Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume XIV

Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

United States Government Printing Office

Washington

U.S. Department of State

Office of the Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

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Office of the Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of State

May 2018

Contents

Preface

List of Sources

List of Abbreviations

List of Persons

Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962

January-May 1961: Consideration of the Question of Germany and Berlin (Documents 1-31)

June-July 1961: The Summit Conference at Vienna June 3-4; NSAM No. 58; the Western Reply to the June 4 Soviet Aide-Memoire (Documents 32-73)

July-August 1961: NSAM No. 62; the Second Acheson Report on Berlin; Meeting of the Four Western Foreign Ministers at Paris (Documents 74-103)

August-September 1961: The Division of Berlin; the Brandt-Kennedy Correspondence; Vice President Johnson's Trip to Berlin; General Clay's Appointment as Special Representative to Berlin; NSAMs No. 92 and 94; Meeting of the Four Western Foreign Ministers at Washington (Documents 104-153)

September-October 1961: Conversations With Foreign Minister Gromyko; Beginning of the Pal Correspondence (Documents 154-170)

October-November 1961: The Crisis at the Friedrichstrasse Crossing (Documents 171-204)

November-December 1961: Discussions Among the Four Western Allies on Negotiations With the Soviet Union (Documents 205-241)

December 1961-January 1962: First Meetings Between Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko (Documents 242-280)

February-March 1962: Final Meetings Between Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko; Beginning of the Crisis Over Air Access to Berlin (Documents 281-317)

Index

Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts that contributed to the formulation of policies and records that provided supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

The editors of this volume, which was compiled in 1991, are convinced that it meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing. Although this volume records policies and events of more than 30 years ago, the statute of October 28, 1991, allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a triennial subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series. This subseries documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the 3 years (1961-1963) of the administration of John F. Kennedy. In planning and preparing the 1961-1963 triennium, the editors chose to present the official record of U.S. foreign affairs with respect to Europe, the Soviet Union, and Canada in six print volumes and one microfiche supplement.

Volume V , Soviet Union, includes documentation on U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. Volume VI , Kennedy-Khrushchev Correspondence, includes the comprehensive record of correspondence between President Kennedy and Soviet Chairman Khrushchev. Volume XIII , Western Europe and Canada, documents U.S. policy regarding European economic and political integration, U.S. participation in NATO, and U.S. bilateral relations with Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962 (presented here), and Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962-1963, document U.S. involvement in the continuing Four-Power negotiations over divided Germany and the status of the Western-occupied sectors of Berlin. A combined microfiche supplement to volumes XIII , XIV , and XV  will be published separately. Volume XVI, Eastern Europe, presents the basic record of U.S. relations with Austria, Finland, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, as well as documentation on general U.S. policy toward the Eastern European region and U.S. efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem.

The statute of October 28, 1991, requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on all the major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors judge that this volume was prepared in complete accordance with the standards and mandates of this statute.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

In planning and preparing this volume and the other five documenting U.S. foreign policy regarding Europe during the Kennedy administration, the editors concluded that the records of the Department of State would constitute the central core of the published record. In preparing this volume, Department of State historians have enjoyed complete and unconditional access to all records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized (lot) files of the policymaking levels; the files of the Department of State's Executive Secretariat, which comprehend the official papers created by or submitted to the Secretary of State; the files of all overseas Foreign Service posts and U.S. special missions; and the official correspondence with foreign governments and with other Federal agencies. Any failure to include a complete Department of State record in the Foreign Relations series cannot be attributed to constraints or limitations placed upon the Department historians in their access to Department records, information security regulations and practices notwithstanding.

The editors of this volume fully researched the papers of President Kennedy and other White House foreign policy records. These Presidential papers have become a major part of the official record published in the Foreign Relations series. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of this documentation has been routinely made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. Particular thanks are due to officials at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library for their assistance in preparing this volume.

These Presidential files were supplemented by White House documents in Department of State files. The Department of State files were valuable for the implementation of the policy decided at the White House and, at the beginning of 1962, in following the course of the talks between Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

The editors also used their complete access to the papers of General Maxwell Taylor, which proved to be an invaluable source for the formulation of policy under President Kennedy. The Taylor papers and a smaller collection of the papers of General Lyman Lemnitzer, both at the National Defense University in Washington, are indispensable to the understanding of U.S. policy during the Berlin crisis.

The editors have selected from White House, Department of State, and National Defense University records memoranda of conversation and records of meetings between the President and his principal foreign policy advisers. They have also included internal U.S. Government policy recommendations and decision papers relating to Berlin. In addition, the editors made use of a body of declassified JCS files at the National Archives and Records Administration. Copies of classified JCS materials were obtained from the Joint Staff on a request basis. The editors selected documents that indicated the policy recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding various major foreign affairs policies.

Completion of the declassification of this volume and the final steps of its preparation for publication coincided with the development since early 1991 by the Central Intelligence Agency, in cooperation with the Department of State, of access by Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from among those records still in the custody of that Agency. The Department of State historians have been provided selective access to particular special files of the Agency. The Department has used this access, as arranged by the CIA's History Staff, in the compilation of this volume.

The List of Sources identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume.

Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XIV

In selecting documents for inclusion in volume XIV, the editors recognized the predominant role of President Kennedy and his advisers at the White House in formulating policy with respect to Berlin and to the German question. This volume focuses on the many meetings of the President with his advisers from the White House, the Department of State, and other agencies, as well as the written advice to the President from these advisers. The editors also included the advice and recommendations on foreign policy issues from top-level military commanders and advisers.

The volume presents a comprehensive collection of the records of the President's meetings with heads of state and government with respect to Berlin. Also presented are records of the principal negotiations on policy and military contingency planning regarding Germany and the Berlin crisis that took place among the Western Allies as well as with representatives of the Soviet Union.

In focusing on the major lines of the development of the crisis, the editors have expanded the principles of selection adopted for previous volumes documenting the Berlin problem, focusing more extensively on its military aspects. As before, they have presented a record of the U.S. reaction and response to the major political events within the Federal Republic of Germany insofar as they figured directly in ongoing high-level political negotiations.

Intelligence information regarding Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin and Germany in general was vitally important during the Berlin crisis and found its way into political documents selected for publication. The editors did not, however, attempt to document any particular operational activities by intelligence authorities in connection with the German problem or to explore the scope and impact of intelligence operations.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material omitted from this print volume and from the microfiche supplement because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been delineated. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The unnumbered first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Declassification Review

The declassification review of this volume in 1991 and 1992 resulted in the decision to withhold less than one percent of the documents originally selected. The remaining documentation provides a full account of the major foreign policy issues confronting, and the policies undertaken by, the Kennedy administration during the first part of the Berlin crisis.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

1) military plans, weapons, or operations;

2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;

3) foreign government information;

4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;

5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;

6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;

7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;

8) cryptology; or

9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under Title IV of the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act, amended on October 28, 1991, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and assists with any access and/or clearance problems that arise. Time constraints prevent the Advisory Committee from reviewing all volumes in the series.

This volume has not been reviewed by the Advisory Committee.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the John F. Kennedy Library, in particular Suzanne Forbes, who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon, Charles S. Sampson collected, selected, and edited all the material presented in this volume. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the editorial and publication process. Rita M. Baker and Vicki E. Futscher did the copy and technical editing and Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Natalie H. Lee, Chief) oversaw the production of the volume. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

William Z. Slany

The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs

September 1993

List of Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Indexed Central Files. One of the principal sources of documentation for this volume was the indexed central files of the Department of State. Many of the documents were selected from the following files:

611.61: U.S.-Soviet relations

762.00: German political affairs

762.0221: German territorial issues

862.181: internal travel in Germany

962.72: air transportation in Germany

Lot Files. Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

Ball Files: Lot 74 D 279

Files of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, 1961-1967.

Berlin Desk Files: Lot 91 D 305

Master files of the Berlin Task Force beginning in 1961.

Berlin Desk Files: Lot 91 D 306

Various files pertaining to Live Oak planning on Berlin, 1955-1977.

Berlin Desk Files: Lot 91 D 313

Basic documents on Germany and Berlin beginning in 1944.

Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379

Files of Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, 1942-1971.

Bruce Files: Lot 64 D 327

Diaries of Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, 1948-1974.

Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State for 1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State for 1962, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State for the years 1961-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. This lot includes records on the President's trips to Europe in 1961 and 1963.

EUR/CE Files: Lot 86 D 339

Files relating to Germany and Berlin, 1955-1972.

Hillenbrand Files: Lot 88 D 325

Files of Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand primarily relating to Berlin and Germany, 1950-1975.

INR-NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing copies of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates including the NIEs and SNIEs for 1961-1962.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the Secretary of State with the heads of government and foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and certain other countries for the years 1953-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 476

Correspondence of the President with various heads of state for the years 1961-1966.

PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957-1961.

PPS Files: Lot 69 D 121

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for 1962.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163

Correspondence between Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and the Chairman of the Soviet Union, and other high officials of the two countries, 1961-1969.

Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149

Memoranda of the President's conversations for the years 1956-1964.

Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192

Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, including texts of speeches and public statements, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations, for the years 1961-1969.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330

Memoranda of the Secretary's and Under Secretary of State's conversations for the years 1961-1964.

S/S Files: Lot 68 D 350

Records of Cabinet Meetings, 1953-1965.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265

Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, administrative documents, but not the minutes of the meetings themselves, for the years 1961-1966, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316

Master files of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 1961-1968.

S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Actions, for the years 1961-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCS Files

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470

Files of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 1961-1968.

OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382

General and country files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for 1961.

OSD Files: FRC 65 B 3464

Miscellaneous files of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1961.

OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542

Records of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their special assistants, 1962.

OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6489

Miscellaneous records of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their special assistants, 1951-1966.

National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.

Lemnitzer Papers

Papers of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1959-1960, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1960-1962.

Taylor Papers

Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1955-1959; Military Adviser to the President, 1961-1962; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-1964.

Naval Historical Center, U.S. Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

Burke Papers

Papers of Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, 1955-1961.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Norstad Papers

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts

National Security Files (NSF)

Chester V. Clifton Series

Country Series

Departments and Agencies

Meetings and Memoranda Series

President's Appointment Books

President's Office Files

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

Rusk Appointment Books

Vice Presidential Security Files

Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

Bowles Papers

Published Sources

Only those publications cited in the volume are listed here.

Documentary Collections and Periodicals

The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog and Microfiche. Woodbridge, Conn., Research Publications (formerly Washington, Carrollton Press), 1977 ff.

De Gaulle, Charles. Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964. New York, undated.

Meissner, Boris, ed. Moskau Bonn, Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1955-1973, Dokumentation. Koln, 1975.

Salzmann, Rainer, ed. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1961, IV Reihe, Band 6; 1961, IV Reihe, Band 7; 1962, IV Reihe, Band 8. Frankfurt, 1975-1977.

U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 1962. Washington.

————. Department of State Bulletin, 1961-1962. Washington.

————. Documents on Germany, 1944-1985. Revised edition. Washington, 19 86.

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961. Washington, 1962.

USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR i GDR). Otnosheniia SSSR s GDR, 1949-1959, Dokumenty i materialy. Moscow, 1974.

Watt, D.C., ed. Documents on International Affairs, 1961. London, 1965.

Memoirs and Secondary Literature

The Department of State takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these memoirs nor does it endorse their interpretations.

Adenauer, Konrad. Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, Fragmente. Stuttgart, 1968.

Alphand, Herve. L'etonnement d'etre, Journal, 1939-1973. Paris, 1977.

Bohlen, Charles E. Witness to History, 1929-1969. New York, 1973.

Brandt, Willy. Begegnungen und Einsichten, Die Jahre 1960-1975. Hamburg, 1976. (English translation: People and Politics, the Years 1960-1975. London, 1978)

Cates, Curtis. The Ides of August. New York, 1978.

Catudal, Honore M. Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis. Berlin, 1980.

De Gaulle, Charles. Memoires d'espoir, Le renouveau, 1958-1962. Paris, 1970. (English translation: Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavors. New York, 1971)

Dulles, Eleanor L. The Wall: A Tragedy in Three Acts. Columbia, S.C., 1972.

Ehlert, Nikolaus. Grosse Grusinische Nr. 17. Frankfurt, 1967.

Grewe, Wilhelm G. Ruckblenden, 1976-1951. Frankfurt, 1979.

Kroll, Hans S. Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters. Cologne, 1967.

Macmillan, Harold. At the End of the Day, 1961-1963. London, 1973.

————. Pointing the Way, 1959-1961. London, 1972.

McDermott, Geoffrey. Berlin: Success of a Mission? New York, 1963.

Nitze, Paul H. From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir. New York, 1989.

Rostow, Walt W. The Diffusion of Power. New York, 1972.

Salinger, Pierre. With Kennedy. New York, 1966.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times. 2 vols. Boston, 1978.

————. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston, 1965.

Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York, 1965.

Sulzberger, Cyrus L. The Last of the Giants. New York, 1970.

Talbott, Strobe, ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston, 1970.

————. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston, 1974.

Wyden, Peter. Wall: The Inside Story of Divided Berlin. New York, 1989.

List of Abbreviations

ABC, atomic, biological, chemical

ACDA/IR, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency/Interpreting Branch

AG, Attorney General

AP, Associated Press

APC, armored personnel carrier

ASAP, as soon as possible

ATC, Allied traffic control

ATO, Allied traffic office

AUS, active unit status

B, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

B/FAC, Deputy Coordinator for Foreign Assistance, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

BASC, Berlin Air Safety Center

BERCON, Berlin contingency

BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

CDU, Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)

CEMA, Council for Economic Mutual Assistance

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe

CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CVA, attack aircraft carrier

CVS, antisubmarine warfare aircraft carrier

DDR, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)

Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram

Dept, Department

Deptel, Department of State telegram

DM, Deutschemark (German Mark)

DOD, Department of Defense

ECE, Economic Commission for Europe

EDT, Eastern daylight time

Embtel, Embassy telegram

EUCOM, European Command

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

FDP, Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)

FedRep, Federal Republic

FonOff, Foreign Office

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

FYI, for your information

G, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Polictical Affairs

GA, General Assembly

GDR, German Democratic Republic

GER, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

G/PM, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs

IAA, International Access Authority

ICC, International Control Commission

ICG, Interdepartmental Coordinating Group

ICJ, International Court of Justice

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IS, International Staff

ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

IZT, interzonal trade

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JS, Joint Staff

K, Khrushchev

L/EUR, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State

MC, memorandum of conversation

MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance

MP, military police

MRBM, medium range ballistic missile

MRP, Mouvement Republicain Populaire (French political party)

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Niact, night action; communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night

NORAD, North American Air Defense

NSC, National Security Council

OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

ourtel, our telegram

PAA, Pan American (World) Airways

PermRep, Permanent Representative

PMK, President's Meeting with Khrushchev

POLAD, Political Adviser

Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

PPS, Policy Planning Council, Department of State

QBAL, Quadripartite Berlin airlift

RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

reftel, reference telegram

Rep, Representative

reurtel, reference your telegram

RFE, Radio Free Europe

RG, Record Group

RIAS, Rundfunk in Amerikanischen Sektor (U.S. Radio in the American Sector of Berlin)

S, Office of the Secretary of State

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Eurolpe

SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his party to the Department of State

SED, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)

SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe

S/O, Operations Center, Office of the Secretary of State

Sov, Soviet; Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

SovDel, Soviet Delegation

S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State

SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party)

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

STRAC, Strategic Air Corps

STRAF, Strategic Air Force

SU, Soviet Union

tel, telegram

Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State or his party from the Department of State

TTD, temporary travel document

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State

US/MC, United States/memorandum of conversation

UN, United Nations

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

USAF(E), United States Air Force (Europe)

USAREUR, United States Army, Europe

USCOB, United States Command(er), Berlin

USDel, United States Delegation

USG, United States Government

USIA, United States Information Agency

Vopo, Volkspolizei (Peoples' Police)

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

WEU, Western European Union

WFM, Washington Foreign Ministers (Meeting)

WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions

Z, Zulu time zone

List of Persons

Acheson, Dean, former Secretary of State and Special Consultant to the President

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Adzhubei, Alexei I., Khrushchev's son-in-law, and Editor in Chief of Izvestiia

Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States

Amrehn, Franz, Deputy Mayor of Berlin

Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February-December 1961; thereafter Under Secretary of State

Bohlen, Charles E., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Bolshakov, Georgi N., Editor of USSR magazine

Bowles, Chester E., Under Secretary of State, January-December 1961

Brandt, Willy, Governing Mayor of Berlin

Brentano, Heinrich von, German Foreign Minister until October 1961

Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom from March 1961

Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Burdett, William C., Jr., Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., Chief of Naval Operations until August 1961

Cabell, General Charles P., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Caccia, Sir Harold, British Ambassador to the United States until October 1961

Carstens, Karl, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry

Cash, Frank E., Jr., Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Chayes, Abram J., Legal Adviser, Department of State, from February 1961

Clarke, General Bruce C., Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe

Clay, Lucius D., President's Special Representative in Berlin with the rank of Ambassador from August 1961

Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister

Davis, Richard H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Day, Arthur R., Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

de Gaulle, Charles, President of France

Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury from January 1961

Dowling, Walter C., Ambassador to Germany

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961

Fessenden, Russell, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Finletter, Thomas K., Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council from March 1961

Fowler, Henry H., Under Secretary of the Treasury

Freshman, C. Arnold, Officer in Charge of German Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Gavin, James M., Ambassador to France from March 1961

Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 24, 1961

Gray, Major General David, Head of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Grewe, Wilhelm C., German Ambassador to the United States

Gromyko, Andrei I., Soviet Foreign Minister

Guthrie, John C., Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador at Large, February-December 1961

Hillenbrand, Martin J., Director of the Berlin Task Force and the Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Holloway, Jerome K., Jr., Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Home, Lord Frederick Douglas, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Hood, Viscount Samuel, Minister of the British Embassy in the United States

Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States from January 1961

Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 1961

Kaysen, Carl, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Kennan, George F., Ambassador to Yugoslavia from May 1961

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 1961

Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States from January 1961

Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Kissinger, Henry A., National Security Council Staff member until November 1961

Klein, Gunther, Berlin Senator for Federal Affairs

Kohler, Foy D., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Krapf, Franz, Minister of the German Embassy in the United States until September 1961

Kroll, Hans S., German Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Laloy, Jean, Minister of European Affairs, French Foreign Ministry

Lazarev, Colonel, Soviet Deputy Political Adviser in Berlin

Lebel, Claude, Minister-Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States

Legere, Colonel Lawrence J., Assistant to the President's Military Representative

Lejins, Nora, Department of State interpreter

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lightner, E. Allen Jr., Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission at Berlin

Lucet, Charles, Director of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry

Lyon, Cecil B., Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in France

Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury

Mautner, Karl F., member of the Berlin Task Force

McCloy, John J., former High Commissioner for Germany and, from January 1961, President's Adviser on Disarmament

McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence from November 1961

McGhee, George C., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, February-December 1961; thereafter Under Secretary of State of State for Political Affairs

Mende, Erich, Chairman of the West German Free Democratic Party

Menshikov, Mikail A., Soviet Ambassador to the United States until December 1961

Mikoyan, Anastas I., First Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Millar, Sir Frederick Hoyer, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Murrow, Edward R., Director of the United States Information Agency from March 1961

Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from January 1961

Norstad, Lieutenant General Lauris, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Ormsby Gore, David, British Ambassador to the United States from October 1961

Owen, Henry D., National Security Council staff member until December 1961; thereafter member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State

Pelen, Pierre, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States

Pervukin, Mikhail G., Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic

Roberts, Sir Frank, British Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Rostow, Walt W., Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until December 1961; thereafter Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 1961

Salinger, Pierre E.G., the President's Press Secretary

Schroeder, Gerhard, German Foreign Minister from November 1961

Seydoux, Francois, French Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Shuckburgh, Sir Evelyn, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Smirnov, Andrei A., Soviet Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Smirnovsky, Mikhail N., Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States

Solovyev, Colonel A.I., Soviet Commandant in Berlin

Sorensen, Theodore C., President's Special Counsel

Spaak, Paul-Henri, Belgian Foreign Minister from February 1961

Steele, Christopher, British Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany

Stevenson, Adlai E., Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 1961

Stikker, Dirk U., NATO Secretary General from April 1961

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until April 1961; thereafter Counselor at SHAPE

Strauss, Franz Joseph, German Minister of Defense until October 1961

Taylor, General Maxwell D., President's Military Representative from July 1961

Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Thomson, John A., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States

Tyler, William R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Ulbricht, Walter, Chairman of the Council of State and of the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic

Watson, Major General Albert, II, Commandant in Berlin from May 1961

Winckler, Jean-Claude, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States

Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962

Contents

January-May 1961: Consideration of the Question of Germany and Berlin

1. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, January 9, 1961, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B41/1-961. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and POLADUSAREUR.

2. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, January 28, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2861. Confidential. Drafted by Rusk.

3. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 2, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in U on February 16. A memorandum of Grewe's conversation with Bowles on the Atlantic Community, also on February 2, is ibid. On the previous day Grewe had paid an initial call on Secretary of State Rusk. Memoranda of their brief conversations on East-West relations, Atlantik Bruecke, and Berlin and the interzonal trade agreement are ibid. A memorandum of their conversation on NATO is printed in vol. XIII, Document 93.

4. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 4, 1961, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-461. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 74B.

5. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 17, 1961, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/2-1761. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Lejins and approved in S on March 5 and in the White House on March 7. Brentano was in the United States to attend the German-American Conference February 16-19. For the briefing paper outlining the German and U.S. positions for this conversation, see Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 302 ff. Memoranda of Rusk's conversations with Brentano on the afternoon of February 16 concerning French-German relations and Berlin are in Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/2-1661, and Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. For Grewe's account of Brentano's visit, see Rückblenden, pp. 458-460.

6. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 23, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-2361. Confidential. Drafted by McBride and approved in S on March 7. Memoranda of the parts of the conversation on the European Economic Community and French-U.S. relations are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, February 28, 1961, 9:43 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bohlen and Hillenbrand; cleared by Kohler, Davis, Stoessel, and the White House; and approved and signed by Rusk. Attached to the source text was a draft by Bohlen, dated February 21, which begins and ends along similar lines but includes as a possible solution a reunified Berlin with a special status as a free city and with access guaranteed in all directions. For Hillenbrand's draft, dated February 20, see Declassified Documents, 1977, 46E.

8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 10, 1961, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1061. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

9. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 10, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the White House on March 20. Grewe mentions this meeting briefly in Rückblenden, p. 461.

10. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 13, 1961, 3-3:40 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the White House on March 23. The meeting was held at the White House. A briefing paper for this meeting, transmitted by Rusk to the President on March 10, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1061. A memorandum of Brandt's conversation with Rusk on March 14 covering similar topics is ibid., 762.0221/3-1461. For Brandt's account of his conversation with the President and visit to Washington, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 17-18 and 80-83.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 16, 1961, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1661. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 46D, and printed in part in Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, p. 304.

12. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-3161. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on March 30. At the end of February Bundy had tasked the Department of State with preparing a report for the President on the problem of Berlin. (Memorandum from McGhee to Kohler, February 27; ibid., 762.00/2-2761) An initial draft of March 13, containing four annexes on the development of the crisis, possible all-German context for a Berlin solution, discussion of Berlin in isolation, and contingency planning, was revised and transmitted to Bundy on March 24. (Ibid., 762.00/3-1361) The text printed here is a “streamlined version” of the March 24 draft as requested by Bundy; only the summary is printed.

13. Memorandum From Henry A. Kissinger of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy

Washington, April 5, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 2794.

14. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 5, 1961, 3:10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1833. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text bears the typewritten notation: “Uncleared."

15. Memorandum of Conversation

April 6, 1961, 3:45 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1833. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burdett. The meeting was held aboard the Honey-Fitz.

16. Editorial Note

17. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 13, 1961, noon.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in S on April 22 and in the White House on May 11. The meeting was held at the White House. For the Scope Paper prepared for the meeting, see Declassified Documents, 1978, 403B.

18. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 15, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. For Grewe's account of this conversation, see Rückblenden, pp. 464-468.

19. Editorial Note

20. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, April 25, 1961.

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 5B.

21. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)

Washington, April 25, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2561. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand.

22. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

Washington, May 5, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1985, 2382.

23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State

Oslo, May 9, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1860. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on May 8 and authorized by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Moscow. Rusk was attending the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Oslo.

24. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 24, 1961, noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-2461. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

25. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 24, 1961, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-2461. Secret; Limit Distribution.

26. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, May 25, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1905. Secret. Drafted by Armitage (SOV) and Cash and cleared by Kohler, Hillenbrand, and Guthrie (SOV). Prepared as one of the many position papers for the President's meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna June 3-4.

27. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, May 25, 1961, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-2561. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 257E.

28. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 27, 1961, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-2761. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Berlin, and Bonn.

29. Talking Points Paper

Washington, undated.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1894. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was prepared for President Kennedy's meeting with de Gaulle May 31-June 2 in Paris.

30. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, May 31, 1961, 12:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1891. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. The meeting was held at the Elysee Palace. A summary was transmitted in telegram 5266 from Paris, May 31. (Ibid., CF 1893) For de Gaulle's account of the President's visit, see Memoires d'Espoir, pp. 267-271. Additional documentation on the President's visit to Paris is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIII.

31. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, May 31, 1961, 2:50 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1891. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. The meeting was held at the Elysee Palace. A summary was transmitted in telegram 5278 from Paris, June 1. (Ibid., CF 1893)

1. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, January 9, 1961, 5 p.m.

395. Paris for Embassy, USRO, CINCEUR Thurston and Finn. Following is our assessment current East German situation and Sov/East German policy re Berlin at year's end—with particular reference to recently concluded IZT and FedRep-Sov trade negotiations. It appears clear that Sov/East Germans did not expect from West such strong reaction to East German harassments as IZT cancellation. Presumably when Ulbricht sold Khrushchev on his Berlin program at Sochi last Aug they counted on no such Western reaction. It now evident that FedRep cancellation of IZT raised spectre of such serious economic difficulties for USSR/GDR that they felt obliged defer program for time being. Alternative was undoubtedly new Berlin crisis which most inopportune from Kremlin's point of view at this time.

Cessation of IZT would have seriously endangered GDR production plans, slowed rate of economic growth, and forced revision of East German contribution to CEMA plans. GDR would have had to forego long heralded goal of overtaking FedRep in per capita consumption of certain consumer goods by end of 1961. These economic costs were avoidable only if Sov Union could assure adequate substitutes for products normally obtained in West Germany.

Despite Khrushchev's announced willingness fill gaps if IZT agreement not renewed, all circumstances and available evidence suggest Sovs unable to assume economic burdens resulting from rupture IZT and unwilling to assume political burdens resulting from creation new Berlin crisis. Detailed Sov-East German examination of requirements must have revealed impracticability at this time for Sov bloc to fill them in event of breakdown FedRep-GDR trade because of continued East German utilization of 1) West German engineering standards (DIN, Deutsche Ingenieur Normen) and 2) certain Western raw materials not obtainable from bloc sources. Recent statements by Ulbricht and other East German leaders have stressed need to adjust East German production machinery to bloc standards and raw materials in order reduce dependence on West. Intelligence reports confirm planning activities in GDR economic apparatus directed toward this end.

Sov and East German IZT policies and propaganda since Sept 30 and Behrendt's conduct of negotiations have been consistent with over-all Kremlin policy to avoid precipitating Berlin crisis until another effort made to negotiate Berlin settlement with new U.S. administration. Timing IZT abrogation of course was not of Sov-GDR choosing. Acceptance of challenge which abrogation represented, particularly in form of interference with West Berlin traffic allegedly based on IZT Annexes, would have precipitated major Berlin crisis.

Main trends SED policies are following lines noted ourtel 277 Dept, 257 to Department.[2] Here is increasing evidence that creation of Staatsrat in Sept after Pieck's death has given Ulbricht further instrument for increasing his direct personal power. Under Stoph, who is emerging quietly as Ulbricht's chief deputy, GDR ministries are being transformed into unified administrative structure directly controlled from a single party-government office. We take for granted that in final top-level SED discussions on IZT negotiations, Ulbricht and Stoph threw their support to GDR Trade Minister Rau against those who were opposing any GDR “concessions”.

We continue be impressed by fact that SED, while carrying out major administrative changes, is avoiding policies against own population which would dissipate SED energies. Reasons for this are both economic and political. Absence overt farmer resistance to collectivization has not resolved regime's agricultural problems, particularly in light of growing shortages of milk and pork. Possibility also exists that during late winter and early spring agricultural situation will further deteriorate due to inadequate fodder supplies. Industrial production below expectations during last half of 1960 and SED now carrying on major propaganda campaign calling for increased industrial production, perhaps as prelude to introduction higher work norms.

Refugee flow, which currently has reached proportions surpassed only in “crisis years” of 1953 and 1956, poses perhaps most important socio-economic problem. Regime has sought ineffectively to reduce flow primarily by concessions to professional groups where loss particularly damaging. Consideration of drastic control measures is presumably being held in abeyance, pending negotiations on Berlin.

Soviet/East Berlin decision reach “compromises” with FedRep on IZT and FedRep/Soviet trade agreement does not, of course, indicate any change in basic Soviet/East German policy regarding Berlin. Both “compromises” were worked out with relatively little loss face from Communist standpoint. Gain from Western standpoint, however, has been demonstration to Soviets/East Germans that West can and will react strongly even to minor encroachments on Berlin status.

Next following message sets forth views West Berlin leadership on current situation in light of conclusion IZT agreement.[3]

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B41/1-961. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.

[2] Telegram 277 from Berlin, October 10, 1960, reported that the German Democratic Republic was willing to discuss a new interzonal trade agreement. Telegram 257 from Berlin, October 18, 1960, assessed GDR intentions and capabilities. (Ibid., 662A.62B41/10-1060 and 762.00/10-1860)

[3] Telegram 396 from Berlin, January 9, reported that West Berlin leaders were convinced that the cancellation of the old interzonal trade agreement on September 30, 1960, in reaction to continued Soviet harassment of Berlin, had been a correct decision. Not only had it led to easing travel restrictions on West Germans, but also to the negotiation of a new trade arrangement. (Ibid., 662.62B41/1-961)

2. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, January 28, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing a brief chronology[2] of the principal events relating to Berlin which have occurred since the ending of the first Berlin blockade in 1949.

The period covered falls logically into two parts: that from the end of the blockade until November 1958, when the current “Berlin crisis” began; and the period of the crisis itself since that time.

The first period was characterized by the readjustment of relation-ships between the Western Allies and West Germany, between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, and between the USSR and East Germany. The last of these in particular set the stage for the Soviet efforts to dislodge the Allies from West Berlin which began in 1958.

Soviet tactics to force Western abandonment of Berlin which, with the measures taken by the West to counter them, dominate the second period, have gone through two general phases. The first was a direct threat to Allied access rights to West Berlin. This threat took the form of the stated intention of the USSR to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and turn over to the latter the control over Allied access to the city. In the second phase, which has developed since the abortive Summit meeting of May 1960, the Soviets have substituted a gradual de facto transfer to the East Germans of control over Berlin, and in this framework harassment has centered on West German-Berlin relations. A return to the earlier tactic may be expected and may in fact be heralded by Khrushchev's reiteration on January 6 in Moscow of his threat to sign a separate peace treaty.[3]

Meanwhile, relative quiescence has prevailed since Western, particularly West German, countermeasures brought an easing of East German harassment of Berlin access late in 1960.

There are indications that Mr. Khrushchev will be returning to the Berlin question in due course, perhaps soon. The chronology will give you a brief outline of the past pending a full briefing.[4]

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk[5]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2861. Confidential. Drafted by Rusk.

[2] Not printed.

[3] For an extract of Khrushchev's January 6 speech, including the statement on a separate peace treaty, see Documents on International Affairs, 1961, pp. 259-262.

[4] On January 18 the Department of State sent to the White House a briefing paper on Berlin for President Eisenhower's meeting with President-elect Kennedy on January 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/1-1861) Eisenhower apparently did not use the paper or even mention Berlin during the meeting. (Memorandum of conference between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy by Clifton, January 24; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, WH Correspondence)

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature

3. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

German Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe

Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy

The Under Secretary

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand,GER

The Under Secretary said he wanted to point out that he personally had on several occasions taken a strong position in conversations with Ambassador Menshikov on Berlin. He had described Berlin as a symbol of the present situation in Central Europe. This symbol had to remain as long as the situation remained unchanged. He had asked Menshikov how the Soviets would view an increase in the Allied garrison of Berlin by 5,000. When Menshikov had indicated this would be unwelcome, the Under Secretary had made the point that a diminution of 5,000 in the strength of the West Berlin garrison would likewise have the same symbolic importance for the Berliners. The present level of the garrison, as an expression of this symbol, could not simply be changed. It would be a mistake to look for less strength on the part of the new Administration, the Under Secretary continued. If anything it would react with greater strength to prove its seriousness. This was not a good area for venturesome diplomacy. The new Administration was prepared to take the risks involved. Our new President was both intelligent and tough, and would not be pushed around. He had both convictions and courage. However, he was anxious to find the beginnings of solutions. Ambassador Grewe commented that this was precisely his impression and constituted the burden of his own reports to Bonn. He believed his Government felt the same way about the new Administration. This was why he had actually received no instructions to query the Department as to why the President's State of the Union address[2] did not contain any reference to Berlin, despite certain murmurings in the German press on this score. The Under Secretary said he was in a position, based on personal knowledge of how the speech was prepared, to assure the Ambassador that there need be no cause for worry on this point. A reference to Berlin had actually been in the first draft, but this was eliminated in the process of revision in the White House in order to avoid highlighting this issue. The Under Secretary said we should take the lid off our imagination and examine these problems together confidently. After all the Germans had achieved what was described as “a miracle”. Ambassador Grewe said he did not like this term “miracle” applied too frequently to Germany. It raised expectations about German performance too high.

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in U on February 16. A memorandum of Grewe's conversation with Bowles on the Atlantic Community, also on February 2, is ibid. On the previous day Grewe had paid an initial call on Secretary of State Rusk. Memoranda of their brief conversations on East-West relations, Atlantik Bruecke, and Berlin and the interzonal trade agreement are ibid. A memorandum of their conversation on NATO is printed in vol. XIII, Document 93.

[2] For text of the State of the Union address, January 30, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 19-28.

4. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, February 4, 1961, 1 p.m.

1839. Following views on German and Berlin problems naturally reflect only situation as seen from Moscow. I believe Soviet interests as such lie rather in German problem as whole than Berlin. Soviet Union interested in stabilization their western frontier and Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, particularly East Germany which probably most vulnerable. Soviets also deeply concerned with German military potential and fear West Germany will eventually take action which will face them with choice between world war or retreat from East Germany. Even if Berlin question were settled to Soviet satisfaction, problem of Germany would remain major issue between East and West. Berlin question nevertheless of great current importance because:

1) It is convenient and forceful means of leverage for Soviets;

2) Khrushchev's prestige personally involved;

3) Soviets under some pressure from Ulbricht regime;

4) Present situation in Berlin threatens stability of East German regime because of its use as escape route, base for espionage and propaganda activities, etc.

Soviet proposals on Berlin designed enable East German regime eventually to acquire it or as minimum completely neutralize it, while to some extent saving face for West.

Impossible to assess with any degree accuracy Khrushchev's present intentions. He obviously trying build up case for settlement favorable to him this year. Extent to which he will have to push this problem will be affected by developments in other fields, both of general nature such as trade and disarmament as well as progress on other specific political problems. I believe that if there were some activity on German problem indicating that real progress could be made after German elections, he would be disposed not bring matters to head before that event. This might mean, for example, a meeting of Foreign Ministers having a first session in September in preparation for summit conference after elections. If there is no progress on this specific question and little progress in general situation, Khrushchev will almost certainly proceed with separate peace treaty. Extent to which he would then allow East Germans attempt gradual strangulation of Berlin would depend upon other developments, but separate treaty would in my view bring about highly dangerous situation and one which could get out of control.

Looking ahead there appears to be no prospect of reunification Germany on basis satisfactory to us for many years. I therefore believe best approach to settlement of German problem would be modification of package proposal we put forward at Geneva[2] but with period before they would have to face free elections increased. I think Khrushchev might accept 10 year period but 7 years or even less might be negotiable. Some of military clauses could be modified and we would of course have to insist upon maintaining our position in Berlin and having better guarantees for access especially for West Germans. We could of course not be sure Soviets would carry out such solution even if agreed upon but it would have advantage of gaining time for both sides and would be solution under which we could keep our principle of self-determination intact. This appears to me of great importance as it is one of best cards we have with which to oppose Soviet policies.[3]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-461. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 74B.

[2] For text of the Western Peace Plan (RM/DOC/8), May 14, 1959, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 624-629. See also Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. VIII, pp. 687 ff.

[3] On February 8 Ambassador Dowling, while agreeing with the premise that the long-range prospects for reunification were “practically speaking nil,” commented that he found it difficult to distinguish between Soviet policy toward Berlin on one hand and Germany on the other. He stressed the need to convince Khrushchev that there was “no painless way for him to undermine the Western position in Berlin,” and that any attempt to do this unilaterally held as many dangers for the Soviet Union as for the West. (Telegram 1218 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-861; published in full in Declassified Documents, 1977, 74C)

5. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 17, 1961, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

US-German Relations

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President

The Secretary of State

Walter C. Dowling, Ambassador

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

Pierre Salinger, Press Secy

Mrs. Nora Lejins, Interpreter

Germany

Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Foreign Minister

Dr. Hilger van Scherpenberg, State Secretary

Dr. Hasso von Etzdorf, Ministerial Director

Mr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter

In his preliminary remarks the President stated that he was very much interested in arranging a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer. He hoped that Von Brentano would convey to the Chancellor the appreciation of the US Government for the cooperation and friendship of the German government during the past years. The new Administration hoped that this cooperation would continue also in the future and that all mutual problems would be worked out satisfactorily.

The Foreign Minister in turn thanked the President for his recent communication to the Chancellon.[2] Lack of time had prevented the Chancellor from replying so far. He wanted the President to know, however, that the President's letter was of great assistance to Chancellor Adenauer, coming as it did, the day before his departure for the Paris talks.

President Kennedy then briefly mentioned some of the points he wished to discuss with von Brentano. First among them, of course, was the Berlin question. He was anxious to have the Germans understand the reason why his Administration had so far been silent on the Berlinquestion except for a comment made in answer to one question during a press conference. This did not by any means signify a lessening of United States interest in the Berlin question. As long as there was a lull, however, he had not wanted to provoke either action or comment in the matter. But the President expected renewed pressure by the Soviets in the coming months. He asked the Foreign Minister for his comment and suggestions concerning possible effective means with which to counter the subtle pressures which the Soviets were expected to exert.

Von Brentano assured the President that Germany fully understood the stand taken by the US and was in complete agreement with the President's procedure in the matter. Moreover he, too, felt sure that there was no need to raise the question now. We would have to deal with it sooner or later. Von Brentano expressed his belief that Soviet pressure would again be exerted, if only in response to pressure by the Soviet Zone of Germany. The leaders of the Soviet Zone cannot tolerate the symbol of a free Berlin in the midst of their Red zone. This is completely unacceptable to them, and therefore they will do all in their power to stimulate the Soviet Union to action with regard to Berlin. Von Brentano feels that such pressure will be dangerous only if it should result in a blockading of Berlin. For instance, this might be the result if the Soviet Union were to sign a separate peace treaty with Eastern Germany. The Foreign Minister himself is of the opinion that the Soviets will hesitate to take any drastic steps with regard to Berlin as long as they know that the Western Allies will not tolerate any such steps. Under such circumstances the Soviet Union may continue to threaten but will not take any actual steps for some time to come.

The President further probed to get the Foreign Minister's thinking as to the possibility of the Soviet Union signing a separate peace treaty in spite of the fact that it is clear that the West will not tolerate any infringement of Western rights in Berlin, and then using this as an indirect means for increasing pressures on Berlin. Von Brentano agreed that this, no doubt, would be the intention of the Soviets, but he doubts that the Soviet Union will take the final step in this direction as long as the West remains firm. The President came back to this point several times, indicating the gradual development of Soviet action, that is, first signing a separate peace treaty—while continuing the status quo in Berlin for a certain length of time—and then resorting to further and more drastic action. The Foreign Minister agreed that this danger definitely existed and that the signing of a separate peace treaty would result in a step by step development, eventually leading to drastic action with reference to Berlin. The first step would be the signing of the treaty. Secondly, the Soviet Union would give instructions to the East Zone to continue Berlin traffic and other arrangements very much as at present, if anything according the Allies even better treatment than now. This, however,would be followed by a change and definite action. While the Foreign Minister considered this a possibility, he appeared to feel very strongly that there would be no action on the part of the Soviets as long as they knew that the Allies would not stand for any disruption of the present Berlin arrangement. He admitted, of course, that the danger existed and was latent.

The President then asked whether Brentano thought that United States difficulties in the Congo, Laos, and in Latin America would increase the chances of trouble in Berlin. The Foreign Minister thought so. He then indicated that the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, who had been recalled to Moscow and had not been expected to return to Bonn before the end of March, had just returned. He was to see Chancellor Adenauer this evening at 6 p.m. for the purpose of delivering a message from Khrushchev.[3] While Von Brentano did not know the content of the message, he felt that it was most likely an answer to the Chancellor's letter concerning the repatriation issue. The Foreign Minister would not be surprised, however, if Khrushchev's message were to contain a proposal for bilateral German-Soviet talks. The Foreign Minister wanted it understood that Germany had no intention of engaging in such talks.

The President then inquired into the prospects of future German-Polish relations. The Foreign Minister replied by calling attention to the primary problems complicating German-Polish relations:

1. The Oder/Neisse frontier question. Millions of former residents of the area east of this line, now living in West Germany, bitterly oppose the acceptance of this frontier.

2. A much more difficult problem to solve is the following: Germany has maintained the principle of not entering into or maintaining diplomatic relations with any country recognizing the Eastern Zone of Germany and thereby accepting the Soviet concept of two German states. Germany has no intention of giving up this principle and proved this in its action vis-a-vis Yugoslavia. The Foreign Minister feels that Germany acted correctly, for if nothing had been done when Yugoslavia recognized the East Zone of Germany, other countries might have followed suit.

Within these limits, it is Germany's intention to do everything possible to improve German-Polish relations. As a beginning—if Poland agrees—Germany wishes to establish a trade mission in Poland, which would maintain constant contact between the two countries. Since Poland is the freest and most accessible of the Iron Curtain countries, Germany also wishes to intensify its cultural contact with this country in thehope of eventually influencing political thinking thereby. The Foreign Minister has some doubt as to the success of this venture since preliminary talks, carried on in Copenhagen between the Polish and German Ambassadors stationed there, were not very promising. The Polish Ambassador was most negative in his reaction.

The President asked whether the initiative for the Beitz talks had come from the Chancellor or the Foreign Minister, or whether it had been that of Beitz himself. The Foreign Minister indicated that the initiative had been Beitz's, but that he had kept in touch with the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister both before and after the talks. The President inquired whether additional similar talks were scheduled. He stated that the United States, too, is very much interested in more cordial relations with Poland. In view of the uncertainty of success in this respect, the President was very much interested in knowing how Germany fared in this area. The Foreign Minister stated that Germany was definitely desirous of continuing the efforts to establish closer relations with Poland by continuing further talks in Copenhagen. He pointed out that there are at present fairly substantial trade relations between Germany and Poland and that some effort will be made to utilize these relations, which moreover are to be further expanded and improved, to increase German political influence as well. (Dr. van Scherpenberg interjected at this point that the German-Polish trade talks were, of course, perfectly normal procedure on a governmental level. Moreover, Germany was presently envisaging a long-term trade agreement with Poland.)

Secretary Rusk asked at this point whether many Polish students were presently studying in Germany. The Foreign Minister replied that there were a small number of Polish students in Germany and a small number of German students in Poland.

[Here follow five pages of discussion of the U.S. balance of payments, disarmament, and the communiqué. For final text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, March 13, 1961, pages 369-370.]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/2-1761. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Lejins and approved in S on March 5 and in the White House on March 7. Brentano was in the United States to attend the German-American Conference February 16-19. For the briefing paper outlining the German and U.S. positions for this conversation, see Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 302 ff. Memoranda of Rusk's conversations with Brentano on the afternoon of February 16 concerning French-German relations and Berlin are in Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/2-1661, and Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. For Grewe's account of Brentano's visit, see Rückblenden, pp. 458-460.

[2] For text of Kennedy's February 7 message on the Atlantic Community and NATO, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 94.

[3] At their meeting on February 17 Soviet Ambassador Smirnov delivered to Adenauer a letter from Khrushchev on repatriation and an aide-mémoire from the Soviet Government on the Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union. Extracts of the aide-mémoire are printed in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 723-727, and Documents on International Affairs, 1961, pp. 272-277.

6. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 23, 1961.

SUBJECT

East-West Relations, Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Gavin

Mr. McGhee, S/P

Mr. Davis, EUR

Mr. McBride, WE

Mr. Beigel, WE

Ambassador Alphand

M. Lebel

M. Winckler

M. Manet

M. Pelen

Ambassador Alphand said that the French Government was perfectly satisfied that there should be US-Soviet bilateral discussions on outstanding problems but thought that there should be prior agreement among the three Western Powers and accordingly that there should be tripartite discussions on this range of matters. He expressed appreciation to the Secretary for the US views which had been conveyed to him and to Ambassador Caccia on February 22.[2] He added that the French Government had the same view as ours with regard to a Summit Meeting and felt strongly that there should not be a second Summit failure and that such a meeting should not be scheduled unless at least some small progress could be envisaged.

Ambassador Alphand continued, saying that while there were critical problems in Cuba, Laos, Congo, and throughout Africa, nevertheless in the French view Berlin remained the number one problem even though the Soviets have been silent on this issue recently. Ambassador Alphand referred to Khrushchev's recent letter to Adenauer which the French thought was important.[3] He noted that although the tone had been polite, the substance of the letter had been very tough. The French had an extensive summary of the letter and it appeared to reiterate the two-Germanies concept and the free city of Berlin idea. Also the French were under the impression that the letter underlined thenecessity and urgency of an agreement on Berlin and Germany. He thought that the Soviets, in effect, had asked for talks on this subject with the Western Powers. He said that Gromyko had recently indicated the need for reaching a German settlement in 18 to 24 months.

Ambassador Alphand continued saying that the French view was that the two-Germanies concept and the free city of Berlin idea remained basic to Soviet thinking and that they were anxious to achieve these ends. The French thought that there might be an interim arrangement to be followed by a more definitive settlement. If this did not happen the French feared that the Soviets would conclude a separate peace treaty with the East Germans and then arm this Communist regime to greater extent than at present.

Ambassador Alphand continued, saying that Berlin was our first worry and that the French feared some major Soviet move before the German elections. Khrushchev needs to demonstrate some progress on Berlin. He then asked what the US view was with regard to talking with the Soviets on Berlin and whether we thought it would be necessary to enter into such discussions before next fall. He then asked what was our appreciation of the possibility of a unilateral Soviet action to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and also whether we believed we should oppose by force interference with access from West Germany to Berlin. He wondered if the views of the new Administration on these questions were different from those of the previous Administration.

The Secretary, in replying, agreed with the overriding importance of the Berlin question, especially to the Federal Republic. He said that while the new Administration has not thus far had to comment in detail on the Berlin question this did not mean that we did not attach a tremendous measure of importance to this problem. At the present time we were in a period of civility with the Soviets even on the Congo. In fact it was a wait and see period. However, he agreed with Ambassador Alphand that the Soviets would probably not leave the Berlin issue alone for long. He noted that Ambassador Menshikov, prior to President Kennedy's inauguration, had been seeing a number of political figures and indeed had been extremely active. On the whole in these contacts Ambassador Menshikov had made rather gruff and blunt statements regarding Berlin and had stressed the urgency of the problem. However, since the inauguration the Soviets have not mentioned Berlin to us here nor have they mentioned it to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow. He reiterated that while Ambassador Menshikov has not raised this problem with us, we did not expect this situation to last. Berlin as a subject was tabula rasa since January 20. We did not think it particularly wise to challenge the Soviets on this issue when they were not pressing.

Ambassador Alphand inquired if we were also acquainted with the Khrushchev letter to Adenauer. The Secretary replied in the affirmative. Mr. Davis noted that we had a brief summary of this and expected to receive the text soon.

Ambassador Alphand said that in fact we could really consider that the Berlin question was again on the table because the Soviets had raised it with the Germans. He said the French were not entirely clear whether the Soviets would make any more formal requests for talks with the Germans or with the three Western Powers. In any case he thought there would be some move before the German elections and he repeated that Gromyko had stated that the Soviets would conclude a separate peace treaty unless there were an agreement within the period of 18 to 24 months.

The Secretary asked if the French believed that the Germans had any different appreciation of the Berlin question from that of the three Western Powers. Ambassador Alphand replied in the negative. The Secretary asked if the recent Franco-German talks[4] had led the French to believe that there could be any further development of de facto talks between the East Germans and the West Germans. Ambassador Alphand said that they had held some discussions and that more might develop but that it would probably be insufficient to bring about any Berlin settlement. He said the West Germans had told the French that they were prepared to continue de facto talks. The Secretary said that if the Soviets could not obtain any concessions it was of course possible that they would conclude a separate peace treaty. He wondered if the talks between the East Germans and the West Germans threw any light on the degree of danger of such a treaty. Mr. Davis said that such a treaty would be dangerous both because it would enhance the status of East Germany and because it would lead East Germany to have certain greater freedom of action on the access question.

Ambassador Alphand said the French felt that the Soviets and East Germans would attempt progressively to sever access to West Berlin after the signature of a separate peace treaty. He said that this whole problem had been discussed extensively both here and in Bonn and that contingency planning had been in progress to cover the actions we should take in the event of progressive steps against the access routes. He said this planning was not completed in the countermeasures field. He thought we should discuss further the moves which might be taken in the trade field, navigation, etc., against the East Germans in the event of a separate peace treaty in order to prove that we are serious on these problems. However, our experts need new instructions. He said that the US and French positions were somewhat more in favor of a positive line on countermeasures than were the British. He said he considered this an urgent problem. Mr. Winckler said that there had also been planning for a probe on the Autobahn if necessary but said that this was of course a dangerous operation. However, this was being considered in the event that the Soviets did sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and then move against the Berlin access routes. Mr. Winckler also thought it was important to take clear and coordinated actions around the world in this event in order to show our firmness before Khrushchev's prestige was engaged and to give him an opportunity to back down. He thought it was important to take measures of this type before any military showdown. In response to Mr. McGhee's question, Mr. Winckler said he thought these could be in the travel field, in shipping, and in control of aircraft. He said it was very important that these measures should be coordinated to show our seriousness and perhaps lead to the Soviets backing down. The Secretary inquired if the French thought that the Soviets attach more importance to preventing the reunification of Germany or to the liquidation of the Berlin situation. Are they more interested in establishing East Germany firmly than in a Berlin settlement on their terms which would lead to a crisis? Ambassador Alphand referred to Khrushchev's talk with de Gaulle in which the Soviet Premier had stressed that the division of Germany must continue.[5] Ambassador Alphand said he personally could not really give priority to one of these problems over another in the Soviet view but that certainly the reunification of Germany under conditions of freedom was unacceptable to the Soviets because it would wreck their position in the Satellites. However, he did not think that the Soviets could continue to stand the Berlin situation indefinitely either but stressed the importance of Western firmness.

The Secretary agreed that we must continue our planning work here. He said the US Administration was studying this problem and then would want to have tripartite talks. He said we were not planning any initiative with the Soviets on Berlin. Ambassador Alphand said the French were not planning any initiatives either since we did not want anything from the Soviets but merely wish to retain our rights. The Secretary said we were in Berlin rightfully and legally. However, the Soviets could make difficulties and we did not want to dramatize these to the point which would require military action. He wondered if even more important than the military problem was the question of maintaining the life of the city of Berlin. He thought that if the Soviets moved against Berlin they would take almost imperceptible steps to tighten the noose around Berlin. A sophisticated approach of this type would of course be hard to react to. We thought this was much more likely than any blunt action.

The Secretary noted that Ambassador Menshikov in his talks around town had stressed the urgency of some action because of Khrushchev's personal situation. He wondered as to the meaning of this. Ambassador Alphand thought that perhaps Khrushchev wished to prove to the Chinese Communists and to the Satellites that his policy paid. Therefore he needed some success. Furthermore he thought that Khrushchev was under pressure from East Germany to get rid of the Berlin showcase. The Secretary said Ambassador Menshikov had given some impression that there were pressures on Khrushchev to achieve a settlement. In any event, he concluded that the Berlin problem would not sleep for long. Ambassador Alphand said that perhaps there was a Chinese problem although he believed that the leaks on Soviet-Chinese differences had been well organized.

The Secretary concluded that the Berlin problem was a most serious one and that we should pick up our contingency planning and consult urgently together. He thought it was important to tell Khrushchev soon that we were serious about Berlin even if the situation remained fairly quiet. He said it would appear that there was no division of policy between the United States and France on this issue. Ambassador Alphand agreed but said that the British position was slightly different. The Secretary said we would discuss this problem with Macmillan here soon and that Berlin unfortunately fundamentally would remain a pressure point on which the Soviets could exert pressure on us because of the difficult situation on the ground.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-2361. Confidential. Drafted by McBride and approved in S on March 7. Memoranda of the parts of the conversation on the European Economic Community and French-U.S. relations are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

[2] A memorandum of this conversation, in which Rusk explained that Ambassador Thompson was returning to Moscow with instructions to begin discussions on U.S.-Soviet bilateral problems but not on the more general international problems including Berlin, is ibid.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 5.

[4] For Adenauer's account of his visit to Paris, February 9, see Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pp. 80-88.

[5] For de Gaulle's account of Khrushchev's visit to Paris March 23-April 3, 1960, see Memoires d'Espoir, pp. 237-246; for Khrushchev's account, see Talbott, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, pp. 417-442.

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, February 28, 1961, 9:43 p.m.

1402. You should not take initiative in raising subject of Germany and Berlin, but if Khrushchev does so within established pattern Soviet position, suggest you respond along following lines:

New Administration has been giving careful consideration to problem of Germany and Berlin. It is recognized that entire situation in Germany and also that in Berlin is unsatisfactory both to Western Powers, Germans themselves, and Soviet Union. Central difficulty is of course continued division of Germany. United States continues to believe that there will be no real settlement of this problem or any real tranquillity in Central Europe until Germans are permitted to unite themselves. This will remain our constant aim and we would not be disposed to take any legal or other definitive steps which would appear to perpetuate or legalize this division. However as a practical matter we recognize that chance of its achievement in immediate future is remote. It is therefore necessary to endeavor to deal with this abnormal situation and we would like to emphasize that abnormality stems from situation in Germany as a whole and cannot be applied exclusively to one element thereof such as West Berlin. It would seem realistic common sense therefore to endeavor to find some means which would, without prejudicing the future unification of that country, to try, insofar as possible, to reduce its potentiality for serious friction which could lead to grave international dangers. It would seem to us that to change existing status in Western Berlin alone in direction of a free city of some other scheme of like nature would merely be to increase the abnormality of an already abnormal situation resulting from division of city and of country.

One possibility would be to leave city as it is, since however unsatisfactory, it has been nonetheless since 1948 at least tolerable for both sides. Soviets however maintain that some form of peace treaty with East German regime is essential and say they cannot wait much longer before proceeding to sign such peace treaty. We cannot physically stop them from doing this, although we could not approve or underwrite treaty confirming the division of Germany and would have to oppose it publicly. On other hand, a major practical interest to us would be effect which such peace treaty would have on our position in Berlin. Provided arrangements similar to those under the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters[2] were still continued in effect, we could try to make necessary adjustments.

Mr. Khrushchev maintains that since Soviets have put forward their proposals on Berlin, it is now turn of West to make counter-proposals. West has made proposals in past which proved unacceptable to Soviets. We shall consult with our Allies and in due course put forward our ideas. Mr. Khrushchev must surely understand however that it would not be possible for US to contemplate a change in city in regard to our rights and position in Berlin which would represent material change for worse in Western position in that city or access thereto.

Comment: If Ambassador feels there is any possibility of misunderstanding, it should be made clear that discussion does not constitute reply to recent Soviet memorandum to FedRep.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bohlen and Hillenbrand; cleared by Kohler, Davis, Stoessel, and the White House; and approved and signed by Rusk. Attached to the source text was a draft by Bohlen, dated February 21, which begins and ends along similar lines but includes as a possible solution a reunified Berlin with a special status as a free city and with access guaranteed in all directions. For Hillenbrand's draft, dated February 20, see Declassified Documents, 1977, 46E.

[2] For text of letters between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin and German Democratic Republic Foreign Minister Bolz, September 20, 1955, see Otnosheniia SSSR s GDR, pp. 649-652; for the Bolz letter alone, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 460-461. See also Foreign Relations , 1955-1957, vol. XXVI, pp. 537-538 .

8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, March 10, 1961, 5 p.m.

2147. Germany-Berlin. After I had completed presentation of our views,[2] Khrushchev noted I had not mentioned question of Germany which he wished to discuss. He said USSR had put forth its position in aide-mémoire to Adenauer,[3] that it did not want to change anything in Germany, but to fix juridically what had happened after the war. He said to leave situation as is would cause instability and encourage German revanchists. Khrushchev mentioned that memo to Adenauer was published at German request.

He said he had explained Soviet position in great detail to Pres Eisenhower who, he said, had understood him, but Pentagon and others had deliberately exploded relations between us and sent U-2—a matter, he said, which is now in past.

He said he would like very much that Pres Kennedy would regard with understanding Soviet position on German question.

USSR would like to sign treaty with Adenauer, Ulbricht, and US. He said he knew US desired unified Germany; USSR also desired unifiedGermany; but to conceive of unified Germany under either Adenauer or Ulbricht would be unrealistic. Therefore, he said, let us conclude a treaty with two Germanies; we are ready to stipulate with US a provision of whatever is necessary for people of West Berlin to have political system of their own choice. He said borders now exist between FRG and GDR and between Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and these borders have legal force but need legal foundation. He said Socialist camp does not want to expand toward West and, if US were ready to proceed on peace treaty, they would be prepared state this when working out treaty. If our wartime Allies do not agree, he said, SU and all Socialist countries will sign treaty with GDR. He said West Berlin is bone in throat of Sov-American relations. If Adenauer wants to fight, he said, West Berlin would be good place to begin conflict.

Khrushchev said his frank desire, and he wanted us to understand him, is not to worsen but to better relations with US. He said he had expressed similar desire to Adenauer but did not know yet his reaction. If Adenauer understands me correctly, he said, this would render it impossible for aggressive forces to use present situation for preparation of aggression, and everyone understands what this would mean with nuclear weapons.

I said President was reviewing our German policy and would wish discuss it with Adenauer and other Allies before reaching conclusions but was difficult to see how there could be much change in our basic policy. I inquired whether if free city of Berlin were created there would be special clause in peace treaty referring to this setup. When he replied in affirmative I inquired why then separate treaty could not make provision for continuance present situation in Berlin. Khrushchev asked what attracted West so much in Berlin. I answered we had given our commitment to people there and our prestige now committed. Khrushchev asserted Western powers are in Berlin because of Germany's capitulation. He said no one is encroaching upon West Berlin. Let us work out together a status for West Berlin: we can register it with UN; let us have joint police force on basis of peace treaty which can be guaranteed by four powers, or symbolic force of four powers could be stationed West Berlin. He made clear this would not include East Berlin which was capital of GDR.

He said USSR would join whatever guarantees necessary to keep West Berlin the way it is and added that no threat from any side would be allowed which would assure us that its prestige would not suffer. He said West Berlin had little meaning for USSR.

I said I agreed USSR had no interest in West Berlin, but pointed out Ulbricht was very much interested. Khrushchev replied Ulbricht would also sign commitment on West Berlin.

In line with Deptel 1402,[4] I said situation abnormal in Berlin because situation in Germany is abnormal; we were not disposed to legalize permanent division of Germany; we were re-examining whole problem of Germany and Berlin; problem of Berlin unsatisfactory to both of us as is entire situation in Germany. I said I thought much could be done to reduce tensions and expressed opinion President would be disposed do something to help relaxation. I added I did not want to attempt to reflect President's views until he had chance to consider problem and discuss it with our Allies.

Khrushchev replied he would like President to understand correctly Soviet desire to solve German question. If agreement could be reached, he said, it would be big success. He said he did not know how Germans thought, and said Adenauer was very aggressive now. He said he wanted US and USSR to be together on this question—this would be understood correctly by our peoples—just as during war we shed blood together against Germany. He said peace treaty does not involve any factual change in situation. I interjected, “except Berlin”. He replied they were not striving for West Berlin. He said USSR even ready to keep such a capitalist island as West Berlin within GDR because USSR in 1965 will surpass West Germany in per capita production. He added USSR would surpass US in per capita production in 1970.

He reiterated that if Pres Kennedy and they could sign treaty it would mark great progress in American-Sov relations. If treaty were not signed, American and Sov troops would continue to confront each other, and situation would not be one of peace but one of armistice. If treaty were signed, it could be implemented by installments including gradual withdrawal of American-Sov troops from Germany, and atmosphere of trust would be established to help disarmament negotiations.[5]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1061. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.

[2] Thompson met with Khrushchev for 3 hours on March 9 near Novosibirsk to deliver a letter from President Kennedy on U.S.-Soviet relations. In addition to bilateral relations and Berlin, they discussed the Congo, Laos, and disarmament. Further documentation on this meeting and text of the letter are published in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume V.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 5.

[4] Document 7.

[5] On March 17 CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr broadcast a detailed account of Thompson's conversation with Khrushchev. (Telegram 1518 to Moscow, March 17; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-1761) On March 18 Thompson expressed his dismay at the leak and stated that conversations with Khrushchev would lose their value if he believed his remarks would appear in the press. (Telegram 2219 from Moscow, March 18; ibid., 611.61/3-1861)

9. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, March 10, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

The President opened the conversation by inquiring with respect to Ambassador Grewe's plans. The latter said he would leave on Saturday and make four speeches in Boston before leaving for Europe on Tuesday. He expected to return about March 25 or well before the Chancellor's visit. Some discussion ensued as to the nature of the speeches the Ambassador would be making and the audiences he would address relating particularly to the speech scheduled to be made at Ford Hall in Boston.

Referring to the Adenauer visit the President said that the Vice President was anxious to have the Chancellor come to Texas during his visit.[2] The Vice President had suggested that the Chancellor visit a new medical school, then come out to his ranch for a reception. The President said we would of course make the arrangements and provide the transportation. The Chancellor could fly out in the morning by jet and return either late that evening or the next morning. The President thought that if the Chancellor had the time he would find this trip interesting. The Ambassador took note of the suggestion and said he would be glad to take it up with the Chancellor.

Ambassador Grewe then referred to his discussion with Mr. Ball with respect to the US statement on the recent revaluation of the German mark.[3] He observed that the use of the phrase, “useful but modest step,” in the US statement had created difficulties in Germany since it led to speculation that the revaluation would be followed by further appreciations of the value of the mark. The President expressed appreciation for this problem, which he was sure had not been intended by the Treasury. The statement had not been brought to his attention before issuance andhe personally felt that it would have been better simply to say that this was a “helpful” action. The President said the Ambassador could certainly assure the German Government that the United States did regard this action as “helpful”. He added, however, he felt that the Dutch action following upon the German revaluation had confused the issue and added to speculation. He agreed that efforts must now be made to convince people generally that this was a finished operation.

The Ambassador then commented on the statement of Ambassador Harriman during his visit to Germany to the effect that the United States Government did not consider itself bound by the previous negotiations with the Soviets with respect to Germany and Berlin.[4] He himself understood exactly what this meant, that it referred to compromise proposals which had been put forward, and that sort of thing. However there had been some speculative interpretation in Germany to the effect that the statement meant that the new Administration was reviewing and might change fundamental positions on Germany. He suggested that perhaps the Brandt visit would offer the occasion for the issuance of a communiqué which would clarify the US stand. The President and Mr. Kohler both commented in this connection on Secretary of State Rusk's press conference the previous day[5] and the Ambassador agreed that this had gone far toward putting Mr. Harriman's statement in context both as regards US policies toward Germany and Berlin and as regards our specific intention to maintain Allied rights in Berlin.

The President said we would consider the question of what we would say to the press on the occasion of the Brandt visit. However he reminded the Ambassador that his government had been anxious, while remaining firm and determined with respect to Germany and Berlin, not to seem to be throwing out a challenge to the Soviet Government. He felt that it was better to let the challenge or threat come from Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev.

Ambassador Grewe then gave the President a brief report on the Khrushchev letter to Chancellor Adenauer of February 17 and attached memorandum setting forth in adamant terms the Soviet intention to move ahead on Germany and Berlin along the lines of their established position of a peace treaty and “free city.” In this connection he referred to the consultation which had taken place by the quadripartite ambassadorial group in the Department with respect to this memorandum.[6]

The President expressed his interest and was assured that the Khrushchev memorandum to Adenauer had been sent to him by the Secretary of State for his information together with the Western analysis agreed by the ambassadorial group. He requested that he also be provided with some of the Soviet press commentaries on this subject which Mr. Kohler undertook to do.

The President then brought up the subject of the conversations which had taken place with respect to the US balance of payments and German surplus positions. He commented that the appreciation of the mark in fact would increase the cost of support of our troops in Germany which at the rate of $350 million plus per annum was one of the major factors in our balance of payments accounts. He said that during the past couple of weeks our gold losses had been stemmed but that we had lost a lot during January and that the problem remained with us. He very much hoped that the Germans would move forward toward helping to alleviate this problem referring in particular to possible reductions in costs in Germany and German procurements in this country. He repeated that the fact that the Dutch had followed suit in appreciating the value of the guilder had removed some of the good done by the mark appreciation but again repeated that this had been “helpful” and that it was now necessary to make it clear that there would be no more changes. The President again referred to the importance of a continuing German aid program to the lesser developed countries and Ambassador Grewe hastened to assure him that while the amounts involved were subject to Parliamentary action he was authorized to confirm Foreign Minister Brentano's commitment to a continuing aid program.

Ambassador Grewe then brought up the recent story in the Star based on Secretary Rusk's letter to Secretary McNamara hinting a possible change in US approach to military strategy. He expressed appreciation for the clarifying statement which the Secretary had issued the following day but emphasized the great interest of the FRG in this question.[7]

The President said that he hoped to send a statement to Congress within a matter of days on the strengthening of American military programs and posture.[8] He continued to say that he had been examining the state of our contingency planning with respect to Berlin and that this was a subject which he would want to discuss with Chancellor Adenauer. He said he also wanted to discuss this with Prime Minister Macmillan and with the French to be sure that we are all firmly agreed as to what we would do in case we have a Berlin crisis again this year.

The President then went on to say that he had read an article in the Washington Post this morning which purported to find anti-German sentiment on the increase in the United States. He said that while he recognized that there was some anti-German sentiment here he was sure that there was much less than in most other countries notably the UK. He said that in fact he had been impressed by the fact that the US press had for the most part taken the side of the Germans in the controversy that arose on the occasion of the visit to Bonn of former Treasury Secretary Anderson. He said also that it was generally overlooked how many Americans there are of German origin who have good will toward Germany. Ambassador Grewe observed that he thought the President's role with respect to this matter was decisive. He felt that American sentiment very closely reflected the views expressed by the leadership of the country. The President said he thought that if we continued to seek agreements on the problems under discussion and announced the results from time to time that this in itself would help to improve the feeling in the United States toward Germany. He himself wanted to see the most harmonious relations prevail between the two countries. In this connection he said that he had been surprised to find that there are many Germans in the Vice President's section of Texas. Chancellor Adenauer was greatly admired in the United States and was regarded as the symbol of a new Germany. He thought that the Chancellor's travel to Texas might be a very useful demonstration and he hoped that it would be possible for the Chancellor to do this. Ambassador Grewe agreed and repeated that he would certainly discuss this with the Chancellor probably toward the latter part of next week.

The Ambassador asked if the President could then summarize the subjects which he would like to discuss with the Chancellor. The President then itemized: (1) Germany and Berlin; (2) Contingency planning; (3) Economic and financial problems; (4) Aid to the underdeveloped countries and (5) Western strategy. He added that the Secretary of State might have others to suggest.

At the end of the talk Ambassador Grewe reverted to the question of a statement to be made on the general views of the new Administration toward Germany and Berlin, either on the occasion of the Brandt visit or on another appropriate occasion. He said he would put forward a personal suggestion that this statement might refer to and confirm the Administration's support of the Paris treaties of 1954. This would in fact cover all the main points without making it necessary to go into detail in a public statement. Moreover since these treaties were the results of discussions which had gone far forward under the Truman Administration such a reference would have the effect of leaving the impression that the US policy on the problems of Germany and Berlin was really bipartisan in nature.

The President indicated that he would consider this suggestion and would wish to review the Paris treaties in this connection.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the White House on March 20. Grewe mentions this meeting briefly in Rückblenden, p. 461.

[2] For a transcript of President Kennedy's press conference on March 1, during which he announced that Chancellor Adenauer would visit Washington March 12-13, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 135-143.

[3] Ball made this statement in an address before the Chicago World Trade Conference on March 7. (Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1961, pp. 449-454) Grewe's discussion with Ball has not been further identified.

[4] Harriman visited Bonn and Berlin March 6-8 for talks on a wide range of subjects, but primarily on NATO. Reports on his discussions were transmitted in telegrams 1403-1405 and 1416 from Bonn, March 8 and 9 (Department of State, Central Files, 123-Harriman and 611.62A/3-861) and telegram 487 from Berlin, March 9. (Ibid., 123-Harriman)

[5] For a transcript of Rusk's press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1961, pp. 431-439.

[6] At Grewe's request the Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin met on March 8 to discuss the Soviet memorandum. Grewe stated that the memorandum contained no new Soviet proposals, that it was mild and non-polemical, and that it should not be regarded as an ultimatum. The Working Group members approved this analysis and agreed to seek the views of their governments on a reply that would also be based on the outcome of any Khrushchev-Thompson talks on Berlin. (Memorandum of conversation, March 8; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-861)

[7] Grewe is referring to a story on the front page of The Washington Star, February 27, 1961; for text of Rusk's statement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 20, 1961, p. 399. Rusk's letter to McNamara, February 4, is published in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume VI.

[8] For text of the President's special message to Congress on the defense budget on March 28, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 229-240.

10. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, March 13, 1961, 3-3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

Germany

Willy Brandt, Governing Mayor of Berlin

Franz Krapf, Charge of the German Embassy

Egon Bahr, Press Chief of West Berlin Senate

After the initial greetings, the President opened the conversation by asking Mayor Brandt about the forthcoming elections in Germany. The Mayor replied that he expected some campaign activity in May and June but the real political campaign would only get underway intensively in August.

The President then asked how the Mayor saw developments with respect to Berlin's status. The Mayor said that he thought the critical date to keep one's eye on was the October Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. He believed that Khrushchev might feel the need of some kind of action favorable from his point of view prior to that meeting. In reply to the President's question as to what the nature of such action might be the Mayor expressed the opinion that it would probably not be in the form of a serious military confrontation. However, Khrushchev might decide to go ahead with his program to conclude a separate peace treaty with the “GDR”.

The President then turned to the subject of the current situation with respect to access to Berlin and movements within the city. The Mayor referred to the recent incidents of harassment by the East Germans of movements between West and East Berlin and expressed the opinion that the outcome of this in the form of the December arrangements between the East and West Germans had been satisfactory from the West's point of view. On the general subject, he acknowledged that it was always possible to have movements into West Berlin from West Germany harassed and made difficult in which case conditions of life in West Berlin would worsen. However, he pointed out that considerable stockpiles of fuel and food had been built up in the city which he thought would be sufficient for the population to carry on for about six months. This would give time to find a way out of an impasse.

The President then commented that of all the legacies of World War II which the West had inherited Berlin was the most difficult; he expressed the opinion that we would just have to live with the situation. He then asked the Mayor's opinion as to whether, if Khrushchev concluded a separate peace treaty, the East German regime would act independently of Moscow. The Mayor replied in the negative. He added that the “GDR” had tried to act independently some times in the past but again expressed the opinion that the December experience had exercised a restraining influence. Fundamentally he could not believe that the “GDR” would be permitted to go very far on its own. In reply to the President's further inquiry as to whether he thought Berlin constituted a real point of weakness for the “GDR” Mayor Brandt replied in the affirmative. He said he thought that the existence of West Berlin made it hard for Ulbricht to stabilize the East German regime. The comparison between West and East Berlin was very visible and was unfavorable to the East. Moreover West Berlin provided an escape hatch for the Eastern population. He said that he had to admit that the existence of West Berlin was a serious problem for the Ulbricht regime which had absolutely no mass basis of support, unlike, for example, Poland.

The President then referred to the problem of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland and asked the Mayor what he thought the Federal Government could do about this. The Mayor replied that it would be difficult for any West German Government to go beyond the Allied position that frontier questions could only be finally settled at a peace conference. It was his personal view that if ways could be found to bring the peoples together the question of the boundary would become a less important one. He felt that particularly if some small modifications could be made in a frontier it would be possible to find a solution satisfactory to both Germans and Poles. The President questioned whether since reunification of Germany was not foreseeable perhaps for a period of many years, this question might not increasingly exacerbate relations between Poland and the FRG and all the West. The Mayor said that this could be the case but pointed out that in any event it was for the time being the East German regime and not the FRG which bordered on Poland. Some further discussion ensued on this problem and its relationship to the German desire for reunification, the importance of which relationship the President recognized. The Mayor confirmed that this was a basic consideration, then went on to say that he thought it might be possible to have some new discussions with the Russians. Possibly they could be brought to agree to some kind of self-determination for Germany after a period of perhaps 10 years with some interim arrangement during that period. The President questioned whether there would be any Russian interest in such a proposal as the Mayor described it. He said he did not see how it would serve their purposes to agree to any self-determination formula. The Mayor said he had no specific idea as to the acceptability of such a formula to Moscow unless perhaps it could be accomplished as a result of broader agreements between the East and West in such fields as arms control. In this connection the President asked the Mayor's views as to whether proposals for Central European neutral zones or arms zones such as had been propounded by Mr. Kennan some years ago might be useful.[2] To this the Mayor replied with a firm negative.

The President commented that it was very hard to find grounds for agreement with the Soviets on anything beyond perhaps removing restrictions on crabmeat and this was really unilateral. He then went on to ask the Mayor's estimate as to whether economically the “GDR” was a net help or burden to Moscow. The Mayor replied that on balance he felt that Moscow still regarded the “GDR” as an economic asset. He repeated, however, that the regime was politically weak and said it was possible that some day the Soviets might find a reunified non-Communist Germany better and easier to deal with from their point of view than a corrupt Eastern regime. In reply to a further question from the President about the reliability of the “GDR” armed forces the Mayor expressed the opinion that the “GDR” Army might fight effectively elsewhere but that in the case of a really significant move on Berlin they were likely to revolt and go over to the other side.

The President then asked how the people in Eastern Germany regarded West Berlin. The Mayor said that West Berlin provided a window to the West for the East German population and kept alive their hopes for an eventual change. Without West Berlin this hope would die. As to the relations between the governments of the two parts of the city the Mayor referred to East Berlin Mayor Ebert as “the least known” Mayor in the world. He said that he had never met Ebert and that the relationship between the two parts of the city was limited to technical contacts. Expressing his appreciation for the Mayor's explanations, the President said he had not been in Berlin himself since 1949.

The President then turned to the question of the balance of payments situation, referring to his recent talks with FRG Foreign Minister Von Brentano.[3] He said that in addition to his concern about our own situation he is now worried about the British who are having considerable trouble in the wake of the revaluation of the German mark. The Secretary of the Treasury had informed him that the British had lost nearly 10% of their gold reserves during the last 7 days. He felt that the West needed some mechanism which would prevent the development of these imbalances and the strain which gold surpluses put on the international payments situation. He said that the cost of maintaining the United States troops in the Federal Republic, which ran to about $340 million in gold every year, was a major factor in the U.S. situation. The problem here was not one of relief for the U.S. budget or the U.S. taxpayer but of the outflow of gold. The United States is committed to keep the U.S. divisions on the continent and he personally believed our conventional forces should be strengthened so that we would not be faced with the question of using nuclear weapons in the middle of Germany. The President feared that some mistaken impressions had resulted from the Anderson visit to Germany last December. He wanted to make it clear that the United States was not asking for budgetary relief but was concerned about its gold position and also that of the British. If the FRG should undertake a program of aid to the underdeveloped countries this might ease the strain. Also and more directly it would be helpful if the costs of maintenance of our troops could be reduced and if the FRG should procure additional military equipment in the United States. He felt that there had been considerable misunderstanding of U.S. purposes. Mayor Brandt agreed that some misunderstanding had developed in connection with this problem. He was personally convinced that we needed not only military strength but cooperation in political strategy, in the conduct of a peace offensive and in the economic field. He was very pleased with the establishment of the OECD. The importance of these questions was understood and agreed to in Germany by both major parties. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) would not oppose agreements reached by the present Government to help in the balance of payments situation and to undertake a program of aid to the lesser developed countries. Indeed on aid they would be inclined to go even farther than the present Government. He thought that these questions would play no real role in the electoral campaign. The only questions on the part of the SPD would be as to how the Government planned to work these matters out, particularly from a budgetary point of view.

The President commented that we had some differences of opinion in the United States as respects economic aid programs but he thought there were no important differences as to the need for military preparedness. He referred in this connection to the “grandiose” requirements which had been put forward by General Norstad as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Concluding, he remarked that maybe when the elections were over we could get down to details on these questions.

The President then explained to the Mayor that his administration had not said much about Berlin since the new administration took office. It was too bad that Ambassador Harriman had recently had to make a statement in Berlin which had necessitated further statements by Secretary Rusk and then further clarifications. He had felt that it was better on this subject to leave the launching of any challenges to Khrushchev. Mayor Brandt said that he entirely agreed to this position and the West Berliners fully understood it. He said that if the Soviets do raise the Berlin question again he felt the West should seek to broaden the agenda. The President commented that he had thought Mayor Brandt's point in his television interview as to the inadequacy of the UN as a guarantee for Berlin following the Congo experience was well made. He also commented in this connection that Senator Mansfield had been active in promoting this idea. However, the President said he recognized that the UN would not provide a satisfactory guarantee for West Berlin. The Mayor said he believed that the presence of United States troops was not only the essential guarantee for Berlin but also important for the United States itself. He felt that if the Russians were told clearly that the U.S. position there must not be challenged then they would have to respect this position.

The President asked the Mayor's views as to the build-up of the FRG military forces. The Mayor replied that he thought the situation was satisfactory in this respect. Perhaps it could be improved some-what though he did not believe that the FRG should build its forces up to the point where it would create fears among its neighbors in Western Europe and arouse apprehensions in Eastern Europe. It was necessary to find the right level.

The President then referred to the political campaign and asked what the issues would be. When the Mayor replied health, schools, public roads and the like, the President commented that this sounded very familiar to him. The Mayor then went on to say that there would be no serious foreign policy issues in the campaign. Originally there had been major differences between the SPD and the CDU in the foreign policy field, particularly as relates to the approach to Moscow and the East; however, both parties had had to face up to the realities over the last 10 years, during which the Soviets had given no reason for hope. Both parties were convinced that West Germany could only go with the West. The President commented that when he had met Chairman Ollenhauer of the SPD in 1956 this had been a period when the SPD had been more optimistic as regards negotiations with the Soviets. Mayor Brandt replied that that time had gone by. The SPD was now firmly committed to the West.

The meeting concluded with discussion of and agreement on the statement which would be made to the press by Mayor Brandt regarding his talk with the President.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Confidential. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the White House on March 23. The meeting was held at the White House. A briefing paper for this meeting, transmitted by Rusk to the President on March 10, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1061. A memorandum of Brandt's conversation with Rusk on March 14 covering similar topics is ibid., 762.0221/3-1461. For Brandt's account of his conversation with the President and visit to Washington, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 17-18 and 80-83.

[2] For text of the series of lectures given by George F. Kennan over the BBC in 1957, see George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom, and the West (London, 1958).

[3] See Document 5.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, March 16, 1961, 7 p.m.

2209. Eyes only Secretary. Department repeat as desired. All my diplomatic colleagues who have discussed matter appear to consider that in absence negotiations Khrushchev will sign separate treaty with East Germany and precipitate Berlin crisis this year. My own view is that while he would in these circumstances almost certainly conclude separate treaty, he would likely attempt avoid immediate crisis on Berlin by some method such as instructing East Germans not to interfere with Allied access for given period time. Important factor in Khrushchev decision will be status overall Soviet relations with West at time decision made. Present outlook is not favorable. While I anticipate possible settlement Laos question, conflict between East and West in Africa and South America will continue if not increase; test ban agreement extremely doubtful; continuation general disarmament discussions even if arranged will be prolonged and at least in beginning unpromising. Moreover in judging intentions new administration Soviet judgment will be influenced by number of steps we have taken indicating greater militancy on our part. Among these are increased arms budget including preparations for guerrilla warfare, adverse decision on licenses for machine tools to Soviet Union, President's public appeal for support RFE[2] which Soviets consider dedicated to overthrow Communism in Eastern Europe, and President's request for modification MDA Control Act[3] in context of hopes for freedom of Eastern European peoples. Latter two actions particularly likely support Chinese arguments accommodation between East and West impossible. Apart from fact I think it unfortunate President became personally involved in RFE appeal I do not question wisdom or necessity these actions, and Soviets by declaration 81 Commie Parties[4] and Khrushchev's Jan 6 speech have given us ample justification. Nevertheless believe we must appraise realistically possibility Soviet conclusion US determined on what they label “positions of strength” policy.

Von Brentano's statement re desirability Four-Power negotiations[5] on peace treaty would appear indicate he has endorsed Kroll's idea of such negotiations as means of stalling until after German elections. This appears to me highly questionable tactic. So far as I have been informed Brentano did not raise this question in discussions Washington.

At such time as President might meet Khrushchev, discussion German problem will be main point exercise so far as he concerned and he will probably make decision on his German policy at that time or shortly thereafter. Therefore seems to me important that President have something to say to Khrushchev on this problem which will at least give us possibility of avoiding separate treaty and subsequent Berlin crisis. It goes without saying that one aspect would be convince Khrushchev we would fight rather than abandon people of West Berlin. If this is all that is done, highly probable Khrushchev will force issue, provided his colleagues cannot or do not prevent him, before October Party Congress. Regardless outcome this particular issue, and it could involve real possibility of world war, we would almost certainly be led back to intensified Cold War relationship.

Alternative would seem to be that President should be able hold out prospect of negotiations which would as minimum enable Khrushchev save face somewhat and maintain his position. Although I continue believe Khrushchev is probably better from our point of view than anyone likely to succeed him, I do not advocate this course of action in order keep Khrushchev in power as I do not believe that in first place we know enough about workings this regime to calculate accurately effects our actions on leadership and in any event do not believe this should be basis of US policy. I do believe we should attempt avoid actions which likely lead to dangerous situation if this possible. Among possible actions I consider most advantageous would be modification Western package peace plan proposal which in effect would defer showdown on German reunification for say seven years combined with British and US declaration reassuring Soviets on frontier problem and an interim Berlin solution which would reduce temperature this trouble spot and give West Germans better basis for access. Even if Soviets should refuse discuss it, our having put forward such proposal would weaken ability Khrushchev to take drastic action on German and Berlin problems. As absolute minimum I suggest President could discuss with Khrushchev possibility of both sides defusing Berlin problem by unilateral actions on both sides without formal agreement. On our side this might mean giving up RIAS and reducing covert activities based on Berlin.

If we expect Soviets to leave Berlin problem as is, then we must at least expect East Germans to seal off sector boundary in order stop what they must consider intolerable continuation refugee flow through Berlin. Wish point out that recent Western actions in Berlin have shown that, unless we change our policy, price we would exact for such action is virtual boycott East Germany. Seven year plan, which I advocate, should in itself ease Berlin problem by reducing refugee flow which disadvantageous to West in many respects.

I note Von Brentano in discussion with President evaded being pinned down on facing consequences of separate treaty as Adenauer has always done. Suggest it would be advisable that Adenauer know before he visits US that President expects him present some clear ideas or proposals on handling German and Berlin problems and that at present stage simply putting off decisions is not good enough, as we will in effect by inaction be choosing between alternatives. One of these is conclusion separate peace treaty and he should be prepared give President answers to such questions as following: if policy is not to take positive steps to prevent separate treaty

1) How do Germans suggest we handle situation in which following separate treaty, East Germans begin slow harassment and strangulation Berlin economy without disturbing Allied access;

2) What action does he propose we take if East Germans close sector boundary and what would West Germans do;

3) How would West Germans handle refusal East Germans deal with them on such matters as trade and incidents except on formal governmental basis.

In this connection I do not believe West Germans can effectively desire of East Germans to continue trade as in these circumstances I believe Soviets would furnish East Germany requisite economic support although reluctantly.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-1661. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 46D, and printed in part in Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, p. 304.

[2] For text of this appeal, made during the President's press conference on March 8, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 152-160.

[3] The President made this request in his State of the Union address.

[4] For text of this December 6, 1960, declaration, see Pravda, December 6, 1960, or Izvestiia, December 7, 1960.

[5] For text of Brentano's March 13 speech on peace with one Germany, see Dokumente, Erster Halbband, pp. 409-416. On March 24 Kohler wrote to Thompson, thanking him for this telegram and stating that, despite some press distortion, fuller reports on what Brentano said indicated there was no change in the West German position on a peace treaty. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-2461)

12. Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, undated.

THE PROBLEM OF BERLIN

Summary

1. However impelling the urge to find some new approach to the Berlin problem, the facts of the situation strictly limit the practical courses of action open to the West. The history of the Berlin crisis since November 1958 gives little reason for thinking that a lasting settlement can be devised which, under current circumstances, will prove acceptable to both East and West.

2. A vital component of the Western position is the maintenance of a credible deterrent against unilateral Soviet action. Without this the full geographic weaknesses of the Western position in Berlin will have decisive weight in any negotiation. Thought should be given to the possibility of developing and strengthening deterrents other than the pure threat of ultimate thermonuclear war.

3. While we should give further thought to the possibility of providing some all-German “sweetening” for continuing discussion of the Berlin question with the Soviets, this should be done in awareness of the unlikelihood that any real step towards German reunification can be achieved within the calculable future under circumstances acceptable to the West. It also seems questionable that any all-German approach acceptable to the West will alone suffice to provide the basis for even a temporary solution to the Berlin problem.

4. In planning, therefore, for further negotiations with the Soviets, the Western Powers must prudently expect that they will once again be forced to discuss the question of Berlin in isolation. While a number of possible proposals for an arrangement on Berlin should be further studied to see if they contain the basis for an acceptable settlement, it seems unlikely that any of them will be negotiable with the Soviets or, if negotiable, acceptable to the West.

5. Under certain circumstances, however, the Western Powers might find it desirable to aim at a limited arrangement involving stabilization of existing access procedures, allowing for a certain East German role but preserving the essentials of the Western position. Alternatively they might find it necessary to contemplate the execution of their contingency plans.

6. While the Western contingency plans as now developed constitute a highly articulated system of related stages, we must realistically expect the intrusion of unpredictable factors as well as possible efforts by our Allies to reopen, under crisis conditions, certain aspects of contingency planning.

[Here follow sections on political and military aspects of the Berlin crisis (pages 2-3), the problems of deterrents (pages 4-5), a position for possible four-power negotiations (pages 6-7), discussion of Berlin in isolation (pages 7-9), and contingency plans (pages 9-10).]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-3161. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on March 30. At the end of February Bundy had tasked the Department of State with preparing a report for the President on the problem of Berlin. (Memorandum from McGhee to Kohler, February 27; ibid., 762.00/2-2761) An initial draft of March 13, containing four annexes on the development of the crisis, possible all-German context for a Berlin solution, discussion of Berlin in isolation, and contingency planning, was revised and transmitted to Bundy on March 24. (Ibid., 762.00/3-1361) The text printed here is a “streamlined version” of the March 24 draft as requested by Bundy; only the summary is printed.

13. Memorandum From Henry A. Kissinger of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, April 5, 1961.

SUBJECT

A Possible Visit to Berlin

One of the difficulties is how we can bring home to the Soviets our determination to maintain our rights in Berlin. Words may not be enough. Representatives may be ignored such as was Ambassador Thompson's warning with respect to Laos. Thus it may be worthwhile to consider whether it may not be wise to stake the President's prestige deliberately to the freedom of Berlin. The forthcoming visit with President de Gaulle may provide such an opportunity. I would recommend that consideration be given to a brief stop in Berlin either just before or just after the visit to Paris. The advantages seem obvious: (1) It would signify as nothing else our commitment to the freedom of Berlin. (2) It would be a tremendous boost for the morale of the population of Berlin. (3) It would make a profound impact in public opinion in the Federal Republic.

The disadvantages (together with some counter arguments) seem to be:

(1) The concern such a trip might cause to the Secret Service. Still I cannot imagine a Communist attack on the person of the President.

(2) There will be a delicate political problem because of the German electoral campaign. If Brandt receives the President, Adenauer must be there too. Or else, a stop in Bonn has to be added and this might open the floodgates.

(3) The Soviets may construe such an action as a provocation and it might focus unnecessary attention on Berlin. This seems to me excessively timid. The Soviets will not drop the Berlin issue through an oversight. They have raised it at every opportunity since the inauguration.

Henry A. Kissinger

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1985, 2794.

14. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, April 5, 1961, 3:10 p.m.

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH

PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

WASHINGTON, APRIL, 1961

SUBJECT

East-West Issues: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Secretary of State

Secretary of the Treasury

Secretary of Defense

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Dean Acheson

Ambassador Stevenson

Ambassador Harriman

Ambassador Bruce

Mr. Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Charles E. Bohlen

Mr. G. Mennen Williams

Mr. Walt Rostow

Mr. George McGhee

Mr. John M. Steeves

Mr. Harlan Cleveland

Mr. William C. Burdett

Mr. James W. Swihart

U.K.

The Prime Minister

Lord Home

Ambassador Caccia

Sir Norman Brook

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar

Honorable Peter E. Ramsbotham

Sir Patrick Dean

Mr. John Russell

Mr. Philip de Zulueta

Mr. John Thomson

The President observed that Mr. Acheson was leaving tomorrow for a meeting of the World Court. He said he would like to have Mr. Acheson present his views on Berlin and the subject could be followed up tomorrow.[2]

Mr. Acheson said that the President had drafted him to get some studies started. He had not reached any conclusions. The studies would be ready when he returned. However, some rough conclusions came to mind which might lead the Prime Minister to associate him with the late-lamented administration. In his thinking he approached the problem of Berlin with certain semi-premises. 1) There was no satisfactory solution to the Berlin problem aside from a resolution of the German problem. It did not look as though the German problem were in train for immediate solution. 2) It looked as though the Soviets would press the Berlin issue this year. 3) There was no solution that would not weaken the Western position. The same issues would confront the West under less favorable circumstances. He could see no proposals on the whole of Germany which would be better or put the West in a more favorable position.

Thus, Mr. Acheson continued, we must face the issue and prepare now for eventualities. Berlin is of the greatest importance. This is why the Soviets press the issue. If the West funks Germany will become unhooked from the Alliance.

Political and economic preparations are not adequate. There has got to be some sort of military response. When we would come to a military response is a difficult question. We would not do so on purely formal matters such as who stamps a pass. The important test is substantial interference with the traffic to Berlin, civilian or military. There are three ways of responding; on the air, on the ground or by threat of a nuclear response. The last is not wise, but reckless and would not be believed. This brings us to a ground or air operation. He would hope we could go further than before with Live Oak, etc.

Since the last airlift, Mr. Acheson went on, developments have caught up with the use of aircraft as a test of will. He did not think the West had the capability of forcing access versus determined Russian opposition. What is needed is a test of will. He hoped the test would make it clear to the Russians that Western interest in access was more important than Russian interest in stopping access. Berlin is vital to us but not to them. Ground-to-air missiles have been brought to a point where aircraft cannot survive. Thus there could be no test of the will in the air. The Russians would just shoot down the planes with their rockets. On the ground it would be really possible to raise some ugly questions for the Russians and to show the Russians that it was not worthwhile to stop a really stout Western effort. A small battalion or a brigade is not enough. A division with a division in support is required. Then we would have a very formidable weapon. If the Russians were to throw some twenty divisions at it our division could get back. If East German divisions were used maybe we could take care of them. There would be no resort to nuclear weapons. We would have tested and seen whether Russia was really firm on Berlin. If Russia threw back the attempt all would rally and realize the need to increase their efforts as happened after Korea. Concluding, Mr. Acheson said that these were only his ideas for study. They had not been considered by the President.

The President said that he had not come to a conclusion over what to do, but he had concluded that the state of planning was not adequate. The plans he had seen were not serious enough. The tests proposed did not escalate the matter to a sufficient height. The President asked for the Prime Minister's views.

Lord Home inquired whether in saying that the tests did not escalate high, the President was referring to a land probe. The Russians would have made a choice if they shot down a plane. Mr. Acheson replied that the air probe would face only East Germany with a choice. All sorts of hindrances could be placed in the way of air transport. They could shoot down one or two. What do we do? Bomb the ground?

The Prime Minister said that Mr. Acheson had made a most important point when he stated that he would regard the test as stoppage of military or civilian supplies. He had never thought the British people would go to war over who stamped a document. What counts is what happens to Berlin. Will supplies move? Mr. Acheson's statement is a tremendous advance in the U.S. position. Just saving face with the East Germans was not important. It was a great change. Mr. Acheson interjected that it might become so if after every change the East Germans made another.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that a division would be a very vulnerable body if moving on a narrow front. It would have to spread out if trouble started. Secretary McNamara said he thought of it as something to test intentions. More definite plans were required and he hoped these could be worked out.

The President asked the Prime Minister if it was his view that we should begin with an air lift. The Prime Minister replied that he was told what was done in 1949 could not be done now.

Lord Home maintained that a certain amount of planning was being done. There was plan B calling for action on the ground, which General Norstad favored. Then there was a plan for a garrison air lift and another for a civilian air lift. Quite a bit was being developed. Mr. Acheson commented that the plans are limited by what the planners are authorized to do. Secretary McNamara said we were ill-prepared to carry out a probe. Secretary Rusk recalled that back in 1948 and 1949 the plans were on such a scale that the tests could be stopped by small boys. Now we should make such a serious commitment that the Government's responsibilities would be engaged.

The Prime Minister pointed out that one difficulty has been the forum. Originally the planning was tripartite. Then the Germans were brought in. Now there is talk of NATO. Secretary McNamara said that the planning had been largely tripartite but even the tripartite planning was not very effective. There were two questions. A. To what extent should the planning be broadened? B. What training should there be for the plans? Lord Home asserted he was not convinced by the idea of sending in a division. Bridges could be blown and the division isolated. Mr. Acheson said this would not happen until the Elbe was reached. The President asked about the likelihood of use by the Russians of East German divisions. Mr. Acheson replied that it was the unofficial view in State that this would be very hazardous for the Russians. If the East Germans deserted the Russians would be in great difficulty.

The President commented that it had been said the plans were being developed without commitment. In addition to planning we must make some commitments. It would be helpful to us to know if Britain thought the land probe was too hazardous. If a peace treaty is signed should we go to the air lift. We should come to conclusions. The Prime Minister commented that signature of a peace treaty was not an act of war. The question would arise if the people of Berlin were deprived of what to live on. The West used to take the line that because they had occupied Berlin they had a duty to feed the populace. The Russians accepted the thesis. It was doubtful that they would do so now. Mr. Acheson warned that it was dangerous to be too legalistic. All rests on the spirit of the people of Berlin. For effective purposes there is no difference whether the supplies are for troops or civilians.

Lord Home pointed out that British doubts have been about the ground probe. The garrison air lift, civilian air lift, and diplomatic action seemed sensible. The British should have another look. The Prime Minister agreed.

Ambassador Stevenson recalled that Gromyko had recently said to him that he was disturbed to see that the United States underestimated the seriousness of the Berlin situation.

The President requested Secretary McNamara to obtain more detailed information regarding an air lift, especially on such matters as radio communication, supplies and so forth. He added that we should then reach conclusions on the effects of various forms of blockade. We should make up our own minds. Both of us would be talking to Adenauer and we must be in agreement on what to say. Secretary Rusk suggested following up the matter with the Foreign Office to see if new instructions could be sent to the planning group. The Prime Minister said the discussions should be on a bilateral basis first. The Prime Minister said he was suggesting bilateral discussions on what to do if access were blocked. The President agreed to the proposal.

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar pointed out that the East Germans already control all civilian supplies. If this control were extended to controlover supplies to our troops it would affect morale in Berlin. The result would be the same as a blockade.

Secretary Rusk said that additional bilateral planning would be helpful but we should get into tripartite planning rapidly and then talk with the Germans. Time was an important factor. Lord Home pointed out that German security was not good.

Lord Home expressed the view that on the political side our position was very negative. If Khrushchev says he wants a conference and that he wants to make a change we have no alternative to propose. Khrushchev will then say he is going to sign a treaty with the East Germans. Is it necessarily true that our presence in Berlin based on right of conquest, which is wearing thinner year by year, is on stronger grounds than if based on a treaty? Khrushchev has made only one public commitment—end the occupation status. He could get off this hook if we signed a treaty for a period of 10 years or such. Mr. Acheson replied that Khrushchev was not on a hook and thus does not have to be taken off one. He is not legalistic. Khrushchev is pushing to divide the Allies. He is not going to make any treaty that would help us. Our position is good as it is and we should stick by it. The real problem is reunifying Germany. If we start talking of signing of a treaty we will undermine the German spirit.

Lord Home asked is it not possible that Khrushchev does not wish to pass control to the GDR? Secretary Rusk stated that we would not want to agree that we are in Berlin by the grace of Khrushchev. We are there as the result of war. We are great powers and do not wish to be driven out. This is a fresh fact every day. If we transfer over to a treaty we are starting down a slippery slope. Lord Home admitted that perhaps this was right but added the right of conquest was wearing thin. Mr. Acheson suggested that perhaps it was our power which was wearing thin. Lord Home said he did not like going into a conference knowing we had nothing to offer.[3]

Secretary Rusk commented that the dilemma we have faced all along is that we have never made our case in public opinion. The Soviets have violated most post-war agreements. They have collected all that was promised to them and are trying to cut down on what we thought was our part of the settlement.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1833. Top Secret. Drafted by Burdett. The meeting was held at the White House. The source text bears the typewritten notation: “Uncleared."

[2] Acheson's remarks are a close summary of a memorandum that he sent to the President on April 3 in an effort to establish the premises for an analysis of the Berlin question. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/4-361; published in part in Declassified Documents, 1985, 2547)

[3] Home repeatedly made remarks along these lines in a conversation with Rusk on April 4. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-461.

15.Memorandum of Conversation[1]

April 6, 1961, 3:45 p.m.

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH

PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

WASHINGTON, APRIL, 1961

SUBJECT

East-West Issues: Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

The Secretary of State

Ambassador Bruce

Ambassador Bohlen

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Foy D. Kohler

Mr. John M. Steeves

Mr. William C. Burdett

United Kingdom

The Prime Minister

Lord Home

Sir Norman Brook

Sir Frederick Hoyer Miller

Ambassador Caccia

The Honorable P. E. Ramsbotham

Mr. John Russell

Mr. Philip de Zulueta

The President asked why Khrushchev had not moved on Berlin. Was it the danger of the Western response? What made him hold off? Lord Home thought Khrushchev was not going to lay off much longer. Ambassador Bohlen commented that the Soviets were subjected to strong importunities from the East Germans. They had large stakes in the East German regime but it would not work so long as Berlin was there. He recalled the Khrushchev offer in 1958 of a Free City. Probably, Khrushchev really thought he was offering quite a thing. He underestimated the Western reaction, which was quite sound. The Soviets then realized that they had raised a tremendously dangerous issue. Insofar as Soviet interests are concerned, Ambassador Bohlen said, he did not consider that Berlin was worth the risk. But, the Soviets also had to think of their Eastern empire. It would be imprudent to believe that the Soviets would exercise restraint forever. In addition, the China thing was forcing Khrushchev to be more militant. He was being outflanked from the left. The Secretary observed that a good deal depended on what position Khrushchev felt he must be in before the next Party Congress. Ambassador Bohlen thought he could not stand a political defeat. The question was to what degree are the Russian rulers prepared to use and risk the power of the Soviet state in Laos, etc. They are supporting “wars of national liberation"!

The President expressed the view that if Khrushchev were held off by the threat of a direct encounter with the West we should consider how to build up this threat. On Berlin we have no bargaining position. Thus we ought to consider, as Mr. Acheson suggested yesterday, how to put the issue to Khrushchev as bluntly as possible.

The Prime Minister recalled that we did have a long, drawn-out negotiation with the Soviets on Berlin and at one time it looked as if we were going to succeed. It was something like a play. We maintained that at the end of the play we should be in just the same position we occupied at the beginning. The Russians insisted that at the end there should be a change. Mr. Kohler thought that there was never any real prospect of an agreement acceptable to us. All the Russians were willing to offer was to allow the status quo to continue for a year or so. Lord Home remarked that he was never happy going into a negotiation with no position at all. We might go in with the idea of getting a continuation of the present situation for say three years. During this period, the East Germans and the West Germans could come to some agreement.

The Prime Minister noted that Khrushchev never offered a Free City including both sections of Berlin. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we once did but the offer was immediately dismissed. Lord Home thought we ought to offer something like that again. Mr. Kohler advised doing everything possible not to have to negotiate on Berlin. Lord Home asked whether international opinion would permit our not having any negotiation at all. The Prime Minister thought that if Khrushchev puts up an ultimatum he will then say, let's have a conference. The Soviets, Lord Home said, would put up a proposal which looked reasonable.

The Prime Minister inquired whether we thought Khrushchev would act on Berlin before or after the German elections. Ambassador Bohlen said the West Germans were trying to induce him to wait. The Secretary referred to a speech by Khrushchev saying he would not wait.

Ambassador Bohlen stressed that it was important to broaden the basis of our stance. It tended to be overly legalistic. We could take the position that we have an obligation to the people of Berlin. Our difficulties stem not from our position, but from the nature of the problem. He did not see the Russians accepting an interim arrangement unless there was a clear implication that we would accept a Free City afterwards. Lord Home maintained that there could be a temporary period during which the East Germans and the West Germans could work out their own arrangements. Ambassador Bohlen countered that they could do so under the present situation. The Prime Minister observed that we had made a peace treaty with West Germany without asking the Russians. If they did the same with East Germany it should not matter to us. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the Russians now have exactly the same arrangement with East Germany as we do with West Germany. Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar added that they now wish to go further. The Prime Minister said that if the Russians and ourselves have similar arrangements then we might propose a joint guarantee for the freedom of Berlin. Although our rights based on conquest are strong juridically, as the years pass, they become slightly tarnished. Ambassador Bohlen said that we should rest on the fact that we took certain obligations to the people of Berlin. This would give us a broader basic stance.

The Prime Minister referred to the importance of the public presentation. We should maintain that we are preserving the right of the people of Berlin to have a Free City. He asked whether the United States would mind going for a treaty instead of the occupation status as the basis for our position. Ambassador Bruce explained that the Soviets were occupying so strong a position on Berlin that we could not afford to give away what little we possessed. We would be giving from so little to start with that to give a little would be to give all. We cannot disregard the consequences that would flow in Central Europe and in West Germany from weakening on Berlin. We find that the West Germans are less willing to fight for Berlin than we are. We—the United States, the United Kingdom and France—are protecting the honor of the West. There is no question whatever that more yielding will set off an exodus from Berlin that will be really shocking. We must maintain our forces there. We should be prepared to discuss Berlin but not to negotiate on Berlin. If the Russians cannot better their own position except to our disadvantage, it is best for us to keep things as they are. Seeking an alternative is not feasible. Reducing the Berlin garrison would have little military effect; it is just a police force. The question is one of prestige. If anyone is lacking in imagination it is the West Germans. A real consideration which would influence the Soviets materially would be the de facto recognition by West Germany of East Germany. This would be a matter of great consequence which would affect all of Central Europe.

Lord Home asked again whether it was really impossible to negotiate. We could come forward with a plausible plan, for example, for a Free City. We must have a negotiating position. Ambassador Bruce said that there is a plan which would be sustainable but which we have not advanced. This would involve two points: (1) Berlin should be treated as a whole because of the circumstances under which it was constituted; (2) there should be no difficulties in access. The original sin was in not defining a land corridor, although it was clearly understood at the time that there was to be a land corridor. This would be a reasonable position.

The President remarked that we ought to pursue the matter of what our negotiating position should be if we do enter negotiations. We should also consider the suggestions of Mr. Acheson about what we should do if it is necessary to act. If we are going to be talking to the French, we should determine what our position will be. The Prime Minister suggested adding to point 9 of the agreed paper[2] a study of our position in any negotiation. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we have a working group on Berlin and that we have staffed out every conceivable plan. Developing a negotiating position is not the problem. The fact is that there is no satisfactory solution.

The Prime Minister said we should study whether to propose a Free City. What, in fact, happens if the Russians sign a treaty and do nothing further? What happens if they sign a treaty and do something? The difficulty lies in the area between the two questions. The Russians would probably move gradually. We should study at what point we would break.

The President said obviously the deterrent effect of our response keeps the Communists from engaging us in a major struggle on Berlin. It was necessary to keep the fact of the deterrent well forward.

The Prime Minister asked, what happens when Adenauer dies. Sooner or later, say in five or ten years, the Russians might try to offer the West Germans unity in return for neutrality. Is it so dangerous for the Russians to make this offer? It would be a great temptation for the West Germans. Ambassador Bruce maintained that the great objective of Soviet policy in Europe was somehow to obtain governmental possession of West Germany. Then the German question would cease to exist. Unless the German population was exterminated in the process, the Soviets may misapprehend what is likely to happen in West Germany after Adenauer dies, believing that this event will accrue to their advantage. The extraordinary character of the immigration to West Germany is revealing. The immigration is weakening all that goes to make up the normal life of a state. Last year there were 200,000 immigrants, 70 per cent from vital age groups. The East Germans are pressing the Soviets to stop the flow. Ambassador Bohlen expressed doubt that the Soviets could offer the bait of neutrality. They could not afford to sell the “wave of the future” down the drain.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1833. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burdett. The meeting was held aboard the Honey-Fitz.

[2] Point 9 of the minute agreed by Rusk and Home reads as follows: “Existing machinery in Washington will consider further what the Western negotiating position should be over Berlin if faced by a new Soviet move entailing negotiation.” For text of the agreed minute, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 382.

16. Editorial Note

Chancellor Adenauer visited the United States April 12-13, 1961, at the invitation of President Kennedy. On April 12 he met with the President at 10 a.m. to discuss NATO; a memorandum of this conversation is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume XIII, Document 98. At 4 p.m. Adenauer and Brentano met with Rusk to continue the discussion on NATO and to talk about Berlin. Memoranda of these conversations are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. At 10:30 a.m. on April 13 Adenauer and the President met again to discuss disarmament, aid to underdeveloped countries, and European integration. Memoranda of the first two conversations are ibid.; a memorandum of the conversation on European integration is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume XIII, Document 4. At noon they met to discuss Berlin, the balance of payments, and NATO; the memorandum of the conversation on Berlin is printed as Document 17; memoranda of the conversation on the other two topics are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. At 4:30 p.m. Adenauer and Kennedy met again briefly to discuss NATO and the final communiqué. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid. For the Chancellor's account of the visit, see Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pages 91-97; for Grewe's account of the visit, see Rückblenden, pages 461-464, which also includes a description of meetings not recorded in the formal memoranda of conversation.

17. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, April 13, 1961, noon.

ADENAUER VISIT

Washington, April 12-13, 1961

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Planning and Related Matters

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

Secretary Rusk

Ambassador Dowling

Assistant Secretary Kohler

Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter)

Federal Republic

Chancellor Adenauer

Foreign Minister Von Brentano

Ambassador Grewe

Dr. Karl Carstens

Mr. Weber (Interpreter)

In the discussion in his private office the President raised the question of contingency planning for Berlin. He stated that Mr. Acheson agreed to take this task upon himself, and he understood that Mr. Acheson had discussed the problem to some extent with the Chancellor.[2] The President indicated that he had discussed contingency planning with Mr. Macmillan during the latter's recent sojourn in Washington[3] and intended to discuss it also during his pending talks with General de Gaulle. The important thing which the President wished to point out was that he had noticed that there was a considerable gap between the planning done in such instances and the commitments which the various nations understood they had taken upon themselves. This was true of such organizations as SEATO as well as of other international bodies. The President wanted to have an absolutely clear understanding on the part of the United Kingdom, France and Germany as to what each country, including the United States, understands its duty to be in concerted action, so that it will be possible to know exactly how each country is going to respond to the pressures which may arise. Again, the President reiterated that there was a tremendous gap between the plans that had been worked out and what the various nations were willing to do in the case of need. The President had discussed this problem with the British and he felt that the end of these talks had by no means been reached so far. He was seriously concerned with finding out what the response of the various nations would be under certain conditions. The United States, for instance, wanted to strengthen the military probes in the event that a formal blockade of Berlin might be undertaken by either the Soviets or the East Zone. He indicated that he could hardly say that any final conclusions in this matter had been reached with the British and he felt that discussions would probably have to continue for some time. Moreover, he had no idea at all of what General de Gaulle might be prepared to do. For this reason he was very anxious to get the Chancellor's ideas on how best to strengthen the Allied position with reference to Berlin and how best to demonstrate that the United States was firm in its stand on Berlin. He wanted to hear what the Chancellor envisaged the role of Germany to be in the case of an emergency, especially as regards the commitment of German troops.

The Chancellor replied that the last time he had had a chance to discuss this matter was with Mr. Dulles.[4] It had been at a time when Mr. Dulles was in Bonn. At that time he gained the impression that there was no firm agreement on this matter between the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Mr. Dulles had told him that the planning had reference only to a case in which United States forces might be cut off from access to Berlin, regardless of who it was who cut them off. Mr. Dulles had indicated that in such a case the United States would be prepared to resort to the use of troops, if necessary tanks, and would not hesitate to use atomic weapons if this appeared warranted. At that time there had been no talk whatsoever of German forces being used beyond the Iron Curtain, since, according to Mr. Dulles, this entire situation was regarded by the United States as the direct outgrowth of the 4-power agreement on Berlin.

The Chancellor made reference to his discussions of yesterday with the Secretary.[5] He had not gone into any detail because it had not been the right time to do so. He agreed, however, that this entire matter was a very complicated one, which needed to be discussed quietly and calmly. This morning, then, the Foreign Minister had told him of his talk with the Secretary,[6] and he fully agreed with the conclusion reached on that occasion that, first of all, the problems of international law which were involved in the Berlin situation should be carefully studied and only after that should the matter be taken up again for consideration. The Chancellor indicated that he had wanted to inquire what agreement there existed among the United States, France and United Kingdom and that he had hoped this matter could be discussed to some degree. He realized, of course, that agreements among the three countries were affected, and the situation changed, by the NATO guarantee with reference to Berlin.[7] In any event, the Chancellor wished to assure the President that Germany was prepared to do everything that appeared necessary in the interest of this joint cause.

The President returned to the matter of the gap between the military planning and the commitments and policy decisions by governments in this respect. He stated that the Secretary could testify that such a gap had been found to exist with reference to SEATO in regard to the Laos situation. He presumed that there might well be no clear idea on the part of the various countries as to exactly what the commitment of each nation was with reference to Berlin under the guarantee made by NATO. It was most necessary, however, to find out exactly where everyone stood and how far each government was prepared to go, and the President was going to make every effort to try to clarify this situation.

The Chancellor agreed that a gap of this kind definitely existed, that it had to be closed, and that it was necessary to find out how far each government felt committed.

The President then asked the Chancellor what he thought might happen in Berlin this summer, for example. The Chancellor smilingly replied that he was no prophet. Anything or nothing could happen. When Khrushchev made his threats in November 1958, no one would have expected that he would wait as long as he did.

At this point Foreign Minister Von Brentano made reference to his statement during the conference at the State Department the afternoon of the previous day (April 12, 4:00 p.m.).[8] At that time he had said that there existed two possibilities with reference to Berlin: (1) Some kind of direct action by the Soviets similar, perhaps, to the blockade of some years ago. The Foreign Minister hardly thought that any such action would be forthcoming. (2) The Foreign Minister felt that the Soviet Union might enter into a separate peace treaty with the Soviet Zone, as it had previously announced, and transfer the obligations for the control of access to Berlin to the GDR, accompanied, of course, by carefully prepared instructions as to how to proceed. The GDR would then assume control of access to Berlin and quite possibly start various harassing actions against the traffic seeking access. This might initially be directed against German traffic alone and might or might not be expanded to include the Western Allies. Consequently, the Foreign Minister felt that it was necessary to decide what action should be taken in case the Soviet Union chooses the second alternative. The Foreign Minister felt that it had been pointed out correctly that the responsibilities of the various nations concerned were no longer clearly defined, especially since the issuance of the NATO guarantee on Berlin of December 1958, which had been reconfirmed several times, the last time in the very recent past. These guarantees did affect to some extent the responsibility of the three occupying powers. Germany, too, entered into the picture, of course. In order to be able to carry out the various guarantees, it was necessary for the three powers to get together, with Germany also included, and carefully to work out a program which would indicate exactly what action should be taken in a number of specifically designated eventualities, as well as at what point such action should be taken. Once such a program had been worked out, the Foreign Minister felt, it would be time to inform NATO and discuss the whole matter there, since the NATO guarantee was, of course, involved in this entire picture. This was the reason that the Foreign Minister had suggested yesterday that the matter of contingency planning for Berlin be discussed on a high level in order to clarify and confirm the obligations and commitments of the various parties concerned. The Foreign Minister wished to reconfirm what the Chancellor had said, namely, that the German Government had no intention of not living up to its obligations. After all, the question involved the capital of Germany and beyond that even the very future of Germany itself. If Berlin fell, the Foreign Minister said, it would mean the death sentence for Europe and the Western World.

The Chancellor indicated that the questions of international law pertaining to the Berlin question were very involved and complicated. This matter did not concern only the rights of the three or the four occupying powers. The three Western Allies, as occupying powers, had the right to demand unobstructed access to Berlin. As regards Germany, the legal situation was much more difficult. Germany has no title to Berlin at present from the standpoint of international law. However, it had the hope of becoming re-united and, when this was accomplished, of having Berlin re-instated as the capital of the nation. Germany's approach, therefore, had to be based on the fact that Berlin was not part of Western Germany and that the East Zone was not part of Western Germany at the present time. Therefore, the legal situation was a most confused one and the Chancellor felt that it was highly desirable, in fact absolutely necessary, to study this situation very carefully before engaging in any further talks on the subject.

At this point the President directly inquired what rights, if any, Germany claimed to have on West Berlin under international law, and what rights Germany felt she should have in Berlin. The Chancellor and the rest of the German party vigorously agreed that Germany had no rights in Berlin under international law. Ambassador Grewe spent a few minutes outlining the various agreements and statutes from which the rights of the various parties derived. Some, including the rights of the four powers, went back to 1945. The Soviet rights, of course, went back to that time. Then there were the rights of the Berliners themselves, as the inhabitants of the locality. The German constitution claimed Berlin as the capital of Germany, but this was a de jure situation only and was actually suspended by the occupation statute of 1949.[9] The right of access of the Federal Republic to Berlin was based on various de facto arrangements growing out of its trade relations with Berlin. In all, the legal situation was a most confused one.

The President then asked whether our occupational rights in Berlin gave us the right to provide adequate supplies for the local population. Both Ambassador Grewe and Foreign Minister Von Brentano answered in the affirmative, stating that this was naturally implied in the rights and obligations of an occupying power.

The Secretary of State said that all of us understood that there were various gradations of rights, duties and responsibilities. The three Western Allies were, of course, the three powers principally and most critically involved in the Berlin situation. Over and above this, however, NATO had assumed a guarantee for Berlin. However, the Secretary felt that as the representative of the German people and the German state, especially in terms of future reunification, the German Federal Republic had claims on Berlin. The United States understood these gradations, but as the need for action arose a practical situation would confront all parties concerned which would obliterate by necessity the gradations of responsibility and rights. For this reason the Secretary felt that very close and careful scrutiny of the problem was required in order that all might know what everybody's role was to be and how each of the parties concerned would meet its responsibilities. The Secretary thought that this would require much consultation. The Chancellor stated that he was in full agreement.

The President then asked the Chancellor what, in his judgment, the United States response should be if the Soviet Union entered into a separate peace treaty with East Germany, thereby giving control of access to the GDR, but the latter, while assuming such control, did not interfere with traffic to Berlin.

The Chancellor stated that he was not sure whether the President realized that at present there still had been no peace treaty by the four powers with Germany. He was making reference to this matter for the purpose of indicating once again how complicated the overall legal situation was. A peace treaty was supposed to be signed with all four powers. Again, the Chancellor did not know whether the President was aware of a little-known fact that the Soviet Union still maintained military missions in the area of Western Germany. The three Western Allies had asked Germany not to cause difficulties with reference to these Soviet missions, because the three Western Allies had military missions stationed in East Germany which enabled them to get all sorts of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]information which they otherwise might not be able to obtain. Thus, the Chancellor again indicated that the legal situation was an extremely complicated one; at the same time the national aspects could not be kept out entirely. The Chancellor then continued to say that if an attack were made on American soldiers who were trying to get unhampered access to Berlin, to which they were entitled, then, under its NATO commitments, Western Germany would have to bring its troops into play. Again, however, the Chancellor reiterated that this whole thing was so complicated that he greatly welcomed the Secretary's suggestion that the legal situation be studied carefully before any further steps were taken.

The Chancellor then turned to answer the President's question regarding the action recommended in case of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, without the GDR harassing traffic. If he remembered correctly, he said, a similar question had arisen once before, when the Soviet Union had asked the GDR to take over control of the access routes in the name of the USSR, thereby having the GDR act in the capacity of Soviet agent. At that time the three Western Allies and Germany had rejected the idea of agency very firmly. Thus, in any consideration of the Berlin situation, it was really necessary to have at hand the tremendous bulk of material covering all the various legal involvements and past history.

The Secretary indicated that he hoped the question would be examined both on a tripartite and quadripartite basis and agreed that the legal situation was indeed a most confused one. He said that the situation reminded him of one of the Soviet Ambassadors to Washington, who was quoted as stating that the law is like the tongue of a wagon; it goes in the direction in which it is pointed.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in S on April 22 and in the White House on May 11. The meeting was held at the White House. For the Scope Paper prepared for the meeting, see Declassified Documents, 1978, 403B.

[2] A record of Acheson's conversation with Adenauer on April 9 is printed in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 97.

[3] See Document 15.

[4] For documentation on Dulles' visit to Bonn February 7-8, 1959, see ibid., 1958-1960, vol. VIII, pp. 336  ff.

[5] See Document 16.

[6] This reference is unclear as there is no record of a meeting between Rusk and Brentano on either April 12 or 13.

[7] For text of the NATO guarantee on Berlin, December 16, 1960, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 560.

[8] See Document 16.

[9] For text of the Occupation Statute, April 8, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. III, pp. 179-181 .

18. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, April 15, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS

German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe

The Secretary

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand,GER

Ambassador Grewe began by saying that the Chancellor had sent him to see the Secretary expressly to straighten out a point about which he felt there might still exist a certain obscurity and misunderstanding. The Chancellor, Foreign Minister Von Brentano and the Ambassador had reviewed the course of the formal talks as well as the Chancellor's dinner conversation with the Secretary on the subject of Berlin contingency planning. In addition, Ambassador Grewe noted, he (Grewe) had just had a talk with a reliable American journalist who had said that from his conversations with important people in the State Department he had obtained the impression that there was some uncertainty on the American side as to the ultimate German determination to participate in the case of a real emergency over Berlin. Moreover, according to this same journalist, the Germans were supposed to have shown a certain reluctance to participate in Berlin contingency planning. There was absolutely no basis for the last point, Ambassador Grewe commented. The Secretary observed that he had never heard anyone say that; the first point had a little more background.

After the question had been discussed with him, Ambassador Grewe continued, the Chancellor agreed that the German position might not be clear enough and might require additional explanation. Discussion of the subject with the Germans had started with the visit of Secretary Dulles to Bonn in February of 1959. The Secretary had explained his view as to how the West should react to Soviet harassments and had indicated that the United States was determined to keep the routes to Berlin open, if necessary by force and ultimately by the use of nuclear weapons. At the time the Chancellor had felt a little bit that this proposed course of action did not exhaust all possibilities of averting the ultimate catastrophe and did not allow sufficiently for negotiations in between. Perhaps there was a certain reluctance in the Chancellor's statements to Secretary Dulles which might have led to the impression that the Germans were hesitant about cooperating. In 1960 Mr. Kohler had expressed to the Ambassador certain American anxieties on this score, and had noted that the Federal Republic had not yet even passed the emergency legislation required to deal effectively with a crisis situation.

It was a fact, Ambassador Grewe went on, that the Germans had been excluded from Western contingency planning because of French and British opposition based on the argument that the Three Occupying Powers could not afford to dilute their exclusive legal competency for Berlin. The Germans had only been given information and papers after the planning had been completed, but were reluctant to press too much because of the legal situation of basic Three-Power responsibility. This thought was behind the Chancellor's statement during the recent talks that German forces could not be expected to participate in initial steps. He believed it sufficient to say that, if the three Allies were involved in hostilities, then Germany was involved too along with the rest of the Alliance. He still felt this was the best formula but did not want any misunderstanding to arise over its implications.

The Secretary said he wanted to make the following points:

1. We are under no doubt whatsoever that the US, France, and the UK have the primary and, if necessary, sole responsibility for Berlin as Occupying Powers.

2. We fully understand that the Federal Republic does not have a legal or other basis for asserting its unilateral or special responsibility for West Berlin. We would, therefore, not expect it to participate in the initial steps to be taken. In fact, we would be deeply concerned by any steps the Federal Republic might take in advance of the Three Powers.

3. We feel the situation to be somewhat affected by the change in the de facto situation with respect to the armed forces in Western Europe. The ready divisions are primarily US, Canadian and German. The British and French are not in a state of readiness. The French forces have been very severely depleted. The fact is, of course, that if any serious fighting occurred we would all be involved. We have tried to start from this and work backwards. We believe there ought to be careful tripartite and quadripartite consultation on the contingencies which might arise. There is not now full tripartite or quadripartite agreement on alternative situations which might arise with respect to Berlin. These must be reviewed and discussed in a consultative process in which the Federal Republic must be considerably more involved than in the past.

4. The governments involved should consider these matters at the highest policy level, not just at the planning level, as if plans had nothing to do with policy. Although all decisions could not be made in advance, there must be agreement on the policies which should govern. In an actual crisis governments could not start from the beginning with their discussion of policies and plans. There is now a gap between our plans and our policies.

The Secretary indicated that he now understood the Chancellor's position better with respect to participation of German forces. After all, the kind of action in question would be across the border, he observed. If we should decide on a military probe on the ground, this will involve movement across the border. The problem would be a difficult one to handle if the border could determine NATO strategy in this context. We will have to look carefully at the quadripartite and NATO role to see if there are any legal obstacles affecting military contingency planning. Except perhaps during the initial phase, the Secretary noted, it would be surprising if these legal obstacles proved formidable. This was a point, however, which required clarification in quadripartite discussions. The situation was a little confused at the tripartite level. If the Federal Republic were also confused, it might be difficult to determine who felt responsible for what.

We are agreed, the Secretary continued, that it would be politically difficult for the United States to seem more concerned about Berlin than the Federal Republic. We thought the Chancellor understood this. The subject was one which obviously could be developed only so far bilaterally. Tripartite discussions must be held, moving rapidly into quadripartite discussions. We would begin tripartitely, not to achieve fixed positions before bringing in the Federal Republic, but because of the basic legal responsibility of the Three Powers.

Ambassador Grewe said that in his exposition the Chancellor had begun with the tripartite responsibility to which the Secretary had referred and then moved on to the question of what the Federal Republic could do. He (Adenauer) had also wanted to show that as far as German civilian traffic was concerned there was a vacuum and that this also raised certain problems which had to be considered.

After his conversation with the Chancellor during dinner on April 12, the Secretary commented, he had been a little concerned that if the matter came up the next day with the President, Dr. Adenauer's somewhat compressed response might cause puzzlement with respect to the German attitude. As a result he had spoken to Foreign Minister Von Brentano to alert him that some clarification was needed. We could understand that the German Government did not want to see any diminution in the basic Three-Power responsibility or to get involved in decisions taken without German participation. Our view is that the four governments should straighten the matter out. Perhaps certain other NATO countries would also have to be brought into the picture. After all, NATO as an organization could be involved by tripartite action. The Secretary said he would take the occasion at the airport on Sunday to thank the Chancellor for having sent in Ambassador Grewe and to tell him that we did not think there was any misunderstanding but that we would be in further touch on the subject.

The participation of German forces in any probing action, Ambassador Grewe stated, would mean a change in the basic situation because the East German population would take this as a sign for a general uprising which would presumably have the effect of extending the conflict. We could understand this German view, the Secretary commented, as it related to the initial Western action to reopen access, but if counter-military action by the other side were taken, then this point would be passed. One of the factors in such a situation might be that, if the Soviets attempted to strangle Berlin, the East Germans would be concerned about these implications. Ambassador Grewe agreed they would. As to the question of a civil blockade of Berlin, the Ambassador continued, there seemed to be no concrete planning for this at all. It would be difficult to find a definite line which, if breached by the East, would elicit specific Western measures. Here was the old problem of Communist so-called “salami tactics”. The Secretary said we found it difficult to draw a distinction between the lines of communication of the few thousand Allied troops in Berlin and those of the civilian population. It would not do much good for the troops to be in the city if it were in disorder. This question had to be studied.

In response to Ambassador Grewe's query as to what level the Secretary had had in mind when he had referred to the need for high-level considerations, the Secretary said that, since the issue was so basic and serious, we must have further talks as the opportunity arose. President Kennedy and President de Gaulle would certainly discuss the subject. Perhaps it should also be dealt with in side talks between those directly concerned at the time of the forthcoming NATO Ministerial meeting. Apart from Ministerial consideration, much careful work at a lower level was also required. One thing that must be avoided among the four is a misunderstanding on these points which would have a divisive effect. We must be somewhat careful so that the points emphasized are fully understood by all of the Four Powers. It was a little difficult to comment further on this in the absence of fuller talks, but there appeared to have been an absence of intimate discussions of these matters among the four. As the new American Administration comes in, the Secretary observed, some of the nuances of the past may not be present and the approach may at first seem a little over-simplified. The Chancellor could be assured, however, that the question which had been in the Secretary's mind from the Wednesday dinner conversation had been cleared up.

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. For Grewe's account of this conversation, see Rückblenden, pp. 464-468.

19. Editorial Note

On April 23 the Federal Republic of Germany's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Hans Kroll, flew to the Crimea for a 3-day visit with Khrushchev. During their discussion on Berlin Khrushchev told Kroll that he would sign a treaty with the German Democratic Republic, but not until after the West German elections in September or perhaps until after the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October. For Kroll's account of the visit, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pages 483-489. On his return to Moscow Kroll briefed the three Western Ambassadors on his talks with Khrushchev (telegram 2693 from Moscow, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-261) and on May 2 Ambassador Grewe briefed the Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin. (Memorandum of conversation, May 2; ibid., 762.0221/5-261)

20. National Intelligence Estimate[1]

Washington, April 25, 1961.

NIE 11-7-61

SOVIET SHORT-TERM INTENTIONS

REGARDING BERLIN AND GERMANY

The Problem

To estimate probable Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin and Germany over the next six months or so.

Conclusions

1. We believe that in the relatively near future the USSR will present a formal demand for a renewal of negotiations on the question of a peace treaty for “the two Germanies” and a new status for Berlin. Almost certainly, Khrushchev still prefers to negotiate on this matter rather than to provoke a crisis by unilateral action, chiefly because he desires to avoid the risks of a showdown in this dangerous area of East-West confrontation. He apparently still hopes that, if he keeps in reserve the threat of a unilateral move, Western fears of a showdown will induce the Allies to make concessions at the bargaining table. (Paras. 5, 9, 11)

2. In raising this issue once again the USSR's chief concern will be to strengthen the East German regime by eroding and eventually eliminating the Western position in Berlin, and by bringing the West to recognize the permanence and legitimacy of that regime. The Soviets also hope that success in this will undermine West Germany's confidence in its present policy of participation in NATO's military effort, since it remains a primary Soviet purpose to check the buildup of significant military power in the Federal Republic. (Paras. 6-8)

3. In any negotiations which take place in the next few months, the Soviets would almost certainly not hold fast to their maximum demand for a peace treaty with “the two Germanies” and the immediate conversion of West Berlin into a “demilitarized free city.” Instead they will concentrate on getting an “interim agreement,” of the kind outlined at Geneva in 1959, which would constitute a first step toward eliminating Allied occupation rights in West Berlin. The USSR might in the course of negotiations reduce some of its previous demands concerning such an interim settlement if it could obtain an agreement, which, at least by implication, put a time limit on these occupation rights. This outcome would be intended to lay the groundwork for later advances and would be, in the Soviet view, a major gain. (Paras. 12-15)

4. If higher level negotiations do not take place, or if they break down, the USSR might agree to refer the problem to lower level talks. More likely, however, it would move to summon a Bloc-sponsored peace conference and would eventually sign its long-threatened separate peace treaty with the GDR. Subsequently, the Soviets could transfer to the GDR control over Allied access and, sooner or later, permit that regime gradually to apply a policy of harassments. As another way of exerting pressure, they might choose to exploit the vulnerabilities of German civilian access, a course which would not directly threaten the Allied position but could seriously undermine the integrity of West Berlin. Under this or any other policy, however, the USSR is likely to continue to offer negotiations, always hopeful that the Allies can be induced to accede peacefully to the eventual loss of the Western position in Berlin. (Paras. 19-21)

[Here follow four pages of the “Discussion” section.]

[1] Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 5B.

21. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Hillenbrand) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)[1]

Washington, April 25, 1961.

SUBJECT

Review of Berlin Contingency Planning

There seems little doubt that the British emerged from the recent Macmillan talks with some fairly important misconceptions about the direction of American thinking on Berlin. This was perhaps inevitable, given the very general terms in which Mr. Acheson made his presentation combined with the basic British willingness, which has existed from the outset of the Berlin crisis, to move towards recognition of the GDR in return for an arrangement on Berlin. In any event, we now seem to be in the position where Prime Minister Macmillan regards the supposedly “new” American approach to the earlier phases of contingency planning as linked to the process of reviewing and perhaps toughening the later phases.

At his request, John Thomson came in yesterday afternoon[2] and showed us the British record of the pertinent discussion between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan during which Mr. Acheson made his presentation. There are some material differences of emphasis compared with the American record of this conversation. Based on their record, the British drew much more far-reaching conclusions about the implications of Mr. Acheson's statement, particularly his willingness to go down the road towards acceptance of the GDR and a corollary of his unwillingness to have any procedural stage made a sticking point.

As far as I am aware of his thinking, it is fair to say that Mr. Acheson does not consider the presently-agreed “peel-off” procedure to be a suitable method for making the basic test of whether there is actually physical interference with access to Berlin. He seems inclined to believe that continuation by GDR officials of the same procedures now applied by the Soviets would be a more clear-cut point at which to draw the line and one more likely to obtain both the understanding and support of public opinion.

Given the situation revealed by your conversation with Lord Hood,[3] we need now to give consideration to whether we want to reopen the documentation procedures in our contingency plans. These now provide for the use of a new type of movement orders to identify Allied movements to East German border personnel, who will, in effect, not be permitted to process Allied official travelers but merely to take cognizance of their identity and to receive a copy each at the incoming and outgoing check-point of a form on which the date and time of entry will be indicated.

As you know, upon his return from Europe at the beginning of May, Mr. Acheson intends to resume his study of the Berlin question which he undertook at the request of the President. He has asked that the Defense Department undertake on an urgent basis certain studies relating to the terminal phases of contingency planning. He will also expect that we come up with some thoughts on how his criterion of interference with physical access can be translated into concrete terms.

I have been giving some thought to this, and I am coming reluctantly to the conclusion that, since the “peel-off” procedure does not seem to make sense to many people as a definitive sticking point, we will probably have to seriously consider reopening the agreed documentation procedures, especially now that the British will be pressing hard for a change in something which they initially accepted with great reluctance. Apart from the sheer force of inertia, there is a natural tendency to oppose reopening something which was attained only after much discussion, which has now been embodied in agreed texts of public statements to be made and of notes to be sent to the Soviets, which has been sent to the field in the form of instructions to those who must carry them out, and which has actually led to the preparation and distribution in the field of the “peel-off” forms to be used. On the other hand, the agreed contingency planning already contains a provision permitting GDR personnel, expressly authorized as such, to function as Soviet agents in performing existing procedures with relation to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin. This could possibly provide a basis for return to “imputed agency”.

In attempting to assess where reopening of the present agreed planning might take us, the history of the revision of contingency plans which took place early in 1959 is not without relevance. When the Berlin crisis broke in November 1958, the agreed tripartite plans involved acceptance of processing by GDR officials providing the same procedures as those carried out by the Soviets were preserved. This was to be justified on the basis of an imputed agency concept. Late in 1958, there was a considerable feeling, especially on the part of Ambassador Bruce, that such an imputed agency concept made little sense in the face of an explicit Soviet denial that any agency relationship could exist after the signature of a peace treaty. Secretary Dulles, who was absent from the Department during the first weeks of December 1958 because of illness, and who returned to work only in time to go to the NATO Ministerial Meeting about the middle of the month, was apparently never fully acquainted with the details of the existing contingency planning. It will be recalled, however, that he caused quite a furor by endorsing the agency concept in a press conference which he gave in late November just before going off to Walter Reed. In February he made his last trip abroad—to London, Paris, and Bonn—during which he discussed the first draft of a paper which, in a subsequent form, was eventually to become the basic April 4, 1959 tripartitely-agreed paper,[4] which has since provided the framework for contingency planning. As far as I am aware, Mr. Dulles never really gave up the idea, which obviously appealed to him, of imputing agency status to GDR officials. Without attempting to spell out what this meant in practice, the basic April 4 planning paper merely stipulated that if Soviet personnel are withdrawn from the check-points there would be no objection to providing mere identification of the vehicles of the Three Powers for the information of GDR personnel at the check-points. The “peel-off” was intended to translate this into a specific procedure.

The British interpretation of the statements made to Prime Minister Macmillan during his visit obviously raises fundamental policy questions. Although we indicated our willingness to continue discussions with the British by the middle of this week, I do not think we should rush into any conclusions. The Secretary presumably will be too preoccupied with other matters really to focus on this question. Mr. Acheson will be returning early in May and taking a further look. British eagerness obviously derives from a desire to nail down what they believe to be a significant shift in US policy. Hence, I would suggest that during your next meeting with the British we should hold up the “go slow” sign, possibly making the following points:

1. As Mr. Acheson indicated, the President had asked him to get some studies started. He had not, however, reached any conclusions.

2. Examination of our record of the conversations with Mr. Macmillan plus what we believe we know of Mr. Acheson's thinking does not lead us to the conclusion that he was taking a position which he thought might lead to de facto recognition of the GDR.

3. Mr. Acheson merely stipulated the criterion of physical interference with access to Berlin as the point at which the West would have to make its show of determination. He did not attempt to translate this criterion into concrete terms.

4. Obviously such a criterion does have to be given some concrete embodiment, if it is to have operational meaning. Otherwise, we would seem to be in the impossible position of being willing to meet every and any GDR demand provided only that the traffic keeps moving.

5. We need to give further careful thought to this. Mr. Acheson will be returning early in May and may wish to give some precise definition to his thoughts.

6. We do not see how we can accept, under cover of contingency planning, an approach which involves really a fundamental change of policy towards the GDR. As the British know, anything of this sort would be anathema to the Federal Republic.

7. We will want to think about this further, but perhaps the place to draw the line might be at the point of acceptance of present procedures.

This is already provided for in the contingency plans if the Soviets expressly acknowledge an agency relationship, and in a sense is the essence of the old Solution C, which had been thought of as a possible fallback position during the course of negotiations with the Soviets. It is difficult, however, to see how we could let ourselves get in a position where we must actually negotiate with the GDR on procedures, or in the position of completely renouncing all Soviet responsibility, for that would strike at the basis of the Western legal position.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-2561. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand.

[2] No other record of this meeting has been found.

[3] On April 21 Kohler had given the British Minister, Lord Hood, a one-page memorandum outlining the review of contingency planning which was to be made by the United States and the United Kingdom in light of the Kennedy-Macmillan talks. In the discussion which followed it became clear that the British had not clearly understood the U.S. position on the question. A five-page memorandum of Kohler's conversation with Hood, to which is attached a copy of the U.S. memorandum, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/4-2161.

[4] Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. VIII, pp. 584-589 .

22. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, May 5, 1961.

SUBJECT

Military Planning for a Possible Berlin Crisis

This memorandum is submitted in response to your request (National Security Action Memorandum No. 41, April 25, 1961)[2] for a prompt report on the current military planning for a possible crisis over Berlin.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently reviewed Berlin Contingency Planning to determine deficiencies. In their report to me of 13 April,[3] the Joint Chiefs reaffirmed their view that a solution to a Soviet attempt to deny the Free World access to Berlin must include U.S. and Free World military, diplomatic, and economic countermeasures, on a worldwide basis, in addition to local military actions. They stated that “within existing capabilities and national policy guidance” there are no deficiencies in U.S. Unilateral Berlin Contingency Plans. They reported, however, certain important deficiencies in Tripartite Berlin Contingency Plans. Examples of the tasks to be completed are:

a. Tripartite approval of appropriate training for the tripartite battalion combat force.

b. Development of a plan for use of a tripartite reinforced division to assist in restoring access to Berlin.

c. Tripartite agreement for German participation in Berlin Contingency Planning.

Defense representatives on the U.S. Coordinating Group will take action at the earliest possible time to obtain approval for the correction of these deficiencies.

Although, as the Joint Chiefs report, the unilateral military planning “within existing capabilities and national policy guidance” is satisfactory, the national policy guidance is not. NSC 5803, dated February 7, 1958,[4] on which Berlin Contingency Planning is based, does not reflect new developments in U.S. strategic thinking. Specifically, NSC 5803 implies the U.S. “will be prepared to go immediately to general war after using only limited military force to attempt to reopen access to Berlin.” This is inconsistent with current thinking which proposes the use of substantial conventional force before considering resort to nuclear weapons and other general war measures. An early restatement of our national policy with regard to Berlin Contingency Planning is desirable.

Concurrent with our review of military plans, Mr. Acheson's memorandum to you of April 3, 1961, subject: “Berlin”,[5] was being considered. The Joint Chiefs, on April 28, 1961, in response to a memorandum of April 17, subject: “Berlin”,[6] signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, completed three studies directed at resolving certain questions presented in Mr. Acheson's memorandum. Copies of the Joint Chiefs' conclusions and their studies have been furnished to Mr. Bundy.

The Chiefs' studies indicate that we must plan on employing a ground force of two divisions or more if we are to be effective in reopening access to Berlin without the use of nuclear weapons. This course of action may subsequently require reinforcement of our forces in Europe, shifts in deployments and partial mobilization by ourselves and our allies. Based on the studies, I conclude that:

a. Substantial (in contrast to limited) non-nuclear military action to reopen ground access must be planned.

b. Non-nuclear military actions to reopen air access would not be successful without an expansion of the conflict, and even then would not succeed in reopening and maintaining air access in the face of determined Soviet opposition.

c. There is a wide range of action available to us, worldwide, which can be employed for timely and effective pressure on the Soviet Union in event of another Berlin crisis.

These studies have further reinforced my opinion that both unilateral and tripartite planning are deficient in failing to include the possibility of exploiting the military potential of the Federal Republic of Germany. With German interest in and de facto responsibility for Berlin, I believe we should be prepared to accept German participation in Berlin military action.

Not clearly spelled out in the summary conclusions in the Joint Chiefs memorandum, but adequately covered in Appendix A to their report, is the fact that with but a one or two division force, allied or U.S. attempts to reopen access to Berlin could be stopped by East German forces alone. I do not believe that a great power such as the United States should select a course of action which could lead to defeat by a Soviet puppet regime. Agreeing that the main purpose behind this conventional military operation is political and an extension of the test of will between the USSR and ourselves, I consider it mandatory that, in any military operation larger than a probe, we have at least the level of forces required to defeat any solely Satellite force, without employing our nuclear response. In fact, our planning for action by substantial non-nuclear ground forces must assure that active USSR participation is required to deny us access to Berlin.

In conjunction with the above, we should not overlook the likelihood of an uprising in East Germany and other satellite countries should a sizable and active allied military movement in East Germany take place. There is a need for an immediate assessment of our capability to use and support special forces and guerrilla-type operations and to coordinate them properly with normal military action.

In summary, I believe that:

a. The Chiefs' studies will help resolve three of the questions raised by Mr. Acheson in his memorandum.

b. We must urgently re-examine the national policy guidance on which our unilateral U.S. planning is based, and translate this U.S. policy guidance into agreed tripartite policy.

c. We must arrange for participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in Berlin Contingency Planning.

d. The full potential for U.S. and non-U.S. “special operations” should be developed and coordinated with our planned military actions.

We shall initiate recommendations to the NSC to permit the accomplishment of items b, c, and d.

Robert S. McNamara

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1985, 2382.

[2] Not printed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs, NSAM 41)

[3]  JCSM-237-61, “The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218,JCS Records)

[4] Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. IX, pp. 631-644 .

[5] See footnote 2, Document 14.

[6] A copy of the JCS memorandum, JCSM-287-61, “Berlin,” which has appendices corresponding to subparagraphs a-c below and is summarized here, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Bundy's memorandum requested the three studies summarized in subparagraphs a-c. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 B 3464, Germany 091)

23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State[1]

Oslo, May 9, 1961.

Secto 27. Bonn pass USBER Berlin info 4. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:[2]

Lengthy quadripartite discussion of Berlin last night revolved around three points noted Secto 13.[3]

On timing of German reply to Soviet memorandum February 17, von Brentano agreed this could wait until after President's visit to de Gaulle. Pointed out, however, that too much delay in reply might give German political opposition basis for charging that Government deliberately stalling. Meanwhile quadripartite consultations on text should proceed.

Ministers generally agreed that there was no basis for Western initiative to open negotiations with Soviets on Berlin. Von Brentano stressed that any change in status of Berlin likely to be deterioration and that peace treaty between Soviets and GDR could have no legal effect but might serve as instrument to achieve greater recognition of GDR among noncommitted countries. In response to Lord Home's query whether there were any price Germans prepared to pay to prevent peace treaty, such as interim arrangement for 18-24 months while West and East Germans tried to settle question, Von Brentano strongly opposed any idea of all-German talks. Apart from problem of sitting down with GDR regime which lacked meaningful mandate, such talks could only lead to anything if FedRep prepared to make concessions which would jeopardize freedom of West Germans and threaten entire Western Alliance. However, Von Brentano did not exclude possibility of eventual Four-Power negotiations in response to Home's conclusion that implication of discussion was that even if Soviets offered negotiations and put forward seemingly attractive proposal, West would have no negotiating position and could do no more than simply say to Soviets they should go ahead and sign their peace treaty and face consequences.

Couve made point that German fear of initial interference with civilian rather than Allied military access did not correspond to likely development of situation. Civilian access already controlled by GDR, and arrangements could be worked out by East and West Germans as before. Direct threat following signing of peace treaty was to Allied military traffic which thereafter would presumably no longer be processed by Soviets. He reiterated his belief that Soviets were completely serious about Berlin as of vital interest to them and West must accordingly expect them to proceed with announced intention of signing peace treaty and turning over responsibility to GDR. Couve saw no reason why West could not negotiate with Soviets on Berlin as in 1959 at Geneva. Essential basis preservation freedom of West Berlin was continuation Western military presence, but this need not be at present force levels.

Ministers agreed that possible misconception on part of Khrushchev re Allied firmness of intentions on Berlin, as indicated his recent conversation with German Ambassador Kroll,[4] could be highly dangerous and that means of correcting this should be given serious consideration.

In response Secretary's query, Von Brentano vigorously denied that determination of West Berliners had softened with increasing prosperity or that interest of West Germans in Berlin not passionate. Loss of Berlin would have disastrous effect in FedRep, he mentioned, and hence on entire Western Alliance. At several points Von Brentano made strong plea for full German participation in Western contingency planning to which he felt FedRep had important contribution to make. This would not derogate from basic tripartite responsibility for Berlin. Secretary noted would be helpful to have from Germans exposition of what they felt to be responsibility of FedRep for Berlin including legal respects. Noting NATO interest this subject at Ministerial Council meeting in afternoon,[5] he also made point that Western Powers should move ahead on contingency planning so report could be made to NATO.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1860. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on May 8 and authorized by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Moscow. Rusk was attending the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Oslo.

[2] A copy of this 9-page memorandum of conversation (US/MC/10) is ibid., CF 1862.

[3] Secto 13, May 8, transmitted a summary of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom at 9:30 p.m. on May 7 at which they agreed to discuss with Brentano the following three questions: 1) timing of the German reply to the Soviet memorandum of February 17; 2) should the West take the initiative for negotiations with the Soviet Union; and 3) should the West try to correct Khrushchev's apparent mistaken view on Western firmness on Berlin. (Ibid., CF 1860)

[4] See Document 19.

[5] Summaries of the discussion of the international situation by the North Atlantic Council on May 8 were transmitted in Sectos 15 and 19, May 8 and 9, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-OS/12-861 and 396.1-OS/12-961)

24. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, May 24, 1961, noon.

2887. In order repeat interested missions this message not highly classified but trust will be handled with great discretion. I shall give abbreviated account British, French and German colleagues.

Yesterday AM Kuznetsov phoned to say K would be attending American ice revue and hoped I would be present. On arrival my wife and I were taken directly to his box. He was accompanied by Furtseva, Kuznetsov, Troyanovsky, and his son and daughter-in-law. At intermission we sat down to supper in adjoining room and did not return to revue.

K said frankly he had seen enough ice shows and invitation was excuse for discussion forthcoming meeting with President. He said he expected leave Sat or Sun by rail stopping in Kiev for some relaxation as well as Lvov and Bratislava where he would spend 30 hours. He expects arrive Vienna about noon June 2. He will be accompanied by wife and daughter-in-law.

Conversation ranged over wide field and as I could take no notes sequence following report may not be exact but essentials were as follows:

He revealed plainly he was troubled by problem how deal with President on question Berlin. He would not make same approach to President as he was now making to me although he knew I would report our current conversation. This was different matter however than for him and President to have discussion on this delicate problem in front of their assistants. In general he took same line with me as he had with Kroll stating if no agreement reached on Berlin they would sign separate peace treaty in fall or winter after German elections and probably after Party Congress. This would end our occupation rights and East Germans would control communications. He realized this would bring period of great tension but he was convinced would not lead to war. German reunification was impossible and in fact no one really wanted it including de Gaulle, Macmillan and Adenauer. He said de Gaulle had told him not only should Germany remain divided but would be even better if it were divided in three parts.

I told him with utmost seriousness it was my duty as Ambassador to see that he was under no misunderstanding of our position and that if he signed separate treaty and force was used to interfere with our communications it would be met with force. He replied if we wanted war we would get it but he was convinced only madman would want war and Western leaders not mad though Hitler had been. I said our prestige was deeply engaged in our pledge to people of Berlin and we would carry out our commitment. When he plugged their free city proposal I said frankly we were bound to be suspicious of emphasis they put upon changing basis of our rights there and reduction of our troops. When he said nothing would really be changed I asked about our access and he replied frankly this would be prevented except by agreement with East Germans. When he denigrated importance of Berlin I inquired why then should he take such risks over it and observed while he might not want Berlin, Ulbricht clearly did. I pointed out he had himself observed our troops had no military value. He repeated many times throughout conversation it was 16 years after war and necessary put end to occupation. Under my pressing he said one reason for action was that so long as question remained in present status Adenauer would aspire to make Berlin capital of West Germany. In this connection he referred to talk of Bundestag meeting in Berlin. I probed further to find out what elements of problem were of greatest importance to him and mentioned refugees. He brushed this aside and said Berlin was running sore which had to be eliminated. I said although problem had existed for 16 years we had survived that period without too great difficulty. We could not stop him from signing peace treaty but important question was whether our rights were interfered with. He repeated categorically our access would be prevented. He said they would not touch our troops in Berlin but they might have to tighten their belts.

He said however they would not impose blockade. When he reverted to question of frontiers and said this was of great importance to Poles and Czechs and was disturbing factor I expressed personal opinion that if this were heart of problem it would not be too difficult to handle. He expressed great interest in this but I refused to be drawn further. At one time when he was again talking of horrors of war but his determination to face it if necessary he said he could not believe we would bring on such catastrophe. I pointed out it was he who would be taking action to change present situation. To this he replied we would be ones who would have to cross frontier. To emphasize seriousness our position I said I thought in West we looked at matter in following way. If we gave in to his pressure we would lose West Berlin and this would probably lead to loss of West Germany and Europe. When he challenged this position I said psychological effect would be disastrous to our position. He said their proposal had been designed to save our prestige. I said it would not do so. He referred to proposals they had made to Adenauer and said they were prepared to accept temporary Berlin solution to allow two German sides negotiate but said clearly if they did not agree at end of given period peace treaty would be concluded with two Germanies. He knew we would not agree and he would sign separate treaty.

Perhaps one of his most revealing remarks was when I suggested situation might be left as it is. He declared with some heat that we apparently wished to damage their prestige and said matter could not go beyond fall or winter this year. He reminded me his original plan had been to act within 6 months. Thirty months have now passed. He threw out possibility of our each reducing our troops in Germany by say one-third. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

He seemed to be groping for some possible way out of impasse and I therefore put forward in guarded terms as purely personal suggestion my thought that we might agree to put matter off for number of years on basis of our Geneva package proposal. He repeated matter could not wait and that this was problem which was spoiling all our relations. He was convinced if this problem could be solved we could make much progress on our many other problems. These other problems were serious but none of them was vital as was German problem. When I said our Geneva proposals had not been bad he said in any event Western Ministers had withdrawn them. I thought it best not to deny this but also not to confirm it. In presenting my suggestion I said this would give us time to approach disarmament question calmly and success in this would facilitate solution of German problem. He said frankly disarmament impossible as long as Berlin problem existed. He ignored my question how long Ulbricht needed to consolidate his regime to point where he could face free choice of people, making remark it was question of different social systems. In this part conversation he referred to fact we had prevented Soviet Union from collecting reparations from Germany but we agreed no point raking over past history.

Early in conversation K stated he had read President's remarks to Soviet journalists[2] and said he approved of them. He expressed admiration for President but said with obvious pleasure that President had made error in Cuban affair. When I observed Cuban affair put President in even more difficult position in tackling German problem he said he fully understood this. He also referred several times to his talk with Eisenhower and said he had strong impression Eisenhower understood Berlin question could not be left unresolved and had it not been for U-2 agreement might have been reached at summit meeting. He referred frequently to items in our press commenting on what he would and wouldn't do about Germany and said he was convinced Allen Dulles' agents were heating up Berlin problem deliberately. I of course denied this categorically.

In discussing his Berlin proposal he said they asked only addition of symbolic Soviet forces in West Berlin. He categorically rejected my mention of possibility an all-Berlin solution.

Other subjects and comment in septels.[3]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-2461. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] For an account of President Kennedy's remarks to group of Soviet journalists on May 22, see The New York Times, May 23, 1961.

[3] In telegram 2890 from Moscow, May 24, Thompson added that Khrushchev seemed “most anxious” that the talks with President Kennedy should “go well,” and stated that he was convinced that Khrushchev was “deadly serious” about concluding a separate treaty. Telegram 2898, also May 24, transmitted a list of minor items discussed with Khrushchev. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-2461)

25. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, May 24, 1961, 2 p.m.

2889. I note in conversation with Kohler Grewe said Kroll had indicated I favored our proposing negotiations on German problem.[2] This inexact. All four Western Ambassadors here in agreement however that matters should not simply be allowed to drift. When Kroll told me he thought negative German reply to Soviet memorandum might precipitate Soviet action on Berlin I disagreed. While I do not think Khrushchev is in any real danger from his colleagues, the one issue which might cause them to attempt unseat him would be belief he taking action which might lead to war. I do not believe he will take such risk before Party Congress. Presumably after Congress which will doubtless add more of his supporters to Central Committee he will probably be in position to carry out any policy he desires.

There are four reasons why I believe we should attempt develop better position on German problem. First is that we should endeavor achieve better position before world opinion both in order to attain greater unity with our Allies and to make more difficult dangerous Soviet action. Despite basic soundness our Geneva proposals Soviets have succeeded in creating impression in world opinion that we are saying no to proposal that would avoid war. I believe it essential that we get in position where it is Soviets who are saying no. There are number of possibilities that fall in this category and I believe we should not delay in working out plans with our Allies. Among possibilities of largely propaganda content are such steps as internationally supervised referendum in West Berlin on question whether they want free city or continuance present situation pending reunification. Do not believe our argument that this was decided in last Berlin elections is convincing to world opinion. Another possibility is an all-Berlin proposal which I believe Soviets would refuse but this is not absolutely certain and many of objections to free city West Berlin would apply to all-Berlin free city plan.

Second reason is that we owe it to ourselves and to world make every possible effort to see if some way around present impasse can be achieved. I continue to believe that in showdown Khrushchev might be tempted by my idea of something along lines of our Geneva proposals spread out in time provided this were coupled with some action on frontiers such as unilateral British and American statements similar to that already made by de Gaulle. We might state that in eventual peace conference we would not support any change in frontiers. I realize of course this could not be advanced until after German elections. Suggest package could also include better assurance of West German access to Berlin.

Third reason is that until we in West can agree on some positive position it is difficult for us to handle tactical problems which are constantly arising. President's meeting with Khrushchev is case in point.

Fourth reason is that no question but what Soviet prestige as well as our own is deeply involved in Berlin question. Therefore if we hope arrive at peaceful solution some formula must be found which would enable both sides save face. This difficult but not impossible. This is area it seems to me President might most usefully explore with K in private stating frankly what his purpose is.

There is some difference of opinion among my colleagues and I gather in our capitals about effect of separate peace treaty. I personally feel this will lead to really major crisis and that war will hang in balance although this is the one area in which K has some possibility of backing down. I am inclined to disagree with statement by French Foreign Minister at Oslo [3] that problem would be Allied access rather than German. This may be true in beginning stages but German access seems to me our greater weakness and more likely possibility of radical action from Communist side.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-2461. Secret; Limit Distribution.

[2] In an extended conversation with Kohler on May 4, Grewe, based on reports from Kroll, had asked whether Thompson and the Department of State favored some initiative for negotiations with the Soviet Union. Kohler replied that this was not the U.S. position. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 396.1-OS/5-461)

[3] See Document 23.

26. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, May 25, 1961.

PMK-B/1

BERLIN AND GERMANY

(Khrushchev will undoubtedly raise; if not, President should.)

Anticipated Soviet Position

Khrushchev will perhaps begin by saying—as he did to Ambassador Thompson[2] —that he would like very much for the President to understand the Soviet position. He may again add that he had obtained such understanding from President Eisenhower only to have the resultant improving relations deliberately exploded by the Pentagon and others.

He will probably say that the Soviet aim, as presented formally, most recently in his February 17 memorandum to the Chancellor, is not to change anything in Germany, but merely to fix juridically what has happened since World War II. Leaving the situation as it is would cause instability and encourage German revanchists.

The USSR would like to sign a treaty with the East Germans, the West Germans, and the US. The USSR, like the US, desires a unified Germany, but to conceive of a unified Germany under either Adenauer or Ulbricht would be unrealistic. Therefore, let us conclude a treaty with two Germanys.

The USSR and the GDR will join in whatever guarantees are necessary to keep West Berlin the way it is, and no threat from any side will be permitted. US prestige will not suffer. The West Berlin status could be registered with the UN, guaranteed by the Four Powers, and protected by a joint police force or symbolic military forces of the Four Powers stationed in West Berlin.

The existing borders between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic and between Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have legal force but need legal foundation. The Socialist Camp does not want to expand westward and would be prepared to so state in working out a treaty with us. If their wartime allies do not agree, the Socialist countries will sign a treaty with the GDR.

West Berlin is a bone in the throat of US-USSR relations. If Adenauer wants to fight, West Berlin would be a good place to start. The problem of West Berlin must be solved. The USSR desires a negotiated agreement. At this point Khrushchev might indicate a willingness to negotiate an interim agreement. If agreement cannot be reached, the USSR would see no alternative to a treaty with the East Germans, under which control over access to Berlin would become their responsibility.

Khrushchev may conclude by saying that he very much wants the President to understand that his frank desire is not to worsen—but to improve—US-USSR relations as well as USSR-FRG relations. This would make it impossible for aggressive forces to use the present situation to prepare aggression, the significance of which, with nuclear weapons, everyone understands.

If the US and the USSR could reach agreement on Berlin and Germany, it would be a great success, creating an atmosphere of trust in which US and USSR troops could be gradually withdrawn, and which would help disarmament negotiations. If not, Soviet and American troops will continue to confront each other, and the situation will not be one of peace, but one of armistice.

Recommended US Position

The President might wish to say that the new Administration has been giving careful consideration to US policy on Berlin and Germany, but it is difficult to see how there can be much basic change.

The situation in all of Berlin—not West Berlin alone—is abnormal because the situation in all of Germany is abnormal. The central difficulty is, of course, the continued division of Germany. We continue to believe there will be no real solution of the German problem or any real tranquillity in Central Europe until the Germans are reunified. This remains our ultimate aim, and we are not disposed to take any legal or other definitive steps which would appear to perpetuate or legalize the division.

In order that the possibilities of a disastrous miscalculation be reduced, it is absolutely vital for the USSR to understand the following. Berlin is of paramount importance to the US. The US is in Berlin by unimpeachable right of conquest. More importantly, it is there with the overwhelming approval of the people of West Berlin, which has been demonstrated many times in the past and can be easily demonstrated at any time in the future. It is there to protect the freedom of West Berlin, and, under existing circumstances, it is wholly convinced that there is no other way to protect that freedom. We have no intention whatsoever of being forced out of Berlin and will use all means to see that we are not. US concern with strengthening conventional forces should under no circumstances be interpreted as affecting our decision to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend all the NATO area, including Berlin.

We would consider the proposed “separate peace treaty” between the USSR and East Germany and the abandonment by the USSR of its responsibilities to us to be a grave violation of the legal situation in Berlin. Such a unilateral act cannot affect our rights in Berlin, and we are determined to continue to exercise those rights, including specifically the right of access.

In all of this we have the full support of our allies. The West is convinced that its fate is intimately associated with the fate of West Berlin.

But now let us consider why we should avoid a showdown and how we can.

[Here follow sections on Stalin's policy toward Western Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany's efforts to integrate into Western Europe.]

Avoiding a Crisis

There are aspects of the present situation in Germany and Berlin unsatisfactory to the USSR just as there are aspects unsatisfactory to the US. There is, however, nothing in the present situation in Germany and Berlin really intolerable to either. The Soviet Union cannot really believe that the continued existence of West Berlin offers any threat to Soviet security—or indeed to the continued existence of the East German regime. There is, of course, the type of competition foreseen and approved by the Soviet Union as “peaceful coexistence” but a mutual willingness to accept this competition is a fair test of the real meaning of the “peaceful coexistence” concept. For a decade after the Berlin blockade ended until the Soviet initiative of November 1958, the situation in Berlin and Germany was relatively quiet.

Looked at from the historical view, it would clearly seem to be the part of wisdom for the Soviet Union and the Western powers to avoid a sharp confrontation and a crisis situation in Germany and Berlin. As Khrushchev himself has frequently pointed out, the major and overriding international problem of the day is disarmament. To jeopardize progress in this all-important field by forcefully striving for political pains of minor significance compared to disarmament must surely be shortsighted. The problems of Germany, Berlin and European security can be approached in a much more promising context when we have begun to progress toward disarmament. The settlement of these problems would then become immeasurably easier.

Under conditions of increased international tension not only would forward movement on disarmament become most difficult, but there would arise the strong probability of an acceleration of the armaments race.

Negotiations

Khrushchev may well ask whether the West is ready to negotiate about West Berlin. If so, the President might wish to say that he would have to consult with his allies, but that they—with the US—undoubtedly “remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force, but by peaceful means through negotiation” and “remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.” (This is from the statement of the Three in Paris after the abortive summit of May 1960,[3] and there has been no change in this position.) If Khrushchev brings up the question of level of negotiations, the President might wish to say that, speaking personally, the foreign minister level would seem appropriate for a meeting after the necessary preparatory work has been done through diplomatic channels.

Discussion

Khrushchev would be less than human if Laos, Cuba, and Yuriy Gagarin have not reinforced his normal self-confidence to the point where over-boldness and possible miscalculation could constitute a grave potential menace to the whole world. In such a mood, Berlin must offer a temptation that may very well be too strong to resist. Although Khrushchev is undoubtedly reluctant to risk a major war, the real danger is that he might risk just such a war without realizing he is doing so. He must, therefore, be warned in the firmest and most solemn manner that the US has no intention whatsoever of being forced out of Berlin and that in any attempt to do so he would be taking the gravest possible risk.

In his initial talk with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev's treatment of the problems of Germany and Berlin was cast in a semi-philosophical vein, as much a sort of chalk talk to get President Kennedy's “understanding” of the Soviet position as a discussion of the issues. It might be to our advantage to take this cue and do what has often been suggested but not yet done in any rounded way—set out fully our own views on the course of the postwar development of West Germany.

We would envisage a kind of historical account, designed to lay particular emphasis on two themes: 1) the state of the Federal Republic's armament and the attitude of the Federal Republic toward the Soviet Union and the bloc are to a considerable extent a reaction to Soviet policy and actions; and 2) under Adenauer, the Federal Republic has taken significant steps to merge its policies, and even some institutions, with its neighbors, and this development is decidedly in the Soviet interest. Our objective would be to suggest to Khrushchev that, while the situation in Germany and Berlin cannot be considered satisfactory from the point of view of either of us, it has been, and is, tolerable with no great strain and should be left alone until some significant measure of progress toward disarmament has been made. Conversely, we would be suggesting that an aggressive Soviet policy in Germany may well act to encourage exactly the developments in Germany and Europe which Khrushchev seeks to avoid. A reduction of armaments, on the other hand, would change the entire context within which we approach the problems of Germany and European security with greatly improved prospect for a mutually agreeable settlement.

It is, of course, extremely unlikely that Khrushchev would agree to leave the Berlin situation alone, but this approach might exert some influence toward reducing the terms on which he would agree, either explicitly or implicitly.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1905. Secret. Drafted by Armitage (SOV) and Cash and cleared by Kohler, Hillenbrand, and Guthrie (SOV). Prepared as one of the many position papers for the President's meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna June 3-4.

[2] See Document 24.

[3] For text of this statement, May 17, 1960, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 706.

27. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, May 25, 1961, 7 p.m.

572. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel, CINCEUR for Finn. On assumption Berlin will be among major issues discussed Vienna, I should like to emphasize several aspects Berlin problem that appear important from vantage point of Berlin itself.

Basic Sov aim toward Berlin unchanged though tactics apparently have become more reasonable as result of Western resistance. West Berlin has remained free because Sovs have realized that precipitate action to absorb it into GDR would entail grave risk of war.

Playing on West's strong desire avoid war, Sovs trying push us into making new arrangements that will appear reasonable but actually will start erosion process ending in Berlin's absorption into GDR.

Sovs and GDR in major propaganda campaign since abortive summit have been trying soften up West by convincing us (1) Khrushchev really means he cannot wait any longer and intends soon to force issue through conclusion separate peace treaty; (2) Sovs certain West will not fight for Berlin; (3) We should therefore agree on interim arrangements ala Geneva 1959) or face consequences.

Although continuing flow of refugees may constitute serious long-range social-economic problem for GDR and is certainly an acute irritant, pressures on Khrushchev from GDR to solve Berlin situation are probably no greater today than in recent past. Certain compulsion for a Berlin “solution” exists as a result of Khrushchev's own artificially stimulated propaganda campaign, which creates a face-saving problem. However, frequently mentioned pressure to report progress on Berlin to CPSU Congress in October should have declined in light Sov space success and advance of Communism in Laos and Cuba. In short Sovs could live with Berlin status quo for some time.

I doubt if Khrushchev has firm policy decision or timetable on Berlin at this moment; fact no real Berlin showdown during past two and one-half years indicates inter alia Sovs not sure unpredictable West will not fight for Berlin. In this situation with both sides heavily committed to retain positions and neither anxious to force matters to showdown that could precipitate war, Vienna meeting provides opportunity, perhaps one of last opportunities, to convince Khrushchev of U.S. determination make good on Berlin pledges regardless of consequences.

Fact that Khrushchev will attempt convince President of his own determination solve Berlin along familiar Soviet-GDR lines only serves to emphasize importance this psychological duel at Vienna. I believe Soviet toughness re their Berlin intentions reflects serious desire change Berlin status, but also includes large element of bluff. I doubt Sov resolve is sufficient to risk thermo-nuclear war. Therefore, at this stage, U.S. must be even tougher if Khrushchev is to go away from Vienna convinced his threats are too risky to warrant carrying them out.

I realize President in first meeting with Khrushchev will not wish appear unreasonable; however, any indication President willing discuss “interim solutions,” compromises, or modus vivendi if Sovs sign separate peace treaty, would reduce impact of warning Khrushchev of dire consequences his miscalculating our resolve.

Fact that in this meeting things can be said which cannot be spelled out in quadripartite conference may give President opportunity tell Khrushchev in blunt language that we consider USSR solely to blame for division of Germany and denial right of self-determination to German people; Sovs should keep hands off Berlin where U.S. committed to stay; there really nothing further to discuss on Berlin itself.

In sum, Vienna will be psychological testing ground and U.S. position on Berlin in my view should be molded carefully to create strongest possible impression on Khrushchev of U.S. firmness of intention on Berlin in effort to deter him further from course of action he has been threatening since Nov 1958.[2]

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-2561. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1976, 257E.

[2] On May 26 the Embassy in Bonn reported its full agreement with the arguments presented in this telegram and endorsed the recommendations advanced. (Telegram 1971 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-1661)

28. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, May 27, 1961, 1 p.m.

2939. Re Berlin tel to Dept 572 and Bonn tel 1971.[2] While I agree in main with analysis contained Berlin reftel I do not believe this is whole story. I not only do not believe Khrushchev has necessity of reporting progress on Berlin to Party Congress but believe he will deliberately wish to put off crisis until after he has further consolidated his position at Congress. However I consider K has so deeply committed his personal prestige and that of Soviet Union to some action on Berlin and German problems that if we take completely negative stand suggested by Berlin, this would probably lead to developments in which chances of war or ignominious Western retreat are close to 50-50. Situation is not changed by fact it is of K's own making. However, I believe there is real suspicion here that we and/or West Germans hope to develop position in which we can use force or threat of force to bring down Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Both sides consider other would not risk war over Berlin. Danger arises from fact that if K carries out his declared intentions and we carry out ours, situation likely get out of control and military as well as political prestige would become involved making retreat for either side even more difficult. Soviets have strong nerves and far greater cohesion with their allies. Geography and local balance of forces are in their favor. Assuming we are prepared carry our policy through to end and K found he had misjudged us, would probably be too late for retreat. In these circumstances it seems to me we should make every effort avoid allowing such situation to develop.

I agree we should not allow gradual erosion our position by embarking on slippery path of tempting compromises. In my view President has difficult task of convincing K on one hand that we will fulfill our commitment to people of Berlin and on other that it is not our intention to saw off limb on which he has crawled. I believe best approach would be to tell him frankly that neither of our two great powers can suffer humiliating defeat over this issue and that we would be prepared to endeavor work out some kind of solution which would save face on both sides but essentially leave problem on ice while we attempt tackle other problems.

General background from which I view this problem is that it would not be to our advantage to revert to all-out cold war or have Soviet Union swing over to Chinese policy. Given President's programs I believe that despite recent Soviet successes time is on our side. I consider this the more true in view of real possibility eventual split between Soviet Union and Red China. Therefore consider our policy should be directed toward gaining time and reducing possibility of direct confrontation Soviet-US power. As I have frequently reported, additional reason for not simply taking uncompromising position is that lengths to which Soviets will go and extent to which we can maintain unity in Western camp will depend upon image this problem held by world opinion. At present time do not believe this satisfactory from our point of view. Since Geneva we have virtually dropped discussion our peace plan, whereas Soviets have constantly focused attention on their proposal. We have thus been maneuvered into position of saying no to proposal that would avoid warlike situation. Strongly believe we must put Soviets in position of saying no.

In view his conversation with me, quite possible K will attempt slide over Berlin problem in sweetness and light atmosphere. In this event believe President should force issue.[3]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-2761. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Berlin, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 572 is printed as Document 27; regarding telegram 1971, see footnote 2 thereto.

[3] In telegram 1989 from Bonn, May 30, Ambassador Dowling expressed his agreement with the view that the United States should try to gain time and avoid a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union on Berlin, but he stressed that willingness to negotiate should pertain to German reunification and not just Berlin. He concurred that the West had been maneuvered into a bad public position on Berlin, and concluded that the President should force the issue along the lines suggested by Thompson. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/5-3061)

29. Talking Points Paper[1]

Washington, undated.

BERLIN AND GERMANY

(The President might wish to raise)

We agree with de Gaulle that Berlin is of paramount importance. It is the symbol of our determination and ability to prevent further Communistexpansion in Europe. The US is determined, in cooperation with its allies, to preserve the freedom of the people of West Berlin and to defend the Allied position in the city, upon which the preservation of that freedom to such a large extent depends.

US concern with strengthening conventional forces should, under no circumstances, be interpreted as affecting our decision to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend all the NATO area, including Berlin. As we have recently informed NATO, “deterrence requires that NATO shield forces continue to have an effective nuclear capability, and the Soviets must never be allowed to doubt NATO's readiness to use this capability, if necessary, together with the nuclear forces outside the European theater, to counter Soviet attack on Europe."[2]

We believe the Soviet Union is likely to heighten tension over Berlin this year most probably by a renewed threat to sign a “separate peace treaty” with the “GDR”, possibly with an indication of willingness first to have another round of negotiations. Depending on how the issue is raised, it may become desirable again to enter into negotiations on Berlin and Germany. France, the US, the UK, and the Germans should, therefore, review the position they should take in such negotiations.

We should attempt to negotiate on Berlin only within the context of the entire German question. However, we must realistically be prepared to negotiate separately on Berlin. Furthermore, it seems questionable that any all-German approach acceptable to the West would provide the basis for even a temporary solution to the Berlin problem, or indeed that any real step toward German reunification can be taken within the foreseeable future under circumstances acceptable to the West.

If the Soviets sign a “separate peace treaty”, our position should be that this unilateral act cannot affect our rights in Berlin, and that we are determined to continue to exercise those rights, including specifically the right of access.

The US is urgently and thoroughly reviewing certain aspects of Berlin contingency planning with a view to the development of more precise governmentally-agreed courses of action. When our review is concluded, in the very near future, we wish to discuss this matter with the French, the British, and the Germans—through the established Washington machinery—as well as with our other NATO allies.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1894. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was prepared for President Kennedy's meeting with de Gaulle May 31-June 2 in Paris.

[2] Regarding the statement that Finletter made to the North Atlantic Council on April 26, which contained this phrase, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 103, footnote 2.

30. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, May 31, 1961, 12:30 p.m.

[2]

US/MC/1

PRESIDENT'S VISIT

Paris, May 31-June 2, 1961

SUBJECT

Wednesday Morning Talks

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Kennedy

Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)

France

General de Gaulle

Mr. Andronikoff (Interpreter)

The President opened by saying that the range of problems common to the two countries extends all over the world from Laos through Africa and Latin America. There is, however, the problem of Berlin which is particularly important at this moment as it may come up during the week end talks with Mr. Khrushchev. What is General de Gaulle's point of view on this question?

The President then reported the conversations between Mr. Khrushchev and Ambassador Thompson[3] in which Mr. Khrushchev said that he had waited long enough, that he has commitments in this area and that his prestige is engaged. He said therefore that after the elections, it is time for him (Khrushchev) to carry out his commitments. Ambassador Thompson spoke of the Western commitments in the area and particularly of the presence of Western troops. Mr. Khrushchev said that those troops should prepare themselves to tighten their belts.

The President again asked the General for his thoughts about the manner in which this question should be discussed with Mr. Khrushchev. Backing down on Berlin would clearly represent a defeat for the Western Alliance and result in a very serious weakening thereof. What is General de Gaulle's opinion on this question, not only for the immediate future but also for the longer range point of view?

There seemed to be two possibilities. One is to say that neither the status of Berlin nor the right of the Western Powers to free access to and from Berlin are subjects for negotiation. The other one is that the right of free access to Berlin is not a subject of negotiation but that the future status of Berlin can be a subject of discussion. If the second position is taken, it might lead to some talks about Berlin such as the ones which took place in Geneva at an earlier date.[4] Such talks will be fruitless but will give the appearance of a negotiation.

General de Gaulle replied that for two and a half years, Mr. Khrushchev has been saying and repeating that his prestige is engaged in the Berlin question and that he will have to have a solution of it in six months, and then again in six months and then still in six months. This seems to indicate that Mr. Khrushchev does not want war. If he had wanted war about Berlin he would have acted already. This is a psychological question. General de Gaulle had already said to Mr. Khrushchev: “It is annoying to both sides that Berlin should be located where it is; however, it is there.” There is no reason why the Western Allies should withdraw. Under the circumstances, why is it that Mr. Khrushchev keeps on raising the question of Berlin. “You pretend,” said General de Gaulle to him, “that you seek a detente. If such is the case, proceed with a detente. If you want peace, start with general disarmament negotiations. Under the circumstances, the entire world situation may change little by little and then we will solve the question of Berlin and the entire German question. However, if you insist on raising the question of Berlin within the context of the cold war, then no solution is possible. What do you want? Do you want war?” Mr. Khrushchev had replied that he didn't want it. In that case, de Gaulle told him, do nothing that can bring it about.[5]

The President said that the question was how to make the Western position believed by Mr. Khrushchev. There is a danger that he might not believe in our firmness. The General himself had asked whether we would be ready to trade New York for Paris. If the General himself, who has worked together with the United States for so long, could question American firmness, Mr. Khrushchev can question it also. The problem then is how to convince him.

General de Gaulle said it is a situation with which we are faced. It is important to show that we do not intend to let this situation change. If we were to retreat, if we were to accept a change in the status of Berlin, if we were to accept a withdrawal of the Western troops from Berlin, or if we were to accept that obstacles be put to our communications with Berlin, this would be the defeat. It would result in an almost complete loss of Germany and in very serious losses within France, Italy and elsewhere. We must not retreat before Soviet dictation. Now, in speaking with Mr. Khrushchev, we must make it clear that we are not asking for anything. It is he who seeks a change. That change we reject. If he uses the GDR to stop us, then we will push through the GDR because it is obvious that we are stronger than the GDR. If he wants war, we must make it clear to him that he will have it. But the General does not think that Mr. Khrushchev wants war.

The President asked what would happen if Mr. Khrushchev signs a peace treaty with the GDR—for such a possibility clearly exists—and if he transfers the inspection rights to the GDR, if furthermore the GDR begins by stamping all travel documents and then possibly step by step renders communications more difficult, what would be our position in such a case? Should we act immediately as soon as a treaty is signed and as soon as the GDR assuming the rights of inspection begins to stamp documents, or should we wait to act until such time as restrictions are imposed on our communications?

General de Gaulle said that we cannot prevent Mr. Khrushchev from signing anything he wishes with the GDR. This is his own Communist business and none of ours. We must, however, make it clear that no matter what he does with the GDR it will not be recognized by us in any way. Our position remains that there can be no peace treaty except as signed by all four powers. We must also make it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that no internal Communist document between him and the GDR changes in any way the position that the responsibility concerning Berlin is a Russian responsibility (as well as, of course, a responsibility of the Western Allies) and that it can change only if all four powers agree to a change. It must be made clear to Mr. Khrushchev that we do not recognize any duality between him and the GDR. To us, both are one and the same thing. We do not accept any stamping of papers by the GDR. What they sign between themselves is their business, but we might make it immediately clear that we do not accept any consequences of their action. Should we wait, we could be drawn into serious difficulties. In particular, we could even be brought to a state of affairs where we would have lost without seeming to have lost but in a way which would be understood by the entire world. In particular, the population of Berlin is not made up exclusively of heroes. In the face of something which they would interpret as our weakness, they might begin to leave Berlin and make it into an empty shell to be picked up by the East.

It is the firm opinion of the General that the course of action which he outlined is a necessary one. If Mr. Khrushchev had wanted to go to war, he would have done it already.

However, this is the question of the general Soviet intentions which the two Presidents will be discussing later.

Another point is that the thing which may be discussed is not the particular situation of Berlin but rather the general situation of Germany. If Mr. Khrushchev wishes to talk about it, we can talk about it once more. But we should not talk about Berlin in isolation and we should ask Mr. Khrushchev outright if he wants to humiliate us—in which case he will not succeed—or does he want war?

The President asked in what manner this could be handled in detail. If Mr. Khrushchev signs a treaty with the GDR, this in itself is no reason for a military retaliation on our part. If the GDR starts stamping travel documents, this is not, per se, a cause for military action either. In what way, therefore, at what moment, shall we bring our pressure to bear? Right now Mr. Khrushchev can sign a peace treaty, the GDR can start stamping documents and then little by little, it can make the situation more difficult, causing the economic ruin of Berlin. How do we answer that?

General de Gaulle answered that the criterion is the use of force either by the Soviets directly or by the GDR. If either he or his lackeys use force to cut our communications with Berlin, then we must use force. We must see clearly that no GDR exists other than the Soviets themselves and that no matter what documents Mr. Khrushchev signs, the responsibility in regard to Berlin remains his.

The President said that he agreed. If we should weaken, then we should have suffered a severe blow in both Western Germany and in all of Europe, a blow which would not be mortal but would be serious. The point is how to convince Mr. Khrushchev of our firmness. Let us again look at the situation which might follow a signature of a treaty between the Soviet Union and eastern Germany and the stamping of documents by the GDR and the stoppage of our access to Berlin. Is the General satisfied with the Allied plans as they exist right now and which in such a case we call for a demonstration in approximately company strength and in case of failure, possibly in brigade strength? Are these good plans?

General de Gaulle replied that there is no possibility of a military victory for us in the area of Berlin. What we must make clear is that if there is any fighting around Berlin, this means general war.

Prior to adjourning for lunch, the President asked General de Gaulle about the manner in which the fourth estate should be handled.

General de Gaulle replied that the French do not intend to say anything at all for the present.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1891. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. The meeting was held at the Elysee Palace. A summary was transmitted in telegram 5266 from Paris, May 31. (Ibid., CF 1893) For de Gaulle's account of the President's visit, see Memoires d'Espoir, pp. 267-271. Additional documentation on the President's visit to Paris is in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume XIII.

[2] The time on the source text is listed incorrectly as 12:30 a.m.

[3] See Document 24.

[4] For documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May 11-August 5, 1959, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, volume VIII.

[5] Regarding de Gaulle's conversations with Khrushchev on Berlin in March 1960, see footnote 4, Document 6.

31. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, May 31, 1961, 2:50 p.m.

US/MC/2

PRESIDENT'S VISIT

Paris, May 31-June 2, 1961

SUBJECT

Wednesday Afternoon Talks

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Kennedy

Mr. Glenn (Interpreter)

France

General de Gaulle

Mr. Lebel (Interpreter)

Berlin

The President opened with a summation of the morning talks on Berlin.[2] The positions of the two countries are fully in agreement. If Mr. Khrushchev signs a treaty with the G.D.R. in spite of warnings from the West, the two countries should advise immediately as to a common response. Secondly, the military of the two countries should study the contingency plans so as to translate into such plans the best thinking of both governments. This should be coordinated with the British. The President does not know what the British position is. He hopes, however, that the British share the one of the French and Americans.

General de Gaulle said he had already discussed this question with the British.[3] Mr. Macmillan's position is not clear and he is somewhat hesitant. He cannot, however, take any other position than the one agreed upon by the two Presidents and he does not really wish to take any other position. As for a tactical approach to Mr. Khrushchev, it should be a direct one and not one based on legalistic argumentation. We should ask Mr. Khrushchev what is it that he wants. If what he wants is for us to retreat, this is something that we do not want. If he uses force, we will use force. He represents a great power and so do we. Great powers, and this means the U.S. and also the U.K. and France, cannot be treated as if they were insignificant entities. Mr. Khrushchev says that he is sensitive to his prestige and so are we. This is a type of language which fits in with Mr. Khrushchev's view of the world and which he appreciates.

The President asked whether there wasn't something which would go beyond mere words which we should do in order to convince Mr. Khrushchev of our firmness. The danger is that Mr. Khrushchev might not believe that we would resort to war and that in consequence he might try to undertake the strangulation of Berlin step by step, thus bringing about a situation without issue. The President does not believe that the present military plans are satisfactory. They speak only of a first probing action so weak that it could be stopped by a couple of companies. No decision has been taken about probing in brigade, division or several division strength. It is necessary that Mr. Khrushchev be made to understand that we are decided, if necessary, to wage nuclear warfare. At the present moment he may believe that the position of the U.K., for example, is hesitant and that he can gain everything by undertaking actions none of which taken individually would be enough of a provocation, but all of which taken together would destroy our position. In order to keep him from taking such a risk, we must make our position clear by actions. The United States is proceeding with strengthening the material capabilities of its armed forces; additional common planning might be useful. In 1949, we had nuclear superiority and we resorted to the air lift in Berlin. At the present moment, the Soviet Union has great nuclear capabilities and Mr. Khrushchev may think that we would not dare to go equally far.

President de Gaulle replied that it is true that Mr. Khrushchev must be made to understand that we will stand firm. It would be good indeed if some strengthening of the Berlin garrisons were undertaken. If the United States does it, France and the U.K could proceed in parallel. (Note: It seems that there was a slight misunderstanding between the two Presidents. President Kennedy seems to have spoken about the strengthening of the material of the U.S. forces in general; President de Gaulle seems to have understood this as strengthening in material of the Berlin garrisons.) President de Gaulle then said that in 1949 the air lift proved relatively easy as the West had nuclear superiority. At the present moment, the situation is not the same. Nevertheless, a useful action in the direction suggested by the President would be the public strengthening of the Air Force units having the capability of carrying out an air lift. This would clarify the situation, because the only thing which can be done against air lift is to shoot a plane down. This is an act of war and a clear act of war. It is possible to quibble about when force is actually used to stop some trucks or to stop a train, but it is impossible to deny that force is being used when a plane is shot down. The U.S. is right in strengthening the Berlin garrisons but a clearer action would be to strengthen air lift capabilities.

The President said that at the present moment the question of supplying the Berlin garrisons does not create a problem as there exists a capability of four sorties a day which is sufficient. The problem is more difficult in regard to supplying the civilian population. Nevertheless, the West still has time to study that question, which is unlikely to create any complications before the end of the summer.

President de Gaulle said that there is another aspect of a possible Berlin Blockade which is worth mentioning and that is that of the economic situation in Russia. Russia is no longer economically self-sufficient. She seeks trade relations with the West. Likewise, the G.D.R. needs trade relations with West Germany, on which it depends for its very life. This is something which has changed since '49 and which Mr. Khrushchev must take into account. There is, therefore, a possibility of economic retaliation in addition to the military action and this economic retaliation is something which Mr. Khrushchev must take into account because he needs trade with the West. For example, Russia has recently bought sixty thousand tons of meat from France. As for Berlin, it has supplies for its civilian population for six months which would give the West time. Generally speaking, the West is not as weak as people think in regard to the Berlin question and Mr. Khrushchev must be made to understand this.

[Here follows discussion of Laos and Africa.]

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1891. Secret. Drafted by Glenn. The meeting was held at the Elysee Palace. A summary was transmitted in telegram 5278 from Paris, June 1. (Ibid., CF 1893)

[2] See Document 30.

[3] For Macmillan's account of his conversations with de Gaulle on Berlin, during the latter's visit to England November 24-29, 1960, see Pointing the Way, pp. 415-425.

June-July 1961: The Summit Conference at Vienna June 3-4; NSAM No. 58; the Western Reply to the June 4 Soviet Aide-Memoire

32. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on June 23. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 25 from Paris, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-651) For two other accounts of this conversation, apparently based on this memorandum of conversation, see Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 504-505, and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 370-373. The texts of all the memoranda of conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev at Vienna are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume V.

33. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 3:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on June 23. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. Brief summaries of this memorandum of conversation with quotations based on the last three paragraphs are in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 374, and Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 585-586.

34. Record of Conversation

London, June 5, 1961, 12:45 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. The meeting was held at Admiralty House. In a private meeting from 10:30 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. the President had briefed Prime Minister Macmillan on his meetings with de Gaulle and Khrushchev. (Note of the Points Made During the Private Discussion, June 8; ibid.) For Macmillan's account of the briefing and the President's visit to London, see Pointing the Way, pp. 355-359.

35. Editorial Note

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, June 8, 1961, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62B/6-861. Secret; Limit Distribution.

37. Memorandum From Henry Owen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, June 9, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda, Henry Owen. Secret.

38. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, June 10, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Aide-mémoire. Secret.

39. Editorial Note

40. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 14, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1461. Secret. Drafted by Moffett, initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on June 26.

41. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 15, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1561. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Vigderman and approved in U on June 22.

42. Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning

Washington, June 16, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, BQD-CCI. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash. Attached to the source text was a distribution cover sheet.

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, June 17, 1961, 7:34 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1761. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Paris and London and repeated to Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

44. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, June 19, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1961. Secret.

45. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 24, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2461. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Tyler and approved in S on June 29.

46. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 24, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-2461. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand, also initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on July 3.

47. Editorial Note

48. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Paris, June 27, 1961, 1:35 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2761. Secret; Priority. Repeated eyes only to the Department of State, which copy is the source text.

49. Report by Dean Acheson

Washington, June 28, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-561. Secret. Attached to a July 5 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, which states that access to the report should be limited and permitted only in Rusk's office, and to a June 28 memorandum of transmittal from Rusk to the President, which states that this was a preliminary version of the report. A table of contents, also attached, is not printed.

50. Editorial Note

51. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, June 28, 1961, 9:21 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Lehmann on June 27; cleared by Kohler, Hillenbrand, Tubby, and Fessenden; and approved by Rusk. Sent to 17 missions in Europe and Canada.

52. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, undated.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

53. National Security Action Memorandum No. 58

Washington, June 30, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs. Secret.

54. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Counsel (Sorensen)

July 4, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Secretary Rusk was in Washington.

55. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 5, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-561. Secret. Drafted by Mautner (S/O).

56. Paper Prepared by Thomas C. Schelling

Washington, July 5, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General. No classification marking. The source text bears Bundy's notation: “Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] Weekend of 7/21.” Bundy noted that the study had made a “deep impression” on the President.

57. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy

Washington, July 7, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Secret. Printed in part in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 387-388. According to Schlesinger, on July 6 he, Chayes, and Kissinger had discussed their misgivings about Acheson's report (Document 49), and Schlesinger prepared a memorandum for the President expressing their thoughts. He gave the memorandum to Kennedy at lunch on July 7. Kennedy in turn asked Schlesinger to prepare an unsigned memorandum on the Berlin problem. (A Thousand Days, pp. 386-387) The memorandum is printed here in full. Under Secretary of State Bowles sent Rusk a similar memorandum on July 7, expressing his concern about the trend of U.S. thinking on Berlin. Bowles stressed that Acheson's report robbed the United States of control over the course of action, was an all-or-nothing policy, and appeared to be largely devoid of political objectives. While Bowles favored low-key military preparations, he also believed more emphasis should be placed on negotiations, including the preparation of a draft peace treaty. Finally the Under Secretary suggested that a study based on his ideas, “in confrontation with Dean Acheson's proposal would focus the major policy issues for decision by the President.” (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-761)

58. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon

Washington, July 7, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information but a marginal notation reads: “Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] week end of 7/8/61."

59. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris,July 8, 1961, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-861. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Moscow.

60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Washington,July 9, 1961, 3:06 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-961. Secret. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Hillenbrand.

61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, July 9, 1961, 5:21 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Hillenbrand. Also sent to 10 other NATO countries and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

62. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (McDermott) to Frank Cash of the Office of German Affairs

Washington, July 10, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 256B.

63. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy

Washington, July 12, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning. Top Secret. On July 8 Rusk, McNamara, and Taylor flew to Hyannis Port for a meeting with the President. According to one account Kennedy expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of Berlin planning and, impressed by the reservations which Schlesinger had raised to Acheson's report, decided to ask Acheson to prepare a political program for Berlin. (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 388-389) No other record of this meeting has been found. On July 10 the President sent a short memorandum to Taylor asking him to provide a list of the things agreed at the meeting and the papers he had requested from the Departments of State and Defense. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning)

64. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington,July 12, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1261. Top Secret. Drafted by Topping and approved in G on August 4.

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, July 12, 1961, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.00/7-1261. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

66. Memorandum of Discussion in the National Security Council

Washington, July 13, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on July 24. For another report of this meeting, see Document 67.

67. Notes on the National Security Council Meeting

Washington, July 13, 1961, 4:10 p.m.

Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Top Secret. These handwritten notes were presumably made by Lemnitzer. For another account of this meeting, see Document 66.

68. National Security Action Memorandum No. 59

Washington, July 14, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Taylor, Sorensen, and David Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

69. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington,July 14, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1861. Top Secret. Drafted by Topping on July 18 and approved by Johnson on July 31.

70. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington,July 15, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Confidential. Drafted by Nitze on July 17. The meeting was held at the Metropolitan Club. On July 12 and 17 Menshikov had similar conversations with Bowles and Rostow. A memorandum of his conversation with Rostow is ibid., and is summarized in The Diffusion of Power, p. 230; a memorandum of his conversation with Bowles is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7-1261.

71. Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Rusk

Washington,July 17, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron. Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed is a 2-page paper, also dated July 17, on the military buildup. The paper favored a “low key” approach and noted that the psychology of a mobilization was not desirable at the present time.

72. Memorandum of Meeting on Berlin

Washington, July 17, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy.

