of his colleagues came out to be present at his departure.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on January 26. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 123 C.

² President Eisenhower visited Spain December 21–22, 1959.

³ Not found. In his memoirs, Bonsal noted that he was primarily responsible for the draft. (Bonsal, Cuba, Castro, and the United States, p. 121. Regarding the further drafting of the statement and its release on January 26, see Document 438.

437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, January 25, 1960—8:20 p.m.

1059. For Braddock from Bonsal. Deptel 1058.² Soonest after President’s press conference and following delivery of copy to Acting FonMin as instructed in Deptel please transmit copy statement with my compliments to Argentine and Brazilian Ambassadors telling them I hope they will agree it represents major effort to deal with situation created by Castro’s recent television appearance³ and Government press material in calm, moderate manner as befits relations Cuban-American peoples and principles of Inter-American system. Add that we earnestly hope President’s words will be received in friendly spirit uttered and that deterioration relations can be arrested. Ask them if they have any suggestions and tell them how much I have appreciated their advice and in case of Argentine, his cooperation. FYI It would be my hope these two influential Ambassadors might advise their GOC contacts and particularly those close to Castro to react soberly and calmly to what may well be final opportunity avoid serious consequences resulting U.S. public and official reaction to insults our Government and high officials have suffered at Castro’s hands and in GOC press. End FYI

I leave your discretion whether similar aproach might be made to Mexican Amb and possibly also to Dihigo. Perhaps Bethel could talk to Franqui but most important avoid any implication of threat from Embassy official which Revolución could exploit.

You will wish to ask Ambassadors you approach to observe discretion re your conversations.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2560. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Bonsal, cleared with Calhoun and Mallory, approved by Rubottom, and signed by Mallory for Herter.

² Presumably the reference should be to telegram 1050; see Document 433.

³ See Document 430.

438. Editorial Note

The draft statement to be issued by the President underwent further revision as a result of telephone conversations between Secretary Herter and Assistant Secretary Rubottom at 6:20 and 6:40 p.m. on January 25 and between Herter and Goodpaster at 8:55 and 9:10 a.m. on January 26. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) A revised text as sent to the President in the evening of January 25 is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2560. A copy of this revised text, with further handwritten changes apparently made by the President, is in Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba.

The final, approved statement was released to the press at the President’s news conference held in the Executive Office Building at 10:31 a.m. on January 26. For the transcript of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pages 125–134.

In his statement, the President expressed his concern at the deterioration of U.S. relations with Cuba, “a country with whose people the people of the United States have enjoyed and expect to continue to enjoy a firm and mutually beneficial friendship.” The President restated U.S. policy toward Cuba, which included:

1) Strict U.S. adherence to the “policy of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, including Cuba.”

2) Continued enforcement of U.S. laws, “including those which reflect commitments under inter-American treaties.” The President noted the number of invasions mounted from Cuban territory directed against other countries, “in several cases attended with serious loss of life and property damage in the territory of those other countries.”

3) U.S. concern regarding the tendency of Cuban Government spokesmen, including Prime Minister Castro, “to create the illusion of aggressive acts and conspiratorial activities aimed at the Cuban Government and attributed to United States officials or agencies.”

4) U.S. recognition of the right of the Cuban Government to “undertake those social, economic, and political reforms which, with due regard for their obligations under international law, they may think desirable.”

5) In cases where the rights of U.S. citizens under Cuban or international law have been disregarded, U.S. commitment to seek solution of disagreements through ‘diplomatic negotiations” or “other appropriate international procedures.”

The President concluded his statement as follows: “I should like only to add that the United States Government has confidence in the ability of the Cuban people to recognize and defeat the intrigues of international communism which are aimed at destroying democratic institutions in Cuba and the traditional and mutually beneficial friendship between the Cuban and American peoples.” (Ibid., pages 134–136)

439. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 26, 1960—6 p.m.

1772. Deptel 1059.² After reading President’s statement Brazilian Ambassador said he considered it very good and had only one fault to find, which however he considered fairly serious. In last sentence he believes words “government and” should be inserted after “ability of the Cuban” since otherwise he feels this statement will be resented as attempt to drive wedge between government and people and will undo the good which otherwise results from the statement. He urges if possible clarification or correction be issued.

Leitao da Cunha liked reference in fifth point to recourse to appropriate international procedures. He said there is no danger of losing respect his country and Latin America if we keep our differences with Cuba on a lofty plane, avoiding every form of bilateral pressure, even such as denying to Cuba our premium price for sugar which he feels we would be justified in doing. Such measures he is convinced would be regarded in many Latin American countries as economic reprisal or aggression, regardless of merits of case. He strongly suggests we utilize only international procedures, beginning with conciliation mechanism within OAS and proceeding to International Court if necessary.

Brazilian Ambassador likened Cuban attitude toward US to spite of a child against parent or teacher which could lead him even to destroying his prized possessions. This theory was further supported he believed by observation that present GOC leaders, however naturally intelligent, are immature, inexperienced and like children playing with fire arms. Situation he feels calls for psychoanalytical approach.

Leitao da Cunha offered to be as helpful as possible but said he had little contact with leaders. “They don’t want any advice.” He felt it was going to help situation for GOC to miss Ambassador Bonsal for a little while.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1–2660. Confidential; Niact.

² Document 437.

440. Editorial Note

In the evening of January 27, President Dorticos responded to President Eisenhower’s statement of the previous day. A translated text of Dortico’s statement was sent to the Department in telegram 1790 from Havana, January 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/1–2860)

In telegram 1792 from Havana, January 28, the Embassy reported that several of its officers watched Dorticos make the statement and that his delivery was marked by an air of “defiance and intransigence. “The Embassy offered its opinion that the statement contained some ground for optimism in that it affirmed the Cuban Government’s desire for friendly relations with the United States and its willingness to negotiate differences. But the Embassy felt the basic condemnatory attitude toward the United States remained unchanged. The Embassy observed that any progress toward a resolution of existing difficulties will be “slow and difficult.” (Ibid.)

441. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between Senator James O. Eastland and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), Washington, January 28, 1960¹

Washington, January 28, 1960

SUBJECT

Cuba under Castro; sugar legislation; Dominican Republic

I started the conversation by telling the Senator that I appreciated his having telephoned me regarding his committee’s interest in certain Cuban exiles and that I had come to discuss the Cuban problem with him. He replied that he was under heavy pressure from several members of his committee to resume hearings on Cuba, mentioning Senator Dodd as one of those pressing the hardest.

I said that nobody in the Department was sanguine over the prospects in Cuba under Castro but that it might be better to wait a while longer before resuming hearings. Such people as Diaz Lanz and other defectors from the Castro movement had helped to start the movement and perhaps their time would come. Cubans identified with the Batista government, such as Nuñez Portuondo (who the Senator said he did not know), were not helpful at this stage of the game. Castro was making many mistakes and eventually the Cuban people would wise up to him, I said. They would do whatever was required at that time. The Senator rejoined that the same thing had been said about China and Czechoslovakia and look what had happened to them. I said that the cases seemed to me to be different.

I pointed out the role that might be played eventually by the OAS under the terms of the Caracas Resolution. I explained that opinion against Castro was ripening throughout the Americas. The Senator evinced some interest in this. I mentioned the editorials labelling Castro as a dictator recently printed in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. I told him about the Lopez Mateos comments regarding the Castro government in a press conference in Rio de Janeiro.² When I said that harsh punitive action against Castro by us unilaterally would spring the trap which the communists and others had baited for us, the Senator seemed to agree.

Responding to his inquiry about the Department’s position on sugar legislation, I said that the administration and the industry were practically in agreement on a bill to give the executive authority to take whatever steps necessary to assure an adequate supply of sugar and to protect the national interest. The Senator said that he was not sure that he would support such a bill but that he would study it carefully.

The Senator asked whether Trujillo would not be willing to move against Cuba. I said that he might if he were given encouragement although recently Dominican radio attacks on Castro had ceased. I said this was probably a purely temporary self-serving gesture by Trujillo. The Senator seemed quite surprised when I told him about the reports of hundreds of persons arrested in the Dominican Republic and that internal problems were probably keeping Trujillo fully occupied at this time.

The Senator expressed appreciation for my having called on him and I agreed to keep in touch with him regarding Cuban developments. The Senator mentioned a Cuban Colonel, formerly a Batista officer, who was prepared to testify but could not recall his name.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/1–2860. Confidential. Drafted by Rubottom.

² Not further identified.

442. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Dreier) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, January 28, 1960.

SUBJECT

Treatment of Cuban Problem in OAS

I refer to my memorandum of January 22² concerning the procedures of the OAS in connection with the Cuban problem and the possibilities and limitations of each. The present memorandum deals with the objectives that we might seek in the Cuban situation and, therefore, the procedures of the OAS that might be used.

The main factors to be borne in mind in this regard seem to me to be the following:

1. There is little, if any, prospect of a real improvement in our relations with Cuba so long as Castro and his Communist-oriented backers (Raul Castro, Che Guevara, et al.) remain in power.

2. We must hope that the Cuban people will themselves correct this situation. However, at the present time it does not seem as though opposition to him has either become sufficiently strong or well organized to warrant any expectation of effective action in the near future. More time is therefore needed for the political ferment within Cuba to proceed.

3. At the same time, the strength of the Communist-oriented group seems to be increasing. We are therefore faced in effect with a race between the increasing power of our enemies in Cuba and the growth of an opposition among those who can be expected to pursue the desirable goals of social change in Cuba while maintaining a friendly relationship with the United States. This race can be favorably or unfavorably affected by actions of this country.

4. There may well come a point at which the growth of the power of the Communist-oriented group so far exceeds development of an effective opposition that we may have to consider drastic action of a political or economic sort. Such action, if it becomes necessary, should be taken only after a series of other steps by which we would have clearly demonstrated our desire to handle the problem by orderly and less drastic means. The maximum support of other members of the inter-American community should be sought in advance by careful preparatory work.

5. Our basic objectives must be a) to contribute to the process by which the Cuban people will themselves replace the Castro Government with one with which it is possible to negotiate, and b) to maintain the best possible position in the eyes of the other Latin American countries so as to have their support for whatever steps may ultimately be necessary.

I assume that we are assembling a list of measures—unilateral, bilateral and multilateral—that we can at any given time employ in working towards the above objectives. At the present stage, it seems wise to emphasize bilateral negotiations rather than to move quickly into multilateral procedures. This is desirable because the Cubans will have the same opportunity as we to exploit the propaganda opportunities of OAS or UN discussions. Furthermore, our position in an international organization will be stronger if we have made a record of seeking to settle the problems through direct negotiations. With respect to multilateral procedures, we should first of all maintain our position, which is supported by the Charters of the OAS and the UN, that governments having disputes should seek to settle them through regional procedures before bringing them to the Security Council of the UN. Material is being prepared for Ambassador Lodge to be used in the event the Cubans should bypass the OAS and bring their complaints against the United States before the Security Council.

The main steps that should be considered with reference to the OAS are suggested below. If taken, they should be spread out over a period of time, emphasis being placed first upon the informational activities covered by points 1) and 2). The later steps would, of course, have to be reviewed in the light of existing circumstances.

1) Make a statement at a forthcoming meeting of the Council of the OAS of our position regarding the Cuban situation.

2) Initiate a continuing flow of information to the other American governments on developments in Cuba. While this material should be carefully prepared, we should not attempt to cover everything in one document at one time, but plan a series of presentations to other governments to be carried out over several months.

3) Request the Inter-American Peace Committee to take cognizance of the charges of intervention and aggression which the Cuban Government has leveled at the United States, emphasizing our already demonstrated willingness to provide full information to the OAS on this matter and urging that the Cuban Government be requested to do likewise. It is likely that the Cuban Government will not respond favorably to such an initiative. However, this fact would militate in our favor, and would furthermore give grounds for opposing a move by Cuba in the UN which Castro has already suggested.

4) Possible submission to the International Court of Justice, or to arbitration, of carefully selected legal disputes with Cuba as a further demonstration of our desire to settle them in an orderly manner.

5) If the situation in Cuba continues to deteriorate after the foregoing has been carried out, we could plan for a meeting of Foreign Ministers which would be called with a view to calling upon Cuba a) to submit her disputes with the United States to procedures of settlement provided for in the OAS or other provisions of international law, and b) to take effective remedial action against the threat of Communism if this dangerous influence grows.

In the last analysis, should more drastic action on our part become unavoidable in the interests of national security, we would seek, in the light of existing circumstances, the maximum support of the OAS through a meeting of Foreign Ministers that would sanction political or economic measures. It should be emphasized that the repugnance to the Latin American countries of anything smacking of intervention would render such action by the Foreign Ministers very unlikely except in a clear case of strong Soviet or Chinese Communist influence in Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/1–2860. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Dreier. Copies were sent to Mallory, Edward A. Jamison, Wieland, and John C. Hill. Rubottom wrote on the source text: “A good paper. Many thanks.”

² Not printed. (Ibid., 737. 00/1–2260)

443. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn) to the Ambassador to Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Washington, January 29, 1960.

SUBJECT

Increased Information Effort in Cuba to Help Counter Castro’s Anti-U.S. Campaign

As we discussed in your office Wednesday afternoon,² the proposed increased effort is based on the premise that there is a longstanding reservoir of goodwill among the Cuban people toward the U.S. (The anti-Americanism stems from Castro and his governing group and the communication organs that follow his line. As yet it has not cut deeply into the basic friendliness of the people.)

The tone of our output should be low-key, calm and friendly.

The content should be factual, constructive, explanatory, simple. It should underscore the warm ties that have existed for so long between Cuba and the U.S. It should point out how and why any erosion of these friendly ties—political, economic, social, cultural—is harmful to both the Cuban people and the American people.

The content should also stress the continuing danger of Communist infiltration to both our countries and to the rest of the Hemisphere.

Implicit in our approach, as you stated, must be the idea that “we are in sympathy with change in Cuba.” The purpose here is not to try to “answer” Castro or to take direct issue with the government or individuals representing it. Rather, it is to explain how and why the best interests and ideals of the Cuban people are identical with the best interests and ideals of the American people.

We recognize realistically that this expanded information effort will at best be but a small part of the totality of influences at play in the complex Cuban situation. But the step-up is necessary: (1) to keep as clear a U.S. image as possible before the Cuban people at a time when Castro has increasingly portrayed the U.S. as the source of greatest threat to Cuba; (2) to maintain and increase the friendship Cubans as individuals hold for the U.S.; (3) to avoid leaving a vacuum for Communist and ultra-nationalistic extremism to fill; (4) to provide an increased supply of readily-available material documenting the dangers of Communism.

A rough estimate of the cost of these additional information activities runs somewhere between $150, 000 and $200, 000. We would attempt to find this amount within the Executive Branch rather than seek a supplemental appropriation from Congress.

The following are suggested elements for this program, as discussed with you:

1. A series of three or four documentary films with animated graphics, explaining simply such subjects as the significance to Cuba of the U.S. market for Cuban sugar and the U.S. quota system, the importance to Cuba of U.S. investments, the advantage of agrarian reform when properly carried out (e.g., Italy, Taiwan, Japan), the accomplishments of U.S.-Cuban technical cooperation, etc.

2. Pamphlets and booklets illustrating the positive benefits to Cubans of economic and other ties with the U.S. These publications to utilize, in part, the scripts and graphics in the films mentioned above.

3. The pulling together, in book or brochure form, of a well-documented study of Communist activity and penetration in Cuba, revealing the opportunism of the Communists in their previous friendship to Batista and their present efforts to “use” the July 26th Revolution for their own ends. With this would go additional supplies of printed materials exposing the methods of international Communism in general and materials explaining democratic processes. (Over the past year USIS–Cuba has experienced greatly increased interest in its anti-Communist, pro-democratic output. For example, the current price at Cuban bookstalls for our publications “What is Communism?” and “What is Democracy?” is $3.00 a copy.)

4.

Stimulation of the formation of a non-governmental group of leading American citizens long known for their interest in Cuba. To be called “American Friends of Cuba” or something similar, it would comprise educators, journalists, economists, men of letters, and businessmen. It need not be a long list, perhaps not more than 20 or 30. Possible names discussed in your office included: Adolf Berle, one of the Rockefeller brothers, Herbert Matthews, Dr. Roland Ely, Dr. Charles Thompson, Dr. Samuel Flagg Bemis, Preston James, Dr. R. L. Wharton, Scott Thompson.

This group, addressing its many personal friends and the Cuban people as a whole, might originate much of the content of the expanded information program—achieving a credibility and friendliness of approach not available to the U.S. Government. Once underway, its work could be brought to the attention of the President (possibly at one of his press conferences) and he would endorse it wholeheartedly as a splendid means, by friendly acts, of keeping alive the warm ties between the Cuban and American people. He might cite it as exemplary of the people-to-people idea he believes in so firmly.

The following are projects suggested for the “American Friends of Cuba” group:

a.

Sponsor a series of paid advertisements in Cuban newspapers, in the form of friendly letters, setting forth the benefits of continued private investment, spelling out the sugar quota, reminding of cultural and historic ties, stressing the dangers of Communism, etc.

Sponsor on Cuban TV stations the films mentioned in (1) above.

b. Work up a program designed to help the tourist business in Cuba, again spelling out in simple, friendly terms the assurances required on the Cuban side.

c. Invite an appropriate group of Cubans to the U.S. to visit the Tennessee Valley Authority.

d. Consider sponsorship of a study projecting Cuba ahead 25 years and setting forth an action program which, step-by-step, would achieve the 25-year goal. Reform measures compatible with the interests of the Cuban people and with our own practices would be incorporated in the study. This would provide potential sound leaders with a progressive alternative course, in the event of sudden collapse of the present regime or Castro’s becoming a Peron-type dictator.

5. A series of cultural attractions to be brought to Cuba under the auspices of the President’s Special International Program or other sponsorship. The Soviet Exhibition is being moved from Mexico City to Habana in early February. This is the height of the cultural “season.” If we could send a number of outstanding “name” performers or groups in the near future, it would serve to soften the impact of the Communist attractions.

6. Intensified effort to speed up the creation of the proposed Bi-National Center in Santa Clara—George MacCready to go there on temporary detail from Santiago to open the Santa Clara Reading Room and guide the formation of a bi-national board—and a Bi-National Center Director to be recruited for assignment to Santa Clara as soon as possible.

I hope it will be possible to sit down with you and Mr. Rubottom early next week, so that action may be pushed forward immediately on those activities which are agreed upon.

A.W.

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Mar.) 1960. Secret. Drafted by Washburn. Attached to a note of February 1 from Washburn to Rubottom, in which Washburn explained that the memorandum was the result of discussions he had the previous week with Bonsal, McKnight, Cushing, and Jack Williams. Washburn noted that USIA Director Allen “approves the concept and approach it presents. “He also noted that the recommendations were “confined strictly to expanded information effort within Cuba to be undertaken by USIA Washington and USIS Cuba with the assistance of your staff here and the Embassy staff in Habana.”

² January 27. No record of this conversation has been found.

444. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, January 31, 1960—8 a.m.

1830. For Ambassador Bonsal. At Argentine Ambassador Amoedo’s request I went to see him afternoon January 30. He said he believed very strong forces were working to bring retraction of GOC from conciliatory attitude toward US taken by Fidel Castro at his persuasion and reflected in statement of Dorticos. [2 sentences (5 lines) not declassified] Although he says he made no promise to Castro re Bonsal’s return, it is clear to me that he at least gave Castro reason to hope Bonsal would be back soon.

I told Amoedo I had not heard anything from Washington on this matter but was sure it was receiving closest attention. I suggested possibility that a premature announcement of Bonsal’s return might be construed here as an acceptance by US of Dorticos premises and conditions as a basis for diplomatic talks; he felt that announcement could be worded to avoid this interpretation. Amoedo stressed that it was important for effect abroad that US not turn down Cuban offer to negotiate, even though prospects for successful negotiation were dim.

My appraisal: Enemies of US like Raul Castro and Che Guevara will probably try to block efforts toward establishment of good relations with US even if Fidel Castro wants them, which on the basis of a long record we are entitled to doubt. Roa is not our friend and is trying to bring about Cuba’s aggrandizement at our expense and discomfiture. However, Fidel Castro and Dorticos are not likely to retreat from Dorticos’ statement in immediate future since statement seems to have met with good popular response and to retract it would put Cuba in bad light with other countries at very time it is trying to promote a large international conference. Next move is up to US, and it should be positive. I suggest I be authorized to have an exploratory conversation with Roa for purpose of finding out whether a reasonably propitious atmosphere exists for constructive negotiations. If such appears to be the case, I believe an announcement should be made by the Department of the Ambassador’s early return.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/1–3160. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

445. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 1, 1960—6 p.m.

1843. Embtel 1792.² President Dorticos made principal speech at ceremony at Habana University January 30 marking close of “Marti Week”. Cultural Attaché Rylance attended, and reports that speech, while ostensibly praising Marti, used quotes and other references which were in some cases even distorted, in order to achieve strongly anti-American slant. This view borne out by published texts of speech.

Dorticos pointed out that Marti lived “in exile” in United States, learned at first hand our outlook toward Latin America and our intentions towards that area, particularly the Caribbean. Said he both guide and prophet. Said Marti bore witness to beginnings of economic and social system constituting grave threat to Latin America. Said Marti wrote that United States was trying to force war between Cuba and Spain in order to gain possession of Cuba under pretext of intervention. Claimed that Marti wrote that Pan American Conference of 1889 clearly showed that Latin America must stand united against aggressive and expansionist schemes of United States. Quoted Marti as maintaining that the Caribbean nations should stand as bulwark of freedom against another. Said that Marti wrote that a country should sell to more than one purchaser for self-preservation, “and when we say now that we are disposed to buy and sell with all countries, they say we are communists”. Added that neither was Marti a communist when he said that Latin America should arrange for United States to know realities of Hemisphere, in order to avoid American disdain. Concluded that Cubans could now state that no one disdained their nation, which known to whole world.

In opinion Embassy officers who have followed his public statements, this is the strongest and most thoroughgoing anti-American speech Dorticos has made. It casts doubt on sincerity of his statements in reply to President Eisenhower that GOC desires improved relations with United States.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–160. Confidential; Priority.

² See Document 440.

446. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 1, 1960—7 p.m.

1844. Embassy increasingly concerned over incursions of unidentified aircraft over Cuba, which have become bolder and more numerous during past two weeks, and particularly those raids in which incendiaries have been dropped resulting in burning of sizeable quantities of sugar cane. Regardless of origin of aircraft, large portion of public convinced they come from US or are part of counter-revolutionary plan masterminded in US. While Fidel Castro has not returned to subject in his several public appearances since his January 20 blast,² it is evident public becoming aroused. Consulate Santiago reports that in Camaguey and Oriente provinces situation building up quite a head of steam, with all blame being put on US. Embassy has noted similar situartion in Habana. Press is playing up aerial sorties with increasing sensationalism. Number of organizations denouncing attacks mounting. These include labor organizations as well as associations of cane growers and mill owners. Number of protest telegrams received by Embassy on rise. Many appear inspired by various sections of 26 July Movement.

Embassy believes that long-continued anti-American campaign, coupled with aircraft incursions and public reaction, is rapidly developing into a situation in which resentment, inflammatory public utterances and press treatment, and desire for retaliatory action could quickly develop into direct action with little warning. Should raids continue, or should Castro abandon present policy of refraining from attacks on United States, this potentially dangerous situation could erupt into demonstrations and/or attacks against United States property or individuals.

A responsible American businessman has suggested to Embassy that in order relieve tension and prove good faith GUS might offer assistance in air patrol of Cuban coast until sugar harvest completed. Embassy aware of pitfalls if patrol undertaken and raids continue, as well as complications which might arise from casualties resulting from aggressive action against unidentified aircraft. However, since offer would probably be declined, thus achieving main purpose from our standpoint, Department may wish to consider it.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 5400/2–160. Confidential; Priority.

² See Document 430.

447. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, February 2, 1960, 2:30–2:39 p.m.¹

Washington, February 2, 1960, 2:30–2:39 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Herter next spoke of the Cuban situation. The composite reaction to the recent statement by the President has been very good.² Favorable reactions have occurred everywhere, even in Mexico and Venezuela which were question marks. He said the President of Cuba has replied in a rather non-inflammatory way. Some Latin-American diplomats have suggested that Bonsal should return, but the State Department feels there are several essential steps that would have to precede that. He showed the President a memorandum of instructions to our Chargé in Havana,³ calling on the Cubans to give assurances regarding proper treatment of our Ambassador, before Bonsal returns.

The President thought this was all right as a statement to be made orally by our Chargé. He said he would have shortened it to its essentials—that the Cubans will repudiate any charges of complicity and insults against the United States, and will stand ready to talk on all problems. Mr. Herter said that the Cuban Foreign Minister (Roa) has returned to Havana and is being rather unhelpful. He has stated that the Cuban government would like to see a Democratic Administration come to power in the United States since he thought the Cubans could deal more successfully with them. The President asked that the specifics of this statement be furnished to an appropriate member of the White House Staff.⁴ [Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on February 8. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

² Press and official reaction in Latin America to the President’s January 26 statement was summarized in a memorandum from Herter to the President on February 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–260) The memorandum is also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 917.

³ Presumably a copy of Rubottom’s memorandum of February 1 to Herter, which discussed the possibility of Bonsal returning to Cuba, to which was attached a draft telegram to be sent to Braddock requesting that he first obtain certain assurances from the Cuban Government. (Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Mar.) 1960) The telegram as sent to Braddock is infra.

⁴ Roa’s televised remarks on January 28 were quoted in Revolución the following day and were the subject of a memorandum, February 4, from Calhoun through Goodpaster to Robert Merriam. (Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–460)

448. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, February 2, 1960—9:20 p.m.

1097. Embtel 1830.² Department generally agrees with the views and recommendations contained reftel. If present moderation GOC continues request you seek interview with Foreign Minister on Thursday, Feb. 4, and make presentation to him along following lines:

(1) Although obviously GOC and USG profoundly disagree on responsibility for admitted deterioration relations between them, Department considers President Dorticos statement³ as preparing way for return to diplomatic norms and improvement over insulting and unfounded charges contained in Castro’s addresses of January 18 and 20⁴ as well as in GOC organs such as Revolucion during that week of Jan. 18. Dept. disposed to take Dorticos’ statement re readiness negotiate at face value.

(2) Serious charges have, however, been made publicly by Castro and GOC organs against officials our Government and these have been couched in offensive insulting terms. Amb. Bonsal’s personal integrity has been impugned. A public retraction of such charges would be desirable and USG believes same would help its approach to more substantive problems. You should request GOC reaction this suggestion. FYI: We recognize this step by GOC may not be politically feasible but you should not indicate this to GOC at this time. End FYI. You should state Department will insist on admission of error re charges Embassy involved illegal or improper activities and that before any decision can be reached on Bonsal’s return GOC must give assurances through Roa that there are in fact no charges against Ambassador and that henceforth any doubts GOC may have on matters of nature raised by Castro and GOC publicity media will be taken up through normal diplomatic channels and thoroughly ventilated through these channels before being given present one-sided public treatment.

(3) In addition to immediate question of intemperate accusation against US and its officials, GOC will of course recognize that useful negotiations can only be undertaken on basis demonstrated willingness both governments and their leading officials (a) maintain atmosphere free of public accusations and recriminations, (b) observe the standards of international law and of their respective domestic laws applicable to each other’s nationals and their interests, and (c) work within traditional spirit US-Cuban friendship and inter-American solidarity. You should seek assurances on these points.

(4) In event question of interview between Castro and Bonsal, assuming latter returns, is raised by Roa, you should make clear that Bonsal will be glad to see Castro at GOC initiative but will not himself request interview. Delays of five and six weeks when Castro previously was asked to see Bonsal as well as offensive treatment Bonsal especially in official press and radio determine this position.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/1–3160. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stevenson and Bonsal; cleared with Rubottom and in substance with Berding and Whiteman; approved by Herter; and cleared in draft by Herter with President.

² Document 444.

³ See Document 440.

⁴ See Documents 424 and 430.

449. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 4, 1960.

1876. Deptel 1097.² Saw Roa at 1450 and went over points one to three of reftel with him taking care to avoid using any offensive language.

Roa was cordial. He said he believed Dorticos’ statement³ had opened way for resumption of normal diplomatic relations, which GOC desired. He agreed entirely with points 3a and 3c. He requested that my representation be put in form of a note verbale which he could take to President and Prime Minister. He said GOC would be ready to resume negotiations with U.S. immediately on Ambassador Bonsal’s return and expressed optimism that all problems could be satisfactorily resolved if both countries were reasonable.

I reminded him that decision re Ambassador’s return hinged on our receiving the assurances of GOC, given through him, that it had no charges against Embassy for illegal or improper activities and none against Ambassador, and that any furture doubts of such nature would be taken up and ventilated through normal diplomatic channels before being made the subject of public statements. Roa said this was a matter which would have to be decided by the Government, which was one of his reasons for requesting note verbale. He promised GOC would reply promptly to such note.

Roa stated also that we would shortly receive note replying to our No. 203 of January 11⁴ re seizures of American property by INRA.

Roa’s reaction to our approach seemed to me satisfactory and his request that representation be put in writing not unreasonable. I recommend we provide such a note, tactfully drafted, covering points one to three. Roa did not raise question of interview between Castro and Bonsal and I did not bring it up.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–460. Confidential; Limit Distribution; Niact. The time of transmission and receipt are not given on the source text.

² Supra.

³ See Document 440.

⁴ See Document 422.

450. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 5, 1960—8 a.m.

1886. Embtel 1841 (not sent Santiago).² Following observations submitted assist Department in evaluation of sincerity and effectiveness of reported decision by Castro to work for improved relations with United States. Since January 27 Habana daily Revolucion, considered governmental spokesman, has refrained from open attacks on United States. There has been some minor sniping in paper, apparently caused by natural bent of members of staff. Other Habana pro-government dailies La Calle, Diario Libre and Diario National have been consistently anti-American but have not reached levels of violence displayed earlier. Habana daily Combate, understood controlled by Directorio Revolucionario, has continued its already extremely anti-Americanism.

Governmental papers Adelante in Camaguey and Surco and S Maestra in Santiago have continued their extreme anti-Americanism unabated.

Pro-grovernmental radio commentators and radio stations in Habana and throughout country have continued their extreme anti-Americanism. Two most notable commentators in this respect are Pardo Liada and Tony Fernandez.

Communist outlets, including newspaper Hoy and radio station Union radio, of course continue anti-American campaign unchanged.

On other hand, there are evidences that word is out at some levels. On TV last night Conrado Becquer, head of Sugar Workers Union, who has been violently attacking US at all opportunities recently, was notably mild and restrained. Only slip was when he said that one indication that person was “Batistiano” (a cause for removal from labor office), was sign of “pro-Americanism”.

There are clear evidences of deep-rooted and continuing anti-Amercanism within GOC. Francisco Rodolfo Tamas (Embtel 1862³ ) felt that key factor in his dismissal was friendliness toward Embassy personnel. Cases of two other Cuban officials, both considered otherwise competent and loyal to GOC, who were dismissed recently because of close associations with Americans have come to Embassy’s attention. A particularly strong example of this atitude is dismissal of Doctor Israel Castellanos Gonzalez night of February 2. Castellanos has served Cuban Governments for over 40 years, and was long time head of National Bureau of Identification, with international reputation among Police Departments because of his interest in scientific police procedures. Raul Castro and wife Vilma Espin headed group of military which entered his office and summarily dismissed him. A witness has informed legal attaché that Castellanos was told there no criticism his work, and that he being dismissed solely because “too much of a lover of the gringos”. His files at office and home since systematically searched.

Embassy believes expressed desire Fidel Castro for improved relations with US motivated basically by desire reduce increasing number serious problems pressing on him. No indication as yet any fundamental change in his basic attitude distrust and latent hostility. Failure some governmental spokesmen and organs follow new line may be due to administrative confusion characteristic of GOC. Such people as “Che” Guevara and Raul Castro considered anti-American by deep and highly emotional conviction, and if Fidel attempts to permanently alter the former posture of GOC toward US he will encounter serious difficulty with them and other like-minded persons in positions of influence.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–560. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Santiago de Cuba.

² In telegram 1841, February 1, Braddock described his conversation that day with Brazilian Ambassador Da Cunha about the state of U.S.-Cuban relations. Da Cunha speculated that until the “Cuban revolutionary ardor had spent itself, normalization of relations might be unobtainable, and that by that time Cuba might have become a socialist state or independent communist state like Yugoslavia, a possibility which some other Latin American countries might eventually also face.” (Ibid., 611. 37/2–160)

³ In telegram 112 from Kingston, February 2 (repeated to Havana), the Consulate General reported the arrival in Jamaica of former Director of the Chemical Industry Section of INRA, Francisco Rodolfo Tamas, who said he wanted to disclose fully to the U.S. Government information about INRA. (Ibid., 737.00/2–260) In telegram 1862 from Havana, February 3 (repeated to Kingston), the Embassy noted that Tamas probably had significant information, including knowledge of INRA’s operations and perhaps of Cuba’s negotiations with the Soviet bloc. It strongly urged that the Department take prompt steps to obtain information from Tamas. (Ibid., 837. 16/2–360)

451. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 8, 1960—4 p.m.

1926. Consular agent Tate reported from Camaguey by telephone at 14:00 today that at approximately 11:30 today hostile demonstration of some 400 students assembled in front of his house after marching through main sections of city. Tate was warned shortly in advance, and informed police who had small group of officers there. Tate reports demonstration organized in local normal school apparently under leadership Sergio Rodriguez, student leader there. Most students of normal school, as well students of local institute of Secondary Education (high school) participated.

Tate closed house and grounds, and met students in street in front. He reports that their principal protests were: (1) Misrepresentation situation in Cuba by United States press, (2) Landing of U.S. Marines in Santo Domingo, and (3) Burning of Cuban sugar cane fields by aircraft coming from United States. Crowd carried hastily prepared banners and placards referring to foregoing points. Some signs also mentioned United States economic imperialism, but this did not appear to be important item.

Tate reports held lengthy discussion with group ten or fifteen leaders, which finally adjourned at his invitation inside grounds his home. He reports that he made following observations in connection numbered items above:

(1) Information in U.S. press on Cuba based on data collected at first hand in country, cabled reports frequently prepared by Cubans and information from Cuban and American residents. Pointed out that Cuban press giving highly distorted and hostile treatment to United States and United States Govenment, and inquired whether they thought Adelante, governmental paper in Camaguey notable for violent, vicious, and continuing anti-Americanism, unbiased. Tate insisted that charges in American press of Communist penetration here true, and from own detailed personal knowledge of local situation was able to mention by name two or three known Communists holding responsible positions in GOC.

(2) Tate said that he was not familiar with details landing of “Marines” in Santo Domingo, but pointed out that this was recreational visit, that Marines and sailors were unarmed when they went ashore, and clearly had no intention of intervening in any way in Dominican Republic internal affairs.

(3) Tate said that no evidence had been adduced to establish that planes burning cane fields came from United States, that United States authorities were particularly vigilant to prevent such activities, and that he personally believed planes came from some other locality.

Tate reports that hostility of crowd appeared directed toward the United States Government rather than American people individually. He took position that United States Government reflects views of people, and had conducted itself in correct and sympathetic manner toward legitimate aspirations and actions of Cuban people and Government. He reports there were occasional expressions of hostility. The crowd arrived chanting “paredon” (“to the wall” in translation, currently used in Cuba to mean “execute him”). During his conversation a colored leader shouted at one point, “get a machine gun and we will kill him right now”. There were occasional strongly derogatory references to President Eisenhower and United States Government. One of the principal leaders remarked, “we may have Communist, or Venezuelan, or whatever other infiltration, but what we will never have again is American infiltration.”

Tate reports the demonstration peacefully dispersed after about one hour, and upon receipt of assurances that protest would be promptly reported to Embassy. He dismissed police, and feels that he is in no personal danger.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–860. Official Use Only; Priority.

452. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn)¹

Washington, February 12, 1960.

Dear Abbott: The proposed action program for USIA in Cuba as set forth in your memorandum of January 29, 1960, to Ambassador Bonsal² has been read within the Bureau with considerable interest. With the modification noted below, we enthusiastically endorse the proposed program.

Your suggestion that the tone of output in Cuba, at the present time, should be low-key, calm and friendly, and the content constructive and factual, meets with full approval here.

We have suggested a few small changes in your projects. For example, we do not feel it would be wise to push the idea of our sympathy for agrarian reform at this time because we might imply we agree with the way it is being done in Cuba. Also, regarding your point 3, a “well-documented study of Communist activity and penetration in Cuba” might be almost impossible to achieve; instead we suggest pamphlets showing Communist techniques elsewhere. This approach would be less subjected to Government of Cuba criticism. If the shoe fits the Cuban situation, the impact will not be lost on the Cuban people.

While the idea of a group such as “American Friends of Cuba” is a good one, for the moment we might drop from the paper any specific names, since some are controversial, and work out a panel in later discussions.

As to b. under point 4, we feel the tourist business will improve when the anti-Untied States campaign ends and the atmosphere is more conducive to United States travel to Cuba. Cuban officials should be reminded of this at every opportunity, of course, but a USIS project of this scope would seem unwise at this time.

The only other suggestions are to invite non-governmental people to TVA and other such projects, to specify that a study project on Cuba’s future be conducted by a private research organization in Cuba, and that private rather than Cuban Government sponsorship should be given cultural presentations at the Cuban end.

The projects as listed in the attachment³ have the concurrence of the Department, which hopes they will be undertaken as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

R. R. Rubottom, Jr.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Mar.) 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Cushing and cleared with Wieland and Ross and in draft with the CIA and Hill.

² Document 443.

³ This February 10 memorandum, entitled “Revised Program for Cuba,” is not printed.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

453. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, February 15, 1960, 10:05–10:55 a.m.¹

Washington, February 15, 1960, 10:05–10:55 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

He [the President] said he had been talking to Mr. Pawley.² He is a most knowledgeable man as regards Latin American affairs, particularly in the Caribbean area. He had, for example, gone to Cuba as an emissary from civilians having interest there, but with the knowledge of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Rubottom, to get Batista to abdicate in favor of a junta. Batista would have done this had the U.S. guaranteed to keep the junta in power, but this could not be done.

[2 sentences (4 lines) not declassified] The President added to Mr. Herter that it has crossed his mind that we should make some further use of Mr. Pawley in a Latin American assignment. Mr. Herter said that Mr. Pawley had had large interests in Santo Domingo which would interfere with this but that he has disposed of them. The President said Mr. Pawley had told him he had disposed of all his holdings in Cuba, Santo Domingo, Mexico and Haiti. Mr. Herter said that the situation in Santo Domingo is very bad in that the Trujillo Government is acting against the moderates and may soon create a situation like that in Cuba where the opposition is taken over by wild radicals.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on February 19. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)

² The President met with William Pawley from 9:45 to 10:05 a.m. and from 11:39 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. (Ibid.)

454. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, February 17, 1960, 3:17–3:55 p.m.¹

Washington, February 17, 1960, 3:17–3:55 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Goodpaster, Gordon Gray

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

I discussed in some detail a proposal² which was being considered with respect to Cuba and which had been discussed at the February 17 meeting of the 5412 Group.³ The President made the following points. He doubted the efficacy of the undertaking from the point of view of stopping subversive activities because of his feeling that support for the subversive activities would be forthcoming from the Soviet Union in any event.

Aside from the efficacy question, he said first he wondered why we were thinking of something on such a narrow basis. He said that he wondered why we weren’t trying to identify assets for this and other things as well across the board, including even possibly things that might be drastic. He thought it would be a good idea for the Group to talk with a man he had talked with as Government officials interested in the problem. I pointed out to him that this was only an authorization to identify assets and to see whether this even could be done. I made it clear that Allen Dulles was not prepared to go ahead with it; that he didn’t know whether he had the capability of going ahead. I suggested that we ask that the study and identification of assets go ahead on a broad basis, including this one and then upon his return from the trip he would be in a better position to sit down and consider it. He said he didn’t mind making the study of possible courses but he wanted to make it clear that this action is forbidden until the Group has fully reviewed it and if they think we should go ahead he would like to be involved. I said this would enable people to go ahead with finding out what is possible but without any authorization and this and other things could be considered at that time. He said that was fine.

Gordon Gray

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Prepared by Gray on February 19. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) The source text, however, indicates the meeting began at 3 p.m.

² [Handwritten notation in the source text not declassified]

³ No record of this meeting has been found. NSC 5412/1 was the NSC directive in effect at this time setting forth basic authority for covert operations. The NSC 5412 Special Group was a subcommittee of the National Security Council, comprised of Department of State and Defense officials, which was set up to review covert action proposals.

455. Editorial Note

As a result of Foreign Minister Roa’s suggestion to Braddock on February 4 (see Document 449) that the remarks made to him that day by Braddock be put in the form of a note verbale, the Embassy in Havana and the Department of State exchanged telegrams regarding the text of such a note. These telegrams are in Department of State, Central File 611.37. The final text, as approved by the Department, was transmitted in telegram 1128 to Havana, February 9. (Ibid., 611.37/2–560) The Embassy delivered the note to the Foreign Ministry on February 10. (Telegram 1956 from Havana, February 10; ibid., 611. 37/2–1060)

On February 18, the Cuban Foreign Ministry sent a note of reply, the following translation of which was transmitted in telegram 2081 from Havana, February 18:

“The Minister of Foreign Relations cordially salutes the Chargé d’ Affaires Ad Interim of the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of his note with the written version of the oral statements which he made on February 4 in compliance with instructions from the United States Department of State.

“The views of the revolutionary Government of Cuba in this respect are the following:

“1. Although in fact the Government of Cuba differs from the Government of the United States of America with respect to the genesis and the responsibility for the actual state of relations between the two countries, it is exceedingly pleased by the expressed disposition of your government to negotiate the pending problems within diplomatic norms—initiative taken by the President of the Republic, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, in his reply to the statement of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. It is proper to underscore that the Government of Cuba has been, and is, opposed to treating these problems outside the regular channels for relations between friendly governments and peoples. Numerous proofs, oral and written, duly verify this point.

“The Government of Cuba understands that in his televised appearance of January 20, the Prime Minister, Dr. Fidel Castro, in making known a document taken from a person accused of counterrevolutionary activities, did not depart from the proper formalities. The Prime Minister limited himself to reading it, without making personal imputations against the Embassy, and much less allusions of any character against His Excellency Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal. He made it known furthermore, thereafter, that he was placing the document in reference at the disposal of the interested parties. The government which I represent therefore rejects as groundless the presumption that the Prime Minister, Dr. Fidel Castro, made ‘unfounded charges in offensive terms against American officials.’

“On the other hand, the Prime Minister, Dr. Fidel Castro, and likewise most representative figures of the revolutionary government have indeed been victims of groundless and offensive imputations on the part of legislators and high American officials, in the civilian and military fields, who have moreover defended on occasions the use of force of economic reprisals and insinuated, on other occasions, with obvious malevolence, influences or infiltrations incompatible with the nature and purposes of the Cuban revolution. We would have no objection to make with respect to the defamatory and mendacious campaigns of certain American publications and wire services if it were not for the expressed official affirmation of their ‘objectivity and independence’. The Government of Cuba scrupulously respects the freedom of expression and is therefore not a party to the opinions poured out by the Cuban press, not excluding the newspaper Revolucion which is not, as the Department of State seems to assume, the official spokesman of the Government.

“In reply to the question formulated in numbered paragraph two of your memorandum, the Government of Cuba has no accusations to make against His Excellency Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal, nor against officials of the United States Embassy, and has no difficulty in reiterating to the Ambassador the esteem which he has always enjoyed.

“The Govenment of Cuba shares the judgment that the negotiations of the questions pending between the two governments should be carried on in an appropriate atmosphere, with strict observance of international law and of the respective national laws and within the spirit of the traditional friendship between the United States of America and Cuba and of the inter-American solidarity.

“The Minister of Foreign Relations takes the opportunity to renew to the Chargé d’Affaires Ad Interim of the United States of America the testimony of his very distinguished consideration.” (Ibid., 611.37/ 2–1860)

456. Memorandum of Discussion at the 435th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 18, 1960¹

Washington, February 18, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matter unrelated to Cuba.]

Turning to Cuba, Mr. Dulles reported that Mikoyan’s visit had marked the definite espousal of Castro by the USSR. Cuba and the USSR had signed a trade agreement by which the USSR had extended $100 million in trade credits.² The two countries had also agreed to collaborate in the UN and would probably resume diplomatic relations soon. Cuba was selling five million tons of sugar to the USSR over the next three years, one-fifth of which was to be paid for in cash. Cuba had also agreed to take Soviet goods which would constitute ten per cent of Cuban foreign trade. The USSR was also supplying Soviet technicians to Cuba. Reports of the agreements between Cuba and the USSR had made no mention of the question of Soviet arms being supplied to Cuba. Mikoyan was understood to have expressed a willingness to provide aircraft to Cuba if requested. When Mikoyan made a speech at a rice cooperative concerning the assistance which the USSR would give to Cuba, the crowd had shouted “and guns and planes too” and Mikoyan had repeated “and guns and planes too.” Mr. Dulles thought, however, that provision of MIGs to Cuba by the USSR would be a development favorable to the US, since it would unmask Soviet intentions toward Cuba.

Mr. Dulles also reported that the controls imposed by the Castro government were arousing strong opposition among the middle class and students in Cuba, but the anti-Castro forces remained uncoordinated and at the moment were impotent. The Leftist trend in Cuba continued and the government was imparting an anti-US slant to all its actions. Foreign Minister Roa had recently asked for a study of the Guantanamo Naval Base agreement with a view to its possible revision. Secretary Herter said that an official in the Department of Defense had recently made an unfortunate statement to the effect that the Guantanamo Base was the cheapest US base. He asked how much we were paying for the base. Admiral Burke said we were paying only $2000 a year. Secretary Herter said he hoped this figure did not become public. This was a fantastically low price for this piece of real estate. Mr. Scribner asked whether we were providing anything else of value in return for base rights. Admiral Burke said of course we had provided Cuba with its freedom; moreover, the economy of the whole area near the base was supported by the activities of the base. Secretary Gates said that unfortunately Cuba controlled the source of water used by the base. Mr. Stans said he had recently heard the suggestion that the US should pay the world price for sugar and should put the difference between the world price and the subsidy price in escrow for payment to Americans whose properties are expropriated in Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² Mikoyan visited Havana February 4–13. The Cuban-Soviet Commercial Agreement was signed on February 13. An analysis of the agreement, apparently prepared in the Department of State, February 18, is in Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba January–June 1960.

457. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, February 18, 1960, 3:10 p.m.¹

Washington, February 18, 1960, 3:10 p.m.

At the conclusion of the matter the President telephoned about,² the Secretary said he would like to take this opportunity to thank the President for taking the time to personally go over the speech the Secretary gave today at the National Press Club.³ The President asked how it had gone, and the Secretary said he thought all right. The Secretary said most of the questions following the speech had to do with Cuba.

The President said in his press conference⁴ he put this sugar business as a part of the whole economic thing and tried to put it on a broad basis. The President said because the Secretary had made a previous comment to the effect that we were considering whether we should do this, some reporters are trying to imply that the President and the Secretary are not coordinated. The President said laughingly that he gets this same thing with Nixon, and the Secretary agreed the press is always trying to build up a story indicating differences which don’t exist.

The Secretary said he talked a little today about why this was put into effect in 1934. The President said he thought this preferential thing went way back into the teens. Secretary said Guantanamo went way back. The President said he had thought this was done way back because he didn’t think we could do it as late as 1934 because of the most-favored nation thing. The Secretary said it was done at the time of the depression and there were five other nations—Philippines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico. The President said the Philippines was American then. The President said he had nearly come to the conclusion that we ought to keep collecting the differential, putting this money aside and then saying this money will be held in escrow until we have justice. The Secretary said that is a much favored procedure at the moment and if they can’t show us they are giving just compensation, etc., this may be the answer. The President said if we don’t make an agreement on this now we are in a fix if Castro is disposed of and a more agreeable government takes over; on the other hand, the President said if we do it but don’t have to activate it, we would be all right. The Secretary said that is why we are asking for the power in the Executive Branch even though it is a headache.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No drafting information is given on the source text.

² Not identified.

³ For text of the speech, as well as a transcript of the question-and-answer period that followed, see Department of State Bulletin, March 7, 1960, pp. 354–361.

⁴ The President’s news conference of February 17. (Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 189–199)

458. Memorandum From Henry C. Ramsey of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)¹

Washington, February 18, 1960.

SUBJECT

Possibilities of Salvaging Cuba

This memorandum is a hasty response to your request of yesterday for my “long-range plan for Cuba”. I am no authority on Cuba and have no long-range plan for its salvation. Nor, insofar as I can detect, does ARA. The general view within ARA is one of defeatism, that nothing can be done until a new Administration takes a fresh look at our Latin American policy with a view to making departures from existing attitudes and policies.

The views and approach suggested herein are my own and have not been discussed within ARA or elsewhere.

General Observations

I think all of us must approach Cuba with great humility. We have never in our national history experienced anything quite like it in magnitudes of anti-US venom, claims for expropriation, or Soviet threats to the hemisphere. Communications between our governments have broken down. There is not a clear enough realization among our own people that pre-Castro Cuba will not return, or that, if we are to reestablish influence within Cuba, it must be in a context different from that which obtained in the past.

Ambassador Bonsal has characterized the Cuban revolutionary reaction to the pattern of US investment in Cuba, and to the US in general, as comparable to Main Street’s reaction to Wall Street in the 1890’s and the heyday of Populism. I think he is correct. The moral is that if influence and communication between these poles is to be reestablished, the basis must be comparable to what occurred in this country: Wall Street must move nearer to Main Street and make it clearer that its activities are conducted with Main Street’s interests in mind.

ARA appears to view Cuba and Castroism as more localized phenomena than I believe they are. I think Castros could come to power in countries which would vitally affect our interests—Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, Peru and Guatemala, to name the most likely candidates. ARA does fear that the Dominican Republic and Haiti can be engulfed in Castroism. It is my opinion that Castroism is more likely to be resolved within the hemispheric macrocosm than within the Cuban or strictly Caribbean microcosm.

The Department has in general exercised commendable moderation in dealing with Castro but lack of communication with him has reduced us to a state of semi-paralysis. We have been too prepossessed, I think, with this problem of communication and its breakdown. We perhaps overemphasize “what might have been” (or what might still be accomplished) had Ambassador Bonsal been given greater opportunities of maintaining contact with Castro and had he (Bonsal) been accorded the time and courtesy to explain fully the American position and our equity in the Cuban economy.

I think we fail to realize that Castro does not speak our language and does not want to listen to it. The most recent Cuban response to our most recent note on expropriations makes this clear. However much or little attention Castro and his lieutenants have devoted in the past to the philosophy and economics of the US system is largely immaterial. They do not speak our language and do not aspire to speak it. As a result, we are not likely to influence them by continuing to insist on addressing them in the language of private enterprise, the sanctity of private property, the equities of just compensation, etc.

A continuation of the present impasse is dangerous. There is an observable slippage in Cuba toward Soviet influence and Afro-Asian neutralist orientation. The global struggle for influence within the developmental revolution, like nature, abhors a vacuum. The longer the present impasse continues, the more likely it is that Congress and antagonistic business elements may goad the Department into intemperate or punitive action, and the more likely it is that public opinion may coalesce in a belief that Castro and his henchmen are communists and should be dealt with accordingly. Both these eventualities could further separate us from Cuba and isolate Cuba within the Inter-American system.

I am inclined to believe that Castro is probably an anarcho-syndicalist of the Spanish mold, rather than a communist, though there are undoubtedly communist influences at work on him and within Cuba. The internal evidence of the revolution and the general subordination of the Government to INRA point tentatively at least in the direction of anarcho-syndicalism. I think it would be wise at this stage to build from this probability. Among other things, to do so would allow us more maneuverability and confer on Castro more avenues of retreat.

We cannot take too much satisfaction from the fact that Castro and his immediate entourage may not be bona fide or crypto-communists. From the standpoint of our business interests, it would appear to make little difference from the record now unfolding whether they are communists or anarchists.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of foreign policy and capacity to influence, the difference could be considerable. If the leftism of the Castro revolution is an indigenous variety of traditional Latin American leftism (cf. certain resemblances between Castroism and the Bolivian revolution of 1952), the possibilities of keeping Cuba out of the Soviet orbit of influence are obviously better than they would be were Cuba governed by outright communists. It is therefore important that we not drive Cuba further toward Communism by perpetuating the present vacuum in US-Cuban relations.

Partly because Castro has a psychopathic antipathy to being criticized as a communist, partly because doing so may take our eye off the ball, and largely because Castroism is an explainable phenomenon with which we shall probably have to contend on a larger scale in the decade ahead unless we learn how to contain and influence it, I think we must combat the excesses of Castroism in terms other than Communism.

To do so will require us to develop techniques of communication which we do not now possess or have permitted to atrophy. To develop (or redevelop) these techniques of communication will require departures from existing attitudes and policies and the exercising of the capability of identifying ourselves—of communicating—with the mass aspirations of our southern neighbors, whether they be Cubans, Panamanians, Colombians or Venezuelans.

Our objective should be to reach the underprivileged masses of the hemisphere in somewhat the same fashion that Milo Perkins has attributed to the US image projected by F.D.R. in the Good Neighbor days. If the Latin American masses can again identify the US as having a true concern for their welfare, certain of the mainsprings of existing anti-US sentiment can be abated and we can begin to talk with the Castros from a position of greater strength. At a minimum, we could deny Castro considerable of his present audience and discredit some of his anti-US demagoguery.

US Objectives

Our more important objectives (purposes) vis-à-vis Cuba and Castroism should be to (1) minimize Sino-Soviet influence within Cuba by developing helpful hemispheric and US influences within the Cuban revolution which will temper it and maintain it within an inter-American context, (2) check the spread of Castroism to other Latin American nations, (3) persuade Cuba and, by example, other Latin American countries with heavy US or foreign investments that private capital and productivity serve a social purpose and represent necessary contributions to the developmental aims of the society, (4) salvage what we can of the American investment and economic structure in Cuba, and (5) accomplish these purposes without overt US intervention and within a hemispheric framework.

I think our point of departure must be that keeping Cuba out of the Sino-Soviet orbit, and returning it to the Inter-American system, is more important than the salvaging of the US investment in Cuba to the complete satisfaction of the US business community. This is a bitter pill to swallow but its medicinal value would be considerable if it induces us to make a start toward curing the symptoms of Castroism in other countries where the American investment is even heavier than in Cuba.

Steps in the Right Direction

The immediate hurdle in US-Cuban relations is the pending Congressional legislation on the sugar quota. It is my understanding that the Executive Branch will ask that the existing legislation be extended for one year and that the Executive be given authority to make adjustments in existing quotas. I hope and assume that this legislation will pass. It would permit us to buy necessary time and give the Executive the flexibility required to maneuver with Cuba on quotas and prices. This would open an area of communication which might be helpful.

In the longer-range, I believe we should utilize the meeting of the Committee of Twenty-One (scheduled for Bogota in July) to announce a liberal US policy in favor of a hemispheric development plan of rationalized industrialization and agrarian reform, in which Cuba would be invited and expected to participate. Although Cuba is a member of the Committee, it is possible she may boycott the meeting. ARA’s best judgment, however, is that Cuba will attend.

The Committee of Twenty-One is an outgrowth of Operation Pan-America and is intended (1) as a stop-gap to the postponed Quito Conference and (2) as a forum further to discuss hemispheric collaboration in Operation Pan-America. Regardless of the tortured past history of Operation Pan-America, it appears that a principal purpose of the Brazilian initiative in this respect is to conduct a hemispheric survey of the underdeveloped nations and their developmental problems toward the end of developing a rationalized plan for industrial and agricultural advancement. Surveys under contracts let by the OAS are now being conducted in 11 countries.

I would suggest that our general strategy and position at the Bogota meeting should be to:

1. Assure that all members of the Committee, including Cuba, attend, by letting it be known well in advance that we support the general concept of a hemispheric development survey and invite all countries to permit surveys.

2. Invite individual countries, including Cuba, to discuss their developmental problems and objectives toward the end of ascertaining what common denominators exist.

3. State, in turn, the problem confronting US interests if the developmental process engulfs productive US investment and enterprise.

4. Announce a US policy in respect of land reform.

5. Reinvite Cuba to join the Inter-American Development Bank, which would be designated as the executive agency to implement the hemispheric development plan.

6. Utilize the meeting for purposes of launching a massive infusion of the Rostow Doctrine into Latin American developmental thinking.

7. Discuss in general terms at least the main lines of the S/P hemispheric defense and development concept and the relationship of military to developmental expenditures.

8. Be prepared to discuss the financing of social welfare and housing projects, as suggested by Senator Aiken and others.

The overall US purposes should be (a) to lay a liberal framework for hemispheric development (including land reform) in which Cuba would be expected to play a role but the direction of which would be a hemispheric enterprise through the agency of the Inter-American Development Bank (which Cuba should be reinvited to join), and (b) to discuss candidly and within the general ideological framework of the Rostow Doctrine the problem of the US’s supporting Latin American development programs if the expropriation of US properties is entailed in the developmental process.

In the latter connection, we might lay the groundwork for some broad inter-American doctrine that the US, either bilaterally or multilaterally, will make certain developmental funds available in exchange for undertakings by the recipients that certain modalities will be observed in their relations with their hemispheric neighbors, including the maintenance of peace and the postponement of expropriation of foreign-owned properties for X years or until the country was safely into the take-off of development and could afford adequate compensation.

The Advantages of Some Such Approach

I can see many advantages vis-à-vis the hemisphere and Cuba alike in some such approach:

1. It would repair our somewhat strained relations with Brazil regarding Operation Pan-America and launch something which must be done in time, i.e., the placing of the development problem in a hemispheric and multilateral context. This would permit Brazil to exert moderating influences on Cuba. I cannot help but think that facing the development problem on a multilateral hemispheric basis would be a great fillip and that it would activate some sort of developmental Monroe Doctrine against Sino-Soviet penetration and influence.

2. It could lead Cuba into the Inter-American Development Bank.

3. It would tend to head-off or contain the present Cuban initiative in calling for a conference of underdeveloped nations to study development problems, now scheduled for September, in which Afro-Asian neutralist nations have shown more interest than Cuba’s Latin American neighbors.

4. There could be solid advantages in our discussing our problem in Cuba against the larger problem and general background of US private capital’s past and prospective contribution to Latin American development.

5. It might widen the lines of communication to Castro and even widen his horizons to the long-haul entailed in socio-economic development.

6. It would give us an excellent opening to drive home the tenets of the Rostow Doctrine and the thesis that existing sources of production should not be disrupted (though they might be reformed or converted to greater social consciousness) during the critical developmental process.

7. It could acquaint Castro more fully with hemispheric problems and certain of our own. It could thus serve to narrow the differences between the languages we now speak, or would speak to each other.

8. Difficult as it will be, the formulation of a US position favoring land reform would confer great advantages in liberalizing the US image among the masses and of easing the impact of future Latin American social revolutions on the landowning oligarchies. Land reform has been effected in only handful of countries and always as a result of a bloodbath. It is the spark which can set off social revolutions in other countries and light the way for Castroism’s spreading. We should therefore associate ourselves with it—notwithstanding that it would open certain rifts between ourselves and the oligarchies—as a reinsurance for US private investment against further Cubas.

Conclusion

Having taken such steps in the context of hemispheric development, having stated our policy to be one of orderly hemispheric development through agrarian reform and industrialization, and having argued our case for the preservation of existing productive enterprise regardless of how mixed the ultimate indigenous system may become as the revolution progresses, I believe we would be in a better position than we now are to weather the Cuban storm, to influence Castro toward moderation, and to counsel him to move more cautiously in impeding the productive capacity of American investment in Cuba. But we cannot be certain.

It may be too late to attempt to moderate or influence Castro through furnishing financial and technical assistance in connection with his land reform program. In any event, such would now probably be impossible because of Congressional attitudes and the opposition of US business interests. Yet it is a tactic which might be held in reserve and one which should be perfected for other countries which will one day effect land reform either peacefully or by revolution.

Some such tactic might conceivably be used in the future to influence Castro to place his priorities on the distribution of state and unused, rather than productive US, land. Had we had a land reform program when Castro took power, we might have invoked some such strategem—since land reform requires financing and technical assistance in large doses for some period of time—to divert Castro from US properties. That time has passed and with it, very probably, lost opportunities to salvage more than we are likely to salvage of US-owned lands. My fear is that the Soviets will step into the financial and technical breach only after havoc has been raised with the US-owned plantations.

I believe something along the above lines promises more than the continuance for another year of what I conceive to be our present policies and tactics. We have gone downhill progressively throughout the past year and Mikoyan’s visit should awaken us to how far downhill we now are.²

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Signed by Ramsey who indicated that the memorandum should not be distributed outside S/P. He sent a copy to Morgan and another copy for circulation within S/P.

² 

In another memorandum of February 18 to Smith, Ramsey offered an addendum regarding the Guantanamo base problem, “which can blow any long-longe Cuban policy we devise sky-high if we take a hardnosed attitude.”

Ramsey continued: “I can think of no way to handle the troublesome problem of Guantanamo other than to move toward the ‘hemispherization’ of US bases (other than those leased from the UK) in the Caribbean area”. He concluded: “The rationale would be that certain of our allies furnish ‘position support’ in implementation of the hemispheric defense concept”. (Ibid.)

459. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, February 20, 1960.

SUBJECT

Priority Actions Arising from Discussions with Senate Foreign Relations Committee²

a)

Soviet or Communist Bloc Arms Shipment: Members of the Committee expressed great interest in what the U.S. would do if the Soviets sent MIG’s or other arms to Cuba and asked, particularly, if this would call for collective action under the Caracas Resolution³ or other inter-American instrument. It was indicated to the Committee that acquisition of arms from the Bloc, in conjunction with other evidence of ties with international Communism, could form a basis for inter-American action in accordance with the Caracas Resolution.

Actions Taken or Contemplated

a) Instruction to Embassy Moscow to inform Soviet Government of our arms embargo policy and its relation to efforts of OAS and Inter-American Peace Committee and to warn USSR actual arms shipment would be received [perceived] as serious breach of these efforts to lessen tensions and as inconsistent USSR protestations of desire for world relaxation of tensions. (Instruction in process clearance)⁴

b) Publicity for foregoing—in OAS, Inter-American Peace Committee or elsewhere—if Soviets or satellites ship arms.

c) Current unattributed publicity, through Latin American outlets of Soviet agreement to furnish airplanes and arms as affront to efforts of all American Republics to maintain peace.

d) Possible convocation of Foreign Ministers or COAS meeting if airplanes or arms shipped, depending on types and quantities and Latin American reaction thereto.

b)

Guantanamo: Several members of the Committee asked how Cuban efforts to take over Guantanamo would be handled. It was explained that the Treaty made our right to remain in Guantanamo clear and that the Castro Government did not have the military capability to eject us. The Committee was assured that we did not intend to compromise our rights on this issue.

Actions Taken or Contemplated

a) Government, principally Navy, has publicly made clear we will not give up Guantanamo.

b) Armed Forces (CINCLANT) has contingency plans to defend Base.

c) Public relations handling of any Cuban official demand that we abandon Base or renegotiate Agreement, or of any Cuban harassment of base by strike, cutting off water supply. (To be done by ARA/P.)

c) Diplomatic handling of contingencies with other American Republics and OAS (To be done by RPA in consultation with CMA and other offices.)

c)

Caracas Resolution: The Committee showed great interest in convoking an inter-American meeting to take collective action under the Caracas Resolution. It was explained to the Committee, that, along this line, a program was being initiated to pass to other American Governments information concerning the international Communist aspects of the Cuban situation and that such bilateral exchange of information and consultation was necessary to prepare for any such meeting.

Action Taken or Contemplated

a) There have already been numerous exchanges with other Governments re Cuban situation, though to date U.S. has not highlighted Communist aspects.

b) ARA has prepared initial draft⁵ of presentation on Cuba, Castro and Communism which—with additional research and editing—might be used as basis for presentation to other governments.

c) Task Force has generated large amounts of unattributed materials on Communism in Cuba to prepare ground for diplomatic action.

d) Embassy Habana should prepare up-to-date study on international Communism and Cuba. (Action: CMA)

e) New Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) should be prepared to take into account Mikoyan visit as last SNIE (prepared in December 1959)⁶ did not support any finding that Castro regime under international Communist control. (Action: CMA)

f) Plan for OAS action and schedule should be developed for use in event it is decided to convoke inter-American conference. (Action: Amb. Dreier and RPA)

d)

Economic Measures: The Committee expressed great interest in what economic measures might be taken, the consensus being heavily on the side of taking action by cutting the Sugar quota. The Administration’s position on the Sugar Act was outlined and it was emphasized that, in view of Treaty commitments and Latin American sensibilities about intervention, the Executive should be given discretionary authority to effect a cut ostensibly on economic grounds.

Action Taken or Contemplated

a) Sugar Act Amendment.

b) Committee now working on possibilities of clearing away Preferential Trade Agreements, GATT obligations, etc. which would stand in way of taking economic measures. (CMA)

c) Study of relative economic advantages to Cuba and to U.S. in dollars and cents of existing relationship. (CMA)

e) Compensation for American Property: The Committee generally expressed a desire for prompt rigorous action to assure compensation for expropriated U.S. properties and to deter further expropriations in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America.

Action Taken or Contemplated

a) Action Plan⁷ approved by Mr. Dillon.

b) Study of possible action against selected Cuban assets. (Now under way by CMA)⁸

f) Return of Ambassador Bonsal: The Committee asked about the return of Ambassador Bonsal and was assured that no decision was taken. The consensus of the members who spoke of this issue was that he should not return soon.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba January–June 1960. Secret. Drafted by Hill. No initials appear on the source text.

² The date of the discussions is not given. They were presumably of an informal nature between Hill and members of the committee.

³ Reference is to Resolution 93 adopted at the Tenth Inter-American Conference meeting at Caracas, March 28, 1954; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955, vol. I, pp. 1300–1302.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ A copy of this draft paper entitled “Cuba, Castro, and Communism” was circulated to Rubottom and others in ARA under cover of a memorandum of February 23 from Hill. (Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba January–June 1960)

⁶ SNIE 80/1–59, “The Situation in the Caribbean Through 1960,” December 29, 1959; text is scheduled for publication in volume V.

⁷ See Document 414.

⁸ Not further identified.

460. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 20, 1960.

SUBJECT

Evidences of a More Conciliatory Attitude Toward the U.S. by Castro and the Government of Cuba Since the President’s Statement of January 26th²

Since the President’s statement of January 26th, there has been a notable absence of anti-American statements and attacks against high officials of the U.S. on the part of Castro and high officials around him. Castro’s words on the night of February 18 were noteworthily restrained considering the plane incident early that same day. (Tab A, Deptel 2095)³ This restraint has also been observed to a noticeable but lesser extent by the 26th of July party organ, the newspaper Revolución, except for a brief lapse at the time of the naval visit to the Dominican Republic on February 6th. The same cannot be said for the presumably government controllable radio stations Radio Mambi and Radio Union which have lashed out with vicious attacks in the interim since the 26th although with less frequency and in a somewhat less violent tone.

In the provinces, particularly Oriente, the 26th of July newspapers, Surco and Sierra Maestra, continued their anti-American line for several days after the 26th, then apparently got and obeyed the word to tone down until the time of the naval visit to the Dominican Republic when the anti-American campaign was revived and has not again been stopped, although it is less violent in tone than previously.

[Here follows a recapitulation of recent exchanges of notes by the U.S. and Cuban Governments.]

Conclusion:

The GOC, although it has in no way suffered a change of heart toward the United States, apparently genuinely desires the return of Ambassador Bonsal and a return to more normal relations. Its motivation may well be that it fears it has gone too far and too fast, both for the Cuban people and in the eyes of the Hemisphere. Its “conciliatory gestures” have probably been sufficient to persuade the other Latin American countries that the USG should respond affirmatively. Further evidence of the firmness of this attitude may be tested in Raul Castro’s speech to the students on February 23 and Fidel Castro’s scheduled speech in Holguin on February 24.⁴

Another important element which has come into the picture and which must be carefully weighed in any decision regarding the return of Ambassador Bonsal is the recent Mikoyan visit to Cuba during which the U.S.S.R. signed a trade and economic assistance agreement and promised Cuba airplanes and arms on request. The two countries also agreed to collaborate in the UN and on other international matters. Castro has publicly praised the results of this visit. The return of the U.S. Ambassador in this context is likely to be interpreted in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America as U.S. acquiescence in this new Soviet-Cuban relationship.

Recommendations:

1. Decision regarding Ambassador Bonsal’s return should be postponed until the President’s return.⁵

2. The President and you, in discussions with Government leaders on your forthcoming trip, should seek to consult with them regarding the treatment of the Cuban problem and, specifically, attempt to elicit their suggestions, including the timing and handling of Ambassador Bonsal’s return.⁶

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2–2060. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson.

² See Document 438.

³ None of the attachments is printed.

⁴ At a conference sponsored by the Students Association of the School of Education of the University of Havana on February 24, Raul Castro, according to the Embassy’s summary account, “unleashed the most violent anti-United States attack since Fidel Castro’s speech of January 20.” (Despatch 1256 from Havana, March 7; Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/3–760) Regarding Fidel Castro’s speech of February 24, see Document 463.

⁵ President Eisenhower, accompanied by Herter and Rubottom, among others, left Washington on February 22 for a visit to Puerto Rico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Surinam, before returning to Washington on March 7. Documentation on the trip is scheduled for publication in volume V.

⁶ Herter initialed his approval of both recommendations on February 20.

461. Letter From Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd¹

Washington, February 21, 1960.

Dear Selwyn: I deeply appreciate the message² you forwarded to me through Ambassador Caccia regarding the prospective sale of six unarmed British helicopters to the Cuban Navy. I know you have given this matter serious consideration and I do not want to let this opportunity pass without first expressing my gratitude for the splendid cooperation we have received from your government in controlling arms shipments to the Caribbean area, a policy which seems more important now than ever. I have in mind not only the position you have taken with respect to British export of arms and military equipment but also the numerous occasions in which you have joined with us in trying to forestall arms shipments to this area from other European supplier nations.

As you know, we are most concerned with the continuing deterioration of our relations with the Cuban Government. We feel that Mikoyan’s recent visit was a long step toward the breaking of the remaining links between the Government of Cuba and the American family of nations and presages the establishment of close working relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union. I refer not so much to the commercial agreement but rather to such things as the statement in the joint Cuban-USSR communiqué which asserted that it is “the clearly recorded interest of both governments to collaborate actively in the United Nations in favor of co-existence,... “,³ the provision for Soviet technical assistance in factory construction and the possibility of the renewal of diplomatic relations.

The Soviet Union has up to now moved with a certain caution in regard to relations with Cuba. However, I believe this to be the first of a series of steps which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is undertaking to bring Cuba into the closest kind of collaboration.

Under the circumstances, I am sure you will appreciate our concern with the shipment of any matériel which, even in minimal proportions, increases the potential of the Cuban armed forces. While I do not wish to exaggerate the security aspects of the problem, the time may come when we can no longer ignore the implications which a Soviet influenced Cuba may have for the peace and progress of the hemisphere.

In making your decision, I feel you would also wish to consider the following factors.

While it is true that the helicopters do not seem to be adapted for direct over-water flight to the Dominican Republic or Haiti, our best information is that the June expedition to overthrow the Dominican Government was escorted across the Windward Passage by a Cuban Navy vessel which vividly raises the possibility that such helicopters could and may be intended to be used by the Cuban Navy to support landings or to exploit a beachhead, especially if the current situation in the Dominican Republic deteriorates to a point where Castro is tempted to intervene. The same, of course, applies to some extent to Haiti.

More important, however, is the possibility that if the lines continue to be drawn sharply in Cuba on communism and other issues deriving from Castro’s drastic actions, there may, before too long, be a renewal of guerilla warfare in that country including, as is habitual in the Caribbean, the smuggling of arms and equipment to anti-Castro guerilla forces. In this event, it might be of some embarrassment to have helicopters supplied by any of us utilized by Castro to spot and put down these revolutionary efforts.

You may also have noted the statements made by Mr. Mikoyan in Cuba with respect to the sale of military aircraft on request to the Castro government.⁴ Should such sales materialize, we ourselves think that there would be a very adverse reaction by the United States public and Congress which, as you know, is very much concerned about the Cuban situation. If we were to appear to relax our embargo in order to compete with the Russians or if our trusted allies appeared to be turning away from us on this matter, I am afraid, in such circumstances, the subtleties with respect to range and capacities of helicopters supplied directly to the Cuban Navy would be lost so far as public reaction is concerned.

Finally, we take into account that, as a result of a resolution⁵ passed by a meeting of American Foreign Ministers which I attended in Santiago, Chile last year, the Inter-American Peace Committee is now actively engaged in a study of the tensions existing in the Caribbean area. Should the Soviet Union carry through with a sale of aircraft or other arms, it might well be that this group would have to take some cognizance of this action as contributing to these tensions and that an even stronger action by the inter-American community could conceivably result. If there were a disposition by other American Republics to condemn such Soviet action, we would, of course, consider it to our advantage to encourage this action. In this event, it would, of course, be regrettable if we or our allies could also be charged with furnishing equipment of military utility to the Cuban armed forces precisely at a time when we were working with the Inter-American Peace Committee on these matters.

I am sorry to have burdened you with such detail on a matter which, in itself, is of such relatively minor weight. It does, however, reflect our grave and deepening concern with developments in Cuba.

Once more, let me express my graditude for the close cooperation and sympathetic understanding you have extended to us in the matter of our Caribbean arms policy.

With warmest personal regards.

Most sincerely,

Chris⁶

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5622/2–2160. Confidential. Transmitted to London in telegram 6314 to London, which is the source text.

² In Lloyd’s message of February 15, he mentioned the British Government’s interest in selling six helicopters to the Cuban Navy and its belief that the helicopters did not come within the scope of the embargo on exporting arms to the Caribbean. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Cuba)

³ Ellipsis in the source text.

⁴ Apparently the same statements referred to in Document 456.

⁵ For text of this resolution, Resolution IV, adopted at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the American States, Santiago, August 18, 1959, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 364–365.

⁶ Telegram 6314 bears this typed signature.

462. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 24, 1960.

SUBJECT:

Continued illegal flights over Cuban territory from U.S. airfields

Discussion:

The recent incident in which a small aircraft departed from Florida and was blown to pieces together with its two occupants, apparently while attempting to bomb a Cuban sugar mill, serves to highlight a situation which is contributing to the present unsatisfactory state of our relations with the GOC, and, perhaps more importantly, is giving the GOC damaging propaganda with which to foment anti-American sentiment among the Cuban people. Despite the reported step-up in enforcement activities on the part of Justice, Treasury and the FAA following the leaflet-dropping flight of Diaz Lanz over Habana last October 26th, the Department has continued to receive numerous accounts of harassment flights over Cuba, many reportedly for the purpose of dropping incendiaries on sugar cane fields. On February 21, a plane is reported to have flown over a part of Habana, and, when subjected to ground fire, jettisoned two or three bombs at sea not far from one of Fidel Castro’s residences. The propaganda use to which this incident will be put needs no elaboration.

While we have no evidence that the plane on February 21 or any of the others (except for the Diaz Lanz flight and the plane destroyed last week) came from U.S. territory, we must now accept this possibility and recognize the credence which will be given in Cuba and elsewhere in the world to Castro’s assertions that all such raids have their genesis in the United States. I feel that it is of the utmost importance that every available resource be used to insure that air incursions of this kind do not depart from U.S. soil. Unless we can maintain the position that the USG is exhausting every effort to prevent them, we are in a highly vulnerable position with respect to three important phases of our approach to the entire Cuban problem; namely, (1) our, efforts to prevent the Castro Government from obtaining arms or airplanes from whatever source, including the Soviet Bloc, because of the plausibility such raids lend to the Castro thesis that he needs arms to defend himself; (2) any moves which the USG may wish to make to achieve OAS joint action on the Cuban problem—because of the counter-arguments and attacks which the air raids make available to the Cubans; and (3) hemisphere opinion, now increasingly critical of Castro, is likely to swing to his support if the raids are not halted. Such raids also serve the GOC as an effective rallying cry to allay increasing criticism and dissatisfaction among the Cuban populace, and are both a direct and indirect threat to U.S. citizens resident in Cuba (see Embtel Tousi 113, February 23 attached in which the Director of USIA is requested to bring up this matter at today’s OCB luncheon). (Tab A)²

Conclusion:

It is the considered opinion of ARA that renewed and imaginative efforts should be made by the pertinent federal agencies to prevent these flights from originating in U.S. territory and to determine and prosecute (or otherwise deter) those persons who are responsible for them. It is evident that the stepped-up efforts of these agencies toward this end, which followed the Diaz Lanz leaflet-dropping flight over Habana last October 26th and the President’s request that something be done to stop this type of activity, have not been sufficient. Failure to achieve the resolution of this problem could contribute significantly to the continued tenure of the present Cuban Administration.

Recommendations:

That you bring up this problem at the next meeting of the Cabinet. The factors which have prompted a recommendation for consideration at this high level are as follows:

(1) the seriousness of the problem and the failure so far to resolve it.

(2) the fact that it involves various federal agencies including Customs and Coast Guard (Treasury), FBI and INS (Justice), FAA (White House), and the Department of Defense (whose top officials will be present) which makes essential the closest cooperation and coordination.

(3) the apparent need for a new and effective approach to this problem.

(4) the opportunity which this approach would give to make clear at the highest level that the Department does not urge greater efforts at enforcement because of any desire to protect or support Castro but for quite the contrary reasons as outlined above.³

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Cabinet Memos to Secretary. Confidential. Drafted by Stevenson, initialed by Mallory, concurred in by Harris H. Huston (SCA), and routed in draft through Merchant who initialed it.

² Not printed. According to Jeremiah J. O’Connor’s preliminary notes on the Operations Coordinating Board meeting of February 24, the matter was raised by OCB Acting Chairman Harr. The notes further indicate that the Board “deplored the present situation and expressed doubt that enough action was being taken to prevent the illegal flights.” In response to Merchant’s statement that Acting Secretary Dillon planned to raise the issue with the Cabinet, the Board members urged that the Department of State “undertake to ‘canalize’ US executive action.” (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Files, Lot 61 D 411, Policy 1959)

³ Dillon initialed his approval on February 24.

463. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, February 25, 1960–3 p.m.

2150. Fidel Castro February 24 in televised speech outlined government’s economic policy. Occasion was assembly of labor delegates organized by CTC to deliver pledges of workers to contribute four percent of earnings to purchase of government’s industrial bonds. Although Castro did not directly attack United States, he savagely and insistently attacked private foreign capital and foreign companies in Cuba. His statement of economic policy appears mark clean break with free enterprise system. Salient points:

1. Revolution must stand or fall on solution of country’s economic problems.

2. Unemployment is basic problem in economic difficulties and solution depends on creation of new jobs through agricultural and industrial expansion.

3. Living standards can not be raised by decree, but by increase in production and productivity.

4. Private investment, especially foreign private investment, not a solution. Foregn investment demands guarantees, sends its profits abroad, exploits the workers and represents colonialism with consequent enslavement of the nation. Any future foreign capital invested in Cuba must be in form of loan to GOC. Industrialization must be achieved by national savings.

5. First fruits of Russian loan agreement will be a steel mill and a refinery.

6. Workers contributions will be used in planned program of industrial expansion and enterprises created will be known as “peoples industries.” Workers will receive seven and one half percent interest on bonds purchased.

Audience enthusiastic and Castro frequently interrupted by applause and cheers. Present statements on private investment mark complete reversal of position of six months ago and seem to indicate adoption full state control of economic activity.

Text follows by despatch.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 837.00/2–2560. Confidential; Priority.

464. Memorandum From Edward E. Rice of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)¹

Washington, February 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuba

I suggest, if there arises another case of alleged hostile intrusion into the Cuban airspace similar to that which recently occurred, that we offer Cuba the free loan of some World War II type planes (e. g., P–51). The offer, even if refused, would have good impact in Cuba.

It would be good policy to discourage US investment in plantations in countries which have not had their social revolutions. We should be backing land reform for such countries, as we did with long-term political success in Japan. We should cooperate with any non-Communist group which is in power and is willing to put it into effect. A social revolution successfully carried out under non-Communist auspices, as in Mexico, is like an inoculation against Communism. This is a sound principle which we should back in preference to any short-run interests.

My policy for Cuba would be as follows:

(1) Declare that the US Government regards with sympathy the wish of patriotic Cubans to be masters in their own house and efforts designed to reduce wide disparities of income there.

(2) Declare that we must and will do what we can, within the limits of our policy of non-intervention, to protect legitimate American economic interests in Cuba. At the same time take a fairly relaxed attitude as to what can be accomplished until Cuba’s revolutionary fever has burned down.

(3) Try to determine for ourselves which US investments: (a) have been exploitative and have drained off high profits while paying low wages; (b) stand in the way of Cuban land reform; or (c) have followed enlightened policies and can make a continuing contribution to the Cuban economy. And then give differentiated treatment, in representations to the Cubans, to these differing categories and corporations.

With policies of this sort, we would be in a position to approach the Mexicans, who have had their social revolution, and suggest they offer the Cubans the advantage of their experience. Mexicans in Havana would be better than Soviet advisors and more acceptable than Americans.

Implicit in what I suggest above is the need to determine the facts about the returns which have been enjoyed on US investments in Cuba. If we find that returns have often been very high, it will be good ammo for the policy of not bleeding too hard for the US corporations. High returns on foreign investments justified by high risks are incompatible with a high degree of US Government protective action. It seems to me that this is especially true of corporations in the sugar field which have enjoyed high profits at the expense of the US consumer under our quota policy. If our findings are significant, we will want to discuss them with appropriate Congressional leaders—whose understanding we have got to win if we are to implement any good long-run policy for Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Rice. Copies were sent to Morgan and Ramsey.

465. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, Washington, February 26, 1960, 9–11 a.m.¹

Washington, February 26, 1960, 9–11 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Cuba Overflights—Acting Secretary Dillon set forth the problems created by any illegal flights over Cuba that originate from American airfields. He believed Castro could exploit these to the detriment of any efforts we may make through the Organization of American States for improving the situation in Cuba. He outlined the effort being made to stop these, and the help being given by Treasury, Defense, Justice, and the Federal Aviation Agency. He thought the problem was essentially one of the many small abandoned airfields in Florida where it might be necessary to establish guards at all times. The Attorney General agreed that the illegal flights must be stopped somehow, but that the latest known incident was one of a routing flight from a regular field which then deviated from flight plan.

It was agreed that Gen. Persons should get in touch with General Quesada and ask him to discuss the matter further with Mr. Dillon.

Mr. Dulles noted the possibility that some incidents may have been originated deliberately in Cuba to create the impression of United States’ hostility.

Mr. Rogers pointed out that only one airplane incident has occurred since our new system of protective measures was undertaken.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series. Confidential. Prepared by Minnich. The Vice President presided at the meeting.

² According to the Record of Action of the meeting (RA–60–147), the following agreements were reached regarding illegal flights over Cuba:

“a) All departments and agencies which can make an effective contribution are requested to employ their powers, personnel and facilities more fully and in closer concert to enforce this government’s policy of interdicting illegal flights or incursions or exports of arms to Cuba.

“b) The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency is to assume primary responsibility for this intensified effort and will be so notified by the Assistant to the President.

“c) Consideration will be given to prompt public statements whenever evidence is conclusive enough to demonstrate the innocence of the United States in any incidents of this sort.” (Ibid.)

466. Letter From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, February 26, 1960.

Dear Livie: I am becoming increasingly concerned over deteriorating conditions in the Caribbean. I am especially concerned over the present situation in Cuba, in whose security the Navy is directly interested by reason of this island’s strategic location with respect to the sea approaches to the southern United States and the Panama Canal, and because of the location there of the Guantanamo Naval Base. Cuba appears to be in the process of falling under the domination of International Communism. Should this trend continue unchecked and a communist dominated or “front government” become a reality, a direct threat to the security of the United States would be presented. Additionally, a communist controlled state in Cuba would serve as a base of operations for the further spread of communistic influence in the Western Hemisphere having as its aim the isolation of the United States from Latin America.

Because of my concern, I am taking the liberty of sending you the attached paper as indicative of current Navy thinking in this matter, —namely that positive action to reverse the present trend should be initiated to the end that the communist threat is eliminated and a stable, friendly government established in Cuba. Action taken now in the case of Cuba will also facilitate and provide a foundation for any similar actions which may be necessary to prevent the spread of communism in Latin America and to stabilize other areas where unrest is appearing.

I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Jack Irwin.

Sincerely,

Arleigh

Enclosure

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. ACTION IN CUBA²

Introduction

1. The Castro Movement in Cuba is a vehicle by which international communism appears to be gaining a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. If the present trend continues, it will soon be too late for the United States to stem the Soviet incursion into this hemisphere. This situation, in its many ramifications, presents an immediate threat to the security of the United States and to that of our important neighbors in North and South America.

Problem

2. What action can be taken to prevent the establishment of a communist state in Cuba and to restore a stable, friendly government?

Background

3. The U.S. has never renounced the Monroe Doctrine. This was reaffirmed by Secretary of State Dulles in his address to the Nation on July 12, 1954,³ on International Communism in Guatemala. In that address, Mr. Dulles stated:

“For several years international communism has been probing here and there for resting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics.”

“This intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies.”

The United States is bound by treaties which commit it to seek settlement of hemispheric disputes by peaceful means, but which also provide for action in the event of aggression either from outside the hemisphere or within. Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro, 1947,⁴ requires each contracting party to send to the Security Council of the UN complete information “concerning the activities undertaken...⁵ for the purpose of maintaining Inter-American peace and security.”

Article 6 of this treaty states:

“If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack... or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on ... the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.”

The Declaration adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela, March 1954,⁶ states:

“That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for the meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.”

The 26th of July Movement succeeded in displacing Batista on 1 Jan 1959. Since that time the Castro regime has followed increasingly the classic strategy for establishing a communist state. The communist time table is delineated in American Embassy Havana Dispatch No. 903 dated 29 December 1959.⁷ The ruthless elimination of the opposition, assumption of dictatorial powers, suspension of elections, the “Hate America” campaign, the studied breakdown of the economy and confiscation of property, the initiation of relations and trade with the Soviet Union, the forbidding of anti-communist activity and the breakdown and reconstitution of the Armed Services and police are all typical communist maneuvers.

The majority of the Cubans are not yet committed to the acceptance of communism nor are they aware of the trend of the Revolution in this direction. The lower classes, however, continue to give full support to Castro and the Revolution.

It has not yet been proved that Castro himself is a communist. However, some of his principal deputies as well as other leaders are believed to be communists. In any case, individuals susceptible to communist influence are occupying key positions in the government as well as in all important organizations and trade unions. Two developments are noticeable. Communists are being appointed openly and are being elected (in trade unions) to key positions. Hidden communists in the 26th of July Movement are taking positions in seeming opposition to the open communists.

At present the Cuban Armed Forces are disorganized and apparently capable only of guerrilla warfare. Intelligence reports indicate that the Soviet Bloc may be supplying technicians to assist in training the new forces and supplying arms to the new government. There is no present indication that the fall of the Castro Government is imminent. If it should fall, however, the government would most probably emerge as a communist government because opposition leaders have been eliminated and there appear to be no leaders of stature remaining around whom anti-Castro/anti-Communist peoples could rally. Should Castro fall or be assassinated, mob action which would probably result would jeopardize the safety of Americans in Cuba. Finally, in the worst extreme, the possibility of direct support for Cuba by the Soviet Bloc, even to the extent of an open mutual security agreement, cannot be disregarded.

Discussion

4. Three basic courses of action are open to the U.S.

A. Multilateral Action through the OAS.

B. Unilateral Overt Action by the U.S.

C. Covert Unilateral Action by the U.S.

All subsidiary actions, such as economic pressure and moral suasion, which will assist in achieving the objective should also be taken in addition to the above.

A.

Multilateral Action Through The OAS.

The machinery exists in the declaration and agreements of the OAS for the U.S. to request convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS with subsequent investigation of the government in Cuba, and, if approval of the member states is obtained, intervention to prevent a communist take-over.

(1) Advantages:

(a) It would be in consonance with our national policy and our treaty commitments under the OAS.

(b) It would strengthen the OAS and would reassure the Free World and the Latin American States of U.S. willingness to live up to commitments.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) Uncertainty of support for OAS action by other Latin American States.

(b) Delay in OAS action could result in a communist controlled front government being a “fait accompli” in Cuba.

(c) Could result in the entire problem ending in the Security Council of the UN where the Soviet Union has a veto.

B.

Unilateral Overt Action By the U. S.

The U.S. has the capability to seize Cuba by direct military action, and after a consolidation period, cause the establishment of a friendly, non-communist government.

(1) Advantages:

(a) It would be in consonance with the Monroe Doctrine, which is still basic U.S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere, and would solve the problem.

(b) It would serve notice to the world that the U.S. will not tolerate the establishment of a communist or communist “front” regime in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) It would re-emphasize to the world that the U.S. will not hesitate to act when its security is at stake.

(d) It would dispel any illusions by the world at large that the U.S. is unwilling and unable to act no matter what the provocation. It would also probably stop the “baiting of the U.S.” in which some minor powers throughout the world indulge.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) It would violate our OAS commitments to seek settlement by peaceful means.

(b) It would lead to charges of aggression against the U.S., both in the OAS and in the United Nations, with the resulting possibility of UN and OAS action against the U.S.

(c) It would prove that the U.S. is not willing to abide by its treaties if U.S. interests dictate otherwise.

(d) It could isolate the U.S. from the other American States.

(e) It would violate the principle of non-intervention.

C.

Covert Unilateral Action by the U.S.

The U.S. could assist rebel groups covertly to overthrow the present government and re-establish a friendly government. Concurrently, it could take all possible measures to alert all friendly nations and the U.S. people and branches of the U.S. Government to the danger of the threat in order to discredit Cuba and bring world opinion to the side of the U.S.

(1) Advantages:

(a) U.S. would not be charged with aggression.

(b) If carried out successfully, Free World and Latin American opinion would be favorable to the U.S.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) There is no certainty of success.

(b) The effort might well come too late.

In considering and comparing the above courses of action, the basic assumption that the United States cannot and must not permit within the Western Hemisphere the establishment of any government dominated by the International Communists is paramount. Therefore, if other courses of action fail, the U.S. must, even in the face of adverse world opinion, take unilateral action to prevent such an occurrence.

Until the situation reaches the stage where direct unilateral action by the U.S. is the only means left, it appears that a combination of those parts of courses of action A and C which have a fair chance of success should be followed in order to utilize the prime advantage given under A, i.e., the cooperation and good will of the other American States.

Conclusions

5. The following conclusions are reached:

a. The establishment of a Communist government, or a “front” government following communist precepts, in Cuba would be a direct threat to the security of the U.S. and would endanger hemispheric security.

b. The U.S. should initiate positive action to eliminate the threat before a communist or “front” government in Cuba is a “fait accompli.”

c. Although the revolution still has the support of the masses, the resulting government in Cuba is following the path of international communism. Although they are not yet aware of the trend toward communism, Castro has the personal loyalty of the masses.

d. American holdings are being confiscated. American lives may be endangered if stable, responsible government is not ensured.

e. The Monroe Doctrine is still basic U.S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere.

f. Procedure exists under the Declaration of Caracas to request action by the OAS against a Communist threat to hemispheric security.

g. The U.S. should proceed to document the extent of infiltration of communists into key positions in Cuba and the extent of extra-Western Hemispheric Communist support of the present Cuban regime.

h. The U.S. should initiate a campaign to apprise all U.S. agencies, the U.S. public, and the other American States of the threat in order to gain support for any future action that may be taken.

i. The U.S. should covertly support the Cuban opposition.

j. The U.S. after having gained the required support, should present its case before the OAS in order that joint action by the members of the OAS may be taken to eliminate the communist threat and establish a friendly, stable government in Cuba.

k. The U.S., as a last resort, should take unilateral military action to eliminate the threat.

Recommendations

6. To accomplish the above, the following plan of action is recommended:

a. Immediately document the communist time table and the communist take-over in Cuba.

b. Use all resources and media to make the U.S. and the other American States aware of the threat. The following should be utilized to accomplish this:

(1) Intelligence briefings of:

(a) U.S. Government officials.

(b) Newspaper representatives and editors.

(c) U.S. businessmen operating abroad and going abroad.

(d) The IADB members and Latin American diplomatic personnel and military attachés.

(e) The Catholic Church (possibly through the Apostolic Delegate).

(f) Church groups operating in Latin America.

(g) Latin American officials visiting the U.S. and U.S. installations.

(2) Orientation of radio broadcasts and news reports, both government and private.

(3) The U.S. Information Service.

(4) All country teams.

c. Covertly support the Cuban opposition. Select and groom trusted Cubans as appropriate to assume responsible posts in a friendly government.

d. Be prepared to use force to safeguard and evacuate U.S. Nationals should the situation deteriorate to the point where they are endangered.

e. When support has been gained, request, in conjunction with other members of the OAS, convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS under the terms of the Declaration of Caracas to:

(1) Seek OAS action to call on Cuba to place herself under OAS auspices “in order to preserve the revolution for the people and prevent communist take-over,” and;

(2) Seek OAS action to intervene by force in the event the above fails, and;

(3) In whatever joint group is formed to accomplish the above, keep U.S. participation to a minimum in order to force the Latin American States to assume their responsibilities to the Hemisphere and to counter accusations of U.S. imperialism.

f. In the event time does not permit completion of the above, or as a last resort, be prepared to take unilateral military action to establish a non-communist government in Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret; Personal.

² Secret.

³ Delivered in fact on June 30, 1954; for text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1311–1315.

⁴ Signed at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947; for text, see 62 Stat. (Pt. 2) 1681.

⁵ All ellipses are in the source text.

⁶ Resolution 93 adopted at the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, March 28, 1954; for text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1300–1302.

⁷ Enclosed with despatch 903 was 6-page outline that brought together “the principal indications and manifestations of Communism and anti-Americanism in the revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro.” On the basis of this data, the Embassy in Havana concluded: “The facts as revealed to date show the Castro regime as bitterly anti-American and perhaps implacably so. Some of the attitudes and actions of the regime seem clearly to reflect a Communist orientation, while others could be Communistic but could equally be due to ultra-nationalism or anti-Americanism.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–2959)

467. Editorial Note

On February 22, Minister of State Roa gave Chargé Braddock a note, which the Cuban Government also released to the press, expressing the Cuban Government’s intention to appoint a commission to begin negotiations in Washington on matters pending between the two governments. The note indicated that the negotiations must not be subject to any measure “being adopted, by the Government or the Congress of your country, of a unilateral character which might prejudge the results of the aforementioned negotiations or cause harm to the Cuban economy and people.” (Telegram 2115 from Havana, February 23; Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/2–2360) The Embassy recommended that the U.S. reply should reject the condition established by the Cuban Government, but should be drafted with a view to winning support from other Latin American countries for the U.S. position, support which the Embassy felt the Cuban Government had aimed to enlist by the note’s tone, timing, and publication. The Embassy felt that the condition was “unacceptable both in practice, given the independence of Congress, and in principle,” given the Cuban Government’s unilateral acts against legitimate American property rights in Cuba. (Telegram 2116 from Havana, February 23; ibid.)

The drafting of a reply was the subject of telegraphic correspondence between the Department of State, the Embassy in Havana, and President Eisenhower’s party, which was then visiting Brazil. In Secto 7 from Rio de Janeiro, February 25, Secretary Herter conveyed the President’s suggestion that Braddock should explain to Cuban authorities the actual relationship between Congress and the Executive branch and the “practical impossibility” of accepting the Cuban condition. The President also thought the point might be made that new legislation was needed to replace the expiring law, and the Executive branch could not simply by decree continue the present legislation. (Ibid., 611. 37/2–2560)

The reply, as finally agreed upon by the Department of State, the President’s traveling party, and the Embassy in Havana, was delivered by Braddock to Roa on February 29. The text of the note, in which the U.S. Government expressed willingness to begin the negotiations but rejected the condition set by the Cuban Government, was issued as Department of State Press Release 92, February 29. Also on February 29, Braddock gave to Roa another note (No. 236) that reads:

“I have the honor to refer to Your Excellency’s note of February 15 replying to this Embassy’s note of January 11 which vigorously protested the treatment by the Government of Cuba of United States nationals who own property in Cuba.

“Your Excellency’s reply has been transmitted to my Government. I am now instructed to state that the Government of the United States rejects the statements in Your Excellency’s note that the Embassy’s note of January 11 contains a ‘grave error of understanding’ and is ‘manifestly thoughtless’. The Government of the United States reaffirms the statements contained in its note of January 11 and in the informal memoranda referred to therein.

“I am furthermore instructed to state that the Government of the United States finds it difficult to reconcile Your Excellency’s reply to the Embassy’s note of January 11 with the expressed desire of Your Excellency’s Government to resolve questions pending between our two Governments through negotiations conducted in a friendly spirit.

“It is hoped that the Government of Cuba will give renewed consideration to the matters presented in all good faith and objectivity in my note of January 11 and that it will furnish specific comments with regard to the illustrative cases which have been brought to its attention.” (Text enclosed with despatch 1218 from Havana, February 29; ibid., 837. 16/2–2960)

In telegram 2184 from Havana, February 29, Braddock discussed his delivery of the notes to Roa and how he touched on the points suggested by President Eisenhower. Braddock said that while Roa was at first somewhat heated in his reaction, particularly to the first note, he calmed down by the end of the conversation. Braddock felt that the Cuban Government would proceed with the plans for the negotiations in spite of the U.S. rejection of its condition. (Ibid., 611. 37/2–2460; published also in Declassified Documents, 1985, 968)

In telegram 2230 from Havana, March 3, the Embassy reported that since the presentation of the note there had been a growing public campaign clearly sponsored by government sources accusing the United States of economic aggression. One Cuban newspaper published on March 3 the purported text of a proposed bill submitted by the Executive branch for amending the Sugar Act in a manner unfavorable to Cuba. (Department of State, Central Files, 837. 235/3–360)

468. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)¹

JCSM–72–60 Washington, March 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

U.S. Action in Cuba

1. The government of Cuba appears to be following the path of International Communism. The establishment of a government in Cuba controlled by the International Communists would present a direct threat to the security of the United States and would serve as a base for the further spread of Communist influence in the Western Hemisphere. The United States should, therefore, initiate now a program of positive action to re-establish a stable, friendly, non-communist government in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the actions recommended in the attached study² can contribute towards achieving the above stated aim, and would also contribute to any future action that may be required to reduce unrest and thwart the establishment of International Communism in Latin America.

3. It is recommended that the attached study be introduced into the National Security Council for consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC64 A 2093, Cuba 091. Secret.

² Not printed; it is entitled “Study and Recommendations for U.S. Action in Cuba,” February 2, 1960, and is virtually identical to the enclosure to Document 466.

469. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 7, 1960¹

Washington, March 7, 1960

SUBJECT

Visit of Cuban Chargé d’Affaires a.i.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Mr. William A. Wieland—Director, CMA

Dr. Enrique Patterson—Cuban Chargé d’Affaires a.i.

The Secretary asked Cuban Chargé Dr. Enrique Patterson to come to his office at 5: 30 p.m., March 7. On his arrival, the Cuban Chargé was informed by the Secretary that this Government was extremely disturbed by the unfounded and irresponsible statements attacking the United States in connection with the explosion which occurred aboard a French munitions ship recently in Habana harbor.²

The Secretary pointed out that, on the morning of March 5, our Chargé d’Affaires in Habana called personally at the Foreign Ministry³ to express the grief and sympathy of the Government and people of the United States over the tragic consequences of the explosion in Habana harbor. He also pointed out that at the same time the Chargé had offered the assistance of the United States and that the Department of State had also issued a statement early Saturday, March 5,⁴ expressing the shock and sadness felt in this country over the incident. The Secretary pointed out that later the same day, Prime Minister Castro had attacked the United States and attributed to it the responsibility for the explosion. The Secretary told the Chargé that the Department had promptly issued a statement to the press⁵ denying the implications of Prime Minister Castro’s statements and announcing that it would protest through diplomatic channels the unfounded and irresponsible accusation. He handed the Chargé a copy of the Department of State press statement of March 5, 1960.

The Secretary read from a memorandum which had been addressed to him by Mr. Rubottom on March 7,⁵ describing the shock felt by the Government and people of the United States when the Prime Minister expressed his belief that the United States was responsible for the explosion. Still referring to the memorandum, the Secretary described the tenor of Prime Minister Castro’s remarks as extremely provocative and apparently calculated to transform the understandable sorrow of the Cuban people into resentment against the United States. He said the United States Government vigorously rejects and protests this unfounded and irresponsible attitude by Prime Minister Castro and considers that his baseless, erroneous and misleading statments on this occasion can only contribute further to the unhappy deterioration which has occurred in relations between our two countries over the past year. The Secretary contrasted the Prime Minister’s attitude with the expressions in the Cuban Government’s note of February 18⁶ in which it shared our opinion that negotiations between the two Governments should be conducted “in an appropriate manner, with strict observance of international laws and within the spirit of traditional friendship between the United States and Cuba and of inter-American solidarity.” Still referring to the memorandum, the Secretary told the Chargé that this Government finds itself increasingly obliged to question the good faith of the Cuban Government with respect to a desire for improved relations between the two Governments. He also told the Chargé that a note of protest would be prepared by this Government.⁷ Dr. Patterson said he would forward the Secretary’s remarks to his Government and expressed personal hopes that relations between the two countries would improve.

A substantial summary of the Secretary’s statement to the Chargé was subsequently given to the press.

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, March 1960. Official Use Only. Drafted by Wieland.

² On March 4 a French ship, La Coubre, bringing arms from Belgium, exploded in Havana harbor. A number of French crewmen and 75 Cuban dockworkers were killed.

³ A copy of the note that Braddock presented to the Foreign Ministry on that occasion is in Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, USG Notes to GOC.

⁴ A copy of this statement, also issued at the same time by the Embassy in Havana, is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, March 1960.

⁵ A copy is ibid.

⁵ A copy is ibid.

⁶ See Document 455.

⁷ A copy of this March 15 note, delivered by the Embassy in Havana to the Foreign Ministry, is in Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, USG Notes to GOC.

470. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 8, 1960—7 p.m.

2301. Country Team of unanimous opinion there is no hope that US will ever be able to establish a statisfactory relationship with Cuban Government as long as it is dominated by Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Che Guevara and like-minded associates. If there was any doubt on this point after Mikoyan visit and Cuban-Russian agreement, we feel it has been removed by manifestation of Cuban attitude toward US as provided by fabricated, irresponsible charge of GOC that US responsible for La Coubre explosion.

Embassy believes this charge, coupled with other hostile acts of GOC and mounting anti-US frenzy part of government-controlled mass media indicate deliberate attempt to precipitate a crisis in Cuban-American relations and force US to take drastic measures re Cuba.

Country Team has considered following courses of action for US: (1) conciliation, (2) strong action including economic measures, (3) maintenance of firm, dignified, restrained attitude, reflecting disapproval of regime but doing nothing overtly to hasten its downfall or that would provide basis for charge of US intervention. Of these courses Country Team believes (3) is still most profitable for US to follow, but recognizes danger that (A) Cuban economy may not collapse under Castro and (B) 2 or 3 years of continued anti-US indoctrination of Cuban people, especially of youth, may do damage to Cuban-American relations that will take many years to repair. This attitude, while scrupulously non-interventionist, would provide tacit encouragement essential to development of an active political opposition to Castro.

Together with policy of restraint toward Cuba, Embassy believes US should continue discreet efforts to awaken other Latin American countries to dangers to continent from Castro’s excesses and Communistic tendencies.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–860. Secret; Priority.

471. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 8, 1960—8 p.m.

2305. Embassy telegram 2303.² Foreign Minister Roa said he had called me with respect to Secretary Herter’s statements to Cuban Chargé Enrique Patterson yesterday. Roa said there had been some confusion due to fact Secretary’s oral statement did not correspond in tone or substance or date with written communication which Secretary handed Chargé at the same time. The oral statement contained, he said, remarks which were insulting, threatening and aggressive against Cuban Prime Minister and that Cuban diplomatic representative should not have been obliged to listen to such offensive remarks about his Chief of State.

I said that surely the Minister understood how deeply offended we were at accusation by Prime Minister that US, which had a history of which it was very proud, should stoop to such a repulsive act as the explosion of the French ship. Roa replied that Castro had rationalized the explosion but had made no charge against US and had merely said we have no evidence but have the right to believe that so forth and so forth. I remarked that Castro’s statements added up to an accusation and were understood by the Cuban public as such. Roa handed me signed copy of the statement reported in reference telegram.

I asked Roa if he knew what press correspondents outside of his office were saying. As he did not know, I said we had been hearing from press all afternoon that Foreign Minister called me to announce that Cuba was breaking diplomatic relations with US. He smiled and said that was ridiculous. We agreed that press sometimes no help in our business and I left, to face large battery of correspondents and photographers who were shortly to be disillusioned by Roa as to his purpose in calling me in.

Topping accompanied me on visit.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–860. Official Use Only; Priority.

² In telegram 2303, March 8, the Embassy reported that Roa had given Braddock a statement that day, just prior to releasing it to the press, protesting the statements Herter had made to Patterson on March 7 (see Document 469) as “insulting” and “aggressive and threatening” to Cuban national dignity. (Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–860)

472. Editorial Note

On March 8, the Planning Board of the National Security Council, at the request of the President’s National Security Adviser Gordon Gray, discussed the Cuban situation. According to briefing notes which Gray subsequently prepared for the Council, the salient points of the Planning Board’s discussion and some of the conclusions reached were the following:

“In considering U.S. interests in Cuba in the present circumstances, the Planning Board concluded that, in order of priority, they were as follows:

“First—Denial of Cuba to the influence and control of hostile interests.

“Second—The Guantanamo Naval Base, about which I will have more to say later.

“Third—The effect our Cuban policy has on other Latin American countries, i.e., a possible loss of U.S. prestige and encouragement of other revolutionary groups on the one hand, or a possible favorable reaction to our policy of non intervention and restraint.

“Fourth—Safety of U.S. citizens in the present circumstances, in which there seems to be no threat to them. “Fifth—U.S. business interests.

“The Planning Board believed there was no clear prospect for satisfactory relations with the Cuban Government, as now constituted, which would allow us fully to protect our interests. However, the responsible agencies did not rule out the possibility that a change for the better could evolve. For its part, the U.S. Embassy in Havana believes there is no hope the U.S. will be able to establish a satisfactory relationship with the Cuban government so long as it is dominated by Castro and his like-minded associates.

“In these circumstances, the question was posed to the Planning Board: Must we continue to tolerate the Castro government in view of the effect its policies are having on our interests? The Planning Board concluded that no overt action against the Castro regime would, at the present time, be in U.S. interests (a) because of the absence of any apparent alternative to the present government, (b) it would tend to solidify Castro’s support—indeed, Castro may be trying to provoke such action, (c) the obligations we have to the OAS and the need of having its support for any measures taken, and (d) because of the effect on world opinion.

“Notwithstanding the conclusion just reported, it was felt that the U.S. might consider undertaking to pay Cuba world prices instead of the subsidy price for sugar and depositing the difference in the Bank of International Settlements on behalf of U.S. citizens who have had properties expropriated without adequate reimbursement by the Castro government; subject to adjudication by the World Court.

“The Planning Board also believed every effort should be made to get members of the OAS and, to the extent appropriate, the organization itself interested in the dangers involved in the Cuban situation, especially the Communist threat. Toward this end, it also was recognized that the U.S. should take initiatives in publicizing Cuba’s hostile actions.

“With regard to the Guantanamo Naval Base, the Planning Board recognized the possibility (a) that the U.S. might be asked to evacuate with a deadline or (b) that physical action might be taken. The Planning Board noted that there was no clear statement of U.S. policy as to what the U.S. should do in the event either situation developed. In this connection, there is some reason to believe that the Castro government is questioning the legal basis for the existence of the Guantanamo base.” (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation)

473. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 9, 1960.

SUBJECT

NSC Discussion of Cuba, March 10, 1960

Background.

1. We understand that Mr. Gray has requested that Mr. Allen W. Dulles include Cuba in his briefing of the NSC on March 10 and that Mr. Gray intends to follow this up by posing certain questions relative to our actions in Cuba. This follows immediately on a letter which Admiral Burke (Tab A) sent to Mr. Merchant² recommending that the United States follow a policy of collective action through the OAS coupled with covert support of anti-Castro elements in Cuba and, should this fail to bring a solution in time, that the United States be prepared to take military measures. It is understood that Admiral Burke’s recommendations were subsequently endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission as a proposal to the National Security Council³ but that, as the result of the position taken on behalf of the Department by Mr. Merchant in reply to Mr. Gray’s query, the latter has agreed that Admiral Burke’s proposals not be taken up by the NSC Planning Board at this time.⁴

2. You will recall that the Department’s position at the discussion of the Cuban problem at the NSC on January 14⁵ and previously has been that it would be inadvisable for the NSC through the Planning Board to develop a special policy paper on Cuba, essentially because

a. The President has already approved a basic paper on Cuba (Tab C)⁶ which remains valid and which the Department and agencies concerned are seeking to implement as effectively as possible with a rather detailed political, informational, economic, and covert program. The substance of the policy and implementing programs have been briefed to the NSC (January 14) and the JCS (January 8).⁷

b. There is no disagreement between the Departments and agencies concerned about our basic approach towards Cuba—that the Castro regime is a threat to our security interests and the achievement of our objectives in Latin America, that there is no reasonable hope that the Castro regime will voluntarily reverse the policies which run counter to our interests and objectives, and that consequently we seek a change in Cuba with the minimum damage to U.S. prestige and interests in the hemisphere and elsewhere in the Free World. The achievement of this policy objective does not require new policy determinations but carrying out by the agencies immediately concerned—at this time primarily State, CIA and to some extent USIA—of highly intricate and delicate operations in daily coordination with each other in the current highly fluid situation. While the Department has and will continue to give appropriate briefings on our activities with respect to Cuba to the NSC, the OCB, and the JCS, it is not desirable that these bodies set up rigid operational guidelines with respect to our diplomatic, economic, informational, and covert activities, and it would probably be counter productive for the Departments and agencies concerned to subject their operations to review and concurrence in the NSC–OCB.

c. In view of the fact that any action tending to cause a change in Cuba is subject to being construed in Latin America and elsewhere as “intervention,” it remains highly important that our approach to the Cuban problem and our plans to achieve the desired result be held as strictly as possible on a “need-to-know” basis and especially the circulation of papers within the Government tending to imply that the United States seeks a change.

Recommendation.

That this position again be sustained in any discussion within the NSC concerning the possible development or consideration of a plan for Cuba by the NSC Planning Board. Should the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mr. Gray, or others suggest the need for a further formulation of basic policy towards Cuba, it might be suggested that they be invited to go to the President with you for a discussion. In the event that their suggestions are essentially operational you might suggest that they take these up directly with the Departments and agencies concerned. ARA would be prepared to participate in briefing or discussing the Cuban situation with any member of the NSC who desires further information.

Attached, for convenience, are a copy of the reply which Mr. Merchant has sent to Admiral Burke (Tab B)⁸ and suggested answers to questions we understand Mr. Gray may raise at the NSC (Tab D).

[Tab D]

CUBA⁹

Suggested Answers to Questions Which Might Be Raised at NSC March 10, 1960

1.

Question—What are basic U.S. interests in Cuba?

Answer—Our basic security problem is that the Castro Government is pursuing policies, including calculated hostility to the United States and close association with the Communists, which run counter to every one of our stated policy objectives for Latin America (NSC 5902/1¹⁰ ). Castro’s program is to establish firmly in Cuba a government hostile to the United States, follow a neutralist if not pro-Soviet foreign policy, incorporate pro-Communists if not Communists in key positions, and follow the path of complete state management of the economy. If successful, Castro would undoubtedly further intensify his efforts to bring into power governments responsive to his leadership in other Caribbean and Latin American countries and it is not unlikely, in view of the instability of a number of governments in the area and of the sympathy which Castro still wakes among radical-nationalist as well as pro-Communist elements that he might succeed in at least a few countries. In this event, we would be in very serious difficulties in our Latin American relations. All other dangers—except the possibility that Cuba would be made available clandestinely or otherwise to hostile forces for operations directly against U.S. military security—are subsidiary to this main danger.

2.

Question—Is there any prospect of satisfactory relations with the Cuban Government, as now constituted, which will allow us to protect our interests?

Answer—Our experience with and assessment of Castro indicates that the odds that Castro would genuinely modify his position are so long that they would not form a safe and reasonable basis of policy. We must look to elements which are opposed to Castro’s policies but acceptable to the Cuban people.

3.

Question—What do we do if Castro asks us to evacuate Guantanamo or if we are attacked there?

Answer—Although Castro has thus far not raised the Guantanamo issue except in the form of a few references in his speeches, there are intelligence reports that he has requested a study to be prepared as to the procedure to be followed to terminate the agreement. We are not prepared to accede to any request that we evacuate the base. If Castro should attack the base or—as is more likely—seek to harass the base by cutting off the water supply, strikes, demonstrations, etc., we would take the necessary action within the base perimeter to maintain its integrity and security and understand that the Navy has up-to-date contingency plans for this purpose.

4.

Question—Should we begin to take overt political and economic measures against the Castro Government in retaliation for Castro’s actions against U.S. persons and property?

Answer—Before such actions can be decided upon, it is necessary (a) to assure the understanding if not support of the other American Republics in order to prevent action being taken against us in the OAS and determine whether we could effectively handle the resultant Cuban complaint in the United Nations, (b) explore the possibility of taking multilateral action through the OAS rather than unilateral U.S. action, (c) remove, insofar as possible, the impediment of bilateral and multilateral treaties obligating the U.S. and Cuba not to take such actions, and (d) as in the case of the Sugar Act, obtain from Congress the necessary authorization which the President does not now have to take certain economic measures. Efforts to prepare the ground in all of these fields have been actively underway for some months.

The timing, and the degree to which the U.S. would actually apply political and economic sanctions, will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. On the one hand, we have our reputation as well as our property interests to safeguard, and will probably have to use some degree of political and economic sanctions not only to compensate our expropriated property owners but also to avoid domestically and internationally any feeling that the Government is not strong-willed enough to resist Castro’s attacks and depredations. On the other hand, we must carefully calculate the effect of any such measures to assure that they will in fact strengthen and not weaken the hands of Cubans who are opposed to Castro. We cannot expect patriotic and self-respecting Cubans, no matter how distasteful Castro’s policies may be to them, to side with the U.S. if we go so far along the lines of reprisals that the quarrel no longer is between Castro and the real interests of the Cuban people but a quarrel between the U.S. and their country. We must remember, also, that a Cuban thrown out of a job because of U.S. reprisals is likely to become anti-U.S. and pro-Castro while one out of work because of Castro’s own mistakes is likely to become anti-Castro and pro-U.S.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Top Secret. Drafted by Hill and concurred in by Gerard Smith. The source text is neither signed nor initialed by Rubottom.

² Document 466.

³ See Document 468.

⁴ The exchange between Gray and Merchant has not been further identified. Regarding the Planning Board meeting of March 8, see supra.

⁵ See Document 423.

⁶ See Document 387.

⁷ See Document 419.

⁸ Tab B was a draft reply from Merchant to Burke which was revised slightly and sent to Burke on March 10; see Document 475.

⁹ Top Secret. Drafted by Hill.

¹⁰ Text of NSC 5902/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” February 16, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume V.

474. Memorandum of Discussion at the 436th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 10, 1960¹

Washington, March 10, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles then summarized the situation in Cuba. He said that the U.S. Embassy Country Team had reached the conclusion that there was no hope that the U.S. would ever be able to establish satisfactory relations with a Cuban Government dominated by Castro and his associates. The Cuban charges in connection with the ship explosion, the anti-U.S. propaganda in mass media in Cuba, and the generally anti-American actions of the Cuban Government could be a deliberate attempt to force a crisis. In this situation, any incident could result in violence against U.S. citizens in Cuba. In fact, the U.S. Embassy had already invoked the preliminary phase of its plan for the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the country. Castro is reported to be planning presentation of a demand that the Guantanamo Naval Base be evacuated within 30 to 45 days after sugar legislation unfavorable to Cuba is introduced in the U.S. Congress. Cuba might also take the Guantanamo Base question to the UN. Abusive personal attacks by the government-controlled radio against the President and the Secretary of State continue. Newspapers continue their anti-American attacks. Castro and Guevara dominate the new Central Planning Board which will control all Cuban industry. The Freeport Sulphur Company and the Bethlehem Steel Company would close down their operations in Cuba this month. The Freeport Sulphur’s Moa Bay plant remained unfinished. Mr. Dillon said the $20–$30 million needed to finish the Moa Bay plant could not be obtained because the banks would not provide the money in the absence of a certification that the situation in Cuba was the same as the situation obtaining when the original loan was made. Secretary Anderson believed that only $10–$15 million of the physical plant in Moa Bay was lacking; the rest of the $20–$30 million was working capital. In reply to a question from the President, Mr. Anderson said the plant had been started two years ago. Mr. McCone said the plant was integrated as part of the firm’s New Orleans refinery in the U.S. and could not operate alone. Mr. Dillon said the refinery in Louisiana could not operate independently either. He felt that Nicaro operations in Cuba might have to be closed down also, since the moratorium on the imposition on Nicaro of the new Cuban export tax would expire Sunday. We maintain that the tax is not in effect because of the contract with the Cuban Government which provides for no change in the export tax. We will not stop operations in Cuba until the Cubans move in and force the collection of the tax. Mr. Gray said he understood the Cubans had seized large Italian-owned properties. Mr. Dulles said $40 million in Italian interests had recently been seized. The President said it was difficult to figure out what Castro was trying to do. During his trip he had discussed this matter with the Latin American Presidents, [less than 1 line not declassified]. The President had asked his Latin American hosts what they would do about the situation in Cuba, especially the sugar subsidy problem. Frondizi and one other President had indicated they would notify their ambassadors in Havana to warn Castro about his activities. The President said that Castro, however, appeared to be getting away with his activities; nothing seemed to have any effect on him. Mr. Dillon said that the warning referred to by the President was issued and did have the effect of slowing down Castro’s attacks on the U.S. for a few days. Now the Cubans are saying that our military exercise in Puerto Rico is a practice for the invasion of Cuba. The President said we did not need any practice to invade Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

2. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (NSC Action No. 2166–b–(l); NSC 5902/1; NSC Action No. 2177)²

Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the Planning Board discussion of U.S. Policy toward Cuba. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note³ is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)

Mr. Dillon remarked that any threat to the safety of U.S. citizens in Cuba would probably develop overnight. The Country Team report that there was no hope of satisfactory relations with Cuba, while new, was merely a confirmation of our basic current policy toward Cuba. Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba. This objective is not being realized at the present time because there is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed, the result of Castro’s disappearance might be a Communist take-over. If Castro were successful in his effort to provoke us into intervention, the result would help the USSR, since American intervention in Cuba would be considered in many parts of the world as a counterpart of Soviet intervention in Hungary. It was becoming more and more likely that the law we originally planned to recommend to Congress on sugar would not be passed; and indeed we may not now want it passed. It had been planned to recommend an extension of the sugar subsidy without change except for the provision that the President would have authority to make changes at his discretion. Congress will probably now want to go further than this recommendation. Mr. Dillon reported that up to the present time he had felt we should be careful not to take actions which would have a serious effect on the Cuban people, but now he believed we need not be so careful about actions of this kind, since the Cuban people were responsible for the regime. If Castro continued his present activities, the results would be catastrophic throughout the hemisphere, whereas a set-back to the Cuban economy as a result of Castro’s actions might be a desirable development, since it would show that Communist-type activity does not pay. Our legal position with respect to the Guantanamo Naval Base was firm. The only basis for attack on our position would be the argument that the treaty was imposed on Cuba and that it was a very old treaty. However, if the matter were brought to the UN, we would be in a difficult position because our posture is that we do not wish to keep a military base if the indigenous country does not want our base. There was a certain similarity between Guantanamo and Bizerte, where the French case is based on legalities and our position is that the problem is a political one. However, we are standing on legal grounds with respect to Guantanamo, even though our position is a difficult one.

Admiral Burke believed we had a legal right to stay in Guantanamo, which was a very useful training base. Guantanamo differed from Bizerte in that we had been established in Guantanamo for a long time and there were no Cubans living inside the base area. Cutting off the water supply would be the only means of Cuban attack against the Guantanamo Base. If the water supply were cut off, we could continue to support the base by means of Navy tankers, perhaps even by installing plants which manufacture fresh water from sea water. Admiral Burke reported incidentally that we had attempted to obtain water by drilling on the base, but had been unsuccessful. In fact, we had feared for a time we might strike oil. The 230 marines on the base would be able to hold it against a Cuban armed attack. In Admiral Burke’s view, Castro may want to provoke our intervention in order to lower U.S. prestige in Latin America so that other Latin American revolutions could be created. The Latin American military men to whom he had talked favored a strong U.S. stand, felt that the U.S. had exercised a great deal of restraint so far, and insisted that we should not allow ourselves to be pushed further.

The President said a certain amount of pro-Castro sentiment had been expressed by small groups in the countries he had recently visited. His host Presidents had labelled this sentiment as Communist-inspired. On the trip he saw displayed some signs favorable to Castro, but was aware of no demonstrations. The Latin American Presidents had counselled further forebearance by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Organization of American States would finally see the potential danger in Cuba and take concerted action. The Latin American Presidents, however, had no idea as to how the situation in Cuba should be handled. The President had suggested to them that they should not condone a situation which might result in frightening U.S. business away from Latin America. To some extent each country is restrained from action against Castro by a vociferous Communist element.

Mr. Gray asked whether the Council should keep the situation in Cuba under constant surveillance and whether it was the consensus of the Council that, for the time being at least, our present policy toward Cuba should continue to be pursued. The President said he did not wish to endanger the lives of Americans living in Cuba. We would be forced to take action other than diplomatic action if U.S. citizens were in danger, and we ought to know what action we would take in such a contingency. We might finally have to use force if U.S. citizens were exposed to mob violence. Admiral Burke thought we needed a Cuban leader around whom anti-Castro elements could rally. Mr. Dulles said some anti-Castro leaders existed, but they are not in Cuba at present. The President said we might have another Black Hole of Calcutta in Cuba; and he wondered what we do about such a situation. Mr. Dillon felt it would be necessary to face that situation when it arrived. Admiral Burke noted that we had plans for immediate evacuation of the 10,000 Americans in Cuba, as well as military forces to put these plans into execution. Secretary Douglas was somewhat pessimistic about the possibility of evacuation, saying that someone was bound to get hurt during such an operation. The President remarked that we could blockade the island and say it is quarantined. Mr. Gray asked whether State and Defense should be directed to review contingency plans regarding Cuba. Mr. Dillon said plans were being reviewed constantly, but the difficulty was that all the contingencies could not be foreseen in advance. Admiral Burke believed Cuba could be blockaded within two to three hours after the order was given. Mr. Patterson asked whether economic measures as such had hurt Castro. Mr. Dillon believed that economic measures against Castro would not have much effect in a short time. Moreover, Castro would probably be able to counteract economic sanctions by receiving what he needed from the Soviets. The President said he could not do this if we blockaded the island. Admiral Burke suggested that we should intensify our propaganda to persuade the OAS and the Cuban people to support our policy. The President agreed, adding that we could do almost anything if we had the support of the OAS. Mr. Dillon pointed out that the State Department was constantly endeavoring to secure the support of the OAS. The President agreed with the suggestion of Secretary Anderson that the Inter-American [Development] Bank should be used as a method of gaining the support of OAS countries. He added that we should endeavor to think of all possible ways of influencing Latin American countries to favor our policies in Cuba. [2 sentences (4 lines) not declassified] The President said the Argentinians had been very bitter about Guevara. Secretary Anderson said the following story was going the rounds: When Castro wanted to take over the Cuban Bank, he had asked at a meeting of his supporters whether there was an economist present. Guevara had raised his hand and Castro had appointed him head of the Bank. On the way out of the meeting Castro had said to Guevara “I didn’t know you were an economist”, and Guevara had replied, “Oh, I thought you said a Communist.”

Mr. Gray said the subject of Cuba would be brought before the Council frequently. The President said Cuba ought to be brought before the Council at each meeting in the immediate future in order that the Council could see what the new developments were.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of the above-mentioned intelligence briefing, and the views of the NSC Planning Board as presented orally by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

b. Noted the statements by the President that:

(1) Every effort should be made to influence the other members of the Organization of American States to recognize the dangers involved in the Cuban situation and support action with respect to them.

(2) The responsible departments and agencies should keep current plans to deal promptly with likely contingencies which might develop with respect to Cuba, especially those involving the safety of U.S. citizens and the Guantanamo Base.

(3) The developments with regard to the situation in Cuba should be reviewed by the Council each meeting for the immediate future.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for information and guidance.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on March 14.

² Regarding NSC Action No. 2166–b–(l), see footnote 3, Document 410. Regarding NSC Action No. 2177, see footnote 9, Document 423. Text of NSC 5902/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” February 16, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume V.

³ See Document 472.

⁴ Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 2191. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Records: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

475. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)¹

Washington, March 10, 1960.

Dear Arleigh: I was much interested in your personal letter of February 26, 1960² on Cuba and the Caribbean situation, in which I noted a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve this result.