73. Editorial Note

32. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between The President and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna

PARTICIPANTS

US

The President

The Secretary

Ambassador Bohlen

Ambassador Thompson

EUR—Mr. Kohler

D—Mr. Akalovsky (interpreting)

USSR

Chairman Khrushchev

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Mr. Dobrynin, Chief, American Countries Division, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Menshikov

Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[Here follows discussion of Laos and disarmament.]

Turning to the question of Germany, Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted to set forth his position. He said that he understands that this will affect the relations between our two countries to a great extent and even more so if the US were to misunderstand the Soviet position. Conversely, if the US understood the Soviet position correctly our two countries would be brought closer together rather than be divided. Sixteen years have passed since World War II. The USSR lost 20 million people in that War and many of its areas were devastated. Now Germany, the country which unleashed World War II, has again acquired military power and has assumed a predominant position in NATO. Its generals hold high offices in that organization. This constitutes a threat of World War III which would be even more devastating than World War II. The USSR believes that a line should be drawn under World War II. There is no explanation why there is no peace treaty 16 years after the war. This is why the USSR has suggested that a peace conference be convened. In this connection, the USSR proceeds from the actual state of affairs, namely, that two German States exist. Our own wishes or efforts notwithstanding, a united Germany is not practical because the Germans themselves do not want it. No delay in the matter of signing a peace treaty is justifiable and only West German militarists gain from such a delay. A peace treaty would not prejudice the interests of the US, the UK, or France; on the contrary, these interests would be best served by a peace treaty. The present situation looks as if the US opposes a peace treaty while the USSR wants it. Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted the President to understand him correctly. He would like to reach agreement with the President—and he said he wanted to emphasize the words “with you"—on this question. If the US should fail to understand this desire the USSR will sign a peace treaty alone. The USSR will sign a peace treaty with the GDR and with the FRG if the latter so desires. If not, a peace treaty will be signed with the GDR alone. Then the state of war will cease and all commitments stemming from Germany's surrender will become invalid. This would include all institutions, occupation rights, and access to Berlin, including the corridors. A free city of West Berlin will be established and there will be no blockade or interference in the internal affairs of the city. West Berlin should have a clearly defined status. If the US desires, guarantees could be given to ensure non-interference and the city's ties with the outside world. If the US wants to leave its troops in West Berlin, that would be acceptable under certain conditions; however, the Soviet Union believes that in that case Soviet troops should be there too. Likewise, the USSR would be agreeable to having neutral troops stationed in Berlin. UN guarantees would be acceptable as well. The USSR would be prepared to join the US in ensuring all the conditions necessary for preserving what the West calls West Berlin's freedom. However, if the US rejects this proposal—and the USSR will regard such an action as having been made under the pressure of Adenauer—the USSR will sign a peace treaty unilaterally and all rights of access to Berlin will expire because the state of war will cease to exist.

The President said that first of all he wanted to express his appreciation of the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had set forth his views in such a frank manner. At the same time the discussion here is not only about the legal situation but also about the practical facts which affect very much our national security. Here, we are not talking about Laos. This matter is of greatest concern to the US. We are in Berlin not because of someone's sufferance. We fought our way there, although our casualties may have been not as high as the USSR's. We are in Berlin not by agreement of East Germans but by contractual rights. This is an area where every President of the US since World War II has been committed by treaty and other contractual rights and where every President has reaffirmed his faithfulness to his obligations. If we were expelled from that area and if we accepted the loss of our rights no one would have any confidence in US commitments and pledges. US national security is involved in this matter because if we were to accept the Soviet proposal US commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper. West Europe is vital to our national security and we have supported it in two wars. If we were to leave West Berlin Europe would be abandoned as well. So when we are talking about West Berlin we are also talking about West Europe. The President said he would like to see the relations between our two countries develop in a favorable direction so that some arrangement could be found. Mr. Khrushchev seems to agree that the ratios of power today are equal. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why a country with high achievements in such areas as outer space and economic progress should now suggest that we leave an area where we have vital interests. How can the US agree to East Germany's preventing it from exercising our rights we had won by war? The United States cannot accept an ultimatum. Our leaving West Berlin would result in the US becoming isolated. The President emphasized that he is not President of the US to preside over isolation of his country just as Mr. Khrushchev, as leader of the USSR, would not want to see his own country isolated.

Mr. Khrushchev interjected that he understood this to mean that the President did not want a peace treaty. He said that the President's statement about US national security should mean that the US might wish to go to Moscow because that too would, of course, improve its position.

The President replied that the US was not asking to go anywhere; we were not talking about the US going to Moscow or of the USSR going to New York. What we are talking about is that we are in Berlin and have been there for 15 years. We suggest that we stay there.

The President continued by saying that the US was interested in maintaining its position in Berlin and its rights of access to that city. He said he recognized that the situation there is not a satisfactory one; he also recognized that in the conversations Mr. Khrushchev had had with former President Eisenhower the term “abnormal” had been used to describe that situation.[2] However, because conditions in many areas of the world are not satisfactory today it is not the right time now to change the situation in Berlin and the balance in general. The United States does not wish to effect such a change. The US is not asking the USSR to change its position but it is simply saying that it should not seek to change our position and thus disturb the balance of power. If this balance should change the situation in West Europe as a whole would change and this would be a most serious blow to the US. Mr. Khrushchev would not accept similar loss and we cannot accept it either. The question is not that of a peace treaty with East Germany but rather of other aspects of this proposal which would affect our access to Berlin and our rights there.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he was sorry that he had met with no understanding of the Soviet position. The US is unwilling to normalize the situation in the most dangerous spot in the world. The USSR wants to perform an operation on this sore spot—to eliminate this thorn, this ulcer—without prejudicing the interests of any side, but rather to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world. It wants to do that not by intrigue or threat but by solemnly signing a peace treaty. Now the President says that this action is directed against the interests of the US. Such statement is difficult to understand indeed. No change in existing boundaries is proposed; a peace treaty would only formalize them. The USSR wants a peace treaty because such a treaty would impede those people who want a new war. Revanchists in West Germany will find in a peace treaty a barrier impeding their activities. Today they say that boundaries should be changed. But if a peace treaty is signed there will be no ground for revision of the boundaries. Hitler spoke of Germany's need for Lebensraum to the Urals. Now Hitler's generals, who had helped him in his designs to execute his plans, are high commanders in NATO. This logic cannot be understood and the USSR cannot accept it. Mr. Khrushchev said he was very sorry but he had to assure the President that no force in the world would prevent the USSR from signing a peace treaty. 16 years have passed since World War II and how long should the signing of a peace treaty be delayed? Another 16 years, another 30 years? No further delay is possible or necessary. As far as US losses in the last war are concerned, losses are difficult to measure. Loss of a drop of blood equals the loss of a pint of blood in the minds of those who shed that blood. The US lost thousands and the USSR lost millions, but American mothers mourn their sons just as deeply as Soviet mothers shed tears over the loss of their beloved ones. Mr. Khrushchev said that he himself had lost a son in the last war; Mr. Gromyko lost two brothers, and Mikoyan a son. There is not a single family in the USSR or the leadership of the USSR that did not lose at least one of its members in the war. Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that he wanted the US to understand correctly the Soviet position. This position is advanced not for the purpose of kindling passions or increasing tensions. The objective is just the opposite—to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of development of our relations and to normalize relations throughout the world. The USSR will sign a peace treaty and the sovereignty of the GDR will be observed. Any violation of that sovereignty will be regarded by the USSR as an act of open aggression against a peace loving country, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom.

The President inquired whether such a peace treaty would block access to Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev said that it would.

The President then said that the US is opposed to a buildup in West Germany that would constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. The decision to sign a peace treaty is a serious one and the USSR should consider it in the light of its national interests. Referring to the question of boundaries, the President said that General de Gaulle had made a statement on this question.[3] This problem has been discussed in the Western world and there is some division of opinion on this matter. However, the US is committed to the defense of Western Europe and has assisted Western Europe in the past. The President said that one of his brothers had been killed in the last war, when the US came to Western Europe's assistance. If the US were driven out of West Berlin by unilateral action, and if we were deprived of our contractual rights by East Germany, then no one would believe the US now or in the future. US commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper. The world situation today is that of change and no one can predict what the evolution will be in such areas as Asia or Africa. Yet what Mr. Khrushchev suggests is to bring about a basic change in the situation overnight and deny us our rights which we share with the other two Western countries. This presents us with a most serious challenge and no one can foresee how serious the consequences might be. The President said it had not been his wish to come here to Vienna to find out not only that a peace treaty would be signed but also that we would be denied our position in West Berlin and our access to that city. In fact, the President said, he had come here in the hope that relations between our two countries could be improved. The President stressed he hoped that Mr. Khrushchev would consider his responsibility toward his country and also consider the responsibility the President of the United States has toward his people. What is discussed here is not only West Berlin; we are talking here about Western Europe and the United States as well.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he could not understand the President's reference to Western Europe. The USSR does not wish any change; it merely wants to formalize the situation which has resulted from World War II. The fact is that West Germany is in the Western group of nations and the USSR recognizes this. East Germany is an ally of the socialist countries and this should be recognized as a fait accompli. East Germany has new demarcation lines and these lines should become borders. The Polish and Czech borders should be formalized. The position of the GDR should be normalized and her sovereignty ensured. To do all this it is necessary to eliminate the occupation rights in West Berlin. No such rights should exist there. It would be impossible to imagine a situation where the USSR would have signed a peace treaty with the US retaining occupation rights, which are based on the state of war. The US may say that its blood was shed, but the USSR shed blood too and not water.

The President interjected that our rights were based on a four-power agreement. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was so in the absence of a peace treaty, but said that a peace treaty would end the state of war and those rights would therefore expire.

The President said this meant unilateral abrogation of the four-power agreement by the USSR and emphasized that the US could not accept such an act. Mr. Khrushchev replied that this was not so because the USSR would invite the US to sign a peace treaty and would sign it alone only if the US should refuse to do so. In that event the US could not maintain its rights on the territory of the GDR. The President again referred to the four-power agreement, but Mr. Khrushchev replied that the USSR considered all of Berlin to be GDR territory. The President stated this may be Soviet view but not ours. If the USSR transfers its rights, that is a matter for its own decision; however, it is an altogether different matter for the USSR to give [away?] our rights which we have on contractual basis. He said that the USSR could not break the agreement and give US rights to the GDR. Mr. Khrushchev rejoined by saying that this was a familiar point of view but had no juridical foundation, since the war had ended 16 years ago. In fact, President Roosevelt indicated that troops could be withdrawn after two or two and a half years.

Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that all the USSR wants is a peace treaty. He could not understand why the US wants Berlin. Does the US want to unleash a war from there? The President as a naval officer and he himself, a civilian although he participated in two wars, know very well that Berlin has no military significance. The President speaks of rights, but what are those rights? They stem from war. If the state of war ends, the rights end too. If a peace treaty is signed US prestige will not be involved, and everybody will understand this. But if the US should maintain its rights after the signing of a peace treaty, that would be a violation of East Germany's sovereignty and of the sovereignty of the socialist camp as a whole. Mr. Khrushchev recalled that President Eisenhower had agreed that the situation in Germany was abnormal. Eisenhower had said that US prestige was involved. Then the possibility of an interim agreement was discussed, an arrangement that would not involve the prestige of our two countries. Perhaps this could serve as a basis for agreement. The USSR is prepared to accept such an arrangement even now. Adenauer says that he wants unification but this is not so. As far as unification in concerned, we should say that the two German governments should meet and decide the question of reunification. A time limit of say 6 months should be set and if there is no agreement we can disavow our responsibilities and then anyone would be free to conclude a peace treaty. This would be a way out and it would resolve this question of prestige, which, Mr. Khrushchev said, he did not really understand. Mr. Khrushchev said that he had hoped that Eisenhower would agree subsequently at the Summit, but the forces which are against improvement of relations between the US and USSR sent the U-2 plane and the USSR decided that in view of the tensions prevailing as a result of that flight this question should not be raised. However, the USSR believes that time for such action is ripe now. Mr. Khrushchev expressed regret on his own behalf and on behalf of his colleagues and allies at not having found understanding on the President's part of the Soviet Union's good intentions and motivations. If only the German question were resolved the road would be clear for the development of our mutual relations. The USSR does not want to infringe upon any-body's interests, but neither would it concede its own interests. Mr. Khrushchev said he believed that the US does not want territorial gains although there is ideological disagreement between the US and the USSR. However, ideological disagreements should not be transferred onto the plane of a devastating war. He said that he was confident that people would be reasonable enough not to act like crusaders in the Middle Ages and would not start cutting each other's throats for ideological reasons. If the United States disagrees with the Soviet proposal it should at least understand the Soviet position. The USSR can no longer delay. It will probably sign a peace treaty at the end of the year, with all the ensuing consequences, i.e., all obligations will come to an end. The status of West Berlin as a free city will be guaranteed and complete non-interference will be ensured. West Berlin will be accessible to all countries with which it will want to maintain ties. However, access will be subject to GDR's control, since communication lines go through its territory. If the US is concerned about what it calls freedom of West Berlin, let us develop guarantees jointly or invite the UN. No nation will understand the US position of perpetuating the state of war with Germany. The USSR will explain its position to the world. It wants to prevent the possibility of war. If the US refuses to sign a peace treaty, the USSR will have no way out other than to sign such a treaty alone. The USSR lost 20 million people in the last war while the US lost 350 thousand.

The President interjected that this was why the US wanted to prevent another war.

Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that if the US should start a war over Berlin there was nothing the USSR could do about it. However, it would have to be the US to start the war, while the USSR will be defending peace. History will be the judge of our actions. The West has been saying that Khrushchev might miscalculate. But ours is a joint account and each of us must see that there is no miscalculation. If the US wants to start a war over Germany let it be so; perhaps the USSR should sign a peace treaty right away and get over with it. This is what the Pentagon has been wanting. However, Adenauer and Macmillan know very well what war means. If there is any madman who wants war, he should be put in a straight jacket. Nations close to USSR territory know what war will mean for them. The USSR thinks of peace, of friendship, and it is happy with its trade relations with West Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. It is not by accident that trade between the US and the USSR is still frozen but that is a problem for the US. So this is the Soviet position. The USSR will sign a peace treaty at the end of this year. Mr. Khrushchev concluded by saying that he was confident that common sense would win and peace will prevail.

The President said he recognized that the situation in Germany was abnormal. Germany is divided today. When President Roosevelt talked about the withdrawal of troops he was not able to foresee this situation or the fact that our two countries would be on different sides. The US does not want to precipitate a crisis; it is Mr. Khrushchev who wants to do so by seeking a change in the existing situation. The President then said the US was committed to this area long before he had assumed a position of high government responsibility. Now Mr. Khrushchev suggests a peace treaty at the end of the year, which would deny our rights in that city and our rights of access. Mr. Khrushchev knows very well that Berlin is much more than a city and yet he makes such a suggestion. Is that a way to secure peace?

Mr. Khrushchev replied he did not understand how the signing of a peace treaty could worsen the world situation. Peace is always regarded as something beneficial while the state of war is regarded as something evil.

The President said that the signing of a peace treaty is not a belligerent act. He had not indicated this at all. However, a peace treaty denying us our contractual rights is a belligerent act. The matter of a peace treaty with East Germany is a matter for Mr. Khrushchev's judgment and is not a belligerent act. What is a belligerent act is transfer of our rights to East Germany. West Berlin is not important as a springboard. However, the US is committed to that area and it is so regarded by all the world. If we accepted Mr. Khrushchev's suggestion the world would lose confidence in the US and would not regard it as a serious country. It is an important strategic matter that the world believe the US is a serious country.

Mr. Khrushchev wondered what he should do in these circumstances. He said he believed that US intentions led to nothing good. The USSR would never, under any conditions, accept US rights in West Berlin after a peace treaty had been signed. He said he was absolutely convinced that the peoples of the world would understand such a position. Moreover, the US had deprived the USSR unilaterally of its rights and interests in West Germany, it had deprived the USSR of reparations in West Germany, and it had signed a unilateral peace treaty with Japan. As a result of this latter action the Soviet Union still has no peace treaty with Japan.

The President interjected that Mr. Khrushchev had said to President Eisenhower that he would have signed the treaty. Mr. Khrushchev confirmed this, while Mr. Gromyko said that the fact remained that the US had signed the Japanese peace treaty without the Soviet Union.

Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that the US regarded all this as appropriate, but now it says what the USSR wants to do is immoral. The USSR would like to do it together with the US, but if the US refuses to sign a peace treaty the USSR will do it alone. East Germany will obtain complete sovereignty and all obligations resulting from German surrender will be annulled. The factor of the USSR's prestige should be taken into account. What the US wants is to retain the rights gained after World War II even after a peace treaty has been signed. This is a policy of “I do what I want”. The USSR regards East Germany as a completely sovereign state and it will sign a peace treaty with it. Responsibility for violation of that sovereignty will be heavy.

The President said that there is every evidence that our position in Berlin is strongly supported by the people there, and we are committed to that area. Mr. Khrushchev says that we are for a state of war. This is incorrect. It would be well if relations between East Germany and West Germany improved and if the development of US-USSR relations were such as to permit solution of the whole German problem. During his stay in office, Mr. Khrushchev has seen many changes, and changes will go on. But now he wants a peace treaty in six months, an action which would drive us out of Berlin. If we accepted such a proposition we would lose our ties in West Europe and would lose all our friends there. We do not wish to act in a way that would deprive the Soviet Union of its ties in Eastern Europe. Mr. Khrushchev had said that the President was a young man, but, the President continued, he had not assumed office to accept arrangements totally inimical to US interests. The President said he was prepared to discuss any problem but Mr. Khrushchev should take into account our interests just as he says we should take into account his views.

Mr. Khrushchev said that then an interim agreement should be concluded. However, no matter how long a time limit such an agreement were to provide for, the Germans would not agree because no one wishes reunification. An interim agreement would be a formal factor, it would give the semblance of the responsibility for the problem having been turned over to the Germans themselves. If the US does not wish such an arrangement there is no other way but to sign a peace treaty unilaterally. No one can force the US to sign a peace treaty but neither can the US make the Soviet Union accept its claims. Mr. Khrushchev then said that an aide-mémoire on the Berlin question had been prepared so that the US could study the Soviet position and perhaps return to this question at a later date, if it wished to do so.[4]

The group then moved to the dining room for lunch.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on June 23. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 25 from Paris, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6-651) For two other accounts of this conversation, apparently based on this memorandum of conversation, see Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 504-505, and Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 370-373. The texts of all the memoranda of conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev at Vienna are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume V .

[2] For documentation on Khrushchev's discussions of Berlin with President Eisenhower during his visit to the United States in September 1959, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. IX, pp. 35 ff.

[3] Presumably reference is to a statement on Germany made by de Gaulle at his first press conference on March 25, 1959, and reiterated at his second on November 10.

[4] The Soviet translation of its aide-mémoire was transmitted in Secto 21 from Paris, June 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-561) For the Department of State translation, which is basically the same, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 729-732. For the Russian text, see Pravda, June 11, 1961.

33. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Vienna, June 4, 1961, 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Vienna Meeting Between The President And Chairman Khrushchev

PARTICIPANTS

The President

D—Mr. Akalovsky (interpreting)

Chairman Khrushchev

Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

After lunch, the President said he wanted to have a few words with the Chairman in private.

The President opened the conversation by saying that he recognized the importance of Berlin and that he hoped that in the interests of the relations between our two countries, which he wanted to improve, Mr. Khrushchev would not present him with a situation so deeply involving our national interest. Of course, he recognized that the decision on East Germany, as far as the USSR was concerned, was with the Chairman. The President continued by saying that evolution is taking place in many areas of the world and no one can predict which course it would take. Therefore, it is most important that decisions be carefully considered. Obviously the Chairman will make his judgment in the light of what he understands to be the best interests of his country. However, the President said, he did want to stress the difference between a peace treaty and the rights of access to Berlin. He reiterated his hope that the relations between the two countries would develop in a way that would avoid direct contact or confrontation between them.

Mr. Khrushchev said he appreciated the frankness of the President's remarks but said that if the President insisted on US rights after the signing of a peace treaty and that if the borders of the GDR—land, air, or sea borders—were violated, they would be defended. The US position is not based on juridical grounds. The US wants to humiliate the USSR and this cannot be accepted. He said that he would not shirk his responsibility and would take any action that he is duty bound to take as Prime Minister. He would be glad if the US were to agree to an interim agreement on Germany and Berlin with a time limit so that the prestige and the interests of the two countries would not be involved or prejudiced. However, he said, he must warn the President that if he envisages any action that might bring about unhappy consequences, force would be met by force. The US should prepare itself for that and the Soviet Union will do the same.

The President inquired whether under an interim arrangement forces in Berlin would remain and access would be free. Mr. Khrushchev replied that would be so for six months. In reply to the President's query whether the forces would then have to be withdrawn, the Chairman replied in the affirmative.

The President then said that either Mr. Khrushchev did not believe that the US was serious or the situation in that area was so unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union that it had to take this drastic action. The President referred to his forthcoming meeting with Macmillan and said the latter would ask what had happened. The President said that he would have to say that he had gained the impression that the USSR was presenting him with the alternative of accepting the Soviet act on Berlin or having a face to face confrontation. He had come here to prevent a confrontation between our two countries and he regretted to leave Vienna with this impression.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that in order to save prestige we could agree that token contingents of troops, including Soviet troops, could be maintained in West Berlin. However, this would be not on the basis of some occupation rights, but on the basis of an agreement registered with the UN. Of course, access would be subject to GDR's control because this is its prerogative. Mr. Khrushchev continued by saying that he wanted peace and that if the US wanted war, that was its problem. It is not the USSR that threatens with war, it is the US.

The President stressed that it was the Chairman, not he, who wanted to force a change.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that a peace treaty would not involve any change in boundaries. In any event, the USSR will have no choice other than to accept the challenge; it must respond and it will respond. The calamities of a war will be shared equally. War will take place only if the US imposes it on the USSR. It is up to the US to decide whether there will be war or peace. This, he said, can be told Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer. The decision to sign a peace treaty is firm and irrevocable and the Soviet Union will sign it in December if the US refuses an interim agreement.

The President concluded the conversation by observing that it would be a cold winter.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on June 23. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. Brief summaries of this memorandum of conversation with quotations based on the last three paragraphs are in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 374, and Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 585-586.

34. Record of Conversation[1]

London, June 5, 1961, 12:45 p.m.

PRESENT

Prime Minister Macmillan

Foreign Secretary, Mr. de Zulueta

President Kennedy

Lord Home said that the Foreign Office had examined the Soviet Aide-mémoire about Berlin[2] which Mr. Khrushchev had given to President Kennedy in Vienna. The general effect of this Aide-mémoire on public opinion might be substantial since on the face of it it appeared fairly reasonable. President Kennedy said that this was why he felt it important to consider what answer should be made to the Aide-mémoire. Lord Home suggested that it was desirable to work out as soon as possible an Allied negotiating position. He did not suggest that negotiations should begin at once, but consideration of the Allied position ought to start forthwith. The Prime Minister said that the President was to make a speech in the United States on June 6 and this might be an opportunity for restating the West's moral position as protectors of the people of West Berlin. It would be useful to have such a statement on the record, especially if, as seemed likely, the Aide-mémoire soon became public property. President Kennedy pointed out that any Allied negotiating position should be quadripartitely agreed. The Prime Minister said that the President and he had felt that for the West to offer negotiations now might seem to be a sign of weakness. It might be better to try to get Laos settled first. The Foreign Secretary agreed that this might be a helpful line. The President said that it would be of help to him if the United Kingdom could draft a possible reply to the Aide-mémoire which he could consider together with other suggestions. The Prime Minister agreed that the United Kingdom would try to prepare such a draft and said that he felt that in this a restatement of the West's moral position would be of value. The President pointed out that the West's moral position rested on the defense of the people of West Berlin and he had wondered whether in this connection a suggestion for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the West Berliners might have some public appeal. Lord Home suggested that the idea of a plebiscite had been used rather frequently in the past and might not be thought to be a serious contribution. This idea should be studied; it would, however, seem unwise for the West to become committed to holding a plebiscite.

The Prime Minister asked if it was the President's impression that Mr. Khrushchev proposed to summon his Peace Conference immediately. President Kennedy said that he could not be sure. His impression was that Mr. Khrushchev was most likely to hold his hand until the Party Congress in October at which time he might say that he had put his proposals for Berlin to President Kennedy in June and had had no answer.

Lord Home suggested that it would be impossible in any case to hold negotiations before the West German elections. He was not sure whether or not it would be wise now to offer to negotiate in the autumn. In any case, negotiations should not be about Berlin only, but should be about “the problem of Germany and Berlin.” It would be difficult to make an entirely negative reply to the Soviet Aide-mémoire. The West should perhaps respond in some way; this might involve agreeing to negotiate or putting forward counter proposals about Berlin. The Prime Minister suggested that work should begin at once on the nature of any counter proposals. Lord Home agreed but was not hopeful that any satisfactory counter proposals could be worked out. The Prime Minister said that one possibility might be to try to negotiate something for West Berlin which looked good at least on paper and then to prepare to react against any attempt to overturn such a settlement by physical attack. President Kennedy said that the difficulty about this approach would be to say what the West would gain from such an arrangement. There was a danger of the West appearing to have been defeated. Lord Home suggested that the Soviet proposal that their troops should be stationed in Berlin together with those of the Western powers might not be essential to the Russians. There might also be some possibility of exploiting the Soviet suggestion of a guarantee of “unobstructed contacts” to protect the West Berliners. The idea of a United Nations presence might also be used. The President asked what the real objections would be to such an arrangement. Lord Home said that any guarantees would in fact only be effective if they were given by countries which were prepared to act to uphold them if necessary. But in a sense this was already the position of the Western rights. President Kennedy pointed out that on this basis the West would have lost their rights of occupation in Berlin. He feared that the Russians would insist on their troops being present in West Berlin. In addition, the Soviet plan would involve Western recognition of the D.D.R. The Prime Minister agreed and said that after such a settlement had been reached, the next step might be for the D.D.R. to say that the existence of West Berlin was intolerable to them. West Berlin would then become a Danzig and the West would have to go to war on that. However, the real situation might be no worse than it was already. The difficulty was that meanwhile the West would have seemed to have been weakening. The President agreed and asked what advantages the West could claim from such an arrangement. The Prime Minister suggested that the only possible gain would be in the security of the civilian population of West Berlin. At the moment the Allies had no legal rights to insist on unobstructed access for civilian supplies to West Berlin. This position would be theoretically improved if the freedom of civilian traffic were to be guaranteed by treaty.

The President suggested that in fact civilian supplies only went in freely at the moment because of the presence of Allied troops and the threat of Allied intervention if the supplies were obstructed. It would therefore be very difficult to appear to make a good bargain on the basis of a favorable change in the legal position of civilian supplies. The Prime Minister asked if there would not be great difficulties even now if civilian supplies were to be obstructed. The President agreed that there would indeed be great difficulties. He supposed that supplies for the garrison would have to be flown in together with as much civilian supplies as could be carried. The Foreign Secretary inquired about contingency planning. The Prime Minister said that the President and he had felt there should be political contingency planning as well as military. The President agreed and said that he felt that as a practical measure of preparation, military stock piles in Berlin should now be increased. It might be desirable also to decide on the type of military probe which might be necessary and possibly to agree that if this was turned back, an airlift should be organized. Lord Home pointed out that if there was an airlift the West might well be forced into negotiations if only because in the event of a Western aircraft being shot down by the Russians the situation would be brought to the United Nations by someone. It might be more difficult for the West to negotiate in such circumstances. The President said that he was not sure about this. He could see that the Russians might make propaganda capital out of action to maintain Western troops in Berlin but if they shot down an aircraft, they would not be in a good moral position.

The Prime Minister suggested that it might be worth considering telling Mr. Khrushchev that the West had no objection to his making a treaty with the D.D.R. if he wanted to, but that they could not accept any change in the position of West Berlin. Such a position would at least avoid the need for a negotiation with the Russians which could be represented as an attempt to prevent the signature of a peace treaty. Lord Home said that he had been wondering if the West could tell the Russians that they had no objection to the Soviet treaty with the D.D.R. provided the Russians guaranteed Western access on present terms for a period of time.

The Prime Minister said that all these possibilities certainly ought to be examined. The first point was to decide if and how to reply to the Aide-mémoire. Then the West should work out their real political position together with a military contingency plan to correspond to this. He felt that the contingency plans should include an examination of what the West's political response might be if the Russians signed their treaty but did nothing to interrupt the communications of West Berlin or alternatively did interrupt the military or the civilian supplies or both. As regards the political position, an important question was what the West could be said to gain from an agreement with the Russians; the possible gain in the security of civilian supplies was the only advantage which he could immediately see.

President Kennedy said that he was concerned about what he should say in his speech on June 6. It would be very helpful if he could have any British ideas before he left for Washington. One difficulty was that the Federal German Government would have seen the Russian Aide-mémoire but would not have seen the record of the conversations in Vienna in which he had rebutted Mr. Khrushchev's arguments. He therefore felt that he must state clearly the West's obligations to the people of West Berlin and make it plain that the West could not accept that their rights could be unilaterally abrogated. If such unilateral action were to be permitted, no guarantees for the future would have any value.

The Prime Minister said that the simple position for the West to take would be to say that the Russians could do what they liked about a treaty with the D.D.R., but the West stood on their rights and would meet any attack on these with all the force at their command. The President said that it was certainly this threat which had stopped Soviet action up to now. Unfortunately, there were some grounds for believing that after recent events in Laos and elsewhere, the West seemed to the Russians to be weaker and Mr. Khrushchev might no longer believe in the West's firmness of purpose. After all, even in 1949 when the West had a nuclear monopoly they had not been prepared to force their way into West Berlin, and the Russians knew that they were now relatively stronger than they had been twelve years ago.

Lord Home said that he feared that Mr. Khrushchev was being forced into some action over Berlin by his difficulties with the D.D.R. and with the other satellites. Refugees were still coming to West Germany at the rate of about one million a year. Mr. Khrushchev might feel that he had to find a way of stopping this. The Prime Minister said that the truth of the matter was that whatever might be happening in other parts of the world, in Berlin the West was winning. It was a very poor advertisement for the Soviet system that so many people should seek to leave the communist paradise.

The meeting ended at about 1:25 p.m.[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. The meeting was held at Admiralty House. In a private meeting from 10:30 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. the President had briefed Prime Minister Macmillan on his meetings with de Gaulle and Khrushchev. (Note of the Points Made During the Private Discussion, June 8; ibid.) For Macmillan's account of the briefing and the President's visit to London, see Pointing the Way, pp. 355-359.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 32.

[3] Following this meeting, at the President's suggestion, Home, Hoyer Millar, Caccia, Ormsby Gore, Bruce, Bundy, and Sorensen met to consider the contents of the President's speech and to discuss political and military contingency plans. They agreed that the speech should include a reaffirmation of Western rights and responsibilities, a brief statement of Khrushchev's views, and a strong reassertion of the fundamental Western obligation to sustain the right of choice of the people of West Berlin. (Memorandum by Bundy, undated; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1907)

35. Editorial Note

While President Kennedy went to London to brief Prime Minister Macmillan on the conversations with de Gaulle and Khrushchev (see Document 34), Secretary of State Rusk went to Paris to brief the North Atlantic Council and the French on the meetings in Vienna. In a conversation at 3 p.m. at the Elysee Palace, Rusk summarized the discussions on Laos, disarmament, Cuba, Africa, and Berlin, noting in particular that Khrushchev had appeared rather relaxed on all the topics except the last. Rusk stressed that Berlin seemed to be the main issue for the Soviet Union, which seemed “to greatly fear a unified and rebuilt Germany which would be an ally of the West.” (Memorandum of conversation, June 5, 1961; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, France)

In his briefing of the North Atlantic Council Rusk again stressed the importance of the Berlin question and reported that the Soviet aide-mémoire gave a good picture of Khrushchev's views on the problem. (Polto Circular 7 from Paris, June 5; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-561)

On June 5 Kohler, Hillenbrand, and Dowling briefed Chancellor Adenauer on the meetings at Paris and Vienna. On Berlin Kohler reported that the President had replied strongly to Khrushchev's reiterated determination to go ahead with a peace treaty. He stressed that the President had reaffirmed the vital importance of Berlin to the United States, and concluded that if anything might be drawn from the talks, it was the likelihood of a crisis developing over Berlin, probably after the Communist Party Congress in October. (Memorandum of conversation, June 5; ibid., 611.51/6-561) A summary of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 2027 from Bonn, June 5. (Ibid., 611.62A/6-561)

On June 6 President Kennedy invited 15 congressional leaders to the White House for a report on his trip to Europe. A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. It is also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 2256. At 7 p.m. on the same day the President addressed the American people on his trip, stating that the visit to Vienna had been “a very sober two days.” For text of his address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 441-446.

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, June 8, 1961, 7 p.m.

2054. Embtel 1989.[2] With growing possibility that 1961 may bring Soviet decision to sign separate peace treaty and turn over control of Allied access to so-called GDR, need for urgent review and consolidation of Berlin contingency planning, already begun at the President's direction, is now clearly evident.

Following suggestions, growing out of our local review, are therefore submitted for consideration in overall planning:

1.

In my view, work on political moves and economic countermeasures should be pressed forward urgently, so that NATO Alliance will be in position take concerted measures demonstrating to Soviet Union our combined resolve not to accept Soviet action aimed at unilateral termination of our rights in Berlin. There is still a long way to go before Alliance could carry out economic countermeasures currently under study, for example, and while series of diplomatic moves obviously will be necessary and undoubtedly are contemplated at time crisis arises, present plan refers only to public announcement and notes to Soviet Union. I would suggest that agreement be sought on wide range of measures which might be put into effect as and if issue comes up, including economic embargo against entire Soviet bloc. At same time, I would question whether we should attempt to adopt now a rigid, ascending order of measures of mounting pressures, since we might well find it expedient to make a move of some severity, such as military alerts, evacuation of dependents, embargo, closing ports to Soviet shipping, etc., in first stages to create needed impact early in developing situation. Effectiveness of countermeasures taken last autumn was undoubtedly due largely to fact they were prompt response to East Zone restrictions, but experience in Bonn has demonstrated that tripartite agreement is normally long-drawn-out, difficult achievement.

In other words, our present goal should be to obtain governmental agreement now that certain measures, including those global in nature, will be used, and preparations therefore begun at once.

Psychological actions, for use prior to and during crisis, must also be designated to impress world opinion with rightness of our position. Only specific action which I can suggest now is use of Soviet tactic of “confidential” talks with neutrals in which we might stress fact that basis for international relations would be utterly destroyed if rights under agreements are to be invalidated unilaterally.

2. As for military probe in case of interference with Autobahn access, let me say at once that I regard it as an essential element of any contingency planning. But I wonder if it would not be difficult to obtain support of world opinion where it used solely for support of our own access to Berlin. On other hand, use of military means to support survival in freedom of two and one-quarter million Berliners would surely gain wide measures of support. For this reason, among others, including the problem of full Allied agreement, I suggest that further consideration might be given to circumstances under which our contemplated military probe would be maintained. Furthermore, I have grave doubts re wisdom of ourselves instituting new procedures in connection with surface access (i.e., so-called “peel-off” procedure, should Vopos replace Soviet guards at checkpoints) at a time when we would in essence be insisting on maintenance of status quo. Yet present plan seems to contemplate only two basic alternatives: either institution of new procedures, with some degree, at least implied, of East German control of access, or use of military probe. Question in my mind, therefore, is whether it would not be preferable to reject at outset any East German control of our surface movements, and to move at once to garrison airlift for Allied movements when Vopos first appear at checkpoints. This would at least have advantage of preserving freedom of action in further stages of crisis, aside from perhaps arousing sympathetic echoes in world opinion of first Berlin airlift. Moreover, I would surmise that if East German regime were thus frustrated in its desire to assert control over Allied access, it would move fairly rapidly to interference with civil traffic, whereupon we could then (after placing Berlin on ration basis, etc.) move to carry out military probe.

Finally, I feel strongly that contingency planning should include agreed guidance fromFedRepto populace of Soviet Zone. It must be expected that they will become increasingly restive as crisis approaches, and we should have decided well in advance what attitude we would want them to take up.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62B/6-861. Secret; Limit Distribution.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 28.

37. Memorandum From Henry Owen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)[1]

Washington, June 9, 1961.

Mac—

1. I agree that taking a philosophic view of the peace treaty will trouble the West Germans.

2. On the other hand: The West Germans will be even more troubled if we keep on building up the peace treaty as a big issue, and then it happens—as it will—despite our protests.

3. Which is worse—

(a) Bothering the Germans now by putting main emphasis on access, rather than the peace treaty?

(b) Bothering them a lot more in six months, by huffing and puffing about the treaty until it occurs—and then laughing it off (which is all we'll be able to do)?

4. I would suggest placing increasing stress on these points (which are not new), in our public posture:

(a) A peace treaty would have no validity; it would change nothing as far as Western rights are concerned.

(b) Access is a critical issue. The U.S. must stand firm on this issue if it is to fulfill its obligations to the people of Berlin.

5. An additional consideration: World opinion will understand the issue of keeping the traffic moving to Berlin; the Soviets lost propaganda-wise from the last blockade. World opinion will not get excited about the treaty issue.

Henry Owen[2]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda, Henry Owen. Secret.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

38. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, June 10, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

I enclose two interesting papers on Berlin. One is a draft of a reply to the Soviet Aide-mémoire,[2] which has not yet been cleared through the Department of State, but which the Secretary thought you might want to review at this informal stage, because any expression of your opinions would be very helpful to the Department as it works ahead. The draft answer includes a long mimeographed paper (which you will probably not want to read) which is a possible submission to the International Court of Justice. I also enclose the Soviet Aide-mémoire in case you want to refer back to it.

The draft answer is a pretty good document, of its kind. It is right in the tradition of arguments on our side, and it would probably be persuasive to those who have tended to agree with us in the past. It is well worth study. Except for reiteration of the Western peace plan of May 14, 1959, it contains no affirmative proposals, but the exception is a substantial one.

I also enclose a long paper on Berlin from Henry Kissinger.[3] This is a powerful document, setting forth one strong line on Germany. Kissinger's fundamental conclusion is that we should “take the offensive” on German unification. At this moment, the more interesting questions for you are in sections 1 through 5, and perhaps also section 7. The military contingency problem should probably be left open until we hear from Acheson and the Defense Department.

In addition, I have messages for you from both Joe Alsop and Walter Lippmann. You will not be surprised to know that they take different views on Berlin. Alsop is for a strong and essentially unyielding position, carried all the way to war if necessary. Lippmann is for a negotiated solution, and has interesting ideas on what it should be. In essence, he would like to have us propose measures looking toward the genuine neutralization of West Berlin, in return for guarantees spelled out in detail by all parties, along the lines of the Lateran Treaty. Joe Alsop, like Henry Kissinger and most of your advisers, would hold that any neutralization of West Berlin would be a form of surrender, followed by great damage to the whole position of the West. Lippmann's answer is that a real normalization of Berlin would be a gain to us and no real loss to Adenauer or anyone else. He holds that if you take the lead in this direction, the net result would be a gain, not a loss, in U.S. prestige. I find his proposition well worth considering, but I must say that I cannot see any good in accepting a Soviet presence in West Berlin, which Lippmann is prepared to do.

On two or three broad points, however, I am interested to find that Alsop and Lippmann agree. First, they share my view that in extraordinary measure this problem of Berlin is one which you will have to master and manage, under your own personal leadership and authority. This is true because whatever course you determine upon will require a much higher level of understanding and support from the American people than we can now be sure of. It is true also because only your lead can provide the necessary degree of common direction to the West. Four-power parleys will almost surely produce uncertain postures. If you wish to be wholly unbending, you will have to confront the British with your own decision that this is how it must be. If you want to explore a new arrangement, you will have to find ways of making Adenauer accept your decision.

A second point of agreement is that we must avoid what both men call the Cuban error. We must not plan a firm line which runs out of gas with a local defeat. If we do not mean to press the issue right up to war, even Joe would prefer that we now negotiate an accommodation.

I myself think there may be ways of having the best of both Alsop and Lippmann, by making serious military preparations now, while at the same time we strengthen the attractiveness and acceptability of our political posture, both before the world and also before the Russians. This might or might not take us to the particular position which Lippmann advocates, but it would probably have a more open and forward-looking flavor to it than the draft reply which is enclosed.

But these are merely marginal notes. The first order of business, I think, is for you to make sure in your own mind that ways and means of work are established which will put you in immediate, personal, and continuous command of this enormous question. We are preparing recommendations for a procedure on this.[4]

Finally, I should report one comment from Dean Rusk. He believes that the draft reply is good as far as it goes, but he believes also that the whole problem should be looked at freshly, “as if by men from Mars.” I think this means that he shares the view that I have tried to express above—that you will want to examine every part of the problem yourself, freshly and carefully.

McG. B.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Aide-mémoire. Secret.

[2] Neither enclosure is printed. The draft reply had been sent to the White House on June 8 attached to a memorandum from Battle to Bundy. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-861)

[3] A copy of this undated 31-page paper is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946.

[4] Bundy added the last sentence by hand.

39. Editorial Note

On June 10 McGeorge Bundy asked the Department of State to prepare a Talking Points Paper to brief the National Security Council on the results of the Vienna talks. (Memorandum from S/S to EUR, June 10; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-1061) On June 12 the Department of State transmitted an 8-page list of talking points including the following on Germany and Berlin:

"1. Khrushchev attacked German militarism and said no delay in signature in a peace treaty was justifiable. USSR wanted agreement with U.S. but in its absence would sign a separate peace treaty with GDR, the state of war would cease and all commitments, including occupation rights, institutions and allied access would become invalid. U.S. troops could stay in Berlin under certain conditions; Soviet troops should also be there and neutral troops under UN guarantee would be acceptable.

"2. The President contrasted Berlin with Laos. He said we fought to get to Berlin. Our national security is affected by what happens there, and we have contractual rights to which every President involved has reaffirmed his obligations. If we allowed ourselves to be expelled from Berlin no one could have confidence in our commitments and this deeply involves our national security. He, no more than Khrushchev, is prepared to preside over isolation of his own country.

"3. President rejected Khrushchev's charge that reference to national security signified U.S. wanted to improve its position. The U.S. was not pushing but was interested in maintaining position in and access to Berlin. Situation might be unsatisfactory but situations elsewhere unsatisfactory and this not the right time to change Berlin situation. Neither U.S. nor USSR could accept the change in balance of power that would result from Soviet proposal.

"4. Khrushchev defended peace treaty as restraint on German revanchists. Said no force could prevent USSR signing treaty. GDR sovereignty would then be established and its violation regarded by USSR as open aggression.

"5. In reply to President's question, Khrushchev specifically said allied access to Berlin would be blocked by peace treaty. President reiterated that our views and interests should be carefully considered and said Khrushchev had laid down a most serious challenge with unforeseeable consequences. Expressed hope Khrushchev would consider both his and President's responsibilities toward their own countries.

"6. Khrushchev maintained USSR wished only to formalize existing situation and gain recognition as a fait accompli of the existence of the GDR socialist state. Continuance of U.S. occupation rights after a peace treaty was impossible to imagine.

"7. President said Soviet Union cannot give U.S. rights to the GDR.

"8. Khrushchev said USSR prepared to accept interim agreement not involving prestige of two countries right now. Agreement could set six months time limit for Germans to solve question of reunification. Then U.S. and USSR could disavow responsibilities and anyone would be free to conclude a peace treaty. He expressed confidence that our people would not start cutting each other's throats for ideological reasons. Said USSR can delay no longer, will probably sign peace treaty at the end of the year. He later specifically referred to December.

"9. Later Khrushchev said that USSR would be defending peace if the U.S. started a war in Berlin. U.S. should avoid miscalculation, but if U.S. wants war over Germany let it be so. He was confident common sense would gain the upper hand and peace prevail.

"10. The President denied any wish to precipitate a crisis but stressed our profound commitment in Berlin. It is strategically important that the world believe the U.S. a serious country whose commitments one could rely on. Said signing of a peace treaty not a belligerent act but denial of our contractual rights would be.

"11. Khrushchev said USSR would not accept U.S. rights in Berlin after a peace treaty and was convinced the world would understand the Soviet position.

"12. The President said our position in West Berlin was strongly supported by the people there. President is prepared to discuss any problem between us but we should take carefully into account each other's views and interests. He did not assume office to accept arrangements totally inimical to U.S. interests.

"13. Referring to an interim agreement Khrushchev said it would be a formal factor giving the semblance of turning the problem over to the Germans. He referred to the aide-mémoire (later handed to U.S. officials) and concluded U.S. could study it and perhaps return to the question later if it wished.” (Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 300, Folder 535)

At its June 13 meeting the National Security Council discussed Berlin based on this paper. While no NSC record of the meeting has been found, General Lemnitzer's handwritten notes on the meeting read as follows:

"Vienna—

"Difficult time in store on Berlin.

"Sec State—reviewed pol. situation.

"1st step—answer aide-mémoire, timing is rather vague. Cannot abandon. Western position is difficult.

"Pres—status of supplies.

"Sec reviewed.

"civil defense?

"reorg on CD—costs, $300 m

"$50 m to be used for shelters

"$100 m for new buildings

"Pres—We must get in touch with every American—he must be resp—what can he do—etc.” (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29, L-215-71)

40. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, June 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

U.K.

The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Home, Foreign Secretary

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, the Foreign Office

Mr. J. E. Killick, Head of Western Department, the Foreign Office

Mr. J. O. Wright, Private Secretary

Mr. Denis Greenhill, Counselor, British Embassy

Mr. John Thomson, First Secretary, British Embassy

U.S.

The Secretary of State

Mr. Dean Acheson

Mr. John J. McCloy

Mr. George C. McGhee, Counselor

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Martin Hillenbrand, Director, GER

Mr. James D. Moffett, U.K. Desk Officer

The Secretary asked Lord Home for his impression of the meaning of the Soviet aide-mémoire about Berlin. Did he think that the document really represented any new approach on the part of the Soviets? Does it confirm that we are now on a collision course? The Secretary added that as he had mentioned in London,[2] Khrushchev had appeared to attach considerable importance to the problem in Vienna; in fact, he had practically memorized his aide-mémoire.

Lord Home said that he did not believe that the Soviet document represented anything new, that it was merely old material hashed over again for the purpose of propaganda and public opinion. Lord Home referred to a conversation he had had with Gromyko in Geneva just before leaving for Washington. Gromyko had appeared to make two points during that talk: (1) that there would be no row and no blockade over West Berlin and (2) that the Soviets felt that something must happen by October, attaching great importance to this timing. Lord Home did not know whether Gromyko meant that we are now in the midst of a six-months period for action or whether such would commence with October. It would appear clear, however, that if the West offers no acceptable terms on Berlin prior to October the Soviets will sign a peace treaty with East Germany. The Secretary wondered at Gromyko's reference to no row, finding it hard to believe that the Soviets would make such an issue over this problem and still refrain from a blockade or other action if their aims were not achieved. Lord Home confessed that this attitude of Gromyko's was only an impression he had gained but that he felt that Gromyko meant to say that the Soviets expect to make a treaty with the GDR, that the Western allies would have to make terms with the East Germans, but that the GDR would not make very much trouble. The Secretary repeated that he found it hard to conceive of no interference and noted that the aide-mémoire specifically referred to the cancellation of all Western rights on the conclusion of the treaty.

In response to the Secretary's query about the timing of a reply to the aide-mémoire, Lord Home said that British thinking was that a response should (1) take account of world opinion and endeavor to restate Western positions plainly; (2) emphasize inconsistencies in the document itself and (3) gain time, perhaps by posing questions which would carry on the correspondence. Mr. Kohler said that the State Department has prepared a rough draft of a reply to the aide-mémoire.[3] We feel that Khrushchev's message is probably a little stronger than previous statements of the Soviet position. We agree that the communication gives us a chance to restate our position. We also feel that there may be a basis for leading the Soviets into a long series of legal procedures. We have in mind an “injunction-type” operation which could take the form initially of a case before the International Court of Justice. Presuming non-acceptance by the Court, the Security Council and then the General Assembly could be brought into the picture, culminating with perhaps a request by the General Assembly for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. It was realized that all of this would be temporizing, but the prolonged litigation could gain time and favorable publicity. Lord Home asked if we were sure we had a good legal case. Mr. Kohler replied that our lawyers have prepared a brief on the question of our rights in Berlin which they consider fairly water-tight. Mr. Acheson questioned the probable connotation of the legal approach, wondering if we would be prepared to withdraw if our rights were called in question by a legal tribunal. He suggested that for other reasons we would want to maintain our position in Berlin regardless of decisions reached by impartial bodies. Mr. Kohler responded that we are pretty sure of our legal case on Soviet attempts unilaterally to terminate our rights in Berlin.

Lord Home asked if we couldn't consider a counter-suggestion to the Soviets. We might say to Khrushchev in our reply to his aide-mémoire that his ideas are interesting but how about applying them to the whole city of Berlin. The Soviets might find it difficult to respond to such a suggestion. Mr. Kohler noted that, of course, we still have the all-Berlin proposal which was presented to the Soviets at Geneva and which they rejected out of hand. Lord Home said that it would be well to consider our views on an all-Berlin solution since we must anticipate that someone like Krishna Menon might very well come up with the idea in the United Nations, perhaps hoping to win thereby a Nobel Peace Prize.

The Secretary said that he felt that immediately we must determine the nature of our responses to the Soviet aide-mémoire. Subsequently, however, we should be prepared to review the whole question of Germany and Eastern Europe. We might have to look further than the Western Peace Plan put forth at Geneva.

Lord Home said that he had not been thinking of specific counter-proposals to be made in response to the aide-mémoire. Rather, he thought it might be well to put questions to Khrushchev. Perhaps we could reply to the aide-mémoire in another two weeks or so including a question or two followed by subsequent questions later on.

The Secretary asked Mr. Acheson if he saw any advantage to getting a legal decision from the International Court of Justice on our rights in Berlin. Mr. Acheson observed that he thought the chances were very slight that the Court would take such a case. Mr. Kohler said that the Russians have, in fact, acknowledged our legal rights in Berlin. This is not the question. The question is can they legally terminate those rights at this time.

Sir Evelyn expressed the opinion that the political arguments will outweigh in most people's minds the legal side of the question. For instance, many people will feel that the West is being unduly legalistic if it insists on getting a ruling from the Court. Mr. Kohler acknowledged that this might be so but he felt that the purpose of the legal brief is one of propaganda.

Mr. McCloy said that he felt that we are all being too equivocal in our position in Berlin and that we should take a stand firmly on our rights. He had doubts about asking too many questions or seeking decisions on these rights.

Lord Home stated that he didn't see that there was any action open to the West, short of the German elections, but to keep alive our correspondence with the Soviets. He wondered if we might, in replying to Khrushchev, suggest a foreign ministers' talk. The Secretary said that we may get to this at some stage but he saw no advantages to seeking such a meeting at this time.

Mr. McCloy referred to his conversations with Ambassador Menshikov[4] in which the Ambassador repeatedly urged that we tell the Soviets exactly what we want and what we will insist upon as regards West Berlin after the Soviets conclude a treaty with the GDR. Mr. McCloy asked if we could not make some proposals, such as a corridor arrangement, though he realized this might offend Adenauer. Could we propose a whole city arrangement?

Lord Home responded that he did not think that we should be as specific as this in our reply to the aide-mémoire. He wondered if Menshikov's remarks to Mr. McCloy were not in the context of a free city.

Mr. Acheson asked if it isn't clear that Khrushchev has started on a course which he will not change. If that is so we want to know what to do to gain time to make preparations. The Secretary interjected that we should certainly want to know what to do with the time we save. Mr. Acheson went on to say that we should set about immediately, next week even, to try to change Khrushchev's appraisal of the situation. We should increase our capabilities available for our contingency plans.

The Secretary said that there is a difference between saying that we are on a collision course with the Soviets on this issue and saying that Khrushchev himself thinks that he is on a collision course. Are there things still remaining to be done to let him know that we are ready and that he is on such a collision course? This can be done, for example, by dispositions with our forces. For instance, the U.K. might qualitatively enhance its own forces in Germany. We both might build up stocks in West Germany and in Berlin. These are steps which might make Khrushchev realize the course he is upon. The Secretary said that a probe to be creditable to the Soviets would have to have other things behind it. We need more general preparedness. Lord Home agreed that this was desirable but don't we have to take it to NATO? This is essential. The Secretary replied that we, ourselves, and the British could institute measures of preparedness in our own national forces without reference to NATO. He felt that if this action were dependent on NATO consultation, it might almost amount to a situation where NATO has a veto. Lord Home replied that this cannot be helped, that NATO is involved in the matter and we can't very well leave them out. Mr. Kohler observed that in critical times we have found that the NATO countries will stand firm.

The Secretary asked Mr. Acheson to describe some of our conclusions on national preparations for Berlin contingencies. Mr. Acheson said that actually there is no issue regarding discussions in NATO, the question is only when. There is a vast difference between a theoretical discussion in NATO and recommendations from the United States which are more than theoretical. We must convince Khrushchev that we are starting on a course with its own momentum. Some means of accomplishing this are (1) to begin calling up more troops for intensive training, to include Regular National Guard and Reserve units and to insure that this training would be more than the usual summer maneuvers; (2) we might fly STRAC units to Europe; (3) we might redeploy some SAC units; (4) we could revive our nuclear testing program; (5) increase military budgets; (6) shifting of units in Europe. All of these are dangerous but sometime or other someone has to realize the seriousness of the situation. Lord Home commented that this would involve overt planning and the Secretary replied that we would want it so. Lord Home asked if these preparations might not induce someone like the Indians to bring our “war-like” measures before the UN. Mr. Acheson said that the UN can't move very fast. In any case the measures contemplated would not constitute mobilization. Mr. Kohler commented that we could expect some action from the neutrals whatever steps we took at the time of the crisis. Perhaps our contemplated injunctive type of action could head this off.

With regard to actual shooting, Lord Home asked if we couldn't force the initiative on the other side by our probe. Mr. Acheson said that whether we could induce a shooting by the probe would depend on its nature and the size. The danger is that a small probe would look ridiculous. Mr. Shuckburgh noted that there seemed to be a difference in the British and American use of the term “probe”. The British thought of the “probe” as a small scale action aimed only at seeing whether there would be obstruction on the access route. The Secretary said that the purpose would be to get the trucks through. It is conceivable that the Soviets or East Germany might allow a small probe to pass but stop the trucks. In discussing the possibility of an airlift the Secretary said we should also bear in mind that we would at the same time impose severe sanctions on trade, communications and so forth, on both the Soviets and the East Germans. We should really make the Soviets feel the effect of these. Mr. Kohler said that the airlift itself would be sufficient enough for our garrisons, that our JCS had said that it is not now militarily feasible to provision the whole city in view of possible technical counter-measures. Lord Home felt that British military thinking was more optimistic. It was agreed that there might be more comparison of view on this matter between the two military establishments.

Returning to the question of a reply to the aide-mémoire the Secretary said that we might at least go as far as mentioning the Western Peace Plan. Lord Home asked if we could not try to concert on a reply in the next few days, along the lines of restating our position with maybe a tricky question or two. Perhaps we would think out a more complete position carefully before putting it forth. Mr. McCloy and Mr. McGhee felt that we haven't stressed vigorously enough the point that East Berlin should be on the same terms as the Western part of the city.

(Further conversation during lunch)

The Secretary said that we hoped a reply on Berlin could be ready this week. It would be necessary, of course, to line up agreement on this reply on a quadripartite basis and to inform our NATO allies. Mr. Kohler said that he thought we should not dismiss the possibility of going to the ICJ on the whole question. The Secretary agreed that in our reply to the aide-mémoire we might ask the Soviets to agree that the legal issues be referred to the ICJ. If Khrushchev did not consent, this might of itself redound to our advantage. Mr. McCloy commented that he doubted that the case would reach the Court. Mr. Kohler agreed but thought that by making the attempt we might stave off action by the Soviets on Berlin for some time. He felt that if the case did get to the ICJ our position would be sustained.

The Secretary said that he agreed that we should try to counter the Soviet demands and he wondered whether the UN might not agree to undertake the protection of an access corridor to Berlin. This might be combined with an “all-Berlin” idea. He suggested that we might float the idea of a plenary peace conference in, say, November, to be composed of all of the ex-enemies of Germany. This might well take us through the winter months when an airlift would be difficult.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1461. Secret. Drafted by Moffett, initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on June 26.

[2] According to Rusk's Appointment Book, he stopped at London on June 5 after briefing de Gaulle and the North Atlantic Council, but no record of any discussions in London has been found. (Johnson Library)

[3] A copy of the first draft reply was transmitted to the White House on June 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-861) A second draft was transmitted on June 17. (Ibid., 762.00/6-1761)

[4] These conversations have not been identified, but probably occurred during talks on disarmament between McCloy and Menshikov in spring 1961.

41. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, June 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

Senator Mansfield's Speech on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Chester Bowles, Under Secretary

Wilhelm G. Grewe, Ambassador, German Embassy

Alfred G. Vigderman, EUR/GER

Ambassador Grewe called at his request to discuss Senator Mansfield's speech of June 14, 1961 on the Senate floor proposing a solution for Berlin.[2] The Under Secretary pointed out that this was the third time in three years that Senator Mansfield had made a similar speech. He assured the Ambassador that neither he nor the Secretary, nor so far as he knew, the President, had been even aware of what Senator Mansfield intended to say. The Under Secretary remarked that he could understand that there might be some confusion abroad resulting from the fact of Senator Mansfield's position as majority leader. Those who were familiar with the European parliamentary system and who were not as aware of the nature of the American system could easily fall into the misunderstanding of assuming that Senator Mansfield's views necessarily reflected the views of the government in power. Finally, the Under Secretary pointed out that if any consideration were to be given to revision of our policy on Berlin and Germany, the Germans would be the first to be consulted.

Ambassador Grewe pointed out that Senator Mansfield was supported in his views by the remarks of Senators Humphrey and Kefauver. People in Germany were bound to think that a strong tendency seemed to be developing in the majority party in the United States to favor a solution along the lines of the one proposed by Senator Mansfield. It was in the German view necessary that an authoritative statement separating the Administration from the views of Senator Mansfield be issued.

The Under Secretary observed that a formal statement by the Department would only increase the attention being given to the remarks of Senator Mansfield and could only result in further headlines, which was perhaps not what was wanted. To this the Ambassador countered that the German concern was both for the reaction of the German press to the Mansfield statement and the danger of the incorrect assumptions which the Soviets might draw from that statement. Reading from the New York Times, Ambassador Grewe remarked on the isolationist character of the following quotation from the speech:

"The full meaning of the Western commitment, Mr. Mansfield said, carries the ‘ultimate implication’ of American willingness to pledge ‘the lives and fortunes of every man, woman and child in the nation to Berlin's defense’."

This, Ambassador Grewe said, was precisely what was implied in any military alliance. The Ambassador went on to say that White House Press Assistant Secretary Hatcher when queried about the Mansfield statement had refused any comment, thereby leaving the situation ambiguous. On the basis of the foregoing, Khrushchev could easily think something was in movement in the United States.

The Under Secretary then ascertained from Mr. Roger Tubby, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, that there had been no questions from the press on this subject addressed to the State Department, but told the Ambassador that perhaps his wishes could be accommodated by the State Department press spokesmen at the daily noon briefing tomorrow when comment might be requested by a correspondent on the Mansfield speech.[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1561. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Vigderman and approved in U on June 22.

[2] For text of Mansfield's address to the Senate proposing a free city of Berlin to include all four sectors, and the ensuing remarks by other Senators, see Congressional Record, 87th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 107, pp. 10328-10334.

[3] At 6:15 p.m. on June 15 Bowles telephoned Kohler and reported Grewe's concern. Although Bowles was still skeptical, he told Kohler that the Department should issue a statement because Grewe was so insistent. Kohler agreed to draft a statement. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) On June 16 at the noon press briefing, the Department of State spokesman stated that Mansfield was speaking on his own and that the U.S. position on Berlin remained unchanged. This position was reiterated by Secretary Rusk later in the day. (Telegram 492 to Berlin, June 20; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/6-1961)

42. Record of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning[1]

Washington, June 16, 1961.

BERCON R-14

The participants were: White House—Mr. Acheson, Dr. Kissinger; State—EUR—Mr. Kohler (Chairman), Mr. Davis; G—Mr. Kitchen; S/P—Mr. McGhee, Mr. Fuller, Mr. Owen; SOV—Mr. Thompson, Mr. Guthrie, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Turpin; GER—Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Vigderman, Mr. Cash, Mr. Day; U—Mr. Rogers; B—Mr. Fluker; L/EUR—Mr. Kearney; B/FAC—Mr. Weiss; IO—Mr. Buffum, Mr. Palmer; RA—Mr. Burns; INR—Mr. Witt;S/S—Mr. Veliotes; Defense—Mr. Nitze, Col. Armstrong, Col. Wolf; JCS—Adm. Farrell, Lt. Col. Cannon;CIA—Mr. Stuart.

Mr. Kohler opened the meeting by saying we were faced with a new crisis, perhaps more serious than any before, which might bring Berlin contingency planning into play. He said that Mr. Acheson had been requested by the President to study Berlin contingency planning and was ready now to give his preliminary views.

Mr. Acheson began by saying that his purpose was not to interfere with any present operation but rather to stimulate further thought and activity. He said Berlin contingency planning was not simply an exercise divorced from reality because we had no choice but to assume that Khrushchev meant what he said. Decisions had to be made, and we had to act resolutely or not act at all.

A fundamental question, he continued, concerned the importance of Berlin. He said he thought Berlin was very, very important indeed, certainly involving deeply the prestige of the United States and perhaps its very survival. He did not believe a political solution was possible. The question was essentially one of US will, and we had to make up our minds and begin to act regardless of the opinions of our allies.

The central problem was that Khrushchev did not believe the risk of acting today was as great as it formerly was. Pressures on him might also have increased. In any event, he was now willing to do what he had not been willing to do before, and this was undoubtedly due to the feeling that we would not oppose him with nuclear weapons. Our problem was to increase his fear that we would use nuclear weapons if necessary.

Mr. Acheson continued by saying he began with the premise that our action depended on our determination to use nuclear weapons if we had to. Otherwise, we should not start. It was absolutely essential to increase the belief that we would use nuclear weapons to oppose Russian advances. Passivity did not increase deterrent credibility. By itself, the threat to use nuclear weapons did not increase the belief that we would use them. Nuclear weapons should not be looked upon as the last and largest weapon to be used, but as the first step in a new policy in protecting the United States from the failure of a policy of deterrence.

Mr. Acheson said that a basic question was what could be done to increase the credibility that we would use nuclear weapons. He said the military experts had to work out the use of force over a period of time beginning around the first of July and timed as an increasingly somber course. Time was a medium in which things happen. The effect of actions was increased when they were spread over a period of time. This also had the effect of excluding panic. The US had to make preparations and act as if it were prepared to use force up to, and including, nuclear force, if necessary. The only alternatives would be to have more luck than could be expected by any stretch of the imagination, or to withdraw from Berlin.

Mr. Acheson said that if he were right in his conclusion that Berlin was vital to the power position of the US, withdrawal would destroy our power position. We had to act so as neither to invite a series of defeats nor precipitate ourselves into the ultimate catastrophe.

He said the present Berlin contingency planning anticipated that at some point (not important for the present discussion) we would refuse to accept the demands made upon us. Our access would be blocked, and the crisis would occur. There would then be a symbolic probe, followed by certain political actions, and then a battalion would go up the Autobahn, be stopped, and we would have demonstrated that a blockage existed. He presumed that present Berlin contingency planning meant that nuclear weapons would be used, but his criticism was that everything would come too late to affect Soviet decisions before they were made. Nothing was planned to increase the belief that we would use nuclear weapons. This would really amount to preemptive war with nothing being done first to increase credibility. It would involve the use of nuclear weapons without getting the benefit of their deterrent effect.

It would be better to build up our preparations toward the use of force in order to put ourselves in the best possible position to act, as well as to make deterrents more credible.

As an illustration of what Mr. Acheson had in mind he cited the following, indicating that it was in very rough order and was entirely a military matter to be decided by the JCS and the Department of Defense. We might begin by intensive training of all reserve units. This would be much more than the usual summer training and would be designed to bring the reserve to battle-worthy condition. We might fly STRAC units to Europe and bring fewer men back, thus increasing our strength in Europe. There might be training exercises in Europe and redeployment of troops to battle stations as if in preparation for an action toward Berlin. The crash programs for Polaris and other missiles and submarines should continue. There should be a resumption of nuclear testing. There should be a resumption of the current equivalent of the U-2 flights. Later on, carriers should be deployed. There should be proclamations of limited and unlimited national emergencies, supporting resolutions in the Congress, and substantial increases in the military budget. There should be a movement of troops to Europe and a general alert of SAC.

If this did not affect Soviet decisions, and they proceeded as indicated, we should go into a garrison airlift for Berlin and continue to present ground traffic at the check points.

This might be followed by a military movement indicating the eventual use of tactical nuclear weapons and then strategic nuclear weapons.

It would be important to bring our allies along, but we should be prepared to go without them unless the Germans buckled. In the latter event, we would at least not have led the way to surrender. We should be prepared to go to the bitter end if the Germans go along with us.

Considerable preparation of the American people and Congress would be required, and a large program of air raid shelter construction might be undertaken.

These ideas should be explored during the next two weeks, a decision should be made, and action begun.

Mr. Acheson concluded by saying this was a very risky course, but it was not foolhardy if the US Government were really prepared to use nuclear weapons for the protection of Berlin on which we had staked our entire prestige. If we were not prepared to go all the way, we should not start. Once having started, backing down would be devastating. If we were not prepared to take all the risks, then we had better begin by attempting to mitigate the eventual disastrous results of our failure to fulfill our commitments.

Mr. Kohler expressed general agreement. He said Mr. Acheson's proposals fully answered the UK objections, since the approach which the British preferred would make no use of the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, but would prematurely lead to the decision on their actual use. The British have also said that the worse course of action militarily would be to expose a division or so to being chewed up on the Autobahn.

Mr. Acheson said that General Norstad had recently stated that it would be undesirable for the allies to use too small a force and be made to look ridiculous, while by contrast it would be highly worthwhile to concentrate strong forces in readiness near the Autobahn.

Mr. Nitze cautioned that General Norstad had seemed less sure that this larger force should actually cross the border, however. He said Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh had made the point that it was essential not to scare people to death with our buildup.

Mr. Acheson said the reactions of our allies were the crux and the hardest part of the whole matter. If our allies had serious inhibitions against action, we had better find it out. We should proceed not by asking them if they would be afraid if we said “boo!”. We should, instead, say “boo!” and see how far they jump.

Ambassador Thompson said he agreed a decision was certainly necessary. He said there were three time periods: (1) between now and the German elections in September or the October Communist party congress; (2) the period between then and the ratification of the separate peace treaty; and (3) the period thereafter.

The difficulty he saw was that we would be engaging Khrushchev's prestige to a maximum making it very hard for him to back down. We should leave room for him to back down. The suggested procedure would also develop maximum pressure behind the compromisers.

Ambassador Thompson felt that in the first time period we should take steps that would exert the maximum effect on the Russians and the minimum effect on our allies, e.g., construct air raid shelters, increase military supplies to Berlin, and so forth.

The way out Khrushchev might see might involve signing the separate treaty, thus in his view alleviating the frontier situation, and then seeing that the East Germans handle access to Berlin in a way tolerable to us. The way we act would determine what he thought would be tolerable to us. We must not corner him completely. The idea of the garrison airlift was appealing because it would leave Khrushchev a way out.

As it was important for our effect on the Russians that they not think we were isolated from our allies, it would perhaps be best not to say “boo!” first before getting the British leaders with us.

Mr. Acheson said it was quite a problem to convince Khrushchev we were serious while, at the same time, letting the British know we were not.

Mr. Kohler said the essential problem was to get into a position where we could give Khrushchev a face-saving device rather than have him give us one.

Ambassador Thompson felt that actions known only to the Russians would be the most effective.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that it would be difficult to conceal certain steps, Presidential declarations, justifications to Congress, and so forth.

Mr. Acheson felt that Congress might be persuaded to go along on the basis of the existing emergency legislation to be followed up at some later date with a supporting resolution.

Mr. McGhee asked whether proposing alternative solutions would be considered weakness by the Russians.

Ambassador Thompson replied affirmatively but said while not offering such proposals now, we should leave the way open to do so at a later date. He felt we should explore the possibility of holding a referendum in West Berlin.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that the earlier Adenauer proposal might be useful in this regard.

Mr. Nitze said it would be necessary to mobilize the entire US behind this program and that, therefore, it would certainly be visible. He said there was not a lot of time before a decision had to be made, if we hoped to influence Soviet actions. He estimated one year at the most and said that if the program were going to be implemented it had to be started promptly.

Mr. Kohler felt that Khrushchev would probably not move before the October party congress, but he might very well announce there that he planned to call a peace conference in December.

Ambassador Thompson suggested it might very well be useful now to go ahead with the visits of top-level Soviet air force officers to the US in order to show them the strength we have so that they might exert their influences before a point of no return. He felt putting on an impressive show for them might have a real restraining effect.

Admiral Farrell said the Soviets had a good idea what we have; the important thing was to give them the impression that we were prepared to use it.

Mr. Kohler said the thing that was most urgently needed was a good, clear directive from the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense as to what they wanted done. He asked Mr. Acheson how soon this might be expected.

Mr. Acheson felt that the basic papers should be gotten to the two Secretaries and the President at the earliest possible moment so that they could make their decision.

Mr. Kohler said we had to make up our own minds, and our allies would follow.

Mr. Acheson said the garrison airlift was appealing because to stop it the Soviets would have to shoot a plane down. He was, however, certain that even with the garrison airlift the situation would heat up very quickly.

Ambassador Thompson said that given even the best outcome, we would end up paying a certain price. We should attempt to find out what that price would be and see if we could advance it as a solution. He indicated that British and American statements along the lines of the French statement on the Oder-Neisse Line and other frontiers would form an element in such a price.

Mr. Acheson said that the basis for decision should be before the two Secretaries by the end of next week. It had to be done within ten days at the very outside.

Admiral Farrell said that at the next Ambassadorial Group meeting the British representative should be queried as to the status of progress in CINCBAOR's plan for employment of a tripartite reinforced division to restore ground access to Berlin. In addition, it might also be appropriate to request any recent information on the further plans for conducting training for the tripartite BCT forces.

Mr. Nitze said the Department of Defense felt the British-suggested meeting of the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff was unnecessary, and it would, therefore, be difficult to ask the British for this information having just indicated that our lines of communication with “Live Oak” were good enough so that a meeting was not necessary. Mr. Nitze felt it might not, after all, be unwise to get the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff together.

Admiral Farrell suggested that we explore the feasibility of attempting once again to obtain British and French approval for greater German participation in “Live Oak” planning, as previously recommended by General Norstad and supported by the United States.

It was agreed that this would be raised on June 17 with the British and the French.

Mr. Nitze said June 26 was the target date for getting a full set of answers for Mr. Acheson from JCS.[2]

He continued that it might be well for a working group to start soon, perhaps June 19, to list the various kinds of steps necessary to be taken.

Admiral Farrell said his people were working on the basis that a favorable decision would be made.

Mr. Davis said State would undertake the preparation of a paper in conjunction with Defense. He said Mr. Hillenbrand was the logical person and promised that State would contact Defense the week of the 19th.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, BQD-CCI. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash. Attached to the source text was a distribution cover sheet.

[2] On June 12 Bundy had sent a memorandum to McNamara asking, in connection with the report that Acheson was doing for the President on Berlin, for studies on various measures the United States might take to influence Soviet decisions on Berlin. The studies were not to reflect policy decisions, but to provide an analytical framework for review of the Berlin problem. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Secretary of Defense et al. Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Germany 091)

43.Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, June 17, 1961, 7:34 p.m.

2267. Eyes only for Chiefs of Mission, Stoessel, and Norstad. Taking advantage of presence in Washington of Shuckburgh and Laloy, Kohler and other Departmental officers have held series bilateral, tripartite and quadripartite discussions on Berlin over past three days.[2] These understood to be informal and not binding on govts but resulted in useful exchange of views on various current aspects of Berlin question. Principal subjects covered were:

1) Reply to Soviet Aide-mémoire of June 4

US circulated to British, French and German's working draft of possible US reply to Soviet aide-mémoire received in Vienna.[3] Text deals at some length with standard Soviet arguments and concludes with alternative endings. First alternative proposes that issue re status respective parties in Germany and Berlin and effect any separate peace treaty on such status be submitted to International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 36 of Court Charter. Second alternative advances all-Berlin proposal.

In explaining rationale for Court proposal, Kohler noted that certainty very great that Soviets would never voluntarily submit to jurisdiction of International Court. As exchange with Soviets on this subject taking place, we and Allies would start taking certain measures military preparedness in line with contingency plans which now under active review US Govt. After Soviet rejection US proposal for contentious litigation, we would then consider going into Security Council, as likewise contemplated in contingency plans, seeking both cease and desist order and request by Council for advisory opinion from Court on legal issue involved. If, as anticipated, Soviets veto such request, then consideration would be given to going into General Assembly and repeating same process, except that Soviet veto would not apply. While this taking place Western Powers would have numerous opportunities to make speeches, propagandize and win wide public support for their position on Berlin. Idea would be to keep Soviets on defensive, and on assumption some country bound in any event bring Berlin issue into UN once it begins approach critical point, course of action proposed would enable Western Powers to keep better control of situation by having problem arise in UN on our terms. Kohler stressed that Court would of course not be asked to adjudicate fact of Western rights in Berlin but Soviet claim that by its unilateral action those rights can be extinguished.

Ensuing discussion showed considerable interest in possibility such Western initiative, though agreed this would represent important policy step which would require careful prior consideration by govts. Shuckburgh concurred that Berlin would get into UN whether Western Powers liked it or not and that it was better that it get in on our terms rather than have it dragged in on somebody else's terms. He said possibility would be put by Home to Prime Minister next Tuesday after which British would have more definitive reaction.

Speaking against background of what he admitted was President de Gaulle's “allergy” against anything smacking of UN, Laloy said he could appreciate rationale of suggested approach. He expressed doubt however about possible effect on Khrushchev and wondered whether such action might not precipitate crisis rather than serve to delay it. If present Soviet threats were comparable to those in past, perhaps West should think twice before taking action which might bring about very situation Western Powers trying to avoid. He pointed in this connection to certain hesitancies and ambiguities which he had noted in most recent Khrushchev speech explaining post-Vienna position.[4] It was agreed that speech deserved careful analysis to determine whether any such significance could be read into it.

Grewe likewise expressed personal doubts about course of action. He wondered whether West could actually be sure of case if it should get into Court. He also wondered whether Western ammunition was not being fired too soon. Kohler commented that there was pretty strong feeling in Washington that this time we were moving toward real confrontation with Soviets over Berlin and that Soviet aide-mémoire was opening gun.

We had for obvious reasons maintained relative silence on question since May 1960 while Soviets continued propagate their “peace treaty” and “free city” gambits. However felt that we must now get into more positive general posture with view to developing political, propaganda and deterrent campaign which we would be prepared to sustain from now to end of year.

In response to query by Shuckburgh as to whether all-Berlin alternative should be given equal weight, personal view those present was that, while this subject to further consideration by govts, main attention should be on Court proposal.

2. German Reply to Soviet Memorandum of February 17

After considerable discussion text of reply agreed.[5] Germans noted however that FonOff had indicated it wished propose some additional language which would require meeting of Four Power Working Group next week. It was also agreed that final form of German response could really only be determined when basic decisions made as to content US reply to aide-mémoire of June 4. Grewe observed that there was considerable pressure on German Govt to send long-delayed German reply to Soviets. In discussion related timing of German and US response, despite certain German hesitancies, consensus was that this likewise could only finally be decided in light timing American response. Kohler commented that delivery American reply before July 4 holiday weekend would be desirable in order ensure maximum publicity and suggested there might perhaps be two-day gap between two, with German reply following. Grewe said German reply would lose all impact if it came in wake of American. Shuckburgh and Laloy pointed out that timing envisaged seemed too tight in view importance American reply and need for careful governmental consideration. Kohler observed one merit of early reply was that it would cut off speculation on possible weakening our position.

Only substantive point of importance in discussion German reply was whether specific language should be included in response to Soviet charge of German militarism, as in earlier draft, that FedRep does not seek independent nuclear capability or transfer of nuclear weapons to national jurisdiction. Grewe said that his Govt felt that this was something which should be kept in store for possible later use and not included as commitment vis-à-vis Soviets, who are here giving nothing in return. This argument generally accepted, but inclusion such language in American reply to aide-mémoire, as in draft under discussion, considered desirable as statement of fact which US would be in position to make.

3. Contingency Planning

This subject discussed only bilaterally and tripartitely. Kohler noted that subject presently under intensive review in US Govt and that we hoped shortly to come up with some fairly specific proposals to heighten effectiveness of Western deterrent in Berlin situation. He stressed US feeling, which conveyed to both British and French on previous occasions, that US felt probe contemplated on too small a scale to prove anything and that action to reopen access required greater commitment of Western forces as well as firm decisions by govts to planning and execution of courses of action. Shuckburgh noted that one difficulty was that British did not feel present Live Oak exercise represented adequate mechanism, from that point of view, for injection views of British Chiefs of Staff. He claimed that it was impossible for British Govt to make political decisions required when British Chiefs of Staff seem to differ with us in their evaluation basic facts involved, such as feasibility airlift, implications of ground action, etc. He therefore proposed that British and French Chiefs of Staff send high level representation to Washington to discuss directly with US Chiefs of Staff. US suggested that British and French might consider sending higher level officers to participate in Live Oak discussions. British may however continue press for meeting of type indicated.

4. Procedures

Shuckburgh, Laloy and Kohler agreed that meeting of three at one of capitals extending for 10-day period might be desirable toward end of July to attempt tie together various strands of allied planning both re contingency planning and tactics and substance for next round with Soviets. No decision taken in this matter, but agreement was general that some sort of working group session as prior to Geneva Conference 1959 and Summit Conference 1960 would probably be necessary, whether or not West attempting move toward negotiations with Soviets prior to threatened peace treaty action. Question of German participation such meeting raised but not decided, although US view is that this essential. Kohler also urged full German participation in Washington Ambassadorial Group and closer association with Live Oak exercise. French and British seemed more responsive than previously and said would take up with their Govts.

Full memoranda of conversation being pouched.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1761. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Paris and London and repeated to Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

[2] Memoranda of Kohler's conversations with Shuckburgh on June 15 and Laloy on June 16 are ibid., 762.00/6-1561 and 762.00/6-1661; memoranda of the tripartite discussion on June 16 and the quadripartite discussion on June 17 are ibid., 762.0221/6-1761.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 40.

[4] For the English text of Khrushchev's address on June 15, see Documents on International Affairs, 1961, pp. 286-302. Extracts are printed in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 734-736, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 579-583.

[5] This text has not been found; for the text as delivered on July 12, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Zweiter Halbband, pp. 1227-1230; for the English text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 750-753.

44.Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, June 19, 1961.

DEAR DEAN: In this afternoon's discussions in the White House[2] I mentioned the possibility of Khrushchev using the Berlin Question to gain concessions in Southeast Asia.

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum which I sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff this morning on the same subject which may be of interest to you.

Sincerely,

Arleigh

Enclosure[3]

Washington, June 19, 1961.

Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Op-61B

SUBJECT

Berlin (U)

1. Mr. Khrushchev's deliberate initiation and intensification of the Berlin crisis may well be prompted by a conviction that the time is propitious for the removal of the West Berlin enclave. This is his ostensible motivation, and such an interpretation appears to be supported by a degree of logic. However, there are considerations which militate against accepting this rationale completely.

2. Khrushchev is fully aware of the fundamental nature of the Berlin problem to the United States. He knows that we know that a firm U.S. stand is essential to the preservation of the NATO alliance and to the power position of the U.S. in Western Europe and eventually in the world. Understanding this, even if he considers that we have weakened in the strength of our convictions, he must realize that the stark confrontation he has presented us on Berlin is extremely hazardous. Khrushchev has stated that he does not want a war over Berlin. He most certainly does not want an all-out nuclear war. It is probable that he does not even want to hazard current Soviet momentum by any kind of a war.

3. If a Berlin settlement with significant advantage to the USSR appears to Khrushchev to be unattainable, it is quite possible that he would seek a quid pro quo elsewhere in exchange for a deferment of a solution on Berlin. It may be that he has deliberately raised the alarm on Berlin in order to seek concessions elsewhere. One of the most dangerous areas for seeking such a concession would be Southeast Asia. He may envision a relaxation of the Berlin crisis in exchange for an understanding that the U.S. would not forcefully resist further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.

4. As tension mounts in Europe, there will be an increasingly strong tendency to focus our concern on Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and others responsible for planning and the formulation of national policy should bear in mind that faced with an impasse on Berlin, the Soviets may seek to obtain advantage elsewhere. U.S. acceptance of such an alternative would perhaps be less dramatic than a Berlin defeat in undermining U.S. leadership of the Free World, but the end result would be no less certain.[4]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1961. Secret.

[2] The meeting at the White House dealt with the recommendations of the Cuban Task Force, but according to Burke's notes:

"There was a long discussion on Berlin. I gave a speech on Berlin and the need to stand fast. If we gave up on Berlin and were unable to keep status quo on Berlin, we would lose the world. I then gave a speech similar to the memorandum which I turned in this morning (copy attached). The President and the Vice President listened, with the Vice President nodding affirmatively all the time. Mr. Rusk didn't say anything.

"There were considerable questions about our military preparations for Berlin, and the State Department preparations for Berlin. All the plans from all departments should be ready by the end of this week. It was pointed out that some such board as this would be useful for the Berlin situation.” (Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Bumpy Road Materials)

[3] Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[4] On July 14, in response to a question by the President, Rostow also commented on the connection between Berlin and Southeast Asia, stating in particular that the U.S. military buildup should take into account the crises in both areas. For text of his memorandum to the President, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963 , vol. I, pp. 215-216 .

45. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, June 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

Reply to the Soviet Aide-mémoire of June 4, 1961, on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State

Herve Alphand, French Ambassador

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State

Claude Lebel, Minister of French Embassy

Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor of French Embassy

William R. Tyler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

The Ambassador said he had received a message from Foreign Minister Couve de Murville instructing him to inform the Secretary that in the course of his recent conversation with Gromyko in Geneva, the latter informed him from Khrushchev personally that the substance of the aide-mémoire of June 4 on Berlin was intended to apply to the French and UK Governments as well as to that of the United States.[2]

In view of this, the French Government felt it would be desirable, in the interest of Western solidarity, for it, and the British also, to send a note to the Soviet Government. He said the British were being approached in London today on this matter. The Ambassador went on to say that his Government felt the three replies should be identical, or at least very similar. At the same time, the French Government felt that the reply should restrict itself entirely to statements of principle, and should not propose any course of action by the West or even hint at any initiative which it might take. He said that his Government felt that any suggestion at this time of going to the ICJ would weaken the public position of the West since it would imply a certain weakening of Western resolve.

In reply to the Ambassador's question the Secretary said that we would be prepared to consider the idea of sending three replies to the Soviet aide-mémoire, but that it would be desirable that these be, if not identical, at least very nearly so. Mr. Kohler recalled that we considered it desirable to propose to the Soviets that we go to the ICJ, and that this should be borne in mind by the Ambassador in advising Paris of our willingness, in principle, to consider the idea of three replies, assuming the British were prepared to go along.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2461. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Tyler and approved in S on June 29.

[2] Gromyko had informed Couve de Murville along these lines on June 16.

46. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, June 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

German Ambassador Wilhelm C. Grewe

The Secretary

Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand,GER

Ambassador Grewe said he had come under instructions to deliver to the Secretary an aide-mémoire setting forth his Government's views on the role of the Federal Republic in the event of Western military action on carrying out Berlin contingency plans.[2] This, it would be recalled, had been requested during the visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Washington in April. Ambassador Grewe added that he was himself going to Bonn on consultation the following Saturday and would therefore appreciate some indication of the latest American thinking on Berlin.

After thanking the Ambassador for the aide-mémoire, the Secretary stated that the most immediate problem was to move ahead with our reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire handed us at Vienna. After the quadripartite discussion was completed, there had to be consultation with the other NATO countries. We now had a draft to give to the French, British and Germans which represented a governmentally-approved draft.[3] Mr. Kohler observed that we would distribute this at the Four-Power meeting scheduled for June 26.[4] In response to Ambassador Grewe's query, Mr. Kohler indicated that the draft still included the language about submission of the case to the International Court of Justice but that the French had already expressed their opposition. Ambassador Grewe said that he was also under instructions to ask for elimination of the International Court from the present response. The German Government had hesitations about the idea and wanted more time to study it.

The Secretary commented that the problem was that an important legal point is at the heart of the Soviet position, i.e., whether our rights can be terminated by unilateral Soviet action. The Soviets normally try to give a legal cloak to their actions, and the legal point must be dealt with in our reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire. As far as other countries are concerned, it would strengthen our case if we could note that procedures exist for determining legal points of this kind. Ambassador Grewe said he agreed that it was important to refute the Soviet legal argument. Actually most of the Bonn objections were directed at the suggested subsequent action of having the Security Council request an advisory opinion from the Court. In response to the Secretary's query, Ambassador Grewe confirmed that this reflected a general feeling of uncertainty on the part of his Government about the role of the UN in the Berlin question. The Secretary commented that, if the question heated up, others would bring it into the UN whether we liked it or not. Ambassador Grewe agreed that this might happen in a later stage of the development of the crisis. Mr. Kohler noted that in our contingency plans we had agreed to go to the Security Council in a sort of injunction procedure. A country cannot go into the UN just for an advisory opinion but must submit its case. The contingency plans provide for our trying to get a cease and desist order.

The Secretary said that we are trying to bring to an early conclusion certain military studies started shortly after Vienna. We hoped that by the end of this month we would be ready to start talking about these. We believed we must review the existing contingency plans before the next round of discussions with our Allies. We hoped this review would soon be completed. In the meantime, the earlier contingency plans were still there. We hoped, the Secretary continued, that the other Governments were reviewing their positions, but we also wished to create the impression that there was no weakness on our part about West Berlin. This presented somewhat of a dilemma. It was obviously our desire to bring our thinking up-to-date but we must avoid any appearance of weakness. This problem had emerged during his press conference on Thursday,[5] the Secretary noted.

Ambassador Grewe observed that both Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Von Brentano understood fully the President's remarks in April that the West must improve its contingency planning.[6] The Ambassador pointed out that the question of German participation in this planning was raised in the second part of the aide-mémoire he had just given the Secretary. He had the impression that British and French opposition to this had diminished. The Secretary commented that full consultation with the Federal Republic would obviously be necessary. Other consultations might also be possible arising out of the difference in initial responsibility.

Ambassador Grewe went on to say that the second part of the aide-mémoire also drew attention to the civilian traffic to and from West Berlin. This required urgent study, particularly its relationship to the question of nonmilitary countermeasures. The Ambassador noted that in his presentation in Paris the Secretary had mentioned a tripartite paper on nonmilitary countermeasures. The Federal Republic wanted to participate in and contribute to the discussion of this subject. Mr. Kohler said that the British and French agreed that the Germans should participate in this.

The Secretary observed that failure to consider civilian traffic was not a result of any specific conclusions being drawn from our review of contingency planning. He did not draw any real distinction between military and civilian supplies. The military position would become impossible if the civilian population were starving. We were taking this fully into account. Mr. Kohler commented that the airlift during the Berlin blockade of 1948-49 had dramatically demonstrated how civilian traffic could become military traffic. The Secretary went on to say that some thought that a Soviet blockade would concentrate on military supplies. He had thought that the chances were perhaps greater that the Soviets would focus on civilian traffic so as to be able to say they were not interfering with military traffic. Mr. Kohler said that we had considered that there was a certain balance of interest between the East and West Germans which kept the traffic moving. Since the breakdown of the Summit Meeting in May, 1960, however, we had given much attention to civilian traffic. Ambassador Grewe observed that the legal position of civilian traffic had to be elaborated. There was no agreed formula covering it. Mr. Kohler noted that the two kinds of traffic had been treated differently in practice, and Ambassador Grewe added that the Soviets obviously believed them to be different. Mr. Kohler agreed the precise situation of civilian traffic must be spelled out.

The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Grewe were willing to make any observations about the possible attitude of the East German population in event there were serious trouble in connection with Berlin. The Ambassador said there would certainly not be any popular support for any action taken by Ulbricht. He was actively supported only by party functionaries. The big majority of East Germans wanted to see West Berlin remain as it is. It was important to them as a potential escape hatch, a place where they could visit relatives. Whether these people would cause trouble was another question, however. He did not expect they would do much except perhaps in the event of armed conflict on the access routes with large Allied contingents including Bundeswehr units, penetrating East Germany. This would introduce new factors. This possibility was something to which the West should point one day, making clear to Khrushchev that he could not calculate strength purely in terms of opposing military divisions but must also consider the eventuality of internal trouble in East Germany. [1 line of source text not declassified]

Referring to the aide-mémoire handed the Secretary by Ambassador Grewe, Mr. Kohler observed that it concentrated on the point of military conflict. Could it be assumed to be implicit that, as far as preparations or redeployments which might be desirable in the build-up period were concerned, German backstopping could be counted on? Ambassador Grewe said that Bonn had not commented specifically on this, but his interpretation would be along the lines indicated by Mr. Kohler. The Secretary observed that this also flowed from what was said in the aide-mémoire about contingency planning.

Ambassador Grewe said that his Government felt to an increasing degree that emphasis on nonmilitary countermeasures was important. Khrushchev would concentrate on nonmilitary measures, i.e., on small actions to which the West would find it difficult to counter with military action.

There followed a discussion of the factual situation on the Autobahn to Berlin. Ambassador Grewe concluded that the initial test would most likely apply to military rather than civilian traffic since the procedures covering the former would presumably immediately be affected by a Soviet peace treaty with the GDR.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6-2461. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand, also initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on July 3.

[2] An English translation of this aide-mémoire, mistakenly dated June 26, is ibid., 762.00/6-2661.

[3] For text of this draft, dated June 20, see Declassified Documents, 1977, 46E.

[4] At the June 26 meeting the Four-Power Working Group completed consideration of the German reply to the Soviet note of February 17 (see footnote 4, Document 43), and agreed that substantially identical notes should be sent by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in response to the Soviet aide-mémoire of June 4. In addition the United States agreed to drop from its draft the idea of an appeal to the International Court of Justice. (Memorandum of conversation, June 29; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2961)

[5] For a transcript of Rusk's June 22 press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1961, pp. 51-57.

[6] See Document 17.

47. Editorial Note

On June 26, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to Secretary of Defense McNamara, for transmission to the White House, JCSM-431-61, which was their response to Bundy's memorandum of June 12 (see footnote 2, Document 42). Attached to JCSM-431-61 were the three studies that Acheson had requested to form a framework for the review of the Berlin question. Paragraph 3 of JCSM-431-61 reads as follows:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the immediate concern is to influence Soviet decisions on Berlin before they are taken this summer or fall. United States preparations for the Berlin crisis—in the US, in Europe, and world-wide—should be taken in both nuclear and nonnuclear military areas concurrently. In this connection the requirement for modernizing, strengthening, and improving the US and Allied military posture world-wide has been recognized; however, the basic consideration remains the need for re-establishing the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Our Allies must have the confidence and the USSR must be made to believe that the United States has the will and determination to use nuclear weapons in the defense of NATO, Berlin or the US position world-wide, as necessary, rather than submit to Soviet abrogation of US and Allied rights or position. Berlin is the immediate concern, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the questions posed by Mr. Acheson are contained herein.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, BQD-CCI Berlin Contingency Planning)

48. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

Paris, June 27, 1961, 1:35 p.m.

ALO 565. Personal for Chairman JCS and Director Joint Staff from Gen Norstad.

I was very pleased to participate in the recent meeting with the JCS and Acheson when the subject of Berlin was discussed.[2] Since you were not able to attend, I send herewith a brief summary of my views:

The present threat to the Allied position in Berlin is certainly more serious than other similar crises during the last five years, perhaps even more critical than the blockade in 1948-9; on the political side, this situation demands decisions, policies and plans; certainly the general direction of our course must be established now. Since this is too obvious to require further emphasis here, I will limit my comments to the field of military actions.

In the first place, any military measures should, in their nature and timing, be related directly to political decisions, actions or overtures, they must lead step by step to the establishment of a position, to the achievement of a purpose. They must:

1. Add, in fact, to our strength and improve our posture.

2. Contribute to the credibility of the deterrent by conveying to the Soviet the impression of calm, deliberate preparation for a serious response.

3. Enhance the chances of success of the political measures to which they are related.

4. Leave us at all times in a position of flexibility.

It seems to me that military measures may be divided into three broad categories:

1. The fundamental, including steps to improve national preparedness such as special reserve training, increased emphasis on civil defense, mobilization activity particularly in the logistics fields, etc.

2. The strategic, including movement of troops to Europe ostensibly for training purposes, improvement of supply position in the theater, etc.

3. The tactical, including movement of troops to positions from which actual military action could be launched.

Both the timing and the specific nature of actions must, of course, relate to political steps being considered. In principle, however, I believe certain fundamental actions should be undertaken now, to be followed in due time by activities in the other two categories in the order indicated, as the situation dictates.

It seems to me that we must retain flexibility, freedom of action, whatever we do. Rigid measures would call for opposite but greater reactions and thus quickly lead to hand-over-hand escalation which, even at an early stage could commit us to a road from which there could be no turning except by resort to all-out war or by the acceptance of defeat. To avoid this, I believe that if reserves are called up for training, the call-up should be for a stated period of time after which we would be free to exercise our judgement as to whether they should be retained for an additional period, whether others should be called up to take their place, or whether the whole project should be stopped.

In the strategic category, movement of troops should be conducted under the guise of training. For example, if three battle groups should come over at any given time, perhaps two could return to the U.S. and be replaced by another two or even more.

Similar illustrations could be developed within the tactical category.

At this time, I believe we should avoid announcing that we are taking actions on a “for the duration” basis, since this would quickly establish positions of the utmost rigidity on both sides and would lead to escalation at an accelerating rate.

It seems to me that we must be absolutely firm in support of our rights in Berlin; we must make it absolutely clear that we intend to discharge our obligations to the people of that city.

However, the measures we employ to gain our objectives should, and I believe can, leave us with considerable freedom of action. In the military field our activities must clearly add to our effective strength and general preparedness and, at the same time, leave us in a position of flexibility. Such a position, if coordinated with appropriate political actions, would provide us with the best foundation from which to meet the threat of the next six months. Needless to say, the value of any actions which may be taken by us will be multiplied many times if, at the same time, equivalent or supporting measures are taken by our Allies.[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2761. Secret; Priority. Repeated eyes only to the Department of State, which copy is the source text.

[2] The meeting took place on June 14 and is mentioned in JCSM-431-61 (see Document 47); no other record of this meeting has been found.

[3] Later on June 27 Lemnitzer replied that he appreciated Norstad's views, and in particular agreed with the need to retain flexibility of action. Lemnitzer reported that the JCS and Secretary of Defense McNamara had discussed Berlin at length on June 26 and 27 and on the latter date agreed that there must be military alternatives short of nuclear weapons following the rebuff of a probe and that a substantial expansion of U.S. forces was the required alternative. (JCS 998202; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables)

49. Report by Dean Acheson[1]

Washington, June 28, 1961.

I. Foreword

A. The Nature of the Issue

The issue over Berlin, which Khrushchev is now moving toward a crisis to take place, so he says, toward the end of 1961, is far more than an issue over that city. It is broader and deeper than even the German question as a whole. It has become an issue of resolution between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the outcome of which will go far to determine the confidence of Europe—indeed, of the world—in the United States. It is not too much to say that the whole position of the United States is in the balance.

Until this conflict of wills is resolved, an attempt to solve the Berlin issue by negotiation is worse than a waste of time and energy. It is dangerous. This is so because what can be accomplished by negotiation depends on the state of mind of Khrushchev and his colleagues.

At present, Khrushchev has demonstrated that he believes his will will prevail because the United States and its allies will not do what is necessary to stop him. He cannot be persuaded by eloquence or logic, or cajoled by friendliness. As Sir William Hayter has written, “The only way of changing [the Russians'] purpose is to demonstrate that . . . what they want to do is not possible."[2]

Until that demonstration is made, no negotiation can accomplish more than to cover with face-saving devices submission to Soviet demands.

Once the demonstration has been made, negotiation can resolve the issue in a number of ways, from face-saving for a Soviet retreat to mutual concessions on non-vital matters. Solutions of this nature are outlined in Chapter III, below.

To offer any concessions now, however, will only result in an appearance of weakness and real impairment of future negotiating position.

Ambassador Thompson has stated the principal objectives of the Berlin offensive:

1. To stabilize the regime in East Germany and prepare the way for the eventual recognition of the East German regime;

2. To legalize the eastern frontiers of Germany;

3. To neutralize Berlin as a first step and prepare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;

4. To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance; and

5. To discredit the United States or at least seriously damage our prestige.[3]

It is plain that, if carried to its conclusion, the Berlin offensive strikes at the power and world position of the United States. Even its more limited purposes are gravely damaging to the United States and the Western Alliance. This is the nature of the crisis which confronts us; not the fate of a city, or of its two and one-half million people, or even the integrity of our pledged word.

So long as issues of the magnitude outlined are sought by the U.S.S.R., and believed by them to be within their grasp, real negotiation is impossible. Only by winning the test of will can we change the Soviets' purpose. Only thus can we demonstrate that what they want to do is not possible.

B. The Nature of the Demonstration

West Berlin has been protected, in the last analysis, by the fear that interference with the city, or with access to it, would result in war between the United States and the Soviet Union. War, as used here, means eventually nuclear war.

If Khrushchev now contemplates embarking on a course of interference, and later does so, it means that his fear of war resulting has declined. He has been quoted as saying as much.

The capability of U.S. nuclear power to devastate the Soviet Union has not declined over the past two years. The decline in the effectiveness of the deterrent, therefore, must lie in a change in Soviet appraisal of U.S. willingness to go to nuclear war over the issue which Khrushchev reiterates his determination to present.

This being so, the problem is how to restore the credibility of the deterrent—that is, how to cause Khrushchev to revise his apparent appraisal of U.S. willingness to resort to nuclear war, rather than to submit to Soviet demands.

Two methods commonly suggested completely miss the nature of the problem.

The first of these is for the United States to threaten to use its nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union should give control of access to Berlin to the East Germans and if they should attempt to exercise it. But, if Khrushchev's belief in U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons over this issue is not sufficient to deter him from going forward with the plan, the threat to use them would not deter him either. He would not believe that we would carry it out.

The second suggestion is that, if and when the East Germans take over the control points and attempt to exercise control, a small allied military force, e.g., a few vehicles, should brush aside the control officers and proceed towards Berlin. If this force is not stopped by the East Germans, so the argument runs, the latter would have been deterred from exercising control of Berlin traffic. If the force is stopped and turned back, and if protests, military preparations, economic pressures, and diplomatic moves are not effective, the next resort would be use of force on the order of a battalion or somewhat larger. If this force were turned back, eventual resort would presumably be to nuclear war.

There are several conclusive objections to this suggestion.

The principal one is that it is not addressed to the main point—Russian disbelief in U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons. If this disbelief continues, the East Germans would wave the small force, and then the battalions, on to Berlin and continue to control traffic on unacceptable terms, or they would stop both the force and the traffic. They would not have been deterred. If the U.S. then resorted to nuclear war, it would be doing so not to deter interference with access to Berlin, but because deterrence had failed. The United States would have failed to convince Khrushchev that it would do what, in the end, it did do—and failed largely because it would have made no effort to convince him by its conduct prior to final action.

Thus we would have suffered the worst of both worlds. We would have started nuclear war without having had the benefit of the deterrent effect which our determination to start that war, rather than submit, would—if known—have had on Russian decisions.

The lesson of this reasoning is plain. The resort to nuclear war is not a deterrent; nuclear weapons are not the last and most powerful weapons in the hierarchy of violence to be employed to protect Berlin. Their employment would mark their failure as a deterrent, and would be designed to protect the United States and its allies from the consequences of that failure.

Thus we are continually thrown back on the necessity of devising, and starting quickly, a course of conduct which will change the present apparent Russian disbelief that the United States would go to nuclear war over Berlin, rather than submit. This report submits a plan to do this. Before coming to the plan, an early, secret, and vital decision is necessary.

C. The Decision to Resort to Nuclear War, If Necessary

Nothing could be more dangerous than to embark upon a course of action of the sort described in this paper in the absence of a decision to accept nuclear war rather than accede to the demands which Khrushchev is now making, or their substantial equivalent.

To do so would be a policy of bluff, with disaster as the consequence of the bluff being called. The disaster might even take the form of our receiving a nuclear strike if the impression we made was better than our determination.

To think of the bluff as a “calculated” risk is pure self-deception because there can be no quantitative calculation of that risk in the Berlin situation.

All that can be safely said is that Khrushchev probably would not incur the certainty of nuclear war over Berlin if he could see far enough ahead that war was certain. But, given his background and the inherent obscurity of the situation, we cannot be sure that before events had passed beyond control he would see that war was certain.

To sum up the situation: There is a substantial chance, not subject to evaluation, that the preparations for war and negotiation outlined here would convince Khrushchev that what he wants is not possible without war, and cause him to change his purpose. There is, also, a substantial possibility that war might result.

It is, therefore, essential to make an early decision on accepting the hazard and preparing for it. The “substantial possibility” of the success of the course of action here depends on the existence of a core of hard decision, understood in all its grimness and cost. Furthermore, the condition of the country in the event of war will also depend on an early and deliberate decision. A hasty and improvised decision in the eleventh hour of approaching panic and hysteria could add vastly to the cost of war.

II. Preparations

To convince the Soviets that we are in earnest about defending Berlin we must be in earnest about it.

This means that the military, economic, and political power needed for this defense should be made ready for use. Measures to this end should be begun immediately and should be increased over the time available.

It is not necessary that all military preparations have been completed by the time that East German personnel are expected to replace Soviet personnel along the access routes. The use of force might be deferred for some time after this, while final military preparations are being completed. This would enable us to avoid steps which would prematurely raise tensions, at a time when this might divide the alliance and circumscribe Khrushchev's flexibility in negotiations—thus hindering attainment of our basic purpose. The more drastic of our preparations will be more impressive to Moscow, and perhaps, have a less disturbing effect on our allies if taken later on as the crisis deepens, when they will be more suited to the immediacy of the threat.

The purpose of the preparatory measures will be twofold: (1) to put us in a position, at an appropriate time, to use the power necessary to achieve our purpose; and (2) to convince the Soviets, by the extent of our preparations and of our commitment, that we have determined to go to the use of force, including nuclear war, rather than submit.

If these preparations are to have their full and essential effect, they must be wholly authentic and real. They must not be affected or deflected by alleged psychological considerations designed to impress the Russians. Both to impress the Soviets and, later on, to preserve this nation, the preparations must be as solid and sound as time permits. The phoney is easily recognized and almost surely will be disastrous.

We should neither conceal nor dramatize our preparations. To conceal them would be impossible. To dramatize our preparations would be self-defeating, both in suggesting to the Soviets that these preparations were designed primarily for effect and in frightening our own people, our friends, and neutrals. Announcements should be made in a low key and related to world tensions rather than to Berlin alone, so as to avoid giving the appearance of laying down a direct challenge to Khrushchev on this issue.

Along with these preparations should go constant education as to the real nature of the Berlin issue, assertion of our continued readiness to meet and discuss this issue with the Soviets, and frank elucidation why basic interests are not negotiable.

The preparations, and the subsequent action, suggested here will require the closest consultation and planning with our allies, first with the British and French and then with all our NATO allies. This government should lead the joint planning both in proposals and, more importantly, in action to put them into effect. The British, especially, and perhaps the Germans, too, will be more ready to follow action rather than to accept proposals. The latter can be delayed and frustrated by endless debate and refinement. Our unilateral action should generally be timed so as to spur decision and action by our allies.

We should not argue publicly with our allies if they hesitate to go as far and fast in their preparations as we do; this would only advertise divisions in the Western camp. Nor should we decrease the extent or speed of our preparations, to correspond to theirs.

If it becomes clear that our preparations are causing our allies to defect from the basic Western position regarding Berlin, we should, of course, reconsider the matter. Barring this eventuality, however, we should move forward vigorously and seek to persuade our allies to go as far as possible with us, rather than join those who will be clamoring for a face-saving surrender to Soviet demands.

So far as positive help is concerned, the Germans are probably the most important of our allies and the French, for logistic reasons if nothing else, second. If West Germany should collapse along the way, the Western position would be in bad shape. A “damage control” operation would be in order and should be in the plans. (See Chapter V)

B. The Stages of Preparatory Action[4]

Preparatory action should be taken in three stages, increasing both in seriousness and in being pointed directly at the Berlin crisis.

1. The first stage should be between the Fourth of July and the German elections on September 17th.

2. The second stage should be between September 17th and the signing of a USSR-GDR peace treaty.

3. The third stage should comprise the period between the signing of the peace treaty and the turning over to the GDR of control of access to Berlin.

By the end of the third period the U.S.A. should have its forces in being in improved readiness, with necessary arrangements poised for the final preparations required to be able to use force. It should have completed at home and abroad intensive education on the nature of the issue centering around the Russian demands regarding Berlin. It should have allied economic sanctions in a state of readiness. It should be prepared to conduct political moves and to undertake or resume diplomatic negotiations, should the preparations suggested here have the desired effect on Khrushchev and make negotiations possible (assuming that this has not already occurred).

C. Military Preparations

The military preparations should be of three distinct types:

1. Preparation of non-nuclear forces for substantial use on the ground and in the air in Europe and on the high seas. Examples of the actions to be taken to this end, subject to further military judgment and to questions of order and priority, are:

(a) Seek, by measures initially short of partial mobilization, to compress the time needed to bring necessary units of reserve components to a state of battle-readiness, so that they could be called up in the event force had to be used over Berlin. Encourage our allies similarly to increase the readiness of their reserves, and offer to help supply such equipment as we can and as is needed for this purpose.

(b) Bring US forces in Europe up to full strength. Try to persuade our allies similarly to raise the manning levels of their existing forces on the continent.

(c) Move some STRAC and USAF units to Europe, gradually raising the level of forces there and replacing the forces despatched there from the US by calling up Guard and reserve units.

(d) Improve our ability to transport and deploy additional forces to Europe.

(e) Move equipment needed by our forces in Europe to the continent, and build up stocks of combat supplies on the continent.

(f) Increase US stocks of non-nuclear ammunition.

(g) There is one further step of the utmost importance which should be taken in preparing for substantial use of non-nuclear force in Europe: that is to tighten SACEUR's physical custody and control over nuclear warheads in Europe. The whole purpose of a substantial use of non-nuclear force in Europe would be defeated if it should escalate into general nuclear war by Western action, before this was intended. To prevent this, it is necessary to ensure that NATO nuclear weapons in Europe will not be fired by our allies or by subordinate US units without explicit Presidential and SACEUR directive—even in the midst of substantial violence and great uncertainty as to whether nuclear warfare is not about to start. This will be difficult, at best; present physical arrangements may not be ideal in this respect. The President should direct that whatever steps are needed to improve these arrangements, and thus assist SACEUR in controlling the allied and US nuclear capable units committed to his command, should be taken by the Secretary of Defense as a matter of urgency.

2. The second category of military preparations would be designed to increase our ability to mount counter-measures on the high seas. This might mean preparing our naval forces so that they could readily force Bloc shipping in specified areas to return to Bloc ports, and increasing the over-all readiness of the Navy to engage in the combat operations which might ensue.

3. The third category would include measures to prepare for general nuclear war. This would mean placing SAC in a suitable state of readiness, which could be maintained over the period of a prolonged crisis without degrading SAC capabilities or generating pressures for a pre-emptive strike. It would also mean taking civil defense measures, including possibly construction of fall-out shelters. The world-wide readiness of US armed forces would need to be increased in a variety of ways.

In carrying out these preparations, we should try to avoid actions which are not needed for sound military purposes and which would be considered provocative. Such actions would have a contra-productive effect on the Soviets in two respects—first, in suggesting that the whole operation was for “muscle flexing” and thus degrading the deterrent effect of our other preparations, and second in creating an atmosphere of challenge and counter-challenge which might make it harder for the Soviets to back down, if they should wish to. Such actions would tend to split the alliance, furthermore, by antagonizing our allies.

Allied attitudes also suggest that preparations for a Berlin crisis should not include steps, which would run contrary to Presidentially-approved US policy toward Europe, looking to sharing nuclear weapons capabilities with France or to deployment of land-based MRBM's in Europe. Nuclear sharing with France would trigger German interest in developing a national nuclear capability; preparations for deployment of land-based MRBM's to European (including German) forces would be taken in some quarters to foreshadow de facto creation of such a capability. The British have opposed deployment of land-based MRBM's to Europe, in part, because of their reluctance to see strategic missiles containing powerful warheads placed in German hands. A Berlin crisis would not be the time to take steps that would thus, in the view of some Europeans, raise the prospect of a German nuclear capability; this would excite the very fears of Germany which we will need to dampen down if Western firmness and unity over Berlin is to be preserved. For the same reason, stepping up the arming of German forces with nuclear weapons would not be useful preparation for a Berlin crisis from the political standpoint.

D. Other Preparations

Preparations for non-military pressure on the Soviets are of vital importance. They will probably be more credible than preparations for military action; they may well have a substantial effect on Soviet intentions.

1. Political. The President will need to seek funds and authority from the Congress to carry out the military preparations suggested above. The President might relate these preparations to the rising world-wide Communist threat, of which Berlin is one element, and make clear, therefore, that we have in mind two quite separate programs:

(a) Short-term steps to meet the immediate threat to Berlin.

(b) Long-range steps to increase the size of the US defense establishment which will be needed, if a full-blown Berlin crisis develops, to meet the prolonged period of stepped up Bloc pressures which such a crisis presumably portends. These steps should not be launched now, but should be clearly foreshadowed: The President could direct the Secretary of Defense to prepare plans for a major increase in US force levels; funds for this increase would be requested of the Congress in the event the international situation deteriorated further. The matter might now be discussed with Congressional leaders. The deterrent effect on the Soviets of such planning would probably be substantial. They must even now bitterly regret the lasting jump in US defense expenditures brought on by the Korean war. It would be useful to convince them that a similar increase might result from a Berlin crisis. But they will only be convinced if we have, in fact, decided to mount these increased expenditures in the event a crisis materializes. As a nation, we have little capacity for deceiving others. At best, we can hope to convince the Soviets that we will undertake dangerous or expensive actions if that is our real intention.

2.

Economic. Preparations for economic counter-measures should also have considerable deterrent effect. Such measures proved surprisingly effective in response to recent East German pressures on civil access to Berlin.

Again, the crux of the matter is a clear allied decision that the measures will be adopted. If such a decision is taken at the highest level of the governments concerned, it would be incongruous not to make specific and detailed preparations to give it effect. Failing the decision, however, the preparations will not carry conviction.

These economic counter-measures would be designed for execution at the time that East Germany blocked ground access to Berlin. They might include some or all of the following:

(a) Cutting off trade between NATO countries and the Bloc.

(b) Denying Bloc ships the right to stop in NATO ports.

(c) Denying Bloc aircraft the right to touch down in NATO countries.

(d)

Denying Bloc nationals and goods the right to transit NATO countries or to be transported aboard carriers of NAT O countries.

The US should lay specific plans for carrying out such measures, insofar as US territory and facilities are concerned. It should inform its allies of its intention and propose that they make similar plans. Firm agreement should be sought this summer.

3.

Eastern Europe. The Soviets might be deterred from a Berlin crisis if they believed that it would result in greater instability—rather than stability—in Eastern Europe. The US should try to convince the USSR that it would and could, in event of a Berlin crisis, stir up dissidence in East Germany and Eastern Europe.

The steps to be taken to instill this conviction are matters of expert judgment, which lies beyond the competence of this report. There are two points to be emphasized:

(a) We can only convince the Soviets that this is our intention if that is, in fact, the case. As in the military field, bogus preparations will be of little value.

(b) The scale of civil disorder which we set out to stimulate should correspond, progressively, to the intensity of the crisis. Full-scale revolt should only be triggered, if at all, when the crisis reaches a stage which is but a hair's breadth from general war, since such a revolt could well lead directly to such a war.

4. World Opinion. Khrushchev has been trying to present his demands regarding Berlin in such a way as to maintain his peace posture with the neutrals and convince them that his object is to eliminate “hotbeds of war.” It is important to frustrate this effort; the Soviets are much more dangerous when they believe that their propaganda has put world opinion upon their side: They are apt to believe that they can take greater risks because we will be inhibited by adverse opinion from taking effective counter-action.

Beginning soon, therefore, a well thought-out, intensive, and continuous campaign should be conducted, both domestically and internationally,to bring out the fact that at the present time there is no threat of any sort to the peace in either Eastern or Western Germany; that peace is a condition and does not depend upon formal documents announcing or proclaiming it; and that Khrushchev is engaged in an operation unique in its cynicism: In the very name of peace, and through the instrumentality of negotiating and putting into effect what he calls a peace treaty, he is taking an action of calculated and far-reaching aggression.

This theme should be developed over and over again and with the most homely and understandable analogies. Speeches by the President, the Secretary of State, other members of the Administration, popular pamphlets (along the lines of one recently put out by the State Department entitled “Berlin: A City Between Two Worlds)”, messages to Congress, and all the instrumentalities of the U.S.I.A. should drive home this lesson—adapting it to the conditions and understanding of various countries, both allied and neutral.

As suggested above, all of this should be done at the outset in low key, stressing reason and determination, rather than crisis and alarm. As the crisis deepens, a greater note of urgency can be added. As these statements accompany and explain preparatory actions of increasing seriousness, they will make clear that these Western actions are intended to preserve the peace against those who use the name of peace and the worldwide desire for peace for their own aggressive purposes.

III. The Role of Negotiations

As suggested in the Foreword, Khrushchev now appears to view the balance of power as inclining in his favor; in this climate, negotiations would fail or lead to agreement unacceptable to the West. While this situation continues negotiation should be regarded purely from the propaganda point of view.

Primary emphasis should be placed, in our public posture during this period, on the all-German rather than the Berlin issue. The Western position on this issue is better than that of the Soviets and this fact should be vigorously exploited. We should review the Western Peace Plan to see if it can be made still more forthcoming and attractive to world opinion. The basic principle on which our position is based—self-determination—should have great appeal to most non-Communist countries.

If the preparations proposed in the preceding section should change Khrushchev's view of Western firmness, genuine negotiations will be useful. They would be designed to build a bridge on which Khrushchev could retreat to safety. If he wishes to retreat it will be easier for him to do so by means of negotiations launched after our military preparations and before the crisis has advanced very far, i.e., before thesigning of a peace treaty. Some proposals suggested for this purpose do not seem promising.

One would be an agreement which united Germany and thus caused Khrushchev to abandon his project of a peace treaty with East Germany. We could not agree to a form of German unification which left East Germany in Communist hands. And there is no evidence to suggest that Khrushchev would agree to any form of German unification which would assure the people of East Germany free choice by a specified date—however distant. The mere signing of such an agreement (whether it was viewed seriously by the Soviets or not) might tend to demoralize the East German regime and undermine its hold on the East German people.

Ambassador Thompson's suggestion of stretching out, e.g., to seven years, the period for agreement between the two German Governments upon a constitution may not be subject to this infirmity, since there would be no commitment to hold elections at the end of this period unless the parties concerned could agree on that constitution. This stretch-out would, however, be highly objectionable to the West Germans; it seems unlikely that we could gain their consent.

Negotiations restricted to Berlin do not seem to be any more promising, unless Khrushchev should mellow considerably under American preparations. The agreements previously suggested have been:

(a) An “interim” agreement which would temporarily defer a peace treaty, or—

(b) An agreement without any time limit, which would define what the consequences of a peace treaty should be for Berlin.

An “interim” agreement could be either:

(a) An agreement such as Khrushchev suggested in his aide-mémoire: The two Germanies to talk to each other, and the Berlin status quo to be maintained while they do. Or—

(b) An agreement such as was discussed at Geneva in 1959—preserving the present situation in Berlin with some limitations on Western forces and subversive-propaganda activities thrown in.

Neither type of agreement would be acceptable to the West Germans, but they would prefer the second to the first since the last thing they want is to have any political dealings with the GDR. The basic trouble with either of these “interim” agreements, however, is that their temporary nature would imply a term on our presence in Berlin. The offsetting advantage, it can be argued, is that they would buy time. This advantage would only be meaningful, however, if the West should decide, at the same time as a temporary agreement was concluded, to mount a crash program to improve its power position. Failing such a decision, a temporary agreement would not seem useful.

This leaves what seems to be the most promising possibility: an agreement whose purpose would be not to defer a peace treaty, but to preserve the Berlin status quo despite a peace treaty. This purpose might be served by what has come to be known as Solution “C.” This would not be a formal agreement but an exchange of Western, Soviet, and East German declarations prior to the signing of a treaty:

(a) The Western powers would declare that their rights and Soviet obligations remained unchanged, that they intended to keep their forces in West Berlin, and that they would deal with East German personnel regarding ground and air access on the same terms as they had previously dealt with Soviet personnel.

(b) The East Germans would declare their intention to respect existing access procedures, except that these would henceforth be performed by German personnel. The Soviets would associate themselves with this East German declaration.

There would not be much in this for the Soviets: Solution “C” would merely give them what they could get anyway by telling the East Germans not to alter existing access procedures after a treaty—plus the slightly heightened status involved in the GDR being permitted to make a declaration. This is probably not enough to make a bare-bones Solution “C” negotiable—even with a chastened Khrushchev.

It may be necessary, therefore, to add on some additional face-saving elements:

(a) A Western declaration that espionage and subversive activities would not be permitted in West Berlin—in return for a comparable East German statement regarding East Berlin. [3 lines of source text not declassified] If restraints on these activities were stated in a unilateral Western declaration, this would give the Communists less of a pretext for interfering in the internal life of West Berlin than if the restraints were stated in a formal agreement.

(b) A Western declaration that no nuclear weapons would be introduced into West Berlin. (This would be harmless, since the Western powers have no intention of introducing such weapons.)

(c) A Western declaration that Western forces in Berlin would not exceed a level approximating their current combat strength.

(d) Stationing UN observers in Berlin and along the access routes to inspect and report on fulfillment of the reciprocal declarations by the Western powers, the GDR, and the USSR indicated above.

An agreement along these lines would still be a major defeat for the Soviets. For it would leave the West Berlin status quo untouched—either physically or conceptually. To call it “face-saving” for the USSR is to use the term loosely.

If our bargaining position is strong enough to save Berlin, but not strong enough to avoid more concessions to save Khrushchev's face, there is one further addition to Solution “C” which might be considered: A declaration by the Western powers recognizing the Oder-Neisse boundary. Such recognition would probably be in the West's interest in any event, as a potential means of eventually weakening Soviet-Polish ties.

This kind of Berlin arrangement would, of course, leave a continuing possibility of trouble, since the access routes would remain in Communist hands. It is sometimes asked whether a more drastic solution is not possible, which would remove these routes from Communist control and thus settle the dispute once and for all.

(a) An all-Berlin non-Communist “Free City” has been proposed. This may have considerable propaganda advantage, but the Soviets would almost [certainly?] not give up Communist control over East Berlin. And any form of Berlin unification which preserved that control would be unacceptable to the West. This proposal thus does not seem negotiable—let alone a means of prying the access routes loose from Communist control.

(b) A special status for West Berlin, alone, has also been suggested: The city to be guarded by UN or other international contingents, and the access routes to come under the city's or the UN's jurisdiction. An international regime for Berlin which would not only deprive the allies of their occupation rights but also deprive the city of Western forces would be disastrous: No international forces could substitute for the Western forces now in Berlin—in maintaining internal order, in deterring Bloc attack, and in convincing the West Berliners that they remain under Western protection.

This chapter must therefore conclude, as it began, by stressing the limited role which negotiations can play in averting a crisis. If other measures have deterred Khrushchev, negotiations can offer him an “out” in the form of optical change in Berlin and thus somewhat increase the chances of peace. If Khrushchev remains as confident and determined as he seems now, however, negotiations cannot solve the problem; the US will have to face up to his physical challenge. The question of how and when to do this is treated in the following chapter.

IV. The Use of Force

A. The Casus Belli

If negotiations fail and the Soviets announce their intention of proceeding with a separate peace treaty, we should make clear that we would view the treaty as an exercise in diplomatic ventriloquism—an act without meaning or validity. We should urge non-Communist states not to grace the occasion with their presence and thus seem to ratify the permanent denial to East Germany of the right of self-determination.

At the same time, the Western powers should make clear the post-treaty posture that they would propose to adopt toward East Germans, when they appear along the access routes and claim the right to “control” Western military traffic. (Civil access to and from Berlin is already subject to East German control.) The chances of a physical collision may be minimized if our position regarding East German functions relative to military traffic have been thoroughly defined before they show up.

Present contingency planning contemplates that the Western powers will identify their military traffic to the East Germans, if they take over access functions from the Soviets, but not allow the East Germans to stamp Western papers, as the Soviets now do.

The arguments for thus trying to limit the East Germans' role are impressive:

(a) If the East Germans insist on paper-stamping, the crisis will be brought to a head at a time when the Western powers are fully prepared—physically and psychologically—for counter-action.

(b) If the Germans back away from paper-stamping, the Western position will have been strengthened. For the debate between ourselves and the Soviets as to whether present procedures constitute merely identification of Western military traffic or “control” of that traffic will have been resolved in our favor.

The argument against this course of action is that it may be politically infeasible.

The British have only agreed to present contingency planning under great duress; in an emergency, they would almost certainly propose that the East Germans be allowed to perform the functions which the Soviets now discharge. There would probably be considerable European press and popular support for the British position; there would be a disinclination for seeming to make paper stamping a casus belli, no matter how much we explained the underlying issue.

The alliance would thus be divided over an essentially procedural question, at the very time when maximum allied unity was needed as a basis for possible armed action in defense of Berlin. The situation would be the more difficult since there might be some questioning in the US press, public and Congress as to whether we had really chosen the most suitable issue on which to fight. There would also be grave difficulty in making our position plausible to the uncommitted countries.

All this would be apparent to the Soviets, and they would be encouraged to press ahead to exploit the Western disarray. In the face of Bloc pressures and allied disunity, it seems likely that the allies would eventually accept the same paper-stamping from the East Germans that they now accept from the Soviets. To avoid such a last minute change in our position under fire, it would be better to straighten out this issue beforehand.

This report suggests, therefore, that the Western powers should announce, before a peace treaty is concluded, that they would allow East German personnel to perform the same functions as the Soviets—no more. This would mean holding the same line against a variety of ostensibly minor changes in these functions which we have held for many years. The difference would be that it would be the East Germans, rather than the Soviets, who would be trying to make the changes. Allied unity could probably be more readily secured on defending this existing line than on trying to improve it at the time of a GDR take-over. And parity of treatment for the GDR would be easier for the USSR to accept as an outcome of the crisis, if it had been deterred and wanted a face-saving “out”.

The East Germans' initial reaction to a pre-treaty announcement by the Western powers along the lines suggested above (assuming that negotiations with the USSR had already failed) is predictable: They would say that the procedures to be followed could only be determined in post-treaty negotiations between the Western powers and the sovereign East German regime.

The West could not, of course, allow itself to be placed in the position of negotiating to secure rights which it already possessed—least of all with a regime which it does not recognize or hold responsible for those rights' fulfillment. At the same time, the West would not want it to appear that it was breaking with the Communists over the issue of dealings with the GDR, rather than over the issue of Berlin's freedom. This would be falling into a Communist propaganda trap.

The Western powers might, therefore, indicate that they remained willing to negotiate with the USSR about post-treaty Berlin and were willing to inform the GDR of the procedures which they would follow if negotiations did not succeed. The manner of this “informing” could be determined at the time—the main object being to choose a manner which would generate a minimum of divisive doubts and disputes among the Western powers. The proposal for reciprocal declarations contemplated in Solution “C” might be revived for this purpose.

But now suppose that the East Germans reject being “informed” about procedures, and insist that post-treaty procedures be determined through direct inter-governmental negotiation with the GDR. They might announce that, failing such negotiation, they would unilaterally specify the new procedures to be followed, and only allow Western military traffic to pass which conformed to these procedures.

Should these “new” procedures be identical to those hitherto followed by the Soviets, the traffic would continue to move under the policy proposed in this report. Should these procedures differ from present procedures in any respect, however minor, the Western powers could not accede. If these powers should allow the GDR to perform functions which they have hitherto successfully denied to the Soviets, they would be hard put to find a peg on which to arrest their subsequent descent down the slippery slope.

B. Initial Blockage

If the Western powers refused to abide by new procedures which the GDR has proposed, their ground military traffic would be turned back. In this circumstance, we should continue the daily presentation of ground military traffic for movement and, upon refusal, move it by air. At the same time, we should begin to apply some of the economic counter-measures discussed in Chapter III. We should also move toward the further build-up of the permanent US defense establishment projected in that Chapter.

While these pressures were being mounted, the relatively small amount of military traffic now going to Berlin could be taken care of by a slight increase in the number of military flights to Berlin. The Communists would, at this point, have to choose between four courses of action:

(a) Negotiating for resumption of access.

(b) Letting the garrison airlift go on indefinitely. This would not permit them to achieve their basic purpose; West Berlin would remain free and under guard of Western forces.

(c) Shooting down the Western aircraft, since passive interference alone would not prevent the small number of flights required to supply the garrison. In this event, we should fight back in the air, with a scale of non-nuclear violence corresponding to that of the Communists. The onus for initial use of force would have been clearly placed on them. If they fired on our aircraft, we would fire on theirs. If their ground batteries tried to interdict our airlift, we would attack those batteries from the air. Such an air war would almost certainly end in Western defeat if the Soviets threw in their full strength. If it became clear that this was the Soviet intention, the Western powers should abandon the air effort and prepare for a large scale use of ground force.

(d) The GDR might cut off civil ground access. In this case, we could move the civil traffic initially by aircraft. There would probably be little political support in Europe for large scale use of force to move goods and persons on the ground, until the option of air movement had been exhausted. The French have recently voiced this view, which has probably always been the British position.

In starting the civil airlift, we should also move to the all-out application of economic counter-measures: cutting off trade with the Bloc, and forbidding Bloc ships and planes from using NATO ports or airfields. The full scale US defense build-up discussed in Chapter III would come into action: X billion would be added to the US defense budget, and US force ceilings would be raised appreciably. Our naval vessels would begin shadowing, delaying, and otherwise harassing Bloc shipping, preparatory to a full-scale blockade. All these pressures would be applied in mounting intensity, if the Communists continued to block civil ground access.

A civil airlift could move enough goods to keep the Berlin economy functioning at full blast, unless the Soviets resorted to passive counter-measures. In this event allied naval forces would immediately begin to blockade the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Soviet Pacific coast. They would require all Soviet vessels seeking to depart those areas to return to port. Our purpose would be to show Western determination and to apply immediate military pressure on the USSR, even before the substantial use of ground force could be mounted, in order to influence basic Soviet political decisions.

If the Soviets nonetheless continued passive interference, the airlift could be hobbled. For passive measures could restrict us to visual flight; and visual flight would not be sufficient to move the needed goods and supplies to Berlin in the long run, as the stockpiles there became depleted. If passive interference were continued, therefore, we should then resort to substantial ground force to restore our access.

C. The Use of Force

The use of force to restore access should begin with a sizable probe—say a battalion—to establish the fact that access to Berlin is physically blocked. Then resort should be had to an operation involving substantial non-nuclear force. Whether this operation takes place at once or not would depend on the state of preparations.

The purpose of the operation would not be the military one of defeating all the Soviet forces which might oppose our forces; this would not be feasible.

It would be the political purpose of moving the Soviets to negotiate a resumption of access by giving the most convincing demonstration of which the West was capable that the Western Allies were not prepared to submit to Soviet demands and would use whatever force was necessary, up to and including general war, in resisting them.

The Western force should thus be large enough so that the Soviets would appreciate the great risk that conflict involving this force would, if not terminated by early negotiations, get out of control and escalate into nuclear war. This means, among other things, that:

(a) The force should not be susceptible of being stopped by the GDR. The JCS believe that 7 divisions and 4 air wings would achieve this end.

(b) The force, together with the other ground forces available for the battle, should be able to defend itself with non-nuclear weapons until it was plain that the political purpose would not be achieved and that nuclear weapons must be used. An opinion of the JCS leads to the belief that such a force is well within US and allied capability.

The way in which such a ground operation might best serve its political purpose requires much further elaboration by the Defense Department.

The initial force to be deployed across the zonal boundary might, for example, be one division—with one in reserve.

This was the course discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their April 28 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,[5] which indicated that “the use of substantial non-nuclear ground forces, in the magnitude of two divisions, could facilitate negotiations to restore ground access to Berlin and compel the Soviets to face the imminent possibility of a broadening of the conflict as well as the possibility of general war, should they persist in obstructing access to Berlin.” The annex to the JCS April 28 memorandum said: “A division could fight well for several days, long enough to accept reinforcement by another US or Allied division . . . If an enemy force of not more than 3-4 divisions opposes the allied force . . . it is quite likely that we could support a two division force indefinitely in East Germany."[6]

The Soviets might conclude, at this point, that the danger of escalation was getting out of hand and move toward a negotiated settlement. Indeed, they might be impelled to this conclusion by preparations for use of this two division force, which could not fail to be evident to them well in advance.

If, on the contrary, the Soviets threw in more force, the allied operation would need to be reinforced. The seven division force mentioned by the JCS might then come into play.

This force could continue the non-nuclear combat in the face of Soviet/GDR reinforcements and thus provide more time for the Soviets to appreciate the risks of the course on which they were embarked and to seek an acceptable negotiated settlement.

After a period of about 1-2 weeks this allied force would need further reinforcement—depending on the Communist strength thrown against it. At some point, either at the end of this 1-2 weeks or later if the seven division force were to be reinforced, a judgment would have to be reached that we had done all that was feasible to convince Khrushchev that the United States would and, indeed, must—in order to preserve its army, its allies and itself—use nuclear weapons. Thus the last stage of deterrence would have been reached, if previous preparations and uses of force had not produced an acceptable settlement of the issue.

V. The Possibilities and Consequences of Failure

It is essential to consider, not only the possibility of success and the risks and danger involved in any proposal, but also the possibilities and consequences of failure. Failure in the course proposed could arise from at least three sources.

First. Even with the most careful handling, our allies, or important ones of them, might become frightened along the way, decide that the risks and dangers exceeded the advantages, and indicate that they were no longer associated with our position.

This could happen, not only because their people might be less stalwart or because their governments came to a different appraisal of the dangers and advantages but also because, to some extent, their interest may be different from ours in one respect: None of them has the prestige or world position which we do; and, therefore, none of them can have that position and prestige at stake.

It is impracticable for the United States to undertake unilateral action in the Berlin area, if for no other reason than that this action would take off from the territory of the Federal Republic and might require, to some extent, air bases, staging areas, assembly areas, and so forth in both France and Great Britain. If these allies, especially the Federal Republic, were to weaken, the plan here developed would fail: While the United States could still launch nuclear warfare, there is very grave doubt that our own Congress and people would support initiation of a general war which arose over Berlin and was disapproved by the Germans themselves.

What could be done to mitigate the danger to our position and to the alliance which this division among the allies would have caused?

The Soviets' reaction to the division among the Western powers would depend, at least in part, on the point at which it had occurred.

If our allies' negative attitude had become manifest when the course of action outlined in this report was first proposed to them, present military contingency planning would presumably not be changed. The Soviets' view of Western intentions would thus remain a skeptical one. They would not expect our allies to go from the planned battalion-or-larger probe (of which they are probably well aware) to general nuclear war. And they would be right.

In this circumstance, there would probably be little chance of reaching agreement with the Soviets on the kind of Berlin Solution “C” discussed in Chapter III. It would be necessary to move toward an agreement more favorable to the Soviets, if a show-down was to be avoided which would result in a humiliating Western retreat:

(a) The West Germans might have to be persuaded to accept the seven year stretch-out proposed by Ambassador Thompson, if this should prove to hold any interest for the Soviets. Or

(b) An “interim” agreement might be sought, even though it might be taken to imply a term on the Western powers' presence in Berlin and to set the stage for greater Soviet pressure at the expiration of that term. Or

(c) A permanent agreement for Berlin might be sought which would create a new juridical status for the city—perhaps placing it under UN or some other form of international protection. The extent of the resulting damage would depend, in part, on whether Western forces could remain in Berlin as part of the UN or international force.

In the wake of such a settlement, at least one asset would have been preserved: the US posture of firm intent. For it would be clear that this US intent had been hobbled only by allied restraint.

If allied unwillingness to permit the course of action proposed in this report were first masked behind generalized consent, and only unveiled at the height of the crisis, the result would be more disastrous. The terms that could then be negotiated with the Soviets concerning Berlin would be very bad indeed; the alliance would be prey to divisive bitter recriminations about responsibility for this outcome.

The Soviets would have, of course, achieved one of their highest objectives for the Berlin operation: They would have split the alliance. They would not yet, however, have driven the United States out of Europe.

It might be possible in this moment of extreme disaster and Russian triumph to propose and have accepted a very large measure of North Atlantic political unity, but the chances would be heavily against it. The Europeans might believe that we had brought them to the verge of annihilation and be unwilling to trust the United States with the even greater powers which it would gain by Atlantic union. The people of this country might feel that our allies had weakened at the vital moment and that they had no fight in them. Our world position would suffer heavily.

It should, however, be noted on the other side that the loss of our prestige and position of leadership would be much less if our allies showed an unwillingness to fight than if we, as a government and people, led them in that submissive direction.

Second. Failure might come from the precipitation of general war before it was necessary, thus losing the important deterrent effect of the non-nuclear military measures which had been planned to precede it.

Nuclear war could occur from mischance. In a broader sense, this is a risk inherent in human nature, in any period of great tension and crisis. In a more specific sense this risk is intensified by the possibility, which has already been mentioned, of premature and unauthorized local use of nuclear weapons in Europe; this possibility can be diminished by tightening up custody and control.

Nuclear war could also occur from miscalculation as to the imminence of the other side's attack. Understandably, the pressure from those responsible for SAC and its Russian equivalent will be very great to have the first strike, and the tendency will be to resolve all doubts in favor of earlier rather than later action. Steady nerves and firm decision at the highest levels will be required to give the preliminary use of non-nuclear force a full opportunity to have its effect before proceeding to nuclear violence.

Third. We must end this report, as we began it, by stating that there can be no assurance that Moscow may not refuse to be deterred and that its actions may not, therefore, make nuclear war unavoidable. This plan represents an effort to increase the deterrent to the greatest extent we can devise. This, we believe, offers the best hope of avoiding war short of submitting to Moscow's demands.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-561. Secret. Attached to a July 5 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, which states that access to the report should be limited and permitted only in Rusk's office, and to a June 28 memorandum of transmittal from Rusk to the President, which states that this was a preliminary version of the report. A table of contents, also attached, is not printed.

[2] Brackets and ellipsis in the source text.

[3] Thompson enumerated these objectives in a 5-page memorandum to Rusk on June 19 which also stated that the Berlin problem seemed to divide itself into four time periods: 1) up to the German elections, 2) from the elections to the convocation of a peace conference, 3) the time between the conclusion of a peace treaty and its entry into effect, and 4) the implementation of the peace treaty. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-1961)

[4] There is apparently no section A in chapter II.

[5] See footnote 6, Document 22.

[6] Ellipses in the source text.

50. Editorial Note

At 10 a.m. on June 28 President Kennedy held his 13th press conference. Among the prepared statements that he made at the beginning of the conference was one on Germany and Berlin in which he stated that the crisis over Berlin was Soviet-manufactured. The President went on to say that there was peace in Germany and Berlin, and if it were disturbed, it would be the direct responsibility of the Soviet Union. In response to questions, the President indicated that the United States would consult with the British and French and that no plans concerning Germany or Berlin had been finalized. For the transcript of this press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 476-484.

51. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

Washington, June 28, 1961, 9:21 p.m.

2115. Paris deliver Finletter by 8:00 am, June 29. Following guidance for use in replying to Allied Governmental inquiries which may arise from Newsweek story (Depcirtel 2105)[2] detailing alleged JCS recommendation for possible military action in connection Berlin and similar press stories this subject:

1. The current situation with respect to Berlin is giving rise to a great many highly speculative press stories largely inaccurate.

2. It is an obvious responsibility of military staffs to work continuously on plans covering a broad range of possibilities. This is true with respect to a number of potentially critical areas including but not limited to Berlin.

3. Foregoing does not alter fact that such plans either individually or in combination are implemented only as a result of a political decision which would of course be made only in full consultation with our Allies.

4. Four power talks on Berlin are continuing in Washington and largely deal with tactical aspects of planning. Reports to the full NAC will be made whenever appropriate. Meanwhile any NATO member is free to put forward suggestions for consideration by the four governments.

5. Meanwhile we do not plan take any of the actions listed in the Newsweek story at this time.

Same line except para 4 above may also be taken with friendly press on background basis.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2861. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Lehmann on June 27; cleared by Kohler, Hillenbrand, Tubby, and Fessenden; and approved by Rusk. Sent to 17 missions in Europe and Canada.

[2] Circular telegram 2105, June 27, reported that the July 3 issue of Newsweek would have a lead story on Berlin including a section on Department of Defense planning. After outlining the story, telegram 2105 noted that guidance for discussing the story would follow. (Ibid., 762.00/6-2761)

52. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, undated.

Discussion at NSC meeting June 29, 1961

[Here follows discussion of security control of documents and Kuwait.]

3. Berlin—The Secretary of State gave a summary account of the current state of the Department's work on the aide-mémoire,[2] on briefing books and on international and other immediate aspects of Berlin planning. He then asked Mr. Acheson to discuss his report.[3] Mr. Acheson did just that. In addition, the following significant comments were made by Mr. Acheson: he gave special emphasis to the idea of the trust of Berlin and the peace which exists there, and argued that the real themes should be that Khrushchev is a false trustee and a war monger, and these themes should be hammered home.

The President asked whether really it was to our advantage to press the argument for unification, feeling that our position lacks appeal. Mr. Acheson argued that this position should not be abandoned but he did not wholly convert the President until the Secretary of State reminded him that self-determination is a better ground than unification, a position Mr. Acheson cheerfully accepted.

The President asked about the value of a plebiscite in Berlin and after general agreement that such a plebiscite would be useful, the Department of State was asked to concert a plan for discussion of such an enterprise with the Germans in appropriate ways, since the initiative ought to come from them.

The President questioned Mr. Acheson about the reciprocal effect of military build-ups on each side. Mr. Acheson agreed that this is a most important point and that planning should be so arranged as to avoid such back and forth challenges as far as possible.

Mr. Acheson made clear his own doubt that interference with civilian traffic will be an early step by the Soviets. Mr. Dillon later noted that in earlier Berlin planning this interference had been rated as a very grave danger and asked what Mr. Acheson's specific recommendation was in such a case. Mr. Acheson, reiterating his feeling that the Russians' own propaganda made such a move difficult now, said that in the event that such an interference did occur, he would propose an attempt at airlift and a prompt resort to other measures described in his report.

Admiral Burke made plain his opposition to the scale of the “probe” recommended by Mr. Acheson and his opposition also to an airlift unconnected with a probe. In reply to the first point, Mr. Acheson emphasized his belief that force must be large enough to carry the clear conviction to the enemy that if the fighting continues, nuclear weapons will be used.

The President noted the difficulty of sustaining a strong political posture and posed the question, as an example, of finding the right answer if Khrushchev proposes a Summit this summer. Mr. Acheson, remarking that it is hard to answer any specific proposal ahead of time, nevertheless believed that it would not behard to find answers as we go along. In reply to a summit proposal, for example, the President could readily suggest that conversations be undertaken first at a lower level. Mr. Acheson believed that there were plenty of “elderly unemployed” people like himself who could be sent to interminable meetings. He thought it important to understand that we could converse indefinitely without negotiating at all, and he asserted that he could readily do this himself for three months on end.

Mr. Dillon raised the question of possible domestic economic effects of a mounting crisis and of a possible need for legislation to give the President necessary powers. In reply the President asked him to assume the leadership of a study of this problem.

It was decided not to make substantive decisions on the basis of this first discussion, and the President directed Mr. Bundy, in consultation with Mr. Kohler and others, to prepare a list of departmental assignments which might be carried forward in preparation for further discussion and appropriate decision in two weeks.

[Here follows discussion of Laos.]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[2] On June 28 the French had tabled a draft of the reply they wanted to make to the Soviet aide-mémoire. In the discussion on June 28 it became apparent that any effort to combine the French and U.S. drafts would encounter serious difficulties. (Memorandum from Hillenbrand to Kohler, June 28; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/6-2861) Following meetings on June 29 and 30, the four powers agreed to send similar but not identical responses. (Telegram 2412 to Bonn, June 30; ibid., 661.62B/6-3061)

[3] Document 49.

53. National Security Action Memorandum No. 58[1]

Washington, June 30, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Treasury

The President desires that the National Security Council be able to evaluate various proposals for US approaches to the Berlin problem, in terms of their concrete implications for action. To this end, it is requested that:

I

The Secretary of Defense should submit by Thursday, July 6, his recommendations as to preparatory measures to improve the US capability to conduct the courses of action described in paragraph 1, below, which need to be launched immediately, regardless of decisions about the scale of action that is eventually intended—measures which should not be deferred until after the NSC meeting of July 13 because of the long lead times involved.

II

The following should be submitted in time for an NSC meeting July 13:

1. The Secretary of Defense should prepare recommendations concerning the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to create a capability for:

(a) a garrison and civilian (QBAL) airlift by October 15;

(b) naval harassment and blockade of Bloc shipping by November 15;

(c) large scale non-nuclear ground action within four months of such time after October 15 as it may be ordered—with tactical air support, as necessary—assuming appropriate use of forces in Europe and assuming reinforcement from the US as necessary to permit the use of two, four, six, and twelve divisions in Europe for the purposes stated in section C of chapter IV of Mr. Acheson's preliminary report to the President, including preparations which will ensure that nuclear weapons now in Europe are not used in the course of such action without direct Presidential authorization;

(d)

keeping SAC in a state of maximum readiness for flexible use over a prolonged period of crisis, without degrading its effectiveness.

These preparations should include only steps which are directly related to the four military purposes set forth above, and should not include measures primarily designed for psychological effect which could be considered provocative or measures which run counter to the US policy toward NATO approved by the President on April 26.[2]

The cost of these preparations and the number of men who would need to be called up for training or added to the US forces should be estimated. Information should be provided concerning the funds and/or authority which would need to be sought from the Congress. Our concern at this point is with the general magnitude of the preparations required and the public impression they will create, not with the details of these preparations or the manner in which the forces would be used.

2. The Secretary of Defense should submit recommendations as to the magnitude and character of a permanent increase in the size of the US defense establishment which might be executed in the event Soviet actions regarding Berlin appeared to foreshadow a long period of greatly heightened tensions. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State should submit recommendations concerning the timing and nature of the actions that might be taken to bring the prospect of such an increase to the attention of the Soviets for deterrent effect.

3. The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, should submit, through the Secretary of State, recommendations concerning the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to create a US and allied capability for applying economic sanctions of progressively increasing severity against the Bloc, beginning October 15.

4. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers should submit very preliminary recommendations as to the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to ensure that execution of the above actions would cause minimum dislocation to the US economy and balance of payments. A fuller report will be expected later.

5. The Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence should submit joint recommendations as to the timing and nature of the preparations to be taken to create a capability for inciting progressively increasing instability in East Germany and Eastern Europe, at such time after October 15 as it may be ordered. Recommendations should also be submitted as to the timing and nature of the steps to be taken to bring this capability to the attention of the Soviets before they make their critical decisions about Berlin.

6. The Secretary of State and the Director of USIA should submit recommendations as to the timing and nature of the steps to be taken to place our case regarding Berlin and Germany before the American public and the world and to gain support for the above preparations, as may be necessary.

7. The Secretary of State should submit recommendations concerning the timing and nature of our negotiating positions on Berlin and Germany prior to the signing of a peace treaty, and concerning the posture which the allied powers should adopt toward the appearance of East German personnel along the access routes following a peace treaty. These recommendations need not be submitted by the NSC meeting of July 13, but the Secretary may wish to discuss possible alternatives in a preliminary way at that meeting in order to keep the political framework of the other studies before the Council. Recommendations on this subject will be discussed more fully at a later NSC meeting.

8. The Secretary of State is given general responsibility for coordinating the various studies covered in this directive and for developing an integrated timetable intended to achieve (i) maximum deterrent effect with respect to the Soviets, and (ii) the agreement and maximum cooperation of our Allies. The instrument for this purpose will be the Interdepartmental Group on Berlin Contingency Planning, hereby redesignated as the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin. This group will be under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State or such representative as he may designate in his stead.

McGeorge Bundy[3]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs. Secret.

[2] Regarding this policy, see footnote 2, Document 29.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

54. Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Counsel (Sorensen)[1]

July 4, 1961.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. SORENSEN (HYANNIS PORT) TUES., JULY 4, 1961

10:20 a.m.

The Sec. said we had some real problems.[2] Most of them were not of substance but on procedures, timing and delays in connection with the Four Powers. One real possibility would be to use the substance of the summary statement, revising it somewhat, as a covering press release when the aide-mémoire is made public. This would give the information people something to work on and would draw it all to a more concise point. The aide-mémoire could be shortened without too much difficulty, leaving the aide-mémoire as a document with more traditional aide-mémoire language and leaving the changes suggested by the other governments. The summary statement could be taken care of. The Secretary said in view of all this we were in for a delay. Sorensen wanted to know how long a delay was involved, and asked how serious it would be. The Secretary said it would be another week or ten days before it could be ironed out with the other governments. The Secretary said that the morning press had indicated a restlessness that no action was forthcoming. The Secretary said on the court proposal we had hammered that pretty hard with our allies. Sorensen said the President had indicated this and that the French had objected. The President thought we should try again. The Sec. said that the British had made the strongest point. This was a question of timing. Rather than make the proposal now by throwing out a card, it might be better to do it at a later stage when we might need it. The court question had been discussed at NSC. The Sec. said if this was the only proposal this would perhaps be interpreted as a sign of weakness because it wasn't much of a proposal. The Sec. asked when the Pres. was returning to Washington and Sorensen said around ten thirty tomorrow morning. The Sec. suggested that Sorensen see the President and give him his reaction (1) we ought to try to deal with the summary statement as a covering press release for the aide-mémoire. We would take certain material in the summary statement and put it back into the aide-mémoire, particularly the last portion. Sorensen asked if it would be left in both the summary statement and the aide-mémoire and the Secretary said yes. The Sec. said to tell the Pres. that on the court proposal we could of course talk about it with the other three but we had hit them hard on it. We were a minority of one. The British reasons were on the other side and the French—de Gaulle—don't want anything to do with this sort of machinery these days. The Sec. suggested the Pres. ring him and he could then get our people to work and have something for the Pres. when he got back tomorrow. Sorensen said if the Sec. did not hear, he was to go ahead on the basis discussed. The Sec. said he had a Four Power working party working on this draft without final commitments of their govts. Sec. said it wasn't quite as easy to start over quite as drastically as this. There was no real problem between Washington and Hyannis Port on the substance of policies involved. Sorensen said he thought the only substantive problem involved was the emphasis on German reunification. The Sec. said he and the Pres. had talked about some changes the day before[3] which were not taken into account in the redraft. The Sec. said if we make the changes and handle the summary press release properly we would be able to accomplish the point the Pres. had in mind.

10:45 a.m.

The Secretary tel. Sorensen back that as he was looking at the summary statement in terms of a press release a real alternative which appealed to him at the moment was that the press release would consist of a covering statement by the President. It would not be an ordinary press release but a covering statement released at the same time. Sorensen said this was what he had thought the Sec. meant.

[1] Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Secretary Rusk was in Washington.

[2] President Kennedy had taken the June 30 draft U.S. reply with him to Hyannis Port for the July 4 holiday. According to Sorensen Kennedy was disappointed with the draft and asked him to prepare a shorter version. (Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 587) On July 3 Sorensen sent the President and Rusk copies of the shorter draft together with a statement of the U.S. position which the President might use as an introduction. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany) The conversation recorded here deals with these two documents.

[3] No further record of this conversation has been found.

55. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, July 5, 1961, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin

[Here follows an extensive list of participants. Secretary Rusk chaired the meeting.]

The Secretary of State opened the meeting explaining that he thought it would be useful to bring the principals who would be working on the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group (ICG) together and discuss in a rough outline the actions to arrive at the necessary recommendations to the President. The principals of the group should be the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, Directors of CIA and USIA and Mr. Bundy from the White House. Ad hoc members would be invited as necessary, such as, for example, the Secretary of Commerce whose participation will be required quite frequently.

A working group under the chairmanship of Mr. Kohler will give full time attention to the problem of Berlin which, undoubtedly, will occupy us all more seriously than any other problem during the next few months. The Secretary then asked his colleagues for comments and whether they envisaged difficulties.

The Secretary of Defense felt that the recommendations requested from his Department would be tentative until coordinated with those of other Departments, particularly State. Defense had a preliminary listing of the necessary actions on the mobilization of men and industrial resources. These, however, must go together with governmental action as a whole.

The Secretary of State suggested that the Interdepartmental working group meet afterwards for a discussion of the problems and for preparation of a briefing of the principals.

The Secretary of Defense said that he thought it would not be wise to submit his recommendations by July 6 without the coordinated views of the Department of State. By July 15, however, the recommendations for action could probably be integrated. Defense felt the buildup of airlift capability by October 15 could be accomplished, as could the capability for naval action by November 15; however, buildup of the capability for ground action four months subsequent to October 15 required decisions shortly although not necessarily before July 15.

Mr. Hillenbrand stated that possible economic counter-measures had been under intensive study for over a year on a tripartite basis, quadripartitely when sanctions against the GDR were involved. NATO was being apprised and asked to cooperate in general sanctions. The member countries are studying the required legislative actions for the effectuation of sanctions. Eventually quadripartite and tripartite groups would merge and the recommendations be shifted to NATO. The legislative problem varied from country to country. The U.K. had fewer problems than anticipated but, nevertheless, it had problems. The French Government had sufficient power; the U.S. had few problems due to Korean War Emergency legislation still on the books. The whole business was a problem of will and policy more than of legislation.

The Secretary then inquired about the various working groups acting on implementation of the instructions and he was informed by Mr. Hillenbrand that they were actively engaged in their tasks. The Secretary then asked that the various Departments turn on the full manpower flow to speed up action.

The Secretary said that he would work out with Mr. Bundy arrangements for a meeting of the principals shortly before the NSC meeting scheduled for July 13 in order to facilitate action at the meeting.

Mr. Bundy said that he and General Taylor had just talked with the President[2] and that a meeting of the full NSC was less important than agreement by the principals upon the program to be presented to the President.

The Secretary then invited all the principals to come to his office,[3] turning over the meeting to the working group under the Chairmanship of Deputy Under Secretary Johnson. He pointed out that the meeting would, no doubt, attract press attention and that contents of the meeting must be strictly withheld from the press, but that the press could know that this was one in a series of meetings which had gone on for some time and that Berlin was the subject of the discussion.

The Secretary, before retiring to his office, gave a brief summary of the developments of the Ambassadorial group's drafting effort of the aide-mémoire in answer to Mr. Khrushchev's aide-mémoire of June 4.[4]

After the principals left with the Secretary, Mr. Johnson took the Chair. He said that Assistant Secretary Kohler, who was absent for a few days, would regularly chair the working group. Mr. Hillenbrand, Director of GER, was Secretary of the group and its focal point. It was now the principal task of the working group to get the mechanics of completing the assignments worked out. Mr. Sullivan stated that Treasury's problem was, of course, its dependence in estimates on the magnitude of the requirement and the general position of the economy. Mr. Nitze said he could give the magnitude estimates to Treasury soon in the form of successive approximations. Mr. Johnson thought the matter could be handled in a form similar to the Laos Contingency Planning. It would be necessary to clarify where decisions were required and then to produce an integrated paper.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that State would hope to receive from the other agencies involved at least a rough outline of their final plans by July 10. These could then be drawn together into a coordinated single paper by July 13, with the individual contributions as attachments. He asked that each paper contain a meaty short summary. He would distribute a model format. State would be prepared to assist in reproduction, typing and so on, if required.

Mr. Hillenbrand suggested anyone call on him if there were questions on form or problems of complete understanding of the instructions.

Mr. Nitze brought up the question of the allied stance and thought this was the State Department's responsibility to judge and shepherd. Mr. Hillenbrand said it was necessary to run on two tracks; one maximizing the deterrent effect on the Soviets and one maximizing the convincing of our Allies. The military contribution to be made by our Allies was an obvious planning gap which would have to be filled but at this stage it was still a unilateral exercise.

In conclusion, Mr. Johnson stated that Mr. Kohler would devote himself exclusively to the Berlin problem. All his other duties had been assigned to Mr. Tyler, his Deputy, for the time being.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-561. Secret. Drafted by Mautner (S/O).

[2] No other record of this meeting, which took place from 3:15 to 4 p.m., has been found. (Kennedy Library, JFK Log)

[3] No record of the meeting in the Secretary's office has been found, but Rusk's Appointment Book shows that it began at 4:30 p.m. and was attended by Rusk, McNamara, Acheson, Murrow, Fowler, Taylor, and Cabell. (Ibid.)

[4] At the meeting of the Four-Power Working Group at 2:35 p.m. on July 5 Rusk explained that the meeting scheduled for July 3 had been cancelled because of consultations with the President about the U.S. draft reply. Rusk went on to explain that the United States now considered it better to couple the reply with a Presidential statement. The Working Group then undertook a further review of the Western texts. (Memorandum of conversation, July 5; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-561)

56. Paper Prepared by Thomas C. Schelling [1]

Washington, July 5, 1961.

NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

It is widely agreed that if the Berlin crisis leads to military action—particularly to military action that we initiate—nuclear weapons should not be used at the outset. This paper is about the role of nuclears in the event we should have to resort to them in Europe.

The thesis is that the role of nuclears in Europe should not be to win a grand nuclear campaign, but to pose a higher level of risk to the enemy. A large-scale regional nuclear campaign that would run its course without triggering general war is so unlikely that it should receive low priority in our planning. Either it would come to a pause, or it would blow up into general war. If the latter, the regional nuclear campaign serves little purpose, if any.

The important thing in limited nuclear war is to impress the Soviet leadership with the risk of general war—a war that may occur whether we or they intend it or not. If nuclear weapons are introduced the main consequence will not be on the battlefield; the main consequence will be the increased likelihood and expectation of general war. The state of the local battlefield will receive less attention than the state of our strategic forces and the enemy's. Nuclears should therefore be used—if they are used at all in Europe—not mainly to destroy tactical targets but to influence the Soviet command.

Nuclears should be used to impress the Soviets with the fact that they cannot win a regional war—that it is unlikely to remain regional if it is fought with nuclears on the scale that tactical military considerations would dictate. The purpose of nuclears is to convince the Soviets that the risk of general war is great enough to outweigh their original tactical objectives, but not so great as to make it prudent to initiate it pre-emptively.

Limited and localized nuclear war is not, therefore, a “tactical” war. However few the nuclears used, and however selectively they are used, their purpose should not be “tactical” because their consequences will not be tactical. With nuclears, it has become a war of nuclear risks and threats at the highest strategic level. It is a war of nuclear bargaining.

This is the way nuclears should be used if they must be used; this is therefore the way our plans should be drawn. And our requirements for nuclear weapons in Europe—numbers of weapons, their location, state of readiness, and means of delivery—should be derived from this concept of their use.

We should plan for a war of nerve, of demonstration, and of bargaining, not of tactical target destruction. Destroying the target is incidental to the message the detonation conveys to the Soviet leadership. Targets should be picked with a view to what the Soviet leadership perceives about the character of the war and about our intent, not for tactical importance. A target inside the USSR is important because it is inside the USSR, not because of its tactical contribution to the European battlefield. A target in a city is important because a city is destroyed, not because it is a local supply or communication center. The difference between one weapon, a dozen, a hundred, or a thousand, is not in the number of targets destroyed but in the Soviet (and American) perception of risks, intent, precedent, and implied “proposal” for the conduct or termination of war.

Extra targets destroyed by additional weapons are not a local military “bonus"; they are noise that may drown the message. They are a “proposal” that must be responded to. And they are an added catalyst to general war. This is an argument for a selective and threatening use of nuclears rather than large-scale tactical use. (It is an argument for large-scale tactical use only if such use creates the level of risk we wish to create.) Success in the use of nuclears will be measured not by the targets destroyed but by how well we manage the level of risk. The Soviets must be persuaded that the war is getting out of hand but is not yet beyond the point of no return.

The implications for our immediate planning are these:

1. Requirements

The adequacy of our nuclear weapons in Europe is not determined by whether we could win a full-scale European nuclear campaign. We should not add nuclear weapons in Europe for that unlikely purpose; we or the Soviets, deliberately or inadvertently, will have shifted the level or locus of war before a regional nuclear war becomes decisive. We should add weapons only if what we have there is insufficient to appear likely to catalyze general war if fully used (or if fully destroyed). Their function is to make the triggering of inadvertent or pre-emptive war a frighteningly probable consequence of their large-scale use or of a massive nuclear effort to destroy them.

2. Character of Weapons

The same applies to their range, readiness, and vulnerability to attack. Readiness for instant front-line tactical use is less important if the use of nuclears is not going to be determined by battlefield criteria. Vulnerability of aircraft and medium-range missiles need not be urgently remedied if an attack sufficient to destroy them would almost certainly trigger a strategic response. Range of weapons and means of delivery need to meet the requirements of selective bargaining use, not of tactical support. Targets outside the theater may appear desirable; weapons outside the theater may be called on.

3. Control

Control over nuclear weapons in Europe must be tight and centralized. Physical safeguards, communications, release procedures, and indoctrination must be designed to permit deliberate, discriminating, selective use for dangerous nuclear bargaining. This means preventing any use, by anyone, not specifically authorized as part of the nuclear bargaining plan. In particular, it means preventing the misinterpretation of any initial bargaining use as authority for general tactical use. Commanders and custodians must be indoctrinated with the recognition that tactical considerations are not determining: This is a controlled strategic exchange.

4. Command

Procedures, communications, and plans must assure a capability for selective release, and for target selection, timing, coordination, and reconnaissance responsive to the needs of nuclear bargaining. Local commanders who may be called on to fire nuclear weapons must be able to comprehend instructions that reflect the strategic nature of the exchange.

5. Plans must be drawn

If nuclear weapons should be resorted to, particular weapons will be fired from particular locations to particular targets at particular times. Messages may need to accompany the weapons; if so, they must carry particular language. The concept of selective, strategic bargaining use is not enough; there must be plans for how to do this.

6. Soviet nuclear response must be anticipated

It is not likely that the Soviets would allow a precedent for U.S. unilateral use of nuclears. Because time will be short, there must be imaginative advance exploration of what Soviet responses, nuclear and verbal, to anticipate and how to interpret them. (The possibility of Soviet initial selective use in a bargaining strategy must also be explored, so that we can interpret it and respond appropriately.)

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General. No classification marking. The source text bears Bundy's notation: “Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] Weekend of 7/21.” Bundy noted that the study had made a “deep impression” on the President.

57. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, July 7, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

This memorandum addresses itself to the following questions:

(1) accepting for the moment the premises of the Acheson paper,[2] what issues are avoided in that paper?

(2) are the Acheson premises adequate? What other premises ought to be brought into the Berlin discussion? What administrative means can help bring about a full exploration of alternative premises and a full consideration of the political issues?

I. Issues avoided in the Acheson paper

A.

The Acheson premise is substantially as follows: Khrushchev's principal purpose in forcing the Berlin question is to humiliate the US on a basic issue by making us back down on a sacred commitment and thus shatter our world power and influence. The Berlin crisis, in this view, has nothing to do with Berlin, Germany, or Europe. From this premise flows the conclusion that we are in a fateful test of wills, that our major task is to demonstrate our unalterable determination, and that Khrushchev will be deterred only by a demonstrated US readiness to go to nuclear war rather than to abandon the status quo. On this theory, negotiation is harmful until the crisis is well developed; then it is useful only for propaganda purposes; and in the end its essential purpose is to provide a formula to cover Khrushchev's defeat. The test of will becomes an end in itself rather than a means to a political end.

This argument avoids a number of major issues.

B. What political moves do we make until the crisis develops? If we sit silent, or confine ourselves to rebutting Soviet contentions (cf. the draft reply to the aide-mémoire), we permit Khrushchev to establish the framework of discussion. As we do this, we in effect invite him to demand from us a definition of the guarantees we would find acceptable. This, of course, casts the US as rigid and unreasonable and puts us on the political defensive.

C. The paper indicates no relationship between the proposed military action and larger political objectives. It defines an immediate casus belli; but it does not state any political objective other than present access procedures for which we are prepared to incinerate the world. It is essential to elaborate the cause for which we are prepared to go to nuclear war. Where do we want to come out if we win the test of wills? German unification, for example: what is our real intention with regard to this traditional objective?

D. The paper covers only one eventuality—that is, the Communist interruption of military access to West Berlin. Actually there is a whole spectrum of harassments, of which a full-scale blockade may well be one of the least likely.

E. The paper hinges on our willingness to face nuclear war. But this option is undefined. Before you are asked to make the decision to go to nuclear war, you are entitled to know what concretely nuclear war is likely to mean. The Pentagon should be required to make an analysis of the possible levels and implications of nuclear warfare and the possible gradations of our own nuclear response.

F. The paper directs itself almost exclusively to the problem of military access. But military traffic is only 5 percent of the whole. 95 percent of the traffic into West Berlin consists of supplies for the civil population. This civilian traffic has been for some time under full GDR control; and in recent weeks the GDR has gone to surprising lengths to facilitate this civilian traffic. Also civilian traffic is far more essential to our professed objective—the preservation of West Berlin. If the military traffic is cut off and the civilian traffic continues, our garrisons could still be effectively supplied. Though the Acheson memorandum states that military planning is also applicable to interruption of civilian access, this raises serious questions about the legal framework and the definition of the casus belli, which are not dealt with.

G. The paper does not define the problem of the relationship of the proposed strategy to the Alliance. What happens if our allies decline to go along? Which of them, for example, will go along with the ground probe? Even de Gaulle has indicated his opposition to sending a column through. What about the United Nations? Whatever happens, this issue will go into the UN. For better or for worse, we have to have a convincing UN position.

II. Random thoughts about unexplored alternatives

A. There are alternative predictions as to the course of events which ought to be examined—e.g., the Russians may sign a treaty with the GDR and make no immediate interference with our access routes.

B. There are alternative premises as to Soviet purposes—e.g., Khrushchev may be seeking to stabilize his own situation and relations in Germany and Eastern Europe; or he may be trying to increase the likelihood of a general recognition of East Germany.

C. There are alternatives to the present US policy toward Germany—e.g., confederation; living indefinitely with a divided Germany; or a comprehensive European solution (such as Gaitskell proposed some years ago).

D. There are alternative conceptions of the role of negotiation—as to timing; and as to framework of negotiations (should negotiations be confined to Berlin? or should they be in an all-German setting? or in an all-European setting?).

E. There are alternative assumptions as to what will change Khrushchev's course—e.g., different kinds of military pressure; different places for military pressure (why Berlin?); possibilities of a political offensive (in East Germany? in East Europe? in United Nations?—why suppose that we are vulnerable to world opinion and Khrushchev isn't?).

F. What procedure can be devised to make sure that alternatives are systematically brought to the surface and canvassed?

a) Mr. Acheson should be asked to fill in deficiencies in his paper and particularly to supply a political dimension.

b) The State Department should be asked to prepare a paper based on the premise that we should go into negotiations well before the crisis. Obviously it would not be fair to ask Mr. Kohler to take this on, since he is committed to the Acheson premises. A State Department group under the aegis of the Policy Planning Staff is presumably ready to prepare such a paper. Abe Chayes is in this group and might well be the State Department man in charge of this operation.

c) The decision withdrawing the Acheson paper from circulation might well be reconsidered. The danger of leaks from restricted circulation is far less than the danger of preventing full discussion of the issues raised in the paper.

d) Some senior non-Achesonians should be brought into the picture. David Bruce, who has an intimate knowledge of the Berlin problem, should be recalled from London for consultation. Averell Harriman might also be asked to come back. In view of the necessity of understanding and defending the US position in the UN, Adlai Stevenson should by all means be brought into the planning discussions.

e) The White House staff should be directed to question all existing proposals, especially from the viewpoint of the effect the pressure of events will have on decisions; and it should be further directed to take an active role in stimulating exploration of the various alternatives listed above (and others which reflection and analysis will bring to mind). In particular, Henry Kissinger should be brought into the center of Berlin planning.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Secret. Printed in part in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 387-388. According to Schlesinger, on July 6 he, Chayes, and Kissinger had discussed their misgivings about Acheson's report (Document 49), and Schlesinger prepared a memorandum for the President expressing their thoughts. He gave the memorandum to Kennedy at lunch on July 7. Kennedy in turn asked Schlesinger to prepare an unsigned memorandum on the Berlin problem. (A Thousand Days, pp. 386-387) The memorandum is printed here in full.

Under Secretary of State Bowles sent Rusk a similar memorandum on July 7, expressing his concern about the trend of U.S. thinking on Berlin. Bowles stressed that Acheson's report robbed the United States of control over the course of action, was an all-or-nothing policy, and appeared to be largely devoid of political objectives. While Bowles favored low-key military preparations, he also believed more emphasis should be placed on negotiations, including the preparation of a draft peace treaty. Finally the Under Secretary suggested that a study based on his ideas, “in confrontation with Dean Acheson's proposal would focus the major policy issues for decision by the President.” (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-761)

[2] Document 49.

58. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon[1]

Washington, July 7, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

The President wishes to ensure that any possibilities for exploiting a Berlin crisis to advance our constructive long-term purposes are fully exploited. To this end, studies of the following questions are requested by August 4, in addition to the more immediate studies already underway:

1. Long-Term Military Strength. What steps might be taken to ensure that our preparations for the Berlin crisis have the maximum lasting effect on NATO's military posture consistent with their immediate purpose? The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Secretary of State.

2. Greater Atlantic Cohesion. What steps might be taken to exploit the felt need for greater inter-dependence which is likely to characterize a period of Berlin tensions and preparations, in order to hasten progress toward increased Atlantic military, political and economic cohesion? For example:

(a) In the military field, seeking agreement on the concept of a NATO missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, as outlined in the President's Ottawa speech[2] —possibly beginning with the longest range ballistic missiles already committed for NATO deployment, i.e., Pershings?

(b) In the economic field, instituting arrangements to share the increased burdens likely to be associated with any prolonged Berlin crisis which could point the way toward larger patterns of burden-sharing and constructive joint action in such other economic fields as trade and reserves?

(c)

In the political field, taking new steps toward the long-term goal of a wider community?

The Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, as appropriate.

3. Political Settlements. Are there useful political settlements, which might not ordinarily be feasible but which might conceivably be acceptable to our allies and to the Soviets if a Berlin crisis dramatized the need for drastic measures to render the Berlin and German situation less explosive? For example:

(a) A Central European settlement which would hold some realistic promise of resolving the German problem?

(b) As part of such a settlement, otherwise, a Berlin settlement which would not only get us over the immediate crisis, but also make future crises less likely—by bringing the access routes under some form of Western or international control?

The Secretary of State.

McGeorge Bundy[3]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information but a marginal notation reads: “Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] week end of 7/8/61."

[2] For text of President Kennedy's address to the Canadian Parliament, May 17, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 382-387.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

59. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State[1]

Paris,July 8, 1961, 3 p.m.

Polto 29. Re Topol 34.[2] We circulated text of US reply this morning, and Stikker, who had privately been approached by some PermReps on timetable, called NAC meeting on timing question for noon. Stikker noted draft French and UK replies not yet received and felt Council and governments would wish to consider three documents. Asked NAC if timetable acceptable, which he personally doubted. He noted that if amendment suggested at July 12 meeting, delivery July 13 not possible. Stressed consultation on Berlin issue of great importance to Alliance, and good deal of policy decision may be involved in replies which might affect serious developments in future. In most countries matter would have to go to cabinets.

Belgium strongly agreed. Belgian Ambassador in Washington had been assured one week's time and Belgium had counted on it. It was in interest of West that consultation be serious. Three working days too short considering all implications. In view July 14 holiday, Belgium proposed NAC consultation Saturday July 15. Noted that NAC already informed that Spaak and many other members of Six would be in Athens re Common Market celebration this weekend and in Rome Monday re Six heads of government meeting. US had had since 4th of June and whole world knew deliberate and serious US staff level consultations and coordination with four that had taken place. Rest of Alliance should be given opportunity to act with same seriousness.

Italy supported Belgium, saying hard to say would be able to reply by 12th, and, with respect to statement in second sentence of US reply, said would be difficult to say other NATO members consulted if in fact their responses not ready.

Netherlands supported previous speakers, adding that if Soviets knew short timetable and absence of many FonMins, they would get impression of rubberstamping by Alliance of US proposal.

France agreed with suggestions. Said French note would only be adopted in Council of Ministers on 12th and could not be circulated to NATO before morning 13th. If minimum two-days consultation needed, NAC consultation could take place 15th, and reply sent on to Moscow for delivery night of 15th or Monday. French note would be very short and US note more important. Greek PermRep thought reply was excellent, but supported plea of time in view mention of NATO agreement in paras 1 and 11 of reply. Luxembourg, Turkey and Canada joined in request for further delay. UK, which circulated its reply at end of meeting, said timetable therefor was same as for US proposal and would report sense of discussion.

US PermRep said he would report unanimous view of Council. Personally, he favored full consultation, which he agreed would be difficult to get in the circumstances, especially as French reply not ready until July 13 and could be important. He would inform Washington to see if delay could not be arranged. He had no information whether there were reasons for the short timetable.

Canada suggested a preliminary exchange of views at Wednesday NAC meeting might be helpful, also noted that if amendments suggested Saturday, further delay in delivery possible.

France pointed out German delivery should be delayed from 10th to about 14th, in view delay other Western replies so as to avoid Russian reply to Germans before other Western replies delivered. German Rep did not know if Kroll yet had date with Khrushchev for 10th but would report.

He agreed it had been intended that German note be delivered two or three days before others. Chair supported French suggestion, noting US and UK support therefor.

Stikker concluded by underlining very strongly necessity for longer period of consultation in light unanimous consensus and his own personal views and noted Council would like to have preliminary exchange of views July 12 with definitive consultation July 15. Agreed press should be told only that NAC consultation on responses to Soviet aide-mémoire had begun.

Recommendation: I strongly urge that we go along with the request of the NAC on timing. I am convinced that it is of importance to give a firm foundation for a posture of Western solidarity, and de Staerke privately tells me that Spaak will state in the Parliament that there has not been adequate consultation unless the proposed timetable is accepted. I think we can use publicly the extended timetable to demonstrate that the Western governments are giving sober and purposeful consideration to the adoption of a firm position on Berlin and that this can be used to our advantage with the Russians and the West. Particularly in light of the factor of delay in the French reply, it simply would not be understood if we did not fall in with this reasonable suggestion of the entire North Atlantic Council.

Please advise.

Finletter

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-861. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Moscow.

[2] Topol 34 to Paris, July 7, transmitted the text of the U.S. reply that had been agreed to on July 4 subject to French reservations about the last sentence in one paragraph. (Ibid., 762.00/7-761)

60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations[1]

Washington,July 9, 1961, 3:06 p.m.

Topol 38. Eyes only for Finletter from Secretary. I am deeply disturbed by restlessness on part of Stikker and NAC members about consultations on Berlin. A first order of business has been to reply to Soviet aide-mémoire. Obviously, such a reply ought to be made in harmony with those who share occupation rights with us and with Federal Republic. This required time needed for careful preparation US proposed reply plus quadripartite consultation. It was not surprising that three other governments had a considerable number of suggestions and that these suggestions had to be resolved into a single text. The principal aspect of the draft reply is that it basically restates the essential elements of the Western position on the most important issues raised by the Soviet aide-mémoire. It does not purport to offer new proposals since such proposals must be carefully worked out among allied governments, including NATO. Since draft reply generally restates what we have considered to be agreed Western position, we hope that NAC governments can review it promptly. Obviously, new proposals would require more time.

Meanwhile, a far-reaching review has been going on within US government on Germany and Berlin. We cannot begin intergovernmental consultations on courses of action or any proposals until we ourselves are clear about how we see the problem and how we think the West ought to proceed. There has not been intergovernmental consultations on these aspects. Unfortunate press speculations and leaks out of context have apparently been picked up in Europe as evidence that far-reaching decisions have been taken and that intergovernmental consultations have moved into final stages without preliminary consultations with Stikker or NATO members. This is simply not so and repeated indications of this attitude among NATO members in the face of your assurances to contrary amount to wholly unacceptable suggestions of bad faith. If NATO members are impatient about delay, they should reflect upon fact that Berlin crisis involves the gravest possible issues and that problem requires serious and intensive study. US must accept its grave responsibilities with utmost clarity and do everything within its power to ensure that its proposals to its allies and to the Soviet Union fully reflect those responsibilities. We could quickly and automatically simply repeat earlier positions but the new Administration has an obligation to review the matter deeply and bring together political, military, economic, propaganda and other factors in a position which can offer wise, firm and effective leadership to the free world.

Also relevant is the observation I made in Oslo that consultation is a two-way street and that the initiative is available to all parties. Despite the fact that it is well known that Germany and Berlin are very much on our agenda for fundamental policy and action determination, Canada has been the only NATO country (outside the quadripartite group) to furnish us with specific and thought-out suggestions about how the crisis can be handled or what the general nature of Western proposals might be.[2] Needless to say, we would welcome such views at the very time when it is known that we are thinking hard about the US position on future courses of action.

In your private conversations with Stikker and NAC representatives, you should feel free to be frank and direct and need not feel defensive.

If NATO governments feel embarrassed by a reference to them in first paragraph our draft reply, you and British, French and German NAC representatives can consult and agree to eliminate that reference or change word “consult” to the notion that “we have had the benefit of the views of” or some such language.

You will be receiving separate instructions on French points raised in Topol 36.[3]

As to timing NATO consultation, we are most anxious to proceed on schedule first indicated.[4] US is under great pressure foreign and domestic opinion about reply. Considerations first paragraph above plus our assumption NATO Governments have also been thinking hard about Berlin seem to us to make original schedule possible. Am sending personal message to foreign ministers this point in effort speed up their response.[5] If we cannot get rapid reaction to reply which largely sets the record straight, it is discouraging to envisage difficulties allied consultations in weeks ahead on basic questions about future course of action. Please do your best on this with individual NAC members.

FYI. President considers timing publication reply most urgent matter and we would have to consider possibility of proceeding unilaterally if proposed schedule cannot be met. End FYI.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-961. Secret. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Hillenbrand.

[2] On July 6 the Canadian Minister brought to the Department of State a memorandum that included seven points that might be part of a supplementary agreement on Berlin. The text of the memorandum and the Department of State's reaction to it were transmitted to Bonn in telegram 28, July 6. (Ibid., 762.00/7-661)

[3] Topol 36 to Paris, July 8, reported that the French could not accept two sentences in the July 4 draft reply and suggested further coordination of the drafts should take place in Paris. (Ibid., 762.00/7-861)

[4] The schedule called for delivery of the German reply to the February 17 Soviet aide-mémoire on July 10, followed by delivery on July 13 of the U.S., French, and British replies to the June 4 aide-mémoire.

[5] See Document 61.

61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

Washington, July 9, 1961, 5:21 p.m.

25. For action by all recipient posts other than London, Paris, Bonn and Moscow. From the Secretary. Please see Foreign Minister or Acting Foreign Minister urgently and discuss following as personal representation from me about Berlin:

USG is now in midst of intensive review problems Germany and Berlin and formulation its own policy for months ahead as basis for early consultation with allied governments. Press speculation and alleged leaks to contrary, no far-reaching final decisions have been taken without consultation our allies. We consider renewed Soviet pressure on Germany and Berlin as most serious development with far-reaching implications for Western Alliance and believe we can meet our own grave responsibilities only on basis of searching examination political, military, economic and propaganda aspects of problem. We assume that other NATO Governments are giving equally serious and urgent attention to issues posed by latest Soviet actions. We expect to be in position to begin consultations by end July and hope that our allies will have made considerable progress their thinking by that time.

Regarding draft reply to Soviet aide-mémoire on Berlin, we are most anxious to make this public on Friday, July 14. Essential character our draft is that it clarifies the record and states essential agreed positions of West but does not attempt to make fresh proposals. Future courses of action will require intensive study by allied governments and consultations referred to above. We earnestly hope that general nature and purpose of our reply will make speedy consideration NATO Governments possible.

For Ambassador: Please impress on Foreign Minister that we consider timing of reply matter of great urgency and that we do not regard content of reply to foreclose full and detailed consultation re future course of Western handling Berlin problem. If point is raised that draft reply contains reference to consultation made by allies and that time has not been sufficient to support this statement, we could modify such language. But we do attach greatest importance to Western unity and ask help allies in handling this matter with public solidarity.

Despite NAC resistance to our proposed time schedule, please do your utmost with Foreign Minister to obtain cooperation in meeting it.

FYI only: We recognize that time required to obtain quadripartite agreement on proposed reply may stir sensitivities some governments about seeming division NATO allies between those afforded time and those not. Appreciating prestige questions involved, nevertheless US must ensure quadripartite unity and has been disappointed speed of this process. Fast consultation with many allies presents complex problem for USG. If we cannot move promptly on what is essentially a restatement of already agreed positions, it augurs badly for maintenance allied unity through consultations on future courses of action. Please do your best. End FYI.

Polto 29 to Department[2] giving background of NAC discussion is being repeated all addressee posts which have not yet received.

London, Paris, Bonn—please inform Foreign Offices we are pressing for original schedule.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Hillenbrand. Also sent to 10 other NATO countries and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

[2] Document 59.

62. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (McDermott) to Frank Cash of the Office of German Affairs[1]

Washington, July 10, 1961.

SUBJECT

Federal Emergency Plan for Berlin

Transmitted herewith in accordance with our conversation this morning is a comprehensive Federal Emergency Plan for Berlin prepared by the staff of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.[2] You will note that this plan contemplates a series of inter-related actions to attain industrial mobilization, military expansion, and increased readiness in civil defense. Although this document has not received final clearance within the agency, I am providing you with a copy of it to serve as a check list of actions which may need to be considered.

During the first phase of our preparations for Berlin—roughly July through August—we must make a number of important decisions. We must also initiate action on those organizational and preparatory measures which, because of leadtime consideration, cannot be deferred, including legislation and funding requirements.

During Phase I it is vitally important from the standpoint of the national economy and the civilian population that we take the following actions:

1) Actions to strengthen our control over the economy to make it responsive to national needs as they develop, and

2) Actions to prepare the population to the fullest extent possible for the contingencies of limited or general war which may develop.

It is proposed that Congress be asked for standby emergency legislation covering:

1) Priorities and allocations,

2) Authority to requisition,

3) Expansion of productive capacity and supply,

4) Acquisition and disposition of real property,

5) Emergency contracting authority,

6) Plant seizure authority,

7) Emergency foreign assistance,

8) Price, wage, and rent stabilization,

9) Control of consumer and real estate credit,

10) Employment control,

11) Settlement of labor disputes,

12) Censorship of communications, and

13) Other general provisions.

OCDM should also move within existing authorities to:

1) Obtain from Department of Defense phased strength requirements and estimates of production requirements for military build-up.

2) Obtain from State Department information on requirements for foreign economic aid.

3) Establish procedure for determining requirements for the civilian population.

4) Obtain from the Council of Economic Advisers, Department of Treasury, and Federal Reserve Board recommendations for indirect economic controls and fiscal policy proposed to meet the requirements of the mobilization period.

5) Initiate preparation for the establishment and staffing of emergency agencies in the fields of stabilization, transportation, communications, and censorship.

6) Notify selected executive reservists of a possible call up to duty on a selective basis.

7) Establish mechanisms and procedures for determining relative urgency of Federal agency programs and establish program priorities if necessary.

Emergency measures are also needed to effect the maximum degree of civil defense preparedness. These actions should include:

1) An intensive public information program stressing emergency actions to save lives,

2) A six-month program to provide a maximum feasible amount of shelter from radioactive fallout,

3) An emergency program to insure the continuity of government at Federal, state, and local levels, and

4) Preparation of a detailed program for the selective procurement and stockpiling and distribution of radiological instruments, medical supplies, and essential survival items.

The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization is in a position to provide detailed support for many of the items listed in the preceding paragraphs. In addition, we are prepared to move ahead in the implementation of this program at the direction of the President.

Edward A. McDermott [3]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 256B.

[2] Not found.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

63. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, July 12, 1961.

SUBJECT

Actions agreed at the discussions at Hyannis Port, 8 July 1961

1. Within ten days (i.e., by 18 July)

a. The Secretary of State will submit a political prospectus on Berlin and related matters with appendices covering political, economic and propaganda actions in support of the U.S. program.

b.

The Secretary of Defense will produce the defense plan in support of the U.S. program to include such matters as the ground probe, airlift (garrison and civilian) and measures to improve overall military posture particularly in the field of conventional weapons and forces. For the latter, he will base his recommendations on the assumption that main reliance will not be placed on the use of atomic weapons at the outset of a military engagement with the USSR in Europe.

(Mr. McNamara considers that the papers being prepared by Defense for the NSC meeting on 13 July 1961 respond to the foregoing undertaking.)

c. Based upon the foregoing documents, the Kohler task force will prepare a combined check list of possible actions relating to Berlin which should be considered for implementation in the present and emerging situation. The list will show for each action the lead time of decision.

[Here follows a paragraph on an unrelated subject.]

Maxwell D. Taylor[2]

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning. Top Secret. On July 8 Rusk, McNamara, and Taylor flew to Hyannis Port for a meeting with the President. According to one account Kennedy expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of Berlin planning and, impressed by the reservations which Schlesinger had raised to Acheson's report, decided to ask Acheson to prepare a political program for Berlin. (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 388-389) No other record of this meeting has been found. On July 10 the President sent a short memorandum to Taylor asking him to provide a list of the things agreed at the meeting and the papers he had requested from the Departments of State and Defense. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning)

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

64. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington,July 12, 1961.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin

[Here follows an extensive list of participants.]

The group met to consider the study assembled by the Department of State in response to NSC Directive No. 58.[2] Mr. Johnson inquired whether members of the group had noted any errors either of omission or commission, or had comments to make concerning the study.

Mr. Fowler[3] felt that the statements concerning economic countermeasures appearing on page 3 of the memorandum were inaccurate, and should be altered to reflect the fact that the Treasury document as such was not completely responsive to the Directive. He also noted that the timetable indicated that high level negotiations within NATO concerning a total embargo would be deferred until September. He felt that a decision should be taken now to press for high level negotiations within NATO aimed at getting firm governmental commitments for actions which could be taken at later dates.

Mr. Fowler also commented that the wording of the paper suggested that economic sanctions would be directed against East Germany. He felt that sanctions should also be sought covering the Soviet Bloc rather than Germany alone. He would hope for a firm United States position to the effect that countermeasures would be applied directly against the Soviet Bloc. In discussing these points, Mr. Hillenbrand mentioned the tripartite work which has been going forward with the British and French on economic sanctions, and possible difficulties, including undesired leaks, which might arise in taking the matter up prematurely within NATO. He felt that the reservations expressed by the Treasury representatives could be resolved, since the problem seemed mainly one of drafting rather than difference in views.

Mr. Nitze felt that the document lacked an annex on the crucial point of tripartite and quadripartite negotiations in building solidarity and unity among our Allies. He also felt that there would be material changes in our program caused by variations in targets and powers. He mentioned a possible stretchout in our military buildup, such as the capability of sending two divisions to Europe by January 1, two more by February 1, and two more by March 1. He pointed out the time element involved in the problems of training, logistics, and equipment.

Mr. Johnson asked for clarification on the item in the Directive concerning capability for military action. Some confusion had arisen as to whether it was intended that the United States be capable of such action by October 15, or four months after October 15. Mr. Acheson said that he had intended the schedule to be much more flexible, that it had not been expected that the United States should be capable of the proposed military action by October 15. Rather, that we should be increasingly capable of such action after that date, and that he felt it would be good if we were capable of doing what we wanted by early 1962.

General Taylor pointed out that it was illogical to wait until we were challenged to start our buildup. It appeared preferable to start the buildup in the expectation of the likelihood of a challenge. Mr. Nitze said that the Department of Defense was thinking in terms of a declaration of national emergency about August 1, the call-up of a reserve division about August 15, and continuing increase in our military capabilities thereafter. He pointed out that the STRAC divisions were airborne and that the military planners would probably, therefore, prefer to hold them in reserve and commit regular infantry divisions first. Responding to queries from Mr. Johnson, he and General Gray said that the principal difficulty was that of manpower. Reserve divisions were necessary for the projected buildup, and they could not be called up in the absence of the powers conveyed under a declaration of national emergency.

The group discussed briefly the question whether naval blockade was an act of war. The consensus was that, regardless of legalisms, it would be so regarded by the USSR. Mr. Acheson said that the United States should be ready for ground action when naval action was undertaken, though ground action need not be undertaken simultaneously. He mentioned the inability to predict the result of blockades, and in that connection recounted events following our general freezing order against Japan of July 26, 1941.

There was discussion of the dates of the various phases. Mr. Nitze felt that the idea of phases was sound, but that they should not be tied to specific dates. Rather, they should be planned on a schedule of possible Soviet actions. He suggested that Phase I cover the period until the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR; that Phase II cover the subsequent period until the GDR took action to control or impede Western access to Berlin; and that Phase III cover subsequent developments. He pointed out that the timing of the first two phases was up to the Russians and the East Germans and that that of the III Phase was ours. In that connection, Mr. Johnson pointed out that the September 17 date for Phase I was tied to the time of the elections in West Germany, and that it would be preferable to plan in terms of four phases, the fourth being subsequent to interference with access.

Mr. Johnson said that the fundamental question before the group was: What should we recommend to our principals to come out of the discussion in the NSC meeting on July 13? He also felt that the group should consider whether the pros and cons of the problem have been sufficiently clearly presented.

Mr. Nitze felt that the two essential first decisions to be taken were those covering a request for additional funds for the military and the declaration of a state of national emergency by the President. He said that the more the Department of Defense examined the problem of building up our strength, the more important the declaration of a national emergency appeared. Our movements after obtaining the authority conferred by such a declaration could be fast or slow, soft or hard, depending upon developments. Mr. Bundy felt that the President might want to have estimates of the effects of a wider group of actions than those covered by the study. Mr. Nitze said that the Department of Defense could have more detailed information along that line available in time for the NSC meeting. He pointed out that Mr. McNamara and others in the Department of Defense were examining that whole question urgently and intensively.

Mr. Acheson felt that the problem of the military buildup had two steps. The first was that of achieving an adequate military level by early 1962; the second that of continuing that level. While we might be able to achieve the level on the basis of a declaration of national emergency, additional legislation would be necessary if it were to be maintained. General Taylor pointed out that an early decision to embark on the buildup was necessary, and that it was possible to leave refinements in the plan for a later date. Mr. Nitze mentioned the difficulty of starting and stopping alterations in our military posture. He said that action in line with the President's Directive was already being taken. This was due partly to uncertainty regarding the situation which the military was expected to achieve by October 15.

Mr. Acheson expressed the view that at the earliest possible moment the President should decide whether a program of the sort contained in this study should be our policy, or whether there would be a “Lippmann-Morgan policy,” which he described “as doing it with mirrors.” He felt that if the United States were to follow anything like the course covered by the study we would have to approach our Allies almost at once at a very high level. He expressed the view that there would be a revolt in Congress if it was not given strong leadership soon on the Berlin question.

Mr. Acheson felt that the matter had been examined exhaustively over the past several months, and that it would be difficult to prepare additional useful papers at this time. He emphasized that the basic decisions must be taken soon. The collateral decisions, although important, could be firmly agreed upon later. We could refine our information and program, but the basic decisions must be taken with as little delay as possible.

General Taylor agreed that an early decision should be made as to the attitude and determination of our Government; the detailed timetable could be developed later.

Mr. Bundy agreed in general with Mr. Acheson's view. He pointed out, however, that the decision to declare a state of national emergency was a major “quantum jump.” In his view, and that of the majority of the group, it was incorrect to think in terms of a “limited” national emergency. He thought the President might wish to know what could be done if the target date were later and no national emergency declared shortly. General Gray and Mr. Nitze reiterated that in the absence of a declaration of a national emergency only limited strengthening of our military posture could be accomplished. This was covered in the first 15 points of the military section of the timetable. Further steps would require national emergency. Responding to Mr. Acheson's query whether there were other legal consequences of a declaration of national emergency, Mr. Nitze said that there were some, but that the most important was that affecting manpower. They agreed that it might be possible for Congress to give the Executive the powers involved in a declaration of national emergency while calling it something else.

Mr. Fowler called attention to the fact that, if a national emergency were declared, the Executive should move to obtain certain other powers and controls at the same time. A declaration of national emergency in itself brings some reactions, and the Executive should ask for the simplest and quickest form of authority in order to control them.

Mr. Johnson said that the discussion indicated there were three major public steps to be taken: (1) a request for additional military appropriations; (2) a declaration of national emergency, with related powers, and (3) economic controls. It was felt that the three steps constituted an integrated whole and that one Presidential decision would cover all three. Not much could be done in the absence of a declared national emergency. Mr. Johnson inquired what could be expected if the declaration of a national emergency were delayed. The Defense representatives felt that the minimum required time for anything approaching the recommended level of military posture was four months from the date of decision to declare the emergency.

Mr. Johnson emphasized to the group the highly sensitive nature of the study, and the extremely limited distribution which would be given to it.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1261. Top Secret. Drafted by Topping and approved in G on August 4.

[2]  NSAM No. 58 is printed as Document 53. The study referred to is “A Study Regarding Berlin Prepared in Response to NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961,” prepared by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin on July 12. An introductory memorandum to the President indicated that the study was not an attempt to evaluate courses of action, but rather an effort to describe them in sufficient detail to permit judgments on them. The study consisted of a 3-page paper outlining imminent decisions to be taken, a summary of the courses of action, and 10 annexes lettered A-J. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Coordinating Group)

[3] Henry H. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury.

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, July 12, 1961, 7 p.m.

76. As Department aware, indications are mounting of growing uneasiness among Soviet Zone populace. Evidence is found in (1) editorial exhortations of East German press; (2) Ulbricht's attempts to reassure public opinion; (3) rising tide of refugee flow into West Berlin; (4) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports.

While some measure of unrest can be attributed to spreading difficulties in economic field (where basic weaknesses were so clearly evinced at time of IZT denunciation last year), with consequence shortages and even rationing in certain sectors, it appears basic tension has resulted from belligerent tone of Soviet and East German propaganda re separate peace treaty and new status of West Berlin to be determined thereby.

Soviet Zone regime's current attempts to hold popular concern in check will probably succeed for time being, but if Khrushchev and Ulbricht continue to build tension as action on separate treaty approaches, it seems to me most likely that refugee flow may increase to actual flood unless additional, harsher restrictive measures are taken against travel from Zone into East Berlin and thence across sector border. On other hand, if such restrictive measures introduced under existing strained conditions, with probability of further economic dislocations, I can foresee real possibility of explosion, [3 lines of source text not declassified].

It is of course somewhat early to forecast trend of events in Soviet Zone. I do not think it premature, however, to consider attitude we must take up should East German populace rise again. My own view is that for US to remain on sidelines in event another June 17[2] would mean end of our prestige and influence in Germany, even were FedRep and population in West to follow our precept.[3]

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.00/7-1261. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] Reference is to the uprising in East Berlin and East Germany on June 17, 1953.

[3] On July 22 the Department of State sent telegram 172 to Bonn outlining its views on the situation in East Germany. It speculated that either the flow of refugees would force the East Germans to take steps to control it or there might be serious disorders in the Zone. For text of this telegram and information on its drafting and the reaction to it in Bonn and Berlin, see Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 187-191.

66. Memorandum of Discussion in the National Security Council[1]

Washington, July 13, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

The Secretary of State opened the discussion by pointing out that the Khrushchev timetable is not under our control. We might well find that any estimated date of the crisis was too early or too late.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the essential point in the Acheson paper was that the U.S. was not currently in a good position to negotiate. If Khrushchev were now willing to protect our basic rights, he would not have moved as he has, and willingness to negotiate, on his part, will depend on appropriate steps from our side. The Secretary recommended a decision to proceed immediately in discussion of economic countermeasures in a three or four-power group. After discussion on this particular point, the President indicated his desire to have a precise program framed for us to put forward. There was discussion of the balance of payments problem, the commodity problem, and the very large role which European countries must play in any economic sanctions. The problem was referred for definite recommendations to the Department of State, the President indicating also his desire that the Treasury play a major part in this problem.

The Secretary of Defense presented the Defense Department's recommended program (annex B of the study of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group of July 12, 1961).[2] There followed discussion of the desirability of a declaration of national emergency. The Secretary of State indicated his view that such a declaration at this time would have a dangerous sound of mobilization, and quoted from the Acheson paper on the need for keeping early steps in a low key. The Secretary of State proposed as an alternative a Congressional resolution or other action authorizing appropriate military call-ups. The Vice President believed that the response to any such proposal in the Congress would be that the President should take the lead.

Mr. Acheson argued that we must do what is sound and necessary in itself, and not act for the sake of appearances. He believed that if we left the call-up of Reserves to the end, we would not affect Khrushchev's judgment of the shape of the crisis any more than we could do so by dropping bombs after he had forced the issue to the limit. He believed that not much later than August we should wish to begin training soldiers, though of course they would not all be called up at once. The Secretary of State agreed that the training process should not be left until too late.

There was discussion of the relation of any military preparation to our Allies, and the President requested preparation of a report showing what contribution we would expect from them, to match our own new efforts.

The Vice President asked whether there was provision for procurement of additional aircraft in the submission of the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense answered in the negative and explained that the new airplanes could not be obtained in a short time, and that this program was designed to provide immediately needed new strength.

It was agreed that the impact of the proposed defense program would require a review of other Administration programs and a study of such matters as stand-by controls and new taxes. These questions were to be reviewed by the Treasury Department, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Special Counsel to the President.

There was further discussion in which Mr. Acheson made clear his belief that the President should decide to support a full program of decisive action. The Vice President agreed. Others felt that we should not take action now which might jeopardize the authorization and appropriation for the foreign aid program. The Secretary of State remarked that it will be a great victory for Khrushchev if by a memorandum and a few speeches he could weaken the foreign aid program.

There was no clear decision on these matters, and it was agreed that alternative programs, at different levels of present expenditure, should be refined for further discussion at the next meeting.

In a smaller meeting with the Steering Group after the NSC meeting, there was discussion of a series of four alternatives. The Vice President favored alternative 1. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State preferred alternative 2, and General Taylor preferred alternative 3.[3] The President did not make a choice, nor did the meeting lead to any clear consensus on the “political scenario.” The President did answer plainly the statement of the Secretary of State that there are two things which matter: our presence in Berlin, and our access to Berlin.

McG. B.[4]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on July 24. For another report of this meeting, see Document 67.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 64.

[3] In preparation for this meeting, Bundy on July 13 had circulated a 1-page memorandum to the Steering Group on the military choices in Berlin planning, which would be the basis for the discussion. It outlined the four following alternatives: 1) proceed with all possible speed with a substantial reinforcement of U.S. forces; 2) proceed with all measures not requiring the declaration of a national emergency; 3) proceed with a declaration of national emergency and all preparation except a call-up of reserves or guard units; and 4) avoid any significant military buildup for the present on the ground that the crisis was one of political unity and firmness of will. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Berlin File/Legere) The meeting is also described briefly in Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, p. 175.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

67. Notes on the National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, July 13, 1961, 4:10 p.m.

1. Rusk reviewed actions to date & described timetable—1st phase now to 17 Sept. We have no control over timetable. Sobolof indicated if our reply to aide-mémoire is negative—might move it up.

No chance of successful neg. with K on Berlin. K is too far out on limb.

Any neg would depend on actions of US & allies.

Explained rationale of program, pol, mil, ec, etc.

Consultation with Allies ASAP. Should begin on ec sanctions.

P[resident]—Question is how we should present it. We should present to Allies in strongest terms. What could kick it off?

Rusk—Link it to political paper proposed actions.

P—Do we have any idea of magnitude of Soviet ec. trade? How we approach Italians?

R—Time schedule—Mon or Tues next week? Later NATO.

P—We should put up specifics to them.

R—I propose I go to NATO to discuss it with them.

P—I would like a report at next NSC.

Dillon—Consultation must be done at a high level. Rush discussion on approach re EC, sanctions.

P—Who will head up this effort?

R—Kohler about mid August.

P—We must put it to them as strong as possible.

Dulles—notes ec. measures vs entire Bloc. Is this possible? Poland for example.

Dillon—All, incl China. Initially perhaps vs USSR—later against others shipping to USSR.

P—What would be impact on other European countries?

Rostow—2 effects—Balance of payments and products.

P—It will be a complicated negotiation.

SecDef went over his paper.[2] Stop deactivation now. CVA, CVS; 6B-47 Wings. Assumptions are available for 1 Jan 62.

P—How about earlier?

Rusk—How About a cong res auth Pres to declare emergency.

VP—Pres should do it followed by cong endorsement. (Believes we should declare nat emergency) Adm & Cong should close ranks and

AG (Bolton?)—Pres has auth from Korea. Pres can call 1 million.

P—Get Counsel of Def and AG together & look into emergency laws.

I explained par 10 of JCS paper.[3]

P—to Acheson—what do you think?

[A?]—If we wait until last minute—it will not influence K. Sometime in August we should begin training.

Sec Def rec. auth supplement appropriation.

BOB—Haven't seen program.

Acheson—Make decision to go ahead with program or not. If go ahead—next step refine program. Who is going to do it. Hope by week after next. Speech to nation.

JCS will meet with P. next week.

?—Do not go to allies piecemeal. Call Amb. back & acquaint them with program. Decide and do what we need to do. Then go to our allies—not before. General talks with allies not good. They must know we are moving. Then I feel they will come along.

P—We will have to review our other req on the hill.

VP—Rumor on hill is $6.7b.

P—How about our debt limit?

Need for security on figure.

Sec Def—We need to cancel deactivation etc if 7/15 activations.

Legislative probs discussed.

Acheson—As far as troops concerned only 2 weeks difference. Method—early next week decide are we going forward with a program. Indicate points to cabinet. Then prepare finished program. Then authorize carrying out program. Get in touch with allies at a real high level. Amb called back and informed. Consultations with cong leaders. Speech week after next. Then proceed with various steps. This only gives a month before call up. Shows US is moving.JCS will have to prepare by Wed a timetable of mil actions. P will talk about pressing other bills ASAP.

Dillon—P should mention Civil Defense.

Ellis [4] explained status of CD legislation.

Get an estimate of what.

P—We must avoid scaring off our allies.

Dulles—We may be in for a long siege.

I made point that decision should not be taken on basis K will back down—We must be prepared to move on.

NSC Wed or Thurs next week.

Check latest NIE [5] on statements re USSR reactions to our increase in strength.

[1] Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Top Secret. These handwritten notes were presumably made by Lemnitzer. For another account of this meeting, see Document 66.

[2] Presumably this is the 3-page paper with attachments entitled “The Defense Department Recommended Program Force Increases and Related Actions.” For text, see Declassified Documents, 1978, 348B.

[3] Presumably a reference to JCSM-467-61, “Partial Mobilization,” July 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records)

[4]  Frank B. Ellis, Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

[5]  SNIE 2-2-61, “Soviet and Other Reactions to Possible US Courses of Action With Respect to Berlin,” July 11. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

68. National Security Action Memorandum No. 59[1]

Washington, July 14, 1961.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary of Defense

The Director, CIA

SUBJECT

Berlin

In preparation for the National Security Council meeting on Wednesday, July 19, the following are requested:

1. The Secretary of State, as Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, is requested to prepare a report evaluating two alternative courses of action from the standpoint of their effect on our international political objectives, with DOD contributing an evaluation of their military implications:

(a) A request, about 2-3 weeks hence, for $4-5 billion, with necessary taxes, stand-by controls, other legislation, and Declaration of National Emergency.

(b)

An immediate request for $1-$1.5 billion, without controls, taxes, etc., and a further request later, if necessary.

This evaluation should include an estimate of the effect of each course of action upon (i) our fighting capabilities (to be supplied by DOD), (ii) Soviet intentions, (iii) allied unity, (iv) prospects for foreign aid. It should also include a discussion of the tactics vis-a-vis our allies that would be appropriate to each of these courses of action.

2. The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, is requested to prepare a report on:

(a) The economic sanctions that we will now ask our allies to be ready to apply if access is blocked, and the tactics that we will now use in seeking allied agreement to these preparations.

(b)

Likely allied reactions to this U.S. approach and the compensatory measures that we should be prepared to adopt in order to secure allied agreement.

The Director, CIA is requested to provide an estimate of the likely effect of each sanction upon the Bloc, from both an economic and a strategic standpoint, and the probable impact on Soviet intentions. The estimate will include three alternatives: sanctions against East Germany only, the Soviet Bloc, and all of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

3. The Secretary of Defense is requested to present a report concerning:

(a) A military operations plan for use in event our access to Berlin is blocked.

(b) The force contributions that we would need from our allies and the preparations that they would have to mount beforehand in order to make these contributions. The Department of State is requested to provide, as part of this DOD report or separately, an evaluation of the likelihood of these allied military contributions and preparations.

4. The Secretary of State is requested to prepare a political timetable which will suggest:

(a) What the timing of various deterrent measures should be before the signing of a treaty;

(b) What further measures should be adopted after the signing of a treaty and before any blocking of our access, what posture the Western powers should adopt toward the signing of a treaty, and what dealings they should have with East German personnel who may appear along the access routes after the signing of a treaty;

(c) What the timing should be of economic, political, and military pressures on the Bloc after blocking of our access;

(d) The timing and nature of our negotiating positions at each of the stages indicated above.

5. The Special Counsel to the President will supervise the preparation of a report on necessary orders, proclamations, and legislation for program 1(a).

McGeorge Bundy[2]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Taylor, Sorensen, and David Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

69. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington,July 14, 1961.

[2]

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin to Discuss Compliance with NSC Directive No. 59[3]

[Here follows an extensive list of participants.]

Mr. Johnson said that the group should decide on the papers to be prepared for the President by the afternoon of Tuesday, July 18, for perusal before the NSC meeting called for July 19, in line with NSC Directive No. 59. He suggested that the economic papers be prepared under a few general divisions, showing:

(1) What we propose ourselves.

(2) The effects on our economy.

(3) The effects of economic sanctions on:

(a) The GDR.

(b) The Soviet Bloc.

(c) The Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(4) What we expect our Allies to do, in specific terms.

(5) The limitations and conditions which our Allies might impose, and what they will probably ask in return.

Finally, the CIA should estimate the results of the foregoing actions on the Bloc in terms of:

(1) Economic effects.

(2) Strategic effects.

(3) Probable reactions.

Mr. Amory [4] felt that the economic papers might include the following sections:

(1) Unilateral actions by the United States.

(2) Actions by NATO and Japan.

(3) The effects if there was total agreement by NATO and Japan. He suggested that perhaps on July 18 the group could discuss the effects if there was only partial success with NATO and Japan.

Mr. Johnson said that the Departments of State and the Treasury would work jointly on the paper called for in paragraph 2. There was much material available which would be useful. He understood that the actions contemplated were to take place after the stoppage of access, and hence were to be the strongest possible measures. The actions considered were to be those handled by the civilian agencies of our government—that is, they were to stop short of a total blockade. He hoped that the economic paper could be a maximum of 7 or 8 pages, and be a qualitative statement rather than statistical tables.

Mr. Fowler raised the point whether the measures were being thought of in terms of short or long duration. It was the consensus of the group that some effort should be made to estimate the results in terms of time, and that we should be prepared to continue the measures for some time. Mr. Fowler added that he thought we should also look into the possibilities of alternative sources of supplies for our Allies.

Mr. Johnson asked that the Department of Defense prepare an evaluation of the courses of action under paragraphs 3(a) and (b) in Directive 59. This should include an estimate of the military capabilities of our Allies.

Mr. Fowler wondered about spelling out the tax and stand-by controls program of paragraph 1 (a) of the Directive. It was felt that this was within the purview of Mr. Sorensen, under paragraph 5, and that if he prepared a paper on the matter a copy would be supplied to State.

There was discussion of the term “military operations” as used in the Directive. Those who had been present at the NSC meeting[5] agreed that it meant “concept of operations”, and should include consideration of such things as the nature of the probe to be undertaken, the possibility of escalation, reactions to interference with ground access and air access, the possibility of access after stoppage, and the quality or our maximum readiness by January 15, 1962, and of troops being deployed by January 1, 1962, with and without a declaration of national emergency.

Mr. Johnson said that target dates should not become fixed, but should rather be used as points of reference since our actions must be related to Soviet moves.

Mr. Nitze raised several exemplary questions which he felt had to be posed to the President: If access to Berlin is blocked, do we undertake an airlift? Do we immediately probe? What if the probe is turned back? What is the capability of the military force available? In that connection, if our Allies contribute all they are supposed to, our capabilities will be increased accordingly. There was discussion of the help we could expect from the Allies. It was agreed that we should endeavor to have them make efforts at least comparable to ours, and that their contributions would be greater as our efforts increased. Mr. Hillenbrand pointed out that the German contribution might vary depending on the election results. General Gray[6] noted that it was not clear whether the Allied contributions would be scheduled for January 1, 1962, or for March 1, 1962. It was agreed that there was a difference between what the military needed, and what it might be possible to get from our Allies. Mr. Johnson felt it best to establish our needs, and use that as a point of departure. “Needs” was perhaps not the best word. It should be the expected effort on the part of our Allies comparable to our own. There was considerable, though preliminary and inconclusive, discussion of the size and efficiency of the military forces which we might realistically expect from our Allies by January 1, 1962 and by March 1, 1962, and of the objectives which might be assigned to those forces.

Mr. Hillenbrand raised the question whether the Allied contribution was related directly to the operation under paragraph 3(a). Mr. Nitze said he understood Mr. Acheson's view to be that a probe should be undertaken consisting of 2 American divisions moving down the Autobahn to a location a few miles inside the East German border, and there establishing a defensive position and waiting to determine the Soviet reaction. If negotiations were not forthcoming, and they were not attacked, they should proceed further. If attacked, war would result. The immediate ground actions would depend on the forces available at the time. Others felt that the existing probe plan, envisaging a tripartite combat team of the three Allied powers, should be adhered to. The inclusion of West German forces would pose a legal problem. It was felt that anything more than a probe along the Autobahn by forces legally entitled to use it would be an act of war. But if the probing forces were so constituted, the action of the Soviets and East Germans in throwing it back would be the act of war, since we have the right to use the road within certain procedural limitations.

General Gray said the effort has to be related to timing. Obviously one could not commit all of NATO to the Berlin probe. This had to be readjusted in Europe within NATO's strategic planning. NATO powers were very far behind in fulfillment of their commitments. The picture was that in the case of all-out war we were only expecting to hold out for a few days East of the Rhine, with nuclear weapons. Without nuclear use, our capability was even lower.

Mr. Johnson underscored that all this needed saying.

The political timetable called for in paragraph 4 of the Directive would be supplied by State.

Mr. Johnson then asked the agencies to contribute their papers in 40 copies in time so that the whole package could be presented to the President by 4:30 Tuesday afternoon, the 18th. The Secretary would be at work on Sunday, July 16th, and would appreciate seeing rough drafts of the contributions.

At the conclusion of the meeting, General Gray distributed copies of a draft outline for a “United States Operational Plan on Berlin"[7] which officers of the Department of Defense concerned with the problem felt it might be desirable to prepare.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1861. Top Secret. Drafted by Topping on July 18 and approved by Johnson on July 31.

[2] The source text does not give a date for this meeting of the Coordinating Group, but internal evidence suggests that it took place on July 14.

[3] Document 68.

[4]  Robert Amory of the Central Intelligence Agency.

[5] See Documents 66 and 67.

[6] Major General David W. Gray of the Joint Strategic Survey Council.

[7] Not found.

70. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington,July 15, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Menshikov

Assistant Secretary Nitze

Ambassador Menshikov began the conversation by saying that he was returning to Russia for a vacation. He would have four weeks net not including travel time. I said I envied him. It looked to me as though people worked less hard in the Communists' world than here. He said that I would see from their twenty-year plan that fifteen years from now, the Communists would have to work very little indeed, but they would have to do some work.

The conversation then turned to the question of relative loyalties to the nation or to the party. He said his responsibilities were almost entirely to the state; and, though a member of the party, that he did not even invite members of the American Communist party to his receptions. I said I could well understand that this might present no conflict with his instructions. He then said that there was much disagreement and arguing within the Communist system between factory managers, Government officials, etc., and that in most of these arguments the question of whether or not one was a member of the party did not enter in. He agreed, however, that the general line was set by the party and governed policies in other areas such as the Government.

He then turned the subject to Berlin and said he hoped we did not misunderstand his Government's position on Berlin. In reply, I said I thought Mr. Khrushchev had made himself eminently clear. My concern was that a basic miscalculation had already been made by him.

Menshikov said that the important thing was for the USSR and the U.S. to understand each other and to agree. In the Geneva negotiations about a test ban, we were proposing an administrator who would impose our will upon the Soviet Union. This they couldn't agree to. Now we were proposing to veto any proposal in the UN to adapt the UN administration to the Troika principle. I said I thought our differences went back to a basic philosophical point—it was our belief that one could find people who could objectively interpret facts and the provisions of a treaty or agreement. We thought people could be found who would place this obligation above loyalty to the interests of a particular nation or a particular party. Evidently, Mr. Khrushchev did not believe this possible.

The Ambassador referred to Hammarskjold and the Congo as an example of a so-called neutral administrator who had gone beyond the terms of his authority. I said we did not consider that Hammarskjold had gone beyond the terms of his authority. We had been cross with Hammarskjold because he had not more forcefully executed the authority which he had. Any objective administrator would undoubtedly cause both of us to be unhappy with him, but we were prepared for neutral administrators to be in control of agreed functions. Evidently the Soviet Union did not agree to this. If so, it was hard to see how one could get away from what would amount to self-inspection.

I then asked the Ambassador what he thought it was we didn't understand about their Berlin proposal. The Ambassador said that Mr. Khrushchev had offered to discuss with us a German peace treaty. He had said that they had their proposals for a treaty, we should present ours. It was only if we refused negotiations or could not agree upon a treaty that they would be forced to go ahead with theirs. I said that I had carefully read the Soviet proposal and was aware of these provisions, but what in effect they were proposing was that we sit down and negotiate under threat that if we could not agree with the Soviet Union, they would sign a unilateral treaty with their puppet Ulbricht and then cut off our rights in Berlin. This threat had now been coupled with threats of nuclear destruction if we attempted thereafter to exercise those rights. Mr. Khrushchev had pointed out to Ambassador Roberts that six nuclear weapons could destroy the U.K. and eight could destroy France.[2] We can't agree to negotiating under such threats. The similarity to Hitler's actions in 1938 has been drawn by some.

I went on to say that I had supervised 500 engineers and technicians in assessing the effects of the atomic weapons dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I had followed studies on nuclear effects since that time. The computations were not difficult to make of what would happen to Russia if a thousand megatons were dropped, if 7,000 megatons were dropped, if 10,000 megatons, or even if 20,000 megatons were dropped. It was easy to refer to such facts, but dangerous. It could lead to a point of no return in our relations.

The Ambassador said that he believed we misinterpreted what they have said about Berlin. They propose no action against a free city of Berlin. I said this is not what Mr. Khrushchev has indicated and certainly not what Ulbricht has said. We quite recognize that they may delay such action but the threat would still be there. The Ambassador then said that we must realize that they firmly intend to sign the peace treaty. I said I fully understood that this was their intention, but they should realize what this may mean before they do it.

The Ambassador said the reason they thought a peace treaty now was essential because things were going on in Germany which must be stopped. There was a revanchist group in Germany which was arming Germany and seeking thermonuclear weapons. I said that the Germans were by and large interested in their tremendous economic prosperity, and that there was little drive to build up military strength in Germany. It was Soviet recurrent threats to Berlin which was forcing German rearmament. If they signed a peace treaty, this would push the NATO alliance closer together and would have the effect of increasing the pace of German armament. They would be forcing the U.S. and Germany closer together and, not only the U.S. and Germany, but also all other NATO allies. The similarity of Khrushchev's threats to those of Hitler would not be lost. I pointed out that it was the Soviet Union that was responsible for having taken the initiative in the Berlin situation. I recalled that I had already said that I believed they had miscalculated. There was, however, still time for them to change. It is they who have increased their defense budget by one-third. They talk of countering de Gaulle's one division being returned from Algeria with ten divisions of tanks deployed across the Autobahn. Certainly this can be done but it won't protect the heart land of Russia.

I recalled that Mr. Khrushchev in his speech of denunciation of Stalin[3] had accused Stalin in the later thirties of having mishandled the German problem so as to bring a threat to the physical base of Communism. I said I should think Mr. Khrushchev would worry about similarities to today's situation.

The Ambassador said he was present when Mr. Khrushchev made his speech. He did not remember that Mr. Khrushchev had emphasized the points I was making. In any case, the situation was now different than that which existed in the late thirties.

I went back to the point that the initiative on Berlin was theirs, and it was time for their side to reconsider. They know what our requirements are in regard to Berlin and Germany, if they want to negotiate seriously about Germany, they could withdraw their threat of unilateral action to terminate our rights and send a special emissary to negotiate with us. It is hard to see how we could very well negotiate under Hitler-like threats of nuclear destruction. The Ambassador said that we would have to shoot first in a Berlin crisis. I said, no, we will exercise our rights. If you shoot to prevent that, we will have to shoot back.

The Ambassador said what is it you want in Germany. I said we want an all German solution based on the right of self-determination. The Ambassador said there are many ways of exercising self-determination. Popular support can be shown in other ways than by free elections. He said, “Did Syngman Rhee really have popular support?” I said, yes, in my opinion, he did for a long period have popular support. I said I thought President Ayub in Pakistan had popular support despite the fact Mr. Khrushchev had called him and the Shah “rotten”. I said Ayub is not rotten; on the other hand, Ulbricht is rotten. He has the support of hardly 15% of his people.

The Ambassador said that this was all very pessimistic with my talk of miscalculation and points of no return. I said to the contrary, it is you who have taken the initiative with respect to Berlin and there is still time for Mr. Khrushchev to change his course. I had always thought the Communists made a virtue of being realists. If, as you say, Mr. Khrushchev is worried about Germany, he must see that what he is doing is driving the West together including Germany. If he signs a unilateral peace treaty with his puppet, he will merely accelerate that process. By that time he may have started a process that neither he nor we will subsequently be able fully to control. His initiative is obviously not working out the way you say he hoped it would. Now is the time to change. When you go back to Moscow, I hope you do all you can to get this straightened out.

At one point I said that one of the principal lines of policy in the early months of the Kennedy Administration had been to cool down East-West tensions and to create a situation in which meaningful talks with the Soviet Union would be possible. Menshikov said he recognized that this had been true and noted that the proposal for a meeting between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev had been Mr. Kennedy's initiative. He said he thought that talk had been useful but that further talks were necessary. One could not accomplish everything in one or two days. I reiterated the point that it was Mr. Khrushchev who had taken the initiative in renewing the crisis over Berlin, and that this had not been our initiative. Menshikov replied that there had been various developments, including our mistake over Cuba, but that the principal factor which had caused Mr. Khrushchev to take the position that he had taken on Berlin was our indication of an unwillingness to negotiate a German peace treaty with them.

At another point in the discussion, Mr. Menshikov discussed their ideas of a free city of Berlin. He said that the East Germans would guarantee rights of access to Berlin and that the Russians would also guarantee them. They would not object to the presence of token Western military forces in Berlin. The question at issue was what the purpose of these forces in Berlin was to be. If they were to be the symbol of a continuation of occupation rights, the Soviet Union could not agree. The occupation had lasted for 16 years and must be terminated. If the purpose of the continued presence of the troops was to symbolize the guarantees that Berlin would remain a free city, that would be alright, but under those circumstances Russian troops should participate. I pointed out that there originally had been a special regime for the entire city of Berlin; that the Soviet Union having turned over its sector to the East Germans now proposed a regime to be applicable only to the Western sectors similar to the one which they had violated for the whole city. I said that we could not agree to this.

Mr. Menshikov referred to the subversive activities which were being conducted from West Berlin. I pointed out that subversive activities were being conducted by the Communists in many areas of the world. If they wanted to negotiate about the general problem, this would be possible, but they had made it clear in previous discussions how difficult it would be for them to put a general halt to such activities.

Mr. Menshikov also referred to the importance of settling boundary questions once and for all. I indicated that the problem of the Oder-Neisse line might be soluble if part of a more general settlement. Menshikov indicated that more was involved than that.

Menshikov said the East Germans should talk with the West Germans. Two regimes existed. The problem of a German settlement was their problem. I replied that I had read Ulbricht's proposals for a settlement some two years ago, and that it was evident that what he wished to negotiate was a division of East and West Germany, not a reunification.

Menshikov repeatedly drew the analogy between our having signed a Japanese peace treaty without Soviet agreement and their proposal for a German peace treaty without our agreement. He said that at that time we had felt a Japanese peace treaty to be necessary. Now they felt a German peace treaty to be necessary. He said we had gotten away with our unilateral Japanese peace treaty because we then had a monopoly of atomic weapons. I pointed out that the two situations were not analagous, and furthermore that even though they now had atomic weapons, they did not have a monopoly—there were now all the dangers of a two-sided situation.

The Ambassador thanked me for having invited him to lunch. I wished him success on his mission.

Paul H. Nitze[4]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Confidential. Drafted by Nitze on July 17. The meeting was held at the Metropolitan Club. On July 12 and 17 Menshikov had similar conversations with Bowles and Rostow. A memorandum of his conversation with Rostow is ibid., and is summarized in The Diffusion of Power, p. 230; a memorandum of his conversation with Bowles is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7-1261.

[2] This exchange had taken place at a performance of the Royal Ballet at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow on July 2.

[3] For documentation on Khrushchev's speech, February 25, 1956, attacking Stalin, see Foreign Relations , 1955-1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 72 ff.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

71. Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington,July 17, 1961.

OUTLINE ON GERMANY AND BERLIN

I. U.S. Interests

A. The vital interests of the U.S. (i.e. interests which involve decisions as to war) are engaged in the German-Berlin problem at the following points:

1. Presence and security of Western forces in West Berlin

2. The security and viability of West Berlin

3. Physical access to West Berlin

4. The security of the Federal Republic of Germany against attacks from the East

B. The U.S. also has important political interests and aims in Germany which have not yet been realized. These may be summarized as the application to all of Germany of the principle of self-determination and the intimate association of a unified Germany with the West. If there must be, on practical grounds, a choice between a unified Germany and a Western Germany integrated into Western Europe, the U.S. interests lie with the latter choice.

C. There are aspects of the German-Berlin situation which are not politically acceptable and are not likely to be changed in the near future, aspects which are not the occasion for a resort to force by the West. Among these are: (a) the de facto division of Germany, and (b) the de facto absorption of East Berlin into East Germany.

D. Certain elements of the German-Berlin problem are of little national interest to the U.S. and could be conceded if it becomes valuable to do so, for example, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a German-Polish frontier.

II. Soviet Objectives

While precise Soviet objectives within any specific time period must be somewhat speculative, the resumption of Soviet pressures against the status quo in Germany and Berlin appear to be aimed at:

A. The actual and formal consolidation of the Communist position in Eastern Europe and East Germany: Khrushchev has reason to be anxious about his situation in East Germany and the longer run prospect in such countries as Poland.

B. A permanent freezing of the division of Germany.

C. Political steps to meet what might be a growing Russian concern about the revival and rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany.

D. A significant dilution of the Western position in West Berlin, looking toward its absorption into a Communist East Germany.

E. The weakening or dissolution of NATO.

F. A blow to Western, and, more particularly, U.S. prestige as a part of the general strategy of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Note: The priorities Khrushchev might attach to the above are also related to factors of timing, for example, he may be seriously concerned with A., B., C. and D. as matters for immediate attention, but may look upon E. and F. as useful by-products if they could be achieved.

III. The Political Problem

The central political problem is to protect U.S. vital interests, I. A. above, without war if possible and to put the U.S. and the West in the best possible position if war should become necessary. This will require:

A. Action on a broad front to convince Khrushchev of U.S. and Western determination to defend these vital interests at all costs.

B. National unity based not only upon a clear public recognition of the issues involved but also upon confidence that every reasonable step has been taken to defend vital interests by measures short of war.

C. Allied unity, based upon allied recognition of their own vital interests—reaching beyond a readiness to follow the leader. Further, allied unity must also rest upon confidence that the allied position is reasonable and that the aggressor is forcing the issue beyond a tolerable point.

D. Maximum support of world public opinion to make aggressive moves by Khrushchev as costly as possible in other areas in which he is interested.

[1] Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron. Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed is a 2-page paper, also dated July 17, on the military buildup. The paper favored a “low key” approach and noted that the psychology of a mobilization was not desirable at the present time.

72. Memorandum of Meeting on Berlin[1]

Washington, July 17, 1961.

PRESENT WERE

The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Bundy

The Secretary of State opened the meeting by stating the general view of his Department that we should begin on a low key, if possible. At the same time, necessary military strength should be built up and the Department would concur in a budgetary increase of $4.3 billion and a call of National Guard and Reserve units if needed.

Secretary McNamara made it clear that a declaration of national emergency was not needed before September 1st or October 1st, although there would be a probable need for a call of air units before the end of the year. After prolonged discussion of the components of the $4.3 billion requested, it appeared that immediately needed actions, for procurement, for Civil Defense, for the build-up of the three STRAF divisions, the possible provision of 64,000 additional men to fill out U.S. NATO forces, and other similar missions, would produce a budgetary request of $3 billion, while the cost of large-scale troop calls under a declaration of national emergency would amount to about a billion and a half more (the difference between this total of $4.5 billion and the total of $4.3 billion with which the discussion began is explained by $200 million for Civil Defense). There appeared to be general agreement that there need be no present request for a declaration of national emergency, and it appeared to be the dominant judgment that a budgetary request for $3 billion would be preferable to a request for $4.5 billion, since the additional money for Reserve units could undoubtedly be obtained after they were called up. Secretary McNamara's preference went the other way, and it was agreed that this question might usefully be discussed by the President with certain leaders of the Armed Forces committees of the Congress. It was also agreed that the President would review these questions of military policy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff before final decision was made.

The Secretary of State said that the second large item for discussion on Wednesday would be the planning of the negotiating position of the U.S., preparatory to discussion with our Allies. What negotiating position should we have, and how should its development be timed? On this point, discussion was inconclusive, and it was agreed that decision should await presentation of the “political scenario” on Wednesday. The Secretary indicated his view that the opening posture of the West should be an emphasis upon self-determination, and that probably we would wish to spin out the discussion in order to make it difficult for Mr. Khrushchev to proceed with concrete steps at an early stage.

The third point which the Secretary brought forward was the question of our eventual position toward the DDR. The President made plain his belief that since we shall have to talk with representatives of that regime at some stage, we should not now take so strong a line that these later talks will look like a defeat. Our rights in Berlin certainly cannot be discussed, but there can at an appropriate stage be a discussion of the way in which our rights are to be maintained without impairment. The Secretary mentioned the possibility of proceeding first through conversations in which the West and East Germans talk together (a notion which has echoes in Khrushchev's Vienna Aide-Memoire),[2] but no decisions, even of a preliminary sort, were reached, except that discussion of the “political scenario” might be lengthy and should be continued after the NSC meeting of the steering group if necessary.

Secretary McNamara made clear that the Defense Department would not be able to present a military operations plan on July 19. It would, on the other hand, have a shopping list of desired allied military actions. The State Department will present a similar paper on U.S. and allied steps in a campaign of economic warfare. The President made clear his concern for a strong U.S. team on this subject, mentioning among others the name of Milo Perkins, a name which Secretary Dillon agreed to check up on.

General Taylor asked about propaganda proposals, and it was agreed that concrete plans in this area should be developed by USIA and submitted through the Department of State. One fairly desirable event is a plebiscite in West Berlin, probably after the German election—though the President was not convinced on this matter of timing.

The President's speech had initially been planned for Monday, July 24, but Mr. Sorensen indicated that this seemed somewhat too early, and it was agreed that he would suggest a definite date at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, July 19.

It was agreed that many items of political, economic and military negotiation should be ready for serious discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in early August.[3] State Department will send an expert team sometime in the week of July 24, and on this team Defense and Treasury will be represented. Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara proposes to see General Norstad in Paris over the coming week end, in order to get his views and to work out a strong agreed position if possible.

The President ended the meeting with a discussion of organizational framework of work on Berlin. At the lower level is the interdepartmental coordinating group under Mr. Foy Kohler. This committee will be responsible for day-to-day operations and detailed planning. It will report to the President through a steering group under the Secretary of State as Chairman, with the following additional membership:

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

Director, CIA

Director, USIA

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Taylor

Mr. Bundy

The President's desire is that this group should meet once a week on Monday afternoons. Among its duties will be the clarification of items to be discussed at the fortnightly Thursday meetings of the National Security Council.

The President asked the Secretary of State whether there could be a similar interdepartmental working coordinating group for Laos and Viet-Nam reporting through the same steering committee. The Secretary replied that there were real difficulties here in the internal organization of the Department of State, but it was agreed that he would present a recommendation on this organizational question at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, July 19. It was agreed that fundamental responsibility for supervision and follow-up would rest with the steering group, initially with respect to Berlin, and if assignment is later given, with respect to Southeast Asia as well.

McGeorge Bundy

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy.

[2] Of June 4; see footnote 4, Document 32.

[3] At a meeting on July 13 with Alphand and Caccia, Rusk had proposed a tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting to take place in Paris at the beginning of August. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/7-1361) At another meeting on July 17 the British and French agreed to the meeting. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 396.1/7-1761)

73. Editorial Note

Despite Secretary of State Rusk's personal appeal to the NATO Allies for a quick discussion of the draft replies to the June 4, 1961, Soviet aide-mémoire, the North Atlantic Council was unable to consider them until July 12, and the United States therefore, agreed to delay delivery of the notes. Following NAC discussion (summarized in Polto 48 from Paris, July 12; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1261), the United States, France, and the United Kingdom resolved some remaining textual differences and delivered their notes on July 17. For text of the French note, see La Documentation Francaise: Articles et Documents, July 25, 1961; for text of the British note, see Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin, 1944-1961, Cmd. 1552, London, 1961, pages 448 ff.; for text of the U.S. note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pages 753-760.

Five days earlier, on July 12, the German Embassy in Moscow had delivered the Federal Republic's reply to the February 17 Soviet aide-mémoire. For the text in English, see ibid., pages 750-753. For the German text and German texts of all the documents mentioned above, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Band 6, Zweiter Halbband, pages 1277-1230, 1248-1260, and 1262-1264. On July 18 the four Western Ambassadors in Moscow met to compare notes on Gromyko's response at the time of the delivery of the replies. In each case Gromyko ended the conversation by saying that it was up to the West whether the Berlin problem was exacerbated or settled by agreement, and all four Ambassadors agreed that in the absence of some settlement, Khrushchev would conclude a separate treaty. (Telegram 179 from Moscow, July 18; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1861)

On July 19 President Kennedy, at the beginning of his press conference, read parts of the statement which had been agreed on July 4 (see footnote 3, Document 55), and released the full text. For a transcript of the press conference and text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 513-523. The statement is also printed in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pages 760-762.

July-August 1961: NSAM No. 62; the Second Acheson Report on Berlin; Meeting of the Four Western Foreign Ministers at Paris

74. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 18, 1961, noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2461. Top Secret. Drafted by Mautner on July 24 and approved by Johnson on July 31. A typewritten note on the source text indicates the meeting began at noon, recessed for lunch, and reconvened at 3 p.m.

75. Memorandum of Meeting on Berlin

Washington, July 18, 1961, 5 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret. Drafted by McNamara on July 19. The time of the meeting is from the JFK Log. (Ibid.)

76. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, July 19, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings, 1961. Secret. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 2257.

77. Memorandum of Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting

Washington, July 19, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on July 25. For two other accounts of the meeting, see Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 590, and Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 180-183.

78. Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group

Washington, July 20, 1961, 5 p.m.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Interdepartmental Steering Group. Top Secret. Prepared by Colonel Lawrence J. Legere on July 22.

79. Editorial Note

80. National Security Action Memorandum No. 62

Washington, July 24, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Lemnitzer, Sorensen, Taylor, and Kohler.

81. Editorial Note

82. Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin

Washington, July 26, 1961, 5:15 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on July 31. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1984, 2753.

83. Editorial Note

84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 28, 1961, 11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2861. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

85. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 29, 1961, 1 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2961. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. The source text bears the note “DR saw Sat,” i.e., July 29.

86. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946. Secret. Attached to a July 29 memorandum from McGhee to Rusk, which stated that this paper was a first draft of a paper on negotiations arising out of the Berlin crisis. On August 4 McGhee sent a copy to Acheson. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/8-461)

87. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 31, 1961, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-3161. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

88. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 31, 1961, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-3161. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

89. Report by Dean Acheson

Washington, undated.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-3161. Secret. Attached to a July 31 memorandum transmitting the report to Rusk. Also attached were a 5-page summary entitled “Talking Paper,” a table of contents, and Tabs A, “The Western Peace Plan,” and B, “Proposed Revision of Solution C;” none is printed. The Political Program and Tabs A and B are also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 144A.

90. Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group

Washington, August 2, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Steering Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Bundy on August 7.

91. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, August 3, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1982, 2259.

92. Record of Meeting

Washington, August 3, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 2258.

93. Editorial Note

94. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, August 5, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1940. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on August 7. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

95. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, August 5, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/8-561. Secret. Drafted by Cash on August 6 and approved in S on August 8. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

96. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, August 6, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on August 7 and approved in S on August 8. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

97. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, August 6, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand on August 7 and approved in S on August 8. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

98. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, August 6, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Lampson and approved in S on August 8. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

99. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State

Paris, August 7, 1961, 2 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-761. Secret; Priority. According to another copy this telegram was drafted by Rusk. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1943)

100. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, August 8, 1961, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/8-861. Secret. Drafted by Lyon and approved in S on August 9. The meeting was held at the Elysée Palace.

101. Paper Prepared by the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin

Paris, August 8, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] week-end of 8/4.” The source text bears no drafting information. On August 7 the Four-Power Working Group had met to revise its report on the basis of the Foreign Ministers discussions. This paper summarizes their decisions. A copy of the text of their report, as revised, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1945.

102. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, August 9, 1961, 10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/8-961. Secret. Drafted by John A. Bovey, First Secretary of the Embassy in Paris. The meeting was held at the Embassy.

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, August 12, 1961, 6:26 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland and Achilles; cleared by Brandin (GER), Davis, Tyler, Kohler, Ball, Johnson, and Bundy (in draft); and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.

74. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, July 18, 1961, noon.

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin—July 18, 1961

[Here follows a list of participants. Assistant Secretary of State Kohler presided at the meeting.]

The meeting discussed in lively conversational form the various aspects of courses a and b of NSC Directive 59[2] and the form these aspects were given in the collection of prepared documents for the NSC Meeting of July 19, 1961.[3]

The discussion ranged over the merits of a rapid, spectacular build-up versus the slower build-up and the usefulness of a permanent re-enforcement of conventional forces; it ranged over the need for American leadership in order to bring along the allies, over the financial burden the various courses might bring on, the limited effect economic sanctions would have by themselves, the enormous difference in defensive posture even a small type build-up would have in Europe. It also covered the weaknesses of the concept of a tri-partite “probe” along the Autobahn, the merits of declaring a national emergency, the need to modernize outdated equipment of our conventional forces, the timing of troop deployments and troop availability, the Allied attitude, the apparent desire of the President and the Secretary to avoid declaration of a national emergency at this time, the psychological lack of preparation of our country, the views of the “Sovietologists”, the danger of the first probe's failure, the airlift capability and other points.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2461. Top Secret. Drafted by Mautner on July 24 and approved by Johnson on July 31. A typewritten note on the source text indicates the meeting began at noon, recessed for lunch, and reconvened at 3 p.m.

[2] Document 68.

[3] Reference is to “Documents Prepared in Response to NSC Action Memorandum No. 59 of July 14, 1961,” July 18, which consisted of a memorandum of transmittal and Annexes A (Report Evaluating Two Alternative Courses of Action), B (Report on Economic Sanctions), C (Department of Defense Submission), and D (Political Timetable for Three Alternative Courses of Action). (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Coordinating Group)

75. Memorandum of Meeting on Berlin[1]

Washington, July 18, 1961, 5 p.m.

PRESENT WERE

The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Generals Lemnitzer, Eddleman, LeMay and Shoup, and Admiral Russell)

1. The President stated he was considering a further supplement to the Defense Department's budget. He discussed the political and economic considerations affecting the declaration of a National Emergency, and stated he believed it would be wise to postpone the declaration of such an emergency until it was required as a foundation for the mobilization of our reserve forces. The Chiefs agreed such action was not required now, and stated that it could be postponed until at least September 1.

2. The President asked if consideration had been given to the action which should be taken by our allies to complement the force increases proposed in the Defense Department budget supplement.[2] The Secretary and the Chiefs stated a list of actions to be recommended to the NATO nations had been prepared. Further, they stated that if the allies followed the recommended program, and if the United States acted in accordance with the proposed budget supplement, by January 1, 1962, NATO would be prepared to launch non-nuclear warfare on a scale which would indicate our determination and which would provide some additional time for negotiation before resorting to nuclear warfare.

3. The President asked if the NATO air forces would be sufficiently strong to follow the ground probe with non-nuclear air action. General LeMay replied that USAFE was outnumbered by the Soviets 10 or 13 to 1 [this is not true, but I did not dispute the point at the meeting],[3] but that if USAFE were supported by its allies, and if the NATO forces took the initiative, they could effectively meet the Soviet in non-nuclear air combat.

4. In response to a question from the President as to how we proposed to strengthen our ground forces, General Eddleman replied that he and I were agreed we should add personnel to the three STRAF divisions to make them combat ready by approximately December 1.

5. The President asked if the additional U.S. combat-ready divisions could be effectively employed if our allies took no action to strengthen their forces. General Lemnitzer stated, “No”. However, Lemnitzer added that when combined with the increases in forces which we can expect from our allies, the additional U.S. forces will provide NATO with an expanded capability for non-nuclear ground action.

6. The President asked what the Navy could do in the Baltic and Mediterranean to harass Soviet shipping. Admiral Russell replied the Navy had prepared plans for such harassing actions, and, with the force increase provided by the budget supplement, the Navy would be prepared to implement those plans. A copy of the Chiefs' paper, dated July 18, listing the proposed harassing actions was left with the President.[4]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret. Drafted by McNamara on July 19. The time of the meeting is from the JFK Log. (Ibid.)

[2] A copy of the Budget Supplement dated 7-18-61 was left with the President. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] Brackets in the source text.

[4]  JCSM-486-61, “Berlin,” July 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218,JCS Records)

76. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, July 19, 1961.

SUBJECT

This Afternoon's Meetings

You will have your Berlin steering group at 3 o'clock and the NSC at 4. The first meeting should allow us to get a clear sense of what we want to review and decide firmly in the second. I suggest the following agenda for the first meeting.

1. A brief review of the military alternatives. You are quite familiar with this, and Annex C of the blue report[2] gives a good summary of the alternatives as they now stand. The only disappointing element of Annex C is the appendix, which shows the State Department's estimate that there will not be a strong allied response to requests for parallel action on their part. It thus becomes a major diplomatic question whether we want to ask strongly for something we may not get. You should also consider Max Taylor's memo on “the third alternative,” in Annex A.[2] (Inked in on the original)

2. Whichever military level you decide on, there is need for additional decisions about a national emergency and about standby controls and taxing authority. I believe there is general agreement in the steering group that the national emergency is not now necessary, but a hard wing of the Kohler group, led by Acheson and Nitze, disagrees. It will be important to decide how to handle this matter in the 4 o'clock meeting so as to have as much harmony and unanimity in the government as possible, once the decision is taken. On standby controls and taxes, Ted Sorenson has a memo;[3] it's not an easy choice.

3. A third item which deserves discussion at the (inked in on orig.) 3 o'clock meeting is economic sanctions policy. Annex B of the blue book gives a clear-cut recommendation for a general economic embargo against the Sino-Soviet bloc if access to Berlin is blocked. The case is worth reading, and it makes clear that we could do a lot of harm to the Sino-Soviet economy, at a considerable cost to ourselves. The intelligence estimate[4] indicates that an embargo in itself is not likely to have a decisive effect upon the Soviets. And again, as Annex B indicates, it will be hard to sell sanctions to our allies, and since the immediate cost will fall more on them than on us, we might have to provide several hundreds of millions a year in compensation.

4. But the most important subject for discussion in the first meeting, and the one which you may wish to put first, is the political scenario. The Secretary of State has sent over a talking paper[5] which indicates his sense of the problem. The first two and one-half pages are a general summary. From IV onward, there is an indicated timetable of activity which carries through pretty clearly to the end of September, and becomes foggy beyond that point—almost inevitably. The paper does not make clear the Secretary's view of two important questions which you may wish to raise with him.

The first is whether we should now make clear that neither the peace treaty nor the substitution of East Germans for Russians along the Autobahn is a fighting matter.

The second is whether we should extend serious feelers to the Soviets with respect to the elements of an eventual settlement of the crisis.

On the basis of the three o'clock meeting, I will try to draft an order of discussion for the four o'clock meeting, and I think you should begin that session by announcing the subjects on which you wish decisions. My guess is that it may make sense to take up the questions at the four o'clock meeting in the order of their urgency, something like this:

1. Level of military build-up

2. Other immediate measures—national emergency? taxes? stand-by controls?

3.

(If you choose) Suggestions for the tone and content of your speech.

(From here on the urgency is somewhat less great, and the key problem is preparation for the Foreign Ministers Meeting.)

4. Economic sanctions policy

5. Immediate political steps

a. Early talks with the Soviets? (Acheson against and Rusk undecided)

b. An immediate decision on attitude toward the peace treaty and East German troops on the Autobahn. (The British are pressing hard for this.)

Some other matters which we are concerned with can be discussed at a slower tempo and should probably be explicitly deferred. Among these are the military operations plan in the event that access is blocked, the Defense Department's recommendations for a long-run defense build-up, details of the civil defense program.

This is probably the most important NSC meeting that we have had, and there is no reason why it cannot be continued tomorrow if you wish.

McG. B.[6]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings, 1961. Secret. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 2257.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 75.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 75.

[3] Presumably this is Sorensen's July 17 memorandum to the President entitled “The Decision on Berlin.” (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

[4] For text of SNIE 2-3-61, July 18, “Probable Soviet Reaction to a Western Embargo,” see Declassified Documents, 1978, 227A.

[5] Not further identified.

[6] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

77. Memorandum of Minutes of the National Security Council Meeting[1]

Washington, July 19, 1961.

[2]

Before the meeting of the Council, there was a meeting of the Steering Group in the President's study on the second floor of the Executive Mansion. The Secretary of State opened this meeting with a discussion which covered the first few pages of his “talking paper” on the political scenario.[3] He emphasized in particular that we must not give our allies a veto, although in practical terms both Germany and France have such a veto de facto. He also emphasized that we must have public opinion on our side and that the force of such international opinion on the Soviet leaders is very great.

Mr. Murrow pointed out that the problem of morale and purpose in Western Europe is more serious than Americans ordinarily believe. The people there do not want to fight for Berlin, and it will take time to change their attitude. If at the beginning we seem impetuous, this change will be harder to effect.

The Secretary of State indicated his support for a military program with three characteristics:

1. A present build-up;

2. A capability to stop DDR troops by the end of 1961;

3. An ability to fight conventional war for several weeks against Soviet forces, at the same point in time.

The Secretary of Defense outlined the specific components of the military program in Annex C[4] and stated his conclusion that there would be no need for a declaration of national emergency before September 1 at the earliest. He believed that Congressional authorization could be obtained for a limited call-up of reserves without such a declaration.

The Cabinet members of the Steering Group indicated their common belief that taxes should be increased in order to give the American public a feeling of participation in the crisis. This belief seemed to be generally shared in the Steering Group.

The President raised the question whether the proposed military build-up would increase the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and the Secretary of Defense replied that in his judgment this would be the effect, but the argument was not fully developed.

It was agreed that one major purpose of the measures now proposed is to effect preparation for a major build-up of forces in Europe, on short notice. The President asked whether these preparations should go forward even if there were a negative response abroad to our proposals for concurrent allied military preparations. The Secretary of Defense answered that he would be in favor of the present build-up and of the further deployment of major U.S. forces to Europe as long as the Germans were willing to play their role, and he believed they would.

The meeting of the whole National Security Council began shortly after four o'clock in the Cabinet Room. Again the Secretary of State spoke from the first pages of his talking paper, and the Secretary of Defense from Annex C of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group report. The President again emphasized his own view that the outlined U.S. preparations would not be adequate without an effective allied response, especially from the Germans and the French.

There then developed a very important exchange between Mr. Acheson and Secretary McNamara. Mr. Acheson initially appeared to wish for a present definite decision to declare a national emergency and begin the call-up of reserves not later than September. Secretary McNamara argued that it would be better not to make a definite commitment now, but to have the understanding that a declaration of emergency would be declared and larger ground reserves called up when the situation required. The Secretary of Defense was opposed to a fixed target date, on the ground that it would be wrong to accept a rigid time-table in advance. He did not wish to have large reserve forces on hand with no mission. Mr. Acheson initially appeared to believe that the proposed course of action was not sufficiently energetic or definite, but the President kept the discussion going until it became clear that Secretary McNamara's flexible time-table would in fact permit a sufficiently rapid deployment in the event of deepening crisis, to satisfy Mr. Acheson. The essential point was that the present preparations would rapidly create a force in being, in the continental U.S., of six Army and two Marine divisions. In the event of a rapidly developing crisis, appropriate numbers of these divisions could be deployed to Europe and reserve divisions called up to take their place, so that up to six divisions and supporting units could be promptly deployed as needed. The exact way in which this deployment and call-up would be interconnected in time was not spelled out in detail, but the up-shot of the discussion was a general agreement that the plans as presented by Secretary McNamara were satisfactory. Mr. Acheson specifically indicated his own approval.

There was further discussion of the relation between conventional forces and the credibility of the deterrent, and there appeared to be general agreement that in fact conventional forces will add to this credibility, creating a chain of plausible U.S. response in which each stage would believably lead to the next higher chain of force.

There was discussion of taxes. The President indicated his current judgment that it would be unwise to add $3-1/2 billion to the budget without asking for additional taxes. On the other hand, the developing recovery might be adversely affected by immediate taxation. But perhaps it would be done by the passage of a tax bill now with the effective date after the first of the year.

Mr. Murrow restated his conviction that preparatory steps should be taken gradually, in part because each step would give us a chance to restate our views and the reasons for what we are doing. He reminded the Council that the polls show weakness in European opinion. To this the Secretary of State replied that opinion can be changed, and the President remarked that we must keep the issue focused on our common commitment.

The discussion turned to government military assistance, and after considerable discussion it was agreed that the U.S. would not for the present offer additional military assistance to allies facing the problem of increased military effort. This judgment was much affected by the opinion of the Secretary of Defense that Germany will not need military assistance, that the UK will increase its force readiness within its own borders, and that in France the problem is not military assistance but Algeria. The Secretary of Defense did believe that it would be important to urge increased procurement in Great Britain, principally by the Germans.

The reference to the British balance of payments problem led to discussion of the parallel problem which might develop for Americans if large new forces were deployed in Europe for a substantial period of time. The Secretary of the Treasury indicated that he would have a real problem in such a case, in the long run, while the Secretary of Defense indicated that over such a period of time there could be rearrangements that would reduce the drain on our gold.

The President asked whether the Germans were now really helping on the balance of payments problem, and he received answers in the general sense of the memorandum supplied to the White House shortly before by the Department of State.[5] In sum, it was felt that the Germans had in fact been increasingly forthcoming, especially in the area of military procurement. The Secretary of Defense pointed out that part of the problem was in difficulties which the Germans had experienced in the complexities of American military procurement, and he said that in his recent conversations with Defense Minister Strauss he had undertaken to make the Department of Defense a purchasing agent for the Germans.[6] In this connection it was agreed that allied needs should be taken into account in the preparation of the U.S. military build-up and in the activation of new lines of production.

The Secretary of the Treasury pointed out the importance of making clear that the military proposals of the Defense Department implied the preparation of a capability, and not a present decision to deploy troops to Europe on a large scale. The President strongly agreed with this comment, and it was agreed that the decisions of this meeting would be recorded and reported to all concerned, with emphasis on the word “capability."

There was brief discussion between the President and Ambassador Finletter about the state of consultation in NATO, and in response to the President's question, Ambassador Finletter indicated that he was not really happy about this matter. The tendency of other members of NATO was to wait for information from the United States, and he was seeking means to place the problem of consideration and counsel on other shoulders as well.

In a separate memorandum the Presidential decisions developing from these matters have been recorded. (National Security Action Memorandum No. 62.)[7]

McGeorge Bundy[8]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on July 25. For two other accounts of the meeting, see Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 590, and Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 180-183.

[2] The source text mistakenly gives July 20 as the date for the meetings.

[3] Not further identified but see paragraph 4 of Document 76.

[4] See footnote 3, Document 75.

[5] Not further identified.

[6] Memoranda of Strauss' conversations with U.S. officials including Secretary of Defense McNamara, July 14-15, are in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1461 and 762.00/7-1561. For Grewe's account of the visit, see Rückblenden, pp. 480 ff.

[7] Document 80.

[8] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

78. Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group[1]

Washington, July 20, 1961, 5 p.m.

1. The meeting discussed the need to inform DeGaulle, Macmillan, and Adenauer of the course U.S. policy is taking. It also reviewed Mr. Bundy's Draft Record of Action covering the NSC meeting of 19 July.[2] The President referred to the scheduled weekly meeting of the Steering Group at 1100, Monday, 24 July 1961,[3] when possibly the draft of the President's speech set for 25 July will be available.

2. General Taylor is impressed with the apparent dearth of political planning anent the Berlin situation. Nowhere does there seem to have been any review of alternative negotiating positions vis-à-vis the Soviets. Instead, State seems only to have been concerning itself with comments on the various levels of military preparedness measures proposed by Defense.

LJL

Colonel, USA

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Interdepartmental Steering Group. Top Secret. Prepared by Colonel Lawrence J. Legere on July 22.

[2] A copy of the draft record of action is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings.

[3] The Steering Group meeting on July 24 dealt primarily with the British balance-of-payments question and Bizerte. (Meeting of the Interdepartmental Steering Group; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Interdepartmental Steering Group)

79. Editorial Note

On July 20, 1961, President Kennedy sent similar letters Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan outlining the speech that he would make on July 25 to the American people. In these letters he reviewed the conclusions that the U.S. Government had reached in its examination of the Berlin question, described additional steps that would have to be taken, and expressed the hope that these measures would convince the Soviet Union of the resolution of the West. For texts of the letters to de Gaulle and Macmillan, see Declassified Documents, 1986, 1866, and 1985, 946; the letter to Adenauer was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 154, July 20, for delivery to the Chancellor. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) On the following day the Department of State transmitted a summary of the points that would be included in the speech to the Ambassadors in the other NATO capitals and Berlin and Tokyo for the purpose of informing the Foreign Ministers of those countries. (Telegram 73 to Ankara, etc.; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/7-2161)

At 4:30 p.m. on July 21 Rusk met with Lebel of France, Hood of the United Kingdom, and Grewe of the Federal Republic of Germany to explain in more detail the particulars of U.S. policy on Berlin. At this meeting Rusk distributed a “Memorandum on Berlin,” dated July 21, which consisted of a memorandum on measures for dealing with the Berlin situation and three attachments: 1) an 11-page military program (a summary of Annex C of the document prepared in response to NSAM No. 59 (see footnote 2, Document 74)); 2) a 4-page paper on economic sanctions (Annex B of the document prepared in response to NSAM No. 59); and 3) an 8-page paper on the information program which would support U.S. policy on Berlin (Annex H of the document prepared in response to NSAM No. 59). Rusk told Lebel, Hood, and Grewe that the memorandum spelled out the U.S. decisions and proposals on Berlin. A copy of the memorandum is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946. A copy of Kohler's memorandum to Rusk in preparation for the meeting is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/7-2161. The Department of State reported on the meeting in telegram 170 to Bonn, July 22. (Ibid., 762.00/7-2261) For Grewe's brief account of the meeting, see Rückblenden, page 484.

80. National Security Action Memorandum No. 62[1]

Washington, July 24, 1961.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

Director, Bureau of the Budget

Director of Central Intelligence

Director, U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT

Berlin

Following the National Security Council meeting on Wednesday, July 19,[2] the President approved the following for further guidance and instructions of the heads of the responsible departments and agencies:

1. Political

The President and the Secretary of State have carefully reviewed together the political situation relating to Berlin, and their position is being stated in Presidential messages to Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Adenauer.[3] The President's views will be further developed in his address to the nation July 25th.

2. Military

The President has authorized a prompt strengthening of the United States' military position, in the light of the general international situation. While the steps immediately authorized are related to improvement of U.S. capabilities in the next twelve months, the President considers these decisions to be steps in a continuing program for strengthening the armed forces. He expects at a later date to review further proposals from the Secretary of Defense relating to the long-time military position of the U.S.

The President intends that all possible steps be taken, without a present call for major ground units of the reserves or the National Guard, to give the U.S. the capability of deploying as many as six additional divisions and supporting air units to Europe at any time after January 1, 1962, that the international situation may warrant it. In connection with an operating decision to effect such a deployment, further measures will be taken to maintain adequate ground forces in the United States.

In pursuit of this decision, the President has directed the submission to the Congress of proposals for appropriative and other legislative authority necessary for this program, without the present declaration of a National Emergency.

In particular, the President has authorized a request for increases amounting to $3.2 billion in new obligational authority. The measures approved are those listed in Attachment 1 of Annex C of the documents prepared under date of July 18, 1961, by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group in response to NSC Action Memorandum No. 59 of July 14, 1961, with the exception of Items 8, 18, and 22 of Attachment 1, and one-half of the sum allotted for Items 10A and 10C.[4]

The President directed that negotiations be undertaken immediately with our allies looking toward their parallel participation in such a higher level of military readiness. In these discussions there will be no initial indication of any U.S. willingness to increase military assistance to our allies for these purposes.

3. Economic

The President approved the policy set forth in Annex B of the report of July 18 with regard to economic sanctions in the event of interference with access to West Berlin, and authorized immediate negotiations with our major allies on such a policy.

The President directed the preparation of a tax proposal to be presented first in his radio address of July 25th. He decided that a decision on a request for stop-gap control legislation should be deferred until the latter part of August.

4. Information

The President assigned to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency the responsibility for coordinating the information activities of the U.S. Government capable of advancing international understanding of the U.S. position on Berlin.

McGeorge Bundy

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Lemnitzer, Sorensen, Taylor, and Kohler.

[2] See Document 77.

[3] See Document 79.

[4]  NSAM No. 59 is printed as Document 68; regarding the documents prepared in response to NSAM No. 59, see footnote 3, Document 75.

81. Editorial Note

At 10 p.m. on July 25, 1961, President Kennedy addressed the nation on the Berlin crisis. After reviewing the course of events since his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna June 3-4, and stressing the grave Soviet threat to Berlin, the President stated that the United States could not and would not permit the Soviet Union to drive it “out of Berlin, either gradually or by force.” The President then summarized six steps in the military field that he was going to take as well as measures for civilian defense. With regard to negotiations, Kennedy stated his willingness to discuss the question and emphasized the importance of the Soviet challenge to the Atlantic Community. For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 533-540. For an account of the drafting of the speech, see Sorensen, Kennedy, pages 590-592.

82. Minutes of Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin[1]

Washington, July 26, 1961, 5:15 p.m.

PRESENT

The President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Nitze, Under Secretary Fowler, Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Owen, Mr. Bundy

The President opened the meeting by asking about progress on our negotiating position. The Secretary responded saying that timing was a major problem. Should we propose a meeting before the 22nd Congress? The Germans might not approve, and he thought the topic should be one for discussion in the Paris working sessions.

The Secretary asked if Mr. Acheson had supplementary comments. Mr. Acheson said the problem was tough. He would advise against calling a peace conference, since that would bring many too many countries into the act. He also believed that it would be wrong at this stage to go to the United Nations.

Acheson believed that the outlines of any proposal would amount to a dressed-up form of the status quo, that such a dressed-up status quo might eventually include a four-nation agreement that they are not going to fight over Berlin, perhaps endorsed by NATO and by the members of the Warsaw Pact. (This endorsement would give a certain indirect role to the DDR.) At a later stage in the negotiations, Mr. Acheson said later, we might go a little further—(1) there could be a discouragement of movements of population as distinct from acts of genuine political refuge; (2) there might be new trade arrangements; (3) we might give assurances on the Oder-Neisse boundary. Mr. Acheson advised against using this last counter unless it buys agreement, because in the view of the Germans it is a substantial issue. The Secretary of State argued that we might accept something like Solution C, in which each side might maintain its own theory with respect to an agreed factual situation.

The President asked whether, in addition, we could agree to a UN presence and perhaps to token USSR participation in such a UN force. The Secretary of State suggested that we might suggest such a UN force for all of Berlin, but that any USSR participation would have to be miniscule, and thus in all probability unacceptable. In further discussion of timing, the Secretary and Mr. Acheson agreed that sometime after the German election but before the 22nd Congress, the United States should propose a conference to convene after the 22nd Congress. The Secretary of State saw a disadvantage in an earlier meeting in that Khrushchev will not want to spin out such meetings and we might come toward a further stage in the crisis sooner than we wish. (Outside the meeting, other students of the crisis have argued that in order to forestall the Soviets, it may be important to have a public Western proposal for negotiations at a future date not later than the end of the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris.) In any event, before we prepare a proposal for negotiations, there should be speeches and propaganda papers, and in response to questions from the President, Mr. Kohler stated that there will not be energetic exploitation of the propaganda themes in the President's speeches and the U.S. aide-mémoire. The Department is also completing its White Paper on Berlin.[2] The President asked again about a plebiscite in West Berlin, and the Secretary of State said the matter was under discussion in the Department of State.

In further comment on the timetable of discussions, the Secretary of State remarked upon the need for conversations between Thompson and Khrushchev, in which we might try to find out further what is on the Soviet leader's mind. Mr. Acheson commented upon the later stages of negotiations, remarking that the first round of discussion would certainly fail and that in the second round we might wish to bring up an incomplete proposal which would give us room for a few final concessions at the end. Such an intermediate proposal might include the notion of joint trusteeship of Berlin and of a four-power agreement not to fight.

Discussion then turned to the “paper stamping” issue. Mr. Kohler presented the elements of the argument developed in his memorandum on the subject. The President indicated his own preference for the opposite position, stated in Mr. Acheson's memorandum (attached).[3] Mr. Nitze indicated that the Defense Department preferred Mr. Acheson's position, on the practical ground that it allowed for a later decision on military action. It emerged from discussion that Mr. Acheson's recommendation is very close to the actual position of the U.S. until the fall of 1958, when Mr. Dulles changed it. In Mr. Acheson's view, we should simply insist that there be no change in present procedures. We could hold to this line sharply, but under the procedures currently approved and supported by Mr. Kohler we should be making a change, in refusing to accept an act of stamping which we had accepted before. Yet we should be doing this for a reason that we had already admitted as invalid until 1958. Mr. Kohler later remarked that after all the fundamental change here is the Soviet withdrawal from participation in the four-power occupation, but Mr. Acheson's argument won the President's approval. Upon inquiry, the President was informed that the act of paper stamping is not in fact an act of approval, but rather one of bureaucratic registration of times of entry and departure, and on this understanding he thought that it would not make sense for us to sustain a position of refusing to permit such stamping.

Mr. Acheson believed that if this new U.S. position were made clear in advance, there would be no question of a concession and the earlier position would simply disappear. Both he and Mr. Nitze were sure that the United Kingdom would not hold to the current position, and the President agreed that we could not press the British on this point. Accordingly, it was agreed that the U.S. would allow the British position to prevail, without making an explicit concession during the working group sessions. The moment of decision will come during the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries. It was recognized that this change might not in fact make any difference in the Soviet position.

During the course of these discussions, Mr. Nitze reported that Brown of the British Labor Party thinks we ought to be prepared to go further than the currently proposed decision and be prepared to talk with the East Germans about the terms and conditions of access to West Berlin.[4] At the President's request, Mr. Acheson stated his objections to this position; it was not a legal objection but a strong opposition to an obvious attempt to humiliate the United States. We should demean ourselves if we talk to these hired men, and he was certain that if the positions were reversed the Soviet Union would certainly not accept any such relationship. The President asked how we distinguished the Chinese Communists from the DDR, and the first answer was that we are not discussing operational issues with the Chinese; the second and more persuasive was that the Chinese Communists do after all represent a very large and powerful de facto political authority and are no man's puppets.

The decision, then, was to change the current United States position, in the course of appropriately managed diplomatic discussions, terminating in the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries; the new decision would be allowed to become public, or at least known to the Soviets, in ways which were not decided at this meeting.

McGeorge Bundy

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on July 31. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1984, 2753.

[2] This White Paper, entitled Berlin—1961, was released on August 18.

[3] Not printed. On July 26 Kohler had sent Rusk a memorandum transmitting a summary paper on Berlin access, dated July 25, and a 2-page undated paper by Acheson entitled “The Problem of the Breaking Point on Access.” These papers indicated that Acheson favored accepting existing procedures and announcing, if the East Germans took over for the Soviet Union at checkpoints, that these procedures had worked satisfactorily for many years and that the West would not permit them to be changed. Current tripartite planning called for changing procedures to prevent stamping of documents by the East Germans. Acheson argued that British support for the changed procedure had been attained under “great duress,” and that they would not be inclined to make paper-stamping a casus belli. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2661)

[4]  McNamara and Nitze had discussed Berlin with Brown on July 24, following a meeting with Norstad the previous day. (Ibid., 741.5/7-2861) The discussions with Norstad had taken all day and dealt with both NATO and Berlin. A memorandum of the morning session (I-18803/61) is ibid.; a memorandum of the afternoon session (I-18893/61) is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 64 B 2382, 092 Germany.

83. Editorial Note

On July 27, 1961, the President's Military Representative, General Taylor, sent a memorandum on Berlin to President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Entitled “Considerations of the Desirability of New Berlin Airlift” and dated July 27, the memorandum examined the pros and cons of both civilian and military airlifts to Berlin, and concluded that the latter could not be mounted quickly enough for increased support for the Berlin garrison and, for this reason, could be dropped from further discussion. Taylor believed that a civilian airlift should be undertaken only “with the utmost reluctance, and only for compelling reasons at the time of decision. An airlift is something like artificial respiration for West Berlin and should not be applied to the patient unless he is in extremis and no better method of treatment is available.” For text of the memorandum, see Declassified Documents, 1978, 68A.

84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, July 28, 1961, 11 p.m.

323. McCloy met with Khrushchev at latter's dacha in Putsunda, south of Sochi, July 26 and morning 27th.[2] Most of conversation centered on Berlin although McCloy repeatedly emphasized he not in position discuss officially any subject except disarmament and could express views on Berlin only as private citizen. Khrushchev generally in good humor, displaying fits of temper only when he referred to what he called US threat of war over German peace treaty and to President's speech.[3] Fol highlights discussion both days. Memcon will follow as soon as available.[4]

1.

Berlin (July 26). Khrushchev raised subject and expounded SOV position essentially in same terms as in Vienna, emphasizing his determination go through with peace treaty under any conditions. Deplored talk in US about possibility war and stressed Sovs did not want war but if war imposed on them they had means destroy all Europe. Said Sovs would match each US division sent Europe with two of their own. Re German reunification claimed no Western power sincere about it; requesting this info be kept confidential, claimed de Gaulle had told him he wanted preserve two Germanies and had confirmed this position last week when he received Amb Vinogradov. Stressed German unification not negotiable and strictly internal matter of Germany. Referred SOV proposal for entering agreement on Germany and contended Sovs wanted no clashes with US but rather friendship and good relations. Lancing West Berlin boil would clear atmosphere since no disputes except Germany exist between two countries. At same time fully realize dangerous moment being approached but peace treaty would still be signed, and nothing could intimidate him. Referred to exchange aides-mémoire on Berlin and said Sovs now preparing reply to ours. Compared this exchange with kicking football back and forth and said this would probably continue until peace treaty signed when US might kick ball different kind and Sovs would do same in return. However, US as well as UK appear willing negotiate; therefore situation should not be inflamed and common sense should be used. Invited West advance its own proposals or [for?] peace treaty and claimed Sovs did not wish impose their own conditions. Negotiations on peace treaty would be open and each side could express its views. Expressed agreement with thesis better have difficult negotiations than war. Pleaded for understanding Sov position and asked McCloy convey best wishes to President. Said believed President displaying restraint and dignity in Berlin matter; true he sometimes engages in polemics but always leaving door open for negotiations. Said if President had proposals Sovs would be happy consider them and perhaps suggest counter proposals. Such exchange might take place on confidential basis. Re-affirmed willingness guarantee freedom and independence West Berlin once peace treaty signed and went so far as to say he thought any Western proposal for such guarantees would be accepted.

McCloy recalled his long background German affairs and stressed danger German problem and need for its solution. Emphasized Berlin symbol US good faith which extended beyond actual territory that city. Said Sov intention sign peace treaty would cause many difficulties and expressed personal view artificial truncation any country fraught with great danger; therefore Germany should be unified and its east borders guaranteed as compensation for damages caused by Germans; this might be followed by non-aggression pact between East and West to prevent Germany from breaking loose. Emphasized US would not go to war if Khrushchev signed peace treaty although we believed such act would be unwise. US concern is over contention that peace treaty would cut off our rights which we had gained by shedding blood and that we and all our commitments would be relegated to whims of East Germany and Ulbricht. Referring to possibility negotiations said anybody prepared negotiate but negotiations should be unrestricted and not on a pre-determined basis as Sovs seemed to suggest. Said horrors modern war obvious to all and inquired why then Sovs disturbing existing situation which no threat to peace. Khrushchev's statement said sign treaty come hell or high water very dangerous. Appealed for statesmanship and expressed hope no situation would be created where weapons would have to be used. Stressed when US public opinion begins to move it has great power behind it which becomes difficult to deflect. Stated President cool and reasonable in this crisis but is also a courageous man who would not surrender vital interests his country.

2. President's speech (July 27 [25]). In strong emotional tone, Khrushchev stated President in effect had declared preliminary war on Sovs because he had presented Sovs with ultimatum and had said if ultimatum not accepted that would mean war. Sovs regretted President took this course, but accepted challenge and would not change policy directed at signing peace treaty and solving West Berlin problem on basis freedom and independence West Berlin. History would judge us if war should occur and would also determine who would survive, but he was quite sure Soviet Union would survive. Said he would talk to General Staff and Defense Minister and ask them to review situation and strengthen Soviet defenses. Said he would be back Moscow Monday and hear their report. If necessary, would publicly inform Soviet people that US presenting Sovs with ultimatum which tantamount to war. US actions confirmed his January 6 thesis that when capitalists and imperialists lost confidence victory on basis peaceful coexistence they would resort to war. Contended war would not be over Berlin but rather war of monopolist imperialists against Socialist countries. US trying assume role international gendarme, something Hitler had aspired to. Reiterated whole Europe would be destroyed in war. As to US, USSR would have to compete with it and probably neither side could wipe out the other. US would survive, but there would be no Wall Street any longer because people would not tolerate system unleashing wars. Said President's intention “mobilize” armed forces and industrial potential might not be followed by similar action on Soviet part because war bound be thermonuclear and Sovs have enough bombs so no need take people away from industry. Said modern war would be decided not by infantry but by rockets and nuclear bombs. Kept emphasizing his rocket commands and implying his great superiority in this field. Reiterated would consult with General Staff and Soviet Govt and draw proper conclusions. Also would inform people US would start war if peace treaty signed because people should know about inevitability of war; war seems inevitable because Sovs will sign peace treaty. Sovs will counter any US action and will respond to war with war. Only a mad man can declare war today. President's statement there was threat to freedom West Berlin fallacious because Sovs proposed guarantee keep freedom that city. Expressed view President reasonable, young man full of energy and wishes display that energy. However, if war should occur he would be last President because no one knows what would happen after war. Said he had made all these statements because it would be strange if, having seen President's speech, he were simply to talk about Soviet willingness disarm while President requesting another $3.5 billion for arms. It would be strange if he should ask McCloy merely convey greetings to President or if he were to “try jump into President's throat without scratching it.” Sov prickly and quite difficult to digest. However, he still believes in President's reason. President will have to consult with his allies and uncertain whether they would want war. In any event, SOV proposal for negotiations on peace treaty remains valid and open. Sovs wish resolve this problem peacefully, remove this rotten tooth, and develop US/USSR relations but on basis of peace treaty and not on basis of ultimatum. Said after thunderstorms people cool off, think problems over and resume human shape, casting away threats.

McCloy said had no chance read President's speech but believed President had not threatened war over peace treaty. President believes Khrushchev will sign peace treaty and there is nothing we can do about it if he insists. However, President deeply concerned about our loss of rights and our people firmly convinced soul and honor of our country represented by these rights could not be surrendered in face of threats. It is this aspect that has developed this serious situation and has led to actions President has taken. Stated would convey Mr. Khrushchev's views to President and said that as private citizen he thought there was community of interests between two sides on German problem and that both governments should study this situation. Said on basis of what he had heard about President's speech and of his talks with President believes way could be found avoid this rock in sea. Khrushchev's charge against capitalists unfounded and there no great difference between capitalists and Communists because all of them in first instance human beings. Nobody stupid enough to want war and our people not afraid of competition with Soviet Union. On contrary, our people impressed by Soviet achievements in such areas as industry, space, and sports. However, US people would not lie down and let Sovs walk by US in this peaceful competition. Expressed view US/USSR cooperation peaceful endeavors would be great boon. Stressed American people sure and tenacious. Expressed hope sunshine will follow storm and would show us way past this obstacle.

[Here follows discussion of Laos and disarmament.]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2861. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.

[2] McCloy had been in Moscow since July 17 for talks on disarmament, and at Khrushchev's invitation he flew to Sochi on July 26.

[3] See Document 81.

[4] McCloy's 25-page memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/7-3161.

85. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, July 29, 1961, 1 a.m.

324. Eyes only for the Secretary from McCloy. Embassy telegram 323.[2] Both Khrushchev's and my statements abbreviated reftel though I made full use of arguments contained in our note and other material in my hands. In summary, Khrushchev was cordial on Wednesday but firm in reiterating his Vienna position. Really mad on Thursday after digesting President's speech. Used rough war-like language returning to cordiality after the storm had passed. Frequent repetition this formula: will sign peace treaty no matter what; occupation rights thereupon cease, access cut off, and necessary then to make a deal with GDR; if you attempt force way through we will oppose by force; war bound to be thermonuclear and though you and we may survive all your European allies will be completely destroyed. Gathered from Ambassadors here that Soviets were making this argument to our allies hinting that they would not follow US in any war moves. All this followed by offers to negotiate peace terms, guarantee access and settle German problem as the only serious one between us.

My estimate is situation probably not yet ripe for any negotiation proffers by US but too dangerous to permit it drift into a condition where cramped time could well lead to unfortunate action.

Intend to proceed Paris to brief NAC as soon as I close here.[3] Would appreciate instructions how far I may go in briefing them on Khrushchev's comments on Berlin. Thompson and I sense Soviets will be pressing allies with threats of destruction to weaken their determination to go along with us.

Thompson believes it wise to emphasize this in Paris, stressing vital necessity for their firmness at this point. Assume no question propriety my briefing them on disarmament. Lyon hints de Gaulle may wish see me Paris. Assume I can talk freely with him re Khrushchev's comments if interview should take place.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-2961. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. The source text bears the note “DR saw Sat,” i.e., July 29.

[2] Document 84.

[3] At 4:51 p.m. on July 29 the Department of State cabled the Embassy in Moscow that the President wanted McCloy to return directly to Washington. (Telegram 303; Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-2961)

86. Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, undated.

I.

CONCEPT

1. Continue execution of presently planned measures for strengthening national and NATO defenses.

2. Protracted negotiation: engage the Powers most concerned in a continuing discussion of the unresolved problems not only of Berlin and Germany but of all Central Europe. Keep this discussion going for years if need be, as in the Austrian treaty talks.

3. Develop negotiating positions which genuinely look toward progress in solving those problems, and make possible enough forward movement from time to time to give the USSR an interest in continuing and subject it to serious political losses in the Free World if it breaks off. This should not be a mere ruse to talk the present Berlin crisis to death, but a statesmanlike program for achieving stability through peaceful change where violent change and immobilism would be equally fatal.

4. Mechanism: hold a Foreign Ministers' meeting, explore initial positions, delegate to deputies constituting a Commission on Central European Problems, including Czechs and Poles, with the two Germanies attached as in Geneva.

II.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

1. Solution to the crisis satisfactory from the standpoint of ourselves and our major allies without a war or a permanent increase of tension with the Soviet Union—if possible in such a way as to lay a foundation for eventual decreased tension and even growing cooperation.

2. Continued independence of West Germany and its association with the West, including NATO and the European Community.

3. Continued right of self-government by West Berlin, sufficiently close association with West Germany to make it economically viable, and access under conditions which will not be subject to the arbitrary decisions of either Soviet or East German officials.

4. Increased unity with our three major and our other NATO allies; increased United States and NATO military strength; use of the present crisis to further political integration of the Western World.

5. Creation, through our conduct, of a clear image to the Soviet Union, our allies and the world generally that we are a united people, confident of our own capabilities and realistic in the understanding of German and world problems, and that we have the capacity to act with firmness and a willingness to take whatever reasonable risks are called for.

6. Evolution of an increasingly stable modus vivendi in Central Europe, including the removal or reduction of tensions at the points of East-West contact there and the normalization of relations to the maximum degree possible across the contact. In this connection, to contrive to minimize fear of Soviet and German aggression, to achieve as tolerable a regime in East Germany as is possible during the period of its domination by the Soviets, and to encourage long term progress toward self-determination in Eastern Europe.

7. Unity of the German people in political freedom if desired both by the peoples of East and West Germany at the time the choice is made, but not at the expense of a war with the Soviet Union or creation of a situation which would likely lead to war.

8. Assurance that gains made as a result of negotiations will be of an enduring rather than a purely transitory nature so as to minimize the possibility of recurring crises over the Berlin/German issue.

9. Conviction on the part of the Free World and the peoples of Eastern Europe that the United States and our allies have been reasonable in handling the post-war German question, while remaining faithful to our commitments and to such fundamental principles as self-determination of peoples.

III.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES[2]

1. To stabilize the regime in East Germany and prepare the way for the eventual recognition of the East German regime;

2. To legalize the eastern frontiers of Germany;

3. To neutralize Berlin as a first step and prepare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;

4. To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance; and

5. To discredit the United States or at least seriously damage our prestige.

IV.

INITIAL STEPS

It is desirable for the West to take the diplomatic initiative at a fairly early stage, but only after a clear demonstration of our will, buttressed by concrete acts, to resist any Soviet attempt at a unilateral resolution of the crisis. Such acts are now in train.

Certain political events are significant in the timing of such an initiative, notably the Belgrade “neutrals” conference, Sept. 1; the West German election, Sept. 17; the convening of the UNGA, Sept. 19; meeting of the Soviet Party Congress in October.

The scope of the agenda for negotiations is important. Because of the disadvantages to the West of limiting it too narrowly to Berlin where we are most vulnerable, as demonstrated at Geneva in 1959, we should aim at a fairly broad agenda, with all-German and even European aspects.

Initially the exchanges should be at the Foreign Ministers level. A lower level probably would be futile and a summit should be avoided.

Hence, at the Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled August 5 and the NATO meeting agreement should be sought with the principal allies to propose a Foreign Ministers meeting of the Four Powers having all-German responsibilities to consider the questions of European security, including Germany and Berlin. The agenda would be worked out through normal diplomatic channels. It would be advantageous to issue such an invitation late in August (before the Belgrade meeting) and hopefully well in advance of any Soviet initiative. If couched in general terms it is not believed that such an invitation would cause an unfavorable German reaction. A meeting might be proposed for early November (after the Moscow Party Congress).

If the Soviets issue an invitation for a Foreign Ministers conference in terms comparable to what we would propose, we should accept, subject to the working out of a suitable time and agenda. If the Soviets propose a general Peace Conference, the Western Powers, without foreclosing the possibility of an eventual conference, should counterpropose the Foreign Ministers meeting previously suggested.

V.

NEGOTIATING POSITIONS

The Western Powers would make substantive proposals at a Foreign Ministers' Conference and would suggest that they be considered by a Commission on Central European Problems, which would include the Czechs, the Poles, and German advisers. These proposals are described below, without regard to the tactical questions associated with their presentation. We might initially bring forward proposals which would be less acceptable to the Soviets, and then gradually modify them if and as negotiations showed some signs of being fruitful. It would be essential, however, to be sufficiently forthcoming to attract the Soviets to the protracted negotiations we envisage.

1. German Unity. We would put forward a modified version of the Western Peace Plan, but not so called. It would include essentially the Mixed German Committee of Stage II, with some modifications and with emphasis on its role in all-German relations and in negotiations regarding German unity, but without fixed time limit for all-German elections and with its life being extended to 7 years as proposed by Ambassador Thompson. The Mixed Committee's functions might be expanded to include the promotion of not only contacts and cultural exchanges but also trade and credits between the two parts of Germany, with a clear implication that this might involve an expansion of West German credits to East Germany. Numerous deletions would need to be made from the existing Western Peace Plan, and among these should be the provision for an all-Berlin solution and the security provisions of Stages II and III.

2. European Security. We would suggest that the Commission on Central European Problems develop arrangements to assure European security and to safeguard against surprise attack in Europe. We would indicate our willingness to consider some or all of the following:

(a) The Western Powers going on record as opposed to any forcible change in the existing German frontiers. (Alternatively, we could announce our intention to approve these frontiers substantially unchanged in a final German settlement.)

(b) Guarantees that neither GDR nor FRG armed forces should have independent control of nuclear weapons or delivery systems.

(c) A Four Power non-aggression declaration or pact, to which other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could declare their adherence (thus avoiding treaty relations with the GDR).

(d) A Central European zone of inspection of armed forces against surprise attack, and possibly eventually their limitation under agreed international arrangements (such zone not to be exclusively German).

(e) A tacit agreement not to deploy MRBM's in Germany. (Such deployment is presently precluded, as far as the US is concerned, by the statement of US policy toward NATO and the Atlantic nations, approved by the President April 21, 1961.)[3]

3. An outline German peace treaty. This should indicate our views as to Germany's position and role in the international community, with broad guarantees of security both for Germany itself and for its neighbors vis-a-vis Germany. It would be adaptable to whatever decision the Mixed German Committee may eventually make as to Germany's unification.

4. Berlin. We should, ourselves, seek to have the question of Berlin put aside while we first discuss Germany and European security. We would raise the question of Berlin only if the Soviets move toward unilateral action affecting Berlin, either by signing a treaty with East Germany or interfering with our access rights. We should, however, make clear that any agreements reached on the questions of Germany and European security will go into effect only if a satisfactory settlement regarding Berlin is reached without a fixed time limit.

When the question of Berlin is discussed—either as the last item on the agenda at our initiative or earlier at Soviet initiative—we should make a determined effort to obtain an arrangement which would put an end, once and for all, to recurring crises over Berlin. We should bring into play all the bargaining power we hope to gain from the German and European Security negotiations. To this end, we should propose placing access to West Berlin under the administration of West Berlin itself or, if this is not possible, of an International Authority, exercising such powers as necessary to assure free, unimpeded access under fair conditions to all nations. In return, we should offer the concessions regarding force levels, subversive activities, etc., offered by the Western Powers at Geneva in 1959, plus possibly a unilateral declaration that all-German political activities (notably meetings of the Bundestag) would not take place in Berlin so long as the agreed arrangement was being fulfilled in all other respects. While the Free City proposal is unacceptable, we can—and do—recognize that West Berlin is not an integral part of West Germany and is subject to certain reservations not applicable to West Germany.

If the Soviets reject our proposals and move toward unilateral action in Berlin, we might propose the reciprocal declarations called for in “Solution C” plan (London Working Group Report, 1959).[4] This would mean that East German officials could handle access arrangements, provided that they observed the procedures now existing. Some additional features (e.g. of the July 28 proposal re force limitations and “questionable activities")[5] might be included. There could be a UN presence to give added assurance that agreed arrangements would be fully observed.

The various proposed solutions for the Berlin problem which would depend primarily on UN action, including the proposals that the headquarters of the UN be moved to Berlin and that all-Berlin be placed under UN controls, were considered. Except as mentioned in “Solution C”, none are recommended at this stage, because of the current Soviet attitude toward the UN, including their “troika” proposal, and because Ambassador Thompson feels that an all-Berlin solution is so distasteful to the Soviets that they would exact a higher price for it than for a solution covering only Western Berlin. We will continue to study more limited possibilities for UN involvement.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1946. Secret. Attached to a July 29 memorandum from McGhee to Rusk, which stated that this paper was a first draft of a paper on negotiations arising out of the Berlin crisis. On August 4 McGhee sent a copy to Acheson. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/8-461)

[2] From a memorandum from Ambassador L.E. Thompson to the Secretary, June 19, 1961. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding this memorandum, see footnote 3, Document 49.]

[3] For text, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 100.

[4]  Ibid., 1958-1960, vol. VIII, pp. 639-641 .

[5] Ibid., pp. 1082-1083.

87. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, July 31, 1961, 1 p.m.

340. Paris for Kohler. In preparation for Western consultations on Berlin problem and possible eventual negotiations with Soviets, may be useful review Soviet aims as well as our own in order ascertain area open to negotiation. Following enumeration of Soviet aims omits more general and distant objectives such as spread of Communism, break-up NATO Alliance, absorption West Berlin by East German regime, etc., although Soviets will so far as possible endeavor that any settlement either advance these aims or at least not make their achievement more difficult.

1. Some change in present situation in West Berlin. Khrushchev personally so far out on limb on this issue now that he could abandon it only at price of concessions in other areas which we clearly could not make. Minimum changes necessary are probably something along lines of what we offered at Geneva. Soviets will make strong effort however end occupation status as well as to stop refugee flow, reduce subversive espionage and propaganda activities based on West Berlin, obtain commitments to reduce or at least freeze numbers of Western troops, limit types of weapons stationed West Berlin, attempt to introduce symbolic Soviet forces, obtain confirmation that West Berlin not part of West Germany, and if possible reduce present legal and financial ties between them.

2. Signature by Soviet Union of peace treaty with East German regime. Khrushchev also personally deeply committed to conclusion treaty which Soviets desire not only as important step toward eventual recognition of East German regime but also to establish better legal basis for recognition present German frontiers. Drafting of separate treaty will probably present difficulties since hard to see how Soviets can impose desired restrictions in military field on GDR alone. Soviet position that signature of treaty must necessarily end Western access rights somewhat inconsistent with their acknowledgment they do not intend molest Allied troops remaining in Berlin although they will of course state they are there illegally. Soviets could of course make provision in treaty for continuance present situation West Berlin pending reunification, and only argument K has advanced against this is that it would hurt Soviet prestige to do so.

3. Stabilization of regime in East Germany through de facto recognition and removal at least some of harmful effects on regime of present Berlin situation, particularly flow of refugees.

4. Measures to increase Soviet security in Eastern Europe. These might include schemes along lines Rapacki Plan,[2] limitation on German armaments, etc. Soviets profess not to be concerned over any direct military threat to them from West Germans but genuinely fear that West Germany may embroil them in war with US.

5. Steps to improve legal basis of Germany's frontiers. In this question Soviets have much in mind their own acquisition German and Polish territory.

Our own objectives are well-known but for purposes of agreement appears to me that most important considerations are that we must maintain our commitment to people of West Berlin and that any settlement must not violate our major general principles including right of self-determination. This does not mean of course that we could not accept proposal which made no provision for self-determination within any given period of time. In following telegram[3] I propose to submit suggestions for possible approaches to settlement taking account of foregoing considerations.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-3161. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] For text of Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki's address to the U.N. General Assembly, October 2, 1957, proposing a nuclear free zone in Central Europe (U.N. doc. A/PV.697), see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 889-892.

[3] Document 88.

88. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, July 31, 1961, 1 p.m.

341. Paris for Kohler. In attempting arrive at possible solution to Berlin and German problems it would be highly desirable for us to make up our own minds as to most favorable approach in order to influence thinking of our Allies and agree with them so far as possible in advance of any discussion with Soviets. Difficulty, apart from danger of leaks, is that in advance of negotiations impossible know what importance Soviets attach to various factors involved. Effort seems worth making, however, and hope following suggestions may be useful. We may for tactical reasons wish to put forward proposals which Soviets likely to reject but following discussion limited to approaches which appear realistic.

1. All-Berlin solution. I do not personally believe there is great mileage in this approach. Soviets would demand extremely high price for including East Berlin and even solution involving only West Berlin will be extremely difficult. Maintenance of security by troops of four powers involves all the headaches we have experienced previously with four-power administration. Reliance on neutral or UN troops highly questionable. All-Berlin solution would not enable us escape problem of refugees although might be easier for East Germans to control refugee flow for whole city than to close internal sector boundary. All-Berlin solution would probably lead to demand for Berlin and GDR UN membership. From Soviet point of view successful amalgamation of socialist and capitalist systems within city would be powerful argument against their contention that this could not be done for all of Germany. Therefore I do not believe they would agree to or carry out such plan.

2. Peace package plan postponing for 7-10 years showdown on German reunification through free elections combined with selection of such measures as Western commitment not support change in present frontiers,NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact, prohibition of atomic arms to East and West Germany, etc. It would of course have to be combined with some interim solution for Berlin along lines of our Geneva proposals. One reason Soviets might be tempted by such solution is that they could easily find means of evading elections when time came by accusing West of violations. It would also resolve Berlin problem for length of time K likely to be in power. Such solution would probably reduce refugee problem to tolerable proportions. It would not meet K's desire to sign peace treaty but this might be met in part by agreement on principles of peace treaty which we have already drafted and considered advancing earlier. As part of such package we might attempt to get better assurances of West German access to Berlin. Believe K could paint such settlement as victory while we would have avoided dangerous Berlin crisis and not only maintained but strengthened our position on self-determination.

3. Peace treaty approach. We might attempt to negotiate identical peace treaties which West would conclude with West Germany and Soviets and Allies with East Germany. Such treaty would have to make provision for interim arrangement for Berlin pending reunification either on contractual basis or by maintenance present situation. While negotiations would be extremely difficult believe K would pay high price for such arrangement since it would go far to recognize de facto existence East German government and would appear to be in line with his demands except for status of Berlin. Would be far easier to obtain Soviet agreement reasonable peace treaty terms on such basis than would be case of eventual treaty with reunited Germany. For example, difficult for K to insist on onerous military provisions so long as Germany divided. We would have to be firm in excluding any anti-Nazi provisions which would facilitate intervention in internal affairs. Such approach could of course envisage all-Berlin solution although as indicated above I think this unwise. Such proposals could include some of the sweetening measures described in para 2 above. It would be in line with apparent desire most of our Allies continue division of Germany but would of course be difficult for West Germans to accept. For this reason doubt we should advance it now but suggest it be staffed out and kept in reserve in event we reach impasse on other solution.

4. Settlement similar to above which would envisage Communist powers concluding separate peace treaty with East Germany but with some interim arrangement on Berlin. Soviets have shown no interest in such solution and K indicated to Roberts[2] interim Berlin solution now unacceptable, but cannot be excluded as possibility. Does not appear as attractive to me as foregoing suggestion, since in arriving at it we would have to go far toward recognizing de facto existence GDR and under such settlement Soviets would doubtless insist on arrangements for Berlin that would be more onerous than in foregoing proposal. Disadvantage both these plans is that they would recognize principle of separate treaty which would be awkward if no settlement reached and Soviets proceed with their own plan.

I am still inclined to favor approach set forth in para 2 above.[3]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-3161. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] British Ambassador to the Soviet Union Sir Frank Roberts.

[3] On July 31 the Mission to the United Nations submitted its thoughts on the various possibilities involving Western initiatives on Berlin or Germany at the United Nations. (Telegram 305 from USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-3161)

89. Report by Dean Acheson[1]

Washington, undated.

BERLIN

A POLITICAL PROGRAM

Preface

My earlier report on Berlin, dated June 28, 1961[2] gave Khrushchev's purposes in pressing to a 1961 year-end crisis his Berlin demands of November, 1958, as:

1. To stabilize the regime in East Germany and prepare the way for the eventual recognition of the East German regime;

2. To legalize the Eastern frontiers of Germany;

3. To neutralize Berlin as a first step and prepare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;

4. To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance; and,

5. To discredit the United States or at least seriously damage our prestige.

The paper further stated that Khrushchev was now going further than the USSR had ventured since 1948, because he believed that the U.S.A. would not use nuclear weapons to stop him, and could not do so otherwise. The paper suggested a method of altering this belief and inducing in the Kremlin a frame of mind conducive to a settlement conformable to the interests of the U.S.A. and its allies. Steps are under way to attain the capabilities necessary to do this.

The political means and end of this endeavor are outlined here.

First, a word as to the end. The immediate end is simple. Since the world position of the U.S.A., the integrity of NATO, and the future of Germany and, perhaps, of Europe are drawn in issue by Khrushchev's demands, the immediate purpose of the U.S.A. is to frustrate them. Another end of very great importance is to do this without precipitating nuclear war.

The more distant end is the one which this Government has sought in Europe since the late 1940s. It is to begin the stabilization of the free world by the stabilization of Europe. This stabilization should ultimately involve (i) the de-Sovietization of East Germany; (ii) the countries of Eastern Europe regaining a substantial national identity; (iii) limiting armaments so that the possibility of successful offensive action, either way, in Europe will be greatly reduced.

This is a long-term aim; there is no sensible short-cut. But progress toward this long-term aim may be facilitated if we can (i) use the Berlin crisis to develop and put forward sensible proposals regarding Germany and European security, (ii) obtain, at the conclusion of that crisis, an acceptance and stabilization of the status quo in Berlin, without sacrifice of Allied rights, with perhaps some machinery for continuing negotiations about Germany and European security. Unless Khrushchev is foolish enough to commit his prestige to forcing the allies to accept his terms, he ought not to find this impossible. We probably cannot attain more, i.e., force him to accept something which is worse for him than the status quo, without war. We should not give him more, i.e., something which would be worse for us than the status quo, “to save his face.” As will be seen the status quo can be garnished without sacrifice, if that seems necessary, at the proper time.

Second, a general word about political means in reaching the end just outlined.

Means should be adjusted to the various periods into which the Berlin operation seems likely to fall. While each will merge into the one following it, three phases with distinctive characteristics seem probable:

Phase I: The phase of preliminary jockeying until after the German elections. During this time a forthcoming posture toward negotiations is required, without translating this posture into such specific and novel proposals as would cause alarm and division in Germany. During this period a vigorous effort should be made to lay our case regarding Berlin before the world and to concert with our allies about the specific political steps that will be required after the German elections. A Western call for a Foreign Ministers' Conference will be necessary during this Phase.

Phase II: The phase of open and formal negotiation, between the German elections and the conclusion of any peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany. For the start of this phase what is needed is a counter-proposal to Khrushchev's proposed conference for treaties with either one or both of the two Germanys. The essentials of the counter proposal are that:

(a) as put forward, it should make no major concessions;

(b) it should have something of novelty and more of appeal to allied and neutral opinion; and

(c)

it should be capable of being added to later on if the USSR appears willing to negotiate in earnest.

Specific suggestions are made in Section II of this paper as to what the content of this counter-proposal should be and as to how it might be expanded, as the negotiations progress, so as to provide a basis for agreement.

Phase III: The period following the signing of a peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR, if this occurs. In the event an agreement safeguarding the Western position in Berlin has already been achieved, this Phase can be viewed with some equanimity. If not, this Phase will be a dangerous one and the political keynote should be calm constancy—neither retreating under pressure from the bedrock positions which we will have previously developed nor increasing our demands on account of heightened tensions. Such a firm and consistent political posture will hold the best chance of achieving a peaceful settlement in this Phase.

These general principles are given body in succeeding sections of this paper.

Phase I: Until the German Elections

1. Propaganda. This is the time to launch our propaganda campaign regarding Berlin with vigor and effect. If we can move free world opinion to our side, the Soviets will be less likely to expect us to be inhibited by that opinion in resisting their pressures, and they will reckon the political costs of those pressures in determining their future actions. The themes of our propaganda campaign should be simple:

First, Freedom: In the name of creating a Free City, the Soviets are trying to deprive two million West Berliners of the freedom they already possess.

Second, Peace: In the name of creating a peace treaty with Germany, they are threatening the peace that already abounds in Germany.

Third, the Defaulting Trustee: World War II left the Four Powers as trustees of Germany and Berlin. The three Western powers have fulfilled the terms of the trust; the Soviet Union has not only defaulted on those terms but has absconded with the assets.

Fourth, Self-Determination: The principle of self-determination is basically what stands between the Soviets and ourselves. We want the people of Berlin and Germany to have the right of self-determination. They don't.

We have not even begun to exploit those themes.

Imagine what the Communists would do to damage our position in every part of the world, if we mounted as bald and cynical an aggression as they are now undertaking against Berlin. We could expect “save-Berlin” committees to spring up in many countries. Resolutions demanding justice for Berlin would converge on us. Demonstrations against U.S. Embassies in many countries could be expected. Delegations from all sorts of legal and humanitarian organizations would be sent to Berlin, and their reports on the threat to freedom would be widely publicized. It is probable that such a campaign would weaken our alliances and have a real impact on uncommitted opinion throughout the world.

We can hardly be said to have risen to the opportunity which the Communists have thus presented us.

This may be due, in part, to the fact that we have tried to exploit it with the normal resources of the government. They are not adequate to the task. Unusual measures are required in this, as in most other fields of Berlin planning.

There is at present, for example, no person of eminence in the Government whose only task is to arouse the world to Soviet iniquity regarding Berlin and who seeks to spur new and unorthodox activities of the Government to this end. We recommend that such a person be appointed as a special assistant to the Secretary of State. He should have a flair for propaganda and considerable background in the tangled problem of Berlin. Such a person is the late Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning, Gerard C. Smith.

2.

Concerting with our Allies. Phase I is also the time for agreement with our allies on the moves following the German elections. Such moves are suggested later in this paper. No time should be lost in agreeing on them with our allies.

The first proposal is the calling of a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference to convene in October or November. The call should be made in time to avoid discussing Berlin in the UN General Assembly which opens September 19. UN consideration of the issue would not be in our interest at this stage. The mere fact of that consideration would slow Western military preparations and inhibit serious political moves. To keep the Berlin issue out of the UN, a Four Power negotiation should be pending before the GA convenes. A Western proposal for such negotiation before the German elections would be more likely to strengthen than weaken the Chancellor's position, provided we do not go into premature public detail about the proposals to be advanced at the Conference.

In proposing a Four Power Conference, the Four Powers should suggest that it be so constituted, in view of the gravity of the occasion, as to be an effective forum for negotiation, rather than propaganda. They should, therefore, propose that its sessions be attended only by each Foreign Minister and one adviser. As a fall-back, they might be prepared to accept the 1959 Geneva position—a great claque of attendants, including West and East German “advisers"—on the understanding that the serious business of the Conference would be handled in more restricted sessions.

3.

The International Court of Justice. We should make no further proposals to submit our right to be in Berlin—and to stay there—to the World Court. This proposal does not make the same impression abroad as it does in the United States. Many Americans are in the grip of the illusion inherent in the American Bar Association slogan “World peace through world law”. No one else is; and we really do not believe it, either. Vital issues are political issues and are not judiciable. As we shall see, there is no “law” on these subjects; and no nation will accept third party adjudication—in effect arbitration—on matters affecting their world position and/or their vital interests. Nehru would not arbitrate Kashmir; or Sukarno, West New Guinea; or Nasser or Eden, Suez; or de Gaulle or the FLN, Algerian independence or their claims to the Sahara; or Khrushchev, Berlin. For us to do so means to the world that if the Court should take jurisdiction and decide that we had no rights in Berlin, we would be willing to accept the decision. This, in turn, means to others that we cannot care very much one way or the other.

To have made the challenge once gets out of the proposal any good there is in it. To push it further will expose its phony aspect. The Court would not accept jurisdiction on our request over Soviet objection. An advisory opinion could only be obtained, if at all, on the request of the Security Council, where the USSR would veto it; or, of the General Assembly, where the requisite majority would be improbable, if the Communist bloc objected and if all the Afro-Asians and Latinos saw, as they would, the implications for them in a court decision being obtainable on some of their shenanigans—Castro's, for instance.

Finally, when we talk about our “legal” rights in Berlin—and when the Russians talk about the “legal” effect of their proposed treaty on our “legal” claims, neither of us means that there are any accepted rules or judicial decisions applicable to the issues raised. What we are doing is to gild our positions with an ethos derived from very general moral principles which have affected legal doctrines. On our side, the gilt is the morally binding effect of agreements. On the Russian side the gilt is that the moral effect of an agreement is affected by time and changed conditions—for instance, upon restrictive covenants not to sell land to persons of color. No “law” determines which of these moral values shall triumph in a specific case.

In the case of Berlin to stress our willingness to accept judge-made law would be either a sign of indifference or a fraud.

4. Quiet Approach to Soviets. Paragraph 10 of the “Memorandum on Measures for Dealing with the Berlin Situation” which was given to the British, French, and German Ambassadors on July 21[3] suggests the value of an early, informal, and quiet talk with some Soviet official to warn of the dangers of rigid positions, and suggests the advantage of keeping open opportunities to maintain the status quo.

This approach should be made toward the end of the first phase, or the beginning of the second phase, before the Soviets are locked into courses which will be difficult for them to reverse.

We should use a special channel for this purpose, to emphasize the gravity of the matter and to keep the approach out of the normal line of diplomatic fire. This tactic was successfully used in the talks with Malik (then Soviet representative to the UN) which led to ending of the Berlin blockade and to armistice negotiations in Korea.

For instance, Mr. Bohlen might speak to a representative of the Soviet Government along these lines: “We are strengthening our position against the contingency of trouble over Berlin, will continue to do so as the crisis deepens. Do not doubt that our most vital interests and prestige are engaged. But do not doubt also that this course of action is not of our making. It is not we who are attempting to change an existing peaceful situation. Whenever the Soviet Government wishes to end the crisis which it has created, we are prepared to make this possible."

We should go no further unless the Soviet Government responds constructively. If it should do so, we should accept reciprocal Western and Communist declarations that existing access procedures should be maintained after a peace treaty, regardless of who performs them. This is the essence of what has come to be known as “Solution C."

It is barely possible that the Soviets might wish to end the crisis in this way soon. It is more likely that they would not. Even so, the approach would have been useful, since the Soviets would know that serious talks were open to them as the crisis deepened. It is essential that this approach should have all the appearance of informality and privacy, and should thus be kept absolutely secret—even from our allies.

Phase II: Period Between German Elections and a Peace Treaty

1. Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference. The agenda for a Foreign Ministers' Conference should be brief and non-controversial, e.g., “a peaceful settlement of the questions of Germany and Berlin.” Our opening stance at this Conference should meet three requirements:

(a) It should not give away anything of value.

(b) It should have sufficient of the novel to draw favorable comment in the free world.

(c) It should be susceptible of later expansion or contraction, so as to serve as a basis for serious negotiations—if these become possible.

2. Western Peace Plan. These requirements would be best met by changes in three major aspects of the Western Peace Plan:

(a) Berlin: The present proposal for an all-Berlin solution in Stage I should be replaced by a more realistic Berlin proposal: The Four Powers declare that they will maintain the status quo in Berlin pending reunification. In the meantime, Berlin would be the headquarters of the Mixed Committee and the all-German Assembly called for in the Peace Plan.

(b) Mixed German Committee: The functions of the Mixed German Committee, which is designed to promote all-German contacts and unity, should be expanded to include the promotion of mutually beneficial trade and credits between the two parts of Germany, with a clear implication that this would involve increased West German credits to the GDR. Given the present parlous state of East Germany, this would seem a generous and appealing gesture by the West, and might help to slow down the flow of refugees. In addition, the Peace Plan's existing provision that alternative electoral laws must be submitted by the Mixed Committee to the German people for vote after a period of one year, if the Committee cannot agree on a single law during this period, should be deleted—leaving only the provision that if the Mixed Committee cannot agree on a single law in thirty months the Four Powers should then determine its disposition. This would somewhat extend the period within which the Mixed Committee would be a forum for serious negotiation and discussion between West and East German officials, and pave the way for the further extension contemplated by Ambassador Thompson. (See paragraph 4, below.)

(c) European Security: The disarmament and European security provisions of the Western Peace Plan are out of date. They should be replaced by a proposal to create a Standing Four Power Commission (with German advisers, if necessary), which would negotiate about arrangements to maintain security and to safeguard against surprise attack in Europe. These arrangements would come into force at appropriate stages of the Peace Plan, as might be agreed in the Four Power Commission. In making this proposal, we would suggest immediate conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Four Powers. Considerable emphasis would be placed on this suggestion: Europe is faced with a clear threat of war over the threat of a unilateral change in the status of Berlin; the first item of business is to dispose of these two threats. The non-aggression pact would be coterminous with and contingent on the Berlin arrangement proposed under (a), above. Upon German unity, it would be replaced by more permanent security arrangements agreed to in the Four Power Commission.

3. Negotiation. These changes would not make the Western Peace Plan acceptable to the Kremlin. They would, however, be sufficiently novel and reasonable as to make it difficult for the USSR to dismiss them out of hand. We should try to spin out the negotiations about these proposals, as long as we could.

(a) This would enable us to spell out our position on German unity in sufficient detail as possibly to convince some elements of the Soviet leadership that unification could be secured, if they wished, on a basis that would not injure their security. This might have some long-term influence on Soviet policy.

(b) Our position on the question of German unity is better than that of the Soviets in terms of popular appeal. The longer we can publicly debate this question, the better for us from a propaganda standpoint.

(c) Prolonged negotiations would give us time in which to carry forward our military preparations, which might affect Soviet intentions.

4. Next Steps. When we had strung out this negotiation for all it was worth, we would have to decide whether the Soviet attitude had been sufficiently affected by our political and military posture to make genuine negotiation feasible. If so, we should move toward our real negotiating positions, which would involve the following amplification on each of the three above changes in the Western Peace Plan:

(a) Berlin. The Berlin proposal in the Western Peace Plan should be expanded to provide for declarations that activities which threaten peace or the interests of other parties would—consistent with fundamental human rights and freedoms—be avoided in Berlin, plus perhaps a general undertaking to discourage excessive movements of population, so long as reasonable freedom of movement is permitted within the city, including freedom to live in one part and work in another without economic or other penalty. We should try to bargain for some form of international control over the access routes in return for these and the further concessions indicated below.

(b) Mixed German Committee. The life of the Mixed German Committee should be extended to seven years, as Ambassador Thompson has proposed. The future of the Mixed Committee thereafter, if it had reached no agreement on German unity in the meantime, would be decided by the Four Powers—as in the existing Peace Plan. This would permit West and German official representatives to talk to each other about the electoral law and about increased contacts, trade, etc., for a considerable period, without any irrevocable commitment to unity at the end of this period, and with a consequent enhancement of the stature of the GDR. (While we should not enhance that stature by having US, UK, and French officials talk with the GDR, West German contacts are a different matter—given their long history.)

(c) European Security. The Western powers would indicate that they were prepared to discuss the following measures in connection with the work of the Four Power Commission envisaged in the revised Western Peace Plan: (i) a zone of inspection against surprise attack in Europe, with the possibility of eventual limitations on forces in this zone being left open; (ii) a declaration by the Western Powers recognizing the Oder-Neisse frontier; (iii) a declaration by the Federal Republic indicating its intention not to produce or acquire nuclear warheads; (iv) unilateral declarations by the Four Powers not to deploy MRBM's in Germany (we have no intention of doing this anyway). These or any other measures agreed to in the Four Power Commission would—like the continued evidence of the Mixed German Committee—be dependent on fulfillment of the Berlin arrangements referred to under (a), above.

5. Further Negotiation. Several variants of further negotiations might be envisaged, depending on reactions to these proposals:

(a) Early Agreement. The Foreign Ministers might themselves seek early agreement on the revised Western Peace Plan. If they made good progress, they could persevere and leave to a Summit the task of consummating final agreement on that Plan. Such agreement is not wholly inconceivable; the idea of setting up a Mixed Committee to handle German matters and a Four Power Commission to consider European security might have considerable attraction for the Soviets, even in return for their leaving the Berlin status quo untouched. In this case, of course, no peace treaty between the USSR and East Germany would be concluded—at least for the seven years in which the Mixed Committee would function.

(b) Continuing Negotiation. The Foreign Ministers might conclude that the negotiation was too complex and time-consuming for them, and set up the Four Power Commission to negotiate further about all these aspects of the Western Peace Plan, not merely about European security and safeguards against surprise attack in Europe. This might result in a negotiation as prolonged as that which led to the Treaty of Westphalia; indeed, the Commission might become a standing feature of the international scene and the Berlin crisis might tend to be subsumed in its larger deliberations. Again, no treaty would be concluded between the USSR and East Germany, at least so long as these deliberations continued.

(c) Peace Treaty. The Soviet Union might be indisposed to postpone a peace treaty with the GDR, but indicate a desire to continue negotiating in the Four Power Commission about some of our proposals (e.g., regarding European security and a Mixed German Committee) as separate items, after a treaty is concluded. Our posture, in this case, should be that negotiations about these subjects must hinge on an agreement first being reached which will protect our position in Berlin against the effects of the intended Soviet peace treaty. For this purpose, we should propose the reciprocal declarations which have come to be known as Solution “C”. These declarations would leave each side free to reserve its position regarding the juridical status of Berlin; have the East Germans declare that they would maintain existing access procedures; and have the Western powers declare that they would deal with East German personnel on this basis, avoid subversive activities, not increase their forces, etc. (A simplified version is set forth at Tab B.) Once such an agreement had been reached we would be prepared, despite a Soviet-GDR peace treaty, to go ahead with establishment of the Four Power Commission to discuss matters German and European.

6.

The Political Side of Military Arrangement. Phase II would also be the time for political discussions with our allies, to persuade them to take the following steps in connection with the Berlin crisis:

(a) To agree to place appropriate forces under NATO command and operational control at an appropriate time before military action, so that SACEUR could order these forces into position.

(b) To agree to the use of these forces by NATO in an agreed military operation which is part of an agreed program of action to preserve allied rights in Berlin and allied security in Europe.

(c) To agree to a political command structure to give the Supreme Commander orders through a military channel.

The negotiations of these steps should not be started in the Phase I for three reasons.

First, the Germans will find it difficult to negotiate before the election.

Second, in all probability, US proposals for the military operation—allowing for the process of JCS preparation, Department of Defense review, and Presidential approval—will not be completed until about the middle of September. Our allies are not likely to be willing to turn substantial forces over to a Supreme Commander, to agree that they may be used in a military operation, and to agree to a political command structure unless they know what the operation is to be and are able to judge of its effect.

Third, our allies will also want to know the larger program for dealing with the whole Berlin crisis in all its phases, negotiation, economic pressure, pressures of other sorts, as well as military action. Development and discussion of this larger program with our allies will take time.

At some point in Phase II, however, these prerequisites will be behind us, and it should be possible usefully to discuss the politico-military proposals indicated under (a)-(c), above, with our allies.

The political command structure will require the most delicate negotiation of all. Only the President, with the efforts of the Secretary of State and Defense, can handle this. What is recommended here is that the NATO Council, with the authorization of their Governments, or at least with the authorization of the governments whose forces are represented in the Central Command, should delegate the direction of the operation to a war council consisting of the United States, France, Germany, and Great Britain, and that this war council delegate the executive command to the President of the United States, who would communicate to the Supreme Commander through his Chiefs of Staff.

If this could be arranged, it would combine the Command procedures which were adopted in World War II and in the Korean War. It will be recalled that in World War II, the basic strategic decisions were made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, advised by the combined Chiefs of Staff, or, more realistically, each advised by his own Chiefs of Staff, and the resulting decisions then coordinated through the combined Chiefs of Staff. When coordination with the Russians became necessary, Stalin joined the conferences which laid down the basic strategy. But the Russian staff never entered into joint command relations with the combined staffs of the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the Korean War, where there were more participants, although the overwhelming proportion of the force was United States and Korean, the United Nations delegated to the United States the command function for the United Nations. Thereafter, General MacArthur—in theory at least—operated as and under the controls of an American Theatre Commander. The State Department was charged with continuing consultation with the other governments having forces in the United Nations Command through their Ambassadors in Washington.

If our NATO allies could be persuaded to adopt the recommendation made above, the net effect of it would be that President Kennedy would consult, so long as that was possible, with Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan, on such major strategic questions as when to begin military operations, when to break them off, and when to escalate them. The United States Chiefs of Staff, who would issue the military orders, would consult with the tripartite NATO military Standing Group (General Heusinger is an ex officio member) here in Washington.

If some such arrangements are not worked out, the Supreme Commander in Europe will be put in the position of conferring directly with the Heads of Governments and reaching his own interpretation of their direction. In other words, for practical purposes he would be under no civilian or governmental control. I have no doubt that he, as well as the governments concerned, would believe that this imposed greater responsibility upon him than any field commander should carry.

8. [sic] Allied Attitudes. Negotiation of these politico-military arrangements with our allies will be difficult, but no more difficult than negotiation of some of the political proposals suggested earlier. The Germans and, to a lesser degree, the French will be highly resistant to some of these proposed changes in the Peace Plan. Given the degree in which the Chancellor and General de Gaulle dominate the actions of their governments in the foreign field, it is doubtful whether German and French agreement can be secured except through direct talks between the heads of government. At some point before the Foreign Ministers' Conference such talks will be necessary. Indeed, it may be that two rounds of talks will be required: One to agree on what needs to be done and give directives to the Foreign Ministers to spell out the details, and another to review and approve their work. The amount of time and persuasion which will be required to move the Chancellor and General de Gaulle should not be underestimated. The task may be slightly eased, however, by the fact that we will be concurrently discussing the proposed military operation and command arrangements with them. As the Chancellor, in particular, contemplates the specific alternative to successful negotiations his attitude may mellow.

Phase III: After a Treaty

1. Two alternative assumptions may be made:

(a) That negotiations concerning a Berlin agreement have prospered, but that negotiations concerning the Western Peace Plan have failed and the Soviets therefore proceed to sign a peace treaty. In this case, our attitude toward the treaty should be more one of sorrow than of anger: We should denounce its signature, but keep the denunciation in low key since our basic purpose—preserving the status quo in Berlin—will have been achieved through prior agreement.

(b) An alternative assumption is that the Soviets sign a treaty after failure of negotiations concerning Berlin, as well as concerning the Western Peace Plan. The rest of this section discusses U.S. policy under this assumption.

2. We should prepare well in advance for this contingency:

(a) by discounting the treaty and thus minimizing the damage that its signing will do to our prestige;

(b) by making clear that we will allow East German personnel to perform access functions identical to those which have been performed by the Soviets. This announcement should not be too long delayed, lest it appear a last minute retreat in the face of pressure.

3. If the East German regime insists, after a treaty has been signed, that new access procedures be agreed to in formal negotiations between the GDR and the Western powers, the latter should refuse. They should state that the access procedures are a matter of right which are not subject to negotiation. They have consistently refused to negotiate any change in these procedures with the Soviets, and they see no reason to treat the East Germans differently.

4. The Western powers should also make clear that they remain ready to engage in the exchange of unilateral declarations called for by Solution “C” (which would include a declaration by the East Germans that they intend to continue existing procedures unchanged and reciprocal statements, which take note of that declaration, by the Western powers).

5. If the East Germans should ask to negotiate about the wording of these reciprocal declarations, the Western powers should request the West Germans to serve as intermediaries in bringing GDR views to the attention of the Western powers and in conveying the intentions of the Western powers to the GDR. If this is refused, the Western powers should be willing to receive proposals through the USSR and to reconvene a Four Power Conference to discuss the matter with the USSR.

6. At such a Conference, our position should be governed by the principles and proposal set forth under II, above. To go further would be to concede, under threat, something we would otherwise have refused. This would encourage the Soviets and the GDR to view crisis-promotion as a productive and rewarding occupation.

7. If the East Germans refuse to permit Western military traffic to continue without direct and formal negotiation with them, we should go to a garrison airlift—while continuing each day to present our vehicles for passage on the ground in order to maintain our claim to ground access.

8. The Communists could then either:

(a) let the garrison airlift go on, in which case their objective would not have been achieved;

(b) extend the blockage to civil access, in which case we would mount a civil airlift;

(c) use force against the airlift, in which case we would use counter-force, wherever this could most effectively be applied;

(d) negotiate.

9. Whichever one of these options was chosen, our political posture should remain the same: We should be willing (i) to close out the crisis at any time that the East Germans would permit our traffic to move under pre-treaty procedures; (ii) to exchange reciprocal declarations with the GDR concerning those procedures; (iii) to negotiate with the USSR about the question of Germany and Berlin in a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference. We should not raise our asking price because the crisis had deepened; this would vastly increase the chances of war.

10. It is always possible, of course, that the crisis would develop, e.g., by triggering an East German uprising, in a way which would convince both sides that restoration of the status quo ante was unfeasible. In this case, proposals involving more rapid and radical change than those described under II, above, might be required to create a viable situation. We should, in the innermost recesses of the U.S. Government, develop proposals looking to quick, drastic and constructive change in Central Europe, which could be brought forward in this event.

11. Looming over all these events will be the United Nations—interested, agitated, impotent. It is not in our interest to hasten UN consideration of the Berlin issue. If a Foreign Ministers' Conference fails and the Soviets seem disposed to unilateral action, however, UN interest will become uncontrollable.

It would be better for the West if the issue were first raised in the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly, since debate will be more manageable in the Council. If some other country were about to bring the matter before the General Assembly, U.S. action in the Council might be necessary. This might take the form of a proposal that the Council call on the parties concerned not to take unilateral action to alter the status of Berlin or the access routes and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the issue. If the East Germans nonetheless proceeded to block our access, we might then seek a further resolution calling on the parties concerned to restore the situation which had existed prior to their action.

These resolutions would both command impressive majorities and be vetoed by the USSR. These facts would not be harmful as we prepared for forceful action to fulfill what was clearly the manifest will of a majority of the Council—a will which the Communists would be flagrantly disregarding.

There might at this point be general urging that the U.S. should go from the Council to the Assembly, before using force. If we disregarded that urging some other country might—after Security Council action had been concluded—bring the matter before the Assembly.

Our posture in any Assembly consideration of the issue should be the same as in the Council. Reactions to that posture would be more diverse in the Assembly than in the Council, but Council action would have set a helpful precedent; we should hold to that precedent and urge our friends to do the same. We should not be delayed or deflected by GA debate from courses determined upon to meet GDR blockage of access to Berlin.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-3161. Secret. Attached to a July 31 memorandum transmitting the report to Rusk. Also attached were a 5-page summary entitled “Talking Paper,” a table of contents, and Tabs A, “The Western Peace Plan,” and B, “Proposed Revision of Solution C;” none is printed. The Political Program and Tabs A and B are also published in Declassified Documents, 1978, 144A.

[2] Document 49.

[3] See Document 79.

90. Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group[1]

Washington, August 2, 1961, 4 p.m.

PRESENT WERE

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, The Attorney General, Chairman JCS, Director CIA, Mr. Sullivan of the Treasury Department, Mr. Wilson of USIA, General Taylor and Mr. Bundy

The Secretary opened the meeting by circulating a memorandum from the operations center describing the progress of the working group sessions in Paris.[2] The Secretary described his own itinerary for the week of his absence.

He then turned to the question of the timing and form of discussions with the USSR. He expressed his view that Ambassador Thompson, perhaps with associates, might meet with Khrushchev later in August in an attempt to get him to talk and to clarify certain aspects of the Soviet position. The Secretary also expected that there would be discussion in Paris of a four-power meeting of the Foreign Ministers, and that such a possibility and our favorable view of it should be known before the General Assembly opens. It would not be to our advantage to have early discussion of Berlin in the UN, partly because of the Tunisian affair. The Secretary believed that a Western summit would be needed before the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The immediate and urgent problem was propaganda, and there followed an extensive discussion of ways and means of making our case more strongly all around the world. Mr. Wilson presented a number of ideas which are best summarized in his supplementary memorandum (attached)[3] of the following day. The Attorney General emphasized the need for a simple slogan or idea or thought which could be continuously emphasized. In response, it was suggested that the main ideas are those already stated in the President's speech; that we should keep the peace and keep Berlin free. A third strong idea is that of self-determination. It was agreed that coordinating and executive responsibility within the Administration would be centered in USIA under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State.

The discussion then turned to military questions, and it was agreed that the Defense Ministers should meet shortly after the Foreign Ministers' meeting and that this should be arranged in Paris. The first urgency on the military side is to get agreement among the major Governments on the basic policy of a strong military build-up. The Secretary of Defense asked for further consideration of the political value of certain military actions that might not be immediately necessary for their own sake. He specifically mentioned the possibility of cutting down on the number of dependents in Europe and the possibility of large-scale temporary troop movements of one or two divisions now based in the U.S. It was agreed, in this context, that the NORAD exercise now planned for the beginning of October would be politically valuable. In response to a question from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense stated that the program for increases in military production is going forward satisfactorily.

McGeorge Bundy

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Steering Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Bundy on August 7.

[2] A copy of this memorandum is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-261. Regarding the sessions of the Four-Power Working Group July 28-August 4, see Document 93.

[3] Not printed.

91. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, August 3, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin Negotiations and your Meeting with Mr. Rusk at 4 PM

The Secretary of State yesterday gave you two papers on Berlin negotiations,[2] and they raise certain questions which you and he need to decide before he goes into the Foreign Ministers Meeting over the week end. The papers have not yet been read by any members of the Steering Group except the Secretary and myself, but some of the issues received preliminary discussion there on Wednesday afternoon.[3] Your last talk with the Secretary will be at four o'clock this afternoon. He leaves at midnight.

The two papers are thoughtful and careful, and in their basic outlines much alike. One comes to the Secretary from Dean Acheson and the other from George McGhee's staff. Both are heavily influenced by the indefatigable staff work of Henry Owen. The issues which need to be decided today are relatively small. Some larger questions may need further planning and thought.

Both papers divide the Berlin problem into three phases:

Phase I. From now to the German elections on September 17th.

Phase II. From the German elections to the possible signing of a separate peace treaty.

Phase III. After the peace treaty.

The immediate questions pertain largely to Phase I, slightly to Phase II, and in only one respect to Phase III.

Phase I

There is general agreement on the following points in this Phase:

1. There should be no actual negotiations of a formal sort. We need time to concert our military build-up, and public substantive negotiations before the German elections would create turmoil in West Germany.

2. At some time in this period the Western states should make a proposal for negotiations in a four-power Foreign Ministers meeting to be held any time after 1 October—presumably after the 22 Congress, not before. (The Congress opens on October 17th, for approximately ten days.) No one wants a full-scale summit at this stage, but any level below the Foreign Ministers would probably be ineffective.

3. A Foreign Ministers meeting should probably be preceded by a Western Summit for the purpose of concerting a Western negotiating position. The French and German Governments in particular are very rigid, and even modest modifications in the existing Western Peace Plan of 1959 will require direct negotiation among Western Heads of Government.

Undecided questions about Phase I are as follows, and all of them need attention at your meeting this afternoon:

1. Should there be a “quiet approach” to the Soviets before the German elections? The Acheson paper suggests that someone like Chip Bohlen might drop a plainly serious hint to some Soviet colleague suggesting that while we are now strengthening our position, this military course of action is not of our making, and whenever the Soviet Government wishes to end the crisis which it has created, we are prepared to make this possible, in serious discussion. This quiet approach would not be discussed with any of our allies—otherwise it could not remain quiet. My impression is that most of the professionals in the Department approve this approach but the Secretary has not yet indicated his own view. What he does approve and will probably mention to you, is exploratory conversations by Thompson with Khrushchev, designed to find out whether the Soviets have anything further to say yet on their own side at this stage. My own hunch is that unless Thompson is in a position to send up some new signal of his own, all we shall get at present is a repetition of what everyone has been hearing since Vienna. Certainly McCloy got nothing new on the negotiating side.

2. If there is agreement on a Western proposal for a Foreign Ministers meeting, when should this proposal be made? The Acheson paper says not later than the end of August. In the Steering Group yesterday, after the Secretary left, there was a strong preference for moving quickly. This is the view of McNamara, of USIA, of Taylor and myself. The argument is that we gain both at home and abroad by taking the initiative in proposing the negotiations, and that if we do not get a proposal on the table soon, the Soviets will beat us to it. This view is shared by Thompson, and Dowling reports from Bonn that it will not make the Germans nervous, in the light of the general firmness of our position. The Secretary has not yet indicated his own preference.

3. When and how should our position on paper stamping be made clear? Our internal decision is made, and it was agreed last week that the Secretary will make it plain in Paris. It is also agreed that long before Phase III it will be important to have it well known, so that our acceptance of East German paper-stampers would not be a great prestige defeat. But how soon do we clarify this point publicly? This question has not had adequate discussion, and perhaps you should flag it by asking the Secretary for a definite recommendation.

4. The timing and location of a Western summit deserves some thought. The Secretary's current notion is Bermuda in early October. He quite rightly wants it to be far enough from Europe so that Khrushchev cannot wedge himself in. My own question is whether Washington would not be better, or even, conceivably, Hyannis Port if you wanted relative privacy and a really small working group. The hazard of a Western summit is that it will be a big and untidy affair, when the real purpose is to bring your personal authority and leadership to bear on a handful of men.

5. On one further matter there is no disagreement but your own leadership and pressure are important—propaganda. It is agreed that we should use the next two months energetically to advance understanding of our position and of the low character of the Soviet effort. It is also generally agreed that leadership here should be placed in USIA (although the Acheson report suggests a new Special Assistant to the Secretary of State). The real problem is that the center of international sympathy should be directed toward people of West Berlin and not toward the official position of the U.S. Government, and this takes some doing. The Acheson report states well and strongly the four central themes of freedom, peace, faithful trusteeship and self-determination. We are for all four, and the Soviets are currently in fact against them all on Berlin.

Phase II

The execution of our plan of negotiations would be the main business of Phase II. I do not think you need to go into detail on this with the Secretary this afternoon. In essence the two papers before you suggest that at the beginning we should adopt a slightly modified version of the Western peace plan. The modifications will take some negotiation with our allies, but they should make the program look more forward-looking, while safeguarding our main interests. It is agreed that we should insist upon discussing both Germany and Berlin.

Until you have time to study and master the details of the two proposals, I doubt if you and the Secretary could usefully get very far into this question. It may be best if you simply ask him how far he means to go in the discussion of the substance of negotiating proposals in Paris. My own response to a study of these papers is that they are sensible within their limits. They do not, in my judgment, adequately examine wider alternatives like calling a peace conference, or proposing that the United Nations have a role in Berlin.

Phase III

In Phase III, the questions all turn around this general problem: what form of interference with access to Berlin triggers what form of response? These questions are very hard ones, and the consensus of the Steering Group yesterday was that they need not have first priority attention for the coming meeting. But as General Taylor points out, it is going to be important to have a clear view on some of these issues fairly soon, and certainly before any Western summit we should have views of our own and they should have been argued in the appropriate forum—possibly that of the Defense Ministers.

McG. B.[4]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. Also published in part in Declassified Documents, 1982, 2259.

[2] Documents 86 and 89.

[3] See Document 90.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

92. Record of Meeting[1]

Washington, August 3, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

PRESENT

The President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Owen

1. The Secretary said that he hoped in Paris to (i) secure allied agreement to the military build-up; (ii) clinch preparations for economic sanctions; (iii) get a coordinated NATO propaganda effort into high gear.

2. The Secretary spoke of the possibility of an early instruction to Thompson to make a quiet approach to Khrushchev. One object would be to get Khrushchev engaged in a discussion of the access question. This object might better be achieved in private rather than in a formal talk.

3. The Secretary said that by the end of this month he thought the Western powers would be in a position to propose a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Conference. That Conference might take place in early October or early November. A meeting of the Heads of Western governments immediately concerned should take place beforehand in Bermuda.

4. The Secretary said that he hoped not to get very far into the content of our negotiating position in discussions at Paris. He did not think this was the time to press the Germans into making concessions on either the German or European security questions—particularly in view of the upcoming elections. The President agreed, suggesting that the French and Germans would have to get the wind up before they were moved to give us the flexibility we will need on some issues in order to get the better guarantee of access we want. He thought that Ambassador Kennan's suggestions[2] made sense but that this was not the time to push our allies. The Secretary suggested that we might be able to make some progress just by asking our allies the right questions. He reported German Defense Minister Strauss' remark to Mr. Acheson[3] —that the Germans have not yet faced up to the risk of war over Berlin; he thought that they will be more flexible when they do. The President added that our allies' negotiating mood may also mellow when they are asked to undertake costly military preparations.

5. The President asked what our counter-proposal to Khrushchev should be. The Secretary said that our initial proposal should be for a change in the status quo in our favor, to balance the change that Khrushchev is seeking in his favor. This would prepare the way for later hard bargaining.

6. The President asked about Solution “C”. The Secretary described it as a series of reciprocal declarations between Western powers and the Communists, in which both sides would reserve their juridical positions and agree to preserve the physical status quo except for replacement of Soviet by East German personnel along the access routes. The Secretary said that we could not prevent Khrushchev from signing a treaty but we might be able to build up enough resistance thus to deter him from blocking our access after a treaty.

7. The Secretary said there was one point on which he wanted to make his position clear to the President before his discussions at Paris. Shooting should be an act of last resort; non-military means (e.g., an airlift and sanctions) should be exhausted first. Even a small probe could quickly get out of control.

8. The President suggested that a Defense Ministers' meeting be held at the end of August. He mentioned, as one of the questions which would require decision at some point, whether aircraft should be maintained in a state of non-nuclear readiness. In this case, a delay of several hours would have to ensue before they could use nuclear weapons, instead of a comparable delay before they could use iron bombs, as at present.

9. The Secretary said that while in Paris he would visit the NATO Council with the Attorney General. After Paris he would go to Italy to see Segni. He would write to the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers from Paris. The President thought well of the British suggestion that the Secretary come home by way of London.

10. The Secretary intended that Ambassadors Bruce, Dowling, Thompson, and Kennan constitute a standing group to provide ideas on Berlin. Kennan would also be keeping in touch with neutrals. The Belgrade meeting of neutral nations was briefly covered.[4]

11. Tripartite consultation would take place in Washington. The Secretary would consult with the two Ambassadors; French and British members of the Standing Group would be brought in, as appropriate. This may not satisfy the French; they will have to be convinced that we meant what we said when we suggested that discretion would be needed.

12. The President asked about the possibility of a plebiscite in Berlin. The Secretary said that he would discuss this with the Foreign Ministers in Paris. The President suggested that we might have to indicate our willingness to abide by the results. There was some discussion of how to phrase the question so that it would favor neither side. The President rather liked: “Mr. Khrushchev has made a proposal for changing the status of Berlin. Do you support this?"

13. The President mentioned Senator Case's letter dealing with the possibility of a canal from Czechoslovakia.[5]

14. It was agreed that the decision to propose a Four Power Foreign Ministers' meeting in early October should not be firmly taken in Paris, but should be referred to the Heads of Governments. The danger of leaks would thus be minimized.

15. It was agreed that the U.S. would ease off its present position on paper stamping, letting the UK carry the ball with the French and Germans. This allied decision should be made known later in the year, in advance of a treaty, e.g., in November or December. Meantime, we could see if it could be traded for something from the Soviets.

16. The President mentioned the likely difficulty of persuading de Gaulle and Adenauer to our proposed positions at a Western Heads of Government meeting. The Secretary suggested that, in the end, de Gaulle would probably go along with our proposals, if the President indicated that they were essential to preserve our position in Berlin.

17. There was some discussion of propaganda themes. The President did not think much of the “defaulting trustee” theme. The Secretary said that our propaganda would be geared to the main themes in the President's speech,[6] which was being widely translated and circulated.

18. The Secretary said that we should try now to keep Berlin out of the UN, where we would lack support as a result of Bizerte. We would have to take Berlin to the UN, however, if there were a peace treaty and moves were made against our access.

19. The discussion turned away from Berlin:

[Here follow six paragraphs on other topics.]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 2258.

[2] Not further identified.

[3] See footnote 5, Document 77.

[4] The Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was scheduled to be held in Belgrade September 2-6.

[5] Not found.

[6] See Document 81.

93. Editorial Note

On July 27, 1961, a U.S. Delegation, led by Assistant Secretary of State Kohler and including Legal Adviser Chayes, Director of the Office of German Affairs Hillenbrand, Under Secretary of the Treasury Fowler, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze, flew to Paris for a week of meetings with representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany to lay the groundwork for the Foreign Ministers meeting beginning August 5. At its first meeting this Four-Power Working Group agreed on the following order of business: 1) Political problems; 2) Politico-military problems; 3) Economic phases of contingency planning; and 4) Information program.

The U.S. memorandum on Berlin, which was distributed to the other Western powers on July 21 (see Document 79), served as the basis for discussion.

By August 2 the Working Group had drafted a report on Soviet motives and intentions; reached general agreement, although the French and Germans had doubts, that negotiations with the Soviet Union should be opened before it signed a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic; and discussed the forum, scope, and substance of the negotiations. Discussion of politico-military problems revealed that the other Western powers had reservations about a large-scale ground probe, while talks on the economic aspects of contingency planning reached a consensus on a total embargo of the Soviet bloc in the event of a “substantial” blockage of access to Berlin. (Memorandum for the Secretary, August 2; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-261)

In commenting on the early meetings of the Working Group, McGeorge Bundy told the President that the U.S. Delegation “was even less ready to think of new positions than the Acheson-McGhee papers recommend,” and suggested that the President talk to Secretary Rusk about this rigidity. (Memorandum attached to telegram 588 from Paris, August 2; Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

On August 4 the Working Group completed its discussions and submitted its report to the four Western governments. Entitled “Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin, Paris, July 28-August 4, 1961,” it consisted of six sections: I) Soviet Motives and Intentions, II) Tactics, III) Substantial Political Questions, IV) Strengthening of the Forces of the Alliance, V) Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures, and VI) Review of Berlin Contingency Plans. A copy of the report, with 10 attached U.S. papers on various aspects of the Berlin problem (MCB Memo 3(I)), August 4, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1945. Kohler's telegrams summarizing the activities of the Working Group are ibid., Central Files, 762.00/7-2861 through 762.00/8-461. For Chayes' recollections of the meetings, see his oral history interview at the Kennedy Library.

94. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, August 5, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

US/MC/2

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN

Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Nitze

Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Sir Francis Festing

Mr. John Killick

France

M. Couve de Murville

M. Charles Lucet

M. Charles de Carbonnel

M. Jean Laloy

SUBJECT

Tripartite Meeting on Berlin and Germany

Couve de Murville opened the first Tripartite Meeting by suggesting that, while the Germans should normally participate in discussion of the Berlin question, there were certain aspects of the matter about which the three could perhaps talk more frankly in their absence. After referring to the consultative work accomplished by the Four-Power Working Group, the Secretary stressed the importance of bringing the Germans into future work in the most intimate way. It was necessary to have them participate to the point where the German people could not make the charge that their Government was not fully informed or involved. If a crisis is to come, it would be important that the Germans be involved in the center of the matter rather than at the side. The U.S. hoped that they could be included as full partners in the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington. As a result of the present meetings and the subsequent NATO meeting, we hope to achieve a high degree of Allied unity demonstrating that the West is prepared to protect its vital interests. It is important that we confront Khrushchev with an impressive display of unity for this will heighten the chances of a peaceful settlement.

After noting that the Working Group had produced a practical report[2] for the Ministers, Lord Home agreed to bring the Germans fully in with the possible exception of their participation in early Ambassadorial talks in Moscow. We would not want, he thought, to press the Germans too much before their elections, particularly if such subjects as the de facto recognition of the GDR or UN involvement in the Berlin crisis were to come into the picture. Otherwise we could not bring the Germans in too much. Regarding the military build-up, the British would be prepared to call up the territorial army and to mobilize their reserves if necessary. They hope to join with the U.S., France, and Germany in obtaining the cooperation of the NATO countries, although it would be unrealistic to expect that the latter could produce much more strength on the ground.

Couve said he agreed entirely that the Germans must be completely in the picture. There might be a few things which could best be discussed tripartitely but this would not prejudice full German participation. One thing was certain. The Berlin question was much more a question of the future of the Federal Republic than of Berlin itself. While it was essential to save the liberties of two million Berliners, it was even more important to keep the Federal Republic attached to the West. Our main objective must be to avoid anything which could alter this and lead to German neutralism or an approach to the Soviets. In response to Home's question as to whether there was really any danger of this, Couve emphasized Berlin was really crucial for our relations with Germany and the future of the Atlantic Alliance. If the West suffers a political defeat the work of fifteen years will be undone and the course of the future will be profoundly changed. This is the spirit in which the Allies must consider the problem. Whatever they did, the Federal Republic must be in full agreement.

Home broached the timing question, noting that it seemed certain that the West will have to negotiate with the Soviets and will be pushed into negotiations either by the UN or by other pressures. What would be the best point at which to take the initiative to propose negotiations? Couve responded that there were two aspects: the tactical problem of when to take the initiative and for what date to propose talks, and the substantive problem of the Western negotiating position. Before deciding to have negotiations, he felt the West must decide on its substantive policy. He did not have any question as to what it should be.

The Secretary said he thought there would be considerable value in a Western initiative on negotiations so as not to appear simply to be sitting back with reliance on the status quo until Khrushchev pulls the West into negotiations. The West should have proposals regarding convening negotiations before the meeting of neutrals by the end of this month and certainly before the UNGA session opened on September 19. Unless such negotiations are in prospect, others might take initiatives which would work to the West's disadvantage. UN discussion of Berlin at this time is not likely to be to Western advantage. Therefore we want to discuss an early initiative for a Foreign Ministers meeting to take place in the autumn—perhaps the first week in October, or if the Soviets prefer a later date—the first week in November. Regarding a substantive position, he supposed the West might start with proposals on which we would not necessarily expect to end but which would improve the status quo. From these we might expect to move to some de facto regulation of the situation in conformity with our interests and consistent with the maintenance of something like the status quo.

Over the present weekend, the West could not expect to arrive at a detailed negotiating position and this is not desirable. Probably such a position could not be achieved before the German elections. He agreed that the West must eventually arrive at a unified substantive position but he questioned whether, if we were unable to give the Germans complete details of our proposals now, this should be a barrier to an initiative towards negotiations. In any event and apart from the question of German participation in preparations, there were grave disadvantages in going well into the autumn without such an initiative.

Lord Home queried whether the Secretary was saying that we must move towards negotiations with the Soviets but not yet decide on what we would negotiate except to the extent that the Ambassadorial probe in Moscow might proceed. The Secretary agreed but noted that some Ambassadorial contact in Moscow was in any event inevitable. What he had in mind was that beyond a possible Ambassadorial approach, we should propose a specific Foreign Ministers' meeting to the Soviets and that this would become known publicly—hopefully with Soviet acceptance of such a meeting. If we did not do this, our friends and Allies including those in NATO would be unwilling to support what seemed like a military build-up and the need for related economic and propaganda measures unless these were accompanied by a move towards negotiation. Home mentioned that Nehru was getting restive. If the problem got into the UN now, the position of the West was likely to be weakened thereby. This was the reason for an initiative on a Foreign Ministers' meeting before September 19 without revealing the substance of our position. In preparing the Western substantive position, Couve said there was a case to be made for the absence of the Germans if we actually have negotiations with the Soviets. The West could always advance something along standard lines combating the Soviet peace treaty proposal with proposals for German reunification on the basis of self-determination or for the unification of Berlin. Everyone on both sides knows that these are not practical. The discussion will inevitably move on to the status of Berlin and access thereto. He was not certain that agreement with the Soviets on these subjects was possible. If there is agreement on Berlin, this means that the status quo will not be maintained as such. What the Soviets want is to crystallize the existence of the GDR and to change the Berlin situation in such a way that it is no longer a factual part of the Federal Republic not merely in the economic and financial sense. It was the political absorption of West Berlin into the Federal Republic which particularly worried the Soviets. The West Germans had been “silly enough” to insist on holding Bundestag and other meetings, having visits of the Chancellor and other officials, and other activities there. There was the burning problem of the refugees. If the Soviets accept an agreement on Berlin, Couve continued, for the Allies this would somehow have to involve a guarantee of Western communications even if the continuation of the occupation status was not formally recognized. The Soviets would indubitably insist on the discontinuance of West German political activities in Berlin under cover of the occupation status. This is a fact which we and the Germans must face if there is to be any agreement with the Soviets. However, all purely German communications with Berlin are presently under GDR control. Any agreement would have to stop what the Western Powers are doing to help Federal Republic political activities in West Berlin. The Soviets will insist that GDR control of German traffic between the Federal Republic and Berlin include refugees. This is what a substantive agreement really comes to in the last analysis. As to tactics and the role of public opinion, he frankly did not see the problem in the same light as the Secretary. This was a vital issue. Our life and future depended on what came out of the crisis. It was essentially a test of strength between the Soviet Union and the U.S. He frankly did not see how, if this were the case, you could impress the Soviets by taking the same line on negotiations as the Soviets. Vital Western national interests were at stake. The role of the UN was not an essential fact in this situation. The only essential fact was our relationship to the Soviets and how we do or do not deal with them. If the present situation is a trial of strength, it is essential to show no weakness. Therefore, he could not help but agree with the Secretary in his emphasis on maintaining not only unity in fact, but the appearance of unity. But to take action in the way proposed would merely show what was really at the bottom of our hearts—fear of war. We must not be weak in our position. Khrushchev says this is an issue on which the West will not fight and that we will finally accept his position. Perhaps in the last analysis he is right but it would certainly be wrong to give him the immediate impression that he is right. Here Couve came back to his first point, that the entire future of the Federal Republic and our relationship to it was at stake.

Home said that since the East Germans presently control all civilian traffic to West Berlin except air communications, if we were to get a reasonable de facto arrangement because Khrushchev wants no war, we would not be much worse off than at present except that Allied air access could not be used to move refugees. Couve agreed that 95% of Berlin traffic was now controlled by the GDR but he emphasized that the other 5% is the crucial traffic. It was not really pure military traffic which caused trouble, but a use of military rights as a camouflage for essentially German traffic. It was natural from their viewpoint that the GDR would want to control this. A neutralized West Berlin to the Soviets would mean that no German could enter or leave Berlin except with GDR permission. The result would be a progressive adjustment of the Germans in West Berlin to the factual situation. Home mentioned that the East Germans could achieve this effect now. Couve said the point was that the refugees are transported by air. This was the real issue. He wanted to say this now while Von Brentano was not present when it was awkward.

The Secretary commented on the trial of strength to which Couve had referred. We agreed this was involved here but this strength had many components. We should like not to discount too much the value of world reactions and the importance which this has both to Khrushchev and to ourselves. The Sino-Soviet bloc has extensive objectives in other parts of the world and is making large efforts in non-Communist countries. If we can show up their Berlin position before the rest of the world this would be a political factor they must take into account. If we can not convince most UN countries that our position is reasonable and that we are not just being stubborn, the pressure will be towards some position which will be difficult for us. In democratic societies people do not think much of war as an instrument of policy unless they believe war is unavoidable. We believe nuclear war to be possible in the Berlin crisis although we do not say this is inevitable. If we ask our peoples to take a risk of this magnitude, we must make clear that every feasible effort is being made to achieve our objective by other means. Democracies must be led to conflict with clear consciences.

Couve said he did not want to give the impression that he underestimated what the Secretary had said. The support of public opinion and of the noncommitted countries was very important. But when our very lives are at stake, this is not essential. The substance of our vital interests is essential. He also agreed concerning the importance of public opinion within the Western Alliance and the necessity that people be willing to follow their governments. It is essential that we explain and be understood, but this cannot change our basic position because Berlin is linked to our vital interests. It was not impossible that the crisis would lead to nuclear war but we must accept this risk. If what we accept instead weakens our position and our unity, it will be possible to avoid nuclear war in 1961. But this would merely lead to nuclear war in 1962 or 1963. This is not a policy. We have learned that in the past and must evaluate the present situation in that light.

In response to the Secretary's query as to whether Couve detected significant substantive differences between us and the Germans on these matters, Couve said he did not know. They obviously could not accept certain things which the other three might wish to propose. When it came to the real trial, he did not really know what their stand would be and he suspected they likewise did not know.

Home said that he did not think we should press the Germans too hard at this time. However, the fact was that Khrushchev was saying things which seemed reasonable to the rest of the world. A peace treaty did not sound bad and Khrushchev would certainly offer guarantees before he made a peace treaty. If he did this, the West could not avoid negotiations. Therefore, as the Secretary had said, we must consider how we turn negotiations to our best advantage. If they come after a peace treaty is signed, then we must take account of the new position of the GDR. If they come before a peace treaty, Khrushchev might say he will make a peace treaty anyway but it will be subject to prior arrangements with the Allies. Home said he could see that if we surrendered the basic rights of West Berlin this would shake NATO and turn the Germans toward the East. The West must insist on the freedom of West Berliners including their freedom of movement to West Germany, but this inevitably involved some measure of recognition of the GDR. The Secretary noted that the fact that 95 percent of the present traffic to Berlin is controlled by the East Germans in itself is a sort of de facto recognition of their existence and of the need to deal with them. Home said two points on which agreement is necessary with Khrushchev would involve status of the GDR and our position on Berlin. On the second point, if Khrushchev did not want war, he might be willing to accept some compromise for at least sometime ahead. He had no objection to asking for a conference soon on Germany and Berlin without revealing our real negotiating hand. The Secretary said we might do this through diplomatic channels.

When Home repeated that the apparent reasonableness of the Soviet position for the rest of the world would make it impossible for the West to go to war without negotiations, the Secretary said this also had some relation to the “test of firmness”. In the past he had sometimes felt the West was too nervous about negotiations as if the Soviets were 12 feet tall. We should have more confidence in ourselves and in our ability to talk to them even if we might never agree. By the first week in October many things which we were undertaking in the military, economic and propaganda fields will have begun to make their impression on Khrushchev in terms of underlining Western seriousness of purpose. By that time, the West should not be in a disadvantageous position to talk. If we did not show willingness to negotiate, our position would be eroded by the feeling that we should have explored every possibility before Allied traffic is actually turned back at the barriers.

In response to Couve's query as to whether to answer the last Soviet note,[3] Home said that in the last Soviet note Khrushchev had given us an opening by showing sensitivity on self-determination. This suggested a Western offer of a plebiscite. Couve commented that, speaking of tactics, it seemed to him that for some months now Khrushchev had been very self-confident and believed that the Soviet Union would not have to face a real crisis. The U.S. military decisions were good and could not fail to make some impression with the Soviets as evidence of U.S. firmness. If we now went to Khrushchev and said we wanted to negotiate, he would immediately conclude that we were not serious. An Ambassadorial approach in Moscow along the lines envisaged would also lead him to conclude that he could proceed. The minimum the West could do is to let the situation develop a little to see if Khrushchev can come to be persuaded that this is a serious matter. Home disagreed and said that the UNGA was convening on September 19. Someone would undoubtedly come forward and ask for negotiations. If we had to respond, the West would be in a weaker position than if we took an initiative ourselves. Couve commented that he did not think it would be India, Ghana or Indonesia that would be the decisive factor in the Berlin situation.

The Secretary referred to the President's speech to the U.S. people.[4] We recognized that there were several audiences as well as the U.S. people. Not only the U.S. people, but our Allies—more than 40 countries—and not just NATO—they all had a direct interest if we got into war with the Soviets. We felt it important to make two points that we were prepared to fight for our vital interests if necessary but if they could be protected by peaceful means so much the better. The President had strongly emphasized that a Western initiative be taken on negotiations and that we did not have to detract from our position of strength. Instead it was an essential part thereof. We attach more importance to U.N. countries and the effect their attitudes might have on Khrushchev. We also had interests in other parts of the world which we want to further and regarding which we need to think in the Berlin context. By early October the seriousness of the U.S. steps could have impressed Khrushchev that we are facing a war possibility. Khrushchev had certainly read the President's speech in full. A lack of interest in negotiation could scarcely make him feel we were more serious than otherwise. In fact, it might have the opposite effect. In the past, he has recognized that to scare the West he need only suggest negotiations. We are arming, but part of our purpose for this is to support us in negotiation.

Couve said that what Khrushchev says is clear in the Soviet note. He is prepared to talk purely on his own grounds. Our position has always been that we are willing to negotiate but not be subject to preconditions or threats. This had been discussed at great length two and one-half years ago before the Geneva Conference.

Home said he had to agree with the Secretary that the general effect of military measures would be enhanced by an offer to negotiate. Otherwise people would say the West had gone over completely to a military solution. He suggested that in late August or early September we might reply to the latest Soviet notes; in early September we could conduct the Ambassadorial probe in Moscow; following the German elections we could make a proposal just before the UNGA opening and before Khrushchev had reached his own decision on a peace treaty. Couve said that it was clear that Khrushchev had already decided to convene a peace conference after the October 12 Party Congress—perhaps in early November. Home responded that the question was whether he told the GDR whether the peace treaty is to be unconditional or to take account of a prior understanding with the Allies.

The Secretary hoped that we could take political steps to upset Khrushchev's timetable for signature of the peace treaty. If a Foreign Ministers' meeting were scheduled for early in October or November, it would be hard for him to go ahead. It would certainly be more difficult for him to persuade non-Communist countries to attend a peace conference. At this point, there was some inconclusive discussion over which countries might conceivably be invited to a Soviet peace conference.

In response to the Secretary's query as to how, in the absence of negotiations, Couve saw developments for the rest of the year, Couve said he did not exclude negotiations, but he did not like the way they were presently being proposed. This seemed to him to be the way of weakness coming too soon after a show of strength. We should answer Khrushchev's note saying that we are always ready for negotiations but cannot negotiate on his terms but only under reasonable, open conditions. This might go forward in 2 or 3 weeks and the American Ambassador might then emphasize the seriousness of the Berlin situation and whether he has drawn all the conclusions possible from developments he has now in motion.

The Secretary commented that if we try to avoid negotiating on terms Khrushchev has suggested it was all the more important that we initiate negotiations on terms we want. Another factor relating to timing was that precisely because we take the Berlin situation so seriously in terms of our vital interest, we want to ensure to the extent possible that events themselves did not take control. Beyond a certain point, prestige and other elements would assume new proportions. The need for talks with the Soviets grows not only out of the problem of Berlin but out of our approach to it. Talks were not a sign of weakness; but we will talk because we understood what was at the end of the trail.

Home said he always kept coming back to the Soviet position that after the peace treaty, we must arrange access with the GDR. Our position then might well force on us a degree of de facto recognition of the GDR beyond what we want to concede. He agreed with the Secretary, that in the future the longer negotiations are postponed, the more rigid positions will be. Our objective should be to get prior guarantees from Khrushchev, before he signs a peace treaty, regarding the effect of the peace treaty on our position. He agreed, of course, that we must not give away West Berlin and lose West Germany in the process. Couve said that he had not precisely meant that. We obviously had to try to make a deal and this involved giving something away.

Lord Home said such a deal would be much more difficult in the post-treaty situation. He agreed we wanted to wait until September 17 before indicating we wanted a Foreign Ministers meeting. Couve reiterated his proposed timetable for answering the note, saying we should negotiate but only under reasonable conditions. Delivery of the note could be accompanied by a warning from the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow and in September the Western Foreign Ministers might meet again and assess the situation and the steps to be taken. This would still be a month before the Party Congress and we would be rid of the German elections. In any case, a conference with the Soviets could not take place before the end of October or early November. After expressing a lack of enthusiasm for another Western Foreign Ministers meeting, Home said such a meeting could not take place before the German elections. Although Couve had said it should take place before the UNGA session, he hoped agreement could be reached that September 19 would be a good date on which to make the Western offer on negotiations. Another Western Foreign Ministers meeting would make it appear that the Western Powers were running after negotiations. He thought agreement on when to offer negotiations should be reached now. The Secretary asked why it was necessary to wait until September 19. He did not object to answering the Soviet note if we had something quite specific in it about negotiations and if it were to be made public before the UNGA session, but there seemed to be a disadvantage in continuing a note exchange if we just said we were willing to negotiate but showed no sign of doing something specific. Home commented that we did not really need to answer the note until mid-September. The Secretary said the longer we delay in offering negotiation the more we run risk that the Soviets will take an initiative before the Party Congress along the lines intended for after the Party Congress, and then we should be reacting to their terms.

Couve said that this would mark a change in the Soviet position. The Secretary said that the Soviets were making real headway with their proposals on a peace treaty and guarantees. We do not have anything in front of them to counter their proposals and this puts us in a weak position. We would have great difficulty in the U.S. in going ahead with a military build-up including the calling up of reserves, tripling the draft call, and pushing the civil defense program unless people knew diplomacy was at work trying to find out if all this were necessary. It would tend to undermine the present economy at Home and in the Alliance unless other members of the UN knew we were exploiting every resource of diplomacy to protect our vital interests. Home noted his agreement. Couve, however, said this argument worked both ways. If you announce the conference at an early date, the world would inevitably relax and say it is all over and the West is going to make a deal with the Soviet. U.S. newspapers were right now commenting on a conference leading to a solution. This was the idea of the NATO allies and had been expressed in the recent WEU meeting. What, however, if the negotiations do not succeed? Then the pressure on the West will be the same as now. What do we do then if the crisis continued? He would hate to propose negotiations without first knowing what the Western substantive positions would be and this is not discussed in the Working Group Report. Home observed that this could be worked out in a later Working Group session and then the Western Foreign Ministers would have to meet and settle policy. If we delay too long and are exposed to pressures, this presumably will weaken our position.

The Secretary said the pressure and eventual disunity arising from a failure to offer negotiations would actually weaken the West in Khrushchev's eyes. He has gambled on Western disunity before. If negotiations are postponed until later, there may be false hopes about their outcome. If they failed there would be too little time left to educate the people regarding the seriousness of the issue which could not be resolved. We should begin to find out sooner rather than later whether negotiations are likely to settle the issue and what the real Soviet position is.

Couve said once again this cuts two ways. There was an obvious way we could get NATO unity and that was to imply that negotiations would settle the problem. This would be applauded. The harder and more realistic way was the better one. Home commented that obviously everybody wished that negotiation would settle the problem. If not, “we shall not have a meeting again”.

Regarding contingency planning, Couve said that if it came to a real crisis and our communications were blocked, it was essential that we arrange things so that we were not obliged to be the first to shoot. Here he entirely shared the Secretary's preoccupation. In practice, the only way to do this is to use the air corridors. We should attempt to continue military transport by air and not begin with land operations.

The Secretary said we agreed. Our general attitude has been that since Berlin crisis may be a real one and cannot be eliminated by incantations such as the phrase “nuclear deterrent”, we should try to force the other side to take the initiative with military measures. If we get to the situation where we have to fight, gaining time by an airlift to let our troops get into position might be desirable even if we could not sustain the city of Berlin by air for an extended period of time. We would also wish to bring economic sanctions and other measures to bear.

Home said he agreed on airlift question. As to economic sanctions, he also agreed but felt that detailed plans for various situations involving escalation to a total blockade needed to be worked out. We should develop a variety of economic weapons and study their consequences. The Secretary noted that we had just received a cable from Moscow reporting that the Italians had told our Ambassador that the Fanfani-Khrushchev talks[5] had largely covered the same ground as the Vienna aide-mémoire and the McCloy talks. However, Khrushchev had made the point that, after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty, the Soviets were prepared to use force to prevent unauthorized air access to Berlin. Couve noted that Khrushchev had already said that. The Secretary observed that Ulbricht had said it. Couve said that in any event, an airlift as in 1948 was not possible because of nuclear balance. It would not last more than one day.

Home asked, looking at October 12 as a final date for Soviet decision, and even assuming Khrushchev makes up his mind October 1, when would Couve set a date for the conference? Couve said he was not sure Khrushchev had not now made up his mind. He thought he had. Home commented that if he agreed to make an agreement with us on Berlin, he would have to incorporate its terms in the treaty. Couve said that Khrushchev had already made up his mind and knows we will ask for negotiations. All he has to do is read the newspapers.

Home said if he knows we are going to do it sooner or later, isn't there some reason for doing it sooner?

The Secretary said that he doubted whether we should consider talking about our ultimate substantive position in the near future. It seemed impossible to prevent leaks, and thus our first word would become our last word. There was some merit in postponing discussion of the Western substantive position and not disclosing it too early in advance.

Home said we could, of course, work out a position on the all-German question opposing our self-determination principle to their peace treaty. We would get stuck on this. We would then work out our position on Berlin based on the three essential conditions in the Working Group Report. This would not be too hard to do. Perhaps new ingredients like the frontier question could be added. The Secretary said if we do not establish a substantive framework for negotiations now with the Soviets, the alternatives available to us later might be even worse. He observed that discussions were both frequent and unavoidable in Moscow. It was better to have a unified discussion than to have individual discussions on a non-unified basis initiated through diplomatic channels. Khrushchev might take the initiative or other Governments might do it. He could not guarantee that we would not talk to Khrushchev during the rest of August.

Couve observed that if the Soviets can speak to the U.S. Ambassador that will be enough for them. If this is done, care should be taken that nothing comes out to the German public. Home observed that if we know the Foreign Ministers are going to meet, the Moscow probings need not be started so urgently.

The Secretary ended on the note that if nothing is happening there is always danger of tinkerers and meddlers attempting to intervene.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1940. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on August 7. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

[2] See Document 93.

[3] For text of the August 3 Soviet note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 766-769.

[4] See Document 81.

[5] Telegram 403 from Moscow, August 4, repeated to Paris as telegram 91. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-461)

95. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, August 5, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

US/MC/5

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN

Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Ambassador Bohlen

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Cash

Germany

Dr. Von Brentano

Professor Carstens

General Schnez

Dr. Ritter

Mr. Weber

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Field Marshal Festing

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Mr. Killick

France

M. Couve de Murville

M. Charles de Carbonnel

M. Charles Lucet

SUBJECT

First Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and Germany

At the first quadripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers, the following portions of the “Report of the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin"[2] were considered: 1) “Soviet Motives and Intentions"; 2) “Strengthening of the Forces of the Alliance"; 3) “Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures"; and 4) “Review of Berlin Contingency Plans” (Ground Access Procedures).

Couve opened the meeting by suggesting a discussion of the Working Group's Report.

In connection with the first section on “Soviet Motives and Intentions,” the British asked the Germans to comment on developments in East Germany.

When Von Brentano said that he had received a telegram from Governing Mayor Brandt this morning reporting that it looks as if the “GDR” is beginning a program of harassment of intersector Berlin traffic with the first steps being taken against East Berliners working in West Berlin, he mentioned the fact that such workers were now being obliged to pay for many things (for example, their rent and utilities in East Berlin) in DM West. This is a move to eliminate their incentive to work in West Berlin. A check of identity papers is to be initiated. There are reports that S-Bahn traffic is to be halted and the passengers required to get out for inspection although there have been no concrete steps to implement this. All of these measures will affect the refugees who are still coming in record numbers. The Germans are afraid that any additional measures will simply increase these numbers by creating panic. They feel that there is now no danger of the disorders of June 17, 1953, and they are doing nothing to encourage such developments. However, the despair of the people in East Germany is increasing, and this could easily become dangerous if the Berlin door were closed.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that an attempt to seal off refugees would result in a build-up of pressure in East Germany which might lead to an explosion and precipitate the problems under consideration sooner than expected. He suggested that the Four Governments keep their members of the Washington Ambassadorial Steering Group fully informed regarding the situation in East Germany so that information could be exchanged because it is important for us to keep as alert as possible and not be caught by surprise. He thought it would be enough if the Ambassadorial Group would keep the “Soviet Motives and Intentions” section of the Working Group Report current. He felt this section was adequate as of today, but that in coming days certain priorities might emerge.

Lord Home agreed that the “Soviet Motives and Intentions” section was all right and that the Ambassadors in Washington should be the center of an exchange of information regarding East Germany.

Von Brentano said that he agreed because of the necessity of keeping this problem under current review as developments in the Zone might provoke another Hungary. We must decide in advance how we would react. It was his personal opinion that it would be impossible simply to protest. He did not think West German public opinion would acquiesce if the border police and the West German army remained quietly in their barracks in such an event.

Couve said that he agreed with Von Brentano that developments in East Germany could lead to a very serious situation.

It was agreed that the Washington Ambassadorial Steering Group should keep East German developments under consideration.

The Secretary asked if it was not correct that the Federal German Government not only did not encourage the refugees to come to West Germany but wished that they would remain in East Germany in order to keep elements there sympathetic to the West. He thought the Ambassadorial Steering Group should begin consultations as to what our attitude should be if trouble really developed. He called attention to Annex A of the “Tactics” section of the report concerning the situation in East Germany and said this subject should be given constant close attention.

Couve said that all we could do now was to refer the matter to the Ambassadorial Steering Group and ask that the Group keep its information on the situation current. Couve then suggested that the Ministers address themselves to the “Tactics” section of the Report.

The Secretary said that he thought this part of the paper came in the wrong place because it was necessary first to consider what the NATO Alliance must do in a serious effort to strengthen itself in order both to create the basis for any future negotiations and to begin to get ready for the contingency of military action. He said that the U.S., after long and careful study, had concluded that negotiations with the Soviets could not be successful under existing circumstances, i.e., until Khrushchev had been influenced by our efforts to strengthen ourselves. He stated that the first step was to consider what measures need to be taken to strengthen the West. Military steps were important not only as a demonstration of our determination but also to make our deterrent credible. Khrushchev had concluded that with the nuclear stand off he could discount the possibility of nuclear war. The U.S. felt that NATO military plans should be realized and other measures taken so that Khrushchev would conclude that the West was indeed serious about Berlin. We also should take economic measures leading to a complete blockade if necessary. Also in the propaganda field actions should be taken to create an atmosphere more likely to lead to more successful negotiations. He suggested, therefore, that the military should first consider steps to strengthen the West and save the more complex matters of “Tactics” and “Substantive Political Questions” for the next meeting.

This was agreed.

Lord Home said that the U.K. has forces all over the world, and that it did not wish to strip one area to reinforce its troops in Germany. He said, however, that the U.K. could get two light anti-aircraft regiments and one other anti-aircraft unit with guided missiles to Germany in late August or September. He said that, in addition to cancelling the withdrawal of three fighter squadrons from Germany, the U.K. will now send one additional fighter squadron and has earmarked another Canberra squadron for this purpose. He said that the British Government could concentrate a division of two brigade groups in the U.K. for reinforcing U.K. troops in Germany. One armored regiment could be brought from Hong Kong and a brigade headquarters from Cyprus. He said that these were all visible moves that would be quickly known to the Soviets. He said that the U.K. was ready to recall reservists and to mobilize territorials which could be put in Germany in about 17 days.

Couve said that the French had problems similar to those of the British, but that their main problem was, of course, Algeria. However, they have already recalled one good division from there and would complete its reconversion for European warfare early in September. He said that they had not yet decided to recall the second division because the situation in Algeria had not developed as they had hoped. They might, however, decide to do so later. They were, however, withdrawing some Air Force personnel now to reinforce their tactical Air Force in Eastern France and in West Germany. He said that further steps would be taken if necessary. This meant the recall of reservists (which could be done in about one week) to complete divisions now in Germany. He added that they would reconsider the deployment in Algeria if this becomes necessary and would recall more reservists. All of this was under serious consideration. Nothing would be announced unless it was decided to withdraw the second division. He said that, by early autumn, the French would be ready to take the necessary steps. Lord Home said that the British steps were not very spectacular but, spread out over a period of time, they would have the desired effect.

Couve said that what the U.S. is doing is of course immense, and the other Allies should also act even if they could not do so on the same scale.

The Secretary said that the U.S. Memorandum on Berlin of July 21st[3] shows on pages 5 thru 8 the steps we would take. We had considered when we might move into a state of national emergency and call up the Reserve and National Guard and had decided not to do so at this time particularly not to create the psychology of mobilization. We also wished to undertake measures which we could support for some time because we should think of a general strengthening for the long pull. The President can declare a national emergency and call reservists and National Guard units to duty promptly. We attach the greatest possible importance to what the NATO Alliance does. Khrushchev will watch very closely, and if only one, two, or three countries act, he might conclude that there was little support for our program within the Alliance, and this could be a very serious problem. Also if Khrushchev sees troops called up without the necessary production backup, he might conclude that we are not in earnest. Our preparations to increase our strength must be such as to produce a force that could, in fact, fight. Otherwise we might produce neither the effect we wish to on Khrushchev nor the force that we might need to apply at a later date. He asked what we could do to bring about an improvement in the Alliance's readiness to fight. Should our Defense Ministers consult quite soon (that is, all the NATO Defense Ministers, not just the Four)? Other steps should be taken in a NATO-wide context. Not only the troops, but all the essential supporting elements should be ready.

Lord Home felt that a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers might possibly produce some alarm. He questioned whether or not the NATO Permanent Representatives might not study the problems involved. He remarked that the British Defense Minister had talked with Secretary McNamara just the other day.

Couve suggested that when the Secretary reported to the North Atlantic Council he might raise the problem of what the others could do. He added, however, that he was not opposed to a meeting of the Defense Ministers or the Chiefs of Staff.

The Secretary said that the U.S. was not partial to any particular method but felt strongly that there should be an organized follow-up.

Von Brentano said that he was in full agreement with what the Secretary had said, and he felt that it was exceptionally important. He said that the Germans had been greatly impressed with the actions the U.S. Government was taking and with the necessity that this be a cooperative effort. He said that it was very important for the Soviets to see that the West was ready to create the necessary force and to use it if necessary. With regard to the U.S. Memorandum of July 21st, in which the U.S. had expressed its wishes and expectations concerning contributions from its Allies, the Defense Ministers had already discussed these in Washington. Concerning the German build-up first to 9 and subsequently to 11 divisions by next year, it was necessary that specific measures be taken, but he believed it doubtful that they should take these measures prior to their elections on September 17. He felt this would lay the German Government open to accusations that could markedly affect the outcome of the elections. He felt it might be dangerous to our joint efforts if the Germans tried to move too rapidly before September 17 in that the special measures might be taken, but that in so doing the CDU/CSU might lose the election and a government come to power which would not implement these measures. He felt that the Germans must take the necessary steps, but that they must wait until after September 17. He felt that it was necessary for the Defense Ministers to agree, and perhaps this might be done within the NATO framework. He said that the Netherlands representative had explained just the other day in WEU the steps his Government was undertaking. He thought consultations should perhaps begin with the Three or Four Defense Ministers so that measures would be coordinated. He said that he was convinced that the President was right when he had said that military weakness leads to war. He said that the Germans were prepared to establish the 9 and 11 combat-ready divisions and to assign the necessary Air Force units. The Secretary said that the U.S. understood election problems, but that the next five weeks could be quite important for their effect on Khrushchev. He assumed something could be done short of full mobilization for action. He asked what the Germans could do before September 17.

Von Brentano replied that a few days ago the Chancellor had discussed this problem with representatives of the Defense and Foreign Ministers, and had concluded that certain build-up measures could take place and arming be done. He pointed out that the Germans had had to build their military forces from nothing. He added that relevant statements would be made in election speeches to create the proper psychological basis for the necessary steps. He added that some measures could be taken before the elections such as holding troops scheduled for demobilization, and that other steps would be taken after the elections. He added that the necessary preparation would now be made. He concluded by saying that the Germans were ready to participate.

Lord Home asked whether there were any objections to the reinforcement of tripartite troops in Germany prior to September 17. Von Brentano assured him that there were none.

Couve said that the real problem for all of us is when to call up the reservists.

The Secretary asked whether the Germans could now make known their intentions about the first 9 divisions. Von Brentano said he could not reply because he lacked the technical knowledge, but that he thought the statement that Defense Minister Strauss had made to the press yesterday in Bonn indicated that the Germans would do all that their NATO Allies expected of them.

The Secretary said that it was necessary that the Allies understand what was really in our minds. There are certain elements in the German and Berlin situation which are absolutely vital to our national interests, i.e., the presence of the Western forces in Berlin, the ability of West Berlin to live as a city, and the maintenance of its physical access to the Federal Republic and the rest of the world. He said that these were vital in the sense that we must fight in order to retain them. This was not just because of the West Berliners, Allied rights, or NATO's future (although all of these were involved), but because of the policy of the Sino-Soviet bloc throughout the world. He said that this would be a historical turning point in the great confrontation. Although Khrushchev has not spelled out exactly what he would do, we must face the prospect that he will move against West Berlin. Khrushchev thinks we would not move to nuclear war if necessary. We should, of course, protect our interests without nuclear war if at all possible, but it seems to us that Khrushchev may have made a judgment which we run the risk of not being able to reverse before nuclear bombs fall. He felt that the conventional build-up will help us to engage the Soviets fully and to convince them that if we were prepared to go so far, we would be prepared to go the rest of the way. Otherwise, Khrushchev might persist until too late. We must make Khrushchev fully understand that we will defend our vital interests regardless of the cost, and that thus Khrushchev might eventually have to face nuclear war. Couve said he entirely agreed. Lord Home said that the British felt that the build-up was necessary and probably the only way to defend our vital interests in Berlin. The Secretary wondered whether the Ministers might not have informal consultations over night on how to proceed further, i.e., by a meeting of the Defense Ministers, or other meetings. This was agreed.

The Ministers then turned to Section V of the Report, “Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures”. Lord Home referred to Paragraph 4 and said he proposed a build-up in the NATO program of a series of different measures progressively mounting toward an economic blockade. He said that he did not want to convey the idea of a blockade from the start and asked if this formula could be agreed. He said a number of economic measures could be taken now and the British would like to take preparatory actions concerning a number of others. He felt it was important to get the program build-up in the right way in the North Atlantic Council.

The Secretary said that he felt that there was no difference in approach. If we could agree on the most severe and the least severe actions a number of measures could be prepared between the first warning measures and a complete embargo.

Couve said that he thought that the word “blockade” was better than the term “embargo”. The French had doubts concerning attempts to impress the Soviets by means of preparatory measures on economic countermeasures. Khrushchev had said many times that economic countermeasures were exactly what he anticipated, and that he would not be concerned. He might draw the conclusion that we would do nothing in addition to taking economic countermeasures. He felt that both embargo and blockade were important, but that preliminary measures might make the wrong impression.

Von Brentano, referring to Paragraph 3, said he thought that it was important to consider what type of economic measures should be taken and when. He felt it was important to act when a peace treaty was signed because the signature would be the start of a process. The conclusion of the treaty with the Soviet Zone is not an end in itself, but merely a means of carrying out further Soviet intentions. He could not envisage the continuation of interzonal trade after the conclusion of a separate peace treaty. He said that the Communists did fear economic countermeasures as had been indicated in their reaction to the West German abrogation of the interzonal trade agreement, and Khrushchev's stated willingness to accept economic countermeasures was merely an attempt to forestall them. He wondered if we should not take countermeasures of the character of a blockade when the separate peace treaty is signed.

Couve said he thought Paragraph 3 was in accordance with the German position. He felt that Von Brentano had been very convincing. He was convinced that a blockade would be a strong weapon. However, in considering that the signing of a separate treaty would be an aggressive act, it was necessary to consider what should be the casus belli—the signing of the treaty or interference with our access. Von Brentano said that he was not criticizing the economic countermeasures paper which he understood, but that it was necessary to discuss divergent views. The paper was not a decision, but rather a guide line.

Lord Home said that he had looked upon economic reaction, like military reaction, as concerning physical interference with access. He did not think signature of the treaty alone would be a cause for action. He said that he didn't much like Annex B of the “Recommended Minute on Economic Countermeasures.” He pointed out that “Temporary Travel Documents” had proved we had another effective weapon. He said that, after signing the treaty, the Soviets may change nothing. He felt that the Allies must react only to actions, not the signing of a treaty. What we really need is a basket of many varied countermeasures from which to choose.

The Secretary said that we should give NATO our thinking on this subject. He suggested that the paper be given to NATO so that they could get busy and take similar action. He said that we were all agreed that economic countermeasures alone would not be decisive, but merely an auxiliary action. Other measures could be taken, for example, breaking off U.S. negotiations with the Soviets on civil air matters and cultural and scientific exchange. Economic countermeasures should be like the console of a pipe organ, on which one could pull out one, several, many, or all stops.

Von Brentano said he did not think it likely that Allied traffic would be blocked and civil traffic continued, but he could not imagine continuation of interzonal trade if Allied access was blocked. He added that the signature of a treaty alone would mean nothing if Berlin were not located where it was. But because it was where it was, the signature of the treaty would be very significant.

The Secretary said we would wish to think about this. We felt that such a treaty could not affect our rights. The real test would be what happened after the treaty was signed.

Von Brentano said this was quite right but that we all knew why Khrushchev wanted to sign this treaty. The Germans thought it would be too much to permit interzonal trade to continue after the signature of the separate treaty. The Secretary said that he doubted that the signature of the treaty alone without some further act would give us a basis on which to move.

Couve said he was not certain that the treaty was directly connected with this section of the report inasmuch as it was not mentioned therein. The convocation of the peace conference is mentioned, but the signing of the peace treaty is not. He added that there would be a psychological consequence of the signing of the separate treaty in Germany that would not occur in the U.S., the U.K., or France.

Von Brentano said that it was right that, if the separate treaty were signed and the situation unchanged, action was not called for, but the case would be quite different if the treaty were signed and followed by cutting off Allied traffic to Berlin with a concurrent continuation of interzonal trade.

The Secretary asked whether we should not get the various economic countermeasures lined up in this paper and decide later when to apply them.

After various suggestions regarding a re-draft of the Minute, it was agreed that the U.S. would undertake this effort before the next meeting. It was also agreed that the next step was to supply the information to the North Atlantic Council. It was agreed that an embargo was essentially an economic measure, while a blockade was military, but that both should be considered by the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington.

The Secretary suggested that the next topic for discussion should be Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the paper “Ground Access Procedures”, a portion of the Working Group Report entitled “Review of Berlin Contingency Plans”. The rest of this paper could be discussed tomorrow. The Secretary said that we had considered the access procedures question in terms of the casus belli. All along we have held that the Soviets have not controlled our rights. Considering East Germans as agents of the Soviets was almost a waste of time when everyone knew that they were merely puppets for whom the Soviets should be responsible. It would be hard to convince anyone that we should go to war simply because of the substitution of East Germans for Russians at the control points. This was somewhat different from the U.S. view taken in the past, but it was felt that it was sound.

Couve said he did not see much difference between Allied acquiescence in East German execution of the procedures presently followed by the Soviets with respect to ground access to Berlin and the so-called “peel-off” procedure.

Von Brentano said he saw no basic change as long as the system would work.

Everyone agreed to A, B and C of Paragraph 2.

Couve said that he was a little at a loss to see what was meant by Paragraph D calling for a study as to whether it might be possible to extend the scope of the arrangements now governing civil traffic by having the East and West Germans at the technical level agree on procedures governing all travel to and from Berlin including Allied military traffic.

The Secretary pointed out that most Berlin traffic was handled in this way. He said that if it became necessary to talk to the East Germans concerning the Allied traffic to Berlin, we would not wish to do so, nor would we wish to go to war in order to avoid doing so. If the Allies talked to them, it would increase their international prestige, which we would not wish to do. On the other hand, no one would understand our going to war simply because no one would talk with the East Germans. In such a situation, it would seem preferable for the West Germans to talk to the East Germans about Allied traffic as they now do about the 95 per cent of the Allied traffic which is civilian.

Von Brentano said he understood the idea, but that it would be a mistake to think it would work. It is true that interzonal traffic and traffic from the Federal Republic to Berlin is continued on a basis of East-West German exchanges at the technical level. He added that he had never thought much of this particular arrangement, and he thought even raising the idea of the Germans handling Allied traffic on this basis would be dangerous. It would be dangerous to broach the subject to the East Germans. The East Germans would undoubtedly say that if the Allies want to talk, they (the Allies) should be the ones to do so. In this process, we would have implied that the East Germans have some right to be consulted about Allied traffic, and this could be dangerous. He said that these were merely his thoughts on the subject and not a definite German reply as no final decision had been made. Couve said that from a practical standpoint Allied traffic moves to Berlin by road, air, and rail, and under the 2 A procedure, there was no problem with road traffic. Allied rail traffic is already handled at the East-West German technical level. This left only the problem of Allied air traffic, which was handled on a purely quadripartite basis in Berlin. He asked if it might not be possible to reverse what we had done in 1948, when we ceased to travel on the ground in favor of the air, by this time ceasing to travel by the air in favor of the ground.

Mr. Kohler explained that the well-worked-out existing contingency plan provides for the operation of the Berlin Air Safety Center on a “tripartite” basis without Soviet or East German participation. There are ample communication channels for making available to the East Germans the information necessary for a continuation of our flights through the corridors without necessarily jeopardizing flight safety. Therefore, no need exists for considering the control of Allied air traffic at the East-West German technical level.

It was agreed that the study proposed in Paragraph 2 D should be undertaken.

It was then agreed that this discussion covered the “Ground Access Procedures” paper, and the Ministers would discuss the “Military Aspects” section of the “Review of Berlin Contingency Plans” on August 6, 1961.

After a brief discussion of a line to be taken with the press, the meeting was adjourned.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/8-561. Secret. Drafted by Cash on August 6 and approved in S on August 8. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

[2] See Document 93.

[3] See Document 79.

96. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, August 6, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

US/MC/3

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN

Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Nitze

Mr. Hillenbrand

France

M. Couve de Murville

M. Charles de Carbonnel

M. Charles Lucet

M. Jean Laloy

M. Froment-Meurice

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Field Marshal Festing

Mr. Buxton

Federal Republic

Dr. Von Brentano

Dr. Carstens

Dr. Ritter

Major General Schnez

SUBJECT

Second Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and Germany

Couve began the meeting by reading a cable from Moscow reporting the Fanfani-Khrushchev conversation. He particularly noted that, after the Fanfani statement that the Soviets were raising a threat of general war and were acting dangerously, Khrushchev had claimed that this would not happen but had then added that maybe the Soviets would have to shoot first if the Allies attempted an airlift. Khrushchev said that they had already shot down a U-2 once and would repeat it.

The Secretary reported the contents of Ulbricht's letter to President Kennedy delivered in Prague (reported Tosec 12)[2] and noted that, in accordance with agreed procedures, we would take no further action with respect to the letter.

Military matters related to contingency planning were then discussed and are separately reported.[3]

The Secretary suggested that the Foreign Ministers might meet before leaving Paris after a text is available of Khrushchev's speech scheduled to be made tomorrow night,[4] since they might wish to consider if it made any difference to what is being said in the present meetings. After some discussion, the question of a further meeting was left open for later decision. All agreed nothing should be said publicly about the possibility.

The Secretary said that the question raised by the Working Group paper on tactics was how the Western Powers should explore a settlement of the Berlin problem by political means. He assumed all could agree that the primary objective must be to settle it by political means rather than by war. There will, at some point, have to be negotiations with the Soviets. The Soviets have made proposals which are before the world. We cannot lead democratic countries and the NATO Alliance into war unless they are convinced that war has been imposed upon us and that every reasonable step has been taken to settle the problem by peaceful means. The Working Group had considered various ways of raising the problem, for example: by convening of a peace conference, by Ambassadorial explorations in Moscow, and by a Foreign Ministers meeting. We were dubious, the Secretary continued, about the value of a peace conference whatever its composition. We were also skeptical about an early raising of the Berlin question in the U.N. which is filled with people not deeply seized with the problem before us and inclined to avoid war at any price. This situation gave considerable advantage to the side willing to press its case most vigorously. Experience had shown that, since the Soviets generally are unwilling to grant concessions, the U.N. countries applied pressure to the Western Powers to make them. Moreover, countries which favored self-determination elsewhere seem disinclined to apply it to Europe. The Bizerte problem also had consolidated the Afro-Asian Bloc and has created a mood antithetical to the Western position on Berlin. We had considered the idea of trying to get a standstill resolution in the Security Council, and we believed that if the crisis reached a critical point it would inevitably get into the U.N. We did not, however, propose to take a U.N. initiative at this time unless this should be necessary to head off U.N. action by someone else, for example Nehru. Despite the discussion of this possibility in the Working Group paper,[5] we did not see an opportunity for the exploration of the merits of the question through Ambassadorial consultations in Moscow. Since at some stage there must be consultation with the Soviets, we are inclined to feel that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers would be most suitable and most likely to head off U.N. action. The timing of such a meeting is of considerable importance and we assume that it should not occur before the German elections. The Secretary said he had to confess that there were some divergent views on the U.S. side regarding the timing of a conference, but on balance he thought that a meeting scheduled to take place after the Communist Party Congress but publicly known before the Party Congress would be the best solution. If a Foreign Ministers meeting could be held later rather than earlier it might somehow defer Khrushchev's timetable and it might also be followed by a possible Summit meeting or a peace conference.

In the U.S. we had a problem about the timing of public knowledge that such negotiations would occur. The U.S. people as well as the Alliance were waiting for some initiative. There were disadvantages in waiting indefinitely, as if we feared negotiations, until the Soviets presented us with an initiative. This spoke for public knowledge of an offer to negotiate before the Soviet Party Congress, the convening of the UNGA and possibly before the Belgrade neutralist congress. Some had felt that an offer of negotiations could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. He was not sure, the Secretary observed, that the measures being taken in the military field necessarily would become more impressive with the passage of time than at the point of announcement revealing Allied unity in the decision to take them. He felt that some time in early September we should suggest that a meeting of Foreign Ministers take place late in October or early in November. This involved the possibility, of course, that the Soviets would make a counterproposal for a meeting in early October before the Party Congress.

As to substance, the Secretary said that he did not believe we could now write down a complete negotiating position. On the other hand, our Governments were not without many ideas on which they could promptly consult and agree. The Secretary reviewed two basic categories of proposals which the West should consider:

1. Those proposals directed to improving the situation from our viewpoint as opposed to Soviet proposals to their advantage. These might include emphasis on the principle of self-determination in Germany, a simplified Western Peace Plan, and an all-Berlin proposal perhaps with presence of U.N. observers at the critical points of access. Perhaps we could include certain security arrangements in Europe along the lines already discussed.

2. Those proposals for the inevitable point at a conference when it became clear that there was no basis for a meeting of the minds on the proposals noted. We must assume Khrushchev will probably sign a peace treaty with the GDR and will press for some sort of GDR recognition. He could have his peace treaty and his theory of the case, provided he did not put it into practice. This would not be the first time two incompatible theories have lived together if not pressed to their logical conclusions. The question of whether any aspect of general security arrangements would be pertinent at this point should be studied.

Home said he completely agreed with the Secretary's analysis. There will clearly be negotiations with the Soviets, and the question was what kind would be to our best advantage. Unless the West were very careful during the next weeks, the Soviet position would become more plausible to the outside world with its emphasis on a peace treaty and the likely offer of guarantees of access to West Berlin. Since the Western stress was now on the military buildup, the danger was that we shall appear to world opinion as the side moving towards a warlike solution of the Berlin problem. Concerning the substance, he said that he, too, was not sure how far in the next few weeks agreement had to be reached on a negotiating position on Berlin. Our aim was not to weaken Western rights but to improve our situation. He could therefore see an advantage in taking the initiative fairly soon toward negotiations. This might help Khrushchev to postpone a peace treaty or at least to make it conditional on the GDR's acceptance of a Berlin solution agreed by him and the Western Powers. Obviously, the meeting itself could not take place until after September 17.[6] In reply to the latest Soviet note,[7] the Western Powers could offer negotiations. The reply could go forward in a week or two, or in any event before the UNGA met. He was not too concerned with the meeting of the neutralist countries. Moreover, while he could understand the point that, if a Western offer were made too soon after the President's speech people would relax, the Western presentation could be put in a way to avoid this effect.

Von Brentano acknowledged the danger that the Soviets may achieve some psychological success with their emphasis on a peace treaty and a free city of Berlin with guarantees. Many people believe more in words than in what is behind them. Moreover, the West must not give the impression that it is seeking a purely military solution. He also recognized that some countries might raise the Berlin question in the U.N. and this had to be watched carefully. If such an initiative threatened, the West would have to act promptly, but apart from this he agreed that a Western initiative to raise the Berlin question in the U.N. was not desirable. The U.N. Missions must be instructed to watch developments carefully. He said that he had certain reservations about the report received from the U.N. Missions and the German observer,[8] particularly respecting the overly optimistic estimates. This report could, however, serve as a basis for further studies.

Von Brentano admitted that public opinion exercised pressures for direct negotiations, and that the idea could not be repudiated. However, as the President had said, we cannot negotiate on the basis of “What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable”. There was no indication that the Soviets were thinking in any different terms. Negotiations under such conditions could only lead to a worsening of the status quo which is already bad enough. Events were moving swiftly. The receipt of the Soviet notes[9] had already overtaken the Working Group report in one respect. He did not think that the German elections were an important factor in the timing of a bid for negotiations and the neutralist countries were too divided to make their conference of much relevance. However, he was concerned that an expression of willingness to negotiate under current conditions would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Khrushchev's statements were getting stronger, not weaker, and he was stating his maximum program in ultimative terms. Accordingly, negotiations should not be proposed but also they should not be refused.

Von Brentano recapitulated the possible substance of Western proposals. A plebiscite on the all-German question emphasizing self-determination was a good idea and will be painful for the Soviets. While he had certain reservations regarding an all-Berlin proposal, he personally did not object in principle. If the Soviets refused it, it might be easier for the West to refuse the discussion of partial solutions. The Western Peace Plan might be revised to eliminate obsolete portions and to simplify it for better public understanding.

Couve repeated essentially the same arguments on negotiations as he had advanced the day before.[10] He argued that while the problem is one of tactics and of substance, substance must command tactics. Khrushchev keeps repeating the same line publicly and privately. Everyone seemed to be prepared to repeat the 1959 Geneva performance[11] for the first half of the conference, but the West had to be realistic. If it raised the all-German question first, the discussion would not last more than twenty-four hours. The concept of a protracted meeting with the Soviets on a German settlement seemed utterly unrealistic. The only thing that can really be discussed with the Soviets is the problem of Berlin, and this did not mean the reunification of Berlin [Germany?]. He could not be as optimistic as Lord Home and talk in terms of “improving” our position. It was irresponsible to propose negotiations without knowing what the West is prepared to do. This was a difficult and disagreeable responsibility which had to be faced. The first step is to reply to the last Soviet note and to express the view that for the West, negotiation is the proper way to settle this important problem. However, he did not think we should say we are prepared to negotiate on a German settlement since the Soviets would merely say: “Let us call a peace conference.” Perhaps the West might indicate that it is prepared to discuss all the problems at issue between us without preconditions. The Western Foreign Ministers should meet again in mid-September before taking any final decision. Meanwhile, however, we must study what is negotiable with the Soviet Union. The Secretary's timetable for actual discussions might be correct, but he did not think that we should now proclaim that we are going to propose negotiations.

Home said that he agreed that we should insist on the absence of preconditions in offering negotiations, but we could not expect Khrushchev to retract publicly. He referred to a cable just received from Ambassador Roberts in Moscow stating that unless the West had definite proposals, any Ambassadorial approach would only bring from Khrushchev a repetition of the standard position in harder terms or persuade him that we were threatening him and he should act. As to substance, Home agreed that a debate on the all-German question would not last long, but it might be of considerable value to the West in exposing Soviet opposition to self-determination. As to Berlin improvements, he was not sure, if Soviet guarantees on presence and access were obtained, that the West would not be better off than it is now.

The Secretary said that, as the first order of business, we would want to work out the details of counterproposals on Germany and Berlin. We had agreement on general principles and these could be put together quickly. It will be more difficult to work out a fall-back position. He did suppose, however, that we could spin out the discussion on public proposals more than twenty-four hours. It would not be a negotiation in the classic sense, but a debate in which we could discuss both their proposals and ours showing the hollowness of Soviet claims compared to their performance since 1944. He hoped that we would not have to leave to a Western Foreign Ministers' meeting just before the UNGA the question of whether there would be negotiations, though the final preparation of proposals might be left for such a meeting. When the West looked down the path leading to a possible nuclear combat (at this point the Secretary suggested that the other Foreign Ministers might usefully be briefed on the implications of this), he doubted that the Soviets are not aware of the true situation, and he could not be worried that they would feel that we were weak. They knew better.