As you are doubtless aware from the briefing which Dick Rubottom and I gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 8, 1960,³ most of the courses of action suggested in the memorandum headed “Recommendations for U.S. Actions in Cuba” which you transmitted with your letter were initiated some time ago and are constantly being intensified. To recapitulate, our own thinking on the Cuban situation as it relates to Communism and our own security interest has been as follows:

a. The maximum objective of International Communism—in the immediate future—is the consolidation of a radical, anti-American Revolution friendly to the USSR in Cuba and the utilization of Cuba as a base to promote similar revolutionary movements in the Caribbean. The minimum objective of the Communists, if they are unable to achieve the foregoing, is to make the United States pay as high price as possible for the elimination of the undesirable features of the Cuban Revolution. In particular, the Communists stand to gain by provoking us into armed intervention, or otherwise taking interventionist actions in violation of our commitments in a manner which could be made to appear as if the United States reacted the same way as the Soviets did in Hungary and other satellites.

b. Unless we were indefinitely to occupy Cuba militarily, the only solution to the Cuban problem is necessarily the emergence of a Cuban leadership willing to and capable of governing the country along lines acceptable to the Cuban people and along lines consistent with basic U.S. policy with respect to Latin America. This will take time. On the one hand, it is doubtful that any Cuban Government which resulted from U.S. armed or other overt intervention could long survive our withdrawal. On the other, despite our own long-standing misgivings concerning Castro, it is an inescapable fact that he came into power with overwhelming support not only in Cuba but elsewhere in the hemisphere, including in this country. Although that support has largely evaporated in the United States—and, to a lesser extent, in responsible circles in the other Latin American Republics—Castro and, particularly, his reform program still enjoy very considerable support in his country. Cubans, even those disillusioned with Castro, have yet to find an alternative leadership which they believe would actually carry out the reform measures which public opinion still demands. Opposition elements tainted with collaboration with the Batista regime are still politically unacceptable and could not establish a stable government. Opposition groups that might be acceptable to Cubans are beginning to organize more effectively but, at best, it will be months before they are ready for vigorous action.

c. The primary objective of U.S. policy should be the acceleration of the creation of an effective, patriotic movement friendly to the United States within Cuba and among Cuban exiles to counter Cuba’s current trend. The first task is to assure, insofar as we are able to do so, a climate in which responsible and friendly Cubans would find it worthwhile to oppose Castro policies which help the Communists and undermine good U.S.-Cuban relations. On the positive side, we should and are taking actions and making statements which would encourage such elements to organize more effectively and to expect our support and collaboration in their efforts to achieve political and economic progress for Cuba by taking a different road than the present Cuban regime’s. At the JCS briefing, we gave an indication of the covert activities underway towards this end, as well as an indication of the extensive unattributed effort which has been underway for over a year to identify and expose to public opinion throughout the hemisphere the Communist aspects of the Cuban problem. On the negative side, our policies are guided by the principle that opposition to Castro’s policies in Cuba will increase fairly rapidly if it is clear to Cubans that Castro himself is responsible for political and economic deterioration of the country. However, the consolidation of the opposition will be slowed down it Castro can succeed by wrapping the flag of patriotism and nationalism about himself in further convincing the Cuban people that the United States has aggressive designs on the Cuban nation as a whole and that the United States rather than Castro’s policies is responsible for Cuba’s difficulties. We must, therefore, exercise the greatest care that we do not unnecessarily transform the developing dissatisfaction of the Cuban people with Castro into a fight between the United States and Cuba, for no self-respecting Cuban could then afford to support us against his own country.

d. While we believe that inter-American action through the OAS and/or some economic action by the United States in defense of its rights may play an important role at the proper time, we must not let these possibilities cause us to lose sight of the critical fact that no solution will be possible until an alternative leadership is ready to move in. If the application of collective or unilateral pressures should bring the Castro Government down before an acceptable leadership is ready to take over, the probabilities are civil war or a take-over by even more Communistic elements. Either would bring us closer to armed intervention. Thus, while we are going ahead in the process of influencing the other American Republics to see the Communist and other aspects of the Cuban situation as we do and preparing the ground for possible Inter-American consideration of the Cuban problem, we intend to control the timing of any such meeting insofar as possible to coincide with the development 01 an alternative leadership, It is also the intention of the Administration to propose to the Congress that the President be given discretionary authority to alter sugar quotas in the national interest and we have developed and are putting into effect an action plan to obtain the release of the United States from certain other economic commitments which impair our ability to take action in the economic field when this could contribute to safeguarding our interest or to the creation of conditions favorable to a leadership opposed to Castro’s policies.

With respect to all these matters, a most important element is time. Time is needed for Cubans to realize that the deterioration of their political and economic life is due to Castro’s excesses, including his connections with International Communism. Time is needed for an alternative leadership to emerge and to organize effectively for action. Time is also needed further to awaken Latin American opinion to the dangers of the situation and for Latin American Governments to come around more to the point of view that the Cuban situation is a matter of common concern, not just a U.S-Castro quarrel. We are using all available facilities to make this time as short as possible, but our experience in other difficult situations in the Near East and Central America indicate that immediate results are not to be expected. Meantime, we are going to have, we believe, to exercise restraint from taking actions which, while reflecting our own great sense of concern and urgency, would actually retard the process of change which we all desire.

I should point out also that, while action in the OAS at the right time may be desirable as a means of encouraging an alternative Cuban leadership, we would probably have to contend with Soviets in the United Nations. It is almost certain that the Cubans will try to anticipate or counter any U.S. approach to the OAS by going directly to the United Nations. Furthermore, actual “enforcement action” by the OAS would probably be brought up before the United Nations under Article 53 of the UN Charter even if we argued that any action taken by the OAS constituted only “recommendations” to governments. This reinforces our view that action in the OAS—which can be taken under the Charter by convoking a meeting of Foreign Ministers, as well as under the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Resolution—should primarily be viewed as a means of strengthening Cuban opposition to Castro’s policies at the right moment rather than as a means of quarantining Cuba and waiting to see what happens. It would at present be somewhat difficult to bring a case against Cuba under the Caracas Resolution since the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate⁴ —which we have asked to be reviewed—does not find the Cuban Government to be Communist-dominated at present. If our own Estimate does not yet substantiate the case, it would be difficult in a short time to persuade less well informed governments that “the political institutions” of Cuba are under International Communist control or domination.

As you are aware, our basic national policy (NSC 5902/1)⁵ views armed intervention as a last resort to be approved by the President when all else fails. We would be most reluctant to make or concur in such recommendation to the President until there had been a reasonable chance for all other solutions to be tested.

Thank you again for sending me a copy of your memorandum. As you know, the NSC is keeping the Cuban problem under constant scrutiny, having discussed it in some detail at its January 14 meeting and again this morning.⁶ At the first of the meetings, the Secretary of State reviewed the policy toward Cuba which has been approved by the President, and the consensus of this morning’s meeting was that this policy is essentially correct. We anticipate that, at future meetings of the NSC, there will be further discussions concerning Cuba to determine whether there should be a modification of policy toward that country. In view of the fact that today’s NSC meeting indicated continued agreement on the validity of the policy discussed in January, it would appear unnecessary to develop new policy documentation at this time, especially as the proposals in your Navy memorandum closely parallel policies which are already underway. Should you, or your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs, desire a further briefing on our actions and operational plans to carry out the policy, I should be more than glad to arrange it.⁷

Sincerely,

Livingston T. Merchant⁸

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by Hill and cleared with Mallory and Gerard Smith.

² Document 466.

³ See Document 419.

⁴ SNIE 80/1–59, “The Situation in the Caribbean Through 1960,” December 29, 1959; text is scheduled for publication in volume V.

⁵ NSC 5902/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” February 16, 1959, is scheduled for publication ibid.

⁶ See Document 423 and supra.

⁷ 

This final paragraph had been substantially revised by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs at Merchant’s request. It had been initially drafted by Gerard Smith in a memorandum of March 8 to Rubottom as follows:

“If the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not satisfied with present policy, I suggest that the Secretary of State advise the Chairman of the JCS that he would be glad to review this policy and its present implementation with the Chairman of the JCS at a meeting with the President—in view of the fact that the policy has received Presidential approval and in view of the fact that the policy very recently was reviewed by the Secretary of State at the National Security Council (January 14, 1960).” (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961)

According to a memorandum of March 10 from Frank Mau (S/S–RO) to Gerald Lamberty (ARA), Merchant preferred that ARA draft a new concluding paragraph along the following lines:

“Thank you again for sending me a copy of your memorandum. I think that the NSC should keep the situation in Cuba continuously under scrutiny to ensure that our policies are appropriate. Your memorandum, which I understand has now been approved by the JCS, together with my comments on it should, I think, be useful in preparing for such discussions.” (ibid., Central Files, 737. 00/3–1060)

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

476. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, March 11, 1960, 11: 30 a.m.¹

Washington, March 11, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

I Cuban Situation—(JCS Initiative)—Briefing by Captain Cresap—J–3

Captain Cresap started his briefing by referring to the deteriorating situation in Cuba which may require the use of US armed forces and the steps which might have to be taken. He said there were about 10,000 US citizens (report from American Embassy Habana of February 29) who might have to be evacuated from that country. He said there were about 4,000 US Government employees and dependents in Cuba, 3,000 of whom were at Guantanamo and most of the remainder in Habana. There were 4,800 non-official resident Americans in Cuba, 3,500 of whom are in Habana, 700 in Oriente Province and 200 in Camaguey. In addition at any one time there are about 1,100 American tourists in the country. He pointed out that the overall responsibility for the evacuation of Americans rests with the Department of State and that normal practice is to use commercial aircraft and ships for the evacuation. In the event these facilities are not adequate or in the event armed assistance is necessary, the Department of State calls on the Department of Defense for assistance.

Insofar as Cuba is concerned, the Commander of the Caribbean Sea frontier has the responsibility for seaborne evacuation. This command is divided into two groups, the Eastern and Western. Their mission is to conduct evacuation of non-combatants, and, if necessary, to provide landing forces to protect those being evacuated. Although there are many ports in Cuba which might be used, this command anticipated large-scale evacuation only from the ports of Habana and Guantanamo. Air evacuation would be concentrated at two air fields having 7,000 plus foot runways, i.e., the airport at Guantanamo and the Jose Marti Airport in Habana.

The US base at Guantanamo was obtained by the United States under two agreements with Cuba in 1903 and 1934. Under these agreements the US leases the land for the base at $3,400 a year and the agreements can be modified only by mutual action, unless the United States unilaterally lets its base rights lapse. Guantanamo is the key link in our network of Caribbean bases, which include Panama, Roosevelt Roads and Trinidad. The basic mission of the base is to protect maritime routes in the Caribbean and the approaches to the Panama Canal. Our investment in the Guantanamo base is approximately $76 million. The most vulnerable aspect of the base is its water supply which comes from a pumping station on the Yatros River approximately four miles from the boundary of the base. Within the base there is storage for about five million gallons of water, an 8 to 10 days supply at reduced consumption. The Navy has two clean gasoline tankers which it can use for water. Each tanker has a capacity for 750,000 gallons of water. In an emergency additional tanker-type vessels could be furnished expeditiously with water being hauled from the United States itself in the first instance. Closer sources, such as Jamaica, could be developed very quickly.

The JCS has approved plans for action necessary for the support or re-establishment of a Cuban Government friendly to the United States and to protect US citizens where necessary. Under these plans it is anticipated that under one alternative forces would be used from the United States and other nations, and under another alternative US forces would be used unilaterally. The plans envisage, in one instance, that only Naval and Marine forces would be used with the Navy providing amphibious support and the Marines landing forces. Only a few hours would be necessary to implement this Navy–Marine plan. In another instance it is anticipated that all US services would provide forces with the Navy providing a task force, the Marines amphibious landing forces, and the Air Force and Army airborne forces. This plan also can go into effect within a few hours.

The plan provides for blockade if necessary. It was pointed out that this would be a very serious step because under international law a blockade is an act of belligerency. Under the blockade territorial limits would be drawn and publicity would be given these limits.

There is no point to blockading only Cuban ships in view of the limited number of these. CINCLANT would require 24 hours to implement any blockade.

The JCS are extremely concerned over the situation in Cuba. On March 1st the Chiefs submitted a plan to the Chief of Staff outlining the steps necessary to provide for a stable Government in Cuba along the following lines:

1. Document the communist timetable for the complete communization of Cuba;

2. Publicize the threat;

3. Give covert support to forces friendly to the US;

4. Provide forces to protect US nationals;

5. Consult with the OAS under the terms of the Declaration of Caracas under which Cuba would be governed under OAS auspices and if this were not possible support OAS action, such as intervention with an international police force.

At this point the briefing by Captain Cresap was concluded.

Admiral Burke said he disagreed with the briefing on one point, that in view of history over the last 30 years a blockade was not necessarily an act of belligerency. He said this theory was a pre-World War I rule which actions by the Communists and others in the intervening period had rendered invalid. He felt that blockade was a belligerent act only when the President declared it so to be. He said we could call a blockade something else, such as a “search for arms”.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that, while Admiral Burke’s observations were no doubt practical, he thought that if, for example, claims under our blockade were to be adjudicated in the ICJ, the judges in that international court would undoubtedly be guided by the international rule of a blockade being a belligerent act.

With regard to Guantanamo Mr. Merchant asked whether US forces there were sufficient to ensure the protection of the base. Admiral Burke replied that they were. Mr. Merchant asked if it were true that Guantanamo was situated in desolate country. Admiral Burke replied that it was and that the land was not arable. Mr. Merchant wondered whether this then would allow our intelligence sources to detect a Cuban military build up to attack the base before such an attack was made. Admiral Burke said that this was the case. Mr. Merchant wondered whether the vulnerability of the water source would affect the security of the base. Admiral Burke said we could haul enough water for the base’s needs.

Mr. Merchant then referred to a recent letter he had received from Admiral Burke² concerning Cuba and said he thought it was an accurate portrayal of our existing policy toward Cuba. Admiral Burke said he had just received Mr. Merchant’s reply³ to that letter, but had not had time to study it.

Admiral Burke thought that our efforts in the propaganda field toward Cuba should be increased significantly and he hoped more could be done in this field. He thought that overall our operation to combat the Cuban situation was going slowly.

Mr. Mallory agreed that operations in Cuba were going slowly. He then pointed out part of our problem was that the current valid National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)⁴ stated Cuba was not communist dominated. He said we had asked for an urgent reassessment of this Estimate which was promised for next week. He thought that if the Estimate concludes that Cuba is communist dominated we can then more realistically and effectively approach other countries on this basis and enlist more readily their support. He did not think, however, that this would prove to be the case as yet but pointed out that we should have almost weekly estimates of the situation.

Admiral Burke said that if the Cuban Government was not communist nevertheless it was still acting like a communist government. Mr. Merchant alluded to the Alsop column of today for evidence of how responsible American reporters were still not facing up to the realities of the situation.

Mr. Smith⁵ wondered at the low figures on our investment in Guantanamo ($76 million). Admiral Burke said that these figures were based on pre-inflation construction costs, that it would cost approximately $200 million to replace the existing facilities.

Admiral Burke referred to his meeting early this week with the Defense Minister of Ecuador who had pointed out that one of the basic problems in South America is that of orienting the common people to the difference between democracy and communism. The Ecuadorean official had also said something had to be done in Cuba and done quickly. Admiral Burke thought that we had not done as much as we could in describing the danger of Castro to the other South American countries.

Mr. Merchant referred to President Eisenhower’s recent trip to four South American countries and said that considerable progress had been made in exposing our views on Cuba in those countries. Mr. Merchant then said that we supply our embassies in South America with policy guidance on key issues and he wondered how our diplomatic instructions were tied in with policy guidance sent independently by Defense to the Service Attachés. Admiral Burke said that most Ambassadors kept in very close touch with the Service Attachés in this sense and that, of course, the country team concept was also applicable.

Mr. Achilles expressed the view that it would be more effective for us to concentrate with the peoples of South America on the concept of Castro as a dictator rather than Castro as a communist. Admiral Burke said it would not be easy to do this quickly. Mr. Achilles agreed but thought we ought to keep at it.

Mr. Merchant noted that the NSC was keeping the Cuban situation under constant review.

Admiral Burke repeated how disturbed he and the Chiefs were over the Cuban situation and asked that Mr. Merchant let them know what they could do about it.

General Decker, reverting to Mr. Achilles’ statement, agreed that it would take time to convince the ordinary people of South America that Castro is a dictator, that it was not easy to get universal acceptance of this fact although it should be obvious to the more educated elements.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, March 1960. Top Secret. Drafted by Edward T. Long, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Merchant. The cover sheet, which contains a list of 29 participants from the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council, indicates that the memorandum was not cleared with the Department of Defense.

² Document 466.

³ Supra.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 475.

⁵ Gerard Smith.

477. Editorial Note

On March 11, British Ambassador Harold Caccia met with Under Secretary Merchant at 6:30 p.m. According to Merchant’s memorandum of their conversation, Caccia gave him a letter from Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary Herter “on Cuba and the Middle East.” Merchant wrote that he made the following response to Caccia’s inquiry as to what was the U.S. Government’s basic policy toward Cuba:

“Having glanced at the letter, I replied that the Secretary would wish to give a considered answer but that in a word our policy with respect to Cuba remained one of exercising restraint. I added that this was increasingly difficult under mounting Congressional and public pressure for reprisal. One of the keys to the situation, I said, was the absence of emergence so far either within or outside Cuba of an alternative leadership which could serve as a rallying point for moderate Cuban opinion. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–1160)

The letter from Lloyd to Herter has not been found. A letter of March 11 from Caccia, however, bears the following handwritten marginal note by Merchant: “Handed me by the British Ambassador, 6 p.m. 3/11/60. LTM”. The opening paragraph briefly mentions Cuba, but Caccia’s letter deals primarily with the Middle East. The opening paragraph reads as follows:

“The Foreign Secretary asked me to have a word with the Secretary of State on his return from Latin America about two separate topics. One is Cuba, and we have already given a copy of our Joint Intelligence Committee paper to the Caribbean officer. We are waiting for your views on this paper, and I will make our further points orally.” (ibid.)

The Joint Intelligence Committee paper has not been further identified. No reply by Herter to any letter of March 11 from Lloyd has been found, but Merchant’s reply of March 18 to Caccia’s letter is ibid. No other reference, except for Merchant’s memorandum of conversation, has been found to any letter from Lloyd to Herter.

The possibility that Merchant had erred in identifying the letter is further suggested by the absence of any reference to a March 11 letter in a letter regarding Cuba that Lloyd sent to Herter on March 17.

In this letter, which was transmitted to Herter under cover of a brief note of the same day from Hood, Lloyd thanked Herter for his February 21 letter (Document 461) and observed that he did not see “much likelihood of spontaneous action” by other Latin American governments to reverse Cuba’s drift toward the Communist bloc nor did he foresee any “serious counter revolutionary effort” in the near future. Under the circumstances, the British Government’s refusal to permit the sale of the six helicopters would reduce its “moderating influence” on the Cuban Government. Not only would such a decision have a bad effect in Great Britain, but it would stimulate criticism elsewhere that the British action was dictated by the United States. Lloyd assured Herter that if it became obvious, before the helicopters were ready for delivery, that their arrival in Cuba would “seriously complicate the situation,” the British Government would not hesitate to revoke the license. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, March 1960) In a brief reply of March 22, Herter pointed out that the United States had just revoked an export permit previously issued for two helicopters ordered many months ago. The Secretary concluded: “As you say, presumably by the time your own are ready for delivery, the situation may have changed and we will have a chance to discuss the matter again.” (ibid.)

478. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 14, 1960—5 p.m.

2370. Argentine Ambassador Julio Amoedo informed me March 11 he was suggesting to some Latin American colleagues that they make point of mentioning to Foreign Minister Roa their concern at Cuba-US tension. I expressed interest and requested he keep me informed.

Last night Amoedo came to my house following long conversation he said he had just had with Roa and with presidential secretary Luis Buch. [2 sentences (7 lines) not declassified] (Amoedo said he pointed out to Roa recent conciliatory press statements by Herter.) Roa had accurately described to Argentine Ambassador meeting to which he summoned me on March 8 and had said that Castro had specifically directed that I be treated with courtesy and restraint since “American Chargé has done nothing personally to add fuel to flames”. Amoedo said he had urged Roa to send us GOC’s suggested agenda for discussions and believes we should show conciliatory spirit by accepting GOC assurances that no accusation intended against Ambassador Bonsal. Amoedo willing as before to help promote a friendly settlement and still sees himself in possible role of mediator. I told Argentine Ambassador that in my judgment Cuban agreement with Soviet Union and recent charge of US complicity in ship explosion had introduced new elements in situation and that I would have to consult Department as to whether we wished actively to seek a reconciliation. I said it my impression we were now considering our Cuban policy more in light of its effect rest of Latin America than Cuba itself. [2 sentences (5 lines) not declassified] Amoedo believes temporary rapprochement feasible, however, and that Latin America would want us not to leave any possibility for friendly settlement unexplored. For US to be “victim” of Cuba’s excesses and abuse was best way he thought to overcome Latin American predisposition to side with weak American republic against powerful US. Amoedo very definite that to modify our policy of patience and restraint now in favor of tough policy would be tactical error.

Department’s thinking on subjects herein discussed would be appreciated.² One advantage of conciliatory course even if very transitory would be that it would facilitate Bonsal’s return.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–1460. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Buenos Aires.

² No direct reply by the Department has been found, but telegram 1359, infra, constitutes a partial answer.

479. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba¹

Washington, March 15, 1960—9:05 p.m.

1359. In connection with possible return to Habana of Ambassador Bonsal consideration being given to issuance by Secretary or Department spokesman following statement: “Ambassador Bonsal was called to Washington for consultations some weeks ago. Charges had been made against the Ambassador by officials of the Cuban Government, and charges had been published in the newspaper Revolucion regarded as the official spokesman of the Cuban Government. The Cuban Government has now conveyed assurances to our Government to the effect that it has no charges against the Ambassador and has informed us that opinions expressed in the newspaper Revolucion are not to be considered as having an official character. In view of these assurances and of the importance which our Government, for its part, attaches to making every possible constructive contribution to the conduct of our relations with the Cuban Government, Ambassador Bonsal is being instructed to return to Habana at an early date.”

This statement appears to be along lines foreseen in exchange of Notes Verbales with Roa.² Department requests Embassy’s views on rush basis particularly as to reference to Revolucion.

Department would also appreciate in separate message Embassy’s views as to possible arrival statement to be made by Ambassador.³

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–1560. Secret, Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bonsal; cleared with Wieland, Stevenson, Kretzmann, and Calhoun; and approved by Rubottom who signed for Herter.

² See Document 455.

³ In telegram 2386 from Havana, March 16, the Embassy noted that the present was as good a time “as we are likely to get to announce Ambassador Bonsal’s early return.” Although the “Hate America” campaign had not abated, the Cuban Government’s official attitude toward the United States was “somewhat better than it has been. “ The Embassy approved the suggested statement by the Secretary of State and favored the retention of the reference to Revolucion. In telegram 2396 from Havana, March 16, the Embassy furnished the text of a suggested short arrival statement for Bonsal. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–1660.

480. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, March 16, 1960, 9:15 a.m.¹

Washington, March 16, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

5. Sugar Legislation

Mr. Rubottom recommended that with respect to Che Guevara’s charge of “enslavement” by the US, we develop a public line to keep the pressure on Guevara and keep the matter active in the Latin American press. He noted that the question of sugar legislation was being approached on our side as a purely economic matter and that we had to assure our own supplies. The Secretary said that we should raise the question of Guevara’s statement on a diplomatic level. He then described some of the difficulties anticipated in Congress with respect to consideration of the sugar bill as they had emerged at the Leadership meeting yesterday.² He said there had been a consensus that there should be early action on the legislation.

6. Cuba

There was a full discussion of where we go from here with respect to Cuba as a result of the Secretary’s request for opinions as to whether Ambassador Bonsal should return. There was a consensus in favor of having him return with the understanding that if there were further difficulties he would be finally withdrawn. Mr. Rubottom urged, and Mr. Dillon agreed, that in our Cuban policy we should carefully mix the sweet with the sour. Mr. Dillon noted that the revoking of licenses for sale of helicopters would be a decidedly sour note.

Later the Secretary asked Mr. Hanes if he had a list of steps which had been taken by the FAA and FBI with respect to control of airports in the Southeastern states. Mr. Hanes reported the various measures being taken by Quesada to tighten up control and to obtain full information regarding activities at airports in the area. He said that he would furnish the Secretary with a memorandum³ and the Secretary emphasized the importance of having evidence of action taken by us to prevent illegal flights.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, March 1960. Prepared by Calhoun. Secret. An attendance list is attached to the source text.

² A memorandum of discussion at this meeting, which took place at the White House on the morning of March 15, is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings.

³ Not found.

481. Paper Prepared by the 5412 Committee¹

Washington, March 16, 1960.

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2.

Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba, [3 sentences (10 lines) not declassified] (Tab A² )

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro’s basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. [2 sentences (4 lines) not declassified] (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and directions of the “exile” opposition. [3 sentences (7 lines) not declassified]

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

[Numbered paragraphs 3–5 (29 lines) not declassified] (Tab C³ )

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program [2 lines not declassified].

Tab B

PROPAGANDA⁴

1. [paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one “gray” U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. [21/2 lines not declassified]

[3 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. An undated, unsigned note attached to the source text reads: “This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the President at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960.” For a record of this meeting, see Document 486. Also published, in part, in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1537.

² Tab A was not declassified.

³ Tab C was not declassified.

⁴ Secret; Eyes Only.

482. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)¹

Washington, March 16, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuba

1.

Since the Council discussed the Cuban situation last Thursday,² the subject of the Guantanamo Naval Base has become an open point of friction between the U.S. and Cuba, and there seems to be little hope that, barring bold U.S. initiatives, the situation will not become increasingly and rapidly worse. Now that this new issue has been handed to an already aroused Cuban public, it is possible that U.S.-Cuban relations have been ushered into a crisis stage.

(The following two paragraphs are tailored to be used as a Council Briefing Note if so desired)

2. On the assumption that Fidel Castro and/or his associates retain power over the forthcoming period and continue to take drastic “reform” measures, I wonder if it is not accurate to assume that the situation in Cuba now calls for utilizing the lessons of Suez? One thing that has always impressed me is the rapidity of developments when nationalist passions are running high. Suez was nationalized in less than a minute without a single agency or department in Washington having predicted it. In the light of our knowledge of the Castro regime, I think we had best be prepared for any eventuality, especially (a) an announcement that the Cuban government has abrogated the treaty providing for our presence at Guantanamo, (b) an outright attack on the base and (c) attacks on American citizens. Even at the risk of seeming to be excessively alarmist, is it not possible that decisions of hemispheric importance may have to be made in the period between the March 17th and March 24th meetings?

3. If time is of the essence in this situation, there are several priority decisions that probably should be made today:

First: How shall the U.S. respond if the treaty providing for U.S. presence at Guantanamo is abrogated by the Castro regime?

(a) Shall we, as a preventive measure, offer to negotiate a new treaty now before the Cubans demand it?

(b) Shall we continue to wait and be forced to negotiate or fight after the Cubans have set the stage?

(c) Shall we begin preparations to evacuate the base now on the assumption that the situation will not become better; thus making Cuba a hazardous location for such an important facility?

(d) Shall we abide by OAS advice?

Second: How shall the U.S. respond if Cuban citizens attack Guantanamo?

(a) Shall we meet force with force? If so, how long are we prepared to hold out before world opinion? Are we willing to risk a majority vote against the U.S. in the UN General Assembly? Would we not possibly harm irreparably our relations with other Latin American countries, especially it the conflict became a protracted one?

(b) Shall we offer to negotiate when the attack comes on the condition that Cuban forces withdraw?

(c) Shall we take the issue before the OAS and abide by its decision as to what course the U.S. should follow?

Third: How shall the U.S. respond in the event of serious attacks against U.S. citizens?

(a) Shall we take a preventive measure now by recalling all U.S. citizens and imposing travel restrictions in the anticipation that acts of violence might occur?

(b) Shall we send in U.S. forces to protect them?

(c) Shall we threaten to send U.S. forces unless the Castro government guarantees their safety?

(d) Shall we request the assistance of OAS representatives in Cuba on behalf of U.S. citizens?

(e)

Shall we seek the advice of the OAS?

(End Briefing Note)

4. A proposal which might be worthy of a fourth decision falls into a separate category. It is unconventional and radical, but it might prove to be the means of altering—in one way or another—present U.S.-Cuban relations. It is that the President might consider sending a letter to Castro saying that he personally is concerned over the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations and believes, under the serious circumstances which clearly exist, the time has come to abandon traditional channels for an attempt to solve our differences on a higher level. Accordingly, the President would propose that Castro meet with the President’s personal emissary who, with Castro’s consent, would arrive in Cuba within ten days seriously to discuss U.S.-Cuban relations privately with Castro.

5. It is difficult to imagine that Castro would turn the President down. If he did, he would be even less popular with other Latin American states and we, for our part, would know more about the man and the problem we are dealing with. Such an approach at least would get us out of the present situation. It might open up a better era; it might also usher in a worse one. If the latter, we would be required to take—either with or without the OAS—drastic measures. In such a case, we would be in a stronger position for having made an honest attempt to seek accommodation with Castro before making an attempt to remove him from the scene or forcing him to reform.

6. There was a time, just following his successful take-over of the Cuban government, [less than 1 line not declassified] and there are many who believe there is much to be salvaged if the right tactics are used. Like so many other new nationalistic leaders—Nasser, Mboya, Nkrumah, Touré, etc.—Castro does not respond readily to conventional diplomacy. Being unconventional has become their political trademark. In this way they are much like the Russians who understand the new leaders perhaps better than most.

7. If the foregoing argument for sending an emissary sounds feasible, there are a number of things an emissary should attempt to clarify to Castro. A partial list follows:

(a) U.S.-Cuban attitudes toward the Guantanamo Base.

(b) U.S. expectations that Cuba will compensate for seized U.S. properties.

(c) U.S. belief that the Communist threat has been heightened by certain Castro policies.

(d) Status of U.S. Citizens.

(e) Cessation of anti-U.S. propaganda.

(f) Non-involvement of U.S. in clandestine activities against Cuba.

(g) Possible U.S. assistance for Cuba if Castro is reasonable on the above-mentioned issues.

8. A synopsis and analysis of the proposed sugar legislation is attached. The legislation was approved at the White House yesterday at a meeting of high-ranking government officials and legislative leaders.³ The legislation was given to Congress by the Department of Agriculture last night and the text of the bill and the attached synopsis were released by the Department of Agriculture today at noon. The new legislation contains only two provisions which basically alter the present arrangement. Please note 3–c and 4 of the attached synopsis.

Samuel E. Belk

Attachment

Washington, March 4, 1960.

Paper Prepared in the Department of Agriculture

SYNOPSIS OF PROPOSED BILL TO AMEND AND EXTEND THE SUGAR ACT OF 1948, AS AMENDED

The Bill proposed by the Administration would accomplish the following objectives:

1. It would extend the Act for a period of four years, i.e., from December 31, 1960 to December 31, 1964. A four-year extension would follow precedent and give farmers, the industry and sugar consumers a reasonable period for forward planning. (Sec.4)

2.

Marketing quotas would be increased by 50,000 tons for the mainland sugarcane area and 150,000 tons for the beet area.

This would be in compensation for domestic areas giving up their rights to Puerto Rican deficits.

During the past three years the mainland cane quota has on the average received 40,000 tons and the beet quota 130,000 tons through reallocations from Puerto Rico. By giving the two mainland areas fixed increases in their quotas in lieu of claims on future Puerto Rican deficits, mainland producers will be able to market consistently throughout the year and the eastern refiners can depend upon their supplies of raw sugar. (Sec. 1)

3.

Section 2 of the proposed Bill would amend the provisions for reallocating to other supplying areas the deficits resulting from failures of producing areas to fill their quotas.

(a) Deficits from Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands would be prorated 96 percent to Cuba and 4 percent to the full duty countries, to restore quotas to such countries on the same basis that they would lose quotas under Section 1. (par. 4)

(b) The deficit area provisions (Section 204 of the Act) would be rewritten for the purpose of the simplification and clarification and of providing a better balance of supplies. Deficits from Hawaii, which ships to the west coast and the Gulf would be prorated to the beet and mainland cane areas (par. 3); and deficits from the mainland cane area would be prorated to other domestic cane areas, (par. 2)

(c) Section 204(c) of the Act would be amended by providing that quotas for foreign countries other than the Republic of the Philippines would be reduced in accordance with determinations of deficits by the Secretary. At present the Secretary can determine deficits and make reallocations but he cannot cut quotas for the countries having deficits.

The proposed amendment would make the Act safe to use when foreign countries develop shortages during our heavy consuming season. Without this amendment, a foreign country against whose quota a deficit has been declared, might be able to dump surpluses on our markets late in the year when our import needs are light. (Sec. 2(b))

4. Section 3 would authorize the President, in the national interest or to secure adequate supplies, to reduce the quota for a calendar year for any foreign country other than the Republic of the Philippines and authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to cause or permit the importation of a corresponding quantity of sugar.

This would give the President standby authority to deal with emergencies that might develop during the period for which the Act will be extended. This section and section 2(b) would become effective upon enactment, whereas the other provisions become effective January 1, 1961.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation. Secret. Drafted by Belk.

² See Document 474.

³ See footnote 2, Document 480.

483. Memorandum of Discussion at the 437th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 17, 1960, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, March 17, 1960, 10 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles said that in Cuba there was continuing evidence of Communist activity in the operations of Castro and his government. Apparently the Cuban Government was planning a hemispheric peace conference in Havana in May or June in place of the abortive Hungry Nations Conference. Representatives of about seven Latin American countries plus a Soviet jurist and other Communists recently met in Havana to prepare for this peace conference, which is being called in implementation of a plan developed by Latin American Communists [21/2 lines not declassified]. The Communists in Latin America have been following the general directions laid down in the Moscow meeting. The Communist Party of Cuba held a plenary session in February and decreed a week of solidarity with other Latin American Communist Parties during March.

The Sino-Soviet Bloc continues its active support for Castro. Mr. Dulles then detailed a considerable number of examples of contacts between Cuba and various members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Propaganda against the U.S. by Cuba continues to be strong. The Guantanamo Naval Base workers recently accused the U.S. of various abuses on the base. A report from Panama indicates that U.S. munitions may be planted and “discovered” in Cuba soon. Castro is using his diplomatic posts abroad to distribute violent anti-U.S. propaganda. In Guatemala the Cuban Ambassador even advertises in the newspapers against the U.S. The President remarked that he had recently held meetings with Latin American Ambassadors and curiously enough the Cuban Ambassador had appeared on both occasions.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Gray recalled that the Council had discussed U.S. Policy on Cuba at its last meeting and had decided to keep developments in Cuba under review at each subsequent meeting in the immediate future. A series of recent developments gave some indication that Cuba might intend some action against the Guantanamo Base. Mr. Gray understood that the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had conferred regarding planning for protection of the Guantanamo Base.³ Admiral Burke believed that an attack on Guantanamo would not succeed, although considerable harassment of the base was of course possible. Our forces in Guantanamo were prepared for Cuban action. Our forces also have evacuation plans designed to remove U.S. citizens from Cuba in case of need, although it must of course be realized that if mob violence breaks out against Americans in Cuba, a great many of our citizens may be killed or injured before our forces can control the situation. We have plans for landing two airborne battle groups in Cuba in addition to a landing of marines in the Guantanamo area. Additional support forces would be landed as necessary. Admiral Burke believed that U.S. forces could move through Cuba at will without opposition. He also noted that the Navy was ready to blockade the island immediately if ordered to do so.

The President said we were constantly hearing stories of Communist penetration and domination in countries all around the world. He wondered how many Communists had been won over to Communism by bad living conditions and how many by the hope of power. We apparently did not have the secret of appealing to people in the same way. Except in Turkey and Pakistan, the climate in none of the underdeveloped countries appears to be completely antagonistic toward Communism. If we could discover the main inducement or enticement which causes persons to embrace Communism, we could perhaps operate more effectively. Secretary Herter felt that the two factors mentioned by the President were the main ones; that is, ambitious individuals became Communists because they were hungry for power and in addition the Communists had the ability to capitalize on the desire of the masses of people for better living conditions. Admiral Burke said that in addition there was always a large element in a population which was against everything and many people would follow any aggressive forceful ruthless leader. Mr. Dulles believed nationalism played a part in the growth of Communism. The President said nationalism was not compatible with Communism since the Communists would always bow to Moscow. He wondered how often ideas of Czechoslovakian nationalism could find expression now. Mr. McCone was inclined to agree with Admiral Burke’s remarks. He pointed out that during Hitler’s years of power there had been enclaves of Naziism in Latin America because some Latin Americans apparently admired Hitler as a ruthless leader.

Secretary Herter then described what had happened to a plantation owned by a friend of his in Cuba. The 5000 cattle on this plantation had been taken over immediately by Castro agents and were being gradually butchered and sold. The 25,000 acres of sugar cane would be taken over as soon as the crop was harvested. The sugar mill on the plantation was being run by a committee of five including the superintendent, a representative of the farmers, a representative of labor and two representatives of the Castro Government. Mr. Herter felt the whole middle and supervisory class in Cuba was disillusioned with Castro, but the tenant farmer continued enthusiastically to support him. After the sugar cane is cut, the fields must be fertilized and cleaned up, an operation which requires financing. The plantation owners have been told that they must finance the tenant farmers in this operation. The plantation owners, however, have virtually written off their plantations as lost. Mr. Herter felt that in this situation sugar production in Cuba would inevitably fall and that great injury would be done to the tenant farmer in the long run. The President said that injury would be done to the U.S. if the Administration could not get authority from Congress for altering the sugar quotas. Apparently Mr. Cooley did not agree with the proposals the President had made yesterday.⁴ Mr. Dulles felt that two years of operations by Castro would result in thoroughly gutting Cuba. Mr. Gray said he had only one other comment. Many things which we hope will not happen could happen suddenly in Cuba. Nasser for example had nationalized the Suez Canal in Egypt in one minute. Mr. Gray felt that some Cuban action against the Guantanamo Base might be taken very suddenly. The President asked how large the Guantanamo Base was. Admiral Burke showed the President a map of the base. Secretary Herter concluded the discussion by remarking that our treaty rights with respect to the base were as clear as a bell.

The National Security Council:⁵

Discussed the policy implications of recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba, with particular reference to the status of contingency planning for possible threats to the safety of U.S. citizens and to the Guantanamo Base.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs.

² One such meeting was a luncheon given by the President on March 9, (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments) The other meeting has not been identified.

³ See Document 476.

⁴ Apparently a reference to the President’s remarks at his press conference regarding changes in the Sugar Act. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, p. 2981.

⁵ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2195. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

484. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 17, 1960, 11 a.m.¹

Washington, March 17, 1960, 11 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter

General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter said it was the view of the State Department that Ambassador Bonsal should be sent back to Cuba. He believes that this is the last time Bonsal should return if the Cubans involve him in their charges and plots in the future. He showed the President a proposed message to our chargé in Cuba, including the text of a proposed press release.² The President said he agreed that we might as well get Bonsal back in Havana, to do whatever we can with a very unsatisfactory situation. Mr. Herter said that the South Americans are reacting very favorably to the restrained and correct actions being taken by the United States in this whole matter, and he thought Bonsal’s return would help this.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on March 18. The source text indicates that the conversation followed the NSC meeting. The time is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1982.

² Not found.

485. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, March 17, 1960.

SUBJECT

Status of Possible OAS Action on Cuba

In response to your request² for a status report on possible OAS action on Cuba, I would like to inform you that the Department, CIA, and USIA are engaged in an accelerated program to prepare Latin American public and governmental opinion to support the United States in possible OAS action under the Caracas anti-Communist Resolution and/or a number of other avenues open to us through the OAS. There is little prospect that the United States will be able to act with success through the OAS in the immediate future. One reason is that our own latest National Intelligence Estimate³ does not find Cuba to be under Communist control or domination, and we lack all of the hard evidence which would be required to convince skeptical Latin American Governments and the public opinion behind them.

Before OAS action is decided upon, we should assure (a) that a Cuban opposition leadership capable of taking advantage of the pressure the OAS would place on Castro is in a position to act, and (b) that our efforts to enlist Latin American support will not generate excessive pressures on us to undertake a significantly expanded and more dramatic economic assistance program for Latin America to counter Castro’s appeal. Moreover, it is probable, if not certain, that the Castro Government will attempt to forestall or counter any U.S.-stimulated action in the OAS by placing its case against the U.S. before the UN, and we would have to be prepared to deal with this contingency. There is enclosed a further statement on the status of possible OAS action on Cuba.⁴

Christian A. Herter⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/3–1760. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that Herter took the memorandum to the White House at 2:30 p.m. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1984, 942.

² Not further identified.

³ SNIE 80/1–59, “The Situation in the Caribbean Through 1960,” December 29, 1959; the text is scheduled for publication in volume V.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

486. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 17, 1960, 2:30 p.m.¹

Washington, March 17, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary Anderson, Secretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Richard Bissell, Colonel J.C. King, Gordon Gray, Major Eisenhower, General Goodpaster

After Mr. Herter gave a brief comment concerning use of the OAS in connection with the Cuban situation, Mr. Allen Dulles reported to the President an action plan² provided by the “5412” group for covert operations to effect a change in Cuba. The first step will be to form a moderate opposition group in exile. This will take about one month. Its slogan will be to “restore the revolution” which Castro has betrayed. A medium wave radio station to carry out gray or black broadcasts into Cuba will be established, probably on Swan Island (south of Cuba, belonging to the United States) in two months. Concurrently a network of disaffected elements will be established within Cuba.

To a question by the President Mr. Bissell indicated the opposition would probably be located in Puerto Rico. Mexico would be better if they could be brought to agree, which is not likely. Venezuela would be even better, but it is not probable that the government could permit this. Mr. Rubottom thought Costa Rica may be a possibility and this will be explored.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that preparations of a para-military force will begin outside of Cuba, the first stage being to get a cadre of leaders together for training. The formation of this force might take something like eight months.

The President said that he knows of no better plan for dealing with this situation. The great problem is leakage and breach of security. Everyone must be prepared to swear that he has not heard of it. He said we should limit American contacts with the groups involved to two or three people, getting Cubans to do most of what must be done. Mr. Allen Dulles said [11/2 lines not declassified]. The President indicated some question about this, and reiterated that there should be only two or three governmental people connected with this in any way. He understood that the effort will be to undermine Castro’s position and prestige. Mr. Bissell commented that the opposition group would undertake a money-raising campaign to obtain funds on their own—in the United States, Cuba and elsewhere.

Mr. Gray commented that events may occur rapidly in Cuba, and force our hand before these preparations are completed.

Secretary Anderson stated that Castro is in reality financing his operations out of the funds of the U.S. companies that are operating in Cuba. He suggested that the Administration might take steps to bring business leaders together with elements of our government to consider what course the businesses—which are now being milked of their assets—should take. He said he had received a report that Castro is trying to inflame Cuban opinion and create an incident against the Americans which would touch off attacks on Americans in Cuba which might result in the death of thousands. The President stated that once the operation Mr. Douglas [Dulles] had proposed gets started, there will be great danger to the Americans in Cuba. Mr. Rubottom said that the “warning phase” of our evacuation plan is already in effect, and that many Americans are leaving, with almost no new ones going in.

Mr. Anderson said he thought that if we were to cut the Cubans off from their fuel supply, the effect would be devastating on them within a month or six weeks. There is some question whether other countries would join in denying fuel oil—especially Venezuela. Mr. Anderson added that if Cuba is to seize the Nicaro plant or other U.S. Government property, we could not stand on the sidelines. In response to a question by the President, it was brought out that there is no treaty on this, and that Cuba of course has the right to confiscate the plant so long as compensation is given. Mr. Rubottom stated that if we wanted to cut their trade drastically we could denounce our two trade agreements with them. This would of course cut into the sales by our manufacturers to the Cubans. Mr. Nixon asked what we are doing with regard to cutting off new capital, pulling out private firms and cutting off tourism. Mr. Rubottom said that much of this is occurring of its own accord.

The President told Mr. Dulles he thought he should go ahead with the plan and the operations. He and the other agencies involved should take account of all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the actions that we would take in response to these. Mr. Irwin said the main Defense concern is how we would get our people out. We have contingency planning, but it would involve military action. The President said he would like some ground work laid with the OAS to let the Latin American countries know that if the Cubans were to start to attack our people in Cuba we would be obliged to take action.

Mr. Allen Dulles returned to the point made by Mr. Anderson—that American business in Cuba wants guidance. The President said we should be very careful about giving this. Essentially they will have to make their own decisions. Admiral Burke stated that many of the American firms want to pull out, but do not want to endanger their people who are there. Mr. Nixon said he thought we should encourage them to come out. Particularly if they think they should get out and are simply staying there to help the U.S. Government, we should disillusion them on that score immediately.

The President said that at the next meeting he would want to know what is the sequence of events by which we see the situation developing—specifically what actions are we to take. He said our hand should not show in anything that is done. In the meantime, State should be working on what we can do in and out of the OAS. Mr. Nixon asked Mr. Herter whether support was developing satisfactorily within OAS. Mr. Rubottom’s answer indicated that the situation is not clear. The President said that, as he saw it, Castro the Revolutionary had gained great prestige in Latin America. Castro the Politician running the government is now losing it rapidly. However, governments elsewhere cannot oppose him too strongly since they are shaky with respect to the potentials of action by the mobs within their own countries to whom Castro’s brand of demagoguery appeals. Essentially the job is to get the OAS to support us.

Mr. Gray asked whether OAS support will only be forthcoming if the Cubans actually attack Americans on the island. Mr. Rubottom thought that the OAS might be brought to act prior to such an attack on the basis of Castro being tied up with international communism. The President asked whether we have to base it on the word “communism” or whether we couldn’t base it on dictatorship, confiscation, threats to life, etc. Mr. Nixon said he thought the Caracas Resolution was based on the term “international communism.”

Mr. Bissell said he understood the sense of the meeting to be that work could start on forming the opposition Council and on other preparations. Mr. Herter said that the radio station is very important. The President asked that we try to obscure the location of the radio station.

G.
Brigadier General USA

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on March 18.

² Document 481.

487. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 18, 1960¹

Washington, March 18, 1960

SUBJECT

Cuba; Dominican Republic

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Senator George A. Smathers

R. R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary

The Senator, who had called by appointment made at his own request, began by recalling that he had served with the Secretary when they were together in the House and that they had many friends in common, and that he had a very high regard for the Secretary. The Senator said that he had known Mr. Rubottom for several years and they were close friends and that he had respect for him.

The Senator said that he had come primarily to express his concern about the situation developing in Cuba and the Department’s policy respecting that country. He had read in the paper that morning that the Department was considering the return of Ambassador Bonsal to his post in Habana, and he wanted to make clear his opinion that this would be a mistake. He had detected a pattern in our policy toward Cuba which made him wonder whether some of the junior officials in the Department were more tolerant than they should be of the Castro regime which, in his opinion, was completely anti-U.S. and certainly heavily communist infiltrated. If we were not alert to this problem, we would have a communist country only 94 miles from our shore.

The Senator said that he was equally concerned with the appearance of our exceptionally tough policy toward the Dominican Republic. He said that he had no brief for the Trujillo dictatorship but that it was clear that the Dominican Republic, as well as Trujillo personally, were clearly anti-communist and had always been friendly toward the United States; whereas we were not clamping down tightly on arms shipments to the Castro Government, we were preventing any shipments at all to Trujillo.

The Secretary interjected with surprise at this point since, he said, the policy of the Department was to prevent any arms shipments to either of those countries. When Mr. Rubottom inquired regarding any specific cases, the Senator said that he had seen some airplanes which were being readied for shipment to Cuba in a hangar at the Miami airport during a visit there around the middle of January. Mr. Rubottom said that he was unaware of any airplanes going to Cuba and asked for details. (Senator Smathers later said that he understood that these planes were still in the hangar in Miami.) The Senator said that he had been under rather severe criticism in his home State because of the statements he had made following his recent trip to the Dominican Republic in which he had reported the Generalissimo’s willingness to hold free elections in a year. He acknowledged that he might have been mistaken in making such a declaration, adding that he had visited the Generalissimo with former Ambassador William Pawley, who had encouraged him to do what he did.

The Senator said that he had visited most of the countries of South America on his recent trip and that he had discussed the Cuban problem with the Presidents and other officials in each country. They had inquired why the United States was so restrained in its dealings with the Castro Government, declared the Senator. He believed that the time had come for us to adopt a tough attitude toward Castro since this would gain us respect throughout the hemisphere and elsewhere in the world.

The Secretary pointed out that he, too, had discussed the Cuban problem during the recent trip of the President and that he had heard expressions of approval of our policy toward Cuba. The Secretary said that the return of Ambassador Bonsal was designed to have a senior, experienced official on the ground during these perilous times and that the move should not be interpreted any other way.

The Senator reiterated strongly his view that the Ambassador should not be returned to his post since it would be interpreted as “appeasement” of Castro. He said that he would attack this move on the floor of the Senate and he hoped that the Secretary and Mr. Rubottom would not take this as anything personal.

The Secretary made quite clear to the Senator that the Department and he, personally, were just as concerned about the orientation of the Castro Government as the Senator.

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 64 D 199, March 1960. Official Use Only. Drafted by Rubottom on March 28 and approved in S on March 30.

488. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, March 19, 1960, 12 p.m.¹

Washington, March 19, 1960, 12 p.m.

Mr. Allen Dulles called about sending Bonsal back to Cuba. The Secretary said he was very sorry about Mr. Dulles’ being upset but he thought everyone knew about it. Mr. Dulles said they didn’t know about it until they saw it in the papers. The Secretary said we had released it because of the trouble started in the Senate and mentioned Smathers’ role. Mr. Dulles said he realized it was not purely a policy decision and whatever the Secretary decided he would back him but he was worried about the effect of this action on what they were doing. It was a decision, the Secretary said, which the President had made the day before² and it was thought that this was as good a cover as we could have. The controlling factor, as he saw it, was the worry re the lives of American citizens. If Bonsal has to come out again, that will be it. The Secretary said he did not want to throw in any monkey wrenches. Mr. Dulles thought it should be made clear that if Castro continues with his present techniques through the radios which he controls and is going to stir up his people against the Americans, we would have to consider asking Bonsal to leave. He thought there should be some stated purpose. The Secretary said if Bonsal is snubbed and insulted, we would have to ask him to come out for good. This is the last effort at reasonableness. We were in the same frame of mind as CIA was. The Secretary mentioned the Brazilian Foreign Minister’s calling in his Chargé on Kubitschek’s line of their acting as intermediaries. He had gone to the top and the Secretary said he had gotten a memo on the conversation with the top.³ The Secretary said that Rubottom was at the Brazilian Embassy this morning. There were two conditions involved—(1) the Sugar Act and (2) the question of giving asylum. Mr. Dulles added the Secretary might want to wait a little and see how it works. They would study it. The Secretary said it did not represent any policy change. If anything, it might be easier from a clandestine point of view.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. Prepared by Asbjornson.

² See Document 484.

³ Not found.

489. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray), White House, Washington, March 21, 1960, 10:30 a.m.¹

Washington, March 21, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

4. I then said to the President that I was afraid that we had had some failure of coordination with respect to Cuba for which I would have to take a major share of the responsibility. I reminded him that he had at one point asked me to see that the State Department reported to him as to exactly what we were doing in the OAS with respect to Cuba.² I told him that it was understood with the State Department that this report would be given at the beginning of the Special Meeting with him on the afternoon of March 17,³ and he would recall that when I called upon Secretary Herter, Secretary Herter said he would deliver his report to the President, which he had in his pocket.

I then said that I had learned from Mr. Allen Dulles on the night of March 19 that he was quite upset that he had learned about Mr. Bonsal’s return to Cuba only from the newspapers. Mr. Dulles had not felt that he should have a voice in the policy of whether Mr. Bonsal should return but rather that he be fully informed in view of the fact that Mr. Bonsal’s return might have a serious impact upon matters which had been discussed with the President in that meeting.

The President said that he was not aware of any failure of coordination and that in any event we had not closed our embassy in Havana and the return of the Ambassador was perhaps not as consequential to Mr. Dulles’ purposes as the latter had thought. I said that I would not wish to make a big issue of the matter but repeated that I had been in error for not pressing Mr. Herter more fully from [for?] his point of view on the Cuba situation.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President. Top Secret.

² See Document 485.

³ See Document 486.

490. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 21, 1960—5 p.m.

2459. I made a preliminary call at noon today on Foreign Minister Roa. Roa’s attitude, while personally friendly, was uncompromising and unsatisfactory with respect to the following matters touched upon:

1. Referring to long friendly relationship between US and Cuba, I expressed regret GOC had now seen fit to take a position outside free world community in present tense international situation. Roa strongly objected to this statement, insisting that Cuba was freer than it had been and was a full and active participant in OAS and UN. By implication he rejected concept that community represented by US was free and communist bloc [was] slave.

2. I brought up cases of extralegal seizure of American properties and expressed dissatisfaction with GOC’s reply to our representations (Embassy notes 203, January 11 and 236, February 29 and Cuban note February 15: see Embassy despatches 1144, February 16 and 1218, February 29² ). He said he had passed all our memoranda on this subject to INRA, and that parties were free to pursue these cases through Cuban judicial channels if dissatisfied. He rejected charge that these seizures were extralegal. I insisted on getting answers through Foreign Office in specific cases raised by us. He was vague.

3. Roa said Cuba had grievances against US. He mentioned sugar legislation. He then stated there were some 500 cases of war criminals in US for whom extradition had been denied. I challenged him on this gross exaggeration and asked him for a list of such cases, since to my knowledge actual instances where GOC had introduced extradition actions in American courts did not number more than two or three.

Roa said GOC was prepared to resume negotiation of differences with us through normal diplomatic channels. No specific arrangements for doing so were discussed at this preliminary meeting. I am skeptical that talks will produce any satisfactory results but am firmly of opinion we must go through procedure.

Roa leaves Friday³ for four day stay in Venezuela on invitation Foreign Minister Arcaya.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/3–2160. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Caracas. Bonsal returned to Havana on March 20.

² Regarding Embassy Note No. 203, January 11, see Document 422. Regarding Embassy Note No. 236, February 29, which was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 1218, see Document 467. The Cuban Foreign Ministry’s Note of February 15 was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 1144 from Havana, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 837.16/2–1660)

³ March 25.

491. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 85–60 Washington, March 22, 1960.

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN CUBA

The Problem

To estimate present and probable future Communist control or influence over the leadership and policies of the Castro regime in Cuba.

The Estimate

[Here follows a summary of the trend of events in Cuba including expropriation, participation by Communists in the government, the growing strength of the Cuban Communist Party, and Cuban contacts with the Soviet bloc]

5. These developments obviously raise serious questions as to the degree to which Cuba may now be or may become subject to international Communist control. Certainly the local Communists have taken advantage of the opportunities afforded them to influence the course of government policy and to develop their own position within the armed forces, INRA, and other key elements of the Cuban political structure. Prolongation of the present situation will result in even greater Communist influence in Cuba and will further encourage Communists and other anti-US elements throughout Latin America.

6. However, Fidel Castro remains the dominant element in the regime and we believe that he is not disposed to accept actual direction from any foreign source. His susceptibility to Communist influence and suggestion and his willing adoption of Communist patterns of action spring from the parallelism of his revolutionary views with the current Communist line in Latin America, from his conviction that Communism offers no threat to his regime, and from his need for external support. He almost certainly has no intention of sharing his power or of abandoning his announced objective of developing a neutralist “third force” position for Cuba and other nations of Latin America in association with the Afro-Asian world. Moreover, his fanatic determination to direct the course of the revolution and the preponderant popular support he commands would make it difficult at this time for the Cuban Communists or their Bloc supporters to force Fidel Castro in a direction contrary to that of his choice. We consider it extremely unlikely that the PSP, which has little broad support among the Cuban people, could soon develop sufficient strength to make openly an effective bid for power on its own. Although development of pro-Communist strength in the armed forces and elsewhere may eventually give them such a capability, we believe that Fidel Castro’s appeal to the Cuban masses, rather than the coercive power of the armed forces, represents the present mainstay of the regime. In the event of Fidel Castro’s death, Raúl Castro and “Che” Guevara would assume the leadership of the regime. Under these two, the Communists would be given an even greater opportunity to perfect their organization and to influence the policy of the government. Raúl Castro and “Che” Guevara, however, would not command the popular support which Fidel Castro now inspires.

7. We believe that for some time Communist leaders will continue to concentrate on influencing the formulation and implementation of policy and on covert infiltration of the government—and that they will avoid any challenge to Fidel Castro’s authority or any claim to formal PSP participation in the government. Particularly in the light of Soviet experiences with Kassim and Nasser, the Soviet leaders are well aware of the need for caution in dealing with messianic nationalist leaders. They probably believe that the present state of affairs is weakening the US position and advancing their interests, not only in Cuba, but throughout Latin America. The Communists probably also believe that the US will lose in influence and prestige so long as Castro’s successful defiance of the US (including his acceptance of bloc assistance) continues, and that the US is faced with the dilemma of tolerating an increasingly Communist-oriented Cuba or of arousing widespread Latin American opposition by intervening. Above all, the Soviets probably wish to avoid a situation in which the US could secure broad Latin American support for action to curb Castro. While Castro’s regime has lost prestige in Latin America, particularly among government officials and the upper and middle classes, few popular leaders in the area are prepared to dismiss Castro as merely a pro-Communist demagogue. For many Latin Americans, especially the masses, Castro remains an important symbol as a destroyer of the old order and as a champion of social revolution and of anti-US and anticapitalist feeling.

8. We believe that Fidel Castro and his government are not now demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement. Moreover, we believe that they will not soon come under such demonstrable domination or control. We reach this conclusion in part because we feel that under present circumstances international Communism does not desire to see a situation arise in which it could be clearly demonstrated that the regime in Cuba was under its domination. Yet, we believe that the Cuban regime is in practice following the line set for Latin American Communist Parties at the time of the 21st Party Congress in Moscow in February 1959 and that it will continue to pursue policies advantageous to the Communists and to accept Communist assistance and advice in carrying them out. Cuba may give increasing appearances of becoming a Communist society. Although Castro may for tactical reasons seem at times to moderate his relations with the US, he appears intent on pressing ahead with his anti-US campaign, which might come to involve attempted expulsion of the US from its Guantánamo Base, abandonment of Cuba’s privileged position in the US sugar market, a complete diplomatic rupture, and danger to the lives of American citizens. The more he becomes embroiled with the US, the more he will look to the Bloc for support, including provision of military equipment, although both the Bloc and the Cubans would probably seek to avoid any accusation that Cuba was being made into a Soviet base. Should the Castro regime be threatened, the USSR would probably do what it could to support it. However, the USSR would not hesitate to write off the Castro regime before involving itself in a direct military confrontation with the US over Cuba, or, at least during the present state of Soviet policy, in a major diplomatic crisis with the US.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on March 22. According to a note on the cover sheet, participating in the preparation of the estimate were the Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurring in the estimate were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 1513.

492. Memorandum of Discussion at the 438th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 24, 1960¹

Washington, March 24, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles said that just before Ambassador Bonsal’s return to Cuba, Guevara had warned that Cuba faced an economic war with the U.S.² The President of Cuba had made the strongest attack to date on the U.S., including a statement that the U.S. was responsible for the ship explosion.³ Mr. Dulles then reported that the recent plane incident was a provocation by Castro, as indicated in a report from J. Edgar Hoover.⁴ This information could not be used publicly, however, because of its sources. Secretary Herter said that the U.S. Government, contrary to reports in the press, had no intention of apologizing for the recent plane incident. Mr. Dulles, continuing, said that Castro remained in control of Cuba, although the opposition was becoming more outspoken, especially on the Communist issue. Castro was continuing on his radical course. He had recently organized “people’s stores” in the rural areas and was beginning their organization in the Havana area, thus conforming to his dictum that he would take the countryside first and then the cities. An independent front of free transmitters, a radio channel, had been organized with many Communist announcers. Mr. Dulles noted that the intelligence community had recently prepared a new Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 85–60⁵ ). Mr. Dulles then read the following extract from the Estimate:

“We believe that Fidel Castro and his government are not now demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement. Moreover, we believe that they will not soon come under such demonstrable domination or control...⁶ yet we believe that the Cuban regime is in practice following the line set for Latin American Communist Parties at the time of the 21st Party Congress in Moscow in February 1959 and that it will continue to pursue policies advantageous to the Communists and to accept Communist assistance and advice in carrying them out.”

Mr. Dulles said he felt there was in Cuba a nearly native communism parallel to, but not accepting orders from, international Communism. Cuba, accordingly, did not fall directly within the scope of the Caracas Declaration, but approached a country having a native communist movement.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

5. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (NSC Action No. 2166–b–(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2177, 2191 and 2195)⁷

Mr. Gray said the subject of U.S policy toward Cuba was before the Council for discussion in accordance with NSC Action 2166. Secretary Herter said he had asked our Embassy in Cuba to ascertain whether Guevara’s recent statements regarding the sugar subsidy are official statements of the Cuban Government. He felt this question would have considerable bearing on consideration of the sugar subsidy in Congress, in view of the intemperate statements by Guevara. Admiral Burke wished to point out to the Council that he was not fomenting revolution in Cuba. The President asked whether Admiral Burke had been accused of fomenting revolution. Admiral Burke said he had been so accused. Secretary Herter concluded the discussion by remarking that contingency planning with respect to Cuba was excellent.

The National Security Council:⁸

Noted recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² Reference is to Guevara’s March 20 speech, reported in telegram 2463, March 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2160)

³ Reference is to Dorticos’ March 20 speech, reported in telegram 2448, March 21. (ibid., 611.37/3–2160)

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Supra.

⁶ Ellipsis in the source text.

⁷ Text of NSC 5902/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Latin America,” February 16, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume V. Regarding NSC Action No. 2166–b–(l), see footnote 3, Document 410; NSC Action No. 2177, see footnote 9, Document 423; NSC Action No. 2191, see footnote 4, Document 474; and NSC Action No. 2195, see footnote 5, Document 483.

⁸ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2201. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

493. Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting, White House, Washington, March 25, 1960, 9 a.m.¹

Washington, March 25, 1960, 9 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Cuba Overflights (CI 60–69)² —Mr. Quesada reported on the measures taken since the last Cabinet discussion of this subject when he was asked to coordinate Federal activities to prevent these overflights. He stated that an information clearing point had been established in Miami, under the Bureau of Immigration, and that arrangements had been made with all who lease light planes to report activities other than those with regular customers. In addition, light plane operators have been made thoroughly aware of the heavy penalties provided for violations of existing laws and regulations; also the Air Defense Identification Zone regulations are being sharply enforced.

There was brief discussion of the most recent incident and of the evidence suggesting that it may have been inspired by a well-known Castro supporter. Mr. Rogers hoped that in the light of such devious possibilities, State Department would not ever prematurely apologize for overflights. Mr. Herter assured him that State Department was being careful to await the establishment of pertinent facts.

It was noted also that the evidence in this latest incident is not yet sufficiently clear to determine what might best be done in the interests of the United States.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Series. Confidential. Prepared by Minnich.

² This Cabinet paper has not been further identified.

494. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, March 25, 1960—9 p.m.

2530. Under Secretary Marcelo Fernandez called me to Foreign Ministry this evening and handed me four notes which Roa had evidently prepared prior to his departure for Venezuela. They deal with following subjects:

1. Recent public declarations by Secretary Herter which “concern Cuban Government seriously since it has been judged in unfriendly manner and in terms far distant from reality in which our people are living today”. Note² quotes press reports of Secretary’s alleged statements³ regarding Communist sympathizers in GOC and that some actions of Cuban Government appear to follow Communist line. Reference is also made to statement by Secretary admitting that Castro uses “some dictatorial methods”. There is reference to general press campaign against Cuba. Statement is also made in connection with inter-American agreements on communism, that since no government and no international organization opposed use ferocious tyranny which did away with 20,000 Cuban lives no government nor any international organization has moral or juridical authority to interfere, violating Cuban sovereignty, in the political, economic, social and cultural direction which our people have given themselves.”

2. A note⁴ asking that Federico Figueras Larrazabal, General Secretary of the Guantanamo Naval Base Cuban workers union, be replaced in his job in order “to dissipate the intense uneasiness” resulting from Figueras firing. Note also refers to report that base has hired many former Batista soldiers who are engaged in counterrevolutionary activities. I told Fernandez that this was not a matter falling within the competence or authority of the Embassy. He asked me, however, to transmit his note as a request for “the good offices” of our government in a matter in which the Cuban Government recognizes the full and complete authority of the US Government, i.e., hiring and firing at the base.

3. A protest against the denial of licenses for export from the US to Cuba of two helicopters.⁵

4. A protest against the withdrawal of US Department of Agriculture inspectors who have supervised shipments of Cuban fruits and vegetables to the US.⁶

Although Fernandez was not clear, I believe that Foreign Office intends to publish these notes without delay or at least to publish fact that they have been delivered. I told Fernandez that in case of note about Secretary’s reported remarks we might well decide to return note unanswered. Fernandez later telephoned to say that while three other notes would be given to press this evening decision on whether to publish note on Secretary’s reported remarks would be deferred until tomorrow and that I would be advised.

Texts will be cabled tomorrow.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110. 11–HE/3–2560. Confidential; Priority.

² Text of this March 25 note was sent to the Department in telegram 2537 from Habana, March 26. (ibid., 110. 11–HE/3–2660)

³ The note cited Herter’s statements as reported in a UPI despatch of March 22 and an AP despatch of March 23.

⁴ Text of this March 25 note was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 1360 from Havana, March 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 737. 56311/3–2660)

⁵ For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1960, pp. 704–706.

⁶ For text, see ibid., p. 708.

495. Memorandum of Discussion at the 439th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 1, 1960¹

Washington, April 1, 1960.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles then reported on the situation in Cuba. He said Cuba was more and more becoming a base for Communist activities in Latin America. The Communist Party had recently held a meeting in Havana and had announced plans for conducting a great fight against “the common enemy”, that is, the U.S. The plight of Puerto Rico held in bondage to U.S. imperialism had been emphasized. Cuban groups were leaving for other Latin American countries to advertise the Castro Revolution. The Friends of Cuba Society, a Communist-front organization, had been identified in thirteen Latin American countries. Toledano, the Mexican Communist, was in Havana to prepare a constitution for a new hemisphere labor movement. The only remaining independent TV commentator in Cuba had just been forced to give up broadcasting and seek asylum in the Argentine Embassy. Efforts of the Cuban Government to stimulate anti-U.S. sentiment were continuing. The Castro brothers had recently said that Cuba would not be another Guatemala because volunteers were ready in many Latin American countries to defend Cuba’s second revolution against any attack by U.S. imperialism. Fidel Castro had rejected private investment as a means of solving Cuba’s problems. Nicaro would soon be forced to close down if the restrictions imposed upon it were not eased. Negotiations, however, were continuing. Defections of Castro officials in various parts of the hemisphere continued. There is a lack of a rallying point against Castro and also a lack of opposition leaders. Finally, Mr. Dulles said that in his view Castro’s aims were much broader than Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Gray noted that Raul Castro was reported in the press as saying that while Cuba did not like the Guantanamo Base, the government did not intend to move against it. Mr. Herter said against this statement we must offset the fact that Fidel Castro had said that Cuba did not acknowledge the obligations of the OAS because the revolutionary Government had not signed the treaty. We are making formal inquiries to determine whether this is the official position of the Cuban Government. Secretary Herter then noted that one of the candidates² for the Presidency of Brazil is in Cuba at present, apparently because he feels that a visit to Cuba is a political asset. This candidate has stated that if elected President of Brazil, he would institute a Castro-type reform in that country. Mr. Dulles remarked that no politician in Latin America dared openly to oppose Castro at the present time.

At this point the President returned to the meeting.

The National Security Council:³

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs.

² Janio Quadros.

³ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2206. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

496. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and Senator James O. Eastland, Washington, April 1, 1960¹

Washington, April 1, 1960.

Mr. Rubottom called the Senator to tell him that he had heard about something yesterday which prompts him to call because the Senator has been very cooperative and helpful and we want to be the same.

Mr. Rubottom said he heard that some newspaperman had gotten hold of a line, or at least he may be working on it—we don’t know if he has a story—to the effect that Senator Eastland’s committee or certain parts of the committee and the INS, General Swing’s outfit, are “pressuring” certain of these more recent defectors from Cuba to appear before the committee. The man who received this phone call came immediately to Mr. Rubottom to ask him if he had heard anything about it. Mr. Rubottom said he had not, and the man called back the newspaperman and told him we knew nothing about it.

Mr. Rubottom said he doesn’t like journalists developing that line of approach to this matter which is a very delicate one, and he just wanted to tell the Senator that as far as he is concerned he feels we still have the cooperation of his committee.

The Senator said he had not heard a thing about this and wondered what the point would be in such a story. Mr. Rubottom replied he would guess that this would then tend to discourage defectors—he would suppose—and they would be afraid to come up to the United States if they thought they would have to appear before committees.

The Senator said the person they have subpoenaed is the wife of one of the Americans in Cuba and it is the only one he knows about, and they have been going down there interviewing.

Mr. Rubottom said he had one of his colleagues call Joe Swing last night because he wants to do everything possible to avoid giving credence to this thing. General Swing said he did not know of anything either, as far as “pressuring” is concerned.

Turning again to the hearings, the Senator said he has never agreed he won’t hold them...² just while the trip was in progress. Mr. Rubottom said he understood that. The Senator continued that he totally disagrees with our Cuban policy but hasn’t tried to embarrass us. He thinks we should pull the sugar quota. Mr. Rubottom asked if he had told Cong. Cooley that since he wants to leave it that way for another full year. The Senator said “it is going to be” but frankly he agrees with everything Sen. Smathers has said. He said he thinks it is appeasement down there and a lot of others up here feel the same.

Mr. Rubottom said he wishes we could say a lot of things in public but frankly we can’t. It is a very tough situation we are going through. Mr. Rubottom said all he is trying to do is tell the Senator that we had heard a story might be printed. He said he has no misunderstanding about “how you and I expressed ourselves when we talked, but I don’t like the press trying to drive a wedge in between”.

The Senator asked Mr. Rubottom if he is opposed to their interviewing people who come over from Cuba and Mr. Rubottom replied, not in all cases. If there are some good speakers, e. g. right now a newspaperman and former labor leader are traveling around Latin America, who go around and make speeches against Castro, he thinks we should encourage them to do that kind of thing without milking them dry in the kind of forum the Senator’s committee presents. Further, if we can keep in touch with each other as we have been doing Mr. Rubottom said he believes we can be mutually helpful.

In closing, the Senator said he would have his secretary call Mr. Rubottom’s office and give us the names of the two or three people that have been subpoenaed by his committee.

Later in the morning the Senator called Mr. Rubottom back to tell him that the people his committee has subpoenaed are Americans, relatives of the two involved in the recent plane incident. Mr. Rubottom commented it might be that the reporter was on a “fishing expedition”.

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (April–June) 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Kruppenbacher. Copies were sent to H, SCA, CMA, and ARA/P.

² Ellipsis in the source text.

497. Memorandum From Richard G. Cushing of the Office of the Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn)¹

Washington, April 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

Reactions on visit to Habana²

A five-day visit to Habana leaves the informed visitor with the definite impression that Cuba has been transformed from a dictatorship of the right to a dictatorship of the left, complete with slow suffocation of human rights. These main points stand out:

1. There still is no organized opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba although the Catholic Church and other anti-Communist organizations and individuals (i.e., Luis Conte Aguero) have expressed, directly or indirectly, their displeasure over the Communist trend.

2. Anti-Castro Cubans and most Americans there want the United States to take a “harder line” toward the present GOC in order to show official displeasure with the course of events and indicate support for the more democratic elements in Cuba.

3. The Communists are making strong headway, encouraged by the official line that to be anti-Communist is to be anti-revolution (one man received a three-year prison term for writing an anti-Communist slogan on a wall), but at the same time anti-Communist elements are coming to the surface and are seeking encouragement of any kind from the U.S.

4. Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, widely considered a Marxist, is the real power in Cuba, although Fidel still is the mystic symbol, the front man to sway the masses.

5. The economy is deteriorating steadily but not at an alarming rate now that sugar revenues are coming in and dollar reserves are being conserved by severe import restrictions; new tax measures seen likely, and without doubt will be blamed on the U.S.

6. Numerous Cubans and Americans favor no cut of the sugar quota per se, but instead, abolition or reduction of the two-cent premium.

7. Cuba has become a police state, with anywhere between 4,000 and 8,000 political prisoners held in various jails, many without charge and in some cases under deplorable conditions, and with an informer system more highly developed than under Batista.

8. The end of any semblance of independent press, including radio and television, is imminent; the four remaining Cuban newspapers considered independent are expected to come under Government control in a matter of weeks at best, and the same fate is seen for the few remaining radio and television stations.

9. American businessmen are finding they cannot do business in Cuba and slowly are pulling out, in some cases (i.e., Esso Standard) quietly so as not to precipitate GOC intervention; one estimate, widely quoted, is that 3,000 Americans have left Cuba in the past six months, out of a total of around 8,000.

10. Anti-United States propaganda is not entirely effective but because of the force of repetition has been swallowed in whole or part by a dangerous number of Cubans, even those who should know better.

11. Any invasion of Cuba by whatever opposition group very likely would be blamed on the United States, and could be blown up by the GOC into a situation endangering American lives; the Cubans are volatile people susceptible to any such spark.

12. Government take-over is accomplished with finesse; it is done by degrees, and always with explanations accepted by a good number of the Cuban people as in the national interest.

13. Castro’s popular support has diminished; responsible informants, even some close to the Government, concede that he now has about 50 per cent of the Cuban people behind him as against 95 per cent or better when he took over.

14. Anti-Castro Cubans and a good number of Americans feel Ambassador Bonsal’s return without a real show of the GOC’s willingness to negotiate reflected U.S. weakness if not outright capitulation, and point to the four Cuban notes³ which greeted the Ambassador on his return as an indication of GOC hostility and propensity to needle the United States.

15. There are increasing shortages of certain luxury food items such as butter and imported canned goods but, from all indications, the poor still are eating fairly well because of ceiling prices on the basic popular food items such as meat, rice and beans. Shortages of import items such as spare machine parts, pharmaceutical supplies, and electrical appliances are beginning to plague the upper and middle classes.

16. Much good has been accomplished; for example, recreation areas for children and “the masses” have sprung up where military or police centers once stood and are extremely popular; clinics for the poor have been established; personal graft is at an all-time low, etc.

17. While Habana seems to lack the gay, carefree air of a year ago, the Cubans have not lost their sense of humor, and anti-revolutionary jokes abound. Miami is referred to as “West Berlin”. INRA spelled backwards is “A Russia Nos Iremos” (We’re heading toward Russia). A child asks his father how far it is from Habana to Miami; the reply: “Never mind, son—keep on swimming!”

18. Cubans opposing the regime hope for a strong, no-holds barred, information campaign on medium wave radio beamed into Cuba in Spanish. Station WKWF in Key West, although only one-half kilowatt in power, is heard clearly in the greater Habana area in the morning and at night. Several anti-Castro figures prominent in Cuban radio and television, including Amadeo Barletta, are interested in buying the station or taking air time in order to broadcast the type of program the U.S. Government could not engage in, but which, they feel, would have a profound impact on the Cuban people.

19. There is little confidence that VOA short wave broadcasting has any real impact or listenership.

20. The American business colony is extremely reluctant to support any kind of information program but hopes the Embassy can do something or encourage others along this line. The U.S. business community clearly does not want to irritate the GOC in any way.

21. Ambassador Bonsal is willing to accept, if the time seems right, an invitation to appear on “Ante la Prensa” or some other CMQ network show if he is allowed leeway in framing up his own replies; he knows that CMQ may be intervened at any time and realizes that time is running out on getting the American viewpoint across to the Cuban people in this most effective way.

22. USIS/Habana is finding the walls closing in insofar as informational programs are concerned in view of the steady takeover of newspapers, radio stations and television outlets; however, films, books, pamphlets and exhibits still are circulated with varying degrees of success and cultural programs are, if anything, more extensive than before. Some Embassy officers foresee the eventual closing down, by degree, of USIS informational programs but heightened cultural activity, particularly in the exchange of persons field.

23. The most productive target audiences for USIS at present seem to be students, labor, and church groups.

24. The more democratic Cuban teachers are alarmed over increasing Marxist materials being injected into the public and private school systems starting with the first grade.

25. Advertisements from an “American Friends of Cuba” group of prestige names, if constructively friendly in tone, would be accepted by most Cuban newspapers, even possibly by Revolución, since the official line has been that the Cuban people have no argument with the people of the U.S.

26. A University of Habana professor says the GOC plans next to convert the institution into a “People’s University” and transform the plush Riviera Hotel, now under Government control, into a huge dormitory. He adds the incredible rumor, heard from other sources, that Ché Guevara will replace the retiring Dr. Clemente Inclan as Rector.

27. The Communists in Cuba have been able to identify themselves completely with the revolution. Juan Marinello, a Cuban Communist leader, told Robert Berrellez of AP last month that PSP strength has reached 130,000. Communism is evidenced by trade pacts with the USSR, East Germany and Poland, the constant travel between Cuba and the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, the Communist flavor of the anti-U.S. propaganda, the use of Communist goon squads (with the Communist newspaper Hoy brazenly in their pockets), the replacement of anti-Communists in the labor movement, the displays of Communist literature on bookstands, punishment of those voicing anti-Communist thoughts (i.e., Urrutia, Matos), Communist-line textbooks for the school system, and in many other ways.

28. Anti-Castro Cubans still are firm in their rejection of anyone even remotely connected with the hated Batista and Trujillo.

29. The GOC, according to a reliable source connected for many years with Cuban radio and television, has obtained a Swiss 100 kilowatt radio transmitter equipped with a directional scoop antenna and a single control knob which enables the operator to switch from 2 megacycles to 30 megacycles in a matter of seconds; this equipment, ideal for jamming, also can be used to broadcast on any frequency desired. This same source said the GOC is planning the installation of a 10-kilowatt television transmitter at Barasoa, at the eastern tip of Cuba, with the idea of beaming television across the strait to Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

30. It would be unproductive at this time to criticize Fidel Castro, who still wears the halo of honesty and social progress. More vulnerable, however, are Ché Guevara (an Argentine) and Raul Castro, neither of whom has broad public support.

31. As the Cuban people lose their access to unbiased information, and USIS assets diminish, it appears evident that the full story must be delivered to the Cuban people in order to inspire the pro-democratic elements still existing and cause those bent on a pro-Castro course to doubt the wisdom of their own leaders. To do this, the use of Ambassador Bonsal on CMQ might well be one of the few high-impact projects available to us. Another could be clandestine leaflet and pamphlet activities, including the cartooning of Castro as Ché Guevara’s puppet, showing simply that an Argentine is running Cuba. Outside the island, medium-wave broadcasting by responsible and well-known Cubans (such as those ousted from CMQ or the Telemundo operations) as well as by the U.S. Government, with its necessarily softer but official approach, would seem highly useful. At the same time, because the GOC is sensitive to hemisphere attitudes, increased efforts might be made to build understanding and support in other countries of Latin America for the U.S. position vis-à-vis Cuba.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba January–June 1960. Confidential. Also addressed to John P. McKnight (USIA/IAL).

² The dates of Cushing’s visit have not been determined.

³ See Document 494.

498. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 5, 1960—4 p.m.

2661. Embassy telegram 2530.² On March 25 Cuban Foreign Office sent us four notes and published them, which subjects were: A) Secretary’s remarks about Communists in GOC; B) firing of labor leader at Guantanamo and hiring by base of former members of Batista armed forces; C) denial of licenses to export helicopters to Cuba; D) withdrawal of Department of Agriculture fruit and vegetable inspectors formerly stationed here. Recommendations and materials for replies are presumably in Department’s hands. I would hope that I could give replies to Roa in course this week. Suggested texts for replies to A), C) and D) have been submitted to Department (see Embassy telegrams 2553, 2610 and Embassy despatch 13 of April 3).³ Suggested reply to B) will be sent Department today.

In delivering notes I would express belief that treatment of these matters as “further US aggressions” in 26 of July press has been unhelpful to improvement in relations between our governments.

I recommend that I be authorized to tell Roa that we regret his having published these four notes in such a manner as to convey an impression of worsening relations between our two governments and while we believe that exchanges on the relatively minor matters dealt with in these notes should be conducted through normal diplomatic channels without publicity at least until such time as both governments have achieved a full understanding of each other’s position, fact Roa published Cuban notes leaves us no choice but to publish our replies, which we are doing simultaneously in Washington and Habana.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110. 11–HE/4–560. Confidential.

² Document 494.

³ None printed.

Inauguration by the U.S. Government of a policy to weaken the Cuban economy, April–July 1960

499. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, April 6, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–660. Secret. Drafted by Mallory.

500. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, April 6, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4–660. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Mallory. Copies were sent to Herfurt and Colonel J. C. King.

501. Memorandum of Discussion at the 440th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 7, 1960

Washington, April 7, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

502. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)

Washington, April 8, 1960.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba (January–June) 1960. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hill.

503. Editorial Note

504. Memorandum From Edward E. Rice of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)

Washington, April 13, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Rice. Also initialed by Smith.

505. Memorandum of Discussion at the 441st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 14, 1960

Washington, April 14, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting.

506. Editorial Note

507. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, April 23, 1960—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4–2360. Official Use Only; Priority.

508. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, April 23, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Signed by Herter and initialed by the President. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 252.

509. Editorial Note

510. Diary Entry by the President, April 25, 1960

April 25, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. The source text bears the following note: “Dictated by DDE.”

511. Memorandum of Discussion at the 442d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 28, 1960

Washington, April 28, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

512. Letter From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, April 29, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Chron. Confidential; Personal. Copies were sent to Hare, Allen Dulles, and Goodpaster.

513. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, April 1960.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Habana Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, Communism. Secret; Noforn/Continued Control. Document number not declassified. This 67-page paper was transmitted to certain diplomatic posts in the American Republics as an attachment to CA–10924, June 27, in which recipients were authorized to use the paper as background information in discussions with officials of the host government. Recipients were asked, however, not to refer to certain information cited in an unsigned memorandum, dated June 16, that was attached to the cover sheet. None of the information cited therein was in the Summary. The decision to circulate the paper was apparently taken at Herter’s direct suggestion. In a June 6 memorandum to INR, to which was attached a copy of the paper, Krebs noted that Herter thought “a good deal of the material contained therein might be used effectively in other Latin American countries.” Krebs asked INR to check with CIA to see whether the paper could be distributed, perhaps in sanitized form. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)

514. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, May 2, 1960

Washington, May 2, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, May 1960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom and approved on May 8 by Dillon. The place and time of the meeting are not indicated on the source text.

515. Memorandum of Discussion at the 443d Meeting of the National Security Council, High Point Relocation Site, May 5, 1960

May 5, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs.

516. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, May 5, 1960—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/5–560. Confidential; Priority.

517. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, May 11, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Sugar 1960. Secret. Drafted by Mallory and Hill and concurred in by L, E, H, and S/P.

518. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, May 13, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Central Files, Confidential File.

519. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)

Washington, May 18, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by Hill and Devine and initialed by Mallory for Rubottom.

520. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, May 23, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–2360. Confidential. Drafted by William G. Bowdler and George O. Gray.

521. Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 24, 1960

Washington, May 24, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on May 25.

522. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)

Washington, May 26, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/5–460. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rubottom.

523. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann), Washington, May 31, 1960

Washington, May 31, 1960

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (April–June) 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Dorothy W. Miller. Sent to CMA, CMA/C, and REA.

524. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)

Washington, June 1, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (April–June) 1960. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Hill.

525. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, June 2, 1960.

Source: Department of State, ARA Files: Lot 78 D 287. Secret. Drafted by Rubottom. The source text bears the following handwritten notation by Rubottom: “Not forwarded. Hold for record purposes. Points covered by direct consultation between Rubottom & Mann, Mann and Dillon, and Rubottom & Secy. Herter. (last on 6/3)”.

526. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Havana, June 6, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–660. Secret; Eyes Only.

527. Memorandum of a Conference, Department of State, Washington, June 7, 1960

Washington, June 7, 1960

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–760. Confidential. Drafted by Torrey and approved in U on June 16.

528. Memorandum of Discussion at the 447th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 8, 1960

Washington, June 8, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on June 15.

529. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, June 10, 1960

Washington, June 10, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared and initialed by Goodpaster on July 5. Other participants included Herter, Persons, Dillon, and Goodpaster.

530. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)

Washington, June 13, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–660. Secret; Eyes Only.

531. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, June 14, 1960.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and The Joint Staff participated in the preparation of the estimate. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on June 14. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction.

532. Notes on the Discussion at the Special Meeting of the National Security Council, White House, Washington, June 22, 1960, 2:30–3:15 p.m.

Washington, June 22, 1960, 2:30–3:15 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, NSC Special Meetings. Secret. The notes were made by Esterline and were included in his June 25 memorandum to Gordon Gray. The time and place of the meeting are taken from an unsigned, undated memorandum, which summarized the decisions reached at the meeting and included a slightly different list of participants. It also noted that Gordon Gray subsequently informed the President of “the nature of the discussion” at the meeting. (ibid., Records of the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs)

533. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 23, 1960

Washington, June 23, 1960

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–2360. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson and approved in U on July 9 and in S on July 15.

534. Editorial Note

535. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, June 27, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–2760. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom and initialed by Rubottom and Herter.

536. Memorandum of a Conference, Department of State, Washington, June 27, 1960

Washington, June 27, 1960

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stevenson and approved in S on July 26.

537. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, June 27, 1960, 10:22–11:14 a.m.

Washington, June 27, 1960, 10:22–11:14 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on July 5. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

538. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Havana, June 28, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–2860. Secret; Eyes Only.

539. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray), White House, Washington, June 29, 1960, 9:30 a.m.

Washington, June 29, 1960, 9:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Gray on July 6.

540. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, June 30, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. Transmitted to the President under cover of a June 30 memorandum from Herter, in which the Secretary noted that on June 27 “we discussed the question of Cuba in relation to the OAS” and he hoped the memorandum would clarify some of the questions the President raised at that time. Regarding that meeting, see Document 536.

541. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 30, 1960

Washington, June 30, 1960

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–3060. Secret. Drafted by Torrey and cleared in U on July 25.

542. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, July 5, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

Washington, July 5, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, July 1960. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A list of attendees is attached. Merchant presided at the meeting.

543. Memorandum for the Files by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, July 6, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (July–Sept.) 1960. Secret. Drafted by Rubottom. Attached to a July 6 memorandum from Rubottom to all Office Directors in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, in which he noted that he had “embellished my remarks to some extent in the interest of achieving greater impact and in order to give credit where it is due to a few other helpful governments in the Hemisphere.”

544. Memorandum of a Discussion, White House, Washington, July 6, 1960, 11 a.m.

Washington, July 6, 1960, 11 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. The source text is a memorandum for the Staff Secretary prepared by Paarlberg on July 7. Eleven pages of handwritten notes on the discussion, apparently in Paarlberg’s hand, are ibid.

545. Memorandum of Discussion at the 450th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 7, 1960

Washington, July 7, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Robert H. Johnson on July 11.

546. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, July 8, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

Pentagon, Washington, July 8, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, July 1960. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert Donhauser, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Merchant. A note on the source text indicates that it was not cleared with the Department of Defense. A cover sheet lists 25 participants in the meeting from the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.

547. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

Washington, July 8, 1960—7:32 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–860. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Joseph J. Sisco and Michael H. Newlin; cleared with Rubottom, Wilcox, and Jamison; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dillon.

548. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 9, 1960—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–960. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

499. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, April 6, 1960.

SUBJECT

The Decline and Fall of Castro

Salient considerations respecting the life of the present Government of Cuba are:

1. The majority of Cubans support Castro (the lowest estimate I have seen is 50 percent).

2. There is no effective political opposition.

3. Fidel Castro and other members of the Cuban Government espouse or condone communist influence.

4. Communist influence is pervading the Government and the body politic at an amazingly fast rate.

5. Militant opposition to Castro from without Cuba would only serve his and the communist cause.

6. The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship.

If the above are accepted or cannot be successfully countered, it follows that every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba. If such a policy is adopted, it should be the result of a positive decision which would call forth a line of action which, while as adroit and inconspicuous as possible, makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.

The principal item in our economic quiver would be flexible authority in the sugar legislation. This needs to be sought urgently. All other avenues should likewise be explored. But first, a decision is necessary as to the line of our conduct. Would you wish to have such a proposal prepared for the Secretary?²

LDM

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–660. Secret. Drafted by Mallory.

² Rubottom initialed the “yes” space provided on the source text.

500. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, April 6, 1960.

SUBJECT

U.S. Representation in Cuba in Event of Break in Diplomatic Relations

Preparations need to made against the unhappy possibility of breaking relations with Cuba. Such a break is not presently foreseen but any preparations must be thought out in advance to protect our interests. There are two possibilities:

1. That we can maintain no representation.

2. That the Ambassador and his staff will depart but that the consular representation may be maintained.

In the event of No. 1 above, investigation should be undertaken to determine what country might be best equipped to take over the representation of U.S. interests.

In the event of No. 2, we should proceed as for No. 1 and, additionally, we should so prepare our consulate staff as to make it most useful. In this respect, it would appear desirable as of now to review the abilities and numbers of officers assigned with a view to promptly making such changes as may be desirable. In this connection the senior consular staff has had extended assignment in Cuba and replacements must be considered in any event.

If you approve the above course of action, plans will be developed with PER and with other agencies.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4–660. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Mallory. Copies were sent to Herfurt and Colonel J. C. King.

² Rubottom checked the “approved” space provided on the source text.

501. Memorandum of Discussion at the 440th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 7, 1960¹

Washington, April 7, 1960.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

General Cabell reported that the Castro regime in Cuba continued to further communist objectives in Latin America. The Fourth National Congress of the Youth Section of the Communist Party in Cuba, meeting in Havana, had drawn delegates from Soviet Bloc as well as Latin American countries. A preparatory meeting for an ostensibly non-communist Latin American Youth Congress is scheduled for April. A Cuban mission is touring Latin America to publicize this Youth Congress. Other Latin American communist efforts centered in Cuba include a Latin American Peace Conference, a Latin American Conference “to create the apparatus to fight imperialism” and hemisphere labor meetings. General Cabell said the trend toward closer Cuban economic and trade contacts with the Soviet Bloc continued. Cuba recently concluded with Poland a trade agreement which was reported to provide for the shipment of helicopters from Poland to Cuba. This agreement had followed trade agreements with the Soviet Union and East Germany; Cuba also appeared to be negotiating with Hungary. The first shipment of Russian crude oil is now enroute to Cuba, which has announced a plan for the establishment of government gasoline stations selling gasoline made from Soviet oil. In this connection, General Cabell thought the Cuban Government may be planning to take over the Texaco refinery in Cuba. Seventy Cubans would leave this month for a tour of the USSR and seventy Russians would tour Cuba. Some of the top Cuban communists were going to Moscow to explore Soviet willingness to make military commitments to Cuba. Internally, Castro was tightening his political controls. He had accelerated his plans for dominating the universities. The government-dominated leaders of student organizations had established special courts for the trial of students accused of counter-revolutionary activity. Two thousand students from rural areas had been selected by Castro to attend the University of Havana and help control the student bodies. Anti-American tirades in Cuba, including personal vilification of President Eisenhower, continued. As against these developments General Cabell wished to report on two somewhat more favorable aspects of the situation. There was an increasing possibility that the Conference of Underdeveloped Nations would not be held at all or would turn out to be a much less significant conference than Cuba had anticipated. Replies to the Cuban invitation for this conference had been much less enthusiastic than the Cubans had expected, a development which was due in part to the U.S. attitude. For example, Venezuela, Cuba’s closest friend, had recommended postponement of the conference. A second favorable development concerned the campaign to expose Castro in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, a correspondent [1 line not declassified] had written a series of articles emphasizing Castro’s trend toward communism. These articles had been prominently displayed in the Brazilian press and had apparently had a great deal of impact on the Brazilian leaders.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dillon said the information related by General Cabell on the Cuban-Polish trade agreement apparently came from Cuban sources. We had talked to the Poles about this agreement and had been informed by them that no helicopters or military equipment of any kind would be sent to Cuba. The Poles had insisted that the only aircraft involved in the trade agreement were small Piper Cub-type planes for crop dusting. Mr. Dillon noted that in the Shergalis case, the Department of Justice intended to convene a grand jury in Miami. We have affidavits from Shergales and from his common-law wife stating that he was a Castro agent. Apparently Shergalis, under pressure from the Castro Government is now about to retract this testimony. Mr. Dillon said we had queried our Havana Embassy as to the number of Americans now in Cuba and had been told that only 6000 U.S. citizens remained on the island, a decrease of 3000 since the last estimate was made.

The President asked whether President Lleras directly or indirectly referred to Cuba in his speech yesterday.² Mr. Dillon said he had found no reference to Cuba in the press reports of the speech. The President said Lleras was very much on our side and had given the impression that he hoped the OAS would take Castro and the Cuban situation more seriously in the future. Before Lleras left Colombia he asked other Latin American leaders a number of questions about Castro. The President added that if we could get Latin America on our side, we could do whatever we wished with respect to the situations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Mr. Dillon believed that any anti-Castro statement or action by Lleras would be more effective if it were taken after his return to Colombia. If he took action when he was in the U.S., it might be interpreted to be a result of U.S. pressure. The President agreed and pointed out that Lleras took some action before coming to the U.S. The Vice President said that Lleras’ speech had been couched in general terms with a great deal of emphasis on the concept of freedom. His speech could be aimed at any country violating the precepts which it contained and there had been no specific mention of the situation in Cuba.

Mr. Gray reported that in conversations with State Department officials, he had noted an intense concern with respect to the sugar legislation pending in Congress. Mr. Gray wondered, in view of the importance of sugar legislation to our general security position in Cuba, if everything was being done that could be done to secure passage of the legislation. The President said he understood the legislation was in the Agricultural Committee of The House. Mr. Dillon said Representative Cooley was adamant on this question. The Congressional leadership appeared to prefer a one-year extension of the Sugar Act which would incorporate the flexible provisions desired by the Administration. The provision for flexibility might be written into the measure when it reached the Senate. Mr. Dillon believed that a one-year rather than a four-year extension would be passed by Congress. The President wondered how it would be possible to make economic arrangements on a one-year basis. Mr. Dillon agreed that operating on a one-year basis was virtually impossible, but said that Representative Cooley had special reasons for wanting only a one-year extension. These reasons were connected with his desire for passage of a broad agricultural act next year. Mr. Gray wondered whether the sugar legislation should not be discussed on a bi-partisan basis with the Congressional Leaders at an appropriate time. Mr. Dillon said the difficulty was that Cooley’s position was supported by both parties because sugar legislation was such an emotional issue that the leadership feared that a debate on the floor on a plan for a four-year extension could not be kept within proper bounds.

The National Security Council:³

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² Not further identified. Colombian President Lleras Camargo issued a statement on April 8 at the conclusion of a visit to Washington; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 111–112.

³ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2211. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

502. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Washington, April 8, 1960.

Dear Phil: Thank you for calling to my attention the impression in certain Cuban circles that the “U.S. is supporting Batista [Pedraza]. “²

I hope that the fact that Pedraza abandoned his own efforts here to organize an anti-Castro movement (FYI only, with a little indirect prodding) and got out of the country may help somewhat in this regard and that the news that we have cancelled his visa will also be beneficial. I am not too hopeful, however, that we can rise entirely above these suspicions until a more appealing and respectable opposition to the trend of Cuban policy manifests itself effectively. When that time comes, we might expect that at least the more reasonable and benevolent Cubans—if they must conjecture about U.S. support to anybody—might be disposed to think we would prefer the better leadership. Meantime, we can expect to be victims of all of the hostile elements who so assiduously try to build up the impression that we are behind such elements as Pedraza, as well as victims of Pedraza and his like who themselves are known tendentiously to claim U.S. backing in order to rally support among exile elements.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that perhaps our most important responsibility now is to identify and use the whole range of our policies to develop an effective Cuban leadership which realistically has the potential to reverse sharply at an early date those elements of Cuban policy which are bringing us daily closer to a showdown not only in Cuban-U.S. relations but in our whole relationship with the hemisphere. We are persuaded that there is no reasonable hope that this sharp turn can be brought about by negotiations and accommodations and that, in the long run, the only way that adventurers can be prevented from establishing leadership over anti-Castro forces is for a better leadership to emerge. I think you can rest assured that all who work with us share, along with you, an appreciation of the type of leadership we should not support if it can be helped and would welcome positive indications of where more desirable leadership might be found and what we should do to assure that it comes forward as rapidly as possible.

Sincerely yours,

R. R. Rubottom, Jr.³

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba (January–June) 1960. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hill.

² 

In a letter of April 1 to Rubottom, Bonsal wrote:

“There is an impression prevalent in certain Cuban circles that ‘the United States is supporting Pedraza in his plans to invade Cuba.’ I do not know what if anything can be done about this. Support by us of Pedraza or of any military adventurer would be, in my judgment, a disastrous mistake on our part.” (ibid.)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

503. Editorial Note

In late March and early April, Lloyd A. Free, a former official with the United States Information Agency, visited Cuba with the primary purpose of arranging a survey of Cuban public opinion. The impressions which he gained from his trip were set forth in a paper entitled “The Cuban Situation”, dated April 13. Free’s conclusions included the following:

“1. The Cuban situation has become a good deal more grim in recent weeks. It is rapidly worsening. No tendency toward moderation is evident; in fact, quite the reverse. The country is rapidly being taken to a point of no return.

“2. A marked trend toward a monolithic state is obvious, not only in terms of governmental ‘interventions’ in general (i.e., nationalization), but particularly in the creation of a government monopoly over the media of mass communications. The expression of dissenting opinions is rapidly becoming impossible. (I witnessed the mob action that prevented Conte Aguerro from broadcasting.)

“3. The moderate elements in the government have been almost entirely squeezed out, including of course some of Fidel Castro’s most fervent original supporters.

“4. The Communists are unquestionably wielding increasing power; in fact, they are acquiring something of a monopoly of influence. As is well known, it has become lèse majesté to criticize them—or even to raise the question of Communist infiltration and influence.

“5. The middle and upper classes are clearly being systematically destroyed. The majority of these elements, including most of Castro’s original supporters in the middle and upper groups, appear by now to be jittery, demoralized and disillusioned. Some of them are still hoping against hope. Most of them have not yet reached the stage of open resistance to the Castro regime. However, it is my tentative impression that they are rapidly reaching a potential turning point, where with proper leadership they could be mobilized against Castro.

“6. Most Cubans remain personally friendly toward individual Americans. However, as a result of Castro’s psychotic anti-American campaign, they are becoming afraid to show evidences of pro-American feelings. Many of them, particularly in the upper groups, have even become apprehensive in recent weeks about being seen in the company of an American.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)

A handwritten note on the source text reads, “I think William Pawley brought to President 4/25.” Regarding the President’s conversation with Pawley on April 25, see Document 510. Free’s memorandum is also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 773.

504. Memorandum From Edward E. Rice of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)¹

Washington, April 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuba and the Dominican Republic

I hope and assume we are readying, for possible use, means for overthrowing the Castro regime; one should always have two strings to one’s bow. The same applies to Trujillo’s regime.

I want to suggest, should it appear in the national interest to set off such operations, that consideration be given to timing them in a way which gives recognition to their interrelationship. The political damage resulting from a US involvement in Cuba could be minimized by our first or simultaneously helping overthrow a hated dictator.

I am inclined to the view that overthrow of the Trujillo regime, accompanied by assumptions or evidence of US involvement, might have some helpfully sobering influence on the Castro regime, though I am not convinced such would surely be the case. Moving in on both regimes simultaneously would be useful in preventing Castro from trying to participate in or take advantage of Trujillo’s overthrow.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Rice. Also initialed by Smith.

505. Memorandum of Discussion at the 441st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 14, 1960¹

Washington, April 14, 1960.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Turning to Cuba Mr. Dulles reported that a Senor Betancourt (no relation to Venezuela’s Betancourt) had recently defected in Cuba and had told U.S. officials that he sees three possible outcomes of the Cuban situation: (1) the assassination of Castro, which would make him a martyr, (2) Castro’s suicide, which is a possibility in the event of failure and (3) a continuation of the present trend, resulting ultimately in a socialist dictatorship and a Batista-type terror in Cuba. Senor Betancourt had said that Castro was a warped personality and he had accordingly suggested that the U.S. appoint a committee of three to deal with him—a committee consisting of a psychologist, a diplomat and an actor of the Orson Welles type.

A recent invitation by Cuba to Honduran students and legislators to attend the Conference of Underdeveloped Nations indicates that Cuba is abandoning the concept of making this conference an official governmental one. Cuba appears to be preparing to establish diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia. Pavlicek, a career diplomat in Latin American affairs who as Minister to Mexico had arranged for the shipment of Czech arms to the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954, would probably be the Czech Ambassador to Cuba. The Cuban communists were increasing their efforts to control the Cuban Labor Federation. The President’s letter to the Chilean students² had received wide notice in Cuba and elicited a favorable reaction among many people who are becoming disillusioned with Castro.

Mr. Dillon thought the President’s letter to the Chilean students was very effective throughout Latin America, especially in Chile. We had recently called the attention of Argentina, Chile and Colombia to the fact that a Cuban radio station had been calling the presidents of these countries “lackeys and slaves of U.S.” On Tuesday³ we are planning to send a ship to the Nicaro facility in Cuba to load nickel. This will be a test case because the 90 day moratorium on application of the Cuban export tax to Nicaro expired on April 1. It will be interesting to see whether Cuba will apply the tax and compel Nicaro to shut down. Mr. Dillon said it was his impression that the Cuban censorship was becoming more and more effective, so that it was increasingly difficult to get the truth to the Cuban people. He asked whether Mr. Allen would like to comment on this point.

Mr. Allen said USIA had been discussing means of presenting factual information to the Cuban people. His agency had been under some pressure from U.S. newspapers and Members of Congress on this point. The Senate had recently passed a resolution allocating $100,000 to be used by USIA to buy time on Florida radio stations for programs aimed at Cuba.⁴ However, a conference committee had refused the allocation of additional money, suggesting that funds already appropriated be used for the purpose. Studies in USIA had developed two possibilities for getting the factual information to the Cuban people. One project would be a 500 kilowatt mobile standard-wave radio station in Florida transmitting programs beamed to Cuba. It would take at least nine months and possibly up to twenty months to put this project into operation. A second project was the proposal to fly an aircraft over Key West for the purpose of beaming television programs into Cuba, probably on Channel 8. This project could be put into operation in about eight weeks if the Navy would provide USIA with a Super-Constellation aircraft now being used on weather patrol duties. However, this project was fraught with certain difficulties. The Federal Communications Commission, although it would of course cooperate if directed to do so by the NSC or the President, was strongly opposed to the operation because it feared that the result would be a radio war in the Western Hemisphere. In any case, FCC would like to be heard before being directed by the NSC to proceed. Mr. Allen pointed out that if Mexico or Canada beamed programs to one of our cities from an aircraft, we would be furious. A similar reaction might be expected from Castro. Moreover, if it became known that we were broadcasting on a particular channel, Castro could shift his television stations to this channel and jam our programs. In fact jamming is so easy that Castro might retaliate by jamming other U.S. stations. So much for the technical difficulties of this problem. There were other difficulties also. Beaming television programs to Cuba from an aircraft would give Castro a platform from which to denounce the U.S. for television aggression. He could pose as a martyr, saying he was a victim of the powerful U.S. and ask other Latin American countries to rally to his defense. In the light of all these difficulties, USIA was searching for alternate means of getting factual information to the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts to Cuba have been augmented. The difficulty with short-wave broadcasts is that there are only about 150,000 short-wave sets in Cuba, most of which were imported by Castro during his days as a guerrilla. It might be possible for USIA to buy time on local stations in Florida for broadcasting Cuban programs. The most useful station for this purpose is one owned by Mr. Storer, who is most cooperative and whose station has broadcast to Cuba on an experimental basis. Most radio stations do not wish to rent two or three hours of good listening time to the USIA for Spanish-language programs because they are fearful of losing their regular listeners. Mr. Allen concluded by saying he would welcome guidance on the USIA problem.

Mr. Dillon was inclined to think that any contrived solution such as broadcasting television programs from an aircraft would be less than productive in our relations with Latin American countries unless the operation produced a very definite dividend. Mr. Allen said it had been suggested that we broadcast Big League baseball games to Cuba since the Cubans appeared to be baseball fans. Mr. Dillon doubted that broadcasting baseball games to Cuba would advance our policy very far. Mr. Allen said of course we would mention other news in the pause between innings of the baseball game. On balance, Mr. Allen agreed that while baseball broadcasting to Cuba had some attractions, it was not sufficiently dignified for a U.S. program. The Vice President agreed that broadcasting from an airplane would be counter-productive; it would not produce enough benefits to compensate for its disadvantages. The Vice President had no objection to taking action which would be bitterly protested by Castro provided such section would really damage the Castro regime but he saw no point in taking action which would merely irritate Castro without producing tangible benefits for the U.S. No doubt Castro would charge the U.S. with aggression if a U.S. broadcast prevented Cubans from listening to his speeches. Overt action of this kind should not be undertaken by the U.S. unless we are sure that it will result in great benefits to us. The Vice President wondered about the possibility of buying time on Miami stations. Mr. Allen said most of these stations were low-powered stations although there was a Spanish-language station in Miami. The Vice President thought the power of the low-powered stations might be increased. Mr. Allen felt we should expand our short-wave broadcasts, investigate the possibility of buying more time on local stations, etc. He also pointed out that the International Telecommunications Conventions contained the principle that nations wishing to broadcast internationally should do so by short-wave and that standard wave or television broadcasts should use only enough power to cover the territory of the broadcasting state. The Conventions also contain the principle that nations should not broadcast on standard wave or television from the high seas.

Secretary Anderson wondered whether it would not be more useful to expend available funds for the purpose of introducing more short-wave sets into Cuba rather than to buy time on local radio stations. Mr. Allen felt the introduction of more short-wave radio sets would be feasible. Mr. Dulles said distribution of these sets might present a problem but he would look into the matter. The Vice President said he understood the number of people in Cuba disenchanted with Castro was constantly increasing. He wondered whether twenty per cent of the population was disillusioned with Castro by now. Mr. Dulles said disillusionment with Castro had occurred principally among the educated classes of the population; there was not much evidence of any change in the feeling of other classes for Castro. A change in the sentiment of the lower classes would only occur over a long period of time, probably as a result of economic difficulties. Mr. Dulles reported that some Cuban intellectuals would soon be broadcasting to Cuba from Boston at night. It was hoped that a second radio station over which Cuban refugees might broadcast would be installed in five or six weeks. Mr. Dulles then read from a report of the Secretary General of the Popular Socialist (Communist) Party in Cuba. This report indicated that the Communist Party recognizes that Castro, as the leader of the revolution, can do more to promote communist aims in Cuba than anyone else. The report indicates that the communists are keeping in the background in order not to make difficulties for Castro in his international relations. The report declares that the major aims of communism are being accomplished in Cuba. It declares that Castro knows that he has the strong support of the communists, that he has said that anti-communists are imperialist agents, that he has given the communists credit for creating during the last thirty years the anti-imperialist sentiment which made the revolution possible and that he has admitted that the revolution could not have succeeded without communism. The report declares that Castro and the leaders of his government consult the communists regularly, that communists are in key positions in the army and in the government, and that a communist-controlled Cuban government could not make as much progress towards the aims of communism as the present government is making.

The Vice President said this report appeared to indicate that the communists feel they have the Castro government well in hand. Mr. Gates asked to whom the report was made. Mr. Dulles said apparently it was circulated among Cuban communists. The Vice President wondered whether the report could not be publicized. He felt publicity would be very effective in this case. Mr. Dulles said he would investigate to determine how widely the report had been circulated already. He would not want to publicize it in such a way as to uncover his sources of information. The Vice President agreed but thought that if the report had been widely disseminated, it would be impossible for the Cubans to tell which recipient had passed it on.⁵

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting.

² For text of the President’s April 8 letter to the President of the Federation of Students of Chile, as well as a translation of the February 24 letter from the Federation to President Eisenhower which was given him during his trip to Chile, see Department of State Bulletin, April 25, 1960, pp. 648–658.

³ April 19.

⁴ Reference is to an amendment to the Second Supplemental Appropriations bill offered on March 24 by Senator Karl E. Mundt.

⁵ The discussion of the Cuban situation constitutes NSC Action No. 2213. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

506. Editorial Note

On April 20, Ambassador Bonsal delivered an address at the annual luncheon meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce in Havana.

In telegram 2826 from Havana, April 16, Bonsal informed the Department of his intention to give the address, stated that he did not wish to burden the Department with the entire text, and asked for its views on three points he intended to make, which he quoted. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4–1660) In telegram 1567 to Havana, April 19, which was drafted and cleared entirely within ARA, the Department concurred with the outline of Bonsal’s proposed address and suggested a few minor revisions. The Department also suggested that Bonsal release the text to the Cuban and U.S. press. (ibid., 611.37/4–1960) In telegram 1572 to Havana, April 19, which was drafted by Under Secretary of State Merchant, who also initialed it for the Secretary of State, the Department noted that after further consideration of the proposed speech, it was concerned at the difficulty and risks inherent in any comprehensive statement of U.S. policy toward Cuba in the pre-May 1 atmosphere and during the period when Congress was considering sugar legislation. The Department offered some additional suggestions for changes in the text and recommended that Bonsal keep the speech “as short as decently possible.” (ibid., 611.37/4–1660) In a memorandum, April 20, to the Executive Secretariat, the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant, Max V. Krebs, noted:

“In the light of the continuing acerbity of public statements by Castro and other Cuban leaders, and of the critical nature of our relations with Cuba, the Secretary desires until further notice that all public statements issued by the Department having to do with Cuba e cleared either by himself or one of the Under Secretaries.” (ibid., 737.00/4–2060)

507. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, April 23, 1960—noon.

2932. Fidel Castro interviewed on national radio-television hookup last night. Program lasted three and half hours. During appearance he repeatedly attacked Government US in strong terms, repeating and elaborating on themes he used in Berrellez and Bates interviews earlier this week.² Attack was strongest, most direct and insulting, and least inferential to date. Names of Eisenhower, Herter and Rubottom figured prominently in his denunciations of United States. Throughout program he looked tired and nervous and was frequently rambling and halting.

Asked about betrayal statement in Eisenhower letter to Chilean students³ Castro launched violent attack on Eisenhower and United States policy towards Cuba which he described as fascist, Goebbels-like and a betrayal of principles for which thousands of persons died in past war against fascism. He regarded attention given Cuba recently by Eisenhower, Herter and Rubottom in public statements as part of a plan to foment a fifth column in Cuba. In the new US preoccupation with Trujillo in the OAS he saw clear evidence “that the North American Government was maneuvering against the revolution” and “trying to establish a procedure which at any time could be turned against us”.

Castro devoted considerable time to discussing Manuel Beaton and Nino Diaz groups in Oriente. He minimized their significance although admitting he had gone to area to organize militia who will hunt them down. During course of this answer he accused Guantanamo Base officials of using various counter-revolutionary elements to set up a focus of opposition. He noted that Latifundists in Santiago de Cuba had connections with base, among them Nino Diaz who makes frequent trips to United States. He referred to “casquitos” being used by base. He charged overflight of base planes in Sierra Maestra area were connected with Beaton operations and were done without requesting or obtaining permission of Cuban authorities.

Castro painted picture of possibility of aggression any day. Asserted that revolution was increasingly strong and will know how to deal with it.

Asked series of economic questions he described how national tourism boomed over Easter, foreign exchange reserve position had improved greatly under direction of Guevara, labor census was essential to obtain non-existent statistics and establish employment rosters to solve unemployment problem.

Full text of appearance will be pouched as soon as available.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4–2360. Official Use Only; Priority.

² Bates’ interview with Castro took place on April 19; Berrellez’ interview has not been further identified.

³ See footnote 2, Document 505.

508. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, April 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

Further Report on Status of Possible OAS Action on Cuba

Active endeavors are continuing to impress upon Latin Americans the nature and seriousness of Communist penetration of Cuba and other disruptive activities of the Cuban Government. Successful presentation of the problem to the OAS calls for not only the careful documentation of a “case” on the Communist and other issues,² but developing measures likely to be effective in eliminating the danger and convincing a substantial number of Latin American governments that these measures are required. Work is progressing on all these aspects.

There are a variety of specific issues, beginning with the extensive International Communist influence in Cuba, which go beyond those of an essentially Cuban-United States character and which are of importance to international action. Our public posture to date has been well received in Latin America. While many Latin Americans have grave doubts about Castro, the fact remains that such views have not reached the point where we can count on the Latin American support which would be necessary for successful action in the OAS. Among the reasons for this are the tendency to identify the problem as a solely United States-Cuban controversy and the Latin American inclination to underestimate the extent of Communist penetration which even our National Intelligence Estimate³ does not establish as constituting the “domination or control” called for by the pertinent Caracas Resolution.

A memorandum setting forth in greater detail the information summarized above is enclosed.⁴

Christian A. Herter

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Signed by Herter and initialed by the President. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 252.

² The President wrote in the margin at this point: “This has been almost a zero!”

³ Document 491.

⁴ Not printed.

509. Editorial Note

In an undated note to Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom, the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Robert Stevenson, reported as follows:

“Saturday morning, April 23, Mr. McComber [Macomber] called me on the telephone to ask for my views on how he should reply to a query he had received from Congressman O’Hara of Chicago as to the possibilities and desirability of arranging a get-together on the QT between Castro and President Eisenhower or Secretary Herter. O’Hara said that he had been approached in this matter by Constantine Kangles, Castro’s long-time registered agent in Chicago. Kangles allegedly said that Castro has gotten himself boxed in, that he wants to get off this anti-U.S. line, that he is genuinely worried, etc. I told Mr. McComber that the whole idea sounded fantastic to me; that there are several good reasons for rejecting any thought of it even if we were certain that the reports on Castro’s fear are correct, which I, personally, do not believe for a moment. I pointed out that such a maneuver, or even a rumor that it was being considered by us, would serve to undercut the Ambassador’s position and would harm our position vis-à-vis Castro in the rest of the Hemisphere, the position that we have been working so hard to create. Mr. McComber agreed completely and said that he would tell O’Hara that the he should send back word that Ambassador Bonsal is in Habana as the President’s representative and they should take their problems to him.”

Attached to Stevenson’s note is a copy of a letter of April 25 from Ambassador Bonsal to Rubottom, in which Bonsal indicated that he had been approached two days earlier by Bud Arvey, son of Chicago Democratic party leader, Jake Arvey, about a “negotiation” he had been conducting to arrange a meeting between President Eisenhower and Fidel Castro. Arvey had told Bonsal that the possibility of such a meeting had been conveyed to him by his father and by Senator Everett Dirksen. Bonsal noted that Arvey was informed that “such an interview could only be considered on the basis of a formal suggestion in writing from Castro to this Embassy.” Bonsal told Rubottom that Arvey had some time before briefly mentioned the idea to Braddock and Gilmore at a cocktail party and asked whether Rubottom had heard anything about it. Rubottom wrote in the margin of the letter: “I recall some mention of young Arvey, but not of such a proposal.” Beneath this Hill wrote: “Nor me.”

At the end of his undated note to Rubottom, Stevenson wrote that, after reading Bonsal’s letter, he suspected that Arvey rather than Kangles was behind O’Hara’s approach. Both Stevenson’s note and Bonsal’s letter are in Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4–2560.

510. Diary Entry by the President, April 25, 1960¹

April 25, 1960.

[Here follow entries unrelated to Cuba.]

A little later Mr. Pawley came in to see me about our relationships with Cuba.² He is very knowledgeable in this area and since he has divested himself of his commercial interests in the Latin American area, I find it profitable to talk with him. He seems to think that a modicum of sense is not [now?] characterizing some of Castro’s grandiose programs and plans. He believes, as does Harry Guggenheim, that our relationship with the whole of Latin America would be much improved if we should appoint an Under Secretary with duties confined to this hemisphere. I brought up this idea to the State Department many times over the past few years—the staffs there are always so bitterly opposed that I am becoming quite sure that I am right. This morning I told Secretary Herter³ that if I was to be put off in this matter again, I wanted to have some very convincing reason.

[Here follow entries unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. The source text bears the following note: “Dictated by DDE.”

² The President met with Pawley, 9: 14–9: 34 a.m. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

³ Apparently a reference to the President’s meeting with Herter and Goodpaster, 11: 25–11: 32 a.m. (ibid.) No record of this meeting has been found.

511. Memorandum of Discussion at the 442d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 28, 1960¹

Washington, April 28, 1960.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles anticipated that May Day in Cuba would bring forth mass demonstrations in support of Castro. The Cuban Government may nationalize sugar mills and refineries and may make an attack on the Panama Canal policy of the U.S. A meeting of “democratic political personalities” planned for Havana will include a great many Left-Wingers, including Carlton Beals and assorted draft dodgers from the U.S., all of whom will be going to Havana at Cuban expense. Some of the high-ranking Cuban Communists will spend May Day in Peiping. Soviet tankers and cargo ships will soon arrive in Cuban ports. In fact one Soviet tanker has already unloaded fuel oil in Cuba. Some of the leading U.S. petroleum companies doing business in Cuba expect they will shortly be faced with a demand that they process Soviet crude oil. The Readers Digest, which produces its Latin American edition in Cuba, is about to write a story on Guevara and anticipates that as a result its copy will be seized. The Digest is moving its operations out of Cuba.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² The discussion of Cuba constitutes NSC Action No. 2217. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

512. Letter From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 29, 1960.

Dear Doug: In the course of a conversation I had with the President yesterday,² the subject of Cuba was discussed. I expressed my view to the President that there should be someone in a place of high authority who felt himself constantly seized of the Cuban problem and who would take steps to assure that all of the activities of various groups were in harness and that all needed decisions were made when needed. I expressed the view that such an individual should be in the State Department.

The President agreed and said that although for a period of time, indeed for practical purposes for a period of weeks, you would be Acting Secretary, he felt that you should take a special interest in the Cuban situation. As you know, Livie has set up two groups, one under the chairmanship of Mr. Hill, and one under the chairmanship of Mr. Mallory. In addition, there is the Special Group, of which Livie is a member, and in his absence Ray Hare sits. Further, there is a special activity proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob Anderson with which you may or may not be familiar. Allen Dulles has a particular liaison with Bob in this matter. The Defense Department of course has many interests.

The President further asked me to ask Ray Hare to seize himself of the problem as necessary pending your return.

I have discussed this matter with Ray and with Allen Dulles.

I think it important that you, Ray, Allen, and I meet together at your earliest possible convenience on Monday.³ I suggest that I be included because the President asked me to say to you that he wished me to follow the whole matter as his personal representative without of course assuming any authority whatsoever beyond that which attaches to a staff capacity.

You will observe that I am sending a copy of this to Ray Hare, Allen Dulles and Andy Goodpaster.

Sincerely,

Gordon Gray⁴

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Chron. Confidential; Personal. Copies were sent to Hare, Allen Dulles, and Goodpaster.

² This was apparently either Gray’s meeting with the President, 8: 26–8: 30 a.m., just prior to the National Security Council meeting or his meeting at 10: 19–10: 28 after that meeting. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

³ May 2.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

513. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, April 1960.

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN CUBA

Summary

In late 1958, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union requested that high level delegates from Latin American CP’s attend the XXI CPSU Congress in early 1959 to discuss the selection of one country as a base for a hemispheric attack on US policy as well as problems of financial and material support. Cuba appears to have been selected as this base, and the consolidation of the USSR’s cultural organization dealing with Latin America, teamed with Cuban cultural activities, provides possible cover for channelling Soviet financial and material support to Latin American Communists and their collaborators.

International Communist strategy for gaining control in Latin America is the “national liberation struggle”. Because this strategy involves manipulation of non-Communist nationalists, special emphasis has been placed on Chinese Communist tactical guidance, particularly with reference to clandestine and subversive activity. The application of these tactical concepts in Cuba is indicated by the role played by pro-Communists who may be, in fact, Communist party members. Although the Communists may wish to bring known Communists into the Cuban government, this goal may currently be subordinated to the broader objectives of hemispheric subversion.

The Cuban Communist Party (PSP) program was approved in December 1957. This was stated to be an interim program for national liberation, and not the ultimate Socialist program. It listed objectives which correspond to those being carried out by the Castro government. Immediately thereafter, in early 1958, International Communism changed its policy toward the Castro guerrilla movement. Unity agreements were reached with Castro-affiliated labor elements, and with the aid of Raul Castro and Ernesto Guevara, the guerrilla forces were infiltrated. In August 1958 a secret agreement between the Communist Party and the 26th of July Movement was reported from within the Communist movement.

Following the Castro victory, the Cuban CP quickly surfaced and reestablished its overt organization and press. With the aid of Guevara and Raul Castro the Communists gained control over the political indoctrination in the armed forces, into which they infiltrated many members of the Communist youth. They next helped organize the Agrarian Reform Institute under Antonio Nunez Jimenez (a crypto-Communist), which has become an autonomous politico-economic empire. Concurrently, they expanded their influence in labor, despite some opposition, and actively furthered international Communist youth objectives. With respect to foreign relations, Cuban policy has been in accord with the goals of the Soviet-inspired “liberation struggle”. Specifically, Cuban government officials have supported Communist objectives: a Latin American “peoples’ congress”; a WFDY sponsored Latin American Youth Congress; and a congress of “underdeveloped nations”. Closer relations have been established with the USSR, including a commercial treaty.

Efforts have been made to extend aid to opposition elements abroad, thereby aiding the “liberation struggle”. Ernesto Guevara, charged with aid to foreign revolutionaries, has sought to have the Communists accepted in unified movements. To supplement official state-to-state relations, the Cuban government representatives abroad have worked on a “people-to-people” level, lending support to leftist political, student, labor, and cultural groups in which Communists are included. Some Communist infiltration of the diplomatic service is known to exist, and known Communists have been appointed to the Cuban UNESCO Commission. “Cultural counsellors” with regional responsibilities, reportedly Raul Castro’s appointees, include some persons with Communist associations.

There is little reason to doubt that the Cuban governmental leaders under Castro are accepting Communist guidance and are organizing the government so as to serve the purposes of International Communist subversion. Internal Communist sources revealed, during 1959, increasing confidence on the part of the Communists with respect to their influence. Although there is evidence that the Communists fear the “chauvinist” and “bourgeois” attitudes of Fidel Castro, there is no evidence whatsoever that they doubt the friendship of Raul Castro and Ernesto Guevara, who probably have more organizational control over governmental operations than Fidel. However, the replacement of anti-Communist President Urrutia by President Dorticos, and the replacement of a number of moderate or non-Communist cabinet members by radicals and pro-Communists have been the direct result of Fidel’s actions.

[Here follows the body of the paper.]

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Habana Embassy Files: FRC 67 A 677, Communism. Secret; Noforn/Continued Control. Document number not declassified. This 67-page paper was transmitted to certain diplomatic posts in the American Republics as an attachment to CA–10924, June 27, in which recipients were authorized to use the paper as background information in discussions with officials of the host government. Recipients were asked, however, not to refer to certain information cited in an unsigned memorandum, dated June 16, that was attached to the cover sheet. None of the information cited therein was in the Summary. The decision to circulate the paper was apparently taken at Herter’s direct suggestion. In a June 6 memorandum to INR, to which was attached a copy of the paper, Krebs noted that Herter thought “a good deal of the material contained therein might be used effectively in other Latin American countries.” Krebs asked INR to check with CIA to see whether the paper could be distributed, perhaps in sanitized form. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)

514. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, May 2, 1960¹

Washington, May 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuban Policy and Operations

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary

Mr. Allen Dulles, Director, CIA

Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. Richard Bissell, CIA

Assistant Secretary Rubottom

Mr. Gray referred to his letter of April 29 to the Under Secretary,² copies of which were sent to Messrs. Dulles, Hare and Goodpaster, and said that he was responsible for the calling of the meeting to discuss the coordination of policy and operations respecting Cuba.

The Under Secretary, referring to the letter, said that the Department was satisfied with the coordination now being effected under a plan approved by the Secretary. There are two committees which are meeting regularly under that plan: one is an “open” meeting composed of representatives of most of the interested agencies of the Government which meets daily, chaired by Mr. Mallory; the second, a “covert” meeting, attended by a much smaller group, including a CIA representative, Mr. Whedbee, and Mr. Gray, is also chaired by Mr. Mallory. Then there is the OCB weekly group chaired by Mr. John Hill, Special Assistant to Mr. Rubottom, as well as the regular weekly meeting of Messrs. Rubottom, Mallory, King, Gomez, Hill and Curtis which takes up Cuban and other operational subjects of interest to the Department. The latter group discusses exclusively “covert” subjects, except for exchanges of information regarding policy decisions in prospect affecting operations.

The Under Secretary said that, while Mr. Rubottom did not chair all of the committees which were meeting regularly, he was informed of their work. He and the Secretary feel that the work is proceeding satisfactorily under Mr. Rubottom’s direction and that there is adequate coordination.

The Under Secretary acknowledged that the activity under the chairmanship of Secretary Anderson had not been known to him. Mr. Dulles said that he was aware of the committee’s work and thought that it grew out of a discussion that the President had with Secretaries Herter and Anderson following a meeting in the President’s office some time ago.³ Mr. Rubottom recalled a meeting on March 17, during which Mr. Anderson referred to some of his discussions [less than 1 line not declassified] regarding the Cuban situation, but he did not recall that the President suggested the establishment of such a committee. Even though there was no record of a telephone conversation or other discussion regarding the establishment of this committee, chaired by Lucius Clay according to Mr. Dulles, it was generally acknowledged that the President might have requested Secretary Anderson to create the committee and so informed Governor Herter. The Under Secretary said that he would raise the matter with Secretary Anderson.

Discussion next centered on the close liaison that has been established between Mr. Rubottom personally, and the key members of his staff responsible for Cuban affairs, with the business community. Mr. Rubottom told of the visit last week by officials of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey⁴ who had discussed (1) their problem of overdue commercial payments in Cuba and (2) the prospect that they might be requested by the Cuban Government to run Russian crude through their Cuban refinery. He was told that the company had decided in the negative regarding point 2. The company had received one $600,000 payment from the Cuban Government in accordance with the so-called 90-day plan earlier in April and was expecting to receive two additional payments prior to the end of May. A firm decision regarding cash-in-advance payments for oil would have to be weighed on the scales with the action of their competitors in Cuba, the Texas Co. and the Shell Co., according to the Esso officials.

Mr. Gray read from a memorandum⁵ which apparently referred to a briefing session held by Mr. Hill last week for the benefit of various Government agencies who do not participate in the regular meetings on Cuba. The Commerce Department representative, according to Mr. Gray, had discussed the “problem” created for them by businessmen callers inquiring about the overall Cuban situation. Mr. Gray concurred that the purpose of Mr. Hill’s briefing had been precisely to inform representatives of Commerce and other interested Departments regarding the Cuban situation. Mr. Rubottom said that representatives of certain small companies might be going to the Commerce Department to inquire about Cuba. Those with serious problems and long-term interests in Cuba were keeping in close touch with the Department.

Prior to the close of the meeting, Messrs. Dulles and Bissell expressed their satisfaction with the present plans for coordinating matters affecting Cuba. Mr. Gray then said that he was satisfied and that he could carry out his responsibilities.

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, May 1960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom and approved on May 8 by Dillon. The place and time of the meeting are not indicated on the source text.

² Document 512.

³ See Document 486. The meeting with Secretaries Herter and Anderson has not been further identified.

⁴ A memorandum of Rubottom’s conversation with these officials on April 27 is in Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (April–June 1960).

⁵ Presumably a reference to an outline paper entitled “For OCB Briefing—April 28, 1960,” a copy of which is ibid., ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuban Special Meeting of OCB Group 1960.

515. Memorandum of Discussion at the 443d Meeting of the National Security Council, High Point Relocation Site, May 5, 1960¹

May 5, 1960.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dillon believed the situation in Cuba had shown no improvement, although our plans were proceeding on schedule and rather favorably. Castro’s May Day rally had apparently been less successful than expected. During this rally cheerleaders were necessary in order to whip up the enthusiasm of the crowd. Castro has continued and even extended his attacks on Latin American leaders such as Betancourt and Kubitschek. We make sure these attacks, which are broadcast on the Cuban radio, reach the ears of the Latin American leaders who are attacked. Finally Mr. Dillon reported that a Federal Grand Jury had indicted Shergalis and at least one other person for the recent flight into Cuba.

Mr. Dulles said he understood that Cuba had proposed Cardona as Cuban Ambassador to the U.S. [2 sentences (2½ lines) not declassified] Mr. Dillon wondered whether it would be to our interest to expedite the appointment of Cardona as Ambassador to the U.S. since he appeared to be favorable to the U.S. Mr. Dulles said he understood that we intended to delay any action on Cardona but he thought it would be desirable to expedite his appointment as Cuban Ambassador to the U.S. However, he thought Cardona might not accept the appointment unless Castro agrees to attempt to bring about better relations with the U.S.

Mr. Gray said he had seen a report that the Cuban Government wanted to discuss the purchase of the Nicaro nickel facility. Mr. Dillon said after investigation we had discovered that our legal position with respect to the Nicaro facility is not as sound as we had thought it was. It appeared that we entered into the Nicaro operation without any formal agreement between the U.S. and Cuba. The concessions we received from Cuba were based on a 1953 decree by Batista. Since our legal position is not good, we are ready to talk about selling Nicaro. The President said he thought Nicaro existed before 1953. Mr. Dillon said Nicaro existed in Cuba before 1953 but that the 1953 decree provided special tax concessions. Mr. Stans asked what the Cuban Government would use for payment if it bought Nicaro. Mr. Dillon said he supposed the Cuban Government would attempt to pay for the facility with Cuban bonds. Mr. Dillon then added that a group of the wives of political prisoners held by Castro had recently been diverted from picketing the White House to an appearance before the Peace Committee of the OAS. This group had staged an effective scene in the OAS and had then met with a group of Chilean students about to go to Cuba.

Mr. Gray, referring to Nicaro again, said it seemed to him that acceptance of Cuban bonds in payment of this facility would tend to solidify Cuban policy. Mr. Dillon said that while Cuba would probably prefer to use Cuban bonds in payment, we might not accept them.

The National Security Council:²

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs.

² The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2228. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

516. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, May 5, 1960—4 p.m.

3119. Government-oriented and Communist press have had propaganda field day during past two days over hearings by Senate Internal Security Committee. Through wide use of photographs and banner headlines they have gleefully portrayed “war criminals” and “renegade priests” being received by Senate Committee and their expenses paid. This being used to convey idea that USG is protecting these elements and using them in designs to overthrow Castro government. Official reaction so far limited to statement of Roa sent Department in Embtel 3083.²

Elements critical of revolutionary government have begun to express complete amazement and concern over hearings. Embassy officers have been receiving increasing number of calls from contacts at all levels who are bewildered over United States giving this propaganda bonanza to Castro. They express understanding of division of governmental powers in United States but nevertheless wonder whether issues have been placed squarely before the Internal Security Committee in terms of: (1) How totally discredited such persons as Ugalde Carillo, Tabernilla and Diaz Balart are in Cuba and how priests are mavericks who do not represent Church and have been disowned by hierarchy; (2) how prestige of United States is being hurt by these hearings and its case against Castro government undermined in Cuban as well as hemispheric public opinion; and (3) how cause of anti-government elements in Cuba is also weakened by moral impact of this action by Senate Committee and excuse it gives Castro to charge that those who criticize revolutionary government are of same stripe as “war criminals.” Prensa Libre published editorial last night expressing shocked incredulity.

It described hearing of three “war criminals” as “not only an offense to Cuba, but also lack of respect for United States and a shameful insult to the cause of liberty and democracy for which thousands of Cubans have sacrificed their lives in Cuba and many millions of North Americans in all the world.” Editorial states USG should disassociate itself from action of Senate Committee. It concluded saying that cause of democracy and freedom cannot be defended with myrmidons and assassins. Triple A student organization at Habana University, which in recent weeks has been taking increasingly anti-Communist stand, has sent message to Senate Committee expressing its indignation by stating rather than being received as witnesses, “war criminals” should be returned to Cuba to respond before the revolutionary courts for their crimes.

Church and lay organizations will undoubtedly come under increasing pressure to define themselves publicly on Senate hearings issue. As a result they may find it necessary to issue statements along lines of Prensa Libre editorial and Triple A statement.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/5–560. Confidential; Priority.

² Dated May 4, telegram 3083 transmitted a translation of Roa’s statement which had been published in the Havana press that morning. (ibid., 611.37/5—460)

517. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

U.S. Sugar Legislation Required for Economic Action Against Cuba

Discussion

Our policy objective with respect to Cuba is, in the last analysis, that the Cubans themselves should regain effective control of the formulation and implementation of Cuba’s foreign and domestic policies and that they should exercise control in a manner compatible with U.S. security and other vital interests.

It is evident, however, that the policies and programs of the Government of Prime Minister Fidel Castro have not been freely decided upon by the Cuban people and that they now present serious dangers to U.S. security and other interests throughout Latin America.

The tactics which we are employing to help the Cubans regain effective control may be said to be entering a third phase. The first phase—which covered the early months of 1959 and included such actions as the recognition of the Castro Government, the appointment of Ambassador Bonsal, and Castro’s trip to the U.S. —was designed to test any possibility that the moderate group then existing within his following might gain the ascendancy. In this testing phase, our misgivings about Castro were confirmed, as he and his extremist lieutenants rejected cooperation with us and held to an increasingly radical and anti-American course in their domestic and foreign policies. The test, nonetheless, had to be made not only to confirm to ourselves but also to Cuban and Latin American opinion that Castro once in power was unwilling to cooperate.

During the second phase, our tactics have been to maintain a public posture generally described as a “policy of restraint.” The purpose has been to place squarely on Castro the responsibility for deteriorated Cuban–U.S. relations and for economic, social and other dislocations within Cuba. At the same time, with steadily increasing emphasis we have countered Castro’s anti-U.S. accusations, discreetly channelled facts about Cuba and Castroism to the other American Republics and made clear our own position on Cuba—notably in the statements of the President on January 26² and in the reply delivered on behalf of the Chilean students.³ These moves, in addition to safeguarding the United States reputation for firmness and dignity as well as for restraint, have been intended to encourage moderate elements in Cuba and to develop Latin American support for the U.S. position which would be especially needed if OAS consideration of the problem becomes feasible and desirable.

Although there is yet no strong and unified opposition movement, the position and actions of the United States in this second phase have contributed to the development of a climate in which Cuban moderates are rapidly not only becoming disenchanted with the Castro Government but beginning to organize and otherwise manifest their opposition more effectively than previously. In addition, the continuing economic hardships faced by the Cuban urban and agricultural working classes despite Castro’s promises and the atmosphere of confusion and disruption attendant on his reforms have created at least some degree of popular disillusionment, although perhaps half of the Cuban people still support Castro.

The third phase, which we are now rapidly approaching, will require that the United States use judiciously selected economic pressures at those points where Castro’s domestic and international policies have weakened Cuba’s economic structure in order to engender more public discomfort and discontent and thereby to expose to the Cuban masses Castro’s responsibility for mishandling their affairs. A field in which this could most effectively be done is in the field of foreign exchange. Cuba remains heavily dependent on imports while Castro’s policies are bringing Cuba’s foreign exchange position to a point where action on our part would have disproportionately large effect in disrupting the economy in ways that would be brought home quickly to the consuming public. Cuba’s dollar reserves have been brought to dangerously low levels by arms purchases, military adventures, mismanagement, flight of capital, and discouragement of private capital. Tourist receipts on the order of $75 million have practically vanished and foreign creditors, faced with unpaid bills, are moving toward business on a strictly cash basis. The cost of living and unemployment are both mounting at a time when the economy is being decapitalized. Measures taken by the U.S. to reduce Cuban dollar earnings, with appropriate action with regard to their consistency with our international obligations, could have an important effect were it not [now?] on a large scale.

In addition to these tactical considerations, National Security [Council] policy for Latin America⁴ stipulates that if a Latin American state should establish with the Soviet Bloc close ties of such a nature as materially to prejudice our interests, the United States should be prepared to diminish or suspend governmental economic or financial cooperation and take other political, economic or military actions deemed appropriate. In the light of the Soviet-Cuban Trade and Aid Agreements, of the Mikoyan-Castro pledge of cooperation in the UN and of the other evidences of increasing Bloc-Cuban ties and of growing Communist influence, Cuba now clearly falls within the provisions of this policy stipulation.

As we enter into this third phase of our tactics, it is important that the Executive Branch have the discretionary and flexible authority requested in the Administration’s proposed sugar legislation, at least when the Congress is not in session. This may soon be needed to take from Cuba at least part of the premium now accruing to that country on sugar exported to the United States. In any event, should the present legislation merely be extended it would be tantamount to guaranteeing Cuba unrestricted access to the U.S. market on present terms irrespective of what Castro does. Should it subsequently be decided to use the Congressional authorization with a view to intensifying Cuba’s foreign exchange crisis, assist in the effort to obtain compensation for expropriated U.S. owners, or for other reasons bearing on our Cuban policy, I believe that American public and Congressional opinion would support such a move and that, if the injury to Cuba’s permanent interests were not disproportionately large, it would be quite defensible internationally. Politically, Cuba’s five-year deal to sell five million tons of sugar at the lower world market price and with only 20% payable in convertible currency, which Castro has highly praised, places us in an excellent position to point out that we do not even seek “equal treatment” with the Soviets since even a complete elimination of the U.S. premium would still leave Cuba with convertible currency as the proceeds of its sales to this country.

The President included a reference to the need for enacting a Sugar Act in his legislative message to Congress⁵ and it is understood that Congressman Cooley, Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture—who has been reported as hitherto opposed to granting flexible authority to the Executive Branch—now plans to have his Committee act on sugar legislation this week. His present position is not known, but it remains important to the attainment of our objectives in Cuba that the Executive Branch have the power to act with respect to Cuban sugar imports.

Recommendations

It is recommended

1. That you signify, as a basis for the development of Departmental positions and for discussions with other parts of the Government, your agreement that the time has now come for considering the application of selected economic pressures on Cuba and inform the NSC of this decision at its next discussion about Cuba.

2. That, at the next discussion of the Cuban situation in the NSC, you emphasize the importance of obtaining appropriate sugar legislation and invite the participants to take appropriate action in their Congressional contacts and presentations to obtain it.⁶

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Sugar 1960. Secret. Drafted by Mallory and Hill and concurred in by L, E, H, and S/P.

² See Document 438.

³ See footnote 2, Document 505.

⁴ Presumably a reference to NSC 5902/1, “United States Policy Toward Latin America,” February 19, 1959; the text is scheduled for publication in volume V.

⁵ Reference to the President’s May 3 special message to Congress; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 385–394.

⁶ Dillon’s stamped signature and the date, May 11, appear in the “approve” spaces on both recommendations on the source text.

518. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, May 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

Determination under Section 552 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, approving continuance of assistance under that Act to Cuba

The Mutual Security Act of 1960 adds a new section 552 in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”),² which prohibits the furnishing of assistance under the Act to Cuba after the date of enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1960 unless the President determines that such assistance is in the national and hemispheric interest of the United States.

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that you determine, pursuant to section 552 of the Act, that it is in the national and hemispheric interest of the United States to continue assistance under the Act to Cuba for a period of up to 180 days following the date of enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1960, in order to permit the orderly conclusion of assistance under the Act.

The assistance now being furnished to Cuba under the Act consists of two technical cooperation projects and the training of two Cuban nationals in the United States under the technical cooperation program. The first project is a civil aviation project under which there is being provided advisory assistance in air navigation aids and airways communications for purpose of general air safety. The second project is an advisory one in agriculture, with emphasis on development of an agricultural experiment station. Both of these projects are being conducted under project agreements which are effective until June 30, 1960. The two Cuban students now receiving participant training in the United States will complete their courses of study by the end of August.

Within the last eighteen months, several technical cooperation projects have been completed and terminated. There have been several unofficial requests for new technical assistance projects from certain Cuban officials, but these have not been supported by official requests at the necessary level from the Cuban Government. Further, the intentions of the Cuban Government with respect to continuation of the two existing projects have not been made clear and no official request has been received from the Cuban Government for continuation of these activities beyond the presently agreed-upon completion dates.

In view of the absence of any demonstrated interest of the present Cuban Government in continuation of United States assistance, it is not considered that continuation of the program for the next fiscal year can be determined to be in the national or hemispheric interest of the United States. However, it is believed that continuance of the above-mentioned assistance to Cuba under the Act for a period of up to 180 days would be in the national and hemispheric interest of the United States. It would permit an orderly phasing out of activities, the conclusion of projects in accordance with the provisions of the applicable agreements, the gradual withdrawal of United States technical assistance and personnel, and the orderly transfer of project responsibility to Cuban technicians. This would not only serve to minimize the adverse effect of an abrupt departure of United States technical personnel, but would permit the completion of certain project activity, such as final machinery development and report preparation for the kenaf rope-fiber investigation and development work which is now in its final stages. A total of $350,000 has heretofore been planned for continuation of the technical cooperation program for the entire fiscal year of 1961. Only a portion of this amount would be required to phase out activities for up to 180 days.

In sum, the conclusion within the 180 day period of all existing technical cooperation activities in Cuba would not require the cancellation of any existing aid commitments to Cuba nor the rejection of any formal Cuban requests for aid now on hand.

It may be noted that funds appropriated pursuant to section 409(c) of the Act are, in accordance with the terms of that section, being used to finance ocean freight charges on shipments by private United States voluntary relief agencies of relief items for needy people in Cuba as well as other countries. It has been concluded that such financing does not constitute assistance to Cuba within the meaning of section 552 of the Act and thus that it is not necessary to deal with it in the determination which is herein proposed. Accordingly, it is planned to continue this financing for voluntary agency shipments of relief goods for needy Cubans not only during the 180 day period referred to in this memorandum but also thereafter.

Assistance to Cuba has been and is being furnished pursuant to basic bilateral assistance agreements pre-dating both the Batista and Castro regimes. It is not considered necessary or desirable for the United States to terminate these basic agreements. Their continuation in force would provide a basis for resumption of assistance if you should later determine that such action would serve our national and hemispheric interest. In this connection, it is contemplated that if any future request is received from the Cuban Government for assistance it will be evaluated in light of the circumstances then prevailing and, if it appears that a favorable response may significantly serve important United States national interests, will be referred to you for consideration.

IT IS, ACCORDINGLY, RECOMMENDED that you sign the enclosed memorandum³ which contains the determination required by the Act in order to continue assistance to Cuba.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget concurs in this recommendation.

Douglas Dillon

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Central Files, Confidential File.

² The Mutual Security Act of 1960, approved May 14, 1960; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 841–852.

³ This memorandum, signed by the President on May 14, is not printed. On May 27, the Department issued a statement indicating that on the previous day the Embassy in Havana had delivered a note to the Cuban Government informing it of the Presidential determination. For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1960, p. 962.

519. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)¹

Washington, May 18, 1960.

SUBJECT

Soviet Electronic Tracking Station in Cuba

I am grateful for Mr. Morgan’s memorandum of May 11² stating that there is considerable anxiety in the Pentagon lest the USSR openly or secretly install an electronic tracking station in Cuba.

To date we have no information which would indicate that the Soviets have undertaken such an activity. In the light of the increased close relations maintained by the Government of Cuba and the Soviet Bloc and of the leading positions which Communists and their sympathizers have reached in the Cuban armed forces, intelligence services, and other Cuban agencies, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the Soviets would find sympathy if they wished to undertake a covert operation of this type.

At this stage, it might be suggested to Defense officials concerned about this problem that through the USIB they levy on the entire intelligence community a requirement to be alert for any information which might indicate that the Soviets are actually interested in such a project.

Should concrete information be developed that the Soviets have actually initiated work on such a project in Cuba, it would appear to be a matter which would come within the purview of the Rio Treaty, and we would consider in the light of the circumstances prevailing what action would be warranted on multilateral or other basis.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by Hill and Devine and initialed by Mallory for Rubottom.

² Not printed. (ibid.)

520. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1680 Havana, May 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

Visit of Ambassador Bonsal to Oriente Province²

Ambassador Bonsal visited Santiago and Nicaro in Oriente Province on May 16–18. The trip was another in a recent series of visits to various parts of the island for purposes of familiarization and contact with American residents. Within the past few weeks the Ambassador has visited the Isle of Pines and Pinar del Río Province.

The Ambassador was accompanied by Mr. Robert Stevenson, Cuban Desk Officer, and the two reporting officers, as well as the Air Attaché and Assistant Air Attaché who piloted the Air Force Mission plane which was used to make the trip.

The party left Havana during the early morning hours of May 16. That day and night were spent visiting various places in Santiago and its environs. The following day the group traveled to Nicaro. The balance of the day was devoted to going over the nickel plant, visiting schools and observing the construction of the new town of Levisa. That evening the Ambassador and members of the party were entertained by the general manager of the nickel plant at a double function which gave the Ambassador the opportunity to meet the Americans working at the plant as well as the top Cuban managerial personnel. After overnighting in Nicaro the party returned to Habana on the morning of May 18.

It had originally been planned that the trip include visits to Preston, one of the United Fruit Company sugar mills near Nicaro, and Chaparra and Delicias, two sugar mills on the northwestern coast of Oriente Province belonging to the Cuban-American Sugar Company. At the last minute both of these visits were canceled at the request of officials of the two companies who because of recent developments at their respective installations considered that the Ambassador’s presence at that particular time might not be advisable. A visit to the Guantanamo Naval Base was included on the itinerary. However, because of events during the previous week the visit was made contingent on Major Calixto García’s (Oriente Province Military Commander) accepting the Ambassador’s invitation to accompany him to the Base. It was not possible to establish direct contact with the Major, so this part of the trip was dropped.

During the course of the trip the group had several interesting experiences and received a number of significant impressions. These are recorded below under separate headings:

1. Surveillance of Party While in Santiago and Nicaro

During the twenty-four hours spent in Santiago the group appears to have been under fairly constant surveillance, presumably by agents of DIER. These agents were not particularly noticeable during the day on May 16 as the party visited the consulate, lunched at the Rancho Club, and toured such places of interest as El Cobre, Las Guasimas, Siboney Beach, El Caney, and the Surrender Tree Site. However, members of the crew of the Mission aircraft reported having seen what appeared to be agents at the airport on arrival and being followed as they traveled around the downtown area that night. Agents are believed to have kept the group under surveillance during the night at the Rancho Motel. At least a car with three agents was posted at the motel when members of the party got up early the next morning. This same car trailed the Consulate car carrying the Ambassador as it went to the Consulate and from there to the airport via the Morro Castle.

At Nicaro a military guard was assigned to the group. The guard followed the party as it toured the installation and took up positions during the night around the quarters where the Ambassador stayed. The Ambassador was notified that the guard was being assigned to him. The reason given was for his physical protection. In conversations with members of this guard it was evident that they had been heavily indoctrinated.

2. Highlights of Conversations with American Business and Professional Leaders in Santiago

At a reception given at the home of Consul Eberhardt the Ambassador and members of the party had an opportunity to speak with leading executives of American industrial, banking and sugar firms as well as other leaders of the American community in Santiago. Regarding counter-revolutionary groups in the area, they indicated that there had been little activity in recent weeks. Skepticism was manifest over the Beaton group. His support appears to stem from the widespread family connections of the Beatons in the Sierra Maestra which one of the observers described to be as numerous as a Scottish clan. People are still not fully convinced that he might not be a trap. The Nino Diaz movement was described as serious, although he himself was said to be of the swashbuckling type. He reportedly is a man of some means, being the owner of a chain of coffee houses in Santiago. Nobody had any information on his whereabouts or the strength of his movement. Consulate officers who had spoken with Mrs. Díaz, who has applied for a visa, reported that she claimed complete ignorance of the activities of her husband. It was pointed out that Nino Díaz had led the party into Moa which took several Americans up into the Hills in June–July, 1958.

There was a general impression manifest that the Government was encountering increasing economic difficulties in Oriente and popular unrest was growing. Lack of funds to meet current obligations, mismanagement, realization that land was not to be owned by individuals, and recognition of the fact that cooperatives were in many respects little more than mass labor pools were listed among the principal reasons for this unrest. These observers reported that the Government was behind in the payment of wages to public works employees. Workers in cooperatives were said not to have been paid for several weeks or to have received small cash payments with the balance of credit chits for the “tiendas del pueblo”. These “tiendas”, they claimed, were poorly stocked. The Government was also increasing the dimensions of its economic problem daily as it took over more and more administration cane, and to a lesser degree cane belonging to large colonos, with all the attendant responsibility for working this land and paying the workers. These workers were now confronted with the prospect of being paid less by INRA, or having no work at all, and not having available the credit advances which the mills and colonos customarily extended to help tide them over the “dead season”. The consensus was that INRA activities had been conducted without regard to expense and that refusal to heed experience gained over the years by private industry would result in substantial losses in production over a short period of years. In the rice program, although more acreage had been planted, production per acre would be less than heretofore. In the sugar cane industry, the cutting of larger areas this year, the plowing up of some fields for other crops, the failure to make new plantings and cultivate existing crops, and certain other ill-considered actions could only result in diminishing yields for the next few years. One American Sugar Company manager stated that if the Government spent $50,000 a month for employment on his company’s former lands alone, and in addition engaged in huge public works programs, there would still be unemployment and discontent. Several observers felt that by August or September the Government would be confronted with serious unrest unless it is able to pump substantial amounts of money into the area in the intervening months.

Several persons manifest the belief that when trouble came, it would be most serious in Habana. They claimed that the impact of the Government’s propaganda was greater in Habana than in the provinces. As a result the capital would be the last stronghold for the Government’s policies and anti-American attitude, and it would be there that the struggle would be the most bitter and bloody.

There apparently is no imminent clash between communist and anti-communist forces at the University of Oriente as in Habana. The students of the Law School were described as the ones most militantly pro-Government.

The May Day parade and celebration was reported to be poorly attended and unenthusiastic. Sugar mill owners reported that “campesinos” were rounded up during the evening and the night before the parade and taken to Santiago in buses, trucks and trains. Many of those who went did so out of fear or for the lark of the trip.

3. Visit to Cuban-American Cultural Center

On the afternoon of May 16 the Ambassador visited the new Cultural Center in downtown Santiago. This center was established a little over six months ago and is under the direction of George McCready. A tour of the building showed that the Center is very much of a going concern. Mr. McCready reported that at the start of the third trimester the enrollment for English classes had risen to 190 students. As funds become available, he plans to extend and improve facilities for classrooms, library and exhibit room. He reported that so far the political climate resulting from the anti-United States campaign of the Revolutionary Government had not had any appreciable effect on the Center. He indicated that the bulk of the original membership of the Organizing Committee continued on the Committee, including the Provincial Director of Culture. He also stated that cooperation with Government entities continued, particularly with INIT. At the same time, however, he did mention continuing rumors that the Government might intervene or otherwise seek to restrict the operations of the Center.

4. Efforts to Contact Major Calixto García

Efforts by Consul Wollam to make an appointment for the Ambassador to call on Major Calixto García proved unsuccessful. Just before departing Santiago the Ambassador went to the house of Major Calixto García to leave his card and to leave word that if the Major were in a position to do so, he would very much like to invite him to visit the Naval Base. The guards at the house indicated that Major Calixto García was not in but that they would relay the message. The Ambassador indicated that the reply could be sent to the Consulate. No word had been received by the Consulate as of the time that the party returned to Habana. The Ambassador asked Consul Wollam to continue to try to reach Major Garcia and to inform him that he would be glad to return to Santiago if he could make the trip to the Naval Base.

Given the early hour at which the Ambassador called at Major Calixto García’s house and the presence of two automobiles outside the house, it is not unlikely that the Major was in at the time and did not want to receive the Ambassador.

5. Reception at Nicaro Airstrip

There was a small group of men bearing Cuban flags at the Nicaro airstrip when the Ambassador arrived. They were a rather nondescript, listless bunch who said nothing, bore no placards and in general appeared more curious at the show of the arrival of a United States Air Force plane bearing the Ambassador than intent on flaunting the “new” Cuban independence and sovereignty before the Ambassador. A group of demonstrators stationed at the intersection of airstrip road with the highway did wave Cuban flags and shout “Viva Cuba” and “Viva Fidel Castro” as the Ambassador’s car came to a stop. The ringleader shook the Ambassador’s extended hand and kept up with the slogans. When the Ambassador replied with good humor, “Viva los Estados Unidos”, he repeated “Viva Castro” and “Viva Cuba”, but when the Ambassador countered with “Vivan los dos países”, he apparently did not know how to reply so he half-heartedly repeated the same slogan and the incident closed goodnaturedly. At no time could it be said that there was any display of hostility.

6. Tour of Schools at Nicaro

When Nicaro officials informed the Ambassador that some teen-agers not enrolled in the school within the company compound were trying to organize a parade past the place where he was staying, Ambassador Bonsal suggested that he visit the schools in the area. Two of these were Cuban public schools using facilities provided by the company and a third school for the children of American employees. The visit was started shortly after lunch. At the Cuban public school within the Nicaro compound several teenage boys were observed with a large Cuban flag in the process of getting the parade organized. The Ambassador entered each of the school rooms, shook hands with the teachers and principal and spoke to and greeted the children. As he was doing this the teenagers with the Cuban flag moved into the auditorium of the school, which served as entrance and focal point for the school, and started their chant of “Viva Fidel” and “Patria o Muerte”. Many of the students, laughing and acting as if they were in a holiday mood at this break in studies, took up the chant.

At the second public school at La Pasa just outside the company grounds the situation was different. The Ambassador was received politely by the principal, teachers and students. Although there were teenage agitators in the corridors they did not attempt to make any disturbances and there were no chants or other forms of demonstrations in the classrooms. The Cuban captain of the Nicaro Company guards commented that the difference in the way the Ambassador was received was due to the fact that in the second public school the principal was a man who kept very firm control over the school, and that while he could not have prevented a demonstration outside the building, he certainly would not have allowed the agitators to enter the school premises.

As the Ambassador was leaving the second school a caravan of some ten to twelve cars drove by bearing Cuban flags and posters with the slogans cited above. Persons driving in the cars did not shout or make any aggressive gestures. On the contrary they displayed curiosity over the presence of the Ambassador. When he smiled and waved to them, some were observed to smile sheepishly, laugh and return the greeting.

At the American school the Ambassador followed the same procedure of visiting each classroom and greeting the teachers and students. As in the second public school, the reception here was only one of respect.

7. Visit to Levisa

During the Batista regime Levisa was a shanty town on the outskirts of Nicaro where squatters and some common laborers employed at the plant lived in miserable conditions. The town was burned down by the Batista Air Force during the latter part of 1958 because of the alleged cooperation of its inhabitants with the rebels. The Revolutionary Government in July, 1959 set about rebuilding the town on a new, more healthful site using land donated by the United Fruit Company. The construction project was undertaken by the Comisión de Vivienda Campesina of the Rebel Army.

The Ambassador was shown around the project by Lieutenant Lisea, the officer in charge of construction. Lt. Lisea proudly displayed a map of the entire project showing some 300 houses, three schools, churches, shopping and recreational area. Around thirty of the houses were in process of construction. During the tour it was learned that the Nickel Processing Company (Nicaro) was providing its cement-block-making equipment and gravel, while the Cuban Government was providing the cement and labor for making the cinder blocks for the buildings. The molded concrete and chicken wire sheets for the roofing were being made at the Levisa site. According to Lieutenant Lisea the deadline for completion of 200 of the houses had been set for July 26. Each house consisted of two small rooms for living or sleeping, a kitchen and bath.

Later on in the afternoon the Ambassador and his group drove by some of the large, two-story frame barracks, formerly occupied by construction workers for the Nicaro plant which are now teeming with squatters, mostly from the old Levisa site. Presumably some of these people will be resettled in the new Levisa houses. In the meantime they continue to constitute a bothersome problem for Nicaro officials.

8. Meeting with Nicaro Labor Leaders

The Ambassador met briefly with top officers of the Nicaro labor union: José Garcia García, Secretary General, José Luis Ramos, Delegate to Official and Management Organizations, and Fernando de la Vara, Delegate of the Accounting Department. The exchange with Garcia was very cordial. He indicated that it was the interest of the union leadership, reflecting the wishes of the rank and file, that the plant maintain operations and hoped that other factors between Cuba and the United States would not result in closing the plant. The Ambassador indicated that the United States regarded Nicaro as a mutually advantageous enterprise and it was our desire that production continue uninterrupted. With regard to other factors the Ambassador pointed out quite clearly that the United States desires good relations with Cuba and that the present difficulties are attributable to misinformation or erroneous conclusions about United States policy or intentions on the part of Revolutionary Government leaders.

9. Observation of Nicaro Officials

Nicaro officials commenting on labor-management relations at the plant indicated that they had had no problems with their Cuban employees. They stated that the visit of the Ambassador had deeply worried Garcia, who feared that he might have come in connection with the closing down of the plant. They also reported that the closing of Moa and Bethlehem Steel had had a sobering effect on Nicaro labor (some 2, 500 employees) who thought that Nicaro might be next.

Company officials and members of their families expressed deep appreciation for the Ambassador’s visit.

Press treatment of the Ambassador’s visit to Oriente was limited but interesting. Sierra Maestra, the principal government paper in Santiago, came out with a front page story on May 18 under the headline “Mr. Bonsal’s Presence in Nicaro Protested”. The article blew up the motorcade to 200 cars and had them blowing horns and in other ways making a noisy demonstration of disapproval of the visit. The article raises the question of what was behind Ambassador Bonsal’s trip, which it described as “strange and suspicious”. It labeled the visit to the schools as “hypocrisy”. Norte, the daily from Holguín, carried much the same report with additional embellishments. They had the Ambassador arriving in Nicaro from the Guantanamo Naval Base in a Base aircraft. Several radio stations in Habana carried news items on the trip in which they had the Ambassador going to the Naval Base in a military aircraft. Otherwise the Government propaganda machine has not made an issue of the trip. The Habana papers barely mentioned the trip.

For the Ambassador:
Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Counselor

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5–2360. Confidential. Drafted by William G. Bowdler and George O. Gray.

² Rubottom apparently broached the idea of such a trip, among other things, in a letter of April 1 to Bonsal, a copy of which has not been found. In a reply of April 7 to Rubottom, Bonsal referred to Rubottom’s April 1 letter, and noted that he had already made travel plans. (ibid., Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (April–June) 1960)

521. Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 24, 1960¹

Washington, May 24, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.] Mr. Gray said he believed the Secretary of State wished to make some remarks about the situation in Cuba.

Secretary Herter said he would briefly mention a number of developments in Cuba. A Cuban Government-controlled newspaper had recently uncovered certain placards which our Embassy had printed in advance in order to protect Embassy personnel in the event of riots or evacuation. Apparently, the Cubans, charging that the placards indicated that the U.S. intended to attack Cuba, had intended to stage a demonstration but the demonstration did not materialize. The Cuban Government had reported shooting down a light aircraft which came from the U.S. The Cubans maintained that the pilot of this airplane was attempting to fly Batista adherents out of Cuba. The Cuban Ambassador to the U.S., Cardona, has been appointed but has not yet arrived in this country. Secretary Herter was dubious whether Cardona would have enough influence with the Cuban Government to improve U.S.-Cuban relations. Mr. Dulles said Cardona was, however, a very able man. Continuing, Secretary Herter said the U.S. had protested to Cuba after Cuba had announced that it had fired on a U.S. ship, since none of our ships were in Cuban territorial waters. The last two independent newspapers in Cuba had been seized by the government and on May 13 Castro, in even more violent terms than usual, had attacked the U.S.

Secretary Herter reported that oil refineries in Cuba had been using Venezuelan oil under a compromise arrangement enabling them to obtain enough dollars to purchase such oil. Now, the Cuban Government is demanding that the refineries use more Soviet petroleum. If the refineries refuse, they will probably be seized by the Cuban Government. Secretary Herter thought this government would have to be careful about the advice it gave the refineries.

Secretary Herter said there had been considerable discussion about taking economic measures against Castro. One group which had severely criticized the State Department for not taking economic measures against Cuba had now concluded that no economic measures were available to us except the Sugar Act and the tourist trade (which was rapidly evaporating). Representative Cooley was trying to hold up the one-year renewal of the Sugar Act to such a late point in the session that the Senate would not be able to hold hearings on it. We had been talking to Senator Byrd in an effort to counter the Cooley tactics. Mr. Gray asked whether the Secretary of State did not continue to attach great importance to the sugar legislation. Secretary Herter replied that the sugar legislation was very important since it was the only weapon we had against Cuba.

Secretary Herter then noted that on May 17 the Archbishop of Santiago had issued a letter which stated that “the enemy is within” in describing Communist influence in Cuba. It was difficult to tell to what extent this feeling prevailed in the Cuban Catholic Church. Secretary Herter noted that we had been talking about the possibility of a Cuban purchase of Nicaro. If Cuba took over Nicaro, it would be taking over U.S. Government property in contrast to its seizures of private, although foreign-owned, property. Freeport Sulphur is now negotiating to re-open its facilities in Cuba. The situation of Freeport Sulphur is different from that of Nicaro since Freeport’s products can only be refined in New Orleans whereas the concentrate Nicaro ships out has a world market.

Secretary Herter said that the President of Cuba was now on his way to six South American countries to solicit support for Cuba’s position. When Sukarno visited Cuba recently, there was a heated discussion regarding the communiqué which was to be issued at the end of the visit. Castro insisted that Sukarno should condemn the U.S., while Sukarno wished Castro to endorse Indonesian claims to New Guinea. However, Sukarno did agree to attend the Conference of Underdeveloped Nations being promoted by Cuba.

Secretary Anderson said that Cuba had ordered several millions of paper pesos printed. This move could mean that a currency exchange was pending or that inflation was about to take place through the printing of paper money. Mr. Dulles asked whether the new peso bills were different from the old. Secretary Anderson said the new notes were exactly the same as the old notes except for Guevara’s signature.

Mr. Gray said he believed Mr. Dulles wished to make some comments about Cuba. Mr. Dulles said he wished to report on two semi-covert radio activities related to Cuba. Of course, radio activities could never be entirely covert. Several well-known Cuban refugees were purchasing time for anti-Castro broadcasting from a short-wave station in Cuba. Meanwhile a 50 kilowatt radio station was nearing completion on Swan Island which is 400 miles southwest of Cuba and 110 miles off the Honduran coast. This station, which will become the property of a private corporation, is now on the air for test purposes. It is able to cover the whole Caribbean area at night and nearby areas in the daytime. The station will go on the air quietly at first, will then attack Trujillo, and then later will begin to attack Castro.

Mr. Washburn inquired about the attribution of the Swan Island station. Mr. Dulles said the station would be operated ostensibly by a commercial company which would sell time to anyone able to pay for it. The President asked whether defense forces would be stationed on Swan Island to protect this station. Secretary Herter noted that Honduras claims Swan Island.

The National Security Council:²

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba, in the light of an oral summary thereof by the Secretary of State.

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on May 25.

² The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2239. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

522. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Washington, May 26, 1960.

Dear Phil: Spread before me are your letter of April 12, your two letters of April 14, your letter of April 22, that of April 25, of May 2, and of May 4, 1960.² I greatly appreciate your taking the time to pass on these juicy comments of your diplomatic colleagues, the occasional morsels of real news, and your running interpretation of such reports and the over-all Cuban scene. Your letters³ reporting on the various views expressed to you by some of your colleagues at the big clambake with Fidel Castro will be the subject of another letter.⁴

Perhaps Amoedo’s activities have been helpful, although I am still not sure. With Castro seemingly bent on leaning exclusively on his most extreme-thinking as well as communist advisers, he seems neatly to slide two steps backward for every one step forward that he might gain in the estimation of Amoedo and others. Thus, their efforts to approach him and to drill a little reason into his head and his seeming lack of response other than momentary may have convinced Amoedo and others of the futility of dealing with Castro and his government. If such views are conveyed convincingly to the other governments of Latin America, following the inevitable exchange of opinions in Habana by the various Latin American envoys, the results will be beneficial to our cause.

Some comments on the items in your letters: Smith is still interested in Cuba, no doubt about it, but has maintained commendable reserve until now; the Trujillo regime is deteriorating but the timetable is hard to know for sure; your caution in dealing with Rufo is well taken; Lobo will have to do the fanciest footwork of his rather fancy life it he is going to stay on top of his situation for the next few months; any fiddling that Lobo may have done with Cooley certainly has not been helpful, although the signs are now that some of Cooley’s intransigence is beginning to melt.

I note your statement in the letter of April 22: “I do not believe that there is the slightest chance of influencing Castro in any constructive way”. I agree. It would set us back if he attempted any conciliation effort at this time. It has been quite remarkable the way Fidel, Raul and company have anticipated our thinking and planning, as well as the possible role of the OAS which involves far more than just the United States. [2 sentences (3 lines) not declassified]

The campaign of legal harassment regarding Guantanamo is picking up, witness the recent note⁵ about their desire to capture the dollars earned by their employees there. They know this will be hard for us to swallow. The press yesterday reported that Castro had said he didn’t know when Ambassador Miro Cardona would be sent to Washington. Your comments on this would be interesting to have including whether it would seem to affect your position. Incidentally, I have the impression that Roa has been decidedly hard for you to see recently. This is hard to explain and is a matter we shall eventually have to face if my impression is correct and his inaccessibility continues.

We have heard one or two rumors about the possibility of a get-together between Castro and high officials of this government but nobody takes it seriously. We certainly would oppose it. I was interested in your tactics in dealing with Amoedo as set forth in your letter of May 4. I believe you are correct in handling him this way in view of the extent to which he has injected himself into our relations with Cuba. That letter’s last line was also interesting reading, “the rapid growth of domestic opposition”.

I want you to realize that we are fully aware of the difficulties under which you are working and admire the way you are handling one of the toughest assignments an American Ambassador has ever had. Billy joins me in sending warmest regards to you and Margaret.

Sincerely

R. R. Rubottom, Jr.⁶

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/5–460. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rubottom.

² Bonsal’s letters of April 22, May 2, and May 4 were not declassified. (ibid., 611.37/4–2260, 611.37/5–260, and 611.37/5–460, respectively) Regarding his letter of April 25, see Document 509. In his April 12 letter to Rubottom, Bonsal transmitted Amoedo’s account of a recent visit to Palm Beach, Florida, and his conversations there with former Ambassador Earl Smith and former Dominican Ambassador to the United States Porfirio Rubirosa. Bonsal reported Amoedo’s great concern, which Bonsal and other members of the Embassy shared, that Fidel Castro might be assassinated, “either by some of the people whose property and position he has destroyed or by the Communists, if they reach the conclusion that this would serve their purpose of creating further anarchy and confusion in Cuba.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–1260) In one of the April 14 letters, Bonsal reported that Lopez-Fresquet had asked the Embassy to smuggle him out of the country so he could meet with Cuban refugees in the United States to “gather into his own hands all of the reins” of the anti-Castro movement, a request to which Bonsal had been noncommittal. Bonsal said he viewed Lopez-Fresquet with “considerable suspicion” and questioned whether he had cut all his ties with Castro. (ibid., 611.37/4–1460) In the other April 14 letter, Bonsal described his recent conversation with Cuban sugar mill owner Julio Lobo, who spoke of the growing disenchantment of workers and farmers with the Castro regime and urged the United States to provide funds to reliable opposition elements. Lobo also said that he thought he had been able to persuade Congressman Cooley of his belief that any cut in the sugar quota would be a mistake. (ibid., 737.00/4–1460)

³ Not found.

⁴ Rubottom’s letter has not been found.

⁵ Not further identified.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

523. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann), Washington, May 31, 1960¹

Washington, May 31, 1960

Mr. Mann telephoned Mr. Rubottom to inquire about the Cuban-Russian oil deal which he planned to discuss with Secretary Anderson at Mr. Dillon’s request.

Mr. Rubottom said, first, there is a backlog of payments; however, this seems to be resolved to some extent in terms of U.S. companies principally. They have been instructed by the National Bank, by letter from Guevara, to purchase crude that would be delivered by the Soviets and run through their refineries. We have talked to them along the lines that this was a decision they would have to make, but that we would not have any objection to their turning the Cubans down on this if they felt they could. They are keeping an eye on each other. There is the problem of precedence which has been established in other places, such as Guinea, India, maybe Uruguay and Brazil.

Mr. Rubottom said he had the impression in recent weeks in talking to many of the oil people that they are pretty soft on this now. They discussed the angle of how this would affect the Venezuelans. They would probably react to it. Mr. Rubottom said that Perez Alfonso’s statement² was very understanding and sympathetic to this. He had said “we will sell crude elsewhere; we do not have anything to worry about.” That did not jibe very much with the tough position on the part of the companies.

In the same week Mr. Rubottom said he talked to Crossland, Derby and Pipkin of the Texas Co., and people from Standard who were down here on this matter, as well as Proudfit,³ and they were all tough-minded. Since that time Crossland and Derby went down and got some money on their backlog. They have a 90-day agreement and a letter from Guevara which said that the deal was off because they have not responded favorably to it.

Mr. Mann asked what we should do about it—let the companies decide what is best in their own interests? Mr. Rubottom replied he did not think we should tell them to go ahead and do it; on the other hand it would be worse to tell them not to do it. Mr. Mann agreed.

Mr. Rubottom said the meeting with Secretary Anderson this morning may have to do with a letter which came over to Dillon from Anderson enclosing a memorandum⁴ prepared by a committee headed by Lucius Clay. In that memorandum it was agreed we ought to get a tax on sugar to take care of the expropriated companies down there.

Mr. Mann said if we were to go all out to get Castro it would obviously be what we would do. What would the effect be in the other Latin American countries? He said we have to maintain a steady pressure and keep our motives well disguised in this business.

Mr. Rubottom said he thought the ground was paved for us to go ahead. The pressure can be a little more out in the open. We are at the point of having to cut back on the sugar legislation and are prepared to use this power. He said he would like to get the legislation through first and could see no reason why we shouldn’t move ahead hard and fast through bilateral approaches to them under GATT or other agreement procedures called for, in view of the unilateral action the Cubans have taken.

Mr. Mann said perhaps he should get something started in his shop. Mr. Rubottom indicated that the people in Mr. Mann’s shop are bound legalistically on this thing and we sometimes have a lot of trouble with them. Mr. Mann suggested starting seriously to consider the abolition of the tariff preference, to which Mr. Rubottom indicated this would be fine with him. Mr. Mann said he would get them started on it.

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (April–June) 1960. Confidential. Drafted by Dorothy W. Miller. Sent to CMA, CMA/C, and REA.

² Not further identified.

³ No records of these meetings have been found.

⁴ Not found.

524. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Washington, June 1, 1960.

Dear Phil: Our discussions about Cuba with the Secretary, Livie Merchant, and others—as well as the NSC discussions of the situation there—have made clear the firm decision of the Government to do everything possible to get the true, discrediting facts about the Castro regime into public information media in the other American Republics as well as to Latin American governments.

Underlying this concept is the belief that the wire services do not report on Cuban developments with sufficient depth and with sufficient creditability to influence Latin American opinion to the extent necessary and that an under-staffed diplomatic representation of Latin American countries in Habana also cannot be counted on to get the full story to their own governments. It is, therefore, essential that the United States, using the utmost discretion, play an active role in getting the facts to the rest of the hemisphere; otherwise we cannot expect the other American Republics to see the situation in the same light as we do.

As I believe you are aware, we long ago established a Task Force which has the primary task of coordinating the dissemination of unattributed information between the Department, the USIA, and another agency of the Government. In addition, we have now established within ARA a small section under Harry Sylvester (who succeeded Dick Cushing) to prepare and disseminate material on an unattributed basis through these channels on a daily basis. To date the efforts of the various agencies have, in my opinion, made an important contribution to the increasing realization in Latin America of what is actually going on in Cuba. We are generally satisfied with the trend of the public and governmental opinion in the area, but believe that this effort must be further accelerated if we are effectively to isolate Castro and to neutralize and counter the extensive propaganda effort which he, and the Communists on his behalf, are mounting everywhere. Perhaps the most important remaining task in this field is to dissolve or at least dilute the remaining pro-Castro sentiment among such groups as students and labor leaders. It is apprehension about the reaction of these pro-Castro elements that more than anything else inhibits governments from taking a more forceful anti-Castro line.

Your Embassy is expected to play an important role in this effort, especially by making available an adequate amount of information of low enough security classification to be used in unattributed ways. The Embassy has sent in many valuable reports which, however, are of such high classification that they cannot readily be used for this purpose. We also need, on a daily basis, usable information—including human interest material—which will illustrate what is actually going on in the universities, the militarization of labor, the cost of living, arrests, and violations of human rights, etc.

I would be grateful if you would take personal charge of this effort and assure that we have the material that we need to carry forward this part of our work, which I believe to be indispensable if we are to have the support of the American Republics in our policy. We have spoken here with the representatives of USIA and of the other agencies, and I am sure that you will find them more than willing to have their representatives play a full role in the project.²

Sincerely yours,

R. R. Rubottom, Jr.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (April–June) 1960. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Hill.

² 

In a June 10 letter to Rubottom, Bonsal wrote that he would be happy to cooperate and pointed out that “this type of information channeled through respectable Cuban sources or respectable Latin American sources is apt to be most effective—much more so than if it comes from United States sources, even unofficial.” Bonsal added:

“I believe that the WRUL programs with Vargas Gomez, Tony Varona and others are being useful. If it were possible to have these programs reproduced and circulated here on a clandestine hand-to-hand basis, this would be most valuable.”

Alongside this paragraph is written, apparently in Rubottom’s hand: “Good idea! Why not do it.” (ibid.)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

525. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

Action of U.S. Oil Companies (and Shell) in response to Cuban Demand to Process Russian Oil

Tom Mann and I went to New York yesterday to meet with representatives of Esso (N.J.), Texas, and Shell companies. This meeting evolved from a meeting of their representatives with Secretary Anderson on Tuesday,² at which Tom Mann was present, to discuss the problem posed for the companies by the Cuban demand that they process Russian crude in their refineries in Cuba, figures indicating that this might result in their obtaining up to 50 percent of their own commercial requirements in Cuba from Russian sources for the balance of this year.

Mr. Anderson made it clear that it would be in accordance with this government’s policy toward Cuba if the companies decided to reject the Cuban demand. He also stressed that they themselves would have to make this decision. This was in accord with the Department’s views previously decided.

However, Secretary Anderson also made 5 points to the companies which in the latters’ view lay the groundwork for their decision unfavorable to Cuba. The points are:

1. The oil industry in Cuba, i.e. all 3 companies would act in unison.

2. Their decision would be consistent with U.S. policy.

3. If the decision led to their ultimate expropriation, the U.S. government would support their being paid adequate, prompt and effective compensation, a prior memorandum to that effect being made available to them.

4. The U.S. government would make clear by statement or otherwise its belief that no other American oil companies should enter the Cuban market.

5. The U.S. government would also probably indicate its support of the position of the oil companies by communicating this position to the other governments in the hemisphere urging that they respect the U.S. views regarding Cuba’s action.

Complying with points 4 and 5 will require that this government take various steps, including public declarations as well as informal discussions with private companies and with the other governments in the hemisphere. I have concluded that the best way to provide a setting for the refusal of the companies to run the Russian crude through their refineries in Cuba is for the Department to make a strong statement, to be released this weekend, making clear our feelings about Cuban public vilification of the United States and economic discrimination against the U.S.

Mr. Mann and I will confer with Mr. Hager and suggest to the latter that he take the proper steps to bring the problem of the companies to the attention of the Justice Department. While the companies may be taking similar action, they have arrived at their decisions independently.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Files: Lot 78 D 287. Secret. Drafted by Rubottom. The source text bears the following handwritten notation by Rubottom: “Not forwarded. Hold for record purposes. Points covered by direct consultation between Rubottom & Mann, Mann and Dillon, and Rubottom & Secy. Herter. (last on 6/3)”.

² May 31. No record of this meeting has been found.

526. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Havana, June 6, 1960.

Dear Dick: It was indeed thoughtful of you to ask Tex Brewer, the Standard Oil of New Jersey representative here, to fill me in on certain developments of interest to me with regard to the Cuban policy of our Government. For the record and for your confirmation or correction, I am summarizing what Brewer told me—and I am adding some comments of my own which, of course, were not discussed with Brewer.

Brewer called on me at the residence at 3:00 p.m. Saturday, June 4. When I offered to show him the aide-mémoire delivered to the Cuban Government that morning² he told me that he had already seen it the previous afternoon in Washington. He read over my copy of the text and indicated that it seemed to him about the same as that he had read in your office.

From this I gather that the Department was already committed a good many hours before the Embassy received the text of the aide-mémoire to the publication of the document in the general form and on the date in question and that this fact was known to people outside our Government. In all modesty, I believe that we in the Embassy could have made useful suggestions as to the timing, content and drafting of this paper. But that is water over the dam.

Brewer told me that the aide-mémoire was part of a series of positive steps to be taken in our Cuban policy. (You had intimated as much to me in our telephone conversation that same morning—June 4.)³ He then discussed the policy that was worked out in Washington in the matter of the attitude to be assumed by the three foreign oil companies owning refineries here with respect to the refining of Russian crude acquired by Cuba in accordance with the trade agreement with the Soviets. The American companies are Esso and Texaco; Shell is British-Dutch.

Brewer stated that the policy of his company had been, on the assumption that the U.S. Government would take no stand in the matter, that it would be inevitable to refine the Russian crude as desired by the Cuban Government. The assumption, however, turned out to be contrary to fact. At a meeting held perhaps on June 3 in Secretary Anderson’s office with Tom Mann representing the Department and Mr. Barnes CIA,⁴ Texaco and Standard (Esso) were told by Secretary Anderson the following:

1. That a refusal on their part to refine Russian crude in Cuba would be consistent with over-all U.S. policy toward the Cuban Government.

2. That an agreement to make such a refusal by the American companies concerned would not be considered in violation of the U.S. anti-trust laws.

3. That if the Cuban Government were to intervene one of the American refineries to handle Russian crude, leaving the other to refine its own crude from its own sources, our Government would agree that the latter, without incurring any consequences from our anti-trust laws, could refuse to furnish any more crude from its own sources.

On the basis of this statement of U.S. Government policy, Standard (Esso) and Texaco have decided to refuse to refine Soviet crude.

The effect of the policy which the companies now plan to adopt of refusing to refine the Russian crude will be to present the Cuban Government with the alternative of either accepting the decision or of assuming full responsibility for the operation of the refineries and for the procuring of the necessary crude from Russian or other available sources.

Brewer added, however, that the Shell position is still being discussed at high levels in London with the British Government presumably involved. It is hoped that a reply from London will be received on Monday, June 6. In the event that Shell goes along with the refusal to refine Russian crude, the three companies will communicate their decision to the Cuban Government on that same day. If Shell does not go along with the refusal, it will then be necessary to reconsider the whole matter and Brewer will probably go to New York for the purpose.

Brewer showed me a draft of the letter which his company plans to send to Ché Guevara in the event refusal to refine Russian crude is agreed upon by all three companies. It is a well drafted, courteous document stressing that Esso has been in Cuba 78 years, that it has its traditional sources of petroleum in Venezuela, that it has been most cooperative in extending dollar credits for crude imports in the current exchange crisis and that it respectfully refuses to refine the Soviet crude offered by the Cuban Government.

Brewer, Morrison and I discussed briefly the situation as it may develop if the refusal is made. The Government will no doubt treat it as a serious challenge and a test of its strength as indeed it will be. Drastic measures can be anticipated since in the present temper of the Government there will be no moderating voices heard. I think the companies will be intervened and that the Government will make every effort to increase shipments of Russian crude. These are currently estimated at some 900,000 tons from June 1 to December 31 of this year, or about 45 per cent of the estimated refinery runs for the period. The Government will have to find 1,100,000 tons of crude from Russian and independent sources to make up for the lack of crude which the companies are supposed to furnish. The evidence on whether this can be done is conflicting. Normal stocks of crude in the country are the equivalent of 14 to 16 days supply. So the margin is not great.

It is my belief that the Government will try to meet the challenge to its authority “by imperialist oil companies backed by imperialist Governments” in drastic fashion. In addition to possible help from the U.S.S.R. or from the U.A.R. and perhaps others, the Government will, in my judgment, try to make of this a big popular, political issue under the “Patria o Muerte” slogan with rationing of gasoline and other petroleum products, intervention of service stations in addition to refineries, etc. We will hear a lot from the students, campesinos, workers and their militia.

On the other hand, this test of strength will not take place under wholly unfavorable circumstances from our point of view. I am sure that many people here will understand why, under present world circumstances, American refineries should refuse to accept crude from what are in effect enemy sources. The issue of Cuban involvement with the Communist world will be brought out with the greatest clarity. I am sure an overwhelming majority of Cubans oppose this. If any real hardships develop and persist, the Government will lose a good deal. On the other hand, if the Government manages to operate the refineries and to maintain an adequate flow of products, it will have gained a significant victory, comparable to that of Egypt when it demonstrated its ability to operate the Suez Canal. I doubt if the Government’s decision in the matter will be made on the basis of a cold appraisal of possibilities. Nationalistic emotions will predominate.

Brewer tells me that his company is encouraged by the Venezuelan Government’s attitude toward this matter. While Foreign Minister Arcaya favors the Cuban Government’s position on this and many other matters and pretends to regard the replacement of Venezuelan by Soviet crude as a matter of little importance, President Betancourt and Petroleum Minister Perez Alfonso are very displeased at the prospective loss of the Cuban market because of the Cuban-Soviet pact.

The outcome of this situation, if the refineries refuse to handle Russian crude, is hard to forecast. A number of highly complex political and technical factors are involved which have, I am sure, been carefully considered by our Government. I certainly hope for the best. A showdown is unavoidable if not on this issue, then on some other. Perhaps this is as good as any.

I hope that you will keep us as closely as possibly informed on our Government’s development of its Cuban policy. You, of course, will have to be the judge as to how far it is possible or desirable to get us into the decision-making stage of the various steps in what can be called the show-down phase. We may and perhaps do tend to exaggerate the degree to which we in the field can be useful in this respect.

There is, however, one point on which I am sure we are fully agreed. That is the importance of bearing constantly in mind the security of the lives of Americans in Cuba in connection with any drastic steps or statements we may be contemplating. You know as well as I do that our enemies are anxious to provoke an intervention on our part. As the Cuban Government’s position becomes more desperate, the temptation to cause a serious incident which could cause an act of force by us and thus identify the increasing difficulties of the regime or even its eventual fall with Yankee intervention will become greater all the time. Give us as much advance warning as you can of proposed steps and let us join with you in appraising their possible impact on the security of Americans in Cuba.

Sincerely yours,

Phil

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–660. Secret; Eyes Only.

² For text of the aide-mémoire, June 4, delivered to the Cuban Foreign Ministry protesting the Cuban Government’s “campaign of slander” against the United States, see Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1960, pp. 994–995.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Presumably the May 31 meeting; see supra.

527. Memorandum of a Conference, Department of State, Washington, June 7, 1960¹

Washington, June 7, 1960

SUBJECT

Cuban Situation: Meeting with Representatives of the National Foreign Trade Council

PARTICIPANTS

Representatives of the National Foreign Trade Council:

Mr. Harry Pike, H.H. Pike & Co., Chairman of NFTC Cuba Committee

Mr. John Akin, Secretary of the NFTC

Mr. M.L. Haider, Director of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey

Mr. Scott Thompson, Lone Star Cement Co.

Mr. James Stebbins, W.R. Grace & Co.

Mr. H.W. Balgooyen, Director and Executive Vice President, American and Foreign Power Co.

Mr. Jules Jourbert, Otis Elevator Co.

Mr. Folsom, General Counsel, United Fruit Co.

Department of State:

The Under Secretary

Mr. Dixon Donnelley, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary

Mr. R.R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

Mr. Harry R. Turkel, Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs

Mr. William A. Wieland, Director, Caribbean and Mexican Affairs

Mr. Edwin E. Vallon, Deputy Director, Caribbean and Mexican Affairs

Mr. Clarence W. Nichols, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs

Mr. Carl Norden, Chief, Trade Negotiations Branch

Mr. John M. Raymond, Deputy Legal Advisor

Mr. Fabian Kwiatek, Legal Claims Division

Mr. Robert A. Stevenson, Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs

Mr. Michael Balla, Trade Agreements Branch

Mr. Arthur Borg, S/S

After the exchange of amenities, Mr. Pike opened the discussion by stating that he would like to read a prepared memorandum² on behalf of the group. The Statement recalled the December 22, 1959 meeting with this same group³ and indicated that since that time Cuba has moved closer to Communism. It continued that Castro’s invitation and Khrushchev’s acceptance⁴ might have repercussions in Cuba immediately and in the rest of Latin America soon. The memorandum suggested that the United States might take the following steps:

1. Initiate some sort of import and export trade licensing to cripple the Cuban economy. Specifically mentioned were export controls on spare parts for vehicles and machinery.

2. The sugar bill. The group is in favor of the Administration’s proposal but believes that the President’s authority to change the quota should be limited to one year and that the bill should be made bipartisan.

3. A “White Paper” should be released whenever decisive action is taken by the United States.

4. The United States should utilize TV and radio broadcasting as a means of getting the truth to the Cuban people and countering Castro propaganda.

5. The NFTC group, through its associates in Latin America, may be in a position to help by convincing Latin American countries to take concerted action in the OAS should the Department so desire.

6. Plans must be made for a democratic Cuba to follow the present Cuban regime.

7. Time is of the essence, and it is running against the United States. The United States should take firm action—any conciliatory moves should initiate with the Cuban Government and should not be invited or encouraged by the United States.

Mr. Stebbins then commented that in his opinion the United States could do a great deal more in the TV and radio fields stating that it would be to our advantage to “go over the heads” of Cuban officials and take the truth to the Cuban people as Castro does. Mr. Dillon agreed on the importance of informing the Cuban people and added that Spanish language medium wave broadcasts are now emanating from Florida and shortwave broadcasts from Boston on station WRUL, paid for by Cuban exiles. He added that there is likely to be further and extensive action along this line.

Mr. Akin brought up the serious problem of remittances, which the Government of Cuba is making no systematic efforts to resolve. In reply to a question by Ambassador Turkel, Mr. Akin and other members of the group said that there appears to be no discrimination regarding remittances as far as the nationality of the creditor is concerned. They added that a few United States exporters are now on a current 90-day payment basis for this year, but that the large remittance backlog from 1959 has remained untouched.

Mr. Dillon explained that economic pressure alone would not achieve the desired objective in Cuba. He said that the Administration is prepared to accept a “one-year” sugar bill with the President having the authority to modify the quotas in our national interest. He stated that there is no reason to believe that the Administration’s bill is anything but bipartisan in nature. He then commented that some people on the House Agriculture Committee (one was later identified as Representative Cooley) want to delay the sugar bill and to obtain a one-year extension of the present law in order to be in a bargaining position on other agriculture bills coming up for action next year. In this connection, Mr. Dillon stated that members of the visiting group might be in a position to assist in obtaining the sugar legislation desired by the Administration. Mr. Pike asked if an appeal had been made to Mr. Cooley and his committee on patriotic grounds.

Mr. Rubottom commented that indeed it has on several occasions. He added that the vote in the Agriculture Committee on Mr. Cooley’s sugar bill was before the announcement of Khrushchev’s invitation to visit Cuba and before the June 4 United States note to the Cuban Government⁵ and observed that in the light of the above the prospect for the Administration’s bill now looks somewhat better.

Mr. Dillon stated that he did not want to indicate that any direct Government participation is contemplated in the field of radio broadcasting to Cuba, but wished to give his opinion that stronger action in that field may soon be forthcoming. He informed the group that the United States has no intention of making any conciliatory moves, indicating that last Saturday’s note to the Cuban Government made that clear. He also mentioned that the termination of the ICA technical assistance program in Cuba is indicative of our firmer policy and added that other action is under consideration. He stated that extreme measures could not be taken at this time without the support of Latin America.

Mr. Rubottom observed that Mr. Khrushchev’s invitation and the heating up of the cold war were useful in that they awakened the thinking Cubans and other Latin Americans to the menace of Castro’s Cuba. He said that Departmental officers have long recognized that we could not do business with Castro. He added that the Department also recognizes that this view was not always shared by many Latin Americans nor by many people in the United States. He stated that the Cuban picture might be changed by 1) unilateral intervention by the United States, 2) multilateral action by the OAS, and 3) direct action by the Cuban people. He emphasized that the third approach is by far the most desirable. He said that the United States is not going to stand by and watch a Communist state develop 90 miles from our shore. United States policy has served to identify Castro for what he is and to demonstrate that Castro is not going to cooperate with the United States or the OAS. He added that the interventionist policy of Castro in the rest of Latin America is helpful to our cause and commented that the Dorticos visit to Latin America has been a flop despite what has been said in Cuban publications.

In reply to Mr. Pike’s inquiry whether his group could be of assistance in Latin America, Mr. Dillon said that it might very well be useful but that any action should be only with the knowledge and approval of the American Ambassador.

Mr. Rubottom stated that Central America might offer an especially fertile area for these activities, particularly Honduras, Salvador, and Costa Rica. He also mentioned the Bogotá Charter provision relating to economic aggression⁶ and stated that there is a danger that Cuba could be expected to move against us in the OAS and UN should we unilaterally take any action which could be interpreted as economic aggression.

Mr. Thompson stated that he has spent 40 years in Cuba and feels that he knows the Cuban people. He said that the Cuban people are looking to the United States and do not understand how the United States can stand idly by while the USSR is establishing a Communist government 90 miles from the United States. They have approved of our policy of patience but feel that this policy is no longer valid. He estimates that Castro supporters now consist of only about 40 percent of the total Cuban population compared with at least 90 percent a year ago. Mr. Thompson feels that the United States can no longer shrink away at criticism and that we must pay the price of leadership rather than to lose respect because of a weak policy. He added that the Cuban people want nothing to do with former Batistianos nor will they support old-line professional politicians such as Tony Varona.

Mr. Turkel mentioned that he had headed a Task Force to investigate economic pressure that might be utilized against Cuba. The conclusion was that the only effective measure that could be taken concerned sugar and that the Administration, with the present Sugar Act, does not have the power to take the necessary action.

Concerning the future Cuban Government, Mr. Rubottom stated that until Latin Americans, and especially Cubans, can approach politics with reason, we will always have problems in Cuba and elsewhere. He stated emphatically that the United States Government is fully aware of the Communist menace. He also said that in our approach to the Cuban problem we have been fully conscious of the position of the Batistianos and politicians such as Tony Varona.

In response to Mr. Akin, Mr. Dillon said that we believe that about 30 percent of the resident Americans in Cuba have left. He stated that the United States has a flexible evacuation plan that can be placed in operation at any time it is needed. He mentioned that the alert phase of this plan has been in effect for some time and that American citizens would be notified if conditions worsen to the extent the United States feels that they should leave voluntarily and, of course, special plans for emergency evacuation of Americans exist.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–760. Confidential. Drafted by Torrey and approved in U on June 16.

² Not found.

³ See Document 412.

⁴ On June 4, the Soviet Government announced that Khrushchev had accepted an invitation to visit Cuba, but no dates were specified for the visit.

⁵ See footnote 2, supra.

⁶ Article 19; for full text of the agreement signed at Bogota on April 30, 1948, see 2 UST 2394.

528. Memorandum of Discussion at the 447th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 8, 1960¹

Washington, June 8, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles believed that Khrushchev’s agreement to visit Cuba was intended as a device to exploit Cuban hostility to the U.S. He did not know whether Khrushchev would actually come to Cuba but if he did come, the date might be July 26, the anniversary of the revolution. Khrushchev is probably waiting for invitations to visit other Latin American countries before setting a date for his visit to Cuba. Sino-Soviet Bloc trade missions and technicians are arriving in Cuba in large numbers. Two major U.S. oil companies, Esso and Texaco, as well as British Shell, have informed the Cuban Government that they will not process Soviet crude oil. The dependents of the U.S. employees of these companies have been evacuated. Cuba will probably take over the Cuban refineries belonging to these companies with a propaganda blast against the U.S. Cuba appears to be granting visas indiscriminately to Bloc nationals. The Bloc is probably preparing to supply arms to Cuba through Czechoslovakia. Castro may recognize Communist China at any time and it is reported that Chou En-lai has accepted an invitation to visit Cuba. Cuban labor and student delegations are visiting Peiping while a number of Cubans are in Communist China for training in military operations and agrarian reform.

President Dorticos visited Venezuela despite Betancourt’s efforts to discourage him. Throughout Latin America the reception of Dorticos on his recent visit was correct but cool. Mr. Dulles felt that on the whole Latin American countries found Castro’s meddling distasteful but were hesitant to criticize him because he appears to have some following in each Latin American country.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dillon said that the visit of President Dorticos had been unsuccessful. Dorticos had received a very cool reception. Despite this, the newspaper, Revolucion, in Havana had been printing stories about the triumphal progress of Dorticos, whose reception was alleged to have been more enthusiastic than that of President Eisenhower. The State Department was taking steps to send copies of these articles to the countries visited by Dorticos. The President asked whether any photographs of Dorticos’ reception had been obtained. Mr. Allen said that a number of photographs of Dorticos’ visit showed wide-open spaces where crowds were expected.

Mr. Dillon said that the sugar legislation, the one real weapon we have against Cuba, had been reported out of committee but was in unsatisfactory shape. However, since the legislation had been reported out of committee, Khrushchev had accepted an invitation to visit Cuba. He was hopeful that Representative Cooley would recede from his present position in the light of Khrushchev’s move.

The President wondered whether the U.S. would be able to tolerate the situation if the Soviet Union should have the temerity to conclude a mutual security treaty with Cuba, a development which might take place in view of Castro’s anxiety to make a deal with the USSR.

Mr. Gray then noted that an unfortunate error had been made by some officer in the Caribbean Command, who had sent an uncoded message which quoted classified State Department documents which referred to “possible U.S. moves against Cuba.” There was no indication as yet that Cuba had picked up this message, but it was not unreasonable to suppose that Castro has the message and is waiting for the dramatic moment to reveal it to the world. Mr. Dillon agreed that an unfortunate lapse of security had taken place. The message, quoting classified State Department documents, had been sent out over ordinary Western Union wires. The President said he was very much concerned about security leaks. He felt it might be necessary to determine the persons responsible for such leaks and bring them to trial. Mr. Douglas said a complete investigation was underway. The President said we should always try to forgive one mistake but someone should be made to pay for breaches of security. We were perhaps getting too soft in condoning such breaches. In making this statement he also had in mind speeches being made by various officials. Ten years ago a number of generals who had recently been making speeches would have been discharged from the service.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

The President said that during the last few months there had been an epidemic of difficulties—Cuba, Korea, Laos, Vietnam, Turkey, and Indonesia. It was discouraging to try to help various countries achieve stability and then find that the countries which received the most assistance became the most unstable. Mr. Dillon believed that education and improvement in the standard of living would not necessarily produce conservatism or stability.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on June 15.

529. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, White House, Washington, June 10, 1960¹

Washington, June 10, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

The next subject taken up by Mr. Herter was that of the OAS statement put out that day regarding Trujillo. He said it is now possible to go ahead with actions concerning Cuba. The President thought this was fine. He commented that this could be done within the OAS to the extent possible. Mr. Herter recalled that Prime Minister Beltran of Peru expressed great concern over the inroads being made by Castroism and Communism within labor and student groups in South America. The President agreed that Beltran had been quite alarmed at the penetration by Communism in these groups. He hoped the Peruvians would support action against Castro.

Mr. Herter next mentioned the problem regarding the Nicaro plant. We are in a position of being unable to ship out the nickel that is being mined and manufactured. We have to take some kind of action, and he thought the only thing we could do is to go ahead and close down the plant.

Mr. Herter next said that William Pawley has been working with a right-wing group of Cubans, including former Batista police. [2 sentences (4 lines) not declassified] The President asked Mr. Herter to call up Mr. Pawley and tell him to get out of this operation, [less than 1 line not declassified].

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared and initialed by Goodpaster on July 5. Other participants included Herter, Persons, Dillon, and Goodpaster.

530. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Washington, June 13, 1960.

Dear Phil: [Here follow comments about certain Cuban figures.]

With respect to your talk with Tex Brewer² I can well understand how you felt on learning what had transpired here. You are correct in assuming that the course of action had been laid out before you received the text of the Aide-Mémoire,³ and I do not challenge at all your modest suggestion that the Embassy might have helped in drafting the paper.

Actually, the die was cast at the meeting in Secretary Anderson’s office on June 3.⁴ Tom Mann had returned from Mexico that weekend and went into the meeting completely cold. I knew about the meeting only because Tom was good enough to call me a few minutes before he departed for it, and we did try to come up with a common line. Once the Anderson statement had been made, and the companies had agreed not to go along with the processing of Russian crude, we had to determine the best way to deal with a situation which would soon be de hecho.

Here my own views largely prevailed. Rather than react to the Cuban blast, which had to be expected when the government learned of the oil companies’ decision, I thought we ought to have a backdrop covering the whole gamut of our relations with Cuba so that the oil companies’ decision would come into better perspective. The statement was designed to serve as a backdrop and concomitantly to take the offensive in the light of Dorticos’ disgraceful attacks on us in his first 3 stops. I also thought that it would be helpful to us in the all out effort we are having to make to get the Administration’s version of the sugar bill, or at least a satisfactory compromise with the Cooley version. In this regard, I was glad to have your analysis on page 4 about some of the possible advantages that might flow from the decision that was taken. Incidentally, that decision was thoroughly ironed out with the Justice Department (Anti-Trust Division) and our own Legal Adviser.

Of course, we want the Embassy’s advice on Cuban policy and we undertake to obtain it wherever possible. You struck a particularly sensitive point with me in the final paragraph of your June 6 letter. The safety of Americans in Cuba practically never eludes my mind and conscience. While I thought that we could take the calculated risk that this decision involved, it was obvious that the Texas Company wanted to cut its own dependents down to the absolute minimum, and Esso has already been doing that. In fact, any American enterprise in Cuba should be quietly taking similar steps, it seems to me.

Wishing you all the best,

Sincerely,

R.R. Rubottom, Jr.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–660. Secret; Eyes Only.

² See Document 526.

³ See footnote 2, Document 526.

⁴ Apparently the meeting of May 31; see Document 525.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

531. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 85–2–60 Washington, June 14, 1960.

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

The Problem

To estimate likely developments in the Cuban situation over the next six months, with particular reference to prospects for Communist domination or control of the Castro regime.

Conclusions

1. Fidel Castro has replaced Batista’s military dictatorship with a radical-nationalist one which is deeply and increasingly influenced by Communists. There is no longer any prospect of democratic government under his regime. Castro remains the dominant leader of Cuba, and the revolution continues in large measure to be an expression of his own unruly and messianic personality. (Paras. 10–13)

2. Fidel Castro will almost certainly remain in power through 1960, unless he becomes incapacitated to such an extent as to be unable to exercise personal leadership. The opposition to his regime, though growing, is weak and divided and lacks a dynamic leader. Should Fidel Castro depart the scene, a crisis probably would develop in a short time. Raúl Castro and “Che” Guevara would probably seek to carry on, but disaffected elements would almost certainly make a bid for power and there is a better than even chance that the country would be thrown into a period of widespread disorders and bloodshed. (Paras. 25–27, 47–50)

3. The economic situation, although deteriorating in some sectors, has improved in others, and we do not foresee its causing serious political problems this year. The outlook for private investments remains poor in view of the ever-present threat of expropriation and the increasing degree of state direction of the economy. (Paras. 28–38)

4. We are unable to answer the simplified question “Is Castro himself a Communist?” Communists are deeply involved in the remodeling of Cuba—more so than in Guatemala in 1954—and the country has become a base for Communism in Latin America. Clearly Castro regards the Communists as helpful and reliable allies in achieving his objectives; Communists and their supporters are in positions of importance throughout the revolutionary government. Given the mutuality of interest between the Castro regime and the Cuban Communists, it is difficult, and in most respects academic to try, to distinguish the policy and actions of the Castro regime from those which would be expected of a government under actual Communist control in the present circumstances in Cuba. This situation will almost certainly persist so long as Fidel Castro and his associates remain in power. Indeed, the outlook is for Castro’s increased dependence on Communists and they will continue to be able to make many decisions and take many actions without consulting him. If this trend continues, the Communists will gain de facto control of the Castro regime, and are² near this point now. (Paras. 9, 14–19, 22–24, 51)

5. For the next six months or so, however, it appears unlikely that the Communists will have the desire to make a bid for overt power or the necessary strength to maintain it. We believe that the Communists will avoid moves which would place Cuba demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement within the meaning of the Caracas resolution. (Para. 52)

6. Recognition of additional Bloc governments, including Communist China, is likely, and Cuba will probably support the seating of that country in the UN this fall. Bloc aid, probably including the provision of some military equipment, is likely to grow. The Bloc would almost certainly continue economic aid to Cuba and would probably increase the level of aid if US action, governmental or private, threatened to affect adversely the Cuban economy. (Paras. 38, 40–41, 55–56)

7. We foresee no significant change in Cuban foreign policy over the next six months or so. Castro will almost certainly continue his bitter and vociferous hostility against the US, and accuse both the US Government and US business interests of attempts to destroy the Cuban revolution. Through a series of actions and reactions, this anti-US campaign might come to involve a demand for US withdrawal from Guantanamo, a rupture of diplomatic relations, or danger to the lives of American citizens in Cuba. He will almost certainly continue his extensive propaganda and proselytizing activities in Latin America, seeking thereby to undermine Western Hemisphere solidarity, to reduce US influence in Latin America, and to replace unfriendly governments with ones more closely oriented to his own. He would probably sponsor armed intervention in the event of the fall of the Trujillo regime or other favorable opportunities. Cuba will probably become increasingly isolated and suspect vis-à-vis the other Latin American and most African and Asian governments. (Paras. 39, 42–46, 53–54)

[Here follow paragraphs 8–65, which discuss the political situation, the economy, foreign policy, and the outlook for Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and The Joint Staff participated in the preparation of the estimate. Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on June 14. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction.

² The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State would substitute “may be” for “are.” [Footnote in the source text.]

532. Notes on the Discussion at the Special Meeting of the National Security Council, White House, Washington, June 22, 1960, 2:30–3:15 p.m.¹

Washington, June 22, 1960, 2:30–3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Richard M. Nixon, Vice President; Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC; Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State; Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense; Leo A. Hoegh, Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization; Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General; General Wilton B. Persons, Assistant to the President; Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State, Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury; General C.P. Cabell, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Richard M. Bissell, Col. J.C. King, and J.D. Esterline

1. Following a briefing on Cuba by General C.P. Cabell, USAF, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, members of the National Security Council discussed for approximately 20 minutes national policy vis-à-vis Cuba.

2. Vice President Nixon queried the Department of State as to the progress made in organizing support of the U.S. position on the Cuban issue from other member states of the OAS. Secretary Herter responded that although considerable efforts had been expended it appeared unlikely that the heads of state of other Latin American countries, with few exceptions, are willing to take a strong anti-Castro position. Mr. Herter explained that this reluctance apparently stems from a fear of strong pro-Castro elements in the respective countries which might upset the political balance of power should a strong anti-Castro position be adopted by the government.

3. The Vice President said the most disturbing effect of the CIA intelligence briefing was that section of the report that indicated that Cuba’s economic situation had not deteriorated significantly since the overthrow of Batista. Mr. Nixon asked what specific measures could be taken by the U.S. which would result in placing greater economic pressure on Cuba. Secretary Anderson and Under Secretary Dillon responded to this question. Three specific measures were suggested:²

a. Amendment of the preferential sugar quota act to provide for a reduction from 20 to 25 per cent of Cuba’s quota. This quota would then be redistributed to other Latin American sugar-producing countries.

b. Application by the U.S. of the “Trading with the Enemy Act”.³ Secretary Anderson stated that it was important that American refineries in Cuba maintain their firm refusal to refine Soviet oil. It was important that Cuba be denied tankers to move the oil because neither the Soviets nor Cuba have individually or collectively sufficient tankers to move the quantity of oil required to meet Cuba’s needs. Cuba should also be denied any U.S. assistance in refining the oil and we should boycott the refined Soviet oil products. For example, it was suggested that American airlines should refuse to use Soviet oil and oil by-products on the premise that they were of improper grade or not adequate in terms of octane.

4. Secretary Anderson stated that a basic question had to be answered before any economic warfare action should be taken; i.e., it must be agreed that we are prepared to go the whole way in economic action before we undertake any action. He specifically referred to tariffs, sugar quotas, and oil. Mr. Anderson said that time is on the side of the Cubans and, therefore, if we are going to do anything we cannot delay. Secretary Anderson also indicated that discreet economic cooperation with U.S. interests should be possible. Reference was made to recent discussions with major U.S. oil producers. Secretary Herter remarked that sections 15 and 16 of the OAS Charter⁴ make such actions somewhat difficult and that we must be most careful to properly disguise these actions. Vice President Nixon emphasized that the time has come to take strong, positive action to avoid becoming labeled “Uncle Sucker” throughout the world. He referred to incidents which have taken place in other areas of the world recently, and said they have not gone unnoticed in Latin America.

5. Secretary Gates suggested that we might consider greater mutual assistance to certain Latin American nations, possibly giving bonuses to those which have been particularly cooperative. Vice President Nixon commented that he did not think we should give more arms to Latin America. Secretary Anderson said it is of the utmost importance that we firm up our position on mutual security in Latin America. He made reference to the fact that Fidel [Raúl?] Castro will soon be visiting the Soviet Union and a Soviet-Cuban mutual assistance pact could emerge from this visit. Vice President Nixon replied that it is essential that we do something on mutual security before the fact. He said that a statement should be made by the President within the next day or so along the lines that a mutual security assistance pact between Cuba and the Soviet Union would be regarded as an “intrusion” in the Latin American area. The Vice President agreed with Secretary Anderson’s position vis-à-vis economic warfare saying that if we are going to do anything, we should do everything or nothing.

6. Mr. Gordon Gray said that Khrushchev apparently is trying to get an invitation to Cuba in the near future. He asked whether anything could be done to block this. Secretary Herter replied that an effective method would be to deny Khrushchev invitations from other Latin American countries because it seemed apparent that invitations from other countries would figure heavily in Mr. Khrushchev’s decision to visit Cuba.⁵

7. Secretary Herter referred to General Cabell’s briefing and asked whether any action should be taken by the Department in Latin America or throughout the world to play up the identity of the newly-formed Cuban “Frente”. There was general agreement that this should not be done at the present time since close identification with the United States would be counterproductive. It was stressed that members of the Frente are fairly well-known in Cuba and Latin America and should be able to stand on their own.

Note: While the foregoing does not go into minutia of the policy discussion, I believe it does cover basic points and positions taken by the people making these points.

Jacob D. Esterline⁶

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, NSC Special Meetings. Secret. The notes were made by Esterline and were included in his June 25 memorandum to Gordon Gray. The time and place of the meeting are taken from an unsigned, undated memorandum, which summarized the decisions reached at the meeting and included a slightly different list of participants. It also noted that Gordon Gray subsequently informed the President of “the nature of the discussion” at the meeting. (ibid., Records of the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs)

² Only subparagraphs a and b follow.

³ For text, see 50 USC Appendix 1.

⁴ Signed at Bogota, April 30, 1948; for text, see 2 UST 2394.

⁵ Attached to the source text is a June 29 memorandum from Gray to Lay in which Gray notes:

“With respect to the attached I believe that Item 6 is somewhat inaccurate. As I recall it, I said that in connection with Khrushchev’s invitation to visit Cuba it was apparent that his going to Cuba would be largely dependent upon whether he could get invitations from other Latin American countries. I expressed the view that most Latin American countries had indicated they would not issue invitations but there seemed to have been some reason for concern about Mexico. It was then expressed by Colonel King that recent word gave us greater reassurance with respect to Mexico. Secretary Herter stated that we were doing everything we could to encourage other Latin American countries to deny invitations to Khrushchev.”

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature

533. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 23, 1960¹

Washington, June 23, 1960

SUBJECT

The Cuban Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia, British Embassy

Lord Hood, British Embassy

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

ARA:CMA—Mr. Robert Stevenson, Cuban Affairs

After a discussion of disarmament problems, Secretary Herter called to the attention of Ambassador Caccia the news ticker report of the recent pronouncement by the new Cuban opposition organization know as the Frente Revolucionario Democratico which was issued in Mexico. He indicated to the Ambassador our interest in the fact that opposition to the Castro regime has at last coalesced to this degree. He pointed out that the signers are all well-known in Cuba as anti-Batista figures who had at one time supported the Castro Government. Ambassador Caccia asked if the Secretary feels that this opposition movement might soon be able to bring pressure to bear on the Castro regime—if we feel that Castro might soon be toppled. The Secretary said that it is too soon to expect this but that the formation of the group is a most encouraging development. [3 sentences (5½ lines) not declassified]

Mr. Dillon observed that we also share this concern and would hope for British support in the U.N. should the Cubans eventually try to make a case there. Ambassador Caccia said he hoped our representative in the U.N. might work closely with the British representative there and inform him of our desires as to how to handle a possible Cuban approach through the United Nations. For example, would we want support in urging that the question be referred back to the OAS as the proper regional body? The Under Secretary said we can’t tell as yet, because we don’t know how the Cubans will play their cards, but would appreciate British support. The Secretary expressed his fear that the OAS is not a very strong arm on which to lean, that although the Latin American Governments would like to see Castro kicked out they are not yet ready to support us publicly on this point.

Ambassador Caccia said that he would like to get the Secretary’s views with regard to the situation of the petroleum companies in Cuba. He inquired whether the U.S. Government wants the companies to withhold crude shipments or does it consider that there is still some possibility of the companies working out an agreement with Castro. The Secretary said that he was gratified at the present firm position being maintained by the companies and hopes they will hold steadfast, that should the refineries be seized and companies stop shipments of crude, it will raise a considerable problem for Castro. The Under Secretary said that with regard to an agreement, if Ambassador Caccia means should Castro back down, then we would probably have no objection. This though, seems unlikely and while an oil shortage alone might not topple Castro, we would not be unhappy if it should have this result. Should the USSR have to supply all of Cuba’s petroleum needs it would require about one tanker per day from the Black Sea, a long haul. Ambassador Caccia inquired as to the possibility of oil from other sources. The Secretary observed that this is, of course, possible but that the Venezuelan Government has given evidence that it would not look with favor on Russian crude going to Cuba and would therefore probably not condone shipments by independents at the expense of present producers.

The Secretary expressed agreement with Ambassador Caccia’s suggestion that should he encounter the press upon leaving the Secretary’s office he would state that they had been talking about disarmament problems.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–2360. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson and approved in U on July 9 and in S on July 15.

534. Editorial Note

On May 20, Assistant Secretary Rubottom sent identical letters to the Ambassadors in Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico asking their views about establishing a special channel with the Presidents of the countries to which they were accredited to ensure a continuing high-level exchange of information about the situation in Cuba. Copies of the letters are in Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba (January–June) 1960.

On June 23, Rubottom’s Special Assistant, John C. Hill, sent a memorandum to Rubottom and Deputy Assistant Secretary Mallory to which was attached a summary of the replies received from the various Ambassadors. These included all except Ambassador Beaulac in Buenos Aires. Hill noted that the Chiefs of Mission in general preferred “existing channels, some of which are being especially utilized for the Cuban situation.” In the attached summary, Hill noted:

“From the answers received, all but Mexico have already in effect a ‘pipeline’ with a top Foreign Office official, and some might possibly set up a further, top-level exchange media if desirable and necessary. However, Ambassador Woodward says he feels at this time that to ‘organize’ a liaison on the Cuban question would be definitely undesirable; Ambassador Howe makes the same statement.

“Mr. Cale, reporting from Mexico for Ambassador Hill, says Minister Tello has privately stated that the Cuban situation is a problem for the U.S. —not for Mexico. Mexico’s position is now increasingly one of benevolent neutrality and it is doubtful that the Minister would accept such a suggestion for a special channel. However, direct contacts between the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister, and between Embassy officers and ranking Mexican officials, is considered the best way to handle the Cuban problem at present.”

Copies of the various replies, Hill’s memorandum, and the attached summary are ibid. Rubottom indicated on Hill’s memorandum that he approved Hill’s offer to draft a reply to the Ambassadors leaving it up to their discretion as to what channels to use, but to urge them, particularly in the near future, “to give the highest priority to the Cuban situation.” A handwritten note in the margin indicates that the reply was not drafted.

535. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 27, 1960.

SUBJECT

United States Policies toward Cuba

Almost one year ago the Department decided,² along with CIA, that it would be impossible to carry on friendly relations with the Castro Government in Cuba and that, as a consequence, we should devise means to help bring about his overthrow and replacement by a government friendly to the United States. This decision has been implemented by (1) cooperating to the minimum extent possible with the Cuban Government while undertaking to maintain a facade of relations with it, (2) tolerating Castro in his anti-U.S., extremist statements and actions while he revealed his true colors to the world, and (3) covertly supporting the build-up of anti-Castro elements. Castro’s hostility toward the U.S. Government and his unwillingness to cooperate with U.S. private companies has driven him to seek arms, raw materials, including oil, and economic assistance from whatever source available, principally the communist bloc.

There was undoubtedly a predisposition favorable to communism on the part of many of Castro’s most trusted advisers, and perhaps Castro himself; the whole Castro page in history conceivably could represent a dramatic high point in the international communist conspiracy with Castro himself as a communist tool.

Officials in the various agencies who have been given responsibilities in connection with Cuba need to be constantly aware of the desirability, indeed the necessity if we are not to lose incalculably through destruction of the U.S. image as a defender of the principle of non-intervention, of permitting our policy to come to fruition. This will require more time. The identification of Castro with communism has spurred the growth of anti-Castro feeling in Cuba. Leading Cuban dissidents are now organizing outside of Cuba as well, and we have reason to hope that their strength will reach such proportions as to bring about his downfall, perhaps within a period of months. This would be the most desirable end to the Castro menace, assuming that he is replaced by elements friendly to the U.S.

Additional time is also necessary, however, to permit the ripening of the anti-Castro feeling in the rest of the Americas. This is vital since we shall have to turn to the OAS for action against Cuba if the Cuban dissidents should prove incapable of ousting Castro. Ambassador Dreier has prepared some comments on the general posture of the OAS toward Cuba (Tab A).³ In my opinion, the situation in the Americas is moving rapidly and favorably from our standpoint.

Meanwhile, our own attitude toward Cuba has perceptively shifted in the last few days, as the New York Times noted yesterday. Last Monday I made a public statement identifying the Castro revolution with international communism. On Wednesday you supported the Administration version of the sugar legislation which would authorize the President to cut the Cuban sugar quota.⁴ It is widely known that we are now prepared to use such authority. The U.S. oil companies have refused to run Russian crude through their refineries in Cuba, and it is generally known that this action was taken with the approval of the U.S. Government. A Cuban delegation, headed by the Minister of Agriculture, is arriving today to negotiate the possible purchase by Cuba of the Nicaro nickel installation. There is one report that the Cuban Government does not actually want to take over the plant at this time and may be prepared to allow the U.S. to continue operating the plant with a 5%, instead of 25%, export tax as called for under a present Cuban mining law. This would be a decided pulling in of horns by Cuba, but we certainly do not intend to agree to a sale of the Nicaro properties on anything other than a satisfactory basis, which is almost unthinkable in view of our relations with Cuba today.

As far as our broad commercial relations with Cuba are concerned, Mr. Mann is now undertaking at Mr. Dillon’s request to prepare a definitive set of recommendations regarding our bilateral trading arrangements, our mutual commitments under GATT, and other aspects involved in our trading relationships with that country. These will also presumably include references to the possibility of export controls, exchange restrictions and other steps that might be taken short of the full application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, and also the application of that Act itself.

How do we deal with Cuba at this critical juncture? How do we satisfy those who would demand “action”? The situation is moving satisfactorily, in my opinion. We should maintain a steady hand and not be panicked into some extreme step which would suddenly give Castro the chance to appear to be the victim of economic or other aggression. (Most commentators are “excusing” us for planning to cut the Cuban sugar quota.) This may mean that the Cuban Government may next intervene the U.S.-owned oil refineries; it may intervene or expropriate the U.S.-owned utility companies; it may be driven to expropriating the sugar mills. In these instances, and if we refrain from any extreme overt retaliation, we would be the aggrieved party. When the judgment day comes, as I believe it will in the not too distant future, we should be able to obtain adequate, just and effective compensation for the expropriated properties at the very least, or possibly even to resume our traditionally close, commercial ties with Cuba, both in the private and public sector.

Security in the execution of our various programs relating to Cuba should be stressed continually. I am deeply concerned at the number of people in official Washington and elsewhere who are talking about these programs. All officials involved in discussions relating to Cuba should be cautioned to place the most stringent security on their work.

For your information there are attached the following papers:⁵

(a) OAS posture.

(b) Build-up of Anti-Castro Elements.

(c) Cuban Bilateral Relations.

(d) U.S.-Cuban Relations.

Sugar

Oil

Nicaro

Economic agreements

Possible counter measures

(e) NIE—June 14, 1960.

(f) My statement before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Latin America.

(g) The OAS and Possible Soviet-Cuban Military Collaboration.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–2760. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom and initialed by Rubottom and Herter.

² Reference may be to the policy recommendations set forth in Document 376 and the attachment thereto or to the decision alluded to in footnote 3, Document 419, but for which no other record has been found.

³ Not printed.

⁴ For text of Rubottom’s June 20 statement before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, see Department of State Bulletin, July 11, 1960, pp. 60–64. For text of Herter’s June 22 testimony, see Extension of the Sugar Act of 1948 as Amended. Hearings before the House Committee on Agriculture, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960).

⁵ Attachments a, b, c, d, f, and g are not printed. For text of NIE 85–2–60 of June 14, see Document 531.

536. Memorandum of a Conference, Department of State, Washington, June 27, 1960¹

Washington, June 27, 1960

SUBJECT

Questions Concerning the Program of Economic Pressures against Castro

PARTICIPANTS:

The White House

Mr. Gordon Gray

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.

Treasury Department

Secretary Anderson

Defense Department

Secretary Gates

State Department

The Secretary

Under Secretary Dillon²

Under Secretary Merchant

Assistant Secretary Mann

Assistant Secretary Rubottom

Assistant Secretary Smith

Mr. Hager, Legal Adviser

Mr. Charles Bohlen

Mr. Edwin Martin

Mr. L.D. Mallory

Mr. Robert A. Stevenson

Agriculture Department

Under Secretary Morse

Central Intelligence

General Cabell

Col. J.C. King

The Secretary opened the meeting by referring to the list of questions which Mr. Gray had prepared (copy attached) with regard to the above subject. Concerning questions (1) and (2), it was the consensus of the group that the President has given his decision and authorization, in his approval of a program for Cuba on March 14 [17], 1960,³ for the institution of economic pressures against the Castro regime. The Secretary then turned to the matter of sugar legislation and suggested that we should consider how far it can be used as (1) a straight political weapon and (2) from the standpoint of economic practicability. He indicated his understanding that the Department of Agriculture feels that 500,000 tons is the biggest possible cut which should be considered, and inquired, should we cut the quota, will we be able to buy an equivalent amount on the world market? Under Secretary Morse said that he was not aware of a final position with regard to the amount of a cut but that in general he would presume that any cut will have to be allocated to quota countries and there is a question whether they can supply the entire amount required. The Secretary observed that this point would seem to require further study before a decision is taken on the amount to be cut. He added that it is difficult to see how we can do very much to affect the Cuban situation with only the sugar legislation.

Secretary Anderson agreed with the Secretary that sugar legislation alone, that is a cut in the quota, would not necessarily correct the Cuban situation. He expressed the view that we are faced with a situation in which a communist country is taking over American properties, and drew an analogy with the situation in Iran where, when Mosadegh took over the Abadan refinery, Great Britain refused to buy the Abadan product and asked the rest of the world to go along, which it did, and in the end to offset the USSR threat it was possible to work out agreement whereby the refinery was purchased by various interested parties including the Government of Iran. He considers that the same crime is taking place in Cuba today only of a far greater magnitude. The fundamental problem in Secretary Anderson’s view is whether the U.S. Government is ready to levy all of the economic measures in its possession to bring pressure against the Castro regime. He thinks one, or two, or three tough steps would be a great mistake unless the U.S. Government is prepared to go all the way. Castro would figure that one tough step or two tough steps would certainly be followed by additional actions, and assuming that Castro is an intelligent man, which we must assume, he will find out ways to solve the problems which are presented by our actions. Unless we go all the way, in six or eight months he can pick up the slack, judging, as we must, that he will receive the cooperation of the USSR. Secretary Anderson asked is it worth the candle to take partial steps. At the same time he expressed his opinion that if we clamp down the screws now we must be prepared to accept sugar rationing and should prepare the American people for this necessity. The President might have to declare a state of emergency under which action could be taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act which would virtually freeze all trade between Cuba and the United States. He inquired if the group feels the time has come to say to the President that we should cut off all economic support to Cuba. He expressed his view that the reaction in Latin America would probably not be serious. On the other hand, it is his opinion that if we are going to nibble we will have all of the bad reaction and none of the good.

The Secretary said that we must consider carefully what we may get as a substitute for Castro and the matter of timing is extremely important. However, he expressed agreement with Secretary Anderson that nibbling is no good; that we should either take actions which will hurt or leave well enough alone. He inquired of General Cabell as to how things are in his area. General Cabell indicated general satisfaction. Secretary Anderson asked General Cabell if he felt that lowering the economic boom on Castro would be helpful. General Cabell indicated that the Castro Government does not appear to be under serious economic pressure at the present time and that concerted economic pressure is indeed necessary. Colonel King voiced his agreement with this view and added that there is increasing fear among the Cuban population which an act like this on the part of the U.S. would tend to assuage. It would give important moral as well as material support to the growing opposition within Cuba.

Mr. Rubottom referred to the Secretary’s statement on sugar legislation which in his opinion well signifies the present attitude toward the Castro regime. As for our awareness of the communist menace, he referred to his own recent statement before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.⁴ He described to the group some of the pending actions which are now being considered, including the fact that draft notes have been prepared indicating the desire of the U.S. Government to terminate the 1902, 1934 and GATT agreements. He expressed agreement that we should plan to throw the economic book at the Cubans and pointed out that a 500,000 ton cut in the sugar quota means in effect no more sugar to the United States this year. He stressed that we must be prepared for the intervention of the oil companies and probably shortly thereafter the take-over of the electric power and telephone companies. He described the importance of getting the Cuban opposition into an active functioning role around the hemisphere in order that not all of the anti-Castro attitude shall be polarized in the United States. He expressed the hope that it perhaps would not be necessary to invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act at this time as he does not feel that it would be helpful, and inquired whether it might not be done quietly as at the time of Suez.

Secretary Anderson said that this might be possible as no direct citation was made to this Act at the time of Suez but that in order to take over Cuban property and block Cuban assets in the United States the legal authority of this Act will be needed. The Department of Commerce would have to set up export controls and various licensing arrangements. He expressed the opinion that the group seemed to be in general agreement that we should take all or none. He urged that time-wise the faster, the better. The Cubans are now in trouble over their petroleum situation, and we should not delay in following up on this situation.

The Secretary inquired of Mr. Hager as to his views on the legality of the proposed invocation of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Mr. Hager said that we can certainly take the actions described by the Secretary of the Treasury under the authority of this Act, but he is not very optimistic about any possibility of concealing the fact that we are acting under this authority. With reference to Mr. Rubottom’s idea that we should proceed with notification to the Cuban Government that we desire to cancel our bilateral trade agreements, he observed that the agreement of 1902 requires a year’s notice and that of 1934 six months notice—that obviously these agreements cannot be gotten out of the way quickly. Mr. Rubottom remarked that, nevertheless, these agreements do have importance as a facade and in his opinion the U.S. Government should not appear to be in a position of tearing them up as if they were scraps of paper. It is important that the U.S. Government maintain its dignity and that any action which it may take should not be as a result of a stampede or panic; it should be, rather, a relentless, firm pressure, a steady turning of the screw, in a spirit of lamentation and sorrow rather than anger. Secretary Anderson said that he agrees that we should try to use economic bullets rather than real ones. However, he expressed his strong feeling that the President ought very soon to make a positive statement that, should Cuba sign a mutual security agreement with the USSR the Government of the United States would view such an act as a threat to the safety of the western hemisphere. In his view this would lay a clear course for a harder policy line should the Cubans proceed with such a step despite this warning. The Secretary expressed the thought that such a statement should be based on some bigger doctrine or broader base than the mere signing of a mutual security agreement. Secretary Gates remarked that he had received an intelligence report that morning that there is a possibility that Raul Castro will proceed from Prague to Moscow to negotiate a mutual security agreement to be announced on July 26.

Mr. Rubottom observed that should we proceed at this time with unilateral intervention it would turn the clock back 27 years. In his view the group should recognize that it would cause incalculable loss in the hemisphere, he referred to a recent conversation with former Assistant Secretary Henry Holland⁵ who was emphatic in his view that the U.S. Government should avoid as far as possible being cast in the role of aggressor against Cuba—that should this happen it will set back the U.S. in its Latin American policy and hurt our investments in Venezuela and elsewhere in the hemisphere. As to Secretary Anderson’s query whether we shall permit the Cubans to take American properties and sit here and take it, he observed that the Department has worked for over a year to set up Castro for a knock-out and would regret very much should we be stampeded at this time. Secretary Anderson queried whether Mr. Rubottom is of the opinion that Castro is, indeed, in the process of falling on his face. He added that his guess is that time is completely on Castro’s side. If the U.S. lets Castro announce USSR support, will this not give him important strength both domestically and in the hemisphere? The Secretary observed that should Castro do this it might rather aid us in making a good case with the rest of the countries of the hemisphere. Mr. Gray observed that, is there not a question as to what we might say privately in the OAS and what we must say now publicly? Secretary Anderson added, and what do we say now to the Europeans?

Mr. Rubottom stated that our European allies are pretty well convinced of the correctness of the U.S. position vis-à-vis Castro. They have cooperated reasonably well on our arms policy and the British have been cooperating very well in the current oil situation. Secretary Gates asked Mr. Rubottom what his reaction would be if Castro comes back from the USSR and announces a mutual security agreement or some form of agreement permitting Russian bases in Cuba. In his own view he had heretofore considered that such a step might be on the whole good in that it would clearly delineate Castro’s position before the eyes of the world and the hemisphere. However, more recently he has begun to wonder and to try to assess what the impact might be. Mr. Rubottom said that he agreed with Secretary Gates that such action by Castro would be yet another step down the lane which was begun with the Mikoyan visit and now followed by the announcement of the Khrushchev visit and Castro’s visit to Moscow. Such acts tear the mask from Castro’s face and show him for the commie stooge that he is. If this clear communist course which Castro has set does not unite the hemisphere and the Cuban opposition, if we are not successful in our efforts to educate and persuade hemispheric opinion, then we may very probably have to do the job ourselves but at great cost. Secretary Anderson inquired whether in Mr. Rubottom’s opinion the U.S. Government could get OAS support. Mr. Rubottom thinks not. The Secretary expressed his agreement with Secretary Anderson that he considers OAS support for joint action against Cuba very doubtful and that, should the U.S. ask for it and not get it, the OAS might be busted up higher than a kite. Secretary Anderson added that in case of failure some of our friends in the OAS would not just get kicked out of office; some might very well get shot as a result of this gambit. He feels that the issue must be considered on the basis of doing it ourselves (at the possible risk of a set-back of 27 years of effort) or to get behind a group which is trying to overthrow Castro and seek at the same time support from the OAS.

General Cabell observed that we have two things (1) the Governments and (2) the people. The Governments know the danger of Castro and his revolution but fear to stand up and be counted in public. The people remain impressed by Castro’s apparent success and have not yet been disillusioned. Mr. Rubottom observed, however, that there is a change now taking place among the lower classes as well. He agreed, nevertheless, that the position of Government leaders is weak in many cases and cited the instance of the Peruvian Foreign [Prime] Minister Beltran, who had the nerve to tell the Secretary and the President⁶ of the Castro danger and then found himself in the embarrassing position of having to admit that he did not know of the Peruvian invitation extended to the Cuban President Dorticos until the day before Dorticos was due to arrive in Peru.

Mr. Rubottom recommended that we move ahead on controls step by step, increasing the pressure steadily. Secretary Anderson returned to his argument that blocking Cuban assets would be a very powerful weapon. The Secretary inquired of him as to what assets there might be. Secretary Anderson said that there are not many physical or cash assets in the form of bank accounts since the Cuban Government has moved most of its funds to the Bank of Nova Scotia in Canada. Under the type of action he envisages the U.S. Government would freeze all Cuban public accounts, probably leaving private accounts free. However, the principal effect of action under the Trading with the Enemy Act would be that we would not buy Cuban sugar. In other words, the Cubans would have nothing more to sell, we would institute import and export controls, and the effect on Cuban credit in third world countries, except perhaps for the Bloc countries, would be extremely drastic.

The Secretary inquired whether the Trading with the Enemy Act, should it be invoked, have to be done under the Korean emergency? Mr. Hager indicated that the Korean emergency is still in effect and would presumably serve. Secretary Anderson said that, if not, perhaps the President would have to declare another special one with respect to Cuba. Mr. Merchant observed that it would be important to distinguish between private bank accounts and public accounts in that he felt certain the majority of the private bank accounts in this country would belong to persons whose support we would need to maintain; that is persons opposed to the Castro regime. There was general agreement on this point.

Mr. Rubottom said that action taken which might be based on the communist danger and threat in Cuba and to the hemisphere is a much better basis on which to place our cause than U.S. economic interests in Cuba. As to the possibility of utilizing this approach in the OAS, he asked the group’s indulgence to read from a special paper prepared on this subject by Mr. Jamison (copy attached).⁷ With regard to the possibility of a statement on the increasing alignment of Cuba and the USSR, he said that ARA has been considering the possibility of a statement, perhaps by the Secretary or the Under Secretary. The Secretary observed that perhaps, should Raul Castro sign a mutual security agreement, it would be helpful in contributing to the opportuneness and possibility of OAS action.

Mr. Gray inquired whether the group would consider a treaty with the USSR as a meaningless treaty? In other words, would the Soviets meet their obligation or at least is there danger that they might do so? The Secretary said that he himself would doubt it and expressed the opinion that the Soviets would not be around in the event that there were a military show-down over Cuba.

At this point the Under Secretary joined the group to announce that the Administration feels relatively certain of obtaining sugar legislation which would give the Executive a blank check with regard to the sugar quota for Cuba and outlined briefly for the group the provisions of the pending legislation. There followed a further discussion as to the effect of a sizeable cut in the Cuban quota on the U.S. domestic market.

Under Secretary Morse indicated that the U.S. beet producers cannot significantly increase their production before 1962 and that they are insured of selling all the sugar which they can produce prior to that time. He also added that Cuba is a heavy buyer of U.S. rice, beans, lard and flour and should Cuba suspend trade as a result of a cut in the sugar quota the Cuban public might well suffer shortages of these products.

Mr. Rubottom described to the group the status of the Nicaro negotiations indicating his opinion that the latest reports suggest that the GOC has no real intention of trying to buy the plant and might be willing to accept a negotiated tax agreement.

Mr. Bohlen asked if the group might return to the discussion of a possible mutual security agreement between Cuba and the USSR. He expressed the opinion that if the USSR signs such an agreement it would be a striking departure from present Soviet policy as we know it. [1 sentence (3½ lines) not declassified] The Secretary said that it is his feeling that the Soviets would not like to see a complete take-over of Cuba by the communists but desire rather to create the most possible devilment for the United States while leaving the burden on us to prove communist domination. Secretary Gates inquired whether the USSR might not be expected to send volunteers to Cuba. Mr. Bohlen observed that they will send technicians to instruct on arms but that he doubted very much that military volunteers would be provided.

Mr. Gray inquired as to the group’s views with regard to American companies doing business in Cuba. He said that until such time as the U.S. Government is prepared to back up these companies he sees no basis or justification for the Government to try by persuasion or otherwise to prevent normal business relations with Cuba. Secretary Anderson agreed and added that if we ask, most American companies are prepared to cut off business with Cuba, but we cannot ask of them this sacrifice unless we are prepared to give them our full support. In his view Mikoyan did not visit Cuba nor will Khrushchev visit Cuba nor will Castro go to Russia just for the purpose of speaking platitudes. If we sit on our hands and wait and this thing happens, the posture of the U.S. Government will suffer a severe blow. What if the USSR just says that it intends to have a missile base in Cuba? It does not matter whether they intend to do it or not. It might indeed bring the Latinos closer to us, but the effect of such an announcement in this country will be the loudest screaming which has been heard for a long time. Secretary Gates observed that he tends to agree with Secretary Anderson that should the Cubans announce an agreement with the Russians the announcement may have a very profound effect [1½ lines not declassified].

The Secretary said that we should give further consideration to all that we might be able to do to lessen the prospects of a Cuban-Russian success and also to what we can do to back up our own words.

Mr. Mann observed that perhaps we should consider the possibility of a private communication to the various governments of this hemisphere rather than a public announcement by the President. Mr. Rubottom stated that the idea of a private communication with the various Latin American governments would seem to offer possibilities in his opinion. We might address ourselves to these various governments indicating that the Khrushchev invitation to visit Cuba and the plans of Castro to visit Moscow are of profound concern to the U.S. Government and should there be any closer alignment with the USSR on the part of Cuba, the U.S. Government will feel called upon to invoke immediately the Caracas and Rio Treaties. He expressed the view that we can and should seriously consider this step. Secretary Anderson doubted that the Government leaders in Latin America would take a public stand and wondered if to ask them to do so would be fair, for example, to a man like Lleras Camargo who is having increasing difficulties in controlling his own people. The Secretary remarked that several of the Central American countries are in the process of breaking relations with the Cuban Government, and Mr. Rubottom said that there are various other indications that the tempo has picked up. He added that ARA has been doing a variety of things to insure that this tempo will not slacken. The Secretary indicated his desire that this whole matter be discussed with NACOIAA later this week.

Mr. Mann expressed the hope that the Government will not wait for the OAS to take action. Mr. Rubottom observed that there are various things which we should try to do with the OAS while we are at the same time working on other possible steps. He agreed that we should move ahead on the economic front. Mr. Dillon indicated his opinion that there is nothing wrong with the action contemplated with regard to preferences and tariffs but that unless we are ready to go the whole way, that is, cut off all trade, he does not feel we are likely to have success. Mr. Mann observed that we should try to demonstrate that irresponsibility does not pay and that it did not seem to him that we would have to go all the way at once. Mr. Dillon said that very shortly we will have the necessary legislation to take steps with regard to sugar, then perhaps steps with regard to tariff and bilateral agreements and then, “are we prepared to go all the way”?

The Secretary asked all present at the meeting take special care not to discuss the matters covered at this meeting, stressing how important it is that we not telegraph our intentions.

Attachment

QUESTIONS CONCERNING A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC PRESSURES AGAINST CASTRO⁸

1. Is a Presidential decision required, or does the President’s approval of a program for Cuba given on March 14 serve as clear authorization?

2. If a Presidential decision is required, in what form should issues be presented to the President?

3. Should not a firm decision be taken now that every practicable economic pressure be brought to bear?

4. Assuming the decision in 3 above, what specifics need to be discussed? As examples:

a. Assuming that Congress has given the President discretionary power with respect to the sugar quota, should it be reduced 25%? 50%? 75%? 100%? When should such action be taken and should we simultaneously be prepared to redistribute the resulting quota?

b. Should we take simultaneous action with respect to tariffs in every possible case?

c. Should we take every feasible step to deny to Cuba U.S. assistance in refining oil? Should we boycott refined Soviet oil products? Should we encourage American airlines to refuse Soviet oil and oil byproducts (on pretext that they are of improper grade or are not adequate in terms of octane)?

d. Should we not now indicate discreetly to those who control U.S. investment in Cuba that the Government strongly encourages any and all economic pressures?

e. Can we now decide as to the applicability of “Trading with the Enemy Act”? (Involved here is the question of whether all other measures referred to in cumulative total would be sufficiently effective to accomplish our purposes or is invocation of the Act necessary for the needed impact?)

5. If any or all of the above measures are agreed upon, what is our posture within the OAS, as well as publicly, with respect to Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States?

a. Can we ignore them?

b. Can we reconcile our actions with them?

c. Can we somehow take the position that Castro’s conduct has made them inapplicable?

6. What are the organizational and procedural problems involved in an all-out program of economic pressures? For example:

a. Does the OCB and/or its working group have a role?

b. Should there be designated a “quarterback” or “field general” to monitor and coordinate the entire economic pressure campaign? If so, should there not be a single individual designated within the State Department with this as his sole concern?

7. What are the public relations problems? How best do we organize to anticipate and meet them? Especially what is our public posture with respect to the “campaign”?

8. What agencies, other than those here represented, should specifically be brought into the operation? Or, is the coordination process already established adequate?

Related Questions

1. Should a recommendation be made to the President that at the earliest practicable opportunity he take a strong public position with respect to any possible mutual security arrangements between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet Bloc and indeed between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and any Western Hemisphere country?

2. Should we seek extraordinary ways to influence members of the OAS by means of increased economic assistance to those who fully cooperate?

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Stevenson and approved in S on July 26.

² A note on the source text indicates that Dillon joined the meeting late.

³ For a record of the discussion at the March 17 meeting at which the President approved the program for Cuba, see Document 486. The program itself is printed as Document 481.

⁴ For text of Rubottom’s June 20 statement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 11, 1960, pp. 60–64.

⁵ Not further identified.

⁶ Presumably a reference to Beltran’s separate conversations on June 9 with the President and the Secretary of State. A memorandum of the former conversation is published in Declassified Documents, 1984, 1872. A memorandum of the latter conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–960.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

537. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, June 27, 1960, 10:22–11:14 a.m.¹

Washington, June 27, 1960, 10:22–11:14 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter and Dillon

General Goodpaster

The President said the Vice President had just suggested to him that the State Department give consideration to making some kind of a general announcement regarding the penetration of Communism in Latin America, bringing out particularly specific actions of Moscow—for example, extension of aid and particularly any shipment of arms. Mr. Herter said the situation in Cuba is becoming critically bad. The President commented that it would seem we should link Trujillo and Castro up and direct our actions against both of them. Mr. Dillon said the situation regarding the oil companies in Cuba is expected to come to an explosive condition this week. The refineries will run out of non-Soviet crude oil, and will refuse to accept Soviet crude oil. At that time they expect the Cuban government to seize the refineries.

[Here followed discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on July 5. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

538. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Havana, June 28, 1960.

Dear Dick: The situation here is of course pretty hopeless. We are getting more and more into the field of unilateral actions by each party designed to retaliate for actions or attitudes of the other party and carried out with little or no prior discussion.

I venture the suggestion that we make a last attempt, when the question of fixing Cuban suger quotas in accordance with currently proposed legislation comes up, to have some useful discussion. Before we make any determination, I would suggest that I be given an instruction to discuss with the Cubans at the highest possible level our proposed action and reasons therefor so that before we make any final decisions we can have the benefit of their views and possibly modify our action in the light of their reaction to my approaches.

I refer to the memorandum of your conversation on June 10 with Mr. Dillon.² People here are already talking about the diversion of Cuba’s expected quota additions to meet electoral commitments in the United States.

I doubt very much if we want to operate this business in such a way as “to take a good solid slap at Cuba”. My view is that what we want is to be able to take action in defense of our interests as we see them and in a way that will be as convincing as possible to public opinion in Cuba as well as convincing to our own public opinion and to that in the other American republics.

Of course, the uncertainty that exists with regard to this whole matter is probably more helpful than not. But I would like to be able to discuss our proposed action with the Cubans before we take it.

Sincerely yours,

Phil

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/6–2860. Secret; Eyes Only.

² Not printed.

539. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray), White House, Washington, June 29, 1960, 9:30 a.m.¹

Washington, June 29, 1960, 9:30 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

2. I then described to the President the Special NSC meeting on Cuba² which had preceded the regular meeting.

I informed him then that as a result of the special meeting the Secretary of State had convened a meeting in his office in the afternoon on June 27³ to pursue the question of economic pressures against Cuba. I told the President that I had put together a set of questions to serve as a framework of discussion (attached hereto).⁴ The President read them with care and then observed that one question which he was very much interested in which did not appear in the list was whether we in dealing with the whole situation should make any connection with Trujillo and Castro.

I informed the President that we were moving toward the necessary decisions as to whether we would take all-out economic measures but that the Secretary of State wished to consult the Inter-American Advisory Committee in its meeting here next week before finalizing his program.

The President then observed that he did not believe that Khrushchev would enter into a mutual security treaty with Castro. I reported to him that the meeting on June 27 had reflected sharply divergent views on this question which had been raised and persisted in by the Secretary of the Treasury. However, Mr. Bohlen, among others, shared the President’s view.

The President said that he did not quite remember the details of the meeting of March 14 [17].⁵ I reminded him of the program which had been presented by the DCI and approved by the President. I then reported to the President the current thinking as to the timetable of various events.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Gray on July 6.

² See Document 532.

³ See Document 536.

⁴ Printed as an attachment to Document 536.

⁵ See Document 486.

540. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, June 30, 1960.

THE PROBLEM OF CUBA IN THE OAS

There are three forces that can be brought to bear on the Cuban situation: a) action of the Cuban people themselves to replace the Castro Government or change its policy; b) pressure through the OAS which would primarily serve to stimulate and support such action by the Cuban people; and c) unilateral action by the United States. These three pressures can be applied concurrently. The invoking of force unilaterally would, of course, be inconsistent with our treaty obligations and would create widespread disillusionment, if not hostility, throughout Latin America and other areas of the world.

However, we have undertaken during the past year to create a climate in Latin America which would enable us to take a more positive stand in defense of our legitimate interests in Cuba, as we are now doing, including especially the support of legislative authority for you to reduce the Cuban suger quota. Early reactions to this new posture have been heartening although, as expected, the Cuban Government itself is screaming invective.

The OAS contains two agencies in which the question of Cuba can be taken up. First, through the Inter-American Peace Committee, the OAS offers a medium bringing information regarding the Cuban problem to the attention of the Latin American countries whose attitudes towards this problem determine what the OAS will ultimately do about it. Second, the Meeting of Foreign Ministers provides the machinery through which important political decisions regarding the Cuban problem can be taken.

In view of our commitments to the OAS, and the need for gaining maximum Latin American support before any important policy decision is pressed in OAS meetings, we have concentrated thus far upon various steps to make the Latin American Governments more aware of the true nature of the Cuban problem, which many of them have seen in distorted and unrealistic form. One of these steps has been to assure that the Peace Committee will take due cognizance of the Cuban problem in the studies of Caribbean tensions which it was directed to make by the Santiago Meeting of Foreign Ministers last August. It became clear, however, that the Cuban problem could not be dealt with until the OAS had taken some action on the problem of Trujillo and the Dominican Republic. The Peace Committee’s report of June 6, 1960, concluding that international tensions were being aggravated by flagrant violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic, was favorably received in Latin America.² The United States is now pressing the Committee to turn its attention to Cuba, and presenting information to it for that purpose. We are making efforts to get certain Latin American Governments to submit to the Peace Committee information about Cuban intervention in their countries which can serve as the basis of further reports by the Committee.

Neither the Peace Committee, nor the Council of the OAS, offers a satisfactory means of getting basic policy decisions on a problem as controversial as that of Cuba. The next step in the OAS would have to be to convoke a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. While some Latin American Governments would like to see a conference now to deal with the Dominican problem, we feel that the process of educating the other American Republics to an understanding of the need for a firm position regarding Cuba requires further work before a Meeting of Foreign Ministers could be expected to produce useful results. However, the recent assassination attempt on President Betancourt of Venezuela, which he has publicly blamed on Generalissimo Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, may result in a Venezuelan call for a meeting of Foreign Ministers. We are now studying this prospect and the effect it would have on OAS handling of the Cuban situation.

Meetings of Foreign Minsters can be called either under the Rio Treaty or the Charter of the OAS, depending upon the circumstances motivating the meeting and the nature of the action to be taken. As a minimum, a Meeting of Foreign Ministers might be expected to censure the Cuban Government for its actions which have damaged inter-American solidarity and threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere, and to call upon Cuba to rid itself of Soviet influence. As a maximum, a Meeting of Foreign Ministers might produce an agreement advocating the severance of diplomatic relations or authorizing economic measures. It is not believed that a sufficient majority of Latin American Governments are yet prepared to go along with the above measures. However, the increased tempo of Cuban alignment with the Communist bloc is undoubtedly having a profound effect on the Governments of the other American Republics, and we are helping to bring evidence of this alignment, and its threat to the American Republics, to their attention. Still, as Prime Minister Beltran of Peru pointed out to you recently, the impact of the stated ideals of the Castro revolution, however fraudulent that statement has turned out to be, has been very great on the Latin American public at large.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. Transmitted to the President under cover of a June 30 memorandum from Herter, in which the Secretary noted that on June 27 “we discussed the question of Cuba in relation to the OAS” and he hoped the memorandum would clarify some of the questions the President raised at that time. Regarding that meeting, see Document 536.

² For text, see OAS doc. OEA/Ser. G/III/CIP–4–60.

541. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 30, 1960¹

Washington, June 30, 1960

SUBJECT

Committee’s Report on Cuba: Latin American Consultants, Business Advisory Council

PARTICIPANTS

Members of the Committee of Consultants on Latin America, Business Advisory Council:

Mr. Simon Strauss, Chairman of the Committee

Mr. Sam Baggett, Formerly General Counsel, United Fruit Company

Mr. T.H. Tonneson, Standard Oil of New Jersey

Mr. F.T. Mitchell, First National City Bank

Mr. John Burke, Department of Commerce Representative, BAC

Representatives of the Department of State:

The Under Secretary

ARA—Mr. Rubottom, Assistant Secretary

E—Mr. Mann, Assistant Secretary

L—Mr. Hager, Legal Adviser

ARA:CMA—Mr. Vallon, Deputy Director

ARA:CMA/C—Mr. Torrey

After the exchange of amenities, Mr. Strauss commented on the contents of the report on Cuba which was prepared by the Committee of Consultants on Latin America of the Business Advisory Council.²

Mr. Strauss stated that the report was not prepared for publication nor was it the intention of his Committee to make it widely available. He said that it would be made available to other Government agencies should the Department approve. He stated that the full Committee had seen and approved the report, and, in fact, each of the 21 members had received a copy. The report was also reviewed by the Chairman of the Business Advisory Council, but, because of the time element involved, the report does not carry the endorsement of the Council.

Mr. Strauss then briefly outlined eight recommendations of the Committee concerning action that might be taken by the Department with respect to the Cuban situation:

1. The United States should join with other countries of this hemisphere to expose to the world the Communist orientation of the present Government of Cuba.

2. The United States should present a strong note to the Cuban Government on the problem created by the expropriation of properties in Cuba without the benefit of just, adequate, and effective compensation.

3. The United States should accelerate its campaign of truth to the Cuban people. Radio broadcasting was suggested as the most effective means of accomplishing this objective.

4. The United States should consult with the Latin American countries with the end of bringing the Cuban situation before the Organization of American States.

5. Action should be begun at once toward the elimination of the premium price now being paid for Cuban sugar imported into the United States under the sugar quota. It was suggested that the proposed sugar legislation giving the President discretionary authority to alter the quota might also provide for the purchase of sugar by the Commodity Credit Corporation.

6. Exchange and trade controls should be imposed to eliminate Cuba’s dollar income much of which is being used for the purchase of armaments. In this connection, it was suggested that the Trading with the Enemy Act might be utilized.

7. The United States should aid and encourage opposition elements to over-throw the Castro regime and establish a democratic form of government in Cuba.

8. A “White Paper” should be issued to show that Cuban aggressions threaten the peace of the Hemisphere.

In response to a question, Mr. Baggett assured Mr. Dillon that the Cuban sugar interests fully support the proposal that the premium above the world price should be eliminated with respect to sugar purchased from Cuba.

Mr. Strauss stated the Committee’s belief that the most important recommendation contained in its report concerns increased propaganda activities on the part of the United States. Mr. Dillon replied that the Department has given very serious consideration to the use of radio to disseminate the truth to the Cuban people. He added, however, that there are certain complicating factors connected with the use of commercial broadcasting stations for this purpose. He mentioned that the WRUL shortwave broadcasts emanating from Boston are considered very successful and that there are reports that Cubans group clandestinely to listen to these broadcasts. He also mentioned reports of a new station operated by private interests on Swan Island which is now broadcasting on an experimental or “testing” basis. He added that it is possible that this station may soon beam its news and other programs to Cuba.

Mr. Dillon commented briefly on the status of the sugar legislation indicating his opinion that the Senate will approve, by resolution, that part of the sugar bill relating to the Presidential authority to cut quotas in order to expedite action until the Congress re-convenes following the party conventions.

Mr. Rubottom stated that the Department has no objection to the committee making its report available to certain other Governmental agencies, specifically mentioning that the report would be of value to Secretary of Treasury Anderson.

Mr. Mann expressed a fear that the report may have already been too widely distributed stating that the recommendation concerning the overthrow of Castro would most certainly be damaging to the BAC and the United States should it in any way become public information. Consideration will be given to recalling copies of the report sent to the 21 members of the Committee.

Mr. Baggett stated that he understands why the Department could not support the request of industry sources for a letter concerning the acceptance of bonds in payment for expropriated properties and at the same time retain a claim for future adjudication. He asked, however, if the Department could not provide a letter or some other document indicating that a promise of payment does not constitute payment. Mr. Hager stated that this will be considered.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–3060. Secret. Drafted by Torrey and cleared in U on July 25.

² Not found.

542. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, July 5, 1960, 9:15 a.m.¹

Washington, July 5, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Cuban Sugar

4. Mr. Mann reported that a draft presidential proclamation² to cut the import of Cuban sugar was worked out yesterday and that an inter-departmental working committee is expected to finish its consideration of it sometime today. Cuba has 744,000 tons of sugar to be exported, and the planned proclamation would cut this back 700,000 tons. Combined with the fact that Cuba will no longer be called on to make up our domestic deficit, this would make a total cutback of almost 900,000 tons.