In response to a query from Couve, the Secretary said that, if we responded to the Soviet notes by the end of August or early in September, we might in our reply propose the time and the form of negotiations. This could be followed by a meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers just before the UNGA meeting. This seemed a reasonable combination. He was not enthusiastic about engaging in merely another polemical exchange with the Soviets. This added nothing and was not dignified for the Four Great Powers. The responsible Governments had to move the situation somewhat if they were to preserve the support of Western opinion. Home asked whether it might not be a good idea to propose negotiations for sometime in November and say at the same time that the Western Foreign Ministers would meet after the German elections to consider their position. He suggested that the formula “negotiation on the outstanding problems between us” without preconditions could be suggested. The Secretary said he did not know if the West wanted to get into such matters as the stationing of forces abroad, foreign bases, or Laos or disarmament which is being discussed elsewhere.

Couve continued to oppose the idea of suggesting a date for negotiations. He suggested a short reply to the Soviets, perhaps of one or two pages, avoiding repetitive arguments and ending by saying that the West is always prepared to examine the possibility of coming to an agreement on questions in dispute, taking account of the positions of all concerned and under conditions of equality and mutual respect. If the West made specific all-German proposals in a note, they would certainly be rejected and the Soviets would answer with their peace treaty line. Home said that he did not much like a general reference to the willingness to negotiate. People would question Western sincerity since that has been said so often before.

Couve said he was not certain that the Soviets would accept a conference without conditions. The Secretary responded that Soviet rejection would be a demonstration that the Soviets, after talking about negotiations, were now refusing them. Couve argued that, rather than be rebuffed, it would be better for the West to state its position in a general way not involving questions of prestige or substance. The notes could be sent before the end of the month and the West could then see how the Soviets react.

Von Brentano observed that the West did not have to use the exact words in the Soviet notes but could merely state that the Soviet statements showed great differences to exist on the problems of Germany and Berlin and that, taking account of the general state of tension, the Western Powers thought this should be discussed in negotiations.

The Secretary noted one possibility, which he was not sure he thought well of. The Western replies might end with a statement along the lines suggested by Couve and Von Brentano but add that the Western Foreign Ministers are planning to attend the UNGA and would take advantage of the presence of Foreign Minister Gromyko to discuss possible arrangements for negotiations. This might be enough to head off Nehru. Home said he was not sure this was not a good idea. The Foreign Ministers agreed to consider this idea further at the afternoon session.

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on August 7 and approved in S on August 8. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

[2] Dated August 5. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1942) In the letter Ulbricht denied that he was attempting to end West Berlin's communications with the West, but stated that disputes would arise as long as U.S. occupation forces remained in West Berlin and Germany.

[3] US/MC/6, Document 97.

[4] For text of Khrushchev's August 7 speech, see Pravda, August 8, 1961, or Izvestiia, August 9, 1961. An English translation is in Soviet News, August 8, 1961. For a report on the speech, see The New York Times, August 8, 1961.

[5] See Document 93.

[6] The date of the West German elections.

[7] For text of the August 3 Soviet note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 766-769.

[8] A copy of this report was transmitted in telegram 354 from USUN, August 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-461)

[9] The Soviet Union had sent notes to the British and French similar to the one sent to the United States on August 3.

[10] See Document 94.

[11] For documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting May-August 1959, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, volume VIII.

97. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, August 6, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

US/MC/6

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN

Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Nitze

Mr. Hillenbrand

France

M. Couve de Murville

M. Charles de Carbonnel

M. Charles Lucet

M. Jean Laloy

M. Froment-Meurice

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Field Marshal Festing

Mr. Buxton

Federal Republic

Dr. Von Brentano

Dr. Carstens

Dr. Ritter

Major General Schnez

SUBJECT

Second Quadripartite Ministerial Meeting on Berlin and Germany—Military Aspects of Contingency Planning

The Secretary opened the discussion on the “military aspects” part of the section of the Working Group report on contingency planning by saying that the US believed the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington should be given broad responsibility for planning for action on a world-wide basis along the lines of para 6(a) and 6(c) of the contingency planning section of the Report.[2] The Ambassadorial Group might need to be strengthened with more military advisers; it should study and see what is required in this respect. The Secretary also stressed the need for better liaison between Live Oak and the Ambassadorial Group involving, for example, full exchange of documents. He also noted the problem raised in the US military papers circulated August 2 and August 3 about whether NATO machinery as now established is suitable for control of operations at a time when we may be moving into the actual military phase.[3] The channel between SACEUR and Governments requires careful thinking out. The Secretary noted that, in World War II, the practice was to designate one government as the executive agent for each theater, for example the US in Europe and the UK in South East Asia. Moreover, in the Korean War, the US was so designated for UN forces. He was not now suggesting a specific solution, but the problem must be given attention. The US supported the recommendations in para 6 of the contingency plans section of the Working Group report and we would welcome views of other Ministers on the two military papers.

Couve asked whether it could be taken for granted that the recommendations in para 6 were approved. There was no dissent.

Lord Home said he agreed with what the Secretary had said. The question does arise of Norstad and the NATO machinery taking control at some point and with respect to channels between SACEUR and Governments. From a preliminary look at the US papers, which are being studied in London on an urgent basis, he could only conclude that they raised certain large and controversial issues which required further thought. Field Marshal Festing suggested that studies might preliminarily be conducted in the Washington Ambassadorial Group appropriately strengthened.

The Secretary observed that we would not expect immediate agreement but would appreciate the preliminary views of others. Home referred to the expression “discreet use of nuclear weapons” as an example of a statement requiring further study. He noted that the problem of a probe in strength was something about which soldiers had strong views.

Couve said the problem always turned around how to distinguish between an operation on the ground and the beginning of war. The more this was discussed, the more difficult it became to distinguish between the two. Von Brentano welcomed the proposal for full German cooperation in the Ambassadorial Group. He noted the control problem raised by the command structure in Berlin context. Even in the case of only 3 or 4 powers there was a problem of who would decide at the crucial time, and this problem is even more complicated in NATO. It was not enough to say that there would be a common decision. The North Atlantic Council was inadequate for the purpose. Its decision would come too late. Couve commented that it had always been envisaged that if there were to be military action on land or air, governmental decisions would be required. This was what the US papers said. The Secretary observed the paper said that under certain contingencies military action would be taken. If shooting starts, management cannot be conducted by a 15-member body. Soldiers must get their orders quickly and without confusion. They could not be put in the position where every question involved elaborate political discussion. They must have clear directives and there must be effective management of the operation. Couve said that the problem arose because of changes in Western planning which started with a small probe and rose through battalion, regiment and division until now even a corps was being considered by United States. More and more this was synonymous with the beginning of war. This was the reason for the difficulty of decision.

Von Brentano said political principles must clearly have NATO approval, but the conduct of military operations must be done in such a way as to insure clear-cut direction in a single body. No matter of what size, once an operation began, soldiers must be able to act with all facility required to carry out operation most effectively. The West had to find an answer to this problem. Home said the question required study by the Ambassadorial Group and by governments. An operation run by all Chiefs of Staff would not be much better than one run by all Governments. We were now dealing with nuclear weapons and ICBMs and it was hard to see how Governments could be kept out of this. We have troops with tactical nuclear weapons, yet no one knew how to use them in the Berlin context. British military judgment re a two division probe seemed to be that you cannot expose two valuable military units in a manner that runs the risk of losing them.

The Secretary said that, without commitment, he wanted to point out that certain political decisions are required:

(a) As opposed to the situation of 6 or 7 years ago, we are agreed that, under present conditions, military action re Berlin is an action of the last resort. We want Khrushchev to desist from interference with our access to Berlin. Measures such as an economic embargo, an air lift, and a “roaring debate” in the UN should all be resorted to prior to shooting. We distrust the idea of an insignificant military probe to test Khrushchev's intentions, either because we will know them or the probe would be too small to test them. We therefore think non-military means must be used to the maximum before we resort to military means. If Khrushchev shoots down an airlift, the move into the second phase may come rapidly.

(b) The US paper proposes to engage East German and Soviet forces with significant Allied conventional forces to confront Khrushchev with the decision before nuclear war. We do not envisage pushing two divisions down the Autobahn but would consider the entire position along the front in terms of actions to be taken.

(c) If Khrushchev is not deterred, then resort to nuclear weapons would follow.

Each of these three decisions would have to be by Governments, but management of operation would be under some executive agency to be an instrument of policy agreed by Governments.

Home said that the Secretary had expressed the sequence of events as he saw it. The question is how to engage Soviet forces. He frankly had not seen any possibilities which made much sense. The Secretary said broadened Live Oak planning should take up the question immediately.

Couve observed that military planning was also needed for an airlift. If it is shot at, then how would the West react? As to ground action, the question was what kind could be envisaged both to be effective and not to waste precious units. This is a very difficult problem. Home said a possibility was that the Soviets would shoot down airlift planes from ground. Then decision would be whether or not to knock out missile sites from the air. The Secretary said we would presumably want to knock them out. It would be hard to ask pilots to carry on under missile fire. This was the sort of problem the military planners would have to get into. Couve said the Ministers should accordingly ask the Live Oak group to study these two problems. At the same time, the Ambassadorial Steering Group should put into precise form the sequence of political decisions, including economic sanctions, airlift, etc. The Secretary noted that the US Secretary of State, under the American Constitution, could not instruct the military authorities. The US paper was still a draft. Governments should study it to see if they could agree or make suggestions for improvements. The Secretary observed that the Ministers were giving the Ambassadorial Steering Group a large basket of tasks and he hoped the Governments would equip it with an adequate staff.

Couve asked whether the Ministers, though they could not agree on a final version of an instructions paper, could not agree that the US draft be the basis for the work of the Ambassadorial Group and Live Oak exercise. Home said he would have to take a further look at it. While the Ministers were here, perhaps the Delegation members could have a crack at writing a more agreed draft. Couve observed that Governments were not committed to the precise words of the paper. Home said there were statements in it to which he would not like to be committed. Once it starts to circulate, a paper tends to govern thinking. The Secretary commented that if we know there are certain things in the draft which are not liked we could attempt to improve it. He said that Assistant Secretary Nitze would be glad to work with his other colleagues without commitment of any one as to the product of the exercise. Home observed that the British Chiefs of Staff were looking at the two US military papers in London and would require a little longer. In principle they were in agreement with the August 3 paper. Von Brentano welcomed para 6 of the Working Group contingency plans paper as a good basis for new and common work in the Ambassadorial Group. The Secretary concluded the discussion of this subject by saying that perhaps all could instruct their Ambassadors in Washington appropriately without delay so that they could get ahead with the planning.

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand on August 7 and approved in S on August 8. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

[2] Paragraphs 6a-c of the “Review of Berlin Contingency Plans” (Part VI of the Report of the Four-Power Working Group) recommended that the Foreign Ministers ask the Washington Ambassadorial Group to study, on an urgent basis, the means for coordinating military measures beyond the competence of Live Oak, the means of ensuring continuity of military control during the transition from tripartite to NATO mechanisms, and the means of effecting political guidance and control of worldwide military activity during a Berlin crisis. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1945) See also Document 93.

[3] Copies of these two papers, “Military Planning and Preparations Toward a Berlin Crisis” and “Draft Instructions to the Military Authorities of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” are Tabs H and I to the Four-Power Working Group Report.

98. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, August 6, 1961, 4:30 p.m.

US/MC/4

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN

Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Mr. Kohler

Ambassador Bohlen

Mr. Lampson

Germany

Dr. Von Brentano

Professor Carstens

General Schnez

Dr. Ritter

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Field-Marshal Festing

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Mr. John Killick

France

M. Couve de Murville

M. Charles de Carbonnel

M. Charles Lucet

M. Jean Laloy

M. Froment-Meurice

SUBJECT

Third Quadripartite Meeting on Berlin and Germany

The French Foreign Minister opened the third quadripartite meeting by referring to the discussion at previous meeting about timing of negotiations.[2] Lord Home asked whether the others had thought over the Secretary's final suggestion at the morning meeting that our answer to the Soviet Note of August 3 might express readiness to meet with Gromyko while he was in New York attending the UN General Assembly to discuss the possibility for arrangements for negotiation. He pointed out that this might give the West a little leeway by postponing the next round until after the German elections.

Brentano said he thought it would be inappropriate to mention German elections in any reply to the Soviets because this would be of little interest to the USSR. He said they should not play a part in the considerations of the West in regard to the timing of the next move. However, he questioned the advisability of proposing to discuss the Berlin question with Gromyko while he was at UNGA. There was danger that such a step might create an unintentional impression that the West was thinking of bringing the Berlin question into the UN.

Couve agreed. He thought that it would be better to speak about negotiations in Western replies without making any specific suggestions as to timing. Substance and tactics were very much mixed up together. They must be careful not to have the Russians misjudge our intentions or give them an opening which might embarrass us. He would prefer not to commit us to talking with Gromyko on Berlin in New York. There would be an opportunity at that time to decide whether this would be a wise thing to do. To commit West in advance to such discussions seemed to be going too far. It would be unwise to make a precise offer to negotiate before we have even discussed substantive positions. It would be premature to send a note between August 20 and the end of the month taking such a step. This would be far ahead of the schedule which we are told Khrushchev is going to follow. In mid-September we still would have time to take any necessary steps. We are not in an easy situation at present time. The Soviet note was the most violent one we have received. We are awaiting Khrushchev speech tomorrow which is likely to be very violent, especially after the new Russian success in space. Couve questioned whether this was the proper time to make such a gesture. No doubt it would be much welcomed by many persons in the West but how would it be judged in the East? The latter question is the one which should mainly concern us.

The Secretary pointed out that more than sixty Foreign Ministers would be at the General Assembly in September. There was bound to be a great deal of talk about Berlin during the session. The Soviet representatives will certainly talk a great deal about it. If we are wise we will do so also. The major matter we will be asked about will be our willingness to negotiate. The Secretary said that he could not add to points he had made in the morning session as to an initiative with the Soviets for negotiation. He did not suppose the Foreign Ministers could reach agreement at this meeting on this point. The question would be taken up through diplomatic channels between Governments. He could not agree to postponing an initiative on proposing negotiations or arrangements for negotiations until September. He then emphasized the importance of having the Ambassadorial Group move on swiftly in the task of defining negotiating positions. He also asked whether it was necessary to answer the Soviet note at present. It might be preferable not to answer it for the time being unless we could put forward a position.

Couve agreed it might not be necessary to answer the note now but thought it useful to send an answer as soon as we could agree on one.

Home pointed out the danger of too many public statements. Statements tended to harden our positions. Meanwhile our military buildup would be progressing. This might make trouble with uncommitted countries who would think we were being bellicose and unreasonable. For example, there might be trouble with Nehru. He said he had been emphasizing in speeches the advantages of pursuing explorations with Soviets through the quiet unobtrusive channels of diplomacy. It might be possible to hold the line in this way until September. He threw out this idea but rather thought that it would not be enough.

Brentano thought that there might be some possibility of arranging for preliminary talks. Our reply to the Soviet note might merely express readiness to discuss the questions of time and place. He thought the strongest argument against proposing talks with Gromyko in New York was the implication regarding action in the UN. However, although he had reservations he was prepared to withdraw his objections if the others agreed this was the right thing to do.

In reply to a direct question from Home whether the matter could be contained in diplomatic channels for the time being, the Secretary replied he was not sure these contacts would deal with enough substance to support this approach for long.

Home then outlined some possible advantages of such a method. By advocating diplomacy through quiet ambassadorial exchanges the Governments might lead people to expect little by way of publicity. He agreed, however, that the line could not be held for long in this way. We would be pressed too hard to explain how we are responding to Soviet offers to negotiate.

The Secretary summarized the discussion by pointing out that the Foreign Ministers had agreed to instruct the Ambassadorial Group to work on possible negotiating positions. As to timing they were really not too far apart. It seemed that negotiations would probably take place in mid-October or early November. They agreed that they should be on the Foreign Minister level. The principal unresolved question was under what conditions and at what time we should publicly seek such negotiations. In an attempt to meet the views of the others he had proposed the idea of telling the Soviets that they would talk about the matter with Gromyko in New York. There is no doubt that Berlin will be intensely discussed in New York. The Secretary said that he would raise the whole question with the President. Then he explained the U.S. Government's concern with the need for maintaining the confidence of the American people, the Alliance and people throughout the world. Possibly others evaluated this matter differently. We looked upon it as a highly important element in the functioning of a large and disparate democracy. The reactions of the American people to world opinion should also not be overlooked. The Secretary ended his recapitulation by repeating that he could not agree to postponing decisions on when to negotiate in the way that had been proposed in their discussions.

Home said he found the Secretary's position sensible. He had very much the same point of view.

The Secretary then said he hoped that the difference of view on this one question would not obscure the very large amount of agreement which had been reached between them. The disagreement was really over rather a narrow point.

Home emphasized that they must all be careful not to give the appearance of serious disagreement. He threw out the suggestion that perhaps people did not ask questions in France or if they did they did not receive answers. Couve replied the French were like everybody else.

The Ministers then discussed the question of whether there should be a communiqué. The Secretary pointed out the difficulty of issuing a communiqué which had any substance in it before he had reported to NATO. The North Atlantic Council was very sensitive to being made to look like a rubber stamp. The Ministers agreed that a formal communiqué should not be issued. They decided to call in the information officers at the end of the meeting to furnish them a common line for giving background information to the press.

Couve then discussed the work of the Ambassadorial Group in Washington. In his view the work in Washington should be carried on by the same persons who had been doing it in Paris—or as nearly so as possible. They had more expertise generally on this subject than Embassy staffs. Brentano agreed this would provide much needed continuity but was not sure how much he could spare Carstens from the Foreign Office. Home was unwilling to promise that Shuckburgh could work without interruption in Washington, but thought the Washington group could be reinforced from time to time. The Secretary commented they did not want anyone who could be spared.

Couve thought that the planning and preparation of an information program could be done in Washington. The Secretary turned attention back to a substantive question—namely a plebiscite in West Berlin which had important information aspects as well. This was quite different from making plebiscite proposals to the Soviets. The aim was to give the Berlin population an opportunity to demonstrate again, as they had in the 1958 Berlin elections, their overwhelming support for Allied presence and Allied rights in Berlin. This would greatly strengthen the Western posture. He thought this would be very helpful. He asked for German views.

Brentano said that he had discussed this with Mayor Brandt. Both thought it an excellent idea. He said that they would be able to make a definite recommendation to the Ambassadorial Working Group in ten days. The Berlin election was now very remote in time and it would be excellent to give the Berliners a chance to vote again. No doubt they would vote overwhelmingly in favor of the present status of the city. The best way to impress world opinion would be to invite observers from all countries to come to watch the plebiscite. It would have a very strong effect.

Home said it would be wise to have the plebiscite supervised by some impartial plebiscite commission in order to convince non-committed people that the vote had been genuinely free. He doubted, however, that the UN would be willing to take on the job of supervision.

Couve raised the problem of the relationship of a plebiscite to Western rights. It was very important to see to it that a plebiscite did not create the impression that our presence in Berlin was based from something other than our rights derived from the defeat and surrender of Germany. The Soviets would try to exploit this possibility. He also questioned whether it would not have to be the Allies who initiated the proposal.

Brentano said it was very important from the public opinion point of view that the initiative seems to come spontaneously from the Berliners. He saw no legal difficulty in this. The Berlin Senate and House of Representatives could propose this to the Berlin Kommandatura which would not exercise its veto and then the plans could go forward. He pointed out the disadvantages of proposing a UN supervision of the plebiscite because this would certainly lead to a UN debate on Berlin. He believed invitations to observe would do the trick. This should create a great impression. Nothing like this had ever been done in the Communist Bloc. Brentano reassured Couve that there could be no question as to the result.

Couve returned to the difficulty of having a plebiscite under an occupation. Brentano said that the Berliners and the Federal Republic would work out a possible question and submit it to the Ambassadorial Group for approval. He then emphasized the importance of keeping secret the fact that the idea had been put forward by the Working Group. It was essential that it appear to be a spontaneous idea of the West Berliners. They must take the first public step. He urged the greatest caution and thought it might be better to wait until he had returned to Germany before the idea was launched in Berlin. Then there would be less danger of it appearing to have been arranged in Paris. Home again urged that some sort of supervision be arranged so that it would not look like a put-up job. The Secretary pointed out it was a question of observation not supervision. Brentano suggested as a possible question: “Do you wish the Western Powers to continue to exercise their rights in Berlin and continue to protect the freedom of the population of Berlin?” He said that he would recommend a question after consultations in Berlin. Couve again warned against casting any doubts on the validity of Western rights.

The Secretary asked whether the Report of the Working Group on Information[3] could be put before NATO. The Ministers agreed that it could and approved the report. They also agreed to submit to NATO Sections I and V of the Working Group Report (The Soviet Intentions and Economic Countermeasures papers respectively), but Section II Tactics and Section III Substantive Political Questions would not be given to NATO. Section V was approved after amendments to paragraphs 3 through 7 were accepted.

The Ministers agreed that the questions discussed in the section entitled Substantive Political Questions together with the agreed German addendum should be further studied by the Ambassadorial Group. The problems of military preparations should be discussed in NATO. This was NATO business. The Secretary said he hoped other Permanent Representatives of the other Three would tell NAC of their military plans after he had finished speaking on Tuesday. He would be speaking only for his own Government. He was going to give NATO more than was in the President's speech.

The Ministers then called in the information officers and discussed how to handle the press. Brentano argued against a communiqué on the ground that every word would be compared with previous communiqués. Any variations noted would result in endless speculation in the press.

The Ministers agreed to have no formal communiqué. They worked out a common line for background press briefing with emphasis on complete unity of approach. Couve suggested that the answer to questions about what is a reasonable basis for negotiation should be: no preconditions and freedom for each party to discuss his position. The Secretary suggested as a definition of an unacceptable basis for negotiation the phrase in the President's speech, “What is mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable."

The Ministers agreed to say that the possibility of a summit meeting with Khrushchev had not been discussed. If asked whether there would be another Western Foreign Ministers meeting they would reply they would undoubtedly be seeing one another in New York.

The Secretary made the point that this meeting should be treated as part of a process of continuing consultation which had gone on previously and would continue for weeks and months ahead. There was nothing sudden or climactic about it.

Home wondered how questions on preparatory measures should be handled. He did not want to describe them too far in advance of their implementation. The Ministers agreed to use the phrase that they had “agreed on the necessity of certain preparatory measures.” The meeting closed with the Secretary stressing the desirability of emphasizing unity. The Ministers agreed to use the phrase “complete unity of approach."

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Lampson and approved in S on August 8. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

[2] See Document 96.

[3] This report is Tab N to the Report of the Four-Power Working Group. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1945)

99. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State[1]

Paris, August 7, 1961, 2 a.m.

Secto 22. Eyes only for the President. We have just completed the brief quadripartite Ministers meeting on Germany and Berlin. There was a gratifying demonstration of unity and a seriousness of purpose to which your recent speech[2] and initiatives had obviously made a profound contribution. Lord Home was especially helpful in his combination of firmness on the essentials and moderation on lesser questions. Von Brentano was obviously doing his best to contribute to quadripartite unity without exaggerating the special sensitivities which we had reason to expect from the Germans. Couve de Murville showed General de Gaulle's firm approach by a relative insensitivity to problems of public opinion which we can expect within the Western Alliance and in other parts of the world.

I will be able to take a good report to NATO on Tuesday afternoon[3] and urge them to get specifically into the problems of military build-up in accordance with our approved plan, a NATO-wide preparation of economic countermeasures and NATO coordination of propaganda and political action in support of our position in Berlin. Ed Murrow had a productive meeting of quadripartite Information Ministers and their report[4] provides a good basis for intensified NATO efforts in that field.

All four of us agreed that formal negotiations with the Russians should come in October or early November, depending upon the effect of the Soviet Party Congress on timing. We also agreed that the Ambassadorial Working Group in Washington should now prepare in detail our negotiating position. The only point of importance on which there was not agreement was the timing of a Western initiative in proposing a Foreign Ministers meeting to the Soviets. Lord Home and I believe that we cannot delay indefinitely a specific step which would be publicly known to make good on our declared readiness to negotiate and that we should encounter increasing public opinion problems both at home and abroad if we defer such an initiative until after the German elections. Couve de Murville was dead set against any such publicly known initiative until Western preparations had produced some ascertainable influence on Khrushchev. Von Brentano was somewhere in between but rather negative about an initiative. In an effort to break the deadlock I suggested that we might reply to the latest Soviet note[5] before the end of this month and that its conclusion might state that the Foreign Ministers would be in attendance at the United Nations General Assembly and would take up possible arrangements for negotiations on Germany and Berlin. Couve de Murville was unable to agree, perhaps because General de Gaulle has been out of town until Tuesday and Couve seemed to be under specific instructions on this point. It was simply left that we would be in touch with them promptly through normal channels upon my return to Washington.

In briefing the press[6] we have tried to emphasize that this particular Ministers meeting was a part of a process of consultation which has been and would be going on over a period of weeks and months and that climactic decisions would not be expected. Further, we have tried to play down the Ministers meeting in order not to feed the impression in NATO that we were making big decisions prior to NATO consultation. Both points have the virtue of being true.

Bilateral talks with the French on Bizerte have not been as productive as we had hoped.[7] The General is clearly in the mood of teaching the Arabs a lesson, confident that they will come around after his show of force, and indifferent or contemptuous of any action which might be taken in the United Nations. His attitude has paralyzed his subordinates including Couve de Murville. I think we may have succeeded in getting some sort of talks going between the French Consul General in Bizerte and the Tunisian Governor on an exchange of prisoners and on the beginnings of troop withdrawals but I cannot yet confirm what instructions might have gone to the Consul General. If there has been no motion before General de Gaulle's return I shall try to see him and try to explain that we are not meddling but are pursuing important American interests in trying to get this question resolved.

Kohler, Nitze, Fowler, Murrow and colleagues have worked very effectively and have the confidence of their opposite numbers. Even though Berlin and Germany are in Europe, it is quite apparent that Europe is looking to you to bring the West through the coming crisis. The combination of firmness, military build-up and readiness to search for reasonable and peaceful answers which characterized your speech to the nation was undoubtedly the right exercise of leadership insofar as Europe is concerned.

Since Lord Home and I have had a good deal of time with each other, I do not plan to return via London. I will see Segni on Wednesday evening in Milan and Adenauer on Thursday morning during my day at Lake Como and will arrive Washington about midnight Thursday.[8]

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-761. Secret; Priority. According to another copy this telegram was drafted by Rusk. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1943)

[2] See Document 81.

[3] A summary of Rusk's presentation to the North Atlantic Council on August 8 was transmitted in Secto 50 from Paris, August 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-961)

[4] A copy of this report was transmitted in Secto 33 from Paris, August 7. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1943)

[5] Reference is to the August 3 Soviet note.

[6] A copy of the press briefing was transmitted in Secto 20 from Paris, August 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/8-761)

[7] A memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Couve de Murville on Bizerte on August 5 is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1940.

[8] For a memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Adenauer on August 10, see Declassified Documents, 1985, 1649; memoranda of Rusk's briefing of Italian officials on August 9 are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1940; a summary of his briefing of Spaak on August 7 was transmitted in Secto 40 from Paris, August 8. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/8-861)

100. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, August 8, 1961, 6 p.m.

US/MC/13

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN

Paris, August 4-9, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Ambassador Gavin

Minister Lyon

France

President de Gaulle

M. Andronikoff, Interpreter

SUBJECT

Berlin

President de Gaulle welcomed Secretary Rusk, expressed pleasure at seeing him, said that it was always a pleasure to see him and added that he imagined he would be seeing him frequently in the coming months. He said that M. Couve de Murville had informed him of the meetings, and he would be glad to hear from the Secretary himself how he thought the meetings of the Foreign Ministers had gone.

The Secretary expressed appreciation for the President's remarks and said that he brought the best wishes of President Kennedy to President de Gaulle.

The Secretary continued by saying that President Kennedy had charged him to do all possible to further the matter of consultation which President Kennedy had discussed with President de Gaulle[2] and said he hoped that President de Gaulle would be satisfied with what had been accomplished in this connection. Obviously the Three Powers would be in close consultation in the coming months. In Washington, he himself met regularly with the British and French Ambassadors, he had asked the Pentagon to furnish such military help as seemed desirable, and we would welcome any military officials that the French cared to send to participate in this work. The Secretary continued that at least three meetings between the three Foreign Ministers were in view, one before the General Assembly, one before any possible Four Power meeting with respect to Berlin, and one before the NATO meeting in December. There would also probably be a Chiefs of Government meeting.

President de Gaulle replied that this type of consultation was all to the good but not exactly what he had had in mind. There was no objection whatsoever to the Ambassadors meeting in Washington but this was not as he had seen it. He had envisaged a special body such as the Allies had maintained in permanent session following the Versailles Treaty for political cooperation between governments to deal with both political and military matters. The United States did not see it that way. That was all right, the President said, and then asked Secretary Rusk how he thought the Ministers' meeting, which had just taken place, which was necessary, and in which Mr. Von Brentano participated, had gone.

The Secretary said he thought the meetings had gone well. He said that there had been a large degree of unity insofar as the conversations had proceeded. There were still many points to be formalized with respect to military matters, economic matters, psychological matters, but good progress had been made. Further progress was required on Contingency Planning and certain other matters which effect better solidarity. They had not really attempted to formulate a program. There was one matter, the Secretary continued, which concerned President Kennedy. He felt that by early September we would have to indicate publicly that we would be entering negotiations with the Russians, perhaps at the end of October or early November. He did not feel that we could postpone too long the knowledge that negotiations would take place. Mr. Khrushchev talks of negotiations. We talk of negotiations. We are asking a great deal on the part of our people. They will be anxious for us to carry out negotiations before they are faced with the possibility of war.

President de Gaulle replied that the Foreign Minister had told him of our views on this matter. There were, he said, various ways of handling the question of Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev had created the situation. We could say to him, “No, we will not change the status of Berlin. We will not have our rights interfered with. We are there legitimately. We have been there for sixteen years. If you change the status of Berlin by force, we will reply by force. There is another way, such as you Americans propose. You have your views, the British have a view, we have our view. They are not all the same. It is difficult for us to reach common agreement. I know you are thinking that you must negotiate with the Soviets to satisfy your public opinion. I understand your view. If you see there is something which develops from these negotiations which is worthwhile, we will join you. But you really are doing it on your own account. In fact, you have really begun already. Mr. McCloy has seen Mr. Khrushchev; Mr. Thompson has had conversations too. If you had taken the first course, we would have been with you but this way is not our way. We don't like the idea of commencing negotiations without knowing what we are negotiating about. But it is quite natural for you Americans, you are far away and you are in a hurry with respect to Berlin. You are not Europeans. You are naturally very concerned about Berlin, but not as immediately nor as directly as we are. We here in Europe are much more directly concerned. But we have no objections. Please go on with your probing, we have nothing against it. Tell us if you find some substance in these negotiations and we shall join you."

The Secretary indicated that he would like to comment on two points made by President de Gaulle. In the first place, we did not have in mind negotiating without knowing what we were negotiating about. We don't think we are very far apart from the views of the French and British and we think that the remainder of August can be devoted to working out a common plan. However, we believe that we must have some type of calendar, some sort of schedule, or matters could be delayed indefinitely and we might be faced with a Berlin crisis without having any plan.

A second point, the Secretary said, and he wished to make this extremely clear, was that we had no intention of withdrawing from Berlin. We had no more intention of doing so than had France. We regarded Berlin with the greatest seriousness. The Secretary said he wished to remove any other impression which President de Gaulle might have in this connection.

President de Gaulle said that he was very interested in the Secretary's remarks. However, if one were to engage with Mr. Khrushchev, one would have, as the diplomats say, to reach a conclusion. To reach a conclusion with him, one would have to compromise. Either you reach no result or you give up something. If you give up anything, the situation gets more and more difficult, eventually intolerable. However, if you want to probe, we have no objection.

The Secretary said that we don't envisage that negotiations need lead to a compromise. We have no intention of giving our rights away. In fact, the Secretary said, he recalled one negotiation which led to improvement in our situation; in 1949 the negotiations with respect to the blockade. If we get nowhere in negotiations, we intend to make it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that we stand by our rights. We can't prevent his signing a piece of paper, a peace treaty, but we shall make it clear to him that we won't sign it and we won't be influenced by that piece of paper.

President de Gaulle replied that he understood our desire to make matters less disadvantageous for Berlin but said that if we negotiated, it was because Mr. Khrushchev told us he was going to make a treaty. We might hope to improve Berlin's situation, but our negotiations under the circumstances might lead to something worse for Berlin. We would be negotiating because Mr. Khrushchev asked us to. But anyway, why not try? However, asked President de Gaulle, how can we negotiate when Khrushchev insists on what the results will be? He threatens to crush us. He insists on getting his own way. He says come and talk, but if you don't talk, the result will be the same anyway. He'll have his treaty with East Germany. How can anyone negotiate under these threats?

The Secretary said that what was proposed by Mr. Khrushchev need not be a basis for the proposals of the West.

Still, de Gaulle replied, negotiations will be started because Mr. Khrushchev has whistled.

The Secretary asked President de Gaulle how he saw the Berlin matter developing.

At first President de Gaulle misunderstood the question and said that if nothing from outside occurred, there would be no problem in Berlin, which had lasted now for sixteen years. Mr. Khrushchev had created the problem, otherwise it would not exist. Berlin could have gone on living as it had. The situation in Berlin was not impossible. In fact, the West Berliners were quite well off, but Khrushchev was compelling us to negotiate.

Then President de Gaulle explained that he hadn't quite understood the question and said that he himself had explained to Mr. Khrushchev that it would be impossible to have East-West negotiations under the circumstances of cold war which he was creating. If he was serious about trying to reach an accord with the West, he should not have picked on Berlin. However, if he undertook to threaten and issue “dictats”, there could be no serious negotiations. President de Gaulle believed that we should explain this to the people of the world. With Khrushchev behaving the way he was, we should have to either compromise with him and avoid war or not compromise with him and face war. Thus, we should not negotiate because he summons us. But, de Gaulle said, he realized there were sound reasons for the Americans feeling as they did, but the French did not want to negotiate for the sense of negotiating.

The Secretary remarked that if we should reach a crisis over Berlin through some rash act of Mr. Khrushchev's prior to negotiation, we would not be able to aid Europe since the Western Alliance would not allow us to do so. The members of the European Alliance would demand negotiations beforehand.

President de Gaulle replied he understood our position. We were not in Europe. We would have to come to Europe and fight and die in Europe. But the Europeans had a different point of view. They were not in a hurry. If the negotiations went wrong and Berlin were lost, then Germany would be lost and this would be very difficult for France, but again President de Gaulle said there was no objection to our probing. He understood our desire to establish contact with the Soviets but so far he saw no reason for doing so.

The Secretary thanked President de Gaulle for his views and said we would keep in touch with him. He said he must repeat that there was absolutely nothing tentative in our commitments with respect to Berlin. He said it would not be a question of Americans coming to Europe to die but tens of millions would die in the United States for Berlin “as you will die in Europe over Berlin.” We are extremely serious in this.

President de Gaulle said he had only remarked what he had because the Secretary had indicated that if there were no negotiations beforehand the United States could not come to Europe.

The Secretary said he wanted to make this very clear because he thought there might be a misunderstanding. He had said that it could not be possible for us to come to Europe because the Western European Alliance would not permit us to defend the Alliance without having tried negotiations first.

President de Gaulle asked what was the Western Alliance? France would want us to come.

The Secretary remarked that this was quite a different question.

President de Gaulle thanked the Secretary for this clear explanation.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/8-861. Secret. Drafted by Lyon and approved in S on August 9. The meeting was held at the Elysée Palace.

[2] See Documents 30 and 31.

101. Paper Prepared by the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin[1]

Paris, August 8, 1961.

MINISTERIAL DECISIONS ON REPORT OF THE FOUR-POWER WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLIN

July 28-August 4, 1961

The following decisions were made by the Four Foreign Ministers on the basis of the Working Group Report.

I. Soviet Motives and Intentions

The Ministers approved this section of the Report and agreed to give it to NATO.

They instructed the quadripartite Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington to keep the subject of Soviet motives and intentions and the situation in East Germany under constant review.

II. Tactics Paper

There was a general discussion of this paper and especially about the question of a Western initiative toward negotiations and its timing. It was agreed to discuss this matter further through diplomatic channels.

The Ministers agreed that the question of replies to the Soviet notes of August 3 should be considered by the Ambassadorial Group.

They agreed not to give this section of the Report to NATO.

III. Substantive Political Questions

The Ministers agreed that the Ambassadorial Steering Group should work on possible negotiating positions along the lines indicated in this section of the Working Group Report.

The Ministers agreed to the addendum concerning the essential conditions for an arrangement for West Berlin.

They agreed not to give this section of the Report to NATO.

IV. Strengthening of the Forces of the Alliance

The Ministers unanimously endorsed the policy of a progressive buildup of the strength of the Alliance.

They agreed that the buildup should be Alliance-wide and should have an organized follow-up.

They agreed that the problems of military preparations should be discussed in NATO.

V. Recommendations on Economic Countermeasures

The Ministers revised this section of the Report and approved the document entitled “Recommendations on Economic Countermeasures”, which they agreed to submit to NATO. The Ministers stressed the importance of prompt action to establish the legal and administrative basis for rapid implementation of these recommended measures.

They agreed that an embargo is essentially an economic measure, while a blockade is essentially military, but that both should be considered by the Ambassadorial Group.

They directed the Ambassadorial Group to follow up on the implementation of these recommendations.

VI. Review of Berlin Contingency Plans

The Ministers discussed and approved this section of the Report of the Working Group and directed the Ambassadorial Group to carry out the recommendations contained in paragraphs 2 and 6 thereof.[2]

The Ministers agreed to expedite instructions to their representatives on the Ambassadorial Group to enable the Group to proceed without delay; and in the light of the Ministers' discussion of the subject, to draft new directives for Live Oak and other military authorities.

The Ministers also agreed that the Ambassadorial Steering Group should put into precise form the sequence of governmental decisions required in the course of a developing crisis over Berlin, including economic sanctions, airlift, et cetera.

VII. Report of the Working Group on Information

The Ministers approved the information report and agreed that the annex thereto, covering suggested major publicity themes, should be submitted to NATO.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “Sent to H[yannis] P[ort] week-end of 8/4.” The source text bears no drafting information. On August 7 the Four-Power Working Group had met to revise its report on the basis of the Foreign Ministers discussions. This paper summarizes their decisions. A copy of the text of their report, as revised, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1945.

[2] Paragraph 2 called for a review of existing contingency plans; paragraph 6 recommended the studying of Berlin, European, and worldwide military measures to ensure their coordination during a Berlin crisis.

102. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, August 9, 1961, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Chiefs of Mission

Senior Advisers USDel

Advisers USDel

Senior US officials, Paris

SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS

[Here follows discussion of trade promotion.]

2. Berlin: Turning to Berlin and the German question, the Secretary said that we were in for weeks and months of confusion, tension and danger and that there were several ways in which the various missions in the field could be of help during this critical period. The first thing was for the missions to think about the problem, to read the reports of the Working Group and the Foreign Ministers Conference, and to convey their own views thereon. Khrushchev's moves with respect to the various countries represented at this meeting would, of course, influence the Department's estimate of how to reach a settlement. It was, therefore, important for all the posts to report on this subject, even though what they said might seem obvious from their own vantage points.

The Secretary said he wished to explain that US policy would attempt to draw a line between what was vital to our interests and what was important but not worth risking the precipitation of armed conflict. We must all remember that we have two great blocs opposing one another and that war was now much more possible than it had been in the past. One could no longer take comfort in the easy use of the term “deterrent” since events could take over the situation and we ran a grave risk of nuclear war. It was, therefore, imperative to separate what was vital from what was not.

Our really vital interests, the Secretary said, were (1) the Western presence in West Berlin and (2) our physical access to the city with a view to sustaining not only our military forces but also the life and liberty of the civilian population of the city. In everything that Khrushchev has said so far, one can find a certain vagueness which still justifies us in believing that he may not intend directly to attack the vital interests of the West. It is not too late to assume that he is still open to negotiation on many points which affect those interests. In the nuclear age, war, though it may well occur, can no longer be a deliberate instrument of national policy, and peaceful settlement of issues such as Berlin is now essential.

3. Negotiations on Berlin: The Secretary explained that we had reached the conclusion that negotiations would probably take place during a time span running from early October through early November, with probable soundings being taken before October. We estimated that formal negotiations would probably best be conducted after the German elections, and the likelihood was that these negotiations would be at the Foreign Minister level rather than at the Summit or in a general peace conference or in the framework of the UN. However, the moves of the other side may, of course, push us in these latter directions and especially toward the UN. Nehru had indicated that he was thinking of raising the Berlin question in the UN and if the crisis really heats up, the UN will inevitably be seized of it at some stage.

The United States was therefore now trying to define our negotiating positions, i.e., the point at which we would start and the position to which we might come before the windup. In this connection, advice could be welcomed from all of the posts represented.

4. Organizing For Crisis: Mr. Kohler then explained the measures which were being taken to organize the Department to cope with the Berlin problem. He himself would head an interdepartmental team, supported by the “operations center” on this problem, and including Mr. Nitze and representatives of the Treasury, the CIA and the USIA. Mr. Tyler has been named Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs with Mr. Richard Davis as Deputy and Mr. Burdett as his Acting Deputy. The British, the Germans and the French were also reinforcing their Embassies in Washington to provide adequate personnel for the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Steering Group. Mr. Kohler said that the reports of the Working Group which had met here in Paris as well as the USIA report on information activities would be sent to the Ambassadors. Fuller information would be given to all the posts as operations proceeded in Washington.

Mr. Kohler suggested certain lines which should be emphasized in our various missions. For example, in the NATO countries and in Spain it would be well to concentrate on the measures which the US and other Western powers were taking to strengthen their position, while in the Iron Curtain countries it would be well to bring home the consequences to those countries of any armed conflict which might be precipitated by Mr. Khrushchev.

5. Policy Shifts. After discussions, first within the US Government, then the Working Group in Paris and finally the Foreign Ministers, it appeared that the present situation calls for certain changes in our policy reflecting the change in our military plans so as to give us more latitude for action short of nuclear conflict. There would be some duration to this military action, in which we could better probe the intentions of the Soviet Union, and this would naturally affect our political moves. We were now in substantial agreement with our allies that we should maintain our legal position with respect to our rights in Berlin but that we could afford to be less concerned over the question of who actually was responsible for executing the procedures relating to our access rights. For example, the mere turning over of the access procedures to the East Germans was not in itself a casus belli. This posture would give us, we hoped, more time for political maneuver and for the disposition of our military forces. The Allies were also in agreement that air lift should be used as much as possible in the initial stages so as to put the adversary in the position of being the first to commit aggression. Our military plans would have to be changed, and we wanted to leave a wider choice of diplomatic moves and perhaps wider options as to the theater of military operations involving, for example, operations in the Skagerrak or the Dardanelles or even more distant places.

Later in the meeting Ambassador Parsons reported that the Swedes would be extremely sensitive to any operations in the Skagerrak and would probably feel that their neutrality would require them to keep a Baltic channel open through Swedish territorial waters. Ambassador Hare said that the Turks preferred to sublimate their problems with the Soviet Union through NATO and would not welcome a bilateral conflict with the Soviet Union over the Dardanelles. Ambassador Matthews pointed out that the Austrians would object if we were to undertake overflights of Austria in connection with any operations, and he presumed that the Swedes and the Swiss would feel the same way.

The Secretary pointed out that for purposes of contingency planning the degree of escalation which we might expect would vary with our assumption as to the likelihood or unlikelihood of nuclear warfare. The Secretary pointed out that to plan on going from a minor, small-scale military probe directly to all-out nuclear war is a satisfactory policy only if one is sure of never actually reaching that point. We were trying to create a situation where we could gain time through economic and other measures before any shooting actually started. The US no longer anticipated a situation in which interruption of our access rights would be immediately followed by “the big bang” of nuclear warfare, and all the Ambassadors could assure their clients that the United States was not disposed to be rash in this matter. In sum, we have not abandoned hopes for a peaceful settlement.

6. Military Problems: Mr. Nitze then outlined some of the military problems which had arisen from this change of pace. In March and April overall reviews of our military capabilities had led the Administration to take all the measures which seemed sensible to improve and protect the strategic nuclear deterrent. For example, we had accelerated our programs for Polaris, the Minuteman and the early warning systems. When the Berlin crisis arose, these measures were already under way, and the need therefore was to build up our intermediate capabilities. The possibility of calling up National Guard divisions was at once considered, but decided against, since the measures taken had to be ones we could sustain for a long time. Therefore, the United States had decided (1) to strengthen its forces in Europe; (2) to increase our combat ready strength so that by the end of the year we could be capable of deploying six more divisions to Europe; (3) to improve our airlift and sea-lift ties; (4) to cancel several scheduled reductions of our air strength and our aircraft carriers; (5) to expand production of supplies and equipment for non-nuclear warfare; and (6) to build up our anti-submarine capabilities and naval capability for harassment and even blockade. It was important that the Allies should embark on a comparable concurrent buildup, but they also should avoid crash operations which would put them at a peak they could not sustain. They should prepare now for later expansions, if needed.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that each Ally had its own problems in this field. The British were concerned by their balance of payments and by the political repercussions of conscription. The Germans had to keep an eye on their elections and to avoid drawing any accusations of seeking war-like solutions. Nevertheless, it was hoped that the Germans would increase to nine divisions by the end of 1961 and eleven during 1962. The French, of course, had serious domestic problems, principally in connection with Algeria, but they seemed disposed to take very serious risks in Algeria if the crisis got bad enough, in order to bring back their troops. They also contemplated calling up their reserves. The Dutch and others were also taking measures to strengthen their capabilities.

The primary area where military strength was needed seemed to run across the middle of Europe, but, of course, Greece and Turkey were also important and here we had a problem of stretching available money and equipment to help them over the short term. Before any military assistance could be worked out, it would be necessary for EUCOM and the Pentagon to work out plans and in this the help of the various country teams would be important.

Up to now the Ambassadorial group in Washington has been instructing the Tripartite Military Group doing Berlin contingency planning. But if any military action is taken, all NATO should be ready. We are therefore working out a closer relationship for that group with the NATO mechanisms. Good progress is being made in revising the actual plans. The success of the meetings was most encouraging.

The Secretary explained that there had been a real change in American strategic thinking. We were now emphasizing the buildup of conventional forces not because we preferred land war in Europe to hydrogen bombs over the US, but because we were trying to force political decisions before we took military action. We had given up the concept of a “bigger bang for a buck” because it involves too great a danger for all states that their own as well as enemy territory would be subject to complete devastation. Governments were charged during wars not just with inflicting injury on others but with protecting their own populations. Notwithstanding Khrushchev's threats we wanted also to increase his range of choice by not limiting our own choice to the two grim alternatives of nuclear war or complete surrender.

7. Information Activities: Mr. Murrow then explained some of the measures being taken in the field of information. We would shortly be getting out a paper on themes which could be exploited in the propaganda field, and we intended to make maximum use of broadcast time on facilities abroad which were owned or supported by the US. There would also be an interchange among the four Allies in seeking public opinion and conducting information activities in other Allied countries. The themes to be used were simple and subject to repetition. For example, there was the theme that the Berlin crisis is Khrushchev's crisis; there is no need for a Berlin crisis. It is of Soviet manufacture. We would also be emphasizing the question of how many people Khrushchev was willing to kill, in order to have his way with regard to Berlin. Finally, the theme of self-determination could be exploited.

8. Consultations: The Secretary then discussed some of the problems we had with our Allies regarding consultation. In setting up the four-power meeting, for example, the French had insisted that this be preceded by tripartite discussions and these, in turn, had had to be prefaced by a bilateral breakfast with Lord Home. It was important to remember that consultation involves more than just sitting around and waiting to be told what the US plans to do. Those who expect to be consulted should themselves be actively working on the various problems involved and should be ready to put forward ideas of their own, as had been done by only a few of the NATO powers outside the Four. In general, it was much better for the Allies to get their licks in early and to put forward their ideas before the administrative machinery within the US Government had already functioned and had reached decisions which were difficult to modify. Consultation, in short, was a two-way operation.

[Here follows discussion of various national attitudes toward Berlin and topics unrelated to Berlin.]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/8-961. Secret. Drafted by John A. Bovey, First Secretary of the Embassy in Paris. The meeting was held at the Embassy.

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, August 12, 1961, 6:26 p.m.

339. Re Embtel 286 Aug 7, Deptel 172 July 22, Deptel 311 Aug 8.[2] Situation in East Germany causing us increasing concern. Explosion along 1953 lines at this time would be highly unfortunate. Despite inevitable memories in East Germany of 1953 and Hungary, we assume that not only danger of escape hatch being closed but also rising tension between Moscow and Free World is contributing factor. It would be particularly unfortunate if an explosion in East Germany were based on expectation of immediate Western military assistance. Such an explosion would precipitate crisis before military and political measures now underway for dealing with Berlin problem have become effective.

Please report urgently FRG thinking on likelihood of early explosion, what action it contemplates to prevent one, and what action by US and other Allies it would consider useful. As FRG knows, this subject discussed at Paris Foreign Ministers Meeting which decided unanimously “that as a matter of policy, the Allies should do nothing to exacerbate the situation”.

Re Tosec 34 rptd Bonn 311. Subject did not arise during Secretary-Chancellor conversation. Request your views and judgment on apparent divergence.

Rusk

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland and Achilles; cleared by Brandin (GER), Davis, Tyler, Kohler, Ball, Johnson, and Bundy (in draft); and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 286 from Bonn transmitted the appraisal that East German efforts to stem the flow of refugees might become so restrictive as to precipitate a crisis. (Department of State, Central Files, 101.21-NIS/8-761) Regarding telegram 172 to Bonn, see footnote 2, Document 65. In telegram 311 to Bonn, the Department of State noted that officials in West Germany differed among themselves concerning the reaction to an uprising in the Soviet Zone. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/8-661)

August-September 1961: The Division of Berlin; the Brandt-Kennedy Correspondence; Vice President Johnson's Trip to Berlin; General Clay's Appointment as Special Representative to Berlin; NSAMs No. 92 and 94; Meeting of the Four Western Foreign Ministers at Washington

104. Editorial Note

105. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, August 13, 1961, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1361. Confidential; Priority. Received at 4:50 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and POLADUSAREUR.

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, August 14, 1961, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1461. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:26 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, August 14, 1961, 8:24 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-1461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Day and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

108. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, August 14, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 509 Negotiations. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1986, 910.

109. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, August 14, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62B/8-1461. No classification marking.

110. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, August 14, 1961, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1461. Confidential; Priority. Received at 6:58 a.m. on August 15. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLADUSAREUR.

111. Minutes of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group

Washington, August 15, 1961, 10:45 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Steering Group. Secret. Prepared by Bundy on August 16.

112. Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)

Washington, August 16, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Interdepartmental Steering Group. No classification marking.

113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, August 15, 1961, 11:38 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1561. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Thurston (S/O) and cleared by Cash. Also sent to London, Paris, and Berlin.

114. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, August 16, 1961, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1661. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:23 p.m. and passed to USIA at 3:45.

115. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, August 16, 1961, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1661. Secret; Niact. Received at 3:54 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and POLADUSAREUR.

116. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, August 16, 1961, 5:50 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau.

117. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, August 16, 1961, midnight.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Confidential; Niact. Received at 9:10 p.m. on August 16 and passed to the White House at 10 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and POLADUSAREUR. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2866.

118. Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group

Washington, August 17, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Steering Group. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

119. Message From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Paris, August 18, 1961.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to USAREUR.

120. Letter From President Kennedy to Governing Mayor Brandt

Washington, August 18, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Brandt Correspondence. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2867.

121. Report by Vice President Johnson

Washington, undated.

Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security Files, VP Travel, Berlin. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2868. For two other reports on the trip, see ibid., 1978, 209 A and 301 B. The Vice President also reported on his trip in a meeting with the President, Taylor, Rusk, Clay, Bohlen, and Bundy on August 21. A memorandum for the record of this meeting is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. For three other accounts of the visit to Berlin, see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 404-413 and 423-436; Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 483-486; and Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 30-33.

122. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, August 21, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2161. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 467 A.

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, August 21, 1961, 9:17 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Kohler and Holloway. Repeated to London, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow.

124. Record of Meeting of Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, August 21, 1961, 2:30 p.m.

Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29, L-216-71. Top Secret. The source text is Lemnitzer's handwritten notes.

125. Memorandum by the President's Military Representative (Taylor)

Washington, August 24, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 35, Berlin-NATO-Military Buildup. Secret. Attached to Document 253. According to a handwritten notation, copies of the memorandum were taken to a 9:45 a.m. meeting with Bundy and the President on August 24. Taylor's recommendations were subsequently transmitted to Bonn and Berlin for comment. (Telegram 415 to Bonn, August 24; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-2461)

126. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 24, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2461. Secret. Drafted by Brown and approved in S on September 8.

127. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

Washington, August 24, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General Clay. Confidential. A copy was sent to Rusk.

128. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Europe (Norstad)

Washington, August 25, 1961, 10 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret; Immediate. Repeated to USAREUR for Clarke. A draft of this cable showing Bundy's revisions is ibid., National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables.

129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 26, 1961, 7:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-2661. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Holloway and approved by Hillenbrand. Also sent to Bonn, Paris for USRO, Moscow, and Berlin.

130. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 26, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2661. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand and approved in S on September 9. For Grewe's account of this conversation, which took place right after the meeting of the Ambassadorial Group (see Document 129), see Rückblenden, pp. 494-495. On August 25 Grewe had had a similar conversation with Hillenbrand. A memorandum of that conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2561.

131. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Kennedy

Paris, August 26, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. The source text is a Department of State translation. Alphand delivered the letter at 7:15 p.m. on August 26. A memorandum of his conversation with Rusk on that occasion is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/8-2661.

132. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, August 28, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2861. Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 912. A draft of this memorandum by Taylor has points a and b rearranged and a point e: “Reaction to a sudden invitation to negotiation by the USSR.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 39, 6A Berlin) On August 28 Bundy sent the President a 4-page memorandum on the subject of negotiations, indicating that it was a complex subject and “the most important one” the President had before him. After reviewing the question of timing, Bundy stated that the President's principal advisers were split on the issue of the substance of the negotiations and stressed that only Kennedy could decide the U.S. negotiating position. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

133. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 30, 1961, noon-12:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/8-3061. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler and approved by the White House on September 11. The meeting was held at the White House. For a brief account of this meeting by Grewe, see Rückblenden, p. 496.

134. Editorial Note

135. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 31, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret.

136. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 31, 1961, 5:45 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-3161. Secret. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on September 8.

137. Editorial Note

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, September 3, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-361. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Bohlen, cleared by Kohler, and signed by Rusk.

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, September 4, 1961, 6:35 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. The source text bears the notation “Delivered Sept 6.”

140. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy

Washington, September 4, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 35, 6B NATO. Secret. The source text bears Taylor's handwritten notation: “Read by HA [Higher Authority] 5 Sept 61.”

141. Memorandum of Action

Washington, September 5, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-561. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland. Attached to a memorandum from Cleveland to Kohler, also dated September 5.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 7, 1961, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-761. Secret; Priority.

143. Notes on Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group

Washington, September 7, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Top Secret. The source text is Lemnitzer's handwritten notes.

144. National Security Action Memorandum No. 92

Washington, September 8, 1961.

Source: Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

145. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 9, 1961, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-961. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

146. Editorial Note

147. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, September 12, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, Department of State, General. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

148. National Security Action Memorandum No. 94

Washington, September 14, 1961.

Source: Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316. Top Secret.

149. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 14, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/9-1461. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Holloway, initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on October 1. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.

150. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 14, 1961, 6:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1461. Confidential. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on September 19. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 776, September 14. (Ibid.)

151. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 15, 1961, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1561. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler and approved in S on October 2. The meeting was held during a luncheon at the White House.

152. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 15, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/9-1561. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen, also initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on October 1. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 733, October 16. (Ibid., 762.0221/9-1661)

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, September 17, 1961, 3:12 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-1761. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Day and approved by Kohler. Also sent to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

104. Editorial Note

Early in the morning of August 13, 1961, the German Democratic Republic introduced control measures that effectively prevented residents of the Soviet Zone and East Berlin from entering West Berlin. At the same time barbed wire and other physical barriers, which eventually became “The Berlin Wall,” were erected to restrict crossings into the Western sectors of the city. For text of the decree imposing these restrictions and text of the Warsaw Pact powers' declaration of the same day urging the establishment of controls around West Berlin, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pages 773-776.

First reports on these measures were received in Washington by 4 a.m., and in one, telegram 176 from Berlin received at 6:37 a.m., Lightner speculated on the reasons for the restrictions:

"Evidently as a result of increased refugee flow with attendant economic loss to GDR and prestige to Socialist camp, East decided at recent Moscow conference of Warsaw Pact countries to proceed with fait accompli which would drastically disrupt freedom of movement within Berlin and erect frontier with respect entry into West Berlin of Sov Zone and East Berlin residents. In this way East has now taken some of the steps which it had been anticipated would follow from separate peace treaty with GDR.” (Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1361)

In response to the initial reports and telephone conversations with the Mission at Berlin and after conferring with the President at Hyannis Port, Secretary of State Rusk at 12:30 p.m. issued a 3-paragraph statement emphasizing that the restrictions were a violation of the Four-Power status of Berlin and would be the subject of a vigorous protest through appropriate channels. For full text of this statement, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, page 776.

Documentation in Department of State files and at the Kennedy Library on the discussions in the Department of State and the telephone conversations between Washington and Hyannis Port and Washington and Berlin in response to the border closing is sparse. However, for two accounts of these activities, based on interviews with the participants, see Cates, The Ides of August, pages 304-307, 317-323, 328-333, and 336-339, and Dulles, The Wall, Acts II and III. While these accounts do not agree on all the details, they are consistent with the limited documentation available in the Department of State and Kennedy Library.

105. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, August 13, 1961, 7 p.m.

185. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and Finn. At noon meeting of Commandants, Deputy Commandants and POLADs with GovMayor accompanied by Amrehn and Senator Klein, Brandt expressed concern re anticipated psychological reaction to East German measures.[2] He mentioned dangerous possibility of desperate actions by populace, warning that in course of day and night large crowds of people might assemble on both sides of sector boundary, creating public safety problem; West Berlin police alerted to possibility of incidents on Western side.

Senat carefully weighing every word released to public, advising West Berliners continue normal tasks and cautioning them against ill-considered actions. Senat neither urging border crossers from East report for work in West Berlin nor advising them stay in SovSector, but stating that their rights in West Berlin (to continue employment, social security, etc.) being safeguarded.

Under increasing pressure from local as well as foreign press representatives, Senat is emphasizing unlawful and inhumane nature of latest Eastern measures. House of Representatives convening in special session this evening to hear Brandt's report on situation. At his invitation Commandants and Deputy Commandants will attend. Brandt indicated Senat considering holding mass protest rally but no decision yet.[3]

Brandt summed up Senat evaluation that East regime action gross violation of existing rights, including Four-Power status of Berlin, and specifically Four-Power agreements of 1949, restoring status quo ante blockade. He emphasized significance of measures which East had threatened to take only after realization of so-called peace treaty and establishment “demilitarized free city of West Berlin,” and stressed illegality of Warsaw Pact instructions to “GDR” government to take measures on Berlin territory. On basis of above evaluation of Eastern measures, Brandt said Senat believes Western diplomatic steps vis-a-vis SovUnion might be warranted at high level, although Commandants presumably might simultaneously consider new steps vis-a-vis Sov Commandant. Brandt mentioned in this connection that Commandants' protest letters re border crossers (Berlin's 114 Bonn, 131 Dept)[4] not answered, but that situation now radically changed. Brandt also mentioned that he understood quadripartite conversations in progress at high level concerning means available to West (specifically economic measures) to counter latest Communist moves, in order demonstrate that West not prepared to submit tacitly to latest Eastern measures.

Chairman Commandant told GovMayor that Commandants carefully following developments, considering actions to be taken; they fully in agreement with GovMayor's efforts maintain calm atmosphere.

In view Department's press release Aug 13 and telephonic instruction, tripartitely agreed press statement[5] prepared here was replaced by following brief tripartite statement to local press:

"An Allied spokesman today said the three Western Commandants in Berlin have fully informed their governments and any comment must be expected from the capitals."

After special session House of Representatives this evening Commandants are meeting re terms and method of formal protest to Sov Commandant.[6]

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1361. Confidential; Priority. Received at 4:50 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and POLAD USAREUR.

[2] For two other accounts of this meeting, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 10-13, and Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 300-304. The Western Commandants and their staffs had met at 10 a.m. to discuss the closing of the sector borders. For accounts of this meeting, see McDermott, Berlin, pp. 32-33, and Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 298-300. Amrehn, Brandt, and Klein joined this meeting about noon.

[3] The Mission at Berlin reported on this session in telegram 187, August 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1361)

[4] Dated August 3, this telegram transmitted the text of a note from the Western Commandants to the Soviet Commandant protesting the East German violation of the quadripartite status of Berlin. (Ibid., 862.181/8-361) For text of the note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 765-766.

[5] For text of the press release (Rusk's statement at 12:30 p.m.), see ibid., p. 776. The telephonic instructions and the press statement have not been identified further, but presumably they are the ones described by Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 320-321.

[6] The text of the Western Commandants' protest letter was agreed on August 14 and transmitted to Washington for approval. (Telegram 188 from Berlin, August 14, received at 2:17 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1461) The text was discussed by the Four-Power Ambassadorial Steering Group, and at 8:24 p.m. the Department of State approved the text subject to minor changes in the last two paragraphs and approval by the British and French. (Telegram 118 to Berlin, August 14; ibid.) For final text of the letter as delivered on August 15, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 776-777.

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, August 14, 1961, 1 p.m.

318. My British and French colleagues and I met with Brentano this morning at his request for discussion on Berlin.[2] Foreign Minister said he viewed restrictions on Berlin travel as most alarming, and felt this first move would be followed quickly by further restrictions (perhaps selective control of movements of West Berliners and West Germans to East Berlin, or even on access routes to West Berlin) if Western reaction not prompt and vigorous. There ensued discussion of Communist motivation, with Brentano and Seydoux, while recognizing role of refugee flow in Bloc decision, inclined to believe they may be attempting to test Western reaction to gradual establishment of free city concept, while Steele and I considered Ulbricht's hand had been forced by refugee flow. There was full agreement, however, that result was same, regardless of motivation, and that Western reaction to this most serious breach of quadripartite agreement thus far would certainly affect future Communist moves. There was further agreement that two immediate steps should be recommended:

(1) Written protest by Commandants, which should be made “on instructions”, to be followed fairly quickly by notes to Moscow. There was inconclusive discussion whether three Ambassadors should endeavor to see Pervukin, since all three of us expect to be in Berlin this week.

(2) Widest possible ban on East German travel, to be agreed by four governments and presented to NAC for concurrence at earliest possible date.

Brentano said further that Bundestag session scheduled for August 22 would probably be called this week to hear governmental declaration and to make clear government and opposition united on Berlin.

It was assumed that Washington Steering Group would be meeting today for decision on Western countermeasures, and all agreed that promptness of our reactions was vital factor.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1461. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:26 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] For another account of this meeting, see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 366-369.

107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, August 14, 1961, 8:24 p.m.

350. Paris also for USRO Stoessel and Finn. Four Power Ambassadorial Steering Group met today consider Allied reaction GDR sector boundary restrictions. Following points covered:

1. Commandants Protest—Discussed text submitted by Berlin. Agreed delivery urgent. UK and French promised contact Govs. (This is subject another Deptel.)[2]

2. Protest to USSR in Moscow—US stated prepared consider protest at this level in addition Commandants protest. Others agreed this seemed desirable. French said Paris sending proposed text Washington today. It was agreed review text here tomorrow.

3.

TTD ban—US reported on private NATO meeting, consensus of which was favorable to ban. Stated we saw pros and cons. Danger existed GDR would retaliate by imposing restrictions Western travel to East Berlin, as it did last fall. In addition, GDR presumably would hold controls for long period, and removal ban while controls still in effect would be embarrassing. On other hand, if West took no action other than protest, West Berlin would feel let down and Soviets would interpret our inaction as weakness in context larger Berlin situation. We wondered if ATO could simply close down on grounds GDR preventing East Germans from entering West Berlin, hence impossible issue them TTDs. UK stated FonOff saw same danger US mentioned, inclined hold ban until Western travel affected. French uninstructed but felt ban useful. Germans noted Von Brentano had already proposed ban to three Ambassadors.[3] Said FedRep would take parallel action denying issuance passports East Germans. Three Embassies agreed seek Gov views.

Comments Bonn and Berlin (in addition any already made) requested urgently, particularly on pros and cons mentioned above.

4.

Other retaliatory measures—US asked views on other possible countermeasures. Following were mentioned: boycott Leipzig Fair (Germans felt they could not cooperate since included IZT agreement); cut off cultural exchanges; prevent bloc attendance Western fairs; break off US-Soviet air agreement; prevent travel Western citizens to GDR (French and Germans could not carry out). It was agreed any retaliation might well be taken against Soviet bloc as whole, since GDR action implemented Warsaw Pact decision. Generally agreed trade countermeasures should mainly be saved for more serious development involving Western access or German civilian traffic.

Comments all addressees requested urgently.[4]

5. Propaganda exploitation—Agreed this most important. British presented list themes which generally acceptable. US agreed work theme into its information effort.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-1461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Day and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

[2] See footnote 5, Document 105.

[3] See Document 106.

[4] On August 15 the Embassy in Bonn replied that a total ban on East German travel should be instituted, and noted that prominent Germans were urging German businesses not to participate in the Leipzig Fair and that the Federal Republic would cooperate in cutting off cultural exchanges. (Telegram 333; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-1561) The Mission at Berlin replied on the same day stressing that a future challenge to the West in Berlin might be more serious, and countermeasures should be used as a deterrent rather than as retaliation. For this reason, although realizing that they might be dangerous, the Mission stated that economic and trade countermeasures could not be neglected except at “grave risk to our position in Berlin.” (Telegram 211; ibid., 762.00/8-1561)

108. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, August 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

(1) Berlin Negotiations and (2) Possible Reprisals

(1) Negotiations

I find unanimity in your immediate staff for the view that we should take a clear initiative for negotiation within the next week or ten days—safely before the Neutral Nations Conference. Since our allies are hesitant, the lead will have to come from you, at the highest level.[2]

This opinion is strengthened by the border-closing episode, which can be described as one reason more for calling talks—because of the dangerous and explosive weakness it reveals in the DDR.

I hope you can discuss this general question with Secretary Rusk this afternoon.[3] His professionals are more cautious, being committed to a 4-Power process of planning. They see some virtue in the French argument that we ought not to talk about negotiation before we have reached agreement on the substance of our position. But the truth is that we're making very slow headway toward a clear position, as it is; a date for negotiation would put all our noses to the grindstone.

(2) Reprisals for the Border Closing

The Department's proposal for a riposte is likely to be the ending of the travel permits which have been issued by the three powers in West Berlin to East Germans who want to visit allied or neutral countries. This was used a year ago in response to East German harassment of civilian traffic, and it worked well. No one thinks it will cause a reversal of policy this time, in the light of the much more serious causes of this much larger action. But it is argued that it will give some pain, since it will cut off East German access to allied countries and to those neutral nations which play along.

I find this argument unconvincing. I doubt if we should take little actions in reprisal against this big one, especially when the punishment is unrelated to the crime. The only good argument for this action is that it has been discussed among the 4 Powers before as a possible retort to border-closing, and there may be some Allied worry about our “reliability” if we don't support it now.

Incidentally, I find agreement in both Joe Alsop and George Kennan to these three conclusions: (1) this is something they have always had the power to do; (2) it is something they were bound to do sooner or later, unless they could control the exits from West Berlin to the West; (3) since it was bound to happen, it is as well to have it happen early, as their doing and their responsibility.

McG. B.[4]

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 509 Negotiations. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1986, 910.

[2] For text of Rostow's August 14 memorandum to Bundy, which espoused this view, see ibid., 1981, 246 A. Carl Kaysen had also supported the idea of negotiations in a memorandum to Bundy on August 14, in which he also favored increasing the airborne alert force of SAC. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda, Carl Kaysen)

[3] No record of this meeting at 4:45 p.m. has been found, although it is noted in both Rusk's and Kennedy's Appointment Books. (Rusk Appointment Books; Johnson Library, and JFK Log; Kennedy Library)

[4] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

109. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, August 14, 1961.

1. What steps will we take this week to exploit politically propagandawise the Soviet-East German cut-off of the border?

2. This seems to me to show how hollow is the phrase “free city” and how despised is the East German government, which the Soviet Union seeks to make respectable.

3. The question we must decide is how far we should push this. It offers us a very good propaganda stick which if the situation were reversed would be well used in beating us. It seems to me this requires decisions at the highest level.

John F. Kennedy

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62B/8-1461. No classification marking.

110. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, August 14, 1961, 9 p.m.

197. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. At Senat request Commandants and Deputies met at noon today to hear Mayor Amrehn present situation report and Senat views formulated in morning session. In insistent manner Amrehn saw fit to impress on Commandants significance of East German measures and reiterated that in Senat's view protests alone could not suffice in light gravity of situation. Amrehn stated that Senat aware that all necessary steps could be decided upon only in capitals but asserted that indignant and aroused public would not be satisfied by just a Commandants' protest, which press had reported to be intent of last sentence of Secretary's Aug. 13 statement. Amrehn stated mood of Berliners reflects indignation with East German measures and growing disappointment with failure of West take immediate steps. He said Senat also wondered why Commandants had not already protested and recalled that in past far less important incidents had produced Commandants' protest on same day. Amrehn repeated Brandt's hope that diplomatic démarche be made at highest level. (Amrehn was reminded seriousness of situation explained delay as decisions being made and coordinated in capitals where all aspects of problem under urgent consideration.)

Amrehn also reported that—allegedly at popular demand—Senat urgently considering variety of countermeasures within West Berlin. In this connection he reiterated that West Berlin crowds this morning vocally critical of Brandt for making high-sounding statements but failing to take concrete measures. Senat too is reportedly under heavy popular pressure to close SED offices and SED West Berlin newspapers, take measures against display of East German regime decrees and propaganda in West Berlin S-Bahn stations, and deprive West Berliners employed in SovSector of wage equalization fund benefits. Amrehn emphasized that Senat aware it could not take such measures without Allied approval, and that Senat realized necessity for coordinating any local measures with larger action decided upon by governments.

Chairman Commandant ended conference with Germans by informing Mayor that Allied governments dealing with situation and Commandants awaiting decisions.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1461. Confidential; Priority. Received at 6:58 a.m. on August 15. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.

111. Minutes of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group[1]

Washington, August 15, 1961, 10:45 a.m.

PRESENT

Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Under Secretary Fowler of Treasury, The Attorney General, The Director of CIA, Deputy Director Wilson of USIA, The Chairman, JCS, Mr. Foy Kohler, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

Turning to the immediate situation in Berlin, the Secretary of State asked Mr. Kohler to summarize recent developments. Mr. Kohler described the progress which had been made through the Secretary's statement, the delivery of the protest of the three Western Commandants in Berlin, and preparation of a protest for delivery in Moscow. The Secretary of State noted that while the border closing was a most serious matter, the probability was that in realistic terms it would make a Berlin settlement easier. Our immediate problem is the sense of outrage in Berlin and Germany which carries with it a feeling that we should do more than merely protest. It was not easy to know just what else we should do.

In the following discussion it was generally agreed that economic countermeasures would be inappropriate; either they would be much too trivial to count, like withholding Western participation in the Leipzig Fair, or they might set in train a chain of challenges and responses which might affect our own deepest interest, and that of economic and human access to West Berlin.

Similar objections applied not only to such a course as general interruption of travel by East Germans to the West, but suspension of Temporary Travel documents. Moreover, it looks as if the new fence between East and West Berlin is there to stay, and we do not want to reply with temporary and incommensurate reprisals.

The one step for which there was substantial support in the group was the possibility of reinforcements of the West Berlin Garrison. There was no general agreement; and the Secretary of Defense indicated a specific reservation on the ground that such steps, taken as a gesture, were not desirable. His own inclination was to consider some reduction in U.S. military dependents abroad.

The discussion then turned to psychological measures and propaganda. Since it was agreed that, in the words of the Secretary of State, “we must keep shooting issues and non-shooting issues separate”, and since it was further agreed that the closing of the border was not a shooting issue, the problem was essentially one of propaganda. We should reap a large harvest on this front. The Attorney General particularly pressed for a new and stronger organization of our efforts in this area; and it was agreed that there would be a special meeting on this subject at 6 p.m., August 15.[2] It was further agreed that Mr. Earl Newsom [3] would be invited to come to Washington to discuss ways and means of improvement of our propaganda efforts on the Berlin crisis.

McG Bundy

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Steering Group. Secret. Prepared by Bundy on August 16.

[2] No record of this meeting has been found.

[3]  Edwin Earl Newsom, public relations counsel and senior partner of Earl Newsom & Co.

112. Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)[1]

Washington, August 16, 1961.

SUBJECT

Meeting of Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin and Germany, 15 August 1961[2]

1. Mr. Kohler ran down five tasks he felt were now imposed on the Group. In order, with the action taken at the meeting, they were:

a. Revision of Live Oak Directive.

The first point made was that the Nitze-Gray paper on military measures was a “non-committed U.S. paper”, not a firm U.S. position. JCS have used it, however, in drafting a new proposed directive for the Live Oak planners.[3] General Gray had a few copies of a preliminary draft at the meeting, but I was unable to latch onto one. Toward the end of the week, the Ambassadorial Group will consider the question of furnishing the directive to General Norstad, for passing on to the Live Oak staff. General Gray told me that the airlift-before-everything feature of the original paper no longer appears, you will be happy to learn.

Comment. Seems on the track. Probably no objection to the Ambassadorial Group acting on the directive, since (a) it will have been written by U.S. military, (b) it will have to be referred to governments anyway, and (c) it is only a directive to engage in planning, so governments should approve if they have any courage at all on the Berlin question.

b. Revision of Contingency Procedures.

Rather sketchily covered, since Kohler only mentioned a revised proposed note to the Soviets and a revised proposed public announcement, for use when our access is blocked. No down-to-earth substance on “Modalities of access”.

c. Answer to Soviet Aide-Mémoire.

Agreed it was too early to devote much time to this requirement within the Interdepartmental Group (I suppose they meant that State was or would be working on it first).

d. NATO Action.

(1) Military Build-up

Defense agreed to prepare a “quickie” paper in general terms setting forth what extra effort by individual NATO countries the U.S. considered appropriate at this time. Ambassador Finletter has asked for such a paper for his use, and it was agreed to furnish copies for use wherever U.S. officials get asked questions by officials of NATO countries on the build-up.

(2) Economic Countermeasures

The U.S. is in good shape to lay some on when the occasion requires it (according to Undersecretary of the Treasury Fowler)—i.e., the legal angles are under control. Agreed that Treasury would prepare a paper, which could be furnished to our NATO friends (and maybe to some outraged neutrals), outlining some ways to pick one's path through legal-fiscal jungles in matters of this sort.

e. Travel Restrictions in Berlin.

The following ideas were advanced and handled as indicated, the point being Berliners' morale:

(1) Stop shipment of military dependents to Europe.

Shot down as completely counterproductive in the matter of the Berliners' morale.

(2) Increase the strength of the Berlin garrisons.

Deployment of large numbers of VOPO's and other uniformed East Germans could furnish reasonable military foundation for this move. No decision, but the Group rather liked this.

(3) Increase Allied “patrols” in East Berlin.

These “patrols” are composed of two or three official cars with officers and enlisted men, which cruise around East Berlin. U.S. has been doing it for several years, but no one knew if U.K. and French had. The Group really liked this one, which they thought would help underline the legal freedom of passage within the whole city, but I am not sure it would significantly raise the Berliners' morale.

(4) Have a prominent, national-level figure visit Berlin right away.

The Vice-President was prominently mentioned. I felt an urge to nominate you, but was able to suppress it, since the matter had not been raised with you even remotely. The Group liked the idea, and liked the V.P. for the candidate.

L

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Interdepartmental Steering Group. No classification marking.

[2] A summary of the discussion at this meeting was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 354, August 15, which stated that the consideration of countermeasures revealed that most of them were small and relatively ineffective. But the Coordinating Group agreed that something more than protest needed to be done both to bolster West Berlin morale and to prevent the Soviet Union and East Germany from drawing the conclusion that the West was weak. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1561)

[3] Neither the paper nor the draft directive has been further identified, but Legere later commented that the proposed directive was “an affront to any reader with the slightest respect for plain logic,” and that it was completely revised by ISA on August 17. (Notes attached to a memorandum to Taylor, June 30, 1969; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Middle of 1961/Legere) The revised paper was formalized on August 17 as JCSM 558-61, “Draft Instructions to the Military Authorities of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records)

113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, August 15, 1961, 11:38 p.m.

356. Paris pass USRO. Following based on uncleared memorandum:[2]

Quadripartite meeting this afternoon considered subject of counter-measures.

Ambassador Grewe said he had instructions press for suspension of issuance TTD. He argued that this would keep retaliation in the same general domain and would only hurt favorites of East German regime. French representative said that to take no counter-measures might create wrong impression but added we should not go too far since there was danger of escalation. For example, economic measures at this step might lead to Berlin blockade, thus not advisable. French government in principle favored cutting off issuance TTD completely then perhaps making exceptions later on. French were interested in idea of closing down ATO. We must avoid creating impression that we are closing last loop hole for East Germany. (Grewe pointed out TTD's needed only for persons going outside Germany.) French representative stated his government might consider dragging out current bilateral negotiations with Warsaw Pact countries. In general, they did not believe there should be major retaliatory measures on basis these East German measures. They liked British propaganda paper[3] and would make use of it.

British representative spoke against adopting TTD approach as retaliatory measure. Situation not analogous to last September since there has been no interference with Western access and since TTD action cannot this time lead to successful result. Thus ban would be permanent. There is danger that it would lead to countermeasures of same nature as last fall, that East Berlin would be sealed off completely and that IZT would be denounced. After all, British representative argued, major objective is to arrive at arrangements to insure freedom of West Berlin. What can we do in political field to achieve this objective? British had thought of taking advantage delivery protest note to Moscow to include proposals for opening negotiations.[4] Time too short now for this, but perhaps idea should be pursued in connection with proposed reply to latest Soviet note on Berlin. Perhaps we should make a definite proposal for a plebiscite based on principle of self-determination.

Kohler referred to U.S. cabinet level consultations today[5] and outlined U.S. thinking on inadequacy of TTD measure and need for more effective steps as already reported in separate cable covering meeting of Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin (ICG) today.[6] He specifically mentioned possibility of increasing Allied military patrol activity in Soviet sector; possibility of increasing size of Allied military garrisons in West Berlin; and drastic speed up of planned NATO military build up and announcements connected therewith. He also suggested that Chancellor Adenauer might now wish to announce some German military plans before September 17 and take steps to call the Bundestag in session with a view to extending term of conscription in German army. Further, would it be possible for the French to announce the return from Algeria of a second division? He said that U.S., which was well along in carrying out military buildup, might make some supplementary announcements.

British representative said he would ask for instructions. Ambassador Grewe said that speaking personally this line of U.S. thinking appealed to him and that he would report it to Bonn. He indicated that action on TTD's could be viewed as minimum measure and that he thought that suspension of issuance TTD's would not be as ineffective as we think. He also alluded to recommendations of Berlin Senat as to local countermeasures. Kohler said that as reported to us these measures would probably give U.S. no great trouble, and U.K. representative said his government had already given green light to their representative in Berlin. French representative had no instructions.

Kohler concluded meeting with statement making clear that strengthening of Berlin garrison was not yet a U.S. government decision but only a proposal for consideration. It obviously served no military purpose as such. If we are to do this, however, parallel action by British and French obviously desirable and would therefore appreciate their views as well as those of Federal Republic.

Next quadripartite meeting scheduled take place morning August 16th.[7]

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1561. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Thurston (S/O) and cleared by Cash. Also sent to London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] Not found. Presumably this is the meeting described in Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 376-377, although Rusk's Appointment Book does not record the meeting with Grewe referred to by Cates. (Johnson Library)

[3] Presumably the paper noted in numbered paragraph 5 of Document 107.

[4] In addition to countermeasures the Ambassadorial Group also discussed and agreed on the text of a protest note to the Soviet Government, which would be delivered in Moscow on August 17. (Telegram 438 to Moscow, August 15; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1561) For text of this note as delivered, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 777-778.

[5] See Document 111.

[6] See footnote 1, Document 112.

[7] At this meeting the Ambassadorial Group discussed the timing of negotiations with the Soviet Union, the drafting of instructions for General Norstad, economic countermeasures, and the importance of information and propaganda activities. The Department of State summarized the discussion in telegram 452 to Moscow, August 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1661)

114. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, August 16, 1961, 6 p.m.

217. For USIA—From Murrow to Wilson.[2] Please convey on my behalf following observations to the Secretary and others who may be concerned: they are based on conversations with Mayor Brandt, with the most influential Berlin newspaper, news service, radio and television editors, and with a senior officer of the German Press Office in Bonn with whom I have had previous contact and whose judgment I value especially. These interviews, particularly those with editors, were under conditions which I am convinced represented most serious reactions which could not have been concerted to take advantage of my presence here.

In essence these people feel that we are facing a crisis of confidence which endangers quite seriously our position. This is based on the absence of any sharp and definite followup action since the Secretary's statement.[3] However this feeling of letdown is the greater because the President's speech[4] had had such a large readership and television following and had evoked such widespread public acceptance as a promise of firmness. I have not been impressed by German complaints of the lack of display of US military presence since sector borders were closed. I realize also that the longstanding belief that US support is the main and only German protection makes them impatient of our desire to act in concert with NATO Allies. Taking into account these prejudices and discounting numerous emotional arguments which have been made to me I am nevertheless convinced that what is described as the surrender of East Berlin to Ulbricht with all that this immediately implies has been a shock so severe that it can gravely affect our future relations, first, with the city of Berlin and its leaders, and second with the Federal Republic once the extent of the disillusionment here is recognized in Bonn.

I am concerned less with substantive acts than with a psychological climate which I feel can and should be corrected. Since even the most uninformed here is well aware of the ring of Soviet military forces around the city I do not feel that we are being asked to do anything unreasonable. What I do recommend however is that we should take a number of steps which need not necessarily affect the substance of our position but which if sufficiently well publicized would evidence the interest and support which we have so often pledged. Simply as an example, such a relative simple step as the publicized rupture of current negotiations of new cultural agreements with Communist countries would make an impression as would a well publicized and sharply worded statement of what violations of existing commitments the Soviets have made by allowing Ulbricht to close the borders.

I am aware of the constant need of Berliners for reassurance and of the irritation this often causes. The point I want to make as strongly as possible is that I am convinced we run the risk of an abrupt and serious worsening of our relationship with the people of Berlin and then with the Federal Republic unless we take some immediate steps to reassure them since they are now in a very low state of mind. There is very little that USIA as an agency can do about this until we adopt the necessary public attitude.

Comment: I anticipate Berliners will label our Aug 15 letter[5] of protest belated and tepid. No one here asking large violent action, merely some action, some proof this is not “another sample of ‘Hitler's take over of Rhineland’”. I think the timetable for this crisis has been stepped up very considerably and there is real danger that Berliners will conclude they should take themselves, their bank accounts and movable assets to some other place. What is in danger or being destroyed here is that perishable commodity called hope.[6]

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1661. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:23 p.m. and passed to USIA at 3:45.

[2] Repeated to Bonn. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1989, 724. Murrow, who was visiting USIA offices in Europe, had arrived in Berlin on August 12. Apparently on Monday, August 14, he sent a telegram similar to this one directly to the White House; see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 348-349, and Dulles, The Wall, p. 68. No copy of this telegram has been found.

[3] See Document 104.

[4] See Document 81.

[5] For text of this letter, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 776-777.

[6] On August 17 Ambassador Dowling endorsed Murrow's analysis of Berlin morale, stating that he also was “sharply disturbed by crisis of confidence in Berlin.” Dowling continued that he favored “some further, dramatic step” which would reassure Berlin, and suggested that the President send a personal message to the people of Berlin. (Telegram 354 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 662 A.62 B/8-1761)

115. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, August 16, 1961, 8 p.m.

219. Paris for Emb, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. Following is our estimate present situation.

As result increased refugee flow and related Communist prestige loss,SED regime with specific approval of Soviets and other Warsaw Pact countries has taken drastic control action to prevent entry their own people to West Berlin. Seal-off SovZone and East Berlin from West Berlin by military and police action has torn completely asunder residual web of one city fabric and of Four-Power status Berlin. Such closure boundary around West Berlin was doubtless contemplated by East as one consequence of separate peace treaty with GDR. Timing of action was apparently altered by internal GDR pressures. Increased refugee flow forced Sov/GDR hand and action of direct brute force has created a fait accompli. Well planned and abundantly accoutered with a massive display of military and police power, action was initially unqualifiedly successful and continues thus far successful so far as population East Germany or Berlin reaction is concerned, not to mention overall Western reaction.

It appears to us that there are two alternative interpretations of significance of events past 4 days:

1) Since Sovs/GDR have attained by direct action such important desiderata from their standpoint, it might be argued that it should be easier hence to negotiate with them an interim solution concerning West Berlin. Clear as it was before, it should now be crystal-clear that there is no possibility whatsoever of effective negotiations now with the Sovs concerning a broad all-German settlement which would of itself take care of the Berlin problem. Having thus already obtained such important results by last Sunday's actions, Sovs/GDR may be more “reasonable” in negotiations on other aspects of a possible Berlin arrangement.

2) On other hand, it may be argued that if Sovs/GDR are able to “get away” with this fait accompli, other similar actions may be undertaken by them prior to any negotiations and they may be even more demanding in such negotiations. Having taken such a big slice of salami and successfully digested it, with no hindrance, they may be expected to snatch further pieces greedily. Sovs/GDR want to absorb West Berlin, drive out Western Allies, and break down German national resistance. They made a big step toward these objectives last Sunday on East-West Berlin sector line. Their apparent success will encourage them to take further steps.

We believe second alternative is proper interpretation of significance of past few days' events here.

Threatening and arrogant utterances of Sov/GDR leaders since Vienna meeting, as well as their actions, would tend to support second alternative. From local standpoint, we are impressed by how even within a few days one direct action is being followed by another. While the initial action Sunday was directed almost exclusively to control of the movement of SovZone and East Berlin residents, already the East Germans have been introducing regulations and practical measures having the effect of drastically controlling and restricting the movement of West Berliners into East Berlin (ref Berlin's 200 Dept).[2] We anticipate renewal of last fall's effort to control entry of Allied personnel into East Berlin. Two Mission cars had difficulties today. We also note arrogant tone of Sov Commandant's reply to Western Commandants' protest of Aug 3 concerning border-crossers (Berlin's 212 Dept, 185 Bonn).[3]

If our view as to proper interpretation is correct, it means we have now entered phase of actual practical confrontation with Sovs on Berlin, that we have moved out of phase of confrontation, by words and threats and into phase of deeds. If so, it is highly doubtful whether it can possibly suffice to reply to deeds with words of protestation.

What actions should West then take to meet this situation? Suspension of issuance of TTDs we have already recommended (Berlin's 207 Dept, 180 Bonn);[4] economic countermeasures likewise we believe should be instituted at once (Berlin's 211 Dept, 184 Bonn);[5] Western travel into SovZone should be discouraged so far as possible and Western participation in SovZone sports and cultural events should be prohibited, to match restrictions on East German participation in Western events which follows from TTD ban. There may be other countermeasures which should also be applied, but we here have not been privy to detailed discussions of possible countermeasures.

However, what is important is purpose of these measures. Is their purpose to slap Sov/GDR on the wrist for what they have done? Or is it our purpose by strong counteractions to endeavor to indicate to them by deeds the grave consequences of continuation on their part of their current aggressive policy with respect to Berlin? Briefly, our countermeasures should seek to have a deterrent effect. To have a deterrent effect, countermeasures must not be calculated to fit the violation, but must to a certain extent overshoot the mark. We recognize risk that countermeasures which seek to be deterrent may in turn bring on other Sov/GDR countermeasures. We believe this risk has to be borne. Abrogation of IZT by FedRep last Sept in response to GDR Sept 8 decree was a countermeasure which overshot the mark and hence had a deterrent effect, albeit for only a year. The Sovs/GDR have now resumed the encroachment program they interrupted last fall; it may be that our countermeasures will lead them to take other measures sooner than expected. However, that did not happen last fall and if we take totally ineffectual measures they will be encouraged to take further steps faster.

Seal-off of West Berlin has already changed status quo in Communist favor in a way that strengthens their bargaining position in negotiations. It has already weakened effect we hoped to derive from Western military preparations announced by President on July 25. Assuming as we do that negotiations on Berlin will still take place, it is important that our bargaining position be not further weakened by our failure to take impressive countermeasures that will be clearly and widely recognized as such.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1661. Secret; Niact. Received at 3:54 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.

[2] Telegram 200, August 15, transmitted an announcement by the East German Ministry of Interior governing the movement of West Berliners into East Berlin. (Ibid., 862.181/8-1561)

[3] Telegram 212, August 16, transmitted the text of the Soviet Commandant's reply to the Western protest of August 3. (Ibid., 862.181/8-1661)

[4] Dated August 15. (Ibid., 762.00/8-1561)

[5] See footnote 4, Document 107.

116. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara[1]

Washington, August 16, 1961, 5:50 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM SEC McNamara

The Sec returned his call and he said he investigated the possible redeployment of forces in West Berlin through the JCS and Norstad. It would require Br permission to move them closer to the Brandenburg Gate. The Sec assumed it would be a joint venture. Norstad feels strongly this would be a mistake as moving them closer to the border might lead to more action by East Berlin than might otherwise be the case. M cannot evaluate this though.

[1] Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau.

117. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, August 16, 1961, midnight.

223. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. Mayor Brandt handed me today letter for transmittal to President Kennedy. Informal translation follows:[2]

Begin text.

Dear Mr. President:

After developments last three days my city, wish convey to you in personal, informal letter some of my thoughts and viewpoints.

Measures of Ulbricht regime, supported by SovUnion and other East Bloc countries, have almost fully destroyed remnants Four-Power status. While in past Allied Commandants have even protested against parades by so-called Peoples' Army, this time, after military occupation of East Sector by Peoples' Army, they have limited themselves to delayed and not very vigorous step. Illegal sovereignty of East Berlin government was acknowledged by acquiescing in the restrictions of the number of crossing points and of entry into the East Sector. I regard this encroachment as the most serious in the postwar history of this city since the blockade.

This development has not changed will to resist of West Berlin population, but has tended to arouse doubts as to determination of three powers and their ability to react. In this connection the decisive factor is that the West has always specifically invoked the existing Four-Power status.

I am well aware that existing guarantees for freedom of population, presence of troops and free access apply only West Berlin. However, this is matter of a deep wound in life of German people and of being forced out of spheres of common responsibility (Berlin and Germany as a whole) affecting whole Western prestige. See political psychological dangers in two respects: (1) inactivity and mere defensive posture can bring about crisis of confidence in Western powers; (2) inactivity and mere defensive posture can lead to exaggerated self-confidence on part of East Berlin regime whose newspapers already today boast of success its demonstration of military power.

SovUnion has achieved half its free city proposals through use German Peoples' Army. The second act is a question of time. After second act Berlin would be like a ghetto, which has not only lost its function as refuge of freedom and symbol of hope for reunification but which would also be severed from free part Germany. Instead of flight to Berlin, we might then experience beginning of flight from Berlin.

In this situation I consider it proper that Western powers, while demanding re-establishment Four-Power responsibilities, proclaim at same time a three-power status for West Berlin. Three powers should reiterate guarantee their presence in West Berlin until German reunification and, if necessary, have this supported by plebiscite population West Berlin and FedRep. Must also be said clearly that German question is in no way settled for Western powers but that they must insist upon peace settlement corresponding to right of self-determination of German people and security interests of all concerned. Would also consider advisable that West on own initiative bring Berlin question before UN, at least on basis that USSR has violated Declaration Human Rights in most flagrant manner. Appears better to me put USSR in position of guilty party than to have to discuss same theme after motion by other states.

I expect from such steps no significant material change present situation and recollect not without bitterness declarations rejecting negotiations with USSR on basis one should not negotiate under pressure. We now have state of accomplished extortion, and already I hear it will not be possible turn down negotiations. In such situation, when possibility of initiative for action is already so small, it is all the more important at least to demonstrate political initiative.

After acquiescence in Sov step which is illegal, and has been termed illegal, and in view many tragedies occurring today East Berlin and SovZone, we will not be spared risks of ultimate decision. It would be welcomed if American garrison were to be demonstratively strengthened.

I consider situation serious enough, Mr. President, to write to you in all frankness as is possible only between friends who trust each other completely.

(Signed) Your Willy Brandt

[Here follows the remainder of the telegram.]

Lightner

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Confidential; Niact. Received at 9:10 p.m. on August 16 and passed to the White House at 10 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and POLAD USAREUR. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2866.

[2] For a slightly different translation of the letter, see Dulles, The Wall, pp. 99-101. For part of the German text, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 29-30.

118. Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group[1]

Washington, August 17, 1961.

PRESENT

The President; the Secretary of State and Mr. Kohler; the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Lemnitzer; the Attorney General; Mr. Dulles and Mr. Murphy; Mr. Wilson; General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Owen

1. The Secretary of State proposed two actions:

a. Reinforcement of the West Berlin garrison.

b. A statement of protest by the three Western heads of government.

2. The President decided that the US reinforcement should be one battle group (1500-1800 men).[2] Mr. Kohler reported that the UK had indicated, when reinforcement was discussed in the Ambassadorial Group, that it would probably rest on the modest reinforcement it was already effecting. The French had no instructions. The President said that the allied total should be at least 2500.

3. The President asked about our going to the UN. The Secretary said that there would not be sufficient Afro-Asian support to make a good showing. This might encourage Khrushchev. The UN should be held in reserve for a more important and suitable occasion.

4. The President said that this Bloc move should have been foreseen and that Berlin planning should look ahead to such possible contingencies in the future.

5. The President asked about the timing of the reinforcement and of the tripartite heads of government statement.

a. It was agreed that the reinforcement would take place Saturday morning unless a strongly adverse allied reaction developed in the meantime.

b. The tripartite statement would also be made Saturday.

6. Secretary McNamara suggested that (i) this Bloc action might portend a speed-up of Khrushchev's schedule; (ii) our own military preparations should be hastened accordingly. There was some disagreement with his diagnosis, but none with his prescription. DOD proposed to move the deadline by which we would be able to put forces in Europe from January 1 to November 15, and to modify preparatory actions accordingly. Secretary McNamara indicated that this speedup would result in some imbalance and additional cost. The air units and Army specialist units would be called up earlier than now planned. Demothballing of ships would also be hastened. The Guard divisions would not be called up.

7. Secretary McNamara said that the US would not replace the battle group that would be withdrawn from the 8th Division to go to Berlin. He was considering instead some large scale movements to Europe, e.g., moving the stocks for two divisions there. He did not want a decision on this now.

8. The President stressed the need to be ready to frustrate any Bloc action looking to rapid “civilian” seizure of key points in West Berlin. It was suggested that the Communists in East Berlin might become “dizzy with success” and act rashly.

9. The President then directed that the proposed heads of government statement be revised, which was done on the spot.[3] It was agreed that the proposed reinforcement would be announced separately.

10. It was agreed that the Vice President and General Clay would leave Friday evening for Bonn and Berlin, where they would deliver the President's answer to Mayor Brandt's letter.[4] Neither this answer nor Mayor Brandt's letter would be made public. It was agreed that the troop reinforcement might be credited to Mayor Brandt's request, however.

11. No single announcement of the accelerated US buildup would be made. The steps would be announced seriatim, as they were taken. Our allies would make similar statements of any accelerated build-up on their part. The US speed-up would not be credited to the access closing.

12. The President asked about the NATO military build-up. Secretary McNamara said that DOD would submit a memo Friday on this subject.

13. The Attorney General asked if more could not be done to stimulate worldwide protest over the East German action.[5] A group will examine this question and report next week. It will include Mr. Dulles, General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Wilson, and Secretary Goldberg.

14. Mr. Dulles reported a call by General Eisenhower about Berlin. A State-DOD briefing team will be sent, with Mr. Dulles, to Gettysburg Sunday, and Mr. Dulles will notify the General.[6]

15. The President stressed the need for balance, in any press backgrounders, regarding recent events in Berlin. We should make clear that we remained firm in defense of our rights in West Berlin, which had not been affected or threatened by those events.[7]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Steering Group. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[2] For Taylor's recollection of this decision, see his oral history interview at the Kennedy Library.

[3] For text of the proposed statement as sent to Macmillan and de Gaulle later in the day, see Declassified Documents, 1986, 1867.

[4] For an account of the origin of the idea to send General Clay to Berlin, see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 350-352 and 402-403.

[5] The propaganda aspects of the Berlin crisis had been the subject of a memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to the President on August 17. For text, see Declassified Documents, 1979, 44 A.

[6] For a report on this briefing, see ibid., 1981, 407 A.

[7] In 1989 Murphy recorded the following recollection of this meeting:

“Later that Thursday, DCI Dulles asked me to accompany him to a White House meeting that had been called to address the West Berlin problem. In addition to President Kennedy, those present included the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior officials concerned with matters relating to national security, including Foy Kohler, then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and Director of the Berlin Task Force—on which I was to serve for the remainder of 1961 as a CIA representative.

“Mr. Dulles introduced me to the President as an officer who had served several years in Berlin and might therefore provide helpful insights into the psychology of the West Berlin population. In response, the President, as if to caution me not to reopen the issue of the wall itself, observed that ‘our writ does not run in East Berlin’ and asked me to speak to the question of West Berlin morale. The problem, I explained, was one of West Berliners' perceptions. Although they realized that since 1948 there was little the Allies could do to counter Soviet and East German actions in East Berlin, in essence Berlin remained for them one city. East Berliners could shop and attend the theater in West Berlin while relatives and friends in both sectors exchanged regular visits. Whereas over the years there had been frequent crackdowns at border-crossing points, the actual closure of 13 August came as a deep emotional shock. This shock, plus the perception of Western inaction, caused many to fear that the Allies intended gradually to withdraw their protection from West Berlin. Thus, it seemed essential that steps be taken to restore confidence and rekindle the spirit of the West Berliners.

“Others agreed, and the President moved rapidly to order the movement overland from West Germany of reinforcements for the US garrison and a visit by the Vice President. Obviously, the measures had been under consideration by the principals beforehand, but this meeting seemed to crystallize everyone's resolve and led to specific decisions.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 33, No. 4, Winter 1989, pp. 79-80)

119. Message From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

Paris, August 18, 1961.

Exclusive for Gen Lemnitzer from Gen Norstad. Info exclusive for Gen Clarke from Gen Norstad, eyes only. From all reports, the West Berliners continue to be strong and of good morale, considering the circumstances, but they have clearly indicated strong dissatisfaction and disappointment with the developments of the situation since the events of last weekend. Messages from Lightner in Berlin and press reports of British Ambassador Steel's reaction to his Berlin trip yesterday would suggest that the situation is quieting down. Bruce Clarke has told me over the phone that from his air and ground inspection completed yesterday morning, he felt that the situation was relatively quiet. I was surprised, therefore, to receive your message this morning[2] with the news of the action that it is proposed to take over the coming weekend. However, Clarke has just confirmed to me that we are prepared to move the battle group on receipt of orders.

Although my views have not been solicited, I think the seriousness of the situation demands that I advise you of my thoughts. I agree, of course, that there is no military justification for the movement of a battle group to Berlin at this time. 12 to 13 thousand men could do very little in the military sense that could not be done almost equally well by the 10 to 11 thousand that make up the combined Allied garrison in Berlin at this time. Further, the movement of the battle group from its normal station could be considered a weakening diversion, although this is not a really serious point. From the political and the psychological standpoints, I assume higher authority has given consideration to the reaction of the West Berliners to a combat reinforcement of this relative magnitude, that is, substantially a 50% increase in U.S. fighting strength. Since Lightner has indicated in message Berlin to State 141, Aug 17,[3] that they appear not to be concerned with their own physical well-being, there is the danger of their expecting armed action to restore the status quo ante. I gather from your message that the force will be given no mission but to remain in Berlin, and this means, of course, remaining in Berlin indefinitely.

I fully recognize the desirability, if not the necessity, of acknowledging the concern of Brandt and the West Berliners, but I would hope that this could be done by filling established and legitimate military needs which could be sustained on a long-term basis. For instance, we long ago established a requirement for an Engineer company and 9 additional APC's for the Berlin garrison. With all its associated and transport vehicles, a total of about 40, this would make an impressive convoy entering Berlin. In addition to that, some of the permanent Berlin garrison is in Wildflecken undergoing routine training. The overland movement of these elements, involving 600 troops, back to Berlin would require an additional convoy of at least 30 two-and-a-half-ton trucks. The movement of these two convoys into Berlin would certainly be a token of the seriousness of our intentions, would have a valid military basis, and would not run the risk of being unnecessarily provocative at a critical time.

In the light of the atmosphere at the time this subject was considered, I can readily appreciate the desire to dramatize our action by sending the Vice President to Berlin. However, recognizing that this is entirely a matter of personal judgment, I feel that with the relatively quieter atmosphere of this morning, the Vice President's trip might be wasted. The delivery of the President's reply to the Brandt letter by the hands of the hero of a Berlin crisis of an earlier day, General Lucius Clay, would appear to me to be a brilliant stroke; but to add to this the great stature of the Vice President would be overdoing it, and would run the risk of exciting great expectations in West Berlin and possibly also among the unhappy East Germans. This is a big gun which we may need and need badly in the weeks and months to come.

I recognize that a firm decision may have been made, and I am prepared to see that that part of it which falls within my bailiwick is carried out promptly and effectively. If circumstances permit, however, I hope that you will discuss this further with Secretary McNamara.

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to USAREUR.

[2] Lemnitzer's cable, August 18, summarized the discussion at the August 17 Steering Group meeting (see Document 118), noted McNamara's and his military objections to sending a battle group to Berlin, and concluded that the “decision was made for political, psychological and morale purposes and not for military reasons.” (Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak)

[3] Telegram 141 to Paris (226 to the Department of State), August 17, in a general assessment of measures that might be taken in Berlin, proposed strengthening the Berlin garrison for the political effect it would have on the local population. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-1761)

120. Letter From President Kennedy to Governing Mayor Brandt[1]

Washington, August 18, 1961.

DEAR MAYOR BRANDT: I have read with great care your personal informal letter of August 16th[2] and I want to thank you for it. In these testing days it is important for us to be in close touch. For this reason I am sending my answer by the hand of Vice President Johnson. He comes with General Clay, who is well known to Berliners; and they have my authority to discuss our problems in full frankness with you.

The measures taken by the Soviet Government and its puppets in East Berlin have caused revulsion here in America. This demonstration of what the Soviet Government means by freedom for a city, and peace for a people, proves the hollowness of Soviet pretensions; and Americans understand that this action necessarily constitutes a special blow to the people of West Berlin, connected as they remain in a myriad of ways to their fellow Berliners in the eastern sector. So I understand entirely the deep concerns and sense of trouble which prompted your letter.

Grave as this matter is, however, there are, as you say, no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation. Since it represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness, this brutal border closing evidently represents a basic Soviet decision which only war could reverse. Neither you nor we, nor any of our Allies, have ever supposed that we should go to war on this point.

Yet the Soviet action is too serious for inadequate responses. My own objection to most of the measures which have been proposed—even to most of the suggestions in your own letter—is that they are mere trifles compared to what has been done. Some of them, moreover, seem unlikely to be fruitful even in their own terms. This is our present judgment, for example, on the question of an immediate appeal to the United Nations, although we shall continue to keep this possibility under lively review.

On careful consideration I myself have decided that the best immediate response is a significant reinforcement of the Western garrisons. The importance of this reinforcement is symbolic—but not symbolic only. We know that the Soviet Union continues to emphasize its demand for the removal of Allied protection from West Berlin. We believe that even a modest reinforcement will underline our rejection of this concept.

At the same time, and of even greater basic importance, we shall continue and accelerate the broad buildup of the military strength of the West upon which we are decided, and which we view as the necessary answer to the long-range Soviet threat to Berlin and to us all.

Within Berlin, in the immediate affairs of the city, there may be other specific appropriate steps to take. These we shall review as rapidly and sympathetically as possible, and I hope you will be sure to express your own views on such measures clearly to Vice President Johnson and his party. Actions which effectively demonstrate our continued commitment to freedom in Berlin will have our support.

I have considered with special care your proposal of a three-power status for West Berlin. My judgment is that a formal proclamation of such a status would imply a weakening of the four-power relationship on which our opposition to the border-closing depends. Whatever may be the immediate prospects, I do not believe that we should now take so double-edged a step. I do agree that the guarantees which we have pledged to West Berlin should be continuously affirmed and reaffirmed, and this we are doing. Moreover, I support your proposal of an appropriate plebiscite demonstrating the continuing conviction of West Berlin that its destiny is freedom in connection with the West.

More broadly, let me urge it upon you that we must not be shaken by Soviet actions which in themselves are a confession of weakness. West Berlin today is more important than ever, and its mission to stand for freedom has never been so important as now. The link of West Berlin to the Free World is not a matter of rhetoric. Important as the ties to the East have been, painful as is their violation, the life of the city, as I understand it, runs primarily to the West—its economic life, its moral basis, and its military security. You may wish to consider and to suggest concrete ways in which these ties might be expanded in a fashion that would make the citizens of West Berlin more actively conscious of their role, not merely as an outpost of freedom, but as a vital part of the Free World and all its enterprises. In this double mission we are partners, and it is my own confidence that we can continue to rely upon each other as firmly in the future as we have in the past.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,[3]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Brandt Correspondence. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2867.

[2] See Document 117.

[3] Printed from an unsigned copy.

121. Report by Vice President Johnson[1]

Washington, undated.

REPORT BY VICE PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON ON HIS VISIT TO GERMANY, AUGUST 19-20, 1961

In submitting my recommendations, I wish to place special emphasis on my confidential discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt,[2] for they point to the fundamental facts which must be considered in making future decisions.

Chancellor Adenauer told me that he believes the best economic minds should undertake a thorough review of the possibilities of economic sanctions as a matter of extreme urgency. He himself has felt that we should apply sanctions and more recently has become a strong convert to this idea, but he recognizes that a proposal of this kind must be carefully considered in all its ramifications. I listened without making any commitments beyond the promise that I would place his views candidly and fully before the President.

We then discussed the issues raised by Mayor Brandt's letter[3] to which the President had replied in a letter I was taking to West Berlin.[4] I explained that we took the position that we had already made great sacrifices but we were prepared to make more sacrifices in cooperation with our allies. I added that the United States had acted decisively in the present situation as can be seen from the President's policy of sending the Vice President and General Clay to Bonn and Berlin, and directing that additional reinforcements, with their equipment, should be sent to West Berlin. Our arrival, and the arrival of the men and machines, would be almost simultaneous.

I emphasized the importance to us all of receiving greater support and assistance from the British, the French and the Germans. I said I realized that in days past the Germans had operated under a good many restrictions—economic, fiscal, legal and military—but it was necessary now to consider this whole problem in a new context.

I said there was great wisdom for us in our present predicament in remembering the proverb which tells us that where there is a will, there always is a way. We must have the will and we must find the way.

Chancellor Adenauer listened to my statement of this case with the utmost attention. He then told me that he was prepared to extend the period for military conscription in West Germany but the announcement of this new policy would come after the election. He also said he would agree to increase the number of Germans in military service, provided some of the restrictions mentioned by me could be removed. He explained that Defense Minister Strauss had discussed some of these questions in detail with Mr. McNamara.

I replied that the American people would support our commitments with all our national power and all our national resources if only they did not feel that they were being asked to bear an unfair and totally disproportionate burden. They would resent being placed in a position in which there would in effect be a unilateral American commitment when there should be a common determination to carry a shared burden.

Chancellor Adenauer understood this point very clearly. I then explained to Chancellor Adenauer that some of President Kennedy's major problems now arose over the struggle for funds for the mutual security program. An important part of these funds were directly related to Berlin and to the German situation. I added that some of the strongest criticism of the President's program came from the rather sizable group in this country that were opposed to the American people doing so much more than other nations.

I said that anything more which could be done by Germany, France and Britain should be done; and it should be done quickly. I suggested that one immediate measure which would be helpful would be to increase the number of West German police and to give them additional training.

Chancellor Adenauer said he recognized that Germany could not expect America to carry a bigger burden without herself being ready for greater sacrifices.

On Saturday, August 19, I addressed the House of Representatives of West Berlin. Immediately following that address I had my most significant private discussion with Mayor Brandt.

He was somewhat apologetic about his letter to the President and regretted that its contents had been given unauthorized publication in the Federal Republic, a disclosure for which he said he was not responsible. I said it did not add luster to our cause to have our own allies writing critical letters to the President of the United States and putting him to the public question. I then remarked that I had not come to Berlin to debate the past but to reason together with him in quiet co-operation.

Mayor Brandt responded quickly to this approach and I got the clear impression that he was a chastened person, subject to one important exception; he seemed convinced that his letter, with all its faults, had at least moved American policy off dead center.

I told Mayor Brandt that all the points in his letter had been most carefully and sympathetically considered in Washington, even when it had proved impossible to agree with them, and the American policy was set forth clearly and candidly in the President's reply. He appreciated this candor.

I took this occasion to emphasize that the United States could not accept his proposal to abandon the four power treaty and replace it with a three power arrangement. He agreed that the consequences of any such action might go beyond what he had anticipated.

We then turned to the question of bringing the Berlin issue before the United Nations. I explained that it was our judgment that it was very unlikely that this approach would yield any helpful result, particularly when the General Assembly was entangled in the complications of the Bizerte affair.

I acknowledged that everyone in Washington fully appreciated the deep emotions aroused in West Berlin by the division of the city by concrete wall and barbed wire and armed soldiers. We have been aware of this threat for some time, and had responded to it not with words but with actions.

Three times in the last few months the President had taken significant and far-reaching decisions. He had added two billion dollars to the defense budget earlier this year as the Communist challenge became more clearly defined. Then, in a national appeal to the American people and in a special message to Congress, the President added another five billion to the defense program, called up many thousands of young Americans to active duty, lengthened the period of military service, and authorized other painful and costly programs for the protection of the free world and the national interest.

Many of these expenditures and decisions by the President and the Congress were directly related to the situation in Berlin. Now, in a third measure, the President has sent the Vice-President and General Clay to Berlin, and had strengthened their presence in the divided city by the dispatch of additional American troops and military equipment.

After listening to this review of America's actions, which plainly impressed him, Mayor Brandt conceded the force of my argument that it was essential for the people of West Berlin to do far more for their own defense. It was impossible for the United States to carry the load by itself, or to ask Britain and France to do more, if the people of West Berlin failed to make a prompt and adequate contribution to their survival in freedom.

West Berlin has a large and vibrant population; it has important economic resources; and it has the respect of the free world as it faces the Communist challenge. I urged Mayor Brandt to use the strength of West Berlin more comprehensively lest that respect be compromised as others began to do more for the divided city than the citizens were willing to do for themselves. I said it would be very helpful if we could have more British and French soldiers marching in front of the American tanks—but it would be much easier to obtain these allied contributions if West Berlin stood in the front line of its own defense.

He agreed with the broad principles of this analysis, and with the necessity of working out arrangements that would lead to a greater Berlin contribution as a course of action infinitely more preferable than public debates about past mistakes. Mayor Brandt in short was co-operative as well as chastened.

The morale of West Berlin, badly shaken and nervous, has now been restored. As important as the presence of our mission in the restoration of German respect for and confidence in American policy was the arrival of the American troops.

The single most important element in this process of restoring good relations was, beyond question, the sight of the American tanks. The impact would have been immeasurably more significant if the tanks had been new and shining models of our latest and best equipment, fully symbolic of America's power in this jet age.

I returned from Germany with new pride in America's leadership but with an unprecedented awareness of the responsibility which rests upon this country. The world expects so much from us, and we must measure up to the need, even while we seek more help from our allies. For if we fail or falter or default, all is lost, and freedom may never have a second chance.

Since Berlin is basically one battle—even though an important battle—in the world wide struggle between Communism and freedom, there is no single solution to the situation which confronts us. However, there are certain steps which I would recommend as a result of any conversations with leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany and with our officials who are on the scene:

1. It would seem imperative that we urge the other nations of the Western alliance—and specifically England, France and Germany itself—to make a greater contribution to the defense of West Berlin. This is of great importance not only because of the need for strength in that area but because of its effect on promoting a higher degree of unity in the Western alliance.

2. Plans should be made now for increasing the strength of the military forces in Berlin at intervals calculated to bolster morale which must inevitably in the months that lie ahead sag at times. In this connection, it would be extremely helpful for some of our newest and most modern tanks and other forms of “heavy” equipment such as howitzers to be brought into Berlin. The enthusiasm of the Berliners while reviewing the entry of our combat group into the city on Sunday although high at all times was noticeably higher when a few tank carriers went by.

3. As a further step in maintaining morale of Berliners it would be well for the countries of the Western alliance to plan now to send other high officials into Berlin for visits at appropriate times. The people of Berlin obviously feel that this is one evidence of the good faith of their allies.

4. Chancellor Adenauer's unusual interest in a study of the imposition of economic sanctions should lead to a “new look” on our part at this tactic.

5. Every encouragement should be given to increase the West German police and adding to their training.

6. Careful consideration should be given to the fact of lifting some of the remaining restrictions on German military forces—possibly in progressive steps timed to serve as counter measures for Communist moves.

6. It would be well for the United States to quietly discourage any participation in the Leipzig Fair and to impose greater restrictions upon passes used to travel from the East into the Western zone. These steps while not important in themselves should be undertaken simply because failure to do so might give the impression that the United States is not serious in its commitments to Berlin.[5]

[1] Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security Files, VP Travel, Berlin. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2868. For two other reports on the trip, see ibid., 1978, 209 A and 301 B. The Vice President also reported on his trip in a meeting with the President, Taylor, Rusk, Clay, Bohlen, and Bundy on August 21. A memorandum for the record of this meeting is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. For three other accounts of the visit to Berlin, see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 404-413 and 423-436; Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 483-486; and Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 30-33.

[2] For a memorandum of Johnson's conversation with Adenauer on August 19, see Declassified Documents, 1983, 2514; for memoranda of his conversations with Brandt on August 20, see ibid., 1976, 258 B, and 1983, 2515.

[3] See Document 117.

[4] Document 120.

[5] On August 21 Bohlen sent Secretary Rusk his report on the trip stressing that the effect on Berlin morale “was extraordinary and excellent.” (Memorandum to the Secretary; Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-JO/8-2161; printed in part in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 485-486)

122. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, August 21, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin Political Planning

I want to take a stronger lead on Berlin negotiations. Both the calendar of negotiation and the substance of the Western position remain unsettled, and I no longer believe that satisfactory progress can be made by Four-Power discussion alone. I think we should promptly work toward a strong U.S. position in both areas and should make it clear that we cannot accept a veto from any other power. We should of course be as persuasive and diplomatic as possible, but it is time to act. My initial views on both subjects are set out below.

1. The Calendar

I like your plan to issue, before September first, an invitation to negotiations. I think this means that we should this week make it plain to our three Allies that this is what we mean to do and that they must come along or stay behind. I shall be glad to write to General de Gaulle myself if desirable.

I also like your idea that the four Foreign Ministers, at New York for the United Nations, should be empowered to work out a place and time for negotiations. If there is a better way, I'd be glad to accept it. In general, I like the idea of an announcement before September first, discussion of ways and means before October first, and formal negotiation about November first.

Within the category of “discussion of ways and means,” I place the possibility of preliminary private talks between appropriate US-USSR diplomats. I like Chip Bohlen for this, on our side. Obviously such talks would have to be based on a clear and solid sense of our policy, and so I do not think they can begin for about a month—say around September 25th.

I do not think well of the plans for a three-Ambassador call upon Khrushchev to try to smoke him out. Until we have something to suggest ourselves, we shall not get any more out of him than we have been getting since Vienna.

2. The Substance of Our Policy

The Acheson paper[2] is a good start, but it is not a finishing point. What you and I need is a small group of hard workers who can produce alternatives for our comment and criticism on an urgent basis. This, in my judgment, should be a labor separated from the day-to-day operational work and planning under Kohler. I think of such people as Bohlen, Owen and Hillenbrand from State and Bundy and Sorensen over here. Maybe there should be fewer; probably there should not be more. This group should be as nearly invisible as possible, and it should report directly to you and me. Most of the elements of a firm policy are standing around now—and I believe a group with orders from the two of us could prepare a clear paper for my decision in one long session on August 31st. We shall need a paper by that time if we are to talk with our allies and get something like an agreed position from them by the end of September. I would suggest that such a group bring in preliminary proposals on Friday of this week—August twenty-fifth.

In general, what I think we should say to such a small group as guidelines is this:

1. Make the framework of our proposals as fresh as possible—they should not look like warmed-over stuff from 1959.

2. Protect our support for the idea of self-determination, the idea of all-Germany, and the fact of viable, protected freedom in West Berlin.

3. Do not insist on maintenance of occupation rights if other strong guarantees can be designed. Occupation rights are a less attractive base, before the world, than the freedom and the protection of West Berliners.

4. Consider well the option of proposing parallel peace treaties. If we table our own drafts, we might do a lot with this; and Khrushchev would have to look at what we say, because he has invited just this course.

5. Examine all of Khrushchev's statements for pegs on which to hang our position. He has thrown out quite a few assurances and hints here and there, and I believe they should be exploited.

6. Do not put too much distance between our initial proposals and our fall-back position. Indeed it may be well not to have any fall-back position. Our first presentation should be, in itself, as persuasive and reasonable as possible.

Can I have your prompt reaction to this?

John Kennedy

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2161. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 467 A.

[2] Document 89.

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, August 21, 1961, 9:17 p.m.

1004. Paris for USRO Stoessel McGuire. Following discussion Quadripartite Ambassadors' meeting August 21, Kohler chairman.

1) Kohler announced U.S. prepared back German NATO proposal boycott Leipzig Fair. U.S. participation small but attempt being made discourage prospective exhibitors.

2) Kohler hoped UK/French would instruct their commandants associate themselves with U.S. in discussing with Senat possible EastZone sequestration S-bahn rolling stock. Announced U.S. commandant instructed in addition agree de facto measures keep rolling stock West Berlin by means short legal expropriation.

3) Kohler and Ambassadors agreed troop reinforcement and Johnson visit very successful in restoring morale. Grewe thought GDR silence on reinforcement via autobahn “very significant attitude”.

4) Kohler announced U.S. acceptance UK proposal for TTD ban by categories. French agreed in principle but wanted discussions Bonn on adding categories, particularly trade people. UK proposed that its plan be adopted with proviso other categories could be added. Kohler agreed with understanding that this action not be portrayed as counter-measure but as means reducing tension by stopping GDR propagandists, etc.

5) Meeting agreed that Soviet note August 19[2] on sector boundary closure protest required no answer and ended that particular exchange. Kohler noted that tripartite declaration discussed August 18 meeting now had no relevance and would be dropped in view divergent ideas.[3]

6) Kohler reported Soviet concurrence to initialing recently concluded U.S.-Soviet civil air agreement with postponement signing until later.

7) Discussion on negotiating problems evolved along lines August 18 meeting. French unwilling accept U.S. suggestion of possible discussion by Foreign Ministers at UNGA September 19. French demurred at Secretary's suggestion in TV appearance Sunday Aug 20 of public posture that negotiations will take place as anticipating decisions of Allies and inciting neutrals to call upon West for further concessions. French also argued necessary develop firm negotiating position before moving toward negotiations. Kohler replied this not feasible before German elections and unacceptable to U.S. to wait until after that date to act. Kohler again outlined U.S. position stressing necessity of early initiative for negotiations as concomitant to our military build-up.

UK indicated could accept proposal discussion Foreign Ministers at UNGA if preceded by Ambassadorial probes. Latter, Caccia said, could be omitted from text of note and put forward orally at time delivery Western replies. UK also suggested that negotiations be proposed in broader terms than Germany to include other East-West problems. U.S. agreed to discuss language on this with UK tomorrow. U.S. then asked French to report fully to Paris urging French reconsideration Western negotiating position, referring in this connection to Rusk-de Gaulle talks in Paris.[4]

Next meeting tentatively morning August 23.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Kohler and Holloway. Repeated to London, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow.

[2] For texts of the Western protest notes of August 15 and 17 and the Soviet replies of August 18, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 776-780, or Department of State Bulletin, September 4, 1961, pp. 395-400.

[3] A report on the August 18 meeting was transmitted in telegram 845 to London, August 19 (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1961); regarding the tripartite declaration, see footnote 3, Document 118.

[4] See Document 100.

124. Record of Meeting of Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

Washington, August 21, 1961, 2:30 p.m.

Sec State

1. Does not expect USSR to change schedule.

2. Ger considering moving elections from 17 to 10 Sept.

3. Expects USSR action prior to Party Congress—prob about 1 Oct.

4.

K proposals for (a) peace treaty with Germany (b) free city of Berlin, etc.

Not acceptable to US

US Counter proposal—unified Berlin—Germany on basis of self determination

K will probably not accept. He says E Berlin is capital of E Germany.

5. Prob several days of discussion.

6. We must look at what vital issues are: Rights in Berlin—access also. Rights of Berliners. These are the vital issues (legal also). Sec State considers it crucial this time. Not like previously—this is it. Sino-Soviet Bloc has improved its position. Is ready to make major efforts in LA, ME & Asia & Africa. Is ready to challenge US & NATO, SEATO & CENTO.

8. Oslo meeting—disappointing NATO response re African & other probs.

9. If we get kicked out of Berlin—enormous emphasis [prestige?] to Commie bloc—our allies will seek adjustment with USSR.

10. Berlin could result in: a. Status quo—Sec State believes it unlikely to improve status quo. Soviets have [are?] not in habit of giving.

11. Can USSR improve their status quo—we cannot stop peace treaty. If West Germans could improve their rel with E Germany—more likely E & W could work out a reunification.

12. Hope other countries will not recognize E Ger—in case of a peace treaty.

13. What happens after treaty remains to be seen—K could reserve tripartite rights in Berlin. K could agree to permit E & W Germany to live side-by-side.

14. We would not be prepared to renegotiate our rights with E Germans. A clear title on our rights cannot be transferred by K to E Germans.

15. The may become crisis—E Ger could bar our access to Berlin.

16. Sec State rec. ascending intensity of actions. If battle group was stopped, we could have started airlift. We would propose UN action, economic actions, blockade, etc. while we built up mil. preparations.

17. We would need time to justify mil moves. Most difficult to decide is whether initiation of conventional action can be maintained for any period.

18. We must let K know we are ready to move into nuc. war.

19. Mil actions best—pressures in Germany itself. Sec State recognizes it could move rapidly into nuclear war.

20. We cannot accept loss of Berlin or surrender.

21. Br & Fr agree to our def of vital interests. UK may be willing to renegotiate rights. de Gaulle—we are there—rights are non-neg. Germans—might be willing to add.

22. West has not encouraged refugees. West does not want to de-Germanize E Germany. Our interests would be with refugees not leaving E Ger.

23. Not much help from neutrals (Nehru) at least until shooting starts. They know USSR committed to world rev & they may be next. Their ability to be neutral depends on E-W struggle.

My Questions

24. UK—merely building to where they should be now. Fr—if necessary they might consider evac of Algeria. West Europe more for political rather than mil action. Germans want to wait until after election. UK ready to re-call Parliament in order to call up more forces—more ready reserves on continent.

25. 1st neg. with Russians could take place in early Oct.

26. Discussed UN going to Berlin.

27. Govts of West Europe will not be ready to go from small mobile probe to nuc war. Only as last resort.

28. Govts have got to be able to assure that everything has been done—only resort is nuc. war. Nitze's point—re Germans.

29. Sec State wants to give more thought to channeling instructions to commdrs.

[1] Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29, L-216-71. Top Secret. The source text is Lemnitzer's handwritten notes.

125. Memorandum by the President's Military Representative (Taylor)[1]

Washington, August 24, 1961.

COMMENTS UPON GDR RESTRICTIONS ON ALLIED CIRCULATION BETWEEN THE WEST AND EAST SECTORS OF BERLIN

1. It appears to me that the new measures of restraint imposed by the GDR on Allied circulation between the sectors in Berlin are more serious than seem to be generally regarded. For the first time the East Germans have aimed restrictions specifically and publicly at the occupying powers. This new measure has nothing to do with the restraint of refugees, the primary excuse for the sealing off of the East Sector. Its target is the Western Allies who are to be humiliated publicly before all of Germany. It is a measure aimed at further depressing the morale of West Berlin, at destroying the confidence of West Berlin in the Western Powers, and at offsetting the effects of the Johnson-Clay visit.

2. If we allow this provocation to pass unchallenged, it is difficult to see how we can resist restrictions by the GDR on Allied movements on the autobahn, the railway and perhaps in the air.

3. A minimum action to take is for the Western Powers to announce that they will disregard these restrictions and cross into the East Sector wherever and whenever they see fit. What they would do subsequently in living up to this bold language would depend upon circumstances.

4. A second course which recommends itself to me (if supported by our representatives in Berlin) would be for the Western Commandants (or at least the U.S. Commandant) to call up the Soviet Commandant, in Karlshorst, informing him that they are calling on him in a body, crossing at X (a place other than Friedrichstrasse). They would further inform him that they will hold the USSR responsible for any incidents in transiting this Sector border. After waiting a reasonable time to permit the word to get about, they would then proceed to X prepared to cross by force if resisted.

5. While such a course of action is fraught with some hazard and the outcome cannot be clearly predicted, I have the feeling that it would break the rhythm of mounting Communist provocation and prevent later and more hazardous incidents.

M.D.T. [2]

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 35, Berlin-NATO-Military Buildup. Secret. Attached to Document 253. According to a handwritten notation, copies of the memorandum were taken to a 9:45 a.m. meeting with Bundy and the President on August 24. Taylor's recommendations were subsequently transmitted to Bonn and Berlin for comment. (Telegram 415 to Bonn, August 24; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-2461)

[2] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

126. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

Dean Brown, WE

Herve Alphand, French Ambassador

Jean Claude Winckler, Counselor

The Ambassador said the Berlin situation is developing seriously. Yesterday's measures[2] had been the first direct threat to allied access rights. The dangerous period may have come faster than we thought. First, we must be ready to apply counter-measures immediately. This means some review and some government decisions. We all seemed agreed on this. Second, we should make a diplomatic démarche to the Kremlin, either the three Ambassadors together or one speaking for them. The French Government has a draft of what form this approach should take. (The Ambassador then read from the attached paper. [3] In summary, it states that Soviet actions create an intolerable situation. Does Khrushchev want a showdown? If not, then he must abandon unilateral actions and create a relaxed atmosphere in which discussions can take place.)

The Ambassador then commented that unless we take this approach the Soviets will continue their actions believing we are weak when we are not.

The Secretary replied that Khrushchev might simply say that he has made proposals and where are the West's?

The Ambassador said we should then say that we are ready to talk when the tension disappears.

The Secretary asked if the French based this attitude on the Soviet airlift note. When the Ambassador replied affirmatively, the Secretary said the French had expressed their reluctance at the Paris Ministerial meeting even before the Soviets had acted in Berlin.

The Ambassador replied that the West was under threat at that time. To offer negotiations, he continued, without knowing the aims and results of those negotiations could lead to miscalculation by the Soviets. The Secretary said he agreed. We want to protect our vital interests without war. We must get into contact with the other side. The French propose setting up pre-conditions for contact. This might assure mis-calculation before contact.

The Ambassador said that the suggested language is the only one the Soviets understand. The US may believe that public opinion must be considered; the Soviets, however, will interpret a willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness and will step up their threats.

The Secretary said we are talking about the possibility of negotiations. By the time the UNGA comes, we should be ready. If we don't express a willingness to negotiate, there will be increasing pressure within the alliance and in much of the world believing that diplomacy has made no effort to find out if there is a way to avoid a disastrous chain of effects.

The Ambassador replied that it is public knowledge that we want to negotiate. The other side will feel we are ready to yield. They'll say they are ready to negotiate on a peace treaty and turning over Berlin to the GDR.

The Secretary said we do not have to agree to this. There could be discussions over a period of time as to what negotiations would be about.

The Ambassador said we have different views. Over the years we have agreed that we must keep a firm position, that we don't have to take the initiative, and that what we now have in Berlin is better than we could get. Why has the US changed?

Mr. Kohler said we start by agreeing that the key is a demonstration of firmness and determination. We have done this. We don't feel weak, and we don't believe the Soviets think we are weak. We are convincing them by acts. We can show the world we are ready to negotiate and that the Soviets are at fault if negotiations do not occur. We give a demonstration of weakness by an appearance of disunity. The three Governments believe we should take the next step; only France is unbending.

The Secretary asked why the US and France disagree on so many important questions: test suspension, disarmament, the Congo, Southeast Asia,SEATO, consultation, the UN. There is no important question on which the two countries are working closely.

The Ambassador attributed this to the UN, wherein the US attaches significance to a consensus of nations and from which France has only suffered. He then said that the US may consider a meeting of Foreign Ministers. He did not believe France would want to be associated with it.

Mr. Kohler asked about the note to the Soviets.[4] If we, the UK, and the Germans agreed on it, would France expect us to send it without taking any part itself?

The Ambassador said his Government only disagreed on the last paragraph about negotiations. He didn't know what the procedure would be.

The Secretary mentioned the President's letter to de Gaulle[5] on this subject.

The Ambassador suggested we await a reply to it before going further on the note. He said he had seen President de Gaulle before the latest Soviet measure.[6] Now that the latter has occurred President de Gaulle would be even more adamant. He then asked: Is there something we don't know? The meeting between the two Presidents had gone extremely well, especially on Berlin. Suddenly something had happened. Had it?[7]

The Secretary replied negatively. We have different appreciations of what the situation calls for. The President is worried about the alliance falling into disunity over the lack of response to Khrushchev's proposals.

Mr. Kohler suggested the Ambassador confirm this by reading the reports of NATO discussions.

The Secretary said that France is virtually isolated in NATO on this issue. The disunity of the alliance is what will impress Khrushchev the most.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2461. Secret. Drafted by Brown and approved in S on September 8.

[2] On August 23 the number of sector crossings in Berlin for residents had been reduced to seven and, for the Western Allies, to the one at Friedrichstrasse. On the same day the Soviet Union protested to the Western Allies the use of the air corridors to the city for transporting extremists from the Federal Republic. For text of the note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 783-784.

[3] Not found.

[4] Reference is to a draft reply to the August 3 Soviet note. The French objected to the draft because the final paragraph called for negotiations with the Soviet Union. A copy of the draft was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 562, August 25, for information only. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2561)

[5] For text of this letter, dated August 24, in which Kennedy appealed to de Gaulle to agree that negotiations be part of the reply, see Declassified Documents, 1986, 2260.

[6] For Alphand's account of his conversation with de Gaulle on August 23, see L'Etonnement d'etre, pp. 362-366.

[7] On August 22 Winckler had made this point even more forcibly in a talk with Kohler, stating that Couve de Murville had been “astounded” by the change in the U.S. position between the President's speech and the Foreign Ministers meeting. Winckler concluded that France was “not only disturbed but alarmed by what seems to it to be a sudden and inexplicable reversal of the U.S. tactical position.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2261)

127. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, August 24, 1961.

You have asked for my views on the assignment of General Clay as U.S. Military Commander in Berlin.

Both General Lemnitzerand I believe the appointment of General Clay as Commander of U.S. Forces in Berlin would complicate and strain the command channel and the command relationships between the Berlin Commander on the one hand and Generals Clarke and Palmer on the other. Instead, we recommend the appointment of General Clay as Chief of Mission with the rank of Ambassador.

I understand that at present the United States maintains a Mission in Berlin, as well as an Embassy in Bonn. Ambassador Dowling functions both as Chief of the Berlin Mission, and also as Ambassador to the Federal German Republic. Under our proposal, Ambassador Dowling would be relieved of his responsibilities as Chief of the Berlin Mission, and these would be assigned to General Clay. The U.S. Commander in Berlin, Major General Watson, who also carries the title of U.S. Commandant and Deputy Chief of Mission, would report to General Clay. Mr. Lightner, who is assigned as Assistant Chief of Mission and Deputy Commandant, would remain in his present post.

Robert S. McNamara

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General Clay. Confidential. A copy was sent to Rusk.

128. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Europe (Norstad)[1]

Washington, August 25, 1961, 10 p.m.

JCS 1265. From CJCS. Exclusive for General Norstad and General Clarke signed Lemnitzer. Do not deliver prior to 0800 local time.

1. The objective of insisting on our access to East Berlin by the US Command, Berlin, is to demonstrate our determination to maintain our legal right of entry to East Berlin. Concurrently we desire to give political and psychological evidence of US attitude in regard to developments in the Berlin situation. A clear distinction must be made, however, between US right of access to East Berlin and West Berlin. While we consider the US right of access to East Berlin to be important, we do not consider it so vital that it must be maintained by the use of force which entails combat, except that required for self-defense if our forces are fired upon in the implementation of measures indicated below. U.S. forces so fired upon in East Berlin should defend themselves and withdraw to West Berlin, forces fired upon in West Berlin should return fire only so long as they are under fire. No line of action should be initiated to maintain the U.S. right of access to East Berlin, therefore, which would result in serious loss of U.S. prestige if U.S. forces involved should have to withdraw. However, U.S. right of access to West Berlin from FRG is of such importance as to require, if necessary, the use of force entailing combat.

2. While we do not recognize the authority of the GDR/USSR to restrict our access it is considered that the U.S. right of access to East Berlin is satisfied, for practical purposes, as long as one entry point is available for the unimpeded movement of allied personnel.

3. Four types of resistance can be encountered at the access point(s) to East Berlin:

a. Administrative.

b. Passive obstacles which can be removed by personnel.

c. Heavier obstacles which require bulldozer and/or tanks or demolition to remove.

d. Mobs or crowds of civilians or formations of GDR troops or police which refuse to move out of the way of vehicles.

4. Should administrative resistance, such as abnormal requests for identification, or long delays be encountered a request should be made for a Soviet officer. If the Soviet officer does not appear and clear passage within a reasonable time, the vehicle should move forward shaking off any restraint if this can be done without actually knocking down or running over the persons blocking access. If this cannot be done, the vehicle should withdraw.

5. In the event passive obstacles which can be moved by personnel are encountered, the obstacles should be removed and the vehicles proceed.

6. If heavier obstacles which require bulldozer and/or tanks or demolition to remove are encountered, the vehicles should withdraw and instructions should be requested from higher authority.

7. If mobs or crowds or formations of GDR troops or police block passageway, the procedures in paragraph 4 above refer. If it becomes clear that entry cannot be secured without running over or combat with East German personnel, United States vehicles should withdraw, and instructions should be requested from higher authority.

8. In any of the above situations where the vehicle is fired upon, or where it is obvious that vehicles cannot proceed or the lives of personnel are immediately endangered, the vehicle will withdraw.

9. Your recommendation for additional courses of action within the parameters outlined in paragraph 1 above are invited.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret; Immediate. Repeated to USAREUR for Clarke. A draft of this cable showing Bundy's revisions is ibid., National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables.

129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, August 26, 1961, 7:15 p.m.

982. Following based on uncleared memcon.[2]

Ambassadorial Group and military advisers met today with Secretary and Secretary McNamara.

Secretary raised questions of how Western countries see future developments of Berlin situation and how they propose to handle? He pointed out that responsibility for deciding to go to nuclear war is so grave that we must be assured that all other alternatives have been canvassed. Unfortunately, present state Western planning and readiness not adequate to ensure that we have available a wide range of effective alternatives. US does not want to go from a repulsed jeep probe on autobahn to all out nuclear war in one move. We envision rather a series of responses in ascending order of violence. But plans and forces for such responses and their political concomitants must be available. At present, they are not and we run grave risk of relying upon assumption that by saying we will go to nuclear war we are thereby assuring that there will be no war.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that there are also deficiencies in our planning for nuclear warfare. Until such planning takes place, we will not know what our shortages are or what our chances are to make good on such shortages. Planning for conventional war has already revealed shortages which are now being filled as a result.

Defense Secretary reported his serious concern at state of Live Oak and NATO planning. He reported US now doing NATO planning which is undesirable but necessary in view time factor. He said we must enlarge and expand Live Oak to provide wide range alternatives within which governments could make decisions. After considerable discussion problem of bringing all NATO countries into planning process without causing inordinate delays, US reps expressed hope that instructions would go forward to General Norstad to have Live Oak planning take account of NATO implications, such plans to be subject to subsequent review by NATO planners. In meantime, NAC directives to NATO on planning could be prepared and consideration be given to inviting Stikker US for consultation Ambassadorial Group. Secretary noted that events would inevitably merge tripartite plans and action with NATO plans and action in any event.

Nitze reviewed discussions of military experts noting—

1) On blocking or harassing of Berlin air access, experts have catalogued twelve possible situations, three of which require expanded Jack Pine planning which group now discussing. Plans requiring political decisions prior implementation have been isolated. All agreed Smirnov threat (Bonn 430)[3] to civil air lines which probably could be made good showed urgency finalizing air access plans. Nitze reported group confident military planes can supply garrison and handle passenger traffic even in face electronic harassment but military planes unable mount freight airlift with present capability in face such harassment.

2) Naval measures up to and including full blockade Bloc shipping within US capability but economic effect upon USSR negligible and effect on GDR would be for limited period. Secretary suggested US prepare battery legal positions for use in case we wish institute navicert system, seize USSR electronic-spy trawlers, etc. Nitze reported political repercussions from neutrals on naval measures will be severe but that measures would convince Sovs that their actions in Germany were dangerous.

3) Group is considering papers on Live Oak and NATO planning. A recommendation to Ambassadors along line Rusk/McNamara remarks reported above may be available Monday when the Ambassadors meet again.

Only political question raised was Grewe's fear that Soviets have speeded up time table to go to brink because they know we are vulnerable at this time. Germans believe Sovs will stop at brink and begin “nibbling” against West Berlin's political status. Berlin's myriad vulnerabilities could leave city “hollow shell” by time Allies ready for showdown. Grewe hoped we could plan non-military countermeasures to halt this process. He agreed Caccia remark that heretofore there had been consensus that our moves were appropriate. Grewe offered no suggestion new actions. Secretary commented that primary responsibility for maintenance West Berlin morale was with West Berliners themselves. They have been magnificent for 15 years. Even the massive aid we are prepared give them cannot substitute for their internal decisions to maintain their way of life in face adversity.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-2661. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Holloway and approved by Hillenbrand. Also sent to Bonn, Paris for USRO, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] The memorandum of this conversation, which was held at 10:30 a.m., is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

[3] Telegram 430 from Bonn, August 26, summarized an AP dispatch in which Smirnov advocated that air traffic to Berlin be subject to the same controls as rail and road traffic. (Ibid., Central Files, 862.72/8-2661)

130. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 26, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

German Ambassador Wilhelm G. Grewe

The Secretary

Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand,GER

Ambassador Grewe saw the Secretary just prior to his departure for Bonn, and again stressed the anxiety of his Government that something further be done to assist West Berlin and West German morale. He also said he would stress urgently in Bonn the need for accelerated German military build-up despite the electoral campaign. The Ambassador indicated that some thought had been given in Bonn to advancing the elections to September 3 but this had proved technically impossible.

In considering what might further be done along the lines of the Vice-President's visit to Berlin and the US garrison increase, the Federal Government had thought of the possibility of a bilateral exchange of messages between the President and the Chancellor. The Federal Republic would much appreciate some gesture of this kind in the near future.

The Secretary said we would give thought to this problem, the solution to which must start from a clear concept of what the Berlin morale question is about. Unfortunately the West Berliners seemed to have focused on the situation in East Berlin and were tending to permit this to undermine those important components of West Berlin morale to which the West is completely committed. Ambassador Grewe indicated that one of the facts specifically weakening morale in Berlin and the Federal Republic was the fear that a too precise definition of Western vital interests which might warrant military action could undermine the essential basis of West Berlin by providing a dangerous area for Soviet nibbling. The West Berliners could not distinguish between Western acceptance of the closing of sector borders and other rights which we had also stressed. The Secretary commented that stress on vital interests over which we would be prepared to fight obviously did not mean abandonment of the broad range of other political objectives which the West would continue to seek but which we could not realistically expect to be achieved in practice under present circumstances. The Federal Republic obviously also had an important role to play in the maintenance of Berlin morale. The Ambassador indicated that Chancellor Adenauer had just written a dozen letters to the heads of governments of the uncommitted nations stating the Western case on Berlin.[2] The Germans had also given thought to the preparatory action regarding UN countries which the West might take in advance of the UNGA session on September 17 and would be putting a paper on this subject into the Ambassadorial Group.

The Secretary stressed the problem of timing in regard to any possible Adenauer intervention with de Gaulle in order to obtain French concurrence to the operative paragraph on negotiations contained in the proposed reply to the Soviet note of August 3. Perhaps the Chancellor could make a telephone call to de Gaulle. If the weekend passed and the French were unwilling to accept tripartitely this agreed language, we would have to think of doing something ourselves. One possibility was to put the draft before NATO as a US text and to say we were prepared to take the initiative at UNGA in approaching the Soviets along the lines indicated, thus bypassing the French.

Ambassador Grewe said one problem in an approach by the Chancellor was that he might get the same reply from de Gaulle that Alphand had given him (Grewe) yesterday to the effect that, if the Germans favor negotiations, do they know where they will lead. While this was not the proper stage at which to define a new negotiating position, the Chancellor must have some idea of what the West has in mind in initiating negotiations. The Secretary observed there was time to work this out before the UNGA. He thought it important to say that the broad policies of the West on these matters, based on our strategic commitments, agreements and obligations of the Soviets, and our definition of our vital interests, were pretty well established. What was involved in formulating a negotiating position was more than a question of detail. As the Secretary had stated to the North Atlantic Council early this month,[3] Khrushchev had made certain unacceptable proposals. The West would presumably counter these with proposals that would be unacceptable to Khrushchev. Talks would go on for a while and the question would then become one of what both sides would do in the face of de facto disagreement in lieu of war. The Secretary thought that our offering to provide a peaceful solution to the problem of Central Europe was important in gaining support for reasonableness of our position. It would help to take away from Khrushchev the advantage he is getting from reiteration of such phrases as “peace treaty”, “free city” and “guaranteed access”. The Secretary said he did not believe it to be true as de Gaulle suggests, that if we look to negotiations we are acting in the dark. The Allies have been working together for fifteen years. While more was required than merely dusting off the Western Peace Plan, we had in mind no major shifts in the direction of our policies. We have frankly tried to stay away from the details of our negotiating position, partly because of the leak problem.

Ambassador Grewe mentioned that the difficulty in Germany was that prominent American columnists frequently reported what they alleged to be authorized thinking of the U.S. Administration. These added up to a comprehensive catalog of concessions which the U.S. reportedly was prepared to make regarding Berlin, the recognition of the GDR, and European security arrangements. It would be helpful if the Presidential message to the Chancellor, referred to previously, could provide a basis to fight this kind of speculative reporting, for example, by saying something to the effect that the 1954 Paris Agreements[4] were still the basis of U.S. policy. The Secretary said we would consider this, but he did not believe the U.S. should be forced, in effect, to put forward our negotiating position on the basis of newspaper speculation which could not be based on facts. Somewhat facetiously, he added that two things we could not say were that these speculations were not true because we had no thoughts on the subject or that the Federal Republic had gone further towards de facto recognition of the GDR than any other country. Ambassador Grewe commented with respect to the last point that the situation was somewhat different since this was essentially an internal matter of Germans dealing with Germans.

In response to the Secretary's query, Ambassador Grewe said he had received the impression that Khrushchev had definitely speeded up his time-table during the past eight to ten days. However, Ulbricht's speech yesterday[5] may have been the signal that the process may now be somewhat slowed down. (The German Embassy later telephoned to say that further analysis of the text of Ulbricht's speech indicated this judgment to be overly optimistic.)

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2661. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand and approved in S on September 9. For Grewe's account of this conversation, which took place right after the meeting of the Ambassadorial Group (see Document 129), see Rückblenden, pp. 494-495. On August 25 Grewe had had a similar conversation with Hillenbrand. A memorandum of that conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2561.

[2] A copy of this letter, dated August 23, is ibid., 762.00/8-2861.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 99.

[4] For text of the Paris Agreements, October 23, 1954, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 425 ff.

[5] For text of Ulbricht's speech on August 25, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Band 7, pp. 231-241.

131. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Kennedy[1]

Paris, August 26, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have carefully reflected on the contents of your message of August 25 [24].[2] Let me tell you, first of all, that I was not surprised by it. Various reasons, which are those of the United States, make me, indeed, well understand the attitude to which you have been brought in the crisis created by the Soviets concerning Berlin.

You emphasize how much you are concerned with seeking the approval of the States “of the third world”, that of the participants in the coming conference at Belgrade, that of certain sections of American public opinion, and that of the average NATO members. However, these various elements, whose opinion is certainly not without importance but who for the most part have already made up their minds, and you know in what way, do not bear real responsibilities in the question which faces the United States, Great Britain, and France. You indicate that you have thus been led, while strengthening your military means of defense, to contemplate for the Three to enter promptly and openly into negotiations with the Soviets, whatever be the threats that they are hurling at us and the actual acts that they are committing in violation of agreements. Moreover, it is only too clear that the geographic situation of Berlin gives them locally many advantages for pressure and action with respect to the population and the Westerners, advantages which they will certainly continue to use as open negotiations unfold. Lastly, in the situation of strength in which they are already placed one cannot see what could be the field, the basis, and the result of negotiations if not the field, the basis, and the result that the Soviets have ceaselessly proclaimed and that they would not fail to demand more and more loudly as soon as conversations were engaged in before the whole world on the subject of Berlin.

As these facts of the situation do not escape anyone, I believe that the opening of negotiations in the present circumstances would be considered immediately as a prelude to the abandonment, at least gradually, of Berlin and as a sort of notice of our surrender. I am convinced that this would be a very grave blow to our Atlantic Alliance and that the consequences as concern the possibility of approaches, then of arrangements, between Soviet Russia and a number of our allies of today would rapidly follow.

France, as you know, strongly desires that a broad and real international détente—which can only come from acts of the Soviets just as the present tension comes only from them—would permit one day the opening of objective discussions between the United States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and France on all the problems of the world and especially that of Germany. France will reiterate this in the note that it will address to the Government in the Kremlin in reply to the latter's note of August 3. Meanwhile, as a precaution, France is reinforcing its means of defense in Europe. But in the present state of affairs, as it has been created in Berlin by the violation of agreements, acts of violence, threats, and demands of the Soviets, France insists for its part in not engaging in the negotiations which are in fact demanded by Moscow.

As I said on August 8 to Mr. Dean Rusk,[3] it is up to the United States, if they consider it useful, to try to induce the Soviets to define in a precise manner by the normal diplomatic channel their claims and thus to seek to determine if the elements of a positive and honorable negotiation exist. To this my government could not raise any objections. If it should appear as a result of this exploration that such a negotiation could be possible, France would undoubtedly reconsider its position. However, the reasons that I have set forth to you will make you understand, I am sure, why the French note addressed to Moscow cannot include “a proposal for the examination of the possibilities of negotiations by the foreign ministers at New York at the end of September”.

I am, moreover, convinced that you will not see anything in this position which indicates the least separation of my country from yours as to their will to safeguard, together, freedom in the world and to bear, side by side, all the responsibilities that this duty imposes upon them.

With the very cordial assurance of my very high consideration,[4]

C. de Gaulle[5]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. The source text is a Department of State translation. Alphand delivered the letter at 7:15 p.m. on August 26. A memorandum of his conversation with Rusk on that occasion is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/8-2661.

[2] See footnote 5, Document 126.

[3] See Document 100.

[4] On August 27 Rusk met individually with Alphand, Hood, and Knapf to tell them that, in view of the French position on negotiations, the United States no longer wanted to reply to the August 3 Soviet note. Rusk also gave them drafts of a statement calling for a Western Foreign Ministers meeting to begin in Washington on September 14 and a statement that the United States would begin exploratory conversations with the Soviet Union on Berlin and that these talks might take place at the United Nations or through normal diplomatic exchanges. (Memoranda of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2761)

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

132. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, August 28, 1961.

1. I should like to have a meeting of the Berlin Steering Group this week to go over the status of our Berlin contingency planning, in order to see what has been quadripartitely agreed and what is still under discussion. Are there any gaps in our planning which need to be covered? I am particularly interested in knowing what we are doing with regard to the following situations:

a. Interference with the civil air traffic into Berlin. This is very much in my mind.

b. Contingencies arising from the partitioning of Berlin (for example, conflicts between the West Berlin population and the East German police).

c. The extension of Live Oak planning to take into account a greater reliance on conventional forces.

d. Actions to be taken in the case of an East German revolt.

2. Please let me know when you will be ready to have this meeting.

John Kennedy

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2861. Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1986, 912. A draft of this memorandum by Taylor has points a and b rearranged and a point e: “Reaction to a sudden invitation to negotiation by the USSR.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 39, 6A Berlin) On August 28 Bundy sent the President a 4-page memorandum on the subject of negotiations, indicating that it was a complex subject and “the most important one” the President had before him. After reviewing the question of timing, Bundy stated that the President's principal advisers were split on the issue of the substance of the negotiations and stressed that only Kennedy could decide the U.S. negotiating position. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

133. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 30, 1961, noon-12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

Ambassador Grewe called on the President at the request of the German Embassy to present a letter addressed to the President by Chancellor Adenauer (translation attached).[2] The President commented, as the Ambassador handed over the communication, that he had read about it in the press that morning in an article by New York Times correspondent Sydney Gruson from Bonn. The Ambassador protested that this was a very partial and inaccurate account, as the President would see.

After reading the letter, the President commented that he had great difficulty understanding reports of trends towards neutralism in Europe particularly in contrast to the tremendous military preparedness effort which the United States is making. He said he appreciated of course that there had been some disenchantment at the inability of the Allies to hit back vigorously after the Soviet sealing off of East Berlin. This feeling was of course shared in the United States. However, even the counter measures which had been proposed by Mayor Brandt were wholly inadequate responses. The President said he had discussed this question with Secretary Rusk this morning and was very apprehensive about possible Soviet and East German harassment of civil air access to Berlin.[3] He felt it urgent that appropriate counter measures for any such move be readied.

The Ambassador said there were some people who had not been satisfied with the Allied response and there were some criticisms of the continuance of interzonal trade despite the Soviet/GDR action. If further measures were taken against us by the other side without strong reactions there was a possibility of serious discouragement in West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

The President said he was inclined to agree with the Ambassador's remarks and with the observations in the Chancellor's letter. He asked, however, what the Germans expected in the way of Soviet moves and what they expected as counter measures. The Ambassador replied that the Federal Government felt the counter measures might be more timely and might be taken earlier with respect to a whole range of Soviet harassments which fell short of touching what we described as vital interests. The President then asked the Ambassador whether there were any differences between the Germans and others in the Ambassadorial Group. The Ambassador replied that there had been some difference with respect to the application of counter measures related to interzonal trade. At the President's request, Mr. Kohler then briefly summarized the points of view which had been expressed both in the Paris Foreign Ministers Meeting and in the subsequent Ambassadorial Group discussions, pointing out that it was generally agreed even by the Germans that this was an instrument of considerable importance not to be lightly applied, particularly since the burden of civilian traffic—which constituted 95% of the volume—would then fall on Allied military means of transport. Terminating this discussion, the Ambassador commented that the Federal Government was not complaining about this matter. The President said that he agreed that it was desirable that we be able to respond quickly to Soviet moves and not seem supine. He asked that this question of counter measures be urgently discussed in the Ambassadorial Group and pointed out that he was expecting a report on this subject tomorrow.

The Ambassador then said that the FRG was somewhat bothered by public references made to the definition of the three vital Allied interests involved in the Berlin situation and press comments along this line. He said that the FRG feared that this would constitute an invitation to the Soviets to aggress in the sectors which were not included in this definition, such as the ties between West Berlin and the FRG. The President reiterated that there should be a careful examination of all possible Soviet moves and of non-military counter measures, so that if there were a Soviet attack in non-vital areas there would be an appropriate non-vital response.

The Ambassador then commented on a passage of the Adenauer letter stating that, while the Chancellor agreed on the need for negotiations, he was somewhat worried as to whether Western initiative might not be interpreted by the Soviets as weakness. He said there were some West Germans who were reading into our readiness to negotiate a willingness to make concessions, since there was much speculation in the press and our negotiating positions were not publicly known. The President commented that this was the position of General de Gaulle. He said it was a real problem since it was clearly not desirable to try to develop negotiating positions which might be publicly speculated about before the German elections. The Ambassador said perhaps the immediate problem could be handled by having the Information Subgroup of the Ambassadorial Group consider the problem and take a more aggressive information line.

The President then told the Ambassador about his intention to appoint General Lucius Clay as his personal representative with the rank of Ambassador on temporary assignment in Berlin[4] which he thought should help to maintain morale and confidence in Berlin and Germany. After indicating he welcomed this news, the Ambassador added that we needed more Western complaints about Soviet actions. In this connection he said the hint in the President's recent statement about self-determination in Eastern Europe had been considered valuable by the FRG.[5] His Government considered that the Soviets were both vulnerable and sensitive on this point (the President noted that he might have an opportunity to say something more on these lines at a press conference).

The President then said that there was obviously no difference of opinion between the Chancellor and himself. He did want to ask, however, the Ambassador's view as to how serious were the tendencies toward neutralism hinted at in the Gruson story. The Ambassador replied that there was some latent neutralism around, some doubt about how far the West would go and some question about whether the Chancellor's Atlantic policy had been right. For the most part these tendencies were on the part of small splinter parties which had been quiet for the past couple of years, but were now speaking up again. The President asked what they saw as an alternative. Did they want Ulbricht? As the Ambassador shook his head to indicate no, the President assured him that it is the very real purpose of the United States Government to maintain solidarity with the FRG. The United States was prepared and he felt that we were going to the brink of nuclear war. If we were willing to face this prospect, there must be good faith on both sides. This was a very serious question. The Ambassador said he could assure the President that there was no fundamental reversal of mood in the FRG. However there were the tendencies he had described and of course in an election campaign the Chancellor was particularly sensitive to them.

The President thanked the Ambassador and told him he would make an early reply to the Chancellor.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/8-3061. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler and approved by the White House on September 11. The meeting was held at the White House. For a brief account of this meeting by Grewe, see Rückblenden, p. 496.

[2] Not attached. In it Adenauer expressed his understanding of the U.S. desire to negotiate and de Gaulle's concern that negotiations might be misinterpreted. Because of this he welcomed the forthcoming meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers and stressed the need for a fresh examination of non-military countermeasures that might be taken against the Soviet Union. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

[3] The President met with Rusk, Bundy, and Taylor from 9:50 to 10 a.m. (Kennedy Library, JFK Log Book) No other record of this meeting has been found.

[4] At 4 p.m. on August 29 the President and General Clay discussed his appointment as the President's Personal Representative in Berlin. (Kennedy Library, JFK Log Book) On the following day Kennedy sent Clay a letter appointing him to the position and outlining his position in the military and political chain of command in the city. (Ibid., National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General Clay) For text of the statement Kennedy made at a press conference on August 30, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 786-787.

[5] For text of this statement, made at the President's press conference on July 19, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 520.

134. Editorial Note

On August 30, 1961, Thomas K. Finletter, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in response to a request by the President, wrote him a lengthy letter on the attitude of the NATO Allies on the desirability and form of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Berlin question. After prefacing his remarks by saying the Alliance military response had been inadequate and the first reaction to the U.S. proposals on economic countermeasures had been bad, Finletter stated that there was a universal view (except for the French) that the U.S. military buildup had not been accompanied by sufficient emphasis on the political aspects of the question. Finletter went on to describe some proposals within the Alliance on what to expect from the Soviet Union, how the West might anticipate these moves, and what might be done in the event the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. For text of this letter, see Declassified Documents, 1986, 1868.

135. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)[1]

Washington, August 31, 1961.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS PUT TO THE PRESIDENT

The following program was presented to the President for use in the event of interruption of civil air access to West Berlin.

The Soviets may seek to accomplish this interruption in either of two ways: first, by administrative procedures or warnings or threats which would have the consequence of leading the airlines to make their own decisions not to fly, or, second, by a military act such as forcing a plane down in East Germany, which would then be followed by a decision of the civil airlines to stop flying. It was the recommendation to the President that in the former case we should move to military transport without fighter escort, and in the latter case we should move to military transport with fighter escort.

In the event that there is attempted interference with an unescorted military transport, the pilot is to attempt to continue to his assigned landing field in West Berlin, but if the safety of the aircraft requires it, he may make a forced landing under direct threat, in East German territory or in East Berlin. The President wishes to review this recommendation in the light of comments which General Taylor and I made to him after the meeting.[2]

In the event that a military aircraft is forced down or shot down, we would proceed at once to the use of air cover, and the fighter aircraft would have instructions to respond by force to any air attack and to drive off any buzzing aircraft by force if necessary. They would not be authorized to engage in deep pursuit or to attack airfields, and the President overruled a recommendation that they should have standing instructions to respond to anti-aircraft attack by counterattack. He wished to review this question after the first such episode had occurred.

In the event of any interference with civil air access, the allies have agreed to block access of Bloc civil aircraft to their own countries, and to all NATO countries if agreement can be reached. The case will also be taken at once to the Security Council.

Finally, it was agreed that the Secretary of State will call in the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and give him a stern warning against any interference with air access, civil or military, to West Berlin.

McG. B.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret.

[2] According to Rusk's Appointment Book the Berlin Steering Group met at the White House beginning at 3 p.m. (Johnson Library) The President joined the meeting shortly after 4. (Kennedy Library, JFK Log Book) In addition to the decisions recorded here, at 9 p.m. on August 31 Lemnitzer cabled Norstad and reported that the President had approved reinforcement of U.S. Air Force units in Europe and instructions dealing with possible Soviet harassment of U.S. air access. (Memorandum to Lemnitzer, September 1; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, FRC 71 A 3470, 092 Berlin)

136. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, August 31, 1961, 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

East German Threats against Air Corridors to Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Mr. Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, Chargé of the Soviet Embassy

Mr. Oleg M. Sokolov, employee, Soviet Embassy

Mr. John C. Guthrie, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs

The Secretary expressed his appreciation to Mr. Smirnovsky for coming in on such short notice. The Secretary stated that he wished to say a few words on behalf of the President concerning the Soviet note of August 23 and our reply thereto concerning air access to Berlin.[2] He noted that our reply to the Soviet note had come from the three Western Powers and he wished to be certain that the Soviets have a copy of the White House statement of August 24,[3] a copy of which the Secretary thereupon handed Mr. Smirnovsky.

The Secretary continued that he had asked Mr. Smirnovsky to come in because we have noticed a number of East German statements which give rise to a belief that the East German regime may be contemplating some action involving the air corridors connecting West Germany and Berlin. The President, he said, had asked him to point out to the Soviet Government that the United States, under well-established legal authority and procedures, considers the entire air traffic between West Germany and Berlin as an integral whole, a unity. Therefore any attempt by the East Germans or by the Soviets to interfere with this traffic would be considered by the United States an aggressive act and an illegal violation of existing arrangements.

The Secretary directed Mr. Smirnovsky's attention to the final paragraph of our reply to the Soviet note of August 23. He stated that he was at this time reinforcing these statements because of the statements made by East German officials regarding the air corridors. The United States Government, the Secretary said, hopes that the Soviet Union also recognizes our position regarding the legality and propriety of this air traffic and that the Soviet Government and East Germans will avoid any form of action against existing traffic in the corridor. In any such event, the United States reserves to itself the full right to undertake any action which it considers necessary to preserve the freedom of access to Berlin.

The Secretary stated that he wished to add the following general comment. We have supposed that both the Soviet Government and the Western Powers anticipate that at some stage there will be discussions regarding Germany and Berlin. We also understand it to be Mr. Khrushchev's view that such negotiations ought not to be held in any systematic way prior to the West German elections. We are very much concerned, however, that unilateral actions which might be taken or considered prior to such negotiations could greatly increase the tensions and dangers which already exist in regard to the problems of Germany and Berlin. We would find it difficult to understand how a responsible government could permit such actions to increase danger at a time when it is the duty of all of us not to let these matters go beyond control. I would conclude, the Secretary said, by repeating our expectation that no action will be taken to prevent access to Berlin in any form.

Mr. Smirnovsky said that he had no comment to make but would report the Secretary's remarks to his government.

The Secretary told Mr. Smirnovsky that we had inquired through our Embassy in Moscow whether Foreign Minister Gromyko was planning to attend the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. We have been informed that the composition of the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly has not yet been decided upon and the Secretary asked Mr. Smirnovsky if he knew the answer to his question. Mr. Smirnovsky replied in the negative.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-3161. Secret. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on September 8.

[2] For texts of these notes, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 783-786.

[3] For text of the White House statement warning the Soviet Union against interference with free access to Berlin, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 568-569.

137. Editorial Note

On September 2, 1961, George F. Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, reported that as a follow-up to a previous conversation, he had discussed Laos and Berlin with his Soviet counterpart. The latter reported that he had received a personal communication from Khrushchev enthusiastically endorsing further conversations between the two Ambassadors. After discussing Laos, Kennan stated that he had no special authority to discuss Berlin, but that he wanted to say “with all earnestness” that recent Soviet moves in Berlin had made the situation very serious. The Soviet Ambassador, who appeared to be acting under instructions, then outlined the Soviet desiderata: 1) recognition of East German borders, 2) recognition of the existence of two German states, and 3) Soviet disinterest in the people of West Berlin. Kennan replied that this seemed reasonable and could be discussed if the right time and atmosphere were found, but that recent Soviet moves in Berlin made this unlikely. He concluded the discussion by stating that Soviet conduct had been so inexplicable that he could not help wondering if forces had come to the fore in the Soviet Union that placed no value on the peaceful resolution of disputes. Kennan then suggested to the Department of State that this contact be continued as a means of private communication with Khrushchev. (Telegram 359 from Belgrade; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-BE/9-261)

In a cable on September 4 Kennan added that the Soviet Ambassador had left him a 10-page memorandum elaborating the Soviet positions on Berlin and Laos. Kennan suggested how he might reply and stated that he believed the United States was already in a zone of serious danger, should maintain the greatest military and diplomatic vigilance, and “be prepared to act in the great decisions primarily on our conscience and responsibility.” (Telegram 400 from Belgrade; ibid., 762.00/9-461)

On September 5 Secretary of State Rusk personally endorsed Kennan's proposed reply on Berlin (telegram 274 to Belgrade; ibid.) and, in a second conversation on September 6, the Ambassador repeated that recent Soviet actions seemed to refute its desire to solve problems peacefully. After a further exchange, Kennan concluded that the Soviet Union had two irreducible demands: 1) signing a peace treaty and 2) de facto recognition of East Germany under a formula recognizing the two Germanies. (Telegram 438 from Belgrade, September 7; ibid., 762.00/9-761)

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, September 3, 1961.

[2]

660. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Within a reasonable interval after your return you should endeavor to have a conversation with Gromyko if at all possible without any publicity. During this conversation you should inform Gromyko that:

1. While you are not in a position to make suggestions as to arrangements, the United States anticipates that there will be discussion with Soviet representatives in regard to future negotiations. The actual situation in Berlin itself, particularly in regard to Western rights and position there, will of course be a major factor as to whether such negotiations would be feasible. It was the understanding of the United States Government following the meeting between Khrushchev and the President that it was the Soviet intention to leave all matters affecting established allied rights regarding Germany and Berlin unchanged pending consideration of a peace treaty which Khrushchev indicated then and subsequently he hoped to sign by the end of the year. The United States would like to have assurance that allied rights and obligations will not be further affected by any unilateral action either by the Soviet Union or the East German regime.

2. If Gromyko seems willing to discuss negotiations you might endeavor to ascertain from him what the Soviets envisage as a basis for negotiation. He may initially indicate that these would be the consideration of peace treaties with the two Germanies and arrangement for a free city for West Berlin. You should tell him that we could not restrict ourselves to Soviet proposals but would assume that any such negotiations would include Western as well as Soviet views on the subject of Germany and Berlin. You might add if queried that you are not in a position at the moment to be more specific as to what the Western Powers might have in mind.

3. You should endeavor to ascertain from Gromyko without making a major point of it, whether he plans to attend the opening of the UN General Assembly and if so whether he would be prepared to discuss possible arrangements for negotiations with the Secretary.

In the entire conversation you should make plain to Gromyko that the United States takes the situation being created in regard to Berlin with the utmost seriousness involving as it does the entire United States policy in regard to Europe. You should endeavor to convince Gromyko that while we are prepared to negotiate on a reasonable basis, we and our allies are not prepared to accept a Soviet dictated solution. We would expect the Soviet Government not to increase the obvious dangers of this situation and to maintain contact with the United States in the interest of peace which is important to both our countries.

(FYI—I fully realize that this is a delicate task that I have asked you to undertake and will rely upon your judgment as to the manner of conducting these discussions. The points outlined above are for your guidance and you are under no compulsion to abide literally by them.)

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-361. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Bohlen, cleared by Kohler, and signed by Rusk.

[2] The time of transmission is illegible.

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, September 4, 1961, 6:35 p.m.

560. You are requested to deliver following letter from President to Chancellor Adenauer at earliest opportunity:

Begin text:

My dear Chancellor Adenauer:

I was very glad to receive your letter of August 29, 1961,[2] which Ambassador Grewe brought me, and I particularly welcome the opportunity to have the benefit of your views at this critical time.

I agree entirely with your estimate of the severity of the crisis we are experiencing, and of the likelihood that worse is yet to come. Thus, I certainly concur that it is most important for us to remain in close touch and to be able to consult so that we may be in a position to respond rapidly and appropriately to any development in the situation.

It is with this in mind that we are undertaking a substantially increased military effort which is intended to impress Khrushchev with our determination, and which we hope will serve to invigorate our Allies and stimulate comparable efforts by them. If ever there was an illustration of the need for NATO and justification of the reasons why it was founded, the issue of Berlin provides it.

Since we are sure of ourselves and firm in our resolution, I do not share the point of view that we should be reluctant to negotiate, on the grounds that to do so might be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness on our part. We have certainly given Khrushchev no cause to indulge in any illusions that we are suing for negotiations as a result of his pressures. At the same time, both public opinion in democratic countries and the sheet logic of a thermonuclear war demand that we exhaust every effort to find a peaceful solution consistent with the preservation of our vital interests. If Western governments are to have the support of their populations in the grave period ahead, should the Soviets carry out their threats to take unilateral action against our position in Berlin, we must have shown them by our words and by our actions that we have made every reasonable effort to seek a peaceful solution of the crisis. This will, of course, also be important if, as seems likely, the Berlin issue should get involved at some stage in the United Nations.

When our Foreign Ministers meet here September 14, they will undoubtedly discuss not only the tactics and procedures leading to negotiation, but also the factors bearing on the substance of our negotiating position. I must share with you my concern as to how we can manage to keep the Russians from being informed about these vital and secret matters by the press of the free world. This question of leaks to the press is a serious one, and I know we agree it behooves all of us to take whatever measures we can to assure the highest possible degree of discretion in the crucial months ahead.

The Foreign Ministers will also review the work which has been going forward here on counter measures which can be taken against further Soviet encroachments. I entirely agree with you as to the danger of creating discouragement as well as an impression of weakness by failing to respond vigorously to Communist harassments directed at aspects of our position which we do not define as vital but which are nevertheless psychologically and politically important. There is, however, a practical problem of finding counter measures in a given situation which will be appropriate and effective. It will require constant vigilance and imaginativeness not only to react to but to anticipate the moves which a resourceful and ruthless opponent, drawing on all the advantages which geography gives him in the Berlin situation, may take. We must carefully prepare a series of selected responses to various harassments. I am encouraged by the careful planning which is being done in this connection.

In addition to preparing for various contingencies, we can and we should ensure that Khrushchev does not make any hazardous move for lack of having been warned about its consequences. In particular, we have made it abundantly clear to Khrushchev that any attempt to block, or to interfere with, our access to Berlin, be it on the ground, or, as more recently hinted by the Soviet Union, in the air, is a vital matter to us and would be taken by us as an act of aggression.

As you know, I informed Ambassador Grewe that I was about to announce the appointment of General Clay as my personal representative in Berlin. Not only will his immense experience in matters relating to Berlin be of great value to me, but I feel sure that his presence there, in the difficult times we face, will be regarded by Germans and people everywhere as an earnest of our resolve to fulfill the commitments to which we have pledged ourselves repeatedly, and which Vice President Johnson reaffirmed in my name in the course of his recent visit to Berlin.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate to you our intention to maintain our solidarity with the Federal Republic of Germany. I believe our actions, as well as our words, already bear witness to this. We are prepared to do whatever is necessary to meet this challenge, rather than capitulate, or make damaging concessions which would violate our solemn commitments. This is a moment in which the future of the North Atlantic Alliance is at stake, and our collective response may in turn determine whether the world as we know it is to survive.

I am convinced that we will all find within ourselves the resources, the spirit, and the statesmanship necessary to survive this danger and to move on toward our goals of peace, in justice and freedom.

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy

End text.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. The source text bears the notation “Delivered Sept 6.”

[2] See footnote 2, Document 133.

140. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, September 4, 1961.

Recent events provide pretty clear evidence that Khrushchev intends using military force, or the threat thereof, to gain his ends in Berlin. He has raised his ante by progressively isolating West Berlin, by retaining in service several hundred thousand men due for discharge, and by reverting to atomic testing.

Thus far our own defense efforts have been deliberately kept in a low key and at a comparatively normal tempo. I have a strong feeling that the moment has come to shift into a higher gear.

On August 31 you sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara [2] asking him for recommendations on expansion of our military forces in the light of the events noted above. I understand they will be ready for you on Thursday. The decision which you take will be an extremely important one, and it seems to me that you will, therefore, want to touch all the bases and establish a clear record. You might consider some such scenario as follows:

On Thursday, discuss the Defense recommendations in a small group of principals including Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, General Lemnitzer and perhaps Dean Acheson.[3] When you have decided what you are inclined to approve, ask the Joint Chiefs for a formal recommendation on the military program. As a final wrap-up, obtain the advice of the National Security Council in a regularly convened session at the start of the following week, in which the CIA would lead off with the best available estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities.

Mr. Bundy rightly points out that the military program should be closely tied in to the political program which still has gaps. It may be possible to fill in these gaps concurrently with the consideration of the Defense program.

Maxwell D. Taylor

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 35, 6B NATO. Secret. The source text bears Taylor's handwritten notation: “Read by HA [Higher Authority] 5 Sept 61.”

[2] A copy of this memorandum is ibid.

[3] On September 5 Taylor sent Rusk and McNamara a memorandum stressing that the President viewed the meeting on Thursday, September 7, “as a time for important decisions bearing upon the strength and composition of the armed forces for the period of the anticipated pressure on Berlin.” (Ibid.)

141. Memorandum of Action[1]

Washington, September 5, 1961.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS MATTERS

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Secretary of State

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson

White House Staff: McGeorge Bundy, Theodore Sorensen, Arthur Schlesinger

Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland

[Here follows item 1 concerning the President's address to the United Nations.]

2. Re Berlin:

a. The President asked the State Department to consider the following elements of an eventual negotiation on Berlin, and to consider also the extent to which such elements might be included in public statements prior to or during the General Assembly:

(i) a proposal to take to the International Court of Justice the legal status of Western access rights to West Berlin and abide by the results of Court action;

(ii) a plebiscite, handled by the UN, in West Berlin;

(iii) a move of some UN functions, or the whole Headquarters of the UN, to West Berlin, with appropriate guarantees to make West Berlin really a Free City, make the Autobahn an international highway, etc. (The Secretary of State and Ambassador Stevenson both demurred on this proposal.);

(iv) a limitation or prohibition of nuclear arms in either part of Germany;

(v) a limitation of the number of domestic and foreign troops in West and East Germany; and

(vi) a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw pact countries.

b. The President asked the Department to consider whether he should make a statement, prior to the visits of the Presidents of Indonesia and Mali next week, emphasizing the willingness of the United States to negotiate about Berlin. Such a statement could be made at a special ad hoc press conference. The possibility was mentioned that the President might announce on this occasion that he intends to go to New York to address the General Assembly.

[Here follow items 3-5 on unrelated U.N. matters.]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-561. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland. Attached to a memorandum from Cleveland to Kohler, also dated September 5.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, September 7, 1961, 5 p.m.

814. Eyes only Secretary. I saw Gromyko 4 pm today and carried out instructions contained Deptel 660.[2] In reply Gromyko inquired whether we envisaged substantive discussions during time of General Assembly. I replied timing was one of subjects you would wish discuss with him but I thought our position would be fairly flexible on this. We were aware of date Sov Party Congress and did not know whether they would prefer negotiations before or after Congress. Gromyko said Sov Del had still not been selected but decision expected next few days and we would be informed. (There have been rumors here Kozlov might head Sov Del and I think this possibility although in such case Gromyko would probably also go.)

In reply my remarks about neither side taking actions to complicate situation Gromyko said actions of GDR and SU were not intended to do so but were protective measures. On other hand he considered actions we had taken such as mobilization, increase of mil expenditures etc. had complicated situation.

When he disagreed with my observation this was in nature of chicken or egg argument I pointed out we had not proposed any change in Berlin situation. He replied Sovs had not invented this problem but it existed. Sov Govt thought there were possibilities for settlement but not foll line taken by US Govt in increasing mil preparations and threatening force. Although he had not objected to my use of expression “Berlin and German problems” in discussing possible negotiations, in latter part of conversation he made clear that Sov Govt thought signature of peace treaty was only possible solution. When I disagreed he pressed me to state what other solution could be envisaged. I said I was not in position to discuss possible solutions and pointed out that Western Foreign Ministers were meeting on Sept 14 to discuss problem. I said clearly however that in any negotiations we considered each side must be free to present its views.

I had referred to our particular concern over threats to our use of air corridors and in reply Gromyko referred to transport of West German revanchists and saboteurs and daily provocative speeches which were made in West Berlin. He said this situation must be resolved by signature of a peace treaty. When I said this implied that in their view East Germans would then decide who could go to West Berlin he said that after signature of peace treaty access would be arranged by an agreement between East Germany and appropriate parties. I said we did not agree with this but we would be transmitting in next few days a reply to their note on air corridors and I would not go further into matter at this time.[3]

In conclusion Gromyko said he hoped give me reply within a few days.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-761. Secret; Priority.

[2] Document 138.

[3] For text of this September 8 note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 789-793.

143. Notes on Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group[1]

Washington, September 7, 1961, 4 p.m.

Kohler, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Gilpatric, Nitze, Lemnitzer, Murrow, Cabell, Acheson, Taylor, Bob Kennedy

Sec Def explained paper.[2]

P[resident] asked how divs would be employed. 2-1 each Corps; 2-another Corps; 2-mobile reserve.

I made clear our inc. strength will not enable us to reopen access to Berlin.

P asked Acheson—what would you rec.

A would support program's rec. Looks like Sov accel. schedule prob as result of refugee prob. We must accelerate. Other purposes—restore morale of European allies to stand up to prospective military action. If allies go to pieces—we are taking lead. If allies collapse and won't follow us—only way of stopping a disaster is for us to show Eur. what happens when you are weak. Would rec. 4 permanent divs to US Army—phase out reserves—res. have to go home. We should be creating a permanent larger force. All this to be better prepared for future similar crises. Lead our allies out of weakness. Be prepared for action. Not have onus of failure. Picking up pieces if we have a war. Rec to date does not add divs.

P discussed land, sea & air ops.

Nitze air access may be first blocked total. Described possible action—Schonfeld. Discussed escalation. Discussed ground target attacks.

P what then?

Rusk take it to the UN. Purpose of inc str of ground forces: stronger def w or w/o nuc; be prepared for enemy if he attacked in strength. When no W Ger can get to Berlin—we have lost.

Kohler if our air access stopped, we would stop Soviet civil air traffic; 80% goes in Eur. Most to Germany. They want to break link of civilian traffic between WG and West Berlin.

P we don't seem to be able to impress K.

A we must respond with force.

Nitze explained part I naval blockade table; part II acts of war. Allies think they can win over USSR.

P with conventional?

Sec Def yes.

P what would Sov do? go in Iran?

Cabell prob not.

Rusk trouble will break out in other areas.

A was asked why he thinks K won't want to neg—aren't we done?

A because he thinks he can get what he wants without neg.

P won't our troops (air & ground) upset gold flow?

Gil[patric] dep etc.—No.

Rusk asked if the supplies will permit approx 30 days.

Sec Def Yes—as long as they can fight with.

A will our allies fight over Berlin?

Sec Def No—unless we push them hard now.

A I agree. When will they drop by the wayside?

Rusk they have revitalized interests in Berlin. They want to see what neg produce. Believe in the last analysis they will fight.

P read Finletter msg—concern over too much mil action & too little pol.[3]

(Note. Apparently K has told Sulzberger he doesn't want negotiations.)[4]

P How do we get it over to our allies to do something?

Rusk K proposals have not made any headway in Europe. Germans provide a tough problem.

Bundy Sukarno visit—we ought.[5]

Murrow little reaction to our dec to resume testing.[6] We should put forth neg proposal.

A we are worrying about much needlessly. Allies will try almost anything to avoid doing anything. We must not appear too eager to negotiate.

Rusk hope Sec Def will be prepared to move up his schedule.

Sec Def rec approval of 3 items on page 1; 2 & 3 could be together.[7]

P when do we need to decide to move more than 1 div.

Sec Def later.

P we must insist allies do something more before we send more.

Sec Def our purpose is to insure that K knows we will use nuc.

B Kennedy we should get all this written down step-by-step.

Sec Def 1 2 & 3 informs K of our det.

I emphasized not being able to retake Berlin.

A if we had no troops in E & if we would not use nuc he would do as he pleases. We must est cred. of our det to use nuc. There are not enough div in Eur to retake B. We must show K & others we are not going to sacrifice 5 or more divs without use of nuc. We will be more ready to use nuc with more divs. If we don't, we go from meg [reg?] to nuc war.

Nitze with 30 divs you can man the whole line.

Directive to Sec Def

Get down on paper how an additional 10 divs would do. Also naval. Pres is sending a paper to Sec Def.

P 2 & 3 approved. Item 1 is deferred.

A it is spelled out in my 28 June paper.[8]

Rusk we have launched a large effort of our own & exhorted allies to a lot—can we get half hearted now.

A this is only chance of making nuc war unnecessary.

Bundy could be the reverse.

[1] Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Top Secret. The source text is Lemnitzer's handwritten notes.

[2] Reference is to a memorandum from McNamara to the President, September 7, which laid out a schedule of U.S. actions through the end of 1961, summarized the NATO buildup in conventional forces, and described the status of four-power military contingency planning. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

[3] See Document 134.

[4] Regarding Sulzberger's interview with Khrushchev, see Document 146.

[5] Presidents Sukarno of Indonesia and Keita of Mali visited Washington September 12-13 to urge talks between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce tension. A memorandum of their conversation with the President on September 12 is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-1261. For text of their message to the President, see Department of State Bulletin, October 2, 1961, p. 543; for text of the President's September 14 reply, in which he attributed the Berlin crisis to the Soviet Union, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 602-604.

[6] For text of the President's September 5 statement ordering a resumption of underground nuclear testing, see ibid., pp. 589-590.

[7] Point 1 of McNamara's September 7 memorandum directed the call-up of four National Guard divisions; point 2 suspended the movement of dependents to Western Europe; and point 3 ordered the movement of 37,000 army personnel to Europe. On September 12, in NSAM No. 93, Bundy informed McNamara that the President had approved points 2 and 3. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs)

[8] Document 49.

144. National Security Action Memorandum No. 92[1]

Washington, September 8, 1961.

MEMORANDUM TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The following questions seem to me to emerge from our discussion yesterday,[2] and I am sending this memorandum to both of you in the knowledge that many of the questions have both a political and a military component. You may prefer to make separate answers, or you may find it possible to produce a single agreed response. On question 10, I am asking separately for the view of the Secretary of the Treasury, who was out of town during our meeting yesterday.

1. What will the presence in Europe of 6 additional U.S. divisions accomplish

a. In meeting the Berlin situation?

b. In vitalizing NATO and strengthening the long-term defense of Western Europe?

2. Will an increase of our conventional forces in Europe convince Khrushchev of our readiness to fight to a finish for West Berlin or will it have the opposite effect? What other steps of all kinds may help to carry conviction on this point?

3. Supposing that we and our allies raise the ground strength of NATO to 30 effective divisions, what have we accomplished? Specifically:

a. Can NATO then defend Western Europe against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Bloc?

b. Can we safely mount a corps-size probe to reopen access to Berlin and at the same time present an adequate ground shield?

c. How long can 30 divisions be supported logistically in combat?

4. It has been my understanding that we would need to call additional divisions only as we actually decided to send existing divisions to Europe. Since our current plan is to send only one such division, why is it necessary now to call 4 divisions from the Reserve?

5. If we call up 4 additional National Guard divisions now and do not send them to Europe, how can they be usefully employed? How long would it take to convert them to Army of the U.S. divisions? How long would it take to create effective A. U.S. divisions by other means?

6. How much of the 4 division build-up would be justified in view of the overall world situation if Berlin were not an immediate issue?

7. What tactical air support is needed for the planned forces in Europe and what is the plan for providing such support?

8. The reduction in terms of days of combat of the supply backup of U.S. forces in Europe which will result from increasing our forces and from supplying the West Germans has been noted. Would this result in putting U.S. troops in a possible combat situation without adequate supplies?

9. If we add 6 divisions to NATO, may not Khrushchev add 6 or more divisions to the conventional forces facing NATO? Or will logistical problems, fear of attack by atomic weapons and preoccupations in the satellites set a limit on the Soviet conventional forces available for immediate use against NATO?

10. What is the estimated net gold cost per year of the movement of six divisions to Europe and what can be done to reduce it?

John F. Kennedy

[1] Source: Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[2] See Document 143.

145. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, September 9, 1961, 6 p.m.

848. Re Berlin tel 299.[2]

Recognize that in dealing with recent developments in Berlin we have to consider psychology of Germans and particularly West Berliners as well as effect our actions or inaction on Soviet appraisal our intentions. Nevertheless believe we must not be led by events and must keep in mind our long range national interests. In this context desire point out we cannot realistically expect to reach agreement with Soviets on Berlin question without dealing with problem of refugees. I do not believe we could ever formally agree to turn control over to East Germans and therefore if we expect peaceful solution only way this problem could be handled is for us to be able eventually to accept de facto that East Germans will prevent refugees from reaching West Berlin. I therefore believe that in any actions we take we should not preclude this possibility. If UN debate should take place believe emphasis should be on general subject of self-determination for Germany as a whole rather than on problem of Berlin. With regard to reftel while I believe threat to incorporate West Berlin in West Germany can be of utility if used carefully since this is something Soviets very anxious avoid, believe actual taking of this action not in our interest. (German Ambassador is convinced, and I believe rightly, that in any settlement Soviets will demand legal separation West Berlin from West Germany. He indicated his belief that Adenauer would be prepared de facto to put stop to such actions as holding Bundestag meetings in Berlin but implied he could not formally do so.) If we expect Soviets to accept peaceful solution we must be prepared find some way of reducing Berlin's role in cold war along lines of our Geneva proposal. Soviets would have little faith in such proposals if West German politicians, particularly those who may come to power in future, were relatively free to exploit Berlin situation and Khrushchev would certainly not be in position to convince Ulbricht and his other allies that they should accept settlement which would in fact worsen position from his point of view. Believe this card akin to Khrushchev's peace treaty which is more useful as threat than as fact.

While for present we must clearly maintain our own right of free circulation in East Berlin I would go so far as to suggest that with foregoing considerations in mind we should avoid taking position on this matter from which it would be difficult for us later to retreat. In this connection I am somewhat more pessimistic than formerly on possibility reaching agreed settlement and something along lines of Solution “C” may be our only out. In short, while I believe we must take account of psychological factors, we should be very careful not to bar any of few remaining roads to a peaceful settlement.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-961. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 299, September 8, reported that the Western countermoves to Soviet and East German actions since August 13 had been largely ineffective other than as morale boosters for West Berlin. Since the Soviet Union had been trying for some time to weaken the ties between West Berlin and the West, the Mission at Berlin suggested that a dramatic way to strengthen those ties would be to allow West Berlin to become the 12th Land in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Ibid., 762.00/9-861)

146. Editorial Note

On September 10, 1961, Cyrus L. Sulzberger, a columnist for The New York Times who had been in Moscow to interview Khrushchev, sent a letter to President Kennedy with an enclosed message from the Soviet Chairman. Sulzberger apologized for cutting Ambassador Thompson out of the chain, but stated that he had informed him about the message. Sulzberger told the President that Khrushchev had given him the message on September 5 and adjured him that it was off-the-record. The message reads as follows:

"If you are personally in a position to meet President Kennedy, I wish you would tell him that I would not be loath to establishing some sort of informal contact with him to find a means of settling the crisis without damaging the prestige of the United States—but on the basis of a German peace treaty and a free city of West Berlin.

"The President might say what is in his mind concerning ways of solving the problem—if he agrees in principle with the peace treaty and a free city. Otherwise, there is no use in contacts.

"If he does wish some settlement he could, through informal contacts, voice his opinion on various forms and stages and on how to prepare public opinion and not endanger the prestige of the United States or Mr. Kennedy.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163; also printed in Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants, pages 801-802)

For Sulzberger's account of the interview with Khrushchev and the transmission of the message to Kennedy, see ibid., pages 788-805.

On September 23 Pierre Salinger met with Mikhail A. Kharlamov, Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Chief, in New York. Kharlamov asked whether Sulzberger had delivered Khrushchev's message, and when Salinger could not confirm delivery, repeated the message. For Salinger's account of this meeting and the subsequent discussion of Khrushchev's correspondence with the President, see With Kennedy, pages 191-194. On September 24 Salinger sent both Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk a memorandum describing his meeting with Kharlamov. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)

147. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, September 12, 1961.

SUBJECT

Berlin Negotiations

A. As I see it, we reached the following agreements this morning:[2]

(1) The approach of calling a Peace Conference and working toward Parallel Peace Treaties is agreed between us, and you will proceed to have it developed in detail.

(2) We agree that Thompson should open negotiations on this basis with the Soviet Union, and he is to be called back for intensive discussion early next week.

(3) We shall want to plan a careful approach to the Chancellor as soon as is practicable. We did not talk about the man for the job. McCloy? Acheson? I do not think Dowling would do; he reflects Bonn opinion too much to be the man to bend it.

(4) My speech to the UN will contain a statement on Berlin, and Sorensen will attempt a draft that serves all our purposes without giving anything away prematurely.

B. We did not settle clearly some other points and I think we should talk about them with each other again before you get caught up in the Foreign Ministers Meeting. In particular:

(1) You and I may differ on the appropriate distance between an opening proposal and a serious negotiating posture. I really do not want to see us put forward anything like the Western Peace Plan as a basis for serious negotiation. It just does not make sense for us to propose for negotiation an early reunification of Germany or Berlin on the basis of free elections. These are not negotiable proposals; their emptiness in this sense is generally recognized; and we should have to fall back from them promptly. I believe instead that we should keep these ideas forward as those which we prefer, but without any pretense that we believe them acceptable to the Soviet Union at present. In that sense, I am prepared to accept a statement of principles, but I must say that the British document you showed me this morning[3] seemed to me still much too much of a detailed discussion of impracticable machinery; it was not so much a statement of principles as an interesting design for the unattainable.

(2) For these reasons, I am strongly opposed to any revised version of the Western Peace Plan. It seems to me the wrong framework for negotiations, and in my own preference for a peace conference with parallel treaties I am talking about a real reconstruction of our negotiating proposals, and not about a modest add-on. I think there may be some diversities between us on this point also.

C. We agreed this morning that we would keep this whole question very close for the present. In the White House only Bundy and Sorensen know about it, and I hope that in the State Department you can keep it restricted to yourself, Kohler, Bohlen, Hillenbrand and Owen. The latter two, as I understand it, are the staff officers who are already familiar with this proposal as one of many, and I think they and all of us should talk about it, when we have to, without reference to the fact that it currently occupies a preferred position.[4]

JFK[5]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, Department of State, General. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[2] The meeting took place at the White House at 11 a.m. and concerned Berlin and nuclear testing. (Ibid., JFK Log)

[3] Not further identified.

[4] On September 12 Bundy also sent Kohler a memorandum on the President's talks with Rusk about Berlin negotiations to which were attached four “pieces of paper.” The first was a copy of the President's memorandum to Rusk, passed to Kohler “under the table.” For the second, entitled “How To Get From Foreign Ministers Meeting to a Peace Conference,” see Declassified Documents, 1980, 321A. The third was a memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, which he had drafted at Rusk's request and which outlined a proposed Western opening position designed to meet some of the objections to the Western Peace Plan. Bundy had not sent the memorandum because it had been overtaken by Rusk's conversation with the President on September 12. Attached to the memorandum were a draft opening proposal (see ibid., 1980, 320C) and “Some Notes on the Road to a Serious Negotiating Position.” The fourth was a paper by Sorensen on negotiations. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, Department of State, General)

[5] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

148. National Security Action Memorandum No. 94[1]

Washington, September 14, 1961.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Steinstuecken and Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point

The President decided that the following course of action shall be taken with respect to Steinstuecken.[2]

In case of an apparent blocking of access to Steinstuecken or other interference with U.S. rights there, USCOB is authorized to establish the Communists' intention and other pertinent facts by sending to Steinstuecken a vehicular mounted or helicopter borne M.P. patrol. This patrol will not use force in discharging its mission.

If force is considered necessary to reestablish access or other rights, General Norstad will seek authority from Washington.

Helicopter supply of Steinstuecken is authorized, if necessary.