Mr. Macomber expressed satisfaction that the cutback figure is high, explaining that because Congress had such a difficult time in giving the President this authority, it was well that we acted promptly and vigorously. In connection with this, Mr. Macomber described the great difficulty which Congress had had with this issue.

In answer to a question from Mr. Allen, Mr. Rubottom explained that we had not discussed the cut in sugar quota with other Latin American countries as many of them have been reluctant to recognize the danger in the Castro regime. Mr. Rubottom felt we must move on relentlessly. We will get some support in Latin America, however, and the cut will not be entirely unexpected. He felt it would be a mistake to attempt to get OAS backing for this move.

Mr. Rubottom said that our cutback in the sugar quota required some basic policy decisions. The Department of Agriculture and others may wish to buy the substitute sugar at world prices rather than at U.S. import prices, whereas we prefer the latter.

Mr. Rubottom said he plans to inform our Embassy in Havana in advance of the quota cut in order to get its opinion as to whether the safety of U.S. citizens would be affected.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, July 1960. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A list of attendees is attached. Merchant presided at the meeting.

² Not found. Regarding the proclamation released on July 6, see footnote 3, Document 544.

543. Memorandum for the Files by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, July 6, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuba

I told the ARA staff the following at our meeting this morning:

I wanted them to know something of my thoughts behind the various recommendations being made and actions being taken with respect to our presently extremely complex relations with Cuba and, for that matter, the rest of the Hemisphere. For all practical purposes, we are now in virtual open conflict with the Castro government. We have gone as far as we can in trying to distinguish between the Cuban people and their present government, much as we sympathize with the plight of what we believe to be the great majority of Cubans. The recent series of articles by Thomas Wolf in the Washington Post clearly shows the extent to which the Cuban “people” have allowed themselves to be hoodwinked and out-maneuvered, assuming that some of them have been alert, by the communists.

We want to go as far as we can through juridical procedures in the OAS. We have built up the image of the OAS in our public statements, as well as in our private advice to the President and others in the government, to a stronger position perhaps than is really justified. We must defend the U.S. interest which is now seriously menaced by Cuban developments. In all honesty, I believe that we will also be defending the Hemisphere’s interest.

There are very few really courageous leaders in Latin America who are willing to get behind us and publicly acknowledge the extent of the communist menace in Cuba. Ydigoras is one. The Frondizi statement in yesterday’s newspaper² was encouraging, as have been the reports from their Foreign Office in the last few days. The Betancourt approach, while understandable, is responsive to one man’s obsession and his hatred of another, Trujillo. The Lleras Camargo approach is super-juridical and tied too closely to Betancourt, to be useful to us at this time. The Pedro Beltran approach, unless he is willing courageously to say to his own government and to his people what he said to us, will do us little good. This does not attempt to analyze each government leader nor each government’s position in the Americas, although I should cite the encouraging responses we have had from Uruguay in the past few months. I trust that we can count on El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, although there are cracks in some of this armor.

What we must do in defense of our interest and the Hemisphere’s interest is to keep moving in the face of the Cuban menace. This is extremely difficult when we get telegrams from the field such as that from Habana today.³ Other advisers whom we respect would push us in different directions.

I believe that most of the Latin American leaders in their heart of hearts want and expect the United States to move effectively against Cuba now. Their positions are such that many of them cannot give us the support they would like to give us. (I am afraid that some of them would not hesitate to criticize us later if we don’t move.)

We have every right to expect that they will defend their home fronts, however. We shouldn’t hesitate to tell them this when the crucial moment comes. This will mean considerable courage in itself to stand up in the face of the deliberately fomented pro-Castro demonstrations which, these other government leaders must realize, are being directed at their overthrow. It doesn’t necessarily mean that they publicly defend everything that the United States does. It certainly does mean that they stand firm in defense of the principles which they and we hold dear or the consequences inexorably will be: 1. The destruction of the whole inter-American system which we have come to respect so much in the last half century, and 2. The possible thrust of the communist apparatus much more openly than it now is in their own countries.

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (July–Sept.) 1960. Secret. Drafted by Rubottom. Attached to a July 6 memorandum from Rubottom to all Office Directors in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, in which he noted that he had “embellished my remarks to some extent in the interest of achieving greater impact and in order to give credit where it is due to a few other helpful governments in the Hemisphere.”

² Not further identified.

³ Not further identified.

544. Memorandum of a Discussion, White House, Washington, July 6, 1960, 11 a.m.¹

Washington, July 6, 1960, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President on Cuban Sugar, 11:00 a.m., Wednesday, July 6, 1960

Present with the President were Dillon (who had sought the meeting), Rubottom, Mann, Secretary Anderson, True Morse, General Persons, Kendall, John Eisenhower, Hagerty, and Paarlberg. The meeting lasted about seventy-five minutes.

Kendall outlined provisions of the Sugar Bill, H.R. 12311, the Act passed by the Congress July third.²

Kendall then discussed the proposed proclamation, the main effect of which is to cut the Cuban quota for the rest of 1960 by 700,000 tons and to delegate to the Secretary of Agriculture responsibility for procuring needed sugar from other free world sources.

The President said that Agriculture’s authority should be exercised “with concurence of the Secretary of State,” and that the proclamation should so read.

A question arose as to whether the sugar should be procured at the world price or at the U.S. price, which is almost twice as high. The President said that for the 700,000 tons we should pay what we would have paid Cuba. He reiterated this point several times.

There was a brief discussion as to where the sugar should be purchased, and it was indicated that the law spelled this out clearly. The law, contrary to the recommendations State had made to the Congress, forces us to buy from the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Morse said that our necessary acquisition may be greater than 700,000 tons, or that the 700,000 tons may be too deep a cut. In either case our hands are free to make adjustments.

Secretary Anderson said that relations with Cuba would be taken up July seventh in the National Security Council. He pointed out that we were taking a decisive step, that the Cubans were likely to retaliate and that other economic measures might be necessary. He mentioned import-export controls, tariff measures, and the blocking of foreign exchange.

The President said that while we had to base the action on our concern for a dependable sugar supply, it was in effect “economic sanctions.”

The President emphasized the importance of looking forward to subsequent steps which might be needed of an economic, diplomatic, and strategic nature.

Assistant Secretary Mann said it was important to try to carry Latin American attitudes with us.

Under Secretary Dillon said that the American Ambassador in Havana had some apprehension about the use of economic sanctions from the standpoint of security for American citizens in Cuba. No one present, however, expressed any reluctance with respect to cutting the Cuban sugar quota.

The draft press release was reviewed and proposed changes were suggested. The agreed plan was to make a slight change in the proclamation, rewrite the press release and issue both, together with the signing of the bill that same afternoon.³

Don Paarlberg⁴

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba. The source text is a memorandum for the Staff Secretary prepared by Paarlberg on July 7. Eleven pages of handwritten notes on the discussion, apparently in Paarlberg’s hand, are ibid.

² P.L. 86–592. (74 Stat. 330)

³ For text of the Proclamation (No. 3355) and the accompanying statement of July 6 by President Eisenhower, see Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1960, pp. 140–141.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

545. Memorandum of Discussion at the 450th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 7, 1960¹

Washington, July 7, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Turning next to the situation in Cuba, Mr. Dulles dealt first with the seizure by Cuba of the oil refineries.² He said that this seizure could, in the short-term, result in an oil shortage, but that if the Soviets go all out, as they probably will, they can fill Cuba’s petroleum needs. Mr. Dulles mentioned the problem of denying tankers to Cuba for the transport of Russian oil, stating that while he had been abroad he had attempted, with some success, to persuade Onassis not to provide tankers. Secretary Anderson inquired whether Niarchos had not leased some tankers for this purpose. In response, Mr. Dulles indicated that Niarchos had a contract, effective in August, to take oil to Europe from the USSR. Niarchos had promised to try to drag his feet on this contract; he realized fully its implications. Secretary Anderson indicated that some of the commercial banks from whom Niarchos had borrowed money were objecting to his contractual arrangements. Mr. Dulles responded by indicating that any pressure the banks could bring to bear on Niarchos would be useful. Mr. McCone suggested that there was very little the U.S. could do with respect to such contracts because of the considerable liabilities that the tanker-owners incurred if they violated their contracts. Mr. Dulles noted that if the Russians picked up some of the oil that these tanker-owners had contracted to carry, their losses would be reduced.

Mr. Dulles stated that Cuba needs 60,000 barrels of oil per day or 1600 thousand barrels per month. He stated that [less than 1 line not declassified] 8000 barrels were presently on their way to Cuba from the USSR; 700,000 had been shipped by the USSR up to the first of July. He again indicated his belief that, if the Soviets moved vigorously, a shortage could be avoided. However, maintaining the refineries and obtaining spare parts for them would be an important long-range problem for Cuba. Cuba’s reaction to the application of the Sugar Law had been quick, but not so violent as had been expected. Castro did not indicate immediately what sanctions he would apply.³ A labor rally had been called and Castro was scheduled to address a mass protest rally on Sunday.⁴ Violent action against U.S. property or personnel might occur.

Mr. Dulles indicated that Foreign Minister Rojas [Roa] was to be replaced by a pro-Communist undersecretary in the foreign ministry and that the Chief of the Cuban Army is to be replaced by a Communist who had recently returned from a visit to the Bloc. He mentioned the defections of the Cuban Ambassador to London and the defections of other ambassadors. There were unconfirmed reports, he said, that Raul Castro, who is now in Prague, had arranged to obtain small arms and jet aircraft. There is also an unconfirmed report that he is to visit Moscow. Raul Castro had said that U.S. stoppage of Cuban sugar purchases was not disastrous since Cuba had the support of the USSR and other Socialist countries.

Mr. Dulles noted that the landing of the Cuban propaganda-laden plane in Ecuador had resulted in strong protests by Ecuador and also that Ecuador had recently expelled the local representative of La Prensa Latina, the pro-Communist Latin American press service. El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras were considering breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba. In addition to the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua have already done so.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Gray introduced Secretary Dillon who stated that he would review where we stood with respect to Cuba. The situation, he said, had three aspects: (a) the actions that we have taken and that we might take ourselves; (b) the actions that we have taken or might take with our allies; and (c) actions by Cuba.

The action taken by the President the day before on sugar⁵ was likely, Mr. Dillon suggested, to set off a train of events leading to a complete economic break with Cuba. If Castro carried out his threat to seize all or substantially all U.S. investments, the Department of State would be prepared to recommend further action, including invocation of the Trading-with-the-Enemy-Act, the freezing of Cuban assets in the U.S., and the cutting off of all economic transactions. This latter action would accentuate the spare parts problem previously mentioned by Mr. Dulles, and would also affect the availability of certain items needed to operate Cuban industrial plants; for example, chemicals for the Nicaro plant.

Castro’s reaction had been slower than expected. His speech the night before had been aimed primarily at the other Latin American countries where the contest between the U.S. and Cuba will now take place. His speech had been designed to buck up the Cuban case against the U.S.; he had accused the U.S. of being an aggressor because we did not like social reform; he had accused us of being imperialists and opposed to progress. He had also stated that if other Latin American countries obtain portions of the Cuban sugar quota, they could expect the U.S. to cut them off at a later date.

It was important, Mr. Dillon said, for the U.S. to make efforts to ensure that other Latin American countries understand the U.S. position. Most of the governments do understand our position, he indicated, but not the masses. USIA could, he suggested, plan [play?] an important role in this latter respect. It was also important to move ahead on the radio program for Cuba. He said that the U.S. was supposed to start broadcasts from the Swan Island installation very soon. It was important that our side be carried to the Cuban people and that we differentiate our attitude toward the people from our attitude toward the regime.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dillon indicated that he had recently briefed the National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs⁶ and that the Committee completely supported the recent U.S. actions. The Committee felt that the situation in Latin America had shifted in the last three weeks to a month from one in which most Latin American Governments believed that the U.S. attitude of patience was the right attitude to one of feeling that the U.S. was letting Castro push us around too much. Therefore, the Committee believed that we should make a demonstration of our strength.

Turning to further actions that were required, Secretary Dillon indicated that he believed it would be useful to reduce to a minimum the number of U.S. citizens in Cuba. If Cuba took over all U.S. businesses, there was not much reason for U.S. citizens to remain there. In this connection, there was one question on which he would like NSC advice. The evacuation of U.S. citizens involved the question of whether we should make a public statement or give other public indication that we have suggested that our citizens leave. Secretary Dillon felt that if Castro takes over American companies, the companies will probably tell their employees to leave. If we were to make a public statement, it might suggest that the U.S. contemplated immediate further actions. The probable reaction of the U.S. public to such an announcement was also not clear.

The President asked Secretary Dillon why the U.S. Government could not say that, since the Cuban Government had taken actions to eliminate their businesses, the U.S. Government thought it advisable for U.S. citizens to go home. Secretary Dillon agreed that this might be a good idea. Mr. McCone pointed out that other U.S. citizens just lived in Cuba—they were not there on business. Secretary Gates stated that approximately 4100 American residents remained in Cuba. The President suggested that perhaps many of those who were not in Cuba on business were staying there simply to avoid taxes. He indicated he was not too concerned as to whether they stayed on or not. Mr. Allen suggested that it might be better and more effective for the U.S. to take quiet action through the Embassy with no public statement. Such action, he believed, would get around immediately in Cuba and would have more effect on Castro than a public announcement. Secretary Dillon indicated that he was inclined to favor such an approach.

Secretary Dillon then went on to say that the new sugar legislation provides that a portion of the Cuban quota shall be given to the Dominican Republic. The Cubans, he said, had not got hold of this point, but when they did, it would cause trouble. The President said that he had thought that it was not necessary under the law to take such action. While the law gave some the Cuban quota to the Dominican Republic, it also gave the President the right to take action in the U.S. national interest. Secretary Dillon agreed that it might be possible to avoid giving any of the Cuban quota to the Dominican Republic without a change in the law, but that, if the law must be changed, it could be done in the August session of Congress.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Secretary Dillon then went on to discuss U.S. actions with other countries. He stated that the Central American countries would break with Cuba and that Panama might join in such an action. The President inquired as to when the U.S. should break relations. Secretary Dillon, referring to a U.S. break in relations with the Dominican Republic, stated that unless everyone breaks with the Dominican Republic, he would see some advantage in keeping someone there against the time when Trujillo is turned out. We did not, however, plan to send Ambassador Chapin to the Dominican Republic. Mr. Dulles stated that, if the Council was discussing a break with Cuba, he would like to emphasize the fact that he would like advance notice of such a break because it would affect certain of his relationships. The Vice President then inquired whether the Council was discussing a break with Cuba. Secretary Dillon indicated that this was the case. The President then suggested that the U.S. should break with Cuba and the Dominican Republic at the same time. The Vice President stated that nothing could cause more trouble within the U.S. than for the U.S. to break with Trujillo first rather than at the same time that it breaks with Castro. He then went on to say that he did not believe that Betancourt could be trusted. Betancourt would take his present line until he got his way with respect to Trujillo but he would not stay with us on Castro. The President interjected to suggest that Betancourt was, however, interested in selling Venezuelan oil. The Vice President stated that Betancourt was an opportunist and that his support within Venezuela is from the Left. He has, the Vice President indicated, the support of people who are pro-Castro. Of course, the Vice President acknowledged, many people who are pro-Castro are not communists. However, the Vice President believed, the U.S. should not, in order to get his support, go Betancourt’s way with Trujillo on the assumption that he would go with us on Castro. Mr. Dulles agreed that we had to watch Betancourt, and that, in particular, we did not trust his foreign minister and certain others in his government. However, Betancourt was all we had to work with.

The President interjected to say that Mr. Randall’s thoughts had suggested to him that one other effect of a movement in U.S. policy of the kind that had been proposed would be to encourage American capital to resume its flow into Latin America. Such a resumption would, in turn, have an effect on the attitudes of Latin American countries.

Secretary Dillon then resumed his presentation on relations with other countries, particularly those outside Latin America. He stated that the U.S. had brought the oil problem to the attention of other governments in an effort to ensure that other countries do not make available tankers to bring Soviet oil to Cuba. We had had some success with Niarchos and Onassis. They realized they would get no charters with American oil companies if they carry Soviet oil to Cuba. The response from the British had been at a relatively low level in the Foreign Office. This Foreign Office source had stated that he was certain that British oil companies would not make tankers available, but that the Foreign Office did not feel it necessary or wise to make representations to British shipping. We had hoped that the British would be more forthcoming. Secretary Dillon said that the response of the Danes had been rather negative and that we had not heard from other governments. He stated that on July 13 the U.S. planned to discuss Cuba in the NATO Council although, in general, we believe that action in the individual capitals is the better approach. Cuban funds, Secretary Dillon stated, had gone mostly to Canada. We may, therefore, want to get Canada to concert action with us if we freeze their funds in the U.S. The President indicated that we should consult with the Canadians in advance of any U.S. actions that we had under consideration and ask for their cooperation if action should prove necessary.

Secretary Anderson stated that we should make clear to our NATO allies that the basis of our concern in the Cuban situation is that the Russians are about to secure a base in the Hemisphere. Since this was the case, it was immaterial whether or not Castro is a card-carrying communist. He suggested that we should point out to our allies that we have given billions of dollars to them for mutual security and that it is important for NATO to align itself with us to prevent developments which would jeopardize the security arrangements of the Western Hemisphere.

Secretary Anderson then went on to discuss the authority under which the U.S. might act against Cuba. In the case of the Suez crisis, the government had acted under the Declaration of 1950. We do not, Secretary Anderson said, plan to act this year under the 1950 Declaration. Therefore, we face the possibility of a new declaration of a state of emergency in the Caribbean on the basis that the Soviets are in the area. If such action were taken, a whole series of further actions could follow; for example, imposition of import controls and seizure of the assets of the Cuban Government and individuals on the basis of the need to create a fund to recompense people who have lost their property in Cuba. The Secretary pointed out that the approximately one million tons of sugar exports to the U.S. which Cuba would lose this year represented 80 per cent of Cuba’s total exports for the balance of the year. If the U.S. declared a state of emergency, the government could say to American industry that it was not in the U.S. interest for industry to ship goods to Cuba. Industry, he felt, would cooperate. He thought that it was inconceivable that the Canadians would not cooperate with us in the matter of Cuban assets in Canada. Turning to the problem of shipping, Secretary Anderson stated that the government probably could not stop foreign-flag vessels from carrying Soviet oil, but if we declared an emergency, we could specify that no ship could be leased by an American company for, say, three to five years, if it had carried oil to Cuba. Secretary Anderson pointed out that there were only two cables out of Cuba and that one went to the U.S. and the other to Britain. If the U.S. invoked the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, we could eliminate all communications by Cuba with the outside world except by radio.

We should, Secretary Anderson stated, decide whether we were justified in having the President declare a national emergency and then we should find a respectable and juridical basis for such a declaration. Once we block Cuban assets, Secretary Anderson indicated, every central bank around the world begins to worry a little bit. Mr. Southard, the U.S. Representative on the Monetary Fund, believes that this concern will cause an out-flow of gold from the U.S. However, Treasury analysts and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board did not agree. Secretary Anderson stated that he would be willing to take this risk. He concluded by saying that State, Commerce, Treasury, and others should decide very quickly what we should do. Although sugar was the most important item, cutting off Cuban exports of sugar would not in itself be crippling.

Secretary Dillon indicated that the government already had a program ready. The question to be decided, he said, was whether we should use the old Korean proclamation or a new one. Juridically, the old proclamation provided a stronger basis for action in the present case than in the case of Suez. Politically, however, it would be better to have a new declaration.

Secretary Anderson asked whether, if Castro seizes American property and there is a possibility of mob action, the U.S. Government should sit and wait until someone got killed. He believed that this would be a weak-kneed approach. Regardless of who they hold responsible for events in Paris and Japan, the American people are beginning to wonder how much roughing up and how much abuse we can accept. This was not a good posture for the U.S. to be in. Secretary Dillon indicated that he concurred fully with Secretary Anderson’s statement. He said that, once we took the step that we have taken, we had entered the lists. We can only lose or win; it was important that we win.

Mr. McCone indicated his belief that if we had an understanding with our NATO allies, the possibility of a gold out-flow would be foreclosed. Turning to the problem of tankers, he suggested that if Niarchos and Onassis stated that they were not going to make tankers available, the independent tanker industry, which takes its cues from these two individuals, would go along with them. Mr. Dulles indicated that he had said much the same thing to Onassis but that Onassis does not think that the other Greek independents will pay attention to the action he takes. Mr. McCone stated that if Shell and British Petroleum would go along, that would take care of the independent British fleet and the Scandinavian fleet as well. The Scandinavian fleet was pretty well dependent on British business. Shell, he believed, was certain to take action because it was directly involved. Mr. Dillon, in clarification of his earlier remarks, pointed out that the British had made tankers available.

Mr. Hoegh suggested that if the communists had established a base in Cuba, economic warfare would not be enough. The U.S. should charge that the Monroe Doctrine had been violated and should go in and take over. In response to Mr. Hoegh’s comment, the President pointed out that the U.S. would have to prove a number of things before it could take such action. He noted that Mr. Bohlen does not believe that the Soviets will be so foolish as to make an overt military agreement or to establish a base in Cuba. Our policy, the President pointed out, was based on a coalition to stop communism, upon cooperation for our mutual security. As the government made moves, therefore, it had to have American public opinion and Free World public opinion behind it. If you did not, you would have to have an entirely different policy. Mr. Hoegh stated that public opinion in the U.S. would support the sort of action he had suggested. The President said that you could not depend upon expressions of public opinion. Thus, people had called the Japanese affair a debacle and had equated it with the loss of China. You had to lead public opinion on such matters.

Secretary Gates asked whether it would not be desirable to call a meeting of the heads of state of the OAS at which the U.S. would recommend intervention in Cuba and get other Latin American countries to go with us. Secretary Dillon pointed out that the Dominican Republic problem would be taken up at the Friday OAS meeting and that the Latin Americans had said that they will take up Cuba when the Dominican problem has been disposed of. Mr. McCone inquired why an OAS foreign ministers’ meeting could not take place until sometime between the 25th and 27th of July because Kubitschek is visiting Frondizi.

Secretary Anderson suggested that if we did everything possible with respect to Cuba and then the British and the Germans came in with trade, shipping and so forth, we would look like idiots. If we could not ask for NATO cooperation in such a matter, we were in a very bad position. In response Secretary Dillon again noted that the matter would be discussed in the NATO Council. The President suggested that the trouble was that our allies equated every problem with every other problem. Cuba was equated with Suez and Algeria and our allies say that we did not help them on Suez or Algeria. Actually, however, we had done a lot to help De Gaulle and after Suez we had given credits to Britain and France.

[Here follows further discussion of the Dominican Republic]

Mr. Gray stated that he wished to be clear on what had been agreed. He felt that there had been agreement on the problem of evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cuba and agreement that, either by Presidential interpretation or by amendment of the statute, we would avoid giving the Dominican Republic any of Cuba’s sugar quota. He asked what action was required with respect to Canadian cooperation. Secretary Dillon suggested that the President might send some sort of communication to Diefenbaker. Secretary Gates pointed out that next week he, Secretary Herter, and Secretary Anderson would be meeting with the Canadians and that this problem might be taken up at that time. Secretary Dillon agreed that it could be handled in this way. The President suggested that perhaps a note from him to Prime Minister Macmillan was also required. Secretary Dillon reminded the President that he had mentioned this problem in his last communication to the Prime Minister.⁷

Mr. Gray inquired as to whether the Council wished to decide at this meeting whether we should rest on the Korean emergency proclamation or issue a new proclamation. The President said that the Attorney General should be brought in before a decision was made on the matter. Mr. Dillon pointed out that in addition to settling the legal question, we would have to prepare for the further actions under any such proclamation. The President observed that if the Cubans began to kill Americans, there was no question but that some such action would be required. The Vice President commented that the law can be a means to an end and that he believed it would better serve U.S. propaganda objectives to have a new declaration. He pointed out that it would be necessary to say certain new things and that this could better be done in a new declaration. Secretary Dillon agreed that a new declaration was the preferred course.

Mr. Gray inquired of Secretary Gates and General Twining as to whether contingency planning for Cuba was ready. Secretary Gates said that the plans were ready and that they covered such possible actions as a blockade, a U.S. naval and marine action, a multi-service action, or a joint action with South American countries.

Mr. Dulles said that the Swan Island radio was ready to go and that it would be a covert rather than an overt operation. The President said that he wanted the Cuban people told that the American people like them and are trying to help them. Secretary Dillon stressed the importance of speed and the President indicated his uncertainty as to the status of the Swan Island radio. In response, Mr. Dulles stated that if we want to run this radio covertly, we had to go through certain forms. Our plans contemplated making USIA the American governmental voice. He inquired as to whether it was desired to shift the Swan Island radio from a covert to an overt basis. Secretary Dillon said that no change was desired but that it was important to get going. Mr. Dulles stated that this facility had been put up in record time and that one remaining requirement was a permit from the FCC.

Mr. Allen noted that since the President had made his statement the day before, USIA had had it on short-wave every hour on the hour. There were not many short-wave sets in Cuba, but experience had proved that in an emergency situation people who do have shortwave sets turn them on. The President inquired why it was not possible to reach Cuba by broadcasts from Key West. Mr. Allen stated that it was not possible to reach Cuba during the good listening hours from Key West because there were so many stations in Havana and the Key West signal was not strong enough to get in over these local stations. The Vice President suggested that the former Cuban Ambassador to Britain might be useful in broadcasts to Cuba. [1 sentence (2½ lines) not declassified]

After Mr. Gray had announced that the Near East paper would be put over until the following meeting, the President briefly mentioned the question of whether he should stay in Washington in view of recent developments. This, he suggested, was something of a dilemma for if he did go to Newport, people would tend to assume that these problems were not important. On the other hand, if he changed his plans, people might assume that the situation was even more grave than it was. Secretary Anderson thought that it would be important for the President to stay for a short while in Washington. Secretary Gates agreed.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Acting Secretary of State regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba and the Dominican Republic, with specific reference to actions the United States is taking or may have to take in the near future.

b. Agreed that the United States should, under existing circumstances, take the following actions:

(1) In the event that it is decided to advise U.S. citizens in Cuba of the desirability of evacuating the country, such advice should be given by the U.S. Embassy in Havana without public announcement, in the expectation that knowledge of this action would have a greater impact upon the Cuban Government than a public announcement.

(2) Means should be found, including legislation if necessary, to avoid giving the Dominican Republic any of the sugar quota formerly allocated to Cuba.

(3) The United States should seek to achieve simultaneous action against the Governments of Cuba and the Dominican Republic in the Organization of American States.

(4) The United States should develop an additional positive assistance program, preferably through the Inter-American Development Bank, which would be designed in cooperation with the Latin American nations to better mobilize resources for the promotion of economic progress of the Latin American people, particularly through improving and expanding the utilization of arable land. Such a program, including any required legislative proposals, should be urgently developed under the leadership of the Secretary of State in consultation with the Treasury Department and other interested departments and agencies, and the National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs, subject to usual budgetary procedures. Pending preparation of the detailed program, a public statement by the President for early release should be prepared under the leadership of the Secretary of State; this statement would announce that the United States is developing such a positive assistance program, which will be the subject of an appropriate message to Congress and discussion of cooperative action with the Latin American nations. The statement would avoid raising unwarranted expectations as to the additional funds to be provided by the United States and would not be so cast as to create expectations as to legislative action on the program during the current session of the Congress.

(5) Immediate efforts should be made to obtain the cooperation of U.S. allies, especially Canada and other NATO members, in making economic measures against Cuba effective. The forthcoming State–Defense–Treasury discussions with Canada should, among other means, be utilized for this purpose.

(6) The Departments of State, Justice, and other interested departments and agencies should study urgently whether future actions which may be required against Cuba would more approximately be taken under a new Presidential emergency proclamation, rather than under the existing Korean emergency authority. The Department of State should consult with other responsible departments and agencies with respect to its catalogue of such future actions, including among others such measures as termination of tariff perferences, freezing Cuban assets and the imposition of export, transactions, and transportation controls.

(7) Necessary contingency plans for possible action with regard to Cuba and the Dominican Republic, including current military planning, should be kept in readiness

(8) Efforts should be expedited to reach the Cuban people by radio, in order to explain U.S. actions and attitudes and to make clear the friendliness of the U.S. people toward the Cuban people.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for appropriate implementation by all responsible departments and agencies, under the leadership of the Secretary of State.⁹

Robert H. Johnson

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Robert H. Johnson on July 11.

² The Cuban Government seized the Texaco facilities on June 29 and the Esso and Shell facilities on July 1. Ambassador Bonsal delivered a note of protest to the Cuban Government on July 5. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1960, pp. 141–142.

³ On July 6, the Cuban Government passed a nationalization law authorizing nationalization of U.S.-owned property through expropriation. Ambassador Bonsal delivered a note of protest on July 16; for text, see ibid., August 1, 1960, p. 171.

⁴ July 10.

⁵ See footnote 3, supra.

⁶ No record of this meeting has been found.

⁷ Not further identified.

⁸ Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 2259. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

⁹ 

At a meeting at the White House immediately following the NSC meeting, the President, Vice President, Gates, Dillon, McCone, Allen Dulles, and Gordon Gray, among others, discussed the U.S. position to be taken at the Geneva nuclear test talks and the difficulties of coordinating policy with the British Government. According to John S.D. Eisenhower’s memorandum of the discussion, the following exchange took place:

“The President said the difficulty in these decisions is that there are no two-sided problems. He cited Cuba as an example. (Here Mr. Dillon volunteered that Cuba is sending some people to the UN in New York. With Cuba’s predilection to attack the U.S. in the U.N. rather than the OAS, this may have some significance. Unfortunately, since the UN is in New York, we are required to give them a visa.)” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

546. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, July 8, 1960, 11:30 a.m.¹

Pentagon, Washington, July 8, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

Mr. Merchant said that he had two subjects he would like to raise before those on the agenda:

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Mr. Dillon and Ambassador Bonsal had expressed their concern regarding the movement of Marines en route to Puerto Rico because of their proximity to Cuba and the fact that the movement might be interpreted as an act of aggression by the Cubans if the Marines were noted in the vicinity. To this Admiral Burke replied that Ambassador Bonsal was unnecessarily concerned; that the Cubans could not possibly locate the Marines; and that they were out of sight of land 50 to 100 miles south of Cuba. Mr. Merchant, in reply to General LeMay’s remark that if there were trouble in Cuba we certainly did not want to be in a position of being unable to protect American lives, said that he throughly agreed the Marines should be near at hand but that he felt he must urge they be kept sufficiently far from Cuba so as not to arouse Cuban suspicions.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

VI. Latest Developments in Cuba (JCS Initiative)

General Lemnitzer asked to have a run-down on the latest developments in Cuba. Mr. Merchant replied that action is still going forward on covert operations; that the President is contemplating an early announcement of expanded economic assistance to Latin America which would have the added advantage of serving to off-set Cuban charges on our sugar action and that the program would have a long-range impact on the economic development of all Latin American countries. He pointed out that the OAS is voting this afternoon on the Venezuelan request for a meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers early in August. We have told the Venezuelans and the OAS that we would support the Venezuelan request. We had also informed them that we could not consider the Dominican Republic without considering Cuba also. Accordingly, we suggested, following adjournment of the meeting, that it reconvene to consider Castro. As yet we have not received many responses to this proposal.

Mr. Merchant thought that the most disturbing recent occurrence had been the remarks of the Senate Majority Leader in Mexico.² We had called in the Mexican Ambassador here to ask for an explanation.³ As yet, however, there are no signs of hostility against U.S. citizens in Mexico.

Mr. Smith added that a report from the FBI had been received which indicated that the USSR had turned down the Cuban request for tankers.

Mr. Merchant remarked that the British attitude had been discouraging, that we had asked the UK to prevent British-owned tankers carrying goods to Cuba but that the Government had “ducked” our request.

Mr. Merchant also added that we are approaching the Canadians with regard to the blocking of Cuban funds but that the British are pessimistic as to the success of our endeavors.

Admiral Burke commented that as a result of the mass meeting in Havana called for Sunday⁴ the situation might turn into a bloody riot. Mr. Smith commented that at the NSC meeting yesterday⁵ it was agreed that, if Americans have to leave, they would be so advised privately rather than publicly.

The meeting ended with an inconclusive discussion of the proposed Emergency Proclamation.

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, July 1960. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert Donhauser, Special Assistant to Under Secretary Merchant. A note on the source text indicates that it was not cleared with the Department of Defense. A cover sheet lists 25 participants in the meeting from the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.

² Reference is to the statement on July 7 by Mexican Senate Majority leader Emilio Sanchez Piedra expressing solidarity with Cuba.

³ Not identified further.

⁴ July 10.

⁵ See supra.

547. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, July 8, 1960—7:32 p.m.

13. Re: Cuba.

1. Particularly in light Cuban reaction US decision reduce Cuba’s share of sugar quota, Department has considered our position in event Cuba requests meeting of SC to consider one or more of the following or perhaps other charges against US: (1) Economic aggression through sugar quota cut or refusal oil companies refine Soviet oil; (2) US involvement in sabotage French munitions ship La Coubre or recent explosion munitions dump in Habana; (3) US involvement in other violations Cuban sovereignty as result airplane flights over country; (4) US involvement in subversive activities through agents; (5) Hostile propaganda from US sources against revolution; (6) US efforts to prevent acquisition of arms and munitions; (7) Continued presence of Guantanamo naval base.

2. In event Cuba takes such step, our position is that Cuba has obligation resort to OAS in first instance re controversies which unable resolve by direct negotiation. There are two ways to implement this principle in UN.

3. First, we could seek to have majority of SC vote against adoption agenda item submitted by Cuba. This would have effect Council refusing to consider matter at least until OAS had considered Cuban situation. This course would underscore principle that Cuba under Charters UN and OAS and Rio Treaty has obligation to resort to OAS procedures in first instance. Practical effect would be to prevent Cuban oral presentation to SC due to tradition only Council Members speak on question of inscription. Difficulties with this course are political effects on world opinion should US appear fear airing of Cuban complaint in SC and probable attitude friendly Members SC to such course. Mission will recall 1954 experience with Guatemala case when UK and French abstained on inscription since they felt Council’s refusal to consider matter would accord primacy regional organization over universal organization. Of course, attitudes Argentina and Ecuador also important this matter.

4. Second, US could support inscription of Cuban complaint and seek adoption of vetoless procedural resolution citing pertinent portions Article 33 and “decide not to consider” Cuban complaint at this time, thus having effect of referring Cuba to OAS. We would also seek to have friendly SC Members make brief statements in favor of primary OAS consideration Cuban situation. This course might be less difficult for friendly Members of Council to support than outright refusal to consider Cuban complaint. At same time, basic principle that Cuba should resort to OAS in first instance would be preserved.

5. Request USUN’s views on foregoing. You may wish explore above two approaches with British and French on highly confidential, but urgent basis. Emphasize that at moment our basis considering possibility Cuban approach UN lies in violence Cuban attitude sugar quota cut, Castro earlier indication he would go to UN rather than OAS and trip of important official Cuban FonOff (Marrero) to NY.

Dillon

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–860. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Joseph J. Sisco and Michael H. Newlin; cleared with Rubottom, Wilcox, and Jamison; and approved by Wilcox who signed for Dillon.

548. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 9, 1960—noon.

124. Night of July 8 sister in law of Raul Roa informed Embassy officer that she wanted Embassy to know that she had learned from “excellent sources close to Fidel Castro” that Castro is perfectly delighted with the course of events. According to these sources the USG is reacting just the way he expected and wanted them to. The cut in sugar quota was anticipated and desired. Castro thought that initially it would be limited only to distribution of deficit. Fact that it cut deep into basic quota meant that he could charge economic aggression all the more effectively. She commented that Castro feels that our actions in the face of his provocations, for propaganda purposes in Cuba and LA, far outweigh what he does and says. She also commented that the US can anticipate further moves by Castro directed at making the US sever diplomatic relations and even intervene physically. She said she hoped that US would not be too precipitate in retaliating aginst Castro as she is convinced that that is what he is seeking.

Comment: Sister in law very much opposed Castro and together with family leaving for US. Embassy inclined believe her report accurate. Certainly, from watching Castro last night and his speech before Metallurgical Congress July 6 Embassy received impression of pleased and confident, though reckless, Castro. We have growing feeling that he does not care what happens to Cuba and that, in effect, he looks upon Cuba as sacrificial lamb which he can use to defeat and humiliate US in its efforts to isolate him, to wreck inter-American system, and to move on from there to be “liberator” all of LA.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–960. Confidential; Limit Distribution.

Response by the United States and the Organization of American States to signs of increased Soviet support for the Cuban government, July–September 1960

549. Editorial Note

550. Editorial Note

551. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan

Newport, Rhode Island, July 11, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in telegram 248 to London, July 11, which is the source text. The telegram was drafted and approved in S/S and cleared by Goodpaster. The letter, which had apparently been drafted several days before, mentioned neither Khrushchev’s statement of July 9 nor his letter to Castro of July 10.

552. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics

Washington, July 11, 1960—3:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–1160. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hill; cleared with Rubottom, Jamison, Wieland, and Merchant (in substance); and approved by Hill who signed for Herter. Sent to all ARA missions except Havana, and repeated to Havana and USUN.

553. Memorandum of a Meeting Between the President and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray), Newport, Rhode Island, July 12, 1960, 2:12 p.m.

Newport, Rhode Island, July 12, 1960, 2:12 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by Gray on July 14. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1983.

554. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Havana, July 13, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1360. Secret; Eyes Only.

555. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to the Secretary of State

Washington, July 13, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Chron File. Secret. The source text is not initialed. Copies were sent to Dillon, Merchant, Rubottom, and six other officers in the Department of State. A note on the source text indicates that Herter saw the memorandum.

556. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 13, 1960—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1360. Confidential.

557. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury (Anderson), Washington, July 14, 1960, 10:50 a.m.

Washington, July 14, 1960, 10:50 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No drafting information appears on the source text.

558. Memorandum of Discussion at the 451st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 15, 1960

Washington, July 15, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Robert H. Johnson on July 18. The Secretary of State presided at the meeting.

559. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, July 18, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

Washington, July 18, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, July 1960. Secret. Drafted by Thomas W. McElhiney. A list of attendees is attached to the source text.

560. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, U.S. Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1960, 3:15 p.m.

U.S. Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1960, 3:15 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared and initialed by Goodpaster on July 21. Other participants included Herter, Bohlen, Kohler, Wilcox, Hagerty, and Goodpaster. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 217C.

561. Memorandum of Discussion at the 452d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 21, 1960

Washington, July 21, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Robert H. Johnson on July 21. The Secretary of State presided at the meeting.

562. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State

Ottawa, July 24, 1960—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–2460. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling.

563. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, July 25, 1960—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2560. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

564. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter–American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, July 25, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–2560. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted and initialed by Rubottom. Also initialed by Merchant.

565. Memorandum of Discussion at the 453d Meeting of the National Security Council, Newport, Rhode Island, July 25, 1960

Newport, Rhode Island, July 25, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on July 28.

566. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower

London, July 25, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

567. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Gates) to the Secretary of State

Washington, July 26, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Files of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Cuba. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Gordon Gray. Gray’s copy is the source text.

568. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter in Washington and Secretary of State for External Affairs Green in Ottawa, July 28, 1960

Ottawa, July 28, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. The time of the conversation is not indicated on the source text.

569. Memorandum of Discussion at the 454th Meeting of the National Security Council, Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960

Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on August 4.

570. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Havana, August 2, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–260. Secret; Eyes Only.

571. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 3, 1960

Washington, August 3, 1960

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–360. Confidential. Drafted by Osborne, initialed by Rubottom, and approved on August 9.

572. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)

Washington, August 4, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2660. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson and Wieland and cleared with Martin and Merchant.

573. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, August 8, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Presidential Handling. Transmitted to London in telegram 879, which is the source text. A draft of the letter prepared in the Department of State was sent to the President under cover of a memorandum by Merchant of August 6. The memorandum and the draft, which shows the President’s handwritten changes, are ibid.

574. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State

Washington, August 11, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–1160. Secret. Drafted by Charles P. Torrey; cleared with Stevenson and Little; and initialed by Rubottom and Herter.

575. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)

Washington, August 11, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–1160. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. A copy was sent to S/P.

576. Memorandum of Discussion at the 455th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 12, 1960

Washington, August 12, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Charles A. Haskins of the NSC Staff on August 16.

577. Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, White House, Washington, August 18, 1960, 11:05 a.m.

Washington, August 18, 1960, 11:05 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Drafted by Gray.

578. Editorial Note

579. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, September 1, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–760. Secret. No drafting or clearance information appears on the source text. The paper was circulated for comments under cover of a September 7 memorandum from John Hoover (ARA/REA) to other members of ARA and to Marjorie Whiteman. Hoover noted that the draft had been prepared in response to a suggestion from Merchant and that after comments had been obtained, the revised draft would be circulated to E, U/MSC, S/P, USIA, and ICA.

580. Editorial Note

549. Editorial Note

On July 9, in an address before the All-Russian Teachers’ Congress in Moscow, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev made the following remarks:

“It is clear to everyone that the economic blockade of the American monopolies may prove to be the beginning of preparations for intervention against Cuba. We must therefore raise our voice in Cuba’s defense and give notice that these are no longer the times when the imperialists plundered and carved up the world as they wished, when each took his pick of the morsels.... And we for our part shall do everything to support Cuba and its courageous people in the struggle for the freedom and national independence they have won under the leadership of their national leader, Fidel Castro....

“It should not be forgotten that the United States is not so inaccessibly distant from the Soviet Union as it used to be. Figuratively speaking, in case of need Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to launch an intervention against Cuba. And let them not forget in the Pentagon that, as the latest tests have shown, we have rockets capable of landing directly in a precalculated square at a distance of 13,000 km. This, if you will, is a warning to those who would like to settle international issues by force and not by reason.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, page 207; ellipses in the source text.)

Later that day, President Eisenhower, who was in Newport, Rhode Island, issued the following statement:

“The statement which has just been made by Mr. Khrushchev in which he promises full support to the Castro regime in Cuba is revealing in two respects. It underscores the close ties that have developed between the Soviet and Cuban Governments. It also shows the clear intention to establish Cuba in a role serving Soviet purposes in this hemisphere.

“The statement of the Soviet Premier reflects the effort of an outside nation and of international communism to intervene in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. There is irony in Mr. Khrushchev’s portrayal of the Soviet Union as the protector of the independence of an American nation when viewed against the history of the enslavement of countless other peoples by Soviet imperialism.

“The inter-American system has declared itself, on more than one occasion, beginning with the Rio Treaty, as opposed to any such interference. We are committed to uphold those agreements. I affirm in the most emphatic terms that the United States will not be deterred from its responsibilities by the threats Mr. Khrushchev is making. Nor will the United States, in conformity with its treaty obligations, permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere.” (Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1960, pages 139–140)

Memoranda of telephone conversations Secretary Herter had that day with Goodpaster, Rubottom, and Hagerty regarding the text of this statement, along with various drafts of the statement showing handwritten revisions, some suggested by the President, are in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

On July 10, the Cuban Government staged a mass rally in front of the Presidential Place in Havana. The Embassy transmitted periodic telegraphic reports to the Department on the progress of the rally; these telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1060. At the rally it was announced that Prime Minister Fidel Castro was suffering slightly from pneumonia and was unable to attend. President Dorticos, during his speech, read the following July 9 message which had been addressed to Prime Minister Castro by Soviet Premier Khrushchev:

“I have been apprised that the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, has signed on July 6 the law passed by Congress that gives him the right to reconsider the Cuban sugar quota. Mr. Eisenhower immediately after the law went into effect declared his decision to reduce your quota by 700,000 tons.

“It is known to all the world that this measure was adopted by the United States Government as economic pressure against the people and the Government of Cuba in relation to the just measures of information [intervention?] of the oil companies, properties of the monopolies, which took the road of resistance and organized acts of sabotage against these measures of the Cuban Government. History is full of examples of such imperialistic attempts at economic blockade against countries fighting for their economic and political independence but the imperialists are seriously mistaken when they think that such countries stand alone. These times have passed. The Cuban people and Government have many friends disposed to enter into friendly and mutually profitable cooperation.

“The Government of the Soviet Union, expressing the will of its people, sees with sympathy the struggle of the Cuban people and shows indignation over the decision of the United States Government.

“If the Government of Cuba finds it difficult to sell the sugar, the Soviet Government expresses its disposition to acquire, as additional quantities in Cuba, for delivery in 1960 the 700,000 tons the United States has refused to buy.

“The Government of the Soviet Union has charged the Ministry of Foreign Trade with entry into negotiations with the competent Cuban organ.”

This unofficial English translation was transmitted to the Department in telegram 148 from Havana, July 11. (ibid., 737.00/7–1160)

In telegram 153 from Havana, July 11, the Embassy reported its own view, which was confirmed by several other sources, that the rally had been comparatively unsuccessful from the Cuban Government’s perspective. The attendance was the smallest recorded at such mass demonstrations. Many people left before Dorticos spoke, although the Embassy conceded that this was in part due to Castro’s absence.

Bonsal noted that, in light of Khrushchev’s statement of July 9 and his letter of July 10 to Castro, no Cuban could any longer contend that Cuba was not completely aligned with the Soviet orbit. Because this was, in Bonsal’s opinion, contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Cuban people, the Ambassador felt it would be “a powerful influence in developments here” in the near future, although the opposition was still unorganized and leaderless.(ibid.)

550. Editorial Note

On July 10 and 11, President Eisenhower devoted considerable attention during his stay at Newport, Rhode Island, to the preparation of a statement proposing a large-scale economic assistance program for Latin America. On July 10, from 5:44 to 6:53 p.m., he met with Secretary Herter, Rubottom, Hagerty, and Goodpaster. The following morning he met with Herter and Rubottom from 7:52 to 9:52 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Appointment Book)

In a memorandum, July 13, Goodpaster focused primarily on the July 11 morning meeting as follows:

“The group resumed discussion of the proposed statement by the President on a new program for Latin America. On arrival at 6 PM the previous day the same group had met with the President for an initial consideration of the draft at his quarters, and then on the launch en route to the Naval War College. In addition, Mr. Herter and I had reported to the President and discussed with him the Khrushchev threat to extend aid to Cuba, and, at considerable length, developments in the situation in the Congo.

“During discussion of the proposed statement, I had raised with the President questions posed by Secretary Anderson regarding passages stating that there would be a need for substantial additional public funds, and that a message would be sent to the Congress in August. At that time, the President indicated he was not inclined to modify the draft. In the morning, I showed him written suggestions by Secretary Anderson, and advised him of supporting comments by Mr. Stans and General Persons. I also showed him minor revisions worked out with Mr. Herter and Mr. Rubottom late the previous night. The President then made certain revisions to incorporate, in part, the points made by Secretary Anderson. In particular, he recognized uncertainties in timing, as a result of which it might prove to be impossible to send the message to the Congress until after the Bogota meeting of the OAS in September. With these and other amendments he then approved the statement.

“While a reading copy of the statement was being prepared for his use with the press, Mr. Herter took up a number of additional items affecting foreign policy questions. He said that a number of people had suggested, and he had discussed with Mr. McCone, pressing the church to take a more active anti-Castro role in Cuba. Mr. McCone had suggested that he might make a trip to the Vatican to discuss the matter with authorities there. Mr. Herter said that, after checking the matter out with the hierarchy in the United States, this action was considered to be undesirable. As an alternative, he suggested that Mr. Bohlen talk to the Papal Nuncio in Washington. The difficulty is that the top church authority in Cuba is passive and indifferent to the situation there. The President approved this action.”

After discussing several other matters, Herter told the President that the Cuban Government might file a complaint in the United Nations against the United States. Herter said that the Cuban Government appeared “to be trying to bypass the OAS, where such matters should first be considered.” President Eisenhower observed that, “if the Cubans can make a case against us that will have any weight with the other nations of the world, then he could only conclude that he does not know what the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ mean.” (ibid., Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

At his press conference, which began at 10 a.m. on July 11, the President first read the prepared statement in which he announced that he soon would be submitting to Congress a request for additional public funds “to assist free men and neighbors in Latin America in cooperative efforts to develop their nations and achieve better lives.” The question-and-answer period that followed included several exchanges. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pages 568–575)

551. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan¹

Newport, Rhode Island, July 11, 1960.

Dear Harold: The expression in your last letter² of sympathy and support with respect to the Cuban problem was especially heartwarming. It was a great comfort to know you were with us at a time when difficult decisions had to be made and we found ourselves forced, by the course Castro has elected to follow, to engage ourselves and our prestige more directly and publicly than heretofore to resolving this challenge to our security and vital interests.

Because the Cuban problem so profoundly affects not only the security of the United States but is also related to the security of the Free World as a whole, it might be well to review the dimension of the problem as we see it and what we are trying to do about it, although I am sure you and Selwyn have followed the matter closely.

Since Castro took over Cuba a year and a half ago, our policy toward Cuba can be divided roughly in three phases. The first phase might be called the testing phase. Although the known radical and anti-American background of the Castro brothers, and especially their previous involvement in Communist-front causes, gave cause for deep skepticism, the evidence was not altogether conclusive and it could not be foretold how these youthful leaders would react under the sobering responsibilities and opportunities which were theirs. More importantly, at that time there were with Castro’s Government Cubans of ability and moderation who had joined with Castro in pledging that Cuba would have a democratic, elected government, that it would respect Cuba’s international obligations and that, within that framework, it would carry out certain reforms which, in principle, we could all agree were not only popular but needed in Cuba. There was thus some chance that this moderate, experienced and democratic element would check the extremists and this chance had to be tested not only for our own satisfaction but because the great popularity which Castro then enjoyed throughout this Hemisphere and the world gave us no alternative but to give him his chance.

Our first actions, therefore, were directed to give Castro every chance to establish a reasonable relationship with us. As a first gesture, we extended quick recognition and I immediately appointed a new Ambassador to Cuba who was singularly well regarded by Cubans and Latin Americans and who could have established a fruitful relationship with Castro if anyone could. When Castro came to the United States under private auspices in April of last year, he was not only well received by the public and the press, but our own Governmental contacts with him then were calculated to make cooperation possible if he had any disposition for it. We sharply curbed all inclination to retort and strike back at his early diatribes against us, leaving the way open to him to climb off of this line and get down to the serious business of running the affairs of his country responsibly.

Before the first six months had ended, it was clear Castro had failed this test and by Fall I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion, as a basis for our Government’s actions, that there was no reasonable chance that Castro and his lieutenants would cooperate in finding a reasonable modus vivendi with us. The story of the cancellation of elections, of the ascendancy of the Communist oriented group and purge of the moderates, of the executions and the hounding of all anti-Communists, of the abortive Cuban-supported efforts to overthrow various Caribbean governments, and of the shrill anti-American diatribes is too well known to require details. We were directly affected when Castro, choosing the Agrarian Reform Law version advanced by the extremists, authorized the expropriation of extensive American properties without acceptable provision for compensation. When this was implemented, it turned out that not even these unsatisfactory conditions were observed but our people’s properties were seized without even a pretense of observing the Castro regime’s own laws; so far as I know the promised bonds have not even been printed. This naturally aroused widespread disillusionment and indignation in this country but, in the longer view, it was perhaps not so serious and irrevocable as the increase of Communist influence in Cuba. With the moderates gone and the Prime Minister equating anti-Communism with treason to his revolution, our intelligence increasingly indicated that the Communists began permeating Cuba’s life and government. The Communist Party was the only party allowed to operate, its members infiltrating every key government and military department. I imagine that Cuba today is the only country outside the Bloc whose security chief is a Communist.

Despite these developments, it was not feasible for us immediately to take a hard line towards Castro. The second phase of our policy towards him, which acquired the popular misnomer of “policy of restraint,” has covered roughly the last year. Its primary objective and effect was to make clear to the Cuban people and to the world that the deteriorated situation was of Castro’s making, not of ours. We are deeply committed, especially in this Hemisphere, to the policy of non-intervention, and our standing in the world is probably due more than to any other single factor to the instinctive realization of all people that, while we offer aid and leadership, we respect the rights of weaker nations and do not seek to impose our will upon them. We could simply not afford to appear the bully. In this, of course, we realized that our own sources of information as to what was actually happening in Cuba were vastly superior to those available to the public, especially in the Latin American Republics, and that Castro continued to enjoy an undeserved degree of popular hero-worship. It took time and effort on our part for the process of disillusionment in other countries to catch up with the process here.

The third, and more active phase, of our policy is the one on which we are now embarking. The critical element is the degree to which Cuba had been handed over to the Soviet Union as an instrument with which to undermine our position in Latin America and the world. The Soviets, at first, showed some measure of caution as to the degree of their commitment to Castro. The Latin American Communist Party leaders were instructed at the Soviet Party Congress in Moscow last year to give full support to Castro, but Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership did not commit themselves openly to Castro until Mikoyan’s visit last January, a year after Castro came to power. The trade and credit agreements reached then exposed fully the intent of Castro, despite Cuba’s formal commitments under the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States, to orient himself toward the Soviet Union.

It is interesting to speculate about the degree to which the Communists are committed to Castro in the context of the current Soviet-Communist Chinese ideological struggle. We have noted that the Bloc leaders and the Communist theoretical publications have gone out of their way to endorse Castro while largely ignoring of late other positive neutralists. Khrushchev chose, perhaps significantly enough, the Indian Parliament this Spring to endorse Castro.³ He singled out the Cuban Revolution again at his press conference in Paris at the close of the Summit.⁴ It would appear that the Communists see in Castro a reconciliation of Khrushchev’s views on peaceful co-existence and the Chinese Communists more aggressive line. In distinction to other neutralist leaders, Castro fully incorporates the Communists in his regime, carries out a precipitate revolution against the existing social order, and is far more internationalist in his pretensions to spread his revolution to surrounding countries than the usual type of nationalist whom the Communists court. If the Communists could find other leaders who met Khrushchev’s standards of “peaceful coexistence” and Mao’s of a Communist revolutionary we would be in very serious trouble indeed. I have been told that Mikoyan on returning to Moscow from Cuba, was exuberantly rejuvenated, finding that what was going on in the youthful and disorganized Cuban Revolution brought him back to the early days of the Russian Revolution.

As it appears to us, the Castro Government is now fully committed to the Bloc. We cannot prudently follow policies looking to a reform of Castro’s attitude and we must rely, frankly, on creating conditions in which democratically minded and Western-oriented Cubans can assert themselves and regain control of the island’s policies and destinies. We fully recognize, of course, that the pre-Castro regimes of Cuba are discredited and have lost their appeal. Moreover, any solution to the Cuban problem must hold out to the Cuban people the promise of democratic government and reform without the extremism of the present government, which has mortgaged itself to the Soviets and to how far the Soviet leadership is willing to go to support it. It is encouraging, in this respect, that ever increasing numbers of the moderates who are committed to reform have left Castro and are organizing an embryonic resistance movement. Although it is still too early to hope that the Cubans themselves will set matters right, it would, of course, be preferable that they do so rather than force us and the other American Republics to take more drastic action.

As we enter this new phase, our primary objective is to establish conditions which will bring home to the Cuban people the cost of Castro’s policies and of his Soviet orientation and also to establish a climate in which those who recognize the necessity of eventually beneficial relations between Cuba and the United States can assert themselves. This objective underlays the action which I took this week⁵ in eliminating all but a fraction of the Cuban sugar quota for the balance of this year, although there are, of course, ample economic reasons why the United States should not rely heavily as a source of supply for an important commodity on a country whose government has made clear its intent to orient itself towards the Communist Bloc. Nor, in the face of Castro’s hostility, ties with communism, and treatment of our property and other rights could we justify in effect subsidizing his revolution with the premium price we pay for Cuban sugar. I anticipate that, as the situation unfolds, we shall be obliged to take further economic measures which will have the effect of impressing on the Cuban people the cost of this Communist orientation. We hope, naturally, that these measures will not be so drastic or irreversible that they will permanently impair the basic mutuality of interests of Cuba and this country.

We also look to some form of action in the Organization of American States. This has been and remains a most difficult problem. By now, the Governments of most of the other Latin American Republics seem to be recognizing that Castro and the degree to which his movement has become an instrument of the Communists represents a very real threat to them. Yet they remain reluctant to step forward on the issue, in great part because of concern about provoking leftist and deluded elements in their countries but also because, unable to exact [exert?] decisive pressure themselves and preoccupied with domestic problems, they have little eagerness to side with us against a sister Latin American country. Nevertheless, especially if a solution can be found to the emotionally-charged problem of the Dominican Republic, whose regime is universally hated in Latin America, there is room for hope that we will get some support in facing up to the Castro dictatorship.

In the immediate future there are a number of problems in which your help could be most useful. The most important of these, perhaps, concerns the United Nations. It is highly probable that Cuba, recognizing its lack of support among American Republics, will attempt to bypass the Organization of American States and present to the Security Council or to this Fall’s General Assembly some sort of charge against us and that they will receive Soviet support. We should be well prepared for this, and shall rely heavily on your cooperation. You will recall that when Guatemala made a complaint in 1954 (although the cases have more dissimilarities than similarities) there were some divergencies between our two governments. We have always held that, under the Charter, we were obligated in the first instance to seek bilateral settlement and go to the Organization of American States, before the United Nations considered the case.

Another and more immediate problem concerns tankers. As you know, Castro’s insistence on displacing Free World petroleum with Soviet oil led to the taking over of British and American refineries, despite the fact that the companies had in effect previously extended substantial credits to finance continued petroleum exports to Cuba. It appears that the Castro Government now has a commitment from the USSR to supply the oil, but that the latter is having substantial difficulties in finding tankers to move it on this long haul. We think that there is every reason discreetly to discourage the use of Free World tankers to bring Soviet oil to refineries which have been taken from our companies and yours and, more importantly, that a petroleum shortage in Cuba would not only raise questions there about Castro’s capabilities but also crystalize doubts about the reliability of the USSR. Your help, not only with respect to British tankers, but in influencing other tanker-owning countries would be invaluable.

We are also reviewing our arms export and war matériel policies with a view to tightening them up. We have been deeply grateful for the cooperation of your government in the past in this field, all the more so because we realize fully the difficulties which a restrictive policy has caused. However, I am deeply concerned about the quantities of arms which the Castro Government has on hand as a result of the imports which have been made to add to what was taken over from the previous government. There is not only the threat that this increasing stockpile, which may include items being supplied by the Bloc, will be used in movements against other Latin American Governments but the danger that indiscriminate issue of arms and equipment when the Castro Government is threatened or falls will result in civil war or chaos. This would confront us with a most difficult problem. We shall notify your government very shortly of the details of our arms policy, and would be grateful if it were possible for you to take parallel action and help us to obtain the concurrence of NATO and other supplying companies.

Before signing this long—although I think necessary—exposition of our Cuban policy, I should like to reiterate my full endorsement of the trip I understand you are contemplating making to Latin America later this year. In relation to the Cuban problem, I can scarcely think of anything more useful than the very fact of your presence and evident interest in Latin America to impress on the leaders there what is involved in Cuba is a challenge to the unity and security of the Free World, not just a quarrel on property or economic questions between us and Cuba.⁶

With warm regard,

As ever

Ike⁷

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in telegram 248 to London, July 11, which is the source text. The telegram was drafted and approved in S/S and cleared by Goodpaster. The letter, which had apparently been drafted several days before, mentioned neither Khrushchev’s statement of July 9 nor his letter to Castro of July 10.

² Reference is to Macmillan’s letter to Eisenhower of July 2 which dealt primarily with the question of basing U.S. Polaris submarines in Scotland. Macmillan also noted: “I have been thinking a lot about our new troubles with Castro. Chris and Selwyn are I know in close touch about this, but do let me know if there is anything you think we should do. We will to try to help you in any way we can over what might develop into a really serious Russian threat.” (ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Macmillan)

³ For text of Khrushchev’s address to the Indian Parliament on February 11, 1960, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XII, No. 6, pp. 3–5.

⁴ For a transcript of Khrushchev’s press conference in Paris on May 18, 1960, see ibid., No. 20, pp. 7–11.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 544.

⁶ 

In a July 22 letter to the President, Macmillan wrote:

“Let me first tell you how deeply interested I was by your long letter about Cuba and Castro. I am sending you a separate detailed answer. Castro is really the very Devil. He is your Nasser, and of course with Cuba sitting right at your doorstep the strategic implications are even more important than the economic. I fully understand and share your apprehensions. Do let me know if there is any particular point where we are in a position to help, without embarking on measures which are only suitable in times of emergency. The tankers, for instance, we can only control by taking powers similar to those we take in wartime. However, I feel sure Castro has to be got rid of, but it is a tricky operation for you to contrive and I only hope you will succeed.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) For Macmillan’s more detailed reply, see Document 566.

⁷ Telegram 248 bears this typed signature.

552. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics¹

Washington, July 11, 1960—3:30 a.m.

47. Developments of last several days, especially Khrushchev’s threat missiles can reach U.S. in event “aggression” against Cuba, have placed early solution of Cuban problem among imperatives of U.S. foreign policy and offers most fundamental challenge to date to Inter-American System. International Communist leadership and Castro have now clearly and publicly committed themselves to utilizing Cuban Revolution as means undermining U.S. position in Western Hemisphere and of bringing about collapse of Inter-American system. U.S. public opinion, as well as national leadership, is fully alive to challenge presented to this country’s security and vital interests and is determined that solution shall be found as quickly as possible.

Insofar as Latin America is concerned, problem is how early solution can be arrived at with maximum Latin American support and/or least damage to fundamental concepts Inter-American system. In resting its policy on renunciation unilateral intervention, U.S. inherently founded its polity on assurances implicit in their joining in regional security system that Latin American countries would join us in dealing collectively with acts and threats from abroad to security of hemisphere. Khrushchev’s statement, capping cumulative evidence International Communist utilization of Castroism as weapon against security and tranquility of hemisphere, should make it clear beyond reasonable doubt danger now exists. U.S., of course, looks to solution within established principles and concepts of Inter-American system but we must all be clear that failure of Latin Americans to live up to their share of responsibility for collective solution will not be occasion for United States to renounce its basic obligation preserve security this country and hemisphere. Nor, in face Khrushchev threat, can U.S. for world wide considerations afford delay which would have appearance of backing away for fear of Soviet power.

Department fully realizes from your reporting many Latin American governments remain hesitant come to grips with Cuban situation for domestic political reasons and because of complicating factors such as Dominican problem. However, in view of fact U.S. and USSR have now at highest level publicly engaged themselves to opposing position on Cuban problem, time will not permit postponement until such problems are out of way. Choice which Latin Americans will have to make quickly is whether they are willing to join in collective approach or renounce their clear responsibilities under Inter-American system, survival of which is vital to them.

In light of above, Department desires:

(a) by return cable, your best estimate of how far Government to which you are accredited would go towards convoking Foreign Ministers and/or preliminary COAS as Organ Consultation to consider Cuban problem in context manifest Soviet intervention in hemisphere. Immediate objective would be to obtain firm Inter-American statement against International Communist intervention along lines that outlined Deptcirtel 14,² but specifically calling all American States urgently use influence assure observance Inter-American treaties and commitments with respect outside intervention in hemisphere. Sympathy all Governments with Cuban people and their aspirations social and economic reform could also be included.

(b) All Missions (except Ciudad Trujillo) to make immediate determined effort to impress on Latin American Government and leaders, including military leaders, of gravity of situation in Cuba and necessity for Latin Americans themselves to assure [assume?] full share of responsibility in critical challenge to Inter-American system and solidarity. In this connection, all material bearing on Communist infiltration and orientation Cuban Government, violation human and property rights and other evidences of nature Castro dictatorship should be reviewed and conveyed to responsible leaders. In your discretion, you are authorized to show such material to appropriate officials where in your opinion more effective than oral presentation.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–1160. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hill; cleared with Rubottom, Jamison, Wieland, and Merchant (in substance); and approved by Hill who signed for Herter. Sent to all ARA missions except Havana, and repeated to Havana and USUN.

² Not found.

553. Memorandum of a Meeting Between the President and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray), Newport, Rhode Island, July 12, 1960, 2:12 p.m.¹

Newport, Rhode Island, July 12, 1960, 2:12 p.m.

1. I first discussed the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting² of 7 July with the President. I told him that there had been considerable interagency discussion about the item on the new program for Latin America. I said I felt that the best way to resolve the question of the Record of Actions on this point was to simply have it conform with the President’s statement as it had appeared.³ Otherwise, there was no problem with the Record of Actions except that I wanted to make certain on one point. This was the question of whether there was or was not a decision to proceed at some time with full across-the-board economic sanctions against Cuba. The President expressed the view that he was perhaps somewhat at odds with Secretary Anderson on the point because he was not at all sure that economic sanctions would have any real effect on the Castro regime. I pointed out to the President that this was a debatable point but there was another point which needed to be considered which was quite unrelated to the effect on Castro and this was the posture of the United States in the world as well as in other Latin American countries. I said that there were those who believed strongly that at some point we must take strong action against the Cuban dictatorship if only to demonstrate that we would not permit ourselves to be vilified and attacked, our property ex-appropriated, etc.

In any event the President said that he wanted the Record to show that a study should be made as to whether a proclamation was needed for actions which might be taken and a list of actions should be prepared but should not reflect any decision that the actions would be taken.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Prepared by Gray on July 14. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1983.

² See footnote 8, Document 545.

³ See Document 550.

554. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Havana, July 13, 1960.

Dear Dick: We do not report by any means all of the rumors or “bolas” which come to our attention. I have, however, heard from two or three sources that Fidel Castro was caught entirely off base by Khrushchev’s July 9 statement² about what Russia would do to us if we invaded Cuba. The rumor, as I get it, is that he was perfectly furious about a development which puts Cuba entirely under the Soviet wing, and that his illness and consequent non-appearance at the July 10 demonstration was brought on by his anger at the Russians. According to this same “bola”, Ché Guevara and other Communist elements within the Government worked on Fidel, threatened him with arrest or even with elimination and finally brought him to the point where he made his sick-bed talk on the evening of July 10³ expressing appreciation to Khrushchev. As the story goes, however, Fidel is now more or less of a pawn in the hands of Guevara.

I do not have any way to verify this type of “bola”. I am convinced that Guevara is the actual ruler of this country at this time, but that he could not rule for very long without Fidel.⁴ Raul Castro, when he returns, will undoubtedly furnish the answer to some of the questions about relations with the Soviet Union.

The presence here of mysterious weapons, including rockets, and Migs is increasingly rumored. We have not gotten to the bottom of any of these rumors in a satisfactory fashion but I am convinced that there is a good deal in them. I doubt personally if the weapons obtained will make of Cuba a threat to the United States, but they will certainly be a demonstration of Castro’s ability to arm herself against the policies and wishes of the United States and our friends.

I am quite encouraged by the manner in which the situation is developing here. It is possible that Khrushchev’s statement has counteracted some of the unfavorable reactions from our drastic quota cut or at least has given people something else to think about.

I have had several queries as to whether our attempt to “clarify” the statement of the Mexican legislators about Mexican-Cuban relations⁵ could not have been handled by us somewhat more discreetly. It has even been suggested that the Mexican Government might have reacted appropriately without any suggestion from us.

Sincerely yours,

Philip

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1360. Secret; Eyes Only.

² See Document 549.

³ No telegram from Havana has been found reporting on this statement by Castro.

⁴ Bonsal inserted the following handwritten footnote at this point: “Fidel may, of course, wake up to this—he certainly has the power to eliminate the Che!”

⁵ Reference is to a July 7 statement in the Mexican Congress by Emilio Sanchez Piedra expressing solidarity with Cuba, and a statement by Senate leader Manuel Moreno Sanchez at a news conference on July 9 that Mexico should give oil to Cuba.

555. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

Personal Thoughts on Cuba

I.

The following ideas may be of use in the coming phase of our relations with Cuba:

1. We will be subjected to domestic pressures for “action”. We should lean over backwards to resist such pressures, except when a very clear advantage opens up.

2.

The Castro regime is eased on emotional upsurges and has no seriously conceived economic or social programs. It must maintain its impetus by constant injections of new emotions.

We should never forget that new small countries can afford the luxury of acting on their emotions; great powers usually only damage themselves be giving way to emotional impulses.

3. Recent history suggests that intense political situations are not changed by economic pressures. This is especially true where the people involved have a relatively low standard of living.

4. Rapid communications, the cold war, and the United Nations forum leave very little room for big power pressure on small countries. (For example, UK relations with Egypt 1952–56.)

5. It now appears that Castro and the Soviet bloc hope and expect that we will intervene. The above points argue strongly against military intervention.

By the same token, we should avoid turning the economic screws too tight. Economic pressure may gratify certain groups in the US; unless handled with care, it can boomerang in Cuba.

II.

The main thrust of US policy might well be constantly to focus Latin American opinion on the deplorable state of affairs in Cuba. The tone of American rhetoric should be sorrowful rather than angry. A flat American policy of being anti-Castro may only strengthen Castro. We should speak of difficulties in Cuba as though they were a natural catastrophe warranting the sympathy of all free countries for the Cuban people.

Our propaganda line should be in favor of the “poor Cubans”.

We should organize to receive refugees from Cuba as the Austrians did in the case of Hungary. If necessary, we should arrange to house and feed Cubans in special camps in Florida. As the Austrians did, we should revise our immigration laws to favor refugees and urge other members of the OAS to do the same.²

We should use such a program to demonstrate the rule that when given a chance peoples generally flee toward freedom and away from communism.

Our case would be improved if Castro took military steps to block the flow of refugees. A few pictures of Castro’s men shooting refugees attempting to escape would do more to hurt Castro than a host of economic sanctions.

It might also be well to see that photographs of the executions which marked Castro’s assumption to power be given renewed circulation.

The success of the Castro regime was, to say the least, not impeded by certain US newspapers. People like Castro are intoxicated by seeing their name in headlines.

I suggest that to reverse this process the US Government use all of its influence to cut down the public use of Castro’s name. We should set the example in any government releases by speaking instead of the “Moscow oriented junta” or the “behind the scene foreign rulers of Cuba.”

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Chron File. Secret. The source text is not initialed. Copies were sent to Dillon, Merchant, Rubottom, and six other officers in the Department of State. A note on the source text indicates that Herter saw the memorandum.

² Refugees from Trujillo might be included in such a program. [Footnote in the source text.]

556. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 13, 1960—2 p.m.

94. Khrushchev’s carefully qualified threat to aid Cuban revolutionaries in hypothetical conflict with US seems to be in tradition of boasts the Soviet power saved Egypt during Suez affair and prevented US intervention Iraq.

There little doubt Soviets will make bogus claim that they prevented foreign military intervention in Cuba if it does not materialize. In reporting foreign reaction to threat, Soviet press has made use of parallels between Egyptian and Cuban situations and states that it has stiffened Cuban resistance to US.

Possible that move related to campaign against US bases. Clear from Khrushchev’s July 12 press conference² that Soviets recognize effort establish own base Cuba would damage campaign against American bases elsewhere. But, on other hand, they prepared to give full psychological support at least to effort any country eliminate American bases. Threat support Cuba against US attack also counter to expression Western support for West Berlin.

However, threat to US in connection its relations with Cuba introduces new dimension to rocket-rattling in that it applies to situation and area where Soviet security interests less involved than in case of Near East or approach of foreign planes toward Soviet borders. It seems to be an incautious risk of Soviet prestige.

Believe that underlying motive for move is compulsion to recreate image of Soviet military superiority, which damaged by U–2 incident; and which seems have internal as well as external consequences (Embtel 2865³ ).

Secondary motive may have been urge develop corollary to “peaceful coexistence” line which would give encouragement to Communist parties outside Bloc, as well as answer implied ChiCom criticism that Moscow has abandoned international Communist movement because of fear nuclear war. Might be helpful broaden our response to Soviet threats about military support for Cuba by expressing conviction not only US but no other country can be intimidated by Soviet rocket threats—pulling US together with countries from which Soviets endeavoring isolate US. Point should be made that Soviet motive here is to build on success of its psychological campaign claiming credit for stopping Suez conflict with its rocket threats against London and Paris. Point might be made had we supported rather than opposed Suez invasion, such threats would have been meaningless—and that we also have long-range missiles.

Freers

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–1360. Confidential.

² Extracts from the transcript of Khrushchev’s remarks at this press conference in Moscow on July 12 are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 210.

³ Dated June 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6–2760)

557. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury (Anderson), Washington, July 14, 1960, 10:50 a.m.¹

Washington, July 14, 1960, 10:50 a.m.

After a brief discussion of the Ministerial meetings in Ottawa,² Mr. Anderson said the Canadians had been rather shocked at the extent to which things had deteriorated in Cuba and quoted one of the Canadians who had told him that nobody knows anything about Latin America in Canadian Government, except Green who was there once. The Secretary referred to a long document³ he was now going over regarding Latin America and said he thought he might take the occasion to send this under a personal note to Howard Green.

Anderson said he has been told by the Texas Company that their biggest plant in Cuba can’t go more than 30 days without spare parts which spare parts can only come from the US, Germany, possibly Britain or France. Anderson said he didn’t think the Soviets can supply these parts. Anderson said he thought it was terribly important whether the European countries will stand with us on this in not supplying the spare parts. The Secretary said he thought both the British and Germans would stand with us; that certainly the British have the same interests as we do because of Shell. Anderson said Texas has furnished both the State Dept and Commerce Dept with lists of the parts and suppliers and Anderson said he thinks we ought to make sure they don’t make contracts with other European countries who could supply these parts. The Secretary said he agreed and would look into this right away.

The Secretary then said he had before him a memorandum from Tom Mann⁴ on payments for Cuban sugar; that there is between $35 and $75 million not remitted to the Cubans but they are in a very difficult position of being subject to fine if they don’t pay and are worried about the fines adversely affecting any possible future claims. The Secretary said this raises the question of whether we invoke at least partially the Trading with the Enemy Act. The Secretary said he knew some of Anderson’s people had been opposed to partial invoking, and the Secretary suggested he and Mr. Anderson might discuss this after NSC tomorrow. Mr. Anderson said that would be fine; that this may be something we should do on a partial basis.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No drafting information appears on the source text.

² Documentation on the third meeting of the Canada-U.S. Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense held in Ottawa, July 12–13, 1960, is scheduled for publication in volume VII.

³ Apparently a reference to the document described in footnote 6, infra. No record has been found indicating that Herter sent Green a copy of this document.

⁴ A copy of this memorandum, July 12, is in Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (July–Sept.) 1960. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 978.

558. Memorandum of Discussion at the 451st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 15, 1960¹

Washington, July 15, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles next discussed Cuba, pointing out that the initial response of Castro’s officials to Khrushchev’s public statement of support had been enthusiastic but there was evidence that these officials had had some second thoughts upon further reflection. Even at the time of the mass rally on July 10, Castro had seemed less enthusiastic about the “hug of the bear.” While he had welcomed Soviet support, he had stated that Cuba does not depend for the preservation of its independence on Soviet rockets, but rather on the justice of her cause. Even “Che” Guevara, who had been more enthusiastic than Castro initially, had later stated that any Soviet attempt to make Cuba a satellite would be resisted by Cuba to the last man. Cuban opposition to the Castro regime continued to be unorganized but Khrushchev’s speech could have a powerful influence in producing greater organization.

Mr. Dulles stated that there was evidence, [less than 1 line not declassified] of an increasing tendency toward dictatorship in Cuba. There had been growing arrests of the opposition and pro-Castro lawyers had seized the Havana Bar Association and taken over the Board of the Bar Association. Ambassador Bonsal viewed this as an important step in the establishment of government control over professional organizations. The Workers Federation was pretty much under Communist control. Rodriguez, an important Communist who had heretofore stayed in the background, was playing an increasingly important overt role and was being named Minister of Finance. This, Mr. Dulles suggested, gave Cuba a “nice” financial team. Mr. Dulles noted that the recent defection of the Cuban Ambassador in Bonn represented the sixth such defection by a Cuban Ambassador within the last thirty days. The U.S. Embassy had reported growing feeling that Castro was willing to sacrifice Cuban interests to his greater ambition of humiliating the U.S., wrecking the inter-American system, and taking over leadership in Latin America. CIA was inclined to believe that reports of Castro’s illness were genuine and that he had some form of pleurisy.

The Cuban Minister of Industry and Commerce feels that Cuba can lick the Cuban sugar and oil problem but is worried about the possibility of an embargo on food shipments to Cuba. If imports of lard, rice, flour and corn were to be cut off, the effects would be worse than the increasing shortages of farm equipment and industrial parts.

Mr. Dulles indicated that the depressed international market for tankers had helped the Soviets obtain tankers for the run to Cuba. Although State had, with some success, taken steps to influence the major tanker owners, there were a number of others around who were willing to carry the oil and it was almost impossible to keep the Soviets from obtaining tankers. In addition, the Russians were using tankers acquired on new contracts to release other Russian tankers for the Cuban run. The British and Scandinavian Governments had not been as cooperative as they might have been.

Khrushchev had ridiculed the idea of Soviet bases in Cuba, saying the USSR could launch its missiles from the Soviet Union. However, some unidentified, large packages had been coming into Cuba and a certain military base had been put off bounds. It might be that the Soviets would, “just for fun”, put up a short-range missile base some place in Cuba. CIA was watching this situation carefully. Khrushchev’s missile threat and the calling of the UN Security Council into session to hear the Cuban charges² had startled and disturbed Latin American Governments. Many of them were being driven away from their previous attitude of aloofness. They would prefer that the question of Cuba be handled in the OAS rather in the UN.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Gray asked Secretary Herter whether he wished to say anything about Cuba. Secretary Herter said there was one element he would like to mention. There was no question but that Khrushchev’s intervention had been an assist to the U.S. in our relations with the other Latin Americans. Peru wanted a Ministers’ Meeting of the OAS to consider Cuba. A meeting to consider the matter would be held on Friday³ and the U.S. was hoping for a good vote from Latin America.

We did not know how soon the problem of Cuba could be taken up because the problem of Trujillo was ahead of it. As a result of the Venezuelan charges, a Special Committee of Three had been sent to Venezuela. The Committee would report back the middle of next week and at that time it would be possible to set a date for a Ministers’ Meeting. Perhaps the week after next or early in August a meeting could be called to discuss the problems of Trujillo and of Castro. There was agreement that the meeting should be held in Washington. None of the Latin Americans wanted the meeting held in their own capital because of fear of local demonstrations on behalf of either Trujillo or Castro. The Secretary stated that we were dealing with timid people but they had moved considerably since Khrushchev’s speech. Monday⁴ the UN would take up Cuba’s charges of American economic aggression. The Cubans had no particular hope of UN action and the U.S. believed that, after a day or two of debate, the problem would be referred back to the OAS where it belonged.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Secretary Anderson then began discussion of a report⁵ on the Cuban economic situation but before he was well into his presentation, he was called out of the Council room.

Secretary Herter noted that the U.S. Government had prepared a 90-page document⁶ which contains a run-down of the principal events of interest in Cuba and U.S. actions with respect to Cuba from the time of the revolution to the present date. Secretary Herter called this report exciting reading and said it would recall many things which have happened which have since been swept under the rug. He said that Ambassador Lodge will use it in the UN debate and that it could be declassified and distributed within the Government.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Gray at this point asked Secretary Anderson to resume his report on the Cuban economic situation. Secretary Anderson said this report had been obtained through the International Monetary Fund and that it came from a former official of the Castro regime who knows the Cuban economy very well. Summing up the report, Secretary Anderson said that it indicated that the present situation cannot go on; that it has reached a critical stage. So far there has been no problem because businesses in Cuba have not raised prices despite increases in wages. Cuban businesses have taken losses because of their fear of being accused of counter-revolutionary activity. But such a situation could not continue. Secretary Anderson pointed out that Cuba had built up its reserves by $120 million by imposing severe import restrictions while continuing its export trade. He noted that Cubans were now buying $250,000 a week in currency in the U.S. and he wondered whether they might be stashing it away. Mr. Dulles suggested that they might be obtaining it for use in subversive activities in other Latin American countries.

Mr. Gray referred to a message⁷ he had seen which seemed to indicate that the U.S. was about to close down the Nicaro plant. Secretary Herter said this was not correct; that there was a split within the State Department; and that the matter was to be considered further this same day. We had given the Cubans until the 12th of July to resume negotiations and had indicated that we would shut down the plant if negotiations were not resumed by that time. On the 12th the Cubans had said they would resume negotiations. The question now was whether we should shut down the plant anyway, since we were not likely to get anywhere in the negotiations, or whether we should take one more crack at negotiations. Secretary Herter himself believed that we should determine what they have to offer. The Cubans have asked for cost accounting figures as a basis for setting a fair valuation on the plant but it was evident that they were stalling. The U.S. could not go on operating the plant much longer in view of the heavy export tax.

Mr. Gray then referred to what he understood were working level differences involving Mr. Dulles and the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the handling of Cubans coming out of Cuba. Mr. Dulles said that he thought the problem arose primarily in the case of Cubans who went back and forth between Cuba and the U.S. and that CIA and other agencies were in the process of working this problem out. Secretary Herter thought, however, that perhaps the problem needed another look. Mr. Gray indicated that he understood that relations at the working level between State, CIA and INS were not the best even though there was general understanding at the top. Acting Attorney General Walsh said that he was sure that General Swing could handle any problem and that the real difficulty was lack of confidence between the representatives of different agencies down the line. Secretary Herter wondered whether a more basic philosophic question was not involved and whether perhaps a change in the law was not required. In response Acting Attorney General Walsh pointed out that there was some point at which you simply had to circumvent the law and that what was important was that the INS be given a plausible basis for doing so.

Mr. Gray noted that the U.S. Government had made some pretty strong statements on the establishment of a Soviet military presence in Latin America. It was possible that Raul Castro on his present trip would conclude a mutual security pact or military assistance agreement with the USSR. If he did so, what would we do against the background of our strong statements? In response Secretary Herter said it depended on the form such agreements took. He did not believe that it was likely that the Russians would take such action. A more serious immediate problem, he said, was the problem of Guantanamo. Khrushchev in his statement had indicated that the Russians would back the Cubans if they took over Guantanamo. Mr. Gray inquired whether we continued to be prepared to protect Guantanamo against any such Cuban effort and was assured by Secretary Herter that there was no change in our policy in this respect.

Mr. Gray then inquired about the attitude of the Canadians toward the Cuban problem. Secretary Anderson stated that in a meeting of ministers and ambassadors, the U.S. had laid out its views as to what had taken place in Cuba with some frankness. The Canadians had responded that it was not the policy of the Canadian Government to support economic sanctions. The Canadians believed that the U.S. should continue its policy of patient forebearance. When the U.S. representatives had asked how long we should continue such a policy, the Canadians had said “indefinitely.” The U.S. representatives had asked the Canadians whether they were aware of Khrushchev’s recent statements. The indications were that they were only vaguely aware of those statements. The Canadians had been insistent that the initiative should lie with the Latin American countries and that those countries should appeal to the U.S. for aid before we took action. In response the U.S. representatives had pointed out that Latin American Governments could not take such action because, if they did so, the government leaders risked being imprisoned or killed. The Canadians were unwilling to accept any view of Cuban developments except the view that it was simply an internal revolution. They felt that the U.S. was preoccupied with communism. They stated they could not imperil the free right of their banking institutions and businesses to take up any slack that might be created by U.S. economic sanctions. Altogether it was a very disturbing conversation. The Canadians were completely unwilling to accept the idea that international communism was attempting to subvert other countries. They took the view that people should choose for themselves and that it was their business if they chose communism. When the U.S. representatives had talked with the Canadians about conversations on this subject in NATO, the Canadians had stated that NATO was not involved.⁸

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Robert H. Johnson

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Robert H. Johnson on July 18. The Secretary of State presided at the meeting.

² On July 11, the Cuban Government filed a complaint with the U.N. Security Council charging that the United States had intervened in Cuban domestic affairs and had committed economic aggression against Cuba. (U.N. doc. S/4378)

³ Reference is apparently to Saturday, July 16. On July 16 and again on July 18, the OAS Council met in special session to consider the Peruvian Government’s July 13 request that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be convoked. For text of the Peruvian Government’s note, see Department of State, Inter-American Efforts To Relieve International Tensions in the Western Hemisphere, 1959–1960 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 221.

⁴ On Monday, July 18, and on July 19, the U.N. Security Council met to consider the Cuban complaint, which was presented by Foreign Minister Roa. U.S. Representative Lodge denied the Cuban charges and argued that the United Nations should take no action until the Organization of American States had an opportunity to deal with the situation. On July 19, the Security Council approved a resolution submitted by Ecuador and Argentina to this effect by a vote of 9 to 0 with 2 abstentions (U.S.S.R. and Poland). (U.N. doc. S/4395)

⁵ Not further identified.

⁶ Reference is to a draft paper, July 15, entitled “Responsibility of the Cuban Government for Increased International Tensions in the Hemisphere.” The final form of this paper, dated August 1, was submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee on August 2 and released to the public on August 7. For text of the paper, see Department of State Bulletin, August 25, 1960, pp. 317–346.

⁷ Reference may be to instruction A–9 to Havana, July 12, in which the Department asked the Embassy formally to notify the Cuban Government of the U.S. Government’s intention to suspend the Nicaro nickel operation. (Department of State, Central Files, 837.2547/7–1260)

⁸ The preceding discussion constituted NSC Action No. 2261. (ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) On July 19, at 5:30 p.m., Gray briefed the President on the discussion at this NSC meeting. (Memorandum by Gray, July 26; Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President) Gray’s memorandum is published in Declassified Documents, 1986, 552.

559. Notes on the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, July 18, 1960, 9:15 a.m.¹

Washington, July 18, 1960, 9:15 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

15. Freezing of Cuban Assets

Mr. Mann asked whether the Secretary agreed that he (Mr. Mann) talk to Under Secretary Scribner about a limited freezing of Cuban assets in the States. The Secretary said that Mr. Mann should coordinate his action in this regard with Mr. Rubottom. Mr. Mann agreed with the Secretary that the matter is urgent and that the exact timing of any such action in relation to UN and OAS action on Cuba is important. Mr. Mann and Mr. Hager confirmed, in response to a question from the Secretary, that assurance could not be given that compensation sought or obtained through third party suits or other means would not affect later claims for compensation for American assets seized by Cubans. The Secretary said that the Federal Reserves supplying the Bank of Nova Scotia with large sums in $100 bills for transmission to Cuba should be investigated in connection with the consideration of freezing Cuban assets. Mr. Hager commented that the so-called “rifle approach” of a limited freezing of assets may cause more legal difficulties than the general freezing of assets. The Secretary said that he felt instinctively that we did not have a good case for a limited freezing since we were dealing with money owed for goods received; that is, debts owed by American recipients in payment for sugar already received. He said that he had serious doubts about the political wisdom of such a move and he felt that Mr. Mann and Mr. Rubottom ought to look at the matter carefully before proceeding.

TWM

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75, July 1960. Secret. Drafted by Thomas W. McElhiney. A list of attendees is attached to the source text.

560. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, U.S. Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1960, 3:15 p.m.¹

U.S. Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1960, 3:15 p.m.

Secretary Herter first took up the matters before the United Nations. He said the United Nations Security Council had acted to refer the Cuban complaint to the Organization of American States.² The determination of the place to hold the meeting of the OAS has developed into a problem. We are still hoping that it can be arranged for Costa Rica. The President said he thought that anywhere in Central or South America would be preferable to having it in the United States.

Mr. Herter next reported on the status of the Nicaro plant. It is evident that we will probably have to close this plant. However, we are making a final attempt to negotiate its sale to the Cubans. The President asked what recourse we have if the Cubans force us to close it. He commented that our case regarding this plant should be stronger than with regard to private enterprises since its operation is based upon an intergovernmental agreement. Mr. Herter said we will simply do the best we can. The President went on to ask what we would do in case the Cubans try to take the Guantanamo Base over. He was not talking of the water supply, since we can meet minimum needs with water brought in by tanker. Mr. Herter said that as regards the base itself, we have a valid treaty not limited in duration, and subject to change only upon agreement by both parties. The President said what he wants to see is what we do if they attack and how we plan to do it.

Mr. Herter said that, with regard to the Cuban item in the United Nations, and in the OAS, the Latin American countries have come around very well in the last few days. Khrushchev’s behavior and threats have helped in this, particularly his threat of intervention coupled with trying to incite the Cubans to cause trouble over Guantanamo.

[Here follows discussion of maters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared and initialed by Goodpaster on July 21. Other participants included Herter, Bohlen, Kohler, Wilcox, Hagerty, and Goodpaster. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 217C.

² See footnote 4, Document 558.

561. Memorandum of Discussion at the 452d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 21, 1960¹

Washington, July 21, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Next Mr. Dulles stated the Communists were tightening their grip on Cuba. A Latin American young Communist organization was to meet on the 26th of July in Cuba. [1 sentence (1½ lines) not declassified] Delegates were expected from most of the Communist Bloc and Afro-Asian countries including the FLN. Peruvian and other anti-Communist groups would boycott the meeting. [1 sentence (2 lines) not declassified] Havana University had become a creature of the regime as a result of a take-over on July 15. The student federation had ousted anti-Communist professors and was recruiting Leftist professors from other Latin American universities. This would of course improve the situation in these other universities while worsening it in Havana. On the 14th of July the Communists’ daily paper had taken over the printing plant formerly used by Revolucion, the official regime paper which was moving to larger quarters. This action strengthened the Communist daily. Catholic circles in Cuba appeared to be moving away from a previous policy of vacillation. Castro, from his sickbed on July 18, denounced the “Falangists” among the priests. This had been a reaction to the spontaneous demonstrations on the 17 and 18 of July. These demonstrations had been led by Catholic prelates who had been sent to Cuba by Rome in April and May of last year. Mr. Dulles observed in passing that while Castro was probably ill, he also appeared to be in temporary retirement, perhaps because he was not sure of the line he should take. Mr. McCone asked whether these demonstrations had been truly spontaneous or whether they were the product of clerical leadership. Mr Dulles said he was not sure of the answer to this question. The government, Mr. Dulles said, appeared to be cracking down on the church. It had recently denied foreign exchange to two high churchmen who wished to go to Europe. The attitude of the church might be a very important element in future Cuban developments. Mr. Dulles noted that the editor of a very popular Cuban weekly which circulates widely in Latin America had defected on July 18 and at that time had made a very eloquent speech. [1 sentence (1½ lines) not declassified] It was the view of Ambassador Bonsal that Khrushchev’s declaration may have been a serious blow to the Castro regime because it removed doubts as to the Communist orientation of that regime.

Mr. Dulles noted that a 14-man Communist Chinese mission headed by the Chinese Deputy Minister of Foreign Commerce, was in Cuba. The Communist Chinese are likely to agree to buy 500,000 tons of sugar. They have bought 130,000 tons already. There is a large Chinese community in Cuba of about 30,000. Some of these are Communist and some are anti-Communist but the majority, as in the case of the overseas Chinese generally, would probably prefer to be left alone. Mr. Dulles noted that Raul Castro had arrived in Moscow on July 17 and was due to go to Cairo on July 22. He then read parts of the communiqué that had been issued that morning following the Raul Castro–Khrushchev conversations.²

Mr. Dulles went on to say that [less than 1 line not declassified] had revealed nebulous and somewhat pro-Castro actions on the part of the Venezuelan Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister had recommended to the UAR and Bolivia through Venezuelan Embassies in those countries that neutralists support Castro. The Foreign Minister had advised Bolivia and the UAR of conversations with the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela (Mr. Sparks) in which the Venezuelan Foreign Minister had said that Venezuela would not hesitate to back Castro in the OAS and in the UN. Betancourt, however, was pursuing a different policy. Secretary Herter pointed out that Venezuela was now concentrating on Trujillo and did not want the problem of Cuba mixed up with it. He went on to note that an OAS mission was in Venezuela and would report back at the end of the week. At that time the OAS would set a time and place for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS to deal with the Dominican question. The U.S. was also working to get the Cuban problem on the agenda. There was considerable disagreement over where the meeting should be held and recently it had been suggested that it might be held in Puerto Rico on the assumption that Puerto Rico could control any pro-Castro demonstrations. However, the U.S. was somewhat disturbed by this proposal. Secretary Herter pointed to one encouraging note. Colombian President Camargo had said yesterday that this was not simply a dispute between Cuba and the U.S. but involved intervention by another power in the Western Hemisphere. Such intervention, he had said, should be dealt with under the Monroe Doctrine which had been transformed into an inter-American doctrine.

Mr. Allen pointed out that a people-to-people committee had recently been organized to express the regard of the American people for the Cuban people. This represented a new departure in the people-to-people movement. Usually these committees were organized among missionary groups, stamp collectors, etc., and had not got into the political field, although a people-to-people American-Islamic Council had been somewhat involved in political activity. This new group had written a round-robin letter to the Cuban people which had been signed by fifteen prominent Americans. It had been published in Spanish-language newspapers in Miami and New York. Three thousand copies of the Miami newspaper had been sold on newsstands in Cuba and 22 thousand more copies had been ordered for distribution in Cuba. In addition a tear sheet containing the letter had been sent to two thousand leaders all over Latin America. The activities of this group have not got into the U.S. press to any extent but there was a surprising amount of interest in Latin American circles. A Chinese in New York had had the letter translated into Chinese for distribution to the Chinese in Cuba.

Mr. McCone said that he had talked with tanker owners and it was their view that there was no way to keep Cuba from getting surplus tankers. Even if the large operators cooperate, the Cubans would be able to get all the tankers they need. A boycott by the major oil companies of tanker owners who provide tankers is not likely to be effective because the oil companies have imposed such boycotts before and then have forgotten them when the market for tankers changes.

Mr. McCone went on to say that Mexican friends of his were alarmed over the Communist trend in Mexico. These friends had expressed their views in connection with the announcement of a leading member of the Mexican Parliament of his support for Castro. These Mexicans said that the U.S. did not realize the extent of this insidious movement in Mexico. Secretary Herter said that this development had not gone unnoticed by State. Mr. McCone felt, however, that it had gone unnoticed by the American people. Mr. Dulles stated that Mexico had its most anti-Communist government in a long while. Secretary Herter interjected to say, however, that the government was not strong. [1 sentence (2½ lines) not declassified] Secretary Mueller asked whether the trend referred to by Mr. McCone represented simply an extension of the Socialist philosophy or actual association with the Soviets. Mr. Dulles said there were many Leftists in Mexico but there was no trend toward association with the Soviets and that there had been no new political developments in Mexico in the last few months. He pointed out that the pro-Castro statement of a member of the Mexican Parliament³ did not reflect the attitude of the Mexican Government. Secretary Herter noted that we had indications that ex-President Cardenas was an active spearhead in this.

Returning to the question of the Cuban oil situation, Mr. Gray said he understood that the real limiting factor was the operation of the refineries and obtaining spare parts for the refineries. He wondered whether the line was being held on supplying such spare parts. Secretary Herter said he thought so and went on to state that the Cubans could be expected to have some trouble operating the refineries, partly as a result of intermittent interruptions in the power supply. The tanker problem, he noted, had been taken up in NATO which had reached the conclusion that it was beyond control. Mr. Dulles noted that there were 268 surplus tankers available and Secretary Mueller added that this represented six million dead-weight tons of tanker capacity.

Mr. Gray asked what percentage of the Cuban population was Catholic. It was agreed in the discussion that followed that a very large percentage of the Cubans were Catholic, perhaps as high as 95% or more. Mr. McCone pointed out, however, that traditionally the Catholics in Latin America were not very active church members.⁴

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Robert H. Johnson

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Robert H. Johnson on July 21. The Secretary of State presided at the meeting.

² For a translation of the communiqué as published in Pravda on July 21 at the conclusion of Raúl Castro’s visit to Moscow, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XII, no. 29, August 17, 1960, pp. 17–18.

³ See footnote 5, Document 554.

⁴ This discussion of the Cuban situation constitutes NSC Action No. 2269. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

562. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State¹

Ottawa, July 24, 1960—2 p.m.

63. On short notice I was summoned to call on External Affairs Minister Green this morning. He asked me to convey personal message from Prime Minister to President to effect that President of Mexico recently suggested to Prime Minister that they together with President of Brazil should offer United States and Cuba their good offices in finding ways of ameliorating present situation. Prime Minister replied that Canada would be glad to cooperate if this were deemed helpful. Prime Minister is under impression that President of Brazil made similar response.

Prime Minister anxious make clear that he is not contemplating action on part of Canada unless this would be agreeable to the United States. He hesitated to telephone President at Newport because he was doubtful of secure connection. Prime Minister is not informing Mexicans of this message. Canada has apparently not been in direct touch with Brazilians.

Department may or may not wish inform Embassies Mexico City and Rio.

Wigglesworth

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–2460. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling.

563. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 25, 1960—6 p.m.

385. On afternoon of Saturday, July 23, Argentine Ambassador Julio Amoedo tells me he was called to office of Acting Foreign Minister Olivares. He had requested appointment to discuss safe conduct for asylees (Miro Cardona, father and son, and Rojas). However, after assuring him that safe conduct would be settled next week, Olivares said Fidel Castro wished to see Amoedo at once. They proceeded together to Castro’s house at Cojimar, an east Habana suburb. Amoedo found Castro looking sick and repressed [depressed?] although cordial and friendly personally. He was in pajamas. Amoedo was impressed at number of security checks required to enter Cojimar property and also at fact there were apparently no visitors waiting to see Castro (formerly his anteroom was full).

Castro apparently wished to discuss recent Buenos Aires incident where Cuban diplomatic pouch was opened and Peronist correspondence, including instructions for subversive activities from Cooke, a Peronist leader who has been in Habana for sometime, was discovered. (Rumors were current in Habana that afternoon to effect GOA had determined to break with GOC over this matter.) According to Amoedo, Castro was most apologetic regarding incident which he blamed entirely on “General” Bayo, a Spanish Republican officer who helped instruct Castro’s expeditionary force in guerrilla warfare in Mexico in 1956 and has since been fairly prominent here. He has been known as friend of Che Guevara. Amoedo thinks that Che Guevara was responsible for misuse of Cuban pouch.

After about an hour of conversation with Castro in presence of Olivares, Che Guevara dropped in unexpectedly.

Castro said, “What are you doing here?” Guevara replied, “I just happened to be passing by and thought I would drop in.” Guevara sat down and joined in the conversation. (Amoedo believes he was tipped off by Olivares or by someone else regarding Amoedo’s presence.)

Conversation then took a general turn. Guevara denounced Frondizi as a puppet of the Yankees because of Argentine representation to GOC July 14 (Embassy telegram 248² ). Amoedo reacted vigorously. Guevara then referred to “your great friend, the American Ambassador, who is conspiring openly.” Amoedo states that he admitted our friendship and stressed his own friendship and admiration for the United States. Conversation proceeded for some time along more or less familiar Cuban revolutionary propaganda lines with Guevara leading, Amoedo countering his arguments and Castro keeping more or less quiet.

After about an hour and a half of this, conversation ended. Amoedo saw Castro very briefly alone at door on departing. Castro said he would like to come to Argentine Embassy for “un asado” and stressed his friendship for Amoedo. Latter replied he would welcome such visit and reiterated personal friendship for Castro. He told Castro he must have realized attitude of Argentine Government and of other Latin American Governments since this had been clearly expressed to him at the Argentine Embassy dinner on May 10 (Embassy telegram 320³ ). Castro said that situation had changed radically since then.

Amoedo has impression that Castro is really sick and worried and that he is so surrounded and hemmed in by Guevara and other Communist elements, that he is no longer free agent. He believes that Castro was unable, because presence first of Olivares and then of Guevara to talk to Amoedo on whatever subject he had in mind when he summoned him. (But why then did he do so through Ministry Foreign Affairs? He used to have many other channels of communication particularly with Amoedo.) Amoedo told me that he thought he had seen Castro for last time and that latter was a doomed man. He did not attempt predict events but thought situation here hastening to tragic outcome in which Castro would be victim.

Bonsal

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2560. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

² Dated July 15. (ibid., 737.00/7–1560)

³ Dated May 21. (ibid., 611.37/5–2160)

564. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter–American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

Proposal for Good Offices between United States and Cuba

I recommend that you take the position in discussing Ottawa’s telegram No. 63² with the President that he not accept the proposal of good offices for ameliorating relations between the United States and Cuba for the following reasons:

1. The Organization of American States is now seized with the Cuban problem on two grounds: (a) Threatened intervention of an extra-continental power, i.e. Khrushchev statement; and (b) Cuba’s charges against the United States of economic aggression before the U.N. Security Council.

2. The Cuban problem is one of hemispheric dimension and is not one just between the United States and Cuba as evidenced by the unanimous vote of the Council of the OAS to convoke a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

3. Efforts of the Argentine Ambassador in Habana, seconded by the Brazilian Ambassador and others, to bring about some improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations have been to no avail.

Perhaps the best reasons to be advanced by the President are those in (1) and (2) above. For a discussion with the President, you will undoubtedly bear in mind that Mexico is simply unable to assess the Cuban problem in any terms except her own revolution. The Brazilian President, if he has evinced a willingness to participate in a good offices effort, must be judged in terms of Brazilian domestic politics and the desire of President Kubitschek, who is backing Marshall Lott, to offset the effects of candidate Janio Quadros’s visit to Cuba last spring. Moreover, in view of Under Secretary Merchant’s recent reports, it is clear that the Canadians are unable to see the Cuban problem in its truly menacing light. Finally, this initiative for good offices may have come from Cuba itself which is now undoubtedly feeling a heavy economic and political pressure and would tend to prop up Castro just when he is beginning to weaken.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–2560. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted and initialed by Rubottom. Also initialed by Merchant.

² Document 562.

565. Memorandum of Discussion at the 453d Meeting of the National Security Council, Newport, Rhode Island, July 25, 1960¹

Newport, Rhode Island, July 25, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles reported that the Communist Bloc was quite active in negotiations with Cuba. Communist China and Cuba had concluded a trade pact on the 23rd of July. This pact represented an effort by Communist China to win recognition from Cuba, an effort which would probably reach fruition with Cuban recognition in the next few days. An economic aid agreement between Communist China and Cuba is expected later in the year, involving industrial equipment and technical assistance. A communiqué issued upon the completion of Raul Castro’s visit to Moscow speaks of close cooperation between Cuba and the USSR but refrains from mentioning the Soviet threat of rocket retaliation against the U.S. One purpose of this visit may have been to complete an arms agreement. Delegates are now arriving in Cuba for a Latin American Youth Congress. Castro is obtaining more security protection, counter-revolutionaries are being arrested in greater numbers and defections are increasing. Prio, the former President of Cuba, is now ready to seek asylum in a foreign embassy if he is not allowed to leave the country. Mattei, who is well-known as an Italian troublemaker, is considering supplying equipment and assistance to the Cuban oil refineries. The officials of these refineries say that Cuba’s greatest problem in operating the refineries will be replacement parts.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Forthcoming Meeting of the Organization of American States With Respect to Cuba and the Dominican Republic

Secretary Herter said that the Organization of American States would hold a meeting on August 15 to discuss action with respect to the Dominican Republic. Venezuela was trying to effect a separation between the problem of Cuba and the problem of the Dominican Republic. The OAS had sent a special mission to investigate the Venezuelan charge that the attack on Betancourt had been directed by the Dominican Republic. If the OAS proposes sanctions against the Dominican Republic, the case would have to go to the UN. The OAS, however, can recommend measures which each state could implement individually. Secretary Herter said the U.S. would suggest such measures as the following against the Dominican Republic: withdrawal of Chiefs of Missions; the admonition to take into account OAS condemnation nation in relations with the Dominican Republic; refusal to permit the shipment of arms and ammunition into the Dominican Republic; collaborating in preventing shipment of arms and ammunition from the Dominican Republic to other countries, including air and sea patrols; a request that other nations outside the hemisphere take note of the measures recommended by the OAS; creation of a committee to observe the implementing of these measures.

The President asked whether it would not be desirable to add to the list surveillance to make certain that no other American state intervenes militarily in the Dominican Republic. Secretary Herter said the recommendation on the shipment of arms and ammunition into the Dominican Republic would prohibit such intervention and was intended to cover the President’s point.

The President said he believed it was desirable to connect the cases of the Dominican Republic and Cuba but he also believed that it was very necessary to settle the Trujillo situation because it appears to be impossible to shake the belief of Latin America that the Trujillo situation is more serious than the Castro situation. Until Trujillo is eliminated, we cannot get our Latin American friends to reach a proper level of indignation in dealing with Castro.

Secretary Herter then referred to the legal requirement for the purchase of sugar from the Dominican Republic and said an effort should be made to get the law changed in this session of Congress. The President said if the law were not changed, he would simply refuse to buy Dominican sugar. If impeachment proceedings were brought against him, that would take longer than his term has to run. Secretary Herter said his legal advisers had agreed that we were required to buy Dominican sugar but we were simply ignoring that requirement. As a result Congressman Cooley was on the warparth. In Secretary Herter’s opinion, a great deal of the difficulty was expenditure of Dominican money in the U.S. The President said that any proposals to buy Dominican sugar should be sent to him for approval and he would take a long time to study the matter. He also believed we should frankly say that it appears that the Dominican Republic bribes are coming into this country in an effort to influence this government. Secretary Herter agreed that we would lose prestige if we bought sugar from the Dominican Republic after refusing to buy it from Cuba.

Secretary Herter then reported that Mexico had been suggesting that Brazil, Mexico, and Canada should mediate between the U.S. and Cuba. Such mediation would recognize the idea that the sole parties to the present controversy are the U.S. and Cuba. The President said we have already said that we are ready to have our problems with Cuba mediated. We want to have these problems settled peacefully. Secretary Herter said that the whole problem had been shifted toward the concept of the introduction of communism into this hemisphere.

The President said that if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would be the loser. He had confidence in the Presidents of Mexico and Brazil and the Prime Minister of Canada but he thought the problem of Cuba was now before the OAS and should remain there. Secretary Gates said we had a difficult problem of public opinion because the American people were interested in the situation in Cuba but did not care about the situation in the Dominican Republic. The President said American newspapers had been attacking Trujillo for fifteen years. He asked how we could keep the OAS as a going concern. We could not do it if we focussed sanctions on Cuba and forgot about Trujillo. We were able to induce the Latin American leaders to talk seriously about Cuba only after agreeing that Trujillo is also a problem.

Secretary Herter said that procedurally we could not get the case of Cuba before the OAS until the Trujillo situation had been considered because the Trujillo case was brought up first. With respect to sugar legislation, he asked whether the President thought it would be undesirable to prepare any new legislation for this session of Congress. The President said he had not meant to suggest that he was opposed to any new sugar legislation. He would prefer to have the authority of law for refusing to buy Dominican sugar. He said that the OAS would not consider the case of Cuba if we focussed all our attention on Castro and forgot about Trujillo.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on July 28.

² This discussion of the forthcoming meeting of the Organization of American States constitutes NSC Action No. 2273. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

566. Letter From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower¹

London, July 25, 1960.

Dear Friend: This is the more detailed reply² to your letter³ about the Cuban problem. I need hardly say that we fully share your concern at the way in which Castro has allowed his country to become ever more open to communist and Soviet influence.

British material interests in Cuba are of course not on anything like the same scale as yours although we have always had a valuable export trade with Cuba. We have recently been obliged to protest strongly against the illegal take-over of the Shell refinery there—and I fear we have to face a severe deterioration of our trade relations. Of course, we have a direct political interest in the smooth development towards independence of the British West Indies. We are therefore deeply concerned at the introduction into the area of what is rapidly becoming a quasi-communist satellite state. For these reasons, and above all because of the obvious menace which a communist controlled Cuba would represent to the security of the Western hemisphere and so to the whole free world, I was very much interested to learn your views on how this problem should be handled.

As I think you know, we too had hopes, at an earlier stage, that Castro would succeed in carrying out the intention, which he himself sometimes expressed, of preventing Cuba from falling into communist hands. We are now inclined to agree with the view expressed in your letter that Castro and his Government are now so fully committed to the course they have chosen that the only hope for an improvement in the position must lie in the replacement of his régime. But it is not easy to see how this can be done.

We have been encouraged to see the signs of a growing opposition to Castro’s policies, both inside Cuba and in Latin America as a whole. Of course, this is only in an embryonic stage. All the same, it is significant that among some of the very classes which were principally responsible for bringing Castro into power there should now be so deep a disillusionment over the way in which he has deviated from the principles of his own revolution. We had hoped therefore that if this feeling was allowed to develop undisturbed by outside pressures, there was a fair prospect of it eventually growing to such great proportion that with the encouragement of the United States and the other member countries of the Organisation of American States, it might have led to the downfall of the Castro Government and its replacement by something less dangerous. It is true that in waiting unduly long there was a risk of the communists so effectively consolidating their position that they would be even harder to dislodge than was already the case. On the other hand Castro’s spendthrift economic policy, his continued denial of the ordinary freedoms, and his refusal to allow the peasants to own the confiscated land all seemed likely to lead to great internal dissatisfaction.

For these reasons, we watched with admiration the patience with which you were for many months prepared to endure the great provocations which faced you in Cuba. We were also aware that as you make clear in your letter, any departure on your part from a policy of non-intervention would be widely misunderstood. This would be especially the case in Latin America and the Caribbean, where, however clearly your devotion to this policy may be appreciated elsewhere, suspicions of your intentions have persisted as a result of the very size and proximity of your great country, and of recollections of some aspects of United States policy during the past century. These suspicions are of course actively fostered by the agents of the communists—and by those of Castro himself.

Of course we fully understand that in view of the very rapid deterioration of the position which has taken place since Mikoyan’s visit you should now have seriously to consider the possibility of hastening the process of disintegration in Cuba. I must confess to some doubts as to the success of the new policy. Although better off than many Latin American peoples, the mass of Cubans are poor and accustomed to hardship. Having tasted the flavour of revolution they are likely, so it seems to me, seriously to react against a deterioration in the conditions of their life only if they can be confident that this is in no way the work of “counter-revolutionaries” or of the United States Government against which they have been encouraged to feel so much resentment. There does seem to be some danger that if, as a result of the measures which you have taken, or may take in the coming months, conditions of economic hardship are created, many Cubans who might otherwise have gradually drifted into opposition to Castro will instead be inclined to regard him—and themselves—as martyrs. Alternatively, if the impact of these measures is mitigated by a great effort on the part of the Soviet bloc, we can be sure that in their propaganda the communists in Cuba will make full use of the opportunities which this will give them. Furthermore, everything that I hear of the state of feeling in the other Latin American countries confirms the importance of avoiding any action which might create the impression that the United States was actively intervening in Cuba and arouse all sorts of latent suspicions.

I hope you won’t think from what I have said that we disagree with the fundamental principle underlying your policy. On the contrary, we fully agree that everything possible must be done to bring home to the Cuban people the dangers into which Castro is leading them, and to create conditions suitable for the growth of an opposition capable of replacing his régime. It may be that the steps you are taking will have this result and I very much hope that they will. But I cannot help wondering whether, if there were a good chance of further important defections taking place and of it becoming known in Cuba that an increasingly powerful movement was growing up in and outside the country, bent on restoring the revolution to its intended course, it might not be wiser to let the yeast rise of its own accord. Or at least for them to be very unobtrusively supported from the United States.

However, you must clearly play the hand in this affair and we will certainly help you in any way we can. In the United Nations we have already given you our full support in ensuring that the Cuban complaint was diverted into the Organisation of American States in the first place. We will gladly continue to give support of this kind. Similarly I entirely endorse your view that the present situation calls for a continuation, and perhaps a tightening up, of the existing restrictions on the export of arms to the countries in the Caribbean area. We shall be glad to join you in your efforts to secure the acceptance of this policy by other arms supplying countries whom we are able to influence. But I’m afraid the problem of tankers for the carriage of Soviet oil to Cuba is not easy. There is a considerable excess of tanker tonnage in the world at present, and much of it is in the hands of owners whom we cannot influence or even advise. I am told that it would not be possible in the way you propose so effectively to curtail the supply of oil to Cuba as to cause any really serious dislocation there. We—and you—would then be in the position of incurring the maximum odium with the Cubans and perhaps encouraging them to turn still further to the Russians without achieving the aim which you have in mind. As I told you in my message of July 22 we have no legal power to compel tanker owners not to carry oil to Cuba.

It would, however, make it easier for us to help if we had a rather clearer understanding of your actual intentions. I know, and fully sympathize with, your purpose—the unseating of Castro and his replacement by a more suitable régime—but I am not very clear how you really mean to achieve this aim. After all, we have been through it ourselves and know the difficulties and dangers. Meanwhile, it is good to know that our officials are in close touch on all the details.⁴

Yours ever,

Harold⁵

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret.

² Regarding Macmillan’s initial reply of July 22, see footnote 6, Document 551.

³ Document 551.

⁴ In a July 29 letter to Macmillan, Herter wrote that the President had asked him to thank the Prime Minister for his “very thoughtful and helpful letter with respect to Cuba” and to indicate that the President would soon be sending a more substantive reply. Text of Herter’s letter was transmitted in telegram 670 to London, July 29, along with instructions to the Ambassador to deliver the letter to Macmillan. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2960)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

567. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Gates) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 26, 1960.

Dear Chris: I know that you have been devoting a great deal of attention to the Cuban problem. Unless and until more direct action is feasible or necessary, our best course seems to lie in future actions in the economic sphere. Since we have crossed one Rubicon with our sugar and oil actions, should we not consider other economic measures that could have a significant impact on Castro’s regime? It would be most unfortunate for the United States to find that we had applied sugar and oil sanctions only to watch the Castro Government—possibly with Soviet help—survive to strengthen gradually its hold on the people and the economy of Cuba and, perhaps as a result, its influence on other Latin American countries. In the event that further actions are to be taken, their effectiveness would be much greater if applied simultaneously than if staggered over a period of time, thereby allowing Castro a breathing space in which to adjust his economy to each one.

In several parts of the world one can observe a disturbing tendency on the part of smaller nations to seek to involve the Soviet Union in their problems in the hope of playing East against West. If we do not follow through with respect to Cuba, we may be encouraging similar behavior by other countries. This could not only damage our international position but also add signficantly to the risks of a major East-West conflict.

I understand that various economic measures are possible under the Export Control Act of 1949,² and the Defense Production Act of 1950,³ and through withdrawal from GATT schedules of preferential tariff rates on Cuban products. I am attaching a list of possible economic measures as illustrative of the type of actions I have in mind. In giving you my thoughts on this subject, I recognize that the Cuban problem is a complex one with many considerations which must be balanced. Certainly, there are no easy solutions. But from a long range viewpoint, the risks of all-out economic action seem less than those of stopping with half-way measures.

Sincerely,

Thomas S. Gates⁴

[Attachment]

POSSIBLE U.S. ECONOMIC COURSES OF ACTION REGARDING CUBA⁵

1. Trade Reprisals:

A. Discouragement of extension of credit to Cuba on sales of exports.

a. Eliminate any government guarantees or insurance affecting exports to Cuba which may be in effect.

b. Publicize through trade publications the special risks involved.

2. Elimination of Cuban Preferential Rates and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment:

Cuban products entering the United States are subject to preferential rates, in general, about 20 percent lower than the most-favored-nation rates which apply to most countries. These preferences stem from a treaty as modified by subsequent notes of interpretation and most of them are written into GATT schedules. While it would, therefore, take six months or longer to eliminate them, the initiation of the process (denouncement of the treaty according to its terms and notification to GATT of withdrawal of appropriate items from GATT schedules) could take place at any time.

Upon a Presidential declaration that Cuba is a Communist-dominated area, the imports of that country, after denouncement of existing international commitments to the contrary, would be subject to tariff rates prevailing in 1930. This action would result not only in elimination of the Cuban preferential rates but also in reversion to much higher rates since the most-favored-nation rates have been markedly reduced since 1934 by trade agreement negotiations. Thus rates applying to imports from Cuba would become considerably higher than those applying to competing countries.

3. Export Controls:

From the standpoint of national security, the Secretary of Commerce, under the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended, can take any of the following actions with respect to Cuba:

A. Effect a complete embargo on goods to be exported from the United States by denying to U.S. exporters license applications for such shipments. This action would immediately tend to disrupt the Cuban economy until aid was received from other sources, such as the USSR.

B. Effect a partial embargo by denying export license applications for commodities which are essential to the Cuban economy. This action would result in a temporary shortage in those commodities in essential daily use in the civilian economy.

C. Deny services and spare parts regarded as necessary for the maintenance of the civilian economy. This action would result in a temporary breakdown of services and production facilities essential for the proper functioning of the civilian economy.

4. Transportation Controls:

Under Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, the Department of Commerce can cut off Cuba completely from all trade (export and import) with the United States and deny them dollars that ordinarily would accrue through continuation of that trade. They would also be denied materials and foodstuffs necessary for a balanced economy. This sudden impact of cut-off of all trade would present a serious problem to the orderly conduct of everyday life in Cuba.

5. Bunkering Controls:

Under the Export Control Act of 1949 as extended, the Department of Commerce can limit or deny the bunkering of petroleum and petroleum products in the United States, its territories and possessions, to foreign vessels and planes registered in or under charters to Cuba or carrying any commodities manifested or destined directly or indirectly to Cuba, to prevent their carrying on trade and traffic contrary to the security export controls and objectives of the United States.

Other Controls and Actions:

A. Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the U.S. could (1) freeze Cuban bank accounts in the U.S. and prohibit all dealings between U.S. nationals and Cuban firms; (2) embargo all imports from Cuba; and (3) apply “transactions controls” to deny Cuba products of U.S.-controlled firms abroad.

B. The U.S. could discourage all tourist trade to Cuba, including terminating the ferry lines to Florida, landing rights to Cuban planes, and discourage commercial airlines from flying to Cuba.

C. Actions could be taken to restrict commercial communications emanating from Cuba to Latin America and Communist Bloc, to include such operations as the $1,000 weekly RCA traffic between Moscow and Havana.

D. Specific vulnerable areas of the Cuban economy include (1) grain, lard, and rice (the largest single item of U.S. export to Cuba); (2) automotive, machine, electrical, and electronic spare parts; (3) petroleum, petroleum products, and technical assistance in refining; (4) bulk paper for newsprint; and (5) export of sugar from Cuba.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Files of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Cuba. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Gordon Gray. Gray’s copy is the source text.

² Enacted February 26, 1949; for text, see 63 Stat. 7.

³ Enacted September 8, 1950; for text, see 64 Stat. 798.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

⁵ Secret.

568. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter in Washington and Secretary of State for External Affairs Green in Ottawa, July 28, 1960¹

Ottawa, July 28, 1960

Mr. Green telephoned to say he had Ambassador Wigglesworth in on Sunday² and explained something to him about Cuba. The Secretary said he had gotten the message from Wigglesworth and that an answer was on its way. Mr. Green said he wanted to tell the Secretary very confidentially what has come up now, i.e., the suggestion is that the three of them (Canada, Mexico and Brazil) should get in touch informally and ask whether it would be all right for the Heads of State to write letters offering their good offices. Mr. Green said he wanted to clear this with the Secretary before doing anything on this.

The Secretary said he had discussed this matter with the President³ and would like to explain our position to Mr. Green. The Secretary said we are naturally most grateful for the spirit motivating this offer, but this question is going to arise at a meeting of Foreign Ministers set for August 15 in Costa Rica, having been referred by the U.N. to the OAS. The Secretary said one thing in connection with this whole Cuban business is the fact we are most anxious to establish that this is not just a quarrel between the U.S. and Cuba as such, but rather what is happening is a matter of concern to all the Latin American countries. The Secretary said the feeling we had in connection with the offer of good offices is that this is something that might well come after the OAS Foreign Ministers meeting rather than before it, because we are afraid if it came before it would complicate things a good deal and would look as though this dispute were only between the U.S. and Cuba and nobody else, which is really not the case. The Secretary said at the August 15 OAS Foreign Ministers meeting they will first discuss Venezuela’s problem with the Dominican Republic and then an agenda item will come up dealing with the intervention of a foreign power in the whole Inter-American system, which puts the Cuban matter in the broader context and gets us away from the appearance of a US-Cuban dispute. The Secretary said it was his feeling that, while we appreciate tremendously their willingness to help, the offer of good offices before the OAS meeting would be narrowing the problem down to a matter just between the US and Cuba which we want to avoid.

Mr. Green said the proposal is that the U.S. be just contacted informally, and Mr. Green said if this were done, could we just say we would prefer to let it ride and see what happens at the OAS meeting? The Secretary said we could so reply, but we would not want to do it publicly and said this is the gist of our response to Wigglesworth’s message. Mr. Green asked if it would embarrass us if next week the three countries asked us informally whether it would help if there were letters written by the Heads of State and then we could say we would prefer to let it ride. The Secretary said we would rather not have this informal contact since the difficulty is that even though it is informal it is very apt to leak. The Secretary said, however, it was not that we didn’t appreciate the goodwill involved here. Mr. Green said he saw the point, and they will try to work it out that way. The Secretary said he was personally very much interested in this whole matter, and Mr. Green said he knew it was very difficult for us. The Secretary said he had just written Mr. Green a personal note⁴ giving him some background on the Cuban problem generally and Mr. Green said he would appreciate having that very much.

[Here follows discussion of a matter unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. The time of the conversation is not indicated on the source text.

² July 24.

³ This discussion has not been further identified.

⁴ Not found.

569. Memorandum of Discussion at the 454th Meeting of the National Security Council, Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960¹

Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

In Cuba, Mr. Dulles said, the most pressing question was the enigma of Castro’s health. He had no definite information on this point. He believed, however, that Castro was not well and that he was under the control of the communists from the physical standpoint. In other words, it was probable that Castro was no longer his own master. [4 sentences (9 lines) not declassified]

Mr. Gray asked whether there was any speculation that Fidel Castro’s illness had been caused by a bullet. Mr. Dulles said there was no confirmation of this. Mr. Douglas said that it had been reported that Castro was shot on July 29. Mr. Dulles said that such an occurrence was not impossible.

Secretary Anderson asked whether the counter-revolutionaries in Cuba would not make greater progress if Guevara took over, inasmuch as it is Castro not Guevara who has the great popular appeal. Mr. Dulles agreed that if Fidel disappeared, the popularity of the revolution would be decreased. Secretary Anderson asked whether there was any merit in the idea of getting the Latin American Ambassadors to Cuba to assure Castro that he would be accorded asylum in the event he found himself in danger. Perhaps we could fly Castro out of Cuba and get him on our side.

Secretary Dillon reported that there had recently been a quiet rapprochement between Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Castro is now opposed to any anti-Trujillo action in the OAS because he fears that similar proceedings will subsequently be taken against Cuba. Accordingly, we may find Cuba and the Dominican Republic acting together in the OAS.

[3 sentences (7 lines) not declassified] Cuba has called off the “Congress of the Hungry” and the Youth Congress is not getting on too well.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on August 4.

² This discussion of Cuba, as well as other subjects discussed during the briefing by Dulles, constitutes NSC Action No. 2277. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

570. Letter From the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Havana, August 2, 1960.

Dear Dick: The purpose of this letter is to discuss with you certain aspects of our economic policy toward Cuba and to formulate a suggestion for a possible negotiating attitude on our part in the matter of sugar to be acquired by the United States in 1961 and thereafter. I am as convinced as anyone could be that we cannot do business with Castro and the people who currently control him, but I suggest that we should assume attitudes which will have the appearance of constructiveness even though, considering the people we have to deal with, they may not lead to constructive results.

Our current economic policy toward Cuba, so far as it has been revealed to this Embassy, has been manifested in the following actions:

a) The oil companies have refused to refine Soviet crude oil and have defied the order of the Cuban Government that they should do so. They probably would not have taken this attitude without the encouragement of our Government. As a result, the three refineries have been intervened and the Soviet Union has, in effect, assumed the responsibility for supplying crude oil to Cuba, a responsibility formerly discharged by Esso, Texaco, and Shell from their Venezuelan sources of crude. So far, there have been no indications of serious difficulties in the supply of petroleum products here. Such difficulties may develop in the future.

b) On July 6, we practically eliminated the unshipped balance of Cuba’s sugar quota in the United States for 1960. The effect of our action has been to reduce our purchases of Cuban sugar by perhaps as much as one million short tons, if we consider the deficit allocations and consumption increases in which Cuba might have expected to share. So far, we have not experienced any very strong reaction to this step particularly in the other American republics because Khrushchev’s rocket-rattling statement of July 9 has been the center of attention. That was providential. However, the effect will be only temporary and eventually our action in bringing about so drastic a reduction in the sales in the United States of a product upon which Cuba’s economic welfare depends will be subject to sober analysis and discussion with results which, I anticipate, will be unfavorable to us. This will be particularly the case if the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers results in some sort of resolution on behalf of the Inter-American System followed by an increasingly critical analysis of a number of aspects of the policy of the United States toward the other American republics including especially Cuba.

c) Our Government is apparently encouraging American business interests to abandon their activities here. This is apparently designed to increase the burdens and responsibilities of the Cuban Government. The representative of the Continental Can Company here tells me that the President of his company, General Lucius Clay, has been in touch with Secretary Anderson on this subject. Continental Can is abandoning its operation in Cuba which is a very minor one in the corporation’s total activity but which is most important to Cuba and will have to be carried on by the Government. A few days ago the Cuban-American Sugar Company’s three mills here (two of which are among the largest in Cuba) were intervened by the Government allegedly because the responsible management of the company left Cuba. Apparently there is involved here also the return to the National Bank of Cuba of several million dollars representing sugar sold and exported by the Cuban-American Sugar Company. Similarly, I understand that the United Fruit Company is planning to abandon its operations. I assume that other American sugar companies are working along similar lines. The result will be that the Cuban Government will have to insure the financing and the management of a number of important sugar mills although presumably it will be assisted in the financing by the availability to it of the Cuban assets, including local bank balances and raw sugar availabilities of the companies in question.

I hope that the above actions are a part of a carefully thought out program. I would appreciate any information available on the subject. The immediate result of these actions, is, of course, to increase the economic influence of our enemies in Cuba at the expense of our own.

The Venezuelan market for oil in Cuba has been lost for the time being. The Cuban economy has been made wholly dependent for crude on the Soviet Union, which has so far shown itself able to handle the situation. Our companies have lost the refineries and the market. The revolutionary ego is, for the time being at least, being really inflated as a result of this situation. There may, of course, be a day of reckoning—I hope so.

With respect to sugar, the Russsians are buying 1,700,000 Spanish long tons of sugar in Cuba this year. The Chinese Communists are buying 500,000 long tons. That makes a total of 2,200,000 long tons sold to areas whose total purchases in the past have rarely exceeded half a million tons. While it is true that these purchases are at a low price compared to ours and that 80% of the price is to be paid for in goods of unknown price and quality, the fact is that 1960 will go down in Cuban history as the year when the Communists expanded their purchases of Cuban sugar by nearly two million tons while the United States was curtailing its takings by nearly one million tons.

With regard to the policy of “abandonment” of American assets here, I must say that I have shared the view of many Americans here to the effect that the best available policy could be expressed in the slogan “stick with it.” These people believe that the Castro Government should be obliged by positive actions to reduce our place in the scheme of things. Instead, the course of action which we advocate, by creating vacuums in the Cuban economy, also creates opportunities for the Cuban Government to walk in with increasing help from the Communist countries. The policy will, of course, further strain the management and the financial capabilities of the Government.

None of the above elements of economic pressure will bring this Government to its knees though they in themselves are being increasingly interpreted, even by our friends, as unsuccessful attempts to do so.

Now, I tend to think that this Government is doomed because of its own incompetencies and incoherencies and because it is becoming increasingly hateful to increasing numbers of the Cuban people. But I do not claim to have a crystal ball in good working order.

There are some who believe that the Government already is mortally wounded and that the power struggle going on around the sick or captive Fidel represents a final stage in its disintegration. I think that is over-optimistic though I respect the judgment of those who, like my Argentine colleague, take this view. I believe that, while the Government is doomed, its death struggle may well be quite prolonged and, I fear, quite bloody. But I do not believe this regime can last or that the Cuban people will submit indefinitely to the sort of regime which Ché Guevara is fashioning for them.

It is important that the inevitable downfall of the present Government not be attributed to any important extent to economic sanctions from the United States as major factor. (If such sanctions were the only way open to us to keep Communism out of the hemisphere, that would be another question, but I do not believe that is the case either here or in the other American republics where the Communist menace is potentially as great as it is in Cuba and where the economic pressures available to us are considerably less significant than they are here.)

A new government here which was generally believed to owe its existence to the destruction of the Castro Government through United States economic sanctions would be a weak one both at home and in the hemisphere. Castro and his followers would be the latest martyrs to American imperialism instead of, as I would hope, horrible examples of what happens when the Communist International takes over a legitimate revolutionary movement in the Americas.

Also it seems to me that the atmosphere of resistance and defiance created by overt American economic sanctions of the kind described above is helpful to the Castro Government both because it exacerbates the nationalistic sentiment on which Castro lives and because it furnishes a seeming justification for increasingly drastic actions to curtail and destroy private property rights.

This does not, of course, mean that we should continue to follow the same economic policies with Castro’s Cuba as we did with Cuba in the pre-Castro period. Then we were dealing with the government of a country which had long been our friend in time of peace and our unconditional ally in time of war. Now we are faced with an unfriendly government which will be the ally of our enemies in case of war. Our response to the attitudes and actions of the present Cuban Government, in the unhappy event that it remains in power, must be a thorough, if gradual, overhauling of the economic relationship from which the Cuban Government has removed by its actions the reciprocal advantage for the United States upon which the preferential treatment accorded by us to Cuba was based.

The approach which I now wish to suggest to you is based upon the above considerations. It endeavors to tie together, on the one hand, the Cuban interest in holding a share of the United States sugar market—an interest which coincides with our own interest—and, on the other hand, the compensation of American corporations and individuals whose property has been taken by the Cuban Government.

I propose that, at some time before a determination is made as to Cuba’s 1961 sugar quota, I be instructed to approach the Cuban Government at the highest possible level (Castro or Dorticoós) and that I state that the United States Government is considering its policy regarding purchases of sugar from Cuba in calendar 1961. I would add that Cuba had chosen its own course in economic and social matters, as well as in matters of trade with the United States, although our economic and trade interests had been seriously and adversely affected thereby. I would state that this Cuban unilateral action gave us the right similarly to exercise our sovereign power to defend and advance the legitimate interests of our country and of our citizens as we see fit, but that I thought that prior discussion before we reached decisions might be desirable even at this late stage.

Specifically, I would say that as a result of action of the Cuban Government in the past 18 months, United States citizens have been deprived of their property and of essential property and management rights in assets valued at perhaps in excess of one-half billion dollars. I would point out that the prospects of any sort of prompt, effective, adequate compensation appear very slim in view of the circumstances prevailing here. In these conditions, sentiment in the United States for a further drastic reduction of the Cuban sugar quota is very strong and is hard to combat logically. The excessive hostility of Cuban leaders toward the Government and hence the people of the United States has done a great deal of damage. I would have no difficulty in making a very strong presentation on this subject.

I would suggest that there is a definite and logical relationship between continued purchases of sugar by the United States and fair treatment by the Cuban Government of American interests here which have been damaged by it. I would make clear that I am not endeavoring to reverse the policies of the Cuban Government in so far as they represent a legitimate exercise of Cuban sovereignty but that I am asserting the rights of our citizens under Cuban and international law and the right of our Government, in the exercise of its own sovereignty, to take such measures as it may see fit to defend those rights.

I would then make a specific proposal to the Cuban Government. I do not want to suggest the details of such a proposal at this time since they should be the subject of the most careful study in the Department. I believe, however, that the proposal should include the following:

1. The setting up of a Cuban-American Claims Commission with representatives of both governments to consider and, if possible, to agree upon the claims of American citizens against the Government of Cuba. The terms of reference of such a commission would have to include provisions for further procedures in the event of disagreement.

2. A commitment on the part of the Cuban Government to make available to the proposed Commission each year a sum of money which should be at least $50 million and might be initially suggested as twice that amount. These funds could be derived from a Cuban tax on sugar exports or from any other source, it being up to the Cuban Government to fulfill its commitment on this score.

3. A commitment on the part of the United States, if the above points are agreed, to fix a quota for Cuban sugar in the United States of a specific initial amount. I have thought of 2½ million Spanish long tons in this connection but believe this should be very carefully studied.

Obviously, the amount which Cuba would make available for United States claims should bear a relationship to the dollars made available to Cuba as a result of the sugar price differential.

The timing of this approach would have to be very carefully considered. It might be a maneuver which would help in connection with the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers. I cannot judge from here. I do think we should put ourselves in a positive position vis-à-vis this situation as soon as possible. The probable rejection by the Cuban Government of a reasonable proposal by us would be helpful to us in terms of hemisphere opinion. On the other hand, I think it is important that we make a serious effort to arrest the disastrous destruction of our economic interests in Cuba and of our trading position with Cuba, both of which are rapidly going down the drain as a result of the current actions of both governments.

Sincerely yours,

Phil

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–260. Secret; Eyes Only.

571. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 3, 1960¹

Washington, August 3, 1960

SUBJECT

Proposed Offer of Good Offices to United States and Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State

Mexican Ambassador Antonio Carrillo Flores

Assistant Secretary R. R. Rubottom, Jr.

Dr. José Gallastegui, Private Secretary to the Mexican Foreign Minister

Melville E. Osborne—CMA

Mr. Rubottom informed the Secretary that the Private Secretary to the Mexican Foreign Minister was in the Secretary’s waiting room. The Secretary suggested that he be invited to the meeting if the Mexican Ambassador concurred. When the Mexican Ambassador agreed, Mr. Gallastegui was ushered into the meeting.

Commenting that it clearly stated the purpose of his call, the Mexican Ambassador presented the Secretary with a translation of a letter² he had received from the President of Mexico which stated that the Mexican President had initiated communication with the President of Brazil and the Prime Minister of Canada to suggest that the three countries offer the United States and Cuba their good offices in the controversy between the two countries; Brazil agreed but as the position of Canada was not yet determined, the approaches were to be made to the Governments of Cuba and the United States by the respective Ambassadors of Brazil and Mexico. The letter also stated that the Mexican President had personally conducted the negotiations leading to these approaches and he considered the negotiations of transcendent and personal interest.

When the Secretary finished reading the letter, the Ambassador explained that he had discussed the contents of the letter with Mr. Rubottom on August 2³ and also the points that made the United States hesitate to accept such an offer; when the Mexican President telephoned him the following day, he had conveyed the gist of their conversation. In accordance with the Mexican President’s instructions, the Ambassador requested permission to make the following comments orally.

First, Mexico does not condone the remarks that have been made by Cuban officials and other leaders against the United States and its leaders nor those against other countries and leaders of Latin America, including Mexico. Mexico realizes the enormity of the threat to the hemisphere presented by the communist menace even more than the United States since Mexico’s social and political institutions make it more vulnerable to that menace than the United States.

Second, the Ambassador wished to point out that he was not making a formal offer of good offices but was merely having exploratory talks that might lead to a formal offer at a later date. He added that Mexico considered the term, good offices, to mean only efforts to bring two countries together for discussions and not to imply subsequent mediation. He said he knew that in the United States concept good offices is usually related to mediation and he wished to emphasize that he was making Mexico’s offer within the meaning of the Pact of Bogota⁴ which did not tie good offices to mediation.

Third, Mexico recognized that the Cuban situation presented both multilateral and bilateral problems, but believed that the two are related and it might be possible to deal with the multilateral questions more easily at San José if the bilateral matters had already been dealt with between the two countries. He added that Mexico recognized that the San José meeting should take place and in making the offer of good offices Mexico was not attempting to avoid that meeting.

Fourth, in accepting or rejecting the offer of good offices, the moral implications should be considered by the two countries concerned, for it might be an indication of their real willingness to settle the bilateral problems.

The Secretary replied that he deeply appreciated the Mexican offer and the spirit in which it was made. He asked that his appreciation be conveyed personally to President López Mateos. He said that he could readily understand Mexico’s concern, for it is true that the existence of a communist regime 90 miles from the United States shores, though serious, would not present the grave problems to the United States that it would present to the other countries of the hemisphere and to the inter-American system. He said the United States believes that the multilateral problems presented by Cuba are of such overwhelming importance and significance to the countries of the hemisphere and to the Organization of American States that they should be considered first. When they have been dealt with and a decision made as to whether or not the hemisphere is willing to have a Soviet oriented and dominated country in its midst, the lesser problems of a purely bilateral concern would be easier to prepare to treat. He added that as a practical matter little could be done with regard to those bilateral problems in the brief time remaining before the San José meeting. After the meeting had taken place, he said, an offer looking toward the settlement of bilateral problems might prove helpful. The Secretary stated that the United States has always and still is ready and willing to discuss its bilateral problems with Cuba but has consistently been rebuffed by Cuba in its attempts.

The Mexican Ambassador then inquired whether the United States intended to introduce a resolution at the San José meeting that would deal with such aspects of the Cuban revolution as expropriation of property. He pointed out that there was initially in Latin America generally, and even now among leftist groups, a great deal of enthusiasm for the objectives of economic and social reform implicit in the Cuban revolution. Many people in Mexico recall their own revolution which involved expropriations and though from the beginning of the revolution Mexico always adhered to the principles of international law relating to compensation, in their hearts the Mexican people recall the difficulties that arose from the Mexican expropriations.

The Secretary replied that the United States also had hopes for the value of the Cuban revolution to the Cuban people, but these had proven false. He said that the United States had always recognized the right of expropriation with compensation and its position on this subject has been frequently and clearly stated in public. He stated that the United States did not intend to raise such bilateral matters as trade and the expropriation of property any more than was necessary to a complete discussion of the issues to be raised at San José. Mr. Rubottom pointed out that Cuba itself had raised these bilateral matters before the United Nations which had referred the matters to the OAS; furthermore, only the day before Cuba had itself presented a statement of its bilateral grievances to the Peace Committee of the OAS⁵ for consideration in connection with the Committee’s report to be presented at the San José meeting.

The Mexican Ambassador then said he would like to ask the following theoretical question; if Cuba withdrew its request for multilateral consideration by the UN and the OAS of its bilateral problems with the United States, would the United States then find it possible to avoid raising these bilateral problems at San José. The Secretary replied that he thought this might well be so.

Mr. Rubottom inquired whether a similar approach was being made in Habana by the Mexican Ambassador there. Ambassador Carrillo Flores replied that an appointment had been obtained by the Mexican Ambassador to Cuba with the Cuban Foreign Minister on the previous day (August 2), but he did not know the results of the meeting. The Secretary said he would be interested to know the results.⁶

The Mexican Ambassador said that he would convey to his Government that the United States neither accepted nor refused the good offices of Mexico, but believed the question should be left for determination following the San José meeting.⁷

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–360. Confidential. Drafted by Osborne, initialed by Rubottom, and approved on August 9.

² Not found.

³ A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/8–260.

⁴ Reference is to the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogota, April 30, 1948; 2 UST 2394.

⁵ See Document 578.

⁶ In a memorandum to Herter on August 4, Rubottom wrote that Carrillo Flores had telephoned that morning to report that the Mexican and Brazilian Ambassadors in Havana had called on Roa the previous day to offer their countries’ good offices. Roa had reportedly received the offer favorably, but had to contact Dorticos. In response to Carrillo Flores’ question, Rubottom told him that the Canadian Government had told the Department of State that it knew of the good offices effort. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–460)

⁷ Immediately following this conversation with the Mexican Ambassador, Herter met with Brazilian Ambassador Moreira Salles. (ibid., 611.37/8–360)

572. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)¹

Washington, August 4, 1960.

Dear Tom: Thank you for taking the time to give me your views on the Cuban problem as expressed in your letter of July 26, 1960.² I am gratified to note that there is no difference in our thinking with regard to our overall objectives in this situation. As a matter of fact we have been working for several months now in readying plans which would permit the implementation of most of the various further steps which you presented as illustrations of the type of actions which might be desirable.

As I indicated in our meeting of June 27³ on this general subject, the question of timing is extremely important and just now the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers in San José, Costa Rica and the possible support we may get there make desirable at least some additional delay in proceeding with additional economic measures in our national interest.

It occurs to me that you may not have seen a recent study on the Guantanamo Base prepared by the Department’s Historical Division. I am enclosing a copy⁴ as of possible interest and as an illustration of the type of study and preparation in which we have been engaged for many months in order that we shall have both our order of attack and supporting positions well prepared in anticipation of the necessity of joining the battle on various fronts.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Chris⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7–2660. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson and Wieland and cleared with Martin and Merchant.

² Document 567.

³ See Document 536.

⁴ Not printed. (Department of State, Office of the Historian, Research Projects 438 and 441)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

573. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Macmillan¹

Washington, August 8, 1960.

Dear Harold: Since my return from Denver I have discussed more fully your letter concerning the Cuban problem² which Chris kindly acknowledged for me at my request.³ It is indeed most gratifying and reassuring that we are in general agreement in our analysis and estimate that the Castro regime is fully committed to a course inimical to our mutual interests in the area and that the only hope for an improvement in the situation must lie in its replacement.

As you have so accurately pictured, the great majority of the liberal middle-class elements in Cuba, which were primarily responsible for Castro’s accession to power, have now withdrawn their support and many have fled the country to engage in open opposition to the Castro regime. From these very people who are the most knowledgeable as to the internal political situation we have received the unanimous view that the Castro regime’s police control and Communist terror tactics have thoroughly initimidated the politically articulate Cubans, and that left undisturbed, the regime will increase its domination to the point that internal opposition is unlikely ever to attain sufficient strength and resolution to overthrow Castro. Scarcely a day passes that opposition leaders do not stress to us their view that with the clear promise of support from the U.S.S.R. and Red China, time is now working for Castro. In the short run I doubt that this is true; Castro’s open bid for a satellite role has had the effect of thoroughly alarming most of the Governments in this Hemisphere and, hopefully, has disposed many of them to support pressures and efforts to bring about a change of regime in Cuba. Yet their foundations too often rest uneasily on outmoded societies ripe for change, and to make such changes in an evolutionary manner is the responsibility of any wise government. Should Castro manage to survive for another year or more, these nations run the risk of being overtaken by revolution with conditions such as those now existing in Cuba. This kind of change, when it brings Communism in its wake, is intolerable from the standpoint of our national interest and that of the liberal democratic Christian tradition which we all share.

You ask quite understandably how we really mean to achieve our aim of unseating Castro and replacing him by a more suitable regime. Depending somewhat on the results of the forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica on August sixteenth, we expect to move ahead with further economic measures designed to bring pressure on the Cuban economy. To be sure, this will cause some Cubans to rally to Castro’s support, but the great mass of Cubans, who were completely apathetic toward Castro and Bastista before January first, 1959, are still chiefly concerned with their own individual well-being. We are now receiving more and more reports of a return to that earlier apathy on the part of the campesinos, particularly as they discover that most of the promises have been empty ones and that often they are worse off than before.

Moreover, although relatively poor and accustomed to hardship by our standards, by Latin American standards Cubans have had one of the highest levels of living in the area and far higher than comparable classes in the Middle and Far East. A recently returned long-time resident among the country people remarked, “The average Cuban sugar worker wants to receive his earnings in cash and go to the store, buy a white guayabera, white shoes, a bottle of rum and go to a dance; not be paid in script redeemable at a government (people’s) store where only work clothing and rice and beans are to be had and a lecture by a Government official is the only entertainment offered.” I do not underestimate the strength of the fanatic minority still dedicated to Castro nor conceive of any broad support for the abandonment of all of the measures taken by his regime. On the other hand, we have ample evidence to suggest that even among the masses there is as of now no deep unquestioning commitment to his revolution. Moreover, the Government’s virulent anti-United States campaign until now has had singularly little effect despite its control and utilization of all the public information media in the country.

The recent spontaneous gesture of protest by the Congregation at the Cathedral in Habana which shouted “Cuba, Yes; Communism, No” has been followed by a pastoral letter read on August 7⁴ in all the Catholic churches on the island in which the Communist influence now evident in the present Cuban regime is strongly condemned. Reports of growing opposition among students to the seizure of the University of Habana by a Communist-led minority is another hopeful sign. We must emphasize that the world struggle is not Communism against capitalism; it is dictatorship against freedom. The Cuban development is one manifestation of this truth.

We are steadily intensifying our counter-propaganda efforts in the other countries of the Hemisphere. We shall emphasize to the OAS and to the UN whenever the occasion may arise the extent to which Communism has assumed control in Cuba. We shall seek and use every possible opportunity short of outright intervention which might bring pressure to bear on Castro. In line with this latter point we have sought informally by various means not only to discourage and prevent the chartering of tankers with some degree of success, but have also discouraged the shipment of lubricants, spare parts, catalysts and other needed items to the extent that, although by no means certain, we feel the seizure of the refineries may yet cause serious difficulties for the Cuban economy. Needless to say, such help as you can continue to give us in this effort will be most welcome.

You will have learned that over the week end Castro announced the seizure of the bulk of the remaining private American investment in Cuba.⁵ This action was not unexpected as the legal facade on which it is based is the Nationalization Law of July 6, 1960, which was the subject of a formal protest by this Government on July 16.⁶ Nevertheless it is indicative of the extremes to which the Castro Government is prepared to go, and is a further clear indication of its intention to accept satellite status in the Communist bloc. You will also have noted Castro’s presumed effort to drive a wedge between us by his failure to nationalize the Shell property at the same time he nationalized the American oil properties. We shall be reviewing possible courses of action responsive to this latest unjustifiable action while we await the results of the San Jose meeting.

In closing, I wish to stress that we shall also be substantially increasing our efforts on the positive side by way of economic, financial and technical assistance to the countries of Latin America. As we have so often said to the Cubans to no avail, we recognized the need for major changes, revolution if you will, in the Cuban social and economic structure, and were and are prepared, if asked, to assist Cuba and any one of the other countries in bringing about needed improvements carried out legally and responsibly under democratic regimes.

Although we must make sure of the ultimate achievement of our aim, I fully agree that our course is fraught with difficulties and dangers. Your cooperation and support are therefore especially appreciated.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike⁷

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Presidential Handling. Transmitted to London in telegram 879, which is the source text. A draft of the letter prepared in the Department of State was sent to the President under cover of a memorandum by Merchant of August 6. The memorandum and the draft, which shows the President’s handwritten changes, are ibid.

² Document 566.

³ See footnote 4, Document 566.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ The announcement was made on August 6. The Embassy in Havana delivered a note of protest to the Cuban Government on August 8. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 29, 1960, p. 316.

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 545.

⁷ Telegram 879 bears this typed signature.

574. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

Assessment of Latin American Reaction to Possible U.S. Moves Against Cuba

The Department has received reports containing assessments of local reaction to possible U.S. moves against the Castro regime from a total of six of our missions in Latin America. The six posts which have reported thus far are Bogota, Panama City, Mexico City, San Jose, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. The following is a composite summary of these assessments.

1.

Background

In all of the countries there was an initial enthusiasm for the ideals of the Castro revolution and his successful overthrow of the Batista regime. Castro’s popularity has diminished progressively with the passing of time. There still remains, however, a sympathetic attachment to the aims of the revolution, particularly by the lower economic classes, and by some student and labor groups. The reaction in Mexico is unique due to its own revolutionary history and the identity of themes of the Cuban and Mexican revolutions, i.e., agrarian reform and expropriation of foreign interests.

2.

Military Action

The reporting posts were unanimous in their assessments that their respective host countries would be appalled at U.S. military action in Cuba under any conditions other than extreme provocation. Montevideo reported that military action would probably provide the opposition with the most damaging propaganda material in recent decades. Buenos Aires stated that the Argentines would consider U.S. military intervention a flagrant violation of the OAS Charter. San Jose and Mexico stated that endorsement of U.S. military action in Cuba could be obtained only if directed at Soviet military forces actually on Cuban soil.

3. All posts reported that the United States policy of dignity and restraint toward Cuba has been well received and that their host countries prefer a multilateral approach to the Cuban problem. Mexico reported that unilateral political action by the U.S. would be interpreted as bypassing and weakening the prestige of the OAS. Bogota stated a severance of relations by the United States would be interpreted by Colombians as a sign of United States lack of confidence in the other Latin American countries. San Jose and Montevideo stated that a break in U.S.-Cuban relations by the U.S. would be generally understood in view of our long policy of restraint and on the basis of national honor.

4. The assessment of reactions to U.S. economic action against the Castro regime varies. Panama reported that such action on the part of the United States would lead to cries of “reprisals” and probably increase feeling against the United States. Several posts believe that a convincing case could be made for eliminating the premium paid on Cuban sugar. Most posts agreed that U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba would not be endorsed by the host governments because of their own economic vulnerability to the same type of action.

5.

Psychological

The general consensus of the reporting posts is that the United States might gain by playing down the bilateral aspects of the Cuban problem, including the seizures of American properties, and emphasizing such points as 1) the elimination of freedom of the press in Cuba, 2) the ignoring of judicial proceedings, 3) the violation of human rights, 4) the disregard for international commitments, and 5) lack of respect for other governments of Latin America.

As soon as other posts have submitted their assessments, a follow-up report will be prepared.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–1160. Secret. Drafted by Charles P. Torrey; cleared with Stevenson and Little; and initialed by Rubottom and Herter.

575. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)¹

Washington, August 11, 1960.

I imagine you have already acted on the following thought which occurs to me. This is that we should have in completed form within the next month or so a comprehensive contingency plan covering the assistance which we would be prepared to give a new and satisfactory Cuban government should it come into power. I raised this question in a meeting this morning with Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray.² Both of them thought that such planning should be completed on an urgent basis. There are obviously a great many fields of activity and support to cover, ranging from technical assistance to administrative support and economic aid. Other government agencies would be involved, including ICA, CIA, Defense, Commerce, and Treasury.

If in fact we have not proceeded with such planning on a comprehensive basis, it would be my thought to ask S/P in collaboration with ARA to take a first cut at the problem and produce a check list of actions to be taken and agencies which would be responsible therefor. Once such a paper was prepared, I would think an interdepartmental committee should be set up under State Department chairmanship to assign responsibilities and to complete detailed planning. All of this naturally would be conducted in greatest secrecy.

I would appreciate it if you would let me know what if any work has been done on this matter and what you would think of proceeding or continuing along the lines I have suggested above.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–1160. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. A copy was sent to S/P.

² No record of this meeting has been found.

³ Attached to the source text is a note, dated August 15, whose author the editors were unable to determine, which reads: “Had chance only to speak guardedly on phone this evening with RRR before his departure. He said he would ‘leave his point of view’ with Mallory and would speak with Secretary and Mann further on matter while on San Jose trip.”

576. Memorandum of Discussion at the 455th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 12, 1960¹

Washington, August 12, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles then turned to the situation in Cuba. He said the most important new development there is the fact that the Castro Revolution is in a struggle with the Church. In the early days there were indications that the Church had tried to reach a working arrangement with Castro but it had not succeeded. In May the Vatican had sent out two special representatives from Rome. On August 10 Castro had launched a bitter attack upon the Church and had said that “Jesus Christ is on the side of the Revolution.” Mr. Dulles also mentioned the defection of Raul Chibas who had headed one of the two major anti-Batista parties. He said there was evidence that Moscow is preparing to deliver military equipment to the regime as was Czechoslovakia.

Trade relations between Cuba and Communist China had begun on what Mr. Dulles called a sour note. Rice samples had been of poor quality and rice shortages were foreseen. The Latin American Youth Conference was over and had been unsuccessful. The Cuban Communist Party had invited delegates from other Communist Parties to join in a Party Congress. The Congress was to be held on August 16. It was reported that Suslov, Duclos, and Togliatti had been invited.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

Mr. Gray said that the Secretary of the Treasury had a point with respect to Cuba; namely, that we should do what we can with our European friends to make sure that they do not supply deficiencies in the Cuban economy such as spare parts.

Secretary Herter said that at a recent NATO briefing there had been a discussion of South America. He then cautioned that NATO interest is disturbing to the South Americans if it is an organized interest.

Secretary Anderson said that two weeks ago he had asked the technical staff of the New York Stock Exchange to make a study of the reasons for the recent decline in stock prices, particularly the decline in the “blue chips”. He said that a number of reasons had been reported but that the first and major one was the troubled international situation, particularly the inability of the U.S. to protect its interests in Cuba.

The Vice President then inquired what we would be prepared to do to avoid further communist domination or a communist takeover in Cuba. He went on to explain that what he was really asking for was guidance as to what U.S. officials should say when such questions are put to them, as they frequently are by the press. The President observed that such a question had been put to him at his press conference two days before³ and that he had pointed out the difference between a nation doing something independently within its own borders on the one hand and becoming a Soviet satellite on the other hand.

Secretary Herter observed that if there is further evidence of the export of what is happening in Cuba to other Latin American countries, it will be possible to create more support from the OAS. He said that we were slowly bringing the OAS around and that we had been given a “big assist by Khrushchev.” Mr. Dulles said that if the revolution is suppressed by foreign intervention, the result will only be temporary and it will break out again. On the other hand, if the revolution breaks down in and of itself, then there would be a much more solid base on which to build a future government.

The President brought up the subject of sugar and said that we had always approached the subject from the point of view of trying to assure an adequate supply for the U.S. He said that as far as he was concerned, he did not mind if Trujillo complains about our being heavyhanded.

The National Security Council:⁴

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Charles A. Haskins

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Charles A. Haskins of the NSC Staff on August 16.

² Dulles’ briefing regarding the Cuban situation and other subjects constitutes NSC Action No. 2281. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

³ For the transcript of the President’s news conference on August 12, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 619–629.

⁴ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2283. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

577. Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, White House, Washington, August 18, 1960, 11:05 a.m.¹

Washington, August 18, 1960, 11:05 a.m.

PRESENT

Secretaries Gates, Dillon, Anderson, Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, Goodpaster, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Gordon Gray

Mr. Gray opened the meeting by saying that in March² the President had approved planning with respect to anti-Castro activity in Cuba at which time it was agreed that as planning progressed and any activist measures impended, the matter would be brought back to the President. Mr. Gray indicated that Mr. Dulles was prepared to speak.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Turning to Cuba, Mr. Dulles said that generally contemplated in the planning approved by the President in March had been four courses of action.

1.

There has been developed a unified Cuban opposition outside of the country. This has been successful up to a point but the problem is that there is no real leader and all the individuals are prima donnas. This unified opposition is known as the FRD and has six prominent members, five of them representing groups in Cuba with the greatest potential. In response to a question from the President, Mr. Dulles said that all the names were favorably known in Cuba; that there were no Batista-ites among them and all the names had been published except a recent joiner, Cardona. Their theme is to restore the revolution to its original concepts, recognizing that it is impossible to change all of the revolutionary trends. Further in response to a question from the President, Mr. Dulles said that practically all of these have been identified with Castro since he assumed power, most of them in the very early period.

Mr. Dulles also indicated that his people had been, since May, working in a very satisfactory way [less than 1 line not declassified].

The FRD has its headquarters in Mexico. They would prefer to be in the U.S. but had been persuaded to go to Mexico. It should be understood that there will be no ostensible military action directed from Mexico.

The President asked why Mexico had been chosen and Mr. Dulles replied that it had better communications and travel facilities and certain others of the Latin American countries would not accept the presence of the FRD. The U.S. does not wish any open identification with Guatemala and specifically Venezuela and Colombia would not cooperate. He added, however, that the Guatemalan President had been very cooperative.

2.

Radio. Mr. Dulles reported as to the Swan Island operation which is broadcasting on both medium and short-wave. It started by attacking Trujillo. It is jammed in Havana on medium wave but apparently reception is all right outside of Havana. The short-wave is satisfactory throughout Cuba. It is under commercial cover.

The President wished to know whether the commentators were well known figures and received an affirmative response.

Mr. Dulles also reported with respect to a magazine now being published [less than 1 line not declassified] and a newspaper [less than 1 line not declassified]. He also described the [1 line not declassified]. Furthermore there would soon be a clandestine radio operating [less than 1 line not declassified].

The President, in response to a question, was assured that Swan Island was attacking both Trujillo and Castro.

3.

Para-military. Mr. Dulles reported that training of 20 or 30 instructor cadres has been finished in the Canal Zone and these individuals now go to Guatemala to instruct about 500 Cubans. In addition, there are 34 radio operators in training in Guatemala. There is an available airstrip in Guatemala and all of these activities are under the auspices of the FRD.

He indicated that there will be a need for some air force trainers and logistic support people. These would be military personnel (15 or 20 in all) under cover. Mr. Gates observed that he was not too much worried about the trainers but was concerned about a later phase in which the possibility had been mentioned of having some U.S. military who might be involved in going across the beaches.

Mr. Bissell replied that the 15 or 20 referred to would be concerned with the movement of C–54s; that they would be in civilian clothes with false names and most of them are already assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. There would be no conceivable hazard involved and they would get no closer to para-military operations than the airstrip in Guatemala.

4. Operational forces. Mr. Bissell then said with respect to planning for the later action phase, to which Secretary Gates had referred, the need is felt for a standby force preferably of non-Americans with special forces type training. There ensued some discussion as to whether the backup force should contain American officers and possibly men and Mr. Gates again expressed his concern. Mr. Dulles suggested that this matter not be discussed now and should be re-examined in concert with the JCS. Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be unwise to mount any kind of an operation without the determination to see it through and that an abortive effort would be worse than no effort at all. He therefore thought that if this backup force was essential to ultimate success, full consideration should be given to it at this stage in the planning. Mr. Dulles again urged that a decision on this be deferred.

The discussion then turned to present plans for training in Guatemala. General Lemnitzer saw no problem in the request for trainers as outlined by Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Dulles then said that he hoped that the training of the 500 Cubans could be finished around about the beginning of November and they could be ready if the logistics could be worked out by that time. The FRD is acquiring some B–26s. The aircrews for these would be all Cubans.

Mr. Bissell then said that it is possible that the initial para-military operations could be successful without any outside help. He pointed out that the first phase would be that of contacting local groups over a period of perhaps several months and in this period no air strikes would be undertaken. The plan would be to supply the local groups by air and also to infiltrate certain Cubans to stiffen local resistance.

If local resistance is unable to accomplish the mission and the operation should expand, then there may be a requirement for air action. The plan would be to take the Isle of Pines or another small island for an ostensible base for operations of the [less than 1 line not declassified] forces. It is hoped that this may not be needed but we must be prepared for it.

Mr. Bissell said there had been identified no less than eleven groups or alleged groups in Cuba with potential. We are in the process of sending radio communications to them at this time.

Budget. Mr. Dulles said that he had arrived at the point at which it was necessary to go to the reserve for funds to finance the various operations described in the meeting. He felt that we were talking in terms of [less than 1 line not declassified] already spent, including the funds for Swan Island, etc.

The President said that he would go along so long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State and the CIA think we have a good chance of being successful. He wouldn’t care much about this kind of cost; indeed, he said he would defend this kind of action against all comers and that if we could be sure of freeing the Cubans from this incubus [less than 1 line not declassified] might be a small price to pay.

The President concluded the meeting by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves, with the result of starting something before we were ready for it.

G.G.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Drafted by Gray.

² See Document 486.

578. Editorial Note

Between August 16 and 21, the Foreign Ministers of the American States held their Sixth Consultative Meeting in San José, Costa Rica, to discuss various Venezuelan Government charges against the Dominican Republic. Immediately following that meeting, the Foreign Ministers remained in San José to hold their Seventh Consultative Meeting from August 22 to 29 to consider the Peruvian Government’s request for a discussion of the defense of the inter-American system and democratic principles against possible threats.

A discussion of the background of the two meetings, a draft agenda, a draft resolution dated August 4 to be submitted by the U.S. Delegation at the Seventh Consultative Meeting, and a summary of the Cuban Government’s August 1 memorandum submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee, among other documents, were attached to a memorandum of August 4 from Assistant Secretary Rubottom to Under Secretary Merchant. (Department of State, Central Files, 371.04/8–460)

Prior to his departure for San José, Secretary Herter met on August 15 at the White House with President Eisenhower. According to Goodpaster’s memorandum of the conversation:

“Mr. Herter said he planned to make a strong speech at San Jose, Costa Rica, bringing out that the Cubans have violated everything that they had agreed to in the OAS a year ago. On the President’s suggestion, he confirmed that he would not pitch his remarks in terms of Cuban actions in violation of OAS principles and agreements. He said he anticipated a difficult session, but noted that there is some evidence that the Latin Americans are ‘coming around’ to a point of view very similar to our own. The President stressed that he should make clear that the United States has no desire or intention to ‘punish’ the Cuban people. Such disagreement as we have is with the Castro regime.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series)

During the Seventh Consultative Meeting, the U.S. Delegation occasionally called Washington to report on developments or to request instructions. On August 25, Herter called the President who left the National Security Council meeting to take the call. According to a memorandum of their telephone conversation:

“Herter said that things in the OAS meeting in San Jose had been pretty ‘fuzzy’ up until now, that it had been hard accurately to report. Yesterday he had made a pretty strong statement, followed by others (he named Guatemala for one) that were also strong. They are waiting today to see what Cuba does—he thinks that it may be a ‘bomb blast’ and that afterwards the Cuban delegation will walk out. He said that planes had been scurrying back and forth from Cuba to San Jose presumably with instructions for the delegate.

“Herter said that Mexico was ‘weak-kneed’—had been urging Cuba to behave itself, etc. Herter not sure what will prevail. The President said that when Castro said, as he did yesterday, that he was going to seek permanent ties with the bloc (Eastern Europe-Communist and Red China bloc) he thought Mexico was on very thin ground.

“Herter more or less thinks Castro has burned his bridges and that it will probably be good if the delegation does walk out. If Cuba leaves then there will be opportunity for ‘secret’ talks with other members, which the President stressed as important.

“Herter said the most encouraging thing was that Brazil, Argentina and Chile were strongly in support of US position. There is question about Venezuela and as he said, Mexico is weak. The President said if we could get Venezuela and Mexico on our side we would be getting somewhere.” (ibid.)

On August 28, Roger Kirk called Goodpaster with a question about the draft resolution that the Foreign Ministers were considering as a final declaration. According to Goodpaster’s memorandum for the record:

“Roger Kirk called me on Sunday from San Jose (August 28th), on behalf of Secretary Herter who was suffering from laryngitis, to say that a copy of the OAS resolution in its final draft was being sent to me by cable, and saying that the Secretary would like to know whether the President approved his signing the document. I called the President, pointing out that the document did not make specific mention of Cuba, but took the form of condemning the Sino-Soviet intervention in the Western Hemisphere. The President, after discussion, said that if this is the best that the Secretary can achieve, he felt he had no choice but to accept it. He said I should ask whether the Secretary is planning to make a statement identifying Cuba as the country involved in the Western Hemisphere. I called Mr. Kirk and conveyed the foregoing to him. He advised that there had been some thought of making a statement at the time of signing. He checked with Mr. Rubottom on this during our call, and advised that there was some reluctance to identify Cuba as the country concerned in the Western Hemisphere, on the grounds that the whole conduct of the conference had so identified Cuba.

“I asked whether consideration had been given to the idea of saying that while the conference had identified Cuba as the country involved, the United States would have preferred specific mention. I stressed to him that this is a question and not a suggestion or instruction from the President. In further discussion with Mr. Kirk he made clear that the Venezuelans and Mexicans in particular are being very ‘soft’ in this matter, principally for internal reasons and concern of the government that other political factions would use Castro sympathy on the part of public opinion of their country against them.

“I then called the President back to report this. He said to press the issue no further.” (ibid., Herter Papers, August 1960)

Goodpaster’s memorandum is also published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 124A.

At the conclusion of the conference, Herter telephoned the President to report that on every vote the United States had been supported “18 or 19 to 1 or nothing.” Herter said that “there had been almost complete unanimity and that is just about everything the traffic would bear.” The President replied that he “was feeling much better about the meeting.” Herter emphasized that “they had to move pretty slowly” and “could not overplay their hand for fear of antagonizing many people.” The Secretary observed that “it came out pretty well.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation, August 29; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

Upon returning to Washington, Herter met with the President on August 30 to discuss, among other things, the meeting at San José. According to Goodpaster’s memorandum of the conversation, after Herter and the President briefly discussed the situation in the Congo:

“Mr. Herter then gave a report on the meeting at San Jose. He said the initial atmosphere was rather tense, with the U.S. almost isolated and viewed with skepticism as the meeting began. It has been traditional among the Latin Americans to look at the United States as the ‘big bad wolf’ and be fearful of us—specifically of the possibility we will exercise our preponderant power. He said there is a curious attitude among the Latin Americans. They are emotional in their desire to work out their own destiny; at the same time they think the United States is under an obligation to give them large-scale help. [Here follow remarks unrelated to Cuba.]

“With regard to the Cuban resolution, Mr. Herter said there are several passages which give a clear expression of opposition to the deprivation of freedom in Cuba. Mr. Herter said we were fortunate in the way the Good Offices resolution was handled at the meeting. The Cubans rejected it three times. We took the position that we were ready to have it passed, and to have the facts brought out. The Cuban action damaged their position in the conference materially. [Here follow remarks unrelated to Cuba.] Mr. Herter said that action has been started to cut down on the number of Dominican consulates. He stated that Governor Munoz-Marin has asked for the Cuban consulate in Puerto Rico to be closed, having received information of a plot by them to assassinate him.

“Mr. Herter said that Foreign Minister Arcaya of Venezuela was a bad actor in the OAS conference. President Betancourt finally instructed the Venezuelan Ambassador to the OAS to sign the resolutions, and withdrew Arcoya from the conference. He added that the Peruvian government also had finally to withdraw its Foreign Minister. The Honduran Foreign Minister was collaborating with the Cubans, with the support of his President, and Haitian representatives were doing the same. Mr. Herter said that Argentina and Colombia had been excellent in giving firm support.

“Mr. Herter next said that he had talked with Foreign Minister Tello of Mexico. Lopez-Mateos is planning a trip to the north of Mexico in late October and thought there would be a good possibility of his meeting with the President at that time. Mr. Herter said that Tello had been a problem at the OAS. He expressed sympathy for the Cubans, partly because the Mexicans did not have elections after their Revolution until four years had passed. Tello said Cuba should be allowed more time. However, when the showdown came, Tello gave us support.

“Mr. Herter said the meeting avoided the subject of economic aid entirely. He did not raise it because it would look like a bribe. In this connection he said that Nelson Rockefeller had sent a long draft resolution down to him on economic aid. They did not introduce it, however, for just this reason. All in all, Mr. Herter thought he had come out fairly well in the conference. He noted that Mr. Dillon will carry forward the economic discussions at the Bogota meeting the following week. [Here follow remarks unrelated to Cuba.]

“Reverting to the discussion of the OAS meeting, Mr. Herter said that he wished the resolution as passed could have been stronger. The President said he realized the difficulty. He recalled that he had taken the Cuban problem up with four Latin American Presidents on his visit to Latin America, and they just would not reply to his question. He had observed that for Latin America to progress economically, there must be large-scale private investment along with public investment, and that this would be harmed by Castro’s behavior. He asked what they would do about Castro and they would not comment. Mr. Herter said the most troubling thing is that in every country the strength of the Leftists is growing. Within Cuba he found a change in attitude at the time of the Mikoyan visit. Prior to that time the Cubans had made offers of settlement. We have information that he advised them to confiscate the holdings of U.S. business people, adding that Russia would stand behind them. The President asked, outside of Brazil and Venezuela, which were the most left-wing countries. Mr. Herter said that Chile is making every effort to be firm and Argentina is doing the same. Brazil is definitely showing Leftist influence and is very soft in its attitudes. He did not mention other countries. The President asked whether the U.S. has started a program of guaranteeing investment against appropriation. Mr. Herter said that we have, under an ICA law about four years ago which provides for insurance against this contingency.” (ibid., Diary Series)

In a Progress Report on Cuba, September 8, Frank J. Devine, Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, made the following comment about the meeting at San José:

“This meeting culminated with a rejection of Cuban attempts to brand the U.S. as an aggressor and, after the Cuban delegation had walked out, a 19–0 vote approving the ‘Declaration of San Jose’ which reaffirms the tenets of hemispheric solidarity and rejects extra-continental intervention. Neither the agenda nor the final resolution of the Seventh Meeting mentions Cuba by name. The Cubans simultaneously condemned action taken at the meeting and claimed that they themselves emerged the victors. U.S. public and congressional reaction has been mixed. Critics draw highly unfavorable comparisons between the actions taken with respect to Trujillo and those taken (or not taken) in the case of Castro. While the final resolution of the Seventh Meeting falls considerably short of what we would like to have seen adopted, it measures up much more favorably when viewed in terms of the extremes of the spectrum of Latin American thought and sentiment represented among delegates to the Seventh Meeting.”

For text of “The Declaration of San José, Costa Rica”, as well as separate statements by Mexico and Guatemala, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pages 219–220.

In describing the aftermath of the San José meeting, Devine noted:

“The Cuban government has reacted angrily and defiantly to the proceedings of the Seventh Meeting. To counter the ‘Declaration of San Jose’ it has issued its own ‘Declaration of Habana’ and begun dissemination on a hemisphere-wide basis. Cuban appeals for solidarity and support are being received by student, labor, intellectual, leftist, and other groups all through the area. Further U.S. properties have been intervened. Foreign Minister Roa, receiving a hero’s welcome upon return to Habana, has resorted to the vilest and most incredible type of invective with regard to Chiefs of State and Foreign Ministers of the other American republics. Some of his statements have elicited prompt and strong protests from other nations, notably Argentina and brazil. Even the protests have been rejected in unprecedented language.”

Devine described planning within the U.S. Government as follows:

“With the meetings of Foreign Ministers behind us, we are now facing up to the additional actions which may be required in dealing with the Cuban problem. Shipments of trucks and jeeps destined directly or indirectly for the military forces of Cuba (or the Dominican Republic) were placed under restriction this week by the Department of Commerce. We are additionally readying selected economic pressures for application at an appropriate time. We are also pushing ahead with necessary action looking toward early abrogation of preferential trade arrangements between this country and Cuba. Recognizing the fairly steady deterioration of the situation, we are also reviewing prospects and likelihood of evacuation action and are pressing for all feasible reduction of staff and American dependents in Habana. Simultaneously, looking toward the day when Castro finally disappears, officers of the Department are drawing up contingency planning contemplating our relations with and assistance to any successor government.” (Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Cuba)

579. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, September 1, 1960.

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE CONTINGENCY PLAN COVERING US ASSISTANCE TO POST-CASTRO CUBAN GOVERNMENT

Note: This outline plan is valid for a period of approximately six months (through the next sugar harvest).

I. Assumptions:

1. The removal of Fidel Castro from power will follow a period of civil disorder involving riots, bombings, assassinations, guerrilla activities, inter- and intra-Service fighting among regular and irregular armed units.

2. Sino-Soviet Bloc assistance to Castro will fall short of the commitment of regular armed forces, or of actions likely to provoke war with the US. Such political and economic support as may be possible will be rendered Castro, and help may be provided through the services of individual advisers, technicians, tacticians and some “volunteers” from various countries, working through such entities as the “International Work Brigade.”

3. There will be divisions in the loyalties of various groups, some, like the militia and police, predominantly loyal to Castro, and others, like the remnants of the regular armed forces and older traditional labor organizations, mainly opposed to Castro. Castro’s chief support will be found among the Communists and groups that can be manipulated by them.

4. In whatever civil disorder may precede Castro’s downfall, the Communist-manipulated groups will be better disciplined, directed and armed; and following his fall the Communists may go underground and harass the government.

5. The departure of key figures in the Castro government will be accompanied by the looting of the public treasury and the transfer of government funds on deposit abroad.

6. The degree of property damage and destruction is difficult to forecast. At best it may be limited to the breaking of shop windows, minor bomb damage to various structures, and the sacking and burning of some shops and homes. On the other hand, it may include substantial damage to power plants, and industrial and communications installations. At worst, however, there should be enough facilities in working condition to permit the maintenance of minimum essential public services.

II. The New Government:

1. Character and Composition.

a) The new government is likely to be a coalition of various opposition groups, of fragile unity, left of center and strongly nationalistic in political orientation. It will, however, be willing to work with the US in bringing about political, social, economic and financial stability.

b) Because of the widespread support enjoyed by many of the objectives and programs of the Castro government, the proclaimed policies of the new government will be variants of these—although initial measures of implementation will probably be more responsible, and calculated to provoke less objection from the US.

2. Conditions to be Required for US Recognition.

a) Ability to maintain domestic order.

b) Willingness and ability to respect international commitments.

c) Break-off of relations with the USSR, Communist China, and countries subservient to them.

3. Difficulties in US-Cuban Relations.

a) Considering its presumably precarious popular support, the new government’s tenure will depend on its ability to restore order and reactivate the economy quickly. Its nationalistic orientation and support will make US relations with it delicate and difficult. The difficulty will be exacerbated by the ignorance and marginal technical competence of many of the Cuban officials.

III. US Policies Prior to the Castro Downfall:

1. Measures that might be taken to bring about or hasten Castro’s downfall are outside the scope of this paper. However, the following suggested actions would be desirable in order to provide a foundation on which relationships between the US and Cuba could be rebuilt.

a) Dismantling of the preferential structure of US-Cuban economic relations, including the 1902 Commercial Convention, the 1934 bilateral reciprocal trade agreement, the 1939 and 1941 supplementary agreements, and the preferential arrangements associated with US and Cuban participation in GATT.

b) Control of US-Cuban commercial and financial relationships through freezing of Cuban assets in the US and subjecting to licensing control of financial transfers and commercial exchanges.

c) It is recognized that legislation affecting the Cuban sugar quota is within the province of the Congress. However, insofar as possible, the Department of State should use its influence to discourage any further reduction in the Cuban sugar quota in order to make possible the rebuilding of the Cuban economy with a minimum of US financial aid, and to avoid creating interests in other sugar-supplying countries which could only be broken with difficulty.

d) Discreet, informal conversations at the highest level between Department of State officials and selected US business interests looking forward to the development of agreed-on lines of approach to a new Cuban government, regarding the resolution of problems involved in the return or other disposition of, and compensation for, intervened, expropriated and confiscated US properties. These conversations should also explore the feasibility and nature of programs envisaged in IV–7 (b) below. These conversations should be initiated from three to four months prior to an anticipated date of the Castro collapse.

IV. US Policies for the Three-Months’ Period Following the Castro Downfall:

1. Military Aid.

a) Military support should stop short of the commitment of US forces to defend or assist the new government. Assistance could, however, include the provision of arms and equipment, advice, and training of Cuban forces.

2. Political support in any ways that may be found appropriate.

3. Economic and financial assistance should be conditioned on:

a) The restitution of intervened properties to US owners. In the case of this class of properties, where the proceedings have been “informal” and without clear legal basis, it is believed that direct and immediate return would be essential.

b) Agreement to adjudicate on the return to US owners of confiscated and expropriated properties, or, if some other disposition is agreed on with the US Government (see 7a below), to provide appropriate compensation.

c) Assumption of debts of previous Cuban governments, including that of Castro.

d) Agreement to cooperate with the US in programs of economic development and reconstruction of Cuban national institutions. (It might be preferable for this agreement to be informal and unwritten, but as a definite understanding between the top leaders of the Cuban government and the US Government.

4. With respect to US economic and financial assistance, the present plan recognizes as essential the need for the US to “capture” the vital forces of the Castro revolution, i.e., nationalism, obsession with “independence” (both political and economic), widespread pressures for land reform, industrialization, economic diversification, and, above all, with a solution to the abiding problem of unemployment and underemployment at all levels from manual labor to the utilization of skilled, technical and professional personnel. The success of the plan will depend on the ability of the US Government and US private interests to identify themselves with Cuban desires for social, political, and economic change.

5. Financial Assistance.

a) Local currency funds for budgetary support—although Cuban government demand deposits in local banks may be sufficient to meet pressing needs.

b) Cash grant for immediate critical foreign exchange needs, such as for fuels and lubricants, until lines of credit can be reopened and the economy can function again.

c) The above proposals for financial support to the new Cuban government are limited in scope to assistance in meeting immediate needs during the first 30 or 60 days. Measures proposed are temporary ones pending action by IMF or other agencies in the nature of stand-by agreements, stabilization loans, etc.

6. Economic Support.

a) PL480 foodstuffs (Titles II and III).

b) Support of Cuban government measures designed to maintain maximum employment of both urban and rural workers.

c) Stimulate a credit-expansion program through the Central Bank.

7. Other measures.

a) Establishment of a Joint Cuban-US Commission to provide for the orderly compensation and disposition of confiscated and expropriated properties.

b) Create a committee composed of representatives of major US business interests with investments in Cuba and the US Government to study ways and means of developing programs for (i) housing, home ownership, agricultural improvement and diversification for rural Cubans, and (ii) industrialization. These studies, which should eventually evolve into a cooperative US-Cuban effort, should take into account the desirability of technical and financial assistance to Cubans, preferably in association and cooperation with major US agricultural, livestock, mining and public utility interests.

c) Stimulate a cooperative Cuban-US program to completely reconstruct, modernize and improve the Cuban educational system, from pre-primary through university levels, and including vocational and technical training.

d) Devise an information program, including freedom of media and press, and rebuild desirable images distorted or impaired during the Castro era.

8. Devise, plan and establish other cooperative US-Cuban programs that may be considered desirable or necessary.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–760. Secret. No drafting or clearance information appears on the source text. The paper was circulated for comments under cover of a September 7 memorandum from John Hoover (ARA/REA) to other members of ARA and to Marjorie Whiteman. Hoover noted that the draft had been prepared in response to a suggestion from Merchant and that after comments had been obtained, the revised draft would be circulated to E, U/MSC, S/P, USIA, and ICA.

580. Editorial Note

On September 8, Congress approved the extension of $500 million in economic assistance to Latin America (Public Law 735), with the provision that none of the money could be used to assist “any country in Latin America being subjected to economic or diplomatic sanctions by the Organization of American States.” For text of the act, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pages 290–292.

From September 5 to 13, the Third Meeting of the Organization of American States’ Special Committee to Study the Formulation of New Means for Economic Cooperation met in Bogotá, Colombia. On September 13, by a vote of 19 to 1 (Cuba), the Committee approved the Act of Bogotá which contained various recommendations for economic and social development. In approving the act, the delegations, “convinced that the peoples of the Americas can achieve a better life only within the democratic system, renew their faith in the essential values which lie at the base of Western civilization, and re-affirm their determination to assure the fullest measure of well-being to the people of the Americas under conditions of freedom and respect for the supreme dignity of the individual.” Excerpts from the Act of Bogotá are ibid., pages 293–300. Documentation on the Special Committee’s meeting in Bogotá is scheduled for publication in volume V.

Toward the end of the Bogotá meeting, on September 12, Secretary Herter met with President Eisenhower at the White House to review several foreign policy questions. According to Goodpaster’s memorandum of the conversation, Herter said that the meeting “seems to have gone extremely well. Only the Cubans opposed the resolution, and their position was in some ways ridiculous. They presented a resolution calling on the United States to furnish thirty billion dollars in aid, to be utilized as the Latin American countries might decide.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

Consideration by the U.S. Government of possible severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba, September–December 1960

581. Editorial Note

582. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)

Washington, September 27, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (July–Sept.) 1960. Secret. Drafted by Mann.

583. Memorandum of Discussion at the 461st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 29, 1960

Washington, September 29, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

584. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)

Washington, September 29, 1960.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2093, Cuba 091. Secret.

585. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, September 30, 1960, 11 a.m.

Pentagon, Washington, September 30, 1960, 11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, September 1960. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated. A note on the cover sheet, which lists 28 participants, indicates that the memorandum was not cleared with the Department of Defense.

586. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Gates) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 4, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–1460. Secret. A copy was sent to Goodpaster. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1981, 144B. In transmitting a draft of this letter to Gates, Irwin wrote in a covering October 4 memorandum that it might not be desirable to suggest, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended (see Document 584), that “any doubt exists about the matter.” Rather than seek Department of State concurrence for the Joint Chiefs’ proposals, Irwin said it would be better for Gates to send the short letter which OSD/ISA had drafted. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 092 Cuba)

587. Memorandum of Discussion at the 462d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1960

Washington, October 6, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

588. Editorial Note

589. Editorial Note

590. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 13, 1960, 10:56–11:33 a.m.

Washington, October 13, 1960, 10:56–11:33 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on October 15. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 601A. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

591. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)

Washington, October 14, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/10–1460. Secret. Drafted by Vallon. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 918.

592. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, October 16, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Signed by Herter. The source text bears the handwritten initials “D.E.” and the handwritten notation that the Department of State was informed on October 17 that the President had approved. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 919.

593. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 17, 1960, 8:05–8:33 a.m.

Washington, October 17, 1960, 8:05–8:33 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on October 18. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

594. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 19, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba & the Dominican Republic. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson.

595. Memorandum for the Record by the White House Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)

Washington, October 20, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean-Up” Records, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret.

596. Memorandum of Discussion at the 464th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 20, 1960

Washington, October 20, 1960

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on October 24.

597. Memorandum From John C. Pool of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)

Washington, October 26, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2660. Official Use Only. Drafted by John C. Pool and Vallon and routed to Mann through Vallon and Coerr. Initialed by Pool, Vallon, and Coerr.

598. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics

Washington, October 28, 1960—8:53 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2860. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin; cleared with Jamison, Vallon, and Coerr; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Havana, and repeated to Havana, Ciudad Trujillo, and USUN by pouch.

599. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 28, 1960.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba–Opposition Groups 1960. Secret. Drafted by Devine. Initialed by Mann and Herter.

600. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics (Hall) and the Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for Sino-Soviet Bloc (Crawford) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)

Washington, October 31, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by John P. Shaw (INR/RSB) and Robert W. Dean (INR/RAR).

601. Editorial Note

602. Editorial Note

603. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 1, 1960

Washington, November 1, 1960

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–160. Confidential. Drafted by Hanes and approved in U on November 17.

604. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 1, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–160. Confidential. Drafted by Harvey R. Wellman. Ambassador Bonsal had left Havana October 28.

605. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)

Washington, November 2, 1960.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by Henry C. Ramsey. Copies were sent to George Morgan and other officers in S/P.

606. Notes on the 137th Meeting of the Working Group on Cuba, Department of State, Washington, November 7, 1960

Washington, November 7, 1960

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Working Group Notes. Confidential. Prepared by Devine on November 8. Participants at the meeting are identified only as the “10:30 Group Members.”

607. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas)

Washington, November 7, 1960.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Cuba. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Signed by Lansdale and stamped, “Dep Sec has seen.”

608. Memorandum of Discussion at the 466th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 7, 1960, 8:30–10:14 a.m.

Washington, November 7, 1960, 8:30–10:14 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on November 8. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Daily Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

609. Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, White House, Washington, November 7, 1960, 10:15–10:23 a.m.

Washington, November 7, 1960, 10:15–10:23 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Prepared by Gordon Gray on November 14. Copies were sent to Goodpaster and Lay. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid.) The source text indicates that the meeting began at approximately 10:20 a.m. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1984.

610. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)

Washington, November 10, 1960.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba July–December 1960. Secret. Drafted by Devine.

611. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, November 16, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.001/11–1660. Secret. Drafted by Wayne Smith, who was responsible for the political sections; Henry S. Hammond, labor section; Paul D. Bethel, psychological sections; Samuel G. Kail, Army section; and Fred D. Stevers, Air Force sections. Passed to Santiago de Cuba.

612. Editorial Note

613. Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, White House, Washington, November 29, 1960, 11 a.m.

Washington, November 29, 1960, 11 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records, 1960 Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1290.

614. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 29, 1960

Washington, November 29, 1960

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–2960. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Devine.

615. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, December 2, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

616. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 5, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/12–560. Secret. The drafter is not indicated, but presumably was Braddock. Cleared with Gilmore, Wellman, Paul D. Bethel, (less than 1 line not declassified) and in draft with the Navy, Air, Army, and Agriculture Attachés. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.

617. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 6, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–660. Drafted by Bowdler and concurred in by Gilmore, Wellman, (less than 1 line not declassified), the Service Attachés, and USIS. Kail indicated that he concurred but “with reservations about 7a” in the conclusions. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.

618. Memorandum From the President to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 7, 1960.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Top Secret. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1983, 1346. In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on December 7, at 8: 45 a.m., Gordon Gray noted that he gave the President this memorandum “which had been prepared by General Goodpaster which reflected General Goodpaster’s impression of the President’s views. The President signed the memorandum as drafted.” (Ibid., Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba)

619. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Hager) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)

Washington, December 7, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–260. Top Secret. Drafted by Hager.

620. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, December 8, 1960.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret/Noforn Except UK and Canada. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on December 8. According to a note on the cover sheet, the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission representative on the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1984, 1514.

621. Editorial Note

622. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 13, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/12–1360. Confidential. Drafted by Wayne S. Smith.

623. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 16, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/12–1660. Secret. Drafted by Wellman and cleared in draft with (less than 1 line not declassified), the Service Attachés, and USIS. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.

624. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis for the American Republics (Hall) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs’ Staff Assistant (Devine)

Washington, December 21, 1960.

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba Miscellaneous Jan. –Feb. 1961. Confidential. Drafted by Lawrence S. Eagleburger (INR/RAR) and initialed by Hall.

625. Notes on the Meeting of the Working Group on Cuba, Department of State, Washington, December 22, 1960

Washington, December 22, 1960

Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Working Group Notes. Confidential. Drafted by Devine on January 9, 1961. Participants at the meeting were identified only as members of the “10: 30 Working Group.”

626. Memorandum of Discussion at the 472d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 29, 1960, 10 a.m.

Washington, December 29, 1960, 10 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

627. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, December 29, 1960, 10: 30–10: 38 a.m.

Washington, December 29, 1960, 10:30–10:38 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–2960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Eisenhower Library)

628. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Stevenson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr)

Washington, December 30, 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–3060. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson. Written in the margin of the source text in an unidentified hand is the word “Bravo!”

629. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State

Havana, December 31, 1960—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/12–3160. Official Use Only; Niact. Repeated to USUN.

581. Editorial Note

On September 13, the Cuban Foreign Ministry informed the Embassy in Havana that Prime Minister Castro intended to take part in the 15th Session of the United Nations General Assembly later that month in New York. An Embassy officer met that evening with a Foreign Ministry official to discuss security arrangements, transportation and residence facilities, and the size and composition of the Prime Minister’s party. The Embassy officer was told that Castro planned to stay no more than a week and to confine his visit to New York. He hoped to stay as close to the United Nations as possible. (Telegram 1247 from Havana, September 14; Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1460) On September 14, the Department notified the Cuban Embassy that if Castro did attend the General Assembly session, his movements would be restricted to Manhattan Island. This measure was being adopted strictly on security grounds to assure Castro’s personal safety. (Telegram 531 to Havana, September 14; ibid.)

Some concern was felt in the White House and the Department of State over the possibility of a chance meeting between Prime Minister Castro and President Eisenhower, who planned to stay at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel while he attended the General Assembly session. In a September 16 memorandum to Goodpaster, Lorraine Corcoran, White House Secretary, indicated that the Protocol Office at the Department of State wanted to know whether the White House objected to Prime Minister Castro’s car being parked at the Waldorf-Astoria while the President was there. The Protocol Office did not think it was a good idea, although the Secret Service had said “they could live with it.” In the margin of this memorandum, John S.D. Eisenhower wrote the following note: “Told State that D[wight] E[isenhower] couldn’t care less so long as he doesn’t meet F[idel] C[astro] in elevator.” (Eisenhower Library, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, International Series, UN)

On September 23, the Department provided the Mission at the United Nations guidance in the event that Castro violently attacked the United States in his forthcoming address to the General Assembly and furnished an outline of a rebuttal to be given by the Representative to the United Nations, James J. Wadsworth. (Telegram 494 to USUN, September 23; Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2360)

On September 26, Prime Minister Castro addressed the General Assembly and leveled a number of charges against the United States, including the contention that before Castro came to power Cuba had been “virtually a colony” of the United States and that the United States was using the base at Guantanamo to promote “self-aggression, to justify an attack” on Cuba. (U.N. doc. A/PV.872, pages 117–136)

During Castro’s speech, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, who was in attendance, made a remark that apparently escaped the notice of the press and did not appear in the transcript of the proceedings. During his speech, Castro referred to a statement that Admiral Burke had made to the effect that the Soviet Union would not launch rockets if the United States reacted to any Cuban seizure of Guantanamo, because the Soviet Union knew it would be destroyed. Castro commented as follows:

“Just see how an estimate is made, an estimate which is dangerous, since he [Burke] intimates that in the case of an attack on us we are to stand alone. This is something that Admiral Burke has not thought up for himself. But suppose for a moment that Admiral Burke is mistaken. Let us imagine that Admiral Burke, although an Admiral, is wrong. If he is wrong, he is playing irresponsibly with the strongest thing in the world.” (ibid.)

At this point there was applause from the Cuban Delegation and the delegations from certain Communist countries, during which Khrushchev shouted something while brandishing his fist. The U.S. Delegation later learned from a member of the Soviet Delegation that Khrushchev had shouted: “He is mistaken.” (Telegram 822 from USUN, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–2860)

In telegram 1489 from Havana, September 27, Bonsal provided the Department of State a number of points that could be used as a rebuttal to Castro. (ibid., 320/9–2760) Also on September 27, Representative Wadsworth made a short reply during the plenary session to Castro’s speech and indicated that the United States would soon make available a longer response to Castro’s charges. The text of Wadsworth’s statement is in Department of State Bulletin, October 17, 1960, page 621. Regarding the paper which the United States made available on October 13, see Document 589.

In a memorandum of September 30 to Herter, Hugh S. Cumming summarized world reaction to Castro’s speech. He wrote that reporting and editorial comment were “remarkably scant” except for Moscow, Peiping, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba itself. Cuban reporting was accompanied by “fulsome flattery”, and the Dominican Republic radio, according to Cumming, “rejoiced that Castro ‘gave the gringos a tongue lashing.”’ Cumming also noted:

“In the Sino-Soviet bloc Soviet commentators extolled Castro and Moscow Radio covered the speech fully in lengthy summaries and commentaries. A comprehensive TASS summary alleged that the ‘hero of the Cuban revolution’ was greeted by ‘stormy’ applause and that his speech was interrupted by applause from a majority of delegates’ on several occasions. TASS also noted his “passionate support” of Soviet disarmament proposals. There was no radio coverage or comment whatever from any other communist state except Communist China, where all Peiping newspapers featured a long summary of the speech without comment.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737. 11–CA/9–3060)

For further documentation on the 15th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, see volume II.

582. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Bonsal)¹

Washington, September 27, 1960.

Dear Phil: I have your letter of August 2, 1960 to Dick Rubottom² which I gather has not been answered. You may consider your suggestions somewhat out of date in view of all that has transpired since.

In any case, it seems to me that we cannot really hope for any improvement in our relations with the Castro regime until it takes effective steps to diminish Sino-Soviet influence in internal Cuban affairs and to cease exporting its “revolution” to Latin America. The prospects that Castro will take action along this line seem to me to be very dim, if not non-existent.

Similarly, I don’t believe we really have any chance of working out with the Castro regime a satisfactory solution of the problem of the expropriated properties. Our best bet is to wait for a successor regime in the hope that we can work out something fair and reasonable. In this connection, considering the magnitude of our claims and the need which Cuba will have for development capital, I would think we should try for a return of the industrial properties to their owners and for at least the return of a part of the sugar and cattle properties. In this way we could hope for adequate compensation for the properties which remain expropriated.

If this is a sound premise, I see no point in proposing the setting up of a compensation fund to be created out of import or export taxes. There is no reason to believe the Cubans would agree. And even if they should, it would seem to me to give a certain degree of finality to the expropriations. Futhermore, the creation of a compensation fund in the manner you suggest, or in some other manner, is something which could be worked out later if this is thought to be wise. We lose nothing by delaying action on this and we might gain considerably by doing so.³

With every good wish,

Sincerely yours,

Thomas C. Mann⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (July–Sept.) 1960. Secret. Drafted by Mann.

² Document 570.

³ In a reply of October 4, Bonsal acknowledged that his suggestions had been somewhat overtaken by events and agreed that postponement of the creation of a compensation fund as Mann had suggested would be wholly justified. He also observed:

“I believe that your approach to the expropriated properties is sound in principle. I do not believe we have any prospects of getting back lands taken or to be taken under the Agrarian Reform Law. Nor do I think the prospects of getting back the utility companies are good. This has been an issue in Cuban politics for the past generation. I doubt whether the prospects in connection with the refineries are particularly promising, but I am sure we should make a strong effort here. As for the sugar mills, the outlook may be somewhat better.” (Department of State, Central Files, 837.19/10–460)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

583. Memorandum of Discussion at the 461st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 29, 1960¹

Washington, September 29, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles believed that under the Castro regime, Cuba was now virtually a member of the Communist Bloc. [1 sentence (2½ lines) not declassified] On September 10 the first major Soviet Bloc arms shipment reached Cuba. This shipment included ten tanks, 100 anti-aircraft guns, and a large number of machine guns plus ammunition and electronic equipment. Additional armaments shipments were probably on the way from the Bloc to Cuba. A number of Cubans had been under military training in Czechoslovakia for some months. Mr. Dulles thought these Cubans were receiving jet flying training. It was reported that Cuba was preparing to sever diplomatic relations with the U.S. or, alternatively, was attempting to provoke the U.S. into breaking relations. Apparently the Castro regime had now decided to undertake an all-out propaganda campaign against the Guantanamo Naval Base. Mr. Dulles did not believe a direct attack against the Base would be mounted but felt the propaganda campaign would probably include a large number of incidents, including possibly cutting off the water supply of the Base. Castro’s bitter anti-American speech last night² indicated that Guantanamo would now be a major propaganda theme in Cuba. Efforts to tighten the Castro dictatorship and develop Communist control of Cuba are continuing. The last independent radio chain has been taken over by the Castro forces and the last vestige of an independent judiciary is fast disappearing. Castro is attempting to build a political machine at the grass roots. The CTC (Cuban Workers Confederation) has now been virtually captured by the Communists. Despite these developments, the Castro government was facing growing unrest throughout the country and active guerrilla operations in the Escambray area. The U.S. engineers working in that area had reported that travel on the roads was now hazardous and that gun fire continued through the night. However, the guerrilla groups in this area are not cooperating effectively. Cuban waterfront workers are dissatisfied. The Cuban economy is weak, consumer goods are scarce, prices are rising, and the oil refineries are curtailing their operations because of the corrosive effects of Soviet oil and a lack of spare parts. [Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Secretary Dillon said the U.S. was now beginning to implement certain actions with respect to Cuba and was clearing the decks for the forthcoming implementation of certain other actions. We had delivered a notice to the Cuban Government that the Nicaro plant would be shut down in thirty days.³ As a result of inter-agency agreement in Washington, recommendations had been sent to the President for the abolition of preferences for Cuba in the U.S. tariff.⁴ This action would have no immediate economic effect but might have some psychological repercussions and would, in any case, clear the way for later actions with respect to trade. The evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cuba has been speeded up. Military dependents have already been evacuated and the dependents of diplomatic personnel are expected to be out of Cuba by Saturday.⁵ The evacuation of the dependents of U.S. Government employees is intended as an example to the other members of the U.S. community in Cuba, who have been advised to leave the country. Mr. Dillon said it was anticipated that recommendations would subsequently be made for strong economic action such as an embargo on the sale of any commodity to Cuba aside from food and medical supplies. The U.S. would also probably recall Ambassador Bonsal. We did wish to maintain a listening post in Cuba but feel that representation there at the ambassadorial level is no longer effective since the Ambassador’s movements have been restricted by the Castro regime and he has no influence with that regime. Mr. Dillon said all of these preparatory actions were the beginning of strong measures against the Castro regime.

The National Security Council:⁶

Noted an oral report by the Acting Secretary of State on recent and contemplated U.S. actions with respect to the situation in Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² Apparently a reference to Castro’s speech upon his return to Havana on September 28. A summary of the speech printed in The New York Times, September 29, 1960, however, makes no mention of Guantanamo.

³ For text of the Department of State press release of September 29 indicating that the Cuban Government had been informed that day of the U.S. Government’s intention to shut down operations at Nicaro in 30 days’ time, see Department of State Bulletin, October 17, 1960, pp. 604–605.

⁴ This recommendation was made in a memorandum of September 19 from Dillon to the President. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, Cuba Briefing Memos)

⁵ October 1.

⁶ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2309. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

584. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)¹

JCSM–441–60 Washington, September 29, 1960.

SUBJECT

U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1. Ever since the Castro regime came to power there has been a question as to whether Castro would ultimately declare the Treaty, under which the United States maintains a naval station at Guantanamo, null and void and demand that the United States give up the Base. Castro’s speech before the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 1960² provides indications that unilateral denunciation of the Treaty may be expected in the near future. It is the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States should not accede to any unilateral denunciation of the Treaty but should insist on remaining in Guantanamo as it is entitled to do under international law. Accordingly it has been assumed that the United States will remain in Guantanamo and plans have been prepared to defend the Base against all forms of pressure including defense against Cuban military attack.

2. Since no official State Department position is available on these subjects, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State on the following policy proposals:

a. It is United States policy to retain Guantanamo even though Castro unilaterally denounces the Treaty which provides for U.S. operation and maintenance of the Guantanamo Naval Base.

b. The U.S. military is expected to take the necessary measures to defend the Base against all forms of harassment including perimeter defense of the Base in the event of armed attack. In this connection defensive action may be required beyond the Base perimeter in some military contingencies, such as aerial attack or to destroy forces which immediately threaten the Base.

3. It is also requested that the Secretary of State be advised that contingency plans for military action in Cuba have been prepared at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Should the Castro government engage in a major or continuing attack against Guantanamo, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that such action would constitute an act of war and that the United States would respond by directing the implementation of these plans. Also should the Department of State desire military assistance in the implementation of any economic sanctions against Cuba, the Department of Defense is prepared to establish a naval patrol of Cuban waters.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arleigh Burke
Chief of Naval Operations

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 64 A 2093, Cuba 091. Secret.

² See Document 581.

585. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, September 30, 1960, 11 a.m.¹

Pentagon, Washington, September 30, 1960, 11 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

4. The Situation at Guantanamo Bay (State Initiative)

Mr. Merchant said he thought in light of Castro’s recent two public references to our base at Guantanamo,² that this was a good time to exchange our current views on that base.

He said that earlier this morning in the Department of State we had been talking about the possibility of enlisting OAS support in making a public statement that Guantanamo was important to the whole concept of hemispheric defense. Mr. Mallory of ARA thought that perhaps this statement could come out of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). In any event, he (Mr. Merchant) thought this idea was worth exploring.

Admiral Burke thought that the Colombians and Peruvians on the IADB would certainly support this kind of a statement.

General Twining thought that Mr. Merchant had a good point.

Generals Twining and Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke agreed to take a look at this possibility. Admiral Burke said that he would get his people to talk to Mr. Mallory and see how this could be done. He observed parenthetically that Mexico would not support this kind of initiative.

Mr. Merchant said he would get Mr. Mallory in touch with Admiral Burke’s office.

General White observed that he would like to see the U.S. come out some time in a situation like this and say, “We need this for the U.S.” He deplored our tendency always to link our position with others but agreed that perhaps Guantanamo was not the issue on which to make this point.

Mr. Merchant said that maybe we would have to put the Guantanamo issue in “those cold turkey terms”, but this was not yet the time to do it. He stated that the real problem is that the Latin American countries are too scared of and too vulnerable to their own Castro left to act decisively against Castro. We have nursed them along and after all we got a pretty good result out of San Jose. But given the weakness of these Latin American governments, we have to pull them along multilaterally.

Mr. Merchant said he hoped that the Chiefs had their contingency planning for the defense of Guantanamo up to date, even though it is State’s feeling that Castro will probably not attack the base militarily. State feels that Guantanamo is too valuable to Castro as an emotional issue on which to keep the propaganda pot boiling, that Castro will just continue to talk about it.

General Twining asked what State’s position was in the event that Castro did attack Guantanamo militarily.

Mr. Merchant said there was no question about what we should do.

Admiral Burke said that if he attacks, we could defend the base and then we ought to go and take Santiago again.

Mr. Merchant said that if the Cubans attack, that if they make the first move, i.e., fire the first shot, then all bets are off for in effect we are at war with the Castro regime.

Admiral Burke said that at no cost to the Department of State the Navy had several movie cameras ready for action at the border of the base in order to document any type of action there.

Mr. Merchant said there had been talk of the Cubans setting up a peaceful mass march of women and children toward the base. He assumed that the Marines would close the gates before these demonstrators arrived.

Mr. Vallon pointed out that the Cuban line was to press for the return of Guantanamo to Cuba through legal means.

General White wondered jocularly whether it was time to turn Cuba back to Spain.

Mr. Knight asked whether the Cubans were being very careful in not stating they would attack the base.

Mr. Merchant said that was right. Castro had said in his UN speech that the Cubans wanted to get Guantanamo back by legal means. Mr. Merchant then quoted excerpts from Castro’s speech.

Mr. Merchant said that he had been told this morning that the Cubans had erected a fence outside the border of the base and had used this fence in order to make certain that the Cuban workers on the base exchanged their U.S. dollars for Cuban currency.

Mr. Smith observed that as we move economically against Cuba and come closer to denouncing economic treaties we have with Cuba there becomes a sounder justification for Cuba to denounce the treaty by which we occupy Guantanamo. He referred to current actions on tariff preferences as a case in point.

General Shoup asked, “Is this abortion the same Republic of Cuba with which we signed those treaties?”

General White asked whether this regime in Cuba could be related back to a European political system as defined by the Monroe Doctrine.

Mr. Merchant referred to the Caracas resolution which defined international communism as a foreign system under the Monroe Doctrine. Mexico didn’t vote for this resolution nor did Guatemala which was the country under fire at that time.

Mr. Merchant said that if the Cubans jump Guantanamo we defend the base.

General White said but what about beyond the base.

Mr. Merchant said speaking personally, if they attack the base, “that is it—we are at war”. We would move on to Havana. The situation can’t remain static and we hope under those circumstances there would immediately be another government with which we could deal.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328, September 1960. Top Secret. The drafting officer is not indicated. A note on the cover sheet, which lists 28 participants, indicates that the memorandum was not cleared with the Department of Defense.

² Castro referred to Guantanamo in his speech before the U.N. General Assembly on September 26; see Document 581. Presumably the other reference is to Castro’s speech on September 28; see footnote 2, Document 583.

586. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Gates) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 4, 1960.

Dear Chris: With respect to Castro’s recent statements² indicating that the treaty under which we maintain the Base at Guantanamo may be unilaterally denounced in the near future, I wanted you to know that I have recently reaffirmed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff my instructions that we hold this Base against all forms of harassment, including armed attack. Although we anticipate taking no provocative steps, contingency plans have been prepared under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include defensive actions beyond the perimeter of the Base should this be required to meet armed attack.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas S. Gates

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–1460. Secret. A copy was sent to Goodpaster. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1981, 144B. In transmitting a draft of this letter to Gates, Irwin wrote in a covering October 4 memorandum that it might not be desirable to suggest, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended (see Document 584), that “any doubt exists about the matter.” Rather than seek Department of State concurrence for the Joint Chiefs’ proposals, Irwin said it would be better for Gates to send the short letter which OSD/ISA had drafted. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 092 Cuba)

² See footnote 2, supra.

587. Memorandum of Discussion at the 462d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1960¹

Washington, October 6, 1960

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles reported that the National Bank of Cuba sent word to all banks holding credit balances in favor of any Cuban banks to transfer them to the U.K. or to Canadian banks. About $9 million is involved. Cuba also sent instructions to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the disposition of gold held to the credit of the National Bank of Cuba. Mr. Anderson said that Cuba had asked the IMF to sell its gold on deposit in the U.S. to the Bank of England. Mr. Dulles said he assumed Cuba took this action because it was apprehensive that we were about to break off relations or freeze Cuban assets in the U.S.²

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

² These remarks occurred during Dulles’ oral briefing on recent world developments, which constituted NSC Action No. 2318. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

588. Editorial Note

On October 10, the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), Admiral Robert L. Dennison, came to the Department of State for a series of meetings, mostly on the situation in the Caribbean. At 10:30 a.m., he met with Under Secretary Dillon; the Department’s Liaison Officer to SACLANT, V. Lansing Collins; and officers in the Bureau of European Affairs. The memorandum of their conversation regarding Cuba reads as follows:

“During a conversation which also covered the NATO Fall Exercises, Mr. Dillon and Admiral Dennison discussed developments in the Caribbean. Mr. Dillon said that we did not exclude the need for us to use force at some future time. He indicated, however, that at the present time we hope to get inter-American agreement on stopping the flow of Soviet bloc arms into Cuba. In response to a question from Admiral Dennison, Mr. Dillon said it was likely that Castro would break off diplomatic relations with the United States. He then outlined our present thinking, and said that we will probably recall Ambassador Bonsal, but that we hope not to break off relations until Castro does so. We want to keep our representatives in Cuba as long as possible, even though diplomatic contact as we understand it is now virtually non-existent. Mr. Dillon continued that a decision on economic sanctions would be taken this week and probably put into effect next week. We envisage the imposition of export controls under the Export Control Act, probably excluding food and medicine. We do not envisage the Trading with the Enemy Act at this time. We would first wish to consult our allies before imposing the controls. This would include the British, French, and probably the NATO Council.

“In the case of the Dominican Republic, Mr. Dillon said that we envisage imposing selective export controls. Because of our relations with other Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, we feel we must take some action against the Dominican Republic, as well as against Cuba.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, October 1960)

At 11 a.m., Dennison met with Merchant, Collins, and other officers in the Department. The memorandum of their conversation regarding Cuba reads as follows:

“Admiral Dennison inquired whether we had received a reply from the Cubans to our note protesting a recent incident in which a Cuban plane had buzzed a U.S. submarine off Key West. Mr. Merchant said that we had not. Admiral Dennison told Mr. Merchant that he had issued orders to ‘take out’ Cuban planes in similar future circumstances. He did not think that the Cubans would make any overt attempt against Guantanamo, and he was not particularly concerned about the danger of an overt attack on the base. Sabotage was a more likely threat. He reiterated, however, that if it were a question of acting in self-defense, forces under his command at Guantanamo would act without further orders in taking out Cuban positions attacking the base and he made it clear that the base could not be defended effectively from its perimeter. It would be essential to move into Cuban territory; in other words, to defend the base. Mr. Merchant thought that Castro would not be so stupid as to make an overt attack. Admiral Dennison added that he thought Guantanamo would, in any event, be useless to Castro. At this point, Mr. Merchant then reviewed for Admiral Dennison our policy of moving quietly to discourage travel by Americans to Cuba and he noted that the US population in Cuba had been reduced by about one half.” (ibid., Central Files, 737.00/10–1060)

The note under reference here was delivered to the Cuban Embassy in Washington on October 7 and is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1960, page 640.

At noon, Dennison met with Assistant Secretary Mann, Collins, and other officers in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. The memorandum of their conversation regarding Cuba reads as follows:

“Admiral Dennison observed that it was difficult to get intelligence about the Cuban situation. In reply to Mr. Mann’s query as to what support the Admiral would like from the Department, Admiral Dennison said he would appreciate knowing about the plans for the possible withdrawal of our diplomatic representatives in Cuba and the imposition of sanctions. In respect to diplomatic relations, Mr. Mann said that his Bureau is recommending the withdrawal of Ambassador Bonsal but that no break take place now. The objective of removing our Ambassador would be to show our displeasure with the Cuban government but not cut off all contacts with it. Admiral Dennison indicated general agreement with this idea. As to sanctions, Mr. Mann said that we contemplated applying the Export Control Act to Cuba soon. Such action would require the licensing of all US exports to Cuba; it is proposed to grant a general license for the export of food and medicines. In reply to a question from Admiral Dennsion about the dollar value of the exports to be brought under control, Mr. Mann indicated that we hope to cut exports to Cuba by $300,000,000, that is 50%. The value of food and medicines which could continue to go to Cuba was about $80,000,000.

“Mr. Mann stated that we had considered invoking Section 5b of the Trading with the Enemy Act. There are, however, a number of disadvantages to applying this legislation. To invoke it we must proceed on security grounds and here we would run afoul of the Rio Treaty which sanctions only multilateral action. We do hope, however, that we may be able to persuade Latin American countries to go along with sanctions in a few months. Mr. Mann then mentioned the advantages of applying the Trading with the Enemy Act, saying that it would permit us to freeze Cuban funds in the United States and prohibit financial transactions. However, the Cuban government has very small holdings in US banks and, in general, we doubt whether the advantage to be gained by applying the Trading with the Enemy Act would be worth the effort in view of the other controls we have available.” (ibid., Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Oct.–Dec.) 1960)

589. Editorial Note

On October 13, James J. Wadsworth, Representative to the United Nations, transmitted to U. N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld a paper entitled, “Facts Concerning Relations Between Cuba and the United States: A Reply to Allegations Made in the United Nations Against the United States by Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba.” Wadsworth asked that the paper be circulated to all members of the United Nations for their information. The text of the paper, along with Wadsworth’s letter of transmittal, October 12, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 31, 1960, pages 690–701.

In telegram 992 from USUN, October 13, Wadsworth reported that he had “reluctantly” transmitted the document to the Secretary-General. Wadsworth expressed his belief that the paper was “totally unsuited” to the purpose for which it was needed, since it was much too long and gave too much attention to a rehearsal of economic history and arguments unresponsive to Castro’s allegations that were mainly political. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–1360)

590. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 13, 1960, 10:56–11:33 a.m.¹

Washington, October 13, 1960, 10:56–11:33 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Dillon, Mueller, Generals Persons and Goodpaster

Mr. Dillon said he and Mr. Mueller had come in to present to the President a recommendation to prohibit all exports from the United States to Cuba except medical supplies and non-subsidized foodstuffs. He said he did not think this would bring the downfall of the Castro regime, but that it should create major pressures on that government. It will have a very good effect in making the United States position clear, including an encouraging effect on the dissident groups now becoming active in Cuba. Mr. Dillon said that, insofar as the United States is concerned, there is clear authority to take this action under the Export Control Act.² From the standpoint of international commitments, this action can be taken as a defense by the United States against Cuban economic aggressive actions. It would not be consistent with our OAS agreements if we took the action on the basis of bringing political pressure on the Castro regime.

Mr. Dillon said he and other State Department officials had talked with Latin American leaders. Reactions will be mixed. The anti-Communist governments will support us. Leftist governments and groups will criticize us. For example, we must expect criticism from Mexico.

Mr. Dillon said there is a related problem regarding the Dominican Republic. Our action in buying sugar from the Dominican Republic has caused us real problems in Venezuela, but this has not been paralleled elsewhere. We do not want to take concrete moves against the Dominican Republic just at present, since no successor to Trujillo is ready to take power, and the result might be to bring an individual of the Castro stripe into power there. However, the OAS has set up a subcommittee on the question of economic sanctions against the Dominican Republic, and we could put out a concurrent statement that we are joining with this sub-committee to study actions that might be taken.

At this point Mr. Dillon asked the President if he would look at proposed press releases. Mr. Dillon noted a point that has been raised concerning these actions. The logical form of retaliation by us against the Cubans for failing to pay for their imports from the United States would be for us to cut back Cuban imports into the United States. Instead, we are cutting our exports, but we can do this because they have not paid what they owe. Any restriction on imports from Cuba would have to be taken under the “trading with the enemy” act, and we are not ready to take the step of designating Cuba as an enemy. Mr. Dillon said the consideration of this problem is complicated by the fact that the whole story had been leaked to the New York Times and was carried in the morning edition. He said the leak in all likelihood occurred in the State Department. (He noted parenthetically that another even more serious leak was reported in the same edition of the Times—that pertaining to the proposal for Polaris submarines for NATO. This leak has probably come from the Pentagon which has reservations about the project, which were thoroughly expressed in the article.) The President, with some discouragement, said that one reason he will be glad to lay down the responsibilities of his office in a few months is the disloyalty and back-stabbing evidenced in such leaks, in the Pentagon and elsewhere.

The President then went on to say that his principal concern with the proposed action related to the probable reaction in the OAS. Here is one institution which we must hold together. If Mexico were to become disgruntled and if we were to see the Communists come in to power there, in all likelihood we would have to go to war about this. If we were doing the same thing to the Dominican Republic, that we were doing to Cuba, the action would not be so hard to take. He understands, however, that we cannot put the two countries on the same basis since Trujillo is not confiscating our property or refusing to pay for imports. The President acknowledged that the position proposed is logical, but he said it is a very difficult move insofar as Mexico is concerned. Mr. Dillon acknowledged that the Mexican Government is under great pressure from the Cardenas Leftists. The President said he wanted to consider discussing this matter with President Lopez Mateos when he sees him next week.³ Mr. Dillon thought that the problem may be eased for Lopez Mateos if the President had discussed the matter with him before the announcement was made. Mr. Dillon thought it would be harder for the Mexicans to take strong exception if there had in fact been consultation on the matter.

The President then read the proposed release, and thought it would be all right once the decision is taken, with some rearrangement of paragraphs. He observed that it is hard to know what the United States can do in this matter to get twenty rather unstable governments to go along with us. He said he is especially concerned about Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, as well as Venezuela and Colombia. Mr. Dillon said the Argentines will be very strong in our support, as well as the Colombians and the Chileans. There are more questions about the others. He mentioned Venezuelan indications that they will put pressure on our oil companies not to provide oil to the Dominican Republic.

The President stressed that we must not make any mistakes in evaluating the reaction of these countries. Mr. Dillon said we could not at this time get multilateral action of this type against Cuba. He hoped, however, we might later get an agreement at least to stop the flow of arms to Cuba. The President said we should not make any mistakes in a hurry. This matter has dragged on and he is seeing for the first time a very concrete and sweeping suggestion for a ban on exports. We must also think how this action will affect the American people. It tends to look as though we are acting not against Castro but against the Cuban people. Coming in the present weeks, we must be concerned as to its political impact and the possibility it will get mixed up in the campaign. He thought we must recognize the possibility that the Cubans might announce a defense treaty with Russia, and asked for careful consideration of the effect of this action on the OAS and our own population.

Mr. Dillon said he had given a good deal of thought regarding our own population, and noted that, for this reason, he is proposing to exempt medicines and foodstuffs. He observed that U.S. exports to Cuba have already dropped from $500 million a year to $275 million a year because of the Cubans’ economic behavior. This action would cut exports from $275 million to approximately $115 million a year. The President asked whether it would be possible simply to hold down exports because payments are not being made. Mr. Mueller said some effort in this direction has been exerted by passing out information on Cuban practices, but, by giving especially favorable terms and immediate payments, the Cubans are able to get the things most important to them.

The President said that because of the leak of this item that had already occurred, we must be very careful in our handling of it. Mr. Dillon said that the State Department would simply say the matter is under study. The leak will serve to evoke reactions, for example, from the Mexicans which would otherwise be hard to obtain. The President, in concluding, said that the action would not be taken until he had seen Lopez Mateos. Mr. Mueller showed the President his proposed press release⁴ on the procedural steps being taken by Commerce, and the President had no objection to the press release once decision is taken to go ahead.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on October 15. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 601A. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

² P.L. 11, 81st Congress, approved February 26, 1949 (63 Stat. 7), as amended. (50 U.S.C. 2021–2032)

³ A memorandum of President Eisenhower’s conversation with President Lopez Mateos at Ciudad Acuna on October 24 is scheduled for publication in volume V.

⁴ A copy of this draft press release is in Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba.

591. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Gates)¹

Washington, October 14, 1960.

Dear Tom: I have your letter of October 4, 1960² in which you refer to Castro’s recent statments indicating that he may unilaterally denounce the treaty under which we maintain the Base at Guantanamo. In your letter you informed me that you have reaffirmed your instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we hold this Base against all forms of harassment, including armed attack.

I appreciate your assurance that you do not anticipate taking any provocative steps, and I am in complete agreement that your contingency plans should be prepared to include defensive actions beyond the perimeter of the Base should this be required to meet armed attack. I am sure you will agree, however, that a decision of this nature should be made by the President.

It should, of course, also be borne in mind in planning against the contingency of an armed attack upon the Guantanamo Base that such an action by the Cuban Government would call for the immediate invocation by this Government of Article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.³ As you know, this article concerns the responsibilities of all the American States when an armed attack upon one of them occurs.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Chris⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/10–1460. Secret. Drafted by Vallon. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 918.

² Document 586.

³ Signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947; for text, see 62 Stat. (2) 1681.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

592. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, October 16, 1960.

SUBJECT

Recall of Ambassador Bonsal

I believe that the time has come to recall Ambassador Bonsal for consultation and to announce at the same time that he will not return to Cuba. In recommending this action to you, I have taken into consideration the following factors:

(a) Under present conditions in Cuba, Ambassador Bonsal is not able to function effectively and has been subjected to various indignities which tend to reflect on U.S. honor and prestige.

(b) There is no disposition on the part of the Castro regime to negotiate seriously with us.

(c) The Government of Cuba has had no Ambassador in Washington since December 1959.

(d) There are continuing rumors of a Cuban-initiated break in relations with the United States and should this occur United States prestige would be best served by having no Ambassador in that country.

In view of the imminent resignation of Ambassador John C. Dreier I believe that Mr. Bonsal would be an ideal appointment to replace Mr. Dreier, on an interim basis, as U.S. Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States. It is my thought that Ambassador Bonsal would retain his office as Ambassador to Cuba and would be detailed to the OAS position.²

Christian A. Herter

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Signed by Herter. The source text bears the handwritten initials “D.E.” and the handwritten notation that the Department of State was informed on October 17 that the President had approved. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 919.

² In telegram 857 to Havana, October 17, Herter informed Bonsal of his recall and his appointment as interim representative to the Organization of American States. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–1760) On October 20, a Department of State spokesman issued a statement indicating that Bonsal was being recalled for “an extended period of consultation.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p.241) Bonsal and his wife departed Cuba on October 28. For his recollection of the events leading up to the departure, see Cuba, Castro, and the United States, p. 170.

593. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 17, 1960, 8:05–8:33 a.m.¹

Washington, October 17, 1960, 8:05–8:33 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Persons, Secretary Dillon, Secretary Mann, General Goodpaster

Mr. Dillon said the Mexicans are in some difficulty over the question of our action regarding exports to Cuba, in combination with the forthcoming visit of the President to Del Rio. Regarding the first aspect, the Mexicans will say that the meeting of the two Presidents will not be concerned with other than bilateral matters, and will thereby keep away from the Cuban question.² Regarding the other question that has been put to the Mexicans—whether they would prefer to have the President delay his visit until sometime such as January 15th, Mr. Dillon said the Mexicans are not yet ready to reply. The President said his concern is that there should not be a forced postponement occurring at the last minute as happened in the case of Japan.³

Mr. Dillon said that if the Mexicans now tell us that they prefer for the visit to go ahead, they are taking the responsibility not to make a big issue over our action regarding Cuba. With respect to the question of this action, it is clear that the Central Americans welcome it, and in fact consider it long overdue, in view of the provocations the Cubans have carried out against them. Elsewhere, reaction is rather mixed.

The President said his main objection, when the matter was presented to him on the preceding Thursday,⁴ is that he was expected to take action so quickly, on a matter of such wide implication. He said that he had no strong objection at the present time, if the State Department, after careful evaluation, recommended this action as the thing to do. He added that he had talked with the Vice President, who thought we ought to take some action with respect to Cuba at an early date.

Mr. Dillon said the State Department people had studied the possibility of some reaction by the Cubans involving the Soviets. The State Department thinks that the Soviets will not conclude a defense pact with the Cubans, since this would alienate the rest of Latin America.

Mr. Dillon then told the President the State Department will try to develop a feeling in the OAS against arms shipments coming into Cuba. Our own action has led the way in this respect.

Mr. Dillon also added that the State Department is recommending that Ambassador Bonsal be recalled to take the post of Ambassador to the OAS, replacing Ambassador Dreier who is retiring. The President asked if anything is being done, or can be done, regarding the shooting by the Cubans of three Americans charged with insurrection.⁵ Mr. Dillon said that Haiti is showing some initiative in this matter, on the basis that the action of the Cubans is contrary to American practice—for example, when Cubans attempted to invade Haiti.

[Here follows discussion of the situation in the Dominican Republic]

Returning to the first question discussed, Mr. Dillon thought that the Cuban announcement could be made on about Wednesday⁶ if the problem with the Mexicans was resolved. The President agreed, asking that he be informed as soon as the way seemed to be clear.

The President asked what position U.S. sugar consumers would be in if the Soviets were to buy the whole Cuban sugar crop. Mr. Mann said that world sugar production is in a surplus status, and Mr. Dillon said he thought we could manage without undue difficulty by drawing from sources such as Peru, Formosa, etc. The President threw out the idea of buying sugar for storage, as a one-time purchase to build up inventories.

General Persons and Mr. Mann left the meeting. [Here follows discussion of arms shipments to Liberia.]

Mr. Dillon said the Vice President would like to be tied into the President’s action in Cuba in some way. After some consideration, he and the President agreed that this would be very difficult to do in any acceptable way.

The President concluded the meeting by referring to a letter he had recently learned about from George Washington to an intended dinner guest. Washington told this man he wanted him to come in to dinner because he wished to give him a spy mission that he would explain personally. The President observed that spying seems to be nothing new.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Prepared by Goodpaster on October 18. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

² A memorandum of President Eisenhower’s conversation with President Lopez Mateos at Ciudad Acuna on October 24, which gives no indication that the subject of Cuba was discussed by the two Presidents, is scheduled for publication in volume V.

³ Documentation regarding the postponement of the President’s trip to Japan, which had been scheduled for June 1960, is scheduled for publication in volume XVII.

⁴ October 13; see Document 590.

⁵ The three Americans—Anthony Zarba, Robert Otis Fuller, and Allen Dale Thompson—were among a group of about 26 armed men who landed on the north coast of Oriente Province on October 2, almost all of whom were captured by Cuban Government authorities. The invaders were tried before public courts-martial; the 3 Americans were among 10 who were sentenced to death and executed. The Consul at Santiago de Cuba, G.H. Summ, provided the Department a 9-page report on the invasion attempt and courts-martial in despatch 32 from Santiago de Cuba, October 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10–2060)

⁶ October 19. For text of the Department announcement on October 19 that the United States was prohibiting American exports to Cuba except for nonsubsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies, see Department of State Bulletin, November 7, 1960, pp. 715–716.

594. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

Export Controls and Other Cuban Matters

We have no thought that export controls alone will “bring the Cuban economy to a grinding halt” to use the words of a radio news commentator, but we do estimate that this action will exert a serious pressure on the Cuban economy and contribute to the growing dissatisfaction and unrest in the country. It will also bolster the morale of the opposition groups now active in Cuba and elsewhere. As of now we have not learned the official reaction to this step from the more important countries of Latin America. We do have indications of approval and support from Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru and El Salvador. The Chilean Foreign Minister has indicated a feeling of disapproval toward this step.

Our next step in the course of action which we have begun is to prevent Cuba from having access to the U.S. market for Cuban sugar. It is ARA’s recommendation that the President, using his authority under current legislation, fix the Cuban quota at zero for the first quarter of 1961. It is imperative, however, that legislation be introduced early in the next session of Congress to provide that no further “windfall” sugar allotment be made available to the Dominican Republic. ARA and E are now preparing a study² of the effect that cutting off Cuban sugar would have on the United States domestic supply and price of sugar, whether Cuba could benefit from possible supply shortages on the international market and the amount of sugar that the Soviet Bloc could take from Cuba in 1961.

With regard to further help and support from the OAS countries we contemplate a continuing effort to acquaint their governments and peoples with the serious and every day more evident Communist penetration and domination of Cuba, looking forward to further measures against Cuba undertaken on a multi-lateral basis. It is believed that we will shortly be able to demonstrate to the OAS countries the alarming amount of armaments which the GOC is receiving from the Soviet Bloc. It is hoped that this information will be effective in persuading these countries to join us in some form of joint action under the Rio Treaty.

We proposed to the Secretary General of the OAS on September 12, 1960 the convocation of the ad hoc committee created by the 7th MFM for the purpose of clarifying facts in the interest of settling controversies between American governments. The Committee has informally approached the Cuban representative to the OAS and has received no indication that the Cubans are in any way interested that the committee begin to function. We plan to bring out this fact in answering the charges leveled at us today in the General Assembly by the Cuban Foreign Minister.³

Meanwhile, Castro’s recent performance at the United Nations and the latest Cuban law which nationalizes most of the remaining industrial and commercial establishments of the country furnish important additional evidence of the Communist domination and control of Cuba.

Although the recent Urban Reform Law and the final nationalization action of the GOC will provide it with further assets to help it through the so-called “dead season”, Embassy Habana estimates that net foreign exchange reserves will be below $100 million by the end of the year and reports of economic deterioration, discontent and unrest are steadily increasing. However, the Embassy foresees no economic crisis before the year ends.

I believe that the contingency planning with regard to Guantanamo is now fully understood by all Departments having a pertinent interest and/or responsibility.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba & the Dominican Republic. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson.

² Not further identified. For text of the President’s December 16 statement fixing at zero the quota for imports of Cuban sugar for the first quarter of 1961, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, p. 374.

³ See Document 598.

⁴ The following note, in an unidentified hand, is in the margin at this point: “What is it?”

595. Memorandum for the Record by the White House Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)¹

Washington, October 20, 1960.

I presented to the President (on about October 8th) the Defense recommendation for flights over Cuba by U–2 aircraft under SAC command. I reported the inquiry made by Gordon Gray and myself into the necessity for such operations, both for information of value to the conduct of clandestine operations, and for information as to any missile sites being prepared there. I also told him that, as to the question of such flights being conducted by military as against civilian agencies, my inquiry had disclosed that either would be capable of doing it. I recommended to him against military auspices.

He strongly agreed, and disapproved the recommendation as received, on these grounds. I then spoke to him about civilian conduct of the flights. After discussion, I notified Gordon Gray on my own responsibility that it would not be necessary to bring the question of civilian conduct to the President’s attention, but that he and his associates in the special group should feel free to authorize them if they seemed justified.

I fully explained to Mr. Gray the special aspect of this, and agreed with him that he might convey this to Mr. Merchant. Later he informed me that he did so. Because of the problem created by Mr. Gray’s hospitalization, I also gave a full explanation to Mr. Gates. Outside my office, only Mr. Gray, Mr. Merchant and Mr. Gates have the full explanation. I told Mr. Allen Dulles on my own responsibility that there was no need to seek higher authority. Should any untoward result occur, we are agreed the matter will be dealt with along these lines.

Today Mr. Gray told me the group had met and decided to go forward with the operation on a civilian nonattributed basis.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean-Up” Records, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret.

596. Memorandum of Discussion at the 464th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 20, 1960¹

Washington, October 20, 1960

[Here follows a list of participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (NSC Action No. 2166–b–(l); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2177, 2191, 2195, 2201, 2206, 2213, 2217, 2228, 2239, 2259, 2261, 2269 and 2273; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 5, 1960; NSC Actions Nos. 2283 and 2309)

Mr. Dulles introduced Council discussion of the situation in Cuba by presenting that part of his intelligence briefing which dealt with this subject. He said that we believe that active opposition to Castro continues among scattered groups inside Cuba despite fear caused by executions and increasing repression. There are about 1000 guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains. These are poorly armed and have inadequate provisions, but their worst problem is their lack of unity and of effective popular leaders. Most of the potential leaders are either in jail or have left the country. Some could be sent in, however. Most of the guerrillas who were captured and exhibited in trials last week were seized in the lowlands and were seized some weeks ago.

[less than 1 line not declassified] indicate that there have been further defections from the military within Cuba and isolated acts of sabotage. A new decree is ready for issuance which will impose compulsory military training on all males and females between the ages of 14 and 40.

Mr. Dulles noted that Soviet military aid continued; that three shipments have arrived and that a fourth is aboard a Soviet vessel enroute to Cuba. We have recent indications that these shipments have included anti-aircraft artillery, machine guns, jeeps and possibly tanks. We have no definite word on whether they included MIGs. [less than 1 line not declassified] indicates that Cuban pilots and maintenance personnel are being trained in Czechoslovakia.

Guevara is expected to leave for Moscow today as Castro’s representative to the 7th of November celebrations. Reportedly, he will also sign a new economic agreement with the USSR, [less than 1 line not declassified] indicates that Guevara may visit Communist China and hopes also to visit Yugoslavia and Japan. It will be of interest to see, Mr. Dulles suggested, whether a further arrangement on sugar is concluded. The possibility of a sensational Soviet offer has been reported. The Soviets do not need sugar and purchase of Cuban sugar could be a very costly operation for them. The Cuban Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs has indicated that Cuba intends to recognize East Germany. A Cuban sugar magnate, Julio Lobo, who recently left Cuba after his holdings were seized by the government, has said that Guevara had stated to him that while Khrushchev may admit the possibility of coexistence between capitalism and socialism, such co-existence was not possible in Cuba.

Cuba was likely to react strongly to the new U.S. export controls. It may press charges of new U.S. aggression. What it will do was, however, difficult to guess. A few American companies which had not so far been seized—Sears Roebuck, Woolworth, and Coca Cola—may now be intervened and taken over. Castro may make a personal appearance before the UN to present the Cuban case.

After Mr. Dulles had completed his briefing, Secretary Herter described foreign reaction to the U.S. export embargo. He stated that prior to the action, U.S. missions in Latin America had been asked to get the reaction of the Foreign Offices. On the whole, the reaction had been good, in fact, suprisingly good. None of the countries considered it to be an act of external aggression and Chile was the only country that had expressed doubts. An interesting aspect of the reaction was the fact that a number of the countries did not think we had gone far enough. Mr. Herter suggested that we should work through various missions with a view to getting further inter-American action at the Quito Conference on March 1. The most unfavorable reaction had come from Canada.² The Bank of Nova Scotia in Cuba has not been nationalized. The Canadian General Motors is thinking of supplying spare parts to Cuba. The Canadian reaction was discouraging, particularly if it meant that the Canadians would play the part of supplier to Cuba. The NATO countries, on the other hand, had already inquired about trans-shipment controls and are more likely to cooperate.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that two problems had been mixed up in the newspaper accounts of the Canadian reaction. The first was the problem of trans-shipment from the U.S. via Canada to Cuba. The second was direct sales by Canadian companies to Cuba. We had never asked the Canadians to do anything about the second of these problems although the press had raised it immediately in Canada. This was a problem about which Prime Minister Diefenbaker would do nothing. The problem of trans-shipment controls was, however, under consideration in the Canadian Cabinet. In response to a question as to why we were asking the Canadians and no one else to apply transshipment controls, we had told the Canadians that the reason was that we had not previously applied destination controls to Canada. We pointed out that we were asking their cooperation in order to avoid the necessity for applying such controls. Probably in the end, Secretary Dillon observed, the Canadians would come through in some form on the trans-shipment problem.

Another thing that had stirred up the Canadians, Secretary Dillon indicated, arose out of the old problem created by the fact that many Canadian companies are controlled by U.S. parent companies. One example of this problem in the current situation involved a subsidiary of Continental Can in Canada which, upon learning that a Canadian steel company had an order for tin plate from Cuba, told the steel company that if it filled the order, it could expect no business from Continental Can for the indefinite future. We have told the Canadians that they have to realize that this action was an expression of private industry’s feeling about Cuba. We had stated that although such action was probably not wise, it would probably continue to happen. However, the Canadians were very sensitive about this problem. Mr. McCone asked Secretary Dillon whether we encouraged such action by American companies. Secretary Dillon indicated that we did. Mr. McCone suggested that since most Canadian companies were controlled by U.S. companies we ought to get them to cooperate in enforcing the export embargo.

Mr. Gray noted a newspaper story which suggested that perhaps our action on U.S. exports had come too late. This story indicated that in recent weeks the Cuban Government had bought overwhelming quantities of spare parts. He suggested that Mr. Fisk comment on this story when he made his report on the export controls. Secretary Dillon said that while we had no figures on monthly exports to Cuba for September, figures through August totally disproved this news story. In August, exports were $18 million, the lowest level they had ever reached. There had been no significant change from May through August in exports of machinery and vehicles which were running about $3 million per month. Exports of chemicals dropped from $4 million in May to $3.1 million in August. Unless there was a surge in exports in September and the first half of October, the story was not borne out by the facts. Mr. Fisk stated that he had no later figures and agreed that exports had been dropping. There was no evidence, he indicated, of a great build-up just prior to the imposition of controls. Secretary Dillon stated that it was our impression that if we had not imposed controls within two or three weeks, there would have been some important shipments to Cuba. Several American companies were holding shipments back in anticipation of some such action by the Government.

Mr. Fisk then gave the Council a full report on the probable effects of the export controls. He pointed out that Cuban industry is primarily of U.S. design and that Cuba could not conveniently get maintenance and operations supplies to operate its industry from any other source. U.S. machinery and vehicle shipments to Cuba declined from $189 million in 1957 to $101 million in 1959 and to $28 million in the first eight months of 1960. There were a number of reasons for this decline including Cuban import and exchange controls, the reluctance of U.S. firms to advance credit, reduced orders by management because of the uncertain situation, and the reluctance of U.S. suppliers to make shipments to Cuba.

The situation now, Mr. Fisk continued, was one where a minor break-down often resulted in a costly shut-down. A number of firms have ceased operations or have greatly curtailed them for lack of maintenance, repair and operations supplies. Cuba, for example, needed $1 million in bus parts in order to put a number of buses back in operation. It needs hundreds of items for its power and light operations, the absence of which would hamper the sugar industry. The U.S. action should result in major shut-downs and have a snowball effect. Thus the shut-down of a rayon plant would affect tire production and thus would affect automotive transport. Reduced availability of automotive transport would in turn affect movement of all kinds of goods.

Mr. Fisk stated that Cuba could get supplies from the USSR or other Western powers but that since Cuba has predominantly a U.S. economy, replacement would require time-consuming efforts. Cuba was already having difficulties and these difficulties would become worse and more damaging. He noted, for example, that absence of control valves could cause plant closures. Eventually this problem could be surmounted but in the meantime vast amounts of productive capital were kept idle. Tin plate obtained from the USSR had proved unsatisfactory. A catalyst obtained from a non-U.S. source for a Cuban oil refinery was mixed with supplies obtained from the U.S. with disastrous results. Wood pulp obtained from the USSR had not worked in a Cuban rayon plant.

Mr. Fisk pointed out that exports from the U.S. to Cuba totalled $616 million in 1957; $281 million in six months of 1959; and $196 million in six months of 1960. U.S. imports from Cuba were not as important to the U.S. as Cuban imports from the U.S. were to Cuba. Seventy-eight per cent of U.S. imports were accounted for by sugar. Other imports included tobacco, fruits and vegetables, and nickel.

Mr. McCone inquired as to whether the Moa Bay and Nicaro operations had been closed down. Secretary Dillon stated that Moa Bay was shut down and we had given thirty days’ notice that we would shut down Nicaro on the 4th of November. The Nicaro plant has been locally, but not publicly, intervened. Local labor has taken it over and the few Americans still there are gradually leaving. The Cubans may attempt to run the Nicaro plant and pile up the nickel. The nickel cannot be used by the Soviet Union or elsewhere. Until the thirty days are up, the plant continues to run and we are paying for its operation.

Mr. Stans inquired as to whether we had frozen Cuban credits and assets. Secretary Dillon pointed out in response that such action would require invocation of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Mr. Dulles noted that, in any event, most of the Cuban assets in the U.S. were gone. In response to a question from Mr. Gray, Secretary Herter indicated that the actions on U.S. exports had been taken under the Export Control Act and that such action, therefore, did not involve the declaration of a national emergency.

Mr. Gray observed that we could not predict the results in Cuba of our action on U.S. exports. The reaction could range upward to an effort to take Guantanamo. He noted that Mr. Dulles suggested to him the day before that Castro might cut off Cuban sugar exports to the U.S. He inquired as to the impact such action would have upon the U.S. Secretary Dillon stated that such action by Cuba would be in accordance with our own ideas. We plan to set aside Cuba’s sugar quota for the first quarter of next year. The Secretary of Agriculture had recommended the initial step in this direction to the President last week³ —the removal of all controls on U.S. sugar beet production. The U.S. sugar beet growers know the purpose of this action although we have not announced our plans with respect to Cuban sugar imports.

Secretary Dillon went on to say that the Canadians had had what he could only call the presumption to tell us that one reason they were worried about the U.S. action was the fact that they had received reports from their diplomatic sources which did not agee with ours, indicating that the U.S. action would cause a serious loss of good feeling toward the U.S. in Latin America. When we had asked them about the reaction they had got in Central America, the Canadians had had to admit that they had no representative in that area.

Mr. Stans said that he looked upon this U.S. action as a major move and assumed that further moves would follow. He assumed that we were studying all economic sanctions that might be applied and that we would not stop half-way. Secretary Herter indicated that every possibility was being explored. The action on exports was clearly within our own domestic jurisdiction and could not be interpreted under the Rio Treaty as an act of aggression. If we took action which could be interpreted as going beyond the Treaty, it would make us vulnerable to action against us in the OAS. It was for this reason that the Latin American reaction had been so encouraging. Secretary Dillon noted in this connection that the press release had emphasized that this action was in defense of American industry and a sovereign act of the U.S. If we invoked the Trading with the Enemy Act under a new proclamation of emergency, that would be a clearly political act. Such action would cause real problems. If we could accomplish the same result in another way as, for example, we had been able to do in the case of sugar, we would be better off. Secretary Scribner agreed that, in view of the fact that the Cubans had few assets left in this country, we would have to pay quite a price to get very small results if we were to invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act.

Mr. Stans asked if we knew whether the military support being provided by the Bloc was for internal security purposes only or also included equipment that could be used in an attack on other nations. Secretary Herter stated that the Latin American countries were worried about the possibility that Cuba was obtaining equipment for the latter purpose. In the discussion which followed, it was indicated that Cuba might be getting some tanks which could be used in an external attack. It is also possible that Cuba will have two squadrons of MIGs by the first of the year. Secretary Herter noted that there is a sensitivity in Cuba to the possibility of a fake U.S. attack on Guantanamo to justify military action by the U.S. against Cuba. Secretary Dillon pointed out that there were indications that Cuban aircraft on Cuban airfields had been recently painted with U.S. insignia. Our Ambassador was asking about these aircraft in a note⁴ which would state that it was well-known that there were no U.S. aircraft in Cuba and which would suggest that the Cubans might be preparing a provocative military action.

Mr. Gray asked whether the local diplomatic and military authorities had all the authority they required to effect evacuation of U.S. personnel. Secretary Herter pointed out that dependents of U.S. personnel had been told to leave Cuba. General Lemnitzer and Secretary Dillon noted that the dependents of U.S. civilian officials and U.S. military personnel had left Cuba. Secretary Herter noted that we were planning to recall our Ambassador. The situation was hopeless from the point of view of diplomatic negotiations; the OAS Committee of Six had been boycotted by Cuba. In response to a question from Secretary Scribner, Mr. Dulles stated that there were about 4000 non-official U.S. personnel in Cuba. Secretary Herter stated that all these people had been alerted but that they were staying on in Cuba if they wished to do so. A warden system had been initiated so that in the event of violence, these people could be called and could go to places from which they could be evacuated.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba on the basis of a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, comments by the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State on free world reactions to U.S. controls on exports to Cuba, and a report by Mr. Bradley Fisk, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, on the probable effects of such U.S. controls on the Cuban economy.

b. Noted that the Department of State is studying all forms of possible sanctions against Cuba which the United States could impose consistent with its international obligations.

c. Noted a report by the Secretary of State on the status of evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cuba.

[Here follows discussion of items unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on October 24.

² A memorandum of a conversation on October 18 among Dillon, Mann, and Canadian Ambassador Heeney regarding the U.S. export controls on shipments to Cuba is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, October 1960.

³ See Document 590.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Paragraphs a–c that follow constitute NSC Action No. 2322. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

597. Memorandum From John C. Pool of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)¹

Washington, October 26, 1960.

SUBJECT

US Diplomatic Representation in Habana in the Event that Castro Breaks Relations with us

With reference to my memo to you of October 4th (copy attached)² suggesting that we ask the British to represent us in Habana in the event that Castro breaks diplomatic relations with us, you will in the meantime have seen the three memos of conversations which CMA has had with Miss Gillian Brown of the British Embassy, the matter having been brought up by her, not by us. From the last one of these, dated October 21st (copy attached)³ it is abundantly clear that the British do not want to assume our representation and that they feel strongly enough about it to attempt to stave off the request. If we should ask them to do so it is believed we would be turned down—unless the request were made at a very high level. I do not recommend that the request be made.

As for the British suggestion that we ask the Canadians, that should be ruled out because of the way the Canadians are acting about our export control policy. It is rather apparent that (1) they want to maintain their favored position in Cuba and would be reluctant to do anything which might undermine it, (2) they would therefore not want us to ask them and (3) they would probably turn us down if we did.

That would leave us the following countries to choose from: Belgium, The Netherlands, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and Japan. West Germany is out, for she will be breaking relations with Castro herself if Castro recognizes East Germany, which seems quite likely. (West Germany has already approached the Swiss re: representing them in that event). Thus the field is narrowed still further.

All things considered, I would recommend that we ask the Swiss. Switzerland is, of course, a neutral country and is quite accustomed to representing others. On October 25th, we informally and confidentially requested the Swiss Counselor of the Embassy to sound out his government regarding its willingness to assume our representation in Habana.⁴ His personal reaction was favorable and we are now awaiting the official reaction of the Swiss Government.

According to the latest Habana diplomatic list the Swiss have an Ambassador and one attaché there. If we can maintain a Consulate in Habana, whoever represents us would presumably not have too much to do. If Castro does not let us keep our staff in a consular capacity, we could presumably have some of our officers assigned to the Swiss Embassy—this contingency is already provided for in the Dominican Republic. Or, if the Swiss must have additional local employees because of the work they would be doing for us, we can make arrangements to pay them, Tom Linthicum says.

When the time comes, if we should announce that the Swiss are representing us, the press and others might well ask why. Everyone knows it is our usual practice to ask the British, and would wonder whether the fact that we did not do so in this case might represent a split in the allied camp. We could well say that we did not ask them because they too have been targets of attack by the Castro regime; that we did not want to jeopardize their position in Cuba; that we decided to ask the Swiss, who are well known as neutrals, and have had long experience in handling the diplomatic representation of other countries.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2660. Official Use Only. Drafted by John C. Pool and Vallon and routed to Mann through Vallon and Coerr. Initialed by Pool, Vallon, and Coerr.

² Not printed. It was drafted by Pool, but sent from Vallon to Mann and other addressees in ARA.

³ Not attached to the source text; a copy is ibid., 611.37/10–2160. A memorandum of Pool and Vallon’s conversation with Brown on October 3, at which time she raised the question of British representation of U.S. interests in Cuba in the event of a break in U.S.-Cuban relations, is ibid., 611.37/10–360. A memorandum of Pool’s conversation with Brown on October 19 is ibid., 611.37/10–1960.

⁴ A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 611.37/10–2560.

598. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics¹

Washington, October 28, 1960—8:53 p.m.

614. Cuba has requested inscription urgent and important item in agenda UNGA charging US with aggressive plans and acts of intervention. Cuba claimed possess information proving US would attempt large-scale invasion within next few days which might set off “conflagration of unsuspected proportions.” Among other charges, Cuba also alleged US territory and that other Western Hemisphere countries used as bases for operations counter-revolutionaries in US service. Specifically, US (1) violated Cuban airspace Sept. 29 to drop arms anti-Castro rebels, and (2) launched recent ill-fated landing anti-Castro group in which three US citizens presumably participated.

Although Soviet-Cuban motives in raising these false charges clearly aimed at undermining OAS and diverting attention from arms build up in Cuba designed to further Communist expansion in Western Hemisphere, US decided, on balance, not to oppose inscription. Our willingness debate Cuban charges placed us in strongest posture, whereas opposition would have given erroneous impression US case weak. Moreover, it unlikely inscription could have been prevented in expanded GA.

In General Committee October 25 USSR, in effort accord this propaganda item unwarranted importance, sought unsuccessfully obtain recommendation item be allocated to plenary for immediate discussion rather than to committee. Costa Rica and Haiti voted with US against Soviet motion on allocation; Panama and Venezuela abstained. In later vote on motion recommend item be allocated to Political Committee, Venezuela and Panama joined US, Haiti, and Costa Rica in voting affirmatively.

GA plenary expected consider General Committee recommendation on or about Oct. 31. US intends argue, as we did in General Committee, that item should be allocated to Political Committee. We intend to reiterate assurances that US has no aggressive purposes against Cuba. We plan point out if Cuba really concerned at prospect imminent invasion and if Cuba wished maintain its defiance of OAS it would at least have gone to Security Council since that organ has primary responsibility for maintenance peace and security. We plan deny any connection with alleged overflight and landing. We plan state US welcomes opportunity call attention elaborate US measures prevent our territory from being used for illegal activities against Cuba and emphasize US tries prevent US citizens from becoming embroiled in foreign adventures. We believe Cuban charges and US replies and counter-charges should be considered in orderly fashion by Political Committee rather than in plenary where Soviets and Cubans could stage more effective propaganda spectacle.

USUN reports present indications are that most LAs on Oct. 31 will support allocation Cuban item to Political Committee. Moreover, we hope LAs will make clear in statements and corridor conversations: (1) Cuba’s obligation to resort to OAS in first instance in dispute with another OAS member; and (2) their rejection of Sino-Soviet bloc’s efforts intervene in Western Hemisphere. Former principle contained in UN, OAS Charters and Rio Treaty.

For Panama City: Embassy should express hope FonOff that Panama on Oct. 31 will vote against any motion have Cuban item considered in plenary.

For other action addressees: Above sent for your background and use in any discussions this subject. In any such discussion with FonOff you should stress threat to OAS system posed by Cuba’s bypassing of OAS machinery including Ad Hoc Good Offices Committee established by Seventh MFM to settle just such complaints as Cuba has made against US.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/10–2860. Confidential. Drafted by Newlin; cleared with Jamison, Vallon, and Coerr; and approved by Wallner who signed for Herter. Sent to all diplomatic posts in the American Republics except Havana, and repeated to Havana, Ciudad Trujillo, and USUN by pouch.

599. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 28, 1960.

SUBJECT:

President’s Inquiry Regarding Cuban Opposition Groups

Discussion:

During the President’s visit to Mexico, it was suggested to him that the United States Government should not be supporting the anti-Castro group know as the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), described as a communist-influenced group, but should instead give full support to a movement known as Unidad Cubana de Liberacion (UCL). The Central Intelligence Agency is prepared to brief the President on this matter on Monday, October 31, and I believe that you should be aware of the following information which it will be covering in considerably greater detail.

The FRD is a coalition of several anti-Castro groups which was organized in New York last spring and publicly announced at a press conference of its Executive Committee members in Mexico City on June 21, 1960. The groups composing the FRD are anti-Castro, anti-Communist, and anti-Batista. The membership of its Executive Committee is as follows:

Antonio Varona, leader of a large faction of the Autentico Party, which was the official political party during the administrations of Ramon Grau Martin and Carlos Prio (1944–52);

Justo Carrillo, head of the Montecristi Group, which was formed in 1952 by wealthy professionals and businessmen in opposition to the Batista dictatorship;

Jose Ignacio Rasco, head of the Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), which was formed in late 1959 by young Catholic groups in opposition to the Castro regime;

Manuel Artime, nominal head of the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario, an underground anti-Castro movement formed in 1959, whose membership consists principally of defectors from the 26th-of-July Movement; and

Rafael Sardina Sanchez, former Vice President of the Asociacion de Colonos Cubanos (Cuban Association of Cane Growers).

With regard to the charge that the FRD is a communist-influenced group, there is no indication that any of the above FRD leaders has ever been involved in Communist activities or evidenced Communist sympathy. The constitutional manifesto of the FRD strongly condemns the dictatorial and communistic nature of the Castro regime. CIA states that the political orientation of FRD leaders can be described as varying from moderately conservative to moderately liberal; the group has been carefully constituted so as to attract the widest possible popular support in Cuba while avoiding extremes or the inclusion of persons who have become discredited on the basis of past political activities.

The opposition movement suggested to the President as a preferable alternative was the Unidad Cubana de Liberacion (UCL), under the leadership of Francisco G. Cajigas, a former wealthy Cuban businessman now turned political leader. The UCL is the outgrowth of a coalition formed in early 1960 of all anti-Castro groups which were, in varying degree, supporting General Jose Pedraza as their military leader. A number of these groups were identified with the former Batista regime but, more particularly, Pedraza himself was developing a military force in the Dominican Republic with the active personal support of Trujillo, and those two facts served to mark these forces as totally unacceptable in Cuba. While Cajigas is a reputable individual and had no political connection with Batista, he has tainted himself by affiliation with former Batista supporters and with the Trujillo government. The UCL has made determined efforts to gain U.S. Government recognition and support. Spokesmen for the UCL, which in general may be considered to represent the conservative stratum of Cuban politics, have on occasion charged the more liberal FRD with being leftist, if not Communist.

Other Cuban opposition movements and leaders have frequently sought to join with or even take over the FRD. In those cases where the latter group has declined to become thus associated, the other interested groups and their spokesmen have sometimes reacted angrily, have charged the FRD with being leftist or Communist, and have alleged that the U.S. Government is backing the FRD and has chosen less than an optimum instrument for opposing Castro.

All things considered, the political orientation of the FRD is believed to be an acceptable one from the United States point of view and one capable of attracting a fairly wide strata of popular Cuban support. This does not rule out, of course, the possible desirability of its incorporating additional elements; however, it is, I believe, important from the point of view of the Frente’s own standing and acceptability, that any such inclusions be most carefully considered.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba–Opposition Groups 1960. Secret. Drafted by Devine. Initialed by Mann and Herter.

600. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics (Hall) and the Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for Sino-Soviet Bloc (Crawford) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)¹

Washington, October 31, 1960.

SUBJECT

Soviet Intentions Toward Cuba and Communist-Type Controls Instituted by the Castro Government

1. The USSR is determined to provide expanded trade, economic and technical assistance necessary to help the Cuban government sustain and expand the Cuban economy. Moscow seeks by this means to increase Soviet political influence over the Castro regime and to demonstrate to other prospective Castro-like regimes in Latin America that they can become economically “independent” of the US through Bloc aid.

2. Moscow is also determined to provide Cuba military equipment on a large scale for the purposes of extending Soviet influence, meeting Cuban military requirements, and eventual export to other potential Castros.

3. It remains our judgment that Moscow would not actually intervene with its military forces if the Castro regime were attacked by anti-Castro forces. However, the Soviets could be expected to step up arms assistance and to launch a vigorous missile-flexing campaign—along the lines of Suez—in an effort to deter the anti-Castro intervention. This in turn could give rise to the possibility of miscalculation or overcommitment on the Soviets’ part.