No special overt measures should be taken before the event, without referral to Washington.

With respect to the possible closing of the Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point, the President decided, subject to negotiation among the Four Western Foreign Ministers:

(1) All Soviet personnel would be barred from West Berlin except the Soviet Air Control officer and the Spandau personnel;

(2) Additional military forces may be moved to the sector boundary generally, as the crossing point is first closed, if the U.S. Commandant judges such action useful.

If the crossing point is kept closed for a period longer than 24 hours—or some similarly brief period—countermeasures outside Germany of the sort which clearly represent the early stages of more significant measures would be contemplated. Staff work on such possible measures should go forward urgently.

In addition, it is contemplated that the Czech and Polish missions would be expelled from West Berlin, if the Friedrichstrasse Crossing Point is closed for a protracted period.

WWR

[1] Source: Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316. Top Secret.

[2] These decisions were taken at a meeting at the White House at 10 a.m. on September 14 attended by the President, Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Taylor, Nitze, Cabell, Rostow, and Attorney General Kennedy. Lemnitzer's 3-page notes on the meeting are in the National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29.

149. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 14, 1961, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Ambassador Caccia

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Mr. John Killick

Lord Hood

France

Couve de Murville

Ambassador Alphand

Mr. Laloy

Mr. Lucet

Mr. Currien

United States

The Secretary

Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Nitze

Mr. Johnson (part of conversation)

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Holloway

[Here follows discussion of air access to Berlin, Steinstuecken, access at Friedrichstrasse, and access to East Berlin and East Germany.]

Proposed Rusk-Gromyko Talks

In the Secretary's absence, Mr. Kohler introduced the Report of the Working Group with particular reference to the paper on Tactics.[2] He gave his understanding of the paper that the Secretary of State would approach Mr. Gromyko at the UNGA meeting in New York on the possibility of fruitful negotiations with the USSR. If such an approach gave promise at that time of leading to substantive talks, it was agreed that the Secretary could then report back to the Foreign Ministers or go on to arrange on behalf of the other three for further negotiations with Mr. Gromyko. On this last point he noted there was a French reserve.

Couve said that his reading of the Tactics paper led him to conclude that there had been a misunderstanding. The French are still of the opinion that this approach is a completely vain effort, as we do not know what it will lead to. In the French view, the USSR has not changed; it will negotiate only over a peace treaty with Germany and a new status for Berlin. This morning's announcement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry confirms this.[3] Therefore, the French are forced to conclude that any approach to negotiations is “not appropriate” in the present circumstances.

The French Foreign Minister then added that if the American and British Governments are not of the same mind and if they wish to approach the Soviets, there would, of course be no disagreement from the French but it must be understood that the French are not asking the Secretary to make this approach. They are merely saying, “We have no objection.” To the French, negotiations in the present moment mean only that we are negotiating in the dark and under Soviet threats. Couve concluded that under these conditions, “We have nothing to gain” and “I am sure that there is a complete misunderstanding in the paper (Tactics) and in the press."

Lord Home commented that he felt that it was less a difference in understanding than a difference in approach. It is clear to the British that we must negotiate with the USSR and while it is true the line of the USSR is hard, we must be prepared to a certain extent to accept this or run the risk of becoming “atomic dust.” The longer we delay our assent to negotiate, the higher tensions will arise and the less our own people will understand our attitude. As for the Tactics paper, Lord Home said, “I think it right.” If there is a basis for negotiations, he felt all should be done now to set up these so that they might begin by late October or early November.

The French Foreign Minister replied that this is not his view of what is in the Tactics paper.

Mr. Kohler demurred that while at the Foreign Ministers' meetings in Paris the difference in the Anglo-American and French positions may have been greater, particularly as applied to the proposed reply to the August 3 note of the Soviets, the de Gaulle-Rusk talks seemed to have reduced these differences, i.e., while France will not be associated with an Anglo-American probe, should such a probe lead to fruitful negotiations, the French are prepared to join. Couve said that while this is true, this is not what the Tactics paper says. Mr. Kohler replied that as he reads the paper, we are probing only to find “if there is basis for serious negotiations.” Mr. Bohlen pointed out that under the terms of the Tactics paper the Secretary was in any event committed to return for consultation to the Four Foreign Ministers before proceeding.

Couve then read a translation of a French news report which quoted a State Department spokesman as saying today there was “general agreement” that Secretary Rusk was about to set the time and place for negotiations with the USSR when he talked to Mr. Gromyko in New York. Mr. Kohler replied that there had been no authorization for such an announcement.

Lord Home then reviewed the position he had set forth above and concluded that if we do not now choose negotiations, we will allow ourselves to be forced into them—"a most undesirable position.” He would therefore suggest that as the French are not prepared to see if there is a reasonable chance of negotiations, the UK would prefer that the French disassociate themselves now from the probe rather than do so at a later date.

Couve injected that it was only useless negotiations to which the French objected. Lord Home continued pointing out that we have delayed any move from the first of August to the 19th of September and that the situation has deteriorated in those six weeks. There was, he said, no reason to believe that it would not deteriorate further in the next six weeks.

Mr. Bohlen said that his experience has shown that it was necessary in negotiations with the Russians to keep seeking to find out if there was a possibility of a reasonable settlement. Couve replied that nothing has yet been settled with Russians without being agreed upon before, although Mr. Bohlen noted that in matters like Trieste, Austria and the Berlin Blockade the Soviets had changed positions in negotiations. It was the sort of negotiations that had led to the end of the Berlin Blockade (Jessup-Malik talks) which he believed the Secretary would embark upon with Mr. Gromyko.

In response to a question from Mr. Nitze, Couve said that the crux of the negotiating issue is that the Soviets are not prepared to support uncontrolled air traffic to Berlin. Once they had destroyed that, they will have destroyed the basis of West Berlin's political life and, thus, eventually the life of the city. Mr. Bohlen said that he thought there were many facets of negotiations: for one, if we don't negotiate we will leave the Soviets free to act unilaterally; another is that Khrushchev consistently has said in the past that he is prepared to consider Western proposals and we are not going to find out how far he is going to consider them unless we talk to him. Mr. Bohlen added that in his experience dictatorships are most dangerous when they are “allowed to stew in their own juice.” Therefore, we should keep the negotiating channel into the Soviets open.

Lord Home said that we must also consider the quest of negotiations in relation to the possibility of a peace treaty with the GDR. It will be extremely difficult for the West to avoid sitting down with Khrushchev before the GDR peace treaty. Therefore, it would seem best to talk to him first. He said frankly that the Western peoples will not allow us to go on as we have under the threat of death, during the next two months. For his part, he is prepared to let the Secretary explore, then meet again, and see what it is practical to do.

Couve said that in his understanding the only purpose in seeing Gromyko is to discuss substantive issues. In such a discussion, he felt it extremely appropriate for the Secretary of State as spokesman for the strongest member of the Allies to have a serious, or even a grave, discussion with Gromyko. There are many things which can be said in a two man conversation which cannot be said among four. To these he would assent, but he would object strongly to any arrangements for a Four-Power meeting which would be in effect on Soviet terms. He concluded: I understood in Paris that there would be exploration—"then let us know more.” Mr. Kohler said that we considered the Tactics paper to be consistent with what was said in Paris. Couve objected that there certainly was no mention in Paris of arranging the time and place for a conference. To this, Lord Home objected that we cannot extract Soviet positions without a formal meeting. If this could be arranged, he hoped we could get the “guts” of a settlement behind the scenes in time to be ready for the formal meeting.

Mr. Bohlen said he felt it essential that any communiqué for this meeting reflect no disunity. This was agreed and it was decided that after discussion of Laos and African matters, Allied press officials would be told that the three Foreign Ministers had met as usual in consultation; that current events in Berlin and on the situation in the Congo and Laos were discussed; and, that when they meet with their German colleague tomorrow they will move on to the general problem of Germany.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/9-1461. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Holloway, initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on October 1. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.

[2] The Four-Power Working Group met at Washington September 11-13 to review the Ministerial decisions taken in August. (See Document 101.) Reports on their meetings on September 11 and 12 were transmitted to Bonn on those days in telegrams 648 and 666, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1161 and 762.00/9-1261) A copy of the Working Group's Report, BER-1, which had sections on: A. Status of August Ministerial Decisions, B. Soviet Motives and Intentions, C. Tactics, D. Substantive Political Questions, and E. Plan for Western Response to “Separate Peace Treaty,” is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1953.

[3] For text of this announcement, see Pravda, September 15, 1961.

150. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 14, 1961, 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Western Access to Berlin and Related Problems

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador

Mr. Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, Minister Counselor, Soviet Embassy

The Secretary Mr. John C. Guthrie, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs

After an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Menshikov said that he had been instructed to reply to the oral statement which the Secretary had given the Soviet Chargé, Mr. Smirnovsky, August 31.[2] The Ambassador said that the Secretary's statement had been forwarded to Moscow where it had been carefully studied and that he had been instructed by his government to ask what the aims of the Secretary's presentation were and how it should be understood. If the statement meant that the US Government seeks a settlement of the problem of West Berlin on a mutually acceptable basis, and is prepared to sit around a conference table in a businesslike meeting to discuss the problem, then any steps which the US Government might take in this direction will meet the full understanding and support of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government, the Ambassador said, has always advocated peace and the removal of sources of tension between the USSR and the US and has always sought normal relations between the two.

On the other hand, the Ambassador continued, the Secretary's statement can also be understood as a threat. If this is the aim of the statement, it is appropriate to remind the US that the Soviet Union is not a country against which threats can be used. This has been proved by the entire history of the USSR. Threats are absolutely out of place and do not impress the Soviet Union. Warnings are not needed. The Soviet Government stands for relations between states not on the basis of threats and strength but of mutual respect for the rights of the other.

In reply to the Ambassador's first point, the Secretary observed that the United States is prepared to undertake negotiations which might find a solution of the present crisis. We are interested in businesslike, constructive negotiations which will take into consideration the views of all parties concerned. The Secretary said that he expects to discuss these problems with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, if this is agreeable with the latter. However, he does not wish to discuss formulations of the subjects which might be discussed with the Foreign Minister at this time.

With regard to the Ambassador's second point, the Secretary said that he simply wished to remind him that we have received more than one written communication from the Soviet Government and have observed the apparent threats, including some from the East German regime against the air corridors linking West Berlin and West Germany. In his statement of August 31, the Secretary said, his purpose was to underline the position that unilateral actions against Western rights and interests are not only dangerous in themselves but can also impair the prospects for successful negotiations. The Secretary told Ambassador Menshikov that the language he has used does not impress the US. He pointed out that it was not the US which has raised the question of pressures against our right of access to Berlin nor the US which has taken unilateral actions in Berlin. These actions and pressures have come from the other side. It is important, he said, that it be clearly understood that his oral statement of August 31, and written and public statements by the President and others were serious statements and should be taken seriously.

Ambassador Menshikov said that he could not add anything to that which he had already said concerning the air corridors and that the Soviet notes of August 23 and September 2 speak for themselves.[3] As for the Secretary's latest statement, the Ambassador asked the Secretary to review the statements which Ambassador Menshikov had just made.

The Secretary said that he wished to illustrate the kind of unhelpful incidents which could increase tensions and dangers. Just today we have received reports that certain civilian aircraft operated by PAA, and flying in the corridor between West Germany and West Berlin were closely buzzed by fighter aircraft from the other side. We were trying to get further facts on these incidents. However, it is our understanding that these aircraft were flying under normal conditions in the corridor and had the usual clearance from BASC. This type of harassment or close approach without indication of purpose or attitude, the Secretary continued, ought to be avoided at this time. Such incidents raise rather than solve problems and both governments should seek to avoid them.

The Ambassador noted that it was difficult to comment on the incident if the US does not have the full facts. He could only assume that the aircraft had been guilty of some kind of violation of existing regulations.

The Secretary noted the possibility that the problem involved in these latest incidents could be worked out by the appropriate authorities on the spot.

Ambassador Menshikov observed upon departing that he would not be going to the United Nations General Assembly this year and had only gone last year as an exception because Chairman Khrushchev was present at that time.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1461. Confidential. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on September 19. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 776, September 14. (Ibid.)

[2] See Document 136.

[3] For text of the August 23 note and an extract from the September 2 note to the United States, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 783-784 and 788-789; for full text of the September 2 note as sent to the United Kingdom, see Documents on International Affairs, 1961, pp. 356-359.

151. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 15, 1961, 1 p.m.

WFM MC-3

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

The Vice President

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

Mr. Bowles

Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Nitze

France

M. Couve de Murville

Ambassador Alphand

Mr. Lucet

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Ambassador Caccia

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Germany

Dr. Von Brentano

Ambassador Grewe

Dr. Karl Carstens

Toward the end of the luncheon the Secretary gave the President a brief report on the work of the Ambassadorial Steering Group on Berlin and of the four Foreign Ministers.[2] The President responded by speaking of his own interest in the work of the Ambassadorial group. However, he wondered in view of the developing crisis, whether it might not be strengthened, particularly by the reinforcement of the personnel of the Embassies for the purpose, and its methods of work expedited so that the four of us would be capable of prompt and decisive action. In this connection he cited the delay in response to the Soviet/East German clamp-down on the East Berlin sector borders on August 13. He then stressed the basic importance of the build-up of NATO forces. In this connection he referred to US plans and to the difficulties which would be presented for us if we alone in fact seemed to be doing more than all our NATO allies put together. He also emphasized the importance of decisions by the NATO Governments with respect to the application of economic countermeasures, indicating that he had not been encouraged by the NATO discussions of this subject to date. Referring to this latter point, Secretary Rusk said we recognized that problems were raised for some countries in connection with economic countermeasures and that we were prepared to consider these. The President then referred to the question of contingency procedures relating to possible harassment or interruption of ground access to Berlin, indicating that he felt that there should be further work on this and more government decisions as to actions to be taken.

The President called on Secretary McNamara to comment on the contingency planning aspect. Mr. McNamara said that he wanted to stress three points. First of all, he felt it was essential that both national and allied planning be accelerated. He thought that we were far behind the requirements of the situation in this respect. Another critical problem was that of achieving a better balance in available stocks of ammunition and supplies. The third important question was that of planning and reaching decisions with respect to naval actions, particularly the question of blockading Soviet shipping. In response to a question from the Secretary, M. Couve de Murville spoke of the French equipment problem, saying that he believed the French could quickly re-equip their two divisions brought back from Algeria provided they had American help in one or two respects. Continuing on the question of strengthening our military posture, Secretary McNamara said that perhaps work could be expedited if we set new readiness dates. The Secretary asked whether it was better to do this through the military subgroups of the Ambassadorial steering group here or through General Norstad's headquarters. Mr. McNamara replied that he thought the best way to solve the questions connected with the build-up was by rapid unilateral planning on the part of the countries concerned and bilateral discussions in cases where US cooperation and assistance was required. Of course General Norstad should be kept fully informed. There then ensued some general discussion of the question of naval blockade, which Lord Home remarked would be regarded by the Soviets and would in fact be “an act of war.” Couve de Murville commented that an economic blockade would also be regarded as “an act of war.” In connection with the military planning question it was agreed that both national and Live Oak planning should be pushed forward rapidly. The President concluded this phase of the discussion by commenting that if the Four Powers were themselves so far away from agreement and preparedness on these questions the situation was even more serious as respects the other NATO countries. It was clear to him that better consultation with NATO was needed if we were to bring our allies along. The Secretary pointed out that a related and delicate problem which we faced was the question of direction of NATO forces in case of hostilities. This problem had never really been tackled. It was clearly not feasible to have decisions made and directives given by a Council of fifteen members and some way would accordingly need to be found by which NATO would delegate operational control to a smaller group. The President pointed out that in the case of naval actions, for example, in the Baltic or the Dardanelles, the cooperation of Denmark and Norway and of Greece and Turkey would be very important. Lord Home remarked that perhaps in the event of a crisis it would be necessary for the Foreign Ministers to be in permanent session in Paris near SHAPE headquarters. The President remarked that steps might be taken to strengthen the North Atlantic Council by the appointment of members who could speak more authoritatively for their governments.

The President then raised the question as to what differences existed among the four with respect to the problem of negotiations with the Soviets. The Secretary said that it might be premature really to speak of differences since this was a question which still had to be discussed. M. Couve de Murville commented that he thought the problem of negotiations was the same problem as that involved in the military build-up. The real task was to convince Khrushchev that he was facing a serious risk of war and that he would not be allowed to have his own way. Only the United States, he said, had the strength to speak convincingly to Khrushchev along these lines. The President said it was clear that Khrushchev “hears many voices in the West” which presumably indicate to him a division within NATO, particularly between the United States and the European countries. He asked what more we should do than we are doing to convince Khrushchev of our determination. M. Couve de Murville replied that of course the military build-up must continue. However, a United States private warning to the Soviets was extremely important. Indeed, he regarded this as the preliminary to everything.

Lord Home said that he did not think that a warning to Khrushchev and public speeches were enough. It was necessary that we get into a conference where we could talk things out directly. The French Foreign Minister disagreed with this. He said that it was only in the very smallest forum, two or three or four persons, that it would be possible to speak frankly to Khrushchev and not have press leaks. This, Couve said, could only be done by the United States. Only the United States would be able to say bluntly, “What are you up to? Do you want war?"—etc. Lord Home replied that he felt that even in the conversations that Secretary Rusk would have with Gromyko it was not realistic to think that he could get any farther than some agreement on an agenda and arrangements for a conference. M. Couve de Murville again expressed disagreement, repeating that we must convince Khrushchev before arrangements were made for a conference. Herr von Brentano said that he agreed essentially with Couve de Murville. If we went into a conference without satisfactory preliminaries there was great danger of pressures for disastrous compromises. He also agreed with Couve that it was not just a question of Berlin but of the whole confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the West. It was therefore not enough in the exploratory talks with the Russians simply to seek an agenda.

The President commented that after listening to these views he was not sure there was any real difference. Obviously, if the results of the approaches to Gromyko were negative then there could be no meaningful negotiations; though, even in this case, there might have to be some formal meeting to show that every diplomatic effort had been made before we were faced with the decision actually to go to war. However, if the Gromyko talks revealed some prospects of serious negotiations then we could go ahead. Lord Home repeated that Secretary Rusk could not hope to get far beyond arrangements for a meeting and an agenda with Gromyko, since Gromyko was simply not given enough latitude really to go into substance. Of course while the agenda could not be limited to the Soviet proposal of a “peace treaty,” this would clearly have to be included along with our own items.

Secretary Rusk said that perhaps what we were talking about as a difference was essentially only a problem of political leadership. The President of the United States would have the support of all Americans in taking the country to war, if that were necessary, but only if we could do so with a “clear conscience.” The United States Government needed to show that it had made every effort to exhaust possibilities of peaceful settlement. What was required in the circumstances was a mixture of firmness, on one hand, and of readiness to negotiate, on the other. However no one need fear that the United States could go to a disastrous “compromise;” indeed this would be opposed by American public opinion. M. Couve de Murville said that the basic problem was how to avoid going to war. What was important now was the necessity of convincing the Russians of our determination and not the timing or an agenda for a conference. Herr von Brentano, addressing himself principally to Lord Home, said that he wanted to clarify that he was warning only against agreeing to a one-sided or purely Soviet version of an agenda. The agenda for a conference must be two-sided. For example the Soviets' “peace treaty” must be counter-balanced by the West's “free elections."

The President indicated his agreement with Herr von Brentano and added that there was a problem of making known a public position. For example he had been shown broadsides which the Soviets were mailing all over the United States in which Khrushchev was propagandizing his proposals, even in our country, while saying the West had made no response or counter proposals of their own.

Terminating the luncheon discussion, the President said he wanted to stress the role of the Federal Republic in this question. This was a matter of the most vital concern to the West Germans. It was therefore essential that we keep closely in step with them and that we not undertake courses of action or proposals which would turn them away from the Alliance. Herr von Brentano indicated his appreciation of the President's statement.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1561. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler and approved in S on October 2. The meeting was held during a luncheon at the White House.

[2] At the first quadripartite meeting at 10:30 a.m. on September 15, the Foreign Ministers discussed air access to Berlin, intelligence reports on the Soviet Zone, economic countermeasures, and the Soviet timetable for a peace treaty, without reaching any final decisions. A memorandum of this conversation (WFM MC-2) is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1950.

152. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, September 15, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Washington Foreign Ministers' Conference (Restricted Session)

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary

Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Kohler

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Sir Harold Caccia

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

France

Couve de Murville

Ambassador Alphand

Mr. Lucet

Germany

Mr. Von Brentano

Ambassador Grewe

Dr. Carstens

(Interpreter—Mr. Kasterer)

The Secretary, after referring to the fact that the luncheon conversation at the White House[2] had been a good start for this meeting, asked the French Foreign Minister if he could give them the French view as to negotiations and the general courses they should follow, looking down the road. He had in mind that in his conversation with Gromyko, he could say that the Soviet Union and the Western Powers were on a collision course; the Western Powers had rights and obligations and were in Berlin and intended to abide by these rights in which they were supported by NATO; if Khrushchev signed his treaty and as a result considered that these rights were canceled, then they were indeed on a collision course. He asked Couve de Murville to please let his colleagues know what he saw for the future.

Couve de Murville said it was a difficult enterprise to foresee the future. He said the French did not disagree with the idea of any discussions or even negotiations with the Soviets, but rather questioned the type of negotiation. It was clear that the Soviets would certainly not object to a discussion on their proposals for peace treaties and a free city for Berlin, but it was also possible that they might be prepared to consider variations of this in which Western rights were not prejudiced. If, for example, the Soviets renounced their threats then there would be a basis for discussion. (In reply to the question from the Secretary, Couve de Murville outlined what he meant by threats.) The Russians say they will sign a treaty and that as a result the GDR would control access and the Western Powers then must make separate deals with the GDR or possibly the three allies collectively, but if not, there will be no access and any attempt by the Western Powers to go through would be aggression and the Soviet Union, with all its power, would support the GDR against such aggression. This was what he meant as a threat. If there was an indication that the Soviets accept our access rights, this would remove the threat. He was speaking in general terms and there were, of course, many variations on this point, but this is essentially the basis. He continued that if there were to be talks, and repeated that the French did not object to talks, then roughly speaking, the aim should be in the direction of the removal of the Soviet threat. If we are to talk business, this can only be achieved if the real issues are clearly understood by both sides. He said the French fully understand the gravity of the situation and would fight if necessary, but that one aspect was not clear, and that was whether the Soviet Union wants a war or thinks that it can achieve its objectives without war because the West is divided or lacking in determination. Therefore, the aim in any talks with the Soviets should be to convince them of our purpose and determination. The Soviet threats against one country after another must be clarified. He concluded by saying that these talks begun with Gromyko would be protracted as the issues were not simple. He said Gromyko would not be given requisite authority and that they would certainly go on as long as Gromyko is in New York. He concluded that the general idea was to bring the Soviets back to reality unless they want a war, and that as he had said at lunch, he felt the dangers of war lay in misunderstanding.

Lord Home said that he agreed with the objective of bringing the Russians back to reality, and inquired if Couve de Murville would contemplate negotiations if something concerning access came out of the discussions. This, in essence, was the case for probing, but he was not sure that the Secretary would get very far with Gromyko on substance since Gromyko would have no authority. The maximum that might be expected would be an agreement on an agenda for future negotiations.

Couve de Murville replied that the Russians were quite clearly putting their case to the world, saying that they had put forth their views and inquiring what was the position of the Western Powers. In effect, they had put their case in such a way that we could take it or leave it and, in effect, were merely asking for our acceptance. Khrushchev says that access will be guaranteed, but generally, do we know what conditions he had in mind. It was possible that the Secretary could ascertain this from Gromyko. He thought, however, it meant the continuance of the Western right for military access but the suppression of the unlimited right we now enjoy in the air corridors in respect to German travel.

The Secretary agreed that this might be the main purpose, but that he was thinking of what he could say to his colleagues after his talk with Gromyko.

Couve de Murville said it would be difficult to foretell until the conversations had taken place.

The Secretary continued that what he wanted to know was what was the object of the enterprise and specifically what his colleagues would consider a success.

Couve de Murville said he imagined two stages, not necessarily separated by a long term. The first stage, as he had mentioned at the luncheon, would be one of warning the Soviets. No one could tell what Gromyko's reaction would be and, therefore, it was difficult to plan the second stage. But, the second stage would deal with the question of the Soviet attempts against the rights of access in Berlin. For example, an unlikely but good solution would be to transfer to the treaty the Bolz-Zorin agreement.[3] In the second stage he felt that it would be important to find out how rigid the Soviets were on their positions.

The Secretary said he had the impression that what Couve de Murville had in mind would be a successful negotiation and inquired if there was anything that would be satisfactory short of a successful solution.

Couve de Murville said that these talks would take a long time. The Secretary agreed and added that he felt that Khrushchev would wish to participate personally at some stage.

Lord Home remarked that they did not have unlimited time, and pointed out that Khrushchev intended to make his treaty in December and that it would be very awkward for the Western Powers if he got to this point before there were any real negotiations.

Couve de Murville pointed out that the Secretary's talks with Gromyko would constitute real negotiations. He felt that the Secretary would have something to tell them in a week or so regarding Gromyko's reaction and they could then see. He felt that the British idea was that Rusk should see Gromyko and propose a conference in November. In such an event, let us say the twenty-fifth of September to November, everything would be frozen and then in November at the conference it would break down.

Lord Home said he did not see why Couve de Murville saw a breakdown and he thought that the Secretary might go quite a way with Gromyko.

Couve de Murville said that this could be done without fixing a conference date. He said, for example, the military build-up would be affected by the fixing of the conference, there would be general relaxation and people would feel that there was nothing to worry about.

The Secretary inquired how important was it for us to have the situation in Berlin maintained until the conference. He felt that this should be a pre-condition for any conference.

Couve de Murville said that if we fixed a conference, the Soviets would become more confident and would go ahead with whatever plans they had in mind, and that after the conference had failed, the West would be confronted with the choice of capitulation or war.

Lord Home said that he believed that whether you got the conference or not that situation might come when the treaty was signed with the GDR.

Couve de Murville said that if he understood Lord Home correctly there would be a conference in the beginning of November but there would be no conversations with the Soviets. He personally believed in discreet talks rather than a conference.

Lord Home inquired why there should be a stagnation between now and November.

Couve de Murville said that once they had achieved a conference, the Soviets would not be disposed to discuss any subject. He felt the subject of fixing a date for a conference should await the outcome of the Rusk-Gromyko talks. Couve de Murville and the Secretary agreed that the Soviets might discuss substance bilaterally.

The Secretary said that it was obvious that they could not negotiate on Soviet terms for Gemany and Berlin, but that they had in mind a wider agenda under which each side would put forth its proposals. He inquired whether, if the agenda were open to both sides, this would be acceptable to his colleagues or did they feel that they could only accept an agenda which excluded the Soviet item of a peace treaty and a free city for Berlin. In other words, was this a matter of openness of agenda for us or a rejection of the Soviet item.

Lord Home said that in any negotiations both sides have a right to put forward their proposition, a general agenda which seemed to him to be in accord with Khrushchev's. He then read what Khrushchev had said to Nehru.[4]

Couve de Murville said that what was of interest to the West was the question of access; that the occupation statute was an academic question provided it had no consequences.

The Secretary said he was anxious to explore his colleagues' thinking since he was not anxious to talk to Gromyko with his flanks or rear exposed.

Couve de Murville said the Secretary would be doing it with the general support of them all.

Lord Home said there was no need to name dates now, but he personally was doubtful if the talks would get that far. He felt that public opinion would sooner or later get them all around the table and the question was how long they could avoid this development.

Couve de Murville remarked that the Rusk-Gromyko talks may show there is no prospect of a conference.

The Secretary inquired whether we would be better off with no conference or a conference that met and failed—that is a Foreign Ministers' conference since a summit was a different matter.

Couve de Murville said it was too soon to speak of a conference.

Lord Home said that we would not be allowed not to have a conference. People who are about to be blown to atomic dust would insist upon a conference. He personally would prefer to do this on our own initiative than be forced into it. He felt that the Secretary's conversation with Gromyko would give us some idea on the subject, adding that if the conference were fixed, it would be more difficult for Khrushchev to undertake unilateral action in regard to Berlin.

The Secretary remarked that it appeared to be Khrushchev's plan to concentrate on our rights rather than on the status of the GDR; since 1955 the GDR had been treated by the Soviets as a sovereign state, and that he felt that a peace treaty would not change this relationship. The chief effect of a peace treaty would be on our rights, although it might have some effect on the Oder-Neisse line. Otherwise, he did not see why Khrushchev would run all the risks merely to achieve something that he already had. He asked Mr. Kohler if there was any consensus in the Working Party as to what kind of status the GDR was expected to get. He went on to say that the Russians did not seem to be thinking in terms of de jure recognition but rather de facto dealings.

Mr. Kohler said that his colleagues in the Working Group felt that the Soviet purpose was to strengthen the GDR internationally, and to afford the GDR some control over the access question, in addition to breaking the ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin. He said he was leaving aside the more general possibilities such as humiliation of the Western Powers and an impressive demonstration of Soviet power. He said they did not know whether the Russians would insist upon the Western Powers' dealing directly with the GDR and that the military buildup might have had some effect on this point.

Mr. Carstens said he felt that there were two points the Soviets were seeking: (1) the recognition of the GDR as an independent state; and (2)GDR authority over Berlin access; and that the second was the more important.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that there would be little reason in establishing the competence of the GDR unless Khrushchev intended to accomplish something specific by utilizing this competence.

Mr. Von Brentano said that he thought that Khrushchev's intention was the transfer of the control rights over access to the GDR. This would result in a situation where today you might have something but the day after it would be changed; that Mr. X would be permitted to go to Berlin and Mr. Y not. The same procedures would apply to types of goods. The Soviets would then deny any responsibility. He felt that this path was dangerous, if not fatal.

Lord Home pointed out that the Soviets could virtually do that now in regard to German travel by land, although not by air.

Mr. Kohler mentioned that one thing was certain, that no West German official would be permitted to go to West Berlin if the East Germans controlled the access; that one of their main purposes was to break the ties between West Berlin and West Germany.

Mr. Von Brentano said that the removal of the ties with the Federal Republic would be the beginning of the end for West Berlin. He said we should not try to interpret what the Russians really mean, but should read what they say. He mentioned there were people in Germany who lived by interpreting Soviet actions but what they say was very clear. They intend to sign a peace treaty with the GDR and turn over the access to GDR control. The Soviet guarantee would not be a guarantee of the status quo, but merely a guarantee of whatever agreement the GDR might make. There would be no rights left and the West would be in a very difficult position and the Soviets would be completely disengaged.

The Secretary said that while we are all vitally interested in Berlin, it was of greater interest to Germany. He would, therefore, like to inquire of the German Foreign Minister what he saw in the future as to relations between the Federal Republic and East Germany, and between West Berlin and East Germany.

Von Brentano said that this was not an easy question to answer, but, in general, he thought that the division of Germany would become more acute. He said up to now, while traffic had been obstructed by the Soviet Zone, it still continued, but he felt that the travel would now become much more difficult. Trade, he felt, would continue since it was in GDR interest but in September it was made very plain that the negotiators could deal only with trade and with other matters of traffic; they specifically stated they did not have any authority, especially in the financial and currency field. He felt that human contacts would decline and saw little prospect of any improvement in this respect and none whatsoever for any move towards reunification. He mentioned the example of church matters, pointing out that the new bishop of Berlin who lived in the Eastern Sector had not been permitted to come to West Berlin, nor had the Catholic bishops in Eastern Germany been permitted to attend the conference of German bishops. The successor to Dibelius had not been permitted to return to his home in the Eastern zone after a trip to West Berlin. He said the toughness of the East German attitude in regard to the churches indicated what their attitude would be on other matters.

Lord Home said that the revised Western peace plan contained provision for “mixed commissions” and he wondered whether or not one of these commissions might not be a vehicle to make access arrangements.

Mr. Von Brentano said that he had agreed to the proposal of mixed commissions with the exception of the third commission on human rights, which he felt was a little perverse. He had agreed to these commissions because he thought possibly the one on freedom of movement might effect some slight improvement despite their basic objection to the commissions where you would have coming into one body two incommensurable elements. He was willing, however, to try in the faint hope that this might improve communications. He felt, however, that any cooperation was impossible in political fields, no matter whether the commission met once or a thousand times. The Communists' ideas in the political field were so different from their own that there was no hope.

Lord Home said that he would agree on the political elements and human rights but felt that technical arrangements might be helpful in regard to access, particularly if these were guaranteed by the Soviets.

Mr. Von Brentano felt that this would be a very dangerous idea since if allied rights were considered by this commission, made up as it would be of completely disparate elements, the Communists would try and refer this matter to Bolz, the East German Foreign Minister, with implications of recognition. He felt the three Western allies should not favor this course.

Lord Home explained that he had not had allied rights in mind, but German.

The Secretary said that he felt that at some stage Khrushchev was going to sign a peace treaty, but supposed that in the peace treaty there was a reservation along the lines of the Bolz-Zorin letter. There would be no question in regard to rights themselves but it might involve some dealings with East Germans. In other words, the reservation might contain a reaffirmation of the allied rights but the exercise of the rights would be with the East Germans. He inquired what alternatives there would be to the allies in this event: to endeavor to obtain some UN responsibility; or, have the three allies deal with the East Germans; or transfer such dealing to the West Germans.

Von Brentano said the situation would be different if allied rights were the subject of the reservation and with the East Germans to implement. It would be necessary to negotiate with the East Germans, and he felt that the difference between rights and their implementation was razor-thin. The reservations might be in very general terms, which would have to be spelled out in negotiations with the GDR. An opinion on this would only be possible when they saw the language.

The Secretary agreed and added that we should seek to have as little to do with the East Germans as possible. He said he previously, in a somewhat light vein, had referred to the fact that allied rights were in relation to Germany as a whole and that, therefore, it might be possible to have these rights worked out by Germans, if the rights themselves were not involved.

Von Brentano said they would be prepared to accept this fiction but pointed out by reading from the Bolz-Zorin letter the fact that this had been merely done with a part of Germany, the GDR. He also mentioned that these rights were temporarily handled by the Soviets, pending a subsequent agreement.

The Secretary said the Ministers may have strayed somewhat from the purpose of this meeting, which was primarily the talks with Gromyko. He wished to return to Couve de Murville's remark at the luncheon when Couve had stressed the necessity of warning the Russians. He would like to inquire what his colleagues thought were the casi belli. For example, we had been speaking of the three vital Western interests: (1) the Western presence in Berlin, (2) the freedom and viability of West Berlin, and (3) access. He wondered whether these were sufficiently precise, since Gromyko might say that if we accepted the Soviet propositions these would be taken care of.

Mr. Von Brentano said that there was general disagreement between what the Soviets meant and what the Western Powers meant, both on freedom and on access. The Soviets give the term “free city” one meaning, but we have a completely different idea. What we mean is the democratic order with freedom of speech, freedom of political parties, etc. The Soviets have a completely different point of view on ties with the Federal Republic. He mentioned that West Germany paid out 1.2 billion marks a year to the “lost child” of Berlin. He said of course we could say to the Soviets that if they included a definition of our requirements for freedom this might be a possibility, but he felt the incompatibility of ideas was very profound. He continued that it was awkward for a German to talk of these matters but he felt that in this small privileged gathering he could be frank. He said there were many people who said that the situation in Berlin was basically the fault of the Germans but the President had stated at the luncheon that it was not Berlin but our common policy that was at issue. If we started to liquidate the status of Berlin there would be an exodus from Berlin and that this would mean the liquidation of an advanced free world post. He recalled a 1958 conversation at NATO in which it had been said that if Berlin goes, there is no certainty what will go next, and that he felt that in that event there would be more than one Foreign Minister on the way to Moscow to negotiate the circumstances of his country's suicide.

The Secretary said that Mr. Von Brentano had graphically stated the problem. He himself felt that with Gromyko the three vital interests were not enough and it might be necessary to go into further detail. He said we were all agreed on the importance of these three vital issues: our presence in Berlin, our protection of Berlin's freedoms, and the right of access, over which we could not accept control or censure, but that he would feel that we should go beyond this and it might be a good idea to draw up a check list.

Mr. Von Brentano said he was very grateful for the Secretary's words which had said what he had in mind. He felt it would be dangerous to attempt to stick to the three points since Gromyko might consider that anything not mentioned would not be considered important.

Couve de Murville said he wished to make two points. He said that for life in Berlin it was very important to have links with the outside world, and especially with Western Germany. The Russians have raised the matter of political activity, but there were, in addition, many other kinds of ties—economic, financial, currency. He recalled that in 1959 in Geneva on the subject of political relations the Western delegations had said that Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic. He was sure that Gromyko would mention this point to the Secretary. He pointed out that political activities in West Berlin, in effect, were part of the question of access of West Germans to West Berlin. He felt that the main idea was, therefore, the uncontrolled nature of the air corridor for German traffic. He summarized that the two questions which he felt that Gromyko would logically raise were, (1) political activities, and (2) air access.

The Secretary said the Ministers should devote a good deal of their time to the consideration of the proposals which might be made to the Russians. He felt they might think about the possibility of telling the Russians that since East Berlin has been made the capital of East Germany, that they did not have any right to go into the question of the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. He said he felt that when we had first said that West Berlin was not part of the Federal Republic, we had, in effect, been reserving our position on all Berlin. He was not suggesting incorporation of West Berlin in the Federal Republic.

He mentioned that tomorrow the Ministers would also discuss the question of a naval blockade.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/9-1561. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen, also initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on October 1. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 733, October 16. (Ibid., 762.0221/9-1661)

[2] See Document 151.

[3] For text of letters between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin and German Democratic Republic Foreign Minister Bolz, September 20, 1955, see Otnosheniia SSSR s GDR, pp. 649-652; for the Bolz letter alone, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 460-461. See also Foreign Relations , 1955-1957, vol. XXVI, pp. 537-538 .

[4]  Nehru visited Moscow September 6-8 following the Belgrade Conference.

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, September 17, 1961, 3:12 p.m.

735. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:[2]

Quadripartite Ministerial session morning September 16 opened with US briefing on naval blockade report prepared by US group supplemented by Quadripartite committee.[3] Secretary noted blockade was severe step. Said principal question was whether we should take such measure without bracing for Soviet military action in Europe or Soviet initiation all-out war. Home stated maritime control measures covered by report actually first act of war, and were actions to take when war almost inevitable. Felt they perhaps preferable land war however. Suggested study possible uses naval forces other than maritime control in context Berlin issue. Von Brentano expressed FedRep's approval of report, noting such measures gave West arsenal weapons of varying degree severity which had advantage of being flexible and not irrevocable. It was agreed send study to Military Subcommittee.

Meeting having moved to restricted session, Secretary raised question of dealing with Soviet proposals. Noted certain seductive quality in terms “peace treaty” and “free city.” Noted it had been agreed Paris Ministerial Meeting to prepare simplified and attractive Western proposals. He asked Ministers how large gap there should be between initial Western proposals and probable outcome negotiations. Khrushchev had committed himself strongly to signing treaty. Not going be easy prevent this. Asked if we should attempt put treaty into some context in which it would appear as provisional arrangement. Suggested as example declaration reaffirming self-determination German people to provide overriding concept reducing actions of two sides to nature of interim arrangements only. This would open up possibilities of flexibility to be exploited by proposed mixed East-West German technical commissions, European security arrangements, etc.

Couve noted we all agreed treaty would not tough us; we could not prevent it but did not recognize its validity. One thing of importance was consequences Soviets could draw from it re our rights in Berlin. Thus we must concentrate on defending our rights and interests. Secretary agreed heart of our position was insistence on our rights. Feared however Western position would erode after signing of peace treaty as other countries increasingly recognized GDR attempted secure its entry into UN, etc. Thought declaration some overriding principle such as self-determination German people might cast post-peace treaty situation in light of interim status. He had in mind statement such as that of Khrushchev that reunification matter for German people. Home wondered if we could use something like draft opening negotiating proposal suggested by Working Group.[4] We could state certain practical arrangements could be made in interim pending final solution. Von Brentano agreed with Secretary's estimate effects of peace treaty, but argued we could not say Soviets did not want to do what they in fact did want to do. They did not want provisional but final arrangement incorporating GDR in bloc. Suggested using proposal based on Western Peace Plan coupled perhaps with statement of principles worked out in 1959.[5] Idea of mixed East-West German technical commissions might provide rationale for referring to post-peace treaty status as provisional.

Home asked what purpose remained for life of West Berlin now that iron curtain dropped across city. Suggested putting UN into all Berlin or West Berlin. Von Brentano said idea of moving UN to Berlin very questionable. UN would be faced with problems now faced by Allies there; must in any case include all-Berlin; such arrangement could only be interim as division Germany into three separate parts not acceptable permanently (referred to establishment Berlin as international city). Should study possibilities, however. Secretary said US had no formal position on UN aspect but agreed problem of future role for city required hard thought. Believed introduction UN presence of lesser scope than headquarters itself offered possibility. Moving UN headquarters behind iron curtain had prestige value for Soviets. Furthermore, UN guarantee for city could not be as satisfactory as that of Three Powers, while UN would likely feel Three Power guarantee of site of its headquarters inappropriate. Saw other roles for city, such as seat of 4-power and mixed German technical Commissions, etc. It agreed Ambassadorial Group should study question. Secretary also mentioned possibility putting legal aspects Berlin problem before ICJ. Said US experts believed this unwise. Von Brentano agreed.

Von Brentano raised question paragraph 16 Western Peace Plan providing for European security arrangements. Said dangerous take measures in security field without linking them with political solutions. Secretary replied terms of reference of proposed group to study this point very broad. Said he felt political settlement and security arrangements not mutually exclusive in point of time, however. Same question arose in disarmament. Political situation must be taken into account but we should get on with efforts meanwhile reduce effects of confrontation great power systems.

Secretary then raised question FedRep F-84s in Berlin. Couve stated French had talked with pilots and were persuaded of their good faith. He recommended and it was agreed that we remain quiet for the present on the matter.

Ministers were then briefed on Congo situation by Assistant Secretary Cleveland.

Memorandum of conversation will be pouched addressees.[6]

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-1761. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Day and approved by Kohler. Also sent to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] The paragraph on the naval blockade is based on WFM MC-12; the paragraphs on the restricted session are based on WFM MC-14. (Both ibid., 762.00/9-1661)

[3] This report has not been further identified.

[4] Home is referring to Annex D-2 to the Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin, September 13. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1953)

[5] For text of the Draft Statement of Principles, which was part of the Report of the Four-Power Working Group, April 23, 1959, see The New York Times, May 20, 1959, p. 15. See also Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. VIII, pp. 638 -641 .

[6] At 3 p.m. on September 16 the Foreign Ministers met for the fourth and final time and agreed on the text of a report to NATO and the various sections of their own report, including a final communiqué. A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting (WFM MC-15) is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1661. A copy of their Report (BER-2), which had the same five sections as the Working Group Report (see footnote 1, Document 149), with the report to NATO and the final communiqué attached, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1951. A copy of the decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers on the report (BER-3), September 18, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Documents.

September-October 1961: Conversations With Foreign Minister Gromyko; Beginning of the Pal Correspondence

154. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, September 18, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 35, 6B NATO. Top Secret. Prepared by Taylor.

155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, September 20, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, State Department. Secret.

156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, September 22, 1961, 9:25 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-2261. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Fessenden, SOV, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

157. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, September 22, 1961, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN.

158. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)

Belgrade, September 22, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2261. Confidential; Official-Informal.

159. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, September 26, 1961, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2661. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn.

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, September 28, 1961, 9:53 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash; cleared by Hillenbrand, Fessenden, SOV, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

161. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, September 28, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-2861. Secret; Eyes Only.

162. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, September 29, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. For a description of the circumstances of the delivery of this letter on September 30, see Salinger, With Kennedy, pp. 197-200. A copy of the Russian text, dated September 28, also given to Salinger on that occasion, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. This is the first in a series of letters, delivered through special emissaries, that subsequently became known as the “Pen Pal Correspondence.” The texts of all the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI.

163. Editorial Note

164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, October 2, 1961, 6:40 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-261. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash on October 1 and cleared by Hillenbrand, Fessenden, SOV, and S/S. Repeated to London, Bonn, Berlin, Moscow, and USUN.

165. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, October 2, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, State Department. Secret.

166. Editorial Note

167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, October 3, 1961, 8:53 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2661. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted on October 2 by Day, cleared by Kohler and Hillenbrand, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn.

168. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, October 3, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-361. Secret. Initialed by Bohlen. Copies were sent to Bundy, McGhee, and Kohler.

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, October 4, 1961, 9:27 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2961. Secret. Drafted by Day, cleared by Kohler and Hillenbrand, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn.

170. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 6, 1961, 5 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, USSR, Gromyko Talks, Vol. III. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the White House. In addition to an unsigned memorandum, Sorensen, Bohlen, and Rostow all wrote memoranda, dated October 6, with talking points for this conversation. (Ibid.)

154. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, September 18, 1961.

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President on the Military Build-Up and Possible Action in Europe[2]

1. Prior to the meeting of the principals, I gave the President the attached memorandum[3] outlining the probable course of the discussion. Mr. Bundy argued against any call-up at this time because of the adverse impact on the negotiating attitude of the USSR. After some debate, the President indicated a readiness to approve calling up two divisions at this time, withholding a decision on the other two to a later date.

2. When the main meeting began, Mr. McNamara presented his paper, subject: “Military Build-Up and Possible Action in Europe,"[4] and explained the general content. The President then went over the entire paper, which included General Norstad's cable. He noted General Norstad's statement that NATO intelligence credited the Soviets with a capability of committing 100 divisions in the central front, whereas DoD estimate was 55 divisions.

3. General LeMay reported the split in the Joint Chiefs to the effect that the Chairman and the Army favored sending up [to?] six divisions to Europe, whereas the other Chiefs opposed a decision to send any divisions now. They would support, however, some call-up of Guard divisions. Specifically, they would recommend calling up two divisions.

4. The President indicated his hope that any divisions called up would be converted rapidly to AUS, hopefully within 6 months. Mr. McNamara indicated that the Army was very keen to convert these divisions, but he was doubtful at this time. He is not sure that the permanent establishment needs two additional divisions, and is particularly impressed by the probable magnitude of the '63 budget which, on the first go-round, amounts to $64 billion. He indicated satisfaction with a decision to call up a two-division package now amounting to 75,000 individuals.

5. Secretary Rusk, via Mr. Kohler, indicated complete support for the Defense recommendations (i.e., four divisions now, one division to Europe). He indicated no concern over the impact of such action on current negotiations.

6. In the end, the President approved the call-up of an infantry and an armored division with supporting forces, the effective date being somewhere from October 1st to October 15th. He directed Secretary McNamara to prepare a press release explaining the need for these divisions based upon world-wide requirements. He indicated a willingness to reconsider the need for an additional call-up in a few weeks.

M.D.T.[5]

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 35, 6B NATO. Top Secret. Prepared by Taylor.

[2] Taylor met with the President and Bundy at 4:30 p.m.; the main meeting began at 5.

[3] A copy of this 2-page memorandum is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 35, 6B NATO.

[4] A copy of this 13-page memorandum, dated September 18, is in Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316. It was drafted in response to NSAM No. 92, Document 144.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

155. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, September 20, 1961.

SUBJECT

Your meeting with the Secretary of State at 6 o'clock

You have the Secretary of State at 6 o'clock.[2] Many interesting problems may come up: the situation at the UN—your speech—the Congo—trouble at NATO. But the main business should be the Rusk-Gromyko talk. The first serious meeting is at lunch tomorrow. The Secretary will undoubtedly indicate his own sense of the scenario, but the following check list is an effort to summarize what you have spoken of in recent days as your own sense of the agenda.

A. Basic principles underlying the discussion

1. Serious negotiation is difficult, if not impossible, while the air is full of threats. On the other hand, if the atmosphere can be improved, we are quite ready for businesslike and constructive discussion.

2. Our basic objection is to the Soviet threat to end our rights in West Berlin. The Secretary plans to spell out the three fundamental rights and their detailed meaning. He plans to make it clear that we will surely fight for these rights. This he will state as a fact, not as a threat.

3. The proposal for Soviet troops in West Berlin is flatly not negotiable.

4. East Berlin and East Germany are the real root of danger; this danger is not permanently removed by barbed wire and concrete. What is the Soviet view of the future here?

5. Our presence in West Berlin rests fundamentally not only on occupation rights but on the will of the people of that city. We are for what they are for. West Berlin and its people are not a part of the GDR but a part of our fundamental international commitments.

B. Our view of the process of negotiation (this part is where you and the Secretary need to be sure that you clearly understand each other)

1. That the forum of negotiation which we would prefer is serious bilateral talks, to begin as soon as they can be promising. We are not inflexible on the place and parties of such talks: Thompson in Moscow, Kennan and Yepishev in Belgrade, or any other reliable channel will serve our purpose (this point in particular needs to be discussed with the Secretary).

2. That we are not hostile to some form of peace conference leading to an internationally recognized end of the war, if a real basis for understanding can be reached beforehand (this is a most sensitive point, and probably not appropriate for early discussion, but because you and the Secretary have talked about it before, it may be important for you to know his current view).

3.

That in any process of negotiation we do not mean to begin with a restatement of the Western Peace Plan.

This is not for statement to Gromyko, but for clear understanding with Mr. Rusk. Thompson has just added his thoughtful voice against any such restatement, and your own position has been clearly stated before, but the Western Foreign Ministers last week continued to talk about using the revised Western Peace Plan as a starting point.

4. That a Foreign Ministers' meeting is not a good negotiating forum to aim at now. This is the obverse of point 1., and I list it because, again, I think you and the Secretary may not be on the same wave length. A 4-Power meeting, given French attitudes, is a means of having no negotiation at all, and is the opposite of the process of serious exploration which I believe you have wanted.

McG. B.[3]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, State Department. Secret.

[2] No record of this meeting has been found, but the President's Log Book indicates that it lasted for 30 minutes. (Ibid.)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

156. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, September 22, 1961, 9:25 p.m.

1691. Paris pass Finletter 9:00 a.m. Sept 23. Also pass Stoessel and McGuire. During post-luncheon conversation September 21 lasting nearly three hours both Secretary and Gromyko formulated at some length respective positions on Germany and Berlin.[2] Atmosphere was reasonably relaxed but Gromyko's presentation did not deviate from standard version of main Soviet themes as developed at Vienna and thereafter.

Emphasizing that these were bilateral conversations since he did not have mandate to speak for other governments, Secretary stressed that current Berlin crisis was essentially of Soviet creation. Threatened effect of peace treaty would move against vital interests and fundamental commitments of US. We did not want arms race but would not draw away from it if Soviet threats executed. We did not want conflict but would have to prepare and be ready to face one if it forced upon us. Both sides must know clearly what are vital interests of other so that there can be no mistake. We believed, Secretary continued, and thought Soviets believed that two countries shared common interests in preventing war. Soviet proposals however did not seem to be put forward in spirit of discussion and negotiation but rather as kind of unilateral edict.

Mr. Gromyko noted Soviet Government had expressed readiness to have exchange of views between Secretary and himself in order to discuss question of peace treaty with Germany and settlement of West Berlin problem on basis of such treaty. Success of this exchange of views would be measured by extent to which two Governments would succeed in drawing line under World War II by signing peace treaty with Germany. Gromyko then launched into lengthy exposition of Soviet position on peace treaty, alleged FedRep revanchism and militarism and need to recognize fact of existence two German states. If unification at all possible it can be achieved not by heating situation between two German states but rather by peace treaty which would also solve problem of West Berlin. Gromyko reiterated that peace treaty would terminate occupation status and would proclaim West Berlin a free city. However, he argued, idea of free demilitarized city of West Berlin did not signify desire on part Soviets and GDR to gain hold over that city. Soviet Union prepared to accept strictest international guarantees and to have forces of all four powers in West Berlin to ensure what Secretary had called US presence in city. Added another possibility would be to have neutral forces stationed in West Berlin and a third possibility to have UN forces in the city.

Turning to access question Gromyko stated access linked to number of temporary (with stress on word “temporary") agreements concluded as result of unconditional surrender of Germany. Peace treaty would change this situation and would necessitate solution of access problem on different basis. Intention was not to sever communications between West Berlin and outside world or to blockade city, but rule had to be observed that once peace treaty signed access would have to be based on arrangements with GDR through whose territory all communications lines ran including air. Both Soviet Union and GDR have repeatedly stated such arrangements would be respected. Soviet Union wished to reach agreement with US and Allies on peace treaty and West Berlin solution on basis of peace treaty. Only as last resort would Soviet Union sign peace treaty unilaterally. As to timing Soviet Union believed peace treaty should be concluded this year.

In answering Gromyko Secretary said that, while post-war agreements were temporary in sense they were intended to end when it became possible to conclude peace treaty with single German Government, it was not intended that one side would unilaterally terminate them before that time. He stressed that rearmament of FedRep was in non-aggressive framework of NATO and had been preceded by East German action same field. As far as Soviet proposals on Berlin were concerned, East Berlin had simply disappeared from scene and we were told that this is a non-negotiable subject. Thus, having disposed of East Berlin with regard to their four-power responsibility Soviets were now turning to West Berlin which our area of responsibility under four-power agreements. If Soviets wished to have troops in Berlin it could propose their stationing in East Berlin. Best guarantee of integrity of West Berlin and freedom of its population were proposals of three Western Occupying Powers. Moreover our access rights were not available to Soviet Government to be over to East German regime since Soviets cannot turn over to someone else what it does not have itself. Secretary expressed concern that from what he knew of Soviet position two countries were on collision course. It was important not to let situation get out of hand and develop into direct clash. It was for such a reason that he had recently called in Soviet Chargé on Soviet threats to Western air access since unilateral action in this field could seriously impede peaceful discussion.

Discussion of subject terminated with effort by Secretary to obtain indication from Gromyko as to whether latter conceived terms of reference present talks to be as narrow as described his opening statement. Gromyko fuzzed response and Secretary commented that he supposed he could take it that Gromyko did not exclude broader approach than discussion limited to peace treaty and settlement West Berlin problem on basis such treaty.

For Finletter: You may draw on foregoing in presentation to NAC Sept. 23.[3]

Bowles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-2261. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Fessenden, SOV, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

[2] An 18-page memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 611.61/9-2161.

[3] In his summary of the discussion on September 23, Finletter reported that all the North Atlantic Council members agreed that Gromyko seemed to have taken a much more rigid stand than Khrushchev on the Berlin question. (Polto 384 from Paris, September 23; ibid., 611.61/9-2361)

157. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State[1]

Paris, September 22, 1961, 9 p.m.

Polto 375. Dept pass Defense. USUN for Kohler. At NAC meeting September 22 to consider deep dissatisfaction of NAC at relationship between four power Washington group and NAC, skillful and constructive presentation by Stikker held Council in line with hope for increased consultation in immediate future. Stikker told of work that has been going on preparing directive to Norstad and engaged to submit paper to NAC next week, if needs be expressing disagreements. He said political consultation on right track and economic consultation needs improvement. He concluded on basis of point made in Polto 354,[2] which I had given him and three Perm Reps yesterday, per your welcome Topol 391.[3] Canada took lead in criticizing past errors to live up to commitments, seriousness of issues involved, and making constructive suggestion, including insistence better information, particularly on NATO-wide plans. Canada stressed any plan to use nuclear weapons re Berlin even by three is responsibility of NAC. Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and Belgium supported Canada complaints and Stikker's approach, strongly pressing for IS observer or representative with Ambassadorial Steering Group. UK and US opposed, and Stikker said would study further.

UK explained role of Ambassadorial Group, and I agreed with Stikker's principles (Polto 354) and suggested he study matter and make recommendations.

It is clear there is still dissatisfaction, and proof of the pudding is going to lie in the eating of how we deal full NAC into our operations on full partnership basis.

There were continued and pointed requests for prompt reports of Rusk-Gromyko talks.[4]

Full report follows by airgram.[5]

Finletter

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to USUN.

[2] Polto 354, September 19, reported that developments in the previous 48 hours showed that the rest of NATO was very concerned that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were not consulting with or considering suggestions from the Alliance in their discussions of Berlin. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables)

[3] Topol 391, September 20, reported that at the Ambassadorial Group meeting that day the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to be more forthcoming with NATO, while France raised various objections to closer consultations. (Ibid.)

[4] See footnote 2, Document 156.

[5] A-337, September 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/9-2461)

158. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)[1]

Belgrade, September 22, 1961.

DEAR CHET: Time is very short this afternoon and this will have to be a sketchy note; but I wish without further delay to express my bewilderment over the Department's circular telegram 543, September 21,[2] to NATO country Ambassadors on the decisions of the Foreign Ministers' meeting concerning Berlin. Let me quickly cite the points that give me this feeling.

A.

It is said that Soviet action since early August make it more apparent than ever that the Soviets are willing to pursue the hard line to the very brink in order to intimidate and divide the West.

I should think it would be clear to everyone now that unless the West shows some disposition to negotiate in the sense of coming forward with some ideas and proposals of its own, the hard line is going to be pursued in Moscow not only to the very brink but to the full point of a world catastrophe. I fail to understand what seems to me to be our complacency in the face of this trend of events.

B.

It is said that so far there is no indication that the Soviets are prepared to negotiate a reasonable settlement.

I am at a loss to know how anyone could form any judgment of what the Soviets are or are not willing to do in the absence of any negotiations, either private or public, and in the absence of any proposals or suggestions or ideas from our side. I have said publicly, and I can only repeat it now, that there is no way to find out what the Russians will do in negotiations except to negotiate. In the absence of negotiations I am unable to imagine the basis on which we consider ourselves justified in making assumptions about what they would or would not offer.

C.

The Ministers, it is said, have reviewed “practically all previous negotiating positions on both sides including the 1959 Western peace plan."

I would not know what negotiating positions we had ever taken outside of the 1959 Western peace plan.

D. It is said that the Soviet “free city” proposal provides no basis for a settlement since a new settlement would have to safeguard three vital interests: freedom and viability of western Berlin; the presence and security of allied forces there; and free access to the city from Western Germany.

Aside from the fact that it is impossible, as stated above, to know, in the absence of negotiations, what the Soviets would or would not propose, I am not aware that there has been any statement made from the Soviet side which would specifically preclude the achievement of any of these objectives. So far as that is concerned, all would seem to have been conceded on principle in Khrushchev's various statements. I do not mean from this that I think his statements represent, as they stand, an adequate basis for an agreement. Agreements are not reached by public statements presented unilaterally and exchanged over a great distance. I am simply at a loss to know why the fact that these three vital interests have to be safeguarded is taken as meaning that the Soviet “free city” proposal provides no basis for settlement.

I write this note from very real anguish of spirit, for the view of the problem reflected in the Department's telegram seems to me little short of frivolous; yet the stakes, as we all know, are total. It is quite clear that the Russians suspect us simply of stalling; and so long as they suspect that this is our game, and that we have no intention of negotiating in the sense of making any proposals of our own, things are going to continue to get worse. Proposals for self-determination and reunification of Germany (or rather, for unification on the basis of self-determination and in the absence of any agreement on Germany's military future), however justified in the moral terms, represent—as everyone knows—a demand for a unilateral Soviet military and political withdrawal from central Europe. Obviously, this is not a realistic demand, and if this is the only alternative presented to the Russians, it is clear that they would prefer to make war.

Can it really be that it is not realized in Washington that our present course of a sullen and passive refusal to discuss Berlin represents a collision course with relation to very powerful and basic compulsions within the Soviet system? I do not mean by this to voice any certainty that successful negotiations with the Russians are possible. I mean only to say that I cannot understand, in the circumstances, why they should not be given a try.

Sincerely yours,

George F. Kennan[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2261. Confidential; Official-Informal.

[2] Attached but not printed.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

159. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, September 26, 1961, 1 p.m.

601. Bonn for Ambassador. From Clay to Rusk. It is clear to me now that the action of Aug 13 was put on sooner than its probable planned date to prevent collapse of Ulbricht's regime. The internal security measures to save it could be applied only with a sealed border. Soviet representatives apprehensive of Allied reaction stayed in the background to have greater freedom of action. They remain further back than usual but, in general, behave correctly when called to the scene of an incident. Unfortunately, the East German police apprehensive initially in exercising authority over Allied personnel are emboldened by success and trying now to increase their authority.

Harassments not in direct conflict with our basic rights do not worry me although I think they should be checked as they occur to the extent possible without show of force. To show force when we do not intend to use it is one thing we must avoid. However, I cannot accept the escalation theory that any reaction on our part leads to further actions and possible war. The complete acceptance of this policy would lead to the continuing erosion of an already eroded position.

Harassments which are in direct conflict with our basic rights concern me very much. Our right of access to East Berlin had not been questioned since our arrival until recently when our personnel in properly licensed cars were denied permission to enter by the East German police who refused to call a Soviet officer. Our right of access on the highway between Berlin and West Germany reconfirmed in the 1949 agreement lifting the blockade[2] had never been subject to attempted East German control of identification until the last several days. These incidents have not been repeated enough to constitute a pattern and the formal protests being made locally and to Marshal Konev may prove effective. However, I think we should consider now our position if they do become a pattern.

I recognize that negotiations may result in the transfer of Soviet rights to East German Government or that such transfer might occur without negotiations. However, I do not believe we should be governed in the interim by what we would do if such a transfer took place. If we accept the increasing authority of the East German police, we may have little left to negotiate. Further, it seems most important that in the period in which we are seeking a negotiating base as well as during negotiations we are at a material disadvantage if the procedures for the exercise of our rights have already been established.

Also, if incidents increase we could soon find Allied personnel unwilling to use the highway freely which in itself would be a partial blockade. To provide some protection, the army has increased its administrative patrols which is certainly not a show of force. They do have telephone contact with our check points to demand the appearance of Soviet officers. However, they cannot be sufficient in number to really accomplish this purpose. Obviously, there is no way in which we can patrol this long highway to protect our people and a show of force would be of no value whatsoever.

I hope that no pattern is developing from these incidents but I believe that we should plan for it to develop. If it does, we can be sure the East Germans will make it known. I would urge strongly that consideration be given to advising Gromyko that we cannot develop a basis for negotiating unless we are assured of normal conditions governing our access to Berlin from West Germany and to East Berlin.

If the pattern does develop, I would also be apprehensive of the closure of our one entry point to East Berlin. I shall submit a separate report on this soon.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2661. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn.

[2] For text of the May 5, 1949, communiqué, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. III, p. 751.

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, September 28, 1961, 9:53 p.m.

1836. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. Deliver Finletter 9:00 a.m. Sept. 29. Although second discussion between Secretary and Gromyko on Sept. 27 involved more probing re specific details of positions of both sides, Soviet thinking showed little actual movement and no conclusions could be drawn as to basic Soviet position behind conventional formulations on peace treaty and free city.[2]

Gromyko opened on subject of “European security” and “Strategic matters” saying that in speaking of strengthening European security Soviets mean conclusion of peace treaty with Germany and drawing a line under World War II.

Secretary said both US and USSR had interest in European security but Soviet proposals provide too narrow framework. Soviets requested proposals but only within their narrow framework. Suggested agenda might be “Germany, Berlin, and European Security” with each side free to say what it wishes.

Gromyko said peace treaty not conjured up by Soviets but brought to fore by life itself. Sixteen years etc., etc. Added since Soviets located in Europe they especially interested European security. US-USSR agreement could prevent major nuclear war and this was most important thing. Therefore both countries must do utmost to bring positions closer together. Developments in field of military technology made matter urgent. Soviets of course seeking nothing for selves in peace treaty. Had made own proposals now waiting for West's on a peaceful settlement—on a peace treaty. Things moving too slowly.

Secretary agreed US and USSR have common interest in preventing major conflict. US would not be drawn by others into doing anything not of vital interest to US. Believed Soviet position analogous. Situation re Germany and Berlin not entirely satisfactory to either side but peaceful modus vivendi exists. West not seeking to change by force. Soviets had protected their presumed vital interest in refugee question by unilateral action. US not concerned re peace treaty per se but re consequences which Soviets say would flow therefrom. These challenge vital Western interests. We prepared discuss access with Soviets but not with Ulbricht whose statements not always in accord with Khrushchev's.

Secretary said “state of war” in Berlin legal fiction not actual fact.GDR “sovereignty” also legal concept. We find no vital Soviet interest affected by continuance existing situation. Ulbricht clearly wished affect West Berlin by control of traffic.

Gromyko said useful that Secretary recognized situation in Germany and Berlin not satisfactory. However, US must go further and say how situation should be corrected. Said he not prepared believe state of war legal fiction. Soviet Union regarded situation quite differently. Unsettled German borders, including that between two German states, revanchism, militarism not theory to Soviets. Peace treaty not theory or legal fiction to Soviets but rather what West calls vital interests.

Turning to Western rights in West Berlin Gromyko said peace treaty ending state of war would end rights. Soviets could not permit West prevent conclusion peace treaty. After treaty, all relationships with West Berlin would have to be on basis agreement with GDR. Soviets can be involved in guaranteeing access to West Berlin only if there is agreed solution among West, USSR, GDR, and other parties concerned. However, if treaty concluded with only one German state, Soviet Union could assume no such obligation. Ulbricht's statements confirm that GDR would respect its obligations. If two sides did not rely on effectiveness their own guarantees, agreement difficult to conceive.

Secretary had unfortunately failed answer some Gromyko questions, Soviet Foreign Minister continued. Soviets prepared listen any proposals re broadening framework. Said Soviets trying bring two sides closer together but if Western press correct in hinting that Secretary merely trying create appearance of negotiations obviously could be no agreement.

Peace conference should be convened. Soviets trying convince US satisfactory access arrangements could be made but its statements designed to meet Western needs were ignored.

Secretary replied that press reports Gromyko cited do not represent real situation. True Germany divided but Berlin not part of East Germany. Soviet peace treaty could not dispose of US rights. US has access rights which except for short period of difficulty have been fully acknowledged by Soviets since 1945. Soviets have obligations toward US rights and US fails see how Soviets plan discharge obligations. Secretary then read Gromyko two statements by Ulbricht—first made on June 15, 1961, to effect “What is or is not to be permitted in West Berlin will be specified in the peace treaty"—second, made same date, to effect “There are people in West Germany who would like us to mobilize building workers of GDR capital to put up a wall . . . nobody intends to put up a wall."[3]

Secretary said since Soviets want change, up to them not us to demonstrate how our rights would be guaranteed.

If there were clear understanding Western rights in and access to Berlin, we could look into broader questions relating to Germany and security arrangements in order to improve stability in Central Europe. However, we hesitant to go into broader questions when our basic rights being questioned. Secretary emphasized could not leave impression in any way that arrangement between Soviets and GDR can in any respect affect our rights in Berlin. We have examined carefully what Soviets say re access but main impression we received was one of uncertainty. Since these vital matters for us naturally our attention focuses on them.

Re Gromyko's question at previous meeting as to peace conference, Secretary said success of any conference clearly not possible unless governments of primary interest get together first to see how might work out and whether common views could be found. If views of powers primarily concerned are brought closer together, then we could see how any agreement we might be able to reach could be formalized.

Next meeting scheduled September 30, 10:30 a.m.

For Finletter: You may draw on foregoing for NAC presentation.

Bowles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/9-2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash; cleared by Hillenbrand, Fessenden, SOV, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.

[2] A 15-page memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 611.61/9-2761.

[3] Ellipsis in the source text. For a transcript of Ulbricht's press conference on June 15, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, pp. 925-946. For extracts, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 737-744.

161. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, September 28, 1961, 4 p.m.

624. From Clay for Rusk only.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The President's speech[2] has greatly encouraged the thinking Germans in Berlin, although the extreme nationalistic political element will argue that it is not enough. To me, it was exactly what needed to be said and clearly proved that our policy is strong and determined. With full confidence in this policy, I must report that it is being vitiated in Berlin by undue caution verging on timidity. We are fighting a political battle here, not a war. Of course, we cannot win a war in Berlin but we can win the political battle. To do so we must convince the Russians on the ground what our rights are, and not let them lapse one by one. We cannot expect them to believe us otherwise.

It seems to me we have reached a point where various levels of command accept too many incidents in Berlin as routine and thus not urgently importance to our position here. I would like to take our exclave at Steinstucken as an example. As it is within the area in which I have a responsibility, I considered it my immediate duty to pay it a visit. Finding refugees there, I asked for a small patrol to be sent in by helicopter for their protection. The State Department immediately approved the removal of the refugees by helicopter. However, this approval asked that the removal be done as much as possible under cover. We did not have to undertake this operation as the refugees made their own way into Berlin. I suggested then replacing the helicopter service by a truck moving on the ground. This action was turned down even though there had been no Soviet reaction to our helicopter service. In addition, the local commander was told to get permission each time a helicopter was sent into Steinstucken. Additional refugees succeeded in breaking through the police cordon to enter Steinstucken. When permission was requested to remove them by helicopter it required discussion between three commands with a lapse of approximately twenty hours before any action was taken. When the refugees were brought out it was still done as much under cover as possible.

Steinstucken is a recognized part of our responsibility and if we fail to meet this responsibility the repercussion in Berlin would be serious indeed. We can argue with some validity that since we cannot protect Steinstucken by force we must not endanger its people. The same argument applies to our entire responsibility. The right to use the air and our responsibility to protect the people in our sector are the basic rights to which we are committed. We should have moved our helicopters openly but not ostentatiously into Steinstucken and brought whoever we wanted to out openly and proudly. Of course, we would not announce them to be refugees. We would be irresponsible if we played any part in helping refugees get through the cordon but if the Soviet and German police cannot keep them from doing so and they come into the areas for which we are responsible we must provide them protection. Otherwise I cannot see why we are in Berlin. I am sure too that this issue is one which would be clearly understood by the people of West Berlin and by our people at home.

There is no longer time for either caution or timidity when our basic rights are threatened. The Russians are not going to war to stop us from taking refugees out of Steinstucken. They may well take the acts which would cause war if we fail to exercise our rights at Steinstucken in the belief that we have given up these rights. I know of no better opportunity that we have had to have shown our determination, and unfortunately we do not have enough such opportunities to fail to utilize those which do arise.

I am sure that I was not sent here to live in vacuum, nor to see our strong national policy eroded by our failures to act promptly in Berlin. I managed to live here through some critical years without getting involved in the use of force. And I recognize that the use of force in Berlin is not an answer to our problem. However, we must be prepared to force the East German police to use force or to call up their Soviet forces to show our determination. We must be bold without truculence, quietly and not ostentatiously determined, and completely sure of those rights to which we are committed. This requires a greater reliance on those who are responsible in Berlin as they alone have the knowledge and experience to know when reaction is essential. This is not a reorientation of policy but it does imply that now our national policy is firmly established we must support it fully on the ground. If we do this I doubt if we will be pushed into war as we can well be if the East German police and Soviet forces have underestimated our determination. I am sure that there is determination in Washington and that we must make it clear to the people of West Berlin and to the East German and Soviet forces that it exists here, too. This requires no sudden or major change in our immediate posture. It does require a change in thinking in the long channel which comes from you. I believe it a matter of urgency.[3]

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-2861. Secret; Eyes Only.

[2] For text of the President's address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, which included a section on Berlin that attributed the crisis to the Soviet threat to Western rights in the city, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 618-626.

[3] In telegram 640, September 29, Clay reported that he was not entirely clear on the importance the United States attached to access to East Berlin and specifically noted that U.S. encouragement of visiting the Soviet Sector gave the impression that this was a right the United States was prepared to defend. Clay then suggested two alternatives in the event the Friedrichstrasse crossing were closed. The first was to do nothing at the site, but announce publicly that the issue was so serious it would be taken up with the Soviet Government. The second would be to physically destroy the barrier with a tank or heavy equipment to discover the real reason for the closing. Clay concluded by registering his support for the second alternative. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2961)

162. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy[1]

Moscow, September 29, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: At present I am on the shore of the Black Sea. When they write in the press that Khrushchev is resting on the Black Sea it may be said that this is correct and at the same time incorrect. This is indeed a wonderful place. As a former Naval officer you would surely appreciate the merits of these surroundings, the beauty of the sea and the grandeur of the Caucasian mountains. Under this bright Southern sun it is even somehow hard to believe that there still exist problems in the world which, due to lack of solutions, cast a sinister shadow on peaceful life, on the future of millions of people.

But as you will fully understand, I cannot at this time permit myself any relaxation. I am working, and here I work more fruitfully because my attention is not diverted to routine matters of which I have plenty, probably like you yourself do. Here I can concentrate on the main things.

I have given much thought of late to the development of international events since our meeting in Vienna, and I have decided to approach you with this letter. The whole world hopefully expected that our meeting and a frank exchange of views would have a soothing effect, would turn relations between our countries into the correct channel and promote the adoption of decisions which would give the peoples confidence that at last peace on earth will be secured. To my regret—and, I believe, to yours—this did not happen.

I listened with great interest to the account which our journalists Adjubei and Kharlamov gave of the meeting they had with you in Washington.[2] They gave me many interesting details and I questioned them most thoroughly. You prepossessed them by your informality, modesty and frankness which are not to be found very often in men who occupy such a high position.

My thoughts have more than once returned to our meetings in Vienna. I remember you emphasized that you did not want to proceed towards war and favoured living in peace with our country while competing in the peaceful domain. And though subsequent events did not proceed in the way that could be desired, I thought it might be useful in a purely informal and personal way to approach you and share some of my ideas. If you do not agree with me you can consider that this letter did not exist while naturally I, for my part, will not use this correspondence in my public statements. After all only in confidential correspondence can you say what you think without a backward glance at the press, at the journalists.

As you see, I started out by describing the delights of the Black Sea coast, but then I nevertheless turned to politics. But that cannot be helped. They say that you sometimes cast politics out through the door but it climbs back through the window, particularly when the windows are open.

I have given careful thought to what you told our journalists in your personal talk with them and to the difficulties to which you referred. Of course, I fully understand that the questions which have now matured and require solution are not of the kind that easily lend themselves to solution. But they have a vitally important significance for our countries and for all the countries of the world. And therefore we cannot escape them. We cannot shift the burden of solving those questions on the shoulders of others. And who else but the leaders of the two most influential and mighty States—the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.—can the nations expect to work out solutions which could form the basis for the consolidation of peace. After your meeting with Adjubei and Kharlamov I was about to write you a letter right then and, I admit, even drafted one. However, your television address in July,[3] unfortunately, made it impossible for me to send that letter. After that speech which, putting it bluntly, was belligerent in its nature, my letter would not have been understood by you since it completely differed in spirit, content and tone from what you said. After that we not only made speeches and exchanged statements but, unfortunately, also proceeded to an exchange of actions which will not, and indeed cannot, yield any moral satisfaction either to you as President of the United States or to me as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. Evidently both one side and the other are compelled to undertake their actions under the pressure of the various factors and conditions which exist and which—unless we exert a restraining influence—will propel the development of events in a direction in which you and I, and the more so the peoples of all countries, would not like them to be propelled. It would be most of all unwise from the standpoint of peace to enter into such a vicious circle when some would be responding with counter-measures to the measures of others, and vice versa. The whole world could bog down in such measures and counter-measures.

Lately I have had not a few meetings with eminent statesmen and political leaders of Western countries. I have talked with Mr. Fanfani, the Prime Minister of Italy. I shall not describe that talk of which I suppose he, as a representative of a State allied with you, had informed you. Recently I had a conversation with the former Prime Minister of France Mr. Paul Reynaud. He raised a number of questions to which I frankly replied. After Paul Reynaud I received Mr. Spaak, the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium, who for a number of years was the Secretary General of NATO. I listened to him with attention and tried to reply to his questions as exhaustively as possible, to expound our position and explain how we consider it best to solve those questions. I must say that in my opinion understanding can be reached on those questions which were touched upon in my talk with Mr. Spaak. To this end it is only necessary that both sides should display equal interest in settling the problems at issue on a mutually acceptable basis.

The statesmen of many countries are presently displaying great concern for the destinies of peace, they are seriously troubled by the tense situation that has taken shape and they sincerely fear that some rash actions might bring the world to disaster and to the unleashing of nuclear war. These feelings are dear to me and I understand them because, like many Soviet people, I spent the war years at the front and lived through all the horrors of war. I am against war. The Soviet Government is against war. The peoples of the Soviet Union are against war. I say this to you because I believe that you—a direct participant in the battles of the last war—take the same position.

I should like in this connection to dwell upon some of the basic problems which now preoccupy the whole world since the future of mankind depends on their solution. It can be said that in the disarmament question which is the major question of our time there have now appeared certain gleams. I would like to see those gleams in the fact that we have reached agreement on submitting to the United Nations General Assembly a “Statement of Principles"[4] as a joint proposal of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. so that in subsequent negotiations a treaty on general and complete disarmament can be elaborated on its basis. Certainly it must not be forgotten that so far this is an agreement in regard to the principles of disarmament. This is as yet far from the achievement of the actual agreement on general and complete disarmament, and the more so this is not the practical start of such disarmament. But it is precisely the conclusion of such an agreement and its implementation within the shortest possible time that all the nations are expecting of us. For them and for all of us that would mean great joy.

It is important to note that even understanding on the principles of disarmament which we have succeeded in reaching after protracted and intense effort and only after you came to the White House, is a good thing too. Naturally such understanding is not an end in itself. It must, so to say, be the harbinger, the first successful step on the road to general and complete disarmament. That is what we would like to hope.

If, Mr. President, you are striving towards that noble goal—and I believe that is the case—if agreement of the United States on the principles of disarmament is not merely a diplomatic or tactical manoeuvre, you will find complete understanding on our part and we shall stint no effort in order to find a common language and reach the required agreement together with you.

The Soviet Union, as you are well aware, has always advocated the prompt implementation of general and complete disarmament. The solution of that question would, in our profound conviction, radically promote the settlement of other major international problems as well. Our position in that respect is still unchanged.

But you will agree with me, Mr. President, that the present international situation and its tension can hardly be assessed as a simple arithmetical sum total of unsolved issues. After all, the series of measures and counter-measures aimed at strengthening the armaments of both sides which have already been put into effect by our Governments in connection with the aggravation of the German question cannot be disregarded. I do not want here to engage in an argument as to who is right or wrong in this matter. Let us leave this aside for the time being. The main thing is that events are unfortunately continuing to develop in the same unfavourable direction. Instead of confidence we are turning to an even greater aggravation. Far from bringing the possibility of agreement between us on disarmament closer, we are, on the contrary, worsening the situation still further. That is another important reason why the Soviet Union is now attaching such exclusive significance to the German question. We cannot escape the fact that there has been a Second World War and that the problems we have inherited from the last war—first and foremost the conclusion of a German peace treaty—require their solution.

History will not be reversed and West Berlin will not be moved to the other side of the Elbe. In that war the peoples of our two countries fought shoulder to shoulder. But if we fought together, we should indeed keep the peace together.

If you were to come to the Soviet Union now—and this incidentally is something I am hoping for—you would surely convince yourself that not a single Soviet citizen will ever reconcile himself to the peace, which was won at such great cost, being under constant threat. But that will be the case until the countries that participated in the war recognize and formalize the results of the war in a German peace treaty. Yes, that is what our people are demanding, and they are right. That is demanded by the Poles, that is demanded by the people of Czechoslovakia, that is demanded by other nations as well. They are right too. The position of the Soviet Union is shared by many. The impression is formed that understanding of the need to conclude a German peace treaty is growing in the world. I have already told you, Mr. President, that in striving for the conclusion of a German peace treaty we do not want somehow to prejudice the interests of the United States and their bloc allies. Neither are we interested in exacerbating the situation in connection with the conclusion of a German peace treaty. What need have we of such exacerbation? It is in the Western countries that they create all sorts of fears and allege that the socialist States intend well-nigh to swallow up West Berlin. You may believe my word, the word of the Soviet Government that neither we nor our allies need West Berlin.

I do not doubt that, given good will and desire, the Governments of our countries could find a common language in the question of a German peace treaty too. Naturally in the solution of that question it is necessary to proceed from the obvious fact, which even a blind man cannot fail to see, that there exist two sovereign German States.

I was gratified to familiarize myself with the statement which, according to press reports, was made by your representative in Berlin Mr. Clay on the need to recognize that there now actually exist two Germanies.[5] It is impossible not to appreciate such a reasonable and sober pronouncement. I recall Senator Mansfield made some statements in the same spirit. All this warrants the hope that evidently the process has started of a quest for a solution of the German question on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the obtaining situation, a solution in which the Soviet Union and the United States of America must, above all, play their part. Naturally this solution must be such as not to inflict any harm to the prestige of one side or the other.

If we fail to agree on the conclusion of one peace treaty for both German States we also have at our disposal such a course as the drafting of two treaties which would be similar in content—one for the German Democratic Republic and the other for the Federal Republic of Germany. In that case the States that were parties to the anti-Hitler coalition would have the opportunity of signing one or two peace treaties depending on their choice. Such an approach would allow of circumventing the difficulties that appear owing to the fact that not all the possible participants in a peace settlement are ready to recognize both existing German States legally and establish diplomatic relations with them.

In any event the contracting parties could assume moral obligations to assist in the unification into one entity of both German States if the Germans so desire. It goes without saying that such obligations would find reflection in the peace treaty itself. As for the achievement of agreement on the unification of Germany, that is the concern of the Governments of the two German States. I believe such a solution would be reasonable and understandable for everyone. It would be understood by the German people as well.

In signing a German peace treaty the States that participated in the war will have to unconditionally recognize the presently constituted frontiers of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Under the peace treaty those frontiers would be legally formalized, I stress legally, because de facto they already exist and cannot be changed without a war.

We cannot turn our back on the facts and fail to see that until the existing borders of Germany are finally formalized the sluice-gates which release the West German revanchard desires remain open. The followers of Hitler and his policy who, unfortunately, still exist in no small numbers in the Federal Republic of Germany are dreaming of the long-awaited day when, exploiting the lack of a post-war settlement, they will succeed in bringing about a collision between the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and the other former opponents of Hitlerite Germany. Why then should we leave any ground for the activities of those forces which are fraught with the threat of a world conflict? I would think that the legal formalization of the State borders which have taken shape after World War Two equally meets the interests of both the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Thus the borders that have taken shape and presently exist between the two German States would be formalized as well.

There remains the question of West Berlin which must also be solved when a German peace treaty is concluded. From whatever side we approach the matter, we probably will not be able to find a better solution than the transformation of West Berlin into a free city. And we shall proceed towards that goal. If, to our regret, the Western Powers will not wish to participate in a German peace settlement and the Soviet Union, together with the other countries that will be prepared to do so, has to sign a treaty with the German Democratic Republic we shall nonetheless provide a free city status for West Berlin.

Your statements, Mr. President, as well as the statements of other representatives of Western Powers not infrequently show signs of concern as to whether freedom for the population of West Berlin will be preserved, whether it will be able to live under the social and political system of its own choosing, whether West Berlin will be safeguarded against interference and outside pressure. I must say we see no difficulties in creating such conditions, the more so since the assurance of the freedom and complete independence of West Berlin is also our desire, is also our concern. I declare this on behalf of the Soviet Government, and on behalf of the socialist countries allied with us which are interested in the solution of the German question. I wish to emphasize in particular that the German Democratic Republic and the Head of that State Walter Ulbricht are of the same opinion. I say this with full knowledge and in all responsibility.

Voices can also be heard contending that it is not enough to codify in a German peace treaty the guarantees of the freedom and independence of West Berlin since—so it is said—there is no certainty that those guarantees will be honored. The statesmen and political leaders of the Western Powers with whom I have had occasion to meet, sometimes plainly expressed the wish that such guarantees should not only be given under a peace treaty but should also be specially reinforced by the Soviet Union.

Frankly speaking it is hard to understand what such apprehensions are based on. I am convinced that the guarantees established under a peace treaty will be honored and observed by all the States which will have signed the treaty. Furthermore the Soviet Union as a party to the German peace treaty will feel itself responsible for the fulfillment of all the clauses of that treaty, including the guarantees in respect to West Berlin.

But if it is the common desire that responsibility for the observance of the status of West Berlin should be entrusted to the Soviet Union we shall be ready to assume such a responsibility. I and my colleagues in the Government have not infrequently given thought to the way in which the role of the Soviet Union in guarantees for West Berlin could be implemented in practice. If we were simply to make a statement that the Soviet Union will in some special way guarantee the immunity of West Berlin, you will agree that this could prejudice the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic and the other countries parties to the peace treaty. In order to prevent that, in order not to prejudice the prestige of any State—whether your ally or ours—I believe the question should be solved in the way we have already proposed, namely that token contingents of troops of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, the four great Powers which participated in the war against Hitlerite Germany, should be left in West Berlin. In my view that is the sole possibility. Naturally such a system should be introduced not for all time but for a specific period. Evidently an appropriate status for the deployment of the troops of the four Powers in West Berlin would then have to be devised which would be subject to the approval of the other countries signatories of the peace treaty.

Given every desire, we could find no other solution which to any greater degree would strengthen confidence in the reliability of guarantees for West Berlin. If you have any ideas of your own on this score we are ready to consider them.

Of course, such alternatives are also conceivable as the deployment in West Berlin of troops from neutral countries or United Nations troops. I have repeatedly expressed and now reaffirm our agreement to such a solution. We also agree to the establishment of the United Nations Headquarters in West Berlin which would in that case become an international city.

It goes without saying that the occupation regime in West Berlin must be eliminated. Under the allied agreements occupation is a temporary measure and, indeed, never in history has there been a case of occupation becoming a permanent institution. But sixteen years have already elapsed since the surrender of Germany. For how long then is the occupation regime to be preserved?

A more stable status should be created for West Berlin than existed under the occupation. If the occupation regime has lived out its time and has become a source of strife among States it means the time has come to discard it. It has completely exhausted itself, has become a burden in relationships among nations and does not meet the interests of the population of West Berlin itself. The transformation of West Berlin into a free city will create a far more durable basis for its independent existence than the regime of occupation. Furthermore the grounds for collisions among States which are generated by the preservation of the occupation regime will disappear.

Of course, no one can be satisfied with half-measures which superficially would seem to erase from the surface differences among States while in effect they would be preserving them under cover and driving them in deeper. What use would there be if we barely covered up this delayed action landmine with earth and waited for it to explode. Indeed, no, the countries which are interested in consolidating peace must render that landmine completely harmless and tear it out of the heart of Europe.

The representatives of the United States sometimes declare that the American side is not advancing its concrete proposals on the German question because the Soviet Union allegedly is not striving for agreed solutions and wants to do everything by itself regardless of what other States may say. It is hard for me to judge how far such ideas really tell on the actions of the United States Government, but they are based on a profoundly mistaken assessment of the position of the Soviet Union. The United States Government can easily verify that, if it wishes to introduce its own constructive proposals at the negotiations on a peaceful settlement with Germany incorporating the question of West Berlin.

I am closely following the meetings of our Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei A. Gromyko with the Secretary of State of the United States Mr. Dean Rusk. I do not know how you will react to this idea, but it seems to me that it would be useful to broaden contacts between our Governments on the German question. If the United States Government, like the Soviet Government, is searching for understanding and is ready to devise conditions for peace with Germany which would be acceptable for both sides and would not affect the interests or the prestige of any State I believe it could be arranged that you and I would appoint appropriate representatives for private meetings and talks. Those representatives would elaborate for us the contours of an agreement which we could discuss before coming to a peace conference where a decision on the question of a peace treaty with Germany will be taken.

Your wish, Mr. President, that perhaps our Ambassadors in Belgrade should be entrusted with an informal exchange of views, was communicated to me. In fact such meetings have already started. Unfortunately, however, I see from the dispatches of our Ambassador that they are spending too much time in, figuratively speaking, sniffing each other. If this goes on the business will not move forward, whereas it should be tackled with more energy.[6]

I have never met Mr. Kennan but, so far as I can judge by the press, he is, to my mind, a man with whom preparatory work could be done, and we would accordingly authorize our Ambassador. But evidently in that case our Ambassadors would have to be given firm instructions to start talks on concrete questions without needless procrastination and not merely indulge in tea-drinking, not walk round and about mooing at each other when they should talk on the substance.

The following alternative is also possible. You, let us say, could send someone in your confidence to Moscow under some plausible pretext and the necessary contacts could be established there. This method might possibly even expedite the solution of the questions. However, let the final choice be up to you. You might perhaps prefer to charge Mr. Thompson, your Ambassador in Moscow, with that mission. Personally I have had a number of conversations with him and he gives the impression of being a man who can represent you in dealing with the problems that face us. But naturally it is not for me to give you advise in such matters. Please excuse me for intruding in the sphere of questions which are entirely within your own personal competence.

The non-aligned countries addressed messages to you, Mr. President, and to myself. They suggested that we meet to discuss outstanding problems. You gave a positive reply to that appeal.[7] We too reacted favourably to the initiative of the neutrals.

I believe a meeting between us could be useful and, given the desire of both sides, could culminate in the adoption of positive decisions. Naturally such a meeting would have to be well prepared through diplomatic or other confidential channels. And when preliminary understanding is reached, you and I could meet at any place in order to develop and formalize the results of such an understanding. This would undoubtedly be met with great satisfaction by all nations. They would see in that step an important contribution to the settlement of existing differences, to the consolidation of peace. The positive results of such a meeting would generate confidence that all issues can be solved peacefully by negotiation.

We are proposing that a German peace treaty be signed not only to eliminate the vestiges of World War Two, but also to clear the way for the elimination of the state of “cold war” which can at any moment bring our countries to the brink of a military collision. We want to clear the way for the strengthening of friendly relations with you and with all the countries of the world which espouse peaceful coexistence.

You, yourself, understand that we are a rich country, our expanse is boundless, our economy is on the upgrade, our culture and science are in their efflorescence. Acquaint yourself with the Program of our Party which determines our economic development for twenty years to come. This is indeed a grand and thrilling Program. What need have we of war? What need have we of acquisitions? And yet it is said that we want to seize West Berlin! It is ridiculous even to think of that. What would that give us? What would that change in the ratio of forces in the world arena? It gives nothing to anyone.

I often think how necessary it is for men who are vested with trust and great power to be inspired with the understanding of what seems to be an obvious truism, which is that we live on one planet and it is not in man's power—at least in the foreseeable future—to change that. In a certain sense there is an analogy here—I like this comparison—with Noah's Ark where both the “clean” and the “unclean” found sanctuary. But regardless of who lists himself with the “clean” and who is considered to be “unclean,” they are all equally interested in one thing and that is that the Ark should successfully continue its cruise. And we have no other alternative: either we should live in peace and cooperation so that the Ark maintains its buoyancy, or else it sinks. Therefore we must display concern for all of mankind, not to mention our own advantages, and find every possibility leading to peaceful solutions of problems.

When I was already closing this letter I was given the text of your address before the United Nations General Assembly.[8] It has long since become my habit, when reading statements by responsible statesmen, in the first instance to search for and find—even a grain at a time—ideas and propositions which could be useful for the building up of peaceful cooperation among States. Almost involuntarily you sift away all the accretions, all that has been said in a fit of temper, under the influence of unduly inflamed passions. If everything is replied to in the same vein such battles of words would have to be entered into that the voice of reason would be drowned out and the shoots of all that is good and hope-giving in relations among States would be nipped in the bud.

Of course, if one were to attune himself to an aggravation of relations between our countries, your speech before the Assembly could easily be evaluated as a challenge to an embittered dispute in the “cold war” spirit and no one could reproach us as being partial. That speech contains no few points in which homage is plainly felt to those who oppose the normalization of the international situation and seek to whip up a military psychosis by spreading all sorts of fables about the intentions of the Soviet Government and ascribing to it what does not even exist. Hence, evidently, the crude sallies tinted with ideological intolerance which are made against the social and public foundations of socialist society and which look to me, if the consolidation of peace is seriously contemplated, like a square peg in a round hole.

If you are fighting for the preservation of capitalism and consider it to be a more just society, we have our own opinion on that score. You speak of communism with disrespect, but I could reply in kind with regard to capitalism. But can we change each other's mind in questions affecting our outlooks? No, to carry ideological differences into relations among States is tantamount to an out-of-hand renunciation of hopes of living in peace and friendship with each other and we should certainly not take that road.

We can argue, we can disagree with one another but weapons must not be brought into play. I recall our conversation in Vienna about peaceful coexistence. I trust you will remember it and agree now, as you agreed then, that the question of the choice of a social system is for the people of each country to decide. Each one of us submits to his own principles, his own system but this should not lead to a collision between our countries. Let us allow history to judge the advantages of this or that social system.

A few words on Laos.

[Here follow 7 paragraphs on Laos.]

I am now working on the preparation of two reports which I shall deliver at the Congress of our Communist Party: a progress report and a report on the Program of the Party. Naturally, in those reports I cannot pass over such questions as disarmament and the German question. These are the major questions of the day because on their solution depends the course which relations between our countries take in their development, and consequently the course world events take: that is whether they will develop towards the consolidation of peace and cooperation among States or whether they will proceed in a different direction, a dangerous one for mankind. We want to find the solutions of both these questions, we want to clear the road for an improvement of relations between our countries, for the assurance of peaceful coexistence and peace on earth.

Please convey my best wishes to your wife. I wish you and your entire family good health.

I should like to believe that by joint effort we shall succeed in surmounting the existing difficulties and in making our contribution to the solution of the international problems which preoccupy the nations. And then together with you we shall be able to celebrate the successes achieved in the strengthening of peace, and this is something that the peoples of our countries, as well as all men on earth, are awaiting impatiently.

Accept my respects,

N. Khrushchev[9]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. For a description of the circumstances of the delivery of this letter on September 30, see Salinger, With Kennedy, pp. 197-200. A copy of the Russian text, dated September 28, also given to Salinger on that occasion, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. This is the first in a series of letters, delivered through special emissaries, that subsequently became known as the “Pen Pal Correspondence.” The texts of all the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VI.

[2] An account of this meeting on June 26 is printed ibid., vol. V, Document 102.

[3] See Document 81.

[4] For text of the Statement of Principles, September 20 (U.N. doc. A/4879), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1091-1094.

[5] At a reception in his honor on September 22, Clay had stated that West Germany needed to accept the reality of two Germanies. For a report on his remarks, see The New York Times, September 22, 1961.

[6] Regarding Kennan's conversations with his Soviet counterpart, see Document 137.

[7] See footnote 5, Document 143.

[8] For text of the President's address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 618-626.

[9] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

163. Editorial Note

On September 30, 1961, Vice President Johnson, who had been in Sweden to attend the funeral of Dag Hammarskjold, discussed the Berlin situation with General Norstad and Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter at Paris. Norstad outlined his authority to take countermeasures including the provision of military crews to pilot civilian aircraft in the event air access to Berlin was denied. Norstad also expressed his great concern over the situation in Steinstuecken and said that the “Communist intentions in regard to the territory presented very high risks of launching a war.” The Vice President then reported that there was widespread feeling in the United States that America's allies had not fulfilled their defense commitment completely. Finletter agreed with this assessment stating that most of the progress on defense was in commitments rather than performance, but concluded the discussion by saying that “in his judgment the NATO alliance itself is more important than the buildup."

For a 3-page memorandum of this conversation, see Declassified Documents, 1984, 232; for a draft of the memorandum of conversation and a 2-page memorandum containing recommendations based on the discussion, see ibid., 1978, 144B and C.

164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, October 2, 1961, 6:40 p.m.

1893. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. Paris deliver Finletter 9 am October 3.

Summary At third and final New York meeting,[2] Gromyko again indicated importance Soviets attach to fixing border between “two Germanies” and displayed interest in discussion of European security and avoidance spread national nuclear weapons. Held access question could be resolved on basis acceptable to all but not by recognizing or reaffirming occupation status or rights. Said willing sign separate agreement guaranteeing access. Did not deny Secretary's statement that not impossible that two sides with different theoretical understanding of situation may have similar understanding of facts which might permit them to live in peace. End Summary.

Secretary opened by recalling that at last meeting[3] he posed concrete questions re access to West Berlin to which Gromyko might now wish respond. Reviewing at Gromyko's request said West had basic rights not at disposition of Soviets. Latter had obligations to West. Soviets contend these rights and obligations can be intended confirm and assure our rights.

Secretary added he had no mandate to negotiate but was to ascertain whether basis for serious negotiation existed. Soviet framework, “conclusion of peace treaty and solution problem West Berlin on this basis,” inadequate.

Gromyko said Soviets believe peace treaty with West best basis but flexible on this question. Agreeable one treaty with “two Germanies” or two separate treaties.

Secretary observed Soviet-East German treaty not critical issue. Treaty's effect on our rights is critical.

Gromyko continued US could avoid difficulties it saw by signing treaty with only FRG although Soviets do not believe this correct approach. In any case basic principles would remain same, i.e. recognition German borders including that between “two Germanies,” erection barriers against revanchists and militarists, and number other problems.

Treaty or treaties would also resolve question West Berlin on basis free demilitarized city. Soviets and East Germans of course don't need West Berlin. Solution would meet needs all concerned. Access question would also be resolved on basis acceptable to all but not by recognizing or reaffirming occupation status or rights.

Gromyko noted one of most important requirements is respect of sovereignty of “GDR” but does not mean diplomatic relations. However interests of peace best served by de jure as well as de facto recognition “both Germanies” with both admitted UN. West would have to respect sovereignty of “GDR” and reach understanding with it on pertinent matters. Hardly necessary reiterate Soviet willingness give strictest guarantees re access. Willing sign separate agreement on this aspect. Also willing for token forces Four Powers be stationed West Berlin. If treaty signed only between Soviets, East Germans, and other interested states, West Berlin will be declared free, demilitarized city and access will have be resolved with “GDR” on this basis. However wished emphasize vigorously that agreement re status West Berlin and access can be worked out satisfactorily for all if “GDR” sovereignty respected, even if West persists in refusal sign peace treaty with GDR.

Gromyko then said wished turn to question of broadening basis of negotiation. Soviets want clarification of US thoughts re strategic situation and security in Europe. Would not rule out of peace treaty discussions although treaty most important problem. Perhaps what US has in mind would interest Soviet Union.

Secretary said thought some constructive elements in what Gromyko had just said. However, he wished make another point clear. We asked ourselves how many times we were going to be asked buy same horse. We in Berlin by right and in accordance with wartime and post-war arrangements. Soviets had taken steps in East Berlin which they say not negotiable.

Gromyko said Secretary avoided most important question of how long state of war to go on. Soviets cannot accept right of others veto peace treaty. Soviets not pursuing selfish interests only lessening of tensions and peaceful interests all parties. Re Secretary's query on meaning “sovereignty GDR”, Gromyko said Soviet proposals envisage West Berlin as “separate and independent entity."

Secretary said he thus understood Gromyko phrase “sovereignty of GDR” does not include West Berlin. Also failed see how present access procedures infringe on what Gromyko calls “sovereignty of GDR."

Gromyko responded two possible variants of situation: 1) US would not sign treaty with “GDR” but an understanding would be reached separately with “GDR” re “free city” and access; or 2) US would not sign and no understanding would be reached. In first “GDR” would undertake certain obligations and this would solve question re “respect for sovereignty of GDR.” In second West would have to negotiate with “GDR.” No one knew what results would be.

Secretary said “sovereignty of GDR” appeared imply no factual change in manner of access.

Gromyko said possible reach understanding satisfactory to all but substance and form would have to be negotiated.

Secretary said thought elimination factors which might produce World War III more important than termination World War II. West Berlin is free today. US does not believe Soviet forces in West Berlin would help stabilize situation. Could imagine that some sort of UN presence in Berlin could. Also thought cooperation East and West Berlin municipal governments on transportation, power, etc. could. Facts of stable situation should be of greater interest than theory. Not impossible that two sides with different theoretical understanding of situation may have similar understanding of facts which might permit them to live in peace.

Secretary said re Gromyko's two alternatives absolutely basic that there be clear understanding between West and Soviets re access and could not see why Ulbricht could not accept such understanding as part of his arrangements.

Turning to European security Secretary strongly emphasized speaking only for US. Could not make specific proposals since many other countries involved. US does not believe in peacetime US and USSR should be so heavily involved in an area. Should see what can be done to stabilize situation. Disengagement not profitable because would create vacuum. However US takes disarmament very seriously and prepared see what progress could be made in that field. Useful to see how confrontation in Central Europe could be reduced. In interest both sides prevent spread national nuclear weapons. Might also be profitable for NATO and Warsaw Pact to exchange assurances re how could live peacefully. Surprise attack could be studied. Secretary deeply convinced in common interest keep peace. US will study Soviet memorandum to UN on initial disarmament[4] steps carefully to see whether it is linked in any way to what we have in mind.

Gromyko referred to Secretary's remark re Ulbricht acceptance US-USSR understanding. Said US and USSR could make great contribution but Soviets cannot ignore “GDR” and reach understanding detrimental to its interests. Does not however rule out agreement re status of a free city including access in event West fails sign any treaty. Must be based on: 1) recognition German borders which would create barrier to revanchists and militarists; 2) respect for “GDR” sovereignty; 3) prevention of spread national nuclear weapons and of transfer possession or control such weapons to West Germany; 4) status of free city of West Berlin. Form would be matter for negotiation.

Gromyko said very interested in European security. Soviets would study US views most carefully and US should study Soviet views. Soviets firmly reject making peace treaty contingent upon questions of European security.

Secretary said time element alone would preclude this. Said two problems linked in a sense but not of necessity.

Secretary said he wished now to discuss results of talks with President and Allies. He wanted reiterate that in order prevent mounting tension door should not be closed on German reunification although not immediate prospect. Added each side should avoid actions inflaming public opinion.

Gromyko agreed with latter point and said re reunification Soviets proceed from basis that existence two separate German states must be accepted as inexorable indubitable immutable fact. Unity of Germany only possible through arrangements between the two German governments.

For Finletter: You may draw on foregoing for NAC presentation.[5]

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-261. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash on October 1 and cleared by Hillenbrand, Fessenden, SOV, and S/S. Repeated to London, Bonn, Berlin, Moscow, and USUN.

[2] A 14-page memorandum of this conversation, which was held on September 30, is ibid., 611.61/9-3061.

[3] See Document 160.

[4] For text of the September 26 Soviet memorandum (U.N. doc. A/4892), see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 496-504.

[5] On October 2 Rusk discussed the three conversations with Ambassador Bruce, who was in Washington for consultations. The Secretary said they had now progressed to a point where “there was almost a sufficient basis for agreement to negotiate.” (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) This assessment was also made to Ambassador Thompson (telegram 941 to Moscow, October 2; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10-261) and to representatives from the British, French, and German Embassies (telegram 898 to Bonn, October 2; ibid.).

165. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, October 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

Things you may want to know for your meeting with the Secretary of State this afternoon[2]

1. The Secretary is encouraged by his last Gromyko conversation, which makes it clear that the Soviet Union is willing to settle the access problem by new guarantees if appropriate additional arrangements can be made on the following four points:

a. Recognition of German border (both national and zonal), together with some undefined barriers to revanchists and militarists;

b. Respect for the sovereignty of the GDR;

c. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe; and

d. An agreed status of a free city of West Berlin.

2. The Secretary has now asked his staff to prepare recommendations for a substantive U.S. policy line on these matters. So I think we can now say that a real and urgent effort is being made to reach a U.S. negotiating position.

3. The only trouble with the discussions so far is that they appear to imply significant U.S. concessions in return for nothing more than a reassertion of rights that in our view are not open to discussion or concession. Unless something more is put into the record before these conversations close, I think we are on a dangerous slope of appeasement, and I am certain that this will be the view of the Germans, the Frenchmen and the Republicans. Thus I think it urgent that you should ask the Secretary what we can say to Gromyko before he goes back to Moscow which will indicate that in any serious negotiation we should have to make gains of our own. The following are possible proposals:

a. That our access rights should be improved by careful and detailed description of all of them in papers subscribed and guaranteed by all concerned.

b. That international supervision of some appropriate sort be arranged, to make clear that these agreements do not depend upon any supposed sovereign consent of the GDR.

c.

That some one route of access, preferably the Autobahn, be fully internationalized and placed under the immediate control of some other body than the GDR. There is an interesting proposal to this effect from Berlin which might well be the subject of further study.

In short, if we do not get strengthened access or some other important advantage from possible negotiations, I think we will be exactly in the danger that the Secretary of State has suggested: namely, that we may be buying the same horse twice.

4. There are other important tactical questions about negotiations, but this is, I think, the most urgent one and the one on which it is most important that you and the Secretary should reach a common view.

5. Nothing in this note should be construed as criticism of the Rusk-Gromyko negotiations so far. It has been a virtuoso performance on both sides, and the Secretary deserves all sorts of praise for what he has accomplished.

McG. B.[3]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, State Department. Secret.

[2] According to the President's Log Book and Rusk's Appointment Book, Kennedy, Rusk, and Bundy met for an hour at 5:30 p.m. on October 2. No other record of this meeting has been found.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

166. Editorial Note

General Lauris Norstad returned to Washington October 2-3, 1961, for consultations on Berlin and NATO. In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the morning of October 2 Norstad stressed the need for a statement of policy on Berlin which would show the Allies exactly where the United States stood. In an afternoon session, which included Secretary of Defense McNamara, Norstad suggested that the Oder-Neisse line, Berlin as a capital for West Germany, access procedures, and control and inspection areas were all points that might be negotiable regarding Berlin. (Draft Memorandum for the Record, October 6; Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File)

On October 3 McGeorge Bundy, in a memorandum to the President, outlined the points which he should raise with Norstad including what military actions should be taken if access were blocked and how to get the Allies to share political risks and responsibilities for Berlin. (Memorandum for the President, October 3; Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Norstad Meetings)

At 4:30 p.m. on October 3 the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, Taylor, Bundy, Lemnitzer, Dulles, Nitze, and Kohler met with Norstad for an hour for a wide-ranging discussion of NATO and Berlin. The President asked Norstad several questions about the escalation of military responses to the closing of access to Berlin, the need for additional conventional forces in Europe, and the state of contingency planning. Norstad responded that no one response fit every situation, that he wanted three divisions ready in 10-14 days, and admitted that there were no contingency plans that had been agreed with the Allies. Bundy's memorandum of this meeting is ibid.; a shorter record by Taylor with the discussion arranged by topic is in the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 37, 109 Norstad. Lemnitzer's handwritten notes on the meeting are ibid., Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29.

At 6:20 p.m. on October 4 Rusk, McNamara, Nitze, Bundy, Kohler, and Taylor met at the Department of State to assess the meetings with Norstad. In Taylor's summary of the discussion, he stressed the need for the Departments of State and Defense to submit a paper to the President stating what the best courses of action would be “in response to broad contingencies of harassment within Berlin, interference with ground access, interference with air access, and any other broad contingencies which could arise” from the derogation of vital U.S. interests in Berlin. (Talking Paper, October 4; ibid., Taylor Papers, Box 34, Berlin Planning)

167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, October 3, 1961, 8:53 p.m.

460. Bonn for Ambassador. For Clay from Rusk. Ref: Berlin's 601.[2] I have carefully considered points you make in your message. With regard non-vital interests, I agree that we should take whatever measures are feasible, short of use of force, to check encroachments on them. I agree too that we cannot in such cases operate on the premise that any Allied reaction will necessarily escalate to the point where war is possible. This is an area in which no single operating principle can be used for all cases. Each encroachment must be dealt with in manner that puts pressure on Soviets/GDR to maximum degree possible without, in circumstances, involving real danger unacceptable escalation.

We are alive to problems presented by GDR harassment at crossing point and on autobahn. Latter particularly disturbing since touches Allied vital interest, and manner dealing with possible pattern such encroachments being considered in Quadripartite contingency planning. We shall look to you and our Mission in Berlin to detect any such pattern as it begins to emerge. We shall also welcome any suggestions for particular measures to forestall or retaliate for harassment.

With respect transfer Soviet rights to East German Government, (I assume you refer specifically to transfer by Soviets to GDR personnel of checkpoint operations involving Allied access) I entirely agree our willingness ultimately accept such transfer under specified conditions should not govern our actions now. Indeed, we should make every effort mask what is in effect our fall-back position on this point, and should not acquiesce in increase East German police authority beyond that already exercised until transfer actually occurs.

I shall keep in mind, in any further talks with Gromyko, your suggestion for raising with him the maintenance of normal access conditions.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2661. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted on October 2 by Day, cleared by Kohler and Hillenbrand, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn.

[2] Document 159.

168. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, October 3, 1961.

SUBJECT

Soviet position on Germany and Berlin as indicated by Gromyko

It can be deduced from the three conversations which you have held with Gromyko that the Soviet Government is thinking along the lines of an agreement on the question of Germany and Berlin. This position can only be deduced and is admittedly a somewhat optimistic reading of the evidence and contains a number of aspects of the problem which will require further clarification and elaboration before any definite conclusion could be reached. A few remarks about general Soviet attitude in this connection might well be in order.

It is at least a tenable thesis that Khrushchev's purpose in accentuating the crisis over Berlin and Germany was based in part, at least, on his belief that only through some shock treatment would the Western Powers be brought to consider seriously the problems of Germany and Berlin. It was, in all probability, never his intention that this shock treatment would lead to such acceleration of tension that war was a distinct possibility. There is considerable evidence to indicate that Khrushchev made a major misjudgment, particularly in regard to the reaction of the United States, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, of the European reaction to his shock treatment. He was undoubtedly surprised and angered by the actions of the United States, as expressed in the President's July twenty-fifth speech.

After a series of militant and belligerent utterances which followed the President's speech in early August, it seems very likely that the Soviet Government came to realize that continuance on the same path was extremely dangerous and might well lead to general war. Accordingly, since the end of August there has been a noticeable softening of the Soviet line and a number of indications of a desire to find some acceptable, peaceful solution of the problem.

The sealing-off of Berlin on August thirteenth and subsequent Soviet positions in regard to the immediate Berlin situation would seem to have been motivated largely by local situations (i.e., surge of refugees) and certain Soviet moves as part of the war of nerves and, in part, Soviet riposte to the Vice President's visit and the reinforcement of the Berlin garrison by fifteen hundred men (i.e., Soviet notes threatening action in regard to the air traffic to Berlin). However, leaving these local actions aside, despite their immediate importance, there has been since the beginning of September a noticeable softening of the Soviet line, and all Soviet public utterances as well as private conversations that Khrushchev has had with visitors since this date have stressed the possibilities of negotiation rather than the militant threats of a Soviet intention to force upon the West a Soviet-dictated solution. (The Soviet resumption of tests, although in timing related to German crisis, was basically done for military reasons.)

This change may merely be one of tactics, and may be followed at the Party Congress by resumption of the hard militant line. It is noticeable, however, that no serious attempt has been made either in the talks you have had with Gromyko or in any of the conversations which Khrushchev has had with Western visitors to attempt to exercise any pressure on the Western Powers in regard to our measures of military preparations. It is therefore a possible conclusion that the Soviet Union is genuinely seeking a peaceful solution of the present crisis through the mechanism of discussion and negotiation rather than threat and demand. This form of variation of pressures is a classic Bolshevik method and it should be noted as merely an intimation of willingness to reduce original demands, which is not concessions in any sense of the word. Following this tactic, the Soviet Government will continue to attempt during this process to obtain the largest satisfaction of its original position, modified only by the necessity of avoiding war.

Against the foregoing background, it would appear from your conversations with Gromyko that the Soviet Union is tentatively offering the following solution of the problem of Berlin and Germany, which, in essence, involves concessions by the Western Powers in regard to certain all-German matters in return for a Soviet agreement on Berlin which apparently is to be worked out with the USSR for incorporation either in the peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR or, possibly, a “separate” arrangement. The Western concessions in the all-German field are as follows:

1. Recognition of the German frontiers to include the demarcation line between the two Germanys,

2. Respect for the sovereignty of the GDR,

3. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and of transfer of such weapons to West Germany, and

4. Status of a free city of West Berlin.

In return for this, the Soviet Government is offering an arrangement in regard to the status of West Berlin as a free city with agreed guarantees as to access. There are many questions that require clarification before these intimations could form a basis of serious negotiations with the Soviet Union. In respect to the arrangement for West Berlin, these are:

1. Would this arrangement be negotiated directly with the Soviet Union without the direct participation of the GDR?

2. What would be the actual content of such an arrangement assuming it would be negotiated directly with the Soviet Union? Would it constitute a spelling-out of existing arrangements, in particular in regard to civilian air traffic, or would the Soviets insist upon a completely new agreement taking account of “the sovereignty of the GDR?” Would it attempt to include certain prohibitions on the life of West Berlin, or would it leave the current situation there unchanged?

3. Would the agreement be included in the Soviet-GDR peace treaty as obligations between the Soviet Union and the GDR or would it be a separate Four Power arrangement accepted and possibly adhered to by the GDR?

In regard to the Western concessions on Germany, the following points should be elaborated:

1. In what form would the recognition of German borders take place? Would a declaration not to use force in regard to these borders be sufficient? Could a distinction be made between the actual frontiers of Germany and the demarcation line between them?

2. What is meant by “respect for the sovereignty of the GDR?” Would this require direct dealings with officials of that regime in the handling of the implementation of the agreement on access, and in what capacity would they act? Gromyko has intimated that this does not involve any form of recognition.

3. Would a reiteration of the existing limitations on West Germany as regard to nuclear weapons be sufficient or does the Soviet Union envisage some new quadripartite agreement on this point?

4. Would the status of a free city of West Berlin involve any impairment or limitation on the present freedom of activity in that city?

It is extremely important that these and other questions be thoroughly clarified with the Soviet Government before the conclusion can be reached that there is any basis for formal negotiations. They might well be asked of Mr. Gromyko by the President, or possibly preferably by the Secretary, during Gromyko's visit to Washington, and I would venture to recommend that these questions should be phrased in such a manner as to make it plain to Mr. Gromyko that we are not disposed to accept any diminution in existing rights, both in regard to the freedom of the city of West Berlin and a guaranteed access, which the West and the West Berliners now have. In fact, my reading of the shift in Soviet position, backed up by the Intelligence conclusions on Soviet capability, reveals a large area of bluff in the public Soviet stand on Germany and Berlin, and that while if pressed too hard they might go through with their announced intentions, there is still a very large area of Soviet give which must be fully exploited. The essential difficulty in any negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union is that, in effect, the Western Powers will be asked to make what appear to American and world opinion to be genuine concessions in return for a maintenance of the status quo. It is therefore essential that our position in Berlin and the rights of the West Berliners would be somewhat improved in any agreement if we were to avoid dangerous and possibly disastrous psychological consequences.

Note: This paper has omitted entirely the question of the preservation of the occupation statute. In the conversations with Gromyko there was no reference to our intention of preserving this statute, and the Soviets appear to be quite adamant on this point.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-361. Secret. Initialed by Bohlen. Copies were sent to Bundy, McGhee, and Kohler.

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, October 4, 1961, 9:27 p.m.

469. Bonn for Ambassador. For Clay from Rusk. Ref. Berlin's 640.[2] Question of importance our access to East Berlin is one which deserves and has received most careful consideration. It is not vital interest for which we would fight, as we have defined such interests. However it is clearly important element in our relations with Soviets on Berlin issue. Denial of such access is one of last significant encroachments on our position we can permit. Our reaction to attempt at closing crossing point must therefore be such as to make clear to Soviets they approaching very close to point of great danger. Moreover, as you point out, access to East Berlin is of negotiating value and should be preserved if at all possible for this purpose.

On the other hand, as you also note, we have troublesome problem of not committing ourselves so heavily that ultimate acquiescence in closing is interpreted as serious defeat.

Policy we have devised for dealing with situation is best resolution we can see for this dilemma. In approving this policy, including specifically decision not to use force in removing barrier, President had before him above considerations including substantially same argumentation you advance. A principal factor in our reluctance to use force in this manner is problem of followup after barrier destroyed. Our study has led us believe likelihood embarrassment to Allies, in absence willingness enter into combat on issue, greater than that of discomfiture to communists. You have not pursued in your message question of dealing with situations likely to face us after barrier removed forcibly. Since this is a key factor, any thought you might have on it would be welcome.

Regarding method protest you suggest as alternative, this seems reasonable in any case and we suggest it be discussed among Commandants in review we have asked them undertake of general question countermeasures for harassment in Berlin (Deptel 417).[3]

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2961. Secret. Drafted by Day, cleared by Kohler and Hillenbrand, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 161.

[3] Telegram 417, September 27, stated that a paper on retaliation for restrictions on access was being sent and asked that Berlin or Bonn implement its final coordination. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-2761)

170. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 6, 1961, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

The Secretary

Mr. Kohler—EUR

Mr. Akalovsky—D/P (interpreting)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Ambassador Menshikov

Mr. Semenov

Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreter)

The President opened the conversation by welcoming Mr. Gromyko back in Washington and by saying that he appreciated the fact that Mr. Gromyko and the Secretary had met on several occasions and had had useful talks. He said it was important to determine the meaning of the respective positions of the two sides. Statements by both sides had to be translated into the other language, and, at least in the beginning of the talks, it was never precise what each side exactly meant. The President said that he hoped that over the next few days the U.S. would consult with its Allies, just as Mr. Gromyko had indicated that the Soviet Union also had Allies and consulted with them. The talks could then perhaps be resumed in Moscow by Ambassador Thompson, who is now coming to Washington, but who would then return to Moscow in the hope to meet with Mr. Gromyko and perhaps Mr. Khrushchev. The President stressed that what was of interest to him in Mr. Gromyko's talks with the Secretary was this question of definition. The U.S. is speaking of Western presence in Berlin, of its rights of access to that city, and of the viability of that city. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been speaking about the freedom of West Berlin, of guaranteed access to that city, of respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, and of the general matter of frontiers. The problem now is to analyze with our Allies these words in more precise terms, so as to see what assurance there is that our present rights would be maintained and to get a clearer meaning of these terms freedom and guaranteed access. Thus, it would be helpful if Mr. Gromyko could say how the freedom of West Berlin would be guaranteed and how access could be assured jointly in a satisfactory manner. Likewise, it would be helpful if Mr. Gromyko could clarify what he means when he says that the U.S. should respect the sovereignty of the GDR.

Mr. Gromyko said that in view of the fact that he had something to say he would like first to inquire, for the purpose of orientation, how much time the President could allot for this meeting.

The President replied that he was free until six or seven, whatever was useful.

Mr. Gromyko then said that he had certain considerations to voice on the part of the Soviet Government in development of and in addition to the Soviet position as discussed in his talks with the Secretary. He said he wanted to state the Soviet position in principle as well as on the specific questions the President had touched upon. Reading from a prepared text, he went on to say that the U.S. Government and the President personally are aware of what guides the Soviet Government when it advocates a prompt solution of the question of a German peace treaty and of normalizing the West Berlin situation on the basis of such a treaty. As Mr. Khrushchev had told the President in Vienna, the Soviet Government is convinced that the fact that World War II had occurred cannot be escaped. That war had indeed taken place and the problems remaining after it require solution. Sixteen years have passed since the end of the war and the unsettled state of war causes increased tensions in Europe, and not only in Europe, but also throughout the world at large. This situation will remain unchanged until all participants in the World War II anti-Hitler coalition have recognized and formalized the results of World War II. The peoples of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had fought shoulder to shoulder in the war and should now jointly write finis to World War II. The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. If the U.S. does not find it possible to take part in a peace conference, the Soviet Union will call a peace conference and conclude a peace treaty without U.S. participation. However, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to emphasize that the Soviet Government's choice No. 1 is the conclusion of a joint treaty. At the same time, it does not wish the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR, without U.S. participation, to lead to an aggravation of its relations with U.S. and this also applies to the West Berlin problem. Therefore, as had been stressed in the conversations with the Secretary, the Soviet Government is prepared to work out jointly and before a peace treaty is signed the status for a free city of West Berlin and to reach an understanding on other questions relating to the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The Soviet Government proceeds on the premise that such an understanding would be reflected in the peace treaty, which would have been signed between the U.S.S.R. and the GDR, or that it would be formalized in special documents appended to the peace treaty. These are the two alternative possibilities. Thus agreement with respect to West Berlin would acquire international authority from the standpoint of scope and would also acquire legal recognition on the part of the states which would have signed one or two peace treaties. The Soviet Government is concerned about finding common language with the states which had fought together in the World War II anti-Hitler coalition. Frequently the U.S. makes statements to the effect that any solution should not affect its or its Allies prestige. The Soviet Union is seeking such a solution, but it cannot injure its own prestige or that of its Allies.

Mr. Gromyko continued by saying that in the eyes of world public opinion both sides are deeply involved in this question of a German peace treaty. Therefore, the Soviet Government believes that the best thing to do is to see a way out of this situation on the basis of compromise. That is precisely the kind of solution the Soviet Government is now proposing. It is not difficult to see that a separate agreement on West Berlin would benefit the West more than the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is prepared to have such a separate agreement, and is stating that quite formally.

The Soviet Government does not wish to follow the example of the U.S., where the latter had signed a peace treaty with Japan without the Soviet Union and counter to Soviet interests. At that time the U.S. simply signed the treaty and stated that Soviet rights were terminated. The U.S. disregarded Soviet interests and the Soviet Union was unilaterally deprived of its rights to which it was entitled on the basis of international agreements. Incidentally, the Japanese Peace Treaty is another example of the fact that a peace treaty means that there can be no occupation rights.

The President interjected at this point that Secretary Rusk was the only one present who had had to do with the Japanese Peace Treaty.

The Secretary, indicating his disagreement with Mr. Gromyko's remarks, said this was a question which might take two hours to discuss with him.

Mr. Gromyko then referred to the question of the timing for the signing of a German peace treaty and said he wished to state that the Soviet Government sees no fatal date in this respect. This had been communicated by Mr. Khrushchev in his conversation with Mr. Spaak.[2] If negotiations start all parties will be obliged to do their utmost to have the negotiations take place in the best possible atmosphere and lead to the best solution contributing to consolidation of peace. For its part, the Soviet Union would act in this manner. It is natural, however, that negotiations must not be artificially protracted. Nor should the solution of this problem be delayed.

Of course if the U.S. declines to participate in the signing of a German peace treaty, then in addition to the solution of the West Berlin problem an understanding would have to be reached on other questions important to peace and European security. Some such questions had been mentioned by the Secretary, but the Soviet Union had been placing particular stress on them. Mr. Gromyko clarified that what he had in mind was: 1) legal formalization of German borders as they now exist; and 2) non-transfer to the two Germanies of nuclear and rocket weapons, as well as prohibition of the manufacture of such weapons in the two states. Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Government placed utmost emphasis on this question. As to the question of borders, states must take a clear-cut and unequivocal position on this question so as to deprive West German revanchists of any hope for possible revision of the borders. The Soviet Government sees no reason why the great powers should not make their position on the question of borders, including the border between West Germany and the GDR, absolutely clear and formal, whatever their attitude on the question of a peace treaty. As far as the question of preventing nuclear and rocket weapons from being transferred to, or manufactured by, the two German states, is concerned, it appears that the President's proposal at the 16th General Assembly and the Secretary's remarks on September 30—at the third meeting[3] —provide for a possibility of reaching an understanding on this problem. It is in the interests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. not to speak of the smaller states in Europe, to prevent the two Germanies from acquiring nuclear and rocket weapons.

Mr. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Union also hoped to meet with understanding on the part of the U.S. Government in other matters he had mentioned to the Secretary. He also expressed hope that the U.S. Government, like the Soviet Government, is serious with respect to these problems.

Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviet Government believes that an agreement on a free city of West Berlin should provide for strict guarantees with regard to the observance of the city's status and to non-interference in its internal affairs. He also said that he was not sure that the West, including the U.S., completely and accurately understood the Soviet position in this matter. Therefore, he wished to reiterate that the Soviet Government had always advocated the strictest guarantees to ensure the status of a free city of West Berlin. The U.S. Government is aware of the Soviet proposals concerning guarantees, namely, that token contingents of the Four Powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S., France, and the U.K.—be stationed in West Berlin. In proposing a solution of this problem on the basis of stationing token contingents, the Soviet Union is making that suggestion, not on the basis that such contingents would constitute a military factor, but as a political solution of the problem. Mr. Khrushchev had talked about this aspect of the problem in his meeting with the President in Vienna. Such a political solution should be acceptable to both sides as a way out and it would not affect U.S. prestige. Other conceivable alternatives could be the stationing in West Berlin of neutral troops or of UN troops.

Mr. Gromyko then said that in view of the desire expressed by the Western powers that these guarantees be given not only under a peace treaty, but should be specifically reinforced by the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is prepared to assume such responsibility. Of course, that should not prejudice the rights of the GDR and should not be detrimental to the interests of any country, be it a Soviet or U.S. Ally. Taking this into account, the Soviet Government believes that the objective of ensuring the rights and the interests of a free city of West Berlin would be best served by a status guaranteed by the four great powers, i.e., by stationing specified contingents of troops of the Four Powers in West Berlin. Naturally, such contingents would be stationed there for a specified period of time. The Soviet Government believes that this is the best solution. In spite of its efforts the Soviet Government has been unable to find another, better solution. The Soviet Government has weighed the situation and has come to the conclusion that this solution is the best one possible. If Four Power contingents are stationed in Berlin and if there is agreement on this question, then the U.S.S.R. would have the same role of guarantor as the Western powers. Such a solution would be understood both by U.S. Allies and by Soviet Allies. It would not prejudice the interests of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or their respective Allies, including the GDR. Of course, token contingents should not be regarded as occupation troops and should not carry out any occupation functions.

Turning to the question of access, Mr. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Government does not intend to establish any restrictions on West Berlin's ties with the outside world or on access to West Berlin—by land, water, and air—for any outside state. The only thing the Soviet Union proposes is that the procedure for the exercise of such ties and the use of communications running through the GDR be the same as that applied in any other state, whether socialist or capitalist. There should be no discrimination against the GDR. Even today most passenger and commercial freight traffic to and from West Berlin runs by agreement with the GDR and this creates no difficulties for or interference with West Berlin's ties with the outside world.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to state what the Soviet Union could not agree to. First, the Soviet Union could not agree to any claims tendered by the FRG to West Berlin. Some West German figures have been making statements to that effect, but such statements are totally unfounded and the Soviet Union rejects them resolutely. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that such claims have no legal grounds and that West Germany has no relation to West Berlin. Since West Germany has no legal relation to West Berlin, all ties between the FRG and West Berlin must be on the same basis as with any other sovereign state, whether such state is recognized de jure or de facto or not at all.

Referring to his talks with the Secretary, Mr. Gromyko then said that it appeared that the U.S. Government believed the Soviet proposals to provide too narrow a framework for negotiations and would wish that framework to be expanded through inclusion of certain questions pertaining to European security. The Soviet Government could agree to this, but it is not clear as to what questions, apart from a German peace treaty, the U.S. would like to consider in negotiations. True, the Secretary had made hints as to the general trend in which the U.S. believed our thinking should go, but no specific questions had been listed or formulated. On its part, the Soviet Government could name several questions aimed at strengthening European security. First, a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could be meaningfully discussed. It is quite clear that so long as relations between the two opposing military groupings are not channeled into a calm river bed, there can be no strengthening of European security. Secondly, it would be of great significance, for the cause of an international détente, if an understanding were reached to eliminate foreign military bases on the soil of other states. Third, withdrawal or at least reduction of foreign troops stationed in the territories of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Agreement on this question would be regarded as a proof of the desire of these countries to establish a peace-time situation in Europe. Fourth, it would be very useful for the purpose of strengthening European security if, to start, agreement could be reached on an outline for a withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories by stages. Fifth, European security would be protected best of all from aggression if German militarism were prevented from developing, with Western assistance, a powerful army equipped with modern weapons. Of course under the present conditions the GDR must also strengthen its forces to ensure its security. It would be far more useful for the cause of peace if the FRG and the GDR were to have only militia armed with small arms for the purpose of maintaining internal order. Sixth, the Soviet Government believes that it would be useful to delineate a geographic zone in Europe, including both German states, in which no state would be permitted to deploy or manufacture nuclear and rocket weapons. The proposal of the Polish Government on this subject is well known, but until this day our two Governments have not discussed this question seriously. The zone would include the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the GDR, and the FRG. The Soviet Government firmly believes that agreement on this question would have the most positive effect not only in Europe but also throughout the world. Thus life itself brings up a number of questions related to European security, and the Soviet Government advocates their promptest solution. However, it would be incorrect to tie all these questions in one knot or package, and it was this point, Mr. Gromyko said, that he had tried to impress on the Secretary. The Soviet Government believes that it would be better to solve these questions in stages, with main attention being given to the questions that are most important and which are capable of being resolved without delay. Such a question is that of writing finis to World War II by signing a German peace treaty and settling on that basis the status of West Berlin. Then, at the second stage, other questions could be resolved. This is the sequence the Soviet Government believes to be proper. However, if the West cannot accept such a sequence and insists on an inter-related discussion of the German problem and the questions of European security, the Soviet Union could agree to a discussion of a German peace treaty and of such European security problems as lend themselves to a prompt solution, namely: 1) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact members; and 2) agreement to prevent transfer to both Germanies of nuclear and rocket weapons and manufacture of such weapons in the FRG and the GDR. It is quite evident that it would be much more difficult to reach agreement on other issues related to European security. Those issues are more involved and would require more time, and the Soviet Government firmly believes they should not be linked to the question of a German peace treaty and of normalizing the situation of West Berlin on the basis of such a treaty.

Mr. Gromyko then turned to the question of the future course with regard to the exchange of views and to negotiations. He noted that as of now a bi-lateral exchange of views between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is taking place. However, the Soviet Union does not object in principle to a Four-Power conference, which would consider the question of a German peace treaty and normalization on that basis of the West Berlin situation, as well as questions of European security. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union believes that the bi-lateral exchange of views between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., which has already begun, is extremely useful. Mr. Gromyko then said he understood the President to say that he wished this bi-lateral exchange of views to continue. If this understanding is correct, then the President's wish corresponds to the desires of the Soviet Government and of Mr. Khrushchev personally.

Mr. Gromyko concluded by saying that by concluding a German peace treaty, whether on the basis of joint action or of the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR only by certain states, including the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Union wishes to clear the road for an improvement in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and for peaceful co-existence between states irrespective of their social systems. He said that on behalf of the Soviet Government and of Mr. Khrushchev personally he wished to express the hope that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R would succeed, by joint effort, in overcoming in the interest of peace the existing difficulties and in resolving the questions which had been brought about by life itself and which are preoccupying the peoples of the U.S., of the U.S.S.R., of their Allies, and throughout the world. He said he had attempted to clarify the general Soviet position on the question of a German peace treaty and also to reply to specific questions that the President had raised. He said he did not know what the President's reaction would be and reiterated that he had attempted to cover the points the President had referred to at the beginning of the conversation.

The President thanked Mr. Gromyko for outlining his views and stated that as far as future course was concerned he believed bi-lateral discussions would be valuable from the standpoint of our attempting to secure precise definitions of U.S. and Soviet positions. Mr. Gromyko had clarified the views of the Soviet Government today and after we have considered this statement and after Ambassador Thompson returns to Moscow, we could proceed with bi-lateral discussions. Then we could continue on a quadripartite basis because the U.K. and the French are involved in this matter. Mr. Gromyko had said that the Soviet Government had Allies whose interests are involved. The President expressed appreciation for Mr. Gromyko's reference to “compromise” and said that he understood that this word was the same in both Russian and English. However, the meaning of the word in Latin is that both sides are first, i.e., that neither side is lessened by agreement. It is in this spirit that the U.S. approaches the U.S.S.R. The President then said that he wished to say how he understood the Soviet proposal. First, our view on the Berlin question is that as a result of agreements reached at the end of World War II we have a status in Berlin, a status which has been exercised for the most part in West Berlin, and with that status go our rights of access. If both sides should come to agreement—and, the President said, he hoped they would—then the U.S. would wish to make sure that its position is not lessened. On the contrary, it would hope that both sides would come out with improved positions and that they would emerge from that agreement on the basis of equality. This is what we regard as a compromise. The President went on to say that what made it difficult for him to believe that the Soviet proposal was a compromise was Mr. Gromyko's statement that, while the Soviet Union was willing to protect the status of West Berlin in an agreement, in the event that the U.S. did not sign a peace treaty, it proposed that it be done by stationing Soviet troops on an equal basis with Western troops, not in East Berlin, but in West Berlin, which is our responsibility. Thus after turning over East Berlin to East Germany, the Soviet Union wishes to acquire equal status in West Berlin. Furthermore, the Soviet Union proposes that the stationing of these token contingents be only for a certain period of time. So, as a result of such a “compromise” U.S. position would be diminished because: 1) our rights would be negotiated rights, and what is more serious and important; 2) we would share our rights in West Berlin with the Soviet Union; and 3) our rights would be there only for a limited period of time. Thus, at some distance there would have to be new negotiations for new rights. In the light of all this, our rights would be lessened rather than improved. Nothing in the Soviet proposal suggests that our access would be strengthened and would not be exposed to hazards and dangers.

The President then stated that, as he understood these “concessions,” the Soviet Union seemed to be prepared to make them to us in return for our willingness to make at least a decision on the following questions: 1) acceptance of the boundaries of the two Germanies, i.e., the Eastern boundary and the boundary between the two zones; thus, this would establish in effect (a) a line for all of Germany on a basis that is different from what we had adhered to so far; in other words, that would be a concession on our part; and (b) respect for the division between the zones, a degree of status of the two Germanies, and the concept of the sovereignty of East Germany; 2) abandonment by West Germany of all claims to East Germany, which is tantamount to abandonment of the concept of a reunited or unified Germany. In addition, Mr. Gromyko had mentioned the question of nuclear weapons, etc. Thus at least three changes are required in the concepts the U.S. has been holding so far. The President stressed that in his view this was not a compromise, but rather meant trading an apple for an orchard. It would result in a decline of our position in West Berlin and would require our acceptance of other changes which are in the interest of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union wishes us to accept all this without accepting on its part our rights and interests. That, the President stressed, would be not a compromise but a retreat.

The President then observed that of course it would be impossible to settle this matter this afternoon. However, it is important that we discuss these matters with our Allies, so that Ambassador Thompson could then have a further exchange of views. The President said he recognized, and he was sure Mr. Gromyko recognized too, that there was no desire to protract these discussions month after month. We should move with dispatch and attempt to obtain the most precise definitions we can as to what kind of agreement and what kind of guarantees are being talked about.

Referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark that the Soviet Union is prepared to guarantee the status of West Berlin if agreement is reached on such status, the President said that the stationing of token Soviet troops is not a militarily vital issue; what we are interested in is the freedom of West Berlin. This is not a military matter and Berlin is not a military outpost. The President then reiterated his belief that bi-lateral discussions are important and said that a number of questions could be clarified in the course of such discussions, e.g., how access to Berlin could be guaranteed more satisfactorily than it is today, and noted that perhaps Soviet interests could also be advanced in certain areas. If bi-lateral discussions prove to be useful, and the U.S. hopes that they will be, we could then move to a Four-Power discussion so that eventually all of them could express their views at the same time.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he wanted to comment on what the President had said. He stated that the Soviet Government believed the proposals he had outlined to the President to be a compromise acceptable to both sides. These proposals are a way out for both sides and they do not infringe upon their prestige. Mr. Gromyko reiterated that the Soviet Government did not believe these proposals affected U.S. prestige by one iota. Nor did they affect the prestige of the U.S.S.R., which—as Mr. Khrushchev had stated in Vienna—does not need West Berlin.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that on the basis of repeated statements by the U.S. and the other Western powers, it appeared that the Western powers were primarily interested in preserving the existing social system in West Berlin, or what the West called freedom of that city, and also in preserving freedom of access to West Berlin. The Soviet Government has given a positive reply on both of these important issues. Therefore it is difficult to understand why the U.S. or the other Western powers should not be satisfied. The Soviet Government has given a positive reply with respect to guarantees concerning the status of the free city of West Berlin, i.e., preservation of the existing social system or, to use Western terminology, the freedom of that city. As to access, the Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on freedom of access by land, water, and air. Thus the Soviet Union is prepared to reach an understanding on these two cardinal points.

The President said he appreciated this and noted that this was why definitions were important. Mr. Gromyko had said that the Soviet Government is prepared to guarantee the freedom of West Berlin and free access to that city. These are important points and if this is our objective, then the problem is to determine the exact meaning of how we propose to achieve it. Referring again to the question of guarantees, the President said that the stationing of Soviet troops in West Berlin was not a military or political necessity. As to guarantees with respect to access, that should be explored further in later discussions. Thus if our objective is the same and if we recognize that West Berlin is in an extraordinary geographic position, it is very important to have further, more detailed discussions.

The President then remarked that he had to leave soon for the State dinner given by the President of Sudan. However, he wished to make a few comments on the problem of Laos. (See separate memorandum of conversation.)[4]

Mr. Gromyko referred to the President's statement to the effect that he believed the U.S. would lose in three areas as a result of the Soviet proposal on Berlin. Mr. Gromyko said that such an appraisal was not correct and that the Soviet Union was deeply convinced that the U.S. would lose nothing.

The President interjected that he had actually listed five points on which our position would be changed and lessened if we accepted the Soviet proposal. These points are: 1) time limit on our rights; 2) stationing of Soviet troops in West Berlin; 3) recognition of Germany's frontiers; 4) recognition of the division between East and West Germany; and 5) abandonment by West Germany of the concept of a united Germany. This, the President stated, caused concern to us.

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that on the two points the Western powers had always emphasized the Soviet Government had given a positive reply, namely, on the question of: 1) guarantees with respect to the status of West Berlin and to the social system elected by the population of that city; and 2) guaranteed access. This is a positive reply which should be appreciated, but the President failed to pay due attention to it.

As to the question of Soviet token contingents, Mr. Gromyko said this was a way out of the problem. It had been the U.S. which had raised the question of Soviet guarantees with respect to the freedom of West Berlin, and this is a solution of that problem. The President had said that no military factor was involved in this matter and the Soviet Union had said the same. The presence of token contingents from the Four Powers is a political solution and it is a way for the Soviet Union to take responsibility on its shoulders. As to the question of time limit (on a West Berlin arrangement), Mr. Gromyko stated that if agreement could be reached now on the general status of West Berlin and on access to that city, then he believed that the great powers, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., would be able to reach agreement in the future as well. Referring to the question of borders, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union believed our respective positions on this question, to which the Soviet Government attaches great significance, to be close. The Soviet Government believes that it should not be difficult to reach an understanding on this problem.

The President stated there was no need to say that the difficulty lay in the geographic location of that city. Both President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev had called this situation abnormal, but neither Mr. Khrushchev nor he, President Kennedy, had made the decision on this matter in 1945. The erection of the wall in Berlin has caused alarm in the city and, therefore, the question is how we can ensure the viability of West Berlin with all the problems and tensions surrounding it and how we can make sure that access to that city will be free. If the U.S. is to participate in an agreement, it believes it important that there be real guarantees so that the city will not become a shell in three or four months. The President expressed the hope that both sides were in agreement on this question of freedoms. He said that now we should see how this objective could be achieved and then we could examine the question of boundaries.

At the end of the conversation Mr. Gromyko sought to speak alone with the President, and the two went out on the terrace for about ten minutes. After Gromyko's departure the President reported that their private conversation had not reflected anything substantially different on either side than what had been said at the meeting. Gromyko had taken the line of stressing the importance of agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., reiterating his version of the Soviet “concessions” designed to facilitate this result. The President had replied also along the lines of his previous remarks, emphasizing that the Soviet Government could not expect the United States to come to an understanding which would obviously be regarded as a major setback. In this connection he cited particularly the unacceptability of the Soviet proposal to station “token” Soviet forces in West Berlin.

The meeting ended at 7:00 P.M.[5]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, USSR, Gromyko Talks, Vol. III . Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held at the White House. In addition to an unsigned memorandum, Sorensen, Bohlen, and Rostow all wrote memoranda, dated October 6, with talking points for this conversation. (Ibid.)

[2] Spaak visited Moscow on September 19.

[3] For a report on the third Rusk-Gromyko conversation, see Document 164.

[4] See Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XXIV, Document 199.

[5] In a summary of this conversation for the Embassy in Paris, the Department of State reported that the first round of exchanges with the Soviet Union was ended, and suggested that while some aspects of the bases for negotiation seemed clearer and better, others were worse. (Telegram 2029; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-861) On the same day Kohler, on behalf of Secretary Rusk, briefed the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group along similar lines and concluded that the West had not yet reached a negotiating position and that further contact with the Soviet Union was necessary to explore the situation further. (Telegram 970 to Bonn, October 8; ibid., 762.0221/10-861)

October-November 1961: The Crisis at the Friedrichstrasse Crossing

171. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, October 7, 1961, noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-761. Confidential. Repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

172. Letter From President Kennedy to His Special Representative in Berlin (Clay)

Washington, October 8, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General Clay. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

173. Minutes of Meeting

Washington, October 10, 1961, 11 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Lemnitzer's notes on this meeting are in the National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Another record of the meeting is in a debriefing memorandum to Legere, October 11, which indicates the confusion that existed both with regard to different drafts of the papers discussed and to what was concluded at the meeting. (Ibid., Taylor Papers, Box 35, 6B NATO) For Nitze's account of the meeting, see From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 203-204. In preparation for the meeting Taylor had sent the President a memorandum, dated October 10, outlining the three subjects that would be discussed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin)

174. Memorandum of Conversation Between Dean Acheson and the German Ambassador (Grewe)

Washington, October 11, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10-1161. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum of transmittal from Acheson to Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle.

175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

Washington, October 12, 1961, 4:18 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-1261. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden on October 11; cleared by Nitze, S, and S/S; and approved by Kohler.

176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, October 13, 1961, 1:28 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Secret; Priority.

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, October 13, 1961, 8:49 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-1361. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash, cleared by Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

178. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy

Washington, October 14, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAM 107. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

179. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Hyannis Port, October 16, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, October 18, 1961, 9:06 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-561. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Klein (SOV); cleared by the Department of Defense, the White House, Hillenbrand, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and USAREUR for POLAD.

181. Letter From the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy

Berlin, October 18, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General Clay. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

182. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, October 19, 1961, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10-1961. Secret; Priority.

183. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, October 20, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2061. Secret; Niact.

184. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, October 20, 1961, 10 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy.

185. Letter From President Kennedy to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe (Norstad)

Washington, October 20, 1961.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Kennedy, John F. Top Secret. Regarding the drafting of this letter, see Document 184.

186. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, October 23, 1961, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Lightner, Edwin Allan. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLADUSAREUR.

187. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, October 23, 1961, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2361. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Berlin.

188. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 24, 1961, 9:35 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/10-2561. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the White House on October 27.

189. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, October 24, 1961, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2461. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Niact. Received at 11:05 a.m. Also sent to Bonn.

190. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, October 24, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2461. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler. The source text bears Kohler's handwritten notation: “Handed to & read by Sec 10/24-7 pm.”

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, October 25, 1961, 7:28 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2561. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Kohler, and initialed and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn.

192. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, October 25, 1961, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10-2561. Confidential; Niact. Received at 7:55 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and POLADUSAREUR.

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, October 26, 1961, 8:11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2661. Secret. Drafted by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn. The source text bears Kohler's handwritten notation: “Approved by Secy after consideration with President.”

194. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 27, 1961, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2761. Secret; Niact. Received at 1:42 p.m. Repeated to London, Bonn, Paris, and Berlin.

195. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, October 27, 1961, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2761. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received at 5:23 p.m. and repeated to Bonn.

196. Editorial Note

197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, October 27, 1961, 10:03 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10-2761. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared in substance by Rusk, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, London, and Paris.

198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, October 28, 1961, 5:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared in draft by Rusk, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

199. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Paris, October 28, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Lemnitzer and repeated to Rusk and Dowling.

200. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, October 30, 1961, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-3061. Secret.

201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, October 30, 1961, 9:01 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-3061. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared in substance by the President and Nitze, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin, Paris, and CINCPAC as Tosec 2.

202. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 2, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-261. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, November 3, 1961, 10:38 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862A.181/10-2761. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Hillenbrand, cleared by the President, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Tokyo for the Secretary, Paris, and Moscow.

204. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, November 5, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-561. Secret. Initialed by Kohler. Prepared to brief Secretary Rusk on his return from Japan and Korea.

171. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, October 7, 1961, noon.

1885. Our current assessment is that we are heading into very heavy weather with France and de Gaulle on Berlin/Germany policy, and that there has been a deepening of differences, which is most acute on issue of negotiations, but which extends also to substantive aspects. In view recent trends we would not be surprised to see de Gaulle soon expressing publicly his disaccord with direction US policy, which he came close to doing in October 2 speech[2] (reference to France's vocation to hold Allies firm) and which he reportedly did semi-privately September 25 to MRP delegation (reference to almost lost hope of maintaining Berlin status quo because of Allied, especially US position). There is a possibility that de Gaulle's position will lead him to a break with the US and UK on policy in Central Europe, particularly if he has the support of the Federal Republic.

There are four major aspects to French discontent. 1) Negotiations. de Gaulle has been using almost every public opportunity to restate opposition to negotiations with Soviets on Berlin/Germany unless these preceded by détente, condition regarded here as most unlikely to be fulfilled. de Gaulle feels that under present circumstances negotiations mean in fact Western concessions.

One difference in viewpoint on negotiations concerns likelihood of war, which looms larger to US than to French and de Gaulle, who has suggested that “K” will finally back down. Consequently argument does not find resonance here that negotiations are necessary to show world everything was done prior to war to settle questions peacefully. Couve de Murville in speaking 5 October to Foreign Affairs Commission used de Gaulle reasoning of 5 September press conference[3] that opening of negotiations largely irrelevant to question of whether there will be war.

Although French policy on Berlin not governed by policy on Algeria, Berlin tension fits in with de Gaulle efforts disengage from Algeria, and prospect of early negotiations or settlement would complicate his efforts to draw military and civilian attention away from Algeria to missions which France may have in Central Europe or Berlin.

French including de Gaulle have now indicated that they might not take part in negotiations even if these arranged. While we would not want to accept this as final word, we think it constitutes important warning signal.

2) Allied consultation. We have impression—admittedly speculative—that de Gaulle feels he is not privy to American thoughts on where we are going in respect to Berlin. This is not a case of being excluded from important meetings (although he may have the usual suspicions that the US and UK talk more frankly to each other than to French). Rather it concerns the failure to pierce to essence of top US political thinking about what is acceptable and unacceptable in Central Europe, especially with reference to East Germany and European security.

3)

Berlin/Germany. French position basically has been to defend occupation status of Western powers. Lack of public appeal in a position based on World War II has meant less to de Gaulle regime than to US or UK and indeed the authority of General de Gaulle has allowed France to defy many segments of world opinion (Algeria, Bizerte). His well-known views on the UN emphasize this. de Gaulle has, however, been careful to add that perspectives of negotiation are still open once Soviet agitation and menaces cease.

French apprehensions about Berlin negotiations compounded of two principal factors, concern re their own position in Berlin, likely to be weakened in any newly-negotiated status, and concern over the effects of a deal on the Federal Republic. French attitude toward latter is crucial and boils down to firm support for West Germany as far as present territory is concerned. French have been cool to Federal Republic efforts to embrace West Berlin, they are lukewarm on German reunification, and they have no sympathy for German ideas of regaining “Eastern territories” lost to bloc. However, they oppose any steps in direction de facto recognition East Germany which they think would shake Federal Republic. They are nervous about possible new trends in West Germany if policies of postwar years do not pay off. In this sense de Gaulle is oriented toward German position and will probably continue support fully FRG position re Berlin/Germany problem. Although nature of possible deal on Berlin not yet clear (if possibility in fact exists), French will be unhappy if West gives up anything significant re Federal Republic in return for Soviet-GDR permission for Western powers to maintain rights which French think should never have been challenged. This position of course tied in with a less pessimistic estimate than ours concerning both danger of war and danger that a Western policy of no concessions and no negotiations would increase possibility war.

4) European security agreement. French get nervous whenever mention is made of agreement with Russians on European security, and have indicated unhappiness over allusions in President's speeches of 25 July and 25 Sept. Particularly since there is no real Western agreement on propositions to be put to Soviets, we expect further French negative reaction (see Embtel 1823)[4] to Secretary's mention of possible arrangements in Central Europe. French do not think these should be introduced into Berlin talks and are hostile to such ideas. They recognize that US careful not to engage Allies, but they feel that Soviets will take ball and run to detriment especially of French and German positions Central Europe.

In this situation we wonder what useful steps could be taken to avert a collision that could have profound consequences on Franco-American relations. We recognize that French have been cut in fully in Washington talks. Following additional steps might be considered:

1. We might try again delicate operation of convincing de Gaulle and other French leaders that one real prospect is that—despite best efforts West—war may come from Berlin crisis, not because Khrushchev has already decided to have or not have war (de Gaulle position) but because we may not be able to convince him that West will not yield. It is in this perspective that West needs not only to speed-up military preparations but also to arrange negotiations as demonstrating will of West to find peaceful solution if one with honor feasible. There is also ever present danger of incidents that may get out of hand.

2. We might try in bilateral conversations with French to suggest more fully the nature of our thinking as to possible solutions of the Berlin/German problem and as to our possible proposals re European security. Such conversations might alleviate French feelings that they are ignorant of US thinking, and might reduce their jumpiness re the nature of the solutions in Central Europe that we are prepared to accept.

3. As mechanism for above it seems indispensable to have another Foreign Ministers meeting of the US, UK, France and FRG in the near future. We think thought should be given also to a get-together of the Chiefs of State, to which the French have recently alluded. A top-level exchange of messages between President Kennedy and de Gaulle might also help to alleviate current strains.

Comment: The above was drafted prior to the receipt of the Dept's 1990 of Oct. 6.[5] but is being sent as Embassy considers above views merit consideration.

Gavin

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-761. Confidential. Repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] For text of this speech, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, pp. 151-153.

[3] For a transcript of this press conference, see ibid., pp. 140-150.

[4] Telegram 1823, October 4, reported French reaction to the Rusk-Gromyko talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-461)

[5] In this personal telegram from Rusk, Gavin was informed that if France was somewhat withdrawn from the present discussions on Berlin it was by its own choice. The Secretary went on to speculate that de Gaulle might be distancing himself to avoid any responsibility for a failed solution of the crisis. (Ibid., 762.00/10-661)

172. Letter From President Kennedy to His Special Representative in Berlin (Clay)[1]

Washington, October 8, 1961.

DEAR GENERAL CLAY: I think it is important for us to be in close touch, and so I write to bring you up to date on recent developments here and to ask your comment on several important points.

The Berlin problem has two main tracks, military and political. I am determined that we shall be clear and energetic in both. I believe that our military resolution, as shown in preparatory steps during the summer, has much to do with the somewhat increased readiness of the Soviet Union to consider serious negotiations before proceeding with its so-called peace treaty. But the military build-up is not yet satisfactory, and in particular I find hesitation and delay on the part of some who talk as if they were firm and resolute. Moreover, we have not yet worked out a strong and clear allied agreement on military responses in the event of major harassment or blockade of ground access.

I would very much like to have your own informal comments on this issue. The central question is whether we should treat a blockade of ground access as requiring prompt resort to force on the scene, with possible rapid escalation toward general war, or whether we should proceed by stages, allowing the Soviets time to understand the consequences and risks of their action. I am much struck by the force of the observation which you have made in the more limited context of minor harassments in Berlin—that it is important to be prompt and energetic in response, to avoid misunderstanding, and to prevent the hardening of a new status quo. On the other hand, an almost instantaneous resort to force may not be easy to agree with our allies, and may in fact not be in our own interest. It is not clear that we should deliberately embark on a series of actions on the ground that would quickly fail if the Soviets chose to use their full conventional capability, thus facing us very quickly with the choice between defeat and escalation. It is central to our policy that we shall have to use nuclear weapons in the end, if all else fails, in order to save Berlin, and it is fundamental that the Russians should understand this fact. I think they are beginning to do so. But the specific course of military contingency planning remains open.

Closely associated with this problem is that of the amount of authority that we should delegate to General Norstad or to his subordinate commanders. I have read with great interest your own dispatches on these matters and I will count on you to keep us informed of points where you think increased discretionary authority is needed. I do not want to confuse formal lines of communication by commenting now on the specific issues of Steinstuecken and Friedrichstrasse, but I can assure you that your views are most carefully weighed here. I am sure you understand that any limitations which I may place upon commanders in the field reflect no distrust of them, but rather my own sense of personal accountability for actions which may have consequences far beyond the field of responsibility of the specific commander concerned. Our problem, therefore, is to combine flexibility and energy in appropriate responses with the avoidance of action which infringes on responsibilities I cannot delegate. Your experience and your alertness are invaluable to us in working out this issue in specific cases.

The political problem is no simpler. Mr. Rusk's exploratory conversations with Gromyko have been just that and nothing more. As you know from immediate experience, the Germans tend to be nervous about nearly any American statement of these matters, but in fact we are still merely circling each other to find out what the areas of eventual negotiation might be. The real problem is the one which was highlighted by German misunderstanding of your own informal remarks: how do we get the Germans to recognize that it is not a betrayal of them for all of us to face the fact that we cannot enforce reunification now. We should certainly sustain strongly the broad principle of support for reunification, but we are not going to get Soviet agreement on this point right now, and we must find ways and means of sustaining the courage and energy of our German allies in the face of the continued division of their country. If we can strengthen the position of West Berlin, and get a clearly recognized and less easily harassed system of access, I think we can endure a situation in which the uniforms of the junior personnel concerned with these matters are changed. What we will not budge on are the things which are essential to the people of West Berlin and it is on that point above all that your presence and your work can be so significant. Meanwhile, I shall count on your help in finding ways of sustaining a clear sense of common purpose with our friends in West Berlin and West Germany.

Finally, it becomes more and more plain that whatever the form of an eventual settlement, it will be necessary for the West to take energetic measures in further support of the life and meaning of the city of West Berlin. I count on you in this field too, and I look forward to hearing your views on the ways and means of meeting this challenge, as they develop. In my judgment, the basic responsibility and need for initiative here fall to the people of West Berlin themselves and to the citizens of the Federal Republic, but where American stimulus or energy can be helpful, we will not hesitate. The vitality of West Berlin and the confidence of Germany are together the prizes we must win from this crisis.

I am sure that your work in Berlin is hard and demanding, and I can well believe that it has some frustrations. This crisis is one which makes unusual demands on all of us. But I do want you to know that your presence there is a source of encouragement and strength to me as I am sure it is to Mayor Brandt and all the people of West Berlin.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General Clay. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

173. Minutes of Meeting[1]

Washington, October 10, 1961, 11 p.m.

PRESENT

The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer, Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Hillenbrand, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

SUBJECT

Berlin build-up and contingency planning

The meeting began without the President. The Secretary of State reported the results of the exploratory conversations with Gromyko. The results were positive in two respects: The Soviet Union now appears willing to consider an agreement, negotiated directly with the Western powers, which would govern access to Berlin and the status of the city in such a way as to avoid the necessity for separate agreement with the DDR. Mr. Gromyko has also said that there is no “fatal time limit” on the signing of the peace treaty if negotiations prove promising. Nevertheless, the Department of State continues to believe that the need for appropriate military preparations and planning has not changed.

The Secretary of Defense outlined the military deployments which he was recommending to the President.[2] These were subsequently approved by the President and are as follows:

1. Deploy to Europe, starting on 1 November, eleven Air National Guard squadrons and one Tactical Control group.

2. Return from Europe to the continental United States seven Air Force squadrons of the Tactical Air Command.

3. Preposition in Europe the equipment of one Armored Division and one Infantry Division.

4. Revise Operation Long Thrust to deploy battle groups from the 4th Infantry Division in place of the 101st Airborne Division, and through a series of such exercises to provide for the rotation among the five battle groups of the 4th Infantry Division so as to have in Europe for an indefinite period, after the initiation of Operation Long Thrust, at least two combat ready battle groups plus supporting elements.

5. Deploy to Europe the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment with attached Intelligence Detachment. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment is now stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland. Following movement to Europe, it will be replaced by the 150th Armored Cavalry Regiment which is one of the National Guard units called to active duty on 15 October.

There followed some discussion of the problem of military equipment. The Secretary of Defense indicated that in his view the recommendation stated above was the most that could now be undertaken, and he outlined his plans for improving the equipment of the Defense establishment, especially through the military budget for FY-63. The problem is one of balance, and of sustained and high-level attention to all critical items.

At this point the President entered the meeting, and after further discussion of the problem of providing statistics on relative build-up of NATO and Soviet bloc forces, and a question about the attitude of French and German representatives in Ambassadorial meetings (reported as not affirmative by Mr. Kohler) the President quickly approved the deployment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense.

There followed an intensive discussion of contingency planning based on a paper submitted by the Department of Defense and attached to this minute.[3] Comments on this document were as follows: On Paragraph I, there was agreement and approval by the President, on the understanding that the platoon probe would be governed by the agreed tripartite language (attachment 2).

Both State and Defense Departments strongly recommended that Paragraph II be undertaken before Paragraph III. This is one of the major differences between the Washington position and that of General Norstad. The President concurred in this recommendation. It should be noted, however, that II B. permits movement to elements of Paragraph III at an early date, depending upon advance deployment and reinforcement. To put it another way, as we increase our ability to fight conventionally without an immediate recourse to nuclear weapons, we increase our ability to undertake such conventional action rapidly.

On III, it was agreed to reverse the order of subparagraphs A., B., and C. Under the original subparagraph C., there should be added this clause: “with recognition that such naval messages will quite possibly lead to a Soviet reaction in Germany itself.”

In Paragraph IV, the first “selective” in subparagraph B. was replaced by “battle zone” on the President's direction, after General Taylor had argued strongly that the field commander would need freedom of action within his combat area, if his use of nuclear weapons for his own battle was to be successful.

The President asked whether in fact there was much likelihood that IV. A. and B. could be undertaken without leading to IV. C. The Secretary of Defense and Mr. Nitze presented opposite views on this point. The Secretary argued that the consequences of IV. C. were so very grave that IV A. and B. should be undertaken first even though they might indeed lead very quickly to IV C. Mr. Nitze, on the other hand, believed that since IV A. and B. would greatly increase the temptation to the Soviets to initiate a strategic strike of their own, it would be best for us, in moving toward the use of nuclear weapons, to consider most seriously the option of an initial strategic strike of our own. Mr. Nitze believed that with such a strike, we could in some real sense be victorious in the series of nuclear exchanges, while we might well lose if we allowed the Soviets to strike first in the strategic battle. Mr. McNamara felt that neither side could be sure of winning by striking first and that the consequences to both sides of a strategic exchange would be so devastating that both sides had a very high interest in avoiding such a result. On the whole of Paragraph IV, the Secretary of State pointed out that the first side to use nuclear weapons will carry a very grave responsibility and endure heavy consequences before the rest of the world.

No flat decision of preferences or priorities was made with respect to Paragraphs III and IV, and in particular the division of opinion over Paragraph IV was not flatly resolved. It was agreed that a new draft of instructions from the President to General Norstad will be prepared by the Department of Defense, with advice from the Department of State, and the President will review this new draft with the aim of providing for General Norstad a clear guidance as to the basic intentions of the United States with respect to military contingency decisions.

McGeorge Bundy[4]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Lemnitzer's notes on this meeting are in the National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Another record of the meeting is in a debriefing memorandum to Legere, October 11, which indicates the confusion that existed both with regard to different drafts of the papers discussed and to what was concluded at the meeting. (Ibid., Taylor Papers, Box 35, 6B NATO) For Nitze's account of the meeting, see From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 203-204. In preparation for the meeting Taylor had sent the President a memorandum, dated October 10, outlining the three subjects that would be discussed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin)

[2]  McNamara had submitted these recommendations in a 3-page memorandum to the President, October 10. (Ibid.)

[3] No copy of the original draft of this paper has been found, but it is described by Nitze in From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 203-204; for the paper as agreed by the President on October 23, see the enclosure to Document 185.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

174. Memorandum of Conversation Between Dean Acheson and the German Ambassador (Grewe)[1]

Washington, October 11, 1961.

This morning the German Ambassador called on me at his request and remained for an hour's talk. He was disturbed and depressed. I shall not attempt to give the whole conversation in detail, but merely its highlights.

He began by asking me what was going on in the making of United States policy toward Germany and where was our Government headed. I told him that I could not answer this question, except in the most general way; that I had prepared a memorandum on the subject at the end of July,[2] which I had understood was favorably received by the President and the Secretary; but I had not been in the State Department for over a month. I knew from the press that the Ambassador was disturbed and hoped that in the course of our talk he would tell me why.

I reminded him that in my book I had described a meeting with the Chancellor in 1951 in Paris,[3] in which he had asked me whether he could rely upon the United States, or whether it was fattening West Germany to get a more advantageous price upon selling it to the Soviet Union. I had replied that there was no possibility of this as far as I could then see ahead, which was certainly through the administration which would follow Mr. Truman's; and I now wished to assure the Ambassador that he need have no such suspicion of the present one.

I went over the general points of my recommendations on policy, in the course of which he interrupted to say that he would be wholly in favor of such a policy, but that in the past two weeks it was clear that the Administration had taken a new line in regard to several points. In the first place, the Germans had been told almost categorically that it was a waste of time even for negotiating purposes to talk about reunification of Germany. In the second place, they were being urged to form contacts with the East Germans quite apart from any program looking toward unification. Thirdly, the United States was moving toward something which was indistinguishable from de facto recognition of East Germany; and, fourthly we were talking about the desirability or possibility of recognizing, as of the present, the Oder-Neisse line as the boundary of Poland. He said that these points had been practically announced by the press as the official line and that never in his ten years of working with the U.S. Government had he felt so depressed about its policy or about his personal relations with his American colleagues.

I told him that I had gotten from the press the same idea regarding these points, but that I had no such impression from any of my friends in the Department. I would, of course, disagree with such a policy; although it would seem to me that, if a Russian acceptance of the status quo in Berlin (ante the division of the city) could be obtained, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line would be a price worth paying—not that it was worth much, DeGaulle and others having already indicated their willingness to pay it. To this he replied that all that Germany could do, since every fifth person was a refugee from the east of that line, would be to say that force would never be used.

The rest of the conversation was taken up by my urging the Ambassador to urge the Government in Bonn (which he said was practically settled with the Chancellor continuing) to emerge from the trauma of the election and take a positive and vigorous position. My impression of the German official attitude, I said, was that it was negative, suspicious, and hysterical, seeing dangers in every suggestion, protesting, making no positive suggestions, and taking no action. I said that even a wrong attitude was better than none and that action of any sort would calm a nervous situation.

I urged the Ambassador to get the Government to do two things: One was to work out a practical negotiating position, which he was to present and fight for; secondly, to take steps so that the German Government would be able economically, politically, and militarily to play a vigorous and active part in carrying out the agreed policy.

The Ambassador said that he had made the suggestion that if worse came to worst we should blockade the Baltic and the Black Sea. I said that this did not impress me, first of all, because it was a suggestion by them of what someone else should do; secondly, because I had studied the same suggestion and had made it myself, but only upon the realization that such action was quite likely to produce immediate hostilities, for which we had all better be prepared.

The Ambassador asked what I would think of the proposal that Berlin should be made the eleventh Laender [Land]. I said that, as a proposal coming from the Germans, it made no sense to me. In the first place, it would be the height of provocative action by a government which was prepared to take no risk at all. Here again it was the suggestion that somebody else do something. From the point of view of the allies, it seemed to me to be based upon an acceptance of the division of Germany and the attempt to retain an enclave far within East Germany rather than our present position, which was that we held West Berlin as the symbol of reunification of Germany to which we were all pledged. The proposal would play into the hands of those people in England and elsewhere who talked about the folly of “fighting for Berlin.”

I said that what I would like to see from the Germans was a responsible and vigorous attitude by a government which regarded itself as speaking for an important power.

I reminded the Ambassador that, while he was now criticizing what he said was U.S. policy as being too weak, Strauss had criticized my suggestions as being too strong, even to the point of recklessness. The Germans could not have it both ways, and it was time that they worked out a policy which they were prepared to propose and back up with power.

D. A.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10-1161. Confidential. Attached to a memorandum of transmittal from Acheson to Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle.

[2] Document 89.

[3] Sketches From Life of Men I Have Known (New York, 1959), pp. 176-177.

175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations[1]

Washington, October 12, 1961, 4:18 p.m.

Topol 531. For Finletter from the Secretary. Secretary McNamara and I are deeply concerned at slow progress in NAC consideration of instructions to NATO military authorities on Berlin contingency planning. Although we gather several meetings have been held, the reports we have on proceedings to date indicate a lack of any real sense of urgency. We consider it imperative that the Council be given a sense of real urgency in this vital matter and that the discussions be conducted with greater purposefulness. Council's ability to handle this subject, which is so central to our entire Berlin program, is a real test of its effectiveness.

As a first step, I request that above be discussed with Stikker to enlist his help. We are also giving serious consideration to sending Ros Gilpatric over to meet with the Council next week. It may also be necessary to undertake bilateral approaches in capitals if Council discussions continue to drag on.

I would also appreciate full telegraphic reporting on Council's discussions of this subject. We understand there have been some meetings since October 3 on which we have not received reports.

I would appreciate any further thoughts you may have on this matter.[2]

Ball

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-1261. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden on October 11; cleared by Nitze, S, and S/S; and approved by Kohler.

[2] On October 13 Finletter replied that he thought the Department of State was doing the North Atlantic Council an injustice with regard to the time it took to deal with the Berlin problem. Finletter added that the personal discussions that often helped shape a favorable governmental position took time, and stressed that since the four Western Allies took a long time to arrive at their position, several NAC members felt they should have equal time. Finletter concluded that both he and Stikker believed sending Gilpatric at the present time would be a mistake. (Polto 482 from Paris; ibid., 762.0221/10-1361)

176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, October 13, 1961, 1:28 p.m.

1025. Eyes only for Charg[. Please deliver following letter from President to Chancellor Adenauer at earliest opportunity:[2]

Begin text

Dear Mr. Chancellor: Thank you for your letter of October 4.[3]

I was especially gratified by your reaction to my speech at the United Nations, as I was also by Foreign Minister Von Brentano's public expressions of appreciation.

It is a source of satisfaction to me that you have frankly expressed your views concerning European security. It is only through such candid exchanges that we can preserve the unity and resolution of the West, which, we both agree, is absolutely essential.

Before turning to the main subject of your letter, I should like to take this occasion to put before you certain general considerations relating to the present stage of the Berlin crisis. With the conclusion of the round of talks which Secretary of State Rusk and I have had with Foreign Minister Gromyko, the time has come to take counsel with one another. In cooperation with our British and French Allies, we need to assess the significance of certain statements made by Mr. Gromyko, to determine the best course of action for us to pursue, and then to move ahead decisively along lines calculated to achieve our common objectives with respect to Germany and Berlin.

You have been kept fully informed of our discussions with Gromyko through your Ambassador in Washington. As you know, these talks were purely exploratory on both sides. In a real sense they did not move beyond the stage of verbal sparring. As Secretary Rusk indicated to the Ambassadors, the following generalizations seem justified in the light of the Gromyko talks.

1. The Soviets have been warned and they appear to have taken cognizance of the warning that our present course is dangerous to them.

2. They are clear on the point that negotiations on Germany and Berlin must be between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, not between the GDR and the Western Powers.

3. The time element has acquired a certain fluidity in terms of when the Soviets will proceed with unilateral action, but the West does not have unlimited time. The Soviets could, of course, proceed on a basis not disclosed by Mr. Gromyko.

4. Further contact of an exploratory nature with the Soviet Union is desirable not only to probe but to prevent unilateral acts by the Soviets which would change the facts of the situation.

I think it fair to say that, if the substance of a possible modus vivendi on Berlin has not emerged, at least the possible outlines of a procedural formula, of a framework, were suggested within which the West could reasonably explore further the possibilities of such a modus vivendi. I am referring here to the idea that a separate agreement between the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union might be achieved which the Soviets would undertake to superimpose upon their separate peace treaty in such form as to assure our vital interests, which include the freedom and viability of West Berlin.

I assume you would agree that it is not realistically within our power to prevent indefinitely the signing of a separate “peace treaty” between the Soviet Union and the East German regime. We have made it quite clear to the Soviets that we will not be parties to such a treaty, but this act has acquired such symbolic importance for them that at some point they will proceed to consummate it. The question for us is whether we should passively and fatalistically accept this inevitability or whether we should make a final effort to achieve by negotiation a better result than the de facto situation which we will in any event face after the conclusion of the separate “peace treaty”. It must be made clear that we have no intention of withdrawing from Berlin nor do we intend to give our rights away in any negotiations. On the other hand, the logic of history and the needs of the Alliance demand that every effort, consistent with our vital interest, be made to solve this problem by peaceful and diplomatic methods before the ultimate confrontation.

I should not want to give you the impression that I am optimistic about the possible outcome of negotiations with the Soviets. Mr. Khrushchev is not interested in strengthening our position in Berlin, and he obviously has in mind using the leverage which the apparent advantages of geography give him to extract maximum concessions from the West. We cannot permit him to deprive us of any of our vital interests in Berlin, and it may well be that our application of this criterion will make any agreement impossible to attain. But we shall not find out beyond doubt until we have come to grips with the Soviets in a more substantively significant way than up to the present.

In the meantime, we must continue our military build-up and perfect our contingency planning in all its ramifications. This is a matter on which we expect to be in further communication with you.

My own view is that for the immediate future, through the period of the Soviet Congress, bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union should continue, conducted by the United States Ambassador in Moscow with Mr. Gromyko, or if necessary, Mr. Khrushchev. If these bilateral talks go sufficiently well, a Foreign Ministers' conference might be held at a later time, perhaps in mid-November. We would, of course, keep you fully informed on these discussions.

At some point we will have to decide whether to propose negotiations with the Soviets of a formal character. If we cannot make progress through the normal processes of diplomacy, then we shall be faced with even graver military decisions than those we have taken so far. Should the confrontation over Berlin move to the stage of great and dramatic crisis, we shall require not only all the resolution and clarity of purpose which we can muster but also assurances that the Alliance as a whole, and its principal members, are fully aware of and prepared for all the consequences in a military sense.

Coming now to the subject of European security, I agree with you that there is a great lack of clarity surrounding this concept as well as much public confusion.

Perhaps some of this will be eliminated by my stating unequivocally to you that we are in agreement on your main point that the imposition of a special military status for any country of Western Europe, especially the Federal Republic, would be an invitation for further Soviet incursions in Europe. This would, as you say, include great dangers for the United States, particularly for its security.

I should also clarify that so-called “disengagement” is not something we contemplate at all. This would create a vacuum of responsibility, and I do not believe we can escape our responsibilities.

As indicated in the disarmament proposals presented to the United Nations, the United States Government takes the problem of disarmament very seriously and is prepared to exhaust every effort to see what progress can be made in this field. We think it would be worthwhile to see how the confrontation in Central Europe might be reduced. It would certainly be to the great advantage of the West if the concentration of Soviet forces in the satellites could be lowered. Steps should be also studied that would assure both sides that no surprise attack is being prepared, or is about to be launched. All of this proceeds from our deep convictions that it is in the common interest of both sides that the peace be kept.

However, all these matters will require the most careful study and much time for their development. The United States regards this process as a search for areas of agreement. It is by no means something that could be agreed very quickly.

As far as the nuclear weapons component of European security is concerned, I need not remind you that it has been the long-established policy of the US Government not to relinquish control of nuclear warheads to any nation not owning them and not to transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. This policy is reaffirmed in the US Program for General and Complete Disarmament submitted recently in the United Nations.[4] It is my understanding that this concept is in fact entirely acceptable to you, and indeed in conformity with your own announced policies.

Let me assure you that none of this is considered under any illusion as to the nature and purposes of the Soviet regime, with your assessment of which I can wholly agree.

Let me also assure you that I have the security of the United States and the Federal Republic very much in mind and would do nothing that might endanger either, or that might lead to the undermining of NATO, on which the security of both our nations depends.

I trust, dear Mr. Chancellor, that we are in agreement and I would appreciate your sending me your thoughts on these matters to which we both attribute such great importance.[5]

Sincerely, (signed) John F. Kennedy. End text.

Ball

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Secret; Priority.

[2] Another copy of telegram 1025 bears a notation stating that the letter was delivered on October 14. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) A similar letter was sent to de Gaulle. (Telegram 2136 to Paris, October 13; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10-1361) Extracts from the letter to Adenauer are also printed in Grewe, Rückblenden, pp. 506-507.

[3] A copy of this letter, which is summarized in this telegram, is in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany.

[4] For text of this proposal, September 25 (U.N. doc. A/4891), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1098-1105.

[5] On October 18 Dowling reported that the CDU press chief had asked him to call to tell him that Adenauer had discussed the President's letter with the CDU Executive Committee on October 16. As a result of the letter, the press chief said, the Chancellor's uneasiness over U.S. policy had disappeared. (Telegram 932 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/10-1861)

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

Washington, October 13, 1961, 8:49 p.m.

1988. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. French this afternoon came down flatly opposed to London meeting Senior Officers[2] on basis of failure understand US position and not wishing give appearance Four-Power mandate to further exploratory talks with Soviets by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow. While they could not prevent such further explorations they felt them to be undesirable under current circumstances and did not wish to be associated with them. Requested additional explanation US conclusions to be drawn Gromyko talks.

We pointed out that French Government assuming serious responsibility by this position; they have all information we have and we had hoped London meeting would provide quadripartite consensus on where we go from here.

Full memorandum being pouched.[3]

Ball

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-1361. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash, cleared by Hillenbrand, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] At the Ambassadorial Group meeting on October 12 it had been agreed, subject to French confirmation, that a senior officer level working group would meet in London for a week beginning October 19. (Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, October 13; ibid.)

[3] A copy of the memorandum of conversation is attached to a memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, October 14. (Ibid., 762.00/10-1461)

178. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, October 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

Action for Dealing with the Possible Closing of the Friedrichstrasse Entry Point into East Berlin

On September 14, 1961, Secretary Rusk discussed with you the question of our response to a Soviet/GDR decision to close the access point into East Berlin at Friedrichstrasse to Allied traffic. The decision you took at that time is reflected in the National Security Action Memorandum No. 94 of September 14, 1960.[2] (A copy is attached.)

General Clay, however, has now asked that the Friedrichstrasse problem be re-examined in the light of additional recommendations he has just made.[3]

In essence, the General suggests that if the Friedrichstrasse crossing point is closed, we should force the barrier even in the face of desultory fire, with a small number of tanks. These tanks would then take a defensive position in East Berlin immediately inside the entry point. Almost simultaneously, the United States Commandant would demand an immediate conference with his Soviet counterpart, with whom he would insist upon restoration of our entry rights. If, however, our tanks were attacked by East German forces or confronted by substantial Soviet forces, our tanks would withdraw to defensive positions in West Berlin.

General Clay believes such action would probably result in the entry point being kept open and he sees as additional advantages the fact that the Soviets would again be forced to participate in a Berlin problem; we, in turn, would have demonstrated our insistence upon our right of access to and circulation in East Berlin; Soviet intentions and determination might be more clearly revealed; and Berlin opinion would be less disillusioned than if a weaker course of action had been taken.

We see considerable merit in General Clay's proposed course.

1. It would demonstrate that we consider our right of access to and circulation in East Berlin still valid.

2. It would probably make the Soviets pause before taking further encroaching action as well as affect the nature of their subsequent actions.

3. Moreover, unlike other proposals for a military response to a Soviet/GDR closing action, General Clay's proposal does not involve a serious problem of disengaging our forces for General Clay apparently accepts the fact that the operation might be limited to running tanks a few yards into East Berlin without attempting to use the access thus gained.

On the other hand we question General Clay's assertion that such action on our part is likely to keep the access point open. In our view it is unlikely that such a gesture would cause the Soviets to leave the entrance open if they had once decided to close it. As for Soviet participation in Berlin problems, this would not seem to be any longer of major significance once the Communists decided finally to split the city. Soviet responsibility within the city would be of little practical importance once the boundary was closed. And the appearance of their forces to drive out our tanks, if they in fact appeared, would be the last gasp of Soviet responsibility.

Whether this action would be less damaging to Berlin morale than present plans is also moot. The sight of our tanks plunging through the barrier to remain in the East Sector might raise hopes that the wall at last was coming down or at the very least, indicate that we intended to keep the access point open. And then if our tanks simply stopped, and subsequently had to withdraw, the let-down following in the wake of our demonstrated inability to follow through might be greater than if we had implied no bold determination.

A final and major difficulty for us is this proposed course of action, even though it might reduce the problem of follow-up and disengaging forces, still is essentially open-ended, and does not clearly forestall an uncontrollable and unpredictable situation.

However, in considering General Clay's proposals, it seems to us that the purposes of his recommendations might probably be achieved, and at the same time some of its apparent disadvantages avoided, through the following course of action:

If the Friedrichstrasse crossing point is closed either by unacceptable demands for documentation by the GDR or by the erection of a barrier, we might run two or three tanks up to the checkpoint to demolish whatever was barring our entry (even if only a customs-type gate), and then have them withdraw and stationed nearby inside the Western Sector. The Commandant in the Kommandatura chair for the month, or alternatively the US Commandant (Friedrichstrasse is in the US Sector), would then immediately call Karlshorst to protest the situation and demand an urgent meeting with the Soviet Commandant as well as assurances of safe conduct through the sector boundary for purposes of such meeting. He would immediately release a statement, explaining that the Allied forces had destroyed a barrier which the East Germans illegally erected to bar Allied passage, and that the matter was being protested to the Soviet Commandant. He also would make it clear that, following our initial action, this was a problem to be resolved with the Soviets, who continue to bear full responsibility for the situation. If, as is likely, access continued to be denied us, we would take the further position that the Soviets had violated existing agreements and that we would take appropriate countering measures.

The rationale in this course of action would be that we refused to accept exclusion at the hands of the East Germans; we destroyed their barrier; and we then took the case to the Soviets. It would be Soviet refusal to admit us that brought our exclusion, albeit still under protest. Some such line is desirable to explain our withdrawal without pressing the matter further.

It is to be noted that neither this proposal nor that of General Clay is really a plan for reopening access. Both must be considered on their merits as gestures demonstrating Western readiness to react in a forceful manner, and bring home to the Soviets the point that they must expect increasingly vigorous countermeasures to moves against us.

The advantage of this alternative to General Clay's proposal is that it would present no problem of disengaging our forces. It would be sufficiently abrupt so that it would not unduly raise the hopes of the Berliners. It also would be so limited so that the danger of escalation and the possibility of setting off uncontrolled popular demonstrations would be reduced to an absolute minimum. In essence it would have the desirable effects of General Clay's proposed course without leaving us in a vulnerable position, open to unpredictable and uncontrolled developments.

In his message on the Friedrichstrasse problem, General Clay says he believes no response is preferable to a weak response. Presumably the General means we should not even take the measures now proposed (attempt to drive through the crossing point, remove any barrier that can be removed by hand, protest, take retaliatory action against Soviet personnel in Berlin, take countermeasures outside Berlin, move additional forces to the sector boundary, expel Czech and Polish Mission personnel from West Berlin).

It might perhaps be argued that since we could not take measures adequate to restore access, lesser measures would simply demonstrate weakness.

In our view, however, the absence of any response on our part to a Soviet/GDR move at Friedrichstrasse would be unnecessarily supine. To take no action against Soviet personnel, for example, would hardly be understood. To take the obvious retaliatory measures might not regain much of our lost prestige, but not to take them would cost us further prestige.

Recommendations:

The alternatives posed therefore are:

(a) The Clay proposals,

(b) The State Department's variant of those proposals,

(c) Adherence to the September 14, 1961 decision,

(d) A decision to take no action at all.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have told us they prefer General Clay's proposals. However, if for any reason the General's proposals are not politically acceptable, they consider that the State Department's variant of those proposals represents an improvement over present plans.

General Norstad, in a message received today,[4] generally supports General Clay's suggestions but recommends in addition that “with the removal of the barricades, jeeps or other vehicles should be sent through immediately”. He specifies that “no arms would be used except as clearly necessary for defense or rescue purposes”.

As far as the State Department is concerned, we consider that earlier reservations concerning the consequences of forceful removal of barriers are in the main eliminated by limiting the action outlined in the State Department variant of the Clay proposals. The Clay proposals as they now stand are not sufficiently limited in this respect and therefore would not seem to be acceptable. The same is even true of the Norstad proposals. And insofar as General Clay's suggestion that no reaction is preferable to what he terms weak action, this seems to be the least desirable alternative.

The State Department further believes that adoption of any of the alternative proposals should be subject to the agreement of the British and French.

For your use, I am enclosing a photograph of the Friedrichstrasse crossing point, as well as a map showing the Friedrichstrasse area.[5]

George W. Ball

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAM 107. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[2] Document 148.

[3] Clay made these recommendations in telegram 674 from Berlin, October 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-561)

[4] Telegram 2017 from Paris, October 14. (Ibid., 762.00/10-1461)

[5] Neither found.

179. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev[1]

Hyannis Port, October 16, 1961.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I regret that the press of events has made it impossible for me to reply earlier to your very important letter of last month.[2] I have brought your letter here with me to Cape Cod for a weekend in which I can devote all the time necessary to give it the answer it deserves.

My family has had a home here overlooking the Atlantic for many years. My father and brothers own homes near my own, and my children always have a large group of cousins for company. So this is an ideal place for me to spend my weekends during the summer and fall, to relax, to think, to devote my time to major tasks instead of constant appointments, telephone calls and details. Thus, I know how you must feel about the spot on the Black Sea from which your letter was written, for I value my own opportunities to get a clearer and quieter perspective away from the din of Washington.

I am gratified by your letter and your decision to suggest this additional means of communication. Certainly you are correct in emphasizing that this correspondence must be kept wholly private, not to be hinted at in public statements, much less disclosed to the press. For my part the contents and even the existence of our letters will be known only to the Secretary of State and a few others of my closest associates in the government. I think it is very important that these letters provide us with an opportunity for a personal, informal but meaningful exchange of views. There are sufficient channels now existing between our two governments for the more formal and official communications and public statements of position. These letters should supplement those channels, and give us each a chance to address the other in frank, realistic and fundamental terms. Neither of us is going to convert the other to a new social, economic or political point of view. Neither of us will be induced by a letter to desert or subvert his own cause. So these letters can be free from the polemics of the “cold war” debate. That debate will, of course, proceed, but you and I can write messages which will be directed only to each other.

The importance of this additional attempt to explore each other's view is well-stated in your letter; and I believe it is identical to the motivation for our meeting in Vienna. Whether we wish it or not, and for better or worse, we are the leaders of the world's two greatest rival powers, each with the ability to inflict great destruction on the other and to do great damage to the rest of the world in the process. We therefore have a special responsibility—greater than that held by any of our predecessors in the pre-nuclear age—to exercise our power with the fullest possible understanding of the other's vital interests and commitments. As you say in your letter, the solutions to the world's most dangerous problems are not easily found—but you and I are unable to shift to anyone else the burden of finding them. You and I are not personally responsible for the events at the conclusion of World War II which led to the present situation in Berlin. But we will be held responsible if we cannot deal peacefully with problems related to this situation.

The basic conflict in our interests and approach will probably never disappear entirely, certainly not in our lifetime. But, as your letter so wisely points out, if you and I cannot restrain that conflict from leading to a vicious circle of bitter measures and countermeasures, then the war which neither of us or our citizens want—and I believe you when you say you are against war—will become a grim reality.

I like very much your analogy of Noah's Ark, with both the “clean” and the “unclean” determined that it stay afloat. Whatever our differences, our collaboration to keep the peace is as urgent—if not more urgent—than our collaboration to win the last world war. The possibilities of another war destroying everything your system and our system have built up over the years—if not the very systems themselves—are too great to permit our ideological differences to blind us to the deepening dangers of such a struggle.

I, too, have often thought of our meeting in Vienna and the subsequent events which worsened the relations between our two countries and heightened the possibilities of war. I have already indicated that I think it unfruitful to fill this private channel with the usual charges and counter-charges; but I would hope that, upon re-examination, you will find my television address of July 25th was more balanced than “belligerent,” as it is termed by your letter, although there may have been statements of opinion with which you would naturally disagree. To be sure, I made it clear that we intended to defend our vital interests in Berlin, and I announced certain measures necessary to such a defense. On the other hand, my speech also made it clear that we would prefer and encourage a peaceful solution, one which settled these problems, in the words of your letter, “on a mutually acceptable basis.” My attitude concerning Berlin and Germany now, as it was then, is one of reason, not belligerence. There is peace in that area now—and this government shall not initiate and shall oppose any action which upsets that peace.

You are right in stating that we should all realistically face the facts in the Berlin and German situations—and this naturally includes facts which are inconvenient for both sides to face as well as those which we like. And one of those facts is the peace which exists in Germany now. It is not the remains of World War II, but the threat of World War III that preoccupies us all. Of course, it is not “normal” for a nation to be divided by two different armies of occupation this long after the war; but the fact is that the area has been peaceful—it is not in itself the source of the present tension—and it could not be rendered more peaceful by your signing a peace treaty with the East Germans alone.

On the contrary, there is very grave danger that it might be rendered less peaceful, if such a treaty should convince the German people that their long-cherished hopes for unification were frustrated, and a spirit of nationalism and tension should sweep over all parts of the country. From my knowledge of West Germany today, I can assure you that this danger is far more realistic than the alleged existence there of any substantial number of Hitlerites or “revanchists.” The real danger would arise from the kind of resentment I have described above; and I do not think that either of us, mindful of the lessons of history, is anxious to see this happen. Indeed, your letter makes clear that you are not interested in taking any step which would only be “exacerbating the situation.” And I think this is a commendable basis on which both of us should proceed in the future.

The area would also be rendered less peaceful if the maintenance of the West's vital interests were to become dependent on the whims of the East German regime. Some of Mr. Ulbricht's statements on this subject have not been consistent with your reassurances or even his own—and I do not believe that either of us wants a constant state of doubt, tension and emergency in this area, which would require an even larger military build-up on both sides.

So, in this frank and informal exchange, let us talk about the peace which flows from actual conditions of peace, not merely treaties that bear that label. I am certain that we can create such conditions—that we can, as you indicate, reach an agreement which does not impair the vital interests or prestige of either side—and that we can transform the present crisis from a threat of world war into a turning-point in our relations in Europe.

What is the framework for such an agreement? Detailed proposals must be a matter of allied agreement on our side; and formal discussion must await further exploration of specific items. Your letter indicates, however, that you are concerned over how protracted formal diplomatic negotiations can become, with each side asking for the utmost at the outset, making more statements to the press and using extreme caution in feeling out the other side.

I agree with you that these letters should be able to supplement and thus facilitate such negotiations. We are both practical men and these are meant to be private, frank exchanges. I can tell you, for example, that I recognize how difficult it would be to secure your agreement on a plan to reunify Germany by self-determination in the near future (as desirable as I think that is), just as you recognize that we could not be a party to any agreement which legalized permanently the present abnormal division of Germany. That is one reason why we could not be a party to a peace treaty with the East Germans alone, even though, as I said at the UN, we do not view as a critical issue the mere signing by you of such a document. What is crucial, however, is the result which you have asserted that such a signing would have with respect to our basic rights and obligations.

I agree with the statement in your letter that our two governments must, in one framework or another, continue our “obligations to assist in the unification into one entity of both German states if the Germans so desire.” While, as you point out, the method of achieving this goal is properly a subject for discussion among the Germans themselves, this does not excuse us from the responsibility we have assumed since the war to see the country peacefully unified—and this is the reason why we cannot attempt any final legalization as a formal international frontier of the present line of demarcation between the Western and Eastern zones. It also enjoins us against any action which would retard movement across this line—although, not being “blind,” as you say, we cannot fail to recognize that this line does exist today as the Western limit of East German authority.

Whatever action you may take with East Germany, there is no difficulty, it seems to me, in your reserving your obligations and our rights with respect to Berlin until all of Germany is unified. But if you feel you must look anew at that situation, the real key to deciding the future status of West Berlin lies in your statement that the population of West Berlin must be able to “live under the social and political system of its own choosing.” On this basis I must say that I do not see the need for a change in the situation of West Berlin, for today its people are free to choose their own way of life and their own guarantees of that freedom. If they are to continue to be free, if they are to be free to choose their own future as your letter indicates in the phrase quoted above, I take it this includes the freedom to choose which nations they wish to station forces there (limited in number but with unrestricted access) as well as the nature of their own ties with others (including, within appropriate limits, whatever ties they choose with West Germany). Inasmuch as you state very emphatically that you have no designs on West Berlin—and I am glad to have this assurance, for it makes the prospects of negotiation much brighter—I am sure you are not insisting on the location of Soviet troops in that portion of the city.

Thus, although there is much in your letter that makes me doubtful about the prospects in Germany, there are many passages which lead me to believe that an accommodation of our interests is possible. But in our view the situation should be peaceful now, and existing rights and obligations are already clear. What is not clear is how any change would be an improvement. Your letter and earlier aide-mémoire, and Mr. Gromyko in his conversations with Mr. Rusk and myself, have made clear what you would hope to gain by a change—a new status for the East German regime, a settlement of frontiers, and relief from what you regard as potential dangers in West Germany—but it is not clear how we in the West are to benefit by agreeing to such a change. It is not enough to say there will be a “free city” in a city that is already free—or that there will be guarantees of our access when the old guarantees are still binding—or that we can maintain token troops in a city when we have troops there now.

You are, as I said before, a practical man; and you can see that there is no way in which negotiations on that basis could conceivably be justified on our part. We would be “buying the same horse twice"—conceding objectives which you seek, merely to retain what we already possess. I hope you will give long and serious thought to this question—for the kind of “mutually acceptable” settlement you mention is possible only if it brings actual improvements, from the standpoints of both parties.

The alternative is so dire that we cannot give up our efforts to find such a settlement. In the weeks ahead, while we are consulting on these matters with our respective allies and you are meeting with your Party Congress, I hope these efforts can continue—both through this correspondence and through other contacts. Let us also both strive during this period to avoid any statement, incident, or other provocation in Berlin which make a proper negotiating climate impossible. For the present, I believe we can agree on Ambassador Thompson as a very acceptable means of continuing the conversation. He knows of this letter; he has my complete confidence, and I am glad that this channel is satisfactory to you. He is in Washington at present, and will return to Moscow after our inter-Allied talks are further under way.

As for another meeting between the two of us, I agree completely with your view that we had better postpone a decision on that until a preliminary understanding can be reached through quieter channels on positive decisions which might appropriately be formalized at such a meeting. This reminds me that your letter also very graciously stated your desire to have me visit your country. If we can reach a reasonable settlement of Berlin and if the international atmosphere improves, I would take great pleasure in such a visit. I visited the Soviet Union in 1939 very briefly, and would look forward to seeing the great changes that have occurred since then.

Let me make it clear that I do not intend to relegate the achievement of complete and general disarmament to a place of secondary importance. I share your conviction that nothing would do more to promote good will among nations and contribute to the peaceful solution of other major disputes. Our agreement on the statement of principles jointly submitted to the UN General Assembly, while barely a beginning on a matter where we remain far apart, at least holds out the hope that we may someday achieve the final stage of such disarmament, verified to remove the fears of any people that devastation may ever again be suddenly rained upon them.

At the same time, however, our attention is urgently needed on those current problems which keep the world poised on the brink of war. The situation in Laos is one example. Indeed I do not see how we can expect to reach a settlement on so bitter and complex an issue as Berlin, where both of us have vital interests at stake, if we cannot come to a final agreement on Laos, which we have previously agreed should be neutral and independent after the fashion of Burma and Cambodia. I do not say that the situation in Laos and the neighboring area must be settled before negotiations begin over Germany and Berlin; but certainly it would greatly improve the atmosphere.

[Here follow three paragraphs on Laos.]

My wife who is here with me reciprocates your good wishes, and we return the wish of good health to you and all your family. As I recall, I shall be seeing your son-in-law again in the not too distant future, and I look forward to talking with him.

I hope you will believe me, Mr. Chairman, when I say that it is my deepest hope that, through this exchange of letters and otherwise, we may improve relations between our nations, and make concrete progress in deeds as well as words toward the realization of a just and enduring peace. That is our greatest joint responsibility—and our greatest opportunity.

Sincerely,[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[2] Document 162.

[3] Printed from an unsigned copy.

180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, October 18, 1961, 9:06 p.m.

553. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Ref: Berlin's 674.[2] White House has approved new instructions, taking into consideration General Clay's recommendations, in connection with possible Communist action to close Friedrichstrasse entry point into East Berlin to Allied traffic. We intend raise matter today in Ambassadorial Group to seek British and French concurrence and would like USCOB discuss proposal with British and French Commandants to assure speedy tripartite approval.[3]

As approved by White House following course of action by USCOB authorized, in event Friedrichstrasse entry point closed either by unacceptable demands for documentation or erection physical barriers by GDR.

(1) Two or three tanks would be used to force barrier and demolish any obstacle barring entry;

(2) Tanks used for purpose would be withdrawn immediately after accomplishing mission and stationed nearby inside West Sector.

(3) Commandant in Chair for month or, alternatively, USCOB would then call Karlshorst immediately to protest GDR action and demand urgent meeting with Soviet Commandant, as well as assurance safe conduct through sector boundary for purposes this meeting.

(4) Press statement would be issued soonest in Berlin, explaining Allied forces had destroyed barrier illegally erected by East Germans; matter was being protested Soviet Commandant; Allies continued to hold Soviets responsible for assuring unrestricted Allied circulation in East Berlin.

In our view, among advantages this course of action:

(1) Would demonstrate our insistence on continued right of access to and circulation in East Berlin;

(2) Cause Soviet to pause before taking further encroaching action in Berlin and affect nature subsequent actions;

(3) By withdrawing tanks into West Sector, immediately after completion demolition action, we not only forestall problem of disengaging forces; we would also limit possibility of unduly raising hopes Berliners and consequently reduce possibility of uncontrolled popular demonstrations.

Berlin, Bonn and Paris will be advised as soon as British/French concurrences obtained. To expedite matter however suggest USCOB inform British and French Commandants Berlin soonest our intentions.

JCS will issue necessary instructions through military channels as soon as tripartite agreement reached.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-561. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Klein (SOV); cleared by the Department of Defense, the White House, Hillenbrand, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and USAREUR for POLAD.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 178.

[3] The following five paragraphs are a close summary of NSAM No. 107, October 18. (Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316)

181. Letter From the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to President Kennedy[1]

Berlin, October 18, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I had not reported to you prior to receipt of your letter[2] as I am only now beginning to have a real feel of the situation and no specific incident had occurred of sufficient import to bring to your personal attention.

I realize all of the political and military implications involved in the Berlin problem, including the difficulties we face in reconciling our views with those of our Allies, including West Germany. At the same time we must retain the confidence of West Berlin. Otherwise, the flight of capital and responsible citizens could destroy our position here, and the indicated loss of confidence in us would spread throughout the world. Unfortunately the West Berliner is concerned only with what we do. The failure of the British or French to react promptly when incidents occur does not disturb the West Berliner; if we fail, he is dismayed.

Perhaps my greatest concern is that the trespassing on our rights which has taken place in the last several months has been by east German forces; mainly east German police, while Soviet forces have been far in the background. I do not believe that we should have gone to war to stop the creation of the wall, but I do believe that we should have taken sufficient action to force Soviet participation and that this would not have led to war. At minimum, we could have moved back and forth across selected places on the border with unarmed military trucks and this limited action might well have prevented the wall. I was amazed to find that no specific action to this end was recommended here. If there is doubt here as to what to do it could not be expected that a prompt solution would come from elsewhere. I am not critical of our representatives here as they are of high quality. The restraints under which they operate have discouraged imagination and initiative. After all, it takes only a few disapprovals to discourage independent thinking and positive recommendations.

I have respect for our military leadership in Europe and I know the limits of its authority. I am concerned that even as able a Commander as Norstad can report as the American Commander without being influenced by his NATO hat. Perhaps independent viewpoints would be more valuable.

As to relations with the Military Command, I have made no recommendations to the local Commander which are not within the purview of the European Command. However, I can not accept the recommendations I do make to be tossed lightly aside at higher headquarters in Europe. Of course, these recommendations apply only to minor incidents as I would immediately call Washington in a major or emergent matter. However, it is the sum total of many minor invasions of our rights, no one of which seemed important, that cumulatively has resulted in serious and continuing erosion.

I feel strongly that prompt reaction is essential when an incident occurs which threatens a right, and that even a delay of a few hours makes it impossible to take action without increasing the risk of war. If we are to react properly and promptly, the local Commander must have the authority in emergency to act immediately with my advice and consent within the full range of the authority you have delegated to our Military Command in Europe.

Of course, we can not solve the Berlin problem by using force in Berlin. We can lose Berlin if we are unwilling to take some risk in using force to bring about Soviet confrontation even if we withdraw immediately when confronted with superior force. We could easily be backed into war by failing to make it clearly evident on the ground that we have reached the danger point.

Without going into detail, I would like to refer briefly to several recent events. News that refugees were in Steinstucken had reached West Berlin on the morning of my trip and would soon have become public. A failure on our part to rescue these refugees would have seriously damaged our position here. Also, prompt action in sending highway patrols drew strong Soviet protest but stopped harassment of our licensed vehicles on the autobahn. Similar prompt action in pushing military vehicles through Friedrich Strasse on Sunday stopped harassment of our licensed vehicles at our one remaining crossing into east Berlin. I realize the danger of escalation but it works both ways. These few simple actions on our part have eased tension here and restored confidence in West Berlin. I must add that I feel strongly about protecting our right to cross at Friedrich Strasse as we have built it up in the minds of the West Berliners as an important right by pushing as many vehicles as possible through each day.

To me, the handling of these minor harassments is more difficult than the handling of a major harassment. If a major harassment does occur, we must move to break it up by force, withdrawing only if met by superior force. If this occurs we may be sure that a new blockade is inevitable. If we are stopped on the highway, we must probe quickly and, I would think, from Berlin with light military strength to find out the depth of the intent. If our probe is stopped by superior force and compelled to withdraw, we should resort to an immediate air lift concurrently and publicly applying economic sanctions and blockade in an attempt to force Soviet action. If these steps are taken concurrently there will be no panic in West Berlin and we will gain the time for you to make the ultimate decision with calm and objective judgment. If our probe results in the destruction and capture of the force involved, it is of course evident that the Soviet government wants war.

I find it much more difficult to know what to do if rail and water traffic is stopped as a military probe would be of no value in developing intent. I would think we would have to content ourselves with air and highway traffic while this was negotiated.

I am not seriously alarmed at the present time over the morale of West Berlin. However, underneath the outward signs of a normal, prosperous city there is a very real tension. It is not a personal fear of an immediate danger but rather a doubt as to the future of the city as a desirable place to live and to raise a family. There is little if any unemployment at present; people are prosperous and living well. Of course, some of the stores and almost all of the entertainment enterprises have lost their east Berlin customers who had West German currency. I do not regard this as catastrophic. The flight of capital which followed the 13th of August has been stopped and the net loss of people is surprisingly small.

Long range, the problem is real. The Senat recognizes this and is planning carefully for the future. However, until the present crisis is over there can be little reality to the planning. Since the problem is neither pressing nor immediate, I am confident in the development of a program which will sustain the cultural, educational and economic vigor of West Berlin.

I also realize the difficulty in finding a solution to the West Berlin problem which does not create an even more serious West German problem, and that intense nationalism is on the rise in West Germany. Still, I find little evidence in West Germany of the will to fight and I doubt if the West German people are as determined as we are to defend Berlin. Many of the political leaders would like to fix the responsibility on us for any so-called concession in dealing at any level with an east German government. However, some of them are beginning to face the facts. Recently, I have reported conversations with two political leaders which, if they correctly present the views of their respective parties, would seem to make it possible to develop a common position. Obviously, it is most important for the West German government to participate in and to accept this common position so that they share in the responsibility of explaining it to the German people. Otherwise, intense national feeling could lead West Germany into breaking with the West. I hope the new government will seek to share in this responsibility rather than to avoid it and I believe this can be brought about.

It is certain that the measures you have taken to increase our military capabilities have been noted by the Russians and I have a feeling that they are being much more careful here now than a few weeks ago. I find it difficult to understand why this has not been equally effective in convincing our Allies, particularly West Germany, of our determination and in encouraging them to like measures.

I realize, Mr. President, that this is much too long a report to submit to you and I shall be much more brief in any future reports. I am honored to serve as your personal representative. However, I realize that no one knows quite what this means. I can assure you that here in West Berlin any failure to act positively and determinedly with me here in this capacity will be assumed to have your direct approval. Moreover, each time we fail to act my value as a symbol of American determination will diminish and, in fact, will result in greater loss of confidence than otherwise.

I have no ambition except to be of service to you in a critical place and time. Neither frustrations nor work bother me in the least as long as I am of service. I do not believe that you sent me here to live in a vacuum and I know that I can be of no real service if it is deemed wise to be extremely cautious in Berlin. Please understand that I do not now or will I ever question any decision you have made. I must advise you when I feel that any value I may have here as your representative is lost.

I may add, too, that I did not come here to add to your problems and that I am gladly expendable. I do want you to know that I would never permit myself to be made into a controversial figure in these critical times and that if you decide, or I find that I must report to you, that I serve no useful purpose here, I would withdraw only in a manner which would meet with your approval and would not add to the problem here.

With high respect.

Faithfully yours,

Lucius D. Clay

General, Retired

U.S. Army

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General Clay. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[2] Document 172.

182. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, October 19, 1961, 7 p.m.

952. Eyes only for the Secretary. When I talked with Chancellor this afternoon re Gilpatric visit,[2] I referred also to my stay in Washington, and in accordance with my understanding of the President's parting instructions to me to “set the mood” for a possible exchange of views between you and Adenauer, mentioned the President's view re seriousness of Berlin issue, need for Western unity, and desire for harmony of German and American positions. Having heard nothing further, however, re possibility of your visiting Bonn, I was purposely vague as to framework of exchange of views.

Chancellor said he entirely agreed that we must get together, adding that President's letter of October 13[3] and Grewe's reports (he is still here) had convinced him that we were not really very far apart. He went on to say that he was less interested in form of any negotiated settlement than in substance, and that latter had been admirably formulated by the President and you in definition of West's vital interests.

Chancellor said he was much concerned with French attitude, and was considering writing de Gaulle in this sense. It was difficult exercise, however, he remarked, since not only was de Gaulle sensitive in this regard, but faced so many dangerous problems at moment. He concluded by reiterating previous advice that we continue gently to woo de Gaulle to return to NATO fold.

I took liberty of conveying the President's and your greetings to Chancellor, for which he expressed warm appreciation, saying he was keenly aware of gravity of problems which faced the President, and indicating that he would not want in any way to add to this burden.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10-1961. Secret; Priority.

[2] In a letter to Adenauer dated October 16 the President suggested that he send Gilpatric to Bonn to discuss a wide range of defense measures and to make sure that the actions the United States and Germany were taking were both adequate and coordinated. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

[3] See Document 176.

183. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State[1]

London, October 20, 1961, 4 p.m.

1637. Eyes only for the President. From Bruce. In reply to your eyes only telegram 2045.[2]

(1)

The Western position in Berlin has always been minimal, since as result of disastrous terms of 1944 wartime agreement on German partition, possibility of Berlin enclave (ringed by hostile territory) preserving any real independence, depended on (a) determination of Western powers to preserve position there through military force, and (b) forbearance of Soviets.

Latter chance never existed. Also, successful closure of Berlin sector border on August 13, 1961, without Allied military reaction, has now made disadvantageous Western tenancy in Berlin still more vulnerable, and deterioration in West Berlin and West German morale is already significant.

We are left from a trading standpoint (if we maintain Allied garrisons in West Berlin) with no real assets coveted by the Soviets, in compensation for the continuance of our present status quo, excepting two principal ones involving wider issues: (a) de facto recognition of the so-called East German Republic, and (b) other concessions at expense of Federal Republic and our own security.

(2) For the Western occupants to give such de facto recognition would be to consent to their own dishonor. Britain and France might not be unduly squeamish in this respect, for they realize that the US will bear almost the entire onus of any concessions construed as representing repudiation of solemn engagements.

In the interminable arguments taking place over this affair, I am amazed by apparent forgetfulness of the stipulations of the 1954 Paris treaties.

The obligations undertaken by the Western governments thereunder are specific. The Allies contracted, amongst other pledges, to further German reunification by every diplomatic means, not to recognize the division of Germany, and to treat the Bonn regime as the only legitimate government in Germany.

It was largely in reliance upon such promises that FedRep refused the tricky but tempting Soviet offer on reunification in favor of alliance with the NATO countries.

Because the prospect of German reunification within a reasonable time is not realizable, does not absolve FedRep's partners from their professions to advocate it in principle. Nor is the statement that partition is already a reality sufficient to justify recognition of the actual division of Germany, for no government in Western Germany could survive the open acceptance by its Allies that what has at least until now been hope deferred is to be dismissed as forever hopeless.

I have never believed that driving the Allied occupants out of West Berlin was a primary objective of Soviet policy, except insofar as it would impair, even destroy Western solidarity and prestige, so as to facilitate the greater and ultimate Soviet objective of taking possession of West Germany with its immense resources.

They have pursued this latter end with unrelenting tenacity. One of their methods has been to encourage, under the specious guise of promoting peace through a European security arrangement, the neutralization of FedRep. I shall not burden you with my views as to how dangerous to our interest this idea is—I dealt with it at some length in Embtel 1454, October 9.[3]

We are close, I suppose, to the moment of decision. We appear to have a choice between three courses of action: (a) to stand still and await developments from Soviet initiative; (b) to attempt to negotiate a continuance of the uneasy status quo, which would leave us subject to renewal of the same pressures heretofore exercised by the Soviets; they could do this whenever they wished, through their GDR puppet; (c) to seek an internationalization of the whole Berlin area.

I am inclined to think that the last course has never received adequate attention. The internationalization of access routes to Berlin under UN jurisdiction, coupled with a maintenance of our present occupation rights has been suggested. Another is Khrushchev's own comment about making West Berlin the UN capital. Others have proposed the removal there from Geneva of certain subsidiary UN organs.

None of these proposals would, in my estimation, be sufficient guaranties of the liberties of the West Berliners, or acceptable to them. The first is, nevertheless, worthy of further exploration, and the third has minor attractions.

However, amongst numerous variants, there is only one (to be held in reserve until the last moment) that I would advocate strictly as a last resort short of nuclear war, namely moving the UN capital to greater Berlin, internationalizing the whole enclave, including access routes, and retaining, for a period, Allied garrisons in Berlin.

I am aware of the many objections to such a drastic step. Yet I believe this move if accepted would preserve with honor our repeated promises to the West Berliners and to the West Germans, and would keep FedRep a loyal partner. I would certainly prefer it to war, and also to continuance of a status quo, or what is now left of it since August 13, which holds no promise for the future except danger of our losing West Berlin and later FedRep through attrition and disenchantment.

Meanwhile, I would consider it essential that we take, and make credible, decision to engage if necessary in nuclear war rather than lose West Berlin, and consequently, West Germany.

Bruce

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2061. Secret; Niact.

[2] In telegram 2045, October 17, the President asked Bruce for a summary of his current views on Berlin. (Ibid., 762.00/10-1761)

[3] In telegram 1454, Bruce stated that he was disturbed over the possibility of injecting discussions of European security or disengagement into the talks on Berlin. (Ibid., 762.00/10-961)

184. Memorandum of Meeting[1]

Washington, October 20, 1961, 10 a.m.

PRESENT

The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Nitze, Kohler, The Attorney General, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Dean Acheson, Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Bundy

The meeting was devoted to an examination of State-Defense drafts of policy on military actions in the Berlin conflict and a letter to General Norstad which would accompany this statement of policy. Appended to this memorandum are copies of the drafts as they were before the meeting and as they were approved by the President after revision.[2]

The Secretary of State briefly reviewed the purpose of the documents and stated that in his judgment the fundamental issue was that of the speed of movement from interruption of access to direct large-scale military action.

There followed a brief discussion of the problem of build-up, in which General Lemnitzer explained a division in the JCS. General LeMay and Admiral Anderson share General Norstad's opinion that there need not be a large-scale build-up in the immediate future. General Lemnitzer and General Decker agree with the Secretary of Defense that such steps are desirable. The matter need not be decided now, since troops will not be ready for shipment until the middle of November. The Secretary of Defense said the issue will be re-examined and presented to the President at that time.

Secretary Gilpatric remarked on what he regarded as the inconsistency in General Norstad's position: he would defer the military build-up but he wants an immediate military response to interruption of access. The Secretary of State remarked that the apparent inconsistency is resolved in General Norstad's mind by his conviction that any military action will escalate rapidly to nuclear war, so that a large conventional build-up is not relevant. Mr. Bundy suggested that General Norstad also believed that such a build-up might degrade both the credibility and the capability of nuclear forces but the Secretary of Defense disagreed, holding that General Norstad has accepted the usefulness of substantial conventional reinforcement.

The President then asked Mr. Acheson for his views, and from that point on the meeting was dominated by Mr. Acheson's arguments.[3] Mr. Acheson's immediate criticism was directed at the lack of clarity in the draft letter to General Norstad. He suggested a replacement for the paragraph beginning “In the first place” at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2, arguing that the existing paragraph said nothing at all, and that the President should not be asked to give unclear instructions to General Norstad. Mr. Acheson's substitute was designed to make clear the President's distinct insistence upon non-military action before military action, and to emphasize that since the air battle is the most promising of the three non-nuclear forms of action, it should be given preference. Discussion both before and after the President left the meeting led to modest revisions in Mr. Acheson's draft language, which was then incorporated in the letter which the President signed.

Mr. Acheson's broader argument was that both in the military build-up and in the development of a negotiating position, the United States has been spending too much time seeking theoretical agreement with our allies. In Mr. Acheson's view, the momentum of American decision and action is what will make the difference. For this reason he believed that the United States should indeed begin to move divisions in November, and when the President asked why, Mr. Acheson responded that in his judgment any preparation for action will have great effect on what happens both diplomatically and politically. If we do not move until after there is some blockage, we lose the deterrent force of this action. Mr. Acheson did not believe that such a build-up would mislead Khrushchev into thinking that he had to deal only with possible small ground conventional actions. On the contrary, he thought that the serious military movement by the United States is “an ominous thing” which would clearly convey the serious purpose of the American government.

The President remarked that the gold drain implied in such a movement had given him serious concern, and Secretary McNamara and Secretary Gilpatric both responded with comments indicating that this problem might be rendered manageable by further negotiations with our allies.

Mr. Acheson emphasized further that action would help in our difficulties with the Germans. He reported the tenor of his conversations with Ambassador Grewe[4] in which he had tried to press the Germans to come up with actions and proposals of their own, but his own conclusion was that there have now been enough exploratory conversations and discussions and that it is time to act for a while.

At this point the President asked Mr. Kohler how our present relations with the Germans and the French are. Mr. Kohler remarked that he thought the Germans might be moving a little, and that the delay in Ambassador Grewe might indicate serious study in Bonn. He could make no such optimistic judgment on the French, and when the President asked Mr. Acheson for his advice on dealing with de Gaulle, he remarked that this was a problem which he was happy to leave to the Department of State.

Emphasizing his belief that U.S. leadership was the fundamental necessity in negotiations as well as military preparations, Mr. Acheson argued that there is not now any need to press upon the Russians our desire for negotiations. Neither do we need to coordinate with our allies. We need to tell them. In his belief there has been too much conferring with Ambassadors. This was a waste of time, not in the conventional sense but in the sense that it used up days and weeks which might be better spent. Mr. Acheson had recently been brought up to date on the negotiating position being worked out by the Department of State. He thought the Department had some pretty sensible ideas and that it was time to put these firmly before our allies. Mr. Acheson suggested that our Ambassadors should go to the governments concerned and say that this is our position.

Mr. Acheson evidently believed that the center of the matter is the opinion of the Germans; that Chancellor Adenauer is the key to that. While the Chancellor frequently listened to wild and unfounded rumors, he could always be straightened out by men whom he trusted. There had been many statements, innocent in themselves, which could and did create uneasiness when no firm position had been taken and expressed clearly to the Chancellor.

At this point the President had to leave the meeting and asked those remaining behind to attempt an agreed revision of the letter, in the light of the discussion. The President made clear his own general agreement with Mr. Acheson's position on the letter to Norstad, subject to modifying advice from the Secretary of Defense. The revised draft as completed and approved by the President reflects this new consensus.

McGeorge Bundy[5]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy.

[2] For texts of the letter to Norstad and the policy paper as approved by the President, see Document 185. Drafts of the paper on military actions abound, and the specific one referred to here is not clear. Copies of these drafts, JCSM-728-61, October 13, which presented the JCS views on the question; a Secretary of Defense comment on JCSM-728-61, dated October 17; and Bundy's memorandum to the President, dated October 20, summarizing the different views on the subject, are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin.

[3] In describing the meeting to Legere, Bundy noted that “Mr. Acheson, as usual, was the belle of the ball.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Items for Cables to Taylor)

[4] See Document 174.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

185. Letter From President Kennedy to the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe (Norstad)[1]

Washington, October 20, 1961.

DEAR GENERAL NORSTAD: Since your visit here[2] I have given further thought to the two principal subjects of our discussion in relation to the Berlin situation, namely, contingency planning and the preparatory build-up in NATO military strength.

As you have been informed, all the measures you recommended for immediate action have been authorized and put in motion, except for the replacement of the 3rd battle group now in Berlin which will take place when additional such units move to Europe as part of the Long Thrust exercise.

My present thinking on the preferred sequence of types of actions that we should take in the event of any abrogation of Western rights in Berlin is reflected in the sequence of four courses of action designated by Roman numerals in the enclosed outline. The import of this sequence should be clear to you, and I desire that it serve as the guidance for your discussions with our Allies and for your planning of detailed military operations.

In the course of that planning I ask that you spell out for me with particularity your operational concepts for the command and control procedures within your command to be used in the “selective nuclear attacks” and “limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons” referred to in Contingencies IV A and B of the enclosure.

Two aspects of my present thinking about Berlin planning and preparation deserve especial emphasis.

First: What I want is a sequence of graduated responses to Soviet/GDR actions in denial of our rights of access. The purpose is to maintain our rights and preserve our alliance. The responses after Phase I should begin with the non-military and move to the military. We cannot plan in advance the exact time each response should be initiated; for one reason, because we cannot now predict the date of Soviet/GDR action, for another because we cannot foresee the duration or the consequences of each response. But there are some principles applicable to this matter of timing. The earlier responses should be thoroughly prepared in advance and the purpose should be to initiate them and keep them going long enough so that the next response may, if necessary, come in when needed. This requires vigor in preparation, readiness for action, and caution against going off half-cocked. The military sequence indicated begins with the air action outlined in III A 1. Since it seems likely that any form of Soviet blockade will include interference with air access, every effort in preparation should be made to increase the chance of success in air operations. The rewards of success would be great indeed. The other indicated steps are those outlined in III A 2 and III B. These courses will require the timely addition of considerable forces to your command, and appropriate dispositions on your central front. Should it appear that Soviet forces sufficient to defeat these actions are being brought into play, the response, on which you would receive specific directives, will be one or more of those contained in paragraph IV.

Second: At this juncture I place as much importance on developing our capacity and readiness to fight with significant non-nuclear forces as on measures designed primarily to make our nuclear deterrent more credible. In saying this I am not in any sense depreciating the need for realization by the U.S.S.R. of the tremendous power of our nuclear forces and our will to use them, if necessary, in support of our objectives. Indeed, I think the two aspects are interrelated. It seems evident to me that our nuclear deterrent will not be credible to the Soviets unless they are convinced of NATO's readiness to become engaged on a lesser level of violence and are thereby made to realize the great risks of escalation to nuclear war. I will be interested to hear of any suggestion from you as to how we might intensify that realization.

When contingency plans have been completed and received through established channels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will review them with me and my other advisors.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

Enclosure[3]

Washington, October 20, 1961.

U.S. POLICY ON MILITARY ACTIONS IN A BERLIN CONFLICT

In the event military force is applied in the Berlin situation, it is United States policy that the nature and sequence of such use should preferably be:

I If Soviet/GDR administrative or other action interferes with Berlin access by ground or air but is short of definitive blockage, then the tripartite powers should execute Berlin contingency plans, to include tripartitely agreed probes of Soviet intentions by a platoon or smaller force on the ground and by fighter escort in the air; they should continue to use fully any unblocked mode of access.

(Comment: Through this point, risks of major war, unless Soviets wish to start one, are not materially raised by any tripartite action, and therefore, decision on execution is tripartite rather than NATO responsibility.)

II If, despite the above tripartite actions, Soviet/GDR action indicates a determination to maintain significant blockage of our access to Berlin, then the NATO Allies should undertake such non-combatant activity as economic embargo, maritime harassment, and UN action. Simultaneously, they should mobilize and reinforce rapidly to improve capability for taking actions listed below. Meanwhile, they should use fully any unblocked access to Berlin. (If, however, the situation has so developed that NATO forces have been substantially reinforced, after appropriate non-combatant measures undertake without delay one or more of the courses of military action shown below.)

(Comment: Since the Alliance proposes to exploit other means before initiating major military operations, non-combatant efforts to restore ground access will precede the military efforts shown below in any case. A separate issue is the choice between delay while reinforcing in Europe, and prompt action. Without a build-up by the Allies, the range of options for early military action by us is limited. Undue delay could weaken nuclear credibility, threaten the viability of West Berlin, and erode Alliance resolve, but these potential disadvantages may be out-weighed by the higher risk of nuclear escalation if early non-nuclear action were taken with no more than the currently available forces. To the extent that Alliance forces in Europe are raised above present levels, the delays in initiating military action can be reduced or the military action can be tailored to the existing force levels.)

III If, despite the above Allied actions, our Berlin access is not restored, the Allies should take appropriate further action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR intend to maintain blockage of air or ground access, or both, while making clear our intention to obtain re-opened access. Then embark on one or more of the following expanded military courses of action:

A. European Theatre

1.

Expanding non-nuclear air action, against a background of expanded ground defensive strength, to gain local air superiority. Extend size and scope as necessary.

(comment) Opposing strengths probably will be roughly comparable. Military success locally is not impossible. As a political operation, this shows the Soviets visibly higher risks of nuclear war. The pace and volatility of extended air operations raise risks of rapid escalation.)

2.

Expanding non-nuclear ground operations into GDR territory in division and greater strength, with strong air support.

(comment: This is a politically oriented military operation aiming to display to the Soviets the approaching danger of possibly irreversible escalation. Military overpowering of determined Soviet resistance is not feasible. The risks rise, as do the military pressures on the Soviets.)

B. World Wide

Maritime control, naval blockade, or other world-wide measures, both for reprisal and to add to general pressure on the Soviets.

(Comment: This action, by itself, is not apt to be effective and might lead to Soviet initiation of action on the European central front in any case. It lacks direct relation to Berlin and may entail political liabilities. It exploits pronounced Allied naval superiority. It would have a delayed impact on nuclear risks. It is the view of the JCS and the principal unified commanders that a naval blockade should be accompanied by other military action in Central Europe.

IV If, despite Allied use of substantial non-nuclear forces, the Soviets continue to encroach upon our vital interests, then the Allies should use nuclear weapons, starting with one of the following courses of action but continuing through C below if necessary:

A. Selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons.

B. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to achieve in addition significant tactical advantage such as preservation of the integrity of Allied forces committed, or to extend pressure toward the objective.

C. General Nuclear war.

(Comment: The Allies only partially control the timing and scale of nuclear weapons use. Such use might be initiated by the Soviets, at any time after the opening of small-scale hostilities. Allied initiation of limited nuclear action may elicit a reply in kind; it may also prompt unrestrained pre-emptive attack.)

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Kennedy, John F. Top Secret. Regarding the drafting of this letter, see Document 184.

[2] See Document 166.

[3] Top Secret. On October 23 Bundy transmitted this paper to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara as NSAM No. 109.

186. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, October 23, 1961, 2 p.m.

801. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. When entering Sov Sector at Friedrichstrasse on evening October 22 at 7:15 pm in my own car with my wife to join other Mission members at theater, Vopos stopped me and requested identification. (Other members of theater party who had proceeded us by a few minutes entered Sov Sector without hindrance.) I refused show ID and demanded right enter. When this was denied I requested Sov officer. After wait of three-quarters of an hour I informed Vopos I was proceeding as was my right and did so. I got through “maze” and was held up by second line of Vopos; they demanded identification; I refused and demanded Sov officer and waited nearly an hour until arrival Berlin Command Provost Marshal and two MP vehicles. Vopos insisted no civilians permitted enter without showing identification; indicated I could return or proceed with military driver. At this point my wife left car and walked back to check point. I then proceeded with military escort. We proceeded slowly, passed third Vopo check point and into sector about two blocks and returned to West Sector without incident.

We immediately repeated performance with same escort, reentered sector, turned around and returned.

On return I was informed Sov officer was en route to scene. When he arrived at eastern side Friedrichstrasse check point around 10 pm Provost Marshal went over to protest Vopo interference. Sov officer (POLAD Lazarev) admitted action was mistake and would be corrected. On receipt of this information I entered the check point followed by another member of Mission in his privately-owned vehicle. Both cars entered sector, made brief tour and returned without hindrance. Subsequently, another Mission car and French car similarly entered and returned. In meantime U.S. POLAD arrived and also went over to protest to Sov POLAD who apologized for his delay in providing Vopos with facsimiles of U.S. licenses which he said had just been done today. In his turn he protested military escort as armed incursion into their territory.

During course of incident which lasted nearly four hours numerous members press assembled Friedrichstrasse and observed much of what happened including movement of tanks nearby.[2]

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Lightner, Edwin Allan. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.

[2] At 3 p.m. on October 23 the Mission delivered a letter from General Watson to his Soviet counterpart, Colonel Solovyev, protesting the treatment of Lightner and the Soviet failure to ensure the free movement of U.S. personnel within the four sectors of Berlin. (Telegram 805 from Berlin, October 23; ibid.)

187. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, October 23, 1961, 8 p.m.

2196. I called on General de Gaulle this afternoon to discuss the Berlin situation with him. He began by asking me if I had seen his reply to the letter from President Kennedy and when I told him I had not he sent for a copy of it which I read at once.[2] I told him the sentence in which he agreed to the continuing of the present discussions on the Ambassadorial level in Washington and the discussion leading up to that sentence were most significant.

de Gaulle said, to begin with, he does not think we should give the impression of organizing a high level meeting to provide guidance, on a 4-power basis, to Amb Thompson in Moscow. He is not doing anything to prevent us, meaning the USG, from having such a meeting but if we do, it will be on our own. It was for this reason that he could not agree with the President's suggestion of having a 4-power meeting in mid-November.

I then asked de Gaulle what he envisioned would occur if no negotiations were to take place with the Soviets—would not hostilities begin with us having lost an opportunity to make clear our intent to engage in hostilities if they pursued their present course? In answering, he said if the Soviets are thinking of using force against us, this is all the more reason we should not negotiate. It would be negotiating under worst conditions possible.

If they are not, then there is no reason for us to hurry to negotiate. (de Gaulle said in French that in America one gets the impression we are hurrying to try to negotiate. This was not translated by translator.) For the time being, it all depends on the Soviets: wishing to talk at any cost, or giving them that impression, one makes a big mistake. Either they do not want to wage a general war—and de Gaulle says he believes that is the case—then there is no reason to hurry; or they want to go to war and in such case we should not negotiate because it would be negotiating under direct threat. We would suffer a setback in any case, because one cannot make working arrangements with people threatening them.

The fact that we have accepted negotiations has been detrimental. Because of that, Adenauer has lost votes in the last election. That not only affects Germany but other countries as well. What one ought to say to the Soviets, under the circumstances, when they have threatened us with the atomic bomb, built the wall in Berlin, threatened to sign a treaty with East Germany with no promise to guarantee access to Berlin, and indulged in saber-rattling in general—we cannot talk when they apply force in this manner. If they apply force, we will do the same and see what happens. Any other stand would be very costly for not only Germany but all alike.

Gavin

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2361. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Regarding Kennedy's letter to de Gaulle, see footnote 1, Document 176. In his October 21 reply de Gaulle refused to join in any Western approach to the Soviet Union concerning Berlin, adducing many of the arguments made to Gavin in this telegram. de Gaulle also stated that he would not object to U.S. feelers to the Soviet Union and welcomed the U.S. measures to strengthen its military posture. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

188. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, October 24, 1961, 9:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

Delivery of Letter to the President from Chancellor Adenauer

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

McGeorge Bundy, The White House

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

Germany

Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe

The President opened the conversation by inquiring about the Chancellor. Ambassador Grewe replied that the Chancellor was busily engaged in political activities, constructing his Government following the elections. In this connection he said that there was in Bonn, however, basic agreement on the lines of foreign and defense policy and on the steps to be taken to increase the German military effort. He said he had just received a new instruction from Bonn this morning, the essence of which he would like to communicate to the President. The Federal Republic intended, he said, to fulfill all the commitments in the military field which had been discussed with and given by Defense Minister Strauss with respect to manpower build-up and increases in the military budget. He said he would omit the details. However, in general terms the Federal Republic reaffirmed the memorandum which had been delivered to the US Government in May following the Chancellor's visit with the President.[2] The Federal Government realizes that the present situation involves a risk of war; it is prepared to face this risk and indeed to go to war to defend the freedom of Berlin. The Federal Government considers that it is important to reach a common understanding on our military and strategic concepts. Differences had existed on this in the past. However, the Federal Government would not insist on the adoption of maritime measures as an alternative to larger ground and air operations on the continent. However, it considered that such operations would only be convincing if we were prepared to follow them with a preemptive nuclear strike if that became necessary. If such operations were not followed up the Federal Government saw considerable dangers in large scale conventional operations with the possibility that Soviet forces could cross the border and occupy considerable areas of Federal Republic territory, thus leaving the West at a considerable disadvantage. The decision to use nuclear weapons must be made clear to the Soviets as well as the fact that the Soviet Union itself would be a target.

The President inquired whether this meant any change in the German approach to the consultations taking place in the Ambassadorial group. The Ambassador replied that it did not, but it meant simply that the German representatives were prepared fully to participate in the development of military planning. However the Federal Government wanted further discussion of the military and strategic concepts in order to ensure a common position. In this connection Mr. Kohler cited the statement he had made yesterday to the Ambassadorial group to the effect that the United States Government had been considering its own concept of the preferred sequence of military courses of action and that it expected to be discussing these with its allies in the near future.[3]

Ambassador Grewe then handed to the President the Chancellor's letter together with an English translation (attached) prepared with the assistance of the State Department.[4] After reading the communication, the President asked what the Ambassador's views were as to when a meeting might take place between the Chancellor and himself. The Ambassador replied that because of the political situation, probably not until after the first week in November. After some discussion of possible dates which indicated that Indian Prime Minister Nehru would be here November 6, 7 and 8, the President indicated that the best time would probably be the week following that visit, or tentatively around November 11, 12 or 13. The President commented that he thought it was important that he have a chance to meet with the Chancellor. It appeared that there were differences between the positions of the Federal Republic and the French and those of the British and ourselves. He personally thought we must see whether there were ways in which the situation with respect to West Berlin could be improved. Perhaps this would not be possible but he felt that we should explore all avenues. If negotiations with the Russians should break off then we would be faced with a very dangerous situation. The President considered it essential we at least be able to say before reaching that point that we had done everything possible to try for a peaceful solution. He felt it was important to probe Mr. Khrushchev further on his statements about the freedom of West Berlin and of access. He personally would feel much better if we did this before we got to the nuclear stage. The President deplored the press speculation and exaggerations about differences. In fact he said we were not really discussing substance, on which there were no essential differences, but rather differences as respects tactics and procedures.

Ambassador Grewe replied that the Federal Government had never opposed negotiations—indeed he was frequently annoyed by reports which equated the German and French positions—nor had it any objection to exploratory talks. The Germans were even prepared to work on the French to get them to participate. At this point the President remarked that he had had a letter from General de Gaulle who apparently felt that every move toward the Soviets was a manifestation of weakness.[5] Ambassador Grewe resumed, saying, however, that the Federal Government had not been very well satisfied with some of the talks between us. They felt that there had been some change in US policy regarding Germany in recent weeks. He would cite particularly the question of reunification. The United States seemed now to be following another approach on this subject and were urging an increase in contacts between the Federal Republic and the East Germans in connection with reunification instead of supporting the reunification by free elections. Of course the Germans had realized all during the past ten years that there was little prospect of achieving reunification. However it was essential not to abandon this policy. In this connection he cited the restraint that the Federal Government had shown with respect to discouraging East German refugees. This was only possible so long as the hope of free reunification were held out. Thus there seemed to be a divergence between us regarding the question of increased political contacts between the Federal Government and the GDR. The Federal Republic does not think that such contacts would tend to bring the two parts of Germany together, but rather that it would involve dangers like those involved in the Chinese situation in 1947. Moreover the Federal Republic considered that it would be prejudicial to future political settlement if it were left more or less alone as regards this question. Mr. Bundy said that he knew of nothing in US policy which could lead to the conclusions being stated by the Ambassador and asked what specifically the Ambassador was referring to. The Ambassador somewhat embarrassedly cited discussions he had had with the Secretary and Mr. Kohler along these lines. Mr. Bundy observed that these seemed to be related to questions like the proposed technical commissions.

The President then said he thought we should be looking for new approaches. He hoped there could be some formula found to improve the status of West Berlin without changing West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic or with the United States. He saw no real prospect of achieving reunification in the foreseeable future. He then asked what the Ambassador's second difference was. The Ambassador replied that the second difference he saw was in the matter of European security. He said that the explanations in the President's letter to Chancellor Adenauer[6] had been helpful but still had not been sufficient to quell all the German uneasiness. He cited particularly US references to US-Soviet confrontation in Europe. The Germans regarded the confrontation of Soviet and American forces as a desirable situation rather than as a bad one. Some discussion ensued in which it was pointed out to the Ambassador that these references did not contemplate any disengagement but rather a reduction in the mass of the confrontation.

Returning to the subject of Berlin, the President commented that he would argue with General de Gaulle's assumption that the present situation in West Berlin was a satisfactory one on which we should just stand pat. He himself considered it unsatisfactory in many respects and wanted to examine whether there were not some way in which it could be improved. Ambassador Grewe said he would agree with this in principle, but that he saw no prospect of being able to achieve any improvement. Rather he thought that we were faced with a situation in which the Soviets sought concessions from the West in return for a status quo minus in Berlin. He then cited the great impact of the events of August 13 in Berlin. He had visited Berlin during his trip to Germany and Mayor Brandt had told him that instead of a daily average of 500,000 border crossings before August 13 these were now reduced to about 500. The results of the building of the wall had been reflected in the results of the September 17 elections in Germany. All political analysts agreed that the Chancellor's party had lost votes as a result of the Chancellor's reserved and moderate position on this question.

The President then said he was sure that the German Government realizes that if negotiations on this subject fail there is a real prospect of a military engagement with the Soviets. Consequently he agreed that he and the Chancellor ought to meet and try to develop a uniform position. In this connection he cited an editorial in a German paper on his address at the UN which had read all kinds of non-existent “iffy” conclusions into his statements. The United States was not going to give Berlin away. However he wanted to be sure that when we come to the end of the road there will be no illusion and no basis for charges that a satisfactory arrangement could have been worked out if the West had tried negotiations instead of resorting to force.

Ambassador Grewe commented that he felt there was no misunderstanding in Germany about the US position. All Germans were satisfied as regards American determination with respect to what we define as the three vital interests. However he would point out that this is a narrow definition which does not include a range of interests which the Germans consider vital to them. He thought Khrushchev had been sufficiently warned and would be very careful not to take actions which would impinge on these three vital interests, but would rather seek to make inroads on German interests short of these.

The President commented that if the Chancellor saw dangers in the various proposals which were being discussed he would like to see the Federal Government put up proposals of its own which it would regard as acceptable. Perhaps we could then say what we considered to be wrong with those instead of just seeing our own ideas shot down. The Ambassador replied that the Germans did see possibilities but for the most part did not consider them realizable. In this connection he cited the statement he had made to the Ambassadorial group yesterday with regard to free access, Soviet recognition of West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic and the possibilities of an international autobahn. Mr. Bundy inquired about the German views on an all-Berlin proposal. The Ambassador replied that the Germans did not consider that these were realistically attainable, but felt that an all-Berlin proposal would be a useful opening in any negotiation and embarrassing for the Soviets to deal with. The President asked whether the Ambassador did not think that even if there were not good prospects for their realization, the West should put forward Western proposals which Khrushchev might reject. He felt that this might help to improve our position with our NATO allies. The Ambassador agreed that this could be true. However he said that he wanted to cite the record on the Western side which had been good. He had recently re-read the debates in the Bundestag in 1951-52 when the Soviet proposals for German reunification and neutralization were under consideration. He referred particularly to the speeches of Bundestag Deputy Fleiderer about the need for imaginative proposals. As a matter of fact in the ensuing years the West had put forward every proposal which had been conceived at that time which were wide ranging and imaginative. However he would agree that they had not been well publicized, perhaps because in the very nature of things Western proposals had become more complex.

The President then returned to the subject of his disagreement with the position of General de Gaulle. He cited the views which had been put forward by our NATO allies, mentioning in particular Norway, Belgium, Italy and the UK as expecting an effort at peaceful settlement. He understood, however, that the Federal Government favored a continuance of this effort with the Soviets. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative, but said the Federal Government hoped that common ground could be found among the four and limits of our position fixed. He then asked how Ambassador Thompson would proceed in Moscow in view of the French position. The President replied that he thought there would not be much profit in further discussions with the Russians until after he had met with the Chancellor. Ambassador Thompson could perhaps have one or two exploratory conversations, but he thought it important that he have a talk and reach agreement with the Chancellor.

As the meeting broke up Ambassador Grewe said he wanted to cite a small situation in Berlin which illustrated the problem of morale there. He then told the story of an installation in the center of West Berlin belonging to the East controlled railway which had been painted red and decorated with the GDR insignia and which was very upsetting to the West Berliners. He said the Western commandants had not yet decided what could be done about this. The President indicated that this would be looked into by the State Department.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/10-2561. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Kohler and approved by the White House on October 27.

[2] Regarding the Chancellor's visit to Washington April 12-13, see Documents 16-17; the memorandum under reference has not been further identified.

[3] A report on the Ambassadorial Group meeting on October 23 is attached to a memorandum from Kohler to Rusk of the same date. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2361)

[4] Not printed. Dated October 21, the letter stated that the time had come for consultations on whether a basis for negotiations with the Soviets existed, and after reviewing the question of nuclear weapons, the Chancellor suggested that he discuss the issues personally with the President. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) Grewe had shown this letter to Rusk at a meeting on October 22 and discussed German policy along the lines of his conversation with the President. A memorandum of that conversation is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10-2261. For Grewe's account of these conversations, the drafting of the letter, and extracts from it, see Ruckblenden, pp. 507-511.

[5] See footnote 2, Document 187.

[6] See Document 176.

189. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, October 24, 1961, 1 p.m.

813. Bonn for Dowling only. From Clay for Rusk only. Re ourtel 812 Dept, 715 Bonn.[2] While I have never regarded the showing of identification papers except by those in official cars as of major import and thus recommended to the Mission soon after my arrival that we obtain a tripartite agreement to define certain conditions under which we would show identification, I do not believe that we can accept this requirement under pressure. We have not had sufficient time without pressure since my arrival to put an identification procedure into effect.

I am convinced that GDR will require identification at Friedrichstrasse for all US licensed cars not driven by soldiers in uniform as a first step in requiring identification for all Allied personnel. This would of course eliminate any special Allied rights in East Berlin as all foreigners have these rights. Obviously as long as GDR does not close Friedrichstrasse to official vehicles we are not in a position to force entrance or if we would keep the entrance open by force we still would be unable to circulate in East Berlin. Nevertheless, I believe it would be a serious mistake to accept the GDR dictate which has just been announced (reftel) if it is placed in effect. I have always believed that the elimination of Allied rights in East Berlin is of great importance to GDR and that every effort will be made to accomplish this objective before any negotiations take place. Moreover, I do not believe that we can afford to have any remaining right taken away from us prior to and without negotiation as we would then enter into negotiations with only those rights left which we are committed to maintain by force if necessary.

It seems clear to me at this time that the Western Allies have little to gain from negotiation and nothing to gain unless Khrushchev really wants to negotiate in good faith. The FRG position is opposed to any changes in present status in principle although willing to accept certain concessions provided none of the responsibility for such acceptance is placed on FRG. I have serious doubts that Khrushchev really wants to leave to the GDR the full responsibility for control over access to Berlin with the risks of war which this involves and that he will be much more ready to negotiate on a reasonable basis if we are more resistant to negotiations under the present atmosphere.

In any event, I do not believe that we should even be willing to talk with the Russians on the subject of possible negotiation in an atmosphere approaching duress.

Thus, I believe that we should give serious and immediate consideration to calling off such talks until and unless Russia is prepared to guarantee full maintenance of the present status quo until they are either discontinued or lead to negotiations.

I would urgently recommend that you be ready to send for the Russian Ambassador as soon as we advise you that the dictate is being put into effect, advising him that the requirement that Allied personnel in properly licensed cars must submit identification papers to East German police at Friedrichstrasse represents the unilateral assumption of a Soviet right and a unilateral change in the procedure followed for years which we cannot accept in the period in which we are trying earnestly to find a basis to negotiate the Berlin problem. Further, even though the United States and its Allies are earnestly seeking a way to peace we cannot hope to find a basis for negotiation if the rights which we now hold are being subject to attack as we search for this basis. If the Soviet Government is unable to restore the normal procedures now in effect in Berlin and to maintain these procedures during the progress of the talks, there is no further purpose to be served by continuing the talks. I would urge that the Russian Ambassador also be asked to give a reply immediately as otherwise it will be necessary to announce that in the present atmosphere further talks are useless and will not be pursued.

In point of fact, I am inclined to believe that at the moment this would put us in a stronger position than we now occupy. It would certainly enable us to determine the seriousness of both the French and German viewpoints which as they are now recorded are not overly enthusiastic to any negotiations, and indeed would force Khrushchev to show his hand as to whether or not he really desires negotiation.

We will avoid test at Friedrichstrasse today awaiting your consideration of this recommendation. We must probe not later than tomorrow. If unarmed probe fails we will then proceed under our instructions to protest here and if unable to reach Soviet Commandant or protest fails, to try again with armed escort. Under these circumstances, I doubt if armed escort will suffice. Therefore, in event unarmed probe fails, we believe that calling in Soviet Ambassador is preferable alternative to trying armed escort.[3]

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2461. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Niact. Received at 11:05 a.m. Also sent to Bonn.

[2] Telegram 812 from Berlin, October 23, quoted an East German News Agency (ADN) announcement that required persons in civilian clothes crossing the sector border to show identification cards. (Ibid., 862.181/10-2361)

[3] At 6 p.m. on October 24 Ambassador Dowling sent his concurrence with Clay's views, adding that the acceptance of further restrictions on U.S. rights in Berlin would be “most detrimental” to the U.S. position in the Federal Republic. (Telegram 987 from Bonn, received at 3:17 p.m.; ibid., 762.0221/10-2461)

190. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, October 24, 1961.

I telephoned Lightner at 3 p.m.EDT (8 o'clock Berlin time) about his telegram 813[2] transmitting Clay's message to you linking negotiations with the Friedrichstrasse crossing question. The conversation was almost entirely in doubletalk. However I made it clear to him that we had been very surprised at their action in suspending border crossings by personnel in civilian dress today and considered it a serious tactical mistake. I told him that judging by their own reports we had thought that local intervention with the Soviets had more or less settled this problem. Furthermore as we understood it from their own reporting the GDR Ministry of Interior statement was not a new edict at all but simply a new warning based on the regulations which they have had in effect but not enforced for some time.

Lightner indicated that he agreed with me but that he had been overruled by higher authority. He then inquired about our reaction to the suggestion of high level representations to the Russians linking the question of negotiations. I told him this was a matter which we would have to consider further. I pointed out that there were a lot of other factors possibly of greater importance connected with the negotiating question.

Lightner wanted to assure me that his involvement in the border crossing incident Sunday night was entirely unexpected and rather embarrassing. I told him not to worry about our reaction but that his name was today a household word in the US.

I asked Lightner to convey the import of the foregoing to General Clay and tell him that a reply would be forthcoming in due course.[3] I added that he might stress our reaction to the suspension.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2461. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler. The source text bears Kohler's handwritten notation: “Handed to & read by Sec 10/24-7 pm.”

[2] Document 189.

[3] The reply, which was sent in telegram 586 to Berlin, October 24 at 9:03 p.m., reiterated what Kohler had told Lightner, and added that if a protest at Berlin were unsuccessful in restoring the U.S. rights, then both armed and unarmed escorts of U.S. vehicles trying to enter the Soviet sector should be tried. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2461)

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, October 25, 1961, 7:28 p.m.

596. Bonn eyes only for Ambassador. Berlin eyes only for Clay. Re Berlin's 824 to Department.[2] We have instructed Ambassador Thompson who has just returned to Moscow to see Gromyko in order to protest harassments at Friedrichstrasse crossing.[3] (Ambassador Menshikov presently in Moscow attending Party Congress and consensus here is that calling in Soviet Chargé would be considerably less effective than approach in Moscow.)

I fear that you overestimate retaliatory effect of “cutting off talks” which have been in suspense for some weeks and for resumption of which there is no scheduled meeting. Feel termination of diplomatic contacts on subject of Berlin as form of reprisal against Soviets is questionable concept. As matter of fact, such contacts may provide useful channel for transmission of our protests and demands for maintenance of status quo. I have not regarded talks with Gromyko as a search for negotiations but rather as effort determine whether any basis for negotiations exists. It still remains in our national interest to ascertain this especially since we shall, within near future, be faced with number of important decisions on our further military build-up which can only be made in light more knowledge than we now have regarding effect on Soviet position our build-up to date as well as other current factors influencing Soviet policy.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2561. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Kohler, and initialed and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn.

[2] Telegram 824, October 25, received at 12:34 p.m., again recommended calling in the Soviet Ambassador and, if that failed to produce results, closing the crossing point to U.S. vehicles. (Ibid.)

[3] The instructions were transmitted to Thompson in telegram 1131 to Moscow, October 25, 7:27 p.m. (Ibid.) On October 26 Clay responded that the protest in Moscow probably would not serve any purpose and might force a hardening of the Soviet position. He favored further harassing tactics in Berlin until the United States made discontinuance of Friedrichstrasse activities the price for negotiations on Berlin. (Telegram 834 from Berlin; ibid., 762.0221/10-2661)

192. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, October 25, 1961, 9 p.m.

833. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. US Commandant General Watson accompanied by US POLAD and Mission officer called on Sov Commandant Colonel Solovyev 3 pm today at former's request.[2] Watson opened discussion by stating that Sovs had permitted potentially explosive situation develop at Friedrichstrasse, where East Berlin police were illegally attempting control passage U.S. forces personnel into SovSector. Watson then briefly reviewed background on developments and discussions on this subject since his call on Solovyev Aug 26 (Berlin's 333 Dept, 296 Bonn)[3] including US POLAD's call on Sov Colonel Lazarev Oct 17 (Berlin's 762 Dept, 677 Bonn),[4] incident evening of Oct 22 (Berlin's 801 Dept, 709 Bonn),[5] and subsequent Vopo interference (Berlin's 822 and 825 Dept, 725 and 728 Bonn).[6] He pointed out that Sovs had on several occasions implied they prepared take steps remedy situation.

Watson continued that US side considered Sovs bound by four-power agreements whether or not Sovs willing to admit this. He pointed out that US does not recognize East German regime and does not accept regime's pretensions to control US personnel. Watson reminded Solovyev that during previous interview on October 13 (Berlin's 752 Dept, 667 Bonn)[7] Solovyev referred to importance of avoiding disturbing actions at time when government level discussions were being held. Watson concluded by demanding that Sov authorities fulfill their commitment and responsibility to assure unimpeded circulation US vehicles and personnel; he suggested Solovyev might start by obtaining release of two army buses Watson had observed halted on East German side of Friedrichstrasse crossing point en route Karlshorst.

Solovyev began reply by referring to Oct 22 incident. He said vehicle had had to be controlled by East Berlin police under regulations of GDR. He then objected to US action sending armed guard to escort vehicle into East Berlin. Solovyev claimed there no precedent for entry into one sector Berlin of armed personnel from another sector. Said US action had been violation of GDR's order rules. Solovyev then alleged that Sov personnel in civilian clothes who enter West Berlin in military vehicles are controlled by West Berlin police and always show ID cards, which they consider normal practice.

Referring to escort of US vehicle through crossing point this morning by armed soldiers in jeeps, Solovyev called this “open provocation.” He said placing of US garrison in state of combat readiness and stationing of tanks at sector boundary was “sabre-rattling.” He continued, “I am authorized to state that it is necessary to avoid actions of this kind. Such actions can provoke corresponding actions from our side. We have tanks too. We hate the idea of carrying out such actions, and are sure that you will re-examine your course.”

Solovyev then passed on to crossing point procedures. He said our military personnel in uniform never encountered impediments. Difficulties arose only with personnel in civilian clothes, since it was impossible to tell their nationality. Inspection of the documents of such persons was proper under laws of GDR, which Solovyev could not change.

Watson pointed out that he and Solovyev previously had complete exchange of views re responsibilities in Berlin, which it not necessary review. Present difficulties were most serious, and Solovyev would realize how deeply serious we were in matter of free passage. Important principle was involved. Because matter was so serious, Watson was reporting it to his government and assumed that Solovyev would do the same. In meantime, we would continue exercise important principle and take most serious measures to do so. Watson also mentioned earlier suggestion of US POLAD that Sov officer might be stationed at Friedrichstrasse temporarily to deal with Allied personnel until current difficulties resolved. Watson emphasized that all persons authorized use of the various types of license plates described to Karlshorst were under his command and equally entitled uncontrolled passage.

Remainder of interview, which lasted one and one-half hours, was largely repetition, with Solovyev repeatedly asserting GDR regulations were valid and it was normal expect persons not in uniform identify selves. He said all that was wanted was for them to show piece of paper to identify them as US personnel. It not even necessary hand over such document, which could be shown through window. He contended this was not control. Solovyev several times proposed that he called solution to difficulty: Americans in uniform need show no identification while those in civilian clothes should show. Watson firmly asserted license plates were sufficient identification. This was whole purpose of supplying descriptions and photographs in accordance with Sov request. Watson pointed out that East German harassments based on alleged distinction between uniformed and non-uniformed personnel were recent phenomenon. Solovyev asserted new rules had been in effect since August 15. Watson countered by pointing out that since incident involving army buses August 26, there had been no difficulties in army bus movements until today.

Mission comment: Mission considers following were main points emerging from interview:

1. Sovs fully backing GDR in attempt compel US personnel in civilian clothes display ID.

2. Sovs did not categorically reject idea of stationing Sov officer at Friedrichstrasse, but certainly showed no interest.

3. Sovs extremely sensitive to US armed penetration East Berlin. It interesting note that Solovyev displayed no hesitation using term “Soviet Sector” or citing four-power practice when discussing this point though practically in same breath he able disclaim responsibility for GDR actions East Berlin.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10-2561. Confidential; Niact. Received at 7:55 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and POLAD USAREUR.

[2] In telegram 825 from Berlin, October 25, 5 p.m., Lightner reported that another U.S. vehicle had been denied access to East Berlin. Following a lengthy discussion with the Soviet Political Adviser, who denied Soviet responsibility, the vehicle was given an armed escort into the Soviet Zone, and Lightner informed Solovyev that General Watson wanted to meet with him to prevent a difficult situation from arising. Lightner also reported that two platoons of tanks had been moved up to the crossing point and that Berlin Command had been placed on alert. (Ibid.)

[3] Dated August 26. (Ibid., 762.0221/8-2661)

[4] Dated October 17. (Ibid., 762.0221/10-1761)

[5] Document 186.

[6] Telegram 822, October 24, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10-2461) Regarding telegram 825, see footnote 2 above.

[7] Dated October 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B/10-1361)

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, October 26, 1961, 8:11 p.m.

607. Eyes only for Clay. Eyes only for Ambassador. Many thanks your 834 and 835.[2] I would certainly agree that the chances of success in representations in Moscow are not too bright. However it is essential that we test Soviet intentions in a much broader context than the question of entry procedures to East Berlin. In the nature of things we had long since decided that entry into East Berlin is not a vital interest which would warrant determined recourse to force to protect and sustain. Having for this reason acquiesced in the building of the wall we must recognize frankly among ourselves that we thus went a long way in accepting the fact that the Soviets could, in the case of East Berlin, as they have done previously in other areas under their effective physical control, isolate their unwilling subjects. An important consideration is the fact that our Allies would clearly be unwilling to support us in stronger measures, especially on issue of showing credentials where British practice differs from ours. We are having some difficulty in making them face up to the real prospect of armed conflict to protect our basic vital interests as regards West Berlin and access thereto. Consequently while we have favored every reasonable effort to demonstrate the illegality of the Soviet/GDR actions on August 13 and subsequently, and to manifest an intent to maintain our rights by every method short of force, we have not wished this to go so far as to constitute simply a demonstration of impotence, to focus world-wide public attention on the wrong issue and to arouse hopes and expectations on the part of the West Berliners and the West Germans who in the end could only be disillusioned. Thus we have wished to keep “harassing tactics” within these limits. Frankly within the context of these considerations I am unable to see what national purpose would be accomplished by the proposed raid in force. I had not realized that this was a proposal on your part in 824[3] which accounts for the lack of comment in my reply to that message. In fact the British have already indicated strong opposition to the lesser demonstrative course of action described in Deptel 553[4] to be undertaken in the event of a closing of Friedrichstrasse. This is being discussed further this afternoon[5] but in view of the importance of keeping the three principal Allies together it seems quite possible that we cannot get agreement on even this much.

If Moscow's reaction to Thompson's démarche is in fact negative, then we will of course have to review the whole question of where we go from there. In this case, would certainly be obliged to make it clear that any chances for genuine negotiations on the over-all problem would be seriously prejudiced by this unilateral action which places us under duress.

As for making negotiations directly dependent upon restoration status quo in regard showing credentials, we have not embarked upon negotiations because no adequate basis for them exists with respect to most fundamental issues. We could not be in position of saying to Soviets that satisfaction regarding entry into East Berlin would open way for negotiations. Clearly Friedrichstrasse issue is one of many involved in such possibilities.

Please be assured our deep awareness difficulties situation West Berlin and great appreciation your help and counsel. We face here dual necessity of maintaining allied unity on basic issues in face grave Soviet threat while at same time building up pressures on Soviets against further unilateral action. You can be sure that your views and recommendations are given the fullest possible attention.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2661. Secret. Drafted by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn. The source text bears Kohler's handwritten notation: “Approved by Secy after consideration with President.”

[2] Regarding telegram 834, see footnote 2, Document 191. In telegram 835, October 26, 1 p.m., Clay asked for Rusk's reaction to a raid in force into the Eastern sector which would tear down parts of the wall on its return. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2661)

[3] See footnote 1, Document 191.

[4] Document 180.

[5] A 4-line summary of the Ambassadorial Group discussion of the events at Friedrichstrasse was transmitted in telegram 609 to Berlin, October 26, 8:50 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2361)

194. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, October 27, 1961, 5 p.m.

1378. Re Deptel 1131.[2] Shortly before my 3 pm appointment I was informed Gromyko would see me after all. When I made points set forth Deptel Gromyko replied by reading me statement, text of which follows in separate tel, containing Soviet protest same incidents.[3]

I observed his statement alleged we had acted in violation established procedure. I pointed out contrary was case and East German police had changed practice which had existed for 16 years. He merely said we had made lots of changes on our side. He referred to his talks with Secretary and understanding that both sides would avoid steps which would lead to complications. He said action US military in Berlin contradicted this understanding and it followed that evidently American side had changed its mind. If so Sov Govt would be compelled to draw appropriate conclusions. I again pointed out it was their side that had initiated action and I could not understand this at time when we were preparing negotiate settlement problems with Sov Union. Gromyko said sovereign rights of GDR could not be subject of negotiation. US should take account of this in its actions. I asked him if they had already signed separate treaty with GDR. He said when treaty was signed many other things would be implemented and he had discussed these in detail with Secretary Rusk. He said all information available to Sov Govt made it clear there was no basis for statement I had made to him and that our side had sole responsibility for incidents on border. All police were trying to do was establish who people were in these vehicles. If US sincerely desired détente it should not complicate situation. He referred to use of tanks and jeeps. I said I thought it possible to settle this problem and that we would be prepared to discuss it either here or in Berlin but he showed no interest in pursuing subject. At end conversation I asked if he thought it would be useful to instruct our people in Berlin to attempt find solution. He replied Soviet representative would not take part in check point procedure and would not be sent to check points. I remarked this was not only possible solution but he said he was aware that General Watson had discussed this problem with Soviet authorities and that position he had taken was not correct. He said Soviet officials had also made representations to ours in Berlin.

At one point Gromyko said no one had right infringe on sovereignty of GDR. I pointed out that logic of his position was that East Germany would also stop our military personnel in uniform particularly as he had remarked that uniform itself was not proof of identity. He replied I could draw any conclusion I liked.

In view Gromyko's unyielding position I did not put forward suggestions contained Deptel 1146.[4] I pointed out we did not recognize sovereignty of GDR and that they were apparently trying force us recognize it in East Berlin prior to negotiations. I pointed out this resulted in extremely serious and dangerous situation.

Gromyko said he agreed with this. I concluded by saying I would inform my govt of his remarks.

My preliminary conclusion is that Soviets consider they have good issue and will be prepared use force.[5]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2761. Secret; Niact. Received at 1:42 p.m. Repeated to London, Bonn, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 192.

[3] Transmitted in telegram 1379 from Moscow, October 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2761)

[4] Telegram 1146 to Moscow, October 26, transmitted various administrative solutions to the problem of identity documents which might be proposed if the Soviet Union reacted “in any way positively” to Thompson's initial proposals. (Ibid., 762.0221/10-2661)

[5] In a subsequent telegram Thompson suggested that, in view of Gromyko's position, the United States had four possible alternatives: 1) use force to ensure entry, 2) tell the Soviet Union there would be no negotiations until the situation was restored, 3) prohibit Americans in civilian clothing from traveling in military vehicles, and 4) agree to show identity cards to the East Germans, but state that this did not imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic. (Telegram 1386 from Moscow, October 27, 7 p.m.; ibid., 762.0221/10-2761)

195. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, October 27, 1961, 8 p.m.

856. Bonn for Ambassador Dowling. From Clay to Rusk. While situation is tense it looks to me as if it could continue this way for a good may days without any significant change as our confrontation today was [with] Soviet tanks manned by Soviet troops. In view of present circumstances, in telephone conversation with the White House,[2] we are to refrain from further probes until Monday reporting back prior to probing and during the same period will send only uniformed Americans into East Berlin. Our troops are on a partial alert although all of us are confident that we are just in a new phase of the war of nerves, and ours are in good shape.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2761. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received at 5:23 p.m. and repeated to Bonn.

[2] At 11:55 a.m. (Washington time) Clay had called the President to discuss the situation at Friedrichstrasse. No record of this telephone conversation has been found, but in an Emergency telegram to Norstad an hour later, Watson stated that Clay had told the President that he would allow no more Americans in civilian clothing to enter East Berlin until he had reported back and that he would make no probes before October 30. (Telegram 97455; Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak, 1961)

196. Editorial Note

Late in the afternoon of October 27, 1961, 10 Soviet tanks advanced up the Friedrichstrasse to take up positions in the Soviet Zone opposite the U.S. tanks behind Checkpoint Charlie. Shortly thereafter General Clay held a press conference at Berlin Command to announce that their appearance clearly indicated who was responsible for harassment of U.S. officials attempting to enter East Berlin. According to Cates (The Ides of August, pages 485-486) President Kennedy called Clay that evening to review the situation; no other record of this conversation has been found. By midnight the number of Soviet tanks had grown to 30, but at 10:30 a.m. (Berlin time), October 28, the Soviet tanks began withdrawing from the checkpoint.

In one account of the crisis, Chairman Khrushchev ordered the Soviet tanks to pull back to save American face (Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, pages 459-460), but Attorney General Kennedy stated that the President asked him to get in touch with Bolshakov for the purpose of using this channel to remove the Soviet tanks. Bolshakov agreed to do this. (Peter Wyden, Wall, page 266) No documentation has been found at the Kennedy Library or the Department of State to support or refute either account.

197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, October 27, 1961, 10:03 p.m.

620. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Berlin for Clay. JCS communicating with Norstad along following lines re Friedrichstrasse situation:[2]

a. Probes to date have accomplished their purpose.

b. Further probes by U.S. personnel wearing civilian clothes and riding in official U.S. vehicles or privately owned vehicles bearing plates of U.S. Armed Forces and using armed guards or military escort will be deferred.

c. U.S. civilian officials will for the time being refrain from going into East Berlin except that one civilian official will attempt daily to enter East Berlin in a privately owned vehicle without armed escort.

d. All U.S. military personnel entering East Berlin will wear uniform.

Publicly we are taking position that armed probes by US personnel at Friedrichstrasse crossing point into East Berlin have now demonstrated a) direct Soviet responsibility for unilateral action taken by Communists and b) our unwillingness recognize East German authorities with respect to US official civilian personnel. For time being nothing further can be done on spot since matter has now moved to highest governmental levels. Instructions have been issued to defer any further civilian probes with armed escorts into East Berlin. Normal flow of uniformed military traffic into East Berlin will of course continue.

FYI. Propose send communication soonest from Secretary to Gromyko raising question serious effect Soviet and GDR unilateral action on whole basis for negotiation.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10-2761. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared in substance by Rusk, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, London, and Paris.

[2] The decisions were transmitted to Norstad in JCS 2026 at 9:25 p.m. on October 27. They had been taken at a meeting at the White House at 5 p.m. attended by the President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Bundy, Kohler, Hillenbrand, Attorney General Kennedy, Nitze, and Lemnitzer. Lemnitzer's 2 pages of notes on this meeting are in the National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Following the meeting at the White House Kohler briefed Grewe, Alphand, and Hood. Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-2761.

198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, October 28, 1961, 5:30 p.m.

1165. Eyes only for Ambassadors—Paris for Finletter and Stoessel—eyes only. You should request appointment with Gromyko at earliest possible opportunity. At meeting you should convey orally personal message to him from me along lines indicated below, at conclusion handing him Aide-Mémoire (text in separate telegram)[2] which designed for publication in event Soviets release text memorandum handed to you by Gromyko on October 27.

1. It is a source of surprise and chagrin to me that recent developments in Berlin at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point between West Berlin and East Berlin have created highly dangerous situation.

2. I find it incomprehensible in light of our talks with him in the US that Soviet Government has permitted unilateral actions to be taken upsetting 16 years of practice followed by civilian officials of the US Occupation in Berlin in entering East Berlin.

3. I find it impossible to reconcile what has happened in Berlin with his statement to the Moscow Party Congress on October 25[3] in which he expressed hope for improvement of relations with Western Powers, particularly US, and that those relations would return to basis of Roosevelt period.

4. It appears to me that this action must have been designed to create maximum difficulties for US in our expressed hope that exploratory talks could lead to a basis for a peaceful solution to the Berlin question.

5. Not only does such unilateral action make continuance of fruitful talks between us difficult but it seems designed to embarrass the US for having adopted public responsibility in the thought that talks could be fruitful in the first place.

6. Foreign Minister Gromyko will recall that, in our talks, we agreed both sides should do all they could to refrain from unilateral action changing existing procedures which would exacerbate an already serious situation. Yet actions by police authorities of the East German regime changing procedures which have existed for many years were permitted to take place without any prior discussion with us on your part.

7. It should have been clear from our talks that we could not accept any extension of activities by GDR officials except to extent worked out in agreement between us. The attempt at this time to make Berlin sector boundary a definitive frontier is something I cannot understand, particularly since Gromyko must appreciate the sensitivity of boundary question.

8. Before situation which is already serious becomes more grave I would hope you and your Government would consider effects which unilateral action taken by representatives of the East German regime must have, if permitted to continue, on relations between our two countries.

9. In order to provide for a cooling-off period the US Government has instructed that any further entry into East Berlin by Allied official civilians accompanied by military escort be deferred. I would hope that during this period representatives of the Soviet Union and the US would be able to work out some agreed procedure which would permit resumption of normal movement into East Berlin.

10. Mr. Gromyko must surely understand that serious discussions about Germany and Berlin cannot take place under conditions of duress and increased tension. It is obvious that unless a satisfactory solution to this immediate problem can be found it would make impossible profitable discussion of those broader questions to which we should be addressing ourselves.

If Gromyko response is any way positive you should in your discretion make points in numbered paragraphs one and two and in immediately following paragraph of Deptel 1146 to Moscow.[4]

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared in draft by Rusk, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 1166, October 28. (Ibid.)

[3] For text of Gromyko's speech, see Pravda, October 26, 1961.

[4] Paragraph 1 of telegram 1146, October 26, stated that Americans in civilian dress would show identity documents if the Soviets reopened all 12 access points; paragraph 2 stated they would show them if the Soviets opened entry points between the Soviet Zone and each of the three Western sectors. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2661)

199. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to Secretary of Defense McNamara[1]

Paris, October 28, 1961, 4 p.m.

PRS 2741. 1. Having seen Berlin message 855, Bonn 1021, Moscow 1386, and having talked with Dowling on the phone, I wish to express my views on the serious situation now existing in Berlin.[2]

2. We are in a position from which we can move forward, backward, perhaps sideways, but we cannot stand still. In order that the actions we may be required to take over the next few days may lead to something other than an inevitable clash of arms, we must have a clear decision now. I suggest the following course of action be considered.

A. That we exploit to the maximum by every possible propaganda means, and get our Allies to do the same, the note struck yesterday afternoon to the effect that the responsibility of the Russians in East Germany and East Berlin, and the sovereignty in fact in that area, have now been clearly established by the presence of Soviet tanks and troops near the Friedrichstrasse check point.

B. That we restrict Russian entrance and exit to and from West Berlin to one gate, preferably other than Friedrichstrasse. Since the Soviets have done this to us, they must put up with a little pushing around on this point from us.

C. That the rules governing Soviet entrance into the Western sectors and the entrance of tripartite personnel into the Soviet Sector be placed on a completely reciprocal basis, emphasizing the fact that the Soviet personnel will show identification to West Berlin police where identification is required under the reciprocal arrangements. This is substantially the proposal made by Thompson in 1386 to the Dept of State. In this connection, we should emphasize the fact that we will show identification to the police at the check point, since the presence of Russian forces has established the fact that whether the police are German or Russian, they are still symbols of Russian authority.

D. That the President, thru Dowling, demand that German personalities who will play important roles in the new government accept and support this position. If in Dowling's judgment I could be of help, I will of course respond to any request from him. I am confident, further, that Stikker, who carries great weight with the Germans, would be pleased to assist if called upon.

E. That agreement to support the above be obtained from the British and the French. If the French procrastinate, move ahead without agreement from them.

3. Unless accomplished speedily, the proposals made in this message would run the risk of being a step backward. I think therefore that we have no more than 24 hours in which to take action.

4. I know that the suggestion I have made herein is at best a step sideways. I firmly believe, however, it is the course of wisdom.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Lemnitzer and repeated to Rusk and Dowling.

[2] Regarding telegram 1386, see footnote 4, Document 194. In telegram 1021, October 21, Dowling commented on the proposals made in telegram 1386 and suggested that Soviet access to West Berlin be restricted to those individuals involved in quadripartite activities. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-2761) Telegram 855, also October 27, transmitted the substance of a U.S. paper on countermeasures, which had been submitted to a Western Political Advisers' meeting on that day. (Ibid., 862.181/10-2761) A transcript of Norstad's telephone conversation with Dowling on October 28 is in the Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Subject File, Dowling)

200. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State[1]

Paris, October 30, 1961, 5 p.m.

2326. Eyes only for President and Secretary. Upon returning to my office this morning, after my trip to the United States, I asked for an appointment to see General de Gaulle and was given one for 3:30 this afternoon. I called at that time. I told him that President Kennedy was deeply disturbed about the attitude of France in the current discussions about the Berlin situation and he asked me to transmit his views to General de Gaulle.

The reaction of the United States, and of the people of the United States, to cancellation of London meeting, and to general trend of Berlin situation, is one of disappointment and disillusionment.

To begin with, in a democracy such as ours it is important that we show our people that we have offered to discuss any differences of view with another nation before entering into a shooting war. It is important that we do this because we are calling upon our people to make many sacrifices now and war will demand many more of them. In United States we are taking extraordinary measures to prepare country for whatever may come of Berlin situation. Thousands of members of reserves have been called to active duty as well as numerous units of both reserves and our National Guard. This, of course, has had wide-spread impact throughout entire US. We are doing this at a time when we are quite concerned about our present export-import dollar imbalance and it is very costly undertaking for us. We are adding more strength to military forces of NATO than all of our NATO Allies together. We believe this is necessary since we believe we must arm to parley. Our role is a difficult one and one which our people must have made clear to them and one which must have their support. With these reasons therefore, the refusal of France to participate in London conference, and widespread comment in press implying a lack of firmness in US position, is very harmful not only to US position at home but to overall position of Western Powers. We believe in US that we are doing all that we should do in order to deal from a position of strength and we sense a reluctance on part of our Allies to do anywhere near as well. This is disappointing to American people who anticipate greater support in these critical times.

I paused at some length after making foregoing statement and there was no response from General de Gaulle other than acknowledgment that he had understood it. I charged into the brief but pregnant silence that followed saying that while I was aware of fact that he might not want to make a response, I nevertheless wanted to be sure he understood what I had said. He nodded assent.

I then told General de Gaulle that the President was aware of his meeting next month with Prime Minister Macmillan and that the head of the German Government would be visiting Washington in the near future. I told him that the President believes that it would be well for the heads of the four nations to meet after these individual meetings, probably in early December. He believes Bermuda might be most suitable, all things considered, and would hope that it would be a working meeting. He believes that such a meeting should be held for purpose of exchanging views on situation now existing in Berlin in order that this exchange of views might strengthen overall Western position. However, if after such a meeting we were unable to continue on a common course together, and this became a matter of public knowledge such as occurred at time of London meeting cancellation, then it would be best not to have meeting. President believes that it is of utmost importance we work together and present strong united front and that any division which exists among us only serves to weaken our position in Soviet view, despite individual or collective strength we may have.

This concluded what I had to say to General de Gaulle and he then merely commented, “Thank you, Mr. Ambassador for this information, and through you I would like to thank your President. I have taken notes on it and will consider it.”

I should add that this report is an exact statement of what was presented to General de Gaulle since it was based upon a paper prepared before the meeting with him.[2]

Gavin

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-3061. Secret.

[2] In his next telegram Gavin reported that, other than being unresponsive, de Gaulle's “attitude was friendly and warm although perhaps somewhat less upon my departure than when I arrived.” (Telegram 2327, October 30; ibid.)

201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, October 30, 1961, 9:01 p.m.

1238. Exclusive for POLAD, pass eyes only Secretary Rusk.[2] Eyes only for Dowling and Clay from Acting Secretary. Paris eyes only for Stoessel for Norstad. President feels we have achieved favorable result in provoking Soviet intervention in Friedrichstrasse situation. Their clear admission of responsibility provides rationale for proceeding along lines suggested by Norstad's Msg to Secretaries State, Defense, Lemnitzer and Ambassador Dowling which Dept repeating separately to Clay.[3] President therefore feels it would be best solution to move ahead at this time on basis of real reciprocity including limitation of Soviets to one access point. As reported separate telegram,[4] we raised possibility today in Ambassadorial Group. With German qualification re use of West Berlin police, all seemed to feel this would be acceptable and could be supported to public opinion because of reciprocity aspect. They urgently seeking positions their Governments.

Would appreciate receiving your views on urgent basis.[4]

Bowles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-3061. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared in substance by the President and Nitze, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin, Paris, and CINCPAC as Tosec 2.

[2] Secretary Rusk was in Tokyo for a meeting of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.

[3] Document 199.

[4] Telegram 1240 to Bonn, October 30, 10:45 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-3061)

[4] On October 31 Clay replied that reciprocity in showing identity cards would no longer serve a useful purpose. (Telegram 896 from Berlin; ibid.) Dowling supported the plan. (Telegram 1036 from Bonn, October 31; ibid.)

202. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, November 2, 1961, 4 p.m.

920. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. From Clay. Re Deptel 653 Berlin, 1268 Bonn, 2412 London, 2516 Paris, 1192 Moscow, CINCEUR unn.[2]

In my view we have nothing to gain now by having either our military or civilian personnel show identification to East German police at Friedrichstrasse. To do so would imply acceptance of East Berlin being a part of East Germany. Entry into East Berlin is not of sufficient importance to be obtained at this price. Thus, if the demand is made for military personnel to show identification, I would recommend we deny ourselves entry and concurrently close entry to all Soviet personnel except air safety and Spandau personnel if this not already in effect (see ourtel 919 Dept, 812 Bonn).[3] Concurrently, I would recommend that we state publicly we cannot accept this illegal assumption of authority by Vopos which constitutes duress and makes negotiation impossible. We should do nothing else here but remain in defensive posture while Soviet makes whatever move it intends to formally recognize East German Government.

I realize that if this happens and East German police replace Soviet personnel on the Autobahn it is not a cause for war. However, I think it would be far better to await this development than to yield now at Friedrichstrasse.[4]

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-261. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Dated November 1, this telegram reported a discussion with British and French officials about Allied reaction to any East German demand that uniformed military show identification on entering East Berlin. (Ibid., 862.181/11-161)

[3] Telegram 919, November 2, summarized a discussion of the Western Political Advisers on that day in which various countermeasures against Soviet personnel were discussed. (Ibid., 862.181/11-261)

[4] In telegram 1068 from Bonn, November 3, Dowling supported Clay's views and added that since the range of countermeasures in Berlin was limited the United States might consider expelling Soviet and East German trade representatives in proportion to the number of personnel denied entrance to East Berlin. (Ibid., 762.0221/11-361)

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, November 3, 1961, 10:38 p.m.

676. Berlin for Clay. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. For Ambassadors and Norstad. In light of your comments and continuing French and German opposition, President agrees[2] that official civilians in vehicles should continue for time being to refrain from showing identification at Friedrichstrasse crossing. On other hand he does not believe that steps should be taken at this time to implement Para 3 of tripartite recommendations contained Berlin's telegram 855.[3] Apart from fact that quadripartite agreement on this unlikely in light governmental views expressed in Ambassadorial Group discussions here, action proposed does not seem appropriate under current circumstances.

While armed probes of last week were useful in provoking public demonstration of Soviet responsibility, in another sense they simply confirmed Soviet/GDR forces indeed have effective physical control of East Berlin. This is a fact of life which the Western Allies accepted on August 13, and to a considerable degree as long ago as 1948, when the Soviets walked out of the Kommandatura. The identification issue is a particularly weak one, in view of the divergencies of practice with our own pedestrian officials, with the British and with our own contingency planning for ground access. But there are other slices of salami which the Soviets will try to take to establish the wall as a “state frontier” of the GDR. It will be important in dealing with all these not to undertake actions which can only demonstrate impotence, or focus attention on non-vital issues or arouse hopes and expectations which in the end could only be disillusioned. Essential as are a strong posture (and Allied unity) in West Berlin and sustained morale, the big issues can clearly only be solved by coming to grips with the Soviets in a broader context, either by finding a basis for a negotiated modus vivendi, or if this proves impossible, by large-scale preparations for a showdown.

Larger problem has been raised in Moscow and we will of course have to review situation if and when Gromyko gives his reply to most recent Thompson approach.

Bowles

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862A.181/10-2761. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Hillenbrand, cleared by the President, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Tokyo for the Secretary, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] This decision was taken at a meeting at the White House at 9:30 a.m. on November 3. For a further report on this meeting, see Document 204.

[3] Paragraph 3 of telegram 855, October 27, recommended that if Thompson's talks with Gromyko failed to produce satisfactory results, all Soviet and East German vehicles with civilian occupants, except those on quadripartite business, should be denied access to West Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10-2761)

204. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, November 5, 1961.

SUBJECT

Problems of Berlin and Germany in the Last Week

Summary

An inordinate amount of time and energy has been expended by Allied officials in the last week in trying to reach some kind of mutually acceptable arrangements at Friedrichstrasse— the exercise has not been a happy one for Allied unity. Some progress was made at the Ambassadorial Group level in getting ready an outline of Western negotiating positions, but the basis for further immediate probes by our Ambassador at Moscow does not appear to exist as long as the East Berlin access question continues as it is. In the larger sense, General de Gaulle has not changed his position and the new German government has not been formed although this seems likely within a few days. Intimations and evidences of other Soviet and GDR harassments have been seen in BASC, on the autobahn and in the air corridors. To these must be added the Soviet harassment in the name of the German problem of Finland.

Friedrichstrasse

You will have seen the Department's telegram 676 to Berlin of November 3 (Tab A)[2] instructing Berlin not to have official civilians provide identification at the Friedrichstrasse crossing and at the same time not to impose further restrictions on the movement of Soviet civilian officials into West Berlin. The dispatch of this telegram was preceded by a meeting with the President, attended by Mr. Bundy, Mr. Hillenbrand, and myself. We had prepared a draft instruction authorizing the showing of identification by civilian officials and providing the rationale for this action. However, upon consideration, the President felt that, in the absence of French and German concurrence, and given the strong recommendations of General Clay (since supported by Ambassador Dowling), we should continue to impose self-denial upon American official civilians.

We will, of course, want to review the situation when the Soviets have further responded to Ambassador Thompson's meeting with Kuznetsov,[3] as indicated in the telegram. Meanwhile, we are giving urgent thought quadripartitely as to how best to deal with the probable next attempt to slice the salami—GDR demands upon our military to produce identification. It would be only fair to point out that, given the British intention to revert back to authorizing their military to produce identification upon demand, we would again be faced with the fact of differing Allied practices. The President was prepared to accept this in the case of civilian officials. He did indicate, however, that he thought our military should be authorized to produce identification from the outset. He believed that this might be carried off despite the inconsistency of doing this in the face of refusal to permit civilians to identify themselves. I believe this inconsistency to be a matter which would not be obliterated by the mere passage of a few weeks, and it therefore seems likely that our eventual recommendation on military access to East Berlin would have to be consistent with the procedures applied to civilian officials.

Other Harassments

In the BASC we have received a protest from the Soviet controller against local Allied flights over the East Sector in the Berlin Flight Zone.[4] This protest was aimed at helicopter flights on the grounds that such planes are not included in the term “aircraft” whose flights would be authorized. We believe the protest was triggered by the hovering of US helicopters over the Soviet tanks at Friedrichstrasse, although the flights to Steinstucken (approximately twice a week) may have also been in the Soviets' minds. We have rejected the protest.

In East Berlin US military patrols have been harassed by Vopos and we are protesting this to the Soviets. We propose to retaliate against Soviet patrols in our sector and, possibly to institute tripartite patrols of East Berlin to prevent the Soviets from splitting the Allies on this issue (the British and French have not been so harassed as yet).

On the autobahn, our assistance vehicles have been refused passage by the Soviets. Other US military cars have been stopped on suspicion of being assistance vehicles. Although regular military formations have moved in and out of Berlin along the autobahn without incident, we are protesting the stopping of the assistance cars on the grounds that the Soviets can not pick and choose which military vehicle uses the road.

Western Negotiating Positions

There have been some impediments to a true marriage of the German Ambassador's paper and the paper on Western substantive positions which had been previously developed in the Ambassadorial Group. These impediments are now being worked on in a sub-group. The melded paper, which does not as yet reflect the discussion of November 3 in the Ambassadorial Group, is Tab B.[5] One point on which we continue to have difficulty with the Germans is the matter of contacts between the Federal Republic and the GDR. It may be that Grewe's instructions are not current, but he has thus far seemed less than realistic in facing up to the necessity for making practical arrangements with someone from the other side.

Ambassador Thompson has expressed doubts concerning the wisdom of continuing the Moscow probe of the Soviet position on the Berlin and German questions. (Tab C)[6]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-561. Secret. Initialed by Kohler. Prepared to brief Secretary Rusk on his return from Japan and Korea.

[2] Document 203.

[3] In telegram 1398, October 29, Thompson reported his unproductive discussion of Berlin with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetzov, who had shown no interest in the West's proposals. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables)

[4] The protest was transmitted in telegram 921 from Berlin, November 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/11-261)

[5] Not printed.

[6] A copy of telegram 1424, November 2, which was not attached to the source text, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-261.

November-December 1961: Discussions Among the Four Western Allies on Negotiations With the Soviet Union

205. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, November 9, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-961. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was attached to a letter from Stoessel to Kohler, November 9, which states that it is an account based on what Norstad told Stoessel about his conversation with the President on November 7. According to a shorter account of the meeting, drafted by Taylor, only Norstad, Taylor, McNamara, and the President attended the meeting. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 37, 109 Norstad) Attached to Taylor's account are brief summaries of meetings that Norstad attended at the Pentagon on November 6 and 7.

206. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 7, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret. Drafted by Sweeney, initialed by Kohler, and approved in B and S on November 21.

207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 8, 1961, 11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

208. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 8, 1961, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow.

209. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, November 9, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. The letter was delivered to Salinger at the White House at 12:15 p.m. on November 11 by Georgi Bolshakov, editor of USSR magazine. (Memorandum for the President, November 11; ibid.)

210. Editorial Note

211. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 9, 1961, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-961. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

212. Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)

Washington, November 11, 1961.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 510 Partition of Berlin. Secret.

213. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, November 13, 1961, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1361. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; No Distribution.

214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, November 20, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but another copy shows that it was drafted by Day on November 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2061) The November 8 memorandum is not printed. (Ibid., 762.00/11-861) Norstad made this suggestion at a meeting with the President on November 7; see numbered paragraph 6, Document 205.

215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 20, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

216. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 20, 1961, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on November 27. In an unedited draft of the memorandum, the President and the Chancellor initially discussed leading political figures in each country. These 3 pages were not included in the source text. (Ibid.)

217. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 21, 1961, 9 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2161. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on November 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.

218. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 21, 1961, 11 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and Lejins and approved in S on November 26 and in the White House on November 29. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Prior to this conversation with the President, Adenauer talked with Dean Acheson. A 2-page report on their meeting is ibid.

219. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 21, 1961, 11:30 a.m.-1 p.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on November 27. The meeting was held in the President's office at the White House. An unedited draft of this memorandum contains paragraphs on John J. McCloy and nuclear testing. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994)

220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, November 22, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

221. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 22, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on December 1.

222. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan

Washington, November 22, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret.

223. Editorial Note

224. Letter From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk

Moscow, November 27, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

225. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, November 28, 1961, 6:34 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Rusk and Bundy, and approved by Kohler.

226. National Security Action Memorandum No. 117

Washington, November 29, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs. Top Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara and Taylor.

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, December 1, 1961, 7:34 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2461. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Kohler and the White House.

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, December 1, 1961, 8:21 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-161. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Kohler.

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, December 2, 1961, noon.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.

230. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, December 2, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking.

231. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy

Washington, December 7, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAM 117. Secret.

232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, December 9, 1961, 7:43 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-961. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Klein (SOV) and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn and Berlin.

233. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State

Paris, December 10, 1961, midnight.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1061. Secret; Niact. According to another copy this telegram was drafted by Rusk, who was in Paris attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000)

234. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, December 11, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on December 15. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

235. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, December 11, 1961, 11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/12-1161. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.

236. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, December 12, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on December 15. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

237. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, December 12, 1961, 2:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on December 13. The meeting was held at the U.S. Chancery.

238. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, December 12, 1961, 4:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Percival and approved in S on December 13. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

239. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and President de Gaulle

December 12, 1961.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, France/Security. No classification marking. Drafted by Tyler who interpreted for the President. President Kennedy was in Washington; President de Gaulle was in Paris. According to Bundy's record of this conversation, it took place about 1:15 p.m., following a Rusk-Kennedy conversation in which Rusk explained that only the President could change de Gaulle's position on the statement. (Memorandum for the record; ibid.) For de Gaulle's reaction to the telephone call, see Alphand, L'Etonnement d'etre, p. 366.

240. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, December 13, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. Attached to the source text was a 3-paragraph letter of transmittal from Bohlen to Thompson, which stated that it was a “translation as received from the Russians."

241. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, December 18, 1961, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1861. Secret; Priority.

205. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State[1]

Washington, November 9, 1961.

The following subjects were discussed in a conversation at the White House on November 8 [7] between the President and General Norstad. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor were also present.

1.

The President raised the problem of General Clay. He said everyone was well aware of the nature of the problem and of the difficulties it caused General Norstad. The President asked General Norstad if he thought he had control of his military forces in Berlin. General Norstad answered affirmatively, but commented that he was not sure that he was in control of situations which might develop which could lead up to the use of military force and, in effect, make it impossible to avoid the use of such force.

The President expressed considerable concern about recent newspaper articles and radio reports emanating from Berlin indicating General Clay's dissatisfaction with our Berlin policy. General Norstad thought that the situation with regard to General Clay was quieter than it had been and that the newspaper reports probably were about two weeks behind the times.

The President said he hoped and thought General Clay would not make a dramatic resignation. General Norstad said he certainly would do nothing to provoke such action and thought the situation could be handled. Mr. McNamara commented that he had seen the various exchanges of messages between Clay and Norstad and that he felt General Norstad's restraint under the circumstances had been remarkable.

2.

The President raised the question of US action in the event the Friedrichstrasse gate is closed and the crossing point is removed to another point, perhaps a gate in the British sector. General Norstad said that, since we have accepted restriction to one gate and have felt that maintenance of this one gate fulfilled our right of access, could we reasonably resort to force if this particular gate were closed but we were given another gate instead? Although he did not specifically say that we should not contest with force a transfer from Friedrichstrasse to another crossing point, this was the thrust of his comments. The President appeared to accept this point of view, although he did not say so categorically.

General Norstad went on to say that, as the President was aware, his present instructions called for use of force in the event the Friedrichstrasse gate is sealed off and no other crossing point is offered. He also told the President that he had extended these instructions somewhat and had requested General Watson to be ready to knock down four or five other gates in addition to the Friedrichstrasse gate. The President made no comment but did not indicate any disagreement.

3.

With regard to the question of US personnel showing identification, General Norstad said this whole matter should be clarified and discrepancies which presently exist not only between Allies but in our own practices as regards persons crossing by foot or in vehicles should be studied and harmonized. He deplored the fact that we had not moved faster on the original recommendation from Berlin sometime ago that US personnel in civilian clothes should show identification to the Vopos in the same manner as the British. The time which had been spent in considering this recommendation was over long and eventually we were caught in the disagreeable situation of being on the verge of using force to enforce a practice with which no one was really in sympathy.

The President commented that he had appreciated General Norstad's recommendation regarding a possible compromise solution of the identification problem. Parts of it had been put into effect although it had not proved possible to implement all of it.

General Norstad said that there were a number of steps which the Communists might be expected to take in connection with the sector crossing question and he urged that we should be prepared, not only with a list of what the Communists might do, but with positive proposals on what our reaction might be to such actions.

4.

[7 lines of source text not declassified]

General Norstad mentioned Adenauer's forthcoming visit and said he thought it was important that Strauss be included in the German party. He thought Adenauer's star had faded and that Strauss would be a leading figure, if not the leading figure in the new German administration. He mentioned that Strauss seemed to feel that “some people” in Washington wanted to prevent Strauss from seeing the President.

The President said he knew nothing of this and that he would be glad to see Strauss. He had not heard of Norstad's recommendations that Strauss be included in the Adenauer party and he asked General Taylor to see that the State Department looked into this suggestion on an urgent basis.

The President wondered if it might not be well for General Norstad to come to Washington when Adenauer made his visit. General Norstad thought this would not be advisable since it would cast him in too much of a national role. The President agreed.

The President asked if General Norstad thought the Germans would agree to the plan of action outlined in the enclosure to the President's letter to General Norstad of October 20.[2] General Norstad said he did not think they would agree and that they would want no part of it. They are worried about losing Hamburg in a quick Soviet thrust and they would see this danger implicit in the course of action set forth in the enclosure.

5.

On the subject of the President's letter of October 20, General Norstad said he wished to speak very frankly. With specific reference to the enclosure to the letter, he said that it was replete with clichés and jargon which were probably clear to people in Washington but which were not clear to him. He thought the enclosure was poorly drafted, ambiguous, and contradictory. It needed to be clarified and simplified. In its present form, he could not use the enclosure as a basis for instruction to his planners.

General Norstad said he planned to send a brief letter to the President which would transmit three enclosures.[3] Two of these enclosures would deal with the questions raised by the President in his letter of October 20 on command and control procedures for “selective nuclear attacks” and “limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons”. The third enclosure would be a paper which would set forth the guidance given by General Norstad to his planners to develop courses of action. General Norstad thought that this guidance would be in accord with the spirit of the President's letter of October 20. Also, this guidance would contemplate a plan of action which in General Norstad's firm opinion would be acceptable to the North Atlantic Council. General Norstad thought that the present course of action as set forth in the enclosure to the October 20 letter would not be acceptable.

(Note: General Norstad did not raise with the President his point regarding the propriety of transmitting instructions to SACEUR. However, he discussed this at length with Mr. McNamara earlier in the day and Mr. McNamara said that he understood the problem.)

6.

There was considerable discussion of the course of action set forth in the enclosure to the October 20 letter. At several points, General Norstad noted the dangers of placing undue reliance on the idea of a graduated sequence of steps. He said we should plan for these things, but we cannot plan on them.

The President asked General Norstad what we should do if our access to Berlin is blocked on the autobahn. General Norstad replied that our reaction must be positive, direct, related to Berlin, and probably taken on the autobahn itself.

He would first move in one of the small probes foreseen under Live Oak planning as might seem appropriate under the circumstances. He said it would be important for him in issuing instructions to the commanders of the probe to know what the objective of the effort was to be; i.e., what is its political purpose? Obviously, we do not want the probe to lead directly to world war; we do not wish to force greater military involvement. In General Norstad's opinion, the object of the first probe should be to establish clearly the fact that we are being denied an established right of access by force. If possible, we should so act that this denial is exercised by the other side's use of military force. After the initial probe and clear denial of access, we could then go to the UN for a limited period. We should take care not to get bogged down in the UN, but consideration in the UN could be useful if it would reveal clearly that we had been denied access.

The President commented that the UN wouldn't do anything. Why should we go to the UN? Mr. McNamara said that a delay caused by consideration in the UN would give us time to build up our military reserves in Europe for the next step. General Norstad questioned the latter remark. He asked if it was intended that we wait 30 days or so in order to get one or two additional divisions to Europe. He did not see what difference the addition of such forces would make in the actual situation. General Norstad thought that we should hold in the UN until we reach a critical point on the political curve. Then the next step should be taken. There is need for much political planning as to what steps might be undertaken. The President asked what he had in mind. General Norstad said that, for example, if we were getting nowhere in the UN and the Russians were still encroaching on our rights, the President might issue a public appeal to Khrushchev to meet him in Berlin on a specific day. The President could say that he would be in Berlin at 10 am on a certain day and that if Khrushchev were interested in peace, he would be there to meet him. The President should then go to Berlin.

General Norstad said this was simply one idea which might be considered; doubtless there were many other things which might be done, but all should be studied and plans should be readied to meet a series of successive objectives. The President asked General Taylor to make note of General Norstad's comments and to see that the State Department considers them.

General Norstad referred briefly to mention in the enclosure to the President's letter of economic embargo and naval blockade. He thought these were clearly steps which might be useful as collateral to other reactions; however, he did not feel they should be regarded as separate alternatives in themselves. The President seemed to agree.

The President said it would be very useful to him if General Norstad's reply to the October 20 letter could be received before Adenauer visits Washington November 20. Norstad said that it would be submitted before that date.

7.

The President said he wanted General Norstad to know that he appreciated the latter's attitude about sending more divisions to Europe. The President knew that the easiest thing for Norstad to do would be to request these divisions; however, Norstad saw other factors in the situation and had not done so. The President said he was appreciative of this.

(Note: General Norstad's impression is that the President has not yet taken a firm decision on sending additional divisions to Europe. Prepositioning of equipment for two divisions will go ahead, but the decision to send the men remains to be made.)

8. In closing, the President reminded General Norstad that he had asked him to communicate directly with him on any subject whenever General Norstad thought it would be useful to do so. He again urged General Norstad to do this at any time.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-961. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was attached to a letter from Stoessel to Kohler, November 9, which states that it is an account based on what Norstad told Stoessel about his conversation with the President on November 7. According to a shorter account of the meeting, drafted by Taylor, only Norstad, Taylor, McNamara, and the President attended the meeting. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 37, 109 Norstad) Attached to Taylor's account are brief summaries of meetings that Norstad attended at the Pentagon on November 6 and 7.

[2] Document 185.

[3] In an interim reply on November 2, Norstad had apologized for not being able to answer the President's letter in a more timely fashion and stated that he would be in Washington on November 6 and 7 to report on what had been accomplished up to that time. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/11-261) No other reply has been found.

206. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, November 7, 1961.

[2]

SUBJECT

Berlin: Next Step with the Soviets

PARTICIPANTS

Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador

The Secretary

Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler

Joseph Sweeney—BNA

Sir David Ormsby Gore opened the discussion by pointing out that his Foreign Minister thought it was becoming rather dangerous to wait much longer before continuing the probe with the Soviets. It was dangerous in the British view to wait until the Adenauer visit had been completed. It was doubted whether we should wait on the conclusion of the Friedrichstrasse difficulty. The British did not feel that we should wait until we received a reply from the Soviets.

The Secretary observed that we are not sure we will get one. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we think we might, and in any event they owe us a reply. Mr. Kohler said the President might do a little probing on his own on this aspect at his press conference tomorrow.[3]

Sir David asked whether we wanted a reply. Mr. Kohler explained that with our present stance we just about had to have a reply. Sir David relayed the impression that British Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts had received following a lunch with Sobolev to the effect that the Russians might become impatient. The Secretary asked if this was the case why didn't the Soviets ask some questions of us?

Sir David observed that he understood Ambassador Thompson feels debarred from discussing this matter at the moment. It was his impression that Ambassador Thompson felt he should stick to Friedrichstrasse at the moment and get that out of the way first. Mr. Kohler confirmed that was the way he was instructed. Sir David reported that Lord Home wondered whether perhaps Thompson should not be instructed to go ahead and have talks with the Russians. If this were done Ambassador Roberts could follow up with talks and this would hold the position until at least late November and Adenauer would have been here and we would know the Western position.

The Secretary said it was risky to allow delay but also risky to go too fast until we see the color of the eyes of the French and Germans and have determined the negotiating posture of the West. Sir David suggested that our present stance will look fairly strange to the Russians. We have, as he put it, bounced them off the 31st of December deadline and he wondered what they would think of this delay. The Secretary asked if he did not think the line we took on the Adenauer visit as an obvious reason requiring delay would hold them off. Sir David answered that perhaps this would, but he feared the Soviets might take the line that the Americans always do what Adenauer wants them to do.

Sir David then suggested there was a danger that the Friedrichstrasse problem will prove larger than we had thought. The Secretary pointed out that he had told Gromyko there should be no unilateral action. Furthermore, the Secretary pointed out, the Friedrichstrasse problem with the aspect of civilians and identification-showing so undermines the position the U.S. and the U.K. had taken that this was a source of worry to the allies, and he suggested the Soviet action may have been taken for just that purpose. What better action could the Soviets take with the French and Germans than to say we told you so?

The Secretary asked Sir David if he had heard the Humphrey discussion of Berlin on TV.[4] Sir David said no but he had read the account. The Secretary explained this stand seemed to be growing in our country: namely that we should not be the “fall guy” for people who do not want to get hurt. The Secretary smilingly suggested that perhaps we should not use the expression, “fall guy”, but Sir David could translate that before sending it to London. The Secretary informed Sir David that there was some force in the point he had made and we would take it under consideration and would let him know.

Sir David added that Lord Home was rather nervous because he felt that the real point was not the date of Friedrichstrasse but the date of the probe and he feels that nothing is happening. The Secretary observed that all that has happened during the past two or three weeks does not encourage us to probe too far. Mr. Kohler said that for every Sobolev lunch, and he didn't know how well informed he was, there were many other indications that the Soviets were not exerting pressure. Sir David suggested that their national celebrations on at this time might be a factor in not exerting pressure, but we might expect pressure after these celebrations and he observed that there was a suggestion of pressure in Khrushchev's wind-up statement about “not stringing us along”. The Secretary reiterated that we will take a quick and thorough look and Sir David would hear from us within the next day or so.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret. Drafted by Sweeney, initialed by Kohler, and approved in B and S on November 21.

[2] Although the source text is dated November 8, the reference to the President's press conference in the second paragraph indicates that the conversation took place on November 7. On November 6 Lord Hood had held a similar conversation with Kohler. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 762.00/11-661.

[3] For a transcript of the President's press conference on November 8, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 701-709.

[4] For a summary of Senator Humphrey's remarks on November 6, see The New York Times, November 7, 1961.

207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, November 8, 1961, 11 a.m.

1469. Eyes only Ambassadors. At Kremlin reception last night just before concert began Gromyko told me rather casually that he did not plan to reply to Secretary's message on Berlin situation. He said situation in Berlin seemed to have calmed down and he had already made Soviet Govt's position clear in his earlier conversation with me[2] and therefore thought matter could be considered as stand-off. I said I was astonished at this and pointed out that reason situation in Berlin was quiet was that we had stopped our civilians from going into East Berlin in order to allow period of calm in order to resolve problem. Gromyko then said our military had behaved very badly and that it had been extremely dangerous and provocative action for us to have brought up tanks and to have sent armed men into East Berlin. I pointed out that it was East Germans who had initiated affair and we could not be expected to let our position be eroded in this way. As concert began at this moment I concluded by saying I would inform Secretary of his statement.[3]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] See Document 194.

[3] In telegram 978 Lightner commented that Gromyko's casual “brushoff” of the U.S. approach was intolerable. He suggested that the United States should demand a reply, and if no satisfactory reply was received, bar Soviet civilians from access into West Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-961)

208. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, November 8, 1961, 3 p.m.

969. Re Moscow's 1442 Dept, 217 Bonn, 165 Berlin.[2] State frontier of GDR was extended thru city Berlin Aug 13 and has been gradually consolidated in intervening time. Finishing touches, which may end in affecting entrance Allied military to East Berlin and in requiring visas for civilians, are now being put on frontier.

Wall and extension GDR frontier control into Berlin has created major change in status quo and is especially serious because it was done unilaterally by GDR. Occupying powers cannot hide fact GDR with Sov backing has confronted them with direct challenge.

Allies not prepared go the limit on this issue but we have been trying to prevent further unilateral changes prior to commencement of negotiations by showing resolute determination to resist such changes.

None of short term lines of action that have recently been discussed as way to meet challenge is really designed to solve anything. At present we are trying to decide which course has fewer disadvantages: reciprocal showing of documents under pressure or self denial of entry East Berlin.

Acquiescence in unilateral changes will only encourage Sovs/GDR to make further unilateral changes. Denying ourselves entry seems preferable to us as it means we maintain our principle (even if we can't enforce it), and we do not accept precedent of Vopo control within Berlin that could embarrass us if applied on Autobahn. Also, we maintain element of uncertainty re our reaction to introduction Vopo controls on Autobahn; this in turn may put Sovs/GDR on notice that even though we cannot effectively resist salami tactics in East Berlin, we will resist them where our vital interests are concerned. Furthermore, if accompanied by certain reprisals, this course of self denial would be less damaging to Berlin morale than would be our acquiescence in showing documents. Initial reaction to our introduction of Western controls over CD/CC vehicles showed great sensitivity of Berliners to even hint that we might be contemplating submitting to Vopo controls.

We realize disadvantage this policy self denial has in implying further sealing division of city but as Dept aware we believe time has come to face squarely the anomalies of continued adherence to 4-power status which with every passing day has less and less relation to reality. We urge most careful consideration be given to Amb Thompson's suggestion (Moscow's 1388 Dept, 502 Bonn, 155 Berlin)[3] as the “only adequate answer” to Sov/GDR challenge. General Clay and Mission have also pointed out (Berlin's 250, 454 and 787)[4] that closer legal ties between West Berlin and FedRep would be logical answer to incorporation East Berlin into GDR.

Aside from problem of selling idea to Allies, main consideration really is whether it serves our interests now to alter quadripartite basis our policy. This is complicated problem we realize, but there are strong arguments for such new status. We have long felt legal side our Berlin rights less important than fact of our presence here and determination to maintain freedom of 2.2 million Berliners. Negative aspects outlined Dept's 585[5] Berlin replying to General Clay's message are very real but we believe outweighed by arguments in favor. Overriding reason is great need to do something to restore our bargaining position and in light of tactics of other side we see advantage in doing this as fait accompli rather than as something to be negotiated. Believe occupation could continue through some form of occupation statute which would safeguard basis of Allied rights. Continuing adherence to goal of ultimate reunification could preserve long term goal of one Germany.

We believe this matter might profitably be explored in informal way with high-ranking members new German Govt. If there is any possibility of pursuing this idea, suggest every effort be made to keep it quiet in order to face other side with fait accompli. Early announcement of intention to withdraw Allied reservation to Berlin's incorporation into FedRep would provoke outcry and all sorts of arguments against it—not only from Communists—and net result would be confusion compounded.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow.

[2] Telegram 1442 from Moscow, November 3, stated that it was better to have a showdown on Berlin over the issue of access to West Berlin from West Germany than over the question of circulation within greater Berlin. (Ibid., 762.00/11-361)

[3] Telegram 1388 from Moscow, October 28, suggested that if the Soviets persisted in treating the sector border as the East German frontier, the West should consider itself free to remove the restrictions on West Berlin's political relations with West Germany. (Ibid., 762.00/10-2861)

[4] Dated August 18, September 9, and October 28, respectively. (Ibid., 762.00/8-1861, 762.00/9-861, and 762.00/10-2861)

[5] Dated October 24. (Ibid., 762.00/10-2061)

209. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy[1]

Moscow, November 9, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have read your letter of October 16[2] with great attention. It is good that you had an opportunity to write it in a quiet atmosphere, in your family circle, far from the turmoil of the capital. I received your letter on the very eve of the opening of the 22nd Congress of our Party, at a time when Moscow, and in fact all our country—was living an especially elated and exciting life.

You have had probably an opportunity to get acquainted with the published reports on the proceedings of the Congress and you can imagine how much energy, time and attention on my part and on the part of my colleagues that work required. The Congress has adopted a program of material and spiritual development of the Soviet peoples' life—a program unprecedented in its scale.

However joyful it was to work out concrete plans for building communism in our country we could not but think of today since it is vitally important for us that these plans are carried out in the conditions of peace. That is why so much attention was given at the Congress to international problems and, first of all, to the security of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social and political systems which has now been included as a corner stone in the program of our Party. Our present struggle against the consequences of the cult of personality, is, if you wish, at the same time a struggle for a consistent realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

However I am not going to dwell especially on the importance of our Party's Congress. We may, of course, have a different point of view on this matter. It would seem to be more difficult for us to come to a common view on this point than on the German problem.

Now the Congress is over and my friends and I believe that it was quite a success. Now I am able to reply to your letter and express my views on the points you raised in it.

You ask what advantages the West would get if it agrees to the changes resulting from the solution of the German problem. In your letter you even gave a comparison asserting that the Soviet Union wants to trade an apple for an orchard. I do not intend to argue that—such a comparison might be good by its picturesqueness, but in this case, I think, it is absolutely out of place.

What is the orchard which we are allegedly seeking, what is meant by that and what is the apple which, as you say, we are suggesting to trade? Let us consider it.

Let us look first at the proposals of the Soviet Union. The proposals, as you know, are—to conclude a German peace treaty and on this basis to transform West Berlin into a free city. Does the realization of these proposals require any concessions on the part of the Western powers? No, and, once again, no. The Soviet draft peace treaty is based only on the necessity to consolidate and legalize the situation created as a result of the war, to consolidate and legalize the German borders. Have another look at this draft and you will see that we suggest to consolidate by this treaty what had already been sanctified by the signatures which the leaders of our states put in their time under the Potsdam agreement. We demand no changes in these agreements.

This means that nobody gives anything and nobody takes anything from anyone, and that the only point is to fulfill the obligations which the four powers solemnly took upon themselves in Yalta and Potsdam.

Now, what is the position of the Western powers. If there is anyone who wants to get the whole orchard giving nothing in return—that is you and your allies. Let me show this with the facts.

It was stated in the Potsdam agreements that Germany should not be armed, that an end should be put forever to German militarism and revanchism. In spite of that the United States, Britain and France have made West Germany their ally, are arming it—and arming it rather intensively.

One cannot find a single line in the allied agreements which would allow to regard West Berlin and West Germany as one entity. In reality the Western powers as early as in 1948 introduced in West Berlin the West German mark and even made attempts to spread the FRG laws on this city. Together with the FRG the Western powers are now actively using West Berlin against the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries.

These facts alone show that the Western powers in their present demands are stepping aside from the allied agreements and are seeking for themselves such advantages which would have been unthinkable 16 years ago. But the list of such facts does not end at this.

In 1945 the four powers pledged to do their utmost in order that Germany would never be able to threaten its neighbours and the world peace. But now West Germany with your assistance has acquired such strength that it is openly encroaching on the territory of neighbouring countries and starting to grasp its NATO allies by arms and feet.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the FRG hinders also the US Government in the free conduct of the policy which the latter believes to be reasonable and which corresponds to the interests of your country as well as other countries. You and I have agreed to establish and maintain contacts in order to search jointly for mutually acceptable solutions to the German problem. But actually that has not been accomplished yet. And we understand quite clearly that it is first of all Adenauer who resists it, being zealously supported by French President de Gaulle.

It seems to me, that de Gaulle's position is rather accurately described by an allegory which is well known among our people. Once a peasant, so the story goes, boasted that he would go to the forest and catch a bear; he was warned that it was a dangerous undertaking, that bear is a strong beast. Never mind, I'll handle him—said the peasant, and went to the forest. Some time has passed but the peasant still has not come back. The people started looking for him. Where are you?—they cried. The peasant cried back: I am here, I have caught a bear.

—Well, bring him here.

—He won't go.

—Come here yourself.

—But he won't let me go.

More or less the same has happened to France. de Gaulle embraced Adenauer to lean on West Germany and to increase with its help the weight of France in European affairs and, may be, even to try to conduct the events in the whole world. It is an open secret that de Gaulle considers himself to be the most qualified person to determine the political destiny of Europe and not only Europe. Actually it has turned out that West Germany has so squeezed de Gaulle in her arms that he is not able any longer to escape from the embrace. In fact France has been forced to follow in the wake of the policy which is being carried on by Chancellor Adenauer.

That is why de Gaulle is saying now not the things which are helpful for ensuring peace and, consequently, helpful for France and other nations, but whatever pleases Chancellor Adenauer.

There seems to be no need to go back to the question of how and why it has happened that the Potsdam agreements remained to a considerable degree unfulfilled and what effect this fact had on the situation in Germany and in Europe as a whole. This has been stated more than once before. And life itself demands that we should look forward, not backward. It is important now to single out what brings us closer, what will help us to restore the spirit of cooperation and goodwill which was characteristic of the relations between the USSR and the USA during the hard years of war. In our opinion this can be easier and better achieved by a mutually agreed solution of the problem of a German peace treaty. The Western powers not only would not have to sacrifice in any way their interests, they would gain and, indeed, not less than the other states.

To use your comparison, it can be said that by the conclusion of a German peace treaty we would have planted an orchard the fruits of which would be enjoyed by all the states, all the peoples.

It is true that we have to settle this problem in a rather unusual way. At the time when the Potsdam agreement was being signed nobody could have foreseen that two independent states, with different ways of life, would emerge on the territory of Germany. However, it has happened. What can we do? Should we use force so that Germany will again become united? But nobody seems to be anxious to fight for this. President de Gaulle told us frankly that France was not interested in reunification of Germany. And one can understand his position since he fears and, evidently, not without a reason, that a united Germany—if one has in mind the basis for its unification which is advocated by Adenauer—would be a militarist state with all its widely known distinctive habits.

The world public opinion has obviously no sympathy with the idea of reunification of Germany. Such opinion prevails in France, Britain, in wide enough circles of the USA and even in West Germany itself.

The situation existing in Germany is recognized everywhere in the West, but many persons prefer to keep silent. They do so, naturally, not because of a desire to help the reunification of Germany, but because of dislike for the way of life established in the German Democratic Republic. They do not like, of course, the social and political system not only in the G.D.R., but in other socialist countries as well, including, naturally, the Soviet Union. However just as we are not free to establish our systems in capitalist countries, the Western powers have no right to impose one or another way of development on the socialist countries.

I fully agree with you that it would be useless to argue about the advantages of our social systems. We will not find a common language here. That is why the Soviet Government proceeds from the necessity of recognition of what exists in reality; two German states and two systems in the world—capitalist and socialist. Any other approach would inevitably lead us to collision, to war.

We have got an impression that you also want to achieve a mutually acceptable solution of the German problem which would not lead to the deepening of the differences and, eventually, to collision between our countries.

In my opinion we have already passed the stage of sounding out each other's positions. We should now start solving problems, otherwise contacts and negotiations will lead to nothing but marking time.

When I sent you my latest letter[3] I hoped that we would use this line of communication for concrete discussion of still unsettled issues and, first of all, of the German peace treaty as the most complex and urgent one. If both of us departed from concrete discussion and confine ourselves to repeating generalities our confidential correspondence could have been substantially depreciated.

In my recent letter I tried to set forth in detail our position on concrete questions and, I will not conceal, I expected you to do the same. There were, it seemed to me, some grounds for that in the light of the discussions which our Foreign Minister had had in New York and in Washington with you, Mr. President, and with the US Secretary of State. We understand, of course, that you needed some time to study and think over all that had been said. That is why, having found no concrete suggestions in your letter, we expected that Ambassador Thompson would state them on your instructions. So far this has not happened, either.

A certain apprehension is caused by an obvious dissonance between realistic notes which we hear while talking with American statesmen on questions of Germany, and conservative, extremely negative comments on these talks, which are published on the pages of influential newspapers in the United States.

I will not go back to a detailed statement of our position, and will dwell only on the main points. When we talked with you in Vienna you said that the question of Germany should be solved in such a way that the prestige of any of our counties was not hurt. I agreed with you then and I agree with you now. Indeed, the Soviet Union and the USA are great powers and the matter of prestige is important to them. We understand it.

But how the interests of the parties can be taken fully into account when the goal is to draw a line under the past war? It is clear—by the conclusion of a peace treaty on an agreed basis. The conclusion of a peace treaty is a natural way of the completion of war which is accepted by both—civilized and uncivilized peoples. Such a treaty makes it possible to juridically secure the cessation of the state of war and, at the same time, to legalize the changes which resulted from the war. It is in complete agreement with considerations of prestige.

The signing of a German peace treaty would help to liquidate the state of “cold war”, to create better conditions for cooperation between our countries, for the development of trade, for the exchange of scientific achievements etc. On the basis of the peace treaty the question of West Berlin will be solved.

It was said that the time, suggested by us, for the conclusion of a peace treaty sounds like an ultimatum and this hurts the prestige of our partners in negotiations. We have, of course, made no ultimatum. But in order to create the best possible conditions for the achievement of an agreed settlement the Soviet Government has decided not to insist that the peace treaty be signed till the end of this year.

We do not dictate any firm terms for the solution of the German question and you probably know it well. The best way, in our opinion, would be the signing of a peace treaty between all countries which fought against Germany and the two German states which have appeared on the ruins of the Hitlerite Reich and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this basis. But it is also possible to sign two peace treaties—with West and East Germany, and the texts of these treaties should not necessarily be identical.

There is also a third possibility which I mentioned to Mr. Spaak—to agree before signing a peace treaty with the GDR by the Soviet Union and other powers on a status of West Berlin and on the indispensable solution of certain important questions of the post-war settlement in Europe.

What could constitute a special agreement on West Berlin which would then be annexed to a peace treaty and thus would acquire the full juridical force? There can be, certainly, only one thing in it—again the status of a free demilitarized city, in other words West Berlin must become independent politically, live in accordance with its internal laws, freely without any external interference, with the most widely developed ties with any state of any continent.

The situation which has developed in that city is absolutely abnormal. You yourself spoke about it as of a heavy heritage. Consequently it is necessary to liquidate this “heritage” lest it—as an abscess—spoil the relations between our countries and cause inflammation on a healthy body.

You do not need West Berlin if, of course, it is not considered as a base for subversive activities against the socialist countries. And even in this capacity it hardly justifies the hopes of those who would like to preserve the vestiges of World War II in the center of Europe and to thoroughly drive a wedge between great powers. Those who think that it is possible to weaken the socialist countries by organizing subversive activities from West Berlin against them are deceiving themselves. West Berlin does not fit for that under present circumstances—it is a rotten basis. The preservation of the situation which exists there can only generate conflicts and cause anxiety in the world.

Recently, through Mr. Robert Kennedy,[4] you yourself let me know of your concern with regard to the situation in Berlin. I must say we were also grieved by the incidents which took place on the border between West and East Berlin during the last ten days of October and caused the tension that nobody wanted.

I would not like to go into polemics with you and, judging by your message, you do not pursue this aim either. I think, however, that the latest incidents could not have taken place if the American military authorities in West Berlin would have shown more desire to act with due regard to the real situation.

I cannot but agree with you that a period of relative moderation and calmness is particularly necessary now. We regard with understanding such a sober approach which will allow to concentrate on the solution of the problems related to the German peace settlement and not to turn away our attention to the settlement of—frankly speaking—secondary questions.

Your letter of October 16 can be understood in such a way that West Berlin is the very orchard which the Soviet Union wants to get for itself. But for us it is not an orchard, rather it is a weed of burr and nettle. We do not want to walk into this weed, we have no business there. We do not need West Berlin. Let West Berlin live and develop in the way its population wants. We are ready to do everything to this end.

If Western powers have no hidden aims with regard to West Berlin, why can we not agree, then, on transforming it into a free city? International character could be given to the status of West Berlin as a free city by registering it at the UN. Such a solution would not be detrimental to any side since it would be based on the recognition of the existing social and political conditions in West Berlin. The balance of power which has developed between the two world systems after the war would not be changed as a result of the transformation of West Berlin into a free city, and the watershed between them would remain in the same place.

We could explain this decision to everybody and any sober-minded person would understand it because he would realize that our countries really want to liquidate the vestiges of World War II and clear the way for peaceful cooperation among all nations.

But what do Western powers suggest to us? There is only one thing behind all their statements about the adherence to the cause of freedom of West Berlin—the desire to preserve the regime of occupation there at any price. They insist that this regime should be preserved even after the signing of a peace treaty. I am not a diplomat and can be completely frank: if it means only to get a confirmation of occupation rights, then it will be difficult to expect not only agreement but even negotiations themselves, since there will be nothing to talk about. You have to understand that the Soviet Union cannot agree to preserve and recognize the regime of occupation in West Berlin, i.e. by its own hands to help Western powers violate after the conclusion of a peace treaty the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, its ally.

In essence, the present position of the Western powers reflects the same selfish line which they followed in signing the peace treaty with Japan. At that time the Western powers considered it possible to neglect the interests of the Soviet Union and to conclude the peace treaty without it. Now they “allow” us condescendingly to sign a peace treaty with the GDR provided, however, that the regime of occupation in West Berlin remains intact. To agree to this would be not only the loss of our prestige but the complete surrender.

We would prefer to conclude a German peace treaty together with the USA and other participants of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. It is our ardent desire. But if our efforts to make the positions of the sides closer do not reach the goal, all the same we will sign a peace treaty and will do it certainly not with the purpose of securing the occupation rights of Western powers.

It would be the greatest fallacy to expect that these rights could be saved by threats, that under the pressure the Soviet Union will eventually agree to play the part of a permanent sentry guarding these rights. Despite all the threats on the part of Western powers the Soviet Union will in no case retreat from its principal position.

Certainly, if Western powers adopt unreasonable decisions, the consequences will be extremely sad. I think that not only myself but you also wish that mankind will never taste such a bitter lot. In any case these consequences, if they were caused, would not be graver for the Soviet Union than for the USA. For the allies of the USA, which are comparatively small countries, they will be especially tragic. Besides the voice of these countries can be heard in fact only until the guns start talking. When it comes to direct collision they will be even deprived of physical ability to influence in any way the course of events, which will take place in case the fatal line is crossed.

Let us throw away arguments of force and rely exclusively on the arguments of reason. The threats are of no use to us, and I agree with you that we should not talk the language of “cold war”. Such language only prevents us from estimating the situation in the world soberly and seeking the solution of questions which are equally disturbing to both of our peoples. Let us solve these questions in such a way that dealing with them today we would know for sure that the relations between our countries will become better tomorrow and still better the day after tomorrow. This is what is expected from us, you and me—the men invested with great trust and great powers—by all peoples who value peace higher than anything else.

You ask me, who would guarantee that the rights and interests of West Berlin will not be violated and propose that reliable international guarantees should be given to the city. You, Mr. President, and your predecessors have repeatedly made such statements and, naturally, you have bound yourself by those statements before the American and West German public opinion as well as before the public opinion of other countries. But we also are not against guarantees. The Soviet Union and the GDR have no secret plans with regard to West Berlin, and therefore we ourselves propose that guarantees—and the most effective ones—should be given to it.

Thus, we seem to agree with you that there should be guarantees for West Berlin. And here again there are two possibilities. I have already told Mr. Spaak and you about that. The Soviet position is known to you and the Secretary of State also from what was said by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. I want to give you a short summary of our point of view: if the USA is interested in our guaranteeing the status of West Berlin together, the Soviet Union is ready to assume such obligation upon itself. But it must be recognized that the Soviet Union will have equal rights and equal responsibility which other powers—guarantors will have.

I have already written to you that the most realistic way out is that of placing some symbolic contingents of troops of four great powers in West Berlin. And if the troops of four powers are stationed there, the Soviet Union, naturally, will bear the responsibility with regard to guarantees equal to that of Western powers. Such measure will be understandable to both—the allies of the USA and the allies of the Soviet Union. It will not hurt the prestige of any power concerned. But if you want to have your troops in West Berlin while there will be no [of] our troops there, that will not be equal terms. You want us to be guarantors on some other terms which are different from those of others, of yours, but this is not realistic.

I know that in the West attempts are being made to interpret our proposal on guarantees as an expression of a desire to penetrate into West Berlin and to gain a foothold there. Believe me, Mr. President, we are not intruding into West Berlin. Why should we have our troops there? I think that your troops too are not needed in West Berlin. They are guarding themselves, and somebody's shadow.

I will not, probably, make a mistake if I say that in the question of keeping troops in West Berlin prestige considerations are the main ones. Since you believe it so important to keep the troops in West Berlin we are prepared to make a concession. It is a definite concession on our part since the occupation rights cease to exist upon signing a peace treaty and discontinuing the state of war. But in order that this concession is not interpreted as a retreat of the USSR under the pressure of the USA—and not under the pressure of reason and expedience—our token troops should be also stationed in West Berlin. What kind of troops, of what size? It is not very important. It might be that the number of our troops will be substantially less but under an agreement the Soviet Union must be in an equal position with the USA. The Soviet Government wishes to take into account the prestige of the USA, but we would like you also, Mr. President, to display an understanding with regard to our prestige. We must mutually spare each other's prestige. For how long should the token troops remain in West Berlin? At present some people are not quite sure as to how a free city would feel and whether its relations with other countries will run smoothly. But if all the fears that are now being expressed allay, if it turns out that there are no grounds, and we are sure that it is so, for concern about the fate of West Berlin? [sic] Really, it would not be quite clear why it is necessary to keep these token troops in the city forever. And so we propose that an agreement on stationing token contingents of troops of the four powers in West Berlin be concluded for a definite period of time.

If our proposal on stationing the token contingents of troops of the four powers in West Berlin is not acceptable and if you believe that it is really necessary for guaranteeing purposes to keep the troops in West Berlin, well, let them be the United Nations troops. Such a solution should not do any damage to you or to us, France and Britain. The UN troops will see to it that the order as defined by the status of the free city is strictly observed. This would seem to be even better than to keep the troops of the four powers in West Berlin.

I repeat: neither the troops of the four powers nor the United Nations troops should perform any occupation functions. The situation has changed and so another regime corresponding to the conditions of peace time is needed.

I know you are concerned with the question of access to West Berlin. Moreover, you, it seems to me, are inclined to consider it as one of the most important and hard to solve questions. I do not know whether I will be able to dispel the uncertainties but I would like to emphasize with all clarity that neither the Soviet Government nor the Government of the GDR intend to impose any restrictions on the ties of West Berlin with the outside world or on the access to that city of these or those states by land, sea and air.

If we propose that the order of maintaining these ties and of using all kinds of communications going through the territory of the sovereign state—the German Democratic Republic—should be the same as accepted everywhere both in the socialist and in the capitalist countries, then, you will agree we do not demand anything special, any limitations or concessions. If some other order is established it would precisely mean creating a special discriminatory regime with regard to the GDR.

Those who cling to the occupation regime in West Berlin would like, evidently, the Soviet Union to assume the responsibilities of a traffic policeman securing continuous and uncontrolled transportation of military goods of the Western powers into West Berlin. Generally speaking no one objects to an access to West Berlin, but naturally, this access should be exercised with the consent of the country through whose territory the communications of West Berlin run. And if the Western powers still want the Soviet Union to perform the functions of a traffic policeman, then, they need it in order not to have simply an access to West Berlin but the access which rests on the occupation regime.

I will permit myself to give an example. At present the USA seems to intend to recognize the Mongolian People's Republic. How, one may ask, an American Ambassador is going to reach this Republic if he does not obtain our or the Chinese People's Republic's consent to go through the Soviet or Chinese territory? Is the USA going in this case also to disregard the generally accepted international norms and threatening with force to demand for itself exclusive privileges?

You will say, of course, look we do not demand it. It is true, the USA does not demand it. But why, then, do you use a different approach with regard to the GDR?

It seems to me that the US Government does not want to sign a peace treaty precisely because it feels its wrongness in the questions of the order of access to West Berlin. It prefers, it seems, to retain for the future such a position: we are not participants of the peace treaty, we have not signed this treaty and therefore we retain with regard to West Berlin all our rights resulting from the surrender of Germany and the establishment of the occupation regime in West Berlin. But it will be clear to the entire world that the Western powers are in the wrong here. The fact alone that 16 years have passed since the war makes groundless all the talks about further maintenance of occupation regime in West Berlin. Whatever turn the events might take, further uncontrolled use of the territory of the GDR will become impossible. And the point here is, naturally, not the observance of appearances but the real respect for the sovereign rights of states.

At the present time most of the passenger traffic and the overwhelming part of commercial freightage between West Berlin and the capitalist countries are carried out on the basis of agreements with the GDR. It does not create any difficulties or interruptions of the ties of West Berlin with the outside world. Therefore it is difficult, frankly speaking, to find reasons which would justify the belief that the situation may change for the worse after a peace treaty is concluded and a free city is created. Rather, everything speaks in favor of the opposite.

In the interests of clarity I would like to point out that in solving the question of access as well as other questions with regard to West Berlin we cannot agree that the FRG be placed in a special privileged position, and we will never agree to it. The Federal Republic of Germany should enjoy no worse and no better conditions than other states.

At present the FRG authorities are openly, without any disguise using West Berlin for subversive activities against the GDR and other socialist countries. It is first of all these illegal and dangerous intrigues that forced the socialist countries to take defensive measures. And it goes without saying that we will object to the continuation of such a hostile activity when the question of normalizing the situation in West Berlin on the basis of conclusion of a German peace treaty is being solved.

Incidentally, sometimes voices are heard—could not East Berlin be separated from the GDR. I would like to note that this kind of talk is simply not serious. The social and political system in the German Democratic Republic and in East Berlin is one and the same. East Berlin is the capital of the GDR, the seat of the government of the Republic. Therefore, when they talk about a separation of the capital of the GDR it is not even a preservation of status quo, but a change, a breaking of the political and social order. No one will allow that the established state organism existing and developing on the same social and political basis be destroyed. And one should think that this unreasonable proposal is being made not in the interests of achieving an agreement.

It seems that some aspects of the access will have to be settled anew. Whatever is said the allies have never concluded any agreements on commercial and civil air transportation into Berlin and out of Berlin. Due to our oversight such a transportation was put into effect arbitrarily. With the conclusion of a peace treaty that will have to be corrected. Airlines interested in maintaining traffic with West Berlin will have to have a permission of the GDR to fly over its territory.

On the other hand, there are difficulties of a technical nature. How is the air traffic with West Berlin going now? To land or to take off from the airfields in West Berlin planes fly over the city. It is dangerous both for the passengers and, especially, for the population over whose houses planes fly to land and take off. And it is not without reason that airfields are located outside city limits in all countries of the world. Such a practice is prescribed by safety reasons. And if the old outdated practice is still in effect in West Berlin this is explained only by specific conditions which developed as a result of the war.

The government of the GDR is prepared to permit planes flying to West Berlin to land and take off on its airfields located nearby which cannot be considered as worsening of the conditions of access to West Berlin. This is not a far-fetched but quite an actual task if one is to bear in mind that the intensity of air traffic will apparently be increasing year in and year out.

If the token troops of the four powers are stationed in West Berlin, then, the USA and other Western powers will probably insist on the right of free access to maintain communications and to supply their contingents. I think that if it meant flights of a small number of planes defined in an agreement of the four powers to satisfy the needs of the token contingents of troops then the GDR government could agree to that. Apparently these troops would retain those airfields which exist now.

It goes without saying that the German Democratic Republic should be given guarantees to the effect that the air traffic will not be used against its interests. An agreement could be reached that the four powers which would have token troops in West Berlin would exercise mutual control on the border over their transportation into and out of the city. The same control on a mutual basis could be established also for all other military transportation including those for the token contingents of the Soviet Union which would be stationed in West Berlin as guarantors. The GDR would, probably, be satisfied with it. Being its ally we would perform in a sense the functions of the government of the German Democratic Republic, seeing to it that the communications with West Berlin related to the stationing there of the contingents of troops of the four powers should not be used in a way harmful to it.

Such a procedure, as I see it, could not do moral damage to any of the parties concerned.

I am setting forth these considerations in a preliminary strictly confidential order and I hope that they will be met with understanding on your part.

Dear Mr. President, I am writing not to argue with you or to try to play better the next fall-back position as diplomats call it. I have stated to you the first, second and third possibilities. To any of them which you would consider suitable, we are ready to agree. If you have something else to propose—also on the basis of a peaceful settlement—we would willingly exchange opinions with you. But if you insist on the preservation of inviolability of your occupation rights I do not see any prospect. You have to understand, I have no ground to retreat further, there is a precipice behind.

As an optimist, and they say an incurable one, I hope for the better and believe that eventually the solution can be found or, as you write, reconciliation of our interests is possible. And not only possible, it is necessary, for the alternative is a quarrel between the two most powerful nations.

The letter has come out a bit more extensive than I thought originally. But what can one do—the question is complicated and important. You start writing about one thing but some other thing has to be mentioned too.

I have already consumed much of your time therefore, probably, it would be better if I write you another letter on other questions which you raised in your letter.

I will allow myself to express again the hope that our frank, confidential correspondence will help to overcome difficulties however complicated it might seem now.

Sincerely,

N. Khrushchev[5]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. The letter was delivered to Salinger at the White House at 12:15 p.m. on November 11 by Georgi Bolshakov, editor of USSR magazine. (Memorandum for the President, November 11; ibid.)

[2] Document 179.

[3] Document 162.

[4] Presumably Khrushchev is referring to a conversation that Attorney General Kennedy had with Bolshakov on November 7; its substance was communicated directly to Moscow. (Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, p. 521) No record of a conversation between Robert Kennedy and Khrushchev has been found.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

210. Editorial Note

West German Ambassador Kroll discussed Berlin with Chairman Khrushchev on November 11, 1961. After stressing that he was giving his own ideas on the question, Kroll proposed the following: 1) a four-power agreement on Berlin to provide for freedom, viability, and access to the city and the continued presence of the Allies; 2) an agreement between the Soviet Union and East Germany to respect agreements reached with the Western Allies; 3) an agreement between Berlin and the West as well as with the German Democratic Republic to cover technical matters; 4) an agreement between the four powers to set up committees on disarmament and for negotiating a peace treaty; 5) at the time of a Berlin agreement another understanding would be signed by the interested powers to stop provocative propaganda; and 6) that the arrangements suggested in the first five points would allow a general improvement in Soviet-West German relations.

Khrushchev said he wanted to study these ideas, but in principle could accept them. He told Kroll that economic and financial ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin were acceptable, but not political or administrative. Kroll then stated that the wall would have to come down, and Khrushchev indicated that it had been built on Soviet orders and, if there were a satisfactory agreement on Berlin, it would come down. For the Ambassador's account of this conversation, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pages 524-527. For the German interpreter's account, see Ehlert, Grosse Grusinsche Nr. 17, pages 319 ff.

On the following day Thompson reported that Kroll had briefed him and his British and French counterparts along these lines. (Telegram 1491 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/11-1061) On November 11 Grewe briefed the Ambassadorial Group in Washington, and Thompson was informed that this briefing coincided with that given by Kroll. (Telegram 1260 to Moscow, November 11; ibid.) Grewe also reported that the German Government disapproved the line taken by Kroll and did not identify itself with it. Grewe concluded by saying that he was being recalled to Bonn to discuss Kroll's initiative. For Kroll's account of the discussions at Bonn, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pages 527-535; for Grewe's account, see Ruckblenden, pages 516-518.

211. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, November 9, 1961, 6 p.m.

1485. Position taken by Gromyko (my tel 1469)[2] faces US with extremely serious situation and I find it difficult to suggest what appropriate response should be. Following would appear to be principal alternatives:

1) Simply to maintain situation as it exists at present time, continuing self-denial of civilian entry in military cars, coupled perhaps with stern warning to Soviets that we will not tolerate any further encroachments upon our rights in Berlin. This might be effective in preventing further steps by East Germans such as demanding identification military personnel but would of course involve considerable loss of face for US.

2) Some retaliatory action in Berlin such as barring Soviets from West Berlin coupled with refusal to continue preparations for negotiations on broader question. In my opinion this course of action could lead to even more serious difficulties. We would presumably gain French support but would probably lose British. British Amb tells me his govt and particularly Macmillan are already restive at current inaction in moving toward negotiations and that Hood has received instructions to press ahead. If we take public stand against continuation preparations for negotiations I suspect likely result would be another Macmillan visit to Moscow and further strain on Alliance. Judging from NAC discussion number of our Allies are likely to support British. I think it can be excluded that Soviets would simply back down in face of such a stand on our part. Once we took military moves such as calling alerts, bringing up tanks, probes into East Berlin, etc, we so engaged Sov military prestige that simple reversal of East German police action became out of question. Most we could hope for in my opinion from such stand would be Sov willingness to discuss situation and possibly agree on some compromise settlement but I think this unlikely. A more likely reaction would be for Soviets to proceed with their separate treaty and we would have to face supreme test with our Alliance in complete disarray. Before embarking upon such policy would seem important that we know exactly where our Allies and particularly West Germans would stand. In any event I do not believe we should continue exploratory talks here until after Adenauer visit to US.

3) We could take some retaliatory action with object of trying to bring Soviets to discuss situation and perhaps arrive at a compromise solution. Probably most extreme action would be steps toward incorporation West Berlin into FedRep discussed in Berlin's 625.[3] Would probably be better to threaten such action than actually carry it out without warning but there are great dangers in such action and it could precipitate real crisis including Sov signature of separate treaty.

4) Secretary could send further message to Gromyko stating that we could not simply accept continuance of present situation. Perhaps we could at same time broaden problem and state that we consider present situation in Berlin to be explosive one and that in order to get on with negotiations we should take steps to diminish tension there. We could suggest that Commandants be instructed to get together to attempt agree on measures to reduce tension. Soviets may of course maintain position that this is question for GDR and will not like emphasis on four power aspect of having Commandants deal with problem. In this case our proposals might have to be put to Gromyko. In present circumstances difficult suggest what proposals we could put forward if Soviets agreed to any such approach. If we should put forward two points mentioned in Deptel 1146[4] we would virtually have lost our right to object to showing documents to Vopos on basis of principle since we would have agreed to exchange willingness do so for unrelated concession. In broader context of reducing tension however suggest opening of additional crossing points might be put forward in connection with agreement for civilians to show documents to Vopos whenever they had reason to believe use of military vehicles was being abused but not to check all vehicles containing civilians. There might be other concessions on both sides although I am not in position to judge what possibilities are. I should think we might suggest reciprocal efforts of East and West Berlin authorities to enable families to be united.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-961. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Document 207.

[3] Dated November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861)

[4] See footnote 3, Document 194.

212. Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)[1]

Washington, November 11, 1961.

SUBJECT

Deptel 1360 to Bonn (attached)[2] on Documentation Within Berlin

1. Department telegram 1360 to Bonn (and other appropriate posts) is attached. The originators of the policy proposed in this message apparently believe that its logic rests on two pillars of support:

a. Our acceptance of the Wall meant de facto recognition of the end of free circulation in Berlin. Access to the Eastern Sector is not a vital interest; we will not shoot our way into East Berlin because, inter alia, it wouldn't win the argument for us even if we did.

b. To practice self-denial is nobler than submitting to VOPO demands that our military personnel in uniform produce identification; besides, it salvages a little of the free circulation principle.

2. I question the logical sequence here. In fact, we may be failing to follow our reasoning through to its logical conclusion. If free circulation has been all but killed by the Soviets/GDR, why do we not administer the coup de grace ourselves by immediately declaring East Berlin “Off Limits” to all official US personnel? This move would have the following major advantages:

a. Assumption of the initiative, instead of holding our saliva until the Soviets/GDR ring the next change of bells.

b. Logical consistency.

c. Preclusion of inflammatory incidents.

d. Avoidance of the humiliation, sure to be recorded in technicolor, of having US uniformed soldiers submit even once to VOPO turnback.

e.

Dignified reservation for the conference table of our legal claim to the right of free circulation.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. In my opinion General Clay would support the above move, although the record is not absolutely clear in so demonstrating. During October he favored armed escorts rather than permitting civilian officials to show identification, and he has several times spoken favorably of “self-denial” as a proud principle (e.g., Berlin 864 and 927).[3] He has, however, said that “if the demand is made for military personnel to show identification, I would recommend that we deny ourselves entry . . . .” (Berlin 920. Underlining supplied.)[4] This latter sentence does not necessarily envision a VOPO-US-military confrontation at the checkpoint, but it is at least ambiguous.

LGL

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 510 Partition of Berlin. Secret.

[2] Dated November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/11-961) Not attached to the source text.

[3] Dated October 28 and November 11, respectively. (Ibid., 762.0221/10-2861 and 762.0221/11-361)

[4] Telegram 920 is printed as Document 202. The underlined text is printed here as italics; the ellipsis is in the source text.

213. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, November 13, 1961, 3 p.m.

994. From Clay for Rusk only. Before coming back,[2] I send herewith my conclusions from this viewpoint.

It is interesting to find even in our own reports that situation here has stabilized since tanks faced each other at Friedrichstrasse, a most unlikely fighting posture, to withdraw to a much more likely fighting posture about three thousand yards apart. The truth is there is no real change in situation here. It is equally interesting to find newspaper speculation that Khrushchev is retreating because he does not object violently to presentations from the West German Ambassador. I suspect no real change here either.

I have thought for some time that he does want to negotiate and he may believe now that he cannot do so on his own terms. He will not go to war over Berlin and if war comes, it will be because he is prepared to use force now if necessary to destroy move toward Western European unity. If this is objective, USSR will continue pressures here as part of its campaign of intimidation and to probe depth of Allied determination. Thus Berlin, while only incidental to Soviet objective, continues to have high symbolic value. More likely, USSR had as its purpose consolidation of Communist power in Eastern Europe which it may consider accomplished now. If so, this is why he is ready, perhaps anxious, to negotiate now.

Unfortunately, I no longer believe it possible within the framework of a united Allied front for us to have a firm, decisive policy governing its actions and relations with the Soviet Government and its representatives here.

It is clear to me that if a crisis does develop here short of direct military attack, we will have to move unilaterally to save West Berlin although I would expect many of our Allies to follow us even though they would not agree in advance. I have complete respect for the President's pledge to use force to prevent closure of highway open to Allied forces and to prevent interference to air traffic. It will not be this simple. Slowly, but surely, other highways, railways and waterways will cease to be available to serve this great industrial center. A single highway may keep the city alive but not healthy and its economy will die. No single action to this end will seem to warrant the risk of war and our Allies will so insist. Each action will lower the confidence of West Berlin which will rapidly wither on the vine. If and when this happens there will be consternation in Western Europe. Hence, any agreement must clearly define and guarantee the free access to West Berlin essential to its life as a great city.

Western Europe must know that USSR can destroy its cities and towns and much of its population. It has no power of its own to resist. It believes America will use its strength in retaliation which will be too late. Thus, many if not most have reached the stage where they are unwilling to make any real stand.

Thus, save France and FRG, they urge negotiations on which they will also urge almost any concession to avoid war. Pressed by our Allies, we continue to push for united Allied agreement to negotiate even under duress and before we have an agreed Allied negotiating position. Under the alternatives I have seen, we demand nothing we do not now have although we are trying to set a limit as to what we would give up.

In any event, to pursue negotiations before we have established an Allied position which we can accept seems most risky. Moreover, we must not let our own position become so weakened in obtaining Allied unity as to be ineffective. If this happens, it would be better to avoid negotiations or to negotiate unilaterally with such support as we can develop among our Allies.

Today, we have the nuclear strength to assure victory at awful cost. It no longer suffices to consider our strength as a deterrent only and to plan to use it only in retaliation. No ground probes on the highway which would use force should or could be undertaken unless we are prepared instantly to follow them with a nuclear strike. It is certain that within two or more years retaliatory power will be useless as whoever strikes first will strike last.

Meanwhile, seeking Allied unity obtainable at the lowest common denominator is actually moving us rapidly back on the road to Fortress America which, if it happens, would be at an even more awful cost.

Again, I do not believe USSR wants or is willing to risk war now although we cannot exclude the possibility that it has chosen this time for a test of strength. I think, rather, they can be stopped now before it is too late if we are ready for the challenge of wills which today we have the strength to support.

I realize full well that the answers to our problem are not just black or white. Perhaps there is a gray answer. Still, I cannot see where any lesser course now would do more than defer the challenge to a time when our relative strength would be less. If this is our course, there can still be flexibility in defining specific positions although it will be much simpler to set the limits in each instance.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1361. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; No Distribution.

[2] Clay was returning to Washington to participate in talks with Chancellor Adenauer.

214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, November 20, 1961.

SUBJECT

Possible Meeting with Khrushchev in Berlin

In your memorandum of November 8 you asked for my comments on a suggestion made by General Norstad that you might summon Khrushchev to a meeting in Berlin at some stage in the Berlin crisis.

We must distinguish, of course, between the sort of meeting General Norstad suggests, which would be a response to a particular and critical contingency, and the sort that could occur in the course of negotiations on a Berlin settlement. The latter might have occurred prior to a contingency of this gravity, and the meeting in question would then be a second meeting.

In our planning for the Berlin situation we have always had in mind that at some point, in a situation of this nature, a meeting at the highest level with the Soviet Union might be desirable. We have not discussed this extensively with our Allies, but we have included a proposal which could involve such a meeting in our quadripartite planning for the contingency that Allied or German land access to Berlin is blocked. The meeting would be consistent with our planning for other contingencies as well, and there is nothing in existing contingency plans which would be incompatible with the holding of such a meeting.

It is difficult to say this far in advance whether a bilateral meeting would be preferable to one at which other Western statesmen would be present. Our quadripartite contingency planning would normally envisage a Four-Power summit meeting. However, I think it would be well to plan privately for a possible bilateral meeting in the event that this should appear in the circumstances to be the most promising.

With respect to location, Berlin would certainly provide a dramatic site for such an event. A number of considerations must be weighed in the final choice, however, among them the possibility that our Allies would feel that a bilateral meeting would be particularly inappropriate in Berlin, give the Four-Power character of the city. Also, the likelihood of the meeting proving successful would have to be considered, since lack of success in Berlin might have a particularly depressing effect on the Berlin population.

In summary, the idea of a bilateral meeting certainly merits our further consideration. The Department will prepare more detailed plans, of a unilateral US nature, regarding it. This planning will include consideration of site and composition, but the final determination on these points will likely have to be made at a stage closer to the actual contingency.

Dean Rusk

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but another copy shows that it was drafted by Day on November 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2061) The November 8 memorandum is not printed. (Ibid., 762.00/11-861) Norstad made this suggestion at a meeting with the President on November 7; see numbered paragraph 6, Document 205.

215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, November 20, 1961.

THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS

Kissinger believes that the Germans really do not want—though they expect—negotiations and I am inclined to think he is right. That makes it more important than ever to persuade them of our determination on this point and the reasons for it, as follows:

1. We believe that without negotiations a whole series of bad things will happen:

A. A separate peace treaty with substantial sympathy for it among neutrals and sectors of our own opinion.

B. Salami tactics, which may be fast or slow, on the access routes.

C. Further decline in morale and hope of West Berlin.

D. Evident division among allies over countermeasures.

E. Increasing nationalism and militarism in Germany and the United States.

F. Higher tensions throughout Europe.

G. Possible war, conventional or nuclear—and in all of these eventualities a wide-spread belief that we never tested the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

2. Moreover, we believe that these negotiations must be so framed that our position has the strongest possible support both internationally and among our own people. Therefore, we cannot agree to a simple restatement of earlier positions and have urged somewhat different policies on which we hope for discussion Tuesday morning.

3. It is folly for the allies to approach negotiations in divided disarray and therefore we think it of a high importance to have

A. The support of the Chancellor;

B. His help in persuading de Gaulle.

4. We should leave the Chancellor in no doubt that the decision to move toward negotiations has been taken by you and is firm. Kissinger shares the widespread view of the German experts I have seen that your own definite and affirmative leadership is the key to winning and holding the Chancellor's confidence. For this reason Kissinger does not think we should show too much curiosity about the Kroll visit. It is on the whole advantageous to us, insofar as it is not some sort of special separate ploy, and we do not want the Chancellor to think we are worried about his little games. (Bohlen agrees on this.)

McG. B.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

216. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, November 20, 1961, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer in the President's Office

PARTICIPANTS

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer

Heinz Weber (Interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy

Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter)

The Chancellor recalled the recent incident involving German Ambassador Kroll. Khrushchev had called Mr. Kroll to come to see him to tell him how Ambassador Kroll envisaged further developments in the international situation.[2] The Chancellor had carefully investigated what transpired and had asked Ambassador Kroll to come to see him. He now felt fully convinced that Ambassador Kroll could not have acted differently and could not have avoided the conversations with Khrushchev. There had for some time been a rather close relationship between Khrushchev and Kroll. Mr. Khrushchev had invited the latter repeatedly, even to his summer home, to discuss matters with him and it was therefore no surprise that he called Kroll on this occasion. The problem was that Kroll had not been fully informed of everything that had transpired in Washington in the meantime and, therefore, he had given some different versions of what developments might be. To be sure, he had done so purely as his personal opinion and much more had been made of this incident than was warranted. Following his discussion with Khrushchev, Ambassador Kroll had, that very same day, informed Ambassador Thompson and the other Western Ambassadors and had made no statement to the press himself. Shortly thereafter certain information leaked out in the press and the question was where the leaks had come from. From Russia? Or from one of the other three Western Allies? In any event, Mr. Adenauer felt that much more ado had been made about this than was justified.

The President stated that Ambassador Thompson was convinced that the leak had come from the Soviets themselves.[3] The President felt that an advantage of the meeting between him and the Chancellor would be that the next time Ambassador Kroll was called by Khrushchev to be questioned on what the position of the West or of Germany or of the US would be, Ambassador Kroll's task would be easy since he would know exactly what answer to make. Therefore, a concerted stand should be worked out in these meetings. Under the circumstances, the President said that Ambassador Kroll had done the best he could. For this reason, he felt that his meeting with the Chancellor and the latter's subsequent meetings with General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan should result in a firming up of a joint Western position so that there would be no doubt what Ambassador Kroll or Ambassador Thompson or any other Western Ambassador should answer if Khrushchev should question him in this matter.

The Chancellor fully agreed and stated that he felt obliged to admit, for the sake of the truth, that the German Foreign Office was not blameless in the matter, since it had not kept Ambassador Kroll fully informed on developments with reference to the Working Group in Washington. Ambassador Kroll speaks Russian fluently, which makes it on the whole rather easy for him to maintain good relations with the Soviets. However, Ambassador Kroll has strict orders never to speak with Khrushchev without any interpreter, so that the Foreign Office will have at all times a full transcript of everything that has been said based on the interpreter's notes. The Chancellor was sure that he would have a visit by Ambassador Smirnov soon after his own Washington visit. Smirnov would no doubt come to sound him out on future developments. Smirnov had come to see him before the elections by order of Khrushchev, as he had told him. He had discussed many matters, and the Chancellor had a transcript of everything that was said. Smirnov had said nothing about Berlin, however. The Chancellor had then asked him about the Berlin wall, and Smirnov had evaded a reply. After the Chancellor repeated his inquiry and expressed his interest in this matter, Smirnov had said that he would be back after the elections. Therefore, the Chancellor expected that he would have a call soon. He then added that he recalled Ambassador Kroll telling him that Khrushchev had told the latter that the Berlin wall was his (Khrushchev's) idea. Ulbricht's shoulders were much too narrow for that kind of a burden. Khrushchev admitted that the wall was an ugly thing but he felt he had had to do it. The President, at this point said, yes, he supposed to cut off the stream of refugees. Adenauer replied that is the impression you have here, that the wall was put up to cut off the stream of refugees. But that is not the true reason. The stream of refugees increased to sizeable numbers only about two weeks before the wall was put up. Actually, shortly before any measure [was] put into effect by the Soviet Union the stream of refugees suddenly increased. This was the best indication that something was about to happen. Somewhere, somehow, the people get wind of some new oppressive measure and that is what sets off the stream of refugees. This, the Chancellor felt, brought him to the topic of Berlin, which is of such great concern to both the US and Western Germany. In this connection, he wished to state his frank opinion on a number of points which might be on the agenda at tomorrow's meeting involving a military briefing. He would not care to express these opinions in a larger circle. The Russian Note regarding Berlin had been delivered in November of 1958,[4] in other words, about three years ago. Since Mr. Khrushchev did not really insist on a solution of the problem within any very short period of time, the West had been inclined to believe that Khrushchev did not consider the Berlin question a very important one, otherwise he would not have left it pending for three years. This was a completely wrong assumption, however, since Mr. Khrushchev had made good use of the time to build up his conventional arms. Furthermore, when Khrushchev now speaks of no need for discussions this year or for some time to come, he is simply being very clever and sly.

[Here follow five pages of discussion of the future of the Soviet Union,NATO, Soviet-Finnish relations, and Austria.]

The President thanked the Chancellor for his views. He reminded the Chancellor that ever since 1945, and especially during the past ten years, the US had been very much concerned with strengthening Western Europe and cooperating ever more closely with the European community. The Chancellor had done more than anyone else toward solidifying Western Europe, and the US was now planning to pursue the type of economic policies and trade policies that would bring the US closer together with Europe. The present problem however, was to decide what to do vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and what to do with regard to negotiation. The President was of the opinion that the US and NATO were stronger from the nuclear standpoint now than they would be in another two to three years. This did not, he felt, apply to conventional weapons, but the ultimate type of weapon. Therefore, he felt, we might do as well or better in negotiating now than later. At the same time, the President was not overly optimistic concerning the success of the negotiations concerning Berlin; as a matter of fact he felt that the chances were rather our achieving success by these means. Nevertheless he felt that we must try to negotiate. Not only is there the problem of bringing our Allies along with us in the matter of Berlin, since they are not as committed to Berlin as we are, but we have our own nationals to deal with too. At the same time we cannot permit Khrushchev to go about voicing his desire for a peaceful settlement by way of negotiations without responding to it. Our task at the present time, as the President sees it, is first to decide whether to negotiate; secondly, how to associate the British and the French with these negotiations; thirdly, what to negotiate about; and fourthly, under what conditions to negotiate.

The Chancellor at this point made reference to the exploratory discussions carried on so far and indicated that they represented a fine attempt, the further usefulness of which was doubtful, however. He did not feel that there was much more room for additional discussions of this nature. He did not remember who originated the idea, but he had heard the suggestion that the Three Western Foreign Ministers meet with the German Foreign Minister in Paris in December to discuss the Western stand. He felt that this was a good idea and a step which must be taken. The Chancellor does not believe that Khrushchev wants war. He has so many troops deployed that he feels strong in case of a conventional war. At the same time, the Chancellor does not feel that Khrushchev wishes a nuclear war, since he knows that this would lay waste the Soviet Union and this he does not want to do. Khrushchev has emerged from the 22nd Party Congress at the height of his power within the Soviet Union, and there is an element of vanity in what he does because of his fabulous rise. The Chancellor felt that one must neither show fear to Khrushchev nor be impolite to him. He hopes that there can be negotiations on Berlin and he feels confident that such negotiations can be brought to a conclusion which will justify the expectations of the West by maintaining the freedom of Berlin, upholding Allied access to Berlin, and maintaining Western Germany's economic, financial and other ties with Berlin. The Chancellor feels that this is possible.

The President then asked whether the Chancellor was of the opinion that if the Three Western Foreign Ministers met with the German Foreign Minister in Paris and completed the development of a Western position, that the time was then ripe for the Foreign Ministers to meet with the Soviets for further discussions. The Chancellor answered yes. The President indicated that he agreed with the Chancellor's views on the limitations of further exploratory talks. He felt that these preparatory talks were not altogether satisfactory and must now move to a new forum. General de Gaulle had so far been unwilling to take part in any meetings for the purpose of working out a concerted Western position and talks with the Soviet Union since he maintained that all this was taking place under duress, to which he refused to yield. Since the deadline had now been removed the President felt the element of duress should be considered less at the present time, even though certain tensions continued. The President believed that the military briefings tomorrow (Tuesday, November 21) would convince the Chancellor that we would not need to talk from a position of military inferiority. But it was important to persuade General de Gaulle to take part in formulating a concerted stand, or the Alliance would be at odds and pulling in different directions. The only one who could really help us influence the General was, the President stated, the Chancellor.

The Chancellor promised to try and he hoped that he would succeed.

The President indicated that it would be disastrous if the West were to be divided. If General de Gaulle would not wish to go along with the West then the others might have to go on without him, and this was an unsatisfactory solution. Or else, the Western Allies would come to a complete standstill and that would give the initiative to the Soviet Union. The President was of the opinion that General de Gaulle was not opposed to negotiations with the Soviet Union as such, but he was afraid that such negotiations might not sufficiently take into account the interests of Western Germany and that consequently such negotiations might weaken the ties of the European Community and of the Atlantic Community. The President was of the opinion, first, that we should not enter into any negotiations which might threaten to weaken the ties between the Federal Republic and the West. He agreed with General de Gaulle that such negotiations would only help Khrushchev and not us. But he did not feel that we needed to enter into that kind of negotiations, since our military situation was not a critical one and therefore he felt we did not need to make concessions on that score. Secondly, while de Gaulle appears to feel that the mere will to negotiate is a confession of weakness, the President feels that this is not so. Moreover he feels that no advantage can be gained from a refusal to negotiate. He does not feel that the situation regarding Berlin will be improved by permitting it to continue for another year or two. The status quo in Berlin is not a happy one and it lays the population of Berlin open to further and continued harassment. This in itself is bad. We must negotiate in order to improve the lot of the Berlin population.

The Chancellor strongly agreed, stating that, unless the lot of the Berlin population is improved, their hopes will go down, capital will leave Berlin, and the situation will further deteriorate. The Chancellor intends to discuss these implications with the General and hopes to convince him that matters cannot be permitted to continue in this manner.

The President expressed his opinion that further inaction on the part of the -West gives Khrushchev further psychological advantages. Mr. Spaak visited the President only today and at one point expressed the opinion that France would have to be isolated if de Gaulle held to his views.[5] But France, in the President's opinion, is the key to Europe and therefore every effort must be made to persuade de Gaulle.

The Chancellor was emphatic in stating that it would be wrong to isolate de Gaulle and France, and that, instead, both must be won over to the views of the other Western Allies.

The President agreed with this, stating that Spaak had expressed this opinion only in the event that such efforts were unsuccessful, but agreed that every effort must be made to win de Gaulle over. Again the President reiterated that the chief hope for winning over de Gaulle is the Chancellor. The General experienced some difficulties during World War II which have created certain reservations in him vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxon world. de Gaulle is primarily a European.

In explanation of de Gaulle's attitude, the Chancellor asked the President whether he knew the former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Mr. Bech. Mr. Bech had told Adenauer about his experiences interpreting during the war for Churchill, de Gaulle, Roosevelt and even General Eisenhower. He indicated that de Gaulle was very badly treated by these gentlemen, and de Gaulle had confirmed this to the Chancellor. de Gaulle will never forget this. Moreover, the Chancellor reminded the President that the hostility existing between Britain and France is centuries old, much older, in fact than the enmity between France and Germany.

The Chancellor was very gratified to note that a real feeling of friendship and mutual appreciation has been created between the French and the German peoples.[6]

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on November 27. In an unedited draft of the memorandum, the President and the Chancellor initially discussed leading political figures in each country. These 3 pages were not included in the source text. (Ibid.)

[2] See Document 210.

[3] Thompson had transmitted his views in telegram 1517 from Moscow, November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1361)

[4] For text of the November 27, 1958, Soviet note, see Pravda, November 28, 1958; for an English translation, see Department of State Bulletin, January 19, 1959, pp. 81-89.

[5] A memorandum of Spaak's conversation with the President at 10 a.m. is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2061.

[6] The unedited draft of this memorandum of conversation concludes with the following three paragraphs:

"The Chancellor stated that he wished to say only one more thing before joining the others in the Cabinet Room, but he wished the President to know that he felt very seriously about this. If it came to any clash between the West and the Soviet Union, then the West, including the US, could be stronger than the Soviet Union only if nuclear weapons were used from the very beginning. Otherwise, the West could not succeed.

"President Kennedy replied by stating that the US position is that we will use nuclear weapons only if there were indications that they would be used against us, or it were apparent that conventional forces were defeating our conventional forces. This included the type of seizure of territory that the Chancellor had had reference to. Under the above circumstances the US was prepared to use nuclear weapons. That was the reason why we had so many nuclear weapons in Western Germany. They were for tactical as well as strategic purposes. The President continued by saying that even though we might have an agreement on the use of nuclear forces, we must continue to strengthen our conventional forces, if only to give more credibility to the strength and existence of our nuclear power. If Khrushchev does not see evidence of any conventional weapons of any consequence in our possession, then he will not believe that we have any nuclear weapons or intent to use them. For this reason the additional six billion dollars appropriated for military purposes since January have been spent one half on nuclear weapons and one half on conventional weapons.

"The Chancellor expressed the hope that during his present visit he might have the chance to discuss nuclear weapons further. The President indicated that this might be particularly profitable after the military briefings."

At the conclusion of their private meeting the President and the Chancellor met with their senior advisers and reviewed the main points of their own discussion. The Chancellor suggested that he write immediately to President de Gaulle summarizing his conversation with the President and indicating his desire to discuss Berlin with him. The President thought this was a good idea. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994)

217. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, November 21, 1961, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

Negotiations on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

American

Secretary

Mr. Ball, Mr. Kohler, Mr. McNamara, Ambassador Dowling,

Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Hillenbrand

German

Foreign Minister Schroeder, Defense Minister Strauss,

Under Secretary Carstens, Ambassador Grewe, Mr. Krapf,

Mr. Schnippenkoetter, General Schnez, Mr. Simon,

Mr. Hille

Starting with the status of Berlin, the Secretary said he did not know whether the variance in legal interpretation between us and the Germans would make much difference in respect to what we said to the Soviets. He supposed we might try at the outset to get some sort of all-Berlin arrangement and try to bring down the wall. There was no reason to think this would succeed. We might then insist on the status quo, maintaining our rights or moving towards some sort of independent city of West Berlin free to make its own arrangements with the rest of the world. We would not contemplate anything which would weaken its ties with the Federal Republic.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said the Germans thought it would be best to maintain the occupation rights as the source of rights. There was no reason to change the position of the three occupying powers, as the Soviets demanded, since there was no legal basis for the Communist claim that this would take place. On the basis of the maintenance of occupation rights the relationship between Berlin and the Federal Republic could be built.

The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Minister could comment on how he saw this working out in actual discussions with the Soviets. If the Soviets said that there was nothing to be discussed in regard to East Berlin, then the harder we would presumably stress the point that they would have correspondingly less right to have a voice in the affairs of West Berlin.

Schroeder observed that the Soviets accept the fact of the Western presence in Berlin on the basis of the right of conquest. There was no reason to eliminate this. The relations of the Federal Republic to Berlin had to be associated with this right of conquest. If the existing status were changed, then the West would be starting from a zero point and all relationships with Berlin would have to be established from the beginning. The West should, therefore, start with what it had now in any negotiations.

The Secretary indicated we could agree that in negotiations we should start with occupation rights. Any fresh arrangement would be superimposed on occupation rights which would remain in the background to be called upon if required. Schroeder agreed this was the German view. In dealing with the Soviets, the Secretary continued, we may find that agreed practical arrangements may turn out to rest upon different theories. For example, in agreeing on an independent city, the Soviets could claim their view while we would maintain occupation rights in the background. Schroeder pointed out that, from the aspect of international law, the West must emphasize legal occupation rights because this was the most convincing public argument open to it. The Secretary said he did not see how we could agree to a de facto incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic and at the same time find a solid basis for access to West Berlin. Schroeder commented that there were mixed views in Germany on complete incorporation of West Berlin in the Federal Republic. His government took the view that, at least for the time being, there could be no full incorporation for the reason indicated. The Western source of access rights was linked directly to occupation rights and the Germans had no share of those rights.

The Secretary observed that we did not want to make too much a point of this, but he might mention that there was no question but that West Berlin was now our specific responsibility. The American people understood this. If West Berlin were incorporated into the Federal Republic, then we would in a sense become gendarmes for the Federal Republic. This would not be easy for the American public to understand. Schroeder said he fully agreed. Allied rights must overshadow the rights of the Federal Republic which must remain in the background. The Secretary wondered if we could not agree that what we are saying with respect to the status of West Berlin is essentially for ourselves. What we may say to the Soviets may go beyond this. For example, we might propose an all-Berlin solution, or we might say that, if you claim East Berlin is gone, then West Berlin is gone for you. We will strive very hard to protect the full freedom of action of West Berlin to maintain ties with the Federal Republic.

Schroeder indicated that the question of a plebiscite might arise in negotiations with the Soviets. If it did, it should first be proposed for all of Berlin, and only later for West Berlin.

The Secretary said he wondered if it made any difference to the Federal Republic if these relationships which were under discussion took the form of contractual arrangements or agreements. Schroeder commented that this, in fact, did create a problem because of the West German constitution. If relationships were put on a contractual basis then an amendment of the constitution might be necessary and this would be difficult in an internal constitutional sense. The Berliners and the West Germans would consider it the “status quo minus.” The problem was essentially a psychological one. The answer also depended partly on whether any great improvement of access could be achieved. If so, this would perhaps make handling of the constitutional problem somewhat easier. The Secretary asked if there could not be an understanding between West Berlin and the Federal Republic introduced by the statement that pending reunification or full implementation of the constitution, the Federal Republic and West Berlin would establish the following relationships. Schroeder said he believed the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court was that Berlin was a Land of the Federal Republic, apart from certain Allied reservations. The Secretary's question could not be answered without further study. If, in a complete arrangement on Berlin, access thereto were improved, the status question would lose importance. This might be a means of bringing pressure on the Soviets. These legal questions were not so important from the viewpoint of the Federal Republic, but the Berliners' feeling of security depended on (a) the Allied guarantee, and (b) maintenance of vital ties with the Federal Republic. The Berliners were especially sensitive regarding the latter, and the psychological factor was, therefore, more important than the purely legal. There were many Federal offices in Berlin—some eighty in all. From the viewpoint of the Federal Republic these were perhaps not so important, but from the viewpoint of West Berlin the departure of any of them would be interpreted as the beginning of a general exodus. Removal of the Federal coat of arms from a building would be taken as a signal of withdrawal by the Berlin population. Mr. Kohler commented that we agreed the ties would stay as they are. The question was how to do this. The Ministers might even find independent status for the city consistent with our legal position, but this was obviously related to the improvements we could get. The question should be further studied.

Dr. Carstens asked whether the Soviets would not, in talks, say that the Berliners should decide their economic and cultural relations, but would strongly object to the maintenance of political ties. He, therefore, questioned whether this whole approach was useful. If we discussed relationships, the Soviets would try to impose all sorts of conditions on their agreement. The Secretary commented that if the Soviets insisted that East Berlin could not be discussed, then we would say that West Berlin could not be discussed. We cannot accept the claim that what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable as a basis for discussion. But we may need some formula so that the Soviets could say that this is what they were talking about.

With respect to access, the Secretary stated that, in his talks with Gromyko, he had emphasized that there could be no diminution in our access to West Berlin. We have the impression that the Soviets will try to apply pressure to uncontrolled forms of access, especially air. We have taken the view that both military and civilian access is a part of our occupation rights. We have taken the position that civilian access is important. We would not accept East German censorship on air access; they would use this to suffocate the city. We have also taken the position that our access rights are not subject to negotiation between the Soviets and the GDR. The Soviets cannot give away something they do not have. If we could improve or reinforce our rights, so much the better, but it seems that the West Germans want to add to our rights by specific coverage of civilian access. Schroeder said the Federal Republic would like to see the agreement specifically cover civilian rights of access. He could see that there is a difference in view. The Federal Republic says that civilian rights depended on Allied rights. This was recognized in the Jessup-Malik agreement of 1949.[2] The IZT agreement of 1960, which was the first to link the trade agreement to Berlin access, used very vague language to the effect that any concern that traffic might be disturbed or impaired by either of the participating parties was completely unfounded. A permanent solution to the civilian access problem could only be reached if this were blanketed into occupation access rights.

The Secretary observed that our position was that the right of the occupying powers is that Berlin have free access. Any mention in the IZT of civilian access was in addition thereto. The Secretary asked whether the Germans could see any practical effect in covering German access in an agreement. Dr. Carstens said an agreement should include civilian access. After some discussion it was agreed that the term “civilian access” rather than “German access” should be used for purposes of clarity.

Mr. Kohler observed that the problem seemed to be more a semantic one than a substantive one. What we want is at least one uncontrolled means of access. If this can be obtained on the Autobahn so much the better, but at least it should be uncontrolled in the air. But we can never establish this as a formal right in an agreement at the present time. As in the period of the air lift, under crisis conditions we would assimilate civilian access into military access. Ambassador Grewe commented that the crucial problem is in the wording of the access guarantee. We cannot refer only to Allied personnel. German civilian traffic must be covered as well. The Federal Republic was not seeking express guarantees or a formula seeking new rights. Mr. Kohler made the point that the longer civilian traffic could be covered by the IZT the better. We do not want the present practical arrangements for civilian access to be disturbed. If after the peace treaty the East Germans want to deal with the Federal Republic on a government-to-government level regarding trade, they would have to consider the question before throwing the responsibility for access to the Allies. Schroeder said that the Federal Republic had no agreement on access with the East Germans outside of the IZT. It could not be assumed that this would suffice in the long run. Civilian access had to be covered by the Allied mantle to avoid pressure in the years to come.

The Secretary said that if you and we are clear that we will not accept any dimunition in our access rights and these include both military and civilian access, and at least one important means of access must be beyond East German control, then it did not seem necessary to go beyond this. He asked Dr. Carstens and Mr. Kohler to try to arrive at an agreed formulation of the discussion.

With respect to “dealings” with the GDR, Foreign Minister Schroeder said here was a subject on which the Federal Republic had considerable skepticism. One overestimated the capacity of the Federal Republic if one imagined that anything reasonable could come out of negotiations between the West Germans, acting on behalf of the Western powers, and the East Germans. The Federal Republic has no real means of exercising pressure on the GDR. The Allies must therefore keep matters in their own hands without regard to how unpleasant this might be in terms of dealing with the GDR. He cited his own experience as Minister of the Interior to show how the GDR could bring pressure on the Federal Republic with respect to Berlin access. The Federal Republic was not able to tighten border controls directed against the GDR because it feared reprisals against Berlin access. This weakness arose from the pure facts of geography. If the GDR deliberately disturbed Allied access, the Federal Republic could not do very much. It was ready to help on technical difficulties. The Secretary commented that we have said to the Soviets that we will not negotiate with the GDR on access. We have said such negotiations must be between the three Allied powers and the Soviets. Under the circumstances such an understanding might be superimposed on the Soviet-GDR peace treaty. This could clarify the access problem, but the sanction behind access would still be our presence in West Berlin as well as the Federal Republic's trade with the GDR. What we are concerned about is the situation which would result if there is a peace treaty and the Soviets simply leave the access checkpoints. No one will then be there except East German officials. We had assumed that the Federal Republic would prefer to handle technical arrangements with the East Germans through West Germans.

Schroeder commented that the GDR would respect the Allies more than the Federal Republic. It would be a difficult situation if the Federal Republic were to discuss procedures and formalities with the GDR and then arrived at agreements which affected the Allies. He could understand the Allied principle that the Western powers did not speak with the GDR. The solution, therefore, was to set forth the arrangements so clearly in an agreement with the Soviets that everything thereafter would be automatic and no further discussions would be necessary. The Secretary observed that perhaps some measure of misunderstanding arose out of a different view as to the kind of dealings we had in mind. These would not involve the question of our rights but such matters as traffic control. If our rights were established, we had thought the Federal Republic would prefer to do that sort of thing rather than have us do it directly. Schroeder said he could understand how the US could say that it is in the interests of the Federal Republic to deal with the GDR rather than the Allies. But the other side was full of tricks. If you have an agreement on access the GDR will want to codify this. It will make additional demands which are not acceptable to the West. The Federal Republic could not reduce these demands and the Western powers would have to intervene. This would put the Federal Republic in an impotent and laughable position. He referred particularly here to such matters as inspection, documentation, etc. Ambassador Grewe said the Federal Republic would always be willing to talk to the East Germans as far as controls applying to civilian traffic were concerned. Allied traffic was now being discussed. If the Soviets disappeared, a problem would be to whom the Allies might talk. The difficulty was that Federal Republic discussions with the GDR on control procedures at the checkpoints, documentation, stamps, inspections left the Federal Republic in a weak position because these matters were too intimately connected with Allied access rights.

The Secretary said that we needed to make our understanding with the Soviets sufficiently clear. We would hold them responsible under the agreement. If differences arose and no satisfaction was obtainable, then we would complain to the Soviets. Indeed if the West Germans made an unacceptable agreement for us, we would say we did not like it. The point really was whether, with respect to the some 5% of total traffic involved, the Germans would prefer that we make the arrangements at the checkpoints or the Federal Republic would prefer to do this as a part of the total picture. Schroeder commented that he thought it would be better for the Allies to do it despite the unpleasant implications for recognition. This was more consistent with the German position on civil traffic which they wished to have protected under the Allied umbrella. In this instance the legal point on non-recognition was less important than effective maintenance of access. Dr. Carstens observed that if there were physical interference, for example, damage to a bridge, this could be taken care of by the Federal Republic. If, however, it were a question of checkpoint procedures, control of luggage, identification of personnel, etc., there was no purpose in having West Germans talk to East Germans about this. This was the very issue to be discussed with the Soviets. The principle was that the Federal Republic would talk to the East Germans so far as it could. For the rest, the Western powers should talk to the Soviets. The Secretary noted that talking in Moscow would not help much when a practical problem arose at the checkpoints. Dr. Carstens observed that if the East Germans made trouble it would only be with Soviet approval. The Secretary said we may be using “talk” in a different sense. We would not negotiate with the GDR regarding our rights of access, but if a car breaks down and needs help or there are traffic questions that would be something different. Dr. Carstens said he thought this point required more study. It was necessary to distinguish between the different types of cases which might arise.

The Secretary suggested that perhaps UN assistance on the access routes might help solve some of these problems. International civil servants might serve a useful function in this connection. Dr. Carstens commented that they would also add to the difficulties of the situation. If an International Access Authority were obtained that would solve the problem. Even without such an Authority, the Secretary observed, international officials at the key points might provide the answer. Schroeder said he saw no trouble in this. Dr. Carstens, however, indicated he did not have much confidence in such a solution. The Foreign Minister maintained his view that, if this point arose in discussions, the Federal Republic could not object. The Secretary said the Soviets might claim that this would interfere with GDR sovereignty. He said an agreement might attempt to specify a little more in detail the kinds of arrangements now in effect with the Soviets at the checkpoints. In any case there could be no negotiations with respect to Allied rights of access.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2161. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on November 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.

[2] For text of this agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. III, p. 751.

218. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, November 21, 1961, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Negotiations on Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer

Foreign Minister Schroeder

Defense Minister Strauss

Under Secretary Carstens

Mr. Franz Krapf

Mr. von Eckhardt

Mr. Schnippenkoetter

Ambassador Grewe

Heinz Weber (interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy

Secretary Rusk

Secretary McNamara

Under Secretary Ball

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Bohlen

Ambassador Dowling

General Clay

Mr. Bundy

Mr. Nitze

Mr. Hillenbrand

Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

Secretary Rusk said that he had met earlier this morning for over an hour with Foreign Minister Schroeder and other members of the German delegation to discuss some of the questions on the present agenda.[2] As usual, when Ministers do the talking, the experts must tidy up matters afterwards. One of the matters discussed was the legal position of West Berlin, on which there is a difference of opinion between the U.S. and Germany. While Germany considers West Berlin to be a German “Land,” with a certain suspension of its status on the basis of the 1949 action of the Military Governors, the U.S. does not consider West Berlin a “Land.” Whether this difference in view would have any serious effect on the projected negotiations with the Soviets is not quite clear at this point. Both Germany and the U.S. agree that the ultimate aim of both the U.S. and the Federal Republic is to retain the freedom of West Berlin to establish its own relations and other ties with the Federal Republic, which ties are vital to the maintenance of Berlin's existence and prosperity. The U.S. recognizes the importance of the psychological aspects of the situation, since Berlin feels its existence closely tied to Allied rights; at the same time West Berlin has intimate ties with the Federal Republic. The U.S. may have to take the view that the German Basic Law is inoperative for Berlin and that Berlin can make its own contractual arrangements for its ties with the Federal Republic. If the negotiations which the U.S. envisages with the Soviet Union will assure improved access conditions, then the Federal Republic might be willing to put into the background the constitutional aspects of this matter. It is hoped that something more definite can be written up on this subject before the end of these present meetings. The Secretary wondered whether the German Foreign Minister might like to make some comment on his summary of the discussion of this point. The German Foreign Minister had nothing to add.

The Secretary continued that not all aspects of access to Berlin had of course been covered, but only certain ones on which there might be a difference between the U.S. and Germany. Germany was extremely anxious to see that everything was done to guarantee German access to West Berlin. The U.S. took the stand that free access to Berlin was an essential requirement, and that our right to access included both military and civilian access on the basis of our Occupation rights. The West Berliners are entitled to exercise such access, as well as those with whom West Berlin wants to communicate, including the West Germans. Thus, there should be no real difficulties between us and Germany if any arrangement which we might enter into with the Soviets makes it clear that we are talking about full access, which includes both military and civilian access; and, of course, we encompass German access in our understanding of civilian access.

The President understood on the basis of this presentation that there existed no real substantive difference between the U.S. and Germany on the matter of access to Berlin, but that the problem was essentially one of formulation.

The Secretary indicated that the Germans feared that when we talk to the Soviets of Allied access we might refer only to Allied access or infer that this did not include German access. West Berlin cannot live without full access. As a footnote, the Secretary wished to add that there might perhaps be an advantage in having some kind of a new agreement or arrangement with the Soviets on the matter of access. Such an agreement would not destroy our Occupation rights but rather would be superimposed on them. The Occupation rights would remain in the background and could be called upon if needed. Thus the new contractual agreement could spell out in detail what the rights of access were, but they would be based on our Occupation rights. In this manner the Soviets could then concentrate on the new agreement as such, while we could move confidently because all this was based on our Occupation rights, pending a peace treaty with Germany as a whole.

The question of possible dealings with the GDR on matters of access needed to be worked on further, the Secretary indicated. We supposed that first of all it would be necessary to clarify the right of access with the Soviets. We would have to make sure that these rights would in no way be diminished. We would point out that we expected the Soviets to guarantee these rights, and that the Soviets would have to ensure that East Germany would comply with whatever was agreed upon. We, the U.S., would not enter into any negotiations on access rights with the GDR itself.

The problem before us was what might happen after the Soviet Union enters into a separate peace treaty with the GDR. What will happen if the Soviets should subsequently disappear from the checkpoints and withdraw from administrative arrangements with reference to access? Who in that case should take over dealing with the GDR on the implementation of access rights? In order to minimize the international aspects of the GDR, we have suggested to the West Germans that they undertake to maintain the necessary contacts in technical matters. Apparently there has been some misunderstanding on what we mean when we speak about “talking” to the GDR. We do not mean negotiations, but only practical day-by-day dealings, such as might be involved in clearing up traffic jams, doing certain repair work, or getting a barge through a canal. The question of the access rights themselves, or any indicated deliberate political obstruction of access, is something entirely different. Then, we would look to the Soviet Union for satisfaction and neither we nor the Federal Republic will negotiate on such matters with the GDR. At this point the Federal Republic is considering whether it would prefer the Western powers to take over practical dealings with the GDR or whether they themselves should assume this responsibility.

The German Foreign Minister stated that this is a problem which does not involve the matter of recognition of the GDR, but that Germany is concerned about the safeguarding of civilian access. The Federal Republic fears chicanery on the part of East Germany, which may demand unreasonable controls, inspections and institute other forms of harassment. This type of thing will be much more difficult for Germany to deal with than for the Allied powers. It is a purely practical matter for Germany.

The Secretary of State voiced the opinion that on the basis of what has transpired in the conversations of this morning, it would appear that it might be necessary to prepare a detailed description of what the present exercise of the right of access consists of, so that we can insist vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that East Germany must permit the exercise of access at least on the level described in this document. This would require a great deal of detail in order to avoid new access formulae by East Germany. This description of the exact character of the access to be exercised should be included in whatever agreement we reach with the Soviets.

The President indicated that in his discussions with the German Ambassador, he had learned that talks of the nature now discussed had already been taking place between East and West Germans on a number of technical matters.

The Secretary of State then pointed out that the real problem left now was how to handle the 5% of traffic which was the military part of the total. He did not anticipate too much of a problem with the civilian traffic.

The President pointed out that it was very important that every detail of this be worked out.

The Secretary of State then recalled that at one point in the morning's discussions, the possibility of a certain amount of UN participation in this matter had been brought up. He felt that there might be a certain advantage to having international civil servants enter the access-control picture. They would be individuals on the spot, without political implications, to whom either side could talk. Such UN participation might prove to be a barrier to bad faith.

The German Foreign Minister then indicated that, if the UN were brought into the picture in this manner, the occasion would certainly arise where the Secretary General of the UN would have the authority and the need to talk to the GDR. The Foreign Minister felt that this constituted an element of recognition of the GDR which, to him, represented a much greater danger and was less desirable than direct talks between the Allied Powers and the GDR.

The Secretary added that would be no such complication, of course, if there were an International Autobahn [Access]Authority. The Secretary of State then pointed out that the morning's discussion had not gotten around to the stationing of UN troops in West Berlin. To be sure, the Soviets had offered Soviet forces to be placed in West Berlin as guarantors of the freedom of the city. We opposed the stationing of Soviet troops in West Berlin. We were strong enough to safeguard and defend West Berlin ourselves. Moreover, we did not feel that the Soviets had any experience in safeguarding democratic freedom in any area. He felt sure, however, that the question of stationing a UN contingent in Berlin might well arise. He did not feel that the UN was inclined to assume additional expenses and responsibilities such as would be involved in stationing a contingent of troops in Berlin. He also knew that West Germans were skeptical about such a contingent.

The German Foreign Minister confirmed the Secretary of State's statement, indicating that the Federal Republic much preferred to see their share of UN troops in the form of British, French or American troops. Germany was truly skeptical, however, about UN forces as such.

The Secretary of State stated that we did not assume, by any means, that such UN forces would replace the forces of the Three Western Allies. Nor—as the President interjected—assume our responsibility.

The Secretary of State continued that the stationing of a UN contingent would make it much more difficult for the Soviets to resume their pressure on Berlin. Moreover, if UN organizations and activity were brought into West Berlin, the significance of the city would be greatly increased and this measure might put a stop to further harassment by the Soviets. It was no guarantee, however.

The German Foreign Minister pointed out that if it were possible to bring UN authorities and activity into West Berlin this would be highly desirable, but he would first see whether this is really possible before he would consider placing a UN contingent there. The stationing of a UN contingent in Berlin would really be contrary to the usual UN practice. Usually, the host country is expected to guarantee the safety of the UN activity in a given locality. In this case, it would appear as though the UN itself were having to protect its own organization. Thus, he would prefer that the matter of stationing UN activities in Berlin be taken up first, and the UN contingent left for later eventualities.

The Chancellor interjected at this point that he considered the establishment of UN activities in West Berlin extremely important, especially as a psychological measure, since it would convince the Berlin population that there was no intention of ever sacrificing them to the Soviet Union. UN soldiers, on the other hand, did not constitute such a guarantee.

The Secretary of State indicated that this was not a matter which the U.S. felt we should press. It remained to be seen whether some UN contingent might be advantageous, but it was a question to be left open.

The President then asked whether the Chancellor would like to comment on the points thus far covered.

The Chancellor indicated that the first point, i.e., the constitutional status of Berlin, is what he considers most important of all. While Western Germany is ready to do everything in its power for the benefit of the Berlin population, he feels that what is right is right and must be upheld. He himself was the chairman of the Constitutional Committee that drafted the Basic Law. He was, therefore, well acquainted with what had happened in connection with the suspension provisions concerning Berlin's status. He realized that certain things had happened subsequently, which were not quite in accord with these provisions, but the Allies had not objected, since they had not considered these matters particularly serious. Only in one instance had they vetoed a measure thus undertaken. But, from the standpoint of international law, the Chancellor felt, the status of Berlin was very clear and had to be upheld—including the suspension provisions.

The Secretary of State pointed out that there had been general agreement in the earlier morning meeting to do everything possible to uphold West Berlin's freedom of action and its right to maintain its ties with Western Germany, since these were fundamental to Berlin's well-being.

The German Foreign Minister recalled a discussion carried on during the earlier morning meeting about the existence of about 80 Federal German Agencies in West Berlin. While the Federal Republic did not consider many of these particularly important, it felt nevertheless that as long as they were there, their removal would be a psychological blow to the Berlin population, who were very sensitive on such matters. Thus, if the Federal German coat of arms were to be taken down in even one of these offices, it would be interpreted by the Berlin population as a sign of retreat and withdrawal. Thus, the Foreign Minister reiterated this matter was a psychological rather than a constitutional one.

The Chancellor on his part reiterated that he considered this a purely psychological problem, and he wanted to hear no further talk about the removal of coats of arms. He felt certain that in their talks with the Soviet Union the US would be called upon to make certain concessions. If this were so, the US could insist on the introduction of UN activities in Berlin as a sort of replacement, and this would help the situation.

The President confirmed that we should start negotiating on the basis of a position, such as outlined by the Secretary of State, which would insist on the complete freedom of Berlin to maintain its relations with West Germany and with whomever it pleases. He had understood that Ambassador Kroll told Khrushchev that the ties between West Germany and West Berlin were not negotiable. Nevertheless, before we were through negotiating, there might of necessity develop some limitations on the freedom of Berlin.

The German Foreign Minister reiterated what he had said in the earlier morning meeting; namely, that if the negotiations with the Soviets would result in greatly improved and more secure access this might ease many of the other Berlin problems, which would then be viewed in a somewhat different light.

The President then stated he understood that point five had not been covered in the earlier meeting and he proposed that he and the Chancellor withdraw to his office for a private conversation, while the remaining members of the two delegations went over the unresolved points of the agenda.[3]

At this point (11:45 a.m.) the President and the Chancellor withdrew to the President's office.

The Secretary noted that, in his discussions with Gromyko he had the impression that the latter was not only talking about the external boundaries of Germany but also about the internal demarcation line. It is clear that we are not going to recognize this demarcation line as an international frontier nor are we going to recognize the GDR. As to the external boundary, we see no way of changing the Oder-Neisse line in the foreseeable future. Admittedly this point should not be given away free, but we should have it in the background as a possibility for discussion if something valuable could be gained thereby. The Secretary did not see how in this country we could keep open the question of moving the frontier further to the East. We recognize of course that in the past the Federal Republic has renounced the use of force in this context and is willing to repeat this assurance. We on our side are prepared to consider postponing any formal recognition until reunification and the Peace Treaty can be worked out but support of revision of this line to a point further east is not our policy.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that the Federal Republic was prepared to consider repeating to the Soviet Union its undertaking never to have recourse to force to modify the boundary of Germany or to achieve reunification. It is prepared to accept a guarantee of this by the three Western Powers. However, if it were to go beyond this it would be giving up the last thing which could play a role in East-West negotiations. Something which could be used for profit would be abandoned without profit in unfavorable psychological circumstances. Moreover, he did not believe we could get much from the Soviets for acknowledgment of the Oder-Neisse boundary. He was aware that, in 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes had stated that the United States would support a revision of German frontiers in Poland's favor. However, the extent of the area to be ceded to Poland was to be determined only in the final peace settlement. This left open the question of how far any border rectifications had to go. In summary then, Schroeder continued, the Federal Republic was opposed to going beyond renunciation of the use of force. It was opposed to narrowing down the field of future maneuver at the time of a peace settlement without benefit at the present time.

The Secretary said he was not at all sure that this was a point which gave us great bargaining value. The Soviets know that, in general, the Western countries are not prepared to support a movement of the line to the East. There has been the de Gaulle statement, and public opinion in most Western countries would agree with it. Therefore we could probably not get much for a final definition of the boundary in any event. If, however, the impression were left that despite its declaration of renunciation of force the Federal Republic intended to pursue an active policy with respect to its Eastern boundary, this would become an element of instability in Central Europe. It would enable the Soviets to keep Central Europe stirred up regarding German long range intentions. He believed it correct to say that Germany's reconciliation with the West after World War II was of utmost importance in historical terms. The Eastern countries regarded this process in a different light. They did not believe in the purely defensive purposes of the Alliance or the peacefulness of German intentions.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said he understood the points the Secretary had made. If we were now at the stage of an East-West détente, then we could discuss frontier questions quite intensively. But today Germany is divided and the Eastern boundary of the country is within the GDR. The East German regime has solemnly recognized this boundary. The subject of discussion with the Soviets at the present time is Berlin—a question which the Soviets unnecessarily and artificially raised. To discuss the boundary question in this context would be to discuss it in the wrong context. It would create serious political difficulties within the Federal Republic. It would effect a boundary settlement unaccompanied by any other normal aspects of a peace settlement. To sum up, Schroeder concluded, this was the wrong time, place and context for resolution of the Oder-Neisse question.

Defense Minister Strauss asked facetiously whether it would not be a violation of GDR sovereignty if the Western Powers attempted to guarantee one of its borders.

The Secretary commented that, as far as we are concerned, we have emphasized to the Soviets the problem of buying the same horse over again. The President had put it in terms of their attempting to sell an apple for an orchard. We do not believe we should once again be called upon to purchase our basic rights in Berlin. The Soviets will, however, surely raise the boundary question, and he did not believe that the American people were interested in any change in the Oder-Neisse line.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said he could accept what the Secretary said. If the Soviets were really prepared to make a satisfactory Berlin arrangement, then the question would arise whether the matter of peace treaty negotiations were [would] not become pertinent, but outside of the forum of Berlin discussions. If, however, the West gave up in advance, all questions related to the peace treaty, then the Federal Republic would have nothing to gain from a peace treaty. This would destroy the theory we have, which is that a Germany unified on a basis of self-determination is in the best position to negotiate a peace treaty. Although it is true that many people in the world consider the Oder-Neisse line settled, certain facts also remain on the other side of the argument. He could also agree that the longer the West waited on this the weaker its position became, but he had grave reservations relative to settling the Oder-Neisse question within the Berlin context.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister whether he would be willing to present his thoughts as to how he saw the future of reunification. We on our side believed it important to sustain the principle of unification and self-determination in Germany. He wondered how Foreign Minister Schroeder saw movement coming in this direction. How could a solution be advanced?