4. Assuming effective Soviet control of the local Communist movement in Cuba, Moscow will continue to direct these forces to infiltrate the Castro regime and Cuban political, economic and social institutions wherever possible. However, in our judgment, the Soviets would not want the Communists to attempt to seize open control in Cuba for some time to some, particularly so long as the present East-West military balance is maintained. The current Cuban situation has many advantages from the Soviet point of view; an openly established Communist regime would mean a loss of actual or potential sympathy and support from Latin American nationalists and would force the Soviets to choose between two disadvantageous alternatives in the event of a US intervention—either an effective Soviet counterintervention, with serious risk of general war, or Soviet failure to intervene, with potentially serious consequences for the maintenance of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

5. The classic Communist pattern of takeover in Eastern Europe involved among other things: 1. Infiltration of Communists and fellow-travelers into key positions in the government and the economy, 2. Elimination of the upper and middle classes through (a) redistribution of the land, (b) redistribution of housing, and (c) nationalization of industry, banking and commerce. A similar process has already progressed to a high degree in Cuba. The Cubans have also adopted from the Chinese Communists an additional important technique of control, i.e. the establishment of an armed people’s militia on a wide scale, which has in effect replaced the Cuban army. These controls are fast being imposed largely along traditional Communist lines, even if the facade of a noncommunist revolution is being preserved.

6. By force and by persuasion, relying primarily on Communist penetration, Castro has assumed control over all sources of power in Cuba and most facets of Cuban daily life. He has eliminated all opposition political parties, except the Communist Party. He has taken over the military, newspapers, bureaucracy, intelligence organizations, communications media, labor, the banks, and professional organizations. He has taken control of much urban and rural property and close to a billion dollars in US property. He has fanned anti-Americanism as a device to unify popular support and divert attention from internal problems.

7. Based on the techniques applied and the present course of events in Cuba, controls in the future will be extended and increased over: internal travel, church activities, principally church schools, education and youth. Further nationalization of Cuban business, an extensive purge of the Cuban diplomatic corps and further regimentation of the work force is also expected.

8. The effect of these controls will be to make successful resistance to the regime progressively more difficult. Although internal resistance to Castro’s methods and government has tended to rise sharply in the past six months, the curve of resistance is expected to fall off as opposition elements leave the country or are neutralized.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by John P. Shaw (INR/RSB) and Robert W. Dean (INR/RAR).

601. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 465th meeting of the National Security Council on October 31, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Cabell discussed Cuba as follows during his briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security:

“Turning to Cuba, General Cabell stated that that country was identifying itself increasingly with the Communists and was expanding its relations with the Bloc. Cuban diplomats were returning to Cuba for screening and possible replacement if they were not sufficiently pro-Communist. He referred finally to ‘Che’ Guevara’s mission to the USSR and Eastern Europe.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

602. Editorial Note

Toward the end of October, concern was expressed within the U.S. Government that the U.S. position with regard to the defense of the base at Guantanamo was not sufficiently clear.

In a memorandum of October 25 to Under Secretary Merchant, Gerard C. Smith called attention to the record of discussion at the September 30 meeting between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of State officials (Document 585). Smith particularly noted Merchant’s expressed opinion about the implications of a Cuban attack on Guantanamo, namely that such an attack would mean war. Because Smith considered such an attack a real possibility, he asked Merchant whether it would be advisable “to get Presidential focus on this point.” In a reply of November 1, Merchant told Smith that he had thought the matter over and had mentioned it to Secretary of State Herter. Merchant had concluded that “we should let my remarks with the JCS stand and not raise this subject in the White House at least for the present.” Both memoranda are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961.

Also on October 25, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Haydn Williams sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Gates calling attention to Gates’ correspondence with Herter regarding the defense of Guantanamo (Documents 586 and 591). Attached to the memorandum was a draft letter from Gates to the President requesting Presidential confirmation of Gates’ instructions to the Joint Chiefs that “we will take immediate action to hold the Naval Base at Guantanamo against all forms of harassment including armed attack.” In the margin of Williams’ covering memo was written the following comment, dated November 4: “Sec. Def. does not think further correspondence on this matter is necessary.” Williams’ memorandum and the draft letter are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 680.1 Cuba)

On October 28, the President sent a letter to Herter inquiring whether the U.S. public position on Guantanamo had been made clear. No copy of this letter has been found, but it was referred to in the following telephone conversation between Herter and Gates at 10:32 a.m. on October 28:

“Telephoned Secy Gates to say he had gotten a note from the President asking whether our position has been made pretty clear publicly on Guantanamo. Gates said he did not think it had been stated publicly other than his remarks last week in Miami and a statement which Admiral Burke had made in US News and World Report but this did not receive too much notice. Mr. Gates said he made his statement categoric in a TV press interview in Miami but it had not received too wide press coverage outside of Florida. Gates said he had also said in New York in answer to a question in a closed meeting with some 100 bankers that we will defend Guantanamo and if it involves an extension of the problem we have plans to handle that also, and Mr. Gates said this had brought forth rousing applause. After further discussion, and agreement that our position on Guantanamo has not been made very clear publicly and that there is an absolutely extraordinary interest in Cuba on the part of the American people now, it was agreed it would do no harm to have the President make our position publicly clear. In the course of a general discussion in which the Secretary reported briefly on the legal study being made with regard to our Treaty dealing with Guantanamo in which in return for base rights in Cuba we turned over to them the Isle of Pines; Mr. Gates’ illustration of the intense interest in this subject as evidenced by some of the questions he had been asked such as whether articles 15 and 16 in the OAS treaty contradict the Monroe Doctrine, [sic] In the course of the conversation Mr. Gates referred to the fact that his people wanted him to write either the Secretary or the President a letter because the Secretary’s reply to Gates letter had sort of hedged a little with reference to Gates statement in his letter about instructing the JCS. The Secretary said he thought his reply to Gates indicated agreement subject only to approval by the President. Mr. Gates said he quite agreed and had no intention of writing the letter his people wanted him to write.”

At 10:55 that morning, Herter telephoned Goodpaster to say that it would be worthwhile for the President to issue a public clarification of U.S. policy on Guantanamo because “it was good to put the Cubans on notice.” Herter said he would send Goodpaster a suggested statement for the President’s consideration. At 2:50 p.m. on October 28, Goodpaster called Herter to report the President’s agreement that he should say something on Guantanamo. Although he could not fit it into a speech he was planning to give that evening, the President thought he could say something very soon. Memoranda of all three conversations are in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. Gates’ remarks in Miami and in New York have not been further identified. Burke’s statement that if the Cubans tried to take Guantanamo by force “we would fight back” was in U.S. News and World Report, October 3, 1960.

In a memorandum of October 29 to the President, Herter reviewed some of the recent public remarks by U.S. officials regarding Guantanamo and enclosed suggested remarks for the President to make on Guantanamo at a time he deemed appropriate. (Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Oct–Dec) 1960)

These remarks were amended slightly and released to the public by the White House on November 1. The text of the Presidential statement is in Department of State Bulletin, November 21, 1960, page 780.

603. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 1, 1960¹

Washington, November 1, 1960

SUBJECT

Cuban Refugees in Florida

PARTICIPANTS

Under Secretary Douglas Dillon

John W. Hanes, Jr.

Tracy Voorhees

Mr. Voorhees said that he had been tentatively approached about “doing something” for the Cuban refugees in Florida on behalf of the President. He said he had taken the position that nothing of this sort should be done until after the election, lest it get involved in politics; and that after that time, if it were decided by all the interested people and the President, he would be happy to “look into” the situation on behalf of the President. He said if he did so he would hope to proceed by getting the Governor of Florida to establish a committee and take responsibility for what needed to be done, with himself as more or less of a helpful outsider to provide necessary liaison with the Federal Government.

He expressed the opinion, based on the information he had already received, that the problem in Florida is not actually very large or very serious (involving about thirty to forty thousand Cubans in all, of which probably not more than two or three thousand at most are in need of any kind of assistance). He also mentioned, however, that the problem has received much publicity, and the need of doing something suitable is not necessarily related to the actual needs of the situation. He asked the Under Secretary what our policy view was.

Mr. Dillon said that the Department, for important reasons of foreign policy, was most anxious that suitable action be taken so that Cubans in this country not fall into need, or into a situation where they could be portrayed abroad as in difficult straits in the United States. He said he thought it very important for our position in Cuba and elsewhere abroad that Cubans fleeing to this country be adequately received and handled.

Mr. Dillon told Mr. Voorhees that the analysis and program he had outlined accorded very much with our own thinking as to the requirements of the situation. He pointed out that, since this is a domestic problem, the Department of State should not and does not wish to become directly involved in its handling in this country, feeling that this is largely within the province of the Immigration Service, and the Departments of Labor and of Health, Education and Welfare. However, he said that the Department would be more than happy to cooperate in any suitable way, including making available (within the limits of our ability) the experts available within the Department, especially in the Refugee Office. He suggested that Mr. Voorhees keep in touch with Mr. Hanes’ office in this regard.

Mr. Dillon again emphasized, however, that our reluctance to become involved in domestic operations did not detract from our great interest, from a foreign policy point of view, in assuring that suitable action was taken domestically to handle any Cuban situation properly and so as to reflect credit upon the United States response to the needs of these victims of Castro’s oppression.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–160. Confidential. Drafted by Hanes and approved in U on November 17.

² For Voorhees’ interim report as the President’s Representative on the Cuban Refugee Problem, December 19, see Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1961, pp. 45–48.

604. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

G–225 Havana, November 1, 1960.

Cuban Government line past few days had been to stress imminence of armed invasion by counter-revolutionaries supported by U.S. Government-controlled press has been accenting this theme. In speech Saturday² at graduation 55 cadets from Rebel Army’s officer school at Managua, Prime Minister Fidel Castro repeatedly referred to the “imminence of an attack”. He declared that opposition must logically attack now, because longer attack postponed stronger Cuban Government will become. He also indicated as another reason for believing an attack was imminent, that since Cuba had become a matter of contention in U.S. presidential campaign, there was danger present administration would attack Cuba to satisfy interests which support it and to outdo other political party. Concentration of all male militia in Habana area for day of training on October 30 contributed to invasion psychology.

Effect of this Government campaign has been to increase tension in capital and to create public anticipation of imminent armed attack.

It is probable that some elements in Cuban Government, including possibly Prime Minister Castro, believe that armed invasion with U.S. support must be anticipated and may come at any moment. Embassy has no evidence, however, of any preparations by opposition for imminent armed attack upon Government. Opposition sources to which Embassy has access do report that combined invasion-uprising is being planned but is not to take place until several weeks after U.S. elections. These sources speculate that Government may be planning behind smoke screen of invasion reports to simulate an invasion with its own forces in order to trick opposition elements into exposing themselves in situation where they would be easy prey for waiting Government forces. Opposition source claims they are prepared for such a maneuver and will not be tricked.

Apart from such speculation, which Embassy unable to evaluate, Government may have interest in keeping Cuban people in state of agitation at this time with reports of imminent armed attack. This has double effect of (1) maintaining revolutionary fervor of supporters of regime at high pitch so that maximum effort can be obtained for defense effort, especially in militia, and (2) diverting attention of Cuban people, supporters and opponents alike, from disappointments of urban reform law, economic sacrifices and dismal future economic prospects. If time passes, however, without any invasion taking place campaign could backfire on Cuban Government.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–160. Confidential. Drafted by Harvey R. Wellman. Ambassador Bonsal had left Havana October 28.

² October 29.

605. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)¹

Washington, November 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

INR Memorandum of October 31 Entitled “Soviet Intentions Toward Cuba and Communist-Type Controls Instituted by the Castro Government”²

Grim as they are, I believe the prognostications and conclusions of the memorandum under reference are sound.

What I am less clear on is where we go from here.

If the curve of resistance within Cuba falls as opposition elements leave and Castro’s vise tightens, how does an opposition register or return? And does the progressive isolation or “quarantine” of Cuba (export controls, possible OAS breaking of relations or imposition of a blockade on Cuban exports of arms and adventurers) benefit our long-range purpose? Yet it seems to me that the time may not be far off when some sort of naval and air surveillance over Cuban shipments of arms and propaganda to other countries will probably be in the national and OAS interest.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Cuba 1959–1961. Secret. Drafted by Henry C. Ramsey. Copies were sent to George Morgan and other officers in S/P.

² Document 600.

606. Notes on the 137th Meeting of the Working Group on Cuba, Department of State, Washington, November 7, 1960¹

Washington, November 7, 1960

1. Ambassador Bonsal at Meeting: Ambassador Bonsal attended today’s meeting. Among other comments he suggested the following:

a. Use of TV in Getting our Message Across in Cuba. Could we possibly insert our own material into Cuba’s TV channels? Could we telecast from a plane?

b. It is more important every day that we contrast Fidel Castro’s original sayings and pronouncements with what he is saying now. We should keep hitting this contrast.

c. Recent publicity relating to the Guantanamo naval base has not been helpful to the United States.

D. Our memorandum of rebuttal submitted to the UN² in answer to Castro’s charges was excellently done and should be given maximum dissemination.

e. GOC transfer under security conditions of the Embassy’s Attaché plane away from its customary air field points up a propaganda opportunity for us. Castro made loud noises about changing barracks to schools. In practice, however, after effecting this conversion, he then turns around and arms the students and teachers at the same schools to the very teeth. This fact might well be publicized.

[Here follows discussion of USIA activities regarding Cuba, Pentagon propaganda, employment by the AEC and OAS of Cuban nationals, the Cuban Government’s recent arrest of David Salvador, the Soviet bloc arms shipments to Cuba, the Inter-American Defense Board’s handling of the Cuban situation, and a list of action assignments.]

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Working Group Notes. Confidential. Prepared by Devine on November 8. Participants at the meeting are identified only as the “10:30 Group Members.”

² See Document 589.

607. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas)¹

Washington, November 7, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuba

Here are some thoughts on Cuba for your consideration. They result from the discussion in the special group last Thursday² and from subsequent meetings with persons responsible for present operations.

As you pointed out, it does not appear that our present course of action will bring the effective results we desire. The present plan is based on the assumption that the Cuban people would rally to anti-Communist forces in sufficient numbers to bring about a change in government. Communist security tactics, such as creating a peoples’ militia, and the continued support of Castro by a majority of Cubans, block the success of planned actions. Thus, it appears to be time to take another hard look at our plan.

If our present plan now seems to be doomed to failure, then what must be done for success? It is suggested that the following must be done:

a. Re-assess the Cuban situation in realistic enough terms so that a full, fresh decision can be made.

b. Make the decision and commit sufficient U.S. resources for success.

c. Act to provide sounder political grounds for U.S. operations; we should construct our position on the popular side.

d. Isolate Cuba to permit us to have the most favorable conditions possible in solving the problem.

e. Bring a viable government to power in Cuba, on terms acceptable to the U.S.

Assessment. A new assessment of what Cuba means should consider our enemy, the Castro opportunists and the Communists. It seems clear that the Communists are determined to make Cuba their cold war base for obtaining further territory in the Western Hemisphere. They are actively making it a secure base. In so doing, the Communists reap collateral benefits.

The improved Communist techniques employed in an area so geographically remote from Bloc territory are certainly not lost upon the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia who must think of their own alliances in realistic terms. A Communist Cuba on the U.S. door-step is a hard fact which says that a Communist alliance is feasible anywhere. Only effective action by the U.S. can change this conclusion. Lack of effective action also leads to the exploitable conclusion that the U.S. is afraid of the nuclear attack threatened by Khrushchev.

Decision. The U.S. should conclude that the present Communist-controlled regime in Cuba is absolutely intolerable for the U.S. The U.S. should then decide to commit sufficient resources, used energetically, to bring about a desired change in Cuba. Among U.S. resources used should be an NSC special team composed of the most highly competent Americans possible, to plan, organize, and run this operation. It demands the best we have.

The Political Basis. Our present course of action in Cuba, including economic sanctions, is not at the heart of the problem. We need to be in the position of supporting the Cuban people in attaining their own objectives, not making war on them. This need will be even more emphatic if overt U.S. force is used. Ideally, our actions should have the warm, understanding, and sympathetic approval of the people of the Free World, including the campesinos and peons of the Western Hemisphere. This can be done.

There are a series of political actions which can isolate the Communist leaders from the people, give dynamic goals to the Cuban people in terms acceptable to us, and enlist the support of world opinion—if done soon, competently.

First, and easiest, we need to call world attention to the significance of Cuban refugees in a strong enough manner to make the world choose the anti-Castro side. There should be an organized, non-governmental drive to aid these refugees. Emphasis in publicity should be on helpless victims of terrorism, children and the aged. Ex-Batista schemers, with their dirty hands, should be kept out of this program. Leading Cubans who fought the Batistas and who feel that Castro and the Communists have betrayed Cuba should be brought to the fore to organize and run the Cuban refugees, with dedication to return to a free Cuba. The refugees should be in one, unified organization—which means that its stated aims should be broadly humanitarian enough to attract the consolidation of presently diverse Cuban groups.

Secondly, we should create sound, unified Cuban political leadership for the liberation of Cuba. These must be the cream of those opposed to Castro and the Communists, the outstanding thinkers and doers. They must be unified and disciplined in their actions, and U.S. moral pressures and support should be applied to assure unity. This Free Cuba directorate should have clearly stated objectives—a Cuba free of foreign Communist domination, eradication of dictators, and for a definite program in accord with the original aims of the peoples’ Revolution (our own Revolution can be tied in as a common bond). This leadership should create a Free Cuba movement, recruiting the support of the refugees, develop underground support in Cuba, direct the planning, organizing, and operation of liberation forces, and carrying out an aggressive campaign in the Free World, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, to arouse the sympathies of the people towards the plight of Cuba. These actions could raise funds, volunteer manpower, political support as necessary, and particularly provide a good, pro-Liberation propaganda base.

Thirdly, Castro and the Communists must be branded as the enemies of the peoples’ Revolution. To do this, the Free Cuba movement must restate the aims of the Revolution and bring charges against present Cuban leaders for the way they have killed those aims. This psychological operation should be aimed both at world opinion and at the campesinos inside Cuba. Every bit of Cuban, Latin American, and Yankee ingenuity should be used to press this campaign home. There are many experienced experts in the Western Hemisphere who could be recruited to make this a telling campaign.

Given this political and psychological basis, the U.S. would have the organized means and reasons for Cuban liberation in terms permitting strong enough U.S. help to assure success.

THEN, LIBERATE CUBA!

Isolation. After establishing the Cuban plea for help, and strengthened by the legal position the U.S. can affirm by the Monroe Doctrine and by OAS resolution, then the U.S. should act to cut the supply line from the foreign Communists. A blockade should be imposed, preferably as an OAS combined action, but unilaterally by the U.S. if necessary. Communist leadership inside Cuba should be isolated further by publication and dissemination in Cuba of prescribed lists of these leaders and advisors.

Takeover. The Free Cuba movement will have to move into Cuba for the liberation. This will have to be an effective force, with outstanding political and military leadership and organization. The U.S. will have to help ready this force, help its re-entry, help it take-over Cuba, and help it re-establish a viable Cuba with whom we can be friends. This joint political-military-economic action will require a joint U.S. effort by the best political, military, and economic people we have, working as a team to advise and support the Free Cubans, if we are to defeat the Communists in a manner retaining the respect and friendship of the free people of other countries. Covert operations should be an integral part of this effort.

Recommendation. It is recommended that you bring this to the attention of the President, after consultation with the JCS, the Department of State, and the CIA.³

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Cuba. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Signed by Lansdale and stamped, “Dep Sec has seen.”

² November 3. In an attached handwritten note to Erskine, November 7, Lansdale wrote that he had accompanied Douglas to a meeting of the 5412 Committee the previous week to discuss Cuba. Lansdale and General Bonesteel, “whom Gen. Lemnitzer has selected as his personal representative for this,” later went to the Central Intelligence Agency for an operational briefing on Cuba. Lansdale also told Erskine that there was “considerable concern topside (White House and Defense) on the adequacy of what we are doing.”

³ The source text does not indicate whether any action was taken on this recommendation.

608. Memorandum of Discussion at the 466th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 7, 1960, 8:30–10:14 a.m.¹

Washington, November 7, 1960, 8:30–10:14 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

2. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (NSC Action No. 2166–b–(l); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2177, 2191, 2195, 2201, 2206, 2213, 2217, 2228, 2239, 2259, 2261, 2269 and 2273; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 5, 1960; NSC Actions Nos. 2283, 2309 and 2322)

Mr. Gray explained why he had placed U.S. Policy toward Cuba on the Council agenda. He asked whether, in what now appeared to be the unlikely event of a military move by Castro against Guantanamo, the U.S. was wholly prepared with respect to policy and with respect to the coordination of political and military planning. He cited two extremes of possible U.S. reactions in the event of an attack on Guantanamo: “(a) use of only such military forces as might be necessary to protect the Guantanamo Base itself, and (b) a decision that such an attack was an act of war by the Castro Government against the U.S. and that military power should be applied accordingly.” In the latter case the obligations of the military would be different from what they would be in the former case. He assumed that in the latter case, we would pursue hostilities to a successful conclusion. He went on to say it was not clear whether military contingency planning was being done in close coordination with political planning and took full account of the actions that we might take in the UN or in the OAS. He concluded by stating that his reason for raising the issue was to make sure that the responsible departments had the benefit of the President’s views so that, in the event an attack did occur, at least their planning would be complete.

Secretary Gates indicated that military plans were flexible and could deal with a variety of possible political situations. He also noted that the President had been briefed on these plans. The President stated that he was not sure that we could say we would engage in all-out war against Cuba merely because Cuba attacked Guantanamo. Such an action by Cuba could be an adventurist action. We could not make a decision in advance on such a matter. We were going to assure the integrity of the Guantanamo Base but, on the other hand, we did not want to destroy the Cuban people whom, we believe, are friendly to the U.S.

Mr. Gray asked what our reaction would be in a situation in which an overt move against the Base was accompanied by harassment of American citizens. This would be more than an attack on the Base. The President said that in such a case, we would have to decide whether the government itself was responsible or whether action by so-called volunteers was involved. He observed that it would be hopeless for the Cubans to attack Guantanamo with volunteers. If we did more than we had to in reaction to an attack, we would create a bad political situation, but if we did not do what we had to do in order to defend Guantanamo, we would also create a very bad reaction.

Secretary Anderson inquired as to whether any arms were being shipped to Cuba by other than Russian ships. Secretary Gates said that some satellite vessels were involved. Secretary Anderson then went on to state that at the time of the crisis in Guatemala, some British ships were going into Guatemala. We had told the British that we would board and search their vessels if they continued to go in. As a result of our action, no more British vessels went into Guatemala. He wondered whether, if everything was going into Cuba in Russian vessels, we could not get the OAS to take notice of the fact that Cuba was being armed by the Communists and get the OAS to intercept such shipments. Secretary Merchant pointed out that the British and our other allies had cooperated 100 per cent in actions with respect to Cuba. However, it was questionable whether the OAS would support a naval blockade of Cuba.

Secretary Gates observed that what worried him was the possibility that if Castro did not like something we did, he might execute 100 Americans in a public square in Havana. What would we do in such a situation? The President stated that this was a different show. If groups of Americans were shot without trial, that was war; we could not run away from that. In such circumstances we would try to keep the OAS on our side, but we would come to a point where any other action would mean abandoning our self-respect.

General Lemnitzer briefly outlined to the Council the type of military contingency plans that had been prepared. One group of plans provides for military support of an effort to re-establish a Cuban Government friendly to the U.S. A second group provides for protection of U.S. lives and interests, including evacuation if necessary. A final group of plans was designed to re-establish peace in the event of armed attack on Guantanamo. These last-named plans covered a wide range of possibilities. He recognized that the nature of our response could not be decided in advance.

The National Security Council:²

a. Discussed the subject, with particular reference to possible U.S. actions in the event of a Cuban attack on the U.S. base at Guantanomo or on U.S. citizens in Cuba.

b. Noted a summary by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the types of contingencies which might arise with respect to Cuba for which military contingency plans have been prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and a statement by the Secretary of Defense that military contingency planning with respect to Cuba is so varied and flexible that the plans can be adapted to any political situation that might arise.

c. Noted the President’s statement that the United States should maintain the integrity of the Guantanamo base in the event of a Cuban attack; and that the precise nature of the U.S. response to such an attack could not be determined in advance, but that the U.S. response should be of a degree and kind appropriate to the character of the attack.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on November 8. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Daily Appointment Book. (ibid., President’s Daily Appointments)

² Paragraphs a–c and Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 2329. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

609. Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, White House, Washington, November 7, 1960, 10:15–10:23 a.m.¹

Washington, November 7, 1960, 10:15–10:23 a.m.

PRESENT

Secretary Gates, Secretary Douglas, General Lemnitzer, Secretary Merchant, Assistant Secretary Mann, Mr. Harr and Mr. Gray

Immediately following the conclusion of the NSC meeting, this date,² the named individuals met with the President in his office.

Mr. Gray opened the meeting by reminding the President that there had recently arisen the question of the doctrine of “immediate pursuit” with respect to Cuba. Mr. Gray reminded the President that this matter developed during Mr. Gray’s brief period in Walter Reed hospital and had been handled in his absence by Mr. Harr. At that time the President had approved interim guidance³ which now the JCS felt inadequate to the situation and the purpose of the meeting was to seek his approval for further and more explicit guidance.

Mr. Gates and General Lemnitzer both spoke to the problem and the President agreed that explicit guidance should be given.

Mr. Gray suggested that a simple way to handle the problem would be to extend the provisions of NSC 5604 (U.S. Action in the Event of Unprovoked Communist Attack against U.S. Aircraft),⁴ which had been revised as late as February 15, 1959 to be extended to Cuba. The President wondered whether the authority given in NSC 5604 was not broader than he wished granted in the case of Cuba. Mr. Gray read paragraphs 1 and 2 of NSC 5604.

The President indicated that these restrictions were appropriate in the case of Cuba.

General Lemnitzer then read certain further restrictions which the JCS proposed and which the President also approved.

Subject to these restrictions he agreed that the same policy should apply to Cuba as that set forth in NSC 5604. (Both of these sets of restrictions were set forth in Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State dated November 10, 1960 subsequently prepared and attached hereto.)⁵

He then said that he wished it to be understood that only experienced and mature pilots should be involved who could be counted upon to follow the instructions approved. The President also expressed the desire that wherever possible planes be equipped with photographic equipment in order to produce every possible documentation of unprovoked attack and that this consideration should also apply to ships.

Gordon Gray

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Prepared by Gordon Gray on November 14. Copies were sent to Goodpaster and Lay. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (ibid.) The source text indicates that the meeting began at approximately 10:20 a.m. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1984.

² See supra.

³ The President’s approval was given in a meeting on October 17 with Harr, Goodpaster, and Gordon Gray, which is described in Harr’s memorandum for the record, October 17. (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President) The memorandum is also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 1345.

⁴ A copy of this paper, as revised on February 15, 1959, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5604 Series.

⁵ 

Not printed. In the memorandum, Gray briefly described the meeting and indicated that the President had approved the following policy:

“a. Subject to paragraph b below, in the event of unprovoked Cuban armed attack against U.S. aircraft/ships outside Cuban territory, those U.S. aircraft attacked or located in the immediate area of the attack may take against the Cuban attacking force during the course of the attack aggressive protective measures, including if necessary and feasible immediate pursuit of the Cuban attacking force into Cuban air space.

“b. The authority under paragraph a is subject to the following restrictions:

“(1) Such pursuit will not include prolonged pursuit deep into Cuban air space.

“(2) Commanders will not be authorized deliberately and systematically to organize a pursuing force.

“(3) This authority will apply only to sporadic isolated, small-scale incidents.

“(4) Pilots employed against harassing aircraft should be thoroughly briefed that in the event Cuban aircraft harass our forces they will:

“(a) Make their presence known to the harasser by flying close aboard.

“(b) Firing is not authorized except in case of self-defense or attack is made on our forces. It is imperative that fighter pilot be positively certain that either he or aircraft/ship that he has been dispatched to defend has actually been fired upon before he (the fighter) initiates an attack.

“(c) In event Cuban aircraft is guilty of harassment only and has not fired upon our forces, fighter in making presence known by flying close aboard will discontinue these tactics upon the Cuban aircraft’s withdrawal to Cuban territorial waters (3 miles offshore).”

Gray also noted the President’s statements made at the conclusion of the meeting.

610. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, November 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Anti-Cuban Bases in the United States

Discussion

Inevitable leakage and publicity have occurred with respect to anti-Castro training bases in Guatemala. Opposition forces in Guatemala have played politics with this issue and the Cuban Government and press have gone all out to focus hemispheric and world opinion—especially at the UN—upon the existence of such bases in Guatemala and on preparations allegedly underway there for eventual invasion of Cuba.

I am increasingly concerned over the risk which this situation poses to the stability and continuing existence of the Ydígoras Government in Guatemala. Although President Ydígoras himself has accepted this risk and CIA officials profess to be satisfied with the possibilities of suitable cover story and plausible denial with respect to the Guatemalan operations, it seems only a matter of time until Guatemalan, Cuban, or international-body investigators establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Guatemalan Government has lent itself and portions of its national territory to U.S. operations against Castro. In my judgment, any such public revelation would threaten to bring down Ydígoras and face us with the possibility of a power vacuum or worse in this key Caribbean country.

To minimize this danger, I believe we should move promptly to de-emphasize our clandestine training and other activities in Guatemala and to transfer such operations to bases within the United States. Improved security measures would be possible here, and distinct operational advantages would be offered as well. Should public revelation eventually result, the U.S. could, in my judgment, better stand the risk of embarrassing publicity than it could the loss of the present Government of Guatemala.

In proposing the de-emphasis of operations in Guatemala, I would suggest retention of established bases there for such stand-by or occasional use as may be warranted in the future, together with continued training activities by Guatemalan troops at those same sites for military defense of Guatemala against attack from Cuba or elsewhere. This would additionally reassure President Ydígoras that our shift of operations is only tactical and in no way a conscious move to disengage ourselves from him.

Recommendation

That a meeting be held in your office to discuss this matter and to formulate a Department position on the basis of which we may seek the necessary inter-agency approval for establishment of training and strike bases within the United States.²

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba July–December 1960. Secret. Drafted by Devine.

² No record has been found of what action, if any, was taken on this recommendation, but see Document 612.

611. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1126 Havana, November 16, 1960.

REF

Embassy despatch 1480, dated April 13, 1960²

SUBJECT

Communist Infiltration and Influence in Cuba Since April 1960

[Here follows a brief introduction, in which Braddock explains that the “removal of files, reduction in staff and the volume of reporting” made it difficult for the Embassy to prepare periodic reports on this subject.]

Summary

The communist position in Cuba has changed from April 1960 to November 1960 from one of influence and increasing infiltration to one of effective control. Cuban involvement in the international communist apparatus has reached the point of no return and is still increasing. The Castro regime is now believed to be so firmly committed to the communist camp that it could not extract itself even in the unlikely event that it might wish to do so.

Though Cuba is not a Soviet satellite in the traditional sense, it plays as active and as effective a role in Soviet plans for world conquest as any of the countries openly ruled by a communist party and directly controlled from the Kremlin (or from Peking). Though there is some question as to how completely and in what form the Castro regime falls within the Soviet discipline, the attitude, methods and objectives of Cuba’s leaders are such that Cuba must now be regarded as an extension in the Western Hemisphere of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

It appears, then, that, far from indicating that the Castro regime is an independent, nationalist force, the fact that his movement and revolution are not at once ostensibly communist is simply in keeping with the united front tactics outlined by the communists for use in Latin America. Their Guatemalan experience would seem to have taught them that, chameleon-like, they must skirt around the communist label, changing colors at will. They can pass through the initial phases of a power seizure much more easily in a vehicle provided by an extremist, nationalist group such as Castro’s than they can in a vehicle provided by the Communist Party itself. Yet they preserve their freedom of action.

Thus, the movement begins by advertising itself as nationalist. While playing on the theme of anti-Americanism and speaking much of economic progress, it gradually arrives at a virtual identification with the goals and ideology of the Communist Party. This step has now been reached in Cuba, as demonstrated at the recent Cuban Communist Party Congress where the Party almost totally identified itself with the Castro revolution. In the months ahead, ever closer cooperation and identification between the Castro regime and international communism are to be expected.

[Here follows the remainder of the 11-page despatch with the following sections: (1) Cuba’s leaders and International Communism, (2) Communist Infiltration and Influence in the Armed Forces, (3) Infiltration in Public Communications Media, (4) Infiltration in INRA, (5) Infiltration in Other Government Agencies, (6) Infiltration in Labor, (7) Infiltration in the University, (8) Cuban Communist Party and Front Groups, and (9) International Activities.]

Daniel M. Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.001/11–1660. Secret. Drafted by Wayne Smith, who was responsible for the political sections; Henry S. Hammond, labor section; Paul D. Bethel, psychological sections; Samuel G. Kail, Army section; and Fred D. Stevers, Air Force sections. Passed to Santiago de Cuba.

² Not printed. (ibid., 737.001/4–1360)

612. Editorial Note

Beginning in mid-November, the Special Group, or 5412 Committee, began to envision a different concept from that adopted in March for the training of Cuban exiles for the overthrow of the Castro regime.

According to Tracy Barnes of the Central Intelligence Agency, in testimony on April 22, 1961, before General Maxwell Taylor’s Board of Inquiry on Cuban Operations, the Special Group began weekly discussions the previous fall regarding a modification of the Cuban plans. Records of the Special Group indicate that on November 16, Under Secretary of State Merchant noted “the changing concept of the operation. By November 1960, it was recognized that guerrilla warfare operations in the Escambrays were not going well; we were having difficulty with air drops and some change in approach was needed.” Richard M. Bissell, Jr., of the Central Intelligence Agency, told the Board of Inquiry that “one of the problems at this time was the Department of State’s concern about tainting Guatemala and Nicaragua if the size was augmented.” He noted that the Central Intelligence Agency was asked to consider withdrawing the training operation from Guatemala and relocating it in the United States. Upon further consideration, “the use of a base in the continental U.S. was ruled out.” (Luis Aguilar, Operation ZAPATA: The “Ultrasensitive” Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1983), pages 58–59) A copy of the Board of Inquiry’s report is in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Bay of Pigs 1961.

613. Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, White House, Washington, November 29, 1960, 11 a.m.¹

Washington, November 29, 1960, 11 a.m.

PRESENT

Secretary Anderson, Secretary Gates, Secretary Dillon, Secretary Merchant, Secretary Douglas, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Richard Bissell, General Persons, General Goodpaster and Gordon Gray

The President opened the meeting by saying that he wished to talk about the situation in Cuba and particularly a visit he had had earlier in the day from Mr. William D. Pawley.² The President said that as everyone knew Mr. Pawley had had substantial interests in Central and South America over many years and was knowledgeable about the area. He said that Mr. Pawley had told him that he had divested himself of all his investments in the area and therefore had no financial interests which could benefit from his activities. He acknowledged that Mr. Pawley was a zealot but at the same time said that in the many years he had known Mr. Pawley he had not found him wrong in the various predictions and reports which Mr. Pawley had made to him.

The President said that Mr. Pawley was concerned about four things which the President wished to discuss in the meeting. (1) Mr. Pawley felt that the effort in training of the people in Guatemala was too slow and that at the present time we were really going backwards. He felt that the 500 now in training ought to be increased to at least 2,000. (2) While there had been success in getting rid of one of the Communists in the FRD there is still another remaining. Mr. Pawley however thinks Varona is a good citizen. He also made reference to a young member of the FRD who is going around various South American countries who he thinks is very good. However, he has a poor opinion of some of the other members of the FRD and repeated that he thought one was worse than Castro. (3) Mr. Pawley had heard some idea of moving out of Guatemala to Okinawa. Mr. Pawley took a dim view of this proposal and the President agreed on the ground that nothing could be kept secret in Okinawa. [3 lines not declassified] (4) Mr. Pawley knew that the President had a committee on Cuba but was concerned that they were a group of very busy people who could not devote the necessary time and continuity to the Cuba problem. Mr. Pawley thinks the committee should have a strong Executive and the President suspected Mr. Pawley himself would like this responsibility. In any event, the President wondered if Mr. Pawley was not right in feeling that there needed to be some one individual who would have the situation always at his finger tips and also could take an active part in talking with members of the FRD and perhaps with other governments.

The President expressed his unhappiness about the general situation. He said that it was strange that he used to think of Betancourt as a leftist and now he was beginning to look like a rightist in relation to the pro-Castro, pro-Communist attacks against him. Also, it was clear that Castro influences had been involved in the El Salvador situation. The President wondered whether the situation did not have the appearance of beginning to get out of hand.

He then quoted Mr. Pawley as saying that the young member of the FRD who went around to talk to various governments found that some, [less than 1 line not declassified] said that they would put money, men and equipment into the effort on a clandestine basis, whereas open activity of this sort through the OAS would not be possible.

The President then said he wished to ask two questions: (1) Are we being sufficiently imaginative and bold, subject to not letting our hand appear, and (2) are we doing the things we are doing, effectively.

The President adverted to the impending transfer of government responsibilities and said that we would not want to be in the position of turning over the government in the midst of a developing emergency.

Mr. Dulles responded that he did not always agree with Mr. Pawley. He said that the CIA had not wanted to use entirely a rightist group for our purposes and at times Mr. Pawley seemed to have a different view. Mr. Dulles pointed out that there had been at one time or another 184 different groups [3 lines not declassified]. The President asked how might we proceed to bring them all together and Mr. Dulles responded that this was impossible. The President then observed that he did not think we should be financing those we cannot get to work in harness. Mr. Dulles said we would find it necessary to continue to finance some [less than 1 line not declassified] notwithstanding.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that there were some 500 guerrilla trainees in Guatemala and a separate air force group which was very effective. He said that this was now a going operation [2½ lines not declassified]. As for the size of the effort it was felt that we could go up to 600 but above that there would be need for another facility.

Mr. Dulles said that his view was that we should not eliminate the operation in Guatemala but should stiffen the government of Guatemala. He suggested sending military trainees and also some planes. He said that it was clear to him that Ydigoras does not want us to leave Guatemala but the State Department has had a concern about staying there.

Mr. Dillon said the State concern was the operation was no longer secret but is known all over Latin America and has been discussed in U.N. circles. The President said that even if the operation were known, the main thing was not to let the U.S.’ hand show. As long as we pursued that course he was not too concerned.

He said that if we [less than 1 line not declassified] begin to replace them with recruits already available we could build up again to a battalion size.

Mr. Dillon then said that the State Department had begun to think along the same lines as Mr. Pawley, with respect to the number of men needed and that State felt perhaps we should have two or three thousand.

Mr. Gates interposed to ask whether we could now recognize a government in exile. In that event the problems of training would not be so great. The President did not feel this is now possible.

Mr. Bissell said that it had been concluded that we could not train in the U.S. with any hope of security and the President agreed. (This appears to be a Presidential decision which settles a question discussed several times in the 5412 group.)

Mr. Douglas said he wished to clear up one question. In the event that it became necessary to evacuate from Guatemala by reason of an OAS investigation or for some other purpose transportation would be a problem. His question was whether Defense could assume that it would not be called upon on a crash basis. Mr. Dulles replied that he had evacuation plans prepared.

Mr. Dillon then said he would like the opportunity to explain that we had not given up on the idea of some action in the OAS under the Rio Treaty. He said that we had been canvassing the ambassadors here in small groups and have talked with them all more than once. Our objective would be first to bring about an investigation of Cuba through an organ of consultation; second, there would be a report showing what Cuba is doing in seeking to export its revolution, the denial of liberties, etc., and third, a meeting of the foreign ministers in February or March in which it would be hoped that all would agree to:(1) break diplomatic relations and throw out the Cuban embassies, (2) shut off commercial relations thus permitting us to invoke Trading with the Enemy Act, (3) undertake some military action to seal off Cuba and the export of arms, (4) devise some method of controlling all Communist agents in addition to those of Castro. He said there were both encouraging and discouraging aspects. On the plus side, the Central American countries generally agree and the South American countries are less positively excited about it but demonstrate some readiness. On the minus side are three important factors: (1) the impending transfer of government responsibilities in this country. The leaders wish to make sure that the new government would not pull the rug out from such an effort. This means that there must be some effort to get the new administration effectively tuned in to the undertaking. (2) There is likewise a transition or a transfer of responsibilities yet to take place in Brazil. Therefore the Brazilian voice is not yet heard and it is not known what Quadros, who takes office January 1, will do. (3) In any event, there will be outright opposition from Mexico. Mr. Dillon said he knew of no other country which would be so opposed.

The President then said the big gap which we face involves a better public opinion in the Central and Latin American countries as to what is going on. Somehow we must encourage the governments to be more active in teaching their people about the problem.

Mr. Dillon said that our recently adopted economic programs were really a part of such an effort. He said that we now had a new approach in economic programs for Latin America and also through ICA programs which had been immensely stepped up.

The President said that he had a date with the President-elect on December 6.³ He knew that Mr. Dulles had briefed the President-elect on the covert planning.⁴ He intended to speak with Senator Kennedy and would hope that the response would be that he would follow the general line.

Mr. Dillon then said as far as Cuba today is concerned the regime is actually going bankrupt. The USSR has pulled back some on offers of aid. This in the view of the State Department explains the recent Castro suggestions about hoping for better relations with the new Kennedy Administration.⁵

Mr. Anderson pointed out that the fact of bankruptcy in Cuba would make it easier to get useful people to serve with expenditure of money. Also he said that he had heard a rumor, unconfirmed, that there is developing an epidemic of hoof and mouth disease which would enable us and indeed require us to look at the imports of food from Cuba. Mr. Dillon pointed out that we had done nothing about imports from Cuba except sugar.

The President said he wished to come back to the question of whether it would be useful to have an individual executive to pull the whole Cuban situation together who would know precisely at all times what State, CIA and the military were doing and who could answer questions directly should the President require them. He again wondered whether Mr. Pawley might be suitable for this undertaking.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

The President said that he does not share the State Department concern about “shooting from the hip” as he thinks that we should be prepared to take more chances and be more aggressive.

Mr. Dillon said that he thinks there is some point in Mr. Pawley’s view that the FRD may have been too far to the left and perhaps it should be broadened to include more conservatives.

The President then said that if the State Department has some sound person, he would like to have him find out from the governments what they will do. He said that Mr. Pawley plans to go himself notwithstanding.

Mr. Dillon then said that in the last month or two the State Department has become much more aggressive and is taking more chances. This was a reflection in the change of Assistant Secretaries for Latin America.

The President again came back to his feeling that we need someone who would go to see the FRD and the Latin American governments and who would keep in sufficient touch so that he would know what all are doing and keep all others informed.

[1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

The President then said that Argentina and Colombia and possibly Chile ought to be interested in the training effort. If the men can be gotten to those countries and trained there and then assemble at some point for a week in advance of their use, this would be a substantial contribution.

The President again came back to the question of an individual who could (1) deal with the FRD, (2) come into the President’s committee and deal with it as an equal as well as report to the President. (The President again said he liked Pawley for the job but knew that some felt that he was too impetuous.) (3) [2 lines not declassified] and, (4) pull things together. In other words, the President said he felt the need of a coordinating chief.

[1½ lines not declassified] Mr. Dillon said that he would prefer that the group discuss a name and report back to the President and the President approved this course.

The President then said that it was certainly all right to give trainers and ammunition and planes as required to Ydigoras and to beef him up in any way we could and this might even be done overtly.

[1½ lines not declassified] Also, he wanted a careful check on what the various countries would do and would want done.

Gordon Gray

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Records, 1960 Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 1290.

² The President met with Pawley from 9 to 9:48 a.m. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Appointment Book)

³ Eisenhower met President-elect Kennedy in his office at the White House at 9:04 a.m. The two talked until the President’s next appointment at 10:44 a.m. (ibid.) Regarding their discussion, see Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1981), pp. 379–383.

⁴ Regarding President-elect Kennedy’s briefing at Palm Beach in late November by Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, see Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), pp. 68–69.

⁵ See Document 622.

614. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 29, 1960¹

Washington, November 29, 1960

SUBJECT

Activities Against the Castro Regime in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona, Coordinator of the Cuban Opposition Group

“Frente Revolucionario Democratico” (FRD)

Edwin E. Vallon, ARA/CMA

Robert A. Stevenson, ARA/CMA

Robert A. Hurwitch, ARA/CMA

Frank J. Devine, ARA

At his request, Dr. Varona was received in the Department for an exchange of views on the Cuban situation. Although Mr. Coerr had been scheduled to receive him, illness prevented this and Messrs. Vallon, Stevenson, Hurwitch and Devine met instead with Dr. de Varona for two hours and twenty minutes.

Dr. de Varona mentioned that he had originally requested to see the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Mann. While recognizing that many factors might make this impossible he evidenced some unhappiness over the fact that other—and by implication, lesser—opposition leaders had been able to see Mr. Mann. When asked whom he had in mind, Dr. de Varona paused a moment and then cited Aureliano Sanchez Arango. Mr. Devine immediately responded that Sanchez Arango had requested an appointment with Mr. Mann but had never actually seen him. This appeared very considerably to mollify Dr. de Varona. In the course of the lengthy conversation which ensued, the following are the salient points which were made.

1. Damage to U.S. Prestige:

Dr. de Varona emphasized the fact that Castro was greatly damaging United States prestige throughout Latin America and the rest of the world. Other nations in this Hemisphere and in Europe found it impossible to understand how and why the United States was taking such a kicking around from so small a country on its very doorstep and particularly so when the advantages afforded to the Sino-Soviet bloc were so obvious and so great. According to Dr. de Varona the answer to this lay in prompt and effective United States action.

2. Anti-Castro Propaganda:

Dr. de Varona emphasized the volume of pro-Castro and anti-United States propaganda being disseminated throughout Latin America by our enemies. He said that the FRD was doing what it could in the way of pamphlets and other propaganda output but with additional funds could do much more. He said that much more was needed and the United States Government should greatly multiply its own output.

3. Visa Problems:

Dr. de Varona said that Cuban refugees arriving in this country were most reluctant to issue strong denunciatory blasts against the Castro regime so long as their immediate families remained in Cuba. For this reason, it was frequently of great operational interest to expedite visas for family members, however it was usually very difficult if not impossible to arrange such matters. The standard answer received was that another office, another department, or another agency of the United States Government had jurisdiction.

4. Official Surveillance and Restrictions on Plane Plights from Florida:

Dr. de Varona complained that law enforcement by various authorities in the Florida area was much more strict and severe than in the days when Castro forces were operating out of the area against Batista. He termed flying planes out of Florida difficult, if not impossible; he strongly urged that the mutual interests of the FRD and United States Government militated in favor of a degree of tolerance, flexibility and “looking the other way”. Without this, operations of the FRD were very materially hampered. Here again, however, said Dr. de Varona, he and his associates were given to understand that differing government agencies were involved, thereby complicating the problem of enforcement, or more accurately, nonenforcement.

5. Financial Contributions by United States Business Firms:

The present situation in this regard is very unsatisfactory. Dr. de Varona and his associates speak with many business firms in the United States, particularly in the New York area, and find them relatively receptive to the idea of contributing to the FRD’s cause. On checking back a few days later, however, it is usually found that the attitudes of the companies have changed and that they are no longer sympathetically disposed to make contributions. It is understood that their change of attitudes usually responds to advice received from some government agency or department in Washington to the effect that their legal rights and/or position would be adversely affected by virtue of any contributions they might make. Dr. de Varona emphasized that he was not speaking of any question of tax exemption or deductibility but rather the companies in question were given some cause for alarm with respect to legal or criminal liabilities which they might incur. According to de Varona, the companies apparently are afraid of violating United States neutrality laws. He said that he was not aware from whence this advice emanated in Washington but that it was most unhelpful.

6. U.S. Press Treatment of the Cuban Problem:

Anti-Castro propaganda labors under an enormous handicap in that the U.S. press, whether sympathetic to Castro or not, accords him headline treatment. Any action by Castro and his group is front paged. In contrast, anti-Castro action by the FRD or others is either ignored or buried far back in the newspaper. Dr. de Varona expressed his bewilderment at this attitude on the part of the U.S. press and wished something could be done about it.

7. The U.S. Bureaucracy:

The fragmentation of authorities and responsibilities among many departments and agencies in the United States Government is bewildering and alarming. As indicated in the foregoing items, it causes great confusion and lack of direction. Many important questions arising in the course of anti-Castro operations must always be referred to one department or another with consequent loss of time and initiative. If the United States in fact recognizes the serious threat posed to it by the Castro regime in Cuba, there is an imperative necessity for the coordination of its various agencies and for them to speak with one voice and for a single purpose.

8. The U.S. Policy of Non-Intervention:

Dr. de Varona expressed great impatience with U.S. policy of nonintervention. He explained heatedly that the USSR was already, in fact, intervening in Cuba. If the United States planned to wage a careful democracy-type war and preserve all the niceties in its struggle in the face of this threat, it stood a good chance of losing. The Soviet Union and its Communist Party have one of the world’s most practical instruments in the form of the communist international movement responsive in every country to its bidding. In like fashion, the Castro regime in Cuba now has its own “international” operating in practically every country in Latin America. There is a great need at the present time for the United States as the leader and defender of Western democracy to establish its own “international” in other countries, i.e., to create and support indigenous forces responsive to its bidding and prepared to work as actively in support of democracy as the communist parties everywhere are in support of communism. He cited as an example of activities which should be encouraged and expanded the Institute of Political Education established by Figueres on October 3, 1960.

9. Prospects for Effective Action Through the OAS:

Dr. de Varona called attention to his several-page memorandum² recently delivered to the OAS and setting forth important aspects of the Cuban problem. He admitted that the OAS could not become officially seized of such a memorandum unless or until it has been officially sponsored by a member state. He expressed optimism, however, that the Guatemalan representative on the Council of the OAS would in his own presentation make reference to the FRD memo in such a way as to incorporate the latter in the official record of the OAS. Dr. de Varona noted that in his memorandum he had called attention to the necessity of the OAS to face up to its responsibilities and undertake effective action in the Cuban case or, alternatively, to risk failure and disappearance from the scene. He went on to express considerable pessimism with regard to prospects for effective OAS action. He said that for him the San Jose Conference had been a failure and that the general role and accomplishments of the OAS dealing with problems such as the Cuban one were very slight. He noted reports that the United States anticipated the need for another meeting of Foreign Ministers, but he discounted rather seriously the prospects of winning the necessary votes and degree of support from the Latin American members of the OAS. For the United States to pin its course of action and its hopes upon the development of Latin American support in the OAS would be a forlorn hope and a serious mistake. He predicted that Paraguay, Guatemala, and Nicaragua would easily and automatically support the United States. He doubted that Mexico ever would and added that Uruguay would also find it hard to go along. Without breaking down the other countries of the hemisphere, Dr. de Varona expressed great pessimism that the required degree of support would ever be forthcoming.

10. The Cuban Refugee Problem in Miami:

This has assumed serious proportions and merits official attention by the United States Government. Although a committee has currently been named, it has not as yet done very much by way of caring for the refugees. Many of the latter arrive without clothing, personal effects or funds. On humanitarian grounds they must be taken care of and the FRD frequently “stakes them”. This represents a drain on its funds, however, and it should be borne in mind that if other resources were made available to care for the refugees it would help to ease the drain on FRD funds and allow them to be used in more productive ways.

11. Transshipment of U.S. Goods Through Canada:

Official approaches should be made to the Canadian authorities in order to elicit their cooperation in preventing the circumvention of United States export controls over exports to Cuba.

12. Livestock Exports to Cuba:

Under the export control exception provided for medicines and unsubsidized foodstuffs, quantities of livestock are being exported from the United States to Cuba. This is a perversion of the intent of the loophole and something should be done about it. (Note: We did hear recently, for example, that high-grade cattle and hogs were being imported by the Cubans for breeding purposes.) Dr. de Varona also urged full U.S. embargo of Cuban products.

13. Estimate of Fidel Castro’s Popular Support:

Fidel Castro today has 25 to 30% of the Cuban people supporting him. Unfortunately, this includes the most combative type. Although some 70% of the population is probably opposed to him, it is not the fighting type. Of the 70% probably only 15 to 20% would be disposed to fight against Castro. This is because the opposition to him includes landlords, businessmen, dispossessed property owners, monied types of individuals, and professional men, none of whom consider themselves direct action individuals. (At the same time, Dr. de Varona commented that any recruiting for the fight against Castro should recognize that less than full military standards of physical health, age and fitness should be required.) In contrast, the 25 to 30% of the population which strongly supports him includes workers, peasants, and their sons, all of whom are quite prepared to go out and do battle.

14. Strength of Castro’s Armed Forces:

With regard to the militia, Dr. de Varona talked in terms of a strength of some 100,000 but said that many militia members joined up only under pressure and duress and were neither very willing nor trained to fight. Although they are becoming copiously supplied with Soviet and Czech weapons, they are still not in a position to use them. They lack the training to handle and effectively utilize the modern weapons of foreign origin placed at their disposition. The great danger is that given two to three months or more in which to become trained, they may greatly increase their effectiveness as a fighting force. Once they have mastered the tanks, cannon, and modern weapons now being furnished them in quantities, it will be a vastly more difficult problem to reduce them militarily. With each passing month the militia increases in size and increases its degree of preparation. While the opposition may recruit a modest number of additional personnel each month, the GOC is in a position to press into service a thousand or more in the same period. This is a very uneven struggle with only one end in sight. Furthermore, progressive introduction of Soviet or Czech military technicians or instructors may well stiffen the militia’s willingness to fight, perhaps by placing a gun at its back.

15. Clandestine Operations in Cuba:

These are now more difficult than ever before. In earlier times, when forced out of Cuba, Dr. de Varona has been able to continue to receive cash remittances from his going business within that country. The same has been true of other oppositionists active in exile. Today, Castro has made anything of this sort quite impossible. Even the recently promulgated urban reform law has contributed to the difficulty of clandestine operations. In days gone by, Dr. de Varona and other opposition figures have been able to move about relatively freely and securely within Habana. On one occasion, for example, he maintained four separate rented premises and constantly shifted among them. In this way, he managed to elude the vigilance of Cuban authorities and at the end of each month or two would trade off all four premises in favor of new ones. Today this is obviously impossible and the totalitarian controls over properties and dwelling places through the urban reform law has given to the GOC a very effective control and knowledge with respect to the numbers and identities of persons living at each particular address. This and other factors vastly complicate the conduct of clandestine operations within Castro’s Cuba.

16. FRD Representation:

The FRD today has representatives in various cities of the United States and also in all Latin American countries except Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia.

17. Other Opposition Figures and Organizations:

With respect to other members of the forces working against Castro, Dr. de Varona either volunteered or responded to inquiries with the following information:

a. Aureliano Sanchez Arango: This man is a volatile and disturbing influence who always wishes to be the undisputed leader of any enterprise in which he participates. Although he and Dr. de Varona had been quarreling for many years, Sanchez Arango had been welcomed into the FRD. He claimed control of certain assets within Cuba and also his name carries with it a certain prestige. Within the FRD, however, he had been a most unstable element and a poor team player. As a result, he had recently broken with the FRD and was now going it alone. In the Miami area he is now publishing a weekly news organ which, like Batista elements, devotes some 80% of its energy to attacking Varona and the FRD and only about 20% to attacking Castro.

b. Luis Conte Aguero: This man was a radio announcer and commentator in Cuba. He enjoys a certain following in the sense of a radio audience. Criticism of the Castro regime finally forced him to leave Cuba and he aspires to a leading role in the opposition group known as the Alianza. Actually, he overrates himself and his following very considerably and should be viewed in proper perspective as just a radio voice.

c. Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz: He is a young man, somewhat impetuous, who is now working with us.

d. Manolo Ray: This man has been active in the underground and was formerly Minister of Public Works under the Castro regime. It took him one and one-half years to see Castro for what he is and to break with his regime. To some extent, this disqualifies him as a suitable, overall leader for the opposition to Castro. Dr. de Varona has spoken with him by phone and Ray and he will probably meet sometime during the present week in Miami.

e. Andres Vargas Gomez: This is a young man of good family and personal reputation but he represents no one within Cuba. The family and friends on behalf of whom he might speak would not add up even to forty persons. (He felt some progress had been made toward unifying a great number of the anti-Castro groups.)

f. A.R.E.C.: This organization is made up of rich Cuban businessmen and property owners. To date it has given no financial help whatsoever to the Frente. It holds meetings and endeavors to get opposition leaders to endorse its position with regard to the economic reconstruction of Cuba but so far is like “those little palm trees that neither give fruit nor shade.” Any help from AREC would be appreciated, but Dr. de Varona made it clear that he does not expect any.

18. Anti-Castro Operations in the Sierra Escambray:

There are approximately 600 oppositionists now fighting Castro forces in the Sierra Escambray mountains of Cuba. Morale is good. Only about 300 of these are adequately armed and equipped. It is very hard to supply them. Some airdrops have been arranged but the planes encounter so much difficulty that this means of delivery is very uncertain and unpredictable. Delivery from boats is considerably more dependable but has to be effected on the southern coast of Cuba because Castro has militia groups strung out every 6–7 kilometers on the north coast. This means that the boats must go all the way around the island in order to reach the delivery zone. Lack of Mexican cooperation renders it impracticable to think in terms of sending the boats from Mexico. The Castro Government has some 8000 men stationed around the area, with small groups every few kilometers. No useful purpose is served in sending more fighting men into the Sierra Escambray unless or until arrangements can be worked out for supplying them with food, arms, ammunition and necessary equipment. This is the limiting factor; otherwise the group could be quickly expanded.

19. Military Action Timetable:

It is essential that the opposition forces mount their attack against Cuba at the earliest possible moment. Every hour counts in reaching the decisions necessary to this end. Military action should be undertaken within the next two months. Time is running against us and it is an illusion to believe that economic hardship will ever by itself achieve the objective which is sought. It is impractical to talk in terms of mounting an invasion to take the Isle of Pines which is now defended by 2500 Castro fighting men. After seizing the Island, presumably at a heavy cost, the invading forces would still be faced with the major task of launching still another invasion against the mainland of Cuba. It would conserve effort and manpower and be far more sensible to direct the initial effort against the main island itself. A force of 2 to 3 thousand men should be put ashore in Cuba, should take control of an area, consolidate their hold over it, and declare themselves the new government of Cuba. The existence of such a controlled area, in the nature of a safehaven, would ipso facto encourage large-scale defections of Castro’s forces by giving the potential defectors some place to go. Significant numbers of Cubans would respond in this way. It would then be incumbent upon the United States to recognize the newly established government and actively and effectively to support it.

20. U.S. Military Intervention:

Near the end of the conversation, Dr. de Varona admitted his own belief that U.S. military intervention in Cuba would eventually prove inevitable and indispensable. When asked if he contemplated by this the actual dispatch of United States troops or just equipment he responded that he meant both. He pointed out that the Soviet Union was placing significant numbers of tanks at the disposal of the Castro forces and asked rhetorically “where would we get tanks?” He repeated his personal conviction that Castro will be overthrown only by a major military effort and that armed intervention by the United States with men and equipment would prove unavoidable.

21. In concluding his remarks, Dr. de Varona emphasized the community of interest shared by Cuban opposition forces and the United States in any anti-Castro effort. The oppositionists, he said, were fighting for Cuba, while the United States would be fighting for its own position and prestige. He called attention to the example being set by Castro with respect to private U.S. investment in Latin American countries. If other countries in the area saw Castro get away Scot-free with seizure of hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. property, the temptation to follow suit would be irresistible. This as well as all the other factors attendant upon the Cuban case militated strongly in favor of prompt decisive action by the United States.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11–2960. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Devine.

² Not found.

615. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, December 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuba

Following the meeting on Cuba in your office on November 29,² there has been discussion in the 5412 Group concerning methods of better organizing this Government’s total program with respect to Cuba.

It was the decision of the Group that our overt and covert actions must be completely geared into each other. The Group’s further conclusion was that it would be impracticable to focus in one individual the responsibility for both programs but that a senior official in the State Department and a senior officer in CIA should devote their full time to the matter, working together in the closest intimacy. In line with established practice, it would be the State Department official who would coordinate the covert activities with our overt position and who would be directly responsible for conveying policy guidance to the Agency officer responsible for the actual conduct of the covert operations. [1 sentence (1½ lines) not declassified]

If you approve, I will name Ambassador Whiting Willauer as a special deputy to Assistant Secretary Mann to fill this position in the Department, recalling him immediately from Costa Rica. Similarly, Mr. Allen Dulles, with your approval, will name Mr. Tracy Barnes as the officer in the Agency to devote full time to the direction of the Agency’s program with respect to Cuba and to concert with Ambassador Willauer.

The 5412 Group further decided to recommend to you that this group composed of Messrs. Dulles, Gray, Douglas and Merchant should continue and intensify its general supervision of the covert operation and provide the Agency with general guidance in the operation. The Group will maintain close and regular liaison with Secretary Anderson of Treasury, or his designated representative, who will be invited to attend meetings of the Group when matters of important policy are under consideration. The Group further considered that it should meet, together with the members’ individual principals, with you from time to time as it deemed necessary or as you desired.

The Group was also of the opinion that it would be extremely useful to request Mr. Pawley as an immediate mission to call on President Frondizi in a private capacity (though of course every facility would be provided him by the Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified]) to ascertain in detail the latter’s attitude with respect to the present situation in Cuba and the extent to which he might be prepared to contribute to its solution.

Both Mr. Dulles and myself would be happy to inform you in greater detail concerning the qualifications of Ambassador Willauer and Mr. Barnes as well as the reasons for recommending the form of dual organization described above, should you so desire. In the meantime, I enclose brief biographic sketches of them.³

Douglas Dillon

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret. No drafting or clearance information is given on the source text.

² See Document 613.

³ Not printed.

616. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1268 Havana, December 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

Country Team Recommendation on Policy re Cuba (Subject to approval by Ambassador Bonsal, who is absent on consultation in the United States)

Summary

The United States faces in Soviet-supported Castro’s Cuba an intolerable threat to its prestige and its security which has to be eliminated. (1) Conciliation will not remove this threat; the Cuban Government has amply demonstrated its unrelenting hostility to the United States and its refusal to negotiate save on its own unacceptable terms. (2) Time will not cure the problem. Cuba’s economy will be subjected to severe strains as a result of internal pressures, the decrease or discontinuation of U.S. sugar purchases, and the U.S. embargo on exports to Cuba, but early economic collapse cannot be assumed. The enormous strengthening of Cuba’s military power with Soviet bloc assistance, the extension of Government control over all aspects of the economic and social structure, the massive and skillful use of propaganda, and the drastic suppression of individual liberties and perfecting of the repressive apparatus combine to make an overthrow of the Government by the counter-revolutionary opposition all but impossible without outside assistance. (3) Strong corrective measures are necessary if the Soviet-Castro threat in Cuba is to be eliminated. These should be taken by the United States with the participation or approval of its Latin American and NATO allies, if such can be obtained, and if not, by the United States alone, and should include: (a) tightening of economic sanctions; (b) massive increase of democratic propaganda; (c) strengthening and encouragement of the Cuban opposition; (d) termination of diplomatic relations with Cuba; and finally, if necessary, to achieve the objective, (e) interdiction of Sino-Soviet assistance.

The Situation

The United States is confronted in Cuba with a hostile government, violently anti-American, which has confiscated without payment the bulk of U.S. property in Cuba and seems intent on destroying all ties, economic, political and military with the United States. Economically, the Cuban Government is in the course of imposing upon Cuba state ownership, over-all economic planning on the communist pattern, collectivization of agriculture, and state monopoly of foreign trade. Politically, it is imposing a totalitarian police state on the communist model, without constitutional safeguards or democratic freedoms. Militarily, the Cuban Government is creating, and with Sino-Soviet assistance is training and equipping and indoctrinating with communist ideology a nation-wide people’s militia of considerable size. In sum the Castro regime represents the negation of many spiritual and cultural values associated with the Christian democratic civilization of the Western world.

The Castro Government, in addition to being totalitarian, Marxist and anti-American, is constantly placing Cuba more securely within the Sino-Soviet economic, political and military system and under the influence of international communism, both with respect to its external and internal policies. Under Castro, Cuba has become the newest communist satellite. As such it is a bridgehead for communist penetration of the Western Hemisphere. Already Castro propaganda incites class hatred and revolution, Castro agents encourage and finance subversion, and Castro funds and arms are available to finance and equip armed rebellion, throughout Latin America.

The Cuban opposition to Castro, which at first was composed mainly of pro-Batista elements repudiated by the Cuban people, has come to include most of the non-communist former revolutionary collaborators of Castro, who have broken with him on the issues of violation of human rights, betrayal of social reform, and prostitution of Cuban interests to those of international communism. Few key posts in the Castro regime are held by persons who are not communist or pro-communist.

For the most part the opposition, who are divided into many groups, refuse to work together, to unite under a single leader or to accept the discipline and organization essential for effective action. There is however a loosely organized main opposition group concentrated in the United States in the Miami area. It maintains contacts with an underground that extends throughout Cuba and includes armed bands operating in the mountains, principally in the Escambray in Central Cuba. The potential opposition to Castro is enormous, however, and takes in probably well over one-half of the population of Cuba.

Relations between the United States and Cuban Government have deteriorated at a more rapid rate in recent months. The Cuban Government seized the oil companies, and the United States shortly thereafter reduced the Cuban sugar quota. The U.S.-owned sugar companies, oil companies and utilities were confiscated, and the U.S.-owned banks were nationalized. The U.S. embargoed exports to Cuba, and Cuba answered with the confiscation of most of the remaining American-owned enterprises. U.S. citizens have been arbitrarily detained, and diplomatic immunities violated. American citizens apprehended with predominantly Cuban invasion groups were executed while Cubans convicted of the same offense were imprisoned.

The Castro Government has long been attacking the United States viciously in every possible manner and in every country, forum and institution to which it has access. It has accused the United States of planning an invasion of Cuba. It is continually endeavoring to provoke the United States into some act of self-defense which can be trumpeted as an aggression.

Three Possible Courses of Action

In the face of this situation, the U.S. Government appears to be confronted with a choice between three principal possible courses of action:

1. Attempt to reach with the Cuban Government a negotiated settlement acceptable to the United States.

2. Maintain the existing posture of U.S.-Cuban relations on the assumption that time and the Cuban opposition will bring about a change in the policies of the Cuban Government, or a different Cuban Government, without need for further corrective action by the United States.

3. Take further measures, preferably with the cooperation of our allies but if necessary alone, to bring about or hasten the replacement of the Cuban Government.

1. Negotiate

The Cuban Government has tried before, and now with the approaching advent of a new administration in the U.S. is trying again, to give the impression publicly that it is prepared to negotiate with the United States with an open agenda and on the basis of equality and mutual respect. The unremitting violence of its propaganda attacks upon the United States, its high-handed confiscation of more than one billion dollars’ worth of American investments in Cuba, and its intransigence in laying down impossible conditions in the few instances where it appeared that there might be a chance for negotiation, demonstrate amply that Cuba’s present leaders have no real interest in negotiating their differences with the United States. The President of Cuba reportedly indicated recently to the New York Times correspondent in Habana that Cuba’s price for negotiation is the elimination of U.S. economic boycotts and embargoes, U.S. endorsement of the Castro Government, cessation of so-called U.S. hostile propaganda, and a U.S. guarantee against military attack, even by Cuban exiles. As a prior condition for negotiations these terms are believed completely unacceptable to the United States. On the other hand it is no less clear that any negotiated settlement that would be acceptable to the United States would require such fundamental changes in the attitudes of the Cuban leaders toward the United States and the Sino-Soviet bloc and in the direction followed by the Cuban Revolution to date that it must be regarded as completely unrealistic to hope for.

Any indication of readiness on the part of the United States to negotiate outstanding differences with Cuba in the absence of fundamental changes in the attitude of the Revolutionary Government would be interpreted by friends and enemies of the United States alike as weakness and would discourage the spirit of resistance among the Cuban opposition elements in Cuba and abroad. The question is also raised whether in the absence of a radical ideological change by the Cuban Government public opinion in the United States would support a conciliatory gesture toward Cuba after all the injury and abuse Cuba has heaped on the United States.

2. Continue Present Posture

Continuation of our present posture might be the best course to pursue if we could believe that normal political, economic and social forces growing out of the Cuban Revolution itself, together with existing U.S. economic sanctions and pressure from the opposition would within a reasonable time bring about a change in the Cuban Government without need for further strong measures by us. But the Country Team does not believe this.

For more than 18 months after Fidel Castro came to power the United States followed a course of patience and forbearance toward Cuba in the face of extreme provocations. This policy achieved one important result: it won the confidence of most Latin American countries, as well as other countries whose opinion we respect, in the good intentions of the United States, and gave them time in which to see the Castro regime in its true colors. As a result the United States has been able to take three sharp measures against Cuba (reduction of Cuban sugar quota, embargo of exports to Cuba, and the Guatemala–Nicaragua sea patrol) without incurring any appreciable criticism from Latin American or other friendly governments.

The Castro Government is steadily extending its control, however, over all elements of the national life, rapidly building up its military strength with Soviet bloc assistance and perfecting its repressive apparatus. A massive, skillful, anti-American and pro-communist propaganda drive is in full progress which is already having its effect on the ignorant masses and is bound to do so on the rising generation. Although for a relatively short time the opposition to Castro is expected to grow in numbers, thereafter unless it receives encouragement and substantial assistance from outside, its task will become insuperable.

The United States export embargo is creating difficulties for the Cuban economy. The extent to which it, and discontinuation of U.S. sugar purchases from Cuba, will weaken Castro will depend upon the success of Cuban efforts to obtain alternative sources of supply and markets and Sino-Soviet bloc economic assistance. Up to now these efforts appear to have been at least partially successful. While the full effects of the U.S. actions have yet to be felt, over the long term Cuba will probably be able to adjust to the situation created. Other economic difficulties growing directly out of the acts of the Revolutionary Government, including the extravagant spending programs, especially for arms, the dispersal and loss of managerial and technical personnel, the lack of development capital, monetary inflation, and mounting dissatisfaction of the working classes will contribute toward putting a considerable strain on the regime. The Country Team believes, however, that the total effect of these difficulties and strains will not be great enough to bring down the Castro regime, if the regime continues to receive strong Sino-Soviet support.

3. Take Additional Strong Corrective Measures

The adoption of such additional corrective measure as may be necessary to eliminate the Castro communist threat is believed to be justifiable on the ground of self-defense. It is hoped that our vital national security interests could be protected without violating our international commitments. Since the Castro regime is also a threat to the other American states and the inter-American system, the United States should have the support of Latin America and if possible its cooperation in the measures taken. To this end an invocation of inter-American machinery, including a further Foreign Ministers’ meeting, should be undertaken. Consultation should invariably precede any action in which we are likely to want Latin American cooperation or approval. The Cuban situation is also a threat to the defense alliance of the North Atlantic powers, and should be brought to the attention of the North Atlantic Council.

The Country Team believes that the following courses of action, a) to d), must be undertaken by the U.S., with the active participation of our allies if it can be obtained, and by ourselves, preferably with their consent, if they cannot be persuaded to participate actively.

a).

Tightening of economic sanctions

Economic, commercial and financial controls similar to those applied to Communist China should be applied to Cuba and on similar legal and political grounds. The object would be to isolate Cuba from U.S. sources of supply and markets, and so far as practicable from those in countries in alliance with the United States. The support of the other American states would be important but their direct participation in such economic sanctions would not be essential. It should be sought, however, as a prerequisite to securing the active cooperation of the NATO nations, at least in imposing export restrictions on strategic items, which would seem to be essential if our export controls were to be effective.

b).

Strengthening of the Cuban opposition

It is particularly important to strengthen and support the Cuban opposition, since they would have to carry the main burden of the action. Since organization of Cuban invasion forces on U.S. territory is unlawful, the United States should concentrate upon supporting responsible resistance elements in Cuba. If it approves their program and leadership, it should give them encouragement, assist them in organizing and obtaining the arms they need, and be ready to recognize them and provide direct and increasing support in the event of an uprising and their seizure of the Cuban Government or control of substantial parts of Cuban territory.

The Cuban opposition must constitute an acceptable alternative for the Cuban people. Cubans who were associated with the brutality and corruption of the Batista regime have been repudiated in Cuba, and Cubans prominently identified with the corrupt though elected governments before Batista also have little popular appeal. The strongest elements in the Cuban opposition, so far as their appeal in Cuba is concerned, consist of Cubans who support the broad social and economic objectives of the Cuban Revolution, but who are opposed to Castro because of their devotion to democracy, constitutionality and individual rights and their resistance to communism. U.S. representatives should devote their attention to encouraging united action under the leadership of such Cubans.

Among the opposition will be found individuals who have occupied top positions in the Castro Government, including several cabinet positions. A provisional opposition government composed of such individuals would have a palpable claim to recognition by the U.S. and other American states, particularly if they were able to extend their control beginning with the Escambray to a substantial portion of Cuban territory. An assessment of the opposition movement is being made in a separate despatch.²

c).

Increase of U.S. propaganda

Much of the success of the Revolutionary Government today is due to its massive effort and skill in the psychological field, which must be matched and surpassed.

Most of the Cuban people have no access to the facts about developments either in Cuba or the world around them or about U.S. policy. The Cuban press, radio and television have become propaganda instruments of the Castro Government, and they are being used with telling effects.

The U.S. Government must marshall its own forces and also make use of the capabilities of the Cuban oppositionists, to get the facts to the Cuban people, to Latin America, and to the world at large. It must seize the propaganda initiative from the Cuban Government and the international communist movement and must put the Castro regime on the defensive.

Shortwave radio reaches a limited and unrepresentative audience in Cuba. Longwave radio reaches into over a million Cuban homes. The VOA should be beamed into Cuba from enough transmitters on surrounding land or sea so that jamming could not stifle it. The VOA should carry the facts—they have sufficient propaganda impact—without need for embellishment or exaggeration. The VOA would be listened to and believed. The possibility of jamming by the Castro Government of U.S. stations and anti-American broadcasts should not deter us from this course.

We must develop and utilize other means of getting the truth across, including air drops.

d).

Rupture of diplomatic relations

Sufficiently vigorous measures under a) to c) to be effective could not be undertaken as long as the U.S. maintains diplomatic relations with Castro. They must therefore be severed at the moment most advantageous for our purposes. Rupture of relations should preferably be the result of an inter-American resolution, and in any event should be coordinated with friendly Latin American countries disposed to take similar action.

Some of the main advantages of a break would be lost if this move were initiated by Cuba and not by the United States or the American states. Relations could also be justifiably broken on the ground that the Cuban Government is not representative of the Cuban people but is the agent of a foreign power. Severance of relations would stimulate and hearten the Cuban opposition. It would give the United States much more freedom to undertake actions which may be necessary to get rid of the Castro Government.

The subject of breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba is examined more closely in a separate despatch.³

e).

Interdiction of Sino-Soviet assistance

If other measures were not effective in bringing about a change in the Cuban Government, the United States might have to consider intensive economic warfare including para-military measures against Cuba. Particularly if there should be an uprising in Cuba, and if opposition groups should consolidate and extend their centers of armed resistance, it would be important to deny by these means to the Castro Government the assistance it might otherwise receive from the Soviet bloc. This would be an extreme measure creating the risk of war with the Soviet Union. It would be a calculated risk based on an evaluation of the security interests of the United States and Soviet commitments and objectives in Cuba. It should not be undertaken without full prior consultation with our Latin American and NATO allies, and probably not without their cooperation or assent.

Timing

The Country Team believes that the recommendations contained in this paper should be given immediate consideration.

Daniel M. Braddock
Chargé Affaires ad interim

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/12–560. Secret. The drafter is not indicated, but presumably was Braddock. Cleared with Gilmore, Wellman, Paul D. Bethel, (less than 1 line not declassified) and in draft with the Navy, Air, Army, and Agriculture Attachés. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.

² Infra.

³ Document 623.

617. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1280 Havana, December 6, 1960.

REF

Embdesps 1268, December 5, 1960; 707, September 26, 1960; Dept. Instruction CA–2641, September 20, 1960²

SUBJECT

Analysis of the Opposition Movement to the Castro Regime

General

During the past three months the popular support of the Castro regime has dropped markedly. There are no precise figures by which to measure public opinion. However, there appears to be a consensus that Castro’s dedicated support stands somewhere between 15 and 25 percent. The remaining 75 to 85 percent is divided between a firm opposition of about 35 percent and a wavering bloc of some 40 to 50 percent. The trend is for this undecided mass to become increasingly disillusioned with the regime and gradually to shift towards the ranks of the opposition.

Castro is offsetting the loss in popular support with increased indoctrination and strengthening of his military and para-military organizations. The element of coercion is another significant factor which he is employing. This has been subtly and effectively developed, based largely on fear of arrest and of loss of employment.

The decline in public support has recently brought with it the first significant outbreaks of armed opposition to the regime. These have been for the most part spontaneous, isolated actions with poor leadership and insufficient organization and material support. Castro has been able to give the appearance of dealing effectively with them and to gain psychological advantage, at least momentarily, from his successes.

There should be no illusions about what is required to undermine and defeat the Castro regime. The opposition among the population at large needs to increase in extent and intensity. There must be greater cohesiveness, organization and planning among the opposition groups. As the recent successes of the Government have demonstrated, the opposition before it launches a military undertaking must first count with sound leadership, adequate communications and ample material support. None of the basic conditions appears to have been achieved as yet. Until they are, there is little prospect for the overthrow of Castro. The longer it takes to establish them, the more difficult will be the task.

In the succeeding pages an effort is made first to set forth the factors explaining the decline in the popularity of Castro. A second section discusses the principal opposition groups which have been formed. A third section describes the “fronts” established by the armed opposition in terms of location, leadership, relative strength and orientation. In the concluding section an attempt is made to evaluate the opposition movement, and to indicate what is needed to convert it into an effective force capable of overthrowing the Castro regime.

Factors in Rise of Public Opposition to the Castro Regime

The decline in the unprecedented popularity of the Castro regime began as soon as he assumed power. The execution of close to 600 alleged “war criminals” during the first three months of his government earned the enmity of their families and raised the first big doubt in the minds of many Cubans regarding the nature of the regime. From the outset he also created deep resentment among members of the military establishment of Batista who were dismissed and stigmatized, making it difficult for them to find employment elsewhere. The same holds true of many officials in the civil government who have been dismissed in a succession of reductions in force and purges.

The political, economic and social policies followed by the government since then have progressively alienated the upper and middle classes and have now reached the mass of urban and rural workers.

The Upper Class. The upper class for the most part stood aloof from the revolutionary struggle against Batista. Engulfed in their profitable business ventures, comfortable living and pleasure-seeking, they generally ignored the pressures building up. They looked for stability and found it in Batista. They were instinctively distrustful of the crusading social and economic reforms of the Sierra Maestra, although not entirely unresponsive to the romanticism of the rebel movement. When it became evident that Batista was through, many members of this class, without much conviction, joined the pro-Castro tide. However, what little confidence and emotional attachment they may have had for the Revolution was quickly dissipated by Castro’s verbal assault on them as a class and the succeeding agrarian and urban reforms and nationalizations of business enterprises, which drastically reduced property holdings and sources of income. A considerable portion of this class, having interests abroad, have now left Cuba. Among those who remain only a few appear to be actively working with the opposition.

The Middle Class. The middle class is the sector which more than any other contributed morally and materially to the undermining of the Batista regime, enabling Castro to sweep into power. As a class it was emotionally and intellectually dedicated to the proposition that Batista had to be overthrown in order to return to a state of constitutional normalcy and to usher in a period of political, economic and social reform. A not inconsiderable portion also looked for a more independent Cuba politically, economically and culturally, particularly in its relations with the United States. But the class did not envisage the radical type of reforms which have been instituted or the deviation into the Soviet bloc. Because of this background the disillusionment of the middle class with the Castro regime has been more gradual and complex.

The factors have been multiple. Politically sophisticated, the middle class has watched with growing concern such things as the regime’s failure to fulfill promises on the holding of elections, the disregard for its own laws and legal procedures, the stimulation of racial and class hatreds, the increasingly evident totalitarian character of the regime, the Marxist orientation of the government’s economic and social policies, the alignment of Cuba internationally with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the vicious anti-American campaign. On a more personal plane they have been more directly affected by the assault on the press and other communication media, the nationalization or intervention of industries and businesses converting them into employees of the state, the seizure of their own or family property under the agrarian and urban reform laws, the purge at the University of Habana, the usurpation by pressure or naked force of professional associations grouping lawyers, doctors, accountants and publicity agents, etc., the growing scarcity of consumer goods and the interference with freedom of travel.

The reaction to all this has set in but is slow in crystalizing into action. The urban reform law, striking dramatically at the very heart of the concept of private property is accelerating the process. The slowness in the reaction is understandable given the deception and disillusionment which the class has suffered, the lack of any ready alternative to which to turn, and the inhibiting force of government coercion. Generally speaking, the reaction in the provinces has been sharper than in Habana, and in provincial urban and rural areas there appears to be a greater disposition to take up an active role in the opposition.

The elements of the middle class which have joined the organized opposition represent a relatively low percentage, but it is quickly growing. The bulk of the middle class is believed to have no further illusions about the nature of the regime and their eventual fate. A relatively small segment of the middle class, mostly holding official positions in government offices and the educational and judicial systems, either out of conviction or convenience can be expected to remain loyal to the regime.

Lately there has been an acceleration in the emigration of professionals, whom the Revolutionary Government can ill afford to lose. Various exit controls suggest the possibility that the Government may try to prevent essential personnel from departing. This can only serve to drive the middle class further into the opposition.

The Lower Classes. The amorphous mass representing the lower classes has characteristically been on the side of whoever was in power. This is no less true of their attitude toward Castro today than it was toward Machado and Batista in their eras. The “intellectual” issues of human rights, representative government, free enterprise, etc., have little bearing on their reactions. The communist issue is conceded to have some bearing but is not a decisive factor. Guided largely by their emotions and full-stomach psychology, they are captivated by all the fanfare of the revolution and are susceptible to the torrent of propaganda. The economic pinch has not reached the point to disabuse them of this enchantment. At present it is within this largely uneducated, unthinking, highly emotional mass that Castro draws his main support. But there are signs that dissatisfaction is making inroads even here.

The first indications of this trend came in rural areas. Among the factors contributing to it have been: (1) the lack of employment during the dead season, aggravated this year by the dislocation produced by agrarian reform; (2) the lowering of the daily wage paid to farm workers in government-operated cooperatives and intervened enterprises and the payment of a substantial portion of farm wages in script valid only at “peoples stores”; (3) government intervention in agricultural production, putting pressure on farmers to join cooperatives, telling them what to plant, where to sell and at what prices; (4) shortages of basic foods such as rice and black beans.

The trend has been slower in coming in urban areas, particularly Habana. For the most part it is still confined to those segments of the working class which in the past have enjoyed steady work and a relatively high standard of living. This “petite bourgeoisie” is chafing under a series of grievances. Their take-home pay has been reduced by a series of deductions. Their employer is now the impersonal state and unions no longer function freely, meaning that they have lost the ability to negotiate for higher wages, better working conditions and more time off. They see their freedom of movement restricted in terms of job transferability, and pressure to join militia units, attend indoctrination classes, etc. These are also the workers who aspire to ownership of a house, car, and electrical appliances and see these objectives frustrated. They are also accustomed to eat well and are annoyed by the growing shortages not only of imported foodstuffs but of some basic products produced locally such as chickens and eggs.

The discontent of the workers has flared into the open on two occasions: at union meetings of the (COA) bus workers and the electric plant workers. In both instances the government-controlled CTC leadership was able to control the situation without difficulty.

The mass of unskilled workers, the under-employed, and unemployed so far show little signs of outward restiveness. This group has never had much of anything and therefore is an easy prey to the blandishments of the government. Castro is using their ranks—particularly the youth—to recruit persons for his volunteer teachers, work battalions, and militia.

In summary the lower classes are beginning to present a picture of growing discontent among the groups feeling the economic pinch. As a whole, however, this sector, if not still under the spell of Castro and the promises of a better life, certainly gives little signs of openly protesting against the government. Economically they have not been goaded to the point where their grievances would be translated into action, such as demonstrations, strikes and riots.

The Roman Catholic Church. The Church has been somewhat slow and hesitant in taking a firm, public position against the communist-totalitarian orientation of the Revolutionary Government. This has been due in part to timidity of some of the bishops but also to a realistic assessment that given the degree of popularity which Castro has enjoyed and the relatively little political influence which the Church has traditionally been able to exercise, it is unwise for the Church to take an exposed stand by attacking the regime too vigorously. Certainly now the clergy as a whole is fully conscious of the nature of the government and is firmly opposed to it. One general pastoral letter pointing out the dangers of communism and admonishing the Revolutionary Government was issued in August 1960. The more courageous bishops have taken firm public stands in pastoral letters, statements, and editorials in religious publications. Some priests are very active in Church-oriented opposition groups, holding high positions in the directorates. Others perform important courier and protection functions. The Church hierarchy as a whole, however, continues to walk softly so far as attacking the regime is concerned.

The Armed Forces. The traditional armed forces are believed to harbor some opposition potential. The successive purges through which the Air Force and Navy have passed have left a great deal of resentment in those branches. The rise of the militia as the principal military force of the government at the expense of the Army and the National Police is also reported to have aroused dissatisfaction in these branches, particularly in the former. Certain opposition groups report having made inroads into the ranks of the Army.

The Principal Opposition Groups

One of the more discouraging aspects of the Cuban situation is the apparent disarray which characterizes the organized opposition. Confronted with the tremendous task of over-throwing Castro, they give the impression of still being incapable of subordinating personal interests and doctrinal differences to the broader objective of establishing a united front from which to carry on the fight against the Castro regime.

While the number of opposition groups may total several dozen, there appear to be five of sufficient importance to warrant consideration here.

Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD). The Frente is made up of five organizations with headquarters in Miami and presumably with coordinated cadres thoughout the island of Cuba. The component groups are Organización Auténtica (OA) led by Antonio (“Tony”) de Varona; Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionario (MRR)³ nominally led by Manuel Artime; Organizacion Triple A⁴ led by Aureliano Sanchez Arango; Movimiento Democrático Cristiano (MDC) led by José Ignacio Rasco; and Agrupacion Montecristi led by Justo Carillo.

The Frente represents a rather moderate, center position in the political spectrum. In essence it advocates a return to constitutional government based on the 1940 Constitution which was broken with the coup of Batista in 1952. Certain reforms are contemplated as provided in the Constitution but no changes of a radical nature. The Frente is clearly anti-communist.

The civilian head of the Frente is “Tony” de Varona. His military counterpart is said to be Col. Eduardo Martin Elena, a respected career Cuban army officer, reportedly untainted by connnections with the Batista government. The Frente is reported to have a good civilian and military organization within Cuba. When the bid of the Frente to unseat Castro comes, it is supposed to be this internal organization which is to spark the uprising which reportedly will be combined with the arrival of forces from abroad. The Frente is said to have the undeclared backing of the U.S. Government. It is also said that the United States brought pressure to bear on the groups comprising the Frente to gain acceptance by them of de Varona as the undisputed leader.

The Embassy is not able to judge how effectively the FRD command is operating. The impression received from Cubans and Americans returning from Miami is that the Frente is little more than a cockpit of jealousies, personal ambitions and frustrating inertia. Certainly there is little to be seen in Cuba in the way of coordinated and concerted action. A sustained program of sabotage and/or terrorism, for example, to keep the Castro regime off balance and softened up for an uprising and/or an invasion has not materialized. Its effort to supply Sinesio Walsh in the Escambray, if [in?] an FRD operation, was a failure in the public view. The campaign of petards and bombs in Habana appears to have been largely the work of Agrupación Católica Universitaria elements which are tied in with the MRR. This action has been annoying but hardly more than a pin prick for the government. There is no evidence of the Frente having an effective clandestine propaganda machine operating in Cuba. The fact that the Frente is foreign-based makes it an easy target for the Castro regime to brand as the vehicle of Yankee imperialism.

Recently members of the Frente in Cuba with whom the Embassy has contact have begun to express pessimism over the effectiveness of the organization. This attitude is fostered by the evident growth in military strength on the part of the government as contrasted with the reported failure of the Frente to send minimal military supplies to its forces in Cuba.

Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP). This is a relatively new organization established by Castro’s first Minister of Public Works Manuel Ray.⁵ It is based in Cuba, with very little organization abroad at the present time. Ray operates clandestinely from Habana. His following is characterized by its youth. He originally drew his strength largely from “26 of July” elements who had broken with the Castro regime. The group reportedly is growing as various opposition elements join its ranks. Contacts within the group claim that some professional groups have joined and that they count with the support of elements of the Rebel Army who are disgruntled over the government buildup of the militia at the expense of the Army and the communist orientation of the government.

Only recently has Ray come out with a statement of principles and program defining the MRP position. The statement is circulating clandestinely but has not yet been given wide distribution in Cuba, nor apparently much publicity abroad. The MRP platform would in effect take the Revolution back to its original objectives. It contemplates a return to constitutional government after an 18-month period of provisional administration. It supports broad economic and social reforms. It frankly advocates government planning and supervision of the economy, but one in which private enterprise would play a considerable role. It would conserve many of the reform measures instituted by the Castro regime but would carry them out within a framework of representative government, respect for individual liberties, and the primacy of law. The MRP program has given rise to considerable skepticism as to its orientation. The most frequently heard criticism is that it is “fidelismo without Fidel Castro” and “fidelismo without international communism”. The MRP is avowedly anti-communist.

There is little evidence of any action program on the part of the Ray group so far. Most of the effort seems to be going into organization. To date their principal accomplishment has been arranging, with the assistance of the MRR, for the escape of a group of officers held prisoner in Morro Castle. These officers formed the staff of Major Huber Matos. The MRP has talked of assistance to the counterrevolutionaries in the Escambray and of opening a front in Oriente, but there is no positive evidence of their progressing on either project. More recently they have been instrumental in generating some sabotage in Camaguey and Habana.

The MRP has one psychological advantage: it is based in Cuba and its leadership is running the same risks as the rank and file. This has strong appeal to those who are disposed to carry the fight in Cuba. It also manifestly weakens one of the principal arguments which Castro can make against it: that it is a counterrevolutionary movement, organized, supported and directed by the United States.

Movimiento “30 de Noviembre”. This is also a relatively new movement, until recently headed by David Salvador, former Secretary General of the Cuban Confederation of Workers (CTC). Salvador went underground shortly after he was eased out of office following the battle with the communists in the 1959 CTC national congress. He remained active until he was captured by the government on November 4, 1960 as he was attempting to leave Cuba clandestinely for the United States.

The movement is said to be based on followers of Salvador within the ranks of labor and on certain elements in the University of Habana. The following is not thought to be very extensive although it is reported to be well organized and tough. From what little has been gathered about the orientation of the movement, it appears to be further to the left than the MRP. Salvador himself is a former member of the Cuban Communist Party, a maverick politically and probably more of an opportunist than anything else. He is no friend of the United States and is not to be trusted.

Salvador operated clandestinely from Habana. He appeared to have no working relationship with any other opposition group. The MRP reportedly cooperated with him but studiously avoided any kind of merger or organic working arrangement. It is not clear what the fate of the organization will be with the capture of Salvador. The Embassy has unconfirmed reports that the group will try to work its way into the MRP. The Ray organization probably would profit by broadening its base with the labor movement, but it is doubted that it will take in the remnants of Salvador group without very careful screening.

There is no indication that the Salvador group has carried on any kind of action program. One source claims that activities were to begin with the start of the sugar harvest, presumably directed at sabotaging sugar production through damaging of the mills.

Bloque de Organizaciones Anti-Communistas Cubano (BOAC). The bloc is composed of nine separate organizations rather loosely affiliated. Little is known about its leadership. One of the principal figures is said to be Gustavo Cuervo. The directors are for the most part in Miami.

The bloc represents conservative, propertied elements. It gives the impression of being motivated primarily by a desire to recuperate for the monied class the properties which have been taken from them. As such it is not believed to have any influence or support outside those interests.

The bloc gave the appearance of activity earlier this year. It laid claim to the Cayo Cruz ammunition dump explosion. It planned a similar sabotage of the ammunition dump at Managua, but this plot was infiltrated and broken up as it was about to take place. The bloc was also active at one time with well-edited clandestine propaganda, but even this effort seems to have declined lately. In one of the recent waves of arrests one of the top leaders of the bloc in Cuba was seized.

Acción Cívica Anti-Communista (ACA). This is another opposition group of unknown strength, which claims to have united a number of small opposition groups under its leadership. These small groups, said to number about ten, include JACA and SAC (Salvar a Cuba). The backbone of ACA is understood to be a large body of former officers and enlisted men of the old Cuban Army who claim not to be tainted with the crimes or corruption of the Batista regime and want only an opportunity to revindicate their good name. Other sectors of Cuban business and professional life (students, Masons, etc.) are said to be included, but identities of personalities are not known. ACA acknowledges Col. Eduardo Martin Elena as its military chief abroad. It claims its greatest strength is in the province of Pinar del Rio. Its actual capabilities as yet have not been proven.

Counterrevolutionary Fronts

There is a great deal of talk in opposition circles concerning the imminent opening of new military fronts in Cuba but to date the only one that can be said to be operating is in the Escambray mountains in Las Villas Province. The delay in the organization of these fronts is generally attributed to the lack of equipment. Opposition sources claim they have more than enough manpower if only arms and ammunition were available.

For purposes of discussing this aspect of the opposition movement the treatment is presented on a province-by-province basis as given below:

Piñar del Rio. Two attempts at forming pockets of armed resistance in the Sierra de los Organos mountains have failed. Both were fly-by-night affairs which never stood any chance of success. As a result they were easily liquidated by the government. One was led by José Lara Crespo (a non-commissioned officer of the Batista army). He was captured and shot. The second was led by Austin Young, a U.S. citizen. He was captured and sentenced to prison.

Sources within the FRD and the BOAC claim that cadres have been organized in the province and are awaiting the arrival of arms and orders to initiate operations. Recently there have been many reports of arms landings in the province but none of these is confirmed.

Habana. The only action taking place in Habana is limited sabotage and terrorism. The terrain precludes guerrilla operations. Apart from placing petards and assassination attempts against militia, there is little evidence of other activity. Some electric and water facilities have been temporarily interrupted by bomb explosions but these have been minor in scope and impact.

FRD sources claim that the organization of cadres in small towns throughout the province has been about completed. These reportedly will surface when orders for a general uprising are received.

Matanzas. In August 1960 a front was opened in the hills north of the Central Highway between Madruga and Ceiba Mocha on the Habana-Matanzas border. The counterrevolutionary group was led by Gerardo Fundora Nuñez, a former labor leader at the rayon plant in Matanzas. He is said to have been linked with the Triple A organization within the Frente. The plan of operations was primarily to harass transport along the Central Highway. Their support came primarily from groups in Matanzas. The front appeared to be having modest success until the end of October when government forces captured Fundora and several of his men. Fundora and four of his assistants were shot on October 22. The status of the front since the loss of its leader is not clear, although sources connected with it claim it will continue in being. There is no indication that it is functioning at the present time.

Contacts within the Frente state that Fundora disobeyed orders in initiating operations. His task was to organize, accumulate supplies, and await instructions for a coordinated, island-wide move. His impetuous nature led him to jump the gun. His capture and execution and a subsequent wave of arrests in Matanzas and Habana would indicate that a heavy price has been paid by the opposition for his foolhardiness.

From two independent sources the Embassy has heard of plans to open a small front in the swampy area southwest of Amarillas on the Matanzas-Las Villas border. Reportedly there are some 150 men available for this operation. The tactical plan would be to conduct hit and run raids against transport and government installations.

Las Villas. This province, as none of the other five, has been the focal point of opposition to the government. The reasons generally given for this are the following:

(1) Resistance of the small farmers to Agrarian Reform. The pattern of land distribution in Las Villas, unlike that in the other provinces, is one of many small landholders who for the most part work their own property. The Agrarian Reform has hit these landholders particularly hard in terms of reduction of their holdings in disregard of the provisions of the law or interference in their freedom to produce and market what they raise.

(2) Opposition to communist control. From the very outset of the victory of Castro, Las Villas has been in the hands of communists placed there by “Che” Guevara following the fall of Batista. These leaders, both civil and military, have been arrogant and ruthless in the implementation of economic and social reforms.

The center of armed resistance is in the Escambray mountains. Reportedly some ex-Batista elements took refuge in the mountains shortly after the victory of Castro. However, the Escambray did not gain prominence as a center of opposition until the middle of this year when revolutionary elements defected and went into the hills.

The groups which formed in the Escambray appear to have done so independently and to have maintained their separateness, at least until recently. Hence, the pattern which emerges is a collection of bands operating on their own with no central coordination, no adequate system of supply and no satisfactory means of communication. Recent reports indicated that a degree of unity has been achieved around the figure of Captain Membibre (see below).

The group which received the greatest notoriety was that of Sinesio Walsh. The capture and execution of Walsh and his principal lieutenants in October of this year was a psychological blow, but several other bands continue in operation and the government so far at least has not been able to dislodge them. Among these are the following:

Joaquin “El Galleguito” Membibre—he was formerly a lieutenant in the Rebel Army in charge of the military post at Camajuani, Las Villas. He reports a strength of 300 men. He is not believed to be too well armed but there are indications that he recently has received some supplies. As the principal figure now in the Escambray, it is expected that he will obtain such provisions as it is possible to deliver.

Evelio Duque—he was a lieutenant in the Rebel Army and worked as an investigator for INRA in Las Villas. During the revolution against Batista he fought in the Escambray. He is reported to have some 400 men under his command, most of whom are not well armed. He is said to operate in an area called Kabagan. He is reliably reported to have the backing of OA elements.

Rizos (fnu)—he was a major in the Batista army. He reportedly commands some 400 men in an area called Pico Tuerto near Topes de Collantes. His group is said to have an assured source of supply and to possess the greatest discipline. He is said to be associated with Pedraza and maintains himself aloof from other groups.

Other group leaders whose names are mentioned but concerning whom very little is known are: Osvaldo Ramirez (former lieutenant in the Rebel Army), Rafael Aragon (a colono from Las Villas), Luis Vargas (former captain in the Rebel Army, associated with the BOAC), Juan Varela, Roberto Herrera (a revolutionary from Guinia de Miranda in the Escambray), Manolo Calzada, (fnu) Toledo, and (fnu) Lima.

In an effort to surround and eventually liquidate the Escambray counterrevolutionary forces the government has thrown a ring of an estimated 6, 000 men (largely militia) around the periphery. The government appears not to have sent its forces up into the hills to flush out the counterrevolutionaries. The present strategy seems to be to contain them and attempt to defeat them through strangulation and infiltration of their forces. So far the counterrevolutionaries appear to count with the support of the local peasantry. If this were not so, it would be virtually impossible for them to maintain themselves in the mountains.

There has been some talk of opening fronts in two other places in Las Villas. One is in the hills in the northeastern corner of the province near Mayajigua. The other is in the northwestern corner near Coralillo. Plans apparently have not progressed much beyond the talking stage. One source connected with the FRD has recently reported that detailed plans of the Mayajigua front have been submitted to the FRD in Miami and approved.

Camaguey. To the Embassy’s knowledge there has been no effort at armed resistance in this province. There is considerable talk of available manpower but no indication of imminent action. Recent sabotage of trains and electric installations indicate that the MRP is beginning to move in the field of sabotage, as they have been indicating that they would.

Oriente. This province is historically the cradle of revolutions in Cuba. This time, however, it appears to be lagging behind Las Villas both in the degree of public discontent and armed resistance. Two attempts at establishing opposition fronts have failed: Manuel Beaton’s in July of this year in the Sierra Maestra and Armentino Feria’s landing on the north coast between Moa and Baracoa. In both cases it appears that the efforts did not count with the important ingredient of support of the local populace.

In recent weeks there have been reports of defections of some Rebel Army personnel in Oriente who have taken to the hills. Fidel Castro acknowledged this to have been the case with the guard at Imias in his speech of October 15. Major “Nino” Diaz, one of the top figures in the “dissident” MRR, has been reliably reported to have returned clandestinely to Santiago from the United States in mid-October to take command of a front to be opened. The Embassy has received reports of landings on the south coast between Santiago and Guantanamo and on the north coast between Puerto Padre and Banes, but these have not been confirmed. It is unlikely that any armed action will be initiated in Oriente in the near future.

Conclusions

In reviewing the opposition movement as a whole the following tentative conclusions may be drawn on the basis of information available to the Embassy:

1. Discontent among the population is growing and will continue to increase as the economic situation deteriorates. This deterioration is not likely to affect the lower masses in a vital manner for several more months and possibly not until well into the third quarter of 1961.

2. The organized opposition gives the public image of division, confusion and weakness, a circumstance which is defeating its own purpose. It has not shown any capacity for sustained action against the government to date. It cannot hope to capitalize on the discontent until it is able to offer the Cuban people an attractive alternative in terms of leadership and program and demonstrate that it can maintain a campaign of sabotage and military action against the regime. The lack of a foreseeable alternative to Castro is causing many Cubans to think in terms of either fleeing the country or becoming resigned to a continuation of the Castro regime. If such an alternative were in sight, it would serve to encourage people to resist and take greater risk in direct action against the government.

3. The government is determined to suppress the opposition at any cost. It has accumulated a substantial quantity of military hardware from the Soviet bloc and is making great efforts to train the militia in their use. In the face of armed insurrection and/or invasion the government can count on a sufficient number of convinced adherents to put up a good fight. It is not likely that the Castro regime will fall without considerable bloodletting and destruction of property.

4. Time in the long run is believed to favor the government. It gives the government time in which to train, indoctrinate and equip its military forces and perfect its system of terror and control over the populace. Once consolidated a communist regime in Cuba, with the full backing of the Sino-Soviet bloc, will be difficult to unseat without direct, sizable intervention from the outside.

5. Time in the short run will favor the opposition if the economic situation continues to deteriorate to a degree where the masses will be hard hit and the opposition places itself in a position to capitalize on this fleeting advantage. Time is limited and the opposition should be made to realize this.

6. It is seriously doubted whether any foreign-based Cuban opposition movement can have much success without strong support from within the country. Similarly, an internal movement stands little chance unless it is backed by significant assistance from the outside. To accomplish the objective of overthrowing Castro a prompt, united and effective effort of Cubans here and abroad is indispensable.

7. Such an effort might consist of the following elements:

a. Announcement of the composition of a provisional government to direct the struggle against Castro and to assume provisional control following his defeat. For purposes of attracting public support in Cuba among the middle and lower classes this provisional government might be built around the original Cabinet which took over following the fall of Batista. Such important members as Prime Minister José Miro Cardona, Foreign Minister Roberto Agramonte, Finance Minister Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Public Works Minister Manuel Ray, Social Welfare Minister Elena Mederos are already in the United States or in the active opposition in Cuba. Other well-regarded persons such as National Bank President Felipe Pazos, Banfaic President Justo Carillo, Supreme Court President Emilio Menendez, and Army Colonel Ramon Barquin could also be used. In addition representation from the Frente and other groups could and should be used to complete the list and give them a voice in the provisional government. The important thing is to convince the Cuban public that the new government is committed to “rescuing” the Revolution which so many Cubans sincerely desire and initially supported.

b. While it may be a hard pill to swallow for some opposition elements, the program which the opposition as a whole needs to present is one which will appeal to the majority of the Cuban people, i.e., restoration of the Cuban Revolution to its original premises. The program must include substantial economic and social reforms, to be carried out within a framework of representative government, respect for individual rights and the primacy of law. The program will probably have a strong nationalist flavor, but should be one free from communist ties.

c. Both from abroad and inside the country the opposition needs to establish an effective program of propaganda, not confined to radio alone but including reading material which could be issued within the country clandestinely or dropped from airplanes. Special emphasis should be placed on the Cuban government’s communist ties, militarization, popular regimentation, economic deterioration, the influence of foreigners in the Castro government, and factual reporting on national and international events.

d. An active program of sabotage and active and passive resistance should be initiated promptly not only to weaken the government and keep it off balance, but also able to demonstrate to the Cuban public that the opposition has capacity to act and to the public in other countries that Castro does not count with the support of the Cuban people as he claims.

e. One or more military fronts should be opened with a view to gaining control over sufficient territory to establish a provisional government in Cuba as a basis for obtaining recognition from other foreign countries. Such a front would also offer a haven to many persons who are willing to take up arms against the government but have no place to go at the present time. Las Villas Province with the Escambray mountains appears to offer the best possibilities for such a front at the present time. It is not believed that the Castro regime could long resist the pressure of an active military front combined with a campaign of island-wide sabotage and loss in public support.

Daniel M. Braddock
Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–660. Drafted by Bowdler and concurred in by Gilmore, Wellman, (less than 1 line not declassified), the Service Attachés, and USIS. Kail indicated that he concurred but “with reservations about 7a” in the conclusions. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.

² Despatch 1268 is supra. Despatch 707 and CA–2641 have not been found.

³ Because of internal strife the MRR split. The dissident group includes such figures as Ricardo Lorie, “Nino” Diaz, Lucas Moran, Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz, Michel Yabur and Conte Aguero. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ Reports are circulating that Sanchez Arango has pulled his Triple A out of the FRD because of differences over leadership. These reports are not confirmed. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ Manuel Ray is at present in the United States. He left Cuba clandestinely and is expected to return via the same route in the near future. [Footnote in the source text.]

618. Memorandum From the President to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 7, 1960.

This refers to the memorandum on Cuba sent to me under date of December 2, 1960 by Doug Dillon.²

I approve the suggestions regarding the reorganization of the government’s program with respect to that country, except that I think Mr. Willauer should have a position directly subordinate to the Secretary of State for so long as Cuba remains a critical problem in our foreign relations. There should be no doubt as to the authority of the Special Assistant in the State Department (Mr. Willauer) to coordinate covert and overt activities, nor as to his responsibility for conveying policy guidance to the operating agencies. In their broad outline, these policies will, of course, be subject to the approval of higher authority.

D. D. E.³

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Top Secret. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1983, 1346. In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on December 7, at 8: 45 a.m., Gordon Gray noted that he gave the President this memorandum “which had been prepared by General Goodpaster which reflected General Goodpaster’s impression of the President’s views. The President signed the memorandum as drafted.” (Ibid., Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuba)

² Document 615.

³ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

619. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Hager) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, December 7, 1960.

SUBJECT

Cuba

This memorandum is in response to Joseph W. Scott’s memorandum to me dated December 2, 1960,² containing four questions relating to the above subject.

All four of the questions are somewhat interrelated and affected by the same provisions of certain international agreements to which the United States is a party. I would therefore like to call attention at the outset to the following:

[Here follows a summary of various provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and the Convention on Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife (Havana, 1928).]

1.

What would be the legal limitations, if any, to our support for a Cuban government in exile:

Support for a Cuban government in exile would of course be inconsistent with continued recognition of the Castro regime as the lawful government of Cuba.

The United States may unilaterally sever relations with the Castro regime at any time and for any reason, or even without reason. Such a severance of relations does not violate any obligation under any treaty or under international law.

However, the recognition of a government-in-exile and the support of such a government can involve serious legal problems.

It should first be noted that the mere recognition of such a government would constitute a departure from our announced policy in this respect. In extending recognition, we normally consider whether the government is in possession of the machinery of state, administering the government with the assent of the people, and in a position to fulfill the international obligations incumbent upon the particular state. Presumably a government-in-exile would not meet these conditions. It is true that we have in the past recognized governments-in-exile, but those cases have normally involved some important additional factor which would be missing here. In the case of the governments-in-exile of Norway, Netherlands and Belgium during World War II, we recognized on the basis that it was the established government which had fled enemy-occupied territory over which it was the lawfully constituted sovereign. In the case of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government in London, our recognition was on the basis that the annexation of its territory by Germany was illegal. In the case of the Fighting French under DeGaulle, recognition was on the basis of effective control of certain territory of a state partially occupied by the Enemy.

Turning to legal limitation, there is no treaty provision or other international obligation which would specifically prevent us from unilaterally recognizing a Cuban government-in-exile. However, it could easily be argued that such recognition by itself constituted an intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba or a form of interference in violation of Article 15 of the OAS Charter, or a violation of some other of the above obligations of the OAS Charter or even of the general obligation under international law not to intervene in the internal affairs of other States. This legal argument might find favor among Latin American and other States, in the UN or the OAS.

It should be recalled that the U.S.S.R. recognized and signed a treaty with the “Finnish Democratic Republic” (established by the Finnish Communist Party) in connection with the armed attack by the U.S.S.R. on Finland in 1939. The League of Nations Assembly found the U.S.S.R. guilty of “aggression” and pointed out that the U.S.S.R. had established relations with “an alleged Government which is neither de jure nor de facto the Government recognized by the people of Finland in accordance with the free working of their institutions”. The Council of the League then determined that the U.S.S.R. was no longer a member of the League.

The indirect consequences of a severance of relations with the Castro regime and the recognition of a government-in-exile must also be considered. Such a severance of relations does not normally affect treaty obligations, because treaties are between States, as distinguished from governments. Technically, therefore, our treaties with Cuba, relating to Guantanamo and other matters, would continue in force. However, any treaty provisions which required consultation or other action in relation to or conjunction with an effective government in control of territory and governmental machinery would become a dead letter. A severance of relations might also provide an excuse for various retaliations. Finally, after withdrawing recognition from the Castro regime, we would no longer be able to hold it responsible as the government of Cuba for any actions which it took.

Assuming that we went beyond mere recognition and gave active support to a government-in-exile, we would find ourselves subject to charges of violation of more of the provisions referred to at the beginning of this memorandum, depending upon the extent of our support. Cuba might bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly under Article 35 of the UN Charter, alleging a dispute likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 33) or even a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39). On the other hand, if she preferred to proceed under the inter-American system, Cuba might charge an aggression short of an armed attack, or at least a fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, calling for a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

2.

What would be the legal limitations to training Cubans on US soil for ultimate use by a Cuban government-in-exile?

From the standpoint of our international obligations, the legal limitations have already been discussed to some degree under question 1 above. Cuba would undoubtedly charge that such activity, whether condoned or conducted by the United States, constituted a threat of force and an aggression in violation of the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty, and furthermore that it was at least an incipient violation of Article 1 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife, quoted above.

In addition, we might have certain problems under domestic law. Private persons training Cubans on United States soil might run afoul of certain criminal laws (18 U.S.C. 956–960) relating to conspiracies within the jurisdiction of the United States to insure or destroy property of a foreign government within a foreign country, accepting and exercising within the jurisdiction of the United States a commission to serve against a foreign nation, enlisting within the United States in the service of a foreign country, and knowingly beginning or setting on foot or taking part in any military or naval expedition to be carried on from the United States against the territory of any foreign state. These statutes would presumably not be applicable, however, if we recognized a Cuban government-in-exile. Further, in that case there is existing statutory authority for our military authorities to train Cubans (22 U.S.C. 1812).

3.

What would be the legal consequences of a blockade which would prevent shipments of arms going to Cuba?

A blockade is the blocking by naval vessels of the approach to an enemy coast, or a part of it, for the purpose of preventing ingress and egress of vessels or aircraft of all nations. It involves the seizure of vessels or aircraft of the blockaded state, and also the seizure of neutral vessels or aircraft which violate the blockade.

A blockade is itself an act of war. It may be resorted to only in the case of existing belligerency or for the purpose of bringing belligerency into effect. The declaration of a blockade against Cuba would undoubtedly be cited by the Castro regime as an aggression in violation of the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.

There is also a limited form of blockade, the so-called “pacific blockade”, relating only to vessels of the blockaded state. However, this type of blockade would not be effective in preventing shipments of arms to Cuba, since it would apply only to Cuban ships. Further, it is not clear under international law that even a “pacific blockade” is not an aggressive act.

Under our domestic legislation, we already have authority to prevent the export of arms from the United States to Cuba, and also the carriage of arms from any location to Cuba by United States flag vessels. We could also extend our control further under the Battle Act, to affect shipments by recipients of our aid. However, the declaration of a blockade might raise the question whether action had been taken tantamount to a declaration of war, a matter as to which the Congress is given authority under the Constitution.

4.

What would be the legal consequences of a blockade which would prevent armed expeditions leaving Cuba?

What has been said in answer to question 3 concerning blockade applies also to this question.

In the absence of an actual declared blockade, of course, Cuban vessels and aircraft transporting an armed expedition could not be interfered with either on or over the high seas. They could however lawfully be kept under such surveillance as would not amount to harassment and would not interfere with navigation. Furthermore, at the request of any foreign state concerned, the United States could assist in arresting Cuban vessels or aircraft once they had entered the territorial sea or overlying airspace of that state.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–260. Top Secret. Drafted by Hager.

² Not printed. (Ibid.)

620. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 85–3–60 Washington, December 8, 1960.

PROSPECTS FOR THE CASTRO REGIME The Problem

To estimate the prospects for the Fidel Castro regime over the next six months or so, assuming that the US continues political and economic actions against the regime at roughly present levels of severity, and that Castro is not removed from the scene.

The Estimate

The Political Situation

1. Prime Minister Fidel Castro remains firmly in control of Cuba. His overall popular support has declined since its high water mark of early 1959, but as a symbol of revolutionary change he retains widespread support among the poorer classes, particularly in the countryside. No other figure has emerged with the stature to challenge him, and his associates have not achieved comparable popular support.

2. In less than two years the Castro regime has consolidated its hold over Cuban society. New institutions have been created, and others, which have resisted the regime’s domination, have been eliminated or revamped. The National Institute of Agrarian Reform, which controls most agricultural lands, the state farms, “people’s stores,” and many industrial enterprises, is the major vehicle of authoritarian statism. All political parties except the Popular Socialist Party (PSP—Cuban Communist Party) have been destroyed and their leadership silenced or forced to flee. For some time the regime has dominated all mass communications media—newspapers, radio, and television. Pro-Castro elements are in control of all important labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. The regime’s seizure of most major industrial units as well as the property of all urban landlords and its establishment of a network of urban block wardens have further extended its control over daily life in the cities. Censure of the administration by the Catholic Church has resulted in a government-inspired propaganda effort to discredit the Church by identifying it with the Batista regime, the upper class and foreign imperialism. These measures are closely parallel to the traditional pattern of Communist takeover.

The Security Forces

3. To tighten the dictatorship and provide strong defense against its external enemies, the Castro regime, with Bloc assistance, is rapidly building up its military and security capabilities.² Primary stress has been placed on building up the militia, a growing force presently estimated at some 200, 000, which has now taken over many of the internal security functions previously carried out by the regular armed forces. Drawn primarily from lower income peasants and urban workers, the militia represents an attempt by the regime to provide itself with a large security force and to regiment a large number of youth and give them a sense of participation and identification with the regime. Thus far, the militia’s overall combat efficiency is low; many units are still on a part-time training basis. However, there appears to be emerging a nucleus of well organized, well equipped, and well trained units loyal to Castro and strongly Communist-influenced; we believe that within the next 12 months or so these units will develop into a reasonably effective security force.

4. The regular armed forces are still largely disrupted as a result of successive purges and the employment of substantial army and navy detachments in construction and other public works. At present, the combat effectiveness of the air force is virtually nil, that of the navy is poor, and that of the army is low. The army now numbers about 32, 000. Increased emphasis is being placed on training, and Bloc military equipment and advisors have begun to make their appearance. Hence the army’s combat capability can be expected to improve.

The Role of the Communist Party

5. It is impossible to distinguish between the policies and actions of the Castro regime and the program presently advocated by the local Communists. The PSP is playing an increasingly important role in the Castro regime. It is providing guidance to Castro through his chief aides. PSP members fill key administrative, managerial, and military positions. The party’s propaganda apparatus is of inestimable value to Castro. The party line laid down at the PSP congress last summer called for continued strong support of Castro, who was characterized as carrying out the essential first steps of a “revolution of national liberation.” PSP spokesmen indicated that the regime would eventually evolve into a Communist state. Virtually all institutions of Cuban life are being remolded in the likeness of a typical Communist society. In short, for most practical purposes, the present Cuban Government can be regarded as Communist.

The Opposition

6. Internal resistance to the Castro regime has risen in the last six months but is still generally ineffective. The Catholic Church, the only major institution not brought to its knees by the regime, has taken an increasingly firm stand against Castro, but because the Cuban Church has never enjoyed the influence of the Church in, say, Colombia, it serves as little more than a rallying point for opposition. Castro has alienated most of the middle and professional classes, but many have now fled, and the remainder are disorganized and leaderless. Some campesinos are disgruntled, notably over the regime’s failure to redistribute large landholdings as it has promised, and urban labor discontent is increasing with lower take-home pay and consumer goods scarcities. A number of anti-Castro guerrilla groups are operating in the Sierra Escambray area and in Oriente Province, but the regime has reacted vigorously and has thus far been able to contain these bands. Within the armed forces, there probably remains a measure of dissidence and probably considerable resentment at the regime’s decided preference for the civilian militia, but this may decline as more Bloc equipment is made available to them. Moreover, Castro is almost certain to continue to remove dissatisfied elements. Abroad, Cuban exile groups are making some progress toward joining forces, but as yet none appears to have the capability for decisive action against Castro. Hence, while the regime’s enemies are growing in numbers, no one group or combination of them seems well enough organized or sufficiently strong to offer a serious threat to Castro’s authority.

Castro’s Standing in the Free World

7. The Castro regime enjoys a considerable measure of sympathy among the general public in Latin America because it appears to stand for social progress and for emancipation from US economic dominance. Its revolutionary character is not regarded as a defect by those who are out of power. Therefore, there would be no wide basis of popular support for an inter-American move against Castro; indeed most governments would be extremely cautious about committing themselves to such a move. At the same time most governments and ruling groups are alarmed by the revolutionary aspects of the Castro movement. Latin American governments are generally unsympathetic to Castro, and are becoming increasingly worried over the presence of the Bloc in Cuba, the pro-Castro troublemaking minorities in their countries, and Castro’s attempts to export revolution. Nevertheless, Castro is benefiting from the unwillingness of most Latin American governments to act against him except when he or his supporters are caught interfering in their internal affairs.

8. Most Latin American officials probably do not share the extreme concern of the US over the Communist danger in Cuba, and in any event, their concern in this respect is conditioned by the disinclination of any Latin American country, except where its own interests are directly involved, to take a position in open opposition to another Latin American state. Also contributing to the apparent stalemate on Castro is a tendency throughout the area to view the Cuba problem as one between that country and the US and to be critical of US economic sanctions.

9. Only Guatemala, which sometime ago broke relations with Castro and possibly Argentina and Nicaragua, would favor strong OAS action on the Cuba problem. Presidents Betancourt of Venezuela and Lleras Camargo of Colombia are firmly anti-Castro, but neither is prepared to move on Cuba, the former, in particular, because he believes that the US let him down in his efforts to do away with Dominican dictator Trujillo. The other Latin American states will be reluctant to support anti-Castro action in the OAS, with Mexico among the most uncompromising.

10. Outside Latin America, there is little strong feeling against Castro. There was almost certainly a widespread belief that Cuba’s extreme economic dependence on the US would sooner or later provoke a reaction, and though many countries may regret the violence of Cuba’s breakaway, most of them regard this as primarily a US problem. Many of the underdeveloped and neutralist nations of Asia and Africa are inclined to sympathize with Castro in his struggle against the US, while others probably wish to avoid trouble with the USSR on the Cuban issue.

The Economic Situation

11. The Cuban economy as a whole continues to deteriorate, but is not yet close to the point where the stability of the Castro regime is jeopardized. In the last two years, the economy has suffered from the unsettling effects of violent revolution, drastic and haphazard reforms, and the setbacks attending government seizure of virtually all private enterprises. In the past six months, the regime’s economic problems have been compounded by the cutoff in US imports of Cuban sugar and by the embargo of all US exports to Cuba except medical supplies and nonsubsidized foodstuffs. These actions by Cuba’s major trading partner have had a considerable impact on the already sagging Cuban economy, and have aggravated the seasonal decline in Cuba’s foreign exchange reserves, which will stand at about $75 million at the end of December 1960 having been about $200 million in mid–1960.³ At the same time, shortages of industrial goods, including spare parts for US-made machinery, are increasing. Inflationary pressure, springing mainly from large currency issues and government deficit financing, has thus far been kept in check by tightening price, wage, and exchange controls.

12. The regime’s performance in economic affairs has been spotty. Inadequate planning and mismanagement have resulted in wasted resources and some production losses, notably in rice and beans, although agricultural production generally appears to have increased. Industrial production, especially of consumer goods, was initially spurred by increased mass purchasing power and import restrictions, but now may be beginning to feel the pinch of raw materials and spare parts shortages.

13. Meanwhile, Bloc economic assistance has reduced the impact of US sanctions. The Bloc was quick to exploit the US-Cuba conflict by signing agreements for large-scale trade and for financial and technical assistance.⁴ The USSR purchased the 700,000 tons of sugar cut from the US quota in June. It moved quickly to help Cuba meet the serious problems posed by the withdrawal of American oil companies from Cuba in mid-summer and the resulting loss of traditional sources of crude. Even though Soviet grades of oil are imperfectly suited for Cuban refineries, this difficulty is being surmounted and in general Cuba’s POL needs are being met. Castro’s search for substitute suppliers of goods denied him by the US export controls imposed in mid-October has been hampered in some degree by shortages of foreign exchange. However, no other countries, in Latin America or elsewhere, have imposed economic sanctions against Cuba. Hence Cuba has been able to look for supplies not only in Bloc but in non-Bloc markets.

Prospects

14. We believe that during the period of this estimate Castro’s control of Cuba will be further consolidated. Organized opposition appears to lack the strength and coherence to pose a major threat to the regime, and we foresee no development in the internal economic or political situation which would be likely to bring about a critical shift of popular opinion away from Castro. Any further erosion of Castro’s base of popular support is likely to be offset by the growing effectiveness of the state’s instrumentalities of control. The regime’s capabilities for dealing with internal disturbances and foreign-based incursions are almost certain to improve. Effective governmental control over the institutions and daily life of the Cuban people is also likely to increase, making effective opposition more difficult and risky.

15. The efficiency of Cuba’s plantations and industries is likely to continue to decline, but the Communist Bloc will almost certainly take whatever steps are necessary to sustain the Cuban economy. Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the collapse or significant weakening of the Castro regime. Internal controls will facilitate any further belt-tightening required.

16. The prospects for effective international action against Cuba remain poor. Despite the growing concern about Castro and Castroism among many responsible Latin American leaders, inhibitions about taking strong OAS action against Cuba will probably remain strong. Most of the rest of the Free World will probably continue to regard the Cuban problem as one for the US to handle, with many of the Afro-Asian states inclined to sympathize with Cuba.

17. We do not believe that Cuba will make a direct military assault on the Guantanamo base. However, the Castro regime will continue its efforts to undermine the position of the US and to spread the Castro revolution to other countries in Latin America. Given the serious social and economic pressures building up in most countries of Latin America and the weakness of many of the present governments, the chances of the establishment of one or more Castro-like regimes over the next year to 18 months are appreciable.

18. For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. Within Cuba, the institutions on which an avowed Communist regime could be based are being created, with the PSP gaining valuable experience in the process. More importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communists with a friendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and with a highly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of the US. The fact that Castro can be depicted as a nationalist reformer rather than as an avowed Communist is, at this stage, a net asset.

19. The Soviet Bloc can and will provide the assistance necessary to prevent serious deterioration in the Cuban economy in the short run and to permit an expansion of economic capabilities over the longer term. The Soviet Union will continue to support the military buildup in Cuba and will unstintingly exert its influence—short of risking general war—to sustain the present regime.

20. We believe the Soviet leaders wish to avoid becoming overextended in Cuba. Given Cuba’s remoteness from Bloc centers of power and the extreme sensitivity of the US on the Cuban situation, the Soviet leaders will probably stop short of actions which might provoke strong US counteraction, and especially those which might also alarm the other Latin American nations. They are unlikely to encourage a PSP attempt to seize power from Castro. Instead, they will seek to have the local Cuban Communists expand their influence and in other ways prepare the ground for an eventual Communist take-over. The USSR is unlikely to seek military bases in Cuba or to enter formal defense arrangements with Cuba. Moreover, the USSR will probably urge Castro to exercise some caution in pursuing his anti-US policy lest he provoke an undesired showdown. Though Communist China advocates a more active Communist role, and though Chinese Communist influence in Cuba will probably increase, we believe that the Soviet hand will remain dominant in Cuba for at least the period of this estimate.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret/Noforn Except UK and Canada. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on December 8. According to a note on the cover sheet, the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission representative on the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1984, 1514.

² Bloc assistance to date totals some 10, 000–12, 000 tons of military equipment, including large amounts of small arms and ammunition and a few helicopters and probably some tanks, artillery (also antiaircraft), and other relatively heavy equipment. Thus far Cuba has received no combat jet aircraft, though some Czech trainers have already arrived and some jet fighters may be en route. In addition, the Bloc has provided up to perhaps 200 military technicians and instructors and has taken a like number of Cuban pilots and other specialists for overseas training. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The value of US-Cuban trade totaled $900 million in 1959. The US has traditionally supplied 70–80 percent of Cuba’s import needs and taken 60–70 percent of Cuba’s exports. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ [Footnote in the source text not declassified]

621. Editorial Note

On December 8, the Special Group, or 5412 Committee, discussed plans for an attack on Cuba. According to a memorandum dated June 13, 1961, by the Board of Inquiry on Cuban Operations headed by General Maxwell Taylor, at this meeting the person in charge of the paramilitary section for the project “described the new concept as one consisting of an amphibious landing on the Cuban coast of 600–750 men equipped with weapons of extraordinarily heavy fire power.” The memorandum summarized his description of the project:

“The landing would be preceded by preliminary air strikes launched from Nicaragua against military targets. Air strikes as well as supply flights would continue after the landing. The objective would be to seize, hold a limited area in Cuba, maintain a visible presence, and then to draw dissident elements to the landing force, which hopefully would trigger a general uprising. This amphibious landing would not entirely eliminate the previous concept for infiltrating guerrilla teams. It was expected that some 60–80 men would be infiltrated prior to the amphibious landing.”