Schroeder said that the basis for reunification is a free Germany and a piece of this free Germany is our battle over Berlin. If the Federal Republic could “radiate” its influence this would prevent a further decline of the GDR into total communism. Maintenance of psychological connections was important. To reiterate, the Foreign Minister continued, it was necessary to increase possible contacts with the GDR. It was clear, of course, that a totalitarian system such as that in the GDR could only be eliminated from the outside, but the West could not contemplate forceful intervention in the GDR. A difficult historical process was involved, for which no schedule could be set. But, Schroeder continued, we have experienced an acceleration of historical developments in the past because of a shift in the basic forces involved. In 1953, he recalled, Defense Minister Strauss and he had come to Washington, and the main subject of discussion then had been the Saar problem. This seemed beyond solution at the time. Yet 8 years afterwards no one even mentions the subject. Certainly the Saar question is more simple than the present problem, but it was nevertheless a complicated problem in its own right with deep and difficult historical roots. Schroeder referred to the fact that he had used the word “contacts”, but he wanted to point out that he meant it in a somewhat different sense than that normally attributed to it by the US. He did not believe you could overcome a system such as that in the GDR by administrative contacts, if the system was not already shattered internally. The Federal Republic was however, prepared to increase its economic and cultural contacts, even if it did not believe these would bring on reunification. Such a program was not entirely lacking in danger. If such contacts tended to make GDR leaders seem socially acceptable, then the people of the GDR would hold responsible those who contributed to this. In addition to the factors he had already mentioned, Schroeder concluded, a long term program for reunification also required maintenance of Western strength and unity.

The Secretary commented that he was not at all sure that there was much difference between us when we speak of “contacts”. There is some evidence that the people of central and eastern Europe feel themselves part of the tradition of Western civilization. They are attracted to the West. In the case of Poland we feel that the multiplication of our contacts tends to move the Poles in a direction we want to see them move. We have trade with Poland and a lively exchange program. We assume that this great underlying sense of wanting to belong to the West also applies to East Germany. Our effort therefore is to get in to contact with the feelings indicated, even if it involves some official dealings.

Foreign Minister Schroeder said it was sometimes easier for the Federal Republic to do this with foreigners under an ideological system completely different than with the GDR. In other words, were it not for the Oder-Neisse question, the Federal Republic would find it easier to have relations with Poland than with the East German system. There was no doubt of course that 90% of the population of the GDR opposed the regime, but the iron band of the power system in control made all the difference. If the West did anything to encourage an uprising in East Germany, it must be prepared to help the uprising. Otherwise such action would be irresponsible. This consideration set a limit on the kind of activity which the Federal Republic can undertake.

In response to the Secretary's query as to whether the frequently heard statement that there is no alternative to Ulbricht meant that the Soviets could not rely on the bureaucracy or the governmental structure of the GDR, Schroeder indicated that comments on this subject had to be largely based on speculation. People often think of the Ulbricht problem in terms of his special relationship with Moscow as a result of his many years there. He believed that any successor would not conduct policy in a greatly different fashion or basically alter the structure of the government. What would take place would be a pure power struggle. The regime in the GDR was a fairly stable one.

Turning to the subject of European security, the Secretary pointed out that the US is not interested in disengagement. We had had an experience in Korea with disengagement and the results were unhappy. As the Secretary had previously indicated, this would involve an abandonment by the US of its responsibility as a member of NATO. We expect to have a continuing substantive commitment of US power to the NATO Alliance. We were not interested in discrimination against the Federal Republic. In the past the point had been made that, in the essential, confrontation of the East-West power blocs physically occurs in Germany. Attempts to reduce this confrontation were interpreted as aimed at the Federal Republic. This is not what we have in mind. He wondered whether Schroeder saw anything in the disarmament field which might help reduce the scale of Soviet forces in East Germany. Did he see any basis on which the concentration of Soviet forces could be reduced?

Schroeder observed that the Federal Republic considered that the subject of European security could only be discussed in the context of German reunification and should not be raised purely in a Berlin context. The principle is the same as in the case of the Oder-Neisse line. As to the confrontation question, he did not believe that a reduction in Soviet troop strength would change the basic political situation in the GDR, or solve any of its other problems, even if the Soviets were willing.

Defense Minister Strauss said he agreed with Schroeder's general assessment of this question but one aspect was worth further study. Decrease or withdrawal of Soviet forces from the area could be considered if a change of the political situation in the area affected would automatically or gradually be introduced from the outside. Kennan had asked this question. However, he (Strauss) considered it an optimistic speculation that withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area would prevent their speedy return. NATO was not in a position to prevent the re-entry of the Soviet armies because of its basically defensive nature and the grave risks of nuclear war which would be involved. Disengagement is a useful means to reduce tension when both sides are prepared to give self-determination to the people in the area of control. Under current circumstances, however, he did not believe that it would lower tension but would instead create a political vacuum which would bring all sorts of military and political dangers with it. He did not believe that Khrushchev was merely a Russian nationalist interested in securing the frontiers of Russia. He saw Germany as a strategic objective necessary to the further onward march of Communism. Co-existence was merely a methodology to achieve this. If the Soviet Union could pry loose Germany from NATO it would have achieved its next step of marching to the Rhine. As long as the Communists speak of world conquest and act on the basis of that objective the prerequisite of disengagement is lacking. The Communists are not interested in moving their influence back. At this point Strauss produced a map which, he explained, showed that the Western European potential was equal to that of the Soviet bloc up to the Urals. However, 90% of the European potential was concentrated in an area containing only 25% of the Communist potential. Europe could not be backed up any further without suffering mortally. Therefore a firm line of defense was essential.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and Lejins and approved in S on November 26 and in the White House on November 29. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Prior to this conversation with the President, Adenauer talked with Dean Acheson. A 2-page report on their meeting is ibid.

[2] See Document 217.

[3] See Document 219.

219. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, November 21, 1961, 11:30 a.m.-1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Private Conversations Between the President and Chancellor Adenauer

PARTICIPANTS

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer

Mr. Weber (interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy

Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

The Chancellor opened the conversation indicating that he felt the most important thing about the agreements to be reached at the present time was that they should be as flexible as possible.

The President agreed. He felt that the question of access to Berlin is the key issue and this matter should be worked out in as much detail as possible. He felt that the experience of the Federal Republic and the people of Berlin should be helpful in working out all the necessary details on this question prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris.

The Chancellor made the statement that the people of Berlin had grown overly sensitive, owing to the tense situation under which they had been living for so long. If the final results of negotiations with the Soviets made for improved living conditions for the people of Berlin, along with maintenance of their freedom, then the U.S. need not fear any difficulties from the German side.

The President then indicated that there was one matter which he would like to discuss with the Chancellor. He made reference to an article by Walter Lippmann in this morning's paper and asked whether the Chancellor had, perchance, read it. The article stated that the German people have come to realize by now that it has become impossible for the West to gain the reunification of Germany in the face of Soviet opposition. The Soviet Union would always attempt to maintain East Germany as a separate entity. This would increase the Soviet power position and, so Lippmann stated, would cause the Soviet Union to exercise and maintain great pressure on the Federal German Government to disassociate itself from the NATO Alliance and to harmonize its policies with those of the Soviet Union for the purpose of regaining reunification thereby. For instance, by following a policy of neutrality for the ultimate purpose of reunification, Germany would help the Soviet Union in the coming decade to alienate her further and further from the West and to draw her closer to the East. This was Lippmann's view and the President wanted the Chancellor's opinion on it.

The Chancellor stated that he had not read the article but that he is familiar with Lippmann. He could recall the days when he used to read Mr. Lippmann's articles and get excited about them. One day he had spoken to Mr. McCloy about this, who was then in Bonn, and the latter had told him not to worry about Lippmann's prophecies because they always proved false. The Chancellor wanted to assure the President that he shared Mr. McCloy's evaluation and felt, moreover, that the article in today's paper was utter nonsense.

The Chancellor replied that he would wager his head that Lippmann's prophecy was false.

The President then tried to get the Chancellor's reaction, quite aside from the Lippmann article, to the possibility of German rapprochement with the Soviet Union for the purpose of reunification and the degree of pull the Soviet Union might be able to exert on Western Germany in this respect.

The Chancellor stated that he was convinced the President need have no fears of any such eventuality or possibility. The 53 million Western Germans did not want to become enslaved nor did they want to join the 16 million East Germans in slavery. They desired freedom. Of this, the Chancellor was absolutely sure.

The President then asked the Chancellor whether this meant that conditions were different now than they had been at the time of the Rapallo Treaty.

The Chancellor stated emphatically that they were completely different. He continued that perhaps shortly after the 1945 collapse there might have been some such thoughts in the minds of some. But the establishment of the Chancellor's party, the biggest party in Germany, had been precisely for the purpose of avoiding Soviet slavery. The Chancellor felt absolutely sure that there was no danger of any pro-Eastern movement in Germany in the years to come. The big decision of whether to join the East or the West had been taken in the Bundestag in November 1949. At that time, the only dissenting element had been Schumacher and his Social Democrats. All others had seen eye to eye with the Chancellor. Even the trade unions had agreed with him. Schumacher was a nationalist, who had wanted a bigger Germany and who had other aspirations along those lines, and he had forced his Party to voice dissent with the decision taken at that time. However, there was now no further chance of such adverse developments. Since 1945, the Chancellor stated, more than 3 million refugees had fled to Western Germany from the Soviet Zone. These refugees were in the best position to spread the word about what conditions in the East Zone were really like.

The President then inquired about the Chancellor's opinion on the desirability of Western Germany continuing to adhere to the declaration that the Federal Republic renounce experimenting with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons[2] —how did the Chancellor feel about this?

The Chancellor pointed out that he was the one who had made this declaration. He had done so at a conference in London, at which time he had said that Germany renounced the production of ABC weapons. The occasion had been the establishment of the Western European Union. After he had made this statement, Mr. Dulles had come up to him and said that this declaration was of course valid only as long as circumstances remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the Chancellor said, Germany had not undertaken anything in this respect as yet.

The President expressed the opinion that as long as the NATO organization existed as presently constituted, and as long as the US had its weapons stationed in Western Germany with agreement on how and when these were to be used in the defense of Europe and West Germany, he felt that it was highly desirable for conditions to continue as stated in the Chancellor's declaration. He feared that if Western Germany were to begin nuclear experimentation, the danger of war would sharply increase without providing additional security compared to what we have at present.

The Chancellor stated that Germany was not considering any nuclear experimentation.

The President then made reference to a recent speech of his in Ottawa,[3] in which he had spoken about the US turning over Polaris submarines to NATO. The purpose of this had been to lessen the feeling which he felt existed in Europe that each individual NATO country ought to begin to develop its own nuclear capacity. The President wanted to know the Chancellor's opinion on whether this proposal had been helpful in easing the pressure existing in Europe for the development of unilateral nuclear capacities.

The Chancellor stated that he was convinced that it had achieved its purpose, but there was one question he wished to discuss with the President. It was a purely military one, namely: can the President of the US be reached at any time? This was a point made by General Heusinger, who had indicated how very decisive even one hour could be in nuclear warfare. This concern had resulted in the proposal made by General Norstad to the Eisenhower Administration, but it had not been taken up by the Eisenhower Administration any more. This was, in other words, a purely military concern which the Chancellor was in no position to judge. But he felt that he had to rely on the judgment of his military experts and their evaluation of possible developments along these lines.

The President inquired what proposal the Chancellor had reference to.

The Chancellor answered, the NATO Fire Brigade.

The President then indicated that 50% of SAC is even now on 15 minute alert and some of SAC is in the air 24 hours a day. When he is in the White House, the President can be reached at all times, when he leaves the White House there is two-way radio connection every two minutes, and there is two-way connection from the air. The President's various residences have a direct telephone line to the White House and to SAC. The requirements of our own national defense, the President stated, do not permit him to be further than two minutes away at any time. The President then stated that he does not know what the telephone connection between Bonn and Washington is. In theory at least, there is direct telephone between London and Washington and Paris and Washington. If no such connection exists with Bonn, it would be well if such were established, so that communication can be established within seconds.

(The next few minutes of transcript stricken at President's request.)

In a more serious vein, the President then pointed out that the extraordinary thing about Khrushchev is his compulsion to feel that everything he has is better than everybody else's. No matter what one tells him he comes up with something better. He has a purely compulsive need for recognition. The President didn't know whether this was a personal or national characteristic.

In reply the Chancellor made reference to a book which recently appeared in Germany by a man called Mehnert. The book is entitled The Soviet Man. It shows how by careful processes of control and orientation the Soviet Union has succeeded in forming the mentality and reactions of the people to such an extent that there now is what might be termed a “Soviet man,” who believes that everything he has is better than what the others have. The Chancellor pointed out that a similar thing was achieved by the Nazis in their day with reference to a part of the German population. One should not lose sight of the fact that Khrushchev had achieved a fabulous career which, to some extent, had resulted in a degree of megalomania in him. Naturally, one should not believe everything Khrushchev claims. As an example, the Chancellor recalled how Khrushchev told him that the Western world is definitely doomed, and the Chancellor had laughed in his face. To be sure, Khrushchev was a peculiar mixture. The President interjected at this point: a mixture of inferiority and superiority.

Then the President asked for the Chancellor's opinion on how much pressure there is in Germany to change the Chancellor's stand on the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The Chancellor stated that there was none.

(The next ten minutes or so were stricken from the record at the President's request.)

[1 paragraph (9-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President promised that he would make sure that Mr. McNamara would tell the Chancellor and Mr. Strauss what was available in Western Germany at the present time and what further intentions there were along these lines.

[2 paragraphs (9 lines of source text) not declassified]

(The rest of the transcript was stricken at the President's request.)

Prior to going to lunch the President invited the Chancellor to come upstairs to meet Mrs. Kennedy.[4]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on November 27. The meeting was held in the President's office at the White House. An unedited draft of this memorandum contains paragraphs on John J. McCloy and nuclear testing. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994)

[2] or the Final Act of the London Nine-Power Conference, October 3, 1954, which contains this declaration, see Foreign Relations , 1952-1954, vol. V, pp. 1345 ff.

[3] For text of the President's address to the Canadian Parliament, May 17, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 382-386.

[4] At 4 p.m. Chancellor Adenauer received a briefing on the relative military strengths of the Soviet Union and the NATO Alliance. A copy of the briefing is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994. A 4-page memorandum of the Chancellor's discussion of the briefing with the President at 5 p.m. is ibid.

220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, November 22, 1961.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON BLOCKADE OF MILITARY ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN

I attach a State Department memorandum[2] on this subject which shows where we now are on this one. It is a complicated paper, but it boils down to this:

1. The present U.S. position is that uniformed military personnel should refuse to show identification, and should deny themselves access rather than do so. There would be protests in Berlin and Moscow, and then the commandants should be authorized to prevent the entry of all Soviet personnel and vehicles to West Berlin, excepting only those connected with the air control center and the Spandau four-power prison for Nazi criminals. In addition (subject to a final review) we would expect to advocate countermeasures outside Berlin, of a minor sort, as listed on the last page (Annex B) of the State Department paper. The Germans have agreed to all of this. The French and British have agreed to self-denial of access but are still reviewing countermeasures. Our mission in Berlin is now authorized to enforce self-denial for our own military personnel, but retaliation against the Soviets, either inside or outside Berlin, would be a matter for final decision when the occasion arises. Kohler believes we would get agreement on measures inside Berlin, but that British might balk at measures outside Berlin.

2. There is no intention to destroy any barrier by tanks or bulldozers, and Norstad's request for this authority is being refused.[3]

3. Given the wide spectrum of opinion among the allies, I do not think we can expect complete agreement ahead of time on this. My suggestion is that the State Department be instructed to press strongly, at all levels, its own current preferred course. This seems as sensible as any, and there are advantages in having a clear view ahead of time, and standing by it.

McG. B.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.

[2] Neither the paper, “Allied Access to East Berlin,” nor its annexes is printed.

[3] Next to this paragraph in the source text is the handwritten notation: “JCS are in favor of urging to get Allied agreement to this. State disagrees."

221. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, November 22, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting in the Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer

Foreign Minister Schroeder

Defense Minister Strauss

Dr. Carstens

Ambassador Grewe

Mr. Krapf

General Schnez

Dr. Schnippenkoetter

Mr. Weber (interpreter)

United States

President Kennedy

Secretary Rusk

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Bohlen

Ambassador Dowling

Mr. Nitze

Mr. Bundy

Mr. Hillenbrand

Mrs. Lejins

The Secretary indicated that it was the intention to release a joint communiqué at 2:30 this afternoon,[2] whereupon the German Foreign Minister pointed out that no German translation had as yet been made of the communiqué and therefore there would be no possibility to compare the two texts until at least a rough translation was received.

The President pointed out that in view of the importance which everyone attached to these meetings with the Chancellor, he wanted to be sure that the communiqué conveyed the meaning clearly that these present meetings had been preparatory meetings only, and that although agreement had been reached on many points, additional preparations were necessary before negotiations with the Soviets could begin. In effect, he wanted it to be clear that the communiqué would set forth that a series of meetings, for instance with General de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan and by the Foreign Ministers were contemplated before Soviet negotiations could begin. The President also wondered whether the communiqué was explicit enough about the limitations which were being maintained with reference to German armament. He felt that there was still a great deal of suspicion left in some quarters about a reawakening of the German militaristic spirit and therefore wanted to emphasize the fact that West Germany is a peace-loving nation and that the record so indicates. Subsequently, a suggestion was made to change the word “peace-loving” to peaceful as a more preferable term.

The President then suggested that the words “firmly believes and has demonstrated that it” be included in the first line of Point two after “The Federal Republic of Germany”.

The Chancellor expressed the opinion that it was important to stress the defensive nature of the Alliance, whereupon the President suggested including a statement to the effect that: the Chancellor, in emphasizing the defensive character of the German military effort pointed out that the Federal Republic is the only large country that has placed all its forces under multinational control. The Chancellor agreed to this.

The Secretary then pointed out that it was the intention to inform the diplomatic representatives of UK and France this afternoon about the general outcome of the meetings.

The President wanted to know how much detail it would be wise to give them concerning the various points on the list of questions on which there had been disagreement prior to these meetings between the US and Germany. He wondered whether this would serve a useful purpose.

The Secretary pointed out that all these matters had been discussed in the Ambassadorial Group before, and everyone was therefore familiar with these problems. To be sure, it was not at all certain whether any of these points would really come up in negotiations with the Soviets. Nevertheless, it was necessary to continue to work on them in the Ambassadorial Group.

The President then turned to Ambassador Grewe and asked him how he felt about the security aspect with reference to the Ambassadorial Group. The Ambassador answered that it would be impossible to conceal these matters from the Ambassadorial Group. The President stated that he agreed, but he was concerned about security nonetheless and asked what could be done to keep this matter out of the press.

The Chancellor expressed concern that if there were a press leak, there would be no purpose in his writing to General de Gaulle. The President thereupon asked whether it might not be possible to withhold any information until Friday, in other words until after the Chancellor had had a chance to get a letter to the General and he himself had written to Prime Minister Macmillan in this matter. Moreover, press pressure would be much less two days hence. The Chancellor agreed and it was so decided.

The President then indicated that Ambassador Bohlen would undertake a background briefing for the American press, and he understood that von Eckhardt would do the same for the German press. He admonished both to steer the briefings very carefully so that nothing definite would come out until after the exchange of letters. If it were agreeable to the Chancellor, the President stated, the briefings should concern themselves primarily with the atmosphere of the discussions rather than with substantive matters.

The Chancellor was in complete agreement, stating that if we wish to win over General de Gaulle the latter must be made to feel that something special is being done for him. Everything would be completely ruined if the General were to read in the papers details about the US-German understandings reached. This information should come to him in the Chancellor's letter. Dr. Carstens is leaving for Paris tonight with the letter, so that the General should have it by tomorrow.

The President thought it would be helpful if the press background briefings dwelled upon the fact that an overall concert was reached between US and Germany on matters discussed, but that the details remain to be worked out.

The German Foreign Minister pointed out that he would soon face this very same problem himself, since he was speaking shortly before the Press Club.[3] He stated that he would also take part in the German press briefings, and he would say as little as possible about details, leaving the atmosphere to be covered by von Eckhardt.

There followed a brief discussion of an Alsop column in this morning's paper which discussed General de Gaulle's reactions to negotiations with the Soviets, and the President stated that we must be very careful lest we damage our chances by unwise action. The German Foreign Minister indicated that he had seen the article and would keep this point in mind.

The President then pointed out that it would be most helpful from the standpoint of the US if the German people were made more aware than they now are of the effort which the US has expended with reference to meeting the Berlin crisis, including the military forces sent over there, the cost thereof, etc. The German Foreign Minister requested that the appropriate figures be made available to him for use in the German press briefings. This might take the pressure off with regard to disclosing other details.

The Secretary then indicated that a number of points had been discussed earlier this morning which would not necessarily come up for discussion during the negotiations with the Soviets.[4] Among these was the topic of boundaries. The Germans are willing to reaffirm with reference to this point that they will refrain from using force to change their boundaries. The Western Allies would be willing to guarantee this. Western Germany would prefer to see mention of the Oder-Neisse line kept out of any formal agreement with the Soviet Union, since they feel that this matter should be left to a later settlement. The US does not believe that it can support any German wish to move this frontier further east. The Secretary invited the German Foreign Minister to comment on this.

The Foreign Minister indicated that West Germany did not consider the question of frontiers a closed question. In general, however, the Germans felt that it was not wise to bring into the discussions with the Soviets all sorts of questions which did not rightfully belong there but should rather be deferred until a final peace treaty. To take these matters up now would weaken the German stand, and Germany felt that frontiers were a matter that was to be decided by a reunited Germany. This had always been the German stand and a joint stand, too. If the Soviets see that the West is willing to discuss all sorts of really unrelated topics in connection with the discussions about Berlin, they will only increase their pressure and try to exploit the Berlin situation as a lever to obtain concessions on almost anything. For this reason, the Foreign Ministers felt that a declaration on the part of Germany such as indicated by the Secretary above should be sufficient and no further negotiations should take place with the Soviets concerning frontiers.

The President then wanted to know, for his information, what the Germans thought the German frontier would be when a peace treaty was signed and Germany reunited. Would it be the present boundaries? In 1959 General de Gaulle had made a statement to that effect. The President doubted that the Federal Republic accepted this. While they agreed not to use force to change the boundaries, they did not necessarily agree on the boundaries as they were, and might use other means to get them changed.

The German Foreign Minister once more indicated that he felt it was better not to include this matter in any negotiations with the Soviets at this time. If, for instance, the question of German frontiers was settled in connection with the Berlin crisis, the interest on the part of other countries in concluding a peace treaty with Germany would considerably decrease, and Germany's bargaining position would be greatly reduced since there would be nothing left for a give-and-take settlement. In 1946 Mr. Byrnes had expressed US opinion on the matter of German frontiers and had indicated that the US would be willing to support efforts to improve Poland's situation with reference to the Western frontier at the time of a peace treaty. No more had been said about this since. It was correct that General de Gaulle had made a statement about German frontiers in 1959 and the Chancellor had subsequently asked the General to refrain from further statements on this subject, which de Gaulle had complied with. The Foreign Minister was afraid that if this matter were now taken up outside of the all-German question, there was danger that the all-German concept would be weakened and gotten away from. Moreover, if these matters were now discussed in connection with Berlin, it meant bringing in issues which could not be treated in a positive manner. The Foreign Minister pointed out that he was well aware of the fact that 16 years after the conclusion of the war might be a good time to discuss some of these points, but this should be done in a peace treaty and it was not the Germans' fault that no peace treaty had been concluded so far. For all these reasons he felt it was of tactical advantage not to include these matters in the Soviet negotiations.

The Chancellor pointed out that if the question of frontiers were to be included in the negotiations, he would find himself in a most embarrassing position vis-á-vis General de Gaulle. Back in 1959 the General had made the statement on frontiers referred to. The Chancellor had asked him to refrain from further statements of this sort and the General had promised to do so and had kept his word. If this matter were now brought up and subscribed to by Western Germany, the Chancellor would feel embarrassed to face de Gaulle again.

The Foreign Minister added that from the German domestic standpoint it was very difficult to discuss this topic in a positive manner, because to the German population it would appear like giving up a position long adhered to by taking the matter out of context. The German people would hardly understand this.

The President indicated that he had only wanted to confirm the German view for his own information, since the Secretary had indicated as much to him. Thus he suggested going on to other questions. He agreed that the question of frontiers should be passed over insofar as possible and should not be made into a major issue in the Soviet negotiations.

The Chancellor then made the statement that it was very clear to him that in an eventual peace settlement the eastern frontier of Germany would look very much like the present line and would be much like what the Poles wanted. In view of past events it was impossible to roll back history.

The President felt that it would be important not to put the topic of frontiers on any list of possible disagreements. Naturally the US did not wish to assume any position which was inimical to Germany. In any event it was not at all positive that the question of frontiers would be raised at all and he again suggested that we go on to other topics.

The President felt very strongly that by the time of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris in December, a definite plan aimed at the wall dividing Berlin should be ready, a realistic plan, which had a chance of Soviet acceptance. He hoped that this plan could be of such nature that it would maintain the morale of the Berlin population and prevent a major exodus.

The Chancellor agreed that this plan was a very serious matter and he wondered whether it should be put forth by the Three Western Powers or by the Federal Republic. He indicated that it would be difficult for Germany to propose such a plan and he proposed discussing the matter with some of the Berliners themselves.

The President agreed that perhaps the US would have to take on the job of presenting the plan, and the German Foreign Minister promised to try to come up with a plan before the Foreign Ministers' meetings by consulting the Berliners in the matter.

The Chancellor then pointed out that the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had told him in August that if a general improvement in relations were brought about there might be changes in the Berlin wall as well. The President indicated that he did not feel the Soviets would dare take the wall down now, since there would then be a general exodus.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that the topic of nuclear weapons had been discussed. Nothing conclusive had so far been achieved, and Secretary McNamara and Minister Strauss would continue discussions.[5] So far, the Secretary had tried to define exactly what the US was talking about and that anything decided upon would have to be in line with any general disarmament plans, would not interfere with the present NATO stockpiling program, etc.

The President then pointed out that he agreed with what he gathered to be the German view that the German declaration of 1954 concerning ABC weapons should continue in effect for the time being at least. He did not know what conditions might prevail three or four years from now. He also understood that Germany did not want such a declaration mentioned in any agreement with the Soviets, since that would give the Soviets the right to ask for inspections of what the Germans were doing and thus the power to interfere with German sovereignty. Nevertheless, this was an issue that might become important in talks with the Soviets. Would Germany have any objection if it were mentioned in the general context that this declaration remains in effect.

The Foreign Minister reiterated very much the same objections as on the inclusion of the Oder-Neisse line into the framework of Soviet negotiations. If it was inevitable to mention nuclear weapons, Germany would prefer a US declaration on these matters, which might possibly be supported by a German declaration. The matter should not, however, be included from the start. The Chancellor concurred in this.

The President stated that this was understandable and that we did not wish to give away any more than we had to, or before we had to, but it might prove helpful in the final analysis.

The Chancellor then stated that he would like to remind the persons present of the circumstances under which he had made the declaration. He had made it at the time of the founding of the Western European Union, and it had been directed at Germany's partners in this Union for the purpose of removing their fears of a rearmed Germany. The declaration had never been made with any reference to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Chancellor wished to point out, the declaration spoke of not producing ABC weapons. It made no mention of stockpiling in Germany such weapons made by others, or of Germany not using ABC weapons given her by others. The Chancellor felt that if this matter were now brought into the Soviet negotiations it could have very serious consequences. He also wanted to point out that the German commitment also included a promise not to build certain types and sizes of naval vessels or guns of certain sizes. But possible exceptions were provided for and, in certain instances, such exceptions had been made. He wanted to re-emphasize however, that the declaration had never been intended to have anything to do with the Soviet Union. The President stated that he did not know what all of this might be worth in negotiations with the Soviets. He would certainly like to avoid including anything in the agreement with them that would give the Soviets the right to police or inspect what Germany was doing. But a unilateral statement by Germany in these matters might prove useful.

The Chancellor stated that the Western European Union had inspection provisions through the Brussels Pact. But under this Pact the inspection would be carried out by a friendly power. If these matters were included in the Soviet negotiations, the Soviets would demand the right to inspect and that would be extremely bad.

The Foreign Minister once more pointed out that the important fact was that the Soviets were trying to achieve under the guise of Berlin talks what should rightly be taken up under the peace treaty. In the latter, however, any German concessions or adjustment would result in a unified Germany. If these matters are settled by the Berlin talks, the Germans would risk losing all their bargaining points which they would need in order to achieve a satisfactory peace settlement and would still be left with two Germanies, while all advantage went to the Soviets.

The President agreed in general but felt that we must be thinking in terms of two things: 1. a fallback position, and 2. a basic negotiating position, and he felt that with respect to the latter all these matters should be laid down in as much detail as possible, for example, the international highway and Berlin wall. Mr. Kohler indicated that these matters were being discussed in the Ambassadorial Group. Mr. Kohler then indicated that there was no need to discuss the topic of surprise attack nor the topic of European security; a subgroup was working on the latter topic.

The President then pointed out that the matter of European security appeared to give considerable concern in West Germany, where there existed fear of US disengagement. He wished to assure the Chancellor that there was no sense to the rumors of US disengagement. He himself had not heard anyone suggest any such thing in the course of at least the past two or three years. Nevertheless, he felt that certain non-aggression agreements or declarations might be useful.

The Chancellor stated that he did not know where the bad rumors came from; whether they were traceable to the American press, American correspondents, the German press or German correspondents. He was inclined to suspect certain German journalists. He had spoken to the President about the Springer Press and had expressed his view about it. He advised the President not to worry about these recurring rumors in Europe, since he himself did not feel that they had the effect the President appeared to fear they might have.

The President then asked the Chancellor what he thought about reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union that neither side should have more than 30-35 divisions in either West or East Germany. He based his reasoning on the fact that the West could not hope to have more than about 30 divisions available within the next three or four years. So what did we have to lose by making this the limit for the Soviets as well?

The Chancellor pointed out that in the first place even if the Soviets agreed to such a limitation they would never adhere to it, since they are in the habit of breaking any and all treaties and agreements into which they enter. The German Communists do exactly the same thing he added. The Chancellor advised against giving up anything unless one absolutely had to vis-á-vis the Russians. He warned that it is difficult to foretell at present what developments might take place, so why impose limitations which might become burdensome later on. Moreover, if such a limitation were agreed upon, the Sovs would immediately demand the right to inspect Western compliance, and that would give the Soviets an excuse for coming right into Western Germany. The Chancellor strongly felt that we should take the offensive in the negotiations rather than being on the defensive. That was the only way in which to impress the Russians.

Defense Minister Strauss indicated that he wished to leave aside for the moment the political implications of this matter, but there were certain facts he wished to point out: 1) if such a limitation were agreed upon, then the West could never station more than 30 divisions within a useful distance, even if this should become urgently necessary. All of us knew that France would not agree to having forces stationed there. The Soviets, on the other hand, while keeping only 30 divisions in East Germany, could station as many divisions as they wanted immediately adjacent in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc. Moreover, the Soviets had a very fast line of communication between the Soviet Union and East Germany. In the case of need, additional Western forces would have to be shipped all the way across the Atlantic from the US. Secondly, Strauss reminded the group that the military briefings of the day before had stressed the importance of building up conventional forces. For this reason it was altogether likely that the Western Allies would have to increase their divisions to the vicinity of 40, including German, US, Canada, etc., in order to be able successfully to counter Soviet pressure and to make the Soviet Union understand that the West can and is prepared to fight a conventional war if necessary. We must show the Soviets that they cannot hope to beat us in a conventional war. If, however, the limitation is set at 30 or 35, the Russians will immediately take note of that, and if ever the West should station even one additional division anywhere, the Soviets would denounce the West as war-mongers, etc. and we would be playing into their hands propaganda-wise. Moreover, Strauss wished to point out that while the Soviet divisions are generally somewhat smaller than the divisions of the NATO countries, the Soviets had many other independent units additionally and separately (for instance armored units, etc.). The Minister felt that calculations presented at yesterday's military briefing were in error to some extent. They spoke of 20 Soviet divisions in the Soviet Zone of Germany, but German intelligence has very definite information that the Soviets have already moved into Eastern Germany the equivalent of from two to three additional Soviet divisions. By equivalent the Minister implied the manpower and equipment, although not in the form of actual divisions. The same held true of Poland. In other words, Minister Strauss felt very skeptical about the limitation, since it would not really bind the Soviets in any way.

The President reiterated that he was afraid we would never get more than 30 divisions. He had spoken of the gold problem which all this military effort meant to the US, and Germany had, to be sure, been very helpful in this respect. The US certainly could not continue to increase its efforts unless an all-out effort became necessary and there was no indication that Britain would increase her contribution. The French, perhaps, might pull a few more divisions out of the Algerian area, but even this would not appreciably increase the Western potential. Thus, the President did not see how the Western Allied total could get up above 30, unless Germany were to up her contribution substantially. Thus the figure of 30 appeared to be well nigh our limit. Thus, the President reiterated that he was wondering what the value of entering into some kind of a limitation agreement might be, after we calculated carefully what our maximum expectation might be within the next 2-3 years, provided we could keep the Soviets from gaining inspection powers thereby. On the other hand, he felt that the day might come when a nuclear stalemate would be reached, when the Soviet Union would be in a position to destroy the US and the US in a position to destroy the Soviet Union. Then the conventional forces might again become decisive, and in that event any limitation could of course be bad.

Strauss proceeded to point out that there were two over-riding considerations insofar as he could see. One was that for the Soviet Union the divisions in East Germany were not as important as the divisions in West Germany were for the NATO countries. The Soviet Union could send more very quickly at almost any time, while the West would have to bring additional divisions across the Atlantic, thus losing valuable time. Secondly, if in a period of crisis we were to exceed the number stipulated by the agreement, the crisis would be increased and the resulting propaganda effects would play into Soviet hands.

The Chancellor added that he would never agree to any fixed limitation, since it would constitute a confession of weakness and the Soviets would interpret it as such.

The President countered by saying that it is a weakness, since it is a fact that we cannot come up with more.

The Chancellor answered that both in political and military life there was a need for bluffing and one could not do without it.

In conclusion the President brought up the question which he felt would be one of the more subtle ones to handle, namely the degree of recognition to be or not to be accorded East Germany. No doubt, this is one matter the Soviets will push for and it will be a difficult problem and the US is fully aware that the West should not offer more in this respect than Germany is prepared to concede. This is a matter that has to be taken up carefully with some of our Allies, Britain for instance, since certain elements are ready to concede more on this point than Germany can agree to.

The Chancellor stated that Russian tactics are very simple. They are pressure, pressure, and more pressure. Unfortunately the person pressured finally yields, and that is the manner in which the Soviets achieve their successes. If the GDR should emerge from the forthcoming talks with a substantial degree of recognition, what a victory this will constitute for the Soviet Union. The Chancellor will undertake to discuss this matter very carefully with Prime Minister Macmillan and warn him of the consequences of yielding to the Soviets on this point. At the same time the Chancellor has no illusions about achieving German reunification at an early date. He himself is not particularly perturbed about this, citing the historical example of France, which lost Alsace Lorraine in the war of 1870-71. Although France did not regain possession of the territory until 1918, she never abandoned hope nor gave up her claim. What are 10 or 20 years in the course of history after all. It is important however, that the people of East Germany not be deprived of their hope of eventual freedom, and recognition of the GDR would destroy the morale of the people of East Germany. The Chancellor emphasized that he can certainly not be called a nationalist. He would like to say that if he were sure that he could return the people of East Germany to freedom and a life in which they could again determine their own destiny, he would be prepared for any sacrifice, even if this should mean giving up the idea of reunification. But he could not raise his hand to assist any measure that would deprive these people of their hope for eventual freedom. The Chancellor then wished to add one more thing. The entire world was up in arms about colonialism and the need to set the African nations free. Actually, the Chancellor stated, the peoples of Africa, or at least many of them, were eating off golden plates and living much better than the people in the Soviet Zone, who were leading a most deplorable existence, much more so than the Africans of late. It would be inhuman to leave them under the Russian yoke indefinitely. The President then stated that he was most gratified by the amount of understanding the Germans have evidenced for the stand of the US in these matters. The Soviet and US positions, alas, were still very far apart and the President was not very optimistic that any good result would come from the forthcoming negotiations. Gromyko certainly had not made any concessions. The President had noted however, that in his discussions with Ambassador Kroll, Khrushchev had appeared somewhat less adamant than in the talks he had had with President Kennedy. Still there were many points of difference, and there was a good chance that the talks might be unsuccessful. The question to be decided then was what to do in that eventuality. For this reason the President felt that he must insist on all NATO partners keeping up their military commitments. He had recently read about the remarks made by a certain American officer at a reserve meeting to the effect that it was time to recall the troops sent overseas because of the Berlin crisis, now that the crisis was over. This was completely false reasoning and we had to maintain our strength all through the negotiations. Another point the President wanted to mention was that he felt that we were at present in a strong position. While the US no longer had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, he felt we still had the edge on the Soviet Union and therefore he feels we must try to negotiate now. At the same time we must approach these negotiations not feeling that we are being forced into them. It is not as though Khrushchev were taking us to the table. We should appear confident, and we are strong enough to protect our interests. That is the best attitude for achieving success.

The Chancellor stated that the West had made a big error in the past in that it did not know its own values. He understood that Mr. Kennedy was attempting to improve this situation and he wanted to congratulate him on this effort. The Chancellor understood that the President was endeavoring to enlighten the rest of the world on what Communism really is. He wanted to explain the position of the West and place the issue on the level of an intellectual challenge, which is more important than the possession of military divisions. The Chancellor has had a chance to speak with Mr. Lodge who, he understands, is to head up this international effort. The Chancellor hoped that this endeavor will really come about. Then he turned to the matter of Gromyko's making concessions. How could Gromyko make concessions in his talks with the President? The Chancellor recalled his experience with Ambassador Smirnov. On an occasion, when the Chancellor had doubted the Soviet Ambassador's statements, he had told the latter that it was easier to talk to Smirnov's master than to Smirnov himself, and Smirnov had answered that his master is permitted greater freedom of decision. The Chancellor then expressed his opinion that he was convinced that success can be achieved in the negotiations with the Soviets. If, however, too many concessions are made, the affair will register in the eyes of the world as a failure of the Free World under the leadership of the US. But he encouraged the President to be more optimistic about the future, since he himself had seen the change in fortunes in political life, and one must never lose courage. With one thing the Chancellor agrees however. He feels that the President is right in insisting that the other NATO partners must do more and that the Western Allies must remain militarily strong until the Soviet Union has given up its purely aggressive designs.

The President thanked the Chancellor for his visit and expressed his gratification at meeting Minister Strauss. He stated that Khrushchev had frequently mentioned Minister Strauss in their talks in Vienna. Of course, the President smiled, Mr. Khrushchev only says good things about people who are dead and everyone living is bad. Thus Khrushchev mentioned former Secretary of State Dulles as an example of a person with whom it had been possible to reach agreements. The value of the present discussions, the President said, was that there appeared to be mutual understanding between Germany and US of each other's problems and confidence in each other. The President had never had more necessary or more valuable meetings than these since he assumed his office. It was essential and vital for the US and Germany to proceed together. The problem before us is defense of the freedom of Europe and the President had told Khrushchev in Vienna that this is a matter of such vital importance to the US that this country has fought two wars to uphold it. In order to succeed we must have confidence in each other and we must remain in very close contact. In that connection the President reiterated that in view of the Chancellor's fear that it might not always be possible to reach the President in case of emergency, he had explained to him yesterday about the two-minute contact maintained at all times by phone or radio wherever the President went. He again mentioned the direct telephone lines to London and Paris and suggested that a similar arrangement be made with Bonn if it did not now exist.

The Chancellor indicated that he thought this was a good idea. He then thanked the President for his invitation to come to Washington and for taking so much of his time to have such exhaustive talks with him. The President had called these talks valuable, the Chancellor termed them extremely successful from the German point of view. He assured the President that he could always count on Germany to do her duty.

(Note: The German translation of the communiqué never appeared, so that there was no comparison of the texts, or for that matter, agreement on them, at this meeting. The Secretary and Foreign Minister Schroeder and V. Eckhardt left separately prior to the end of the meeting.)

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on December 1.

[2] For text of the communiqué as released, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 538-540.

[3] For an extract from Schroeder's speech at the National Press Club, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Band 7, pp. 953-954.

[4] In a conversation with Rusk at 9 a.m. Strauss had stated that the Germans would prefer to exclude discussion of the proliferation of nuclear weapons from the negotiations on Berlin. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1993)

[5] On November 26, when Strauss and McNamara discussed Berlin further, McNamara handed Strauss a rationale paper on U.S. strategy for the Berlin crisis. A memorandum of their conversation (I-19370/61), November 27, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 B 3542, 091 Germany. The meeting is also described in Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, p. 205.

222. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan[1]

Washington, November 22, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: The meeting with the Chancellor has been successful, in the main. He is clearly in favor of negotiation, and he has undertaken to do his best on this with General de Gaulle, to whom he is sending a letter tonight by Carstens. He agrees with the plan for an effort to concert an agreed position at a meeting of Western Foreign Ministers in December in Paris, in preparation for talks with the Soviets early in the New Year, probably at the Foreign Ministers level.

On substantive issues, too, we are closer to agreement, though differences remain. The Chancellor did not support the notion that the status of West Berlin is controlled by the Bonn basic law, and he noted that the offices of West German ministries in West Berlin could be reduced if at the same time the UN should put some offices in. He sees this as a problem of psychology, not principle.

On the Oder-Neisse, we still have differences. The Germans are willing to repeat their assurance that they plan no change by force. But they don't want to settle the Oder-Neisse matter in the context of Berlin. On our side we have indicated our support for de Gaulle's formula, but we have both agreed not to make an issue of it for now. The Chancellor himself is quite realistic on this point, but problems of internal politics weigh heavily here.

On dealings with the GDR we had no real trouble. The Germans quite understand that practical dealings will be necessary; they would rather have us do it; we would rather have them. I think it's not a serious difference. On recognition itself the Chancellor stands firm: I agreed with him.

On atomic weapons we have made clear our strong view that separate national nuclear capabilities on the Continent are bad.

We continue to press for a NATO solution instead. The Germans will stick to the policy stated in 1954, but again they don't want to make new statements in the context of a Berlin negotiation. The Chancellor made very clear his conviction that German unilateral ownership or control over nuclear weapons is undesirable, and Strauss expressed the same view; they agreed that their needs could be met within a multilateral framework.

On one point we strongly agreed: any negotiations must be directed firmly toward strengthened rights of access. The Germans will be quite forthcoming on other points, I am sure, if we can get something worth having on full and free access.

So we have come some distance and have still some distance to go. But the general tone of the meeting was good, and I believe we are now in a good position to work on General de Gaulle. My general impression is that the German Government is now more flexible than it has been in the past.

The Chancellor was very open and friendly, and his associates made a favorable impression on us. It was a much better meeting than my first encounter with him last April.[2]

Finally, I should report that we also discussed the military buildup. I was able to give the Chancellor an encouraging picture of our current estimate of the nuclear balance, but at the same time we agreed that the conventional buildup is of very great importance. I know the pressures and problems you face in this area, but I am sure you agree that the prospect of effective negotiation depends heavily on our ability to show unity and resolution on the military side. I know our military advisers are in close touch on technical aspects of these problems, but from the broad political point of view I think it is hard to overstate the value of any further military steps you can take as negotiations become more likely.

Sincerely,

John Kennedy

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret.

[2] See Documents 16 and 17.

223. Editorial Note

On November 25, 1961, Aleksei Adzhubei, editor of Izvestiia, interviewed President Kennedy. About half of the interview concerned Berlin, with the President reiterating the U.S. position that Allied rights of access to the city were the basic consideration for the United States. For the transcript of the interview, which was published in Izvestiia on November 28, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 741-752.

224. Letter From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Moscow, November 27, 1961.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I received your letter of November 15 in the last pouch and have now studied the documents enclosed with it.[2] Khrushchev's letter of November 9 is in substance probably the toughest statement of his position to date although couched in polite language. It certainly destroys any hope that might have been built up by his talks with Spaak and others and Gromyko's talks with you and the President, that a broad settlement of the Berlin-German problems is possible at this time. I find it particularly disturbing that this hard line coincides with the Soviet resumption of testing and the move against Finland. I have no satisfactory explanation but suggest the following factors may have played a role.

1) Khrushchev may have been misled by the Gromyko talks and the fact that some of his statements were not specifically rebutted.

2) Khrushchev may have been over-encouraged by the splits in the Western ranks. Important among these in my opinion is the apparent British tendency to compromise and particularly to accept at least de facto recognition of the GDR. Moreover, Soviet intelligence may have become aware that there are some people in West Germany who would be willing to sacrifice West Berlin by some formula which would obscure the fact that they were doing so. Kroll saw Khrushchev at 11 am on November 9th. Khrushchev's letter was almost certainly written after that interview and he may have gained the impression from Kroll that he could make as good a deal or better with the West Germans as with the Allies. Hence by taking a strong line with the President he has a double shot—one at trying to get a favorable agreement with the Allies and, if that fails, having a go with the Germans. If, in fact, the four point program which was leaked to the press that night came from the Soviets as I believe, Khrushchev has the added possibility of splitting the West by floating a reasonable-sounding plan publicly while being tough with the President privately.

3) Khrushchev is subject to pressures both within the Soviet Union and within the Bloc, and he could certainly use a success in foreign affairs. I am convinced that their agricultural failures are quite serious and that the de-Stalinization campaign will have deep and far-reaching effects.

4) Khrushchev is undoubtedly concerned at the weakness of the East German regime and is unwilling if not unable to assist it by massive economic aid.

5) Despite his disclaimer, the position taken in his letter is no doubt a negotiating one and I cannot believe he seriously would expect us to accept it.

6) Although he does not touch on it in his last letter, the Soviets seem convinced that West Germany will obtain atomic arms and doubtless wish to batten down the hatches before this happens. Along the same line, there are doubtless many Soviets who think that “certain circles” in the United States are bent upon the breakup of the communist empire even at the risk of war.

Turning to another aspect of the matter, I am puzzled by Khrushchev's continued use of this channel. Now that he knows that you and I are informed the logical assumption is that he wishes to keep it from someone in the Soviet Union. This could be from some of his colleagues in the Presidium or it could be the Soviet military. In view of his hard line and the over-all military disadvantages, I should think that of the two, the military is the more likely. Another possible explanation is that he might be using this correspondence to keep Ulbricht quiet while he publicly pursues a more conciliatory line. Along the same order of ideas, he may wish to keep the British persuaded that successful negotiations are possible, and to keep the French from getting ammunition with which to oppose negotiations. This brings up the question as to whether it would be wise to show this exchange secretly to Macmillan and possibly Home. I can see no possible advantage to the British in leaking it and it should have the effect of strengthening their position. It seems to me that unity in the West is the most important factor if we are to be successful in the difficult negotiations that lie ahead.

I should think the President should in reply express his shock at Khrushchev's position, state that evidently there is little hope for a broad agreement at this time but that we should at least make every effort to prevent war and that we are in course of working out our position with our Allies and will be in touch through other channels.

With all best wishes,

Tommy

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

[2] The letter is not printed. (Ibid.) Attached to it were Documents 162, 179, and 209 and a November 10 letter on Laos and Vietnam.

225. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany[1]

Washington, November 28, 1961, 6:34 p.m.

1526. Eyes only for Ambassador. If Chancellor's physical condition permits, you should request early appointment to deliver in person following letter from President. If appointment impossible letter should be sent to Chancellor by most expeditious means.

Begin Text:

I was very sorry to receive reports from Bonn over the weekend of your having to take to bed with the grippe. I sincerely hope this limitation of your activity is for the most part precaution and that you will soon be free to pick up your full schedule.

The extra strains you underwent during your successful visit to Washington last week no doubt contributed to your present physical difficulties. On the other hand, I cannot but feel, as I hope you do also, that the benefits of the trip offer some compensation for your discomfort. At whatever cost to yourself, you have done a great service for Western unity.

I regret that it will be impossible for you to carry out your original plan for a meeting with President de Gaulle on November 30, but I note that you will now be seeing him on December 9.

I should be less than frank if I did not tell you that I have been disappointed by what I have learned from Prime Minister Macmillan about his talks with President de Gaulle, particularly as to the latter's continuing negative attitude on the subject of negotiations.[2] As you know, we concluded during our conversations in Washington that negotiations with the Soviets, prior to signature of their separate peace treaty and based on a realistic and agreed Western negotiating position, are a necessary part of getting us through the present crisis so that we can pursue the larger common purposes which we discussed and which were reflected in our Joint Communiqué.

As you will recall, my own rationale underlying the approach to negotiations on which we agreed was set forth in some detail in my letter to you of October 13.[3] I continue to regard it as essential that we make an effort to achieve a satisfactory and peaceful resolution before moving on to the greater problem which a failure of diplomacy must bring. It is highly important that President de Gaulle be brought to accept this and that his Government join with us in utilizing all of the available resources of diplomacy. Failure to do this will create severe strains in the Western Alliance and set in motion a chain of causation which can only be detrimental to our common interests.

It seems obvious that President de Gaulle's attitude is significantly influenced by his estimate of what he considers to be German interests and reactions in this matter. He cannot, therefore, but be strongly and perhaps decisively influenced by the position which you and your Government take. You are in the best position to assure him that what we both believe to be the logic of history in the development of the Berlin crisis is not a necessary prelude to defeat but rather a source of strength and unity if the Alliance must meet its ultimate test.

You may wish to consider the desirability, even in advance of your meeting on December 9, of supplementing the letter which you sent President de Gaulle from Washington with a further letter making the point again that your Government does favor early negotiations with the Soviets and the Western initiatives which will be necessary to lead to them. If you see any useful way in which I might follow up on your own presentation to President de Gaulle, please let me know.

I regret that so much time and effort must be consumed in discussions of tactics and procedures within the Alliance, but I regard the present impasse as most serious and one from which we must make strenuous efforts to extricate ourselves. I know you are aware of this and share my concern about the effects on the Alliance which continued division must have. End text.

For Dowling:

1. British have informed us that Ambassador Steel has been instructed to see Chancellor as soon as possible to convey to him Macmillan's hope that when Chancellor visits de Gaulle, or in any message he may send should his visit be postponed, he will not fail to impress upon de Gaulle that German Government is definitely in favor of early negotiations with Soviets and that he will do his utmost to persuade him to modify his attitude.

2. British have informed us that French did not give impression that Adenauer letter sent via Carstens had been as positive about negotiations as we had anticipated. Implied Chancellor had not confirmed to French position he had taken in Washington in favor of negotiations and of proposal to concert agreed position at meeting of Western Foreign Ministers in December in Paris in preparation for talks with Soviets early in 1962, possibly at level of Foreign Ministers.

3. In event you are able to deliver letter to Chancellor in person, you should stress seriousness with which we regard continuation of impasse created by negative French attitude in face of unanimous feeling of other NATO countries that talks with Soviets are essential part of process either of resolving Berlin question peacefully or of preparing Alliance for ultimate confrontation.

4. You should also make point that effectiveness of Adenauer approach to de Gaulle will partly depend on degree to which latter convinced Germans not acting primarily because of US pressures but out of own conviction.

5. For further background and argumentation, you may draw on relevant briefing papers prepared for Adenauer visit copies of which pouched Bonn November 22.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Rusk and Bundy, and approved by Kohler.

[2] de Gaulle visited England November 24-26. On November 27 Macmillan wrote to President Kennedy summarizing his talks with de Gaulle. For text of this letter and a further description of the visit, see Pointing the Way, pp. 415-425.

[3] See Document 176.

226. National Security Action Memorandum No. 117[1]

Washington, November 29, 1961.

TO

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Contingency Planning on Berlin

In reviewing the latest reports on the status of contingency planning on Berlin, I do not find any contingency plan for the case of disturbance along the sector border which might lead to riots on both sides and possible rebellion in East Berlin. The recent protests of West Berliners, at a time of relatively low tension, suggest that one of the real possibilities in this situation is that we may have a citizen explosion of some sort at a later stage of the crisis.

I would like to have your recommendation as to possible courses of action in this range of contingencies. I recognize the difficulty of framing precise plans ahead of time for a matter so unpredictable as a civilian uprising, but it does seem to me that we should be thinking ahead on this one.

John F. Kennedy[2]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAMs. Top Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara and Taylor.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, December 1, 1961, 7:34 p.m.

769. Eyes only Clay. In reply to your 1056,[2] the President will want to have your promptest evaluation in any new situation arising in Berlin and your recommendations. Hence you should not hesitate use KY-9 phone to him or to me in such circumstances. President's decisions would be made in light of circumstances and instructions issued to all those responsible for execution. Command and other channels are in high state of readiness for just such purpose.

Reference stories out of Berlin attributing to Soviet sources statement that US troop movements autobahn are provocative, we are taking line that these are routine and normal exercise long established rights to be in Berlin and have free access thereto. Since these rights are utterly fundamental to us and involve issue of war and peace, it is important that we not accept their infringement on the one hand and, on the other, that we ourselves not distort significance their normal exercise. We do not ourselves wish to lend credence to Soviet charges by building up exercise of routine rights as something special. President is concerned to avoid giving Soviets any opportunity to divide Allies by a plausible claim that trouble originated in a US provocation.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-2461. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Kohler and the White House.

[2] In telegram 1056, November 24, Clay noted that his discussions in Washington at the time of Adenauer's visit did not limit his authority to telephone directly to Washington if conditions in Berlin warranted it. (Ibid.)

228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, December 1, 1961, 8:21 p.m.

3143. For Lyon from Kohler. Re urtel 2864 Dec 1.[2] Besides belaboring Alphand repeatedly in Quadripartite group as you may have noted from reporting telegrams, I had long private talk with him today on dismal prospects Paris meetings unless French loosen up. Recognizing that Adenauer was key to any change in de Gaulle's attitude toward negotiations as such, I said outlook hopeless for any progress or useful work unless French made clear distinction between tactical questions which could be left in abeyance and development of substantive positions on German and Berlin questions. Argued strongly that we had been doing precisely what Couve proposed last August in Paris. We had in effect deferred to French position on negotiations by suspending further explorations and tried to develop substantive positions as Couve himself proposed in Paris Foreign Ministers meeting. However during recent weeks French had apparently spread their disassociation to both aspects. In this connection I cited Tyler's report Laloy had unsuccessfully tried to get instructions to him on substantive paper and Couve de Murville's rueful question to Gavin as to what Foreign Ministers could do. Alphand confirmed inability get replies to his many requests for specific instructions on quadripartite papers. He indicated appreciation distinction between two aspects and intention of trying to get something done but did not seem hopeful. If you can give this line a boost it would help.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-161. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Kohler.

[2] Telegram 2864 reported Laloy's concern about the forthcoming Working Group meetings, since Adenauer, who was sick, had been unable to meet with de Gaulle as originally scheduled. (Ibid.)

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, December 2, 1961, noon.

1331. Re Deptel 1526 and mytel 1294.[2] Chancellor still confined to his home, unable to receive visitors, and therefore sent Osterheld to me this morning with letter for the President. Signed copy is being sent by air pouch. Following is our translation:

"My Dear Mr. President,

"Ambassador Dowling sent me your letter on November 29.[3] I thank you for it and especially for your friendly words about my visit to Washington. You may be assured, Mr. President, that I also think back on the days in the United States with happiness and with the greatest satisfaction. Compared to this my illness does not matter at all.

"It did not surprise me that the discussions between President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan had no very positive result. I regret this as much as you do. I am also in this regard completely of your view that it is extremely important not to give Khrushchev the impression that the West is disunited. Every indication of divergence on our side confirms Khrushchev in his conviction that the Alliance of the Free World still has no endurance and that it will therefore be possible for him to carry through his plans.

"As you know, I shall meet with President de Gaulle on December 9. I shall present to him your and my opinion and I shall do my best to convince him that we should not strengthen Khrushchev's hopes and that we must at least outwardly present an impression of complete agreement. As soon as I have returned from Paris I shall write to you.

"In the last several days I have thought over all that you said in Washington, among other points also the question of direct communication between Bonn and Washington. I would very much favor it if arrangements could be made so that you could also be reached from Bonn in a few minutes, just as it is already possible to reach you from London and Paris, as you told me.

"The days in Washington were very good.

"With heartfelt greetings, I am as always, Yours."

FYI. Osterheld informs me that for some reason Chancellor has not yet informed FonOff of the President's letter and expressly asked that I handle his reply. Presumably, Chancellor will tell FonOff of exchange in due time but until then Department should keep in mind that neither FonOff nor Grewe are aware of these letters.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.

[2] Telegram 1526 is printed as Document 225. Telegram 1294 is not printed.

[3] See Document 225.

230. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev[1]

Washington, December 2, 1961.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I enjoyed very much my talk with your son-in-law, Mr. Adzhubei.[2] His publication of the entire transcript of our interview was, I believe, a useful step in promoting better communications and public understanding among the citizens of our two countries. I was glad to hear from Mr. Adzhubei that you were in good health, having successfully weathered the arduous proceedings of your Party Congress.

Having previously replied to your letter of November 10 on Laos and Vietnam, I want to reply now to your letter of November 9 concerning Germany and Berlin.[3] Let me re-emphasize my strong desire that we not use this private and informal channel of communication to repeat the usual arguments and assertions normally reserved for public debates and propaganda. We should try instead to identify more clearly our areas of disagreement and areas of possible agreement on concrete matters presently before us.

Your son-in-law and I knew that there was little value in arguing over either our different social systems or our different views of history; and thus we largely avoided those subjects. Consequently I will save for a more appropriate time and place my comments in answer to yours as to who armed which party of Germany first, who violated the Potsdam agreements, why you ended the four-power administration of all Berlin, who is now abusing their presence in Berlin, or whether the Japanese Peace treaty is a precedent for a “treaty” with only part of Germany. Nor am I going to engage in a characterization of personalities, a repudiation of what may have appeared in some Western newspaper, or a repetition of the evidence which shows why I believe West Germany to be incapable of threatening your security.

Let us clear aside in this exchange these differences of view that apparently cannot be changed. And let us, to the extent possible, also refrain from using labels or adjectives that each of us may interpret differently—such as “occupation regime” or “free city”. Let us talk about our responsibility: the actual situations we face now, and the concrete changes which might be discussed to improve those situations. That is the only way in which this correspondence can be meaningful—the only way in which we can make certain that we understand each other clearly and can prevent the tide of events from slipping beyond our control—and the only way, finally, in which we can achieve the lasting peace we both so devoutly desire.

I was very serious in telling your son-in-law that our two nations have the most to lose from war and the most to gain from peace. The program of development which you outlined at your 22nd Party Congress, which was fully described in our press, must necessarily be carried out, as you state in your letter, under conditions of peace. The same is true of the programs I am seeking from the American Congress—to improve our people's health, education, housing, recreation and welfare, for example, as well as general employment opportunities and economic growth.

So, with peace as our goal, let us examine where we stand in more concrete terms. After reading your letter I think it particularly important that you should have my views on these important matters.

(1) Western forces are in West Berlin now—and they will remain there as long as the people of West Berlin want them to remain. This is in accordance with your own position that they must remain masters of their own fate.

(2) Soviet troops are not now in West Berlin, and would not in the future be needed there to guarantee our access any more than they are needed for that purpose now—and we could not under any circumstances agree to their being stationed there, I gather that you are not insisting on this and there does not seem to me, therefore, to be any need for us to become involved in long discussions in this matter except as a part of an all-Berlin solution.

(3) Western rights of access to West Berlin preceded and are independent of the Soviet Union's creation of the present East German regime. Their free exercise is a solemn obligation of the Soviet Government toward us. Those rights should therefore be confirmed and respected by any subsequent regime or any arrangement it purports to make. In no circumstances can we permit these rights to be subjected to the discretion of East German authorities, which might be subject to change; and surely you can understand how that would only increase the chances of unnecessary conflict.

While you may refer to these rights as “occupation” rights, our presence and access are not being imposed upon the West Berliners contrary to their will, and it is the “vanquished” population which is in a position to protest continuation of an occupation. Also, while these rights may not be consistent with your concept of a “free city”, they do mean the city is and will be free in the sense that the West Berliners are free to choose their own future and their own protectors of that future. But whatever those terms may mean in our different languages, these facts remain. And no treaty or other arrangement with the East Germans can alter these facts, inasmuch as West Berlin has never been a part of East German territory.

Consequently, when you propose to conclude with the East Germans a settlement recognizing and consolidating the situation as it actually is, and as it was created as a result of the war, you must surely agree that the present status of West Berlin, including the access and presence of Western forces and the absence of Soviet forces, is one of those situations—and that any realistic settlement must therefore start with these facts.

I am certain that you, as a realist, recognize that we cannot permit West Berlin to be separated involuntarily from the forces of the Western Powers when it is wholly clear that this is what the people of that city want, that these forces constitute a threat to no one, and that you are unwilling, as stated in your letter, to permit East Berlin to be separated from what is now called East Germany.

Let us instead agree on the two principles stated in your letter:

"Let West Berlin live and develop in the way its population wants” without “any restrictions on (its) ties with the outside world or on the access to that city of these or those states by land, sea and air."

If the people of West Berlin should ever decide that the presence of Western forces was no longer necessary or desirable, those forces will leave, without any loss of prestige. But should the people of West Berlin decide to the contrary, that should involve no loss of prestige for you, since you, too, have stated that they should be free to determine their own future. Nor does this “violate the sovereignty” of the East Germans, if any, inasmuch as West Berlin has, as I stated, never been a part of their territory, and therefore our rights in that city, including our rights of access and your responsibility therefor, cannot in any sense be terminated by any unilateral arrangements made with the East Germans.

I do not mean to imply by this that the Three Western Allied Powers and the Soviet Union cannot discuss a clarification and possible improvement of access rights. This is entirely proper, and should, in my opinion, be an important focus of any subsequent negotiations.

So let us avoid the dangers of unilateral actions, of dealing with one part of Germany only, and of abandoning agreements and goals to which both of us are legally committed. Instead let us explore together what we can do together—what joint actions for mutual benefit might be taken to improve the existing situation, without altering those situations that cannot now be altered, and consistent with our joint commitment to ultimate German self-determination. We have, as you point out, renounced force as a means of achieving that goal—but we cannot renounce the goal itself.

You state in your letter that I have not given you any “concrete” suggestions for the settlement of this matter. This is possibly true in a formal sense. But I am actively exploring with our allies our preparations for useful negotiations at the proper time. To enter into negotiations when under threat or pressure is no more feasible for us than for you. In addition, to enter into negotiations that might later collapse for lack of preparation or unity would surely heighten the dangers to the peace. I think you understand moreover, that this is not merely a question of American policy, but also involves the intimate association we have with our Western European Allies.

As you undoubtedly are aware, there has been some divergence of views among the Western Powers on the form and timing of negotiations. There are those who believe, as you have read, that there is such a gap between the positions taken by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers that negotiations would inevitably fail, and thus the situation would become even more unsatisfactory and dangerous than it is today. My own view is that, while there are serious divergences of opinion in regard to those matters before us, they must be considered in serious and responsible discussion—and that we should not permit the present situation, so fraught with the possibility of an explosive incident, to continue without our taking every possible step to ease the matter. I have expressed this view to the other Western Powers.

I am, therefore, hopeful that shortly after the representatives of the Western Powers have met in Paris this month we and you will be in a position to sit down in an agreed and appropriate manner to attempt to reach a solution that is mutually satisfactory to all.

I want to emphasize again that what best serves peace, not merely prestige, must be our chief yard-stick. It is not the effect on Western prestige but the effect on peace in your proposals that causes me concern—and I am anxious, as you are anxious, that we find solutions “on a mutually acceptable basis” which will preserve for years to come the peace we now enjoy. While I regret that this letter cannot now be more precise as to detail, I am hopeful that stating our views clearly on certain matters at issue will help make such steps possible at an early date.

Sincerely,[4]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking.

[2] See Document 223.

[3] The November 9 letter is printed as Document 209. For text of the President's November 16 reply on Vietnam and Laos, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 262 . Khrushchev's November 10 letter is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. For a summary, see ibid., vol. XXIV, Document 224 . For the full text, see ibid., vol. VI, Document 24 .

[4] Printed from an unsigned copy.

231. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy[1]

Washington, December 7, 1961.

This memorandum is in response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 117, November 29, 1961,[2] in which you raised some questions concerning a possible uprising in East Berlin in connection with the Berlin Crisis.

The Ambassadorial Group on December 1 approved on behalf of their governments an intelligence assessment of the likelihood of disturbances in East Germany and a paper on the Western attitude in the event of an uprising in East Germany or East Berlin, which have been under preparation for some time.[3] Copies of both are enclosed. The key passage in the latter paper says, “Whether any form of assistance might in fact be feasible and desirable could only be determined under circumstances then prevailing. Subject to this proviso, we do not believe that the West should, in the event of a revolt, give the population any encouragement or hold out any hope of material assistance despite the anticipated clamor for a strong reaction in the event of disturbances in East Germany in the immediate future.” A key passage of the Rules of Conduct portion of this paper says, “The temptation to cross the border might be very strong especially if the insurgents request assistance. But the only safe course would be for all persons—and especially all troops or uniformed officials—to stay on the Federal German or West Berlin side of the border."

The four delegations of the Ambassadorial Group are now forwarding these papers via capitals to US, UK, and French Missions in Bonn and Berlin and to the Federal Government, for their information and guidance. The Missions in Bonn and Berlin are being requested to implement the Rules of Conduct, in coordination with the German authorities and the Allied military authorities.

Your memorandum also raised the question of possible riots in West Berlin. The West Berlin and Allied military authorities have long had procedures for dealing with civil disturbances. They have recently revised these to take into account the construction of the wall and the particular problems regarding civil disorders which it creates.

If, despite the efforts of the West Berlin police and Allied military forces, disturbances along the wall got out of hand and led to riots in East Berlin, the Rules of Conduct referred to above would apply.

The enclosed papers only apply to uprisings which might occur in the absence of military operations. The Berlin Task Force has also been studying the relationship of unrest in East Germany to possible Allied military operations in connection with the Berlin problem. As soon as this study is completed, we shall examine the problems in the Ambassadorial Group.

Dean Rusk

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAM 117. Secret.

[2] Document 226.

[3] A summary of the Ambassadorial Group meeting on December 1 was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 1555, December 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-161) Neither of the papers, which were attached to the source text, is printed. On December 20 Taylor sent a memorandum to the President stating that the paper on Western responses to an uprising was weak and that it would be better to have no paper at all than one which announced in advance that the West would do nothing in the event of an uprising. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSAM 117)

232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, December 9, 1961, 7:43 p.m.

3316. Paris for Kohler[2] With reference to continued military movements over Autobahn, Department considers it essential they be maintained and conducted at fairly frequent intervals. Movements need not be large. In fact they probably should not exceed company size units. But they should be frequent enough so that Communists aware of them but will not feel challenged in such way that they forced take harassing action.

Moreover, in view publicity which preceded present battle group rotation and implied threats to movements of this kind that have come from Communist, particularly East German side during past few days, it would, in our view, be mistake to suspend further movements at this time and give Communists impressions they succeeded in intimidating us.

Department in touch with Defense and JCS this matter with view getting appropriate guidance along above lines to CINCEUR.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-961. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Klein (SOV) and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn and Berlin.

[2] Kohler was in Paris for a senior officials meeting December 7-10.

233. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State[1]

Paris, December 10, 1961, midnight.

Secto 2. Eyes only for the President. I had a good talk with Lucius Clay this afternoon and reviewed in considerable detail our policies regarding Berlin and Germany. I pointed out that on the one hand some of his concerns were based on local misunderstandings and on the other that he was performing an invaluable service in reporting such matters to us promptly for possible correction. I emphasized the points you made in our last private conversation and he appeared to take them seriously.

He will be in touch with me again this week but I do not believe that he will take any precipitate action which would embarrass the administration. He fully understands that you are carrying the primary load of firmness in Berlin and Germany, as contrasted with the general attitudes of most of our Allies, and that most of the concessions which have resulted in erosion of our position in Berlin were in fact made during the past eight years of a Republican administration. I am certain that he will not act hastily without full opportunity for further consultation.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1061. Secret; Niact. According to another copy this telegram was drafted by Rusk, who was in Paris attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000)

234. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, December 11, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

US/MC/11

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Secretary Rusk

Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Hillenbrand

United Kingdom

Lord Home

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Sir Anthony Rumbold

Mr. Ledwidge

France

M. Couve de Murville

Ambassador Alphand

M. Lucet

M. Laloy

Germany

Dr. Schroeder

Mr. Carstens

Ambassador Grewe

Mr. Krapf

SUBJECT

Berlin

Lord Home began the discussion by stressing the problem which would be created in the NATO Council unless the Four could clear up their differences prior to Wednesday. He requested information on the de Gaulle-Adenauer talks. Couve asked Schroeder to assess the results. The latter said this was not easy since most of the time on Saturday was spent in private conversations and the Foreign Ministers had participated only in the formal discussion towards the end of the afternoon. He could say that agreement had been reached on basic objectives but not to the same degree on procedure. Chancellor and he had taken the position on negotiations of which the others were aware from the recent Adenauer visit to Washington. The French had presented a number of impressive arguments which he would prefer to leave to Couve.

Couve said he wanted to begin from the beginning. The Berlin problem had been under discussion with the Soviets, directly or indirectly, for the past three years. This was not a question merely of the status of Berlin and the fate of its inhabitants, to the defense of which the three Western Powers were committed, but rather one vital to the future of Germany and therefore of Europe, including France, and important also to the UK and the US. It seemed to the French that the Soviets were moving not just to take Berlin but to change the entire situation in Central Europe and thus one step nearer their constant goal since the end of war of creating a satellite belt and neutralizing the rest of Europe.

This was why the French took the Berlin problem so seriously. Since the cutting of Berlin in two in August, the Soviet stress had been on these broader objectives. The pressure on East Germany caused by the refugee flow has greatly diminished. Hence, the Soviets could abandon the time limit for their peace treaty set for the end of the year. The Soviet offensive continued with growing emphasis on alleged German revanchism and with the Finnish action really aimed at Scandinavia. Moreover, in his talks with the Secretary in New York, Gromyko had linked Berlin to the all-German problems of security and boundaries.

The French recognized, Couve continued, that the essential problem of Europe would eventually have to be discussed with the Soviets in one way or another. They had had the illusion in May 1960 that this kind of discussion, including such related problems as disarmament, might take place. For various reasons the Summit had proved abortive. Nobody could exclude the possibility that such broad talks might be revived and the French were prepared for them, though they would not be easy. It was quite obvious that Berlin was not a question in itself for the Soviets but a means to an end, now that pressure to resolve the refugee problem has been eliminated. There was a tendency, he noted, to admit this might be true but then to argue that our business now was the threat to Berlin and that we must therefore offer the Soviets negotiations. The French position was that negotiations would neither be realistic nor useful. They would be unrealistic because they would not deal with the essence of the problem. He saw little prospect of a limited solution on Berlin. If the Soviet position on Berlin alone were taken—that the Occupation is outmoded and should be replaced by the status of a free and neutralized city, that there would be no relations with the Federal Republic except those agreed between us, thus excluding political relationships, and that the Berlin garrisons must go or be reduced to symbolic status for a certain period with Soviet units added—he could not see the West could gain any advantage. On access, the Soviets spoke both of freedom and also of respect for GDR sovereignty, and nobody knew precisely what the Soviets had in mind. Soviet demands were thus far from the position the West was prepared to discuss. In formal negotiations with Soviets the two sides would thus start far apart. Either the West would not budge and negotiations would rapidly collapse, or the West would find a way to compromise the present situation and accept at least part of the Soviet program. Nobody could say where this would lead. Once negotiations had begun it would be difficult to take the responsibility for a breakdown, and he did not believe the Western Powers would do this. It was very well to say that the West must negotiate from a position near the status quo, but it was clear it would have to deviate from this if talks were to succeed. The French also feared that the Soviets would ask for all-German concessions, especially on the military side, and that the Western Powers would end up discussing proposals leading to that neutralization which the Soviets had in mind.

Couve said he knew the question which the others would put to the French was what alternative they had in mind. He noted that in the August and September Ministerial meetings he had defended the position that the Western Powers had to remain strong and unified. They should say that they would not discuss Berlin under Soviet blackmail and threat. The Soviets were not going to risk war over Berlin any more than we were, and the situation could therefore continue for a long time. Two things had happened in the seven months since Vienna: the splitting of Berlin and the lifting of the time limit for a peace treaty. He could not see from the experience of recent months how anything had been lost by not proposing negotiations. The situation was in fact a little less bad. The Soviets and the GDR were compelled to take the risks involved in splitting Berlin, risks not from the West but from the East Germans. The action taken would have had to come at some point. It had been prepared for a long time in advance like the Soviet nuclear tests.

To sum up, Couve stated the real problem was not Berlin but Germany as a whole, which meant Europe. A severe weakening of the Western position in the world would come from offering negotiations which were tantamount to offering a compromise on Berlin. What Khrushchev had said in his speech on Saturday[2] confirmed the French position. He had derided the idea of a discussion limited to Berlin. The West should not fool itself. It could not improve the situation in Berlin but only make concessions. The only thing that mattered was the German question and this was the “real and only casus belli.” In response to a request by the Secretary that he elaborate, Couve said that, when it finally came to a showdown, this would be the point on which the West must fight because its life would be at stake. In response to a further question by the Secretary, Couve said he was referring not to signature of the peace treaty but to a situation where the Soviets would demand German withdrawal from NATO and removal of nuclear weapons from Germany. This did not mean the Berlin situation was not dangerous. He was aware of Western contingency plans but he did not think it would ever come to that.

Lord Home said it was obviously correct to say that Communist strategy was to weaken the position of the Western world and democracy everywhere, but he did not think we could therefore argue that the West should never try to find areas of agreement with the Soviets or to negotiate on anything. Negotiations were already under way on Laos, nuclear tests, and would begin again on disarmament. The probability of success was another question. Couve was correct in putting Berlin in the context of Germany, Europe, and the entire world. This did not mean it could not be the subject of negotiations. There were compelling reasons for at least beginning them. It might well destroy German morale if negotiations on Berlin led to concessions which would damage Germany in the future, but the deterioration of Berlin as now proceeding could also affect Germany. In August he had argued that the chances of deterioration in Berlin were very real, and the experience since August indicates that the city might simply wither away. He did not see how West Berlin could have an effective life until the current situation of uncertainty was settled. Couve had said Khrushchev might do nothing, but the chances were he would make his peace treaty with the GDR, thus putting additional power in the hands of Ulbricht who had his own interests in nibbling away at West Berlin. This process would begin almost at once and lead inevitably to a loss of confidence in Berlin.

The reason for arriving at an agreement on negotiations in the next two days was that the NATO members regarded the military build-up and negotiations as complementary. They would be unwilling to continue their build-up of strength unless there were a prospect of negotiations. The situation might lead to a serious rift in the Alliance.

Couve had said that the Soviet and Western positions were far apart, Home continued, but this was likewise true of other matters about which the West was willing to negotiate with the Soviets, such as disarmament. How could the West tell whether the Soviets were willing to accept reasonable arrangements on access and the status of West Berlin without negotiations? The subject of Western rights could be left aside. The Soviets could say they were ended and the West could say they were continued. In addition, the Western Powers could say they were there because the West Berliners wanted them. As to contacts between the Federal Republic and Berlin, the Soviets had said they could accept economic and cultural ties. The question of political ties might involve giving up such items as Bundestag meetings and certain other contacts which the Federal Republic might find it possible to relinquish. As to contacts with the East Germans, many of these already existed between East and West Germans. It might be possible to find a formula to express these contacts. Thus the West would eventually be trading facts of life which already exist for some compensation from the Soviets.

As to the nature of negotiations, Home added, the Foreign Ministers might have a wide-ranging global agenda including Germany and Berlin, or they could begin on the narrowest possible basis. If Khrushchev said the latter meant GDR must be recognized, the matter could be referred to deputies. Another possibility was that the Western Ambassadors in Moscow could make further probes with Gromyko. He did not favor this since the Soviets would merely say the Ambassadors did not have enough authority to discuss solutions, and might themselves ask for a Foreign Ministers' meeting. Therefore, he now believed, the West should ask for a Foreign Ministers' meeting either to discuss world affairs, including Germany and Berlin, or to begin on a narrow basis with a broadening out only if compensation were obtained from the Soviets each time a larger question were discussed.

In response to the Secretary's query as to the circumstances under which French might consider a general discussion with the Soviets could profitably be held, Couve pointed to the period at the end of 1959 and beginning of 1960 when an atmosphere of détente was “generated.” On this basis a Summit meeting had been agreed. He was not now pleading for a Summit meeting but for the idea that discussion with the Soviets should only be held in that kind of atmosphere if it should be possible one day to create this. This was different from discussions under the present circumstances of threat, blackmail and 100 megaton bombs. He did not see how the West could make any kind of dignified response to the last speech of Khrushchev which brought the situation back to July. Home said this depended on the kind of negotiations which the West obtained. It was better to have the situation stabilized than to have tension continue and Berlin run down.

Schroeder said he understood the French fears that once negotiations began the danger of broadening them to include Europe existed. The best way to diminish this danger was to enter negotiations with a firm Western agreement to keep to the narrowest possible basis. Many had said to the Federal Government that if negotiations had then been under way the events of August 13 would not have happened. This was perhaps incorrect but could not be refuted. The problem existed that, if in the foreseeable time no negotiations were launched offering reasonable prospects, the psychological deterioration in Berlin would increase and the city would disintegrate under the eyes of the West. This was the strongest reason in the German view for seeking negotiation. He also accepted the argument that continuation of the NATO build-up required negotiations. His government, therefore, supported negotiations on a narrow basis with as much agreement in advance as possible to avoid slippage during them.

Couve conceded that a great state of uncertainty existed in Berlin, with many planning to leave. This was almost inevitable in the circumstances, but he did not see how negotiations ending in failure with a big crisis, or in agreement on a change of status of the city would hearten the Berliners and keep them there. Speaking of the Western substantive position, he continued, the Working Group paper contained an ambiguity on the status of Berlin in saying that the source of rights would be maintained. What would be the legal authority of the so-called Occupation powers, who at present are sovereign and on this basis in 1949 opposed certain articles of the Basic Law? In the final analysis Berlin morale depended on the Western guarantee. Any acceptance of the new status which Soviets want would make Berlin morale disappear. This, in his view, was more important than the garrisons themselves. He did not say the occupation could be maintained forever, but it was the essence of the problem.

Home said that, from the viewpoint of West Berliners, if agreement on access underwritten by the West and the Soviets could be obtained, and attached to their peace treaty, this would be an improvement if the occupation status were not dropped on our side. The Soviets could say it was dead, but we could claim it remained. He wondered whether Couve would agree to a Foreign Ministers' meeting with a world-wide agenda which admittedly would quickly get to Berlin but might put the Soviets in a defensive position. Perhaps some compromise between the German and French positions on broad and narrow negotiations might thus be found, or there might be a series of meetings of Foreign Ministers. Couve said his concern was not the question of a broad or narrow agenda but that any negotiation, unless broken off (which the West would not accept the responsibility for), would lead to concessions the Soviet counterparts for which he did not see.

Home said that Gromyko in the New York talks had stressed recognition of the GDR. We could not accept this, but perhaps could use some formula which the GDR might find satisfactory. Gromyko was interested in frontiers. He did not want to say much about this now but he wondered why, in the same way as de Gaulle had previously put it, the Western Powers could not link a commitment on frontiers to eventual reunification, whether or not the Germans felt they could say something on the subject themselves. Such items dealt with the facts of life and did not concede anything if the West obtained an access arrangement which would help Berlin and West German morale. Couve observed that he saw nothing which the other side was willing to give which would be in the Western favor or provide assurance for the future. Facts of life on the Western side were that the Federal Republic is part of the West and a member of NATO and that West Berlin is also a part of the West, but the Soviets did not accept these facts. There must be a balance in acceptance of the facts of life, and the right of the Federal Republic and West Berlin to remain in the West must be the basis of any modus vivendi. Home commented that these were facts of life to which the West would stick through thick and thin. Other facts were also access and freedom of the city. He did not see how the facts of life as the basis of a deal made by the West need put us at a disadvantage.

The Secretary said he thought the Western world was confronted with a crisis in its contest against the Sino-Soviet Bloc of historical proportions. The Communists have made clear that they are serious about world revolution and will press for it where they can. In this sense we will be under pressure for a decade or longer and they from us. We will be exchanging threats and taking action against each other, and there will be periods of greater and lesser tension. Tensions will be reduced prior to negotiations and increased if negotiations fail. A serious problem which the Ministers had to think about was whether a lack of mutual confidence did not exist among themselves. To what extent were their problems not in regard to the Soviet Union but due to a lack of mutual confidence as to intentions and willingness and ability to work together? There was a crisis of the Alliance. He had thought the Western Powers were agreed that their basic position in West Berlin was a vital one, which, if challenged, would be a casus belli. If this were not agreed, we must find it out. The US position started with this premise. We did not look upon negotiations as involving a compromise giving away what otherwise would be a casus belli. We estimate, but do not know for sure, that the Soviets will not wage nuclear war over Berlin, but we could not assume that the Soviets would not risk war over Berlin. The Soviets may very well risk war over Berlin and he had assumed we would likewise. One of the quickest ways to have a nuclear war is to have the two sides persuaded that neither will fight. Precisely because a casus belli is involved in this situation it would be irresponsible for governments that have nuclear weapons under their control not to be in contact with each other even up to the last few seconds before the holocaust. If the West did not come away from these meetings with genuine unity the Soviets will indeed erode our position and the unity of the Alliance is unlikely to be repaired subsequently. He did not equate negotiations with surrender or concessions, the Secretary continued. In a certain sense the status quo is not negotiable and in an equal sense the Soviet proposals are not negotiable. To negotiate with the Soviets and to fail to reach agreement would still leave the status quo which could not be disturbed without war. The fact of negotiations does not commit the West to yield vital aspects of its position. The Western Powers had talked about Solution C. Perhaps there might be some way, in the face of important disagreements, to find a modus vivendi to avoid war. On the question of broad or narrow approach to opening negotiations, we have no strong or complete commitment but would be glad to work with our Allies to obtain a common view. We would be willing to start with narrow position, recognizing that the Soviets will almost inevitably raise broader questions. He wondered, the Secretary repeated, whether the difficulty was with the Soviets or lack of confidence in each other . When security questions arose in his talks with Gromyko, rumors regarding US disengagement intentions began to spread, although he had specifically told Gromyko this was not involved. We were willing to consider the wide-ranging negotiations Home had suggested, including, for example, Communist penetration of Southeast Asia, nuclear weapons, disarmament, and Germany and Berlin. Perhaps such a broad review by Foreign Ministers would be worthwhile. We had thought we could come to quicker agreement by starting on a narrow basis. We also agreed the Soviets could not try to sell us the same horse over and over again. The Jessup-Malik agreement in 1949 had recognized Western rights in Berlin without Western concessions. The situation had changed since then, but with great seriousness he wanted to point out that, apart from the need to keep in responsible contact with the Soviets on more dangerous subjects, we faced the problem of leading the West to maintain its strength and to unify its policies so as to deal effectively both with the Berlin situation and the broader long-run conflict with the Sino-Soviet bloc. He was quite sure that we could not call upon our own people to make a substantially increased effort and to face a great crisis if the impression were given that we were diplomatically sitting on our hands and not trying to find out what the alternatives were. This was also true of the Alliance as a whole which was being asked for extra effort.

He did not want to claim that much was achieved by the Rusk-Gromyko talks but several points emerged: a) Gromyko understood clearly there would be no GDR recognition and appeared to accept this. Their discussion of alternative proposals was based on such an understanding. This discussion was not satisfactory but Gromyko understood there would be no de facto or de jure recognition. b) Gromyko recognized that we are not going to talk with the East Germans but that any arrangement must be between Moscow and the West and the Soviets would impose it upon the GDR. c) The situation was helped by removal of the deadline. Whether or not the talks accomplished this, they did give the Soviets a pretext to explain their postponement of the year-end date. These items were procedural in character, and he must say that on the substance of their free city proposals the Soviet position had not changed. The Soviets know we will not accept their troops in West Berlin or interruption of access. Our problem here is to get Western agreement on a position, then to establish responsible contact with the Soviets to avoid getting beyond the point where governments could lose control of the situation.

Home said he agreed with the points made by the Secretary regarding Russian understanding of the non-negotiable aspects of the Western position. He did not think negotiations necessarily had to collapse or involve major concessions. The West might get something satisfactory out of them. Referring to Couve's citation of Khrushchev, the Secretary said he frankly wondered whether an impartial umpire, examining both recent Soviet and US statements on nuclear strength, particularly our capacity to destroy the Soviets even after a first strike against us, could decide who was being the most threatening.

Couve said he wanted to explain that as to the casus belli the French were in basic agreement with the US. The reason for any confusion was that the French did not think it very likely that the Soviets would go to war on Berlin. If it came to that, it would come to that. It was true to say that France did not want to go to war, and when he said the real casus belli is the future of Germany, that is where our real vital interests lie. He could agree that Berlin was where the Soviets had to be stopped, for this was a question of West Germany. The danger of negotiations is to be drawn into concessions, or if negotiations collapse, the situation would become worse than ever since there would be no further recourse. The Secretary argued that, if we did not talk, our position would be weakened, since we would be seeming to let the crisis develop without clarifying before the world our respective positions. Pressures would build up which, bit by bit would tend to break up the Alliance. Trying to get Allied agreement on contingency plans has proved difficult enough. Soviet salami tactics would further strain Allied unity. If we engage the other side in discussions and explain our position, then we can better maintain unity among us.

In response to a query from the Secretary, which he at first did not completely understand, Schroeder strongly maintained that neutralization is the last thing in the world the Germans want. The Federal Republic started from the viewpoint that it was permanently an integral part of the Western Alliance. This was the consistent policy of present and previous governments. The German attitude on negotiations had nothing to do with any fear that they would lead Germany away from the West which was the known Soviet goal. He indicated that, in revising the official government policy statement, he had in several places stricken the word “neutralization” and substituted “isolation.” It was true, of course, that certain proposals in the military field were believed to have a tendency to lead towards neutralization. As to Home's remarks on the Oder-Neisse Line, he added, these did not belong in this context. The occupying powers were bound by their 1954 agreements with the Federal Republic to discuss this question only with an all-German Government. The Secretary commented that the Soviets had as an objective just as much splitting off the US from the rest of Europe as the neutralization of Europe. The decision on these matters is clearly in our hands.

Home said he was glad that Schroeder had made such a strong point on neutralization and he hoped that this would remove one of Couve's fears. He wanted to reiterate again that the four must have agreed proposals to put to the NATO Ministerial Council on Wednesday along with a clear idea of what they hoped to get out of NATO. Otherwise, the Alliance would appear in a state of disarray.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on December 15. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

[2] For text of Khrushchev's address to the Fifth World Congress of the WFTU, December 9, see Pravda or Izvestiia, December 10, 1961.

235. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, December 11, 1961, 11 p.m.

1403. Following (our unofficial translation) message from Chancellor Adenauer to President just received. (Original being air pouched)

"Bonn, 11 Dec 1961

Dear Mr President:

You will have read the communiqué concerning the talks which President de Gaulle and I held in Paris on Dec 9.[2] The press reactions are not very positive, if for no other reason than that our press spokesmen said little; however, the result of the conversations is considerably better.

I spoke in complete privacy with President de Gaulle in the morning and in the afternoon of the 9th on each occasion for about two hours. The first portion, in the morning, was very difficult. In the afternoon we then achieved agreement, and indeed with the result that a conference with the Soviets about Berlin should be held, if it is established—preferably through diplomatic channels—that such a conference offers a prospect for agreement. President de Gaulle also declared himself agreed that France would drop its reserve, which it has hitherto displayed in talks of the Western powers, including talks on Berlin.

I believe that this is a relatively good result, and I am sure that the talks in Paris were very useful and valuable. It was not to be expected that President de Gaulle would publicly agree with our views immediately. His change in opinion should obviously become perceptible to public opinion, including that of his country, without causing sensation.

President de Gaulle and I also spoke about European questions and about NATO affairs. We parted in close understanding.

I believe that we should now for the time being await Khrushchev's reaction to my conversation with Amb Smirnov.[3]

I have just received your letter of December 9,[4] for which I sincerely thank you. From my talks with you, Mr President, and with General de Gaulle, I have become certain that the West will weather the endurance tests which lie before it, as long as we remain aware that Western solidarity is our most powerful weapon.

I shall see Ambassador Dowling tomorrow and I shall inform him about one or more further details of my Paris visit.[5]

With kind regards, As ever, Yours, K. Adenauer"

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/12-1161. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only.

[2] For the Chancellor's account of the meeting with de Gaulle and text of the communiqué, see Erinnerungen, 1959-1963, pp. 118-133.

[3] Adenauer had written to Kennedy on December 7 about his meeting with Smirnov on that day. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)

[4] This brief letter thanked the Chancellor for his report on the meeting with Smirnov. (Ibid.)

[5] Dowling transmitted a report on his meeting with the Chancellor in telegram 1407 from Bonn, December 12. (Ibid., Central Files, 651.62A/12-1261)

236. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, December 12, 1961, 10:30 a.m.

US/MC/12

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

French

M. Couve de Murville

M. Lucet

M. Laloy

M. Alphand

M. Mayer (Interpreter)

British

Lord Home

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Sir Anthony Rumbold

Mr. Killick

Germans

Dr. Schroeder

Dr. Carstens

Ambassador Grewe

Mr. Krapf

Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)

United States

The Secretary

Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Cash

SUBJECT

Negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin

M. Couve de Murville opened the meeting by asking if the group should now resume its discussion on Berlin.[2]

Lord Home said he would agree, but after lunch he had a few additional things he wished to say about the Congo.

Couve then asked what the group wished to discuss about Berlin.

The Secretary said he felt it was of the greatest importance that we come out of this meeting and the NATO meeting with obvious unity in the West. Otherwise there would be dangerous discouragements. He felt the differences disclosed in the discussions had not been as wide as it had seemed at first glance or as the press seemed to feel. We, ourselves, have not seen a basis for negotiations in the Soviet statements on Berlin. We are under no illusion that the Western position is negotiable with the Soviets. Khrushchev's proposals are not negotiable from our point of view. We do think it of the greatest importance to continue to discuss the matter with the Soviets, especially two or three specific problems. We have a very important domestic issue in the US, where we have called into service about 300,000 reservists some of whom are not happy. We have increased our military budget by 6 billion dollars and will add more in January. We have disturbed our situation at home to increase our strength, and it is, therefore, of the greatest importance to us to be able to say, as we get ready for war, that we are doing everything possible to avoid it. The American public does not expect concessions that would damage the Western position. The pressure of public opinion in negotiations would be for firmness.

The Berlin issue should be precipitated sooner rather than later in order to get a fresh commitment from the Soviet Union. We believe that they are in the process of improving their military weaponry, which will make it more difficult to deal with them in a year or eighteen months. We should recall the ICBM development. The Soviets very early said that they had a fully operational ICBM, and they seemed to think that this was all that was required. They moved with great confidence and aggressiveness. The ICBM illusion has now been dispelled in both their minds and ours by intelligence activities. Today they don't push political developments on the ICBM basis. However, they are presently saying that they have solved the anti-missile missile problem. We don't believe that these are in production, or that they will be for some time, but just a few anti-missile missiles could set them off on a renewed period of over-confidence and aggressiveness. Their recent tests indicate that there has been some significant technical advance in the nuclear field. Therefore, we don't want to drag out the discussion of Berlin, because in 12 or 18 months it may be more difficult to handle.

Our problem is not to assume that a basis for negotiations is already in existence but to see if a basis can be found. This can be accomplished only by responsible contact and by the participation of all four. The US would be uncomfortable doing this alone or with one or two others, in fact in any way except with the participation of all four. The question is how to be in responsible contact on an agreed basis to discover whether a basis for discussion of Berlin exists. There are many ways this could be done. This is the range of problems we might discuss to see if we can find a basis for agreement.

Lord Home said he was quite certain that our aim must be to come out of NATO united. The basis for negotiations is not apparent and may not be found, but it is just possible that it could be found after much discussion. Therefore, we must find out. The alternative is a possible nuclear war. We cannot break off contact. Maybe the Russians won't make war, but they might. Therefore, we really must find out, and we ought to do it all together. The results will affect all of us alike. This can be done in various ways. First of all, the Foreign Ministers might begin a discussion on a broad basis and proceed to a narrow basis or begin with a narrow basis and proceed to a broad basis. Or secondly, we might continue the discussions in Moscow. It might be most profitable for the Ambassadors to talk with Gromyko to discover whether there is, in fact, a basis for a Foreign Ministers' meeting on Berlin. Meeting through the Ambassadors would be normal diplomatic practice. It is hoped that something like this will be acceptable to all of us. If there is not agreement in NATO, very serious differences will be revealed to the public and do great damage.

Couve said he agreed that we might have difficult discussions in the North Atlantic Council where everyone was anxious to reach a settlement, get rid of the problem, and believe that everything was all right so that they would not have to worry or spend money. However, our difficulties with the Soviet Union are more important than those with our allies. Concerning the substance of the Secretary's remarks, the French had never taken a stand against the principle of negotiations. However, it is really not very useful or good for our position to enter negotiations in a situation where no basis for negotiations exists. We need only think of the recent Russian speeches to produce misgivings. However, there is no difficulty in accepting that explorations can be made to ascertain whether a basis for negotiations exists or not. If a basis appears, the French are quite ready to reconsider concerning formal negotiations. In the past explorations there were some discussions on the procedural aspects of the Berlin problem. Even the question concerning our relationship with the “GDR” remains unclear and might be further explored. There was some exploration of this and there was some mention of other problems, but it is fair to say that the substance of any Berlin status was not fully explored. It seems especially after the most recent Soviet speeches that it would be worth while exploring again with the Soviets the question of the status of Berlin, the garrisons, the question of with whom any agreement on access should be concluded, as well as the question which is so important for the Germans of the relations between the Federal Republic and the West Berliners. If that should be useful and could be done by diplomatic contact, he would not see any objections from the French side.

One thing probably would remain open to controversy, that is how any exploration should be made, by whom, and on whose behalf. That is the difficulty. The French do not wish to take a final position now. If explorations are made officially on behalf of all it is difficult to see how this is different from negotiations because all would be committed. He understood the Secretary's feeling that it was good for one to take the responsibility and not the others. This is quite clear. The French share this view. For the past three years and especially the last six months we have been discussing these matters every day. His idea would be that if there were any kind of approach in the discussion of further explorations on Berlin, it should not be the beginning of negotiations. He would prefer that it be done by one ambassador for reasons of convenience. One of the ambassadors in Moscow might make the exploration. He would not commit anyone not even his own Government. He might see what field should be covered and what questions there were to be raised, and where we needed to have a statement of the Russian position in order to see what we should do. We could then decide on negotiations, or wait, or proceed with explorations, or whatever. The French don't think we can have a systematic view under present circumstances. It is quite evident that the situation has changed since August, and it may be completely different in a month from now.

The Secretary said he thought we were moving in a constructive direction. In looking back to the talks with Gromyko, one of the things that had inhibited further development of an exploration for a possible basis of negotiation was that that kind of discussion tended to become a kind of negotiation. The Secretary had not felt much consensus. He had felt that the flanks and rear were exposed and that he could not explore very far. He didn't think there could be much difference in the degree of responsibility of involvement in exploratory talks and in actual negotiations. He didn't think that the US Ambassador could take a tentative position with the Soviet Union. He could not believe the Soviets would believe the Ambassador was not committing at least the US Government. The basis for negotiations is a long way down the road and can be reached only after further discussions, and there could not be a significant degree in differing responsibilities in exploration and negotiation. For explorations to move on, they would have to be quite precise. We have been categorical on some points, but there are aspects which cannot be developed except on a quadripartite basis.

Couve said he could see it was hard to draw the line.

Lord Home said that the choices were between a Foreign Ministers' meeting when they would be in a position to make commitments, or exploration by the Ambassadors obviously following a coordinated line which would be put to the Soviets without commitment. He would have thought the latter, though difficult, would not be impossible. We could give an indication of how we were thinking without being committed. There could perhaps be a series of Foreign Ministers' conferences with adjournments from time to time. We could work through the three Ambassadors with German support. This would be a laborious process, but it would be possible.

Couve said he did not think it would be inconceivable on the basis of the Khrushchev and Menshikov speeches[3] to go to Gromyko and say that we have noted them and ask whether this was in fact the Soviet position. We could ask for explanations. We could ask the Soviets if they think any negotiations with the West are possible on that basis. The Soviets would once again state their positions. We could then discuss this among ourselves and agree that it was not possible to negotiate on that basis. We could then say this to the Russians and see the result.

Lord Home said he thought it was possible to move the Soviets in an argument. Of course they could say that our occupation rights could not persist. We would say that they must. This subject might then be left aside with each side maintaining its own position.

Couve said that we had discussed this for two months at Geneva and then passed exclusively to Berlin discussing an interim arrangement. We then had the question of what would be the situation at the end of the interim arrangement. We had said we would start afresh without our rights having been prejudiced. Gromyko had never accepted this. He had never said yes or no. He had wanted to be free to say that all our rights had been abolished and that we would have to start anew with no rights. That was one reason why we had come to no agreement. If we had come to an agreement, we would have been in a bad position now not knowing what our position was in Berlin.

Lord Home said we would certainly know what our position was even though the Soviets denied it. He reiterated that he felt it was possible to argue the Soviets out of certain things.

Couve said it did not appear very encouraging to him and he wondered why it was necessary to make a statement now.

Schroeder said that it was difficult to know if the Soviets were proposing diplomatic negotiations, or if the Soviets felt contact should be through ambassadors, foreign ministers, or the summit. We don't know what lines the Soviets are thinking on, and it may be worth while to exchange views. There have been the Khrushchev and Menshikov speeches, the interviews with Spaak and Lange, and the letter to Fanfani,[4] all of which were only variations on the opening note the Soviets sent us in November 1958. If, as a matter of fact, a common line is found, for example that the three Ambassadors in Moscow would contact the Soviets, it would be useful to do this in close contact with the Germans, who would send experts to reinforce their Embassy in Moscow.

The Secretary said he felt it was very important to establish demonstrated unity among the Four and NATO in order to prevent the Soviets from getting a sense of disunity and to prevent fishing expeditions with Spaak, Fanfani, Lange, or one of the Four Powers. They will attempt to exploit disunity. Disunity on our part would be a serious political weakness.

Lord Home then said he would like to propose the following formula:

"The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken, on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers, in order to ascertain on what basis it might be possible to undertake formal negotiation at Foreign Minister level with the Soviet Government."

If we find a basis we would then have a Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that this was very close to the actual position. There could be negotiations if an adequate basis were found. This would not be found by public speeches but through discussions.

Couve said the NATO position was not the essential thing. The essential thing was our position vis-á-vis the Soviets. He knew there might be some NATO difficulties, but this should not influence us too much. The real issue is between us and the Soviets, not among the NATO allies.

The Secretary said he thought if there were agreement among the Four, there would not be any difficulty with the allies. If the Four disagreed there would be difficulty. It would be difficult to proceed if the rest of the allies seemed dissatisfied. It would weaken us in relation to the Soviet Union. The allies would come along if the Four were in agreement.

Lord Home said there would be real trouble in the Alliance if the Four could not agree. There was a feeling within the Alliance and even within the UK, that the military effort could not be sustained if at the same time we were not trying to find whether or not there was a basis for negotiation. He would have thought this should have been carried through jointly. He would have thought his formula was not far off.

The Secretary said that if there were no further talks in the weeks ahead, there was a real possibility that the Soviets would go ahead with their separate peace treaty. They might call a conference not limited to the Soviet bloc alone and might get the participation of a number of the Belgrade Powers. But if some activities were in the process it would be much more difficult for the Soviets to act.

Lord Home suggested the substitution of the phrase “on the basis of prior consultation” in his formula.

The Secretary said he would prefer the original wording. “Consultation” was too shadowy for the present situation.

The Secretary then read Mr. Kohler's suggestion for the NATO communiqué.[5]

Couve said his problem was always that this would be negotiation.

Lord Home said exploration would be all right, but exploration gets near to substance.

Couve said that if the formula were put in this way, it would be more on the side of negotiation than exploration.

Lord Home suggested that the meeting might adjourn for a few moments to consider his formula.

The Secretary said that in any event as much as was covered by the formula would occur and in a most disorderly fashion unless agreement were reached. The Soviets were going to play, and unless the matter were handled responsibly we would all suffer. He had been impressed recently with the large number of people who say they know how to get along with the Soviets. He had to admit he didn't.

The meeting then adjourned to consider the British formula informally.

[1] Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Cash and approved in S on December 15. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

[2] For the beginning of the discussion, see Document 234.

[3] For text of Khrushchev's address to the Fifth World Congress of the WFTU, December 9, see Pravda or Izvestiia, December 10, 1961; for extracts and a summary of Menshikov's speech at the National Press Club, December 11, see The New York Times, December 12, 1961.

[4] Spaak visited Moscow in September and Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange visited the week before the Western Foreign Ministers met in Paris. Khrushchev had written to Italian Prime Minister Fanfani on August 22, who in turn had sent a letter to Kennedy describing Khrushchev's approach. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume XIII .

[5] Not further identified.

237. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, December 12, 1961, 2:15 p.m.

US/MC/9

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin

Dr. Klein

Dr. Lemmer

Dr. Bahr

The Secretary

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Hillenbrand

SUBJECT

Berlin

The Secretary began by extending his condolences on the death yesterday of Senator Lipschitz. He then said he knew that sometimes the line to Berlin seemed a long one from Washington, and that he would be glad to try to answer any questions the Governing Mayor might have.

Brandt said that the most important political and psychological question for the Berliners was the relationship of the City to the Federal Republic. He did not know what the Western position was since he had not yet seen Foreign Minister Schroeder. However, there were reports of proposals for changes in the status of West Berlin which had caused fears. Any transformation of the City into an isolated area with only weak links to the Federal Republic would destroy confidence in the future. The Secretary said that, as a matter of international law, West Berlin was under tripartite occupation. This had led to the suspension of inconsistent articles of the Basic Law in 1949. Thus Berlin was not a Land of the Federal Republic under international law. It was essential to maintain occupation rights as a basis for access rights. The Federal Republic and Berlin could not provide such a basis between them for access rights. Thus the status of the City was intimately linked to access. We recognized that the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic were of utmost importance and we did not want to diminish them. The word “contract” had crept into discussions. We did not have in mind that the Federal Republic and Berlin should sit down to negotiate a contract. We would maintain as against the Soviets that West Berlin must have the right to work out its own arrangements with the rest of the world, including the Federal Republic. Many of these arrangements already existed. From an international law point of view these ties rest on consent. We are not suggesting that the constitution of the Federal Republic be changed as long as our position is not affected but vis-á-vis the Soviets we feel that the Occupation status of the City must continue as basis of access rights. Moreover, the Secretary continued, from the point of view of the US people, there was another factor. We had an absolute commitment to the security of West Berlin which was a casus belli all the way to the use of nuclear weapons if necessary. This was a complete commitment. It was easier to justify this as something we had undertaken on our own responsibility rather than as part of a NATO force. We would, therefore, sustain and protect the relationships between Berlin and the Federal Republic, but not on the basis of the Federal Republic's constitutional position.

Brandt pointed out that, even if one could not accept the legal concept of the Federal Republic, many legal and formal links between the two had been established with the consent of the three Occupation Powers, sometimes even at their request. West Berlin should not be regarded as an area with no obligations towards the West German State. The Secretary noted that there might be a difference in what we would say to the Soviets and to the Germans. If the Soviets take the position that East Berlin is not to be discussed, we could respond by saying they have no interest in West Berlin. We want to protect our position with respect to the Soviets. We recognize that intimate links have grown up between Berlin and the Federal Republic and that they are vital to the City. However, we could not expect to translate these into de jure links in any formal agreement with the Soviets.

Brandt said it might strengthen Western tactics if, on certain points, the Western Powers told the Soviets that they also had to take account of the commitments and agreements which they had with their Allies in West Germany and Berlin. The Secretary said he thought it would, in fact, work out this way. Brandt commented that the idea of a new contractual agreement could cause difficulties if the Soviets regarded themselves as silent partners. The Secretary said that, while the relations between the two were not constitutional relations, the Federal Republic and Berlin had links based on the mutual consent of the two. We had to be careful in dealing with the Soviets not to give them a chance to attack our access rights because of such an alleged constitutional relationship. In confidence, the Secretary continued, he wanted to tell Brandt that we wished to reserve the right to put to the Soviets, under certain circumstances, the possibility of making West Berlin the Eleventh Land of the Federal Republic by removing our suspension of the pertinent articles of the Basic Law.

Brandt asked whether the US would demand certain changes in the present situation in Berlin, e.g., removal of the wall. The Secretary said we would put forward an all-Berlin proposal which would cover restoration of free movement in Berlin, but we could not have very much hope that it would be accepted. Brandt agreed with this estimate but thought that it might be possible to get some additional movement between the parts of the City.

In response to the Secretary's inquiry as to whether the Mayor had any doubt as to the US commitment on Berlin, Brandt said he had none but that there were many people in the Federal Republic who had such doubts. He had made this point in a recent memorandum to the Chancellor and to party leaders in Bonn. The Chancellor himself had not been convinced before his visit to Washington. He had returned convinced and perhaps even a little frightened at the extent of the American commitment. Brandt said he also had the impression that the US was now somewhat more convinced that responsible German leaders were prepared to play their part in this serious commitment. The Secretary agreed that some of our doubts had been removed. He also thought that the point had been clarified in Khrushchev's mind, despite his speech on Saturday which did not change much. Khrushchev was perhaps not in the position of strength he had thought he was some eight or nine months ago. Brandt wondered whether he might not come to the same conclusion about his small chances of success in negotiations, as he apparently had prior to his breaking up the Summit meeting in 1960. The Secretary noted that, if the present situation merely dragged on and the Soviets turned over more and more of their responsibilities to the East Germans, this would be followed by a series of erosions. If so, he thought, we should try to pin the Soviets down specifically soon rather than just sit.

In response to Brandt's query as to the talks with Gromyko in New York, the Secretary said that the results had been essentially procedural: (a) the Soviets were aware that we would not recognize the GDR; (b) they were aware we would not negotiate with the GDR on access to West Berlin and that the Soviets would have to take care of any arrangements with us with the GDR; (c) removal of the deadline.

Brandt commented that, in an interview less than two weeks ago, CBS Correspondent Daniel Schorr had asked Ulbricht regarding the peace treaty. The latter had said he was convinced the GDR would get it in 1962 but did not specify when, and in general did not give a very clear impression. On the substantive side, the Secretary continued, Gromyko made no concessions but a certain clarification had been achieved such as his knowing we would not accept the Soviets in West Berlin.

In response to the Secretary's question, Brandt indicated that there had not been much recent discussion in Berlin about a UN role in the City. The Mayor said he had never believed in moving the UN headquarters there, and considered this unrealistic. However, UN agencies would be welcome in Berlin, although he was not “too enthusiastic” about the idea of replacing German agencies with UN agencies. The Secretary commented that we likewise did not believe in moving the UN headquarters to Berlin. This was both a matter of US national interest and prestige. However, movement of certain UN agencies there was another matter. Before his death, Dag Hammarskjold had expressed the view that the ECE might be moved there from Geneva.

Reviewing the current economic situation in Berlin, Brandt said it was better than people thought it would be under the circumstances. Production was increasing despite the heavy manpower losses incurred through the cutting in two of the City. There had been some out-flow of capital to West Germany, but the trend had begun to stabilize early in October and things were now as good as they could be. There was still some movement of people out but people were also starting to come in again. He did not want Berlin to turn into a ghetto and favored free movement of people in and out. Progress was being made on the project to establish West Berlin as a world educational and cultural center, and the efforts of the Federal Republic in this area were being concentrated in West Berlin. The City Government had set up a planning group, with representatives from business, government, trade unions and the universities to assist in this work. He had been fortunate in obtaining the services of Professor Schilling to replace the recently deceased Senator Hertz as Senator for Economics.

The Secretary asked what the other vulnerabilities of West Berlin would be if there were no military action against the City and present access could be maintained. Brandt said these were really negligible. The only weak spot was sewage disposal which is still handled by a common all-Berlin system. If this were disrupted, conditions in West Berlin would be very bad. The City would be forced to dump its sewage into the lake and canal system. This would, however, also badly affect the surrounding GDR areas. Hence there was a strong common interest in maintenance of the present sewage disposal system. As far as water, gas, electricity, and city transport were concerned, West Berlin was self-sufficient. As a matter of fact, Brandt continued, he was convinced that the Berliners could carry on during a certain period of blockade if there were trouble with access.

Brandt explained the various efforts being made to achieve at least a certain measure of movement over the sector boundaries in humane cases. The SED had so far refused permission for family visits over Christmas, but there were indications that General Watson's approach to the Soviet Commandant on this subject had been reported back to Moscow. Brandt favored discussion of this general subject in its broader terms at the Four-Power level to be followed by recommendations to the Germans to take care of the details.

In conclusion, the Secretary returned to the point that Khrushchev also has his worries—not only about the conditions in the Bloc but also in connection with the basic power situation between the Soviet Union and the US. He had been surprised and angered but impressed by the President's speech of July. He did not expect such a vigorous US reaction to his threats.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on December 13. The meeting was held at the U.S. Chancery.

238. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Paris, December 12, 1961, 4:15 p.m.

US/MC/10

QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING Paris, December 10-12, 1961

PARTICIPANTS

Germans

Foreign Minister Schroeder

State Secretary Carstens

Ambassador Grewe

Minister Krapf

Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)

British

Lord Home

Sir Pierson Dixon

Sir E. Shuckburgh

Mr. W. B. J. Ledwidge

French

Couve de Murville

Ambassador Alphand

M. Lucet

M. Laloy

M. Mayer (Interpreter)

US

The Secretary of State

Assistant Secretary Kohler

Ambassador Bohlen

Mr. Percival

SUBJECT

Berlin and Germany

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville opened the third quadripartite Foreign Ministers' meeting on Berlin and Germany with his apologies for being late to the afternoon meeting. He stated that the French Government did not believe it would be good to accept a statement of some kind or another of willingness to negotiate with the Soviets. Especially in view of recent Soviet statements, i.e. Khrushchev statements before the WFTU and Ambassador Menshikov's speech in Washington on December 11, 1961, the French Government felt that a readiness to negotiate would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of Western weakness. He repeated that the French Government was not opposed to Ambassadorial soundings being made in Moscow by one or several Ambassadors. The French, however, did not believe it would be good to state this willingness publicly or have it endorsed by the NATO Council. Such a statement of one kind or another would merely indicate a weakness in the Western position, he repeated.

Lord Home said he would like to pose a question. He believed that Couve had said he did not object to soundings by one or several Ambassadors in Moscow. He wondered whether this statement meant that the French Ambassador in Moscow would be ready to take part in such soundings.

Couve replied that he had not said that the French Ambassador would take part in such soundings. The French Ambassador in Moscow was always in touch with the Soviet Government but he would not now participate in the soundings which were under discussion. By the phrase “one or several Ambassadors”, he had meant that soundings could be undertaken by the American Ambassador or by the American Ambassador and the British Ambassador. It was his impression that the British would like to be associated with the American Ambassador's efforts as had been the case in New York with the Rusk-Gromyko talks.

Lord Home commented that Couve's position posed great difficulties for the four powers. He observed that the French indicated a willingness to see exploratory talks take place but it was difficult to understand why the French Ambassador should not take his share in these talks since the three powers were partners in the same alliance system and had similar responsibilities concerning Berlin.

Couve replied there was a very simple reason. The Soviet position was very clear to the French and had been made more so by the recent Soviet statements to which he had earlier referred. Therefore, the French saw no reason for the exploratory talks to take place.

At this point the Secretary asked for a fifteen-minute recess.

After the recess, Lord Home stated that he was very worried indeed. The French were taking the position that exploratory talks might weaken the Western position vis-a-vis the Soviets but it was a fact that within 24 hours the four Foreign Ministers would have to appear before the NATO Council without any position whatsoever with respect to negotiations. The NATO countries, however, insist upon negotiations and the differences which exist would become publicly known. If there were to be Western contacts with the Soviets, they should be based on an agreed Western position. Otherwise the West would be in a terribly weak position. The Soviets would take advantage of this situation to sow confusion in the NATO alliance which was undoubtedly one of their principal objectives. He asked whether the introduction of the adjective “exploratory” before the phrase “diplomatic talks” in the formula under discussion would help the French.[2]

The Secretary observed that the four Western powers seemed to be in a very grave position. The US had tried to explain why it believed it was necessary to make an approach to the Soviets to ascertain whether there was a possibility of negotiations due to the potentially grave threat to the peace which the Berlin situation posed. The US had no illusions or false hopes concerning the course of such negotiations which would not be easy. The US was not prepared to make concessions to the Soviets which might be regarded as unacceptable by the US and its allies. At the same time, the US saw the possibility that the crisis might become so acute as to lead to a nuclear war. In such a situation, it was imperative to have the complete support of and unity of views within the NATO alliance. He was obliged to wonder whether there is in fact an alliance. When there are overwhelming necessities in dealing with a given and specific situation and this feeling is completely shared by the alliance, the US feels that each member country should overcome its marginal doubts about a particular move so that the alliance can take unified action. He said he was appalled at the possibility of what might happen if the Foreign Ministers left this and the NATO ministerial meetings in obvious disarray. The Secretary asked how the French Government foresaw the most probable course of events if the four Foreign Ministers adopted the view that: there should be no negotiations with the Soviet Union, no exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, and no contacts with the Soviet Union on an agreed Western basis.

Couve responded that the Secretary had mentioned two matters: the alliance and its attitudes and what should be the appropriate course of action now taken by the four Western powers. As to the first, he did not doubt that most of his NATO colleagues yearn for negotiations. It was quite evident that a majority of the NATO countries desired negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin. I think, he said, that France and the United States are very much in agreement on the substance of their position. He did not think that the US had decided to or envisaged making any concessions, even on the status of Berlin, which would endanger Berlin. The French-US difference was on tactics. I would not, however, he said, say the same thing for all the NATO countries, for many of them at the bottom of their hearts do not share our view of what must be maintained in Berlin. One of the differences is in assessing the importance of NATO country attitudes. Concerning the second matter, he said the problem was what should be the Western course of action. The answer to this mainly depended on the Western estimate of Soviet intentions. He doubted that the Soviets would take a major risk over Berlin. He said the Soviets wished to obtain their objectives by frightening the West. They have already removed their time limit on signing a separate peace treaty. While he did not know the future, he doubted that there was a great risk to be run and that the Soviets would lead the West to war. He asserted that if the West takes no action, the Soviets will be embarrassed and not know what step to take next.

When the Secretary commented that if this was the case, both sides would be in an equal position, Couve replied that this might be the case. Nevertheless, it was the Soviets, not the West, who wished to make changes with respect to Berlin.

Lord Home observed that he did not believe that the NATO nations want negotiations for negotiations' sake. NATO did not favor the “sacrifice” of Berlin. If the NATO nations, however, are to make the sacrifices and great efforts needed to face the Soviet challenge over Berlin and possibly be asked for more sacrifices, then they must be satisfied that every avenue be explored with the Soviets. He wondered if the Foreign Ministers could not agree at least to exploratory talks being undertaken with the Soviet Union so that there would be some position to present to the NATO Council.

Couve replied that all thinking about the situation returned to the same basic thought. What was important to the Foreign Ministers, in his view, was not what the NATO Council might think but what the Soviet Union thinks and intends. He opined that if the West showed a willingness for or a desire for negotiations at a time when the Soviets are acting as they recently have, the Soviets will believe the West is both frightened and weak and is therefore, requesting negotiations. Even an outsider, he said, would then judge that NATO had demonstrated its weakness in the face of Soviet threats.

Lord Home countered that it was clear what the Soviets would think about NATO if the four Western powers could not even talk about exploratory talks with the Soviets. In such a situation the NATO countries would publicly demand negotiations. He could not understand why, if the French did not object to exploratory talks, they did object to exploratory talks on the basis of agreed positions. He noted that the formula considered in the morning merely called for contacts with the Soviets. He wondered if the Foreign Ministers could not take the position that recent Soviet statements indicated that Khrushchev showed no current interest in serious negotiations but that if Gromyko wished serious negotiations, the Western Ambassadors in Moscow would always be available to receive any initiative Gromyko might wish to make. Thereby, the onus for further initiatives could be put on the Soviets.

The Secretary stated he could not accept this concept, for important and vital interests were involved. He was not certain that all the governments participating in the consultation with respect to Berlin and Germany were aware that war might result from the current situation. There was a basic casus belli involved in the situation. The American people, he said, would only go to war with good consciences. They would wish to believe that they were fighting for a just and honorable purpose. He would prefer not to take up Lord Home's concept since the West could not leave to the Soviets alone the decision as to whether or not anything more should be said concerning the problem of Berlin and Germany.

Lord Home replied that he was not particularly taken with his own idea which he had merely advanced in the hope that it might be something with which the French could agree.

Foreign Minister Schroeder stated that he had two particular comments to make. He wanted to emphasize that the German delegation had just learned about the Menshikov speech in Washington during the course of the morning. He had not had an opportunity to read a complete text of what Menshikov had said. From the press accounts, however, he could only conclude that Menshikov had repeated most of the ideas contained in the Soviet November 1958 note with certain minor differences with respect to military matters. Menshikov had also rejected the idea of an international access guarantee. Most of the statements which the Soviets make, in his opinion, seem to repeat the demands of 1958. At the same time, the Soviets are faced with a similarly clear purpose and firm Western position which has rejected most of the Soviet argumentation. There is a great gulf between the positions of the two sides. But nothing obliges the West to believe that it does not have some chance to bring about a shift in the Soviet position which was the purpose of the formula suggested during the morning session. What the West wishes to explore is the possibility of reducing Soviet demands. In his opinion, the West should proceed with further exploratory talks without illusions towards goals on which the West is united. The West was agreed on objectives. The current principal difference was on tactics. If the West is to engage in exploratory conversations with the Soviets, it should be done on the basis of a unified agreed NATO supported position, for only in this manner would the Western effort be impressive to the Soviets. If the Western position was not solid and unified, the Soviets would exploit Western differences. In his opinion, unity of purpose and unity of objectives would be supported and clearly demonstrated if there were procedural unity. The procedure suggested in the formula involved no commitments. Equally decisive was the fact that diplomatic efforts had to be accompanied by the NATO military build-up. He agreed with Secretary Rusk that public acceptance and support were required not only for the military build-up but also for the Western position in general, and that Western public opinion would not be satisfied unless it was certain that the Western governments had fully explored the Soviet position. He did not believe that the procedure suggested was harmful even though the French argued that it was due to the two recent Soviet statements. What was more harmful was that if the West seemed in a state of confusion the Soviets would try to cause more trouble. He opined that the Soviets interpreted unified Western action as a sign of Western strength and thought that it represented an effort on the West's part to nail them down in an effort to come to a solution of the Berlin problem. Therefore he believed that the Foreign Ministers should agree to further exploratory talks with the Soviets to see if a real basis for negotiations might exist.

Couve responded by asking whether anyone thought that, exposed to the current trial of strength, the best reply to the Soviets was an expression of willingness to negotiate. He thought that Western display of anxiety to negotiate would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness and as a sign of Western sensitivity to Soviet intimidation. The best response, in his opinion, to Soviet tactics was to say that if the Soviets behaved badly, there would be no negotiations.

Foreign Minister Schroeder reiterated that in his opinion the recent Soviet statements were largely repetitive of previous positions. One of the difficulties is that the Soviets keep publicly answering public statements by Western leaders and thus restrict the area of negotiating flexibility. In his view, it was necessary to let the Soviets know that we could not accept their contentions but that we were willing on the diplomatic level, not in the public arena, to see if there was not some real basis for a negotiated settlement. In some circumstances he might agree with Couve's views but there were two important factors to be borne in mind. In the first place, the Soviet Union was in a position to create changes with respect to Berlin to the West's disadvantage. Either we responded to Soviet salami tactics with protests only or the West had to react more strongly to Soviet moves which might require serious military actions. Serious military steps, however, could not be taken until public opinion was convinced that there was a necessity for such action and was convinced that it was necessary for the West to stand and fight if need be. One cannot, he said, always wait for what appears to be a more propitious time for conversation. The enemy was materially and psychologically in a position to exert strong pressure on the West. He felt it was essential to explore the Soviet position further before the Western area of maneuverability and flexibility was again narrowed.

The Secretary observed that if the Soviets in two different recent speeches on two different days had prevented the West from moving forward together in unity, then these speeches would be two of the most fantastically productive speeches ever made. In a certain sense what the four countries thought was of a major importance was of major significance because of their responsibilities. But it was also important that the NATO alliance display unity. Other countries of the alliance also had their vital interests. An appearance of complete NATO disagreement would make Khrushchev more bold. If he were convinced there was no NATO unity and agreement on how to deal with the Berlin crisis, he might gain the impression that the Western alliance was gravely weakened. This might seriously increase the dangers of miscalculation on his part. In all frankness and good will, he felt obliged to say that he had thought the four Western powers were agreed on the substance of their position. He had to confess, however, that if the most minimum move to develop the substance of the Soviet position was rejected, the U.S. would have to review the whole situation to see if it and its allies were in fact agreed on substance. It would appear that review would be necessary to ascertain whether all four powers had the same objectives. Maybe, he said, Khrushchev is trying to prevent negotiations and will go ahead and sign his separate peace treaty and thus initiate a grave crisis. On the other hand, he may let his threatening campaign peter out. In any case, large risks are involved which must be clarified. The Secretary stated that it would be helpful to him for the four Foreign Ministers to speak alone in private for he was obliged to report to the President and he wanted to clearly understand the French position. After this conversation, he thought it would be possible for the Ministers to determine what might be said in the NATO Council and what should be said to the Press.

Lord Home supported the Secretary's request. He stated that the possibilities of an understanding should be thoroughly exhausted for otherwise “disaster stares us in the face”.

A private meeting followed in which the Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again at 9:45 pm, December 12, 1961.[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1261. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Percival and approved in S on December 13. The meeting was held at the Quai d'Orsay.

[2] See Document 236.

[3] No record of this meeting has been found.

239. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and President de Gaulle[1]

December 12, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS

The President of the United States

President de Gaulle

Acting Secretary of State George W. Ball

Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President

Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR

The object of the call, which was placed by the President on the recommendation of Secretary Rusk (who was in Paris at the time), was to try to get de Gaulle to agree to the following text which had been agreed to by the four Foreign Ministers (US, UK, French and German) in Paris, but which de Gaulle had refused to accept:

"The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers in order to ascertain on what basis it might be possible to undertake formal negotiation at Foreign Minister level with the Soviet Government."

The President told de Gaulle how important it was that Allied unity be maintained, and that we all together move forward in order to try to find a basis for negotiations with the Soviet Government. The President said he hoped that de Gaulle would find it possible to agree to the foregoing text.

de Gaulle said he had two objections: (1) The text referred to “diplomatic contacts”, but did not specify by whom, and (2) it mentioned “on the basis of the agreed positions of the Western Powers”, whereas there were no such agreed positions in so far as France was concerned.

The President stressed his concern at the fact that our positions should be different at a time when we may be finding ourselves close to war. He said he felt that every effort should be made to bridge the gap between us, in order to impress Khrushchev with our unity, and to find an acceptable basis for negotiation. In this way, we would have the whole alliance with us and we would be all together. We would see whether a basis for negotiation existed, and if it did not, we would have lost nothing and we would have demonstrated our unity. We could then see what should be done.

de Gaulle said he could not agree to any language which stated or implied that France considered that it was wise to undertake, or to move toward, negotiations with the Russians. He said over and over again in different terms, that Khrushchev does not want war, that therefore he will not start a war, that the thing for the West to do is to stay put and let Khrushchev come forward with his proposals for negotiation. de Gaulle said that he was not opposed to contacts being undertaken if certain countries wanted to do so, but this was up to them, and France did not wish to be drawn into negotiations because of such contacts.

de Gaulle then suggested that the text in question should contain some such words as: “The NATO Council would approve a proposal that certain countries should continue contacts by diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union."

The President objected that the use of the words “certain countries” would emphasize differences of opinion within the NATO Council, and that the word “continue” would imply that such contacts would be bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was not desirable.

de Gaulle then proposed that the word “undertaken” should be used instead of “continue”, and that the language be left vague with regard to what countries should undertake the contacts.

de Gaulle then proceeded to object to the second half of the foregoing text on the grounds that it went too far in implying that France might be prepared to undertake negotiations with the Soviet Union. He reiterated his strong conviction that it was unwise to make any move toward negotiation at this time, and that France would not be a party to any language which implied that it might, even under certain conditions, be prepared to do so. He said again that it was up to Khrushchev to come forward with his proposals.

de Gaulle made several suggestions, from which it proved possible to arrive at the following agreed text:

"The NATO Council would approve a proposal that diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union be undertaken in the direction which the West is following in order to preserve world peace. The Council hopes that these contacts may serve to ascertain if a basis might be found for negotiations."

The President tried hard to get de Gaulle to accept “on the basis of carefully prepared positions” before the words “in the direction”, but de Gaulle was adamant. First of all, he said that diplomatic contacts were usually preceded by careful preparation and that the proposed language was, therefore, redundant; then he said that in any case this language was obnoxious because it implied that there existed agreed positions between France and her Allies, which is not the case.

The President asked whether de Gaulle thought that it might be possible for France ever to reach agreed positions with her Allies on the subject of negotiations with regard to Berlin, to which de Gaulle replied that there could not be agreement on the point at issue, which was that whereas we felt we should move toward negotiations with the Russians, he, de Gaulle, was of the opposite opinion.

In conclusion, the President thanked de Gaulle for his consideration of these matters, and said he was glad to have had this chance of talking to him. He said he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should now discuss the problem further, and that he would like to call de Gaulle again tomorrow or the next day, should he consider it desirable. de Gaulle said he would be glad to talk to the President again at any time.[2]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, France/Security. No classification marking. Drafted by Tyler who interpreted for the President. President Kennedy was in Washington; President de Gaulle was in Paris. According to Bundy's record of this conversation, it took place about 1:15 p.m., following a Rusk-Kennedy conversation in which Rusk explained that only the President could change de Gaulle's position on the statement. (Memorandum for the record; ibid.) For de Gaulle's reaction to the telephone call, see Alphand, L'Etonnement d'etre, p. 366.

[2] The Foreign Ministers discussed the agreed text at 9:45 p.m. and how it might be presented to the North Atlantic Council. (US/MC/13; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2000) It was subsequently discussed by the Council on December 15. (Polto Circular 76, December 16; ibid., Central Files, 375/12-1661) For the final text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 505-508.

240. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy[1]

Moscow, December 13, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Within a short period of time I had an opportunity to read two [of] your messages—one addressed to our country and the other, a confidential one, to me personally.[2]

I want to express appreciation for those kind words and wishes which were addressed by you to me in the talk with A.I. Adzhubei. I am satisfied, as you are, that this interesting interview has taken place and would like to hope, together with you, that it will contribute to better understanding between our countries. I think you did not expect that we would agree with all your observations. Nevertheless, I would say that some of the ideas expressed by you sound encouraging.

Yes, the Soviet Union and the United States of America must live in peace with each other. They must build their relations on the basis of reason, of due regard for the real situation, and of mutual respect, on the basis of the establishing of the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems in international affairs. This is the only right and sound basis for cooperation and securing of a lasting and stable peace. It is my most ardent desire that it would not remain only a dream and not become a mirage, that creates nothing but false hopes.

But allow me to return to your letter of December 2. I read with satisfaction the words to the effect that our personal and unofficial exchange should not be used for the repetition of arguments and statements usually resorted to in public debates and propaganda. Being in a complete agreement with that I expected to find in your letter something new, not things which I saw many times on the pages of Western newspapers and magazines which are still afraid of fresh air and prefer a stuffy and poisoned atmosphere of the “cold war” but, frankly, I was disappointed because while reading the letter I was finding exactly what you, yourself, have cautioned against.

In your letter you, Mr. President, found it necessary to formulate flatly the demands which must as one may understand you, be accepted without fail by the Soviet Union as a condition for negotiation on the settlement of the German problem. There is hardly any need to say whether it is proper or improper to put forward to one another any preliminary conditions for negotiations? I think there can be no two opinions here. And therefore, leaving aside this question, I would like to express frankly my opinion on the substance of these conditions.

First of all, you state that the troops of the USA, Great Britain and France “will stay in West Berlin as long as the people of West Berlin want them to stay”. It could sound as an ultimatum. But even most die-hard politicians in the West understand now that one cannot speak such language with us. Then, there must be something else in it. Frankly speaking, it is not difficult to understand that an attempt to make the presence of the troops of the three powers in West Berlin dependent on “the will of the population” reflects in effect a desire to create a new basis for their presence there. Evidently, the US Government also has inwardly come to the conclusion that to try now, 16 years after the end of the war, to base its claims upon the right of occupation or the right of a victor, or, as some say in the US, upon the right of the conquest, does not meet either the norms of international law or the spirit of time.

The approach to this question advocated in the letter in all desire cannot be accepted as valid and still less as meeting the aims of the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. As a matter of fact, Mr. President, the troops of the USA, Britain and France came to West Berlin, as known, neither on the request of the population nor for its protection. The purpose of their stationing there—let us be frank with each other—was entirely different from that of which you write in your letter. You want us to recognize now all the changes which have been unilaterally made by the Western powers in West Berlin, and not only in West Berlin, and to stand obediently on guard of the present rights of the USA, Britain and France on which we have never made any agreement with you. For to call a spade a spade we are now acting as traffic cops for the movement of the NATO troops into West Berlin. I emphasize that these are the NATO troops because American, British and French troops stationed in West Berlin are part and parcel of the armed forces of this bloc. And as to the intentions of the NATO with regard to the Soviet Union and our allies we are well informed of them.

You demand that contrary to common sense we continue to be traffic cops on the roads to West Berlin, and your temporary occupational rights become permanent there. How one can count on reaching an agreement on such a basis? This is not the way things happen in life, in any case we cannot agree to this.

You yourself note that it is necessary to avoid “the danger of unilateral actions”, to avoid repudiation “of agreements and goals that both of us have legally assumed”. But why should this wish concern the Soviet Union only? In your letter unfortunately I couldn't find any signs of recognition of reciprocity.

It seems that it is not necessary for me to repeat what were the major points in our agreements on Germany which now—not through our fault—are actually not exercised.

Occupation of any given territory is a temporary measure—this is exactly how it was written down in the corresponding agreements on Germany. Occupational rights can naturally be valid only till the state of war exists. Strictly speaking already now, occupation ought to have been ended since state of war with Germany was terminated by unilateral statements. In any case there can be no place left for it after a peace treaty has been concluded.

One may think that it is a desire to have at any cost its troops in West Berlin that prevents the US from taking part in a peaceful German settlement. You should understand us, Mr. President—and I believe you do—even if the US threatens us, tests our nerves and will, we cannot and will never agree to the prolongation of occupational order, we will struggle for our rights, for a real normalization of the situation in the center of Europe. We cannot be the guards of anybody's occupational rights forever. Sometimes an end must come to all that. Even enslaving agreements have time provisions, let us say, 99 years. Even matrimonial ties, confirmed by church and law, sometimes weaken with time and break. For example, your countryman Mr. Rockefeller, having lived with his wife for 30 years decided to break up the marriage. No use to go into the reasons that caused this divorce but in all probability there must have been some.

As for you, you do not set any time limit. You mean—forever, though you do not use this word. Do they in Western countries expect that socialist system in the GDR will outlive itself and then the German problem will be solved in the way these countries want? But socialism is a progressive vital system, it has no time limit, it will constantly develop and strengthen.

One cannot count on its liquidation. And if that is the reason for the desire to keep forever the regime of occupation in West Berlin—it is a strange, separated-from-life philosophy.

It can rest—excuse my harsh judgements—only on the megalomania, on an intention to act from the position of strength, though at our meeting in Vienna we, it seems, came to joint conclusion that strength and threats are not the argument which leads to mutual understanding.

True, you say that you denounce force as a means for achieving goals. I understand you did not want to say that you are displaying generosity otherwise it would sound humiliating. It is well known that in politics just as in physics every action causes counteraction, and application of force or repudiation of its use are connected, to speak in broad terms, not with the nature of character of one or another statesman but first of all with the actual state of affairs, with the balance of power which makes peaceful settlement of all disputable questions a pressing necessity now and in the future. We have always deemed it unreasonable to orientate ourselves in politics on strength and we call on other governments to do the same.

In defense of your position you refer to the rights and interests of the population of West Berlin. But you, Mr. President, are certainly aware that no one of the socialist countries is infringing upon these rights and interests. We have always proceeded from the fact that it is an internal affair of the population of one or another state to choose its social, political and economic system.

The Soviet Union is ready to declare solemnly and to confirm in a treaty, in any international act the right of the West Berlin population to be the masters of their destiny, to live without any interference from outside, the right of West Berlin for unimpeded ties with the outside would. But we cannot recognize and will not recognize any right for the West Berlin population to call foreign troops into West Berlin since this affects the security of many states. We are for safeguarding the sovereignty of West Berlin but at the same time one obviously cannot neglect the sovereignty of other countries and first of all the sovereignty of the country in the centre of which West Berlin is situated, through the territory of which all its communications with the outside world run. We do not bring the solution any closer when we are carried away by one side of the matter and do not want to take into consideration the other, if we talk of the rights of the two million citizens of West Berlin and do not want at all to give due regard to the right of the citizens of the GDR.

I like your suggestion to speak of “the real situation we face”. I understand it so that, proceeding from the real situation existing in Germany, in Europe and throughout the world, we should try to reach mutual understanding on the most important questions, on which it depends today whether there be peace or war on earth. But the actual situation is not what is to the liking of one side—of the United States or the Soviet Union. It has as its components the whole range of facts, notwithstanding how pleasant or impleasant [sic] they may be. These facts are such that the question of the presence of these or other troops in West Berlin affects many countries, its solution can influence not in a small degree the direction of further development of Soviet-American relations, and all international situations.

Here, like in other questions, one should proceed from the reality of life and to act from the position of reason. In other words, one should see not only his rights and somebody's obligations but also his obligations and somebody's rights, not only defend his own interests but also take into consideration the interests of the other side if one has a desire to sincerely seek a mutually acceptable agreement.

In this connection one cannot but pay attention to the statement in your letter that “under no circumstances”, that is even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, the US has no intention to recognize the sovereignty of the GDR over its own territory through which all communications of West Berlin with the outside world run. I will tell you frankly—[that is] a dangerous position for the cause of peace! In previous messages I dwelt upon this question in detail and explained the view of the Soviet Union. Here I would deem it necessary only to emphasize once again the inconsistency and unreality of such approach. It cannot contribute to a speediest finding of a right solution of the problem we face. We would still like to believe that the Western Powers will understand this and will choose another way, the way of respect for international norms and sovereignty of all states, irrespective of their social system.

Allow me now to express my opinion on another condition—on the possibility of presence in West Berlin of Soviet troops as guarantors. You know well from my messages how the Soviet Union formulates this question. We are not seeking to have our troops in West Berlin. The Soviet Government believes that our troops have nothing to do there, just as the troops of the Western Powers. The best thing would be to have no troops in West Berlin. And if you are very interested in placing foreign troops as guarantors let us agree that these will be the UN troops.

If you do not want the Soviet Union to be a guarantor, we are not fishing for any additional obligations: we have enough work of our own. Please deal on all questions of interest to you with the German Democratic Republic. But we believe that in this case also there should be no troops of the Western Powers in West Berlin and if there still have to be some troops there these should be the UN international troops, on mutual agreement.

However, as I understand, the US continues to insist that “responsibility” should lie on the Soviet Union. You should agree, Mr. President, that we can guarantee the interests of West Berlin only on equal conditions with other states and, naturally, not to the detriment of the sovereignty of the GDR.

It is easy to say, of course: in concluding a peace treaty with the GDR make provisions for the securing of such and such rights for the Western Powers and everything will settle by itself. Firstly, I have to say again that the Western Powers cannot expect from us more than they themselves have done and are doing. Secondly, a peace treaty would hardly correspond to its purpose and even to its name if instead of liquidating the vestiges of the war and occupation it confirmed and prolonged them forever.

If there is a desire to limit the subject of the negotiation only to the confirmation of the occupation regime and the occupation rights, to a more accurate definition as to on what kilometer and how many our traffic cops should stand, then I am not sure whether there will be any sense and, which is more important, any use in such negotiation. I would like to think that in the course of our exchange a necessary degree of accord has been established between us to the effect that the purpose of the negotiation is to bring the situation in a certain area—important from the point of view of the preservation of peace—in accordance with radically changed conditions which, of course, could not be precisely anticipated at its time in quadripartite agreements on Germany and Berlin.

I can express my satisfaction with your words to the effect that the main goal of the USSR and the US Governments is to ensure peace and not only care for prestige. Peace and peace treaty, I think you will agree, are extremely close terms. You are inclined to believe that the peace treaty proposed by us will increase tension. This will depend not upon the treaty but upon the actions of Western Powers. Our proposals on peaceful settlement do not contain anything which could objectively cause an aggravation of situation. It is our deep belief that a peace treaty even with one German state is already a great progress since—though on a part of the territory—it draws a line through World War II, removes its vestiges which, like poisonous plants, give shoots of “cold war” every hour. How a peace treaty aimed at establishing peace among states can cause tension! If there are any other suggestions for solving the problem of liquidation of the occupational regime on the basis of a peaceful settlement, we are ready to consider them and will willingly have exchange of views.

In your letter, Mr. President, you raise a question about your troops as the “guarantors”. We also know that recently in the US there have been much talk and writing in this connection. To listen to some people in the West, it looks as if only they do really care about West Berlin and its population, though it is well known that nobody threatens this city either with war or an invasion.

But let us objectively analyze the situation in West Berlin. You, of course, know very well that the Soviet Union stands firmly to guarantee to the population of this city the right to live at their own discretion. We deeply believe at the same time that West Berlin—and this is in fact the essence of the matter—must have a perspective, a belief in its future. The population of this city needs most of all a healthy economy that can ensure full employment and high standard of living, flow of orders, inflow of capital into industry, and permanently guaranteed markets. Life in West Berlin can be in full swing only when production able to compete is organized, when the city establishes normal relations with other states, including the GDR.

But is this possible under the conditions of preserving the occupational regime which would continue to be an apple of discord and the cause of tension—is this possible? Is occupation the best way to insure the interests of the city? The more troops there will be in West Berlin, the less confidence and the more doubts about the stability of the situation. Stationing of foreign garrisons could testify only to the abnormality of the situation. Is sitting on the volcano helpful for calming down one's nerves? What practical businessman will invest his money into business where all is shaky and a lot is unknown? Who would give him long-term orders, who would seek to live in such city where real frontline atmosphere is artificially maintained?

Without the normalization of the situation, without confidence in its future West Berlin is a doomed city. But it can have future, good, prosperous future in case it ceases to be the center of “cold war”, a base of subversive activities against socialist countries and would not be used to aggravate the situation, which all impedes its life and the life of the neighbouring countries. What the US is proposing now will not cure the present illness of the city but, on the contrary, will make it still worse. Before long everybody will realize that West Berlin cannot exist under the conditions in which it is placed now, its business life will die and the population, deprived of a perspective, will have to seek solutions to all these problems in one way or another.

And not by chance there is even now, as it is evident from reports by Western press, a flight of citizens of West Berlin and “a flight” of capital from West Berlin. This process will inevitably grow if we only do not agree and create a confidence for the city in its future.

If the care should really be taken for the West Berlin population living calmly, without any fear about tomorrow, then it must be firmly acknowledged that the best possible solution is to sign a peace treaty or treaties with two German states and to admit these states to the United Nations. Thus, it will be possible to clean up completely international relations from dangerous and unnecessary layers, which remained as the heritage of World War II. Is it not a tempting and noble aim for the sake of which we together should work?

In treaties or in a solemn proclamation or in a declaration we could express our ideas about the future of Germany—about the restoration of its unity. You propose to proceed in that from the right of Germans for self-determination. You are right. Let us, then—in our positions—proceed from the exact meaning of this word—self-determination. And it means that Germans should self-determine, without an interference from outside. Germans should get together with Germans, one German government—with the other German government and define on what basis and how they will solve the question of the restoration of German unity. Let other powers, on their part, state that they will not create any obstacles for Germans. All must be in the way Germans will agree.

You will probably understand in a different way many things of which I am telling you now. Well, there are reasons for that. The United States of America did not feel all burdens of World War II in such a degree as we did. And you yourself spoke of that. Even today the United States is separated from Europe by the ocean. And everything is felt not so sharp from afar as in proximity. If you really think that you can live without a German peace treaty, it is up to you. We are not going to impose terms of peaceful settlement with Germany upon anybody of our former allies, though we will regret if the US and other Western Powers refuse to sign a German peace treaty.

But let us see what can be done to lessen tension in a situation when one group of states does not consider it necessary to sign a German peace treaty while the other has stated its intention to achieve peaceful settlement even with one of the existing German states.

I have already written to you that the Soviet Government considers it possible to agree, before the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, on basic questions which are of interest to both sides. Thus, it will be possible to avoid an unnecessary aggravation of relations first of all between the USSR and the US and to settle those questions to which each of our governments attaches special importance. It is possible to agree beforehand on a status of a free city of West Berlin as I spoke of that with Mr. Spaak and to make the agreement formal by a special protocol which would be annexed to a peace treaty with the GDR. Other important questions could be solved alongside in due order. If it is accomplished an entirely different situation will come into existence in Europe and especially in West Berlin, and its citizens will undoubtedly sigh with relief. To say nothing of the fact that in this case favorable opportunities for the development of economy and of public and political life will be created in West Berlin.

This is the most wise solution which is expected from the Great Powers by the peoples of the world. It will ensure better conditions for the peaceful life of the peoples of the USSR and the US which they—and I fully support your words—equally need.

I would further like, in the interests of clarity to emphasize once again that the conclusion of a peace treaty is not a theoretical goal but a practical one for us. From the point of view of our national interests it is one of the most important questions and we attach paramount importance to its solution.

You wrote in your recent letter—and this idea was somehow reflected in your interview with A.I. Adzhubei—about the right of the Soviet Union for due ensurance of its national security. This is a fair approach.

You can further ask: what is of particular importance for us in the German question regarding the ensurance of the national security of the Soviet Union? I shall answer in all frankness: our main goal is to exclude a possibility for an outbreak of war in Germany or because of Germany. You maintain that the FRG does not constitute a threat to peace or security of the Soviet Union or other socialist countries. We cannot agree with that because we do not have the right to ignore the hard lessons of the past. To you, Mr. President, our warnings of the revival of German militarism and revanchism look like propaganda. To the peoples of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other European countries German militarism continues to be a real threat, and they must always have this in mind if they do not want the events to take them by surprise again.

Mr. President, is it any use for us to argue whether West Germany is a potential source of a military threat? If one wishes to do so this discussion can be endlessly prolonged for there are no such scales that can precisely weigh the arguments of each side. Wouldn't it be better for us to turn to an objective criteria—historic experience. It binds the statesmen not to dismiss the worst possibility, it demands not to let the events come out of control, and not to make our future and our very existence dependent on the outcome of struggle in Germany between the forces of good and evil. We want to be masters of our destinies. You must agree that after what happened 20 years ago, we have the right to be insured against any historic reverses of fortune.

You think that at present the US has the situation in the FRG under control. Let it be so. And what will the situation be in 5-10 years? Senator Humphrey, for example, believes that soon West Germans may demand that American, British and French troops go because they consider themselves strong enough? And in every probability the Western Powers will have to go. The US would not go to war with Bundeswehr, would it? And what else? Can one be certain that a new lunatic will not appear in the FRG who ignoring real dislocation of forces would want to put into practice what militarists-revanchists are shouting from every roof in West Germany? Then it would probably be too late to think of the creation of security system and the prevention of a threat on the part of German militarism and it might happen we will have to pay for that with millions and millions of lives?

The farther we depart in time and policy from the Allied agreements on Germany, the more difficult it will be to find joint effective guarantees against the threat of German militarism to peace and stability which as it seems have to be our joint aim. If it is difficult now to agree on a German peace treaty because of the differences between the former allies, later on it may turn out to be even more difficult.

I am frankly sharing some thoughts with you and, please, don't understand me that another attempt is made [to] agitate you for a peace treaty. I believe that deep in your heart you will agree with me that the Soviet Union after all it has suffered cannot be indifferent to what is happening in West Germany. Behind every demand of ours to secure lasting peace in Europe and prevent new German aggression—and this is exactly the reason we want to liquidate the vestiges of World War II and to conclude a German peace treaty—are millions of lives of perished Soviet people. We will do everything to have a peace treaty concluded and we cannot act otherwise. Such is our duty before mankind and our right.

With all the wish to have good relations with you personally, to have good relations with your government and the United States of America we must conclude a German peace treaty and we will conclude it even if you do not agree with this. Our most cherished goal is to solve all the problems inherited from World War II in cooperation with the US, in agreement with you. We say this honestly and openly. But I do not want to conceal it either that the USSR will sign a peace treaty with the GDR with all naturally ensuing consequences without the US if there is no other way out.

Of course, in this case too we would try to avoid unnecessary aggravations. I hope that such aggravations will not happen if leading Western Powers defining their position take into consideration multi-sided experience of peaceful settlement with various countries during the post-war period, including those in the Far East.

Of course, we are far from understanding the positive moments that have already begun to show in the course of the exchange of views between the governments of the Soviet Union and the US. But one should not close his eyes to the fact that on main principal questions narrowing the differences in our positions proceeds exceedingly slowly and, may be, sometimes it does not proceed at all.

I would not like you to understand my observations as an expression of desire to argue one or another thesis of your letter only because it comes from the other side. I simply thought that I had the right to state in reply to your frank statements my viewpoint without unnecessary diplomacy in this case.

I believe, Mr. President, that our governments will be able to cooperate to the benefit of all peoples, setting as their supreme goal service to peace and in determining their positions they will always have in mind that we have all the possibilities to live in good harmony and find right solutions of any controversial problems.

The Soviet Union on its part is ready for this. Any journey begins with the first step. We have to make it together and we would like that it will be directed to one and the same goal—the strengthening of peace.

Sincerely,

N. Khrushchev[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. Attached to the source text was a 3-paragraph letter of transmittal from Bohlen to Thompson, which stated that it was a “translation as received from the Russians."

[2] The confidential message is Document 230; the other message has not been identified.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

241. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, December 18, 1961, 8 p.m.

1451. Eyes only for the Secretary. In my call on him this afternoon, Chancellor began conversation re Paris meeting by saying he simply didn't understand what had happened. He seemed critical of everyone concerned. He mentioned Sov moves since date of his talk with de Gaulle, including Khrushchev's speech to WFTU, Menshikov's speech in Washington, note re General Heusinger,[2] propaganda attack on Denmark, etc., and commented it was natural that French would want to wait some weeks before we resumed exploratory talks in Moscow. He referred also to his remark in our conversation last week[3] re de Gaulle's fear of reading in press that he had reversed himself, and went on to say he felt we should have intimated our displeasure to Sovs on their recent moves, sent Amb Thompson out for his holiday, and then delayed soundings until first part of January.

I pointed out completely negative position of French, venturing personal view that had it been merely question of few weeks' delay on talks in Moscow, agreement could undoubtedly have been found. Chancellor rejoined that in light his agreement with de Gaulle, it was impossible that French could have been completely negative, and when I insisted, then said Couve must have been at fault.

I told Chancellor of your statement in telegram to me from Paris[4] that you would be in further touch with him, endeavored to explain difficulty caused by French unwillingness to join in working out agreed position, and asked if he had any suggestions. His only reply was to say I should tell you he would get in touch with de Gaulle, indicating that he would try to clear up what he seemed to regard as merely unfortunate misunderstanding.

My only comment is that Adenauer must find it impossible to visualize split between himself and de Gaulle, and is endeavoring to rationalize French performance. Reston told me yesterday Chancellor took substantially same line as above in conversation with him on December 16, and with me he seemed careful to avoid any indication of annoyance with de Gaulle himself. I surmise, however, that privately Adenauer will make strong attempt to induce de Gaulle to be more forthcoming.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1861. Secret; Priority.

[2] A copy of the December 10 Soviet note on General Heusinger is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2003.

[3] See footnote 4, Document 235.

[4] Secto 43 from Paris, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1561)

December 1961-January 1962: First Meetings Between Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko

242. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, December 19, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1961. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Chayes and sent through McGhee and Kohler.

243. Memorandum of Conversation

Bermuda, December 21, 1961, 4-5:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-2161. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved by the White House on December 29 and in S on December 30. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan met in Bermuda December 21-22.

244. Memorandum of Conversation

Bermuda, December 22, 1961, 9:45-10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-2261. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on December 29 and in S on December 30.

245. Editorial Note

246. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)

Belgrade, December 26, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-2661. Secret; Informal. Copies were sent to Rusk and the White House.

247. Editorial Note

248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, December 28, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/12-2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Bohlen and SOV, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Berlin.

249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, December 29, 1961, 12:37 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/12-2961. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and Rusk and approved and signed by Rusk.

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, January 1, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-162. Secret; Niact.

251. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 2, 1962, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0021/1-262. Confidential; Priority; Eyes Only; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin. In telegram 1832, January 2, 3 p.m., Thompson sent a preliminary report on his conversation with Gromyko, which noted that the only item Gromyko expressed some interest in was the international access authority. (Ibid., 762.00/1-262)

252. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 3, 1962, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-362. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

253. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President's Military Representative (Legere) to the Military Representative (Taylor)

Washington, January 4, 1962.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 510-Partition of Berlin. Top Secret. Attached to a similar but longer memorandum from Legere, dated January 8.

254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, January 5, 1962, 5:19 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Day, cleared by SOV, and approved and initialed by Hillenbrand. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Moscow.

255. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan)

Washington, January 5, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron. Secret; Informal. Drafted by Rusk.

256. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 6, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Vine on January 10 and approved in S on January 18. On January 5 Rusk had also discussed Berlin at length with Ambassador Ormsby Gore. A memorandum of their conversation, which dealt mainly with the international access authority, is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/1-562)

257. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 9, 1962, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-962. Secret.

258. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 9, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1162. Secret. Drafted by Freshman on January 11 and approved in S on January 18. Erhard was in the United States to speak at a dinner of the Economic Club in New York on January 10.

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:02 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-1062. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Bohlen, Bundy, and Rusk (in draft); and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Berlin. On January 5 the Department of State had transmitted to Thompson a preliminary draft of these instructions (telegram 1580 to Moscow; ibid., 611.61/1-562), which were the same in substance as those transmitted here. Thompson had commented briefly on them in telegram 1886 from Moscow, January 6. (Ibid., 611.61/1-662)

260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:07 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1062. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bohlen and Hillenbrand, cleared by Rusk and Bundy, and initialed and approved by Kohler.

261. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, January 11, 1962, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1162. Secret; Priority.

262. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 11, 1962.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Clay Cables. Secret. Prepared by Legere. Copies were sent to Bundy, Kohler, Nitze, Lemnitzer, McCone, and Colonel Ewell.

263. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Kennedy

Paris, January 11, 1961.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is a Department of State translation.

264. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 12, 1962, 11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662.001/1-1262. Confidential; Priority. In telegram 1932 from Moscow, January 12, 6 p.m., Thompson briefly summarized his conversation with Gromyko and stated that the Soviet position was completely negative. (Ibid., 762.00/1-1262) In his next telegram Thompson speculated that the tough Soviet position might be 1) a usual negotiating tactic, 2) an attempt to draw out the talks, 3) a desire for an impasse in order to talk directly with the Germans, 4) a desire for an impasse in the hope of forcing a summit meeting, or 5) a Soviet preference for a breakdown in order to proceed with a separate treaty. (Telegram 1933; ibid.)

265. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, January 12, 1962, 10: 55 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1262. Secret.

266. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, January 15, 1962, 11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1562. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Repeated to London and Paris.

267. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 15, 1962, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1562. Secret; Priority.

268. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, January 15, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1562. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the source text was a brief memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, also dated January 15, in which Bundy noted that the President's memorandum had overtaken a longer memorandum along similar lines, which was attached for Rusk's information.

269. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)

Washington, January 15, 1962, 6:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau.

270. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, January 17, 1962, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1762. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

271. Editorial Note

272. Message to Attorney General Kennedy

Moscow, January 18, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret. Attached to a brief note from Rusk to McNamara stating that Bundy had handed it to him on the morning of January 18. A similar translation by Bohlen is attached to a memorandum from him to Rusk, also dated January 18. It states that the message was received by the Attorney General, that it offered little hope, and seemed “to be rather bad tempered.” Bohlen's translation bears the word “Memorandum” at the top of the text.

273. Notes on the Berlin Meeting

Washington, January 18, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. Secret. Drafted on January 22.

274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, January 29, 1962, 7:39 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1062. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Rusk, Ball, Bohlen, Guthrie, and Kaysen; and initialed and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Berlin.

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, January 29, 1962, 7:43 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1962. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand on January 26; cleared by Rusk, Ball, Kaysen, Guthrie, and Bohlen; and approved by Kohler.

276. Letter From the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to Secretary of State Rusk

Berlin, January 30, 1962.

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Clay Cables. Personal and Confidential.

277. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 31, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-3162. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on February 7. The meeting was held in the White House.

278. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 1, 1962, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-162. Confidential; Priority.

279. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Ball to Secretary of Commerce Hodges

Washington, February 1, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862B.181-LE/2-162. Secret. Drafted by Martin (GER) on January 29 and cleared by Brandin (GER), Freshman, and Hillenbrand.

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 2, 1962, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-262. Secret.

242. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, December 19, 1961.

SUBJECT

Next Steps on Berlin

1. Time is not on our side in Berlin. The Western position there is disappearing—not with a bang but with a whimper. Unless we take affirmative steps, the process will continue. The Communists will both publicize and accelerate it with an abundant repertory of harassing tactics.

2. For the moment, the West continues to have a limited power of initiative. A sufficiently positive move towards negotiations would stabilize the situation for the time being. However, the Soviets could eliminate this remaining room for maneuver by minor unilateral action (e.g., inviting delegates to a peace conference). We could not act in response to the direct pressure of a unilateral change in the status quo.

3. The French should not have a veto over this initiative. We have consulted openly and frankly over a period of more than four months in a more than conscientious effort to meet French objections. Our obligation as an ally is fully discharged. It does not require us to permit the French to block a course suggested by our own appraisal of our national interest and in which the rest of the alliance unanimously concurs.

4. Further probing by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow is not an effective initiative. Unless he moves into the range of outright negotiation, the talks will be unproductive. Even so negotiations at the ambassadorial level pursued quietly and as a matter of routine leave considerable latitude for unilateral pressures by the Soviets. Thus, they do not effectively stabilize the situation.

5. Bilateral negotiations at the foreign ministers level would be an effective alternative. In calling for such a meeting we should put forward our proposals for improving access and securing Western presence in Berlin, without necessarily responding to any of the Soviet demands. We would undertake to secure the adherence of our allies if the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could reach agreement. In practice, we would consult very fully during the negotiations with the Germans and the British and, to the extent they permit it, the French.

6. Rusk-Gromyko negotiations would have the following advantages:

a. They would be overt enough to stabilize the situation, but small enough to be relatively private.

b. They would be at a level which would satisfy both our own public and the allies that we had made a serious try for a negotiated solution.

c. The British would be spared the need to join up with us against the French.

d. We could smoke out the Russians without being fully committed on our side thus retaining some of the characteristics of probe.

e. Although there are disadvantages for the Russians, the prospects of engaging us in bilateral talks may be sufficiently attractive to bring them along.

7. If such a course is to be followed an announcement should be made soon to pre-empt any Soviet initiative. The forthcoming consultations with Prime Minister Macmillan afford a good opportunity for discussing the possibilities. A decision could be made at the end of the talks, permitting a Christmas announcement which might have certain psychological advantages. In order not to give the appearance of an Anglo-American plot, both the French and the Germans should be notified in advance if we plan to discuss this kind of initiative in the Bermuda talks.[2]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-1961. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Chayes and sent through McGhee and Kohler.

[2] On December 20 Kohler, in a memorandum to Rusk, commented that while a meeting with Gromyko did offer one of the few available alternatives, he preferred to start with a probe by Thompson. (Ibid., 762.00/12-2061) On December 23 McGhee also sent a memorandum to Rusk, indicating that both Bohlen and Kohler favored an approach by Thompson, and stating that his basis for judgment did not allow him to take a contrary position. (Ibid., 762.00/12-2361)

243. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bermuda, December 21, 1961, 4-5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

The Secretary of State

Mr. Bohlen

Ambassador Bruce

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Mr. William R. Tyler

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Macmillan

The Foreign Secretary, Lord Home

Ambassador Ormsby-Gore

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh

Sir Norman Brook

Mr. Ian Samuel

In answer to Lord Home, who asked what the next move should be on Berlin, the President said that instructions to Ambassador Thompson had been drafted, as guidance for a first talk with Gromyko. The British were then given the text of the draft instructions.[2]

The Secretary commented that after the probes, there might be a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers. In the first talk, Ambassador Thompson could raise two points: (1) access, (2) the idea of an International Authority. Should the Soviet response hold out some promise, these subjects could be taken up again in the next talk.

Lord Home said there seemed to be four major points, on which we should draw out Soviet attitudes and intentions:

(1) De facto dealings with the GDR—some formula short of de jure recognition.

(2) The question of the frontiers of Germany.

(3) The question of allied rights: Can we find an agreed formula whereby we would not drop our rights, but superimpose on them a practical agreement? We might say to Khrushchev that we want to get away from a war basis for our position, and assume the role of a kind of trustee for West Berlin.

(4) The links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic needs. Was it necessary to hold Bundestag meetings in West Berlin “and that kind of thing"?

The Secretary said the Soviets have repeatedly stressed “existing facts”. Our presence in Berlin is one such fact, and we are not going to be driven out. On the other hand we recognize certain facts pertaining to the other side.

The President asked the Prime Minister whether there was anything he would wish to add to the instructions. He commented that there was one idea which we were considering with regard to access: that the international access route might start deep inside West Berlin, cross GDR territory, and continue into Federal Republic territory to a roughly equivalent extent, thus involving three territorial jurisdictions.

The President went on to say that we could not accept the Soviet claim to have the right to be present in West Berlin, nor the imposition of a time limit on any agreement.

The Secretary referred to certain remarks by Lord Home during the NATO meeting, in which he said we should stick to facts, allowing our respective theories, underlying these facts, to diverge. He went on to say that at some appropriate stage we might say that we considered that the Oder-Neisse line constituted the Eastern border of Germany. Lord Home suggested the formulation might be that “If Germany is reunited, the Oder-Neisse line would be the Eastern border of Germany.” The Secretary said that the issue of the frontiers is one of the few cards the Germans feel they have to buy something with. (There was general agreement that the Germans wouldn't be able to buy much anyway.)

The Prime Minister asked if we expect the probe to be successful. Ambassador Bohlen said he expected there would not be much success at first, and that the Soviets would probably adopt a tough position to start with.

Sir David Ormsby-Gore asked whether we expected the French to be swayed. The Secretary pointed out that the primary target of our endeavors was not the French but the Russians, at whom we should direct our efforts. Sir David Ormsby-Gore said that the probe should be a first move leading toward negotiations. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh repeated this thought with some emphasis.

At this point there was a general discussion on whether Ambassador Thompson should report the substance of his talk to the French and the Germans (as well as to the British Ambassador). Lord Home said that Sir Frank Roberts would give Ambassador Thompson whatever support he could. He added that the German Ambassador, Herr Kroll, would probably want to play a role. Ambassador Bohlen said that so long as Ambassador Thompson talked to Gromyko within the framework of the draft instructions, he would not be exposed, as he would be operating on an agreed four-power basis. Lord Home said there were certain other matters within the Ambassadorial working group report on which we are not agreed quadripartitely, i.e., recognition. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh said the thing to do was to try to reach a possible area of agreement on a practical basis, and then only go to the Germans on specific points which would complete the picture.

Ambassador Bohlen pointed out that if negotiations were conducted on matters relating only to Berlin (i.e., on a narrow basis), this would exclude the Germans from playing a direct role, since they do not have responsibility for Berlin. The Secretary said it would be useful to retain the Ambassadorial group as a base, to which to refer the progress of the talks for consideration, rather than to use the Ambassadors in Moscow for this purpose. He added that it would not be desirable to create too much of an impression of Anglo-Saxon direction of the talks, as this might make the continental powers feel they were being ignored. In particular the French and Germans must not be made to feel left out.

Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh asked whether we were thinking of moving forward to a Foreign Ministers meeting. The Secretary said it would be necessary to take the temperature of the French. We might find ourselves moving toward a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting, and eventually a full Foreign Ministers meeting. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh at this point pressed hard on the necessity of holding out a prospect of forward movement. The Secretary said it might be that our present position (as set forth on the bottom of page 3 in the Working Group paper)[3] was too negative with regard to the possibility of an all-Berlin proposal.

The President asked whether it would not be useful to take a look at the working group paper overnight and see what changes might usefully be introduced. Lord Home raised the question of the timing of the probe. He said he thought it was agreed it should be conducted by “one chap”, who should be the American Ambassador. The Secretary said we should not delay too long before moving. Lord Home said he thought that the German Ambassador in Moscow might play a useful role, and Ambassador Bohlen commented that we should be rather careful about any role to be played by Ambassador Kroll, who had gone somewhat far on his own with Khrushchev. Sir David Ormsby-Gore said that it was important to commit the Germans to any steps which it might be desirable to take.

At this point, the Prime Minister, who had been sitting very quiet in an atmosphere of brooding, said with some vehemence that “all this was very confusing.” The point was: do we want to reach an agreement with the Russians or don't we? The UK would never go to war unless there had been negotiations first. He didn't like the idea of long drawn out preliminary stages. The question to be answered was: do we want to bring the Russians to negotiate? What were the facts? East Germany exists. It is nonsense for the West Germans to talk as though it doesn't exist when they are conducting trade with East Germany to the tune of 300 million pounds yearly. This business about not recognizing the existence of East Germany was pure fiction. The thing to do was to recognize East Germany, not too much and not too little. It is obvious that the GDR could not be elected to the United Nations ("happy country!") because it was part of a divided country like South Viet-nam or South Korea. The French don't want Germany reunited, the Russians don't, and he wasn't sure the Germans themselves wanted it very much. All we had to do was to start by saying that there will one day be a reunited Germany and the Russians might accept this so long as they felt sure it won't happen. He said the thing to do was to find some suitable phraseology “in a Pickwickian sense”. We were going to stay in Berlin by the de jure right of conquest, which we had translated into our de facto presence in that city. After all, 6000 Normans had conquered England in 1066, and they rapidly became absorbed into the legal framework of local laws and customs. They rapidly stopped giving up the tenure of their possessions by mere right of conquest, and similarly we were in a position where we should become in a sense trustees for the continued existence of West Berlin. Then there was the matter of an agreement of access to go in or come out, he said. We should have guarantees that we should be able to do this. So what remained? There was the question of the frontiers, which might be the last item which would be settled by our saying to the Russians: in asking you to come to an agreement with us, we are prepared to give you assurances on the question of frontiers. The thing we must be clear about is what was to be the purpose of our undertaking a probe. The Prime Minister said that he himself had often suffered, in the period of his life when he was engaged in diplomacy, from lengthy instructions of twenty pages or more. It was very hard on an Ambassador to have to cope with this kind of thing. It was difficult to remember all the points which were so carefully balanced in the text. If the purpose of the probe was to lead to a four-power conference, then the Russians would be influenced in the direction of moving toward us. Unless it was clear to them that we wanted a conference, they wouldn't move. If all this was right, the question was how can we bring the allies to agree. The Prime Minister said that he would like at this point to use an American expression, and to say that probably somebody would have to be the fall guy. If that was to be the U.S., the U.K. would be glad to be the “extra fall guy”. The point was that the probes must be a preliminary to negotiations.

Lord Home asked whether we could say to Gromyko that our desire is to have a Foreign Ministers meeting. We would want to make sure that there is a basis for such a meeting so that it won't fail.

The Secretary said that it was clear that we are looking forward to the possibility eventually of a Foreign Ministers meeting. In Paris, Couve de Murville had accepted language which had been proposed by Lord Home incorporating this idea, but General de Gaulle had been adamant. The President raised the question of whether we should move together, or with the Germans, or possibly without the French. He pointed out that the French rights in Berlin had only been derived from the rights which the British and we enjoyed and it was not inconceivable that we might move without them if necessary. Ambassador Bohlen said that it would not be a good idea to start off by proposing a conference to Gromyko. We should find some way of indicating that we would be prepared to hold a conference if the Russians made it possible to reach a basis for holding one.

Lord Home turned to the subject of the presence of Soviet troops in West Berlin. He pointed out that certain Soviet troops are already accepted in West Berlin for certain purposes, such as the guard for the Soviet War Memorial, and the troops required for Spandau prison. Would it be possible to devise some way of admitting Soviet troops on the basis of a token presence? He thought that there was a good deal of face-saving involved in this particular matter. The important thing was that if there were the presence of Soviet troops it should be without their having an unacceptable function.

Lord Home referred to Khrushchev's recent letter[4] to the Prime Minister and said that the UK was considering a reply. There was a draft text, which he would like us to see which contained suggestions for a possible opening of discussions.

The Prime Minister asked whether the United States thought that the Russians really wanted negotiations. The Secretary said that we had at first thought so, but that we were no longer sure since the erection of the wall in Berlin. Lord Home said that the recent tactics of the Russians had been curious, and appeared to suggest that they might be desirous of disengaging. Mr. Bohlen said that another interpretation of their present attitude would suggest that they might be preparing to sign a separate peace treaty.

Lord Home commented that in spite of what Mayor Brandt was saying, evidence was coming in to suggest that the morale of West Berlin was “in a pretty dicky state”. He added that Adenauer certainly is of this opinion. The Secretary remarked that in Paris Couve de Murville had said that the real question was whether it was better to lose Berlin by default, or de facto by its withering away. Ambassador Bruce said that the only comment he had to make was that he thought it was not necessary to try to decide now whether we would move eventually without the French. It might be better to see how things go and take a decision in the light of later developments. Mr. Bohlen said he thought we should first do all we can to ascertain whether a basis really exists for negotiations.

The President said that we should think about a forum for negotiation with the Germans present in the room. He felt that our experience this summer with the Germans had been instructive. Whereas the German Ambassador in Washington had raised all kinds of difficulties in the Ambassadorial group, it turned out, in the course of Adenauer's visit in November, that the Chancellor was much nearer our point of view than he had seemed to be at “arms length”. The Secretary and Mr. Bohlen commented that we should show the French the instructions that we were sending to Ambassador Thompson.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-2161. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved by the White House on December 29 and in S on December 30. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan met in Bermuda December 21-22.

[2] Not found.

[3] Reference is to the Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin (BER-5), prepared by the meeting of senior officers at Paris December 7-10. The report explored narrow negotiations (Berlin alone); broad negotiations (Germany including Berlin and European security), and mixed negotiations (Berlin alone plus some aspects of the German problem). (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1999)

[4] A copy of this letter is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. It is also described in Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 143-144.

244. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Bermuda, December 22, 1961, 9:45-10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin (see previous memorandum on same subject dated December 21, 1961)[2]

PARTICIPANTS

U.S., The President, The Secretary of State, Ambassador Bruce, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. William R. Tyler

U.K., The Prime Minister, The Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Sir Norman Brook, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, Mr. Ian Samuel

The modified instructions to Ambassador Thompson were discussed.

The Secretary said we thought it would be good to make a move in the direction of an all-Berlin solution in the first talk, and not foreclose this possibility to the same degree as in the British draft.[3] The Secretary also said that the British proposal envisages a series of talks, while we feel that it would be preferable to move toward a meeting, should this prove possible.

The Prime Minister asked what we would do if we don't find a basis for negotiation. The Secretary said we would try to achieve a practical solution on the basis of recognizing facts on either side. It was important to keep the situation from deteriorating further. Lord Home asked how much latitude Ambassador Thompson would have. Mr. Bohlen said he would not have much, since the probe would be conducted within the framework of the quadripartite talks in Paris.

The Secretary said the West Germans preferred that we should deal with the East Germans on matters relating to traffic and access, rather than that they should do so themselves. The Prime Minister said that we must move toward negotiations. If the reply from the Russians was very bad and they won't budge, what should we then do? The Secretary said we should ask the Soviets what their intentions are after they have signed a peace treaty with the GDR. The President said that if the Russians are unreasonable and unyielding the question was how do we dramatize the fact that we have done everything we could. He felt that, in such a situation, the Ambassadorial level was not high enough. The Secretary suggested that Gromyko might be asked to come to the UN, where we would turn to the Uniting for Peace resolution.[4] The President commented that the United States should not have to carry the whole burden. The Prime Minister said that should Ambassador Thompson fail to arrange a meeting, we must take some action ourselves. In any case, we must justify ourselves to Western opinion. We must not allow ourselves to drift into war. Had appropriate action been taken at the time, World War I could have been avoided. Sir David Ormsby Gore said it was important to distinguish between the Foreign Ministers meeting to negotiate a settlement on the one hand, and a Foreign Ministers meeting to discuss a very serious situation on the other. Lord Home wondered whether Ambassador Thompson would have enough latitude. Would it be desirable to go back to the Ambassadorial group in case he got nowhere? Mr. Bundy commented that Chancellor Adenauer had shown himself to be more flexible than the German position had seemed to be according to Ambassador Grewe. The Prime Minister emphasized the advantages of working out some kind of trusteeship function for the West in West Berlin. The Secretary said he was somewhat leary of the word “trusteeship” but was rather in favor of superimposing an arrangement on top of our rights, which we would not give up.

At this point the Prime Minister raised the question whether it would be a good thing for the UK to send a reply to Khrushchev's recent long letter, and it was agreed that a reply would be desirable.

There followed some discussion of the British draft reply[5] and certain amendments in the text were proposed. It was agreed that a final paragraph would be added relating the reply to the Ambassadorial talks in Moscow. There should also be some reference to the allies.

The President and the Secretary both said that Ambassador Thompson should, before the end of the year, ask for an appointment. Lord Home asked how it might be possible to use German Ambassador Kroll, and would this be a good thing. The Secretary said he thought it was more important to keep Foreign Minister Schroeder and Grewe informed. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The Prime Minister said that it seemed to him that Kroll had all the qualifications for reaching an agreement with the Russians and that he would much rather have the Germans bear the load rather than us.

The President said he did not want the coordination of instructions to rest with the Ambassadorial group, which had proved too slow and obstructive. The Prime Minister said he welcomed the President's comment. The situation was that Ambassador Thompson might succeed in the first talk, or that the Russians might say no and go ahead with a separate peace treaty, or they might call for a Foreign Ministers meeting. If the Russians were to say no, what do we do? Just sit around? Lord Home said he thought Gromyko would say that what we had to talk to him about was “very thin.” We should be in a position to move further. The Prime Minister said that what we were doing was rather like inviting someone to dinner without telling him just what there would be to eat. We would be saying that there would be soup, probably fish and perhaps a little meat, although the latter was not certain. Lord Home said it might be rather a good thing to let Gromyko take a look at the meat through the kitchen door. The Prime Minister added that Ambassador Kroll might be the person to say to the Russians “By Jove, there's a pretty good stew in there. Of course I'm not supposed to know about it.” The President raised the question of how we get the Germans to move. He observed that Adenauer was much more forthcoming when he discussed these matters himself. We might have a discussion with the Germans on the subject of relations with the GDR and access, also West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic. The President felt we should talk to the Germans about what arrangements might be reached. It was subsequently agreed that it might be best for such discussions to be held in Bonn, rather than in the Ambassadorial group, and that Ambassadors Steel and Dowling could talk with Foreign Minister Schroeder.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-2261. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on December 29 and in S on December 30.

[2] Document 243.

[3] Not found.

[4] For text of this resolution, dated November 3, 1950, see U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), pp. 10-12. It is also printed in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 187 -192 .

[5] Not found. For extracts from the text as sent, see Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 148-151.

245. Editorial Note

On December 23, 1961, Major General Watson, U.S. Commandant for Berlin, who was going to Karlshorst to keep an appointment with Colonel Solovyev, his Soviet counterpart, was refused access to the Eastern sector of Berlin when he refused to show identity cards for his civilian advisers. Watson immediately protested this action and Ambassador Dowling sent a similar protest to Soviet Ambassador Pervukhin. (Telegrams 1232 and 1233 from Berlin, December 23; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-2361) The next day the Mission at Berlin suggested that this was a deliberate affront that demanded counteraction, and proposed that the Soviet Commandant be barred from the U.S. Sector unless corrective measures were taken. (Telegram 1236 from Berlin; ibid., 862.181/12-2461)

On the same day Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bundy called Secretary of State Rusk and told him that the President believed the United States “should do something but not something excessive” about the situation. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) When no remedial action was forthcoming by December 27, Watson sent Solovyev a second letter prohibiting him and his Political Adviser from entering the U.S. Sector until corrective measures had been taken. (Telegram 1243 from Berlin, December 27; ibid., Central Files, 762.0221/12-2761)

246. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)[1]

Belgrade, December 26, 1961.

DEAR TOMMY: I have long been meaning to write you; but, as always in the case of letters in which I myself have the greater interest, I have put it off, hoping to find a moment of proper leisure. Now, I realize time has slipped up on me. We are leaving tonight for a few days skiing in Switzerland, with the two younger children. I am reduced, therefore, to the following brief comments on several matters.

First, my thanks for your telegram of November 3, to the Department, commenting on my 622 of October 14.[2] Since that time, a good deal of water has gone over the dam, and the situation, of course, is somewhat different. The impression here (and it is one which, on the limited evidence available, I share) is that Khrushchev's success at the Congress was more apparent than real; that it was limited largely to taking the Congress by storm with the attacks on Albania and on the symbols of Stalinism; that it is indeed having effects in the foreign communist parties, particularly some of those not in power, which may well be far-reaching; but that in Russia it has not been followed by any extensive personnel changes and has not effectively changed the situation within the Party; that there continues, accordingly, to be a strong admixture of dogmatist sentiment spread throughout the senior echelons of the apparat: a sentiment which does not express itself in any organized factional form, and which for this reason cannot be dealt with by methods of administrative reprisal, but which finds its expression, quite properly and correctly, in the Central Committee voting on important ideological pronouncements and in the normal day-to-day work of the Section for Propaganda and Agitation (or whatever it is now called) and the various sub-organs concerned with ideological matters. My impression is that it is this which accounts for the continued protrusion of unmistakeably dogmatist notes in some of the ideological and political material being put out by the Party organs (see, for example, the editorial in Pravda of December 6, with its underplaying of the XXII Congress and its strong tendency to relate current policy not to the Congress itself but to the declarations of the meetings of the Communist Parties in 1957 and 1960, in which the dogmatist view found strong reflection).

On the other hand (I am now giving you purely my own impression, though I think that the Yugoslavs who follow these matters would agree), the Khrushchevian and dogmatist hands are not the only ones which appear now to be involved in Soviet policy. It seems to me still that there is a third hand which also plays a part: a hand which is not concerned with ideology but is very strongly concerned with military readiness, which has considerable power over decisions on the governmental level, and which, as I have said before, appears to place considerations of readiness for war ahead of the concern for its avoidance. I note your contrary opinion, as expressed in your telegram of November 3, and I earnestly hope you are right; but the violence of various Soviet reactions to NATO policies, the incredible arrogance of the position taken on nuclear testing, and the sinister implications of the Finnish gambit, all continue to make me feel that there is an influence at work in Soviet policy which has nothing to do with ideology and to which Khrushchev finds himself obliged to defer, even though it is often in conflict with the political purposes to which he himself is devoted. I sometimes wonder whether if it could be that the deference he pays to these purely military considerations could be in effect, though probably on the basis of a wholly unspoken understanding, the price required of him for the support of certain elements in the Central Committee who have military interests at heart. However, that is only a speculation.

As I write these lines, I suppose that you will be approaching the first of your formal consultations with the Soviet Government on the Berlin problem. I must confess that so far as these matters are concerned, I have long since fallen by the wayside and am unable to follow what is occurring. I can only assume that I am the victim of some major misapprehension.

In the first place, I fail to understand how we could ever have gotten ourselves in a position where it takes a series of summit meetings with our allies to make it possible for us to conduct perfectly normal diplomatic exchanges which, so far as I can see, need not have been at any time omitted or interrupted. I feel there is something badly wrong with the diplomacy which gives to our allies the power to tell us with whom and when we may have the privilege of normal diplomatic discussion about matters which are not only of mutual interest but of greatest importance to world peace.

Secondly, I regret the wide publicity that has attended the inauguration of such consultations, and feel that, in the circumstances, it will be practically impossible to preserve the confidential character that would be necessary if they were to make real progress. In particular, I think it important, if we are ever to arrive at any tolerable agreement with the Russians over German matters, that we afford to the Russians some possibility of communication with ourselves through channels on which our allies would not listen in. I think it in the interests of these allies themselves that we should have the privilege of such confidential communication. Obviously this will not be the case in the exchanges you are about to inaugurate.

Finally, I am at a loss to understand what it is that we think we are going to discuss with the Russians. So far as I can see we have already undertaken, in the talks with Adenauer, not to discuss anything which could be of interest in Moscow. Laboriously, we have persuaded the French and Germans to permit us to go down for a swim, and even to hang our clothes upon a limb, but we have carefully assured mother Adenauer that we would not go near the water.

I cannot understand, in the face of these circumstances, what it is that we think we are going to explore with the Russians. It would appear to me that if all we propose to offer is in effect a continuation of the present situation—if, that is, there is no concession of any consequence which we contemplate making at any stage of the game—then I fail to see why we think the Russians should have any interest in arriving at any agreement with us at all. If this is all that is involved, the Russians do not need to sit down at a table with us in order to assure its realization: they need only let things go on as they are.

My bewilderment is completed by our repeated statements that we are determined to find out whether the Russians are seriously interested in negotiating. It is now well over three years since Khrushchev began his efforts to get us to the negotiating table. I should have thought their interest in negotiation had been far more liberally documented than our own. And if the answer to this is that the proposals they have put forward in this connection were not acceptable to us, I would like to ask at what point, and why, we began to take the Soviet asking-price, publicly stated before negotiations were even begun, as a firm criterion of what Moscow would finally agree to and to draw our conclusions accordingly about the usefulness of negotiation. You yourself could judge how far we would have got with the Austrian peace treaty or the Trieste problem if we had taken the initial Soviet demands as the final evidence of their position in these problems and had therefore thrown up our hands and said we cannot go to the negotiating table because these demands were not acceptable from our point of view.

Actually, I suspect that we have now delayed too long; that things have changed in Moscow; that the possibilities for negotiation, to which we are now making so laborious and unpromising an approach, may actually have ceased to exist. Had we done last summer, quietly and without the fanfare of publicity, what we are now about to do, I think there might still have been a chance, although even then to preclude such things as the Oder-Neisse line and the recognition of the GDR from the scope of negotiation, and to do this on the basis of a widely publicized agreement with our allies, would always have represented a heavy burden on negotiation. Today, I strongly suspect that the moment is past for even these slender possibilities. The Russians have solved half their problem by the construction of the wall; a measure which need never have been taken had we, instead of shillyshallying with this problem for three years, gone into negotiations at a much earlier date with imaginative and constructive proposals. And whatever may have been the nature of the internal political considerations which moved Khrushchev to push this matter so insistently in the three years beginning with the early autumn of 1958, it seems fairly evident that they are no longer operable. He appears to have absorbed whatever humiliation this failure may have brought him and to have paid whatever price it involved. I should be much surprised, therefore, though pleasantly so, if the initiative you are about to undertake should meet with any very positive response. I should think it more likely that we might soon be confronted with unpleasant unilateral manifestations of Soviet policy reflecting a complete absence of interest in discussing the Berlin problem with us at all.

Forgive me for putting these thoughts to you with such frankness. There may, as I say, be something very basic that I have missed.

I was grateful for your comments on my recent piece about Yugoslav-Soviet relations and find them well taken.

Subject to your own frank judgment, I am thinking of paying a visit to Moscow at some time in the next two or three months. My thought would be simply to go in by train from here and spend four or five days, to get a smell of the atmosphere of Moscow in the 1960s. During recent years, the Russians have sent one person after another to me with the question: “Why don't you come to Moscow?” A year or so ago the Soviet Embassy in Washington demonstratively invited me all the way from Princeton to be present at the reception for Kozlov. Khrushchev has made it clear that he has no grudge against me, and only four days ago the Soviet Chargé took occasion to give me the last of many assurances that Khrushchev had a high opinion of me personally. All these gestures I take as reflecting a desire on Moscow's part to stress that the unpleasantness of 1952 was purely Stalin's doing, and is not to be regarded as constituting a proper source of discussion today.

Annelise joins me in affectionate regards to you all for the New Year.

Sincerely,

George K.

P.S. We shall be skiing at Crans-sur-Sierre until about January 10.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-2661. Secret; Informal. Copies were sent to Rusk and the White House.

[2] In telegram 622 Kennan had offered his appraisal of the forces driving Soviet foreign policy including pressure from the military. (Ibid., 762.00/10-1461) In his reply Thompson said that he would not reject any hypothesis “concerning this unpredictable place,” but disagreed with Kennan's reasoning. He did support Kennan's thesis that Khrushchev intended to carry the Berlin question to the “extreme edge” of the brink. (Ibid., 663.001/11-361)

247. Editorial Note

On December 27, 1961, the Head of the German Section of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, I. I. Il'ichev, handed German Ambassador Kroll a long memorandum, apparently written by Khrushchev, outlining the Soviet position on the world situation and Soviet-German relations in particular. The memorandum broke no new ground on the question of Berlin, although it did allow economic, cultural, and political contacts between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. For text of the memorandum, which Kohler described as “obviously divisive in intent” (memorandum to Rusk, January 1, 1962; Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/1-862), see Europa Archiv, Folge 3/1962, pages D59-70, or Moskau Bonn, pages 876-877. A translation of the memorandum is attached to Kohler's memorandum to Rusk. For Kroll's account of receiving the memorandum, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pages 537 ff.

248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, December 28, 1961.

[2]

1520. Eyes only for Ambassadors. (Verbatim text) FYI: Following are your instructions for your meeting with Gromyko which have been discussed and agreed with the British and Germans and a copy for information will be given to the French. You should request now an appointment for early next week.

We regret that we did not get a draft of these instructions to you sooner and that you saw the first draft from the British.[3] You will very shortly receive a personal message in regard to these discussions from me.[4] End FYI.

You should seek early meeting with Gromyko and make presentation along following lines:

FYI: Your purpose is to engage in a series of discussions with Mr. Gromyko with the object of finding out whether and in what area a basis for negotiations can be found. In your first conversation your main object should be to show the Soviet Government that the US Government and their allies desire to deal with the Berlin question by agreement. Of the three aspects, access, status of Berlin, and larger questions, it is our feeling that in first talk you should concentrate on access and merely listen to Soviet proposals on other two aspects rather than advance proposals of own. In making suitable responses on other two aspects you should use December 10 Working Group Report[5] as guide. You should convey idea that suggestions can be put forward by both sides without commitment and without prejudice to our position of principle. End FYI.

1. Soviet Foreign Minister will have gathered from wording of recent NATO communiqué,[6] and from fact of continuing consultation among Western leaders, that my Government would wish to review where we stand on Berlin situation. My Government assumes that this is an issue we would both want to settle by peaceful means if possible, although great differences in our respective viewpoints admittedly exist.

2. You should say that you have been authorized to go through the various aspects of the problem in order to clarify the attitudes of the two sides. At all these talks ideas and suggestions could be put forward without formal commitment.

3.

We recognize that at present time great differences in our respective viewpoints exist. We have on one side well-known Soviet position that peace treaty or treaties with two Germanies are necessary, and that if Western Powers are unwilling to join with them Soviets will proceed unilaterally to sign peace treaty with GDR, alleging that this will have certain drastic effects on position of Western Powers in Berlin. At same time Soviets maintain that necessary solution for Berlin question is establishment of Free City of West Berlin. On other side, we have well-known position of Western Powers concerning peace treaty with unified Germany and that they cannot unilaterally be deprived of their rights in West Berlin and with respect free access thereto. They are committed to defend freedom of West Berliners and have in this connection defined their vital interests in Berlin situation.

You should make it clear that we do not accept the validity in international law of the Soviet contention that they can abolish Western rights in Berlin by a treaty to which the Western Powers are not parties. The Soviets have never attempted to justify this contention except by fallacious comparison with the Japanese Peace Treaty and it is an argument which you could use to force Gromyko on the defensive. It is on this point that the Soviets are threatening the West with physical interference with their position in West Berlin and they ought to be strongly challenged on it.

4.

The preferred Western position is that Berlin should be considered as a whole. It seems to us illogical and contrary to basic agreement on Berlin that we should be asked to deal with only a part of the city. We would be prepared to consider a number of arrangements affecting the City of Berlin as a whole.

FYI: In event that Gromyko reaffirms previous Soviet position that Eastern sector of Berlin is a non-negotiable subject and refuses to discuss possibility of any all-Berlin solution you should then take following lines. End FYI.

5. Erection of wall through Berlin and subsequent GDR action in sealing off city have made it clear that purpose has been permanent division of city. It is also apparent from Soviet unwillingness to discuss any all-Berlin solution that this is indeed the case. This division of the city in itself has considerably narrowed possible area of negotiation. Question inevitably arises how, in view of Soviet assertion of right to make complete disposition of East Berlin regardless of views of Western allies, they can claim to assert interest in West Berlin. We are being asked to discuss our interests while Soviets claim immunity from any discussion of East Berlin or Eastern Germany.

6. Following additional fact relevant. Soviets have permitted series of unilateral actions in and about Berlin which have changed facts of situation to detriment of Western position. In this connection might be cited unacceptable GDR requirements for showing of identification by official allied personnel at sector-sector boundaries, harassment by Vopos of Allied vehicles in East Berlin and continual threat of further restrictive measures. In addition erection by GDR of baffles near Autobahn checkpoints, rerouting of trains, and threats contained in statements by GDR leaders and in so-called note directed at legitimate US military traffic on Autobahn, appears to threaten further action against vital Allied access rights. Each one of these restrictive actions and threats to allied rights does not help create necessary atmosphere for negotiation.

7. Soviets seem to maintain that Western Powers must start from assumption that existing arrangements will end in West Berlin and that, unless this accepted, agreement is impossible. This amounts basically to demand that we give up our position while Soviets maintain and improve essentials of their position. This is clearly unacceptable. Western Powers have never negotiated with Soviets on occupation rights but on exercise and implementation of their rights. They cannot accept that basis for negotiations must be their prior willingness to renounce such rights.

8. If, therefore, there is to be any progress towards mutually tolerable agreement, neither side can claim in advance that essential condition to such agreement must be full acceptance of its negotiating position. This is incompatible with concept of free negotiations between equal states. Systematic effort must be made to find points on which there is some possibility of progress. Situation is undoubtedly a serious one. Question confronting us is whether basis can be found for negotiations in usual sense, or in event of serious and continuing disagreement, whether factual situation can be handled without war which would be devastating to both sides.

9. Out of earlier discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister there emerged, if not substance of a possible arrangement on Berlin, at least possible outlines of a procedural formula or framework within which possibility of such an arrangement could be further explored. At same time Soviet Foreign Minister seemed to understand that Western Powers could not recognize so-called GDR either de jure or de facto. He also seemed to recognize, therefore, that basic arrangements must be between Soviets and Western Powers and not between latter and GDR. Secretary of State, however, stressed that Western Powers have certain vital interests in Berlin which must be respected. On other hand, Soviet Foreign Minister placed emphasis on end of occupation and creation new status in Berlin. Question arises whether against the background of these substantive positions any acceptable arrangement can be reached.

10. It might be noted that a number of positions which Soviet Foreign Minister put forward in New York and Washington talks, or which have subsequently been expressed in Soviet statements, have raised questions in minds of our Allies as they have in ours. We have noted suggestion that Soviets might be willing to enter into a Four Power arrangement and set forth the essentials of an understanding on Berlin and access thereto which might be reached in Four Power negotiations. We would be willing to consider this as a possible procedure, but more important than procedure would be content of such a prior Four Power understanding. As Soviet Foreign Minister knows, we have defined with some precision our vital interests in Berlin situation, and we must know with some precision how any intended arrangements which would affect exercise of these vital interests would be spelled out.

11. A key point in this context is question of Berlin access. Therefore, suggest that first talk be devoted to this. This is point at which danger seems to threaten and on which unilateral action by one side could have far-reaching results. For this reason it would be interesting to know precisely how Soviet Foreign Minister envisages access arrangements. In spelling out our views you may draw on appropriate portions of Annex III to December 10 Working Group Report.[7]

We understand that the Soviet Government wishes to introduce some changes in the present position with regard to access. In response to the Soviet request, we are prepared to consider propositions. Naturally the result must not lead to a deterioration in the Western position, and since it is the Soviets who wish the changes the burden of proof that the changes accord with the Western interests rests with them. We have been considering what Soviet proposition on access would be acceptable to us. You might put forward the suggestion that we would readily accept the proposition at paragraph 8 of Annex III to December 10 Working Group Report. You should point to the advantages that this would have for reassuring Western opinion and for avoiding possible friction and misunderstanding with the East German authorities. You could portray the addition of air access functions to a possible international authority as an “improvement” which could benefit both sides. To show that we take this scheme seriously you may illustrate it with details from the Draft Charter of the International Access Authority for Berlin (BQD-37) (revised) of November 30).[8] In further spelling out of our views you may draw on appropriate portions of Annex III to December 10 Working Group Report. If Mr. Gromyko should intimate that there are other questions in regard to Berlin, you should, bearing in mind Annex III, tell him that these could be considered depending largely upon what access arrangements the Soviet Government is prepared to make. Consequently it is up to the Soviet Government to indicate whether the propositions in paragraph 8 of Annex III are broadly acceptable.

FYI: Although Soviets have already made several public repudiations of International Authority concept, we have two recent intelligence reports ([2 document numbers not declassified]) giving instances of Soviet officials privately taking a more positive line. One suggested a “corridor” to a “free city” of West Berlin and other an International Access Authority. End FYI.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/12-2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Bohlen and SOV, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Berlin.

[2] The time of transmission is illegible.

[3] In telegram 1801, December 21, Thompson reported that the British Ambassador had showed him his report of a meeting with Khrushchev the previous day and an early draft of Thompson's instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 641.61/12-2761)

[4] Document 249.