The person in charge of training the Cuban force in Guatemala described “the superior characteristics of the individuals, particularly as to motivation, intelligence, and leadership qualities.” He also gave his opinion that this force “would have no difficulty inflicting heavy casualties on a much larger force.” The Board of Inquiry concluded that there was no evidence that the Special Group “formally approved the plan at this time,” but the representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency were “encouraged to continue in its development.” Someone at the meeting also commented that “the existence of the U.S. -backed force of Cubans in training was well known throughout Latin America.” (Operation ZAPATA, page 7)

622. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1335 Havana, December 13, 1960.

REF

Embassy’s G–302, December 1, 1960²

SUBJECT

Reaction of Castro Regime to Election of Senator Kennedy

a. Public Statements of Officials

The few public references to Senator Kennedy on the part of officials of the Castro regime since his election victory have been unfriendly, although less extremely so than during the presidential campaign. On November 27, for example, in a speech delivered at the University of Habana, Fidel Castro declared that in spite of “demagogic statements” concerning Cuba made by Kennedy during the campaign, the Cuban Government would “wait and see” what policy the new administration would follow toward Cuba. Castro’s statements were voiced in a note of sarcasm and he ended his references to Senator Kennedy by saying that Cuba would give the new American President a political education.

In Pyongyang, North Korea, on December 2 National Bank President Ernesto “Che” Guevara stated that Cuba did not expect a change in the aggressive policy of the United States after President-elect Kennedy assumed office. Guevara reportedly went on to say that any change in the aggressive nature of imperialism was unthinkable and that it did not matter to Cuba, therefore, whether Kennedy, Nixon or some other person was in power in the United States.

b. Press Reaction

Both prior to and following the presidential elections in the United States, the line taken by the government-controlled press has been that it mattered little to the Cuban Revolution which of the two candidates, Kennedy or Nixon, should be elected to the presidency, for both represented the North American monopolies, were equally anti-Cuban and could be expected to continue the same imperialist policy followed by the Eisenhower administration (see enclosure 1).³ Revolucion, for example, in its Zona Rebelde column on November 11 summed up its opinion of the Kennedy victory by saying that the new President-elect was simply “the same dog with a different collar” (see enclosure 2). The same day El Mundo outlined its attitude with the following comment concerning Senator Kennedy’s election (see enclosure 3):

“No one has many illusions regarding the changes which could now be produced. No one expects much of Mr. Kennedy and the Democrats, whose capacity to maneuver is limited by the interests of capital financiers, by the big interests and by the groups which exercise pressure on the White House and on the Capitol. But no one wants to assume the responsibility of a negative attitude even before the new administration is born in fact. And this is enough to explain the somewhat positive reaction with which the world had met Mr. Kennedy’s triumph.”

An El Mundo editorial the following day declared that now that Senator Kennedy had won the election he must be judged by his actions and not his campaign statements. The editorial approved of one of his first acts, that of acknowledging Premier Khrushchev’s congratulatory message, but it assailed his announcement that both FBI Chief, J. Edgar Hoover, described by El Mundo as an unpopular figure responsible for the repression of liberal elements in the United States, and Central Intelligence Agency Chief, Allen Dulles, whom El Mundo described as responsible for the U–2 affair, would continue on in their respective positions. These two confirmations, according to El Mundo, indicated that there was little to hope for from Kennedy (see enclosure 4).

As the United States elections passed into the background, less attention was devoted to the issue by Cuban propaganda media, but the government-controlled press attacks against Senator Kennedy did not cease. For example, Prensa Libre on November 27 carried an item which sarcastically declared that as 1961 had been declared the “Year of Education” in Cuba, Kennedy might soon visit the island in order to learn to read and write (see enclosure 5). Habana’s Radio Voz had similar comments to make during the same week.

c. Conclusions

There appears to be no significant change of attitude on the part of the Castro regime toward the U. S. Government as a result of the election of Senator Kennedy. The Cuban position is that though it is willing to “wait and see” what stance the new administration will take, it fully expects Kennedy to continue the same “sterile imperialist policy” of the Eisenhower administration, with the result that “Yankee imperialism” will remain Cuba’s number one enemy. The fact that the Castro regime and its propaganda machine are not pressing the attack as strongly as several weeks ago probably indicates (1) a tactical maneuver possibly aimed at gaining economic concessions from the new administration, and (2) a natural slackening of emphasis due to the fact that the elections are now a fait accompli.

There has been some speculation among American newsmen in Cuba, and the Embassy itself has received reports, concerning alleged Soviet pressure on the Castro regime to soften for the time being its attacks against the United States and especially against the President-elect. Though there is very little upon which to base this speculation, such a move on the part of the Soviets would be consistent with their current line toward the incoming Kennedy administration.

For the Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.
Harvey R. Wellman
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/12–1360. Confidential. Drafted by Wayne S. Smith.

² In this airgram, dated December 1, the Embassy noted it saw “Very little to support” the deductions which certain American newspapermen were making in their despatches that the Castro government was adopting a “softer line toward the United States in anticipation of a change in the U.S. administration.” (Ibid., 611. 37/12–160)

³ None of the enclosures is printed.

623. Despatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

No. 1398 Havana, December 16, 1960.

REF

Embdespatch 1268, December 5, 1960²

SUBJECT

Examination of Advantages of Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba

The Country Team in the despatch under reference concluded that certain additional measures, including a rupture of diplomatic relations, should be undertaken by the United States to eliminate the Castro threat, with the active participation of our allies, if it can be obtained, and by ourselves preferably with their consent, if they cannot be persuaded to participate actively. It recommended that diplomatic relations should be severed at the moment most advantageous for our purposes, preferably as the result of inter-American action, and in any event not without prior consultation and coordination with friendly Latin American countries that might be disposed to take similar action.

This despatch examines more closely the policy advantages to the United States of a rupture of relations with Castro.

Alleged Advantages of Present U.S. Policy

It has been U.S. Government policy hitherto to maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of Fidel Castro as long as possible and to leave any initiative for diplomatic rupture to the Cuban Government. This policy has been adhered to despite the progressive worsening of U.S. -Cuban relations, the termination of any profitable contact between the two governments and the conduct of such relations as do exist in an atmosphere of mutual distrust, enmity and recriminations inconsistent with the traditional concept and normal practice of diplomatic relations.

As understood by the Embassy this policy has been deemed to be in the U. S. interest because of the value of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Habana (1) for intelligence purposes, (2) for the protection of U.S. citizens and their property interests, (3) as a moral support for Cubans in opposition to the Cuban Government, (4) for communication with the Cuban people, (5) as a witness and moderating influence upon the excesses of the Cuban Government, and (6) as an immediate contact with a new government following overthrow of Castro. The Embassy believes that it is time to reexamine these assumptions.

(1)

The Embassy is valuable for intelligence purposes, political, economic and military, [1 line not declassified]. The U.S. Government would not receive nearly as much intelligence or as rapidly if diplomatic relations were broken and it had to rely on friendly governments, anti-Castro Cuban sources and covert American sources.

Overt collection of intelligence, however, is becoming increasingly difficult. Political reporting officers are restricted largely to the press and published materials supplemented by friendly diplomatic sources and limited opposition contacts. Economic officers are similarly restricted as major industry and commerce, and finance have been taken over by the Government. In the military field flight restrictions have been imposed on the Air Attaché aircraft and access is prohibited to sensitive military areas and establishments. Nonetheless substantial on-the-spot intelligence is continuously being accumulated and transmitted.

(2) The protection of U.S. citizens and their property interests have become a factor of diminishing importance. Most U.S. citizens who are not rooted in Cuba have left. Many of those who still remain intend to do so only so long as the Embassy remains. Nearly all U. S. property interests in Cuba have been confiscated, and the Embassy in Cuba can render little further real assistance to U.S. citizens except such as would be involved in an evacuation.

(3)

The Castro Government’s anti-American propaganda, police-state methods, and control of mass media have very greatly reduced the Embassy’s communication with the Cuban people. Pro-Castro Cubans avoid the Embassy and its officials, and except for visa applicants, anti-Castro Cubans are circumspect in relations with Embassy officers.

The USIS is excluded from Cuban press, radio and television, has almost ceased film distribution and has substantially reduced distribution of publications. It does, however, distribute daily news bulletins, and binational centers in Santa Clara and Santiago are still open. The Visa Section still constitutes an important outlet for USIS materials.

(4) The Embassy does constitute a symbol of U.S. resistance to Castro and his communist sponsors, and of U.S. sympathy for Cuba and Cubans, as distinguished from their Government. As such it provides moral support for those anti-Castro Cubans who dare to remain in Cuba and openly or passively resist. The majority of anti-Castro Cubans seem to be preoccupied, however, with leaving Cuba as soon as possible or at least with getting into a position to leave at any moment.

(5) The Embassy’s effectiveness as a witness and moderating influence has not been conspicuous, having in mind the excesses perpetrated by the Castro Government against human and property rights of both Cubans and Americans.

(6) It is becoming increasingly evident that the Castro Government will not be overthrown suddenly or easily by an internal uprising. A combination of external and internal pressures will be required, inconsistent with the continued maintenance of relations and to which a rupture of relations can contribute.

Of the cited advantages of maintaining diplomatic relations, only one, namely intelligence, appears to be a substantial advantage at present. On the other hand, there are real advantages in a rupture of relations.

Advantages of Rupture of Relations

Great numbers of anti-Castro Cubans have fled from Cuba. Most are in the United States. It would be very difficult if not impossible to prevent them from making preparations in the United States to overthrow the Castro Government. It is alleged that they have training camps in Florida with U.S. connivance. It is also alleged that they are receiving financial assistance and arms from U.S. Government agencies. Whether or not these allegations are true, it is suggested that a situation has arisen which may prove embarrasing to the United States as long as diplomatic relations are maintained with the Castro Government.

It would seem that a rupture in diplomatic relations would assure the U. S. Government more scope and flexibility in dealing with the situation in which Cuba is fast becoming a Popular Socialist Republic with a violent anti-American bias in the Sino-Soviet system of states. An embargo on certain U.S. exports to Cuba has been imposed. It may be deemed advisable to impose an economic quarantine similar to that applied with respect to Communist China. To halt continued Soviet economic and military aid and to prevent an influx of communist “volunteers” intensive economic warfare including paramilitary measures might have to be considered. In the propaganda field, it would seem desirable to saturate Cuba from long-wave radio transmitters, operating from surrounding land and sea, with factual statements to counteract the massive propaganda of the Castro Government.

Such further actions of this nature as may be required in U.S. interests are hardly consistent with the maintenance of diplomatic relations. In the absence of a rupture of relations their objective consideration is hampered and their effective application would be impaired.

Rupture is Envisaged under Inter-American Security Procedures

So far as consistent with the protection of vital U.S. interests, U.S. actions with respect to Cuba should be in accordance with inter-American resolutions with which all or at least the great majority of the other American states should be associated. Cuba under Castro has become a “fact or situation” envisaged by Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. Under Article 8 of the Treaty rupture of diplomatic relations is the first measure, following recall of chiefs of mission, upon which the Organ of Consultation may agree for dealing with such a situation. Breaking of consular relations is the next listed measure and under the circumstances should not be dissociated therefrom. Thus rupture of relations would be one of the first measures for consideration at any future Meeting of the Organ of Consultation on the Cuban situation.

It is believed most Latin American Embassies in Habana would recommend support of a U.S. initiative to break relations. Whether their governments would participate or at least approve could be verified by bilateral consultations. Four American states (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua) have no diplomatic relations with Cuba. The Paraguayan mission has been recently expelled. Several Chiefs of Mission, notably the Argentinian, Brazilian, Peruvian, Venezuelan and Panamanian have friction continually with the Cuban authorities as a result of delays in obtaining safe conducts for asylees, offensive remarks about their public officials, denial of franquicias, Cuban intervention in their internal affairs or other activities of Cuban officials.

Most Latin American Ambassadors here are incensed with the increasingly offensive, aggressive and interventionist posture of the Cuban Government. Moreover, they are increasingly concerned with the subservience of Castro to Moscow and the substantial military assistance to Cuba from Eastern Europe. They are looking for some U.S. initiative to help to resolve the Cuban problem. The Mexican Ambassador is apparently the only exception.

Rupture Would Close Visa Escape Valve

In evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining diplomatic relations with the present Cuban Government, the Embassy’s visa operation should not be ignored. Presumably this facility will be maintained as long as we have diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Under present circumstances visas are being requested mainly for refugee purposes. Those obtaining U.S. visas because of fear or opposition are, with certain exceptions, permitted to depart without objection from the Castro Government which thereby is rid of elements of discontent. It is suggested that, apart from humanitarian considerations, it might be in the U.S. interest if as a consequence of the rupture of diplomatic relations this escape valve should be closed and the departure from Cuba of Cuban dissidents should no longer be facilitated. There may be an advantage to the United States and to the Cuban opposition for the latter to have a representative nucleus abroad for purposes of security, organization, planning and liaison, but such a nucleus already exists and will in any event be strengthened from time to time by Cubans who through asylum or other means are able to join it.

Rupture Would Eliminate Embassy Operational Problems

The examination of this question would not be complete without an inquiry into the effectiveness and difficulties of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Habana under present circumstances. American employees are from time to time subjected to harassment; detentions have taken place in violation of traditional immunities; diplomatic households have been broken into, searched and robbed under circumstances indicating official responsibility or connivance; phones are tapped, employees are trailed, public hostility is encouraged; and the Cuban authorities cannot be relied upon to provide protection or to seek out and punish offenders.

Cuban employees likewise are subject to harassment and pressures. The incidence of resignation of local employees, in most cases to enter the United States as immigrants, is high, and it is difficult to replace them with competent and trustworthy employees. Some few local employees are pro-Castro. The Embassy continually receives charges, which are difficult to substantiate, that some are informing on Embassy activities.

The Embassy’s classified files have been so reduced by removal or destruction that the conduct of business is adversely affected. The absence of files hampers political reporting, security checks and the intelligence activity of all Embassy agencies.

While diplomatic relations are maintained, the physical security of the Embassy and the personal security of the Embassy staff are continually threatened. There has been an average of about one security alert per month at the Embassy since the beginning of this year. The Embassy and its personnel are secure only so long as the Cuban Government deems it not to be in its interest to violate that security. The security of Embassy property and personnel is admittedly secondary to the U.S. interest in dealing effectively with the Cuban situation, but exposure to these risks should be justified on this ground and if not so justified constitutes an additional reason for ceasing to maintain diplomatic relations.

U.S. –Cuban relations have so worsened in recent months that the Embassy now has no profitable contact with the Cuban Foreign Ministry or other agencies of the Cuban Government. Most communications with the Cuban Government are with respect to facilities and services necessitated by the existence of the Embassy and the presence of its personnel in Cuba. Diplomatic communications of substance are exchanged in an atmosphere of hostility, suspicion and distrust. Notes are delivered for the record or for propaganda effect which would be served as well by a communication from a protecting power or by a Department statement or press release.

Conclusion

An initiative by the United States with a view to breaking relations with the Cuban Government would on balance appear to be in the U.S. interest. The basis for such action would be that the Cuban Government is no longer representative of the Cuban people or of Cuban national interests, but rather of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the international communist apparatus serving bloc policy, and maintains itself in power by force. Rupture of relations would mean less and slower intelligence on Cuba. The action would, however, further the U.S. objective of securing a change in the Cuban Government in that it would signalize to the Cuban people and the world our conclusion that the Castro regime is not a representative Cuban Government, put the U. S. Government in a better position to strengthen and encourage the Cuban opposition, open the way for more vigorous economic and propaganda measures inconsistent with the maintenance of diplomatic relations, and remove the distractions for U.S. policy created by the attempt to operate a diplomatic mission in Cuba under existing circumstances. Such action is envisaged by inter-American collective security procedures and in the Embassy’s judgement would be supported by most Latin American missions in Habana and would be probably approved by most American states.

Daniel M. Braddock
Chargé d’Affaires a.i.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/12–1660. Secret. Drafted by Wellman and cleared in draft with (less than 1 line not declassified), the Service Attachés, and USIS. A copy was sent to Santiago de Cuba.

² Document 616.

624. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis for the American Republics (Hall) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs’ Staff Assistant (Devine)¹

Washington, December 21, 1960.

SUBJECT

Comments on Attached Memorandum by S/P, Mr. Smith²

The feeling in RAR is that the attached memorandum is generally outdated and that it shows a lack of understanding of Latins and the Latin American ambiente. Mr. Smith makes one or two good points, but as a whole it does not indicate a great deal of depth. For example, he states that Castro has no seriously conceived economic or social programs. (Point 2 of the memorandum.) If nothing else the policies thus far implemented indicate a desire to “free” Cuba from US domination. The recent Bettelheim Mission to Cuba³ recommended a comprehensive economic development program along Marxist lines. If adopted, this program will certainly provide a serious direction to the Cuban planners. It is the trend of present programs—their collectivist tendencies—which must be kept in mind, not the lack of a program. To suggest that the Castro appeal is purely emotional does not, I think, give the devil his due. In point 5 of the memo Mr. Smith states that Castro and the Soviet Union hope for US intervention in Cuba. RSB and RAR do not feel that this is the case. If we believe too strongly that the Bloc and Castro desire intervention we may then lose sight of the principal aim of the Soviets in Cuba, i.e., the establishment of a violently anti-US, pro-Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere for use as a springboard to other Latin American countries.

The arguments against US intervention in Cuba are strong enough without pinning them to a belief that intervention is what the Soviets want.

I would suggest that our recent SNIE on Cuba⁴ is the best answer to a number of the outdated thoughts in the memo.

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba Miscellaneous Jan. –Feb. 1961. Confidential. Drafted by Lawrence S. Eagleburger (INR/RAR) and initialed by Hall.

² Document 555. Smith’s memorandum had been circulated in November to the members of the 10: 30 a.m. Working Group on Cuba for comment. Hall’s memorandum, printed here, as well as memoranda from other members of the Working Group commenting on Smith’s paper, were attached to a memorandum of January 17, 1961, from Devine to Coerr which summarized the various comments. (Department of State, ARA Deputy Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba Miscellaneous, Jan. –Feb. 1961)

³ Professor Charles Bettelheim of the Sorbonne visited Cuba and, in a memorandum of September 19, submitted various recommendations to the Cuban Government on economic development planning. A Spanish translation of Bettelheim’s report was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 821 from Havana, October 11. (Ibid., Central Files, 837. 00/10–1160)

⁴ Document 620.

625. Notes on the Meeting of the Working Group on Cuba, Department of State, Washington, December 22, 1960¹

Washington, December 22, 1960

[Here follows discussion of the refugee problem in Miami, some examples of anti-Castro propaganda, the lowered standard of living in Cuba, the Venezuelan attitude toward the Cuban situation, and the possible funding by the Rockefeller Foundation of a study on Cuba.]

6. Mr. Braddock’s Comments: Our Chargé, Dan Braddock, home on consultation from the Embassy in Habana spoke briefly. He termed the Castro regime entirely hopeless as far as any chance of our ever establishing a constructive relationship with it. He opined that time was running against us—even the opposition in Cuba has no chance for a successful move against the GOC. Its task in this regard will become increasingly difficult in the coming months. Mr. Braddock hoped that the Kennedy Administration would not feel it necessary to make a public showing of “an open mind” for very long, since in the case of Cuba this would immediately be turned undesirably and un-productively lost. He expressed the hope that the new administration could accept a very strong line on Cuba from the outset, could bring along a significant number of Latin American states and that the opposition to Castro would be able to pull itself together for necessary action. He commented that the GOC is building up its military might and totalitarian control very rapidly and that opposition leaders are being apprehended all the time. A move against the regime would have better chances of success within the next six months than at any time thereafter.

7. Questions and Answers: Taking advantage of Mr. Braddock’s presence, various members of the group put questions to him. His answers are reflected below.

a. Mr. Braddock confirmed that Cubans easily pick up the broadcasts from the Swan Island radio but that they are sometimes disappointed by its departures from the facts which they themselves know to be true. Greater respect for the facts would lend it greater weight.

b. Mr. Braddock estimated that there are something over three thousand U.S. citizens still in Cuba. Most of these are now becoming alarmed. Many of them have a protective coloration and are relatively imbedded in the local landscape. True state–side Americans living in Habana other than Embassy staff members probably total 100 or less.

c. There is a continuous influx of persons from the Iron Curtain countries. They arrive steadily by KLM airline. Many are already in Cuba, although no precise figures exist. Families have come with them in many cases.

d. Up to a 1000 or so people are now fighting in the Escambray mountains. They are divided into two or three different groups. The Cuban government seems very serious about routing them out and unfortunately it probably has the capacity to do so.

e. The Cuban-American Cultural Center in Habana is still operating. Conceivably it might survive. 1200 persons are studying English there.

f. Fidel Castro’s popularity is now sinking toward an irreducible minimum. Twenty to thirty percent of the population is probably with him today. This segment, however, includes young and combative types and makes a very effective minority.

g. Latin American diplomatic representatives in Cuba seem to agree to the necessity for cleaning up and getting rid of the present GOC. European representatives seem less impressed with this necessity. The West German Ambassador, or Chargé, even went so far recently when speaking with Acting Foreign Minister Olivares as to term Germany “neutral” in the present difficult situation between the U.S. and Cuba.

[Here follows a list of action assignments.]

¹ Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Working Group Notes. Confidential. Drafted by Devine on January 9, 1961. Participants at the meeting were identified only as members of the “10: 30 Working Group.”

626. Memorandum of Discussion at the 472d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 29, 1960, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, December 29, 1960, 10 a.m.

[ Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Mr. Dulles reported that “Che” Guevara had returned to Cuba after a tour of the Communist Bloc with a great many agreements which, if carried out (a contingency Mr. Dulles considered unlikely), would result in more than half of Cuba’s foreign trade being with the Bloc. Guevara had made agreements with North Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia, East Germany, the USSR, and Communist China. He had apparently established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, Mongolia, Albania, and Hungary. He had obtained a $20 million credit from Czechoslovakia. Apparently, his negotiations with Moscow resulted in extensive trade-aid commitments. Moreover, Moscow had proclaimed its intention to combat “U.S. economic aggression” by providing Cuba with whatever imports it might need and by buying Cuban sugar. The Soviet delegation in Havana had signed an agreement for purchase of a million tons of Cuban sugar in return for Soviet POL. However, Guevara failed to get as much Soviet economic assistance as Cuba desired; a $300 million loan was turned down by the Soviets. Communist China granted some interest-free credit and agreed to train Cubans, particularly in building agricultural stations.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs.

627. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, December 29, 1960, 10: 30–10: 38 a.m.¹

Washington, December 29, 1960, 10:30–10:38 a.m.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary

Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

Following the National Security Council meeting this morning, the President asked me to come into his office. He said that he wanted to talk to me about Cuba and in this connection stated that he had been much impressed by what Bill Pawley had reported to him two days ago² concerning his visit to Argentina and Peru. He asked if I had seen him, and I told him I had done so yesterday and that we were giving hard thought to his report.

The President said that he agreed with Pawley that there should be no formal meeting of the OAS on Cuba. I interjected to say that to circumvent the OAS entirely needed careful thought and that, as the President knew, we had been working quietly with the more friendly ambassadors with a view to later going into an OAS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in which we could count on majority support even though Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, and possibly some others might oppose us. The President said that he was aware of this but he thought we should be instructing our ambassadors to Peru and Argentina to urge those presidents to themselves rally support for us with other Latin American governments. He said that the Latin American governments which were so minded should through diplomatic channels ask us to take action. He repeated several times that they must take the initiative so that we respond to an appeal from others. I pointed out the great difficulty in many of the Latin American governmental leaders giving any public indication whatsoever of support for us in such an enterprise because of their fears of their own Castroist left-wing movements. The President said he understood that.

The President went on to say that he thought we ought to move quickly. He would be happy if before January 20 we could take such a step as a break in relations with the Castro Government done concurrently with a number of other Latin American governments. He then repeated that our representatives in Peru and Argentina should find out how many other heads of government Frondizi and Prado could persuade to take an initiative and ask us to act. The President said that he knew we were working very hard and actively on this problem but that he thought we should move quickly.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–2960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Eisenhower Library)

² No record has been found of a meeting between the President and Pawley on December 27. Reference apparently is to a meeting on December 28 from 9: 26 to 10 a.m. (Ibid.)

628. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Stevenson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr)¹

Washington, December 30, 1960.

SUBJECT

The Question of Continuing Diplomatic Relations with Cuba

In response to your question at the staff meeting today, I am attaching Habana’s Despatch No. 1398² in which Harvey Wellman examines the advantages and disadvantages of breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba. When Mr. Braddock was here we in CMA discussed this question with him and found ourselves in general agreement except with regard to the question of United States initiative in making such a break. It continues to be our view in CMA that it would be much preferred if some of the other Latin American countries might be the first to break relations with United States action to follow very shortly thereafter. We in CMA also feel that should this step be taken we should be prepared to move ahead with such other pressures as are available to us, namely, the invocation of the Trading with the Enemy Act so as to shut off all remaining exports from Cuba to the United States (mainly tobacco and molasses) and perhaps also an extension of the export licensing controls to foodstuffs and medicines.

Ed Vallon has raised the question as to whether such a course might not foreclose any chance of success resulting from our course of action. However, I believe that I can safely say that he is of the opinion that the time has come to move ahead along the lines recommended by the Embassy, hoping but not necessarily counting on parallel action by all of the other OAS countries.

It is my understanding that Jack McKnight has sent a memorandum³ to Mr. Mann suggesting that a break in diplomatic relations at this time would facilitate the anti-Castro propaganda effort. On this point, I would call to your attention a minor discrepancy between Harvey Wellman’s comments as to the effectiveness of the USIS effort in Cuba and Despatch No. 42, also attached,³ written by Paul Bethel, the Acting Information Officer.

In summation, CMA is of the opinion that we should move ahead along the lines recommended by Embassy Habana looking toward an early break in relations with Cuba at a time of our choosing.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737. 00/12–3060. Secret. Drafted by Stevenson. Written in the margin of the source text in an unidentified hand is the word “Bravo!”

² Document 623.

³ Not found.

³ Not found.

⁴ The United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961.

629. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, December 31, 1960—1 p.m.

2651. Revolutionary press this morning carries identical banner headlines “Yankee Invasion Imminent”, with sub-head that Foreign Office Minister Roa had departed during night to New York to denounce attack.² Press stories state that information received by government from creditable sources indicates that plan is being hatched to provoke invasion by US Marines. Pentagon and CIA are accused of developing plan with approval of President Eisenhower who is charged with deciding to use last few days his administration to intervene in Cuba and turn over fait accompli to new administration. Danger of invasion said to extend from today until January 18. As evidence of invasion press cites following: (1) Announcement by Peru that it had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) statement by Uruguayan President Nardone that his government studying possibility of expelling Cuban diplomatic mission and following footsteps of Peru; (3) AP despatch from Caracas reporting that President Betancourt had decided not to recognize new Cuban Chargé d’Affaires; (4) Prensa Latina story that American Embassy in Habana had called all Americans (residents and tourists) to meeting in Embassy at 10 a.m. December 31 to give them a “very important piece of news”. Articles state that certainty of danger led Revolutionary Government to dispatch Roa to New York immediately to denounce the plot before UN and mobilize world public opinion against imminent invasion.

Braddock

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611. 37/12–3160. Official Use Only; Niact. Repeated to USUN.

² For extracts from Roa’s December 31 letter to the President of the U. N. Security Council, in which he requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss ways to prevent “armed units of the United States” from violating Cuban sovereignty, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 250–251.

Index

Abascal, Gerardo, 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 62]

Acción Católica, 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31], 317 [Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 197]

Acción Cívica Anti-Communista (ACA), 1158 [Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 617]

Achilles, Theodore C., 845 [Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477]

Agramonte Pichado, Roberto, 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 132], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 233], 377–378 [Pgs. –378 include portions of ], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 238], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 247], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302], 516 [Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312], 526n [Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 319], 642 [Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379], 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

U.S.-Cuban relations, 347n [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 217], 352 [Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 231], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 236], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 253], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 256], 420–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 455 [Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277], 521–522 [Pgs. –522 include portions of ]

Agrarian reform. See under Revolutionary regime.

Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 255], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 280], 517–519 [Pgs. –519 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 976 [Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 542]

Agrupación Católica Universitaria, 1155 [Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 617]

Agrupación Montecristi, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 410], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599], 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Aguilera, José, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Aguirre, Francisco, 526 [Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 319]

Aiken, George D., 323–324 [Pgs. –324 include portions of ]

Air Force, U.S. Department of the, 634 [Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 375]

Akin, John, 707 [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412], 939–940 [Pgs. –940 include portions of ], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528]

Alfonso, Paco, 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 278]

Algeria, 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545]

Allen, George V., 303 [Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 188], 442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 410], 773n [Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443], 894–896 [Pgs. –896 include portions of ], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 976 [Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 542], 983 [Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 545], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 1022–1023 [Pgs. –1023 include portions of ]

Allen, Max B., 628 [Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371]

Alliegro, Anselmo, 1–2 [Pgs. –2 include portions of ], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 391]

Almeida Bosque, Juan, 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260]

Alvarez Martinez, Eugenia, 755 [Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 430]

Alvarez Tabio, Evelio, 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]

American Friends of Cuba, 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443], 787 [Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 452], 882 [Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 497], 1022–1023 [Pgs. –1023 include portions of ]

American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA), 616 [Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 365], 622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367], 628–629 [Pgs. –629 include portions of ], 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394]

Amoedo, Julio, 776 [Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 478], 928–929 [Pgs. –929 include portions of ], 1025–1026 [Pgs. –1026 include portions of ]

Amory, Robert, Jr., 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 421]

Amoss, Walter J., 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 345–346 [Pgs. –346 include portions of ]

Anderson, Orville C, 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119], 249 [Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 481n [Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291], 599n [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361]

Anderson, Robert B., 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 250], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324], 832 [Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474], 998–999 [Pgs. –999 include portions of ], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

Revolutionary regime, 861–862 [Pgs. –862 include portions of ], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521], 934 [Pg. 934 is part of Doc. 525], 936 [Pg. 936 is part of Doc. 526], 981 [Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 545], 1016–1017 [Pgs. –1017 include portions of ], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

U.S. policy toward, 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 474], 895–896 [Pgs. –896 include portions of ], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 907 [Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 514], 963 [Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 536], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 1119 [Pg. 1119 is part of Doc. 608]

Covert opposition support, 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 907 [Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 514], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613]

Economic pressures, 950–951 [Pgs. –951 include portions of ], 958–964 [Pgs. –964 include portions of ], 981 [Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 545], 985–988 [Pgs. –988 include portions of ], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 1013–1014 [Pgs. –1014 include portions of ], 1018–1019 [Pgs. –1019 include portions of ], 1081 [Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588]

Sugar policy, 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 402], 699–700 [Pgs. –700 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 931 [Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 523], 950–951 [Pgs. –951 include portions of ], 959 [Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 536], 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544]

Andrade, Victor, 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 197], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204]

Antuña, Vincentina, 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 278]

Aragon, Rafael, 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Arcaya Rivero, Ignacio Luiz, 938 [Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 526], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Areeda, Philip E., 517 [Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

Arévalo Bermejo, Juan Jose, 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 389]

Argentina (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25], 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232], 503 [Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302], 766 [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 437], 776 [Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444], 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 474], 928–929 [Pgs. –929 include portions of ], 1025–1027 [Pgs. –1027 include portions of ], 1053 [Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 574], 1061 [Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 578], 1063–1064 [Pgs. –1064 include portions of ], 1171 [Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 620]

Arías, Arnulfo, 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 189], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 197], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204]

Arías Espinosa, Ricardo M., 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 189], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 197], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204]

Arneson, R. Gordon, 77–78 [Pgs. –78 include portions of ], 589–591 [Pgs. –591 include portions of ]

Arroyo y Marquéz, Nicolás, 85–88 [Pgs. –88 include portions of ], 96–98 [Pgs. –98 include portions of ], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 60], 184 [Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 119], 203–206 [Pgs. –206 include portions of ], 290–292 [Pgs. –292 include portions of ]

Arteaga, Cardinal Manuel, 4 [Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2]

Artigas, Ricardo, 259–260 [Pgs. –260 include portions of ]

Artime, Manuel, 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 424], 755–756 [Pgs. –756 include portions of ], 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599], 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Arvey, Erwin B. (Bud), 900–901 [Pgs. –901 include portions of ]

Arvey, Jacob, 900 [Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509]

Asbjornson, Mildred, 866n [Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 488]

Austria, 625–626 [Pgs. –626 include portions of ]

Auténtico Party (PRC) (see also Organización Auténtica), 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 136], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 257], 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599]

Baggett, Samuel G., 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 608–609 [Pgs. –609 include portions of ], 973–975 [Pgs. –975 include portions of ]

Baguer y Marty, 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 241]

Baird, Julian B., 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379]

Baker, J.S., 223–224 [Pgs. –224 include portions of ], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150]

Balgooyen, H.W., 707–711 [Pgs. –711 include portions of ], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Balla, Michael, 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Bank of International Settlements, 827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 472]

Barbour, Walworth, 625–626 [Pgs. –626 include portions of ]

Barletta, Amadeo, 881 [Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 497]

Barnes, Robert G., 42n [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 936 [Pg. 936 is part of Doc. 526]

Barnes, Tracy, 1126 [Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613], 1140–1141 [Pgs. –1141 include portions of ]

Barquín, Ramón, 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 39], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 80 [Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173], 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 197], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 295], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

Bates, Richard, 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507]

Batista, Augustín, 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260]

Batista, Marthe, 567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341]

Batista, Roberto, 567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341]

Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio (see also Batista regime), 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 5–7 [Pgs. –7 include portions of ], 10–12 [Pgs. –12 include portions of ], 29–30 [Pgs. –30 include portions of ], 43 [Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23], 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31], 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 160 [Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 110], 255 [Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 154]

Asylum, 383–384 [Pgs. –384 include portions of ], 391–392 [Pgs. –392 include portions of ], 505–506 [Pgs. –506 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 567–568 [Pgs. –568 include portions of ], 575–577 [Pgs. –577 include portions of ], 591–592 [Pgs. –592 include portions of ]

1958 elections, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16], 37 [Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 50n [Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 57–58 [Pgs. –58 include portions of ], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131]

Retirement of (see also Post-Batista provisional government proposals), 105–106 [Pgs. –106 include portions of ], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 123], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 160], 328–329 [Pgs. –329 include portions of ], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 218]

Rivero Agüero administration role, 263–264 [Pgs. –264 include portions of ], 268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 162], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 163], 282–283 [Pgs. –283 include portions of ]

26th of July Movement, 28–29 [Pgs. –29 include portions of ], 143–144 [Pgs. –144 include portions of ], 151–152 [Pgs. –152 include portions of ], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117]

U.S. military aid to Cuba, 51n [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 124 [Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 144 [Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 102], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157]

Batista regime (see also Post-Batista provisional government proposals; Rivera Agüero administration), 59–60 [Pgs. –60 include portions of ]

Amnesty proposals, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 10], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 12], 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59]

Anti-revolutionary actions (see also U.S. military aid to: Anti-revolutionary use below):

Military offensives, 99–116 [Pgs. –116 include portions of ], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 121], 268–269 [Pgs. –269 include portions of ]

Oriente population transfers, 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 34], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 43]

U.S. citizens kidnappings and, 128–129 [Pgs. –129 include portions of ], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 90], 149 [Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100]

Atrocities, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 43], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 197], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 218], 351 [Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221], 373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 234]

Belgian military aid, 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 133], 215n [Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134]

British and Canadian military aid, 144 [Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94], 152–153 [Pgs. –153 include portions of ], 166–167 [Pgs. –167 include portions of ], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 179], 298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185]

Catholic Church opposition to, 5 [Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23], 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31]

Constitutional guarantee suspensions, 14–15 [Pgs. –15 include portions of ], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 10], 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 54–55 [Pgs. –55 include portions of ], 77 [Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 47], 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 111], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 121], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 182], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201]

1958 elections and, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 12 [Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 43], 99 [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60], 169–170 [Pgs. –170 include portions of ], 173–174 [Pgs. –174 include portions of ], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 121], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 123], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 218–219 [Pgs. –219 include portions of ], 249n [Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]

U.S. military aid and, 5–14 [Pgs. –14 include portions of ], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 43], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104], 173–174 [Pgs. –174 include portions of ]

Corruption in, 286–287 [Pgs. –287 include portions of ]

Dominican Republic military aid to, 293n [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 313n [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206]

Economic situation under, 1 [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1], 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14], 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 18], 162 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 111], 287–288 [Pgs. –288 include portions of ], 290–291 [Pgs. –291 include portions of ], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 182], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 197]

Guantanamo base protection, 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 183–185 [Pgs. –185 include portions of ], 273–276 [Pgs. –276 include portions of ]

National emergency declaration, 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 182]

1958 elections, 1–2 [Pgs. –2 include portions of ], 15–17 [Pgs. –17 include portions of ], 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 38], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 173 [Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 113], 187–190 [Pgs. –190 include portions of ], 217–222 [Pgs. –222 include portions of ], 249–250 [Pgs. –250 include portions of ], 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174]

Batista regime intentions, 28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16], 56–58 [Pgs. –58 include portions of ], 61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38], 75–76 [Pgs. –76 include portions of ], 85–86 [Pgs. –86 include portions of ], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 58], 168 [Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 128], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]

Batista retirement and, 105–106 [Pgs. –106 include portions of ], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 123], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131]

Constitutional guarantee suspensions and, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 12 [Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 43], 99 [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60], 169–170 [Pgs. –170 include portions of ], 173–174 [Pgs. –174 include portions of ], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 121], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 123], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 218–219 [Pgs. –219 include portions of ], 249 [Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]

Cuban public opinion, 36–37 [Pgs. –37 include portions of ], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 220–221 [Pgs. –221 include portions of ], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 177]

General amnesty, 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 34], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59]

Neutral observers, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 12], 28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16], 36–38 [Pgs. –38 include portions of ], 45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24], 50–52 [Pgs. –52 include portions of ], 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 34], 97–98 [Pgs. –98 include portions of ], 105 [Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 128], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 136], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 147]

26th of July Movement opposition, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 217 [Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 218–221 [Pgs. –221 include portions of ], 231–232 [Pgs. –232 include portions of ], 244 [Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 150], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 177]

U.S. citizen protection, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 233 [Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142]

U.S. military aid and, 10–12 [Pgs. –12 include portions of ], 16–17 [Pgs. –17 include portions of ], 48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26], 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 122]

U.S. proposals, 37–38 [Pgs. –38 include portions of ], 51–52 [Pgs. –52 include portions of ], 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 34], 88–89 [Pgs. –89 include portions of ], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59]

1959 election proposals, 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 187], 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196], 317 [Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 197], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 197]

Opposition to. See Revolutionary movements.

Political opposition (see also 1958 elections above; individual politicians), 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 132], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 138], 229–230 [Pgs. –230 include portions of ], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 142], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 147], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 154], 268–269 [Pgs. –269 include portions of ], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169], 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174], 291–292 [Pgs. –292 include portions of ], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 197], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 257]

Press censorship, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 85n [Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 52], 174 [Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]

Truce proposals, 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 45], 84 [Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51]

26th of July Movement negotiations proposals, 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 139], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 181]

United States, relations with, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 21], 95–97 [Pgs. –97 include portions of ], 290–291 [Pgs. –291 include portions of ], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180]

U.S. military aid to, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 23–24 [Pgs. –24 include portions of ], 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 256–258 [Pgs. –258 include portions of ], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 201]

Anti-revolutionary use, 18–20 [Pgs. –20 include portions of ], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 13], 42–43 [Pgs. –43 include portions of ], 48–50 [Pgs. –50 include portions of ], 63–64 [Pgs. –64 include portions of ], 84 [Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51], 92–93 [Pgs. –93 include portions of ], 96–97 [Pgs. –97 include portions of ], 99–102 [Pgs. –102 include portions of ], 106–116 [Pgs. –116 include portions of ], 118–119 [Pgs. –119 include portions of ], 166–167 [Pgs. –167 include portions of ], 192–194 [Pgs. –194 include portions of ]

Anti-Americanism and, 373–374 [Pgs. –374 include portions of ]

26th of July Movement position, 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 39], 125–126 [Pgs. –126 include portions of ], 134 [Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 121]

U.S. citizens kidnappings and, 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 81], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 83], 134–135 [Pgs. –135 include portions of ]

Communist influence and, 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 122], 386 [Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243]

Constitutional guarantee suspensions and, 5–14 [Pgs. –14 include portions of ], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 43], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104], 173–174 [Pgs. –174 include portions of ]

Cuban public opinion, 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 54], 199 [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 126], 251 [Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153]

Latin American positions, 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 203]

1958 elections and, 10–12 [Pgs. –12 include portions of ], 16–17 [Pgs. –17 include portions of ], 48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26], 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 122]

T–28 training aircraft, 109–110 [Pgs. –110 include portions of ], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 68], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 70], 123–124 [Pgs. –124 include portions of ], 152–154 [Pgs. –154 include portions of ], 158–159 [Pgs. –159 include portions of ], 167–168 [Pgs. –168 include portions of ], 193–194 [Pgs. –194 include portions of ], 198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 201–203 [Pgs. –203 include portions of ], 206–207 [Pgs. –207 include portions of ], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131]

26th of July Movement position, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 21], 63–65 [Pgs. –65 include portions of ], 125–126 [Pgs. –126 include portions of ], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 111], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 122], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 130]

U.S. citizens kidnappings and, 123–124 [Pgs. –124 include portions of ], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 81], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 83], 134–135 [Pgs. –135 include portions of ], 142 [Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 193–194 [Pgs. –194 include portions of ], 207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 148]

U.S. public opinion, 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 13–14 [Pgs. –14 include portions of ], 61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38], 66–67 [Pgs. –67 include portions of ], 71–72 [Pgs. –72 include portions of ], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 46], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 48], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 54], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 56], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 179], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203]

U.S. suspension, 66–67 [Pgs. –67 include portions of ], 71–74 [Pgs. –74 include portions of ], 78–79 [Pgs. –79 include portions of ], 83–84 [Pgs. –84 include portions of ], 90–94 [Pgs. –94 include portions of ], 116–118 [Pgs. –118 include portions of ], 142 [Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 144 [Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94], 146 [Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 102], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201]

Batista regime position, 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 121], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 313–314 [Pgs. –314 include portions of ]

Cuban economic situation and, 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 177]

Joint Chiefs of Staff position, 321 [Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]

Latin American positions, 293n [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180]

Rifle shipment, 60–62 [Pgs. –62 include portions of ], 65 [Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 41], 73 [Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 46], 87–88 [Pgs. –88 include portions of ], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 190]

U.S. citizens kidnappings and, 123–124 [Pgs. –124 include portions of ], 142 [Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130]

U.S.-owned companies in Cuba and, 171–172 [Pgs. –172 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward (see also U.S. military aid to above), 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 112], 189–192 [Pgs. –192 include portions of ], 198–201 [Pgs. –201 include portions of ], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 128], 280–281 [Pgs. –281 include portions of ], 330–331 [Pgs. –331 include portions of ]

Bay of Pigs. See Revolutionary regime:

U.S. policy toward: Covert opposition support.

Bayo, Alberto, 1025 [Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563]

Beale, W.T.M., Jr., 406n [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 314], 712n [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 413], 721–722 [Pgs. –722 include portions of ], 724 [Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417], 728–731 [Pgs. –731 include portions of ]

Beals, Carlton, 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512]

Beatón, Manuel, 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 1161 [Pg. 1161 is part of Doc. 617]

Beaulac, Willard L., 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534]

Bécquer, Conrado, 783 [Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 450]

Beers, Elizabeth, 375n [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 235], 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Belgium, 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 133], 215n [Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 364], 625–626 [Pgs. –626 include portions of ]

Belk, Samuel, 697n [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 734–735 [Pgs. –735 include portions of ], 852–854 [Pgs. –854 include portions of ]

Bell, John O., 454–455 [Pgs. –455 include portions of ]

Belt, Guillermo, 315–316 [Pgs. –316 include portions of ], 346n [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 216]

Beltrán, Pedro G., 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 963 [Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 536], 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541], 977–978 [Pgs. –978 include portions of ]

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443]

Benson, Ezra Taft, 522 [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 316], 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 320]

Berding, Andrew H., 9n [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 780n [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448]

Berenson, Lawrence, 505–506 [Pgs. –506 include portions of ], 591–592 [Pgs. –592 include portions of ]

Berle, Adolf A., Jr., 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443]

Bernau, Phyllis D., 349n [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 219]

Berrellez, Robert, 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468]

Beruff, Jorge, 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 399]

Best, John, 151 [Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102]

Betancourt, Ernesto, 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 181], 338 [Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212], 680–681 [Pgs. –681 include portions of ], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505]

Revolutionary regime, 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 250], 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277]

26th of July Movement, 156 [Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106], 207–209 [Pgs. –209 include portions of ], 233–235 [Pgs. –235 include portions of ], 238–239 [Pgs. –239 include portions of ]

Betancourt, Miguel Angel, 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225]

Betancourt, Rómulo, 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 267], 495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 298], 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515], 938 [Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 526], 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 977 [Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 543], 984–985 [Pgs. –985 include portions of ], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578], 1171–1172 [Pgs. –1172 include portions of ]

Bethel, Paul D., 458n [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278], 1124n [Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611], 1190 [Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629]

Bettelheim, Charles, 1184–1185 [Pgs. –1185 include portions of ]

Bez Chabebe, Jorge, 4–5 [Pgs. –5 include portions of ], 311–312 [Pgs. –312 include portions of ], 373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 234]

Bigart, Homer, 38–42 [Pgs. –42 include portions of ], 46–47 [Pgs. –47 include portions of ]

Bisbé, Manuel, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 247], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269]

Bissell, Richard M., Jr., 698–699 [Pgs. –699 include portions of ], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 1059–1060 [Pgs. –1060 include portions of ], 1126 [Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613]

Blanck, Amb., 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 62]

Blanck, Hugo de, 3 [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2]

Blanco, Alberto, 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]

Blanco, Lauro, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Bloque de Organizaciónes Anti-Communistas Cubaño (BOAC), 1157–1158 [Pgs. –1158 include portions of ]

Boggs, Marion W., 440–442 [Pgs. –442 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 560–561 [Pgs. –561 include portions of ], 567–568 [Pgs. –568 include portions of ], 646 [Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380], 683–685 [Pgs. –685 include portions of ], 698–700 [Pgs. –700 include portions of ], 703–706 [Pgs. –706 include portions of ], 740–746 [Pgs. –746 include portions of ], 749 [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426], 791–793 [Pgs. –793 include portions of ], 832–837 [Pgs. –837 include portions of ], 856–859 [Pgs. –859 include portions of ], 872–873 [Pgs. –873 include portions of ], 876–877 [Pgs. –877 include portions of ], 887–889 [Pgs. –889 include portions of ], 893–897 [Pgs. –897 include portions of ], 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 908–909 [Pgs. –909 include portions of ], 925–927 [Pgs. –927 include portions of ], 943–945 [Pgs. –945 include portions of ], 1028–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1039–1040 [Pgs. –1040 include portions of ], 1074–1076 [Pgs. –1076 include portions of ], 1081 [Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588], 1094–1100 [Pgs. –1100 include portions of ], 1118–1120 [Pgs. –1120 include portions of ], 1187 [Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 626]

Bogotá Resolution, 1948, 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527]

Bohlen, Charles E., 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 965 [Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 536], 970 [Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 550], 1020n [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560]

Bolivia, 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 197], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561]

Bonachea, Rolando E., 54 [Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

Bonesteel, Brig. Gen. Charles H., 1115n [Pg. 1115 is part of Doc. 607]

Bonsal, Philip W., 576 [Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345], 703n [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410], 766n [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 437], 780n [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448], 928 [Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 522]

Appointment of, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215], 354–355 [Pgs. –355 include portions of ], 367n [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 230], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 235], 409–410 [Pgs. –410 include portions of ]

Popularity of, 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 424]

Recall of, Jan.–Mar. 1960, 749–753 [Pgs. –753 include portions of ], 756–757 [Pgs. –757 include portions of ], 759–760 [Pgs. –760 include portions of ], 762–763 [Pgs. –763 include portions of ], 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 776–777 [Pgs. –777 include portions of ], 779–781 [Pgs. –781 include portions of ], 803 [Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460], 848–849 [Pgs. –849 include portions of ], 859 [Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484], 864–867 [Pgs. –867 include portions of ], 880–881 [Pgs. –881 include portions of ]

Recall of, Oct 1960, 1076 [Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584], 1081–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ], 1088 [Pg. 1088 is part of Doc. 592], 1112n [Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 604]

Revolutionary regime, 507–508 [Pgs. –508 include portions of ], 628–629 [Pgs. –629 include portions of ], 682–683 [Pgs. –683 include portions of ]

Agrarian reform, 475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286], 509–512 [Pgs. –512 include portions of ], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 310], 516–517 [Pgs. –517 include portions of ], 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318], 529–531 [Pgs. –531 include portions of ], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 607–609 [Pgs. –609 include portions of ], 613–614 [Pgs. –614 include portions of ], 622–623 [Pgs. –623 include portions of ], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 404], 739–740 [Pgs. –740 include portions of ], 868 [Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 490], 1073 [Pg. 1073 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582], 1074n [Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583]

Argentina, relations with, 1025–1026 [Pgs. –1026 include portions of ]

Armed forces, 627–628 [Pgs. –628 include portions of ]

Cienfuegos disappearance, 665–666 [Pgs. –666 include portions of ]

Communism under, 432 [Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264], 447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 270], 474 [Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285], 557–558 [Pgs. –558 include portions of ], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 342], 580–582 [Pgs. –582 include portions of ], 659–660 [Pgs. –660 include portions of ]

Economic situation, 899 [Pg. 899 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508]

Figueres visit, 447–448 [Pgs. –448 include portions of ]

Latin American revolutionary support, 479–480 [Pgs. –480 include portions of ], 503–504 [Pgs. –504 include portions of ], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 364], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 365]

Matos resignation, 629–631 [Pgs. –631 include portions of ], 648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382], 650 [Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383]

Morgan coup attempt, 579–580 [Pgs. –580 include portions of ], 685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403]

Opposition to, 431–432 [Pgs. –432 include portions of ], 553–554 [Pgs. –554 include portions of ]

Political situation, 503–504 [Pgs. –504 include portions of ], 564–566 [Pgs. –566 include portions of ], 660–662 [Pgs. –662 include portions of ], 680–681 [Pgs. –681 include portions of ], 1014 [Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 557 and Doc. 558]

Soviet Union, relations with, 935–938 [Pgs. –938 include portions of ], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 998 [Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550], 1008–1009 [Pgs. –1009 include portions of ], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561]

UN appeal, 1072 [Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 581]

United States, relations with, 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 315], 561–562 [Pgs. –562 include portions of ], 586–587 [Pgs. –587 include portions of ], 592 [Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357], 599 [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361], 622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367], 641–643 [Pgs. –643 include portions of ], 874–876 [Pgs. –876 include portions of ], 883–884 [Pgs. –884 include portions of ], 897 [Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506], 910–911 [Pgs. –911 include portions of ], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546]

Anti-Americanism, 595–596 [Pgs. –596 include portions of ], 603–604 [Pgs. –604 include portions of ], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 364], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 366], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394], 686–688 [Pgs. –688 include portions of ], 732 [Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 419], 747–748 [Pgs. –748 include portions of ], 753–758 [Pgs. –758 include portions of ]

Arms embargo, 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 364], 639–640 [Pgs. –640 include portions of ]

Castro visit, 421 [Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 455–456 [Pgs. –456 include portions of ], 466–468 [Pgs. –468 include portions of ], 480–481 [Pgs. –481 include portions of ]

Cuban exile illegal activities, 639–641 [Pgs. –641 include portions of ], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 391], 668–669 [Pgs. –669 include portions of ]

Cuban tariffs, 593–594 [Pgs. –594 include portions of ], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364]

Díaz Lanz case, 556–557 [Pgs. –557 include portions of ], 564–566 [Pgs. –566 include portions of ], 569–571 [Pgs. –571 include portions of ], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 374], 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392]

Economic aid, 574–575 [Pgs. –575 include portions of ], 578–579 [Pgs. –579 include portions of ], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360], 612–613 [Pgs. –613 include portions of ], 619–620 [Pgs. –620 include portions of ]

Embassy security, 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 342], 668 [Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393]

Extradition requests, 868 [Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 490]

Negotiation proposals, 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538], 1040–1045 [Pgs. –1045 include portions of ]

Nicaro plant, 918–919 [Pgs. –919 include portions of ], 922–925 [Pgs. –925 include portions of ]

Oriente province visit, 918–925 [Pgs. –925 include portions of ]

U.S. private investment, 420 [Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258]

U.S. sugar policy, 593–594 [Pgs. –594 include portions of ], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364], 639–640 [Pgs. –640 include portions of ], 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392], 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538], 995 [Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 548], 1073 [Pg. 1073 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582], 1074n [Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583]

U.S. policy toward, 456–457 [Pgs. –457 include portions of ], 611–617 [Pgs. –617 include portions of ], 658–659 [Pgs. –659 include portions of ], 676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 685–686 [Pgs. –686 include portions of ], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 764 [Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 436], 773 [Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443], 890 [Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 502], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 932 [Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 524], 933n [Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 524], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 1040–1045 [Pgs. –1045 include portions of ], 1114 [Pg. 1114 is part of Doc. 606]

Utilities, 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 358], 597–598 [Pgs. –598 include portions of ], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 364], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 404]

Boonstra, Clarence, 652n [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385]

Borbonet, Enrique, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173]

Bordon, Victor, 510 [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]

Borg, Arthur, 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Bosch, José M. (Pepin), 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277]

Boti Leon, Regino, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 21], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 252], 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271], 455 [Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276], 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294], 500–502 [Pgs. –502 include portions of ], 592 [Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360], 622–623 [Pgs. –623 include portions of ], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399], 686–688 [Pgs. –688 include portions of ]

Botifolls, Luis, 672–673 [Pgs. –673 include portions of ]

Bowdler, William B., 120–121 [Pgs. –121 include portions of ], 186n [Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 198n [Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 217n [Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 918n [Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 520], 1149n [Pg. 1149 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617]

Braddock, Daniel M., 338–339 [Pgs. –339 include portions of ], 580n [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 686n [Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404], 703n [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410]

Batista regime, 3–5 [Pgs. –5 include portions of ], 13 [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24], 217–222 [Pgs. –222 include portions of ], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 160], 282–283 [Pgs. –283 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime, 370–372 [Pgs. –372 include portions of ], 382–383 [Pgs. –383 include portions of ], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 247], 399–400 [Pgs. –400 include portions of ], 410–416 [Pgs. –416 include portions of ], 622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367], 679n [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 398], 706–707 [Pgs. –707 include portions of ], 810–811 [Pgs. –811 include portions of ]

Communism under, 411 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 257], 418–420 [Pgs. –420 include portions of ], 458–466 [Pgs. –466 include portions of ], 1124–1125 [Pgs. –1125 include portions of ]

Opposition to, 416–418 [Pgs. –418 include portions of ], 1149–1163 [Pgs. –1163 include portions of ], 1186 [Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 625]

United States, relations with, 345–346 [Pgs. –346 include portions of ], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 231], 376–381 [Pgs. –381 include portions of ], 400–401 [Pgs. –401 include portions of ], 421–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ], 453–454 [Pgs. –454 include portions of ], 776–779 [Pgs. –779 include portions of ], 782 [Pg. 782 is part of Doc. 449], 785–786 [Pgs. –786 include portions of ], 918–925 [Pgs. –925 include portions of ], 1190–1191 [Pgs. –1191 include portions of ]

Anti-Americanism, 394–395 [Pgs. –395 include portions of ], 401–402 [Pgs. –402 include portions of ], 777–778 [Pgs. –778 include portions of ], 783–784 [Pgs. –784 include portions of ]

Castro visit, 394–395 [Pgs. –395 include portions of ], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 259], 455 [Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276], 473–474 [Pgs. –474 include portions of ]

Havana harbor explosion, 823n [Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 469], 824–826 [Pgs. –826 include portions of ], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 478]

Negotiation proposals, 820–821 [Pgs. –821 include portions of ], 847–848 [Pgs. –848 include portions of ], 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510]

U.S. policy toward, 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 277], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 1112–1113 [Pgs. –1113 include portions of ], 1141–1149 [Pgs. –1149 include portions of ], 1178–1186 [Pgs. –1186 include portions of ]

26th of July Movement, 25–27 [Pgs. –27 include portions of ], 278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171], 434–440 [Pgs. –440 include portions of ]

Braden, Spruille, 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 58]

Braga, B. Rionda, 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 363]

Braga, George, 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397]

Brazil (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 414], 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 766 [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 437], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 783n [Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 450], 798–799 [Pgs. –799 include portions of ], 866 [Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 488], 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496], 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 1061 [Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 578], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613]

Mexican-Canadian good offices proposal, 1024–1025 [Pgs. –1025 include portions of ], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1037–1039 [Pgs. –1039 include portions of ], 1045–1048 [Pgs. –1048 include portions of ], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Breitweiser, Maj. Gen. Robert A., 148–149 [Pgs. –149 include portions of ]

Brewer, Lawrence J. (Tex), 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216], 935–938 [Pgs. –938 include portions of ], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530]

Brewster, Robert C, 537n [Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323]

Brown, Frank G., Jr., 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363]

Brown, Gillian, 1100 [Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597], 1101n [Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 597]

Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 188], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189]

Buch Rodriguez, Luis M., 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 130], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 318]

Budge, Hamer H., 735n [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 420]

Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519]

Bump, 223–224 [Pgs. –224 include portions of ]

Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 201], 339–340 [Pgs. –340 include portions of ], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547]

Batista regime, 90–91 [Pgs. –91 include portions of ], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 70], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 201], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202]

Guantanamo base, 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116], 178–179 [Pgs. –179 include portions of ], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 834–835 [Pgs. –835 include portions of ], 843 [Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 476], 857 [Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 483], 1076–1079 [Pgs. –1079 include portions of ], 1109–1110 [Pgs. –1110 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime, 388–390 [Pgs. –390 include portions of ], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 268], 861–862 [Pgs. –862 include portions of ], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1072 [Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 581]

Communism under, 557 [Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333], 561 [Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 423], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483]

U.S. policy toward, 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 834–836 [Pgs. –836 include portions of ], 843–845 [Pgs. –845 include portions of ], 857 [Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 483], 1076–1079 [Pgs. –1079 include portions of ], 1109–1110 [Pgs. –1110 include portions of ]

Military intervention proposals, 813–820 [Pgs. –820 include portions of ], 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468], 828 [Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 473], 837 [Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492]

26th of July Movement, 119 [Pg. 119 includes portions of Doc. 70, Doc. 71, and Doc. 72], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 85], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 90], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 326–327 [Pgs. –327 include portions of ]

Burke, John, 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541]

Burma, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355]

Burris, Philip H., 599n [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361]

Business Advisory Group, 276–277 [Pgs. –277 include portions of ], 334–335 [Pgs. –335 include portions of ], 345–346 [Pgs. –346 include portions of ], 973–975 [Pgs. –975 include portions of ]

Button, Jack, 517 [Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

Byrd, Harry F., 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521]

Cabell, Gen. Charles P., 215 [Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 325–326 [Pgs. –326 include portions of ], 887–888 [Pgs. –888 include portions of ], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 952 [Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536], 963 [Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 536], 1108 [Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602]

Cabot, John M., 719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 414]

Cabrera Infante, Guillermo, 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

Cabro, Sergio, 561 [Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336]

Caccia, Sir Harold A., 682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401], 845–846 [Pgs. –846 include portions of ], 952–953 [Pgs. –953 include portions of ]

Cajigas, Francisco G., 1105 [Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 599]

Calderón, Adm. José E. Rodriguez, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 54]

Cale, Edward G., 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534]

Calhoun, John A., 429–430 [Pgs. –430 include portions of ], 591–592 [Pgs. –592 include portions of ], 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384], 654n [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 386], 766n [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 437], 848n [Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479], 849n [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480]

Callanan, Paul E., 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363]

Calzada, Manolo, 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Campa. See Fay Rivero, Manuel Antonio.

Campa y Caraveda, Miguel Angel de la, 1–2 [Pgs. –2 include portions of ], 6–7 [Pgs. –7 include portions of ], 49–50 [Pgs. –50 include portions of ], 65 [Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]

Campbell, Maj. Gen. D.S., 737–739 [Pgs. –739 include portions of ]

Campbell, Kenneth, 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 412]

Canada, 144 [Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94], 152n [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 102], 166–167 [Pgs. –167 include portions of ], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 1013 [Pg. 1013 is part of Doc. 557]

Mexican-Brazilian good offices proposal, 1024–1025 [Pgs. –1025 include portions of ], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1037–1039 [Pgs. –1039 include portions of ], 1045–1048 [Pgs. –1048 include portions of ], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

U.S. economic pressures and, 963 [Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 536], 985–986 [Pgs. –986 include portions of ], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1018–1019 [Pgs. –1019 include portions of ], 1095–1096 [Pgs. –1096 include portions of ], 1098 [Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 596], 1101 [Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 597], 1136 [Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 614]

Cantillo y Porras, Gen. Eulogio, 68–69 [Pgs. –69 include portions of ], 226–228 [Pgs. –228 include portions of ], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 158], 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 291–292 [Pgs. –292 include portions of ], 295–296 [Pgs. –296 include portions of ], 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196], 333–337 [Pgs. –337 include portions of ], 342 [Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 225], 411–412 [Pgs. –412 include portions of ], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 295]

Caracas pact. See Frente Cívico Revolucionario (FCR).

Caracas Resolution of 1954, 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 492–497 [Pgs. –497 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435], 770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 441], 801–802 [Pgs. –802 include portions of ], 815 [Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 466], 819–820 [Pgs. –820 include portions of ], 839–840 [Pgs. –840 include portions of ], 843 [Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 476], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536]

Carazo, Rodrigo, 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 267]

Cardeñas, Laźaro de, 1023 [Pg. 1023 is part of Doc. 561]

Cardeñas, Raúl de, 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]

CARE, 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Caretaker government proposals. See Post-Batista provisional government proposals.

Carillo, Justo, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 318], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599], 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617], 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

Carillo Flores, Antonio, 1045–1048 [Pgs. –1048 include portions of ]

Carillo Mendoza, Andrés, 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 181]

Carlson, Frank, 668n [Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393]

Carrington, J.C., 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150]

Castañeras, Juan, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 247]

Castellanos González, Israel, 784 [Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 450]

Castilla, Belarmino (Anibal), 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 101], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225]

Castillo Armas, Carlos, 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 289]

Castro Ruz, Fidel (see also Revolutionary movements; Revolutionary regime; 26th of July Movement), 12 [Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6], 17–18 [Pgs. –18 include portions of ], 30–32 [Pgs. –32 include portions of ], 52–53 [Pgs. –53 include portions of ], 135–136 [Pgs. –136 include portions of ], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 91], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 224], 364–366 [Pgs. –366 include portions of ], 380–381 [Pgs. –381 include portions of ], 503 [Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302], 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 315], 682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401]

Health of, 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 424–425 [Pgs. –425 include portions of ], 430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262], 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 267], 997 [Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 549], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561], 1025–1026 [Pgs. –1026 include portions of ], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Castro Ruz, Juana, 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302]

Castro Ruz, Ramón, 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302]

Castro Ruz, Raúl (see also Segundo Frente; 26th of July Movement; Revolutionary regime), 163–165 [Pgs. –165 include portions of ], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 112], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 114], 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 357–358 [Pgs. –358 include portions of ], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 278], 479–480 [Pgs. –480 include portions of ], 491 [Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297], 503–504 [Pgs. –504 include portions of ], 563n [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496]

Anti-Americanism, 481 [Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 342], 642 [Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379], 804 [Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 460]

Communist influence on, 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 110], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 121], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 122], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 190], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 257], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260], 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 267], 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 278], 580–581 [Pgs. –581 include portions of ]

Conflicts with Fidel Castro, 491 [Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297], 503–504 [Pgs. –504 include portions of ], 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 389]

Revolutionary regime role, 357–358 [Pgs. –358 include portions of ], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 247], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 253], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 295], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 362], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 388], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 389], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 398], 870 [Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 491], 883 [Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498]

Casuso, Teresa, 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271], 469 [Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281]

Caswell, William, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169]

Catholic Action. See Acción Catolica.

Catholic Church, 1024 [Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562], 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215]

Peace efforts, 43–45 [Pgs. –45 include portions of ], 52–54 [Pgs. –54 include portions of ], 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 61–62 [Pgs. –62 include portions of ], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 73–74 [Pgs. –74 include portions of ], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 187], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 189], 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196], 317–320 [Pgs. –320 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime and, 417–418 [Pgs. –418 include portions of ], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 278], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 295], 682–683 [Pgs. –683 include portions of ], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423], 755 [Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 430], 763 [Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436], 879 [Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 550], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561], 1051 [Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 573], 1055 [Pg. 1055 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576], 1153–1154 [Pgs. –1154 include portions of ], 1169–1170 [Pgs. –1170 include portions of ]

Support for revolutionary movements, 3–5 [Pgs. –5 include portions of ], 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 18], 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23], 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111]

Catholic University of Villaneuva, 4 [Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2]

Catholic Welfare Council of the United States, 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 259]

Catholic Youth, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 257]

Centoz, Monsignor Luigi, 43–44 [Pgs. –44 include portions of ], 52 [Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 38], 84 [Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 187], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 189], 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196], 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 634–635 [Pgs. –635 include portions of ], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 421], 786n [Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452], 829 [Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 473], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 904–906 [Pgs. –906 include portions of ], 1015 [Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 558], 1105 [Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 599]

Covert opposition support, 742–743 [Pgs. –743 include portions of ], 955 [Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 535], 1126 [Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613]

Cepero Bonilla, Raúl, 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 252], 455 [Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]

Ceylon, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355]

Chamberlain, Anthony, 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 81], 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 101]

Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin, 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 267]

Chapin, Selden, 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545]

Chaviano, Gen. del Rio, 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 73]

Chibás, Eduardo (Eddy), 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233]

Chibás, Raúl, 63–65 [Pgs. –65 include portions of ], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42]

Childs, Marquis, 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Chile (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 912 [Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 517], 1061 [Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 578], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578]

Chiriboga Villagomez, José Ricardo, 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204]

Chomón, Fauré, 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 177], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 257], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 278], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 295]

Chou En-lai, 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528]

Christian Democratic Party, 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 257]

Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599]

Cienfuegos, Camilo, 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202], 342 [Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 253], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 257], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302], 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 315], 642 [Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379]

Disappearance of, 662–663 [Pgs. –663 include portions of ], 665–666 [Pgs. –666 include portions of ], 668n [Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393], 672 [Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395], 674–675 [Pgs. –675 include portions of ]

Cienfuegos, Osmani, 680–681 [Pgs. –681 include portions of ]

Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 907 [Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 514], 931 [Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 523]

Coerr, Wymberly DeR., 652n [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385], 1100n [Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597], 1102n [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598], 1189 [Pg. 1189 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628]

Cofiño, Angel, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 130]

Coll Nuñez, Jesus, 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]

Collado, Emilio, 707 [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412], 710–711 [Pgs. –711 include portions of ]

Colligan, Richard V., 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169], 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]

Collins, LeRoy, 634 [Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 375], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379]

Collins, V. Lansing, 1081–1082 [Pgs. –1082 include portions of ]

Colombia (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 1058 [Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 577], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578], 1171–1172 [Pgs. –1172 include portions of ]

Commerce, U.S. Department of, 907–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ], 961 [Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 536], 1013 [Pg. 1013 is part of Doc. 557], 1036 [Pg. 1036 is part of Doc. 567], 1065 [Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 578 and Doc. 579]

Committee of Twenty-One, 797–799 [Pgs. –799 include portions of ]

Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), 721 [Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415], 974 [Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 541]

Communist Party. See Partido Socialista Popular.

Confederación de Trabajadores Cubaños (Confederation of Cuban Workers) (CTC), 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 49], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 112], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189], 460 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 278], 1075 [Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 583], 1157 [Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 617]

Congress, U.S., 17–18 [Pgs. –18 include portions of ], 52 [Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 39], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 52], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 190], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 212], 364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 410], 760–761 [Pgs. –761 include portions of ], 1069 [Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580]

Acts of:

Battle Act, 1167–1168 [Pgs. –1168 include portions of ]

Defense Production Act of 1950, 1035–1036 [Pgs. –1036 include portions of ]

Export Control Act of 1949, 1035–1037 [Pgs. –1037 include portions of ], 1082–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ], 1098 [Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 596]

Morse Amendment, 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189]

Mutual Security Act of 1959, 550 [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 328]

Mutual Security Act of 2960, 914–916 [Pgs. –916 include portions of ]

Sugar Act (see also Sugar quota cut under Revolutionary regime: U.S. policy toward), 483–485 [Pgs. –485 include portions of ], 517–520 [Pgs. –520 include portions of ], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 328], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 363], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364], 640 [Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 377], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 397], 735 [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 420], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 855–856 [Pgs. –856 include portions of ]

Sugar Bill, 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544]

Trading with the Enemy Act, 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 959–961 [Pgs. –961 include portions of ], 963–964 [Pgs. –964 include portions of ], 967 [Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 536], 974 [Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 541], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 986 [Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 545], 1013–1014 [Pgs. –1014 include portions of ], 1037 [Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568], 1082–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ], 1085 [Pg. 1085 is part of Doc. 590], 1098–1099 [Pgs. –1099 include portions of ], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613], 1189 [Pg. 1189 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628]

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 801–803 [Pgs. –803 include portions of ]

Senate Internal Security Committee (see also Díaz Lanz case under Revolutionary regime: United States, relations with), 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327], 769 [Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441], 877–879 [Pgs. –879 include portions of ], 910–911 [Pgs. –911 include portions of ]

Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs for Latin America, 96 [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]

U.S. military aid, to Batista, 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 13–14 [Pgs. –14 include portions of ], 50 [Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38], 66–67 [Pgs. –67 include portions of ], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 43], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 46], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 54], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 56], 96 [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 60], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 68], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201]

Conover, Harry, 406n [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 510n [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]

Conte Agüero, Luis, 879 [Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497], 1138 [Pg. 1138 is part of Doc. 614], 1154n [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. See Havana Resolution, 1928.

Cooke, John W, 1025 [Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563]

Cooley, Harold D., 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483], 889 [Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 501], 914 [Pg. 914 includes portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 928n [Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 522], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 522], 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 1029 [Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 565]

Corcoran, Lorraine, 1071 [Pg. 1071 is part of Doc. 581]

Corrigan, Robert F., 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273]

Costa Rica (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 37 [Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 978 [Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 543], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1102n [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]

Council on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP), 519–520 [Pgs. –520 include portions of ]

Cramer, William B., 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 223]

Crawford, William A., 1106–1107 [Pgs. –1107 include portions of ]

Cremata, Radio, 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 391]

Cresap, Capt. James B., 841–843 [Pgs. –843 include portions of ]

Crosby, Lawrence, 483–484 [Pgs. –484 include portions of ], 510–511 [Pgs. –511 include portions of ], 605–606 [Pgs. –606 include portions of ], 609–610 [Pgs. –610 include portions of ], 677–678 [Pgs. –678 include portions of ]

Crossland, Stanley T., 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523]

Cuba. See:

Batista regime

Cuban exiles in the United States

Guantanamo base

Latin American countries

Post-Batista provisional government proposals

Revolutionary movements

Revolutionary regime

Rivero Agüero administration

26th of July Movement

U.S. citizen evacuation

U.S. direct intervention proposals

U.S.-owned companies in Cuba

Specific Cuban political parties

Cuban-American Sugar Council, 483 [Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293], 510–511 [Pgs. –511 include portions of ], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 363], 721 [Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415]

Cuban Confederation of Labor, 44–45 [Pgs. –45 include portions of ]

Cuban Confederation of Workers. See Confederación de Trabajadores Cubaños.

Cuban exiles in the United States (see also Covert opposition support under Revolutionary regime: U.S. policy toward; Prío Socorrás, Carlos), 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 130], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 132], 259–260 [Pgs. –260 include portions of ], 877–879 [Pgs. –879 include portions of ], 940 [Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 527]

Post-revolution illegal activities, 422–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365], 632–635 [Pgs. –635 include portions of ], 639–641 [Pgs. –641 include portions of ], 643–646 [Pgs. –646 include portions of ], 658 [Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 811–813 [Pgs. –813 include portions of ], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 874 [Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494], 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515]

Cuban position, 422–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ], 591 [Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 366], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 391], 668–669 [Pgs. –669 include portions of ], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 757–758 [Pgs. –758 include portions of ], 778–779 [Pgs. –779 include portions of ], 785–786 [Pgs. –786 include portions of ], 808–810 [Pgs. –810 include portions of ], 872 [Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 492], 925 [Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 520 and Doc. 521]

U.S. toleration policy, 704–705 [Pgs. –705 include portions of ], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 421], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 1133 [Pg. 1133 is part of Doc. 614]

Senate Internal Security Committee interviews (see also Díaz Lanz case under Revolutionary regime: United States, relations with), 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327], 769 [Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441], 877–879 [Pgs. –879 include portions of ], 910–911 [Pgs. –911 include portions of ]

Support for 26th of July Movement, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17], 86–87 [Pgs. –87 include portions of ], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 203–204 [Pgs. –204 include portions of ], 206n [Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 133], 251 [Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201], 353 [Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223], 363 [Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 226]

Organization of American States, 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204]

U.S. legal action, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17], 147 [Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 188], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189], 423–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ]

U.S. aid proposals, 1110–1111 [Pgs. –1111 include portions of ], 1116–1117 [Pgs. –1117 include portions of ]

Cuban Liberation Junta, 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89]

Cuban Revolution. See Revolutionary movements; Revolutionary regime; 26th of July Movement.

Cubas, Jorge, 251 [Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 673n [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 395]

Cuervo Rúbio, Gustavo, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196], 1157 [Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 617]

Cullen, Col. Paul, 517 [Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 672 [Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395], 1072–1073 [Pgs. –1073 include portions of ], 1106 [Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 600], 1113 [Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605]

Curtis, E. Glion, 906 [Pg. 906 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514]

Cushing, Richard G., 719–720 [Pgs. –720 include portions of ], 773n [Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443], 786n [Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452], 879–883 [Pgs. –883 include portions of ], 932 [Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 524]

Czechoslovakia, 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528]

D’Acosta, Dr., 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 247]

Da Cunha, Leitao, 342 [Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 783n [Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 450]

Dale, William N., 505n [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 303]

D’Allessandro, Miguel A., 360–361 [Pgs. –361 include portions of ]

Davis, Chester, 703n [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410]

Davis, James C., 432 [Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264]

de Varona, Manuel Antonio. See Varona, Manuel Antonio de.

Dean, Robert W, 1106n [Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 600]

Decker, Gen. George H., 845 [Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477]

Defense, U.S. Department of, 42n [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 114], 321–322 [Pgs. –322 include portions of ], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 228], 387–388 [Pgs. –388 include portions of ], 841 [Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476], 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519]

Cuban exile illegal activities, 634–635 [Pgs. –635 include portions of ], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379], 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465]

Revolutionary regime, U.S. policy toward, 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 737–738 [Pgs. –738 include portions of ], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 1093 [Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 595]

U.S. military aid to Batista, 6 [Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3], 8n [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 12–13 [Pgs. –13 include portions of ], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 41], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 54], 119 [Pg. 119 includes portions of Doc. 70, Doc. 71, and Doc. 72]

Dejoie, Louis, 391 [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

Denmark, 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545]

Dennison, Adm. Robert L., 1081–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ]

DeSeabra, A. José, 588 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 354]

Devine, Frank J., 352 [Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222], 430n [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262], 593n [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 358], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 689n [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 405], 700n [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418], 917n [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519], 1104n [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599], 1114n [Pg. 1114 is part of Doc. 606], 1123n [Pg. 1123 is part of Doc. 610], 1185n [Pg. 1185 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625]

Revolutionary regime, 452–453 [Pgs. –453 include portions of ], 497n [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299], 546n [Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 328], 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384], 1064–1065 [Pgs. –1065 include portions of ], 1132 [Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 614], 1184 [Pg. 1184 includes portions of Doc. 623 and Doc. 624]

Díaz, “Nino,” 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 919–920 [Pgs. –920 include portions of ], 1154n [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617], 1161 [Pg. 1161 is part of Doc. 617]

Díaz Asterain, Rolardo, 680–681 [Pgs. –681 include portions of ]

Díaz Lanz, Marcos, 755 [Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 430]

Díaz Lanz, Pedro Luis, 544–545 [Pgs. –545 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 556–557 [Pgs. –557 include portions of ], 560–561 [Pgs. –561 include portions of ], 564–566 [Pgs. –566 include portions of ], 569–571 [Pgs. –571 include portions of ], 589 [Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355], 631–632 [Pgs. –632 include portions of ], 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 462], 1138 [Pg. 1138 is part of Doc. 614], 1154n [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Díaz Tamayo, Martín, 68–69 [Pgs. –69 include portions of ], 281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173], 295–296 [Pgs. –296 include portions of ], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 395], 755 [Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 430]

Diefenbaker, John G., 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545]

Dihigo, Ernesto, 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 448–449 [Pgs. –449 include portions of ], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277], 481 [Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291], 512–515 [Pgs. –515 include portions of ], 561 [Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336], 592 [Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 395]

Dillon, C. Douglas, 42n [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 250], 406 [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 408n [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 255], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 256], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 303], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 341], 575–577 [Pgs. –577 include portions of ], 945n [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 1010n [Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 555], 1110–1111 [Pgs. –1111 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime, 535–537 [Pgs. –537 include portions of ], 583 [Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 350], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 993–994 [Pgs. –994 include portions of ]

Agrarian reform, 510–511 [Pgs. –511 include portions of ], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 677–678 [Pgs. –678 include portions of ], 707–711 [Pgs. –711 include portions of ], 712n [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 413], 716 [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414], 720n [Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 414], 728 [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418], 731n [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419]

Dominican Republic, relations with, 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 934n [Pg. 934 is part of Doc. 525], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 968–969 [Pgs. –969 include portions of ]

United States, relations with, 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401], 685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403], 832–833 [Pgs. –833 include portions of ], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 914–917 [Pgs. –917 include portions of ], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1076 [Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584], 1081–1082 [Pgs. –1082 include portions of ], 1090 [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593]

Illegal flights, 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 462], 809n [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 810n [Pg. 810 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465], 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515]

Nicaro plant, 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 909 [Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 515], 1075 [Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 583], 1097–1098 [Pgs. –1098 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward, 704–705 [Pgs. –705 include portions of ], 724 [Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417], 833–836 [Pgs. –836 include portions of ], 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 906–907 [Pgs. –907 include portions of ], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 953 [Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 533], 983 [Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 545], 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596], 1128–1131 [Pgs. –1131 include portions of ], 1140–1141 [Pgs. –1141 include portions of ]

Economic pressures, 911 [Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 985–989 [Pgs. –989 include portions of ], 1082 [Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 588], 1084–1086 [Pgs. –1086 include portions of ], 1089–1090 [Pgs. –1090 include portions of ], 1095–1096 [Pgs. –1096 include portions of ], 1098–1099 [Pgs. –1099 include portions of ]

Latin American support, search for, 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Propaganda, 894–895 [Pgs. –895 include portions of ], 940–941 [Pgs. –941 include portions of ], 973–975 [Pgs. –975 include portions of ], 982–983 [Pgs. –983 include portions of ], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545]

Sugar policy, 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 314], 677–678 [Pgs. –678 include portions of ], 721–723 [Pgs. –723 include portions of ], 731n [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419], 889 [Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 501], 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 964 [Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 536], 975 [Pg. 975 is part of Doc. 541], 979–980 [Pgs. –980 include portions of ], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545]

Directorio Estudiantil Revolucionario. See Directorio Revolucionario.

Directorio Revolucionario (Revolutionary Directorate) (DR), 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 111], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 112], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 177], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202], 336 [Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210], 439 [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 265], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 278]

Revolutionary regime and, 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 220], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 257], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 257], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 295], 783 [Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 450]

Dirksen, Everett M., 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510]

Dodd, Thomas J., 769 [Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441]

Dodge, Harris F., 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150]

Domenech Benites, Fidel, 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 278]

Domingo del Castillo Morales, Andrés, 336 [Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246]

Dominican Republic (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 313n [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 197], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 410], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 421], 788 [Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 453], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545]

Batista asylum, 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 241], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 303], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 341], 575 [Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344], 577 [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346]

Revolutionary regime, relations with, 383–384 [Pgs. –384 include portions of ], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 735 [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 420], 770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 441], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Revolutionary support, 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 535–537 [Pgs. –537 include portions of ], 541–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 557–559 [Pgs. –559 include portions of ], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 336], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 359], 806 [Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 461]

U.S. policy toward, 624 [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 451], 864 [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 487], 892 [Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 1028–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1082 [Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 588], 1084–1085 [Pgs. –1085 include portions of ]

U.S. sugar quota reallocation, 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1057 [Pg. 1057 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577], 1084 [Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590], 1091 [Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 594]

Venezuela, relations with, 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 1016 [Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 558], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1038 [Pg. 1038 is part of Doc. 568], 1060 [Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578], 1172 [Pg. 1172 is part of Doc. 620]

Donahue, Francis J., 458n [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278]

Donhauser, Robert, 505n [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 303], 731n [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419], 992n [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546]

Donnelley, Dixon, 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 412], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Dorticós Torrado, Osvaldo, 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 564n [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 338], 565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339], 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349], 598–599 [Pgs. –599 include portions of ], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365], 642 [Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 395], 682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401], 756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431], 872 [Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 492], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Anti-Americanism, 672 [Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395], 777–778 [Pgs. –778 include portions of ], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530]

Bonsal recall, 769 [Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441], 776 [Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444], 779–780 [Pgs. –780 include portions of ]

Latin America visit, 942–944 [Pgs. –944 include portions of ], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 963 [Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 536]

Pazos denunciations, 661–662 [Pgs. –662 include portions of ], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399]

Douglas, James H., Jr., 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 474], 1115 [Pg. 1115 is part of Doc. 607], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613], 1141 [Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616]

Dreier, John C., 92n [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 55], 137–138 [Pgs. –138 include portions of ], 240n [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 146], 313 [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 332n [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 385n [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 490–491 [Pgs. –491 include portions of ], 492n [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298], 635n [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376], 650n [Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 1090 [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593]

Revolutionary regime, 497n [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299], 550n [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 328], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379], 771–773 [Pgs. –773 include portions of ]

Dubois, Jules, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 106], 285–286 [Pgs. –286 include portions of ], 523–524 [Pgs. –524 include portions of ], 595 [Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395]

Duclos, Jacques, 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

Dulles, Allen W., 244–245 [Pgs. –245 include portions of ], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 190, Doc. 191, and Doc. 192], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 902n [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 1023 [Pg. 1023 is part of Doc. 561], 1177 [Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 622]

Revolutionary regime, 397–398 [Pgs. –398 include portions of ], 440–441 [Pgs. –441 include portions of ], 541–542 [Pgs. –542 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 646 [Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380], 706 [Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Communism under, 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341], 684–685 [Pgs. –685 include portions of ], 740–741 [Pgs. –741 include portions of ], 856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483], 872–873 [Pgs. –873 include portions of ], 876–877 [Pgs. –877 include portions of ], 896 [Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 505], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565]

Opposition to, 704 [Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 410], 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 474], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561], 1055 [Pg. 1055 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576]

Soviet Union, relations with, 703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 749 [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 1014–1015 [Pgs. –1015 include portions of ], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1074–1075 [Pgs. –1075 include portions of ], 1094–1095 [Pgs. –1095 include portions of ]

United States, relations with, 382 [Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240], 442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466], 832–833 [Pgs. –833 include portions of ], 856–857 [Pgs. –857 include portions of ], 866–867 [Pgs. –867 include portions of ], 908–909 [Pgs. –909 include portions of ], 925 [Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 520 and Doc. 521], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 1075 [Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 583]

Guantanamo base, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 832 [Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474], 1075 [Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 583]

U.S. policy toward, 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 896 [Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 505], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 906–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1017 [Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 558], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1056–1057 [Pgs. –1057 include portions of ], 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596]

Covert opposition support, 861–862 [Pgs. –862 include portions of ], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 1057–1060 [Pgs. –1060 include portions of ], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1128 [Pg. 1128 is part of Doc. 613], 1140–1141 [Pgs. –1141 include portions of ]

Economic pressures, 683–685 [Pgs. –685 include portions of ], 980–981 [Pgs. –981 include portions of ], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545], 991n [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1024 [Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562], 1081 [Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588], 1098 [Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 596]

26th of July Movement, 84–85 [Pgs. –85 include portions of ], 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75], 124–126 [Pgs. –126 include portions of ], 278–279 [Pgs. –279 include portions of ], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 188], 303 [Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 188]

Dulles, John Foster, 36–37 [Pgs. –37 include portions of ], 51–52 [Pgs. –52 include portions of ], 270–271 [Pgs. –271 include portions of ], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 190, Doc. 191, and Doc. 192], 391 [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245], 494 [Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 298], 814–815 [Pgs. –815 include portions of ]

Guantanamo base protection, 174–175 [Pgs. –175 include portions of ], 179n [Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 116], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 166]

Revolutionary regime:

United States, relations with, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 217], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 223], 364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 229], 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 235], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 238], 382 [Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240], 476 [Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287]

Smith recall, 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 219], 351–352 [Pgs. –352 include portions of ], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 223]

26th of July Movement, 77 [Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 47], 80 [Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 122–123 [Pgs. –123 include portions of ], 129–130 [Pgs. –130 include portions of ], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144]

U.S. military aid to Batista, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 67n [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 41], 71–74 [Pgs. –74 include portions of ], 92–93 [Pgs. –93 include portions of ], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 68], 198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 163]

Anti-revolutionary use, 42–43 [Pgs. –43 include portions of ], 92–93 [Pgs. –93 include portions of ], 106–107 [Pgs. –107 include portions of ], 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122]

Dunnigan, T.J., 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418]

Duque, Evelio, 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Duys, John, 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]

Dysinger, Col. Leonard D., 102n [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 61], 166–167 [Pgs. –167 include portions of ]

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 1184n [Pg. 1184 includes portions of Doc. 623 and Doc. 624]

Eastland, James O., 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327], 769–770 [Pgs. –770 include portions of ]

Eberhardt, Edward L., 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225]

Ecuador, 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 314–315 [Pgs. –315 include portions of ], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545]

Egypt, 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355]

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 281–282 [Pgs. –282 include portions of ], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 190, Doc. 191, and Doc. 192], 476 [Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 780n [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 912 [Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 517], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ]

Batista asylum, 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 567–568 [Pgs. –568 include portions of ], 575 [Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344]

Castro visit, 429–431 [Pgs. –431 include portions of ], 441–442 [Pgs. –442 include portions of ], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286], 482n [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 292]

Latin American countries, U.S. policy toward, 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 410], 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510], 998–999 [Pgs. –999 include portions of ], 1007–1008 [Pgs. –1008 include portions of ], 1070 [Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 580]

Revolutionary regime, 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 327], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 329], 788 [Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 453], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 550], 1069 [Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580]

OAS discussion of, 760–761 [Pgs. –761 include portions of ], 764 [Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 436], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 899 [Pg. 899 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508], 971 [Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540], 1061–1064 [Pgs. –1064 include portions of ], 1188 [Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 627]

Soviet Union, relations with, 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 996–997 [Pgs. –997 include portions of ]

United States, relations with, 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 217], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 250], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 256], 644–646 [Pgs. –646 include portions of ], 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 821 [Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 467], 857 [Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 483], 900–901 [Pgs. –901 include portions of ], 909 [Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 515], 914 [Pg. 914 includes portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518], 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560]

Bonsal recalls, 759 [Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 433], 780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448], 859 [Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484], 1088n [Pg. 1088 is part of Doc. 592]

Díaz Lanz case, 565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 342], 589 [Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355]

Public statement, 764–769 [Pgs. –769 include portions of ], 779 [Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447], 803–804 [Pgs. –804 include portions of ]

Smith recall, 344 [Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 215], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 219], 353–355 [Pgs. –355 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward, 644 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379], 651–652 [Pgs. –652 include portions of ], 656 [Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387], 658n [Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388], 706n [Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 744–745 [Pgs. –745 include portions of ], 829 [Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 473], 983 [Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 545], 1093 [Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 595], 1119–1122 [Pgs. –1122 include portions of ]

British support for, 1000–1005 [Pgs. –1005 include portions of ], 1031 [Pg. 1031 is part of Doc. 566], 1049–1052 [Pgs. –1052 include portions of ]

Covert opposition support, 861–863 [Pgs. –863 include portions of ], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 1058 [Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 577], 1060 [Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578], 1126–1131 [Pgs. –1131 include portions of ], 1164 [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619]

Diplomatic relations, 1189 [Pg. 1189 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628]

Economic pressures, 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434], 764 [Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 436], 835–836 [Pgs. –836 include portions of ], 970–971 [Pgs. –971 include portions of ], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545], 988–989 [Pgs. –989 include portions of ], 991n [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1008 [Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554], 1019n [Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559], 1084–1087 [Pgs. –1087 include portions of ], 1089–1090 [Pgs. –1090 include portions of ]

Guantanamo base, 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1109–1110 [Pgs. –1110 include portions of ], 1119 [Pg. 1119 is part of Doc. 608]

Latin American support, search for, 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 474], 835–836 [Pgs. –836 include portions of ], 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545]

Military intervention proposals, 789–790 [Pgs. –790 include portions of ], 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 474], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545]

Organizational arrangements, 902–903 [Pgs. –903 include portions of ], 907 [Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 514]

Publicity, 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

Sugar quota cut, 442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 402], 793–794 [Pgs. –794 include portions of ], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483], 889 [Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 501], 979–980 [Pgs. –980 include portions of ], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 989–990 [Pgs. –990 include portions of ], 1057 [Pg. 1057 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577]

26th of July Movement, 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 302–303 [Pgs. –303 include portions of ], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206]

Eisenhower, Maj. John S.D., 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 190, Doc. 191, and Doc. 192], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206], 399n [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 251], 566n [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379], 658n [Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544], 991n [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1071 [Pg. 1071 is part of Doc. 581]

Eisenhower, Milton S., 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201], 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435]

El Salvador, 978 [Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 543], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1127 [Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 613]

Elbrick, C. Burke, 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346]

Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., 454n [Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275]

Ellender, Allen J., 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174], 285–291 [Pgs. –291 include portions of ]

Ellis, Adm. Robert B., 119–120 [Pgs. –120 include portions of ], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 85], 135 [Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 86], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 91], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 106], 174–175 [Pgs. –175 include portions of ], 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116], 184 [Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 119], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 121]

Eloy. See Fernández, Marcelo.

Ely, Roland, 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443]

English, Benedict M., 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 363]

Entralgo, Elias, 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 278]

Erskine, Gen. Graves B., 1115n [Pg. 1115 is part of Doc. 607]

Espín, Vilma, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 21], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302]

Esterline, Jacob D., 949–952 [Pgs. –952 include portions of ]

Estrada Palma, Tomás, 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 424]

Export-Import Bank, 330 [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 255]

Facio, Gonzalo, 442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 267]

Fajardo, Luis, 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278]

Fangio, Juan Manuel, 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 112]

Farfan, Lacayo, 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 267]

Farland, Joseph S., 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 313–314 [Pgs. –314 include portions of ], 592 [Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357]

Fay Rivero, Manuel Antonio, 278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171]

Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios (FEU), 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 39], 65 [Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 371–372 [Pgs. –372 include portions of ], 416–417 [Pgs. –417 include portions of ]

Federal Aviation Agency, 634–635 [Pgs. –635 include portions of ], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379], 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465], 813n [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480]

Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI), 363 [Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 226], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 410], 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547]

Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 894 [Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 505], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545]

Fenno, Adm. Frank W., Jr., 274 [Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 268]

Feria, Armentino, 1161 [Pg. 1161 is part of Doc. 617]

Fernández, Antonio, 783 [Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 450]

Fernández, Conchita, 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271]

Fernández, Omar, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Fernández Font, Marcelo, 278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171], 739–740 [Pgs. –740 include portions of ], 757–758 [Pgs. –758 include portions of ], 874–876 [Pgs. –876 include portions of ]

Fernández Garcia, Manuel, 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 500 [Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370]

Fernández Grau, 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 363]

Fernández Rodríguez, Angel, 370–371 [Pgs. –371 include portions of ]

Fignole, Daniel, 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260]

Figueres Ferrer, José, 99 [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60], 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 101], 385–386 [Pgs. –386 include portions of ], 441–444 [Pgs. –444 include portions of ], 447–448 [Pgs. –448 include portions of ], 460 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 278], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 289], 493 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 298], 495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 298], 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325]

Figueres Larrazabal, Federico, 875 [Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 494]

Finn, Richard B., 140n [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 90]

Fisk, Bradley, 1096–1097 [Pgs. –1097 include portions of ]

Fleitas Diaz, Armando, 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 257]

Floete, Franklin, 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364]

Folsom, Robert S., 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Font, Rafael, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 21]

Franqui, Carlos, 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 230], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 278], 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 562n [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 336], 766 [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 437]

Free, Lloyd A., 891–892 [Pgs. –892 include portions of ]

Free People’s Party (PPL), 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 121], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 136], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 141], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 147]

Freers, Edward L., 1011–1012 [Pgs. –1012 include portions of ]

French, J.N., 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169], 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]

Frente Cívico Revolucionario (FCR), 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 112], 178–179 [Pgs. –179 include portions of ], 181–182 [Pgs. –182 include portions of ], 196–197 [Pgs. –197 include portions of ], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 233]

Frente de Obreros Nacionales (National Workers’ Front) (FON), 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 39], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50], 278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171]

Frente Estudiantil Nacional (National Students’ Front) (FEN), 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50]

Frente Revolucionario Democrático (FRD) (see also Covert opposition support under Revolutionary regime: U.S. policy toward), 952–953 [Pgs. –953 include portions of ], 1058–1059 [Pgs. –1059 include portions of ], 1104–1105 [Pgs. –1105 include portions of ], 1127 [Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 613], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613], 1133–1138 [Pgs. –1138 include portions of ], 1154–1155 [Pgs. –1155 include portions of ], 1159 [Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 617], 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

Freshman, C. Arnold, 624n [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368]

Frias, José Antonio, 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 257]

Friends of Cuba Society, 876 [Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495]

Frondizi, Arturo, 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 474], 977 [Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 543], 1141 [Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616]

Frost, Adm., 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75]

Fulbright, J. William, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 54], 761 [Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 434], 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436]

Fuller, Robert Otis, 1090n [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593]

Fundora Nuñez, Jose, 1159 [Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 617]

Gadea, Hilda, 46n [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25]

Gajate, Col., 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89]

Gallastegui, José, 1045 [Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571]

Gans, Oscar, 425–426 [Pgs. –426 include portions of ]

García, Maj. Calixto, 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 389], 918–919 [Pgs. –919 include portions of ], 921–922 [Pgs. –922 include portions of ]

García, Gen. Pilar, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 111]

García García, Jose, 924 [Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 520]

García Montes, Jorge, 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 136], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 160], 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 162]

García Tuñón, Gen. Jorge, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 10], 259–260 [Pgs. –260 include portions of ]

Gardner, Arthur, 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233]

Gardner, G.P., 707 [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412], 710 [Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 412]

Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 408], 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468], 896 [Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 505], 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 961–962 [Pgs. –962 include portions of ], 965 [Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 536], 983 [Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 545], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 1030 [Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 565]

Revolutionary regime:

U.S. policy toward, 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408], 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 1059 [Pg. 1059 is part of Doc. 577], 1119–1120 [Pgs. –1120 include portions of ], 1121 [Pg. 1121 is part of Doc. 609], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613]

Economic pressures, 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 991n [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1034–1037 [Pgs. –1037 include portions of ], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Guantanamo base, 1076 [Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584], 1080 [Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586], 1087 [Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591], 1108–1109 [Pgs. –1109 include portions of ], 1119 [Pg. 1119 is part of Doc. 608]

Gee, Cecil, 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395]

Geneen, Harold S., 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365]

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 328], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 362], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 397], 694–695 [Pgs. –695 include portions of ], 713–714 [Pgs. –714 include portions of ], 716–717 [Pgs. –717 include portions of ], 722 [Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 415], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 417], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 803 [Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460], 931 [Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 523], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536], 1035 [Pg. 1035 is part of Doc. 567]

General Services Administration (GSA), 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364]

Germany, Democratic Republic of, 887 [Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 501]

Germany, Federal Republic of, 1186 [Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 625]

Gilmore, Eugene A., Jr., 38–42 [Pgs. –42 include portions of ], 46–48 [Pgs. –48 include portions of ], 186n [Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 252n [Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 266n [Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 216], 455 [Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276], 622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367], 703n [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410], 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510], 1149n [Pg. 1149 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617]

Gleason, S. Everett, 244–245 [Pgs. –245 include portions of ], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 302n [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 188], 397–398 [Pgs. –398 include portions of ], 541–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ]

Godoy, Gastón, 1 [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 179]

Gold, Ruth S., 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311]

Goodpaster, Col. Andrew J., 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 190, Doc. 191, and Doc. 192], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 475n [Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286], 566n [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340], 760n [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434], 763n [Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436], 779n [Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447], 788n [Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 453], 861n [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 902n [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 945n [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 1000n [Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 551], 1020n [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1080n [Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586], 1084n [Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590], 1089n [Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 593], 1121n [Pg. 1121 is part of Doc. 609]

Batista asylum, 591 [Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356]

Latin American countries, U.S. policy toward, 998–999 [Pgs. –999 include portions of ], 1070 [Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 580]

Revolutionary regime, 651–652 [Pgs. –652 include portions of ], 658n [Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388], 759 [Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 433], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 438], 859 [Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484], 1071 [Pg. 1071 is part of Doc. 581], 1093 [Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 595], 1109 [Pg. 1109 is part of Doc. 602], 1164n [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619], 1188 [Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 627]

Grau San Martín, Ramón, 253 [Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 154], 268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 162], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 257]

1958 elections, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 12], 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 52], 89 [Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 121], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 136], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 141]

Gray, George O., 707n [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 412], 720 [Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 414], 918n [Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 520]

Gray, Gordon, 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 190, Doc. 191, and Doc. 192], 323–324 [Pgs. –324 include portions of ], 326–327 [Pgs. –327 include portions of ], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 410], 706n [Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 1007–1008 [Pgs. –1008 include portions of ], 1034n [Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567]

Revolutionary regime, 442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 867 [Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 489], 909 [Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 515], 1017 [Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 558], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Soviet Union, relations with, 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 952n [Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 970 [Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 558]

U.S. policy toward, 723 [Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416], 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 736–738 [Pgs. –738 include portions of ], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 789–790 [Pgs. –790 include portions of ], 826–828 [Pgs. –828 include portions of ], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 474], 835–836 [Pgs. –836 include portions of ], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492], 1093 [Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 595], 1121–1122 [Pgs. –1122 include portions of ]

Citizen evacuation, 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596]

Covert opposition support, 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 1057 [Pg. 1057 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577], 1059 [Pg. 1059 is part of Doc. 577], 1126–1131 [Pgs. –1131 include portions of ], 1141 [Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616], 1164n [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619]

Economic pressures, 889 [Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 501], 970–971 [Pgs. –971 include portions of ], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 991n [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1008 [Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 558], 1019n [Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559], 1024 [Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576], 1096 [Pg. 1096 is part of Doc. 596], 1098 [Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 596]

Guantanamo base, 857–858 [Pgs. –858 include portions of ], 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 558], 1118–1119 [Pgs. –1119 include portions of ]

Military intervention, 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545]

Organizational arrangements, 902–903 [Pgs. –903 include portions of ], 906–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ]

Refugee program, 1017–1018 [Pgs. –1018 include portions of ]

U.S.-owned companies in Cuba and, 907–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ], 965 [Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 536]

Green, Howard, 1013 [Pg. 1013 is part of Doc. 557], 1024–1025 [Pgs. –1025 include portions of ], 1037–1039 [Pgs. –1039 include portions of ]

Greene, Joseph N., U.S. military aid to Cuba, 67n [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 41]

Grupo de Instituciones Cívicas, 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 233], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 257]

Guantanamo base (see also under other subjects):

Anti-American agitation, 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 57], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 121]

Anti-revolutionary use, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70], 123 [Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 125–126 [Pgs. –126 include portions of ], 129 [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 199 [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 126]

26th of July Movement threats to (see also U.S. citizens kidnappings under 26th of July Movement), 151 [Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102], 174–179 [Pgs. –179 include portions of ], 180–185 [Pgs. –185 include portions of ], 257 [Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 155], 272–277 [Pgs. –277 include portions of ], 279–280 [Pgs. –280 include portions of ], 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189]

Guas Inclán, Rafael, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 12]

Guatemala (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 494–495 [Pgs. –495 include portions of ], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 364], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 423], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1061 [Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 578], 1123–1124 [Pgs. –1124 include portions of ], 1126 [Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613], 1135 [Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 614], 1171 [Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 620]

U.S. covert opposition support training, 1058 [Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 577], 1123–1124 [Pgs. –1124 include portions of ], 1126–1128 [Pgs. –1128 include portions of ], 1131 [Pg. 1131 is part of Doc. 613]

Güell, Gonzalo, 13 [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 128], 282–283 [Pgs. –283 include portions of ], 285n [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 177], 298–299 [Pgs. –299 include portions of ], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206], 383–384 [Pgs. –384 include portions of ], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246]

1958 elections, 50–51 [Pgs. –51 include portions of ], 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31], 54n [Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 75–76 [Pgs. –76 include portions of ], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 123], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174]

26th of July Movement, 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 83], 156 [Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 105 and Doc. 106], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 143], 313 [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]

U.S. military aid to Batista, 7–8 [Pgs. –8 include portions of ], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 72n [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 43], 75–76 [Pgs. –76 include portions of ], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 58], 100–102 [Pgs. –102 include portions of ], 107n [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 64], 124 [Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 195–196 [Pgs. –196 include portions of ], 206–207 [Pgs. –207 include portions of ], 314 [Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195]

Guerra, José Antonio, 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360]

Guerra, Oscar H., 30–36 [Pgs. –36 include portions of ]

Guevara Serna, Ernesto (Che) (see also Revolutionary regime: Communism under; Revolutionary regime: United States, relations with: Anti-Americanism), 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 18], 46–48 [Pgs. –48 include portions of ], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 257], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 278], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 299], 642 [Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379], 1176 [Pg. 1176 is part of Doc. 622]

Afro-Asian mission, 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325], 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 589–591 [Pgs. –591 include portions of ], 703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410]

Agrarian reform, 509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307]

Cuban-Soviet relations, 1014 [Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 557 and Doc. 558], 1187 [Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 626]

Revolutionary regime role, 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302], 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 358], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 388], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 389], 680–681 [Pgs. –681 include portions of ], 870 [Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 491], 880 [Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 497], 883 [Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498], 1009 [Pg. 1009 is part of Doc. 554], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Guggenheim, Harry, 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510]

Guillén, Nicolás, 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 278]

Gutiérrez, Ernest B., 203–206 [Pgs. –206 include portions of ]

Gutiérrez Menoyo, Eloy, 463–464 [Pgs. –464 include portions of ], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 295], 579 [Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348]

Gutiérrez Serrano, Raúl, 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277]

Hadraba, Theodore J., 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418]

Hager, Eric H., 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397], 707 [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412], 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418], 935 [Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526], 961 [Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 536], 963–964 [Pgs. –964 include portions of ], 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541], 975 [Pg. 975 is part of Doc. 541], 1019 [Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559], 1164–1168 [Pgs. –1168 include portions of ]

Hagerty, James C., 566n [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379], 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544], 1020n [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560]

Haider, M.L., 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Haiti, 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 557 [Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 334], 806 [Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 461], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578], 1090 [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593], 1102 [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]

Hall, Carlos, 672–675 [Pgs. –675 include portions of ], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 398], 720 [Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 414], 1106–1107 [Pgs. –1107 include portions of ], 1184–1185 [Pgs. –1185 include portions of ]

Halsema, James, 599n [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361]

Hammarskjöld, Dag, 1083 [Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589]

Hammond, Henry S., 1124n [Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611]

Hanes, John W., Jr., 633n [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 375], 752 [Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 1110 [Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603]

Hanford, Col. Thomas A., 106n [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 68]

Hare, Raymond A., 902n [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512]

Harlow, Bryce N., 566n [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340]

Harmony Commission. See Catholic Church: Peace efforts.

Harr, Karl G., Jr., 738–739 [Pgs. –739 include portions of ], 809n [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 1121 [Pg. 1121 is part of Doc. 609]

Hart, Haydée Santamaria, 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 181], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 295]

Hart Dávalos, Armando, 33 [Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 18], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 230], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 278], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 342], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 365]

Haskins, Charles A., 1055–1057 [Pgs. –1057 include portions of ]

Havana Conference of Hungry Nations, 732 [Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 419], 740 [Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436], 799 [Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 458], 856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483], 887–888 [Pgs. –888 include portions of ], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 1040 [Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]

Havana Resolution, 1928, 535–536 [Pgs. –536 include portions of ]

Hays, Wayne S., 550 [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 328]

Hayward, Rear Adm. A.S., Jr., 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201]

Haza Grasso, Bonifacio, 358 [Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 225]

Heagney, William T., 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]

Hearne, John, 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 303]

Heeney, A.D.P., 1095n [Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 596]

Heilman, Paul, 18n [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208]

Henderson, Loy, 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 223], 375n [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 235], 492n [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298]

Herfurt, Jack A., 510n [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308], 886n [Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500]

Herrera, Roberto, 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Herter, Christian A., 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 351n [Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221], 385n [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 476 [Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287], 492n [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298], 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510], 1000n [Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 551], 1023 [Pg. 1023 is part of Doc. 561], 1028–1029 [Pgs. –1029 include portions of ], 1070 [Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 580]

Batista regime, 56 [Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 33], 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36], 280–281 [Pgs. –281 include portions of ], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 305–307 [Pgs. –307 include portions of ], 330–331 [Pgs. –331 include portions of ]

U.S. military aid to, 13–14 [Pgs. –14 include portions of ], 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 55], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 56], 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122], 313 [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 201]

Citizen evacuation, 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 188], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 201], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 212]

Cuban exiles in the United States, 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 375], 635n [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376]

Guantanamo base protection, 174 [Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 176–177 [Pgs. –177 include portions of ], 275–276 [Pgs. –276 include portions of ], 279–280 [Pgs. –280 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime, 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232], 542–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 589 [Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355], 952–953 [Pgs. –953 include portions of ], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 550], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1102–1103 [Pgs. –1103 include portions of ]

Agrarian reform, 539–541 [Pgs. –541 include portions of ], 543–544 [Pgs. –544 include portions of ], 552–553 [Pgs. –553 include portions of ], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483]

Arms embargo, 624 [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368], 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 381], 653–656 [Pgs. –656 include portions of ], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390], 669–671 [Pgs. –671 include portions of ], 805–807 [Pgs. –807 include portions of ], 845–846 [Pgs. –846 include portions of ]

Communism under, 761 [Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 434], 857–858 [Pgs. –858 include portions of ], 875 [Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 494], 883–884 [Pgs. –884 include portions of ], 904n [Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 513]

OAS discussion of, 761 [Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 434], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496], 899–900 [Pgs. –900 include portions of ], 962–963 [Pgs. –963 include portions of ], 971n [Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 539 and Doc. 540], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1030 [Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 565], 1049 [Pg. 1049 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573], 1061–1064 [Pgs. –1064 include portions of ]

Soviet Union, relations with, 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 402], 934 [Pg. 934 is part of Doc. 525], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 952n [Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533], 953 [Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 533], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 964–965 [Pgs. –965 include portions of ], 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 1015–1016 [Pgs. –1016 include portions of ], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 558], 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596]

United States, relations with, 343–345 [Pgs. –345 include portions of ], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 219], 354–355 [Pgs. –355 include portions of ], 587–589 [Pgs. –589 include portions of ], 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392], 823–826 [Pgs. –826 include portions of ], 872 [Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 492], 925–926 [Pgs. –926 include portions of ], 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 1017 [Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 558], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560]

Bonsal recalls, 749–750 [Pgs. –750 include portions of ], 752 [Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429], 753n [Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430], 756–757 [Pgs. –757 include portions of ], 759–760 [Pgs. –760 include portions of ], 763 [Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436], 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436], 779–781 [Pgs. –781 include portions of ], 848–849 [Pgs. –849 include portions of ], 859 [Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484], 864–866 [Pgs. –866 include portions of ], 1088 [Pg. 1088 is part of Doc. 592]

Castro visit, 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 259], 428 [Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261], 430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262], 431n [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263], 441–442 [Pgs. –442 include portions of ], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 280], 475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286], 481 [Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291]

Cuban exile illegal activities, 633 [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 375], 635n [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376], 643–645 [Pgs. –645 include portions of ], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 874 [Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494]

Eisenhower statement, 764 [Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 436], 766–767 [Pgs. –767 include portions of ], 779–780 [Pgs. –780 include portions of ], 803 [Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460]

Guantanamo base, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 1080 [Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586], 1087 [Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591], 1109–1110 [Pgs. –1110 include portions of ]

Negotiation proposals, 820–821 [Pgs. –821 include portions of ], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1037 [Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568], 1045–1048 [Pgs. –1048 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward, 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384], 656–658 [Pgs. –658 include portions of ], 732 [Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 419], 788 [Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 453], 828 [Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492], 952–953 [Pgs. –953 include portions of ], 961 [Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 536], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 550], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 558], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1034n [Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567]

Covert opposition support, 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 907 [Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 514], 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599], 1164 [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619]

Economic pressures, 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 960–961 [Pgs. –961 include portions of ], 963 [Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 536], 1013–1014 [Pgs. –1014 include portions of ], 1019–1020 [Pgs. –1020 include portions of ], 1024 [Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562], 1034 [Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567], 1048–1049 [Pgs. –1049 include portions of ], 1091 [Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 594], 1095 [Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 596], 1098–1099 [Pgs. –1099 include portions of ]

Latin American support, 766 [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 437], 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 949–950 [Pgs. –950 include portions of ], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 1006–1007 [Pgs. –1007 include portions of ], 1010 [Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 555], 1015–1016 [Pgs. –1016 include portions of ], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1053 [Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 574], 1056–1057 [Pgs. –1057 include portions of ]

Propaganda, 599–602 [Pgs. –602 include portions of ], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521]

Sugar policy, 684–685 [Pgs. –685 include portions of ], 699–700 [Pgs. –700 include portions of ], 793–794 [Pgs. –794 include portions of ], 958–959 [Pgs. –959 include portions of ], 1029 [Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 565], 1091 [Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 594]

26th of July Movement, 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 85], 136 [Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 87], 142–143 [Pgs. –143 include portions of ], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 137], 303–305 [Pgs. –305 include portions of ], 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 203]

Hildyard, David H., 298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185], 625–626 [Pgs. –626 include portions of ]

Hill, John C., Jr., 124n [Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 216 [Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 135], 275n [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 168], 330n [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203], 395–397 [Pgs. –397 include portions of ], 404n [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 535n [Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 322], 563n [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 599n [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361], 633n [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 375], 635n [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 697n [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 771n [Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 442], 786n [Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452], 828n [Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473], 830n [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 473], 837n [Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475], 890n [Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 502], 911n [Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517], 917n [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519], 932n [Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 524], 1006n [Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 552]

Revolutionary regime, 486–490 [Pgs. –490 include portions of ], 497n [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299], 584–586 [Pgs. –586 include portions of ], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 616–617 [Pgs. –617 include portions of ], 650–651 [Pgs. –651 include portions of ], 689–692 [Pgs. –692 include portions of ], 801–802 [Pgs. –802 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward, 470–471 [Pgs. –471 include portions of ], 676–677 [Pgs. –677 include portions of ], 685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403], 697–698 [Pgs. –698 include portions of ], 762–763 [Pgs. –763 include portions of ], 802–803 [Pgs. –803 include portions of ], 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 906–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ], 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534], 991n [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545]

Hoegh, Leo A., 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545]

Hoghland, John S., 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418]

Holland, Henry F., 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 164], 494 [Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 298], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536]

Hollis, Walter, 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418]

Holtz, Harold F., 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364]

Honduras (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325], 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521], 978 [Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 543], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Hood, Amelia, 693n [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 406]

Hood, Viscount Samuel, 647n [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 381], 663n [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390], 952 [Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533]

Hoover, J. Edgar, 872 [Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 492], 1177 [Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 622]

Hoover, John, 1065n [Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 578 and Doc. 579]

Hormel, William, 203–204 [Pgs. –204 include portions of ], 206n [Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129]

Hosmer, Craig, 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 421]

Howe, Walter, 588 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 354], 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534]

Howell, W. Huntington, 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 363]

Hoyt, Henry A., 88–89 [Pgs. –89 include portions of ], 105–106 [Pgs. –106 include portions of ]

Hummel, R.A., 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 150]

Humphrey, Hubert H., 323–324 [Pgs. –324 include portions of ]

Hungary, 887 [Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 501]

Hurwitch, Robert A., 1132 [Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 614]

Huston, Harris H., 808n [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 462]

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 1017–1018 [Pgs. –1018 include portions of ]

Inclan, Clemente, 882 [Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 497]

India, 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355]

Indonesia, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355]

Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA). See Agrarian reform under Revolutionary regime.

Intelligence Advisory Committee, 78n [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48], 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75]

Inter-American Defense Board, 1078 [Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 585]

Inter-American Development Bank, 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 423], 798–799 [Pgs. –799 include portions of ], 819 [Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 466], 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 474], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545]

Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC), 137–138 [Pgs. –138 include portions of ], 772 [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 442], 801 [Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 459], 807 [Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 461], 971–972 [Pgs. –972 include portions of ], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), 137 [Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 88], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 322], 815 [Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 466], 839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 475], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547], 1083 [Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589], 1087 [Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613], 1181 [Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 623]

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 450 [Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 272]

International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 574 [Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 343], 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613]

International Court of Justice (ICJ), 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 406], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 406–408 [Pgs. –408 include portions of ], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 272], 469–470 [Pgs. –470 include portions of ], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 364], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 365], 1016 [Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 558], 1081 [Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588]

International Sugar Agreement, 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294]

Irwin, John N., II, 176–178 [Pgs. –178 include portions of ], 321 [Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 201], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201], 366n [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 229], 737–738 [Pgs. –738 include portions of ], 861–862 [Pgs. –862 include portions of ], 1080n [Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586]

Italy, 625–626 [Pgs. –626 include portions of ], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 474]

James, Preston, 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443]

Jamison, Edward A., 771n [Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 442], 964 [Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 536], 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1006n [Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 552], 1102n [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]

Japan, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355]

Javits, Jacob A., 308–311 [Pgs. –311 include portions of ]

Jimenéz Moya, Enrique, 535 [Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 322], 558 [Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334]

Johnson, Robert H., 980–991 [Pgs. –991 include portions of ], 1014–1019 [Pgs. –1019 include portions of ], 1021–1024 [Pgs. –1024 include portions of ]

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 89–91 [Pgs. –91 include portions of ], 113 [Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68], 117–119 [Pgs. –119 include portions of ], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 90], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 95], 148–149 [Pgs. –149 include portions of ], 321 [Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]

Revolutionary regime, 387–391 [Pgs. –391 include portions of ], 697–698 [Pgs. –698 include portions of ], 731–734 [Pgs. –734 include portions of ], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 421], 739 [Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 423], 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468], 829 [Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 473], 841–845 [Pgs. –845 include portions of ], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1078–1080 [Pgs. –1080 include portions of ], 1108 [Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602]

Joint Intelligence Committee, 846 [Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 477]

Jones, Gerald O., 339 [Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 212]

Jourbert, Jules, 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Junta de Liberación Cubaña, 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 18]

Junta proposals. See Post-Batista provisional government proposals.

Justice, U.S. Department of, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 375], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421], 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465], 935 [Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545]

Juventud Obrera Católica (Catholic Young Workers) (JOC), 5 [Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 130], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 257], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 278]

Kail, Samuel G., 1124n [Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611], 1149n [Pg. 1149 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617]

Kaiser, David, 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294]

Kallis, Seima G., 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418]

Kangles, Constantine, 900–901 [Pgs. –901 include portions of ]

Kassim, Gen. Abdul Karim, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 408], 870 [Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 491]

Keany, Katherine, 599n [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361]

Kefauver, Capt. Russell, 175n [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 114], 183n [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119], 275n [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 168]

Kemp, Frank A., 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294]

Kendall, David W., 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544]

Kennedy, John F, 1128 [Pg. 1128 is part of Doc. 613], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613], 1176–1178 [Pgs. –1178 include portions of ]

Khrushchev, Nikita S., 1002 [Pg. 1002 is part of Doc. 551], 1006 [Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 552], 1008 [Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554]

Cuba visit, 940–941 [Pgs. –941 include portions of ], 943–944 [Pgs. –944 include portions of ], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 952n [Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536]

Revolutionary regime, Military support offers, 965 [Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 536], 996 [Pg. 996 is part of Doc. 549], 1011–1012 [Pgs. –1012 include portions of ], 1014–1016 [Pgs. –1016 include portions of ], 1020–1021 [Pgs. –1021 include portions of ], 1072 [Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 581]

Kieffer, Col. John, 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202]

King, Col. J.C., 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 164], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 886n [Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500], 906 [Pg. 906 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 951n [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536]

Kleberg, Robert J., 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 150], 539–541 [Pgs. –541 include portions of ], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 552–553 [Pgs. –553 include portions of ], 677–678 [Pgs. –678 include portions of ]

Kline, Alvin, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169]

Knight, Robert H., 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 244], 1079 [Pg. 1079 is part of Doc. 585]

Knights of Columbus, 5 [Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3]

Kohler, Foy D., 1020n [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560]

Krebs, Max V., 897 [Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506], 904n [Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 513]

Kretzmann, Edwin J., Jr., 848n [Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479]

Kruppenbacher, Joyce, 807n [Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 461]

Kubitschek de Oliviera, Juscelino, 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564]

Kwiatek, Fabian A., 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 720 [Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 414], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Laferte, Evelio, 42 [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22]

Lamberty, Gerald, 841n [Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476]

Lansdale, Edward G., 1115–1118 [Pgs. –1118 include portions of ]

Lara Crespo, Jos, 1158 [Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 617]

Larrazábal, Wolfgang, 387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]

Lasaga, José Ignacio, 683 [Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402]

Latin American countries (see also Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects):

Communist influence, 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 58], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131], 876–877 [Pgs. –877 include portions of ], 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 1023 [Pg. 1023 is part of Doc. 561], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578]

Cuban exiles in, 279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]

Pre-revolution intervention proposals, 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 314–315 [Pgs. –315 include portions of ], 317–320 [Pgs. –320 include portions of ], 323–324 [Pgs. –324 include portions of ], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 334–336 [Pgs. –336 include portions of ], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215]

Revolutionary regime, Revolutionary courts, 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232]

U.S. policy toward, 280–281 [Pgs. –281 include portions of ], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 408], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 410], 827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 472], 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 1069–1070 [Pgs. –1070 include portions of ]

Economic aid, 798–799 [Pgs. –799 include portions of ], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 998–999 [Pgs. –999 include portions of ], 1007–1008 [Pgs. –1008 include portions of ], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578], 1069 [Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613]

Private investment, 745–746 [Pgs. –746 include portions of ], 797–798 [Pgs. –798 include portions of ], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545]

Propaganda, 796–797 [Pgs. –797 include portions of ], 932–933 [Pgs. –933 include portions of ]

Laurent, Júlio, 423–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ]

Lawrence, David, 375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 235]

Lay, James S., Jr., 697n [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 706n [Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411], 735n [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 420], 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532], 951n [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536]

Lazo, Mario, 251 [Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 164], 673n [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 395]

Lechuga, Carlos, 588 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 354]

LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546]

Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 244], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1059 [Pg. 1059 is part of Doc. 577], 1078 [Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 585], 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596], 1120–1121 [Pgs. –1121 include portions of ]

Leonhardy, Terrence G., 1n [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1], 13n [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 23n [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13], 36n [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 51n [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 60n [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36], 66n [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 43], 85 [Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 96n [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 99n [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60], 110n [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 113n [Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68], 124n [Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 168n [Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112], 212n [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 132], 225n [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 138], 237n [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144], 270n [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 163], 716n [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414]

Batista regime, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 52], 99–102 [Pgs. –102 include portions of ], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 62], 106 [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 181–182 [Pgs. –182 include portions of ], 198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 201n [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 130], 245–246 [Pgs. –246 include portions of ], 261n [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 159], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 160]

Revolutionary regime, 372 [Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234]

26th of July Movement, 207–208 [Pgs. –208 include portions of ], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 137], 233–235 [Pgs. –235 include portions of ], 238 [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 145], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 150]

Lesmus, Cot, 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225]

Lightner, E. Allan, Jr., 341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214]

Linares, Pascasio, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Linthicum, Thomas, 1101 [Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 597]

Litsey, Weldon, U.S. military aid to Cuba, 8n [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 56]

Little, Edward S., 5n [Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 5n [Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 13n [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 66n [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 92n [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 55], 106n [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 192n [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122], 201n [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 229n [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 140], 237n [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144], 240n [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 146], 275n [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 168], 279n [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172], 323n [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 330n [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203], 332n [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 364n [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 369n [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232], 428n [Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261], 452n [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 481n [Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291], 543n [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 1053n [Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 574]

Batista regime, 14–15 [Pgs. –15 include portions of ], 175n [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 114], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 127], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 261–262 [Pgs. –262 include portions of ]

Cuban exiles in the United States, 353 [Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223]

Post-Batista provisional government proposals, 315n [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196]

Revolutionary regime, 352–353 [Pgs. –353 include portions of ], 372 [Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234], 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254]

Llanusa, José, 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399]

Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 977 [Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 543], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1171–1172 [Pgs. –1172 include portions of ]

Llerena, Mario, 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89]

Lloyd, Selwyn, 647–648 [Pgs. –648 include portions of ], 653 [Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386], 663–665 [Pgs. –665 include portions of ], 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394], 805 [Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461], 845–846 [Pgs. –846 include portions of ], 1000n [Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 551]

Lobo, Júlio, 928n [Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 522], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 522]

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 772 [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 442], 1016n [Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 558]

Lojendio, Juan Pablo de, 755–756 [Pgs. –756 include portions of ]

Long, Edward T., 841n [Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476]

López Castro, Amadeo, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 136]

López Fresquet, Rufo, 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 260], 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 469 [Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281], 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 288], 509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307], 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 318], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 660–663 [Pgs. –663 include portions of ], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399], 928n [Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 522], 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

López Mateos, Adolfo, 764–765 [Pgs. –765 include portions of ], 770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 441], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578], 1085 [Pg. 1085 is part of Doc. 590], 1089 [Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 593]

Lorié, Ricardo, 1054n [Pg. 1054 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575]

Lott, Gen. Henrique Texeira, 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564]

Loynaz de Castillo, Gen., 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]

Luce, Clare Boothe, 354–355 [Pgs. –355 include portions of ]

Luce, Henry R., 354–355 [Pgs. –355 include portions of ]

Lynch, Raúl A., 47–48 [Pgs. –48 include portions of ]

Lynn, Col., 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 60]

Machado, Luis, 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196]

Macmillan, Harold, 1000 [Pg. 1000 is part of Doc. 551], 1005n [Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 551], 1031–1034 [Pgs. –1034 include portions of ], 1049 [Pg. 1049 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573]

Macomber, William B., 9n [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 92n [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 55], 323n [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 349n [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 219], 375n [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 235], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 238], 900 [Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509], 976 [Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 542]

Mallin, Jay, 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 102]

Mallory, Lester D., 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 689n [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 405], 697n [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 712n [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 413], 749n [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426], 760n [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434], 766n [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 437], 771n [Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 442], 837n [Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475], 911n [Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517], 917n [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519]

Revolutionary regime, 707 [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 412], 808–810 [Pgs. –810 include portions of ], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 885–886 [Pgs. –886 include portions of ], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 906 [Pg. 906 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514], 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534], 1078 [Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 585]

Malone, Jack, 539–540 [Pgs. –540 include portions of ]

Malone, Michael J.P, 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 363], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397]

Mann, Thomas C., 483–484 [Pgs. –484 include portions of ], 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541], 1092 [Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 594]

Revolutionary regime:

Agrarian reform, 510 [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308], 677–678 [Pgs. –678 include portions of ], 724–725 [Pgs. –725 include portions of ], 1073–1074 [Pgs. –1074 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward, 965–966 [Pgs. –966 include portions of ], 1082–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ], 1100 [Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597], 1104–1105 [Pgs. –1105 include portions of ], 1123–1124 [Pgs. –1124 include portions of ], 1140 [Pg. 1140 includes portions of Doc. 614 and Doc. 615]

Mansfield, Mike, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 54], 323–324 [Pgs. –324 include portions of ]

Marinello, Juan, 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 278], 882 [Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 497]

Marquéz Sterling, Carlos, 153 [Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 103], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 110], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 154], 268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 162], 346n [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 216], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 257]

1958 elections, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 12], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 52], 89 [Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 187–188 [Pgs. –188 include portions of ], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 136], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 141], 241–242 [Pgs. –242 include portions of ], 251 [Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153]

Martí, José, 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 81], 777–778 [Pgs. –778 include portions of ]

Martin, Edwin M., 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 1048n [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Martín Elena, Eduardo, 1158 [Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 617]

Martínez Lamo, Fernando, 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 257]

Martínez Mora, Col., 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208]

Martínez Paez, Júlio, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 21], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233]

Martinez Saenz, Joaquín, 162 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 111]

Martínez Sanchez, Augusto, 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370]

Masferrer, Rolando, 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14], 86–87 [Pgs. –87 include portions of ], 95–96 [Pgs. –96 include portions of ], 103–104 [Pgs. –104 include portions of ], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 112], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 136], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 225], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 234], 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 241], 423–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ]

Masó, Bartolomé, 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 424]

Matos, Huber, 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225], 629–631 [Pgs. –631 include portions of ], 648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 389], 672 [Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395], 674–675 [Pgs. –675 include portions of ], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399], 703–704 [Pgs. –704 include portions of ], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423], 1156 [Pg. 1156 is part of Doc. 617]

Mattei, Enrico, 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565]

Matthews, Herbert L., 78–80 [Pgs. –80 include portions of ], 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 177], 308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 190], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260], 491–492 [Pgs. –492 include portions of ], 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318], 540 [Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 324], 557 [Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 334], 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443]

Mau, Frank A., 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384], 723n [Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416], 841n [Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476]

Mboya, Tom, 854 [Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 482]

McAfee, William, 78n [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]

McCone, John A., 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 410], 832–833 [Pgs. –833 include portions of ], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483], 981 [Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 545], 983 [Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 545], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545], 991n [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 550], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561], 1023 [Pg. 1023 is part of Doc. 561], 1096 [Pg. 1096 is part of Doc. 596], 1097 [Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 596]

McCready, George, 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443], 921–922 [Pgs. –922 include portions of ]

McElhiney, Thomas W., 312n [Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193], 340n [Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213], 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346], 592–593 [Pgs. –593 include portions of ], 1019n [Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559]

McElroy, Neil H., 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 95], 321 [Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 402]

McKelvey, Delano, 237n [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144]

McKnight, John P., 773 [Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443], 879n [Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497], 1190 [Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629]

McLain, Marvin, 517 [Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

Mederos, Elena, 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

Membibre, Joaquín (“El Galleguito”), 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Mendoza Reboredo, Jorge Enrique, 629–630 [Pgs. –630 include portions of ]

Menéndez, Emilio, 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

Merchant, Livingston T., 645 [Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 379], 669n [Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408], 750n [Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427], 808n [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 462], 1006n [Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 552], 1010n [Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 555], 1027n [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1048n [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572], 1055–1056 [Pgs. –1056 include portions of ], 1065n [Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 578 and Doc. 579], 1188 [Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 627]

Revolutionary regime, 809n [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 897 [Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1061 [Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 578]

U.S. policy toward, 731–732 [Pgs. –732 include portions of ], 736 [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 421], 742 [Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 423], 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 473], 837–841 [Pgs. –841 include portions of ], 844–846 [Pgs. –846 include portions of ], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1093 [Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 595], 1119 [Pg. 1119 is part of Doc. 608], 1164 [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619]

Covert opposition support, 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 828 [Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1123 [Pg. 1123 is part of Doc. 610], 1126 [Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613], 1141 [Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616], 1164 [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619]

Economic pressures, 843 [Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 476], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 964 [Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 536], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547]

Guantanamo base, 843 [Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 476], 1078–1080 [Pgs. –1080 include portions of ], 1082 [Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 588], 1108 [Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602]

Merriam, Robert E., 566n [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340]

Merz, Charles, 540 [Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 324]

Mexico (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 18], 764–765 [Pgs. –765 include portions of ], 779 [Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 951n [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1009 [Pg. 1009 is part of Doc. 554], 1023 [Pg. 1023 is part of Doc. 561], 1053 [Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 574]

Canadian-Brazilian good offices proposal, 1024–1025 [Pgs. –1025 include portions of ], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1037–1039 [Pgs. –1039 include portions of ], 1045–1048 [Pgs. –1048 include portions of ], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

OAS discussion, 1061–1063 [Pgs. –1063 include portions of ], 1135 [Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 614]

Revolutionary regime, U.S. policy toward, 1058 [Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 577], 1085–1086 [Pgs. –1086 include portions of ], 1089 [Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 593]

Meyer, Joaquín, 106 [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 471 [Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283], 473 [Pg. 473 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284], 484–485 [Pgs. –485 include portions of ], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 395]

Mikoyan, Anastas I., 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 802 [Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 459], 804 [Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 460], 806–807 [Pgs. –807 include portions of ], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 1002–1003 [Pgs. –1003 include portions of ], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578]

Milanés Dantín, Esther, 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 43]

Miller, Dorothy W., 930n [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523]

Miller, Robert H., 430n [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262]

Minnich, L. Arthur, 874n [Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494]

Miret Prieto, Pedro, 526n [Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 319]

Miró Cardona, José, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 181–182 [Pgs. –182 include portions of ], 185 [Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 186n [Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 238n [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 145], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 201], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 223], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 238], 1025 [Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563]

Anti-Castro movement participation, 1058 [Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 577], 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

Revolutionary regime participation, 346n [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 216], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 225], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 230], 382n [Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 251], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302], 756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431], 908–909 [Pgs. –909 include portions of ], 925 [Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 520 and Doc. 521]

U.S. visa policy, 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 130], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 132]

Mitchell, F.T., 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541]

Moa Bay plant (see also U.S. citizens kidnappings under 26th of July Movement), 185 [Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 359], 672–673 [Pgs. –673 include portions of ], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 404], 832–833 [Pgs. –833 include portions of ], 1097 [Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 596]

Moffett, James D., 624n [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368]

Monge Alvárez, Luís Alberto, 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242]

Montecristi Group. See Agrupación Montecristi.

Mora, Victor, 438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 265]

Morales Gómez, Júlio, 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23]

Morán, Lucas, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 21], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 81], 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 101], 1054n [Pg. 1054 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575]

Moreno Sánchez, Manuel, 1009n [Pg. 1009 is part of Doc. 554]

Morgan, George A., 1113n [Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605]

Morgan, Gerald D., 566n [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340], 794n [Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458], 811n [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519]

Morgan, Thomas E., 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436]

Morgan, William A., 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260], 579 [Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348], 587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353], 622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367], 685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403]

Morobenito, 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]

Morse, True D., 517–520 [Pgs. –520 include portions of ], 721 [Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415], 958–959 [Pgs. –959 include portions of ], 964 [Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 536], 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544]

Morse, Wayne, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 54], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 68], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 70], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 190], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201], 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238], 432–433 [Pgs. –433 include portions of ]

Moser, Benjamin R., 700n [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409]

Movimiento de Resistencia Cívica (Civic Resistance Movement) (MRC), 4 [Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 39], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 257]

Movimiento Democrático Cristiano, 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionario (MRR), 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599], 1154–1156 [Pgs. –1156 include portions of ]

Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), 1155–1156 [Pgs. –1156 include portions of ]

Movimiento “30 de Noviembre,” 1157

Moya Alonzo, Manuel de, 592 [Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357]

Mueller, Frederick H., 1023–1024 [Pgs. –1024 include portions of ], 1084 [Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590], 1086–1087 [Pgs. –1087 include portions of ]

Mujal, Eusebio, 160–161 [Pgs. –161 include portions of ], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 112], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 130], 336 [Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]

Muller, Bishop, 84 [Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51]

Mulliken, Jean H., 517 [Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

Mulliken, Otis E., 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363]

Mundt, Karl E., 894n [Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 505]

Muñoz Marín, Luís, 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 250], 428 [Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261], 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 267], 583 [Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 350], 606–607 [Pgs. –607 include portions of ], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Murphy, Robert D., 92n [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 55], 225n [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 138], 237n [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144], 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 330n [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203], 366n [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 229], 375n [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 235], 385n [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 406n [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 268], 468n [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 280], 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346]

Batista regime, 9n [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 54], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 70], 262n [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 160], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 303]

Retirement of, 652 [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385]

Revolutionary regime, 352–353 [Pgs. –353 include portions of ], 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232], 387–390 [Pgs. –390 include portions of ], 515–516 [Pgs. –516 include portions of ], 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 326 and Doc. 327], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 610–611 [Pgs. –611 include portions of ], 635 [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376], 636n [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 376], 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435]

26th of July Movement, 133–134 [Pgs. –134 include portions of ], 140n [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 90], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 166], 323–324 [Pgs. –324 include portions of ]

U.S. citizens evacuation, 339 [Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 212]

Murrow, Edward R., 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Myers, Lawrence, 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 280], 517 [Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

Nasser, Gamal Abd’ul, 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325], 740 [Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423]

National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs (NACOIAA), 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 983 [Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 545], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545]

National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), 707–711 [Pgs. –711 include portions of ], 939–943 [Pgs. –943 include portions of ]

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 85–2–60, 947–949 [Pgs. –949 include portions of ]

National Security Council, 321 [Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]

Actions:

No. 2029–b, 303n [Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 188]

No. 2166–b–(l), 706n [Pg. 706 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 833n [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 474], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2177, 746n [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 474], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2191, 836–837 [Pgs. –837 include portions of ], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2195, 859 [Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2201, 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2206, 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2211, 889 [Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 501]

No. 2213, 897 [Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2217, 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2228, 909 [Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 515], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2239, 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2259, 990–991 [Pgs. –991 include portions of ]

No. 2261, 1019n [Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559]

No. 2269, 1024n [Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2273, 1030n [Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 565], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2279, 1040 [Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]

No. 2281, 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

No. 2283, 1057 [Pg. 1057 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2309, 1076 [Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2318, 1081 [Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588]

No. 2322, 1100 [Pg. 1100 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

No. 2329, 1120 [Pg. 1120 is part of Doc. 608]

Batista regime, 244–245 [Pgs. –245 include portions of ], 567–568 [Pgs. –568 include portions of ]

Documents:

NSC 5412/1, 789n [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 454]

NSC 5604, 1121 [Pg. 1121 is part of Doc. 609]

NSC 5902/1, 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 376], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 473], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 474], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 475], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 492], 913 [Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 517], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1118 [Pg. 1118 includes portions of Doc. 607 and Doc. 608]

5412 Special Group, 789 [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 454], 850–856 [Pgs. –856 include portions of ], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 1126 [Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613], 1140–1141 [Pgs. –1141 include portions of ], 1175 [Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 621]

Meetings:

362d, Apr. 14, 1958, 84–85 [Pgs. –85 include portions of ]

371st, July 3, 1958, 125–126 [Pgs. –126 include portions of ]

380th, Sept. 25, 1958, 215 [Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134]

384th, Oct. 30, 1958, 244–245 [Pgs. –245 include portions of ]

389th, Dec. 6, 1958, 278–279 [Pgs. –279 include portions of ]

391st, Dec. 18, 1958, 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186]

392d, Dec. 23, 1958, 302–303 [Pgs. –303 include portions of ]

394th, Jan. 22, 1959, 382 [Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]

396th, Feb. 12, 1959, 397–398 [Pgs. –398 include portions of ]

400th, Mar. 26, 1959, 440–442 [Pgs. –442 include portions of ]

411th, June 25, 1959, 541–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ]

412th, July 9, 1959, 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331]

413th, July 16, 1959, 560–561 [Pgs. –561 include portions of ]

414th, July 23, 1959, 567–568 [Pgs. –568 include portions of ]

422d, Oct. 29, 1959, 646 [Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380]

426th, Dec. 1, 1959, 683–685 [Pgs. –685 include portions of ]

428th, Dec. 10, 1959, 698–700 [Pgs. –700 include portions of ]

429th, Dec. 16, 1959, 703–706 [Pgs. –706 include portions of ]

432d, Jan. 14, 1960, 740–746 [Pgs. –746 include portions of ]

433d, Jan. 21, 1960, 749 [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426]

433d, Jan. 21, 1960, 749 [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426]

435th, Feb. 18, 1960, 791–793 [Pgs. –793 include portions of ]

436th, Mar. 10, 1960, 832–837 [Pgs. –837 include portions of ]

437th, Mar. 17, 1960, 856–859 [Pgs. –859 include portions of ]

438th, Mar. 24, 1960, 872–873 [Pgs. –873 include portions of ]

439th, Apr. 1, 1960, 876–877 [Pgs. –877 include portions of ]

440th, Apr. 7, 1960, 887–889 [Pgs. –889 include portions of ]

441st, Apr. 14, 1960, 893–897 [Pgs. –897 include portions of ]

442d, Apr. 28, 1960, 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512]

443d, May 5, 1960, 908–909 [Pgs. –909 include portions of ]

445th, May 24, 1960, 925–927 [Pgs. –927 include portions of ]

447th, June 8, 1960, 943–945 [Pgs. –945 include portions of ]

Special, June 22, 1960, 949–952 [Pgs. –952 include portions of ]

450th, July 7, 1960, 980–991 [Pgs. –991 include portions of ]

451st, July 15, 1960, 1014–1019 [Pgs. –1019 include portions of ]

452d, July 21, 1960, 1021–1024 [Pgs. –1024 include portions of ]

453d, July 25, 1960, 1028–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ]

454th, Aug. 1, 1960, 1039–1040 [Pgs. –1040 include portions of ]

455th, Aug. 12, 1960, 1055–1057 [Pgs. –1057 include portions of ]

461st, Sept. 29, 1960, 1074–1076 [Pgs. –1076 include portions of ]

462d, Oct. 6, 1960, 1081 [Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588]

464th, Oct. 20, 1960, 1094–1100 [Pgs. –1100 include portions of ]

465th, Oct. 31, 1960, 1108 [Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602]

466th, Nov. 7, 1960, 1118–1120 [Pgs. –1120 include portions of ]

472d, Dec. 29, 1960, 1187 [Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 626]

Planning Board meeting, 826–828 [Pgs. –828 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime, 397–398 [Pgs. –398 include portions of ], 646 [Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380], 683–684 [Pgs. –684 include portions of ], 703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410], 1016–1017 [Pgs. –1017 include portions of ], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

Communism under, 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 266], 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 698–699 [Pgs. –699 include portions of ], 856–858 [Pgs. –858 include portions of ], 872–873 [Pgs. –873 include portions of ], 876–877 [Pgs. –877 include portions of ], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565]

Guantanamo base, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 857–859 [Pgs. –859 include portions of ]

Latin American revolutionary support, 541–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331]

OAS discussion, 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1028–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ]

Opposition to, 704 [Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 410], 1055 [Pg. 1055 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576]

Soviet Union, relations with, 698–699 [Pgs. –699 include portions of ], 703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410], 749 [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 943–944 [Pgs. –944 include portions of ], 1014–1016 [Pgs. –1016 include portions of ], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 558], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1074–1075 [Pgs. –1075 include portions of ], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1095 [Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 596], 1187 [Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 626]

United States, relations with, 909 [Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 515], 925–926 [Pgs. –926 include portions of ], 1075–1076 [Pgs. –1076 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward, 697–698 [Pgs. –698 include portions of ], 704–706 [Pgs. –706 include portions of ], 724 [Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417], 826–829 [Pgs. –829 include portions of ], 926–927 [Pgs. –927 include portions of ], 1075 [Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 583]

Economic pressures, 684–685 [Pgs. –685 include portions of ], 699–700 [Pgs. –700 include portions of ], 827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 472], 914 [Pg. 914 includes portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518], 980–982 [Pgs. –982 include portions of ], 984–988 [Pgs. –988 include portions of ], 990–991 [Pgs. –991 include portions of ], 1018–1019 [Pgs. –1019 include portions of ], 1023–1024 [Pgs. –1024 include portions of ], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1081 [Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588], 1095–1100 [Pgs. –1100 include portions of ]

Latin American support, 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1015–1016 [Pgs. –1016 include portions of ]

Military intervention proposals, 789 [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 454], 827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 472], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545], 1118–1120 [Pgs. –1120 include portions of ]

Propaganda, 982–983 [Pgs. –983 include portions of ], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545]

26th of July Movement, 84–85 [Pgs. –85 include portions of ], 125–126 [Pgs. –126 include portions of ], 215 [Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 278–279 [Pgs. –279 include portions of ], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 190, Doc. 191, and Doc. 192]

Navy, U.S. Department of the, 78n [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48], 123 [Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 135 [Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 86], 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 165], 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183], 339–340 [Pgs. –340 include portions of ], 663n [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390], 813–820 [Pgs. –820 include portions of ]

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286]

Neidle, A.F., 391n [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

Nelson, Theodore C., 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75]

Newlin, Michael H., 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1102n [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]

Niarchos, Stavros S., 981 [Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 545], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545]

Nicaragua (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 267], 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 289], 541–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 336], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1126 [Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613], 1135 [Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 614], 1171 [Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 620]

Nicaro plant (see also under Revolutionary regime: U.S. policy toward), 185 [Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120], 233–234 [Pgs. –234 include portions of ], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 146]

Nichols, Clarence W., 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Nichols, John A., 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 609–611 [Pgs. –611 include portions of ]

Nixon, Richard M., 95–97 [Pgs. –97 include portions of ], 302–303 [Pgs. –303 include portions of ], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201]

Revolutionary regime, 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271], 453 [Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274], 469 [Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281], 476–477 [Pgs. –477 include portions of ], 698–699 [Pgs. –699 include portions of ], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 424], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 896–897 [Pgs. –897 include portions of ], 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537]

U.S. policy toward, 704–706 [Pgs. –706 include portions of ], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 412], 724 [Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417], 861–863 [Pgs. –863 include portions of ], 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 505], 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

Economic pressures, 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 402], 699–700 [Pgs. –700 include portions of ], 744–745 [Pgs. –745 include portions of ], 950–951 [Pgs. –951 include portions of ], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 991n [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1089–1090 [Pgs. –1090 include portions of ]

Nkrumah, Kwame, 854 [Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 482]

Noble, Andrew N., 298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185]

Noel, James A., 458n [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389]

Norden, Carl F., 700n [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 412], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 364], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1005 [Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 551], 1019 [Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576], 1081–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ], 1095 [Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 596], 1146 [Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 616]

Novins, Stuart, 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302]

Nuñez, Jesus, 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]

Nuñez, Mario, 85 [Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 101 [Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61]

Nuñez Jiménez, Antonio, 462–463 [Pgs. –463 include portions of ], 510 [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308], 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 318], 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349], 905 [Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 513]

Nuñez Portuondo, Emilio, 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131], 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 341], 652–653 [Pgs. –653 include portions of ], 666–667 [Pgs. –667 include portions of ]

O’Connor, Jeremiah J., 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462]

Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 421]

O’Hara, Barrett, 900–901 [Pgs. –901 include portions of ]

Okinawa, 1127 [Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 613]

Olivares, Carlos, 1026 [Pg. 1026 is part of Doc. 563], 1186 [Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 625]

Oliver, William F., 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 363], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397]

Oltuski Ozacki, Enrique, 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399]

Onassis, Aristotle, 980–981 [Pgs. –981 include portions of ], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545]

Operation Pan-America, 798–799 [Pgs. –799 include portions of ]

Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 638 [Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 376], 650 [Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383], 697–698 [Pgs. –698 include portions of ], 738–739 [Pgs. –739 include portions of ], 809n [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 829 [Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 473], 906 [Pg. 906 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514]

Ordoqui, Joaquin, 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278]

Organización Auténtica (OA) (see also Auténtico Party), 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 177], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 257], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 278], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 295], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Organización Revolucionaria (OR), 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 39], 65 [Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42]

Organización Triple A, 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617], 1159 [Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 617]

Organization of American States (OAS) (see also Latin American countries; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 137–138 [Pgs. –138 include portions of ], 147 [Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 149 [Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 112], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 319], 556 [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 332]

Act of Bogotá, 1069–1070 [Pgs. –1070 include portions of ]

Bogotá Resolution, 1948, 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527]

Caracas Resolution, 1954, 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 492–497 [Pgs. –497 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435], 770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 441], 801–802 [Pgs. –802 include portions of ], 815 [Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 466], 819–820 [Pgs. –820 include portions of ], 839–840 [Pgs. –840 include portions of ], 843 [Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 476], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536]

Dominican Republic, discussion of, 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 1016 [Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 558], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1030 [Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 565], 1038–1039 [Pgs. –1039 include portions of ], 1060 [Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578]

Foreign Ministers meeting, Santiago, 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 559–560 [Pgs. –560 include portions of ], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 423], 807n [Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 461]

Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC), 137–138 [Pgs. –138 include portions of ], 772 [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 442], 801 [Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 459], 807 [Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 461], 971–972 [Pgs. –972 include portions of ]

1958 elections, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 12], 28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16], 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 34], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59], 105 [Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 136]

1959 elections, proposed, 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 187], 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196]

Pre-revolution intervention proposals, 182 [Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 118], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 132], 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 150], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 190], 313 [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 317–320 [Pgs. –320 include portions of ], 323–324 [Pgs. –324 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime participation in, 406 [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 491 [Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297], 527–528 [Pgs. –528 include portions of ], 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496]

Washington Resolution, 1951, 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278]

O’Rourke, John, 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 128], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 317]

Orta, Juan A., 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260]

Ortodoxo Party, 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 39], 69–70 [Pgs. –70 include portions of ], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 197], 370–372 [Pgs. –372 include portions of ]

Osborne, Melville E., 1045 [Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571]

Owen, Richard B., 452n [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 587n [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 362], 624n [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368], 633n [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 375], 652n [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385]

Paarlberg, Donald, 517–519 [Pgs. –519 include portions of ], 979–980 [Pgs. –980 include portions of ]

Packard, Robert F., 736–739 [Pgs. –739 include portions of ]

Padilla Nervo, Ruiz, 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436]

Pakistan, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355]

Pan American Society, 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 58]

Panama (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 314 [Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195], 318 [Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 197], 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 490–494 [Pgs. –494 include portions of ], 502 [Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 301], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 336], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 408], 1054 [Pg. 1054 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575], 1102 [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]

Pando Machado, Emilio, 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196], 448 [Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271], 537 [Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323]

Paraguay (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS subheadings under other subjects), 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 1135 [Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 614]

Pardo Llada, José, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 747–748 [Pgs. –748 include portions of ], 783 [Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 450]

Partido Democrático Independiente, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Partido Revolucionario Cubaño Insureccional, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) (Communist Party), 45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24], 95–96 [Pgs. –96 include portions of ], 160–161 [Pgs. –161 include portions of ], 162n [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 111], 187–190 [Pgs. –190 include portions of ], 198–200 [Pgs. –200 include portions of ], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131]

Revolutionary regime tolerance of, 360–361 [Pgs. –361 include portions of ], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 257], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 458–459 [Pgs. –459 include portions of ], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 349], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 513], 1169–1170 [Pgs. –1170 include portions of ], 1174 [Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 620]

Party of Cuban Unity, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 136]

Party of National Revolution (PNR), 36 [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19]

Patterson, Enrique, 823–824 [Pgs. –824 include portions of ], 826 [Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472]

Pavlicek, 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505]

Pawley, William D., 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 164], 281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173], 788 [Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 453], 892 [Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504], 901 [Pg. 901 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510], 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 1127–1128 [Pgs. –1128 include portions of ], 1130–1131 [Pgs. –1131 include portions of ], 1141 [Pg. 1141 includes portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616], 1188 [Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 627]

Paz Estenssoro, Victor, 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204]

Pazos, Felipe, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 10], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 132], 592–594 [Pgs. –594 include portions of ], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365], 622–623 [Pgs. –623 include portions of ], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

Revolutionary regime role, 346n [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 216], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 252], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 362], 661–662 [Pgs. –662 include portions of ], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399]

U.S.-Cuban relations, 7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4], 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271], 450–451 [Pgs. –451 include portions of ], 468–473 [Pgs. –473 include portions of ], 593–594 [Pgs. –594 include portions of ]

Pazos, Javier, 33 [Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 18]

Pedraza, José Eleuterio, 890 [Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 502], 1105 [Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 599]

Peña, Lazaro, 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 299]

Pendas, Porfirio, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12]

Pérez Alfonso, Rafael Pablo, 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523], 938 [Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 526]

Pérez Cisneros, Enrique, 500 [Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301]

Pérez Hernandez, Faustino, 278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 260], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 389], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399]

Pérez Jiménez, Marcos, 386 [Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243]

Pérez Serrente, Archbishop Enrique, 4 [Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2], 52 [Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206], 540 [Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 324], 682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401]

Perkins, Milo, 796 [Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 458]

Perón, Juan Domingo, 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 54], 162 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 111], 547 [Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 328], 567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 341]

Persons, Gen. Wilton B., 343–344 [Pgs. –344 include portions of ], 566n [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340], 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466], 945n [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532], 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544], 1084 [Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590], 1089 [Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 593]

Peru, 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 963 [Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 536], 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541], 1015 [Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 558], 1060 [Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578]

Phillips, Richard I., 599n [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361]

Piad, Carlos, 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 155–156 [Pgs. –156 include portions of ], 181 [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 118], 393–394 [Pgs. –394 include portions of ]

Picher, Lt. Gen. Oliver S., 148 [Pg. 148 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99]

Piedra y Piedra, Carlos M., 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206], 335–337 [Pgs. –337 include portions of ]

Pierson, Warren Lee, 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363]

Pike, H. Harvey, 707–708 [Pgs. –708 include portions of ], 939–942 [Pgs. –942 include portions of ]

Pine, 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]

Piño Santos, Oscar, 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 318]

Pipkin, James H., 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523]

Plaza Lasso, Galo, 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 189], 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200]

Poland, 887–888 [Pgs. –888 include portions of ]

Pool, John C., 1100–1102 [Pgs. –1102 include portions of ]

Portell Vilá, Herminio, 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 289]

Porter, Charles O., 94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 56], 378–381 [Pgs. –381 include portions of ], 432 [Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264]

Porter, Dwight J., 387n [Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]

Portugal, 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246], 577 [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346], 591–592 [Pgs. –592 include portions of ]

Post, Albert, 406n [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 700n [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 703n [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410]

Post-Batista provisional government proposals, 55–56 [Pgs. –56 include portions of ], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 68–70 [Pgs. –70 include portions of ], 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48], 259–260 [Pgs. –260 include portions of ], 288–289 [Pgs. –289 include portions of ], 295–296 [Pgs. –296 include portions of ], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 189], 315–316 [Pgs. –316 include portions of ], 335–336 [Pgs. –336 include portions of ]

Business Advisory Group position, 276–277 [Pgs. –277 include portions of ], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 334–335 [Pgs. –335 include portions of ]

26th of July Movement participation, 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 132], 265–266 [Pgs. –266 include portions of ], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 201]

U.S. approaches to Batista, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 164], 281–283 [Pgs. –283 include portions of ], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 185], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189]

Potts, G.W., 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169]

Powell, Adam Clayton, 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 238], 424–428 [Pgs. –428 include portions of ], 430n [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262], 431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263]

Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, 1189 [Pg. 1189 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628]

Prío forces (see also Prío Socorrás, Carlos), 65 [Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 42], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 325–327 [Pgs. –327 include portions of ], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202], 371–372 [Pgs. –372 include portions of ]

Prío Socorrás, Carlos (see also Prío forces), 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 28n [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16], 89 [Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 99 [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 154], 268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 162], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 177], 672 [Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395]

Revolutionary regime and, 351 [Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 295], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405]

U.S. indictment of, 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189]

Propps, Herbert F., 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418]

Proudfit, Arthur, 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523]

Proxmire, William J., 99 [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60]

Puente, José, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Puerto Rico, 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Pujol, Guillermo Alfonso, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12]

Quadros, Janio, 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613]

Quarles, Donald A., 302–303 [Pgs. –303 include portions of ], 340 [Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213], 441–442 [Pgs. –442 include portions of ]

Quesada, Gen. Manuel, 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 874 [Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494]

Quito Conference, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 408], 798 [Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 458]

Raines, R. Richard, Jr., 223–224 [Pgs. –224 include portions of ]

Ramirez, Osvaldo, 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Ramos, José Luis, 924 [Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 520]

Ramsey, Henry C, 584n [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 351], 794–800 [Pgs. –800 include portions of ], 811n [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464], 1113n [Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605]

Randall, Clarence B., 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 314], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545]

Rasco, José Ignacio, 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599], 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Ravndal, Christian, 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 314–315 [Pgs. –315 include portions of ]

Ray Rivero, Manuel Antonio, 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 260], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 389], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399], 1138 [Pg. 1138 is part of Doc. 614], 1156 [Pg. 1156 is part of Doc. 617], 1163 [Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 617]

Rayburn, Sam, 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294]

Raymond, John M., 110 [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Redington, Robert J., 281n [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173]

Redmond, Kenneth H., 245–249 [Pgs. –249 include portions of ]

Reed, Allan L., 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183]

Reed, Henry C, 279n [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172], 281n [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173], 526 [Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 319]

Rehm, John B., 42n [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 106n [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 110n [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67]

Reid, Ralph W.E., 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421]

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 113n [Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68]

Revolutionary movements (see also Batista regime: Anti-revolutionary actions; Frente Civico Revolucionario; Post-Batista provisional government proposals; Revolutionary regime; 26th of July Movement), 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 63–64 [Pgs. –64 include portions of ], 162–165 [Pgs. –165 include portions of ], 169–170 [Pgs. –170 include portions of ], 190–191 [Pgs. –191 include portions of ], 206 [Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129], 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183], 335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209]

Catholic Church support for, 3–5 [Pgs. –5 include portions of ], 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 18], 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111]

Communist influence, 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 214–215 [Pgs. –215 include portions of ]

Prío forces, 65 [Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 42], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 325–327 [Pgs. –327 include portions of ], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202], 371–372 [Pgs. –372 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime (see also Castro Ruz, Fidel; 26th of July Movement):

Afro-Asian countries, relations with, 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325], 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 589–591 [Pgs. –591 include portions of ], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 366], 703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410], 740–741 [Pgs. –741 include portions of ], 795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 458], 1172 [Pg. 1172 is part of Doc. 620], 1174 [Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 620]

Agrarian reform (see also Sugar quota cut under U.S. policy toward below), 475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286], 509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307], 516–517 [Pgs. –517 include portions of ], 524–525 [Pgs. –525 include portions of ], 531–534 [Pgs. –534 include portions of ], 546 [Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 328], 755 [Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 430]

Communist influence and, 510 [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308], 905 [Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 513]

Compensation for U.S. property, 532–533 [Pgs. –533 include portions of ], 540 [Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 324], 578 [Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 347], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 349], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 803 [Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460], 975 [Pg. 975 is part of Doc. 541], 1043–1044 [Pgs. –1044 include portions of ], 1047 [Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 571]

Cuban position, 529–530 [Pgs. –530 include portions of ], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360], 622–623 [Pgs. –623 include portions of ]

Judicial settlement, 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 406], 717 [Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414], 727 [Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 417], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418]

Sugar import tax proposals, 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 328], 677–678 [Pgs. –678 include portions of ], 685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403], 695–696 [Pgs. –696 include portions of ], 714–718 [Pgs. –718 include portions of ], 721–723 [Pgs. –723 include portions of ], 726–729 [Pgs. –729 include portions of ], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 931 [Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 523], 1073–1074 [Pgs. –1074 include portions of ]

Sugar price differential escrow proposals, 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435], 792–794 [Pgs. –794 include portions of ], 827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 472], 880 [Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 497], 1045 [Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571]

U.S. official protests, 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 607–608 [Pgs. –608 include portions of ], 613–614 [Pgs. –614 include portions of ], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 404], 739–740 [Pgs. –740 include portions of ]

Cuban public opinion, 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382]

Middle-class opposition and, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 257], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260]

Special commission proposal, 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 319], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 406]

U.S. private investment and, 514 [Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 310], 516 [Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312], 538–539 [Pgs. –539 include portions of ], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337]

U.S. property and (see also Compensation for U.S. property above), 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 292], 510–514 [Pgs. –514 include portions of ], 552–553 [Pgs. –553 include portions of ], 605–611 [Pgs. –611 include portions of ], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483]

Cuban position, 512–513 [Pgs. –513 include portions of ], 529–530 [Pgs. –530 include portions of ], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360], 622–623 [Pgs. –623 include portions of ], 868 [Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 490]

Harassment, 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 363], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 364], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 367], 668n [Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397], 717 [Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 414], 739–740 [Pgs. –740 include portions of ]

Latin American positions, 719–720 [Pgs. –720 include portions of ], 727 [Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 417], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 1047 [Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 571]

U.S. official protests, 515–516 [Pgs. –516 include portions of ], 543–544 [Pgs. –544 include portions of ], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 718 [Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 414], 720 [Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 414], 739–740 [Pgs. –740 include portions of ], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423], 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 424]

Argentina, relations with, 1025–1026 [Pgs. –1026 include portions of ]

Armed forces under (see also Communism under below), 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 247], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 253], 487–488 [Pgs. –488 include portions of ], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370], 650 [Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383], 674–675 [Pgs. –675 include portions of ], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 398], 1136–1137 [Pgs. –1137 include portions of ], 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617], 1169–1170 [Pgs. –1170 include portions of ]

British military aid to. See Arms embargo under U.S. policy toward.

Castro role, 357–358 [Pgs. –358 include portions of ], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 230], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 247], 395-396 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 251], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 253], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 295], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 359], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 362], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 370], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 388], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 389], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 398], 870 [Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 491], 883 [Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498], 1026 [Pg. 1026 is part of Doc. 563], 1042 [Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 570]

Accession to power, 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 341–342 [Pgs. –342 include portions of ], 345–346 [Pgs. –346 include portions of ], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 220]

Power, 382–383 [Pgs. –383 include portions of ], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 254], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 257], 440–441 [Pgs. –441 include portions of ], 947–948 [Pgs. –948 include portions of ]

Castro speeches, 350–351 [Pgs. –351 include portions of ], 380–381 [Pgs. –381 include portions of ], 387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244], 447–448 [Pgs. –448 include portions of ], 507–508 [Pgs. –508 include portions of ], 642–643 [Pgs. –643 include portions of ], 665–667 [Pgs. –667 include portions of ], 747–748 [Pgs. –748 include portions of ], 753–756 [Pgs. –756 include portions of ], 810–811 [Pgs. –811 include portions of ], 898–899 [Pgs. –899 include portions of ]

Chinese People’s Republic, relations with, 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 563n [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 595–596 [Pgs. –596 include portions of ], 652 [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1042 [Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 570], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576], 1174 [Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 620]

Communism under (see also OAS attention to; Soviet Union, relations with below), 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 247], 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 260], 461–463 [Pgs. –463 include portions of ], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 342], 629–631 [Pgs. –631 include portions of ], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 399], 879–880 [Pgs. –880 include portions of ], 882–885 [Pgs. –885 include portions of ], 891 [Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503], 948 [Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 531], 1124–1125 [Pgs. –1125 include portions of ]

Agrarian reform and, 510 [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308], 761 [Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 434]

Armed forces, 432 [Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264], 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 278], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 295], 495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 298], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 317], 554 [Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 330], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 349], 905 [Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 513], 1107 [Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 600]

CIA report, 904–906 [Pgs. –906 include portions of ]

Cuban position, 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 277], 474–475 [Pgs. –475 include portions of ], 491–492 [Pgs. –492 include portions of ], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 299], 503–504 [Pgs. –504 include portions of ], 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 342], 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349], 596–597 [Pgs. –597 include portions of ], 659–660 [Pgs. –660 include portions of ], 796 [Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 458], 875 [Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 494], 883–884 [Pgs. –884 include portions of ], 896–897 [Pgs. –897 include portions of ]

Cuban public opinion, 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 295], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 295]

Díaz Lanz accusations, 544–545 [Pgs. –545 include portions of ], 564 [Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 338]

Figueres accusations, 443–444 [Pgs. –444 include portions of ], 447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 270], 493 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 298]

Labor movement, 353 [Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 397 [Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250], 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 419–420 [Pgs. –420 include portions of ], 460–461 [Pgs. –461 include portions of ], 498–499 [Pgs. –499 include portions of ], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 349], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505]

Lack of evidence, 816 [Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 466], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 475], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 869–873 [Pgs. –873 include portions of ]

Latin America, influence on, 876–877 [Pgs. –877 include portions of ], 887 [Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 501]

Latin American positions, 601–602 [Pgs. –602 include portions of ], 899–900 [Pgs. –900 include portions of ]

Latin American revolutionary support and, 492–494 [Pgs. –494 include portions of ]

May Day celebration, 491 [Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297], 497–500 [Pgs. –500 include portions of ]

NSC discussions, 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 266], 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 698–699 [Pgs. –699 include portions of ], 856–857 [Pgs. –857 include portions of ], 872–873 [Pgs. –873 include portions of ], 876 [Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565]

PSP, tolerance of, 360–361 [Pgs. –361 include portions of ], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 418–419 [Pgs. –419 include portions of ], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 458–459 [Pgs. –459 include portions of ], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 349], 882 [Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 497], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 513], 1169–1170 [Pgs. –1170 include portions of ], 1174 [Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 620]

Urrutia resignation and, 564–567 [Pgs. –567 include portions of ], 905–906 [Pgs. –906 include portions of ]

U.S. policy and (see also U.S. policy toward below), 464–466 [Pgs. –466 include portions of ], 557–558 [Pgs. –558 include portions of ], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 387], 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 421], 796 [Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 458]

U.S. protest note proposal, 749–750 [Pgs. –750 include portions of ], 753 [Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430]

Conference of Underdeveloped Nations. See Havana Conference of Hungry Nations below.

Counter-revolutionary activity law, 706–707 [Pgs. –707 include portions of ]

Dominican Republic, relations with, 383–384 [Pgs. –384 include portions of ], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 735 [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 420], 770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 441], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Revolutionary support, 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 535–537 [Pgs. –537 include portions of ], 541–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 557–559 [Pgs. –559 include portions of ], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 336], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 359], 806 [Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 461]

Economic policy (see also Agrarian reform above), 810–811 [Pgs. –811 include portions of ]

Economic situation (see also Economic aid under United States, relations with below), 546–547 [Pgs. –547 include portions of ], 673–674 [Pgs. –674 include portions of ], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 399], 686 [Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404], 690–691 [Pgs. –691 include portions of ], 700–703 [Pgs. –703 include portions of ], 880–881 [Pgs. –881 include portions of ], 899 [Pg. 899 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508], 912–913 [Pgs. –913 include portions of ], 920 [Pg. 920 is part of Doc. 520], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521], 1016–1017 [Pgs. –1017 include portions of ], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613], 1146 [Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 616]

National Intelligence Estimates, 947 [Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531], 1172–1173 [Pgs. –1173 include portions of ]

U.S. economic pressures and, 702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 409], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536], 1145 [Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 616], 1172 [Pg. 1172 is part of Doc. 620]

Executions. See Revolutionary courts below.

Figueres visit, 442–444 [Pgs. –444 include portions of ], 447–448 [Pgs. –448 include portions of ], 460 [Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 278]

Guevara role, 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302], 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 358], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 388], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 389], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399], 870 [Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 491], 880 [Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 497], 883 [Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498], 1009 [Pg. 1009 is part of Doc. 554], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Havana Conference of Hungry Nations, 732 [Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 419], 740 [Pg. 740 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436], 799 [Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 458], 856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483], 887–888 [Pgs. –888 include portions of ], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 1040 [Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]

Hemispheric peace conference, 856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483]

Labor movement under, 352–353 [Pgs. –353 include portions of ], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 397 [Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250], 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 257], 460–461 [Pgs. –461 include portions of ], 498–499 [Pgs. –499 include portions of ], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405]

Latin America, inspiration for, 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 363], 636–637 [Pgs. –637 include portions of ], 796–797 [Pgs. –797 include portions of ], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 473], 876–877 [Pgs. –877 include portions of ]

Latin American country positions, 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 288], 583 [Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 350], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 423], 770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 441], 783n [Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 450], 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 474], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 865 [Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 487], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 942–944 [Pgs. –944 include portions of ], 963 [Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 536], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 984–985 [Pgs. –985 include portions of ], 1053 [Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 574], 1171 [Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 620], 1186 [Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 625]

Latin American labor organization, 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423]

Latin American revolutionary support, 383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241], 396–398 [Pgs. –398 include portions of ], 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 266], 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 267], 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 479–480 [Pgs. –480 include portions of ], 489–491 [Pgs. –491 include portions of ], 506–507 [Pgs. –507 include portions of ], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 319], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 361], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 364], 617–618 [Pgs. –618 include portions of ], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 387], 742 [Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 423], 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532]

Communist influence and, 492–494 [Pgs. –494 include portions of ]

Cuban public opinion, 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288]

Dominican Republic, 535–537 [Pgs. –537 include portions of ], 541–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 557–559 [Pgs. –559 include portions of ], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 336], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 359], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365], 806 [Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 461]

OAS attention, 493–496 [Pgs. –496 include portions of ], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 322], 542–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 327], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 556n [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 332]

Panama expedition and, 490–492 [Pgs. –492 include portions of ], 502 [Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 301], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 334], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 336], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395]

Matos resignation, 629–631 [Pgs. –631 include portions of ], 648–649 [Pgs. –649 include portions of ], 672 [Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 395], 674–675 [Pgs. –675 include portions of ], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423]

Morgan coup attempt, [3] 1959 [4], 579–580 [Pgs. –580 include portions of ], 587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353], 685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403]

Neutralism, 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 362], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 376], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 387], 795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 458], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 473]

OAS attention to (see also U.S. policy toward: Latin American support, search for below), 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 266], 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434], 827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 472], 1060–1065 [Pgs. –1065 include portions of ], 1188 [Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 627]

Ad hoc committee, 1092 [Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 594]

Cuban reactions, 1064–1065 [Pgs. –1065 include portions of ]

Cuban UN appeal and, 772 [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 442], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 466], 839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 475], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1033 [Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 566], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Dominican Republic discussion and, 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 1016 [Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 558], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1038–1039 [Pgs. –1039 include portions of ], 1084–1085 [Pgs. –1085 include portions of ]

Economic pressures and, 1049 [Pg. 1049 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573]

FRD memorandum, 1135 [Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 614]

Good offices proposal and, 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1030 [Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 565], 1038 [Pg. 1038 is part of Doc. 568], 1047 [Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 571], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Guantanamo base, 802 [Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 459], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 482], 1078–1079 [Pgs. –1079 include portions of ]

Inter-American Peace Committee, 772 [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 442], 807 [Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 461], 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Latin American country positions, 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Latin American revolutionary support, 493–496 [Pgs. –496 include portions of ], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 322], 542–543 [Pgs. –543 include portions of ], 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 327], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 556n [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 332]

Sanctions proposals, 761–762 [Pgs. –762 include portions of ], 764 [Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 436], 773 [Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443], 801–802 [Pgs. –802 include portions of ], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 466], 828 [Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 473], 962–963 [Pgs. –963 include portions of ], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1117 [Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 607], 1146 [Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 616]

Blockade, 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613]

Caracas Resolution intervention, 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278], 492–497 [Pgs. –497 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435], 770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 441], 802 [Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 459], 815 [Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 466], 819–820 [Pgs. –820 include portions of ], 839–840 [Pgs. –840 include portions of ], 843 [Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 476], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536]

Cuban UN appeal, possible, 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 466], 839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 475], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485]

Diplomatic relations termination, 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613], 1189 [Pg. 1189 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628]

Economic pressures, 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 473], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613]

Illegal flights from U.S. territory and, 808–809 [Pgs. –809 include portions of ]

Lack of alternative to Castro and, 838–839 [Pgs. –839 include portions of ], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485]

Lack of evidence of Communism and, 802 [Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 459], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 475], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486]

Latin American positions, 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 474], 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 899–900 [Pgs. –900 include portions of ], 1171–1173 [Pgs. –1173 include portions of ]

Rio Treaty intervention, 536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 322], 839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 475], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547], 1083 [Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613], 1181 [Pg. 1181 is part of Doc. 623]

Settlement procedures, 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 771–773 [Pgs. –773 include portions of ], 977 [Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 543]

U.S. citizen protection, 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 482]

U.S. citizens kidnappings and, 137–138 [Pgs. –138 include portions of ], 147 [Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 149 [Pg. 149 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100]

U.S. economic pressures and, 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 570], 1049 [Pg. 1049 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573]

Opposition to (see also Cuban exiles in the United States: Post-revolution illegal activities; Covert opposition support under U.S. policy toward below), 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 416–418 [Pgs. –418 include portions of ], 488–489 [Pgs. –489 include portions of ], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 388], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 399], 689 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 405], 691–692 [Pgs. –692 include portions of ], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 408], 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 952–953 [Pgs. –953 include portions of ], 1137–1138 [Pgs. –1138 include portions of ], 1149–1163 [Pgs. –1163 include portions of ]

Agrarian reform and, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 257], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 260], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 1159 [Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 617]

Armed opposition, 553–554 [Pgs. –554 include portions of ], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 410], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1138–1139 [Pgs. –1139 include portions of ], 1143 [Pg. 1143 is part of Doc. 616], 1150 [Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 617], 1158–1161 [Pgs. –1161 include portions of ], 1171 [Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 620], 1186 [Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 625]

Catholic Church, 417–418 [Pgs. –418 include portions of ], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 295], 755 [Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 430], 763 [Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436], 879 [Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 550], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of Doc. 561], 1051 [Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 573], 1055 [Pg. 1055 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576], 1153–1154 [Pgs. –1154 include portions of ], 1170 [Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 620]

Lack of alternative to Castro, 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 474], 838–839 [Pgs. –839 include portions of ], 845 [Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477], 876 [Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495], 879 [Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497], 885 [Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 499], 1143 [Pg. 1143 is part of Doc. 616], 1171 [Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 620]

Middle and upper class, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 257], 425–426 [Pgs. –426 include portions of ], 431–432 [Pgs. –432 include portions of ], 445n [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 268], 486–487 [Pgs. –487 include portions of ], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 351], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 891 [Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503], 896 [Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 505], 1151–1152 [Pgs. –1152 include portions of ], 1170 [Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 620]

Revolutionary courts and, 1150 [Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 617]

U.S. business contributions, 1133–1134 [Pgs. –1134 include portions of ]

Organization of American States participation (see also OAS attention to above), 406 [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 491 [Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297], 527–528 [Pgs. –528 include portions of ], 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496]

Political situation (see also Opposition to above), 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 230], 370–372 [Pgs. –372 include portions of ], 393–396 [Pgs. –396 include portions of ], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 251], 404–405 [Pgs. –405 include portions of ], 412–413 [Pgs. –413 include portions of ], 646 [Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380], 648–649 [Pgs. –649 include portions of ], 660–662 [Pgs. –662 include portions of ], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 399], 1169 [Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 620]

Civil rights, 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257], 413–415 [Pgs. –415 include portions of ], 880 [Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 497], 891 [Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503], 1014 [Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 557 and Doc. 558]

Popular support for, 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 257], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 277], 486 [Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 295], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330], 581–582 [Pgs. –582 include portions of ], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 376], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 395], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 398], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 399], 689–690 [Pgs. –690 include portions of ], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 408], 880 [Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 497], 885 [Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 499], 912 [Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 517], 1136 [Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 614], 1186 [Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 625]

Raúl Castro role, 357–358 [Pgs. –358 include portions of ], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 247], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 253], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 295], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 362], 627–628 [Pgs. –628 include portions of ], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 382], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 388], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 389], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 398], 883 [Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498]

Regionalism, 411 [Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 257], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 257]

Revolutionary courts, 342 [Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215], 357–359 [Pgs. –359 include portions of ], 364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 368–369 [Pgs. –369 include portions of ], 377–382 [Pgs. –382 include portions of ], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 253], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 257], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 257], 424–425 [Pgs. –425 include portions of ], 646 [Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 379 and Doc. 380], 703–704 [Pgs. –704 include portions of ], 1150 [Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 617]

Aviator re-trial, 424–426 [Pgs. –426 include portions of ], 628 [Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371]

Roa appointment, 526–528 [Pgs. –528 include portions of ]

Social revolution concept, 583–586 [Pgs. –586 include portions of ], 681 [Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 399], 881 [Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 497]

Soviet bloc countries, relations with, 397 [Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 784n [Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 450], 856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483], 882 [Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 497], 887–888 [Pgs. –888 include portions of ], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 948–949 [Pgs. –949 include portions of ], 1186 [Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 625], 1187 [Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 626]

Soviet bloc military aid to, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 462], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 981 [Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 545], 1074–1075 [Pgs. –1075 include portions of ], 1094 [Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 596], 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596], 1106 [Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 600], 1169 [Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 620], 1174 [Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 620]

Arms embargo and, 626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 369], 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 386], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 801 [Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 459], 806–807 [Pgs. –807 include portions of ]

Soviet Union, relations with (see also Communism under above; Soviet bloc relations with and military aid to above), 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 278], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 299], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 362], 703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410], 732 [Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 419], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423], 795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 458], 871 [Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 491], 904–905 [Pgs. –905 include portions of ], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1108 [Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602]

Bonsal recall and, 804–805 [Pgs. –805 include portions of ]

Cuban public opinion, 998 [Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550]

Cuban takeovers of U.S. companies and, 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578]

Economic aid, 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 402], 749 [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426], 1173 [Pg. 1173 is part of Doc. 620]

Khrushchev visit, 940–941 [Pgs. –941 include portions of ], 943–944 [Pgs. –944 include portions of ], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 952n [Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 965–966 [Pgs. –966 include portions of ]

Military support offers, 961–962 [Pgs. –962 include portions of ], 964–965 [Pgs. –965 include portions of ], 970 [Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545], 996–998 [Pgs. –998 include portions of ], 1006 [Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 552], 1008–1009 [Pgs. –1009 include portions of ], 1011–1012 [Pgs. –1012 include portions of ], 1014–1016 [Pgs. –1016 include portions of ], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 558], 1020–1021 [Pgs. –1021 include portions of ], 1072 [Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 581], 1089 [Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 593], 1106 [Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 600]

Missile base, possible, 1012 [Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 556], 1015 [Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 558]

Nickel imports, 736–737 [Pgs. –737 include portions of ], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423]

Nuñez Portuondo accusations, 652–653 [Pgs. –653 include portions of ]

Oil imports, 733–734 [Pgs. –734 include portions of ], 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496], 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 907 [Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 514], 930–931 [Pgs. –931 include portions of ], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 570]

Tanker availability, 980–981 [Pgs. –981 include portions of ], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 551], 1005n [Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 551], 1015 [Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 558], 1023–1024 [Pgs. –1024 include portions of ], 1033 [Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 566], 1173 [Pg. 1173 is part of Doc. 620]

U.S. refusal to process, 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523], 934–938 [Pgs. –938 include portions of ], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 953 [Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 533], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 967–969 [Pgs. –969 include portions of ], 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547], 1040 [Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]

Sugar quota cut and, 442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 328], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527], 981 [Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 545], 1042 [Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 570], 1094–1095 [Pgs. –1095 include portions of ], 1173 [Pg. 1173 is part of Doc. 620], 1187 [Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 626]

U.S. policy and, 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 478], 913 [Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 517]

UN appeal, 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 831–832 [Pgs. –832 include portions of ], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 482], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527], 993–994 [Pgs. –994 include portions of ], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 550], 1015–1016 [Pgs. –1016 include portions of ], 1071–1073 [Pgs. –1073 include portions of ], 1102–1103 [Pgs. –1103 include portions of ], 1190n [Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629]

OAS and, 772 [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 442], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 466], 839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 475], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1033 [Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 566], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

U.S. rebuttal memorandum, 1083–1084 [Pgs. –1084 include portions of ], 1114 [Pg. 1114 is part of Doc. 606]

U.S.-British cooperation, 952–953 [Pgs. –953 include portions of ], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 551], 1033 [Pg. 1033 is part of Doc. 566]

United States, relations with (see also Agrarian reform above; U.S. policy toward below), 526–528 [Pgs. –528 include portions of ], 561–563 [Pgs. –563 include portions of ], 586–587 [Pgs. –587 include portions of ], 641–642 [Pgs. –642 include portions of ], 742–743 [Pgs. –743 include portions of ], 794–795 [Pgs. –795 include portions of ], 897 [Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506], 908–909 [Pgs. –909 include portions of ]

Ambassadorial appointment, 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215], 354–355 [Pgs. –355 include portions of ], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 237], 409–410 [Pgs. –410 include portions of ], 421 [Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259]

Anti-Americanism, 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 225], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 230], 372–373 [Pgs. –373 include portions of ], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 400–402 [Pgs. –402 include portions of ], 442n [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 267], 479–481 [Pgs. –481 include portions of ], 558 [Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334], 561–562 [Pgs. –562 include portions of ], 595–597 [Pgs. –597 include portions of ], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 362], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 366], 648–649 [Pgs. –649 include portions of ], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 387], 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394], 686 [Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404], 783–784 [Pgs. –784 include portions of ], 815n [Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 466], 816n [Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 466], 856–857 [Pgs. –857 include portions of ], 891–892 [Pgs. –892 include portions of ]

Castro speeches, 380–381 [Pgs. –381 include portions of ], 642–643 [Pgs. –643 include portions of ], 747–748 [Pgs. –748 include portions of ], 753–756 [Pgs. –756 include portions of ]

Eisenhower statement and, 804 [Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 460]

Roa UN speech, 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 364], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 365], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 367]

Bonsal recall, Jan.-Mar. 1960, 749–753 [Pgs. –753 include portions of ], 756–757 [Pgs. –757 include portions of ], 759–760 [Pgs. –760 include portions of ], 762–763 [Pgs. –763 include portions of ], 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 776–777 [Pgs. –777 include portions of ], 779–781 [Pgs. –781 include portions of ], 803 [Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460], 848–849 [Pgs. –849 include portions of ], 859 [Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484], 864–867 [Pgs. –867 include portions of ]

Cuban-Soviet relations and, 804–805 [Pgs. –805 include portions of ]

Public opinion, 880–881 [Pgs. –881 include portions of ]

Bonsal recall, Oct. 1960, 1076 [Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584], 1081–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ], 1088–1089 [Pgs. –1089 include portions of ]

Bonsal visit to Oriente province, 918–925 [Pgs. –925 include portions of ]

Castro ASTA meeting speech, 616 [Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 365], 622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367], 628–629 [Pgs. –629 include portions of ]

Castro asylum proposal, 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]

Castro visit, 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 269], 453–455 [Pgs. –455 include portions of ], 466–467 [Pgs. –467 include portions of ], 472–476 [Pgs. –476 include portions of ], 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 288], 480–481 [Pgs. –481 include portions of ], 482–484 [Pgs. –484 include portions of ], 506 [Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304]

Planning for, 394–395 [Pgs. –395 include portions of ], 421 [Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 259], 428–431 [Pgs. –431 include portions of ], 432–433 [Pgs. –433 include portions of ], 441–442 [Pgs. –442 include portions of ], 448–449 [Pgs. –449 include portions of ], 452–453 [Pgs. –453 include portions of ], 455–456 [Pgs. –456 include portions of ], 468–471 [Pgs. –471 include portions of ]

Change of administration and, 1176–1178 [Pgs. –1178 include portions of ]

Cooperation, 402–403 [Pgs. –403 include portions of ]

Cuban exile illegal activities, 422–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365], 632–635 [Pgs. –635 include portions of ], 639–641 [Pgs. –641 include portions of ], 643–646 [Pgs. –646 include portions of ], 658 [Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 811–813 [Pgs. –813 include portions of ], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 874 [Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494], 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515]

Cuban position, 422–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ], 591 [Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 366], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 391], 668–669 [Pgs. –669 include portions of ], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 757–758 [Pgs. –758 include portions of ], 778–779 [Pgs. –779 include portions of ], 785–786 [Pgs. –786 include portions of ], 808–810 [Pgs. –810 include portions of ], 872 [Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 492], 925 [Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 520 and Doc. 521]

U.S. toleration policy, 704–705 [Pgs. –705 include portions of ], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 421], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 1133 [Pg. 1133 is part of Doc. 614]

Cuban provocative attack, possible, 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596]

Cuban tariffs, 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 252], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 253], 422 [Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 259], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 328], 593–594 [Pgs. –594 include portions of ], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364]

Díaz Lanz case, 544–545 [Pgs. –545 include portions of ], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 557 [Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333], 560–561 [Pgs. –561 include portions of ], 564–566 [Pgs. –566 include portions of ], 569–571 [Pgs. –571 include portions of ], 589–591 [Pgs. –591 include portions of ], 631–632 [Pgs. –632 include portions of ], 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395], 808–809 [Pgs. –809 include portions of ]

Diplomatic relations severance proposals, 886 [Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 995 [Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 548], 1053–1054 [Pgs. –1054 include portions of ], 1075 [Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 583], 1081–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ], 1100–1102 [Pgs. –1102 include portions of ], 1142 [Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 616], 1148 [Pg. 1148 is part of Doc. 616], 1178–1184 [Pgs. –1184 include portions of ], 1189–1190 [Pgs. –1190 include portions of ]

Economic aid, 400–401 [Pgs. –401 include portions of ], 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 406–408 [Pgs. –408 include portions of ], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 328], 578–579 [Pgs. –579 include portions of ], 612–613 [Pgs. –613 include portions of ], 619–620 [Pgs. –620 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 458], 914–917 [Pgs. –917 include portions of ], 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527]

Agrarian reform and, 556n [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 332], 708–710 [Pgs. –710 include portions of ], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421]

Castro visit discussions, 453–455 [Pgs. –455 include portions of ], 466–467 [Pgs. –467 include portions of ], 469–470 [Pgs. –470 include portions of ]

Cuban public opinion, 480 [Pg. 480 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

Cuban requests, 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 250], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 253], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 255], 450–451 [Pgs. –451 include portions of ], 574–575 [Pgs. –575 include portions of ], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360]

Eisenhower statement, 764–769 [Pgs. –769 include portions of ], 779 [Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447], 803–804 [Pgs. –804 include portions of ]

Embassy security, 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 342], 668 [Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393]

Extradition requests, 382 [Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240], 423–424 [Pgs. –424 include portions of ], 868 [Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 490]

Guantanamo base, 650–651 [Pgs. –651 include portions of ], 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 800n [Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 458], 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 474], 842 [Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 476], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 875 [Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 494], 877 [Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496], 883–884 [Pgs. –884 include portions of ], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 522], 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532]

Cuban position, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 292], 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355], 1075 [Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 583]

Cuban UN appeal, possible, 832 [Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 482], 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547]

OAS appeal proposals, 802 [Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 459], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 482], 1078–1079 [Pgs. –1079 include portions of ]

Possible attack, 469 [Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 421], 744–745 [Pgs. –745 include portions of ], 801–802 [Pgs. –802 include portions of ], 827–828 [Pgs. –828 include portions of ], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 473], 834 [Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 474], 843 [Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 476], 852–853 [Pgs. –853 include portions of ], 857–859 [Pgs. –859 include portions of ], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1076–1077 [Pgs. –1077 include portions of ], 1079–1080 [Pgs. –1080 include portions of ], 1082 [Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 588], 1087 [Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591], 1108–1110 [Pgs. –1110 include portions of ], 1118–1120 [Pgs. –1120 include portions of ], 1174 [Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 620]

Soviet military support offers and, 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of Doc. 558]

Havana harbor explosion, 823–826 [Pgs. –826 include portions of ], 832 [Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 478], 872 [Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 492], 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547]

Miami incident, 556n [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 332], 561n [Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 342], 588–589 [Pgs. –589 include portions of ]

Military missions, 364–366 [Pgs. –366 include portions of ], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 231], 376–377 [Pgs. –377 include portions of ], 387–391 [Pgs. –391 include portions of ], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 249], 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355]

Miró Cardona Ambassadorial appointment, 925 [Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 520 and Doc. 521], 980–990 [Pgs. –990 include portions of ]

Negotiation proposals (see also OAS attention to above), 758 [Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 432], 776–777 [Pgs. –777 include portions of ], 780–781 [Pgs. –781 include portions of ], 1144–1145 [Pgs. –1145 include portions of ]

Cuban position, 780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448], 782 [Pg. 782 is part of Doc. 449], 790–791 [Pgs. –791 include portions of ], 820 [Pg. 820 includes portions of Doc. 466 and Doc. 467], 868 [Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 490]

Economic pressures and, 820–821 [Pgs. –821 include portions of ], 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538], 1040–1045 [Pgs. –1045 include portions of ]

Latin American positions, 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 478], 866 [Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 488]

Mexican-Canadian-Brazilian good offices proposal, 1024–1025 [Pgs. –1025 include portions of ], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1037–1039 [Pgs. –1039 include portions of ], 1045–1048 [Pgs. –1048 include portions of ], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Personal emissary proposal, 853–854 [Pgs. –854 include portions of ], 900–901 [Pgs. –901 include portions of ], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 522]

Nicaro plant, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 292], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 404], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 474], 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 876 [Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 909 [Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 515], 918–919 [Pgs. –919 include portions of ], 922–926 [Pgs. –926 include portions of ], 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 965 [Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 536], 1017 [Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 558], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1075 [Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 583], 1097–1098 [Pgs. –1098 include portions of ]

Nickel imports, 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 359], 736–737 [Pgs. –737 include portions of ], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423]

Oil debts, 733–734 [Pgs. –734 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 907 [Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 514]

People-to-people group, 1022–1023 [Pgs. –1023 include portions of ]

Petroleum law, 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 404]

Private food donations, 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 259]

Puerto Rico Marine operations, 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546]

Recognition question, 341–347 [Pgs. –347 include portions of ]

Revolutionary courts, 342 [Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215], 357–359 [Pgs. –359 include portions of ], 364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 368–369 [Pgs. –369 include portions of ], 377–382 [Pgs. –382 include portions of ], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 253]

Senate Internal Security Committee hearings, 910–911 [Pgs. –911 include portions of ]

Student demonstration, 785–786 [Pgs. –786 include portions of ]

Sugar quota (see also Sugar quota cut under U.S. policy toward below), 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 280], 472–473 [Pgs. –473 include portions of ], 483–485 [Pgs. –485 include portions of ], 513–514 [Pgs. –514 include portions of ], 522 [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 316], 593–594 [Pgs. –594 include portions of ], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 362], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365], 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392], 699–700 [Pgs. –700 include portions of ]

Tourism, 758 [Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 432], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435], 787 [Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 452], 913 [Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 517], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 1037 [Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568]

U.S. economic situation and, 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

U.S. invaders courts-martial, 1090 [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593], 1143 [Pg. 1143 is part of Doc. 616]

U.S. private investment (see also U.S.-owned companies in Cuba), 407–408 [Pgs. –408 include portions of ], 420 [Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258], 472–473 [Pgs. –473 include portions of ], 500–502 [Pgs. –502 include portions of ], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 310], 516 [Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312], 538–539 [Pgs. –539 include portions of ], 558 [Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334], 591 [Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 363], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 387], 797 [Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 458], 811–812 [Pgs. –812 include portions of ], 876 [Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495], 947 [Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531]

U.S. property takeovers (see also Agrarian reform above), 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 957 [Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 535], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536], 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538], 980–983 [Pgs. –983 include portions of ], 1040–1041 [Pgs. –1041 include portions of ], 1051–1052 [Pgs. –1052 include portions of ], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578]

Utilities, 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 578 [Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 347], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 358], 597–598 [Pgs. –598 include portions of ], 603–604 [Pgs. –604 include portions of ], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 363], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 364], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 367], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 404], 957 [Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 535], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536]

Urrutia resignation, 564–567 [Pgs. –567 include portions of ], 569 [Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 342], 905–906 [Pgs. –906 include portions of ]

U.S. aid to successor government, 1054–1055 [Pgs. –1055 include portions of ], 1065–1069 [Pgs. –1069 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward (see also United States, relations with above), 405–406 [Pgs. –406 include portions of ], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 277], 489–490 [Pgs. –490 include portions of ], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 328], 554 [Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 330], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 349], 604–605 [Pgs. –605 include portions of ], 611–617 [Pgs. –617 include portions of ], 635–639 [Pgs. –639 include portions of ], 651–652 [Pgs. –652 include portions of ], 656–659 [Pgs. –659 include portions of ], 676–677 [Pgs. –677 include portions of ], 731–734 [Pgs. –734 include portions of ], 742–746 [Pgs. –746 include portions of ], 911–912 [Pgs. –912 include portions of ], 1113 [Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605], 1115–1116 [Pgs. –1116 include portions of ], 1184–1185 [Pgs. –1185 include portions of ]

Aircraft harassment policy, 1121–1122 [Pgs. –1122 include portions of ]

Arms embargo, 624–626 [Pgs. –626 include portions of ], 639–640 [Pgs. –640 include portions of ], 647–648 [Pgs. –648 include portions of ], 653–656 [Pgs. –656 include portions of ], 663–665 [Pgs. –665 include portions of ], 669–671 [Pgs. –671 include portions of ], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 739 [Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423], 805–807 [Pgs. –807 include portions of ], 845–846 [Pgs. –846 include portions of ], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 864–865 [Pgs. –865 include portions of ], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 1005 [Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 551]

Cuban position, 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 381], 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 386], 875 [Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 494], 883–884 [Pgs. –884 include portions of ]

Cuban UN appeal, possible, 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547]

Soviet bloc military aid and, 626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 369], 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 386], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 801 [Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 459], 806–807 [Pgs. –807 include portions of ]

T–28s, 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 364], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365]

Blockade proposals, 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423], 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434], 764 [Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 436], 835–836 [Pgs. –836 include portions of ], 842–843 [Pgs. –843 include portions of ], 857 [Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 483], 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 1117 [Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 607], 1119 [Pg. 1119 is part of Doc. 608], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613], 1142 [Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 616], 1148–1149 [Pgs. –1149 include portions of ], 1167–1168 [Pgs. –1168 include portions of ]

British support for (see also Arms embargo above), 952–953 [Pgs. –953 include portions of ], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1000–1005 [Pgs. –1005 include portions of ], 1015 [Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 558], 1031–1034 [Pgs. –1034 include portions of ], 1049–1052 [Pgs. –1052 include portions of ]

Change of administration and, 1128 [Pg. 1128 is part of Doc. 613], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613], 1185–1186 [Pgs. –1186 include portions of ]

Covert opposition support, 818–819 [Pgs. –819 include portions of ], 828 [Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 473], 838 [Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 475], 850–851 [Pgs. –851 include portions of ], 861–863 [Pgs. –863 include portions of ], 955 [Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 535], 974 [Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 541], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1057–1060 [Pgs. –1060 include portions of ], 1117–1118 [Pgs. –1118 include portions of ], 1120 [Pg. 1120 is part of Doc. 608], 1142 [Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 616], 1146 [Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 616], 1175 [Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 621]

Cuban UN appeal, possible, 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547]

Frente Revolucionario Democrático role, 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 1058–1059 [Pgs. –1059 include portions of ], 1104–1105 [Pgs. –1105 include portions of ], 1127 [Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 613], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613], 1133–1138 [Pgs. –1138 include portions of ], 1154–1155 [Pgs. –1155 include portions of ]

Government-in-exile formation, 1162–1163 [Pgs. –1163 include portions of ], 1165–1167 [Pgs. –1167 include portions of ]

Latin American participation, 1128 [Pg. 1128 is part of Doc. 613], 1131 [Pg. 1131 is part of Doc. 613]

Leadership choice, 890–891 [Pgs. –891 include portions of ], 1104–1105 [Pgs. –1105 include portions of ], 1126–1128 [Pgs. –1128 include portions of ], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613], 1147 [Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 616]

Legal restrictions, 1165–1167 [Pgs. –1167 include portions of ]

Organizational arrangements, 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 512], 906–907 [Pgs. –907 include portions of ], 1127 [Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 613], 1130–1131 [Pgs. –1131 include portions of ], 1140–1141 [Pgs. –1141 include portions of ], 1164 [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619]

Propaganda, 850–851 [Pgs. –851 include portions of ], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1058 [Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 577], 1117 [Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 607]

Publicity, 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 1123–1124 [Pgs. –1124 include portions of ], 1128 [Pg. 1128 is part of Doc. 613]

Training location, 1058–1059 [Pgs. –1059 include portions of ], 1123–1124 [Pgs. –1124 include portions of ], 1126–1129 [Pgs. –1129 include portions of ], 1131 [Pg. 1131 is part of Doc. 613]

Cuban exile illegal activities toleration, 704–705 [Pgs. –705 include portions of ], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 421], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 1133 [Pg. 1133 is part of Doc. 614]

Cuban position, 1112–1113 [Pgs. –1113 include portions of ]

Economic pressures (see also Blockade proposals above; Sugar quota cut below), 831–832 [Pgs. –832 include portions of ], 885–886 [Pgs. –886 include portions of ], 912–913 [Pgs. –913 include portions of ], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 970–971 [Pgs. –971 include portions of ], 1010 [Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 555], 1034–1037 [Pgs. –1037 include portions of ], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572], 1065 [Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 578 and Doc. 579], 1075–1076 [Pgs. –1076 include portions of ], 1097 [Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 596], 1136 [Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 614]

Canadian position, 1018–1019 [Pgs. –1019 include portions of ], 1095–1096 [Pgs. –1096 include portions of ], 1098 [Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 596]

Cuban responses, 1081 [Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588]

Cuban UN appeal, possible, 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 473], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527]

Diplomatic relations severance and, 1189–1190 [Pgs. –1190 include portions of ]

Economic effects of, 701 [Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 409], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536], 1145 [Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 616]

Export Control Act, 1035–1037 [Pgs. –1037 include portions of ], 1082–1084 [Pgs. –1084 include portions of ], 1098 [Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 596], 1218 [Pg. 1218 is part of Index]

Lack of alternative to Castro and, 838–839 [Pgs. –839 include portions of ]

Latin American positions, 1054 [Pg. 1054 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575], 1084–1086 [Pgs. –1086 include portions of ], 1089 [Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 593], 1091 [Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 594], 1095 [Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 596], 1098–1099 [Pgs. –1099 include portions of ]

Latin American support, search for, 972–973 [Pgs. –973 include portions of ], 976 [Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 542], 1145 [Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 616]

Livestock exports, 1136 [Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 614]

Negotiation proposals and, 820–821 [Pgs. –821 include portions of ], 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538], 1040–1045 [Pgs. –1045 include portions of ]

NFTC position, 940 [Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 527]

OAS attention and, 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 570], 1049 [Pg. 1049 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573]

OAS Charter and, 549 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 328], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 397], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 967 [Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 536]

Oil refinery spare parts, 1013 [Pg. 1013 is part of Doc. 557], 1024 [Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 561 and Doc. 562], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565]

Publicity, 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 1042–1043 [Pgs. –1043 include portions of ], 1085–1087 [Pgs. –1087 include portions of ], 1090 [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593], 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596]

Rio Treaty and, 1083 [Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589], 1098 [Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 596]

Soviet-Cuban relations and, 835–836 [Pgs. –836 include portions of ], 913 [Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 517]

Soviet oil, refusal to process, 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523], 934–938 [Pgs. –938 include portions of ], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 953 [Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 533], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 967–969 [Pgs. –969 include portions of ], 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547], 1040 [Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]

State of emergency declaration, 963–964 [Pgs. –964 include portions of ], 985–986 [Pgs. –986 include portions of ], 988–989 [Pgs. –989 include portions of ], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545]

Sugar payments and, 1013 [Pg. 1013 is part of Doc. 557], 1019–1020 [Pgs. –1020 include portions of ]

Sugar price differential, 880 [Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 497], 974 [Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 541]

Sugar quota cut and, 979–980 [Pgs. –980 include portions of ]

Trade agreement termination, 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 362], 694–695 [Pgs. –695 include portions of ], 714–715 [Pgs. –715 include portions of ], 717–718 [Pgs. –718 include portions of ], 722 [Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 415], 725–726 [Pgs. –726 include portions of ], 728 [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 803 [Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460], 839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 475], 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 931 [Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 523], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 960–961 [Pgs. –961 include portions of ]

Trading with the Enemy Act, 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 959–961 [Pgs. –961 include portions of ], 963–964 [Pgs. –964 include portions of ], 967 [Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 536], 974 [Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 541], 982 [Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 545], 986 [Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 545], 1013–1014 [Pgs. –1014 include portions of ], 1037 [Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568], 1082–1083 [Pgs. –1083 include portions of ], 1085 [Pg. 1085 is part of Doc. 590], 1098–1099 [Pgs. –1099 include portions of ], 1129 [Pg. 1129 is part of Doc. 613], 1189 [Pg. 1189 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628]

Western European support for, 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 980–981 [Pgs. –981 include portions of ], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545], 987–988 [Pgs. –988 include portions of ], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 545], 1013 [Pg. 1013 is part of Doc. 557], 1015 [Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 558], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576], 1082 [Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 588], 1095 [Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 596], 1146 [Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 616]

World public opinion, 1008 [Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554], 1095 [Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 596]

ICJ appeal proposals, 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 772 [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 442], 827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 472]

Lack of alternative to Castro and, 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 474], 838–839 [Pgs. –839 include portions of ], 845 [Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477]

Latin American support, search for (see also Revolutionary regime: OAS attention to), 727 [Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 417], 765–766 [Pgs. –766 include portions of ], 768 [Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439], 844–845 [Pgs. –845 include portions of ], 928–929 [Pgs. –929 include portions of ], 945 [Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 977–978 [Pgs. –978 include portions of ], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1006–1007 [Pgs. –1007 include portions of ]

Chilean students letter, 893 [Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 505], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 912 [Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 517]

Cuban-Soviet relations and, 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527], 965–966 [Pgs. –966 include portions of ], 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541], 1015–1016 [Pgs. –1016 include portions of ], 1020 [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560], 1056–1057 [Pgs. –1057 include portions of ]

Cuban UN appeal and, 1015 [Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 558]

U.S. aid and, 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 474], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 951 [Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 532], 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578], 1130 [Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 613]

U.S. propaganda, 719–720 [Pgs. –720 include portions of ], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435], 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515], 932–933 [Pgs. –933 include portions of ], 1010–1011 [Pgs. –1011 include portions of ], 1051 [Pg. 1051 is part of Doc. 573]

Military intervention proposals (see also Covert opposition support above; Guantanamo base under United States, relations with above; OAS attention to: Sanctions proposals above), 735n [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 420], 737–738 [Pgs. –738 include portions of ], 744–745 [Pgs. –745 include portions of ], 789–790 [Pgs. –790 include portions of ], 813–820 [Pgs. –820 include portions of ], 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 473], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 475], 892 [Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 1053 [Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 574], 1185 [Pg. 1185 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625]

Cuban position, 995 [Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 548], 1010 [Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 555], 1190–1191 [Pgs. –1191 include portions of ]

Monroe Doctrine and, 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 421], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 814–815 [Pgs. –815 include portions of ], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 466], 819 [Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 466], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561]

U.S. citizen protection and, 1119–1120 [Pgs. –1120 include portions of ]

Varona position, 1139–1140 [Pgs. –1140 include portions of ]

World public opinion, 834 [Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 474], 837 [Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475], 961–962 [Pgs. –962 include portions of ], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 545]

Morgan coup attempt and, 685–686 [Pgs. –686 include portions of ]

NSC policy paper proposals, 697–698 [Pgs. –698 include portions of ], 723–724 [Pgs. –724 include portions of ], 828–829 [Pgs. –829 include portions of ]

Organizational arrangements, 902–903 [Pgs. –903 include portions of ], 906–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ], 967–968 [Pgs. –968 include portions of ], 1017–1018 [Pgs. –1018 include portions of ], 1127 [Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 613], 1130–1131 [Pgs. –1131 include portions of ], 1140–1141 [Pgs. –1141 include portions of ], 1164 [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619]

Propaganda (see also Covert opposition support above), 599–602 [Pgs. –602 include portions of ], 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 719–720 [Pgs. –720 include portions of ], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 419], 742–743 [Pgs. –743 include portions of ], 773–776 [Pgs. –776 include portions of ], 786–787 [Pgs. –787 include portions of ], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 881–883 [Pgs. –883 include portions of ], 893–896 [Pgs. –896 include portions of ], 921 [Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 520], 974–975 [Pgs. –975 include portions of ], 982–983 [Pgs. –983 include portions of ], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 1133 [Pg. 1133 is part of Doc. 614], 1142 [Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 616], 1147–1148 [Pgs. –1148 include portions of ], 1186 [Pg. 1186 is part of Doc. 625]

Cuban UN appeal, possible, 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547]

Diplomatic relations and, 1190 [Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629]

NFTC position, 940–941 [Pgs. –941 include portions of ]

Television, 1114 [Pg. 1114 is part of Doc. 606]

Publicity, 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

Refugee program, 1011 [Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556], 1017–1018 [Pgs. –1018 include portions of ], 1110–1111 [Pgs. –1111 include portions of ], 1116–1117 [Pgs. –1117 include portions of ], 1133 [Pg. 1133 is part of Doc. 614], 1135–1136 [Pgs. –1136 include portions of ]

Rostow Doctrine, 798–799 [Pgs. –799 include portions of ]

Sugar quota cut, 517–519 [Pgs. –519 include portions of ], 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325], 552n [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 329], 608–610 [Pgs. –610 include portions of ], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 402], 713–714 [Pgs. –714 include portions of ], 735 [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 420], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 423], 802–803 [Pgs. –803 include portions of ], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 967 [Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 536], 993–994 [Pgs. –994 include portions of ]

Aid to successor government and, 1067 [Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 579]

Cuban position, 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 820–822 [Pgs. –822 include portions of ], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480], 868 [Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 490], 880 [Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 497], 928n [Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 522], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 522], 981–982 [Pgs. –982 include portions of ], 995 [Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 548]

Economic effects of, 693–694 [Pgs. –694 include portions of ], 701–702 [Pgs. –702 include portions of ], 715–716 [Pgs. –716 include portions of ], 764–765 [Pgs. –765 include portions of ]

Guantanamo base and, 832 [Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474]

Negotiations and, 820–821 [Pgs. –821 include portions of ], 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538]

Possible destructive effects of, 549–550 [Pgs. –550 include portions of ], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 364], 693–694 [Pgs. –694 include portions of ], 729 [Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418]

Presidential authority legislation, 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 397], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 413], 719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 414], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 797 [Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 458], 834 [Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 474], 839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 475], 854–856 [Pgs. –856 include portions of ], 889 [Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 501], 913–914 [Pgs. –914 include portions of ], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 940 [Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 527], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 964 [Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 536], 975 [Pg. 975 is part of Doc. 541]

Proclamation of, 976 [Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 542], 979–980 [Pgs. –980 include portions of ]

Publicity, 639–640 [Pgs. –640 include portions of ], 764–765 [Pgs. –765 include portions of ], 793 [Pg. 793 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457], 956–957 [Pgs. –957 include portions of ], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 570]

Reallocation of, 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 328], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 402], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 412], 713 [Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 413], 721–723 [Pgs. –723 include portions of ], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 417], 958–959 [Pgs. –959 include portions of ], 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ], 1057 [Pg. 1057 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577], 1090–1091 [Pgs. –1091 include portions of ], 1098 [Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 596]

Soviet-Cuban relations and, 442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 328], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 528], 981 [Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 545], 996–997 [Pgs. –997 include portions of ], 1042 [Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 570], 1094–1095 [Pgs. –1095 include portions of ], 1173 [Pg. 1173 is part of Doc. 620], 1187 [Pg. 1187 is part of Doc. 626]

U.S. public opinion, 710 [Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 412]

U.S. citizen evacuation, 819 [Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 466], 832 [Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474], 835–836 [Pgs. –836 include portions of ], 841–842 [Pgs. –842 include portions of ], 857 [Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 483], 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 946–947 [Pgs. –947 include portions of ], 983 [Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 545], 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1065 [Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 578 and Doc. 579], 1075–1076 [Pgs. –1076 include portions of ], 1082 [Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 588], 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596], 1120 [Pg. 1120 is part of Doc. 608]

U.S. citizen protection, 732 [Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 419], 756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431], 819 [Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 466], 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 474], 842 [Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 476], 852–853 [Pgs. –853 include portions of ], 1119–1120 [Pgs. –1120 include portions of ]

U.S. overflights, 1093 [Pg. 1093 is part of Doc. 595], 1102–1103 [Pgs. –1103 include portions of ]

U.S.-owned companies in Cuba and, 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325], 707–711 [Pgs. –711 include portions of ], 733–734 [Pgs. –734 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 907–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ], 939–943 [Pgs. –943 include portions of ], 965 [Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 536], 973–975 [Pgs. –975 include portions of ], 1067 [Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 579]

Soviet oil imports processing refusal, 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523], 934–938 [Pgs. –938 include portions of ], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 953 [Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 533], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 967–969 [Pgs. –969 include portions of ], 994 [Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 547], 1040 [Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]

U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic and, 892 [Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 507], 968 [Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537], 970 [Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539], 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545], 1011n [Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556], 1029–1030 [Pgs. –1030 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward Latin America and, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 408], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 410], 796–800 [Pgs. –800 include portions of ]

U.S. private investment and, 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 423]

U.S. strategic interests, 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 421], 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466]

Venezuela, relations with, 386–387 [Pgs. –387 include portions of ], 869 [Pg. 869 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 570]

Rey, Santiago, 13 [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 336 [Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]

Rice, Edward C., 811–812 [Pgs. –812 include portions of ], 892 [Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504]

Rio Treaty. See Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

Rivero, Nicolás, 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 395]

Rivero Agüero, Andrés (see also Rivero Agüero administration), 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 12], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 111], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 112], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 187–188 [Pgs. –188 include portions of ], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 121], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 123], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 220–222 [Pgs. –222 include portions of ], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 147]

Election of, 249–250 [Pgs. –250 include portions of ], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 172], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189]

Retirement of, 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206]

U.S. asylum, 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 241]

U.S. visit and emissary proposals, 254–256 [Pgs. –256 include portions of ], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 159], 266–267 [Pgs. –267 include portions of ], 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 162]

Rivero Agüero administration (see also Batista regime), 252–254 [Pgs. –254 include portions of ], 261–264 [Pgs. –264 include portions of ], 267–270 [Pgs. –270 include portions of ], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169], 282–283 [Pgs. –283 include portions of ], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 177], 291–292 [Pgs. –292 include portions of ], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 182], 298–299 [Pgs. –299 include portions of ], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 190]

Roa, Raúl, 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 342], 579 [Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348], 668–669 [Pgs. –669 include portions of ], 732 [Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 419], 780–782 [Pgs. –782 include portions of ], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 825–826 [Pgs. –826 include portions of ], 910 [Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 516], 981 [Pg. 981 is part of Doc. 545], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578]

Agrarian reform, 531–534 [Pgs. –534 include portions of ], 538–539 [Pgs. –539 include portions of ], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 622–623 [Pgs. –623 include portions of ], 868 [Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 490]

Appointment of, 526–528 [Pgs. –528 include portions of ], 537–538 [Pgs. –538 include portions of ]

Castro accessibility, 586–588 [Pgs. –588 include portions of ], 592 [Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357]

Díaz Lanz case, 569–571 [Pgs. –571 include portions of ], 589 [Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355]

Latin American revolutionary support, 492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298], 621–622 [Pgs. –622 include portions of ]

Negotiation proposals, 777 [Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445], 780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448], 782 [Pg. 782 is part of Doc. 449], 790–791 [Pgs. –791 include portions of ], 820–821 [Pgs. –821 include portions of ], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 478], 868 [Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 490], 1048n [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

UN speech, 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 364], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 365], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 366], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 367]

U.S. economic aid, 578 [Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 347], 598 [Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360]

Robinson, Joe A., 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418]

Roca Calderío, Blas, 458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 278]

Rockefeller, Nelson A., 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

Rodón, Lincoln, 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 130]

Rodríguez Loeches, Enrique, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Rodríguez Rodríguez, Luis Orlando, 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233]

Rogers, William B., 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 331], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 341], 643–644 [Pgs. –644 include portions of ], 703–706 [Pgs. –706 include portions of ], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 421], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 812–813 [Pgs. –813 include portions of ], 874 [Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494]

Rojas, Ursinio, 498 [Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 299], 1025 [Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563]

Romualdi, Serafiño, 493 [Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 298], 495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 298]

Romulo, Gen. Carlos P., 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 365]

Rosenberg, Philip, 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 609–610 [Pgs. –610 include portions of ]

Rosenson, Alexander M., 616 [Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 365]

Ross, Arthur, 151 [Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102]

Ross, Robert W., 786n [Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452]

Rostow Doctrine, 798 [Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 458]

Rourk, John P., 700n [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409]

Rubio Padillo, José Antonio, 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196]

Rubirosa, Porfirio, 928n [Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 522]

Rubottom, R. Roy, Jr., 8n [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 13n [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 36n [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 55n [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33], 110n [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 129n [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 136n [Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 87], 142n [Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 225n [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 138], 237n [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144], 284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176], 304n [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189], 330n [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203], 332n [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 351n [Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221], 510n [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308], 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311], 535n [Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 322], 543n [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 546n [Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 328], 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346], 583n [Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 350], 624n [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 669n [Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 700n [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 756n [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431], 766n [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 437], 780n [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448], 840n [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 475], 848n [Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479], 864n [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 487], 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1006n [Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 552], 1010n [Pg. 1010 is part of Doc. 555]

Batista regime, 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 8], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 52], 262–263 [Pgs. –263 include portions of ], 290–291 [Pgs. –291 include portions of ], 308–309 [Pgs. –309 include portions of ], 311 [Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 190, Doc. 191, and Doc. 192], 326–327 [Pgs. –327 include portions of ], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 303]

1958 elections, 1–2 [Pgs. –2 include portions of ], 52 [Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 39], 85–86 [Pgs. –86 include portions of ], 88 [Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 97–98 [Pgs. –98 include portions of ], 105 [Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 128], 245–247 [Pgs. –247 include portions of ]

U.S. military aid to, 5 [Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 8–10 [Pgs. –10 include portions of ], 23–24 [Pgs. –24 include portions of ], 50 [Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 83 [Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50], 87–88 [Pgs. –88 include portions of ], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 54], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 190], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 201]

Anti-revolutionary use, 96–97 [Pgs. –97 include portions of ], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 60], 108 [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 65], 113–116 [Pgs. –116 include portions of ], 192–194 [Pgs. –194 include portions of ]

T–28 training aircraft, 198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 201 [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 203n [Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128], 206 [Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129]

Cuban exiles in the United States, 86–87 [Pgs. –87 include portions of ], 203–204 [Pgs. –204 include portions of ], 633–635 [Pgs. –635 include portions of ]

Revolution, 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 166], 281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173], 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 301n [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 187], 323–324 [Pgs. –324 include portions of ], 339–342 [Pgs. –342 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime, 486 [Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 295], 506–507 [Pgs. –507 include portions of ], 584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 351]

Agrarian reform, 512–515 [Pgs. –515 include portions of ], 605–608 [Pgs. –608 include portions of ], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 363], 677–678 [Pgs. –678 include portions of ], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 412], 716–720 [Pgs. –720 include portions of ], 728–731 [Pgs. –731 include portions of ], 1073 [Pg. 1073 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582]

Communism under, 385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298], 544–545 [Pgs. –545 include portions of ]

Havana Conference of Hungry Nations, 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436]

Labor movement in, 352 [Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222]

Latin American revolutionary support, 617–618 [Pgs. –618 include portions of ]

OAS attention to, 764 [Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 436], 769–771 [Pgs. –771 include portions of ], 801–802 [Pgs. –802 include portions of ], 828 [Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473], 863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 486], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 1061 [Pg. 1061 is part of Doc. 578]

Popular support for, 689 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 405]

Revolutionary courts, 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232], 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 238]

Soviet Union, relations with, 804–805 [Pgs. –805 include portions of ], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519], 930–931 [Pgs. –931 include portions of ], 934–935 [Pgs. –935 include portions of ], 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 1008 [Pg. 1008 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554]

United States, relations with, 344 [Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 215], 404 [Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 503 [Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302], 561 [Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336], 588 [Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 354], 603–604 [Pgs. –604 include portions of ], 633–635 [Pgs. –635 include portions of ], 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392], 742–743 [Pgs. –743 include portions of ], 886 [Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500], 918n [Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 520], 965 [Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 536]

Ambassadorial appointment, 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 223], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 235]

Arms embargo, 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423]

Bonsal recall, Jan-Mar. 1960, 750–751 [Pgs. –751 include portions of ], 765 [Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 436], 779n [Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of Doc. 480]

Castro visit, 428–430 [Pgs. –430 include portions of ], 432 [Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264], 433n [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 264], 448–449 [Pgs. –449 include portions of ], 452–453 [Pgs. –453 include portions of ], 468–473 [Pgs. –473 include portions of ], 476 [Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287]

Economic aid, 454 [Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275], 619–620 [Pgs. –620 include portions of ]

Eisenhower statement, 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 438], 803–804 [Pgs. –804 include portions of ]

Guantanamo base, 650 [Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 473], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 522]

Negotiation proposals, 900–901 [Pgs. –901 include portions of ], 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 564], 1045 [Pg. 1045 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Revolutionary courts, 378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 238]

Sugar trade agreements, 472–473 [Pgs. –473 include portions of ], 593–594 [Pgs. –594 include portions of ], 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392]

U.S. private investment, 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 283], 500–502 [Pgs. –502 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward, 616–617 [Pgs. –617 include portions of ], 635–639 [Pgs. –639 include portions of ], 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384], 676–677 [Pgs. –677 include portions of ], 685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 698n [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 410], 723–724 [Pgs. –724 include portions of ], 732–734 [Pgs. –734 include portions of ], 742 [Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 423], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 435], 829 [Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 473], 955–957 [Pgs. –957 include portions of ]

Citizen evacuation, 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 946–947 [Pgs. –947 include portions of ]

Covert opposition support, 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 473], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 890–891 [Pgs. –891 include portions of ]

Economic pressures, 831–832 [Pgs. –832 include portions of ], 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 885 [Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 499], 911–914 [Pgs. –914 include portions of ], 931 [Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 523], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 960–961 [Pgs. –961 include portions of ], 963–964 [Pgs. –964 include portions of ], 966 [Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 536], 1019 [Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559], 1073 [Pg. 1073 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582]

Latin American positions, 1053–1054 [Pgs. –1054 include portions of ]

Latin American support, search for, 770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 441], 928–929 [Pgs. –929 include portions of ], 932–933 [Pgs. –933 include portions of ], 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534], 965–966 [Pgs. –966 include portions of ], 977–978 [Pgs. –978 include portions of ]

Military intervention proposals, 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 473], 961–962 [Pgs. –962 include portions of ]

Organizational arrangements, 906–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ]

Propaganda, 719–720 [Pgs. –720 include portions of ], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 423], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 423], 786–787 [Pgs. –787 include portions of ], 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541], 975 [Pg. 975 is part of Doc. 541]

Sugar quota cut, 517–518 [Pgs. –518 include portions of ], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 363], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 397], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 406], 696n [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 406], 712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 413], 719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 414], 721–723 [Pgs. –723 include portions of ], 744–745 [Pgs. –745 include portions of ], 763n [Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436], 802–803 [Pgs. –803 include portions of ], 913–914 [Pgs. –914 include portions of ], 941 [Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 527], 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538], 976 [Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 542], 979 [Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 544]

U.S.-owned companies in Cuba and, 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515]

Rivero Agüero administration, 263–264 [Pgs. –264 include portions of ], 277n [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169], 291–292 [Pgs. –292 include portions of ]

Senate Internal Security Committee, 877–879 [Pgs. –879 include portions of ]

26th of July Movement, 80 [Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 130–131 [Pgs. –131 include portions of ], 193–194 [Pgs. –194 include portions of ], 223–224 [Pgs. –224 include portions of ], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 146], 241n [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 247–249 [Pgs. –249 include portions of ], 309–310 [Pgs. –310 include portions of ], 313 [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 201]

Urrutia provisional presidency, 341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214]

U.S. aid to replacement government, 1055–1056 [Pgs. –1056 include portions of ]

Rylance, George A., 777 [Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445]

St. George, Katherine, 735n [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 420]

Salado, Marcelo, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 49]

Salas Amaro, Alberto, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 136]

Salvador, David, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 257], 441 [Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 266], 460–462 [Pgs. –462 include portions of ], 500 [Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301], 642 [Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379], 1157 [Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 617]

Salvar a Cuba (SAC), 1158 [Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 617]

Sánchez, Celia, 449n [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271]

Sánchez, Rafael Sardina, 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599]

Sánchez Arango, Aureliano, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 257], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 1132 [Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 614], 1137–1138 [Pgs. –1138 include portions of ], 1154 [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Sánchez Piedra, Emilio, 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1009n [Pg. 1009 is part of Doc. 554]

Sangenes, Luis, 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277]

Santamaría, Aldo, 278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171]

Santos Buch, Angel, 33 [Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 18], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 39], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Sardiñas, Guillermo, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 21]

Sargeant, Howland B., 707 [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412], 710 [Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 412]

Schow, Maj. Gen. Robert A., U.S. military aid to Cuba, 78n [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]

Scott, Joseph W., 1164 [Pg. 1164 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619]

Scribner, Fred C, Jr., 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 410], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 1019 [Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559], 1099 [Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 596]

Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray (National Second Front of the Escambray), 371–372 [Pgs. –372 include portions of ], 438–439 [Pgs. –439 include portions of ], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 278]

Segundo Frente (see also Castro Ruz, Raúl), 231–232 [Pgs. –232 include portions of ], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 225], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 225], 372 [Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234], 435–437 [Pgs. –437 include portions of ]

Sekou Touré, Ahmed, 854 [Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 482]

Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM), 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 62], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 112], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 225]

Shaw, John P., 1106n [Pg. 1106 is part of Doc. 600]

Shergalis, William J., 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 908 [Pg. 908 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515]

Shields, Robert H., 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 363]

Shoup, Gen. David M., 1079 [Pg. 1079 is part of Doc. 585]

Sindicato Artes Graficas, 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 278]

Sisco, Joseph J., 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547]

Skelly, John, 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 62]

Smathers, George A., 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 289], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 430], 864–865 [Pgs. –865 include portions of ]

Smith, Bromley K., 650 [Pg. 650 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383]

Smith, Earl E.T., 186n [Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121], 279n [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172], 284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176], 305–306 [Pgs. –306 include portions of ], 337–338 [Pgs. –338 include portions of ], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 230], 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 241], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246], 928n [Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 522], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 522]

Batista regime, 5–7 [Pgs. –7 include portions of ], 10–12 [Pgs. –12 include portions of ], 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36], 201n [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 133], 268–269 [Pgs. –269 include portions of ]

Communist influence during, 160–161 [Pgs. –161 include portions of ], 214–215 [Pgs. –215 include portions of ], 268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 162], 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Constitutional guarantee suspensions, 12–16 [Pgs. –16 include portions of ], 54 [Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 173–174 [Pgs. –174 include portions of ]

1958 elections, 21–22 [Pgs. –22 include portions of ], 28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16], 37–38 [Pgs. –38 include portions of ], 50–51 [Pgs. –51 include portions of ], 57–59 [Pgs. –59 include portions of ], 98–99 [Pgs. –99 include portions of ], 173–174 [Pgs. –174 include portions of ], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 123], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 241–242 [Pgs. –242 include portions of ], 249–251 [Pgs. –251 include portions of ]

Batista retirement, 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 123], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206]

Cantillo provisional government, 333–337 [Pgs. –337 include portions of ], 342 [Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]

Catholic Church peace efforts, 52–54 [Pgs. –54 include portions of ], 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 61–62 [Pgs. –62 include portions of ], 74n [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 45], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 187]

Constitutional assembly proposal, 252–254 [Pgs. –254 include portions of ], 262–263 [Pgs. –263 include portions of ], 268–269 [Pgs. –269 include portions of ], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169]

Cuban exiles in the United States, 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 133], 251 [Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157]

Guantanamo base protection, 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119], 273–274 [Pgs. –274 include portions of ], 276n [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Latin American countries intervention proposals, 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215]

Post-Batista provisional government proposals, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 164], 276–277 [Pgs. –277 include portions of ], 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 298–299 [Pgs. –299 include portions of ], 315–316 [Pgs. –316 include portions of ], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 201], 334–335 [Pgs. –335 include portions of ]

Recall of, 343–345 [Pgs. –345 include portions of ], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 219], 351–355 [Pgs. –355 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime, 341–342 [Pgs. –342 include portions of ], 347n [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 217], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 218], 350–351 [Pgs. –351 include portions of ], 364–365 [Pgs. –365 include portions of ]

Rivero Agüero administration, 252–257 [Pgs. –257 include portions of ], 266–269 [Pgs. –269 include portions of ], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169], 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174]

26th of July Movement, 18n [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 28–29 [Pgs. –29 include portions of ], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 80 [Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 185–186 [Pgs. –186 include portions of ], 252 [Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 160], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 181], 336–337 [Pgs. –337 include portions of ]

Communist influence, 150–151 [Pgs. –151 include portions of ], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 251 [Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202]

Sugar company tribute demands, 223n [Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 137], 224n [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 137], 225n [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 138], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 140], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 143]

U.S. citizens kidnapping, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70], 119–121 [Pgs. –121 include portions of ], 125–132 [Pgs. –132 include portions of ], 134–135 [Pgs. –135 include portions of ], 140n [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 90], 141–144 [Pgs. –144 include portions of ], 146–152 [Pgs. –152 include portions of ], 154–156 [Pgs. –156 include portions of ], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 243–244 [Pgs. –244 include portions of ]

U.S. citizens evacuation, 339 [Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 212]

U.S. military aid to Batista regime, 5–11 [Pgs. –11 include portions of ], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 13], 61–62 [Pgs. –62 include portions of ], 126 [Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80], 144 [Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94], 174 [Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 256–258 [Pgs. –258 include portions of ]

Anti-revolutionary use, 18–20 [Pgs. –20 include portions of ], 48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 84 [Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 58], 99–102 [Pgs. –102 include portions of ], 107n [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 64], 108–109 [Pgs. –109 include portions of ]

T–28 training aircraft, 109–110 [Pgs. –110 include portions of ], 123–124 [Pgs. –124 include portions of ], 153–154 [Pgs. –154 include portions of ], 158–159 [Pgs. –159 include portions of ], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111], 198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126], 201–202 [Pgs. –202 include portions of ], 206–207 [Pgs. –207 include portions of ], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131]

U.S. suspension, 72n [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 43], 75–76 [Pgs. –76 include portions of ], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 48], 84 [Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51], 93–94 [Pgs. –94 include portions of ], 195–196 [Pgs. –196 include portions of ]

Smith, Gerard C., 113n [Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68], 635n [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376], 697n [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 698 [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408], 736–737 [Pgs. –737 include portions of ], 794 [Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458], 800n [Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 458], 828n [Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473], 837n [Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475], 840n [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 475], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536]

Guantanamo base, 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 1108 [Pg. 1108 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602]

Revolutionary regime, 892 [Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1010–1011 [Pgs. –1011 include portions of ], 1113 [Pg. 1113 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605]

Smith, Margaret Chase, 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201]

Smith, Walter Bedell, 494 [Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 298]

Smith, Wayne S., 1124n [Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611], 1176n [Pg. 1176 is part of Doc. 622]

Snow, William R, 36n [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 42n [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 49n [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 27], 51n [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 60n [Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36], 66n [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 68n [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 42], 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 43], 73n [Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45], 92n [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 55], 105n [Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 106n [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 136n [Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 87], 225n [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 138], 237n [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144], 270n [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 163], 275n [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 168], 304n [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189], 322n [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 330n [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203], 332n [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204], 366n [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 229], 391n [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245], 452n [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 486n [Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 295], 535n [Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 322], 563n [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 584n [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 351], 599n [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361]

Batista asylum, 505–506 [Pgs. –506 include portions of ]

Batista regime, 45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24], 49–50 [Pgs. –50 include portions of ], 65–67 [Pgs. –67 include portions of ], 88n [Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 92–93 [Pgs. –93 include portions of ], 144 [Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 201 [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 203n [Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128]

Batista retirement, 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 160]

Cuban exiles in the United States, 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 128]

Guantanamo base protection, 174–179 [Pgs. –179 include portions of ], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 166]

Post-Batista provisional government proposals, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 164], 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 315n [Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196]

Revolutionary movements, 162 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 111]

Revolutionary regime:

Agrarian reform, 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324]

Communism under, 497 [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299]

United States, relations with, 379–380 [Pgs. –380 include portions of ], 388–390 [Pgs. –390 include portions of ], 406–408 [Pgs. –408 include portions of ], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 455 [Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276], 470n [Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282], 616–617 [Pgs. –617 include portions of ], 619–620 [Pgs. –620 include portions of ]

Rivero Agüero administration, 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 179]

26th of July Movement, 54 [Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 137 [Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 88], 229–230 [Pgs. –230 include portions of ], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 150]

Society of the Friends of the Republic (SAR), 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 233]

Somoza Debayle, Luis (see also Nicaragua), 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325]

Sorí Marín, Humberto, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 21], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 233], 474–475 [Pgs. –475 include portions of ], 509–510 [Pgs. –510 include portions of ], 525 [Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 318], 526n [Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 319], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365]

Sosa Blanco, José, 57 [Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 34], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 43]

Sosa Quesada, Gen., 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]

Soto, Tio, 415 [Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 257]

Southard, Frank A., 986 [Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 545]

Soviet Union. See Soviet, Soviet bloc, and Soviet Union subheadings under other subjects.

Spain, 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 241], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 341], 753 [Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430], 755–756 [Pgs. –756 include portions of ], 763 [Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436]

Spalding, Francis L., 383–384 [Pgs. –384 include portions of ], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246]

Sparkman, John A., 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 201]

Sparks, Edward J., 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561]

Special National Intelligence Estimates:

SNIE 80/1–59, 802 [Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 459], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 475], 844 [Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 476], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485]

SNIE 85/1–58, 295–297 [Pgs. –297 include portions of ], 362–363 [Pgs. –363 include portions of ]

SNIE 85–3-60, 1168–1174 [Pgs. –1174 include portions of ], 1185 [Pg. 1185 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625]

SNIE 85–58, 265–266 [Pgs. –266 include portions of ], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 182], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226]

SNIE 85–60, 869–872 [Pgs. –872 include portions of ]

Spellman, Cardinal Francis, 540 [Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 324]

Spencer, George O., 106n [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 110–113 [Pgs. –113 include portions of ], 183n [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 119]

Spiralli, Lorenzo, 4 [Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2]

Sprague, Mansfield D., 140n [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 90]

Stans, Maurice H., 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 456], 909 [Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 515], 1098–1099 [Pgs. –1099 include portions of ]

Stebbins, James, 939–940 [Pgs. –940 include portions of ]

Stephansky, Benjamin, 497–499 [Pgs. –499 include portions of ]

Stevenson, Robert A., 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 160], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 179], 308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 190], 330n [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203], 345n [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216], 391n [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245], 406n [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260], 448 [Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271], 452n [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 468n [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 280], 481n [Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291], 483n [Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293], 505n [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 303], 510n [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308], 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311], 543n [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 563n [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346], 599n [Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 693n [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 406], 700n [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409], 707n [Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412], 750n [Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427], 756n [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431], 780n [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448], 803n [Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460], 808n [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 462], 848n [Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479], 952 [Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533], 958 [Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 536], 1048n [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572], 1053n [Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 574], 1091n [Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 594]

Revolutionary regime, 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 512 [Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310], 537 [Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 616 [Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 365], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 412], 900–901 [Pgs. –901 include portions of ], 918 [Pg. 918 is part of Doc. 520], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527], 1132 [Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 614], 1189–1190 [Pgs. –1190 include portions of ]

Stevers, Fred D., 1124n [Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611]

Steward, 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]

Stewart, C. Allan, 10n [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 42n [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 68n [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 42], 113n [Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68], 132n [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 84], 139n [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 168n [Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112], 174n [Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 177n [Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116], 385n [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 492n [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298], 652n [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385]

Guantanamo base protection, 175n [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 114], 181–185 [Pgs. –185 include portions of ]

Revolutionary movements, 79–80 [Pgs. –80 include portions of ], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 70], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 84], 162–168 [Pgs. –168 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime, 442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267], 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 267], 491–493 [Pgs. –493 include portions of ], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 362]

U.S. military aid to Batista regime, 63–65 [Pgs. –65 include portions of ], 78–79 [Pgs. –79 include portions of ], 90–91 [Pgs. –91 include portions of ], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 68], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 70]

Strauss, Simon, 973–974 [Pgs. –974 include portions of ]

Stroh, Rear Adm. Robert, 123 [Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 175n [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 114]

Suárez Fernández, Miguel, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12]

Suárez Lorenzo, Pedro L., 42 [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22]

Suez Canal crisis, 988 [Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 545]

Sukarno, Achmed, 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521]

Sullivan, Ed, 365n [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 228]

Sulzberger, Arthur H., 540 [Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 324]

Summ, G. Harvey, 1090n [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593]

Suslov, Mikhail A., 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

Swing, Gen. Joseph M., 545 [Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 327], 878 [Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 496], 1017 [Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 558]

Switzerland, 1101 [Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 597]

Sylvester, Harry, 932 [Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 524]

Szulc, Tad, 558–560 [Pgs. –560 include portions of ]

Tabernilla, Francisco, 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 182], 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271]

Tamas, Francisco Rodolfo, 783–784 [Pgs. –784 include portions of ]

Tate, Paul A., 629n [Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372], 630–631 [Pgs. –631 include portions of ], 785–786 [Pgs. –786 include portions of ]

Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 70], 1126 [Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613], 1175 [Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 621]

Tello Barraud, Manuel, 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534], 1063 [Pg. 1063 is part of Doc. 578]

10:30 Working Group on Cuba, 1114 [Pg. 1114 is part of Doc. 606], 1185–1186 [Pgs. –1186 include portions of ]

Thompson, Allan D., 1090n [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593]

Thompson, Charles, 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443]

Thompson, Scott, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 169], 334 [Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208], 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 395], 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527]

Tio, Soto, 415 [Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 257]

Tobar Zaldumbide, Carlos, 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 314 [Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195], 332 [Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 204]

Todd, Carlos, 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 395]

Togliatti, Palmiro, 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 576]

Toledano, Vicente Lombardo, 876 [Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495]

Toledo, 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Tompkins, William, 28–29 [Pgs. –29 include portions of ]

Tonneson, TH., 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541]

Topping, John L., 3n [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2], 38n [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 43–44 [Pgs. –44 include portions of ], 46n [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 25], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 48], 103n [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 62], 370n [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 233], 410n [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257], 434n [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 265], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 277], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 398]

Torre, Arlundo, 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 101]

Torrey, Charles P., 939n [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527], 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541], 1053 [Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 574]

Torriente, Cosmé de la, 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 233]

Tortosa, Santiago, 500 [Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301]

Treadway, Lt. Col. Joseph E., 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 111]

Treasury, U.S. Department of the, 398 [Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 250], 407–408 [Pgs. –408 include portions of ], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 364], 634–635 [Pgs. –635 include portions of ], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 379], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 410], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421], 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 462], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of Doc. 545]

Trujillo y Molina, Generalissimo Rafael L. (see also Dominican Republic), 281n [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 246], 537 [Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323], 542 [Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 325], 558 [Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 341], 575 [Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344], 577 [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346]

Turkel, Harry R., 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311], 517 [Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313], 546–551 [Pgs. –551 include portions of ], 616n [Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 716n [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414], 940 [Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 527]

U.S. sugar policy, 677–678 [Pgs. –678 include portions of ], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 406], 696n [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 406], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 412], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 412], 714 [Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 413], 721–722 [Pgs. –722 include portions of ], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527]

26th of July Movement (see also Anti-revolutionary actions under Batista regime; Castro Ruz, Fidel; Frente Cívico Revolucionario; Revolutionary movements; Revolutionary regime; Segundo Frente), 38–40 [Pgs. –40 include portions of ], 75–76 [Pgs. –76 include portions of ], 162 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 111], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 112], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 139], 252 [Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154], 253–254 [Pgs. –254 include portions of ], 264n [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 160], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 181], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 201], 338–340 [Pgs. –340 include portions of ]

Castro role in, 35–36 [Pgs. –36 include portions of ], 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 21], 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 25], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 80 [Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 146 [Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97], 285–286 [Pgs. –286 include portions of ]

Catholic Church support for, 3–4 [Pgs. –4 include portions of ], 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 18], 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 21], 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 23]

Communist influence, 28–29 [Pgs. –29 include portions of ], 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 25], 77 [Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 47], 84–85 [Pgs. –85 include portions of ], 124–125 [Pgs. –125 include portions of ], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 81], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 83], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 85], 150–151 [Pgs. –151 include portions of ], 154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 110], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 121], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 124], 216–217 [Pgs. –217 include portions of ], 248–249 [Pgs. –249 include portions of ], 251 [Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 278 [Pg. 278 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171], 302–303 [Pgs. –303 include portions of ], 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 326–327 [Pgs. –327 include portions of ], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 203]

Batista regime position, 313 [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]

Betancourt position, 207–208 [Pgs. –208 include portions of ]

Business Advisory Group position, 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Cuban public opinion, 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 18]

Lack of evidence, 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 190], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 201]

Latin American position, 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189]

Marquéz Sterling position, 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]

Rivero Agüero position, 268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 162]

U.S. military aid to Batista regime and, 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 122]

U.S. negotiations and, 312 [Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193]

Cooperation with other movements, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 65 [Pg. 65 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 42], 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 42], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 132], 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183]

Crop destruction tactics, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14], 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 18], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 111], 240–241 [Pgs. –241 include portions of ]

Cuban public opinion, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14], 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 18], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21], 52 [Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30], 186–187 [Pgs. –187 include portions of ], 285–286 [Pgs. –286 include portions of ], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 189], 308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 190], 316–317 [Pgs. –317 include portions of ], 326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 201], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 257]

General strike attempt, 1958, 54–55 [Pgs. –55 include portions of ], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 42], 77 [Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 47], 79–84 [Pgs. –84 include portions of ], 88 [Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 62], 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 111], 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 136], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 141], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189]

General strike, 1959, 336 [Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210], 411–412 [Pgs. –412 include portions of ]

Guantanamo base, 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 114], 272–276 [Pgs. –276 include portions of ], 279–280 [Pgs. –280 include portions of ], 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189]

Military situation, 25–27 [Pgs. –27 include portions of ], 31–34 [Pgs. –34 include portions of ], 41–42 [Pgs. –42 include portions of ], 164–166 [Pgs. –166 include portions of ], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 112], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 131], 218–219 [Pgs. –219 include portions of ], 227–228 [Pgs. –228 include portions of ], 231–232 [Pgs. –232 include portions of ], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 161], 278–279 [Pgs. –279 include portions of ], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 179], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 182], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 186], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189], 313 [Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 317 [Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 197], 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202], 434–440 [Pgs. –440 include portions of ]

1958 elections and, 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 112], 217–221 [Pgs. –221 include portions of ], 231–232 [Pgs. –232 include portions of ], 244 [Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 150], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 177]

Soviet Union, relations with, 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 190]

Sugar company tribute demands, 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131], 223–225 [Pgs. –225 include portions of ], 229–230 [Pgs. –230 include portions of ], 233–239 [Pgs. –239 include portions of ], 247–248 [Pgs. –248 include portions of ], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 177]

Urrutia presidency demands, 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21], 63–65 [Pgs. –65 include portions of ], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 335–336 [Pgs. –336 include portions of ]

U.S. citizens kidnappings, 117–138 [Pgs. –138 include portions of ], 140–143 [Pgs. –143 include portions of ], 145–149 [Pgs. –149 include portions of ], 151–152 [Pgs. –152 include portions of ], 154–157 [Pgs. –157 include portions of ], 182 [Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 118], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 121], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 124], 243–244 [Pgs. –244 include portions of ], 279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 189]

U.S. military aid to Batista regime and, 142 [Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 193–194 [Pgs. –194 include portions of ], 207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130]

U.S. negotiations with, 185–186 [Pgs. –186 include portions of ], 284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 190], 311–312 [Pgs. –312 include portions of ]

U.S. press support for, 285–286 [Pgs. –286 include portions of ], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 188], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 189], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 190]

Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 95], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 244], 698n [Pg. 698 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 1078–1079 [Pgs. –1079 include portions of ]

Ugalde Carillo, Manuel, 910 [Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 516]

UNESCO, 905 [Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 513]

Unidad Cubaña de Liberación (UCL), 1104–1105 [Pgs. –1105 include portions of ]

United Arab Republic (UAR), 703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410], 740–741 [Pgs. –741 include portions of ], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561]

United Fruit Company (see also U.S.-owned companies in Cuba), 223–224 [Pgs. –224 include portions of ], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 172], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 363]

United Kingdom (see also Arms embargo under Revolutionary regime), 1100–1101 [Pgs. –1101 include portions of ]

Batista regime, military aid to, 144 [Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94], 152–153 [Pgs. –153 include portions of ], 166–167 [Pgs. –167 include portions of ], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 117], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 179], 298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185]

Revolutionary regime, U.S. policy support, 952–953 [Pgs. –953 include portions of ], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 536], 985 [Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 545], 993 [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1000–1005 [Pgs. –1005 include portions of ], 1015 [Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 558], 1031–1034 [Pgs. –1034 include portions of ], 1049–1052 [Pgs. –1052 include portions of ]

United Nationalist Labor Front (FONU), 353 [Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223]

United Nations (see also United Nations and UN subheadings under other subjects), 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 112], 317–320 [Pgs. –320 include portions of ], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 364], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 365], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 366], 913 [Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 517]

1958 elections, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 12], 38 [Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 50–52 [Pgs. –52 include portions of ], 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 34], 97–98 [Pgs. –98 include portions of ], 105 [Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 136], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 147]

United States-Cuban Sugar Council. See Cuban-American Sugar Council.

Universidad Obrera, 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]

Upton, T. Graydon, 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 283]

Urrutia Lleó, Manuel, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 142], 238n [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 145], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 182], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 215], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 231], 380–381 [Pgs. –381 include portions of ], 410 [Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257], 500 [Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 302]

Anti-Communism, 560 [Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335], 564–566 [Pgs. –566 include portions of ]

Provisional presidency, 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 341–342 [Pgs. –342 include portions of ], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 218], 397 [Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250]

Resignation of, 564–567 [Pgs. –567 include portions of ], 569 [Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 342], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 373], 905–906 [Pgs. –906 include portions of ]

26th of July Movement presidency demands, 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 21], 63–65 [Pgs. –65 include portions of ], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 335–336 [Pgs. –336 include portions of ]

Uruguay (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS sub-headings under other subjects), 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 232], 734 [Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420], 978 [Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 543], 1135 [Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 614]

U.S. citizen evacuation (see also under Revolutionary regime: U.S. policy to-ward), 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 172], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 188], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 201], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206], 338–342 [Pgs. –342 include portions of ]

U.S. citizens kidnappings. See under 26th of July Movement.

U.S. direct intervention proposals (see also under Revolutionary regime: U.S. policy toward), 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 121], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 150], 259–260 [Pgs. –260 include portions of ]

U.S. economic pressures on the revolutionary regime. See Economic pressures under Revolutionary regime: U.S. policy toward.

U.S. Information Service (USIS), 201n [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 225], 466 [Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279], 486 [Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 295], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 295], 599–602 [Pgs. –602 include portions of ], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 773n [Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443], 786–787 [Pgs. –787 include portions of ], 829 [Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 473], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 485], 881–882 [Pgs. –882 include portions of ], 894–895 [Pgs. –895 include portions of ], 932–933 [Pgs. –933 include portions of ], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 545], 1180 [Pg. 1180 is part of Doc. 623]

U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB), 362–363 [Pgs. –363 include portions of ], 917 [Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519]

U.S.-owned companies in Cuba (see also U.S. private investment under Revolutionary regime: United States, relations with; U.S. property and under Revolutionary regime: Agrarian reform):

Abandonment of operations, 858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 483], 862–863 [Pgs. –863 include portions of ], 880 [Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 497], 902 [Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 570], 1042 [Pg. 1042 is part of Doc. 570]

Revolutionary regime policy toward, 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 336], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 358], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 359], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 363], 672–674 [Pgs. –674 include portions of ], 832–833 [Pgs. –833 include portions of ], 862 [Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 486], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 957 [Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 535], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536], 969 [Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538], 980–983 [Pgs. –983 include portions of ], 1040–1041 [Pgs. –1041 include portions of ], 1051–1052 [Pgs. –1052 include portions of ], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578]

Soviet oil, 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523], 934–938 [Pgs. –938 include portions of ], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 946 [Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 530], 950 [Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 532], 953 [Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 533], 956 [Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 535]

26th of July Movement crop destruction tactics, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 12], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 14], 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 18], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 111], 240–241 [Pgs. –241 include portions of ]

26th of July Movement guarantees, 185 [Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120]

26th of July Movement tribute demands, 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 131], 223–225 [Pgs. –225 include portions of ], 229–230 [Pgs. –230 include portions of ], 233–239 [Pgs. –239 include portions of ], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 177]

U.S. military aid to Cuba suspension and, 171–172 [Pgs. –172 include portions of ]

U.S. policy toward revolutionary regime and, 733–734 [Pgs. –734 include portions of ], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 423], 907–908 [Pgs. –908 include portions of ], 965 [Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 536], 1040 [Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570], 1067 [Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 579]

U.S. policy toward 26th of July Movement, 245–249 [Pgs. –249 include portions of ], 276–277 [Pgs. –277 include portions of ], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 180], 334–335 [Pgs. –335 include portions of ], 345–346 [Pgs. –346 include portions of ]

Utilities, 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 342], 578 [Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 347], 594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 358], 597–598 [Pgs. –598 include portions of ], 603–604 [Pgs. –604 include portions of ], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 363], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 364], 618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 365], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 367], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 404], 957 [Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 535], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 536]

Vaky, Viron P., 225n [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 138], 240n [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 146]

Valdes, Nelson P., 54 [Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

Valdez, Ramiro, 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 389]

Valera, Juan, 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Valera, Orestes, 629–630 [Pgs. –630 include portions of ]

Valliere, Raymond, 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346]

Vallon, Edwin E., 624n [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 368], 633n [Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 375], 652n [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385], 669n [Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 693n [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 406], 716n [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414], 721 [Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 415], 749n [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426], 973 [Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541], 1087n [Pg. 1087 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591], 1101n [Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 597], 1102n [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]

Revolutionary regime, 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 407], 708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 412], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527], 1079 [Pg. 1079 is part of Doc. 585], 1132 [Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 614], 1190 [Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629]

Vara, Fernando de la, 924 [Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 520]

Vargas, Luis, 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Vargas Gómez, Andrés, 933n [Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 524], 1138 [Pg. 1138 is part of Doc. 614]

Varona, Manuel Antonio de (see also Prío forces), 68–70 [Pgs. –70 include portions of ], 89 [Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 155–156 [Pgs. –156 include portions of ], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 130], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 132], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 142], 238n [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 145], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 197], 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 201], 1132–1140 [Pgs. –1140 include portions of ], 1154–1155 [Pgs. –1155 include portions of ]

Revolutionary regime and, 393–394 [Pgs. –394 include portions of ], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 295], 691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 405], 933n [Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 524], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 527]

26th of July Movement, 155–156 [Pgs. –156 include portions of ], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 132], 238n [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 145]

U.S. covert opposition support, 1104 [Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 599], 1127 [Pg. 1127 is part of Doc. 613]

Velazco, Raúl, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 42]

Venezuela (see also Latin American countries; Organization of American States; Latin American and OAS sub-headings under other subjects), 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 57], 99 [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 112], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 128], 386–387 [Pgs. –387 include portions of ], 869 [Pg. 869 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491], 888 [Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 501], 943 [Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 527 and Doc. 528], 1102 [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]

Dominican Republic, relations with, 972 [Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 540], 992 [Pg. 992 is part of Doc. 546], 1016 [Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 558], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 561], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 565], 1038 [Pg. 1038 is part of Doc. 568], 1060 [Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578], 1172 [Pg. 1172 is part of Doc. 620]

Oil industry, 926 [Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 521], 930 [Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523], 938 [Pg. 938 is part of Doc. 526], 953 [Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 533], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of Doc. 545], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 570]

U.S. policy toward revolutionary regime, 764 [Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 436], 779 [Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447], 861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 486], 1058 [Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 577], 1061–1062 [Pgs. –1062 include portions of ], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 578], 1171–1172 [Pgs. –1172 include portions of ]

Ventura, Esteban, 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 319]

Vera, Aldo, 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 247]

Verdaguer, Guillermo, 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 128]

Villeda Morales, Ramón, 171 [Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 112]

Viveres, 345 [Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216]

Voice of America, 881 [Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 497], 1148 [Pg. 1148 is part of Doc. 616]

Voorhees, Tracy, 1110–1111 [Pgs. –1111 include portions of ]

Wadsworth, James J., 1072 [Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 581], 1083–1084 [Pgs. –1084 include portions of ]

Wallner, Woodruff, 1102n [Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598]

Walsh, Lawrence E., 949 [Pg. 949 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532], 1017–1018 [Pgs. –1018 include portions of ]

Walsh, Sinesio, 1155 [Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 617], 1160 [Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 617]

Wardlaw, Andrew B., 216–217 [Pgs. –217 include portions of ], 362–363 [Pgs. –363 include portions of ]

Washburn, Abbott, 773–776 [Pgs. –776 include portions of ], 786 [Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452], 879 [Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 521]

Washington, George, 1090 [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593]

Washington Resolution, 1951, 465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 278]

Weitzel, John P., 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 421]

Welles, Sumner, 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 417]

Wellman, Harvey R., 1112n [Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 604], 1149n [Pg. 1149 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617], 1176–1178 [Pgs. –1178 include portions of ]

Wharton, R.L., 775 [Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 443]

White, Ivan B., 577n [Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 346], 669n [Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394]

White, Lincoln, Castro visit, 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273]

White, Gen. Thomas D., 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 244], 1078–1080 [Pgs. –1080 include portions of ]

Whiteman, Marjorie M., 129n [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 137n [Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 88], 174n [Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 225n [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 138], 229n [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 140], 237n [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150], 247–248 [Pgs. –248 include portions of ], 391n [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245], 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311], 780n [Pg. 780 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448], 1065n [Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 578 and Doc. 579]

Whitman, Ann C, 349n [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 219]

Whitney, John Hay, 298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185]

Wiecha, Robert D., 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 62], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 73], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 84], 142 [Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 147–148 [Pgs. –148 include portions of ], 150–151 [Pgs. –151 include portions of ], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 106], 162 [Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 111], 164–165 [Pgs. –165 include portions of ]

Wieland, William A., 5 [Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 8n [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 13n [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 36n [Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 42n [Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 49n [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 27], 51n [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 66n [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 41], 68n [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 42], 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 43], 73n [Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45], 92n [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 55], 105n [Pg. 105 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63], 106n [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 124n [Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77], 129n [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 130n [Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 136n [Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 87], 142n [Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 168n [Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112], 237n [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 144], 270n [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 163], 279n [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172], 316n [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 322n [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200], 330n [Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 203], 364n [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 366n [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 229], 385n [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 242], 391n [Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245], 406n [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 452n [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 481n [Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291], 486n [Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 295], 492n [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298], 510n [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308], 543n [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326], 563n [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 337], 635n [Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376], 652n [Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385], 660n [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 396], 689n [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 405], 749n [Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426], 756n [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431], 771n [Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 442], 786n [Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452], 848n [Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479], 1006n [Pg. 1006 is part of Doc. 552], 1048n [Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572]

Batista regime, 85n [Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 261–264 [Pgs. –264 include portions of ]

1958 elections, 16–17 [Pgs. –17 include portions of ], 45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24], 106 [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 89], 245–246 [Pgs. –246 include portions of ]

U.S. military aid to, 5–7 [Pgs. –7 include portions of ], 10–12 [Pgs. –12 include portions of ], 50 [Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28], 63–65 [Pgs. –65 include portions of ], 73 [Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45], 93–94 [Pgs. –94 include portions of ], 110–113 [Pgs. –113 include portions of ], 123 [Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109], 201–203 [Pgs. –203 include portions of ], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 190]

Post-Batista provisional government proposals, 70n [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 42], 259–260 [Pgs. –260 include portions of ], 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]

Revolutionary regime, 404–406 [Pgs. –406 include portions of ], 424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 260], 526–527 [Pgs. –527 include portions of ], 603–605 [Pgs. –605 include portions of ], 939 [Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]

Agrarian reform, 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 319], 537 [Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323], 605 [Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363], 610–611 [Pgs. –611 include portions of ], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397], 694–696 [Pgs. –696 include portions of ], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 412], 718 [Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 414], 728n [Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 418], 729n [Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 418], 730n [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 418]

Communism under, 428 [Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261], 523–524 [Pgs. –524 include portions of ], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 319]

Latin American revolutionary support, 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 558–560 [Pgs. –560 include portions of ]

United States, relations with, 378–379 [Pgs. –379 include portions of ], 405–406 [Pgs. –406 include portions of ], 448 [Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 273], 478 [Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 288], 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294], 616 [Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 365], 677 [Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397], 693–694 [Pgs. –694 include portions of ], 714–715 [Pgs. –715 include portions of ], 823 [Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 469]

Rivero Agüero administration, 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 179], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 179]

26th of July Movement, 17–18 [Pgs. –18 include portions of ], 54–55 [Pgs. –55 include portions of ], 130–131 [Pgs. –131 include portions of ], 142–143 [Pgs. –143 include portions of ], 155–156 [Pgs. –156 include portions of ], 212 [Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 132], 238–241 [Pgs. –241 include portions of ], 245–246 [Pgs. –246 include portions of ], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 181], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 190]

Wigglesworth, Richard B., 1024–1025 [Pgs. –1025 include portions of ], 1037 [Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568]

Wilcox, Francis O., 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547], 1020n [Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560]

Willauer, Whiting, 385–386 [Pgs. –386 include portions of ], 442–444 [Pgs. –444 include portions of ], 492–497 [Pgs. –497 include portions of ], 1140–1141 [Pgs. –1141 include portions of ]

Williams, Haydn, 1108–1109 [Pgs. –1109 include portions of ]

Williams, John Z., 773n [Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443]

Williams, Langbourne, 736–737 [Pgs. –737 include portions of ], 741 [Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 423]

Wilson, James M., 454 [Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275]

Wilson, Thomas C, 3n [Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2]

Wolf, Thomas, 977 [Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 543]

Wollam, Park F, 95–96 [Pgs. –96 include portions of ], 103–105 [Pgs. –105 include portions of ], 162–165 [Pgs. –165 include portions of ], 198–201 [Pgs. –201 include portions of ], 226–228 [Pgs. –228 include portions of ], 230–233 [Pgs. –233 include portions of ], 249 [Pg. 249 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 357–362 [Pgs. –362 include portions of ], 372–374 [Pgs. –374 include portions of ]

26th of July Movement, 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 83], 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 101], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 139], 238n [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 145], 311–312 [Pgs. –312 include portions of ]

U.S. citizens kidnappings, 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 73], 125–126 [Pgs. –126 include portions of ], 130 [Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 84], 134 [Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86], 136 [Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 87], 141–144 [Pgs. –144 include portions of ], 147–151 [Pgs. –151 include portions of ], 154–155 [Pgs. –155 include portions of ], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 106], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 148]

Woodward, Robert E, 954 [Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 534]

Working Group on Cuba (10:30 Group), 1114 [Pg. 1114 is part of Doc. 606], 1185–1186 [Pgs. –1186 include portions of ]

World Court. See International Court of Justice.

Wright, Adm. Jerauld, 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 101], 340 [Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 268]

Yabur, Antonio Michael, 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 424], 756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431], 1154n [Pg. 1154 is part of Doc. 617]

Yañes Pelletier, Jesús, 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 271]

Ydígoras Fuentes, Gen. Miguel, 977 [Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 543], 1123 [Pg. 1123 is part of Doc. 610], 1128 [Pg. 1128 is part of Doc. 613], 1131 [Pg. 1131 is part of Doc. 613]

Yeagley, J. Walter, 644 [Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 379]

Young, Austin, 1158 [Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 617]

Young, J. Parke, 406n [Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 280], 700–703 [Pgs. –703 include portions of ]

Yugoslavia, 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 355], 703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410]

Zarba, Anthony, 1090n [Pg. 1090 is part of Doc. 593]

Zayas, Jorge, 756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431]

Errata

The following change has been made to Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI. Please be aware that printed volumes have not been revised.

1. Document 91, Footnote 3, Page 141 (date of correction: January 5, 2013)

The citation to “footnote 4” of Document 86 has been corrected to “footnote 3”.

2. Document 92, Footnote 2, Page 142 (date of correction: January 5, 2013)

The citation to “footnote 4” of Document 86 has been corrected to “footnote 3”.

3. Document 93, Footnote 2, Page 143 (date of correction: January 5, 2013)

The citation to “footnote 4” of Document 86 has been corrected to “footnote 3”.

4. Document 203, Footnote 1, Page 330 (date of correction: September 2, 2022)

The Central File citation “737.00/12–3158” in footnote 1 has been corrected to “737.00/12–1358”.