[5] See footnote 2, Document 243.

[6] For text of the December 15 NATO communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 505-508.

[7] Annex III, “Substantive Questions,” outlined what negotiations should achieve.

[8] A copy of this paper is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, BQD Documents.

249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, December 29, 1961, 12:37 p.m.

1523. Eyes only for Ambassador from the Secretary. Instructions sent you yesterday[2] have been coordinated with the British and the Germans. The French have been given a copy for information.

While admittedly these instructions do not offer you much field of discussion we feel that it is important to be able to demonstrate to public opinion here and elsewhere that every effort has been made to explore with Soviets the possibility of finding some basis for negotiation. We do not feel that matters could be allowed to proceed to point where danger of war became acute while Western Powers remained completely inactive. We anticipate that the exploratory conversations which you will undertake may go on for at least two or three meetings and could go on longer if first talks show promise. Although we assume that neither Soviet nor Allied side would wish to use this method for negotiations at final stages, we do not look upon your “probes” as play acting but rather as serious effort to move ahead on questions of substance if possible. You should, therefore, be as alert to any possible leads which might come from Soviet side as would be the case in “negotiation.” The purpose as indicated in the instruction is to explore with Gromyko the possibility of identifying a reasonable basis of negotiation which would justify and permit the calling of a more formal conference probably at Foreign Ministers level.

Your instructions are not intended to preclude the issue of narrow versus broad negotiations, even though they are obviously based upon a narrow beginning. Despite German nervousness about linkage broader questions with specific issues of Berlin, Western governments realize that Soviets will almost certainly inject other issues. Indeed, there are other of these questions such as boundaries, on which West is unlikely to reach unity on hypothetical basis in advance as distinct from need for dealing with specific issues raised by Soviets. If such issues brought up by Soviets during first talk, suggest you tell Gromyko, as instructed, you will report his inquiry or observations to your Government and press for further exploration access problem which, as Western vital interest, could not but affect Western attitude other issues.

Reference your 1801,[3] I would see no objection to your suggesting to Gromyko in the event that he knocks down international control autobahn, the possibility of extension of international authority into West Germany but not as a formal Western proposal but as a suggestion coming personally from you which you would submit to your Government. It would be preferable if this suggestion could come from Gromyko which would give us a better basis for discussion with our Allies. A suggestion of this nature however would fall within the last sentence of the FYI portion on page one of your instructions.

You also should know that immediately prior to my departure for Paris on December ninth Menshikov called to convey an invitation from Gromyko that I should visit Moscow during my European trip.[4] I asked Menshikov to express to Gromyko my appreciation for this invitation but to tell him that my schedule was such it would not be possible for me to come at this time. There are of course powerful arguments against any meeting between me and Gromyko at this stage of developments but invitation in principle was not completely rejected by me and may conceivably be useful at later stage.

Re your 1797[5] we would leave to your discretion how to handle any conversation Berlin and Germany initiated by Khrushchev at the New Year's Eve dinner. We think it would be wiser not to make any specific reference to your instructions in order to avoid vitiating the value of your presentation to Gromyko and should rely rather on standard Western positions and if possible avoid entering into any detailed discussion which might affect your subsequent meeting with Gromyko.

The President has asked me to tell you of his confidence in your ability to carry out this difficult and delicate assignment.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/12-2961. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen and Rusk and approved and signed by Rusk.

[2] Document 248.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 248.

[4] No record of this conversation has been found.

[5] Dated December 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 641.61/12-2661)

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France[1]

Washington, January 1, 1962.

[2]

Drafted by Bundy and Beigel, cleared by EUR and S/AE, and approved by Rusk.

3655. Verbatim text. Eyes only for Ambassador. Embassy requested deliver following letter from the President to President de Gaulle.[3] Letter should be dated December 31. Delivery should be made to Elysee immediately if possible even though de Gaulle may be at Colombey. Inform date, time, delivery.

"Dear Mr. President: I feel the need to write you at some length about two of the problems that we have before us. The very fact that in important matters we have differences makes me think it needful for us to keep in close contact. Moreover, both of us have had recent conversations with Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer on matters which we can well consider also together.

Let me talk first about Berlin. Here, as we know from our exchange of letters in October,[4] we have a serious tactical difference—though our basic goals are the same. We on our side believe that further diplomatic efforts are essential, for the exploration of Soviet intentions and to give clearer understanding to the Soviets of what we can and cannot consider in the settlement of the problems of Berlin and Germany. We do not believe that our people—and still less the people in many allied countries—will face a possible war with the necessary unity and determination unless they are confident that every honorable possibility of a peaceful settlement has been explored. We have taken note of the very strong and general sentiment in favor of negotiation among most of our Allies; we note also that the Soviets seem to have recognized the dangers of forcing the issue, in their postponement, once again, of the deadline for what you have accurately called Khrushchev's treaty with himself. We believe, in these circumstances, that it is important for us to leave no doubt anywhere that if satisfactory negotiations turn out to be impossible, it will not be our fault. Moreover, the possibility does exist, in our view, that an improved arrangement can be made. I do not believe that it would be safe to stand immobile in face of the present situation in Germany and Berlin.

You have powerfully argued a different view, and your Minister sustained it strongly at Paris in December. You believe that K does not want war—and I agree.[5] You believe that concessions are therefore unnecessary, and I agree again. I believe that nothing should be granted in this case except in return for a genuine improvement in our own position and that of the people of Berlin. But there is room for such improvement, and so I do not want to stand still where we are. Moreover, we must measure our course not only against where we are, but against what may happen if we take a different road. I believe that if Khrushchev takes the path of his separate treaty, and if no prior settlement is made, there will be a further deterioration of the whole situation in Europe, even if he avoids war, as I am sure he will wish to do. Yet he must sign the treaty sooner or later; he is too far in to turn back now. And so we must make clear to him, by all available means, that a prior settlement is in his interest as well as ours.

We cannot tell how the present discussions may go. I myself suppose that in some fashion they could lead to more serious and formal negotiations. Those negotiations may be in the framework of an improved hope of agreement, or they may come in the shadow of imminent war. But I think they may come. We must conduct ourselves, in either case, so that our strength, our determination, and the intrinsic values of our position are as clear to the Soviets as to our Allies and our own peoples. And we must be ready for the day when negotiations may break down.

In the current explorations we are proceeding without the help of direct French participation. I continue to hope, however, that if and when serious negotiations take place, France will join us again. Your presence would add strength and influence to our course.

I recognize of course that in any difference of this sort, when unity is so desirable for all, either party—and perhaps both—may be responsible for the divergence. I have hoped in this long discussion to show you as clearly as I can the reasons for the position I am taking.

I want to take this opportunity also to consult you frankly on the question of nuclear weapons. Here again we may have differences, and I think it will be helpful to be candid.

The root of the problem, to me, is the need for reconciling two great objectives. On the one hand, the nuclear arms race is a terrible danger in itself, so that means to limit it must be sought with constant energy. On the other hand, the free nations require effective protection against the danger of Soviet nuclear blackmail. Prime Minister Macmillan and I discussed this problem particularly in connection with the possibility of American atmospheric testing of advanced thermonuclear designs. Such tests would continue the thermonuclear arms race renewed by the Soviets in September—but they may be necessary for the protection of all. I have ordered that preparations be undertaken, but I shall make no final decision for the time being. In any case the preparations will not be completed until spring.

I am conscious of the real divergence between your views and ours in another part of this problem. You believe that France requires the protection of a national nuclear capability, and you have undertaken a determined and extensive effort in this direction. We for our part, while we are fully committed to the defense of Europe, have not been able to believe that a national nuclear force for France is something we should assist. Your country is faced with heavy efforts in this area, and I wonder if there is not some way in which, in a wider framework, our support might not be helpful in providing the kind of protection France needs and must have, in the coming years.

What troubles us, decisively, in the case of a specifically French nuclear capability, is that if we should join in that effort, we would have no ground on which to resist certain and heavy pressure from the Germans for parallel treatment. Yet it is imperative that the Germans not have nuclear weapons of their own; memory is too strong, and fear too real, for that.

Moreover, on technical grounds, we have grave doubts that a truly effective deterrent can be developed and maintained even by nations as strong and far advanced as France, over time. We believe that more space and larger resources are going to be necessary for the deployment of up-to-date weapons systems that will effectively neutralize the blackmailer's threat, especially when his new and highly sophisticated weapons of great strength are taken into account. This may be especially true if progress is made in the antimissile missile field.

Indeed, we have the same doubt about Great Britain. We have cooperated with the British on atomic energy since early in World War II, and we cannot now break a connection so long developed in mutual trust. But we do not believe that as the nuclear age advances the United Kingdom will be able to sustain an effective deterrent of a national type alone. I believe this view is shared by some of our most knowledgeable British friends. If Great Britain were today in the position of France, and if we did not have existing commitments on the exchange of information, I can assure you that our policy toward her would not differ from our present policy toward France.

At present, and I believe for some time to come, the deterrent force of the United States protects Europe too. This is so because of the clarity of our commitment, the superiority of our overall force, and, if I may say so, my personal determination. But I must recognize that as the years pass and the intercontinental capabilities of the USSR increase, the countries of Europe will feel increasingly that they must have ways and means of providing nuclear strength which will clearly and specifically respond to any attack on Europe. I do not believe that the preliminary discussions of this problem in NATO have been prosecuted as strongly and constructively as is necessary, nor do I suppose that NATO in exactly its present form is the only conceivable framework for a new solution. What I do believe is that this problem cannot be solved while France and the United States pursue widely different courses. I have directed an intensive analysis of the problem of the nuclear defense of Europe in the coming age of the effective second-generation thermonuclear missile, in order that I may review the premises of American policy. Is there, do you think, sufficient prospect of a modification in your position to make it useful for us to consult further on this problem?

These two great topics, Berlin and nuclear policy, are perhaps enough for one letter. But I do not wish to close without a more general comment. When I think in larger terms of France and the United States—and of your policies and mine—I do not find it right to emphasize our differences above our agreements. Not only do we share the same fundamental purposes—as we found so clearly in our happy meeting in Paris—we also assess the real lines of force and policy in very similar ways. Even when we differ on tactics—as in the Congo, I fear—we can be helpful from different positions for a common end. And in many cases we do not have such differences. I have heard from Secretary Dillon, for example, of the excellent cooperation between our Governments on the problem of the International Monetary Fund. I have also heard from Averell Harriman of the growing understanding between our two countries on the problem of Laos. And finally, if I may speak of a matter which concerns France alone in direct responsibility, I have greatly admired your statesmanship in the infinitely difficult and important conduct of your affairs in Algeria. Your service here is first to France, of course, but not to France alone.

This letter comes with great personal esteem, and with the warmest good wishes for the New Year, to Mme. de Gaulle and to you from Mrs. Kennedy and me. Sincerely yours, John F. Kennedy."

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-162. Secret; Niact.

[2] The time of transmission is illegible.

[3] A preliminary draft of this letter, which dealt solely with Berlin, was an attachment to a memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy, December 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12-2761)

[4] Regarding the October 13 letter to de Gaulle, see footnote 2, Document 176. Regarding de Gaulle's October 21 reply, see footnote 2, Document 187.

[5] This sentence is handwritten. A January 2 memorandum for the files, attached to the source text, stated that this sentence was added to the text after delivery of the letter. The memorandum continued that this sentence would be transmitted to the Elysée Palace for insertion.

251. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, January 2, 1962, 7 p.m.

1840. I made almost literal presentation my instructions[2] para 1 through first part para 11 except I did not stop after para 4 and made appropriate change in para 9 in order be certain opportunity get in remarks about developments in Berlin.

Gromyko prefaced response with statement my presentation required serious thought and consideration, but he was prepared to give preliminary reaction. Referred to my statement emphasizing importance access as main problem and disagreed stating main question is conclusion German peace treaty in order write finish to World War II. He agreed access important but only as part of general question peace treaty, it is not possible, therefore, discuss access in isolation. He added that to agree discuss access without linking it with other relevant questions and primary question peace treaty would be tantamount accepting viewpoint other side as prerequisite to discussions, at least as far as order of points is concerned.

Gromyko then referred to his discussions with Secretary and President pointing to “complicated formulations” used by them in referring to results these talks and their suggestion procedure and not substance was center of these discussions. However, he stated, conversations covered many important questions all related to drawing a line under World War II. He continued that it follows from these statements Soviet Govt wants agreement on peace treaty which would be signed with both German states which would be in common interest all sides and in support of peace. In these conversations, he stated, it was made clear if no agreement possible, Soviet Union together with other states is prepared sign unilateral treaty with all ensuing consequences for West Berlin and Allied access thereto. If no agreement possible and unilateral treaty signed, Allied powers would bear responsibility make arrangements for access in agreement with GDR.

Gromyko stressed that at same time USSR has declared more than once that they do not rule out agreement on basis four-power agreement, to be concluded prior to signature of a peace treaty, which would establish status for West Berlin. After that Soviet Union would conclude peace treaty with GDR to which prior West Berlin agreement could be appended. Soviet Govt agrees such an agreement reached prior to a peace treaty would include Allied access to West Berlin. “This would not as far as I could determine in my New York and Washington talks be contradictory to Western position and wishes regarding access. Best resolution would of course be conclusion peace treaty or peace treaties with both German states but other courses possible. Gromyko emphasized if understanding reached on status West Berlin, would be possible resolve access question on basis satisfactory to all parties, i.e. West, Soviet Union and GDR. However when understanding devised, arrangements would be necessary to reflect and ensure respect for sovereign rights of GDR.” Gromyko reiterated his desire emphasize that prior agreement on status would open possibility for access agreement. “Therefore it would seem prospects now open for satisfactory solution access question which is of primary interest to Western powers”.

Gromyko stated he considers it possible reach agreement on this as well as on other questions which were touched on in discussions with Secretary and President and with which he was sure I was familiar. He wished to emphasize, however, access question could not be isolated from resolution other questions. We knew very well they were in favor strict guarantee for access. Other questions to be resolved concern both Berlin and Germany and wider question European security which was raised by Secretary Rusk himself.

Gromyko then addressed himself question recognition GDR stating apprehensions raised in his mind by my statement that during New York talks he had seemed recognize fact US cannot recognize GDR de jure or de facto. In actual fact, he stated, you already recognize GDR de facto. He cited Khrushchev that most correct solution this question would be UN membership and diplomatic recognition both German states but Soviet Govt recognizes this is question for each govt to decide itself. However he stated it is impossible resist fact of existence of GDR. Pointed to fact Soviets do not have relations with Portugal or Ireland but do not deny their existence. “We urge US take more sober position more in line actual situation.” Stressed that objectively it is possible reach agreement on questions of interest to both sides on basis satisfactory to both sides, but it is essential realistic position be adopted on these issues.

Gromyko then commented on my statements regarding developments in Berlin including construction of the wall. Stated would not dwell at length on this question since Soviet and GDR positions well publicized. “So-called wall” and other GDR measures were taken in response to threats emanating from West Berlin and US desire use West Berlin as center of diversion against GDR and other socialist countries. Regarding checking documents US personnel desiring enter East Berlin, this stems from GDR sovereignty. “Our appropriate personnel are willing present documents in order enter West Berlin,” and it is only logical both sides have similar procedures. We do not consider that any of these measures such as checking identification should lead to complications in Berlin. There exist more important questions to resolve “in order avoid any collision”.

Gromyko continued it would be wrong to draw conclusion they are prepared to leave West Berlin situation unchanged. This is quite impossible in view threat present situation in Central Europe. “It was announced at Party Congress that we decided not to look upon Dec 31 as fatalistic date. This so-called deadline is now behind us and we took this decision in order to facilitate understanding with the Western powers."

Gromyko expressed surprise over my references to possibility all-Berlin solution. He stated if plan exists to raise question in this manner, no discussion will be possible. “I have to repeat, this question cannot be discussed.” He continued, East Berlin is completely integrated into GDR. West Berlin is the problem precisely because its social system is different. “Western powers recognize this when you speak of desire to preserve freedom West Berlin, in other words, special social system in West Berlin.” Gromyko stressed contention Soviet position obviously designed facilitate agreement with Western powers.

I then discussed question sector controls imposed on Allied personnel, pointing out actions by East German authorities amount to effort to force us to recognize GDR sovereignty in East Berlin. As Gromyko aware in latest development, even our Commandant has been prevented from visiting his Soviet counterpart. This is a serious problem although separate from the one we are talking about today. Regarding peace treaties, our position is well known. We believe there should be one treaty with one Germany. As far as access question is concerned, I recognize one could not reach complete and final agreement without knowledge prospects other aspects of problem.

However, I continued, access question important whether or not we reach agreement on Berlin. I stated in his talks with the Secretary, Gromyko had mentioned necessity to respect sovereignty of GDR. We would be interested in knowing what this means. For example, would GDR have right determine who travels from West Berlin to West Germany and back?

I pointed out as Secretary had stated, we do not desire be in position buying same horse over and over again. If Berlin agreement reached and access not secure, arrangement would not be satisfactory in our eyes. One way resolve this question would be to establish corridor under our control. However, we have also given thought to possibility establishing international authority responsible for Berlin access facilities, without exercising sovereign right over territory of FRG or GDR authorities or West Berlin. I quoted from BQD 37,[3] pointing out authority would include Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn and traffic in the Berlin air control zone and discussed composition of authority governing body. I stressed such an authority would greatly reduce possibility friction between us and hoped proposal would receive Soviet Govt's serious consideration.

In closing, I pointed out our belief all-Berlin solution preferable and if rejected would naturally have serious effect on our view as to how far arrangements regarding West Berlin could go. I agreed we were, of course, prepared to discuss questions other than access but these would be dependent upon nature access arrangement and that is why issue raised first.

Gromyko responded first to the question regarding GDR sovereignty. What he meant was in course of arrangements GDR would give its consent and become one of parties who would agree to respect obligations of the prior agreement. “I am not speaking of what form this obligation would take, only of the substance. If we reach agreement, GDR by accepting obligations under this agreement would thereby protect its sovereignty.” It goes without saying any agreement would have to include specific clauses regarding protection GDR sovereignty.

Regarding corridors, Gromyko stated Soviet position on first alternative suggested well known. Such proposal would be entirely incompatible GDR sovereignty. Regarding second, as he called it, variation, Gromyko stressed he couldn't speak definitively but his impression is it would create a state within a state. However, he added, this is something requiring detailed study and he reserved right make additional comments regarding it. Gromyko then returned to what he termed inacceptability isolating access from rest of West Berlin problem. He stressed that in his talks with Secretary Rusk and the President neither side attempted to limit area conversation. He stressed this question linked with other problems and particularly major problem of writing a finish to World War II. Gromyko asked whether international authority would have to have a specific highway at its disposal. I responded that we had thought of Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn but had also considered possibility construction new road. I made clear arrangement did not contemplate unauthorized entry or exit East Germany and referred to possibility mixed traffic. I also referred to control air corridors and operation air safety center as coming under such an arrangement.

In response to my question, Gromyko confirmed Soviet position it is possible reach agreement on freedom of access and that this could be respected by GDR along with free city of West Berlin. I then stated I desired to be particularly clear about what Soviets have in mind by “free access.” I pointed out if this is what we understand, it would mean people are free to travel back and forth between Berlin and West Germany. It would be very important to us and agreement on it would facilitate our moving ahead on other questions. Gromyko reiterated that proposed prior agreement on West Berlin status would specifically include access question and GDR would recognize this agreement. I pressed for specific understanding that free access would envisage freedom for anyone to travel back and forth. Gromyko responded that in principle it is possible reach agreement on access question provided agreement reached on other points “in which we are interested.” He refused to be further pinned down on this.

I concluded with statement that if he rejected question all-Berlin agreement this would greatly restrict possibility for discussion conditions in West Berlin, and I stressed importance reaching an agreement on access, even in the absence of agreement on other matters, if serious collision were to be avoided. I noted Gromyko had referred to West Berlin free city proposal. Although I did not propose go into that aspect today he would doubtless be thinking over our conversation and I did not want him to think that omission indicated their proposal acceptable to us which it was not. Gromyko said that if there was to be no change in the status of West Berlin what was the point of discussion. I replied the point was to avoid a very dangerous situation. Gromyko concluded that Soviet Union certainly opposed seeing further complication of situation and big powers bear heavy responsibility avoid such a course.

Gromyko expressed readiness continue talks today or any time in future stating we have much to discuss.[4]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0021/1-262. Confidential; Priority; Eyes Only; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin. In telegram 1832, January 2, 3 p.m., Thompson sent a preliminary report on his conversation with Gromyko, which noted that the only item Gromyko expressed some interest in was the international access authority. (Ibid., 762.00/1-262)

[2] Document 248.

[3] See footnote 8, Document 248.

[4] In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk on January 3 Bohlen noted that there were no shifts in Soviet policy on Berlin, but stated that Soviet failure to mention placing its troops in West Berlin probably occurred because the status of West Berlin was not discussed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-361) On the same day Bohlen briefed the Ambassadorial Group on the talks. (Topol 940 to Paris, January 4; ibid., 762.0221/1-462)

252. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, January 3, 1962, 5 p.m.

1854. Although in our discussion Berlin problem yesterday Gromyko mentioned in passing removal of deadline I was struck by fact that he showed no disposition to be in any hurry or interest in how long present phase might continue. Also notable he did not use abusive language re West Germans.

It is clear he will maintain position he cannot discuss details of access until he has fairly clear idea of what access is to. Question arises as to what I should say about our thinking on status of West Berlin. For example if I am to reveal non-negotiable points in Section 2, Annex 3 of Working Group Report,[2] particularly point D concerning West Berlin relationship to FRG, I am afraid discussions would be over. Maintenance of present situation would be more advantageous to Soviets than what we propose. As a minimum I believe Soviets will insist upon our willingness to discuss a new status for West Berlin but might accept arrangement whereby they would be free to state occupation status ended by their separate treaty while we would maintain that our occupation rights continued to exist. In any event believe they will insist that it be made clear West Berlin is not part of West Germany. Believe we have strong argument for reserving occupation rights in order to ensure that no future West Berlin regime engage in provocative actions.

Gromyko based objection to all-Berlin solution on grounds different social system. In order keep ball in play on this issue would it be possible for us to suggest willingness consider establishment “Confederation of West and East Berlin” with each side maintaining its own security, economic and currency arrangements, etc., but with some overall body to handle certain common problems such as transportation, sewage disposal, etc. with possibility a few of its functions could be expanded by mutual agreement. Arrangement would provide for freedom of movement within Greater Berlin and presumably wall would have to be built around rather than across Berlin. In view Soviet endorsement Ulbricht's Confederation proposal for Germany might be awkward for them to object and could be useful device for them to have excuse for removing wall. This would also cover their demand for change in status Berlin and they would share occupation rights by occupation their sector. In any case I need something positive to say about our thinking on status West Berlin at next session and would appreciate as precise guidance as Department can give.[3]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-362. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 243.

[3] On January 4 Clay cabled his strong doubts about discussing confederation as long as East Berlin remained the capital of East Germany. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-462)

253. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President's Military Representative (Legere) to the Military Representative (Taylor)[1]

Washington, January 4, 1962.

SUBJECT

Did anyone advise knocking down The Wall?

1. I understand that Higher Authority has asked once or twice if anyone explicitly advised breaching The Wall back in the early days after its erection. The first point to remember is that The Wall did not go up overnight on August 13. What happened on August 13 was the announcement and promulgation of crossing point restrictions and the stationing of VOPOs to see that they were enforced. The physical construction of The Wall began immediately but of course took more than a little time.

2. You will recall that at first everyone thought of the restrictions in terms of shutting off the flow of refugees, and that in some respects this shut-off was not considered to be too bad a development. However, when it became apparent that the restrictions were to be stringently imposed on the Allies, you dictated the comments which are attached at Tab A.[2] Note the pencilled cover note from Miss LaFrance to me which refers to your taking several copies to an 0945 meeting next door. Note further that in paragraph 4 of your comments you explicitly recommend the use of force to cross at some place other than Friedrichstrasse (The Wall was obviously not yet completed), and that in paragraph 5 you summarize your reasons for the recommendation.

3. It is interesting to note that the date on your comments is 24 August because at Tab B[3] is a copy of a JCS message to USCINCEUR dated 25 August. Basically this is the “We will not shoot our way into East Berlin” policy line and of course the JCS was only reflecting in a military channel the political decisions which the State Department had raised.

Legere[4]

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 510-Partition of Berlin. Top Secret. Attached to a similar but longer memorandum from Legere, dated January 8.

[2] Document 125.

[3] Document 128.

[4] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, January 5, 1962, 5:19 p.m.

879. Paris for USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. French Embassy under instructions raised with Department today subject of barring of Soviet Commandant from West Berlin. Stated French understood and shared US concern over insult to US Commandant. They regretted differing situations which had resulted in Western sectors however and attached great importance to reestablishing common procedures. Suggested that Watson reply to Solovyev letter[2] be accompanied by oral approach referring to thought in Soviet letter regarding maintaining contacts. We could point out that Watson as US Commandant could not be considered in same category as average boundary crosser. His special character should extend to anyone accompanying him, civilian or military.

Department informed French in reply that letter had already been sent Solovyev (Berlin's 1284).[3] French thought statements in Watson letter regarding value of contacts and return to normal procedures provided peg hang follow-up oral approach. We told French we would consider their proposal. Request comments.[4]

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Day, cleared by SOV, and approved and initialed by Hillenbrand. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Moscow.

[2] In Solovyev's letter of December 30, he stated that he regretted the incident on December 23 (see Document 245), but added that the border police were following customary procedures and that their actions were no reason to forbid his entry into the U.S. sector. (Telegram 1258 from Berlin, December 30; Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/12-3061)

[3] Telegram 1284, January 4, transmitted the text of Watson's rebuttal of Solovyev's letter. (Ibid., 762.00/1-462)

[4] On January 7 the Mission at Berlin replied that the Soviets seemed uninterested in maintaining contacts with the Western Commandants and would reestablish contacts if it suited them. (Telegram 1298 from Berlin; ibid., 762.00/1-762)

255. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan)[1]

Washington, January 5, 1962.

DEAR GEORGE: I was much interested in your letter of December 26[2] and appreciated a chance to see it. I hope you and your family had some real relaxation in Switzerland.

I do not pretend to be an expert on Soviet affairs but your long paragraph on page 2 reminded me of a Khrushchev remark at Vienna. He told the President, in words that sounded familiar to politicians, that he was under great pressures from his military and scientific people for more and more money because the Americans were doing X, Y, or Z. He then referred to similar pressures on Kennedy and the race goes on. His manner at the time indicated he was just exchanging impressions with a member of the trade union of political leaders and not trying to work up to any particular point. I suppose that he is subject to regular and pressing demands from his military and nuclear people for more resources and that he must think very hard about saying “no” if he is given a lot of information about the Americans “getting ahead”. Whether these military demands are more insistent than that, related to his own position and support, I would not know.

I won't go into detail on your comments on Berlin. If this were largely a bilateral problem between the Russians and ourselves, we could largely ignore our allies. But it seems to me that it is, in its most fundamental aspect, a European problem. The Europeans might settle it without us, but I can't see how we can settle it without Europe; this is especially so in a period when Western Europe is recovering its power to act in the European interest. As to what we are going to talk about with the Russians, the clue is in your third paragraph on page 3. If the Russians were ready “to let things go on as they are” there would be no crisis and no need for discussion. They are proposing to change matters, including their own most solemn commitments, in such a way as to injure our vital interests. Any change to our advantage is simply brushed aside as not negotiable. What they want to talk about is a diminution in our position, with every prospect that they will try to charge a very high price merely for leaving us alone. The talks are to find out whether there is any possibility of improving both our positions or, alternatively, of insuring our essential interests without a conflict. Thus far they have not shown “a complete absence of interest in discussing the Berlin problem with us at all.” If they do take this line, I suppose it would mean that they have decided either to leave us alone or to take us on at a frightful cost to them as well as to the rest of us. This is terribly oversimplified, for brevity's sake, and I apologize for commenting so inadequately about so serious a matter.

I don't rule out the possibility of your visiting Moscow, but I would suppose it would be better, as your timing suggests, to wait until after Tommy has had this series of talks. Let's take it up a bit later.

All the best to you and your family,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron. Secret; Informal. Drafted by Rusk.

[2] Document 246.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

256. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, January 6, 1962.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

Sir Edward Heath, the Lord Privy Seal

Sir David Ormsby-Gore, the British Ambassador

Richard D. Vine—EUR/RA

The Secretary noted that he was interested by Gromyko's response to a point that we had made of no de facto or de jure recognition of East Germany and its status in East Berlin. Gromyko reacted to this that we had already done so. The Secretary wondered if it would be possible to make progress in this position, brushing aside one point after another.

Another point which had to be tested was whether the Soviets required the four powers signing a peace treaty or whether an agreement among the four powers could be appended to the treaty.

He went on to say that if the Soviets continue to leave unilateral harassments alone, it may be possible to work something out. Gromyko's attitude has certainly not been captious.

Another hopeful sign has been the Soviet reference to political relations between West Berlin and West Germany.

The Secretary also noted that he was beginning to see what was behind the reference to a subsidized Berlin. He had not thought of the Wall in connection with the differential standard of living and the “capitalist enticement” of East German workers, but this seemed to be a great concern to the Soviets.

He also mentioned Brandt's suggestion for control of workers which might be worked out independent of the problem of refugees on the basis of passports, visas, or some such device. This was bogged down, however, on the question of political asylum.

The Secretary thought it nevertheless possible to go on “punching holes in the wall”. The Soviet demands that subversion, i.e., intelligence activities should cease, is not a matter that is susceptible to any agreement.

The French, he continued, are showing a great deal more interest in these talks than they are supposed to.

Heath noted that Couve had said as much in Paris in December.

[1] Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Vine on January 10 and approved in S on January 18. On January 5 Rusk had also discussed Berlin at length with Ambassador Ormsby Gore. A memorandum of their conversation, which dealt mainly with the international access authority, is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/1-562)

257. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, January 9, 1962, 5 p.m.

1907. Eyes only Secretary. Believe that before long I should have some idea of what would in US view constitute acceptable basis for negotiations on Berlin problem. Suggest what I should try to work toward could be something along following lines: Soviets know our thinking on problem of access and would be prepared to see whether some arrangement for international control of Autobahn could be worked out provided satisfactory arrangement reached on status West Berlin. We know Soviet thinking on status West Berlin and would be prepared to see how far we could go to meet Soviet preoccupations (it being understood that we are unwilling renounce our presence and occupation rights) if satisfactory access arrangements worked out. We are aware of Soviet concern with other questions and willing discuss them but outcome would depend upon nature arrangements regarding Berlin. On this basis we prepared arrange for formal negotiations.

On status West Berlin believe that if eventual negotiations are to be successful it would be absolutely essential that we at least be prepared agree to prohibition on West Berlin becoming part of West Germany. In this connection I am troubled by para 19 (b) of Annex 3 to Working Group report. While might be desirable to avoid giving Soviets propaganda advantage of being able say their basic idea accepted, it would seem to me far more important for us to win on substance and let them have short lived victory in appearance. What I have in mind is that if occupation rights and presence of Western troops preserved, and if West Berlin free to make arrangements with West Germany along present lines, including application West German laws, provided West Berlin not incorporated in FRG, it would be small price to pay to call such an arrangement a “free city” or something very similar.

I believe Soviets will have in mind both long and short-range aspects of any settlement of Berlin question and in this connection will wish avoid any provisions which would preclude arrangements which they may eventually hope achieve in Europe as a whole. For example, one of their long-range objectives is to get US troops out of Europe, particularly should large-scale disarmament be achieved. In this connection they would desire avoid language in any agreement which would make continued presence of Allied troops in Berlin virtually mandatory.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-962. Secret.

258. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, January 9, 1962.

SUBJECT

Meeting between Vice Chancellor Erhard and Secretary Rusk, January 9, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

Germans

Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Wolfram Langer, Chief, Economic Policy Division, Ministry of Economics

U.S.

The Secretary

Mr. C. Arnold Freshman,GER, Department of State

The Secretary asked whether there were any special points the Vice Chancellor wished to raise before his visit comes to an end.

Professor Erhard stated he wished to review what was being done for Berlin by the Federal Republic. In addition to special ERP grants and loans, Berlin receives direct budgetary support of DM 1.1 billion; businesses in Berlin receive tax benefits and the people of Berlin are accorded preferential income tax allowances. Since August 13, DM 500 million has also been provided to enable the city to initiate cultural events and improve the economic situation. Sales have risen 7.4 percent over the same period last year and there is no unemployment. The Federal Republic is in constant contact with the Senat. There are plans to make Berlin a pedagogical center through attraction of teachers and creation of broader educational facilities. Particular emphasis will be placed on financial measures to increase the number of students resident at Berlin universities, especially from other countries. Professor Erhard stated that the impression of the wall on visitors, students in particular, is so great as to immunize them from communism.

Berlin's problem is depression, moral and emotional. Here the U.S. can do a great deal, especially in the field of emotional reinforcement. Last week Erhard had talked with Mr. McCloy of the Ford Foundation. The Foundation would like to give some thought to their possible role, particularly looking to stimulating some activity in research, or by setting up a branch office in Berlin to handle cultural activities. President Kennedy's proposals to promote Berlin exports and for U.S. participation in trade fairs would be especially useful. Perhaps export firms should be encouraged to set up branch offices in Berlin. The extent to which U.S. business could be induced now to invest in Berlin would testify to their confidence in that city and would serve to encourage capital from West Germany. The substantial tax benefits accorded firms doing business in Berlin would assist in the write-off of their investment. The morale effect of new U.S. business in Berlin would be tremendous. The West German National Association for Manufacturers (Bundesverband des Deutschen Industrie) might be induced to establish a permanent branch in Berlin. Large projects are not needed, but whatever is done should be visible and publicized. Other measures are also possible, but progress in this direction would be convincing evidence, especially to the Soviet Zone, of U.S. and allied determination not to abandon Berlin.

The Secretary stated that the enormous efforts of the Federal Republic in Berlin were appreciated. He asked whether U.S. banks, for example Chase Manhattan, could establish branches in Berlin, to which the Vice Chancellor responded that this was a good idea, and it would also bring in business.

The Secretary then noted that he had raised the question for immediate consideration whether the Buy American policy could be relaxed to enable our post exchanges to place orders in Berlin.

Secretary Rusk adverted to the passage in the Khrushchev memorandum to Kroll[2] in which he linked the wall with outside subsidies to Berlin. The Secretary asked Erhard for his opinion on what Khrushchev might have had in mind, noting that Khrushchev had indicated that the wall would continue to exist until Berlin became self-sufficient. The Vice Chancellor responded that to exist Berlin needs about DM 2 billion annually in outside assistance. Converted to the Federal Republic, this would compare to about DM 50 billion. If the economic level in Berlin is thus depressed, Khrushchev would have achieved his objective.

The Secretary stated that thinking ahead to the course of the discussions with the Soviet Union, he wanted to speculate on one point. Khrushchev seems to believe that a rapid erosion of life in Berlin will ensue, even under today's situation. He may delay measures because of this element of erosion. Did the Vice Chancellor believe that in the absence of any accord between Moscow and the West the situation in Berlin is likely to deteriorate rapidly, or is Berlin sustainable by the means which have been discussed? Erhard stated that if Berlin is convinced that time will run against the West, that Berlin is to be nibbled away, then Khrushchev is in a very good position.

Herr Langer then interjected the point that every city draws on its suburbs for its human resources. This being no longer possible for Berlin, the city stands to lose 25,000 to 30,000 in population annually—entirely apart from the situation of Berlin's aging population—which would in ten years mean a loss of 250,000 people or more.

The Secretary asked about possibilities for inducing younger West Berliners now living in West Germany to return to West Berlin. The Vice Chancellor noted that this factor did not begin on August 13. Better opportunities exist for them in West Germany although they retain their intrinsic ties to Berlin. To stimulate the movement of labor to Berlin at this time, the Federal Republic was providing marriage subsidies, non-interest bearing loans and paying moving costs to Berlin, among other benefits. Over 1,000 persons now relocated in Berlin from West Germany under this stimulus had found employment.

Prefacing with the comment that his query should not be construed as representing or indicating U.S. policy, the Secretary observed that during the period of the airlift the performance of the Berliners had been fantastic, but that they were then inured to situations of crisis. He wondered whether subsequent prosperity of the city might have had an undermining effect on Berlin morale so that they may not now be as disposed today to face a similar situation. The Vice Chancellor stated that the inner moral fortitude of the Berliners is unchanged; they will be all right so long as they continue to believe in the Federal Republic and the West.

The Secretary said that this point is very important. We are determined to stand fast on Berlin, but it is important that the Berliners be equally prepared. He added that the Vice Chancellor's views on this point accorded with those of General Clay.

The Secretary asked if Minister Erhard felt that the GDR was attempting to reduce the extent of its economic dependence on the West. Erhard replied in the negative. He stated that interzonal trade flows without a hitch. This is not due to GDR love or sympathy for the Federal Republic; interzonal trade is more important to the GDR than to the Federal Republic. While there are certain signs that the GDR is drawing on countries other than the Federal Republic for some of its industrial needs, they would have difficulty switching to new sources since their capital equipment is primarily of West German origin. Erhard then noted that it would be desirable if talks (with the Russians) could begin as soon as possible. A nervous reaction could develop if the feeling arose that talks are being delayed for any reason.

The Secretary said that we will be conferring closely with the Federal Republic on the talks with the Russians. He asked that Professor Erhard convey his regards to Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Schroeder. The Secretary noted in conclusion that Lord Home would be in Berlin the next day and that this would be a tangible sign of our interest.

Professor Erhard expressed his strong interest in the matters discussed with the Secretary yesterday and during this meeting.[3] He felt that everything that could now be done for Berlin—whether of a social, cultural or economic nature—would be a great help and would have considerable effect without necessarily entailing large expenditures.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1162. Secret. Drafted by Freshman on January 11 and approved in S on January 18. Erhard was in the United States to speak at a dinner of the Economic Club in New York on January 10.

[2] See Document 247.

[3] A memorandum of Erhard's conversation with Rusk on January 8, devoted primarily to trade policy and the Atlantic Community, is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:02 p.m.

1615. Paris pass Finletter—eyes only. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Following are your instructions for next meeting with Gromyko (which you should request for early date) containing minor amendments to take account of points made by Germans and British.

Begin verbatim text.

You should seek further appointment with Gromyko and conduct discussion along following lines:

1. US Government considers that initial exchange of views with Soviet Foreign Minister on January 2[2] was useful in helping further to clarify positions of both parties and in providing occasion for each to stress certain questions which considered of particular importance. There also seemed to be agreement that both wanted to settle issues involved by peaceful means, though it is obvious that real substantive differences continue to exist.

2. In first discussion number of principles were stated which we believe are essential for progress towards an acceptable agreement. There is no need to repeat these at length but they should not be overlooked. We particularly stressed that key practical point in Berlin situation is access, for it is on this point that unilateral action by one side could have highly dangerous results.

3. While Soviet Foreign Minister gave his preliminary reactions to presentation of US position, he also indicated that US statements would require serious thought and consideration. We will therefore be interested in hearing his further views on various points raised.

4. In this connection it might be well to begin by eliminating one subject on which it obvious from outset that no meeting of minds is possible, and from what Gromyko has said can be set aside. Proposal for single peace treaty with both GDR and Federal Republic or for a separate peace treaty with GDR is not acceptable to West. We believe that any action which attempts formally to legalize division of Germany would be serious mistake, even regarded from Soviet viewpoint. However, we know that Soviet Union holds other views, and it is clear from our present actions that we are living with this situation and do not contemplate any use of force to change it. Entire NATO posture is based on this approach.

5. In referring to possibility of all-Berlin solution, Soviet Foreign Minister took position that this question could not be discussed and that East Berlin is completely integrated into GDR. He also stated that construction of wall was necessary to combat threats emanating from West Berlin. To take latter point first, it is not purpose of present discussion to analyze motivations for action which took place on August 13. Even Ulbricht in his December 30 Pravda article virtually admitted that wall was directed not so much at outer world but at inhabitants of GDR, who continued to evidence desire to leave. Be that as it may, fact of wall and of ensuing actions directed towards sealing off East Berlin from rest of city has, in practice, constituted considerable unilateral change of status quo in further disregard of Soviet obligations. While US Government, therefore, continues to consider that all-Berlin solution based upon recognition of continuing Four-Power responsibilities, is best and most logical approach to problem, it cannot help but draw certain conclusions from fact that these unilateral actions have been taken. One of these conclusions is that Soviets, having attempted to dispose of their sector of city without consent of West, now claim right to have determining voice in disposition of Western sectors of city. Not only is there lack of logic in Soviet approach, but pressure which is being brought on Western Powers to consent to modifications of situation is in the form of threat of further unilateral abandonment of its responsibilities by Soviets to GDR—in this case those relating to Berlin access.

6. A noteworthy example of such lack of logic is what Soviets say regarding alleged effect of peace treaty on occupation rights in West Berlin. West Berlin has never been part of GDR. No treaty between Soviet Union and GDR can, therefore, terminate occupation rights of Western Powers. Question may further be asked why, if Soviet Union has in mind agreement with respect to Western position in West Berlin, so much importance is attached to distinction between such agreement and occupation rights. Conclusion might be drawn that this is because Soviets believe that, in some way, rights under agreement would be less securely based than occupation rights. It is our suggestion, therefore, that since Soviets understand we are not prepared to abandon our rights in and access to West Berlin, discussion of basis these rights is unnecessary and need not cause difficulties.

7. Given these considerations, we would be particularly interested in further explanation of what in the Soviet view the situation in West Berlin would look like. Soviets continually attack Western occupation as obsolete. The presence of Western troops might be undesirable if they remain in face of opposition of civilian population and if they no longer serve a function which we and that population consider essential. There can be no question but that, in both respects, Western forces are far from obsolete. If there is any question—and we do not believe Soviets really seriously doubt this—about desires of West Berlin population, Western Powers would be glad at any time to have properly supervised plebiscite held in West Berlin. Moreover, experience of Berliners over years has confirmed their conviction that presence of Western forces is necessary guarantee of continuing freedom. Experience of blockade and of continual harassments, pressures and threats from GDR since then could have no other effect. Western Powers do not consider, therefore, that their continuing presence is negotiable. As pointed out in January 2 conversation, Western Powers have never negotiated with Soviets on occupation rights but only on exercise and implementation of those rights. They do not expect that Soviet Union will specifically reaffirm continuation of occupation rights, but they do expect that it will conduct itself in such a way as to take practical cognizance of the facts of life as they exist in West Berlin—including presence of Western protective forces.

8. After you have made statement along foregoing lines, we assume Gromyko will be prepared make further comments on your presentation of January 2. These may merely repeat points made in his “preliminary reaction” or may provide basis for further probing on your part. This is matter which we leave largely to your judgment. You are still both exchanging views and putting forward suggestions which do not commit either side. Essential purpose is still to find out whether and in what area basis for negotiations can be found.

9. Two points on which Soviet have insisted in past which particularly require clarification are changed status for West Berlin and “respect for GDR sovereignty”. Going back to Gromyko's remarks on these subjects during January 2 conversation, you should if this seems appropriate, attempt to draw him out further on his statement to you that it would be wrong to conclude that Soviets are prepared to leave West Berlin situation unchanged in view of threat present situation in Central Europe. We do not understand what threat present situation in West Berlin poses to Eastern Europe unless Soviets consider very existence of a free West Berlin to be such a threat. In putting questions, impression must, of course, be avoided that Western presence is in any way negotiable beyond points in para 3 of Annex III to Working Group Report of December 10, 1961.

10. As to “respect for GDR sovereignty”, your efforts should be directed towards attempting to nail down whether this criterion can be met largely in procedural terms by having GDR concur in arrangements on access made by Four Power agreement or whether some GDR role in access is what Soviets have in mind. You might refer to fact that Soviet Union has frequently used expression “respect for sovereignty of GDR” which we hope can be clarified. In this connection, on January 2 Soviet Foreign Minister took exception to what American Ambassador said regarding de jure and de facto recognition of GDR by citing Soviet acceptance of existence of certain countries with which it does not have relations. Similarly, Soviet Foreign Minister claimed that in actual fact US has already recognized GDR de facto. This suggests to us that what Soviet Foreign Minister has in mind is that we not act as if we deny existence of East Germany, as indeed we do not. Since Soviet Foreign Minister and Chairman Khrushchev have emphasized factual situation, we see no problem arising from our inability to accord some kind of formal de jure or de facto recognition which would go beyond that factual situation. On “respect for sovereignty of GDR” as it relates to Berlin access, we understand Soviets wish to ensure that access rights do not in fact interfere with authority or life in East Germany. This creates no problems for us because we do not wish so to interfere; what we want is access which is not interfered with by East Germany. There are numerous cases in which means of transit across territory or through air space are used without any interference in the affairs of the territory transited. We suggest that Soviet Foreign Minister accept as point of departure concept that guaranteed access would not interfere with affairs of East Germany and that East Germany would not interfere with freedom of access.

11. Although your efforts to pin down Gromyko specifically on whether “free access” would envisage freedom for anyone to travel back and forth were not successful you should make further effort towards this end. You might make point that we assume Soviet Government is sincere in its stated intention of permitting a viable and supportable existence for West Berliners. Soviets must realize as well as we do that this requires continuation of their relations with outer world on really free basis not subject to control of any third party.

12. If in your judgment you need to say more about status of West Berlin than contained above in order to accomplish objective, you may find it useful to set forth present US understanding of legal status of Western sectors of Berlin. These sectors are an area in which supreme authority continues to be exercised by three Western Powers. Relationship which has grown up between Federal Republic and Berlin in various areas of activity has been on permissive basis subject to this authority. While Constitution of Federal Republic provides that West Berlin is Land of Federal Republic by virtue of suspension of pertinent articles of Bonn Basic Law in 1949 this portion of Constitution is inoperative in Berlin. If you deem it desirable further to spell out US understanding of present status West Berlin you may draw on BTF-34[3] as appropriate (copies pouched to you January 4—Registry No. 526272). It may be worth pointing out that one of effects of termination of Western occupation would automatically be to end suspension those articles of Bonn Basic Law referred to above. You might remind Gromyko logical response to Soviet unilateral action directed towards incorporation of East Berlin into GDR would have been incorporation of West Berlin in Federal Republic. However, Western Powers have refrained from considering this action as not contributing to achievement of mutually acceptable arrangement under present circumstances.

13. Should Gromyko insist that Berlin cannot be discussed in isolation but must be related to broader questions aimed at “drawing line under World War II”, you should state that, in our view creation of barriers against World War III is more important than drawing purely technical line under World War II. We must, therefore, consider issues in light of what is possible now in terms of vital interests of each side. If Gromyko responds to this by repeating usual charges against alleged West German militarism and revanchism, you might take line that, while Soviet leaders have placed great stress in recent years on rejection of Stalinism, it must nevertheless be pointed out that the Soviets first began postwar rearmament of Germany by rearming East Germans over Western protests. Western actions have been defensive and designed purely for nonaggressive purposes. You may also find it useful in this context to draw on relevant points made by President in his interview of November 25 with Adzhubei[4] and emphasize conviction of US that present Germany is thoroughly peaceful.

14. If Gromyko continues to insist on discussion of “broader questions” you might observe that every subject can obviously not be discussed simultaneously. We have placed initial stress on Berlin access which we believe critical issue for reasons indicated. He should understand, however, that what US would be prepared to say on other subjects will depend to great extent on reasonableness of Soviet position on Berlin access which we consider to be most appropriate question on which to focus at outset.

15. Re International Access Authority, we are sending in separate message summary of proposal[5] which you may find useful in further discussion with Gromyko. Do not believe, however, that specific language of formal agreement should be tabled pending further explorations. To degree necessary, however, you may also draw for details on draft charter in BQD-37 revised November 30, 1961. In view of German reserve on Board of Governors, you should be cautious in discussing this aspect of Authority not to give impression that composition represents agreed Western position and should indicate that other formulae may be possible.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-1062. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Bohlen, Bundy, and Rusk (in draft); and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Berlin. On January 5 the Department of State had transmitted to Thompson a preliminary draft of these instructions (telegram 1580 to Moscow; ibid., 611.61/1-562), which were the same in substance as those transmitted here. Thompson had commented briefly on them in telegram 1886 from Moscow, January 6. (Ibid., 611.61/1-662)

[2] See Document 251.

[3] A copy of this document, “Relationships Between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany,” is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Task Force Reports.

[4] See Document 223.

[5] Telegram 1617 to Moscow, January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1062)

260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, January 10, 1962, 6:07 p.m.

1616. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Separate cable containing your basic instructions[2] as discussed with British and Germans and passed to French for information suggests line of approach for your next meeting with Gromyko in considerable detail. At same time you are left sufficient latitude to probe Soviets should favorable openings appear, and I am, of course, fully confident that, within broad framework of these instructions and our objectives as you know them, you will feel free to exercise your good judgment.

2. From studying results of your first talk, it appears to us, in essence, that what is involved in this discussion is Western desire for an improved access arrangement with Berlin on one hand, as against Soviet desire for change in (1) status of West Berlin, and (2) other questions relating to Germany as a whole. This may be too simplified a formulation of the problem, since it does not include questions such as “respect for GDR sovereignty”, but its formulation in these terms will help to clarify essence of these talks. As you are fully aware, we have no interest in any change in status of West Berlin and would not advance any of the questions affecting Germany as a whole. We are, however, interested in an improved access arrangement which would reinforce our position in Berlin and safeguard communications between West Berlin and West Germany, and we consider, therefore, that you should be prepared to express, without commitment, our views on improved access agreement, leaving, however, to Soviets to put forward their desiderata in regard to status of West Berlin and more general questions affecting Germany.

3. In spelling out arguments in basic instruction, point should emerge that we have put forward a view on possibility of an international authority covering access and that the Soviets, for their part, should put forth specifically what they have in mind in regard to status of Berlin and other questions. You should stress that until we know Soviet views on these latter two questions, we will not have complete picture which would enable us to judge whether or not a reasonable basis for more formal negotiations exists.

4. If Gromyko, as is possible, spells out “free city” concept for West Berlin, you should not hesitate to use argument of previous instruction[3] that, since Soviets reject completely all-Berlin solution and insist that Eastern sectors of city are integral parts of GDR, this, in our view, deprives them of right to voice in future status of West Berlin. You might emphasize that in these circumstances, there would appear to be no need for any revision of existing status which, as Soviets are aware, is desired and fully supported by West Berlin population. Your purpose in this part of conversation would be to endeavor to obtain a full statement of Soviet position in regard to future of West Berlin without, however, entering into any detailed discussion of Soviet proposal.

5. In regard to other questions, you should pursue identical tactics, that is, endeavor to obtain from Soviets without commitment on our part precise statement of what other questions affecting Germany as a whole Soviets desire to discuss.

6. What we would be after at this stage in talks would be some clear indication of totality of Soviet position. We recognize that at this stage Soviets would probably only indicate first negotiating positions and not, in any sense, final positions, but your judgment as to depth of Soviet feeling in regard to any of these positions would be most valuable. We feel it important to ascertain in relatively near future whether or not there would be any grounds for contemplating more formal negotiations. It is not, however, our intention to bring the talks you are presently conducting to a breaking point since we consider that the very fact of the existence of these talks operates as an inhibition on Soviet action in Berlin itself. On other hand, we have to, at some point, consider alternatives open to us, i.e., movement towards formal negotiations or prospect of breakdown of these exploratory talks.

7.

In this connection, Germans have indicated to us their view that tempo of conversations should be adapted to Soviet tempo which they now interpret as relatively relaxed. In their view, more accelerated pace might give impression West feels its position is weak. Our estimate of degree of Soviet urgency on Berlin differs from line which Germans are now spreading, but we certainly wish to avoid giving any impression of undue anxiety. I would appreciate having your impressions on this general point.

Our further comments on specific points in basic instructions or raised in your cables follow:

8. While we do not believe it desirable to go beyond language in final sentence of paragraph 7 of instructions at present time, you should be aware that British have raised with us possibility of finding formula which, without danger to legal basis of Western presence in Berlin, would go some way to meet Soviet position that West Berlin should no longer be under “an occupation regime”. (Text of British memorandum on this subject pouched Moscow January 8—Registry No. 1506239.)[4]

9. In discussing British suggestion with Ormsby Gore, I said I hoped some way could be found to deal with question without necessity of any formal steps by West Berliners or by us to set up trusteeship which would give Berliners impression that basis of their rights had been radically changed. I suggested that there were perhaps two ways of achieving this: (a) Four-Power agreement which was silent on question of Western occupation rights. This would be superimposed on existing system rather than superseding it. We would say we were prepared to operate on basis of such agreement but if anything happened to agreement, direct application of occupation rights would be restored. Soviets could concentrate on agreement itself. (b) Western Powers could themselves declare that they consider their position in Berlin would be based on more than occupation rights, and that they are holding Western sectors in trusteeship for German people and at desire of West Berliners. This would combine elements of trusteeship and self-determination.

10. While final sentence of paragraph 9 is, therefore, valid at this stage, we may wish at later point to consider interpreting it along lines I suggested.

11. On discussion of “broader questions” raised paragraph 14 of instructions, our basic position remains as set forth in Deptel 1523.[5]

12. Should Gromyko raise question of “subversive activities” you may take line suggested Moscow's 1886.[6] Should he inquire whether West still ready to consider prohibition on atomic arms in Berlin, you should indicate point not covered specifically in your instructions but you will inquire. As to troop levels in Berlin, you should be guided by footnote b on page 2 of Annex III to Working Group Report of December 10, 1961.[7]

13. Confusion regarding German reserve on composition Board of Governors in BQD-37 due to fact that Embassy representative belatedly came in on January 2 with supplementary request for modifications of instructions to which Ambassador Grewe had previously agreed.[8] In most respects these merely attempted reinforcement of positions which were fully covered in original instructions. They did call particular attention, however, to German reserve on composition Board of Governors. This was not shown in November 3 document since reserve only made later and overlooked by German Foreign Office in sending instructions to Grewe on basis of which he concurred contents Deptel 1520.[9]

14. Regarding your 1847,[10] as you aware, bracketed language in subparagraph 3 of Article X of BQD-37 represents fallback position. Is it your judgment that failure to include this point in formal text when put forward as proposal would be determining factor in Soviet acceptance or rejection? Regarding elimination of reference to military forces, believe it would be dangerous in light of our previous experience with Soviet interpretation of agreements not to mention this subject, but we are considering possible reformulations. Suggest that question need not be dealt with directly until specific draft agreement put forward.

15. We have not yet explored with Allies confederation concept as applied East and West Berlin suggested Moscow's 1854 and 1874.[11] Agree idea worth considering further but do not feel it should be put forward in your next discussion with Gromyko. We are not certain of proposed scope of proposal but would presumably have no objection to advancing suggestion for body to handle such matters as transportation, sewage disposal, and other public utilities on common basis. Establishment of body with such limited functions would not require any change in present status of Berlin, however, as only essential action would be delegation of authority to body by respective municipal governments. Seems dubious Soviets would view such proposal as offering any basis for removal of wall and acceptance continuation of occupation. On other hand, if authority of confederation Board expanded so as to make it real substitute for supreme authority held by Western Allies, this would, given nature of confederal system, mean giving East Berlin a veto respecting variety of matters of substantial and possibly vital importance to West Berlin. Alternative to this would be some form of weighted authority but this would seem amount to essentials of all-Berlin proposal which clearly unacceptable to Soviets.

16. Regarding your 1906,[12] no objection to modification of Gromyko quote along lines indicated. I am also giving consideration to questions raised your 1907.[13] As you are aware, basic problem on Western side is finding formula which French would consider as constituting acceptable basis for negotiations.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1062. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bohlen and Hillenbrand, cleared by Rusk and Bundy, and initialed and approved by Kohler.

[2] Document 259.

[3] Document 248.

[4] A copy of this memorandum is attached to the memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 1, Document 256.

[5] Document 249.

[6] Thompson suggested in telegram 1886, January 6, that he reply that measures on subversive activities would apply to both parts of Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-662)

[7] Footnote b stated that the Western powers could accept no substantial reduction in the level of their forces but would consider freezing at the present level or examining a reduction if developments permitted. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1999)

[8] A memorandum of Bohlen's conversation with the German Minister on January 2 is ibid., Central Files, 762A.00/1-262.

[9] Document 248.

[10] In telegram 1847, January 3, Thompson reported that Gromyko was likely to press for further details on the access authority and suggested strategy to meet this demand. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-362)

[11] Telegram 1854 is printed as Document 252. Telegram 1874, January 5, discussed the confederation idea with neither East nor West Germany having Berlin as its capital. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-562)

[12] Dated January 9. (Ibid., 611.61/1-962)

[13] Document 257.

261. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, January 11, 1962, 7 p.m.

1322. Eyes only from Clay for Rusk only. For very limited distribution. I am distressed at Norstad's report on Stockwell complaints and even more at Stoessel's letter to Hillenbrand.[2] This is certainly a back door approach which makes me wonder as to how it originated and, made to Watson's superior, indeed a blow below the belt. More surprising is that the American Commander did not support his subordinate as every action complained about had governmental approval. I am thus surprised to find Stoessel reporting that Norstad believed complaints to have a sound basis. This I reject completely.

Of course, it is obvious that neither British nor French will ever react in Berlin, but fortunately failure on their part to react is taken for granted in West Berlin. Failure on our part could be disastrous. We shall try hard to reconcile actions we believe essential to our position here with extreme British and French resistance to any reaction, but complete success is impossible.

I hope that report receives little attention but I could not let it be in the record as such back door reporting is most unfair to a highly conscientious and competent soldier who deserves full support from his superiors. I recognize it to be aimed at me.

In my opinion, Watson's actions were taken in his capacity as Assistant Chief of Mission in which his responsibility is direct to State Department. I accept full responsibility for them being within approved policies and within such discretionary authority as we have here, as General Watson properly seeks and acts with my advice. I cannot permit him to be blamed for such actions. As I promised, we will do our utmost to keep things quiet here during probing period, but we may not always be able to operate on the do-nothing-in-Berlin policy of French and British and maintain our prestige.

Have sent no copies elsewhere although have no objection copies being sent Norstad and Stoessel if you desire.

Trivers

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1162. Secret; Priority.

[2] On January 5 Stoessel had reported that in a conversation with Norstad, Deputy SACEUR Stockwell had raised British concern about the number of U.S. armed convoys transiting the Autobahn and other U.S. actions in Berlin. In a general comment at the end of the conversation Stockwell said that the British were concerned that a clear break seemed to be developing between the United States and the other two Western powers in the city. (Telegram 3321 from Paris; ibid., 762.00/1-562) In its own cable on the same day the Mission at Berlin stated that the British in the city gave no such picture. (Telegram 1292; ibid.) The letter from Stoessel has not been further identified.

262. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, January 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

Taylor-Clay Telephone Conversation re Density of Military Traffic on the Autobahn, January 11, 1962

At the direction of the President, General Taylor telephoned General Clay in Berlin at 10 A.M. EST, Thursday, January 11, 1962, to discuss the volume of US military traffic on the autobahn. General Taylor told General Clay that the President during the past few days had learned of the current volume of such traffic and, although he realized it was basically in accord with approved policy, was inclined to ask that the measures in implementation of that policy be reviewed so as to avoid an impression of artificiality in the traffic. Before requesting that review, however, the President wanted to know General Clay's views.

In response General Clay said he felt there should be no sudden cut-back in the volume of traffic. Instead, he felt that the volume could be gradually tapered off to some lower level. In answer to a question from General Taylor, General Clay stated that he needed no directive from Washington on this matter but could and would handle the necessary action informally at his end.

At the end of the conversation General Clay referred to the recent so-called “pressure” from various British sources on this subject. General Taylor assured General Clay that this so-called “pressure” had had no effect here.

L. J. Legere[2]

Colonel, USA Assistant to the Military

Representative of the President

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Clay Cables. Secret. Prepared by Legere. Copies were sent to Bundy, Kohler, Nitze, Lemnitzer, McCone, and Colonel Ewell.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

263. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Kennedy[1]

Paris, January 11, 1961.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your letter of December 31[2] discusses frankly two of the principal problems we have to face. I owe it to the friendly relations between our two countries to reply to you with the same cordial frankness.

First of all, you took up the problem of Berlin. On that point, our respective positions are established. You believe that every effort should be made to obtain from the Russians, if possible, an acceptable arrangement for the status of Berlin and the matter of access to Berlin. You consider it desirable that your Ambassador in Moscow sound out the Soviets regarding their intentions on this point. It appears, however, that the Soviets have already on several occasions made their intentions known regarding the fate of both Berlin and Germany, the two matters being, according to them, closely related. These demands, as made known and as, moreover, supported by demonstrations of force, such as the construction of the Berlin wall, atomic explosions, etc., do not make it possible for France to enter into effective negotiations. It does not wish to, nor can it, of course, object to your making contacts with the Soviets on your own account. But unless the Soviets change their position, I do not see how these contacts could enable us to discover a basis for negotiation acceptable to the West. I even fear that, on the contrary, the mere fact that conversations are held under the conditions and in the atmosphere created at present by the Soviets is liable to confirm them in their demands.

You tell me that, although these soundings are made without French participation, it would be well, in the event that negotiations are actually initiated, if France could join the United States and Great Britain. Often in the past, and again very recently, I have expressed the hope that the day might come when, in an atmosphere of relaxation of tension and good will, that is to say, in a completely different atmosphere from the one in which we are now living, real negotiations might be possible between the great Western powers and Russia to endeavor to settle the great world problems, particularly, the problem of Germany. In that event, France would undoubtedly, and very willingly, take part in them. But if it should appear likely, in the light of the present circumstances, that such negotiations would consist in preparing a setback for the West with respect to Germany, France would not participate in them, even though the United States and Great Britain should be willing to proceed without it.

It is true that one of the reasons impelling you to enter into talks with Moscow now is—you have told me this several times—the reaction of the American public. In order to accept the increase in the military burden and, a fortiori, the possibility of an armed conflict, the American public is anxious to have the assurance that everything has been done to settle the dispute by an agreement with those making demands and threats. I have taken note of that tendency, and I know that it is, to a very large extent, the tendency of our Allies. But how can we conceal from ourselves the fact that in view, on the one hand, of the known demands of the Soviets and, on the other hand, of the tendency shown by the West to compromise because of their anxiety, negotiations will lead us inevitably toward successive concessions?

Khrushchev's aim is obviously the neutralization of Germany. Now, as the German people become aware that the Western Allies—essentially the United States—do not intend maintaining everywhere, in all cases and by all means, the situation that was created for it since the war, and that even the Allies are inclined to seek, with respect to Germany, a new arrangement with a threatening bloc, there is reason to believe that, under the pressure of fear, rancor, and self-interest, the German people will gradually come to the point of considering neutralization a way out of their distress and of endeavoring to draw from such neutralization whatever it may appear to offer them in the way of apparent and temporary advantages. And the Kremlin will not fail to facilitate matters for them. However, dear Mr. President, you must understand that the neutralization of Germany would almost certainly lead to the progressive neutralization of Europe. What then would be the fate of the United States, isolated before a strengthened and triumphant Soviet Union and surrounded by the bloc of uncommitted, underdeveloped nations, which because of its very weakness is merciless to the strong when they have given ground. I cannot better explain to you the reasons why France, which is directly concerned through Germany, considers with distrust and uneasiness the policy of negotiation.

You then bring up the matter of atomic weapons and the differences of opinion between us on this matter. In particular, while stating that the United States is concerned over the fact that France is providing itself with atomic weapons, you tell me once more that it does not intend to help France build them. But, as you know, France is not asking the United States to do so. I consider it natural, indeed, that a power which, like yours, has such resources should not want to share its secrets with a foreign State, even though it is its ally. However, without questioning the reason you have given me for this attitude, that is to say, that you could not refuse to give Germany any aid you give France in this field, I do not believe that after what has happened during the last fifty years or so, you could have, with respect to France, the same “memories that are too vivid” and the same “fears that are too real” which cause you to refuse your aid to the Germans.

However, I do not dispute the validity of your opinion regarding the difficulty France is going to have, because of the lack of space and resources, in providing itself with anything at all like the deterrent force of the Soviets. But how can one evaluate the degree of destructive power required to constitute a deterrent? Even if your enemy is armed in such a manner that he can kill you ten times, the fact that you have the means with which to kill him once or even merely tear off his arms may give him pause. Moreover, in the West France is not alone. Its atomic force will certainly add something to the power of the Free World. But, when the time comes, it will doubtless be advisable to organize the combined use of Western nuclear weapons.

And so, in conclusion, I feel compelled to tell you once more how sorry I am that the three great Western powers, which are bound by an alliance that was operative, by force of circumstances, during the two world wars and which, moreover, are very close, in so many respects, in the way of concepts, sentiments, and ideals, do not decide to form among themselves an organized “concert”, independent of the various world or Atlantic organizations in which their responsibilities are engulfed. If, for example, at this time, the United States, Great Britain, and France, should decide to have periodic meetings of their Chiefs of State or Government, of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and of their Ministers of Defense, in order to reach political decisions and, if necessary, joint strategic decisions; if they should designate officials and delegate officers to form a permanent tripartite political commission and military general staff to prepare such decisions and follow up the implementation thereof; if they should affirm together that they will oppose by every possible means any attempt by the Soviets to alter by force the present status of Germany, including Berlin, I, personally, am convinced that the West's faith in itself, the confidence it inspires in the outside world, the cause of liberty and, in short, world peace, would be much better assured than they now are. It is my intention, at some later date, to take the opportunity to write to you along the same line of thought about what I believe should be done jointly by our three States regarding the development of the bloc of emergent, uncommitted nations.

I should like to renew to you and Mrs. Kennedy my best wishes and those of Mrs. de Gaulle and also to tell you how happy we were to learn of the improvement in your father's health, I remain, Mr. President,

Sincerely yours,

C. de Gaulle[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is a Department of State translation.

[2] See Document 250.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

264. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, January 12, 1962, 11 p.m.

1936. Eyes only for Secretary. Gromyko opened our meeting by reading lengthy written declaration[2] prior to handing me drafts for proposed statute for free city West Berlin and protocol embodying guarantees therefor.[3] (Translations documents reported Deptels and documents pouched Department for Kohler January 12.) Declaration reiterated that talks have brought to light certain indications agreement is possible on Berlin and other questions. It stated that although Soviet Government believes best solution would be conclude peace treaty and granting UN membership both German states, Soviet Government ready conclude agreement on status West Berlin prior to peace treaty. Stressed however that questions of formalization of existing German borders, respect for sovereignty GDR, prohibition nuclear arms for both German states, non-aggression treaty between NATO and Warsaw Pact must be considered simultaneously. Other problems such as strengthening European security by withdrawal or reduction foreign troops, establishing atomic free area are all vital points to be dealt with by negotiations after conclusion of West Berlin agreement. Declaration rejected concept international authority Berlin Autobahn as violating GDR sovereignty and in effect establishing a state within a state. In response my questions in first talk it stated Soviets by “free access,” mean completely free access in accordance with accepted international standards for such communication. Also repeated demand for participation of Soviet troops in event Western troops remain in West Berlin on temporary basis and proposed UN membership for West Berlin.

Interpreter then read statute and protocol.

I opened by reading almost verbatim from para 1 instructions[4] but pointed out that I was not so sure initial talks had clarified issues after Gromyko's remarks today. I omitted para 3 and presented para 4, 5, 6 and 7 (with exception of first sentence) in toto. Omitting para 8 and 9 I continued beginning with the third sentence of para 10, but omitted penultimate sentence referring to “numerous cases of transit across territory."

I told Gromyko that on basis his remarks it would seem that we have come full circle and in some respects have taken a step backwards. I pointed out that now it even appeared that an agreement between us on access would have to be followed by an access agreement between GDR and proposed free city. (I made it clear that free city proposal is not acceptable to us.) I noted that he even reiterated Soviet insistence on introducing Soviet troops into West Berlin although it has been made clear on highest level that this would be unacceptable to us. I expressed regret his reaction to international authority for West Berlin access to avoid friction and tension.

Referring to remarks in declaration re Soviet prestige, I reminded Gromyko US prestige also involved and such things as construction of wall in Berlin constitute serious violations our rights. I informed Gromyko I would of course transmit documents he presented but desired stress this does not mean we are prepared consider Soviet concept of free city.

In response Gromyko's criticism occupation rights I pointed out Allied troops in West Berlin do not interfere in life of city. I added only two areas in which they have intervened were to prevent inclusion of West Berlin into West Germany and to preclude appearance of West German troops in West Berlin. I added they also could act to prevent break [outbreak] of provocative actions in West Berlin.

I then read from para 14 of instructions, before concluding with statement Gromyko had stated Soviets would not be traffic policemen and our proposal international authority would have removed this difficulty. I added hope that Gromyko would keep open mind and consider this proposal further.

Gromyko responded with discussion of GDR sovereignty stating we can only reach agreement on basis which would not prejudice GDR sovereignty. He added, “when we speak of this we have in mind genuine respect for GDR sovereignty not just words.” He criticized Western powers as ready to reach understanding ruling out interference in GDR sovereignty, but at the same time trying to exempt access from this understanding. He could not agree to concept of excluding access from rights of GDR. He regretted I had again raised international authority because “we cannot agree establish a state within a state and this idea is unacceptable to USSR."

Gromyko then restated Soviet agreement against contention that access is key question, repeating that it is only one of many questions and cannot be resolved independently.

He then reacted sharply to reference to plebiscite (instructions para 7) rejecting proposal as serving no useful purpose. Stated Germans not asked when troops entered and will not be asked about their withdrawal. Plebiscite he stated “is not logic it is sophistry."

Gromyko then repeated his January 2 arguments declaring any consideration all-Berlin solution unacceptable. He stated East Berlin is organic part of GDR as well as its capital and introduction of this issue is artificial.

Gromyko also responded to my reference to Berlin wall, denying Ulbricht had virtually admitted wall was to prevent West [East] Germans from fleeing. He added that in Soviet view August 13 measures constitute legitimate action to protect GDR borders.

Regarding relationship GDR sovereignty and West Berlin access, Gromyko explained Soviets striving for understanding which would meet interests of both sides. He stated “In our opinion it is possible combine right of unhampered access with respect for GDR sovereignty”. However, he warned, “If you believe we will sign agreement improving and perpetuating your occupation rights you are wrong and all talk will be in vain.” He claimed GDR already has made concessions involving its sovereignty. Pointed to “permission” for West Berlin, “which is located on GDR territory”, to become an independent political entity, and GDR agreement to an arrangement to cover military access for those troop contingents temporarily remaining West Berlin as guarantors for free city. He pointed out this usually included the issuance of visas.

Gromyko then recalled Soviet decision withdraw peace treaty deadline. “We took that step only in order to facilitate agreement on logical basis. If this were understood in any other sense, we would regret it very much”.

Gromyko then shifted to criticism of Allied reluctance request East German permission for access to Berlin, “just because US was one of Allies which defeated Germany”. He cited Soviet example in requesting transit rights from FRG, France, Denmark, et cetera, and recalled reports US intended to establish relations with Outer Mongolia. “Do you intend then to request corridor to reach Outer Mongolia?” Gromyko concluded with statement he wanted only to emphasize free city status and unhampered access to Berlin “are proposed on basis of respect for GDR sovereignty rights and not at expense thereof."

I expressed regret at apparent change reflected in Gromyko's statement regarding access and GDR sovereignty. I said I had understood access agreement between USSR and West would be accepted by GDR “which you regard as sovereign, and this would fulfill requirements of sovereignty.” I continued, it now seems that even after agreement between us GDR would decide whether access in accord its sovereignty rights. I said we assumed Soviets were sincere in stated intention of permitting a viable and supportable existence for West Berliners. Soviets must realize that this requires continuation of their relations with outside world on really free basis not subject to control of any third party and particularly not one which had showed itself hostile to their interests.

I stated best solution German problem in our view would be reunification and peace treaty with one Germany. Since this apparently is not possible, I continued, we had hoped agreement between us on access would avoid future friction. I said we can see no reason why GDR could not agree to West Berlin having unhampered communication with the West, since it is in everyone's interest to remove friction over this problem. One of the rights of sovereignty is to make derogations from it and the current situation certainly justifies special arrangements. I concluded that US Government regards main point is not to draw a technical line under World War II but to avoid World War III.There was considerable discussion of buying a horse twice when in reply to his question as to who owned it I said that “we did”. He took it that I was referring to West Berlin but I explained that I was talking of access which was a right we already enjoyed.

Gromyko ended by stating that he hoped that when documents and his remarks studied I would realize I had been hasty in saying they constituted a step backward.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 662.001/1-1262. Confidential; Priority. In telegram 1932 from Moscow, January 12, 6 p.m., Thompson briefly summarized his conversation with Gromyko and stated that the Soviet position was completely negative. (Ibid., 762.00/1-1262) In his next telegram Thompson speculated that the tough Soviet position might be 1) a usual negotiating tactic, 2) an attempt to draw out the talks, 3) a desire for an impasse in order to talk directly with the Germans, 4) a desire for an impasse in the hope of forcing a summit meeting, or 5) a Soviet preference for a breakdown in order to proceed with a separate treaty. (Telegram 1933; ibid.)

[2] The text of the declaration was transmitted in telegram 1937 from Moscow, January 13. (Ibid., 662.001/1-1362)

[3] Translations of the 11-paragraph statute and the 7-article protocol are ibid., Hillenbrand Files: Lot 84 F 53, Box 1, Folder 8.

[4] Document 259.

265. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, January 12, 1962, 10: 55 p.m.

912. Eyes only for Clay from Secretary. No other distribution. Reurtel 1322.[2] I am glad you reported your reactions to Stockwell's approach in Paris because this gives me an opportunity to make a few points clear as seen from Washington:

(1) To begin with you can be absolutely certain that British observations of this nature are completely without influence on our evaluation of officers like General Watson or anyone else connected with Berlin Mission. We base our judgments of personnel on appropriate qualified American sources including yourself. I have talked with Secretary McNamara and this goes for Defense as well as State.

(2) I do want to say however that it was Stoessel's duty to report information of this kind coming to his attention since it obviously has considerable bearing on problem of our relationship with British. We have noted that British have taken considerable pains both during Home's visit to Berlin[3] and in Bonn to deny that any rift exists. However Stockwell's report makes it seem clear that despite these denials British officials in field have actually reported to London highly critical views. While we see no profit in disclosing this knowledge on our part either in Berlin or Bonn, probability that such critical reports have been sent is pertinent to general problem of trying to bring British along on the whole range of Berlin preparations and contingency planning.

(3) I have not repeated your cable to Norstad but am sending him by pouch a copy of your telegram together with copy of this reply. I cannot of course speak for him but my own impression is that his remarks were addressed not to an evaluation of Watson but to an understanding of Stockwell's concern in the light of reports which appeared to be reaching Stockwell from British sources in Germany. We'll undoubtedly be getting his comments.

(4) We have not had in Washington any approaches from the UK that reflect Stockwell's line. At Bermuda[4] Lord Home asked me whether I was personally in touch with the situation in Berlin and cited the amount of military traffic on the Autobahn as an example. I told him that I was following it very closely indeed. His only remark was, “Well I just wanted to be sure that you are keeping an eye on it personally.” My guess is he had been receiving local British reports but wanted to satisfy himself that the situation on the spot was being handled in terms of governmental policy. He did not offer objections.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1262. Secret.

[2] Document 261.

[3] January 9-10.

[4] See Documents 243 and 244.

266. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, January 15, 1962, 11 p.m.

1671. As seen from here, and on basis brief summary of second Thompson-Gromyko talk given Deptel 1921,[2] most significant aspect of Soviet move to make obvious the firmness of their position on Berlin appears to be tactical relationship of this action to December 27 memo on Soviet-German relations.[3] As we have reported, Germans were unimpressed by memo, and would undoubtedly have maintained their relaxed attitude had Gromyko spun out slow-paced and low-key talks. But Soviet return to hard line seems designed to emphasize that December 27 paper is a realistic bid for bilateral Soviet-German negotiations to settle Berlin problem and improve relations. It may also have consequence of persuading Germans of correctness of their initial assessment re Rusk-Gromyko and Home-Gromyko talks (Embtel 843),[4] i.e., that Soviets are seeking only temporary solution for Berlin issue—perhaps indeed only separate treaty and not agreement with West—in order to continue to use it and German question as leverage to improve their power position in Central Europe. In other words, Soviet move seems calculated to face Germans with choice of maintaining their present foreign policy—with risks to German national interests which Soviets insist this entails—or of “realistic” acceptance of Soviet dominance in Europe as basis for best possible deal and future cooperation of “two greatest states in Europe."

In my estimation, immediate problem is to assure Germans of our resolute rejection of Gromyko's ideas. We think best way to accomplish this would be to encourage Germans to reply promptly and vigorously to December 27 memo; this would have additional advantage of being good instrument for setting forth publicly maximum Western positions. Following a first initial inclination to ignore Soviet memo, FonOff is now considering advisability of reply, and I fear hesitation on our part would only encourage those elements of German opinion favorable to an independent initiative to argue against foreclosing any avenue for protection of German interests.

In brief, initiative lies with us. I am confident Germans will follow our firm lead.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1562. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Telegram 1921, January 13, transmitted a summary of Kohler's briefing of the Ambassadorial Group on the second Thompson-Gromyko conversation. (Ibid., 762.0221/1-1362)

[3] See Document 247.

[4] Dated October 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10-961)

267. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, January 15, 1962, 7 p.m.

1959. Eyes only Secretary. In further discussion with British Amb today of my last talk with Gromyko he advanced idea that possibly Soviets felt necessary to shock West into revealing more of their position, particularly in view interpretation they probably place on Macmillan-Adenauer meeting.[2] I pointed out Gromyko made no real effort to probe our position on “other questions” and Roberts inclined agree with point 5 mytel 1933.[3]

In further study of my talk, almost only new point I can find is indication of Sov willingness continue man (temporarily) checkpoint GDR border after conclusion free city agreement. I find it somewhat curious that Gromyko asked no questions about international authority idea even for purpose of being in better position to knock it down.

I find it difficult make recommendations next step. While can see advantage to continuation of talks, any disposition on our part to explore further Sov thinking could be misinterpreted by them in view of rigid position they have taken. They have tabled free city proposal even though already told it was unacceptable and we could of course table paper on international access authority even though they have rejected it. Am inclined believe we should state that their proposal does not form basis for negotiation since their thinking clearly is to leave Berlin to mercy of East Germans and that perhaps we should turn to discussion of what will happen when they sign separate treaty in order to avoid highly dangerous situation.

I should think that when present Sov position becomes known public opinion in France and US would be satisfied that we have made reasonable effort find basis for negotiations. Should think this probably also true of West Germans. Some problem would probably remain however for British. Assuming Soviet position would not depart very far from that taken by Gromyko, particularly on key point of access, it seems to me there is something to be said for Macmillan-Home visit to Moscow since failure of such mission should enable us present really united front. Point on which British themselves most likely be soft, namely recognition GDR, would probably itself not be enough to get Soviets to agree to adequate arrangements for access and I would doubt that British would risk in present circumstances break in policy with other Western powers particularly US.

Alternative might be Adenauer invitation to Khrushchev. At our last Ambassadors' meeting Kroll said Adenauer personally disliked negotiating with Khrushchev and much preferred deal with Mikoyan. Kroll explained to him this would not be meaningful, from which I take it that quite possibly Kroll had advocated Khrushchev-Adenauer meeting. Adenauer-Khrushchev meeting, which would almost certainly fail, would still leave us with problem of British opinion.

Meeting between President and Khrushchev in present circumstances seems to me out of question and should be held in reserve.

Dept may wish consider calling me home for consultation following my next talk with Gromyko as a way of gaining time, depending on nature that conversation.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1562. Secret; Priority.

[2] January 8-9 at Bonn.

[3] See footnote 1, Document 264.

268. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, January 15, 1962.

RE

Berlin Negotiations

1. I have read Thompson's reports of the second Gromyko-Thompson talk and I think it is time for a hard look at our next steps. I assume the Department will be preparing a third formal instruction, and clearing it with the British and Germans. But I think something more is needed.

2. Should we not pretty soon allow Thompson to open up the discussions a little more? There is a good deal in our own position that cannot be communicated if the British and Germans have to clear it first. We might ask Thompson what he would suggest as the tactics of such a two-way talk—and perhaps we ought to consider also whether Thompson himself is the right channel.

3. I also think we need to decide what to do if the next formal Gromyko-Thompson talks get nowhere. Should we move to more formal talks, or keep trying in this channel? I begin to think we may be having the disadvantages of both types of talks at present: we are unable to talk frankly to the Russians, and yet we cannot really pull our Allies into a position of responsible participation.

John Kennedy

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1562. Secret; Eyes Only. Attached to the source text was a brief memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, also dated January 15, in which Bundy noted that the President's memorandum had overtaken a longer memorandum along similar lines, which was attached for Rusk's information.

269. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler)[1]

Washington, January 15, 1962, 6:15 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR KOHLER

The Sec referred to Berlin's 1338[2] —is there anything in the wind in withdrawing troops. K said it is in the budget thing. He has not seen that one but asked if the Sec saw the one from Dowling to CINCEUR[3] to plan beginning perhaps in Feb the return of 21,000 troops. This is the '63 budget situation. This was discussed with Nitze et al. in the Berlin Task Force Mtg this a.m. They are aware of the problems and will try to come up with some answers. The Sec thinks at this time it would be frightful.K thinks it is for planning and he told them the assumption they could start in Feb was not valid. The Sec said to get a message for Clay and we should check it with the WH. K said the Pentagon is doing a first draft and are sympathetic to our warning of the political consequences.[4]

[1] Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. No classification marking. Drafted by Bernau.

[2] Telegram 1338, January 15 (received at 12:36 p.m.), recorded Clay's concern at the idea of withdrawing troops from Germany during the present crisis. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.0221/1-1562)

[3] Presumably reference is to telegram 1650 from Bonn (repeated to Paris), in which Dowling raised his strong concerns about the impact the return of 21,000 troops to the United States would have on West Berlin, West Germany, NATO, and the Soviet Union. (Ibid., 762.0221/1-1262)

[4] On January 16 Norstad sent a telegram to Lemnitzer indicating his concerns about the reduction. (ECJCJ 9-00740; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables)

270. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, January 17, 1962, 2 p.m.

1349. From Clay to Rusk. Request distribution to Secretary only. Ref JCS 0109 62.[2] I realize hindsight criticism of 13 August cannot be stopped although its continuing agitation does not help us here.

While I feel immediate action on ground here might have succeeded in bringing up Soviet troops thus fixing responsibility such action to have been successful had to be undertaken immediately. It could not have awaited, even if it had been recommended, approval from Allied capitals. Thus, if taken here, it would have had to be unilateral in American Sector only. In my opinion, even if it had stopped wall at exact border in American Sector only it would not have stopped closing of border a few blocks further back. Ulbricht had to seal border to stop exodus which was bringing about collapse of his regime. To have stopped this we would have had to be prepared to move in force across the border unilaterally and indeed with probably complete Allied disapproval. Such a movement might indeed have had far-reaching consequences.

I believe criticism of President most unfair in this instance and if any investigations are instigated by Congress I would be glad to so testify.

However, for the future, I would like to point out this is why I continue to ask for greater discretionary power here in event of emergency. If we fail to exercise it properly, we here are at fault. If we exercise it improperly, almost any error of judgment here can be corrected immediately by the prompt removal of the responsible official. I can only say that as long as I am here and an emergency does develop I am prepared to fully accept instant responsibility for proper action and summary recall if it backfires. I feel strongly President is entitled to this protection if future emergency does develop.

Trivers

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1762. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

[2] JCS 0109 62, January 17, reported that the President wanted from Generals Clarke and Watson a résumé of their statements regarding the Berlin wall and in particular any recommendations they might have made to knock it down. (Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Berlin-Live Oak; published in Declassified Documents, 1989, 2458) The combined résumé was transmitted to the President by Lemnitzer on January 20 as CM-511-62. (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

271. Editorial Note

On January 17, 1962, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Bundy sent the President a 7-page outline for a talk to the National Security Council on the following day. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings, 1962) In discussing Berlin Bundy presented two alternatives. In the first, after stressing that Berlin was the “greatest issue of all,” Bundy discussed the crisis as a conflict of wills and emphasized: “Our will is strong, and our will, not that of our Allies, is what counts.” In the second alternative Bundy wrote that he expected a long and difficult struggle ending in a compromise settlement. Under this scenario it was essential to prevent the Germans from blaming the United States for it. He concluded with the sentence: “At the moment the talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it wise to keep talking."

At the NSC meeting at 10:15 a.m. on January 18, President Kennedy began with a general review of U.S. worldwide responsibilities before turning to West Irian, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, and Berlin. A summary of the President's remarks on Berlin reads as follows:

"There had been no progress in the negotiations up to this point. If that situation persisted, the Soviets could be expected to proceed with a separate peace treaty and there might be a direct test of nerves in the Spring. At such a point the responsibility on the military would be increasingly great. We have to control the developing situation from Washington and a heavy responsibility would rest on the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the military commanders. The President believed it was important to have prompt and careful study of our contingency plans and to think hard about the ways and means of making decisions that might lead to nuclear war. If there were to be any such war, we must know what it is for, and know what other steps we can take before such war comes.” (Ibid.)

272. Message to Attorney General Kennedy[1]

Moscow, January 18, 1962.

[2]

N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received a communication from Robert F. Kennedy[3] that President John F. Kennedy is concerned by a discouraging beginning of contacts on the German problem and on other problems which should be solved in the interests of the improvement of the international situation, the strengthening of peace and the development of normal relations between our countries.

N.S. Khrushchev fully shares the President's concern. He was discouraged even in a greater extent than the President when the USSR Foreign Minister had reported on the results of his first talks with the US Ambassador in Moscow.

The position of the American Government on a number of issues, as set forth by the US Ambassador, actually repeats what had been said many times by former President Eisenhower, Chancellor Adenauer and by other Western statesmen. It proceeds from completely wrong basis and therefore is absolutely unacceptable. In fact the Soviet Union is urged to immortalize by its signature that temporary, by its nature, situation which exists now, that is contribute to the preservation of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

But this is unthinkable. It would be not a step forward, but a step backward. It is understandable that the Soviet Union cannot agree to this. So far as one can judge by the statements of the US Ambassador in Moscow in his talks with the USSR Foreign Minister the United States would like nothing less than to preserve the unhealthy and rather dangerous situation in West Berlin which has been and remains a source of tension in Europe, causes friction among dozens of states, including the USSR and the USA. The Soviet Union is pursuing quite different aims. It wants to remove that hotbed of international tension and create conditions for the development of good friendly relations among nations.

What the United States Government is proposing now would in effect not only throw us all back to the days of Vienna but would have created even worse prospectives. In this respect N.S. Khrushchev agrees with the President. That is why the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers is also discouraged. Yes, discouraged and distressed.

N.S. Khrushchev does not consider it necessary to explain again the aims and position of the Soviet Government since they were stated fully enough at the meeting with the President of the United States in Vienna and also in his private messages to Mr. John F. Kennedy.

On the part of the head of the Soviet Government everything possible has been done to convince the President of the United States that drawing a final line through World War II and solving on this basis the question of changing the status of West Berlin by declaring it a free demilitarized city corresponds equally to the interests of all powers, to the interests of peace. The Soviet Government is not seeking any other aim. It is only deplorable that the US Government and the President are still searching for some hidden motives in the Soviet Union's position on this question. But those motives simply do not exist and therefore there is no need to search for them.

Yet, what should be done now is, of course, to seek an agreement but not to push the events towards a collapse of the renewed exchange of opinions between the Governments of the USSR and the USA and towards new complications?

Now that the parties have already familiarized themselves with each others' positions it would be useful to work out jointly the bases on which a future agreement on West Berlin as well as on other questions which it is necessary to solve with the conclusion of a German peace treaty should be built. Proceeding from that the Soviet Government has worked out a draft of the main provisions of the status of a free demilitarized city of West Berlin and a draft of the protocol on guarantees which is an enclosure to this status.

These documents were given to the US Government by A.A. Gromyko, USSR Foreign Minister through Ambassador Thompson on January 12. The US Ambassador was also given a statement in which the Soviet Government's position on the question of concluding a German peace treaty and normalizing on its basis the situation in West Berlin is explained and where it is emphasized that simultaneously such questions should be solved as appropriate legalization and confirmation of the existing German borders, due respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, non-arming of the two German states with nuclear weapons and barring them from producing those weapons, conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw treaty member-countries.

Having familiarized himself with those documents the President will see that neither the Soviet Union nor the GDR are encroaching upon West Berlin and demand more than the establishment for that city of an international legal status corresponding to the conditions of the peace time. The Soviet proposals—and it is not difficult to realize—guarantee for the population of West Berlin the right to live under the social system they choose and to have free access to the outer world.

N.S. Khrushchev would like very much the President to consider with understanding the concrete proposals which are in the drafts of the main provisions of the status of a free demilitarized city of West Berlin and the protocol on the guarantees. Those proposals do not make harm to anyone, do not discriminate against anybody.

The policy which the Western powers continue to stick to might somehow have been understood in the times when it was originated. That is a policy of diktat, a policy “from the position of strength”. The late Dulles did not make bones about it. But one wants to conduct this policy even now ignoring the enormous changes that have taken place in the world.

The President of the United States has himself said and everybody knows it that now the balance of power is equal. How, then, is it possible proceeding from the equal initial conditions to attempt to conduct a policy of encroachment on the interests of the USSR and its allies—socialist countries? But what the US Government is proposing is aimed precisely against our interests.

It is known that the policy “from the position of strength” with respect to the USSR has proved bankrupt. The establishment of the military bases around the Soviet Union, the discontinuance of trade with it—all that was aimed at the isolation of the USSR and other socialist countries, at undermining their economy. Such policy has suffered a defeat.

And this is clear to every sober-minded man if he does not deliberately close his eyes to it. It is bound to go bankrupt in the future as well if one resorts to it.

The USSR economy is striding forward and prospering. Science and technology are rapidly developing. The Soviet Union has scored great successes in the exploration of outer space. The entire world including the President of the United States recognizes the achievements of our country.

Then how under these conditions one can continue to pursue the “policy from the position of strength"? It is hard to reconcile one with the other. Therefore if the Soviet Union had not complied with and rebuffed this policy in the past, the more so will not it consent to a humiliating agreement now. The USSR will struggle with all available means against any attempt to impose upon it the conditions that do not correspond to the interests of consolidating peace and it will never sign such agreements. If on its part the United States does not display an understanding of this, some time will pass and the world will witness that this policy is suffering the same and even greater defeat as before. If in the past Dulles threatened the Soviet Union relying on the atomic weapons monopoly, now there is no trace of such monopoly. The USSR and the US are equal. Therefore it would be senseless to threaten one or the other side with war. The USSR is threatening nobody, it does not want war, and all its efforts are aimed at excluding war. It is senseless to threaten war on the Soviet people which is seeking only the normalization of international situation and liquidation of the vestiges of the war. The one who tries to frighten the Soviet people and threaten them will get in response the same that he is threatening with and not in a lesser degree.

Therefore the best thing now, if to proceed from common sense and sober consideration of all facts, is to spare no effort to normalize relations, and first of all among major powers, and not to preserve the hotbeds of tension.

N.S. Khrushchev hopes that the President of the United States will display a correct understanding of the situation. N.S. Khrushchev is under the impression that the President has difficulties and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers understands that. But every leader has his difficulties. Therefore it is necessary to undertake joint efforts to overcome those difficulties and reach such agreements which would be beneficial to peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States as well as all other peoples that long for peace and tranquil life.

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret. Attached to a brief note from Rusk to McNamara stating that Bundy had handed it to him on the morning of January 18. A similar translation by Bohlen is attached to a memorandum from him to Rusk, also dated January 18. It states that the message was received by the Attorney General, that it offered little hope, and seemed “to be rather bad tempered.” Bohlen's translation bears the word “Memorandum” at the top of the text.

[2] The source text bears neither a date nor place of origin. This date is derived from Rusk's attached note to McNamara.

[3] Not further identified.

273. Notes on the Berlin Meeting[1]

Washington, January 18, 1962.

PRESENT

President

Secretary Rusk

Under Secretary Ball

Mr. Kohler

Mr. Bohlen

Mr. Hillenbrand

Secretary McNamara

Secretary Dillon

Attorney General Kennedy

Mr. Kaysen

There was some discussion of pen-pals.[2] The President indicated to the group that he thought that German self-denial on grounds of visas or the like was not an appropriate basis for the U.S. to take over responsibility for German traffic. Mr. Kohler indicated he would convey this point to the Ambassadors in an appropriate way.

The President asked whether there was any sentiment in Germany supporting more recognition of the DDR. Mr. Bohlen indicated that he thought there was. Mr. Kohler was somewhat more reserved on this.

Mr. Kohler commented that the British judgment as indicated in the Ambassadorial meeting was the Soviet Union was not in a hurry, and that we ought to pace the Thompson-Gromyko talks accordingly.[3] The President approved the instructions.[4]

Carl Kaysen[5]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings with the President. Secret. Drafted on January 22.

[2] In particular the latest message, Document 272.

[3] A summary of the Ambassadorial Group meeting on January 18, at which Ormesby Gore gave this appraisal, was transmitted in telegram 1965 to Bonn, January 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1862)

[4] Reference is to the draft instructions sent to Thompson in telegram 1681 at 8:06 p.m. on January 18, which stated that the United States was disappointed by the last conversation with Gromyko and informed Thompson that it was not interested in accelerating the pace of the talks nor pushing them toward a break. (Ibid., 762.00/1-1862) This draft was subsequently superseded by the text sent in Document 274.

[5] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

274. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, January 29, 1962, 7:39 p.m.

1767. Paris pass Finletter—eyes only. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Following are agreed instructions for your next meeting with Gromyko which you should request for early date. You will note minor amendments in text contained Deptel 1681,[2] to take account of points made by you and British and Germans.

Instructions contemplate that you will leave with Gromyko text of memorandum as well as text of all-Berlin proposal (proposal for reunification of Berlin) and summary of International Access Authority transmitted to you Deptel 1617.[3] You will receive separate cable regarding amendments to be made in these texts.[4]

You will have noted that text of memorandum to be left with Gromyko while consistent with instructions in present cable, also contains certain arguments and language from basic instructions for first two conversations with Gromyko. While we assume you will wish to read entire memorandum, we leave it to your discretion to omit any portions in your oral remarks which might seem advisable in light of possible interruptions by Gromyko or any exchanges which might take place between you before you have finished. Hence use of expression “record and amplify the opening remarks” in first para of memorandum.

Begin text of instructions

1. We are, of course, disappointed that your last round with Gromyko led to nothing more than restatement both orally and in writing of standard Soviet position on Berlin. We also note that you are inclined to consider that Soviets wish to break off Moscow talks so that they may proceed with signature of peace treaty. Whether this view correct or whether hard Soviet position can be explained at least partly in terms of negotiating tactics, we can all agree that West has no over-riding interest in accelerating pace of talks or in pushing them towards breakdown. Although present indeterminate position creates difficulties in terms of required US decision on military build-up, those are not governing at present stage. On other hand time seems to have come in this round to present Western case strongly and to put certain questions which may cause movement in one direction or another.

2. You might begin by stating that Soviet Foreign Minister, in last discussion, put forward position known to be unacceptable to Western Powers. In presenting para 4 of previous instructions contained in Deptel 1615,[5] you have already laid groundwork for elimination of further discussion of Western role in peace treaty. You should reiterate this point, adding that we are refraining from putting forward Western position in all-German field because we continue to assume that Soviets recognize that no meeting of minds is possible on peace treaty and that they are prepared to take this into account. As to free city proposal contained in Soviet memorandum,[6] you should say that you will be giving Soviet Foreign Minister paper setting forth Western views on subject of appropriate arrangement for Berlin.

3. It is obvious, however, that between points of view set forth in US and Soviet documents no apparent basis exists for agreement. We assume that Soviets proceed from principle that great power cannot be expected simply to accept position of other side. If Soviets are not prepared, as seems to be the case, to discuss seriously an all-Berlin arrangement, they cannot believe that US should be expected to discuss Soviet proposal for free city which, despite verbal assurances, would represent substantial repudiation of position which Western powers have consistently maintained during numerous exchanges and discussions with Soviets since November 1958. Having attempted to dispose of East Berlin without Western concurrences, Soviets appear to be seeking basis on which they could interfere in affairs of West Berlin. Proposal would deprive West Berliners of essential protection they now enjoy and make their contacts with outer world subject to whims of East Germans. There can be no question but that people of West Berlin oppose concept of free city. If there is any doubt in anyone's mind on this point, Western Powers would be glad, as previously stated, to have properly supervised plebiscite held in West Berlin. It would be difficult enough to establish entity comprising all Berlin as a viable, independent city, but this would be almost impossible for a portion of city.

4. It follows that unacceptable positions of both parties should be set on one side for the present and attention should be directed towards finding a common ground on practical matters. US is prepared to continue explore this possibility. Our belief is that appropriate place to begin, since this obviously critical point at issue, would be means of assuring free access to and from West Berlin. In this connection, Western Powers put forward suggestion for International Access Authority. Soviet Foreign Minister has said this unacceptable as inconsistent with “sovereignty of GDR”. Perhaps there is element of misunderstanding here. Soviets seem to be overlooking some basic facts:

a. West Berlin and our access thereto were not subject to any Soviet occupation rights.

b. There is no way by which Soviet Union can confer on GDR rights which it does not have.

c. Any attempt to confer “sovereignty” must therefore be limited by fact of Western position in Berlin.

d. We are prepared to discuss how Western rights can be exercised so as not to interfere with GDR authorities but not how these rights are to be handed over to those authorities. (In pursuing this line of argument you may as you see fit draw on paras 6 and 10 of Deptel 1615, as well as US note of July 17, 1961.)[7]

5. Moreover, International Access Authority would not run counter to procedure which Soviet Foreign Minister in first talk described as consistent with GDR “sovereignty”, namely, that agreement between four occupying powers should subsequently be respected by GDR in arrangement between it and Soviet Union. Access Authority would provide solution to problem which would be compatible with interests of all parties concerned and remove standing source of disputes between them. It need be no more inconsistent with “sovereignty” than any international transit arrangements such as those established under Montreux Convention or overflight provisions International Air Service Agreement are with “sovereignty” of areas concerned. You might at this point hand Gromyko paper summarizing concept of International Access Authority noting that if Soviets wish to pursue matter further we would be glad to provide draft of possible agreement.

6. In event that Gromyko shows no interest in International Access Authority or continues to argue that entire concept is unacceptable as inconsistent with GDR sovereignty, you might point out that, just as Soviets say they cannot discuss idea of International Access Authority, or apparently of all-Berlin solution, we find it impossible to discuss Soviet proposal for free city as contained in draft statute. Where does this leave us? Purpose of present talks is to establish whether basis for negotiations exists. Such basis clearly does not exist in terms of talks so far.

7. After pointing out that we would want to explore further whether there is, therefore, any intermediate point which might provide a basis for negotiations, you might try to ascertain from Gromyko whether Soviets insist on discussion of their free city proposal as prerequisite for further discussion of access question. You should stress point that one great power simply cannot expect another great power to capitulate in face of demands which are clearly unacceptable. We have left certain documents with Soviets presenting our views. If these are not acceptable to Soviets, we are willing to discuss possible modifications or general subject of West Berlin arrangement further.

8. If Soviets have problems with respect to West Berlin, they can raise them. They have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights because they require no such confirmation, but acceptance, as one of the facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with problems involved. If we can assume, as seems to be the case, that both sides have over-riding interest in avoiding collision course on Berlin, then it is only reasonable to expect that both sides will be willing to concentrate on those areas where at least some working arrangement might be possible.

9. You might then go on to point out that, lest there be any misunderstanding as to how we see present situation in West Berlin, status of Western sectors is as set forth in para 12 of Deptel 1615.

10. You might conclude by saying that you will report to your Government and after receiving further instructions, will ask for further meeting during which you hope Soviet position will reflect more appropriately importance of arguments which you have presented. If you consider it feasible, in rounding out response to Gromyko declaration at previous meeting to deal with his emphasis on “broader questions”, you may repeat language along lines para 14 of Deptel 1615.

11. To degree desirable in meeting specific points made by Gromyko or in spelling out US views, you may draw on previous instructions. Since Soviets show no hesitation in repeating stale arguments over and over again, you should feel no inhibitions in this regard. Purpose of exchange would not, however, be to lead to break in discussions but, hopefully, to encourage Soviets to accept that it is in common interest of both great powers to find a Berlin settlement, that they share responsibility for avoiding an impasse and that there is necessity for some give on their part if any progress to be made. End text.

Ball

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1062. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Rusk, Ball, Bohlen, Guthrie, and Kaysen; and initialed and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Berlin.

[2] See footnote 3, Document 273.

[3] Dated January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1-1062) The memorandum was transmitted in telegram 1751 to Moscow, January 26. (Ibid., 762.00/1-2662) The all-Berlin proposal was Annex 4 to Part 4 of the Washington Working Group Report (BER-2), September 16, 1961. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1951)

[4] Document 275.

[5] Document 259.

[6] See footnote 3, Document 264.

[7] For text of this note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 753-760.

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, January 29, 1962, 7:43 p.m.

1768. Eyes only for Ambassador. This telegram deals with three aspects of your next meeting with Gromyko:

(a) General purpose of next round (paras 1-3);

(b) Contingency instructions in event discussion goes very badly (paras 4-7);

(c) Comments on your telegram 1988 (para 8).[2]

1. We have given thought to your suggestion that we should now state to Soviets that their proposal does not form basis for negotiation and that perhaps we should turn to discussion of what will happen when they sign separate “peace treaty” in order to avoid highly dangerous situation. Although under any realistic assumption our purpose in trying to make an arrangement with Soviets is to provide for situation after signature of their “peace treaty”, we are inclined to believe that, for next meeting at least, we should still keep discussion within broader framework and not yet indicate we have come to conclusion that all hope of arrangement other than for in extremis situation has been abandoned. This is intent of basic instructions which you will be receiving in separate telegram.[3]

2. We see purpose of next round, therefore, as essentially to impress on Soviets that rigid maintenance of their present position will prevent agreement but that some flexibility on their part may provide basis for progress. Moreover, meeting will provide occasion for us to get certain documents on record which will be helpful in building public case in event of continuing deadlock and Soviet decision to publish their declaration together with Free City Statute and Protocol of Guarantees.[4]

3. As you are aware, there has been considerable speculation that Soviets really want to bury Berlin issue and that their seemingly unhurried approach to Gromyko's exchanges with you reflects desire to talk subject to death. We know you do not share this view and evidence is certainly lacking to substantiate it. If anything Gromyko says or which comes to your attention from other sources tends to confirm such an intention, report it immediately.

4. We would, therefore, want to avoid at present stage, if at all possible, any implication that we considered talks had reached complete impasse and that only thing left was to proceed to improvisation for crisis situation after peace treaty. Should, however, your discussion with Gromyko on basis of instructions go very badly and should he clearly indicate that Soviets desire to break off talks so that they may proceed to signing of peace treaty, you may, if you consider it essential, observe that perhaps differences are so great between two positions that only practical course seems to be to focus on situation which will arise when Soviets sign separate “peace treaty”. Highly dangerous confrontation would inevitably result if effects of that “treaty”, without prior understanding, were to be what Soviets allege.

5. You might then raise question of status of West Berlin after signature of “peace treaty” between Soviets and GDR. Soviets claim that effect will be to terminate occupation and that arrangements for access to city must be made directly with GDR. As Soviet Foreign Minister well knows, Western Powers do not accept premise from which this description of events derives, namely, that Soviets by an agreement with East German regime can dispose of Western rights in Berlin which was never part of GDR. Soviets have implied, however, that as a matter of procedure, a prior agreement between four occupying powers might be envisaged which would be subject of subsequent agreement between Soviets and GDR. Soviets have indicated what they think should be content of such prior agreement. This initial Soviet position on content is clearly unacceptable to West. Since we cannot agree on status of West Berlin, or on guaranteed form of access such as International Access Authority would provide, and since Allies cannot negotiate with GDR, it would seem important to avoid dangerous situation that we attempt to find agreement on how access to Berlin will be administered after peace treaty. If we can agree that this would be useful subject for discussion, we would be prepared to proceed on this basis.

6. You might then reiterate point contained in para 8 of basic instructions that, if Soviets have other problems with respect to Berlin they can raise these. You might also note that they have said they cannot be expected to confirm Western occupation rights. We are not asking for confirmation of occupation rights which do not require such confirmation but for acceptance, as one of facts of situation, of presence of Western forces in Berlin, and we are prepared to work out new arrangements to deal with the problems involved. If you consider it useful, you may also wish once again to briefly review how we see present situation in West Berlin lest there be any misunderstanding on part of Soviets as to status of Western sectors (para 12 of Deptel 1615).[5]

7. You might then conclude by again making point about avoidance of collision course in Berlin contained in para 8 of instructions and expressing hope that Soviets will reflect upon situation which their position is creating along lines para 10 of instructions.

8. Following are comments on specific points raised in your 1988:

(a) Since your discussions with Gromyko do not purport to be on behalf of French and since we are showing them your instructions only for information at same time they are sent to you, see no reason why summary of International Access Authority proposal and all-Berlin proposal should not be put forward, as provided in instructions, as proposals for purposes of discussion in same way as you originally raised question of International Access Authority. Although distinction between exploratory talks and negotiations at times seems metaphysical, Soviets presumably aware that neither side is making binding commitments to other at present stage. As you are aware, all-Berlin proposal in form suggested for presentation to Soviets is agreed Four-Power document and is Annex in Washington Working Group Report as approved by Foreign Ministers in September 1961.[6]

(b) Text of proposed statement to be made by you and left in writing with Gromyko is being sent in separate telegram.[7]

(c) As you will note, language in paras 2 and 3 of draft instructions (which also being sent you in separate message) has been modified to play down emphasis on “extreme” positions. However, logic of argument being put to Soviets is precisely that we are being more reasonable than they by not advancing positions which we believe to be correct but which other side maintains is totally unacceptable; this shows sincerity of our desire to reach agreement. You will note that arguments against free city have been expanded along lines suggested by you.

(d) We wonder whether our point on compatibility of International Access Authority and of overflights with “respect for GDR sovereignty” is not relevant. As we understand their position, Soviets have maintained that need for such “respect” might be met by prior Four-Power agreement which Soviets would then undertake to have GDR accept. However, they appear also to have made additional argument to you that very concept of International Access Authority, with its excision of area of sovereignty from GDR control, is incompatible with that sovereignty. Similar argument has been made in attacking unregulated air access to West Berlin. Purpose of argumentation in para 5 of present instruction and on overflights in previous instruction was to make point that, even judged by existing practices elsewhere, such Authority or overflights are not per se incompatible with sovereignty. This fact, combined with Soviet agreement with GDR on basis of prior Four-Power understanding, should, therefore, presumably take care of all aspects of “respect for sovereignty of GDR”. While we believe foregoing argument is persuasive, and would be effective in oral statement if this subsequently published, we would not want insist on its inclusion if you believe this would really be counterproductive. Please advise us urgently if this is your conviction.

(e) Language along lines suggested by you regarding discussion of “other problems” has been inserted.

(f) If Gromyko should attempt to pin you down on composition Board of Governors Access Authority, you are authorized respond along lines suggested para 5 your 1988.

9. We are commenting separately on your 2026.[8]

Ball

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-1962. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand on January 26; cleared by Rusk, Ball, Kaysen, Guthrie, and Bohlen; and approved by Kohler.

[2] Telegram 1988, January 19, transmitted Thompson's reaction to the draft instructions that had been sent to him on January 18. (Ibid.)

[3] Document 274.

[4] See footnote 2, Document 264.

[5] Document 259.

[6] A copy of this report is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1951.

[7] Not found.

[8] Telegram 2026 from Moscow, January 24, stated that Soviet policy had been marking time for some months and that Gromyko might be inclined to string out the talks on Berlin. Thompson then offered several reasons for this attitude. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.00/1-2462) In a reply on January 29, the Department of State agreed that the Soviets seemed to be drawing out the talks, but felt that it was still too early to come to any conclusions. (Ibid., 762.0221/1-2962)

276. Letter From the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Berlin, January 30, 1962.

DEAR DEAN: Having now been in Berlin for a little over four months, I believe a review at this time to be timely.

At the time of my arrival West Berlin morale was still low, although definitely recovering from the extreme low point. Confidence in Allied determination, rightly or wrongly, was badly shattered by the wall. However, the restoration of confidence was started by the Johnson visit and by the arrival of reinforcements. Today, morale has definitely improved. The flight of capital has not only stopped, but indeed has reversed, and the outward movement of persons from the city has become only a trickle. Still, there can be no question but that the tension in West Berlin remains high and very little would be required for it to erupt into a mass exodus of both capital and persons.

It seemed essential to me when I arrived to take a few measures to demonstrate American intent to be firm on the ground in Berlin. It would not have occurred to me that I would have been sent here for any other purpose. Examining these few measures now, it is incomprehensible that anyone should regard them as bold or, indeed as some of our Allies do, as dangerous. Herewith are these “bold” measures and their status today:

a. Helicopter flights were undertaken into Steinstucken and a military police patrol was stationed in this American exclave. Both continue, and so far have not developed into the dreaded escalation which had been predicted by some. They have made possible the evacuation of over thirty refugees. Our recommendation to replace the helicopter flights with movements on the ground was not approved.

b. Our recommendation to keep Friedrich Strasse open by force if necessary was approved enough to permit us to maintain the right of entry of our officially licensed vehicles until confronted by Soviet forces. I believe this action to have done more than any other action on our part to convince not only the population of West Berlin, but also the East German and Soviet governments of our determination to be firm in West Berlin. However, any further action to this end has been disapproved.

c. We inaugurated armed assistance patrols to stop harassments on the autobahn. These patrols did effectively stop harassments by East German police and bring about the resumption of control on the autobahn by Soviet military forces. When our patrols were stopped by Soviet military intervention, we countered with the increased movement of armed convoys on the autobahn. Due to pressure from our Allies, these movements have now been substantially decreased.

d. Tanks kept on the alert near Friedrich Strasse were withdrawn to Tempelhof which was immediately followed by Soviet withdrawal of tanks from East Berlin, although it seemed clear that the presence of the Soviet tanks in East Berlin was embarrassing both to them and to the East German government. This withdrawal was not ordered by higher headquarters, but was undertaken in response to the desire of our government that every effort be made to avoid incidents during the period of probing.

e. When our Political Adviser, and later General Watson accompanied by civilian aides, were stopped at Friedrich Strasse, we countered with a ban on their opposite numbers. Our Allies objected to the identification procedures designed to enforce this ban. To meet their objections, in the face of an insulting letter, we now seek the restoration of the procedures formerly in existence. We have agreed to give up our position with respect to the Political Advisers and have not as yet decided our position with respect to continuing the identification procedures. In my opinion, while not relatively important, this approach does indicate a weakness in our determination which we may be sure will be exploited.

Any examination of these measures other than the rather hysterical belief that an incident in Berlin can cause war will indicate that the measures and the remnants thereof which remain have very little of either bold or dangerous characteristics.

On the night the tank barricades were erected it was clear that the East German forces were nervous. I asked General Watson to get permission to move tanks up if it seemed desirable to have a show of force, but this permission was refused unless and until General Watson was prepared to give a specific reason for their use. In my opinion, a movement of tanks that night would have caused consternation in East Germany and in any event could have done us no harm.

Some weeks ago I pointed out that in case of attack there would be no time to then establish an Allied Command. Steps to minimize the time delay have recently been taken. However, no Allied Command not functioning prior to an attack can ever be formed in the time available if an attack does develop. To date, my recommendations for a specific and separate plan for American action have failed to receive any comment.

Also for some weeks conduct to be followed in case of an uprising has been under discussion. If such an uprising should occur and we based our conduct on tentative draft instructions, it could result in my opinion in situations which would be almost intolerable for our position here in the free world. We can depend neither on telephonic communications nor on detailed instructions in the event of a real emergency.

There have been too many who have interpreted the relative quiet of the past several months as an indication of a Soviet desire to negotiate. This I doubt, as the Soviet pattern of pressure has always been a period of application of extreme pressure to the point of risk, followed by a period of quiet. Since as soon as they relieve the pressure we accept it and discontinue any aggressive actions which we may have initiated, they prepare, as they are certainly doing now, their next move. It seems clear to me that our lack of firmness on the ground has made the East German and Soviet governments confident that they can take many additional steps to destroy the morale and economy of West Berlin without risk. I realize that for many years our representatives in West Berlin have been charged with having developed “localitis”. I can only say that it is as clear to me in 1962 as it was in 1948 that we can save Berlin without war only if we refuse to yield further at any point.

However, since we have no specific policy to guide our activities here, I find we must fight each particular case through almost every echelon of government. Obviously, the majority of the actions we could take here do not require such prompt action as to prevent telephonic recommendation, even though the time lag for instructions to return here can often make it impossible to associate counter-action with action. Moreover, some of these actions which we should take are too insignificant to warrant telephonic recommendation although their accumulative effect can be most damaging.

In any event, the instructions under which General Watson must operate are much too rigid for any advice I may give to him to have any value. Hence, I would like to be relieved from this specific responsibility. It has not been clearly understood here that I have neither responsibility nor authority, and this must be made completely clear. Of course, if an emergency develops I will do my best to communicate by telephone. However, I can not accept any responsibility for failure to act in Berlin if there is no time for such communication. Moreover, I have done all that I can do to change our policy in Berlin. I do not believe I am helpful to you or to anyone else in continuing to press my views on individual cases, knowing that they are not consistent with our policy in Berlin even though it is a policy I can not accept.

However, I would be negligent in my duty if I did not specifically recommend once again and for the last time that pursuant to the general policies of the United States and under the general instructions which he has received, our Commandant be authorized and held responsible for taking those measures in an emergency which he deems necessary to support and maintain our position in West Berlin. I believe that the next moves against West Berlin will start soon, possibly with the new East German customs law as it is applied, and that we must meet each move head-on when it occurs. I want to make it very clear that I am not asking for any further authority for myself. Nevertheless, as the senior American representative in Berlin I can not see our position lost by default without clearly reporting to our government that this could happen under our present instructions.

I am fully aware that this makes my presence in Berlin symbolic only. I am also aware of the obligation to the people of West Berlin which I assumed by coming here voluntarily, and of the firm commitment which I made to the President. However, I would rather be here for the remainder of my stay merely as a symbol than to participate in an advisory capacity in a course of action which I do not believe can be successful, or to accept the outward aspects of a responsibility which has no meaning since those I would advise have no authority to act.

I did not discuss these matters at any length with you when I was in Washington as our meetings were beclouded by the publication of a secret cable which obviously made it a bad time to discuss what may be basic differences.[2] While we may not differ at all in basic principles, it is very difficult for me to reconcile our strategy and tactics with these principles.

Please be assured that my commitment still stands, and the timing of my departure rests in the President's hands. Nevertheless, I could not stay here even in this role without making it very clear that I believe our actions here to be so timid and cautious as to vitiate our policy.

I am deliberately expressing my views in a period of relative calm because I expect the strangulation process to start anew soon. If it does not develop, then it will soon become apparent that I am not needed here. If it does develop, I do not believe it can be stopped either with timidity here or with case by case decision in Washington. Since my viewpoint as to our course of action here differs from our apparent intent, I must so advise you before a situation develops which could be embarrassing to both of us. This might well influence the decision as to how long I should remain. While I am here, I shall try to play my symbolic role as best I can and to avoid actions which would be embarrassing to you and to our policy. However, I am out of character.

Sincerely yours,

Lucius

General, Retired

U.S. Army

[1] Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Clay Cables. Personal and Confidential.

[2] On December 21 Clay had sent Rusk a telegram (1223 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12-2161) complaining about the tight restrictions under which military officials operated in Berlin. The Washington Star obtained a copy of the letter and published an accurate summary of it on January 4 despite efforts by the Department of State to stop it. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 4; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192) On January 6 and 7 Clay was in Washington for consultations, and his telegram was the main subject of conversation. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 6; ibid.; and memorandum from Taylor to Lemnitzer, January 9; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 6A, Berlin)

277. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, January 31, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

USSR

Mr. Alexei Adzhubei, Editor-in-Chief, Izvestiya

Mr. Georgi Bolshakov, Editor-in-Chief, USSR Magazine

Mr. Adzhubei inquired whether, before the President started the actual conversation he could clarify the term “arrangement”, which he had used in a conversation yesterday.[2]

The President replied that he thought it might be quite impossible to find a final solution of the Berlin situation at this time and that therefore an accommodation should be found which would prevent tensions from mounting. How such a mutually acceptable accommodation could be found is another question which should perhaps be examined later. The President stressed his belief that no final conclusions could be formed as to what the situation would be some years from now. He stressed that the expectations on which both sides had acted in 1945-6-7 had obviously changed since then. However, the President said, he believed that an arrangement could be found which could stand for a certain period of time. Citing the examples of Laos and the Congo the President reiterated that situations change and that it is quite impossible to look far into the future.

Mr. Adzhubei wondered whether he had understood the President correctly that there would be a final solution after a certain period of time.

The President replied that on the basis of present positions of the two sides he could not see how a final solution could be found. The Soviet Union insists on maintaining the division of Germany and on formal recognition of East Germany. He recalled that he had stated that the United States could not accept this and that he had said why. The President then expressed the view that both sides must avoid reaching the breaking point. He noted that the positions of the two sides are at present quite incompatible. While we cannot find a perfect solution sitting here in the winter of 1962 and cannot foresee how the situation would change some years from now, we must make every effort to reach some mutually acceptable accommodation which would minimize the hazards of the present situation. This, however, may not be satisfactory to the USSR and the question is whether it is going to sign a peace treaty and then see what happens. In any event no final solution seems to be possible on the basis of the present positions of the two sides and no compromise seems to be possible. The President observed that Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson, who are scheduled to meet tomorrow, might discuss the subject. However, he would be prepared to give Mr. Adzhubei some general thoughts on the problem.

The President went on to say that at the last Gromyko-Thompson meeting Ambassador Thompson had talked about an all-Berlin solution—something the USSR would not accept, while Mr. Gromyko had talked about stationing Soviet troops in West Berlin and about establishing a border—something the US cannot accept. Reviewing the recent conversations in Moscow, the President said he had gained the impression that the positions of the two sides were becoming more and more formal, and more and more incompatible. He stressed that failure to reach an accommodation could be fraught with serious consequence. Thus the question is whether both sides can reach accommodation in the light of what is acceptable to them or whether the USSR is simply going to sign a peace treaty and attempt to apply a squeeze with all of its hazards to both sides. The President asked Mr. Adzhubei for his view as to whether it would be preferable for the Soviet Union to sign a peace treaty without accord on matters where agreement is possible and see what happens then, or, alternatively, to seek agreement on the basis of give and take. The President noted that on this the two sides seemed to have opposite positions.

Mr. Adzhubei replied that first he would like to state that it would be best if an all-German solution could be found. The search for an all-German solution should not be abandoned. He expressed the view that the President should continue contacts with Mr. Khrushchev on the subject. Mr. Adzhubei said that he felt that before the issue of international autobahn was raised there had been some possibility in this respect. He recalled Mr. Gromyko's remarks about the possibility of an accommodation on the question of aircraft safety, and he also referred to the idea of placing the UN Headquarters in U.S. Berlin. He continued by saying that, in his personal view, the U.S., having sensed the USSR's “loyalty” and desire for agreement, decided to put pressure on the USSR. The USSR is doing the same. But, as the saying goes, the worst peace is better than a good war. Perhaps a third solution is possible. Mr. Macmillan had spoken some time ago about suspending things in mid air. That suggestion met with some objections. Some people felt that resistance to change was tantamount to weakness. However, the President had suggested at least some accommodation. Mr. Adzhubei then said that both the President and Mr. Khrushchev carry a tremendous burden on their shoulders and that he would therefore prefer to listen to what the President had to say rather than to talk himself.

The President said that he recognized that the Soviet Union was concerned about remilitarization and the revival of nationalism in West Germany as well as about the possibility of West Germany's acquiring nuclear weapons. He said that all this would not be in the interest of peace. However, on all this some accommodation might be found. Referring to his earlier statements about U.S. policy with regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons the President emphasized that any increase in tensions in Berlin would seem to increase the very dangers in Germany which the Soviet Union says it fears.

With reference to the Gromyko-Thompson talks the President said that Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson should speak in specific terms rather than simply reiterate the well-known general positions of the two sides. For instance, the U.S. would like to know whether the Soviet Union insists that the U.S. recognize the GDR as a national entity and then negotiate with it or whether some other arrangement is possible. Likewise, we would like to know whether the Soviet Union insists on having its troops stationed in West Berlin and if so, why. These are the things Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Gromyko should be talking about. Otherwise, the positions of the two sides become more and more formal, the two sides exchange diplomatic messages restating their positions, and nothing happens. The President expressed his concern that so far the talks have not produced anything and observed that the French are saying that the talks are useless.

The President went on to say that the Soviet Union is in a good position as far as applying a squeeze is concerned. However, he pointed out, neither he nor Mr. Adzhubei could tell what may occur on Friedrichstrasse or on the access routes tonight. Incidents may occur there without either side being able to control them. The President then stated that perhaps Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Thompson should attempt to make progress on details. In the event that there should be no progress he would see the new Soviet Ambassador after his arrival and also write to Chairman Khrushchev. The President stated that he viewed the situation as unsatisfactory to both sides, although the Chairman may feel that the situation is better to the Soviet Union in view of the geography. In any event, each side knows what is unacceptable to the other, and it is important to seek accommodation on what is acceptable to them.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he would talk with Moscow on the telephone tonight and express the belief that Mr. Gromyko would talk about the points mentioned by the President. Noting that he did not wish to complain about Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Adzhubei said that Ambassador Thompson had not started the talks along the lines suggested by the President. Ambassador Thompson had bluntly said that the conversation should be about access. This is not the correct way to proceed. On the other hand, the President seems to have in mind concrete issues.

Noting that Ambassador Thompson had already received his instructions, the President said that he would also be sent a report on this conversation, so that he would know what had been said here. The President stressed, however, that there is no point in talking about such questions as free access when we do not know what the Soviet Union means when it says that access to Berlin would be free in accordance with accepted international standards for such communication. The President said that there was need for clarification as to the exact meaning of this statement by the USSR.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he wished to attempt to think along the lines suggested by the President. Noting that he was merely thinking out loud, he said that, for example, recognition of East Germany by some Western states would be a big step forward. It would make it possible to resolve other questions in a more conciliatory manner. For instance, the question of access would be easier to resolve if GDR were recognized by some Western states.

The President stressed that this would require a change in our position from reunification to formal division of Germany. The U.S. could not make such a change.

Mr. Adzhubei said that he did not have in mind the U.S. Nor did he have in mind that all Western states should recognize the GDR. It would be helpful if at least some Western countries extended recognition to the GDR.

At this point the President requested Mr. Akalovsky to prepare a summary of the main points covered, a copy of which he wished to be given to Mr. Adzhubei.[3]

After Mr. Akalovsky had left the room, Mr. Adzhubei inquired as to what the President's attitude would be toward East Germans controlling access under the supervision of an International Commission. The President did not respond to the question but indicated that this question would have to be studied in the light of details.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-3162. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on February 7. The meeting was held in the White House.

[2] According to the President's Log, he had lunch with Adzhubei and Bolshakov at 1 p.m. on January 30. The discussion of “arrangement” took place at this time. Salinger gives a brief account of the lunch in With Kennedy, pp. 213-214, but has it taking place on the same day as this conversation. A memorandum of the luncheon conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Document 150. A 2-page briefing memorandum on Berlin, prepared for the President by Bundy on January 31, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin.

[3] A copy of the summary was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 1780 at 10:07 p.m. on January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/1-3162)

278. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, February 1, 1962, 9 p.m.

2100. Eyes only for Secretary. I opened meeting with Gromyko with brief summary my instructions.[2] I then turned over the text of our memorandum[3] which was translated in full by the translator. On completion of translation I presented text of the all-Berlin proposal and the summary proposal for an international access authority,[4] the latter of which I also had orally translated. In presenting document on access authority I read para five my instructions.

Gromyko responded that he would comment on the documents and my statements but reserved the right to comment further at a later date. He added, “this, however, does not signify our attitude is in any degree favorable to the documents or what you have said today."

Gromyko stated he must assume that the USG apparently does not have any intention of discussing seriously the matters under question. This is confirmed, he said, by the fact that the documents presented concern access and propose creation of an international authority responsible for access. These proposals, he continued, are not at all realistic and Soviet attitude toward them is well-known. “The Soviet Government is strongly opposed to creation of any international policeman, gendarme, fee collector, traffic regulator, or any kind of servant of the Western powers to regulate traffic to West Berlin.” Gromyko then also rejected any all-Berlin proposal as completely unrealistic, and expressed regret negative attitude USG toward proposals which Soviet Government had put forth in order to facilitate progress toward agreement.

Gromyko criticized what he called US concentration on access question. “You and your government and your Allies in NATO may think and consider this the most important issue, but the attitude of the Soviet Government differs basically. Such approach offers only a very narrow area for understanding and in fact precludes agreement on negotiations.” He added, access is only one question. I had not touched on the other questions he had raised such as frontiers and European security. There are many other questions and issues which will arise inevitably when a peace treaty is concluded with the GDR. Making the first of several references to a separate peace treaty Gromyko said, since this treaty will inevitably be concluded, these questions will come up. This attempt to concentrate on access is one-sided, he complained, and does not offer a chance for negotiations.

Gromyko continued by re-stating point which he emphasized in first meeting regarding access. He said we have spoken of access many times. We consider it is possible agree on question of unlimited and unrestricted access providing agreement is simultaneously reached on respect for sovereignty of the GDR. Such agreement would be in accord with centuries old international law. However, he charged, “all your arguments focus on a fear your occupation rights will be given to—or conferred on—the GDR”. Gromyko rejected the use of “confer” in this case, insisting that the rights in question was not the issue and did not pretend that these were a suitcase which can be simply handed over from one to another. He declared that a new situation must be established in West Berlin and that the communications routes from and to West Berlin which are located on GDR territory or in air corridors which go over its territory, or canals which run through its territory cannot possibly exist while ignoring GDR sovereignty. “It is impossible to sign an agreement on this question which is not in accord with GDR sovereignty."

Gromyko then addressed himself to question of occupation status. He stated it was essential to replace old situation which existed under occupation status and which resulted from capitulation which took place 17 years ago. He insisted it was not Soviet Union which initiated practice violating Allied agreements. The fact is, he stated, occupation rights are completely divorced from life today. He took issue with US charge Soviets desire Western powers give up their rights while Soviets retain theirs. Everything we suggest, he stated, is in conformity with facts of situation today and directed toward improvement relations and peace. Displaying sensitivity he said, “you say Western powers never spoke of giving up their occupation rights, but only of exercising these rights. This is your position, Mr. Ambassador, but not ours.” He claimed US proposals aim at maintaining and improving Western position and retaining occupation rights. “We shall never sign, and I mean this figuratively as well as literally, any document which backs these occupation rights, nor agree to sign any document favoring retention of occupation regime in West Berlin."

Gromyko then referred to US profession we do not desire interfere internal affairs GDR and are prepared organize international body handle access. Gromyko claimed this represents very narrow understanding GDR sovereignty and stated “the very establishment of such an international authority would constitute interference in internal affairs GDR”. Gromyko also referred to Western reluctance depend on “whims” of GDR. He complained such formulation constitutes attitude of “looking down on GDR” and is basically improper. He continued, under peace treaty with German states, GDR as well as Allies will assume certain obligations including question of access. Such assumption of obligations by GDR has nothing to do with whims. Referring to our statement responsibility rests with Soviet Government to insure interests of Western powers will not be violated following conclusion peace treaty, Gromyko stated if interests of Western powers are broad and include interests of people, normalization relations between GDR and FRG, liquidation occupation regime West Berlin, interests of Europe, then Soviet proposals are in accord with these interests. However, if your interests are narrow, in other words mean the retention of occupation rights, maintenance West Berlin as source of tension and unrest, and they oppose drawing a line under WW II, then it is true our interests differ.

Gromyko then complained that my statement and recent statements by certain American statesmen suggest “that if no agreement reached and Soviet Government takes certain actions, in other words, concludes a peace treaty with the GDR—and a peace treaty will be concluded—in this case the West would stop short of nothing, including force.” Gromyko warned that if the West is seeking a test of strength and trying to get war, they may very well succeed. Such language, he stated, should not be spoken when negotiating with the USSR, and will not frighten the Soviet Union. He concluded with statement it unfortunately seemed clear US does not intend discuss seriously matter in question. “However, I repeat I retain the right to comment further, as I said earlier. We can arrange a date later."

I responded regretting very much that Gromyko's preliminary remarks had been so negative. I then took up his reference to the international authority as an employee of the Western powers, emphasizing Soviets, as well as Western powers would participate and stated we were prepared work out arrangement for some participation of East Germans and East Berliners, as well as West Germans and West Berliners. (When interpreter used expression “representatives” of East Germany etc. I corrected him.) Authority would not be employee of anyone, but an impartial international organization. Regarding recognition of the GDR, I pointed out that while we are not prepared to recognize it, it is not our purpose demonstrate that we don't recognize it, and we have framed our proposals with this in mind. I then recalled the reference to the international air service agreement and pointed out that this international agreement is subscribed to by some 60 countries which have committed themselves to permit over-flights and emergency landings in their countries. I reminded Gromyko of his earlier statements and added we had thought it might be possible reach agreement with the Soviet Union on access under procedure which he had indicated and that this agreement would then be recognized by the GDR which would cover the question of sovereignty.

I also stated that these proposals were devised in order to avoid friction between us and to prevent any temptation of East Germans to bring pressure on West Berlin or interfere with its access. This was in interest all parties concerned.

I stated that we have made clear the unacceptability of Soviet free city proposal but that if Soviets had problems regarding West Berlin we were ready to discuss them. I pointed out that it is the Soviet side which raised this whole problem. While we do not consider situation in Germany and Berlin completely satisfactory we had been able to live with it. I continued that, since Soviets raised this problem we have tried to find ways deal with it by agreement, and our proposals represent such efforts.

Regarding Gromyko's remarks about the use of force, I stated, “you and your government have said after the conclusion of peace treaty with East Germany Western rights would be ended. We had to take account of these statements and consider what position of our West Berlin troops would be. Apparently you consider they would be there illegally.” I asked Gromyko what would happen to these troops, and stated “we did not believe it would be in interest of peace if you did not understand what our troops would do if anyone tried to throw them out. The same applies to their access to and from Berlin.” Certainly, I continued, it cannot be considered a threat to state that if our troops were attacked they would defend themselves. I agreed we should fix another meeting when mutually convenient. I added hope Gromyko would further consider our proposals which we believe would be in the interest of all those concerned.

Gromyko at this point reiterated his disappointment in our proposals, claiming they are not realistic and apparently the USG is not serious about trying to reach agreement at present time. He then returned to peace treaty question, repeating standard position that best solution would be conclusion treaty with both German states. He insisted Soviet Government not pursuing selfish Soviet interest in West Berlin. “We don't want West Berlin, not one West Berlin street, not one house in West Berlin.” What we do want, he said, is solution in accordance with facts of life in existing situation. “If you don't agree to treaty with both German states, Soviet Union will sign a treaty with the GDR."

Gromyko then turned to question West Berlin plebiscite. He repeated earlier denunciations of proposal and argument that troops stationed in West Berlin were not invited into Berlin following a German vote. In fact, he said, they arrived even against the will of those who were running the Hitler government.

I recalled that Gromyko claimed present conditions demanded change. However, I said, one fact of life today is people of West Berlin want us to remain. Our offer regarding a plebiscite, I explained, was made in case there is any doubt on the Soviet side about this fact. Gromyko insisted question of West Berlin does not depend on will of West Berliners because it is an international question and the interest of several states are involved. I agreed this was international question but pointed out that when we decided on this matter the wishes of the people should be taken into account and reiterated that if there is any doubt on the Soviet side about the wishes of West Berliners, a plebiscite could resolve those doubts. Gromyko then concluded stating he was sorry we had made no progress in our work and, on the basis of what is known about the US position, it seems clear it is not designed to permit agreement. I concluded that I had to agree with the first half of his comment, but of course could not accept the last half.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-162. Confidential; Priority.

[2] Document 274.

[3] Transmitted in telegram 1751, January 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1-2662)

[4] A copy of the all-Berlin proposal, Annex 4 to Part 4 of the Washington Working Group Report, September 16, 1961, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1951. The summary of the international access authority proposal was transmitted in telegram 1617, January 10. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.0221/1-1062)

279. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Ball to Secretary of Commerce Hodges[1]

Washington, February 1, 1962.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: One of the measures actively under consideration in the North Atlantic Council in the context of the Berlin crisis is the U.S. proposal for a NATO-wide boycott of the Leipzig Fair in East Germany, to be held March 4-13, 1962. The Berlin Task Force, on which your Department is represented, has closely followed developments in the Council on this measure.

The Federal Republic of Germany—heretofore the principal western exhibitor—has already adopted an effective policy of informal discouragement and dissuasion of West German firms from participation in the Fair. Accordingly, it appears that the steel and chemical industries of West Germany, which have previously been represented in depth in Leipzig, will be virtually unrepresented in the spring event.

While it is understood that the United States Government cannot prohibit private participation in the Leipzig Fair, there is much that can be done to discourage U.S. businessmen and firms, including foreign subsidiaries, from exhibiting in the Fair. I would hope that in particular your Agency would undertake to contact those U.S. firms, either directly or through the Chamber of Commerce or appropriate trade associations, which have exhibited at the Leipzig Fair in the past or which you have reason to believe may wish to exhibit at the forthcoming Fair, and that they be discouraged from taking part.

The Foreign Commerce Weekly would presumably be an effective instrument for making known generally the U.S. policy in regard to participation in the Leipzig Fair.

I am sure I can count on your cooperation in this endeavor.

Sincerely yours,

George W. Ball[2]

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862B.181-LE/2-162. Secret. Drafted by Martin (GER) on January 29 and cleared by Brandin (GER), Freshman, and Hillenbrand.

[2] Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, February 2, 1962, 6 p.m.

2103. Eyes only Secretary.

1) I suggest we wait for Gromyko to call next meeting. Possible that he might do so shortly. While I could stay within framework present instructions and merely state I would inform my govt his remarks, would be helpful to know promptly whether I should do this or use contingency instructions which were prepared for my last meeting in event discussion went badly.[2]

2) I believe Gromyko will take practically same line as he did in his preliminary reaction. We are unlikely to get any real reading of Soviet policy until return of Khrushchev now rumored to be in Sochi.

3) I am somewhat concerned that Soviets may conclude that under pressure from Adenauer and de Gaulle our position has hardened since Rusk-Gromyko talks and that any agreement involving “other questions” can be ruled out. Therefore suggest in our next encounter I might say to Gromyko that our unwillingness discuss these questions in advance of knowledge general outline Berlin settlement does not mean any change in our position but that it would be obviously impossible for us to get full agreement of our Allies on such matters until we know fairly definitely the shape of a possible Berlin agreement particularly with regard to access.

4) When I briefed my German, French, and British colleagues today all appeared think Soviets unlikely accept international access authority in absence major concessions on our part. Kroll thought Soviets had more interest in peace treaty with West Germany than in Berlin and continued think suggestion he had put to Khrushchev was promising approach. I said I believed Soviets would pay extra premium for peace treaty with both Germanies but problem was whether under any conditions West Germany could accept procedure which carried strong implications of permanent division of country. Roberts said Soviets had again needled him on failure British play role in current negotiations. In this connection Deputy Chief of British Section Soviet Foreign Ministry had referred to Macmillan letter to Khrushchev of Dec 22.[3] Roberts pointed out British being fully consulted and my talks represented agreed position. Roberts said British correspondent had inquired of British Embassy Bonn re Macmillan letter stating his source was non-German. Assumption is it was Soviet.[4]

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-262. Secret.

[2] See Document 275.

[3] For extracts from this letter, see Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 148-151.

[4] On February 3 Thompson was instructed to wait for Gromyko to call the next meeting and to stay within the framework of his present instructions. (Telegram 1802 to Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/2-362)

February-March 1962: Final Meetings Between Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko; Beginning of the Crisis Over Air Access to Berlin

281. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 7, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-762. Secret. Prepared by Kohler.

282. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 7, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-762. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand and also initialed by Kohler.

283. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 8, 1962, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-862. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, USAREUR, USAFE, and CINCEUR.

284. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 9, 1962, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-962. Confidential; Priority.

285. Message From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)

Paris, February 9, 1962, 1:30 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak, 1962. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that Stoessel and Generals Baker and Moore “assisted in drafting."

286. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)

Belgrade, February 9, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-962. Confidential; Official-Informal.

287. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 10, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Copies were sent to Bohlen, Kohler, Bundy, and Chayes.

288. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 12, 1962, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1262. Secret; Priority.

289. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 13, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/2-1362. Secret. Drafted by Imhof, initialed by Imhof and Kohler, and approved in S on March 5.

290. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay)

February 14, 1962, 2:50 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1462. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Kohler and approved in S. Secretary Rusk was in Washington; General Clay was in Berlin. Attached to the source text was a 2-page transcript of the conversation.

291. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, February 14, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-1462. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Kohler. Copies were sent to Bundy, Lemnitzer, Nitze, Hillenbrand, and Ausland.

292. National Security Action Memorandum No. 128

Washington, February 14, 1962.

Source: Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 128. Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara, Taylor, Lemnitzer, McCone, and the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

293. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, February 14, 1962, midnight.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-1462. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:30 a.m. on February 15. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, POLADUSAREUR, and USAFE.

294. Editorial Note

295. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 15, 1962, noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.5400/2-1562. Secret. Drafted by Holloway and initialed by Holloway and Kohler. The meeting was held in Kohler's office at the Department of State.

296. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Washington, February 15, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. The source text bears no drafting information, but on February 12 Bohlen had sent a “first draft” of this letter, which was the same in substance but 3 pages longer. (Ibid.)

297. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, February 17, 1962, 11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-1762. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:30 a.m. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, Moscow, and POLADUSAREUR.

298. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 17, 1962, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5612/2-1862. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:53 a.m. on February 18.

299. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 19, 1962, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-1962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:08 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, USAFE, and USCINCEUR.

300. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 19, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by the White House on March 5 and in S on February 23. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2283, February 19. (Ibid., 611.62A/2-1962) Memoranda of the President's conversations with Grewe on Adenauer's meeting with de Gaulle, German vested assets, and German purchase of U.N. bonds are in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, France, and Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

301. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 19, 1962, 7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/2-1962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:55 p.m.

302. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 20, 1962, 1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-2062. Confidential; Eyes Only. Received at 10:06 a.m.

303. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 20, 1962, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-2062. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:44 p.m. Also sent to Paris and repeated to London and Berlin.

304. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy

Washington, February 21, 1962, 9:30 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 23, 1962, 11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/2-2362. Secret; Priority.

306. Editorial Note

307. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, February 28, 1962, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-2862. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:09 p.m. Repeated to Bonn.

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, February 28, 1962, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-2862. Secret. Received at 8:34 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow.

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, March 1, 1962, 6:01 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-162. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Rusk (in draft), Guthrie, Bohlen, and the White House; and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, March 1, 1962, 6:48 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-162. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hillenbrand and the final paragraph in the White House; cleared by Rusk (in draft), Bohlen, and the White House; and initialed and approved by Kohler.

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, March 3, 1962, 7:16 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-362. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland; cleared by Hillenbrand, Davis, G/PM, SOV, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense (ISA); and initialed and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Moscow.

312. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay)

Washington, March 4, 1962.

Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. Secret; Personal. Drafted by Rusk and approved by Kohler.

313. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, March 5, 1962, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/3-562. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to SHAPE, USAFE, Berlin, Moscow, London, and Paris.

314. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 6, 1962, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/3-662. Confidential; Priority; Eyes Only.

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, March 7, 1962, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/3-762. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, and SHAPE.

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, March 7, 1962, 9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-762. Secret; Limit Distribution.

317. Letter From the Assistant Chief of the Mission at Berlin (Lightner) to the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan)

Berlin, March 8, 1962.

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Confidential; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Rusk, Bundy, Dowling, and Thompson.

281. Memorandum for the Record[1]

Washington, February 7, 1962.

General Clay called the Secretary at approximately 5 p.m. today on the KY-9 phone. He informed him that the Soviets had announced that the south air corridor would be closed to traffic tomorrow, February 8, from 9 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. between levels 3-7000 ft. The French had filed a commercial aircraft flight plan at 7000 ft for these hours. The Soviet controller at Basc struck 7000 and inserted 8000. The French refiled at 7000. General Clay did not know whether the French would go through with the flight but seemed to feel it inadvisable that they do so with a commercial aircraft. However he proposed to file flight plans for 2 unarmed military aircraft during the period of the announced closure to fly at 5-6000 ft. He requested authorization to do so. The Secretary agreed that these flights should be made, undertook to have appropriate instructions issued through military channels and requested General Clay to keep in touch with the French and British on this matter.

The Secretary then called Secretary of Defense McNamara and explained the matter to him. Secretary McNamara also agreed in principle.

The Secretary then went to the White House accompanied by Messrs. Kohler and Hillenbrand and discussed the question with the President. Mr. McGeorge Bundy was also present. After some discussion of the lack of precedent for the kind of complete closure reported by General Clay, the importance of the air traffic, the desirable number and altitude of flights, the President approved the 2 flights for tomorrow as recommended by General Clay.[2]

FDK

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-762. Secret. Prepared by Kohler.

[2] The President's authorization was transmitted to Berlin in telegram 1008, February 7 at 7:16 p.m. (Ibid.) A similar authorization was transmitted to Norstad by the JCS in JCS 3198, February 7 at 9:20 p.m. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables)

282. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, February 7, 1962.

There is attached a paper suggesting a number of points which you may wish to cover during the White House meeting on Berlin scheduled for February 9.[2] It has been prepared in such a way that a copy could be left with the President if you feel this is desirable.

Attachment[3]

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE ON BERLIN?

1. To Bury or Not to Bury? If the Soviets want to bury the Berlin issue, is it in our interest to encourage this or should we push for some new arrangement which will provide a more definitive resolution of the question? The present state of indecision creates problems for the NATO and US military build-up and keeps the Western mood fluctuating from one extreme to the other on the basis of rumors and speculation as to Soviet intentions. On the other hand, no new and more or less formal arrangement which the Soviets would accept is likely to be as favorable to us as the status quo. Hence, on balance, if the Soviets give us any indication that they would like to bury the Berlin question or talk it to death, we would presumably wish to avoid saying or doing anything which would run counter to such an objective. Another possibility is that the Soviets may feel compelled at some point to go ahead with their separate peace treaty but reserve their prerogatives in the field of Allied access (a la the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters). This, too, would be a desirable outcome from our point of view.

2. The French Problem. We have now reached the point where we must reluctantly conclude that, within the current framework of discussions with the Soviets, it will probably be impossible to meet the French prerequisite of a détente for their participation in negotiations. If such a détente can be achieved, it will presumably only be after we have gone much farther than the stage of exploratory talks. If the Soviets are willing to bury the Berlin question, formal negotiations may not be necessary or serve merely a camouflage function. At some point soon we will have to come to grips with the question of French non-participation. The legal problem can apparently be surmounted, if the French do not seek actively to prevent implementation of any agreement. On the other hand, we will probably have to make one more effort, at least for the record, to bring the French along.

3. Assuming the Thompson-Gromyko talks bog down completely and that nothing comes out of the Roberts' approach in Moscow,[4] we seem to have the following ways of keeping discussion of the Berlin question alive either to ascertain once and for all whether the Soviets wish to bury the question or try to find some basis for a modus vivendi:

a. A fresh Summit Meeting. This can be ruled out at present, although a meeting between the President and Khrushchev should be held in reserve for a heightened crisis situation.

b. The Secretary could accept Gromyko's invitation[5] to go to Moscow, perhaps on his way to the Geneva meetings in mid-March. This might be considered if the situation deteriorates markedly in the next few weeks, but will probably not be desirable.

c. The Secretary could meet bilaterally with Gromyko in Geneva on the fringes of a possible conference of Foreign Ministers to start off the disarmament discussions. This seems desirable and probably inevitable whatever the intervening developments. It might provide an opportunity to advance the dialogue further at a high level and to ascertain Soviet intentions more clearly.

d. Transfer of discussions to Washington. With the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador, Dobrynin, bilateral discussions here on Berlin might be more fruitful. However, no matter what his relationship to Moscow, Dobrynin will be at the end of a long instruction line and any attempt to raise the subject directly with Khrushchev would still have to revert back to Moscow.

e. Use of the British channel including possibility of an intervention by Prime Minister Macmillan. It is unlikely that Roberts can accomplish anything which Thompson could not. Action by Macmillan cannot be excluded if there should be a marked deterioration in the situation or if the British are concerned about the development of a total impasse.

f. Bilateral talks between the Germans and Soviets. The indications are that most German officials, including Adenauer, are presently opposed to bilateral talks with the Soviets, although a reply will probably be made in due course to the Soviet memorandum handed Kroll on December 27, 1961. Apart from individual voices, such as that of FDP leader Mende, there has been little noticeable pressure exerted on the Government for such bilateral talks. From the US viewpoint, although there are many arguments pro and con, on balance there is probably more to be said in favor of than against a German effort to explore whatever possibilities may be inherent in the Soviet campaign to encourage bilateral discussions. We would certainly not wish to drive the Germans into bilateral talks against their own better judgment, but if they came to us at some point willing to try their luck, we would probably have more to gain than to lose by encouraging them, as full and trusted partners, to play a more active diplomatic role in our common cause. (A paper discussing the pros and cons in greater detail is available.)[6] The timing and method of initiating talks would, of course, have to be carefully considered as well as their relationship to other discussions which might be going on with the Soviets. In any event, in view of the present German attitude, this does not seem to be something likely to develop in the immediate future.

4. Conclusion. Unless there is some unexpected break in the situation, the most desirable (though admittedly not completely satisfactory) course of action would seem to be:

a. To let the Thompson-Gromyko exchanges in Moscow run their course;

b. To contemplate a meeting between the Secretary and Gromyko in Geneva in mid-March;

c. To await what Dobrynin may have to say upon his arrival here in Washington this month;

d. To encourage the Germans, if the Thompson talks reach a dead end and they seem inclined to take any initiative, to try the possibilities of bilateral conversations with the Soviets.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-762. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Hillenbrand and also initialed by Kohler.

[2] Other than a notation in the JFK Log and Rusk's Appointment Book, no record of this meeting, which took place at 4 p.m. and was attended by the President, Bundy, Taylor, Bohlen, Kohler, and Hillenbrand, has been found.

[3] Secret. Prepared in the Department of State.

[4] On February 5 Ambassador Ormsby Gore had informed Rusk that the British believed Roberts should seek an early meeting with Gromyko on Berlin. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-562)

[5] See Document 249.

[6] A copy of this paper, “Pros and Cons of German Bilateral Discussions With the Soviets,” is attached to another memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, February 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-762)

283. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, February 8, 1962, 6 p.m.

1838. Paris for Embassy and Stoessel. CINCEUR for Norstad. I agree fully with suggestions contained in Berlin's 1466.[2] As I assess Soviet announcements of military flights in corridors on Feb 8 and 9 and attempted preemption air space up to 7500 feet, they add up to experimentation with new mode of procedure which can later be expanded into instrument for limiting Allied air access. If unchallenged, Soviets will have achieved important capability for degrading effective use of corridors on procedural and operational grounds, without necessity of justifying harassments with “controversial” issues of principle or law. Characteristic of their past changes in procedure, Soviets seem to be trying to introduce this departure cautiously and ambiguously, as illustrated by adherence to notification rules and by choice of air space “reservation,” which is below customary altitude commercial flights. I consider this is deliberate tactic aimed at minimizing our reaction.

In rough way utility of new procedure could be compared with such potential access barriers as Babelsberg maze or threats to repair Autobahn. Analogy with surface access, however, goes no further, since our rights in air corridors are unrestricted both by usage and agreement.

I therefore agree with Berlin that we must respond to new procedure vigorously and with purpose of deterring Soviets from continuing it. With this in mind we have formulated following specific recommendations for action Feb 9:

(a) USG should file flight plan and fly into Berlin at 15-20,000 foot altitude in one of two affected corridors.

(b) We should fly unarmed MATS flights below 7,500 feet in both corridors.

(c) We should also fly commercial passenger plane flights, with military crews but without passengers, in north or south corridor, below 7,500 foot altitude.

Flight over 10,000 ft level would precisely equalize Soviet moves, which if acquiesced in will have obvious effect of pinching our traffic into tight coffin of air which today was 3000 ft in height, tomorrow will be 2500 and in future could be further compressed. This should bring home to Soviets our ability to escape their squeeze by unwelcome counteraction and hopefully could lead to abandonment of gambit. Soviets should be held responsible for safety all these flights. With respect to commercial flights with passengers, the primary consideration in determining altitude should be safety of passengers.

Crux of matter continues to be maintenance of normal civil air transportation to Berlin and for this reason I consider it particularly important that we promptly join issue, rather than avoid it, by sending through commercial planes with USAF crews.

There has been no time to discuss this proposal with British, French or Germans here and we recognize that recommendation would involve partial implementation of Cloud Caper concept. Nevertheless, we should proceed along these lines.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-862. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, USAREUR, USAFE, and CINCEUR.

[2] Telegram 1466, February 8, reported that the chief Soviet air controller had announced that Soviet military transports would be flying in both the northern and central air corridors on February 9. The telegram also advised that the British, who had primary responsibility for these corridors, should carry out operations in them and that the Western Allies should consider flying in the corridors above 10,000 feet. (Ibid.)

284. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, February 9, 1962, 7 p.m.

2175. Eyes only for Secretary. Gromyko opened meeting with 15-page declaration (sent by septel,[2] original text pouched to Kohler today). I then told Gromyko I had following preliminary remarks to make and expressed general disappointment contents his declaration. Regarding the objectives of our talks, I stated our aim has been to seek agreement and to reduce tensions. “We would prefer a treaty with a reunified Germany. Since that doesn't now seem possible, we have tried to find an arrangement which would take account of existing realities and to reduce tensions.” As far as procedure is concerned, I reiterated that we have made clear why we believe access question logically should be dealt with first. Insofar as other questions Gromyko raised are concerned, such as frontiers, I stated there has been no change in our position since he had talked with Secretary and President. I emphasized to him that while we are prepared to discuss such questions in due course, it would be impossible for us to achieve agreement with our Allies on these questions until we know fairly precisely the nature of agreement on Berlin.

I denied categorically Gromyko's contention that we desire retain West Berlin as a military springboard. Reminded him Khrushchev himself had once pointed out Western troops in Berlin have no military significance and in case of conflict he would prefer have as many there as possible since they would all be taken prisoner. I emphasized that our obligations to peoples of West Berlin made it necessary retain our troops there.

Regarding international access authority, I confessed could not understand incompatibility thereof with so-called sovereignty of GDR since Soviet proposal also would apparently provide access guarantees for West Berlin. Added, in our opinion, IAA would prevent tensions over access.

I stated we could not of course agree with Gromyko's claim that East Berlin was part of GDR. Pointed out that if we could reach agreement on Berlin question it would in itself reduce most of the tension there. It is because we are unable to agree, that much of the tension present exists.

I expressed surprise Gromyko again raised question of symbolic Soviet contingents in West Berlin, pointing out that my government has made its position on this question clear on several occasions. I repeated that we are unable to see how Soviets can first dispose of their part of Berlin and then pretend to have rights in the other part. Also questioned why Soviets feel it necessary place deadline on presence foreign troop contingents, even under their proposal, since troops are and would be to guarantee Berlin security. This security would remain important until a final resolution of German question.

I then stated that Gromyko had spoken of a peace treaty, even a separate peace treaty, as means reduce tension. I questioned how any action which would threaten vital rights Western powers can contribute to reducing tension. Reminded Gromyko that we have never said we would oppose mere conclusion of a peace treaty with force but that they claim this action would liquidate our rights. I again asked what then would be position of our forces there.

Gromyko expressed inability understand how, if Western powers also have aim of reducing tension, they can oppose Soviet proposals for peace treaty and free and demilitarized city of West Berlin. He insisted retention of “the remnants of WW Two and the occupation regime” is not means of reducing tension and improving relations between our two states. “Soviet Government categorically refuses agree to maintenance existing situation in Germany—absence peace treaty and maintenance occupation regime, which we are convinced are source of tensions and possible conflict.” He continued, Soviet Government cannot agree procrastination present situation.

Gromyko, as in earlier meetings, then expressed regret that so far it has not been possible achieve progress due to US position.

He stated he accepted my explanation that there has been no change in USG position since his talks with Secretary and President, but he said my statement that agreement with Allies impossible until access agreed attests to fact we are trying to impose a plan on these talks to effect that they must revolve around access question. While this is Western position, he continued, Soviet position differs. “We consider it necessary that all questions including peace treaty and West Berlin problem be discussed.” He reiterated that Soviet Government, including Khrushchev himself, does not reject discussion access question which he had already discussed with me.

Gromyko then turned to my reference to Khrushchev statement regarding Western troops in Berlin. He agreed Khrushchev had made such statement to President in Vienna, but, he said, that is exactly why we are doubly surprised West attempting maintain occupation regime in West Berlin, and so opposed to their withdrawal or addition Soviet contingents if troops have no military significance. “They do, however, have significance because they turn West Berlin into serious center of danger by their presence.” Gromyko claimed my statement that forces present in Berlin in response obligations to defend West Berlin population is simply an argument to support US desire retain our troops in West Berlin. He declared “we have no relationship to these obligations.” Western troops came to West Berlin under entirely different obligations—those assumed by the alliance against Hitler Germany. He insisted alleged obligations Western powers to West Berlin population are not legitimate and are without any international legal force. “They also do not reduce tension, but run contrary to the aims assumed by alliance after defeat Hitlerite Germany, that is, the establishment of a peace-loving democratic state of Germany.” Leaving aside fact no one intends disturb West Berlin order, Gromyko stated, such obligations do not arise in Potsdam Agreement or any other agreement we have participated in. He added afterthought, “which you have broken."

Gromyko then turned to my question, which he described as “variant,” why deadline necessary on troops in West Berlin since purpose is to guarantee security. He stated Soviet Government considers indefinite retention Western forces and Soviet forces in West Berlin quite impossible. Such situation does not meet interests of our two states or of peace and security.

Gromyko criticized my statement USG not so much concerned with Soviet peace treaty with GDR, as with its effect on position of Western powers in West Berlin. “Such a situation unthinkable since conclusion peace treaty is not simply formality, but a major step from which would flow important measures.” He concluded by reiterating Soviet Government prefers agreed solution but again said, “Unfortunately, so far position of USG offers no hope for success."

I replied with: Regard question of free city, I had already expressed my views and my government undoubtedly will comment further; regarding question of agreement with our Allies, I pointed out I had not referred just to access, but to nature of the whole settlement of Berlin problem; regarding his remarks on our obligations to population of Berlin having no legal force with Soviets, I pointed out this might be, but he had said Soviets could not consider all-Berlin solution because East Berlin is the capital of GDR. We did not agree with this and “this claim has no legal force with us"; I repeated that US attaches importance maintenance our troops in West Berlin until resolution German question, but denied any intention create a “springboard”. Gromyko began to develop his previous arguments that basic social differences which have emerged between West and East Berlin are basis [omission in the source text] but he apparently thought better of it, and we closed the meeting with my reiteration assurance I would transmit his declaration soonest.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-962. Confidential; Priority.

[2] The Soviet paper was transmitted in telegram 2177 from Moscow, February 9, 10 p.m. (Ibid.)

285. Message From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)[1]

Paris, February 9, 1962, 1:30 p.m.

The following message is being dispatched by normal means to several addressees, including the USJCS; however, I am sending this by special means so that you will have this as early as possible.

"From General Norstad.

"1. In spite of statements of the Soviet Controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center on the evening of 7 Feb concerning Soviet use of the southern corridor, a.m. 8 Feb, normal civil air schedules were maintained on that date and in that corridor, with 20 flights into Berlin and 19 out. US military transports flew 8 flights in and 9 out. The operations were uneventful, neither civil nor military aircraft meeting with any interference.

"2. Today, 9 Feb, a total of 19 civil flights in and 20 out are scheduled in the northern and central corridors during the critical period 0750Z to 1150Z and, in addition, the US and UK are each flying a total of 3 military flights in and 3 out over these same corridors.

"3. Up to the time this message is dispatched the Soviet action has not stopped nor inconvenienced movement of either civil or military transports. It is possible, however, that the Soviet action over the last two days is only preliminary to more positive measures on their part which would actually interfere with our rights of air access, particularly the movement of civil air transport. If this should happen it is essential that our plans permit us to counteract promptly and effectively.

"4. Should the Soviets declare intentions which would lead to interference or significant inconvenience to normal Allied civil air schedules (for example, if by declarations similar to those made on the 7th and 8th of Feb, they should attempt to restrict the entire air space below 10,000 feet or to limit operations to such a narrow band that it would become impracticable for civil air to carry out their normal functions in a normal manner), I propose to take the following action:

a. To direct military air transports to fly in the corridors concerned at the critical altitudes and the critical times in accordance with the general practice of the 8th and 9th of Feb.

b. To arrange for the execution of that part of the Jack Pine plan which calls for civil air transport with military crews (military-sponsored air service) also to fly in the corridors concerned at the critical altitudes and at the critical times, but initially without passengers.

c. To encourage normal civil air schedules to fly at altitudes between 10,000 ft and 25,000 ft. If this is unacceptable to any civil airline, to arrange for military crews to fly civil aircraft at these altitudes, initially without passengers.

d. To direct a limited number of military transports to fly in the corridors concerned at altitudes above 10,000 feet.

"5. Action taken under par 4 above would be carried out strictly in accordance with established procedures except that flight plans covering the initial flights in each category will be submitted to BASC a minimum of two hours before each flight in order to insure complete awareness on the part of the Soviets of our intentions. To the extent practicable other flight plans will also be filed two hours in advance.

"6. Under the circumstances considered in this message, I would maintain an increased number of fighters on ground alert. In the event that these fighters must be employed as contemplated in Jack Pine plan, they would be under the control of the Jack Pine Command Post and the recently revised Jack Pine air-to-air rules of engagement would apply."[2]

[1] Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak, 1962. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that Stoessel and Generals Baker and Moore “assisted in drafting."

[2] On February 10 the Washington Ambassadorial Group considered Norstad's recommendations and approved a and b as within authority already delegated to him. While the U.S. and German representatives supported c and d, as did the French if the Soviets precluded flights below 10,000 feet, the British were unwilling to delegate authority for flights over 10,000 feet merely on the basis of a Soviet declaration of flights in the corridors. (Telegram 4328 to Paris; Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-962)

286. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)[1]

Belgrade, February 9, 1962.

DEAR TOMMY: Perhaps you have seen the Department's circular airgram CA-909,[2] summarizing certain views—whether of our Berlin Mission or of its local acquaintances is not clear—concerning Soviet intentions and probable reactions on the Berlin problem. You probably saw, in fact, the original messages from which it was prepared. Let me—since I would not know where better to turn—pour out to you some of the concern and misgiving which this communication inflicts upon me.

The basic assumption underlying the views set forth in this airgram appears to be that the Russians are bluffing over Berlin; that if confronted with a flat no, they can be depended upon to back down; that there is thus no reason to discuss the problem of Berlin with them at all, much less to come forward with any constructive ideas of our own about it; and that no seriously undesirable consequences are to be feared from so passive and negative an attitude. It is of course true that this assumption might appear to be sustained by the experience of the three and a quarter years that have passed since Khrushchev inaugurated the present phase of this problem. The West, generally, has followed a course of action which, whether actually based on this assumption or not, is certainly not in conflict with it. Yet no war has ensued; nothing worse has occurred to Berlin itself than the building of the wall; and the possibility that Khrushchev's personal position might have suffered in a manner detrimental to western interests is one which responsible western circles have found it possible to view, up to this time, either with incredulity or indifference.

But whether even this seemingly happy picture would justify the assumptions about the future reflected in the Berlin view seems to me another matter. The very weakness of the Ulbricht regime must surely continue to prevent the Russians from accepting with complacency an indefinite continuation of the present situation in Berlin. Moscow cannot realistically be expected to acquiesce happily and passively for any length of time in a situation which permits the western powers and the West Germans both to hold West Berlin as a defensive bastion of political freedom and at the same time to use it as a forward device for keeping alive hopes of eventual unification, for encouraging the East German population in this way to continue to refrain from making their peace with the Ulbricht regime, and thus for perpetuating weakness and instability in the GDR. So long as the present state of affairs exists, the Russians must be expected to continue to agitate the Berlin problem, and the German problem generally, in any way they can, with all the dangerous implications this bears for world peace.

These reflections do not support the hope that Moscow, confronted with frustration in the present phase of the exchanges over Berlin, will simply desist and subside into passivity. And there could, it seems to me, be no greater frivolity on our part than to assume that there could never come a point, in the further tilting and maneuvering over this problem that is bound to follow, where Soviet prestige would become involved to a degree that would make it impossible for Moscow to withdraw empty-handed. I would know of nothing in the historical record to substantiate the thesis that Russians can be counted upon to be always bluffing. Nor do I see any reason to suppose that the aversion they undoubtedly feel to another major war could always be depended upon to keep them from getting into positions where even war, with all its horrors, would appear as the lesser of two monstrous evils. Yet this is the supposition which, to my mind, our Berlin Mission seems to be espousing; and the ease with which it seems to find acceptance in Bonn and Washington fills me with foreboding.

In general, I have never been able to go along with the tendency of some people to look to the populace of Berlin as an unfailing source of sound instinctive wisdom about the realities of the cold war. I yield to no one in my admiration for the Berliners, among whom I spent at least five years of my life, and whom I had opportunity to observe, in particular, under all the strains of wartime hardship. Yet I would certainly not regard them as an unfailing oracle of wisdom about the Russians.

Sound as may be their judgment about political realities in their own city, their tendency to draw inferences from this for the relationship of forces in the world as a whole, and for Russian reactions in given international situations, can hold great dangers for themselves and everyone else, if it is allowed to become a source of inspiration for western policy. Allowing that the communists of the eastern sector find themselves in so weak a situation that in the absence of Russian support they could easily be blown away by a show of fearless and aggressive militancy on the western side—this still does not constitute adequate reason for believing that the Soviet Government, if similarly challenged on a world scale, would react the same way. Berlin is not the world; and nothing could be more misleading, in application to world events, than the heroic and romantic approaches which, due to a favorable constellation of external factors, proved so effective in the case of the Berlin blockade, and to which so many Berliners continue to look as the panacea for all political ills.

Well, forgive me this outburst. Whether or not you agree with it, I think you will understand the concern from which it flows.

My clients here seem to be continuing, despite all setbacks and frustrations, to give priority to their effort to make themselves agreeable to Mr. Khrushchev; and there is a feeling in some quarters here that they have recently had somewhat greater success than previously. I shall be more inclined to attach importance to this when a date is named for Mr. Gromyko's return visit to Belgrade. It seems, however, to be a sad truth that if the Soviet leaders were only to cast one inviting smile in this direction, Uncle Sam, with all his bouquets and food baskets, would be promptly forgotten by Tito and some of those who are now his closest advisers, and they would almost swoon in their eagerness to bask in this eastern sunshine. What the result would be for Yugoslavia's economic situation, I shudder to think. I suspect that if our economic help were to be wholly withdrawn there would actually be a secondary reaction here which would shake the regime, and the society in which it lives, to the foundation.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

George K.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-962. Confidential; Official-Informal.

[2] Not found.

287. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, February 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

Soviet Intentions With Respect to Berlin

A group of senior policy officers of the Department and intelligence officers from both INR and the CIA met yesterday to discuss Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin.

It might be helpful for you to have a brief summary of that discussion.

1. It was generally agreed that the U.S. military reaction last summer to the Berlin crisis, plus evidence within the Soviet Union of popular anxiety over the possibility of war, led to a decision not to risk a military confrontation with the U.S. by a radical sealing off of access to West Berlin.

2. Within the framework of that decision, it was judged that Moscow had not yet made up its mind whether it would:

—Let the crisis drift off, while maintaining limited harassing tactics designed to increase uncertainty among West Berliners and lead to the attrition of the city's life;

—Sign a peace treaty which would provide a basis for heightened pressure on West Berlin, without actually forcing a showdown;

—Pursue more seriously than the Thompson-Gromyko discussions would thus far indicate, an effort at a negotiated Berlin settlement;

—Use the Berlin crisis as a platform for wider East-West discussions and negotiation.

3. The Soviets in choosing among these alternatives will probably be influenced by the way in which the Gromyko-Thompson talks go. We did not feel that at this stage we had sufficient information to guess which of the four options they would adopt. We recognized that Khrushchev has a strong personal commitment “to do something about Berlin” and that this will place him under strong pressure to sign a separate treaty if he finds that he cannot get anything better. On the other hand, he may be loath to go ahead with a treaty because it will use up major ammunition; i.e., the threat of a separate treaty is worse than the reality will probably be.

4. Whatever course they may choose, it was agreed that the possibility of draining away the life of West Berlin was high in the consciousness of authorities in Moscow, and that the greatest urgency attached to putting into effect measures of the kind suggested in William Jorden's report.[2]

5. Aside from this point, three general views were expressed about U.S. policy:

—That we should persist with the status quo and not press for a negotiated settlement;

—That, in view of the cost to West Berlin and the Alliance of uncertainty and harassment, we should take a more forthcoming position than we have thus far taken with respect to a Berlin negotiation;

—That we should seek a negotiation with the USSR on other matters (for example, nuclear arms, a European non-aggression pact, etc.) as cover for a deflation of the Berlin crisis, without a definitive resolution of it.

6. There was, perhaps, some movement within the group in the general direction of the third choice, mainly because it was judged that the minimal degree of recognition for the GDR compatible with Soviet agreement would not command assent in Bonn.

7. The possible relation between other elements in the Communist position and the Berlin situation was explored. With respect to the Sino-Soviet crisis, it was thought likely that this would lead Moscow in the broad direction of relaxation of tension elsewhere. With respect to the Soviet domestic scene, popular pressure for peace and for increased consumption might also press somewhat in this direction. It was finally noted that there appeared to be a recrudescence of Khrushchev's impulse to improve bilateral U.S. and Soviet relations. This was attributed to a mixture of motives, including a desire to constrain the U.S. military budget and to sustain the image of the two giant powers on the world scene. None of these was judged to be a controlling factor in Soviet policy towards Berlin, although they might help determine its direction.

8. My personal reflections on this discussion are:

—It is extremely urgent that we signal to both West Berliners and to Moscow by concrete actions that we do not intend to permit West Berlin to become a shell, despite the unwillingness of Moscow to negotiate a Berlin settlement which would meet our terms;

—It remains crucial to a successful transiting of this crisis that Moscow remain convinced that serious interference with access risks nuclear war;

—The possibility of shifting the focus of U.S.-Soviet negotiations from the Berlin issue to other matters and permitting the Berlin crisis to be deflated in the context of such negotiations deserves urgent exploration.

—The possibility should also be explored of floating the following notion, if the West Germans could be brought to agree: While it is impossible to force GDR recognition on the West in a context of crisis and threats, we are prepared to encourage widened contacts and de facto relations with the East Germans if tranquility is restored and maintained in and around Berlin, and if the East German regime assumes a less repressive, rigid, and aggressive stance.

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Copies were sent to Bohlen, Kohler, Bundy, and Chayes.

[2] Not further identified.

288. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, February 12, 1962, 5 p.m.

2186. Eyes only Secretary. Document on Berlin which Gromyko gave me obviously drafted with eye to publication and suggest we should reply with similar document.[2] Dept will have noted greater emphasis given Oder-Neisse line than internal borders. Also using only border question as example of “other questions” may indicate particular significance Soviets attach to this although this may merely be due to fact that desire to settle this problem is one of their best arguments for peace treaty. Presume that we could meet his argument about impossibility holding plebiscite while our troops in occupation by offering to substitute UN troops until after plebiscite since Soviets would certainly not agree. On other hand imagine such offer would disturb West Berliners. If we wish to seek means to keep conversations going we might put forward my suggestion of a confederation of all Berlin. Unless some new element introduced difficult see how conversations can be kept going much longer on present basis although Gromyko certainly gave me impression Soviets not yet ready for break and in any event would want to put onus for break on us. This problem obviously also related to possibility of Foreign Ministers' meeting on disarmament which would give opportunity for higher level discussion Berlin problem.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1262. Secret; Priority.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 284.

289. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

Tripartite Meeting, February 13: Soviet Intentions; Soviet-German Bilateral Talks; Geneva Disarmament Talks

PARTICIPANTS

French

Ambassador Herve Alphand

M. Claude Lebel, Minister

M. Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor

M. Pierre Pelen, Counselor

British

Ambassador Ormsby Gore

Lord Hood

Mr. J. A. Thomson, First Secretary

US

The Secretary of State

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. William R. Tyler, Acting Ass't. Secretary, EUR

Mr. Johannes V. Imhof, EUR/WE

The Secretary met with the French and British Ambassadors at his office from 4:00 to 5:45 p.m. on February 13. One of the topics discussed was:

Soviet intentions

The Secretary suggested an exchange of views on what the Soviets were really up to in Berlin. He noted that Soviet gestures were ambiguous. Some of their actions conveyed the impression that they were prepared to put the Berlin question on ice for the time being while others, for example recent Soviet actions on the air corridors, served to increase tension.

Ambassador Alphand said the French did not believe that the Soviets were satisfied with the status quo in Berlin. Much more was at stake than merely Berlin. The Soviets did not appear to have made any significant concessions during the Moscow talks. Lack of progress in Moscow was accompanied by some friendly gestures toward the US (the Adzhubei visit[2] and the invitation to Robert Kennedy to visit Moscow[3] ) and also by some tough gestures, notably continued pressure on Western use of the air corridors and the negative Soviet position in disarmament negotiations. Ambassador Alphand felt that the Soviets might have in mind one of two possibilities: direct conversations with the Germans or a summit meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy.

Ambassador Ormsby Gore distinguished between long term Soviet objectives and what the Soviets might be prepared realistically to settle for. Soviet long term objectives no doubt went beyond Berlin but the Soviets were probably aware that they could not obtain their kind of German settlement at this time. The controversy within the Soviet bloc on peaceful coexistence was probably responsible for the ambiguous Soviet posture and for the tendency to keep the door open for a conciliatory as well as for a tough course. Khrushchev must prove to the Chinese that peaceful coexistence is possible but significant Soviet concessions on Berlin might render Khrushchev's position more difficult. Ambassador Ormsby Gore noted that the Soviets had not seized opportunities in the Moscow talks to extend the conversation beyond Berlin.

The Secretary said the Soviets had probably not extended the Moscow discussions because they realized they would have to meet first the problem of Western interests in Berlin. The need to stabilize Eastern Europe plays undoubtedly an important role in Soviet thinking. The ambiguous courses the Soviets were following resulted partly from their own problems and partly from their uncertainty about Western intentions. With regard to the first set of problems the Secretary referred to the state of Soviet agriculture, the effects of de-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet dispute and set backs with regard to Soviet policy toward the under-developed countries. The Secretary said that Soviet uncertainties regarding Western intentions culminate in the question whether the West would really fight a nuclear war over Berlin. Also, as indicated by the NATO strategic briefing, the Soviets might be aware that the West now knows their weaknesses in the nuclear weapons field. It was difficult to predict which course the Soviets would follow. Probably they would not sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany but the possibility cannot be ruled out. Perhaps they may decide to ease tensions. On the other hand, Khrushchev's response to Western disarmament suggestions was not serious but rather constituted a propaganda exercise. However, the Soviets must be aware that the West grows stronger under pressure, as it did during the Korean War. The allocation of an additional $8 billion to our defense budget must concern the Soviets who might also feel that if tension mounts it would be difficult to withhold nuclear weapons from the Germans.

Ambassador Alphand referred to the Secretary's remark that the Soviets were uncertain regarding our intentions. He wanted to know what are the indications the Soviets have that would lead them to conclude that there are uncertainties on the Western side. The Secretary said he had been referring only to the conclusion drawn by Soviet intelligence from Western military preparations. These military preparations, by their very nature, were ambiguous. As to Western political objectives, the Soviets could not have any doubts regarding Western intentions.

Soviet-German bilateral talks. Ambassador Alphand asked what the US position would be if the Soviet-German bilateral talks took place. The Secretary said that provided Western interests in Berlin remained protected and Germany remained an integral part of the Western Alliance, Soviet-German bilateral explorations might not be undesirable. He mentioned, as an example, the Oder-Neisse line. Ambassador Alphand agreed but said that France would be suspicious of any direct German-Soviet talks because these talks would necessarily involve Berlin and Germany's role in NATO. The Secretary agreed that there might be a discussion of these problems in direct Soviet-German talks but did not think this was necessarily dangerous unless the Germans were prepared to make concessions. Naturally, if there were any indication that Western interests in Berlin or Germany's role in Western defense might be affected we would be opposed.

The Secretary wondered why the West Germans did not show greater confidence in their dealings with the East Germans. After all, West Germany was a going concern whereas East Germany was in very bad straits. Ambassador Alphand thought that the reasons were legalistic and that the West German Government wanted to avoid any action that could be interpreted as recognition of the East German regime.

The Secretary asked whether there were any indications of direct Soviet-German conversations. Ambassador Alphand said that there were none at this moment and that Chancellor Adenauer had denied any intentions to enter into such conversations.

Geneva Disarmament talks. Ambassador Ormsby Gore took the position that Khrushchev's reply to Western proposals for a disarmament conference in Geneva, while admittedly of a propaganda nature, was nevertheless more positive than it seemed.[4] His reply had not been controversial. For instance, there had been no reference to the Christmas Island tests. Perhaps it was simply Khrushchev's dislike of bureaucrats which was responsible for his suggestion that the Geneva meeting should be on the Chief of State level. The Secretary said that the Soviet reply contained no openings on substantive matters and had not been preceded by any soundings whether a summit conference on disarmament would be acceptable to the West. He therefore considered it a negative gesture. Ambassador Ormsby Gore thought the proposal for a conference on the Chief of State level was perhaps simply Khrushchev's way of seizing the initiative.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/2-1362. Secret. Drafted by Imhof, initialed by Imhof and Kohler, and approved in S on March 5.

[2] See Document 277.

[3] Not further identified.

[4] For texts of the joint letter from President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman Khrushchev, February 7, and Khrushchev's reply, February 10, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 25-26 and 32-36.

290. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay)[1]

February 14, 1962, 2:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Air Access to Berlin

General Clay opened by reporting to the Secretary the Soviet notice in Basc reserving the south corridor from 0900 to 1315 up to 7500 feet on February 15.

After pointing out to General Clay that contingency plans existed which were the basis on which General Norstad had to act, the Secretary asked General Clay for his specific recommendations. General Clay replied that he thought tomorrow there should be four military transport flights laid on instead of two and that at least two of these should be escorted by fighters.[2]

Referring again to the tripartitely approved contingency planning, the Secretary asked General Clay whether he had checked his suggestion with General Norstad. The Secretary received no clear reply to this point but then went on to point out that since this was a tripartite matter he could not as he did the other day give an immediate response to General Clay.[3]

General Clay then expressed his serious concern that this series of actions on the part of the Soviets threatened to erode access, making the point that while the civil airlines were still flying above the reserved altitudes, passengers were becoming increasingly apprehensive about taking them. The Secretary told General Clay that we appreciated and shared his worries on this and informed him of the tripartite démarche being made direct to Moscow.

In conclusion the Secretary assured General Clay that we would consider urgently how we could bring an end to these Soviet moves or alternatively how we could demonstrate to them that this was not a useful procedure.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1462. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Kohler and approved in S. Secretary Rusk was in Washington; General Clay was in Berlin. Attached to the source text was a 2-page transcript of the conversation.

[2] Clay also made this recommendation in telegram 1513 from Berlin, February 14, received at 5:49 a.m. (Ibid., 962.72/2-1462) Ambassador Dowling seconded his proposal. (Telegram 1895 from Bonn, February 14, received at 2:11 p.m.; ibid., 762.00/2-1462)

[3] See Document 281.

291. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk[1]

Washington, February 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

Berlin Air Corridors

Confirming and supplementing my oral report to you I have now talked (3:10 p.m.) with both General Wheeler and General Lemnitzer who had talked with Norstad about the situation in the Berlin air corridors with particular reference to General Clay's recommendation (Berlin's 1513)[2] to introduce fighter escort. In brief they report the following from General Norstad.

(1) Norstad has the same knowledge of the situation in the air corridors at the same time as General Clay.

(2) In today's operations he had deliberately decided not to introduce fighter escorts.

(3) With respect to the south corridor exercise tomorrow, General Norstad will not introduce fighter escort in the first instance.

(4) However for tomorrow Norstad has increased the American fighters on alert from 4 to 12 and he will plan to orbit some or all of them at the entry to the corridors if there is a recurrence of Soviet traffic comparable to today. (I believe General Norstad is fully aware that he needs a French governmental decision but there was no mention of this.)

(5) General Norstad is aware that he has no authority to introduce fighter escorts either from the US or the other two powers unless there is physical harassment. However if there is any harassment he intends to give the harassed planes fighter protection.

Finally General Lemnitzer told me that he had discussed the foregoing with Secretary McNamara who had approved Norstad's actions and plans.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-1462. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Kohler. Copies were sent to Bundy, Lemnitzer, Nitze, Hillenbrand, and Ausland.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 290.

292. National Security Action Memorandum No. 128[1]

Washington, February 14, 1962.

TO

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Response to Soviet Action Regarding Air Corridors

The President has approved the recommendations in your memorandum of February 14th[2] on Response to Soviet Action Regarding Air Corridors. Since there has been a little confusion in the White House with respect to the precise meaning of your recommendations, I wish to restate what the President understands that he has approved, as follows:

1. That the State Department is authorized to seek Ambassadorial Group agreement to delegate to General Norstad authority

(a) to urge the civil airlines to fly over 10,000 feet if the Soviets seek by declaration to prevent all flights below 10,000 feet, and if, as a result, the civil airlines are unwilling to fly below that limit; and

(b) to fly civil aircraft (initially without passengers) with military pilots over 10,000 feet, if the civil airlines decline to fly either above or below 10,000 feet. (General Norstad already has authority also to fly civil aircraft with military crews below 10,000 feet, if the civil airlines decline to do so.)

2. That U.S. approval of this authority is being communicated to General Norstad, although his exercise of the authority will be dependent upon British and French concurrence, since in these matters he is acting as a Live Oak commander under tripartite instructions.

McGeorge Bundy[3]

[1] Source: Department of State, NSAMs: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 128. Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara, Taylor, Lemnitzer, McCone, and the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

[2] In this 2-page memorandum Rusk reviewed the history of Western policy on flying above 10,000 feet in the air corridors and asked for Presidential authorization for the recommendations in this NSAM. (Ibid.)

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

293. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, February 14, 1962, midnight.

1526. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Live Oak, Stoessel and McGuire. Following is tentative Mission analysis of mounting Sov pressures in air corridors. After exercising last Thursday and Friday relative restraint re Allied aircraft “intruding” on “reserved” flight levels, Sovs today have heated up situation considerably, both with menacing statements and fighter activity in corridors. Announcement of similar exercise for tomorrow would indicate Sovs may well intend keep up pressure for prolonged period of time.

One of Sov objectives undoubtedly is to test Allied reactions. They have already learned that airlines will not fly at “reserved” altitudes irrespective of public statements that civilian flights proceeding as usual. They may also have reached corollary conclusion that any refusal by them to guarantee flight safety will not be defied by commercial carriers. They thus able conclude if this not already clear, that they can disrupt normal civilian traffic even below 10,000 foot level through refusal of flight safety guarantee. They have used occasion offered by “trespassing” of Allied military aircraft on preempted flight levels to harass commercial aircraft flying above critical altitudes and on basis of approved flight plans. Intimidation of airlines and air passengers, and creating nervousness in Berlin by pressure on Berlin's only completely free lifeline is obvious important Sov objective in this gambit.

On technical side, Sovs obviously attempting to establish at least three points:

(1) That flight plan is not validly filed and has no status unless initialed by them (cf, their protest re aircraft flying in corridors without flight plan).

(2)

That Sovs in position clear or not clear Western flights, grant or withhold guarantee of air safety. Second point is not new. Sovs have also in past stated they could not guarantee safety of given flight, but they have not before gone this far to translate this into action to prevent Western flights. They could expand scope of this operation by “refusing guarantee of flight safety” for whole battery of reasons, such as, for example, that Western aircraft had not complied with GDR air radio law.

This contrasts with Western position that flight info is passed to Sovs for their information, and that it solely up to them maintain separation of their aircraft from ours and ensure against other controllable hazards to our aircraft, since they file no plans for own aircraft.

(3) Third point Sovs attempting to establish in principle is one they have long followed in practice: that corridors are under Sov jurisdiction and they can fly in them at will without reference to quadripartite procedures. Allies continue maintain in principle that quadripartite procedures apply to all four powers.

Basic Sov aim may be to undermine principle of their responsibility for safety of any Western flights, reducing their role in BASC to that of observer who receives information from West but assumes no obligations therefrom. This could turn corridors into lawless no-man's-land for civil aircraft, with Sov and GDR aircraft cutting in and out at will.

We believe that creation by Sovs of potentially explosive situation in corridors so shortly after fourth Gromyko-Thompson meeting is designed to impress West that Sovs intend to carry out their Berlin policy come what may and that threats in Gromyko memorandum are meant seriously. All of this may be part of Sov effort to soften us up for summit.

While we have not had opportunity analyze situation with British and French it obvious that French here take serious view of situation. British, though they appear to have modified relaxed thinking such as that presented only recently by Ledwidge (London's 85 sent Dept 2857 rptd Bonn 168)[2] nevertheless tend to play down corridor developments.

Secondary but nonetheless important result of this difference of view has been difficulty re coordinating press releases. Ultra-restraint practiced by British and French problem in having to refer even factual “on query” statements to French Embassy Bonn has resulted in fuzzing over of facts and in unconscionable delays in making most simple statements. While we realize sensationalism is not in our interest and may play into Sov hands by creating increasing public nervousness re air corridors, Dept nevertheless may find it desirable to fill more glaring gaps in information given to public so far.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-1462. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:30 a.m. on February 15. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, POLAD USAREUR, and USAFE.

[2] This telegram, February 2, reported that working level officials at the Foreign Office seemed to have concluded that the Soviet Union had decided to put Berlin on the back burner and that the West could relax for the balance of 1962. (Ibid., 762.00/2-262)

294. Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary of State Kohler had informed the other members of the Washington Ambassadorial Group on February 11, 1962, that the United States favored a protest to the Soviet Ambassador in the German Democratic Republic concerning traffic in the air corridors to Berlin. (Telegram 2196 to Bonn, February 10; Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-962) Coordination of the protest note was done in Bonn, and it was delivered on February 13. (Telegram 1865 from Bonn, February 12; ibid., 962.72/2-1262)

In view of the continued Soviet exclusionary use of the air corridors, on February 15 the three Western powers addressed an additional protest to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For text of this note and the Soviet reply of February 17, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 687-689.

295. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 15, 1962, noon.

SUBJECT

Berlin Air Access and Fighter Escorts

PARTICIPANTS

France

Ambassador Alphand

Mr. Lebel, French Embassy

Mr. Winckler, French Embassy

US

Mr. Kohler, EUR

Mr. Holloway, GER

Ambassador Alphand prefaced his remarks by stressing the determination of the French Government to re-affirm Allied rights in the Berlin Air Corridors. He then referred to the differences in the past between the French and the US/UK positions on the introduction of fighter escorts into the air corridors. While the incidents now taking place on the air routes to Berlin are not exactly those envisaged in our past planning (in that blockage is not complete), the French would like to revert to the idea of governmental declarations prior to the introduction of fighter escorts. To that end, he wished to introduce a draft declaration which, he felt, could be coordinated here rapidly in case of an incident which would call for introduction of fighter escorts and would then be issued by the three governments. Fighter escorts would not be introduced until some hours after this declaration was issued.

Mr. Kohler replied that he felt coordination of such a declaration would require a 24-hour delay which would be unacceptable to the US. He referred to the Jack Pine operation of February 9 when the French insistence on prior governmental approval resulted in a 24-hour delay in the availability of French transport planes for a probe. As General Norstad had US/UK authority to use their transports immediately, he was able to order a prompt and effective response. In the type of serious incident which would call for escorts, a delay of 24-hours would weaken a Western response appreciably. Mr. Kohler also referred to the Soviet demands at BASC this morning at 2:45 a.m. Washington time which might have required immediate action that could not have been taken had we been under obligation to prior governmental approval for a response. Mr. Kohler said we would, however, be prepared to review the declaration in the Contingency Coordinating Group but with no commitment on the US part to delay any reaction which General Norstad might now be authorized to take immediately.

The Ambassador asked if we would consider a declaration if incidents arose which were outside the scope of our present contingency planning. Mr. Kohler said we would consider the response to such an incident to be a new governmental decision for which we would be prepared to consider a declaration, particularly if time would permit.

The French Ambassador asked if the declaration proposal should be raised tripartitely or quadripartitely. Mr. Kohler replied that German participation (air fields, radar, etc.) thus far in Jack Pine made the Quadripartite forum more appropriate; the Ambassador agreed.

Mr. Lebel asked if General Norstad had authority to orbit planes at the end of the air corridors. Mr. Kohler said he did, but that he had not used this authority as yet because the situation in his judgment did not warrant it. Mr. Kohler pointed out that the Jack Pine command post had been activated and that we were to all intents in a war situation as far as communications went. It was no longer a question of telegrams reaching desks, but rather of fighter aircraft being deployed by command posts directly. In such a case, the judgment of the man on the spot must be the decisive factor. This was especially true for any definitions of what constituted physical interference with access. Here, General Norstad had to have the decisive decision.

Ambassador Alphand then referred to a message of General Norstad's[2] which indicated that if the latter lacked authority to commit French fighter escorts at the time of an incident requiring this, he would use US fighters as escorts for French transports as well. This, the French could not accept without a prior French government decision. However, the French position did not take into account the possibility posed by Mr. Kohler that General Norstad would authorize US fighters to perform a rescue mission of a French plane caught in a corridor incident prior to any French suspension of flights or governmental decision to introduce fighters. Mr. Kohler said we would authorize such a mission without question; the Ambassador agreed to present this contingency to Paris.

In response to Ambassador Alphand's question on Soviet motivation in the air, Mr. Kohler said he was inclined to think the Soviets were engaging in a tactical exercise in reply to our insistence throughout four talks with Gromyko that access is the main issue. They may be attempting to demonstrate to us that air access, our only uncontrolled means of access, is really a tenuous matter and that we would be wiser to settle for what the Soviets offer us in the way of guarantees rather than attempt to maintain or improve (through the International Access Authority proposal) the status quo. Beyond that, the Soviets might also be attempting to increase tensions for other purposes, particularly an effort to push us to a summit.

Mr. Kohler concluded that we were satisfied with our response thus far; it has been firm, prompt and appropriate. We were also convinced from this that our delegation of authority to General Norstad had been correct and should not be diminished.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.5400/2-1562. Secret. Drafted by Holloway and initialed by Holloway and Kohler. The meeting was held in Kohler's office at the Department of State.

[2] Not further identified.

296. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev[1]

Washington, February 15, 1962.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In order to permit the further development of the conversations between Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko, I have not answered directly your letter of December 13, 1961,[2] nor the message which you sent me through my brother.[3] I had hoped that these conversations might lead to some more positive note on Germany and Berlin that could be further developed in this more direct and confidential channel.

It appears, however, that neither that series of conversations nor this channel is bringing our positions any closer together. The talks between Messrs. Thompson and Gromyko are tending to become more and more formal, with each side exchanging diplomatic messages restating their positions. Your communications to me still refer to the policy of “positions of strength” as though the West were in some way threatening the Soviet Union—and inasmuch as I am quite aware of the strength and determination of the Soviet people, and you, I am sure, are equally aware of our qualities, I would hope that we could dispense with this kind of exchange which is reminiscent of an earlier period in our relations.

It would seem today that neither of us knows very much more about the prospects for accommodation than we knew many months ago—i.e., you know that the West will not withdraw its troops from West Berlin or accept the stationing of Soviet troops there, and we know that you will not accept any arrangements for the city of Berlin as whole.

While these changes are thus not on the list of possible agreement, I should state again in this regard that it is not the Western powers who are seeking a change in the status of Berlin. While we do not consider the situation in Germany today to be satisfactory, we recognize that there is very little likelihood of effecting any basic change in the direction of Western aims, inasmuch as we exclude the employment of force to this end, and certainly prefer not to initiate any unilateral action that might provoke increased tension or fear. On the other hand, the Soviet Union also recognizes, I am sure, that it cannot unilaterally bring about a change in the existing situation which would result in damage to the rights, obligations and interests of the Allied powers and the people of West Berlin.

Both of us, therefore, however differently we may view the issues, are confronted with the same basic question: how to deal with the present state of affairs in a manner which will (1) avoid any shift favorable to one side and detrimental to the other, and (2) ensure a greater degree of stability and tranquility in the entire German situation. I believe that if we take these two principles as a starting point, we might be able to see some light at the end of the tunnel.

Nevertheless it is increasingly clear that we hold wholly different views on what kind of solution would be best in the long run; and equally clear, therefore, that we must patiently expect the negotiations, exchanges and conferences required before agreement is reached to extend over a considerable period of time. Look how many months and years, for example, were spent in the talks on nuclear tests which, though as yet unproductive, covered an area where a potential agreement was no more urgently in the common interest of both sides. Fortunately, both you and I—or so I strongly believe—are able to take the long view, and to recognize our joint responsibility for patiently continuing the search for a joint solution—instead of taking some precipitate unilateral action that might endanger the peace that prevails in Germany now. While our negotiations should make whatever progress is possible and avoid undue delays, we should bear in mind, as I said to Mr. Adzhubei,[4] that world conditions will look very differently to us three or five or seven years from now, as the result of evolutionary changes, or progress in disarmament or other areas.

For this reason I would hope that we would both take special pains to adhere to that principle, included in the disarmament principles on which we agreed at the UN last fall, which enjoined both sides to refrain, as the disarmament talks began, from any actions in the international field which might tend to increase tensions. As Ambassador Thompson has made clear, we view the recent acts of harassment in the Berlin air corridors with very grave concern; and it does not seem likely that serious progress could be made on these or other talks as long as one side is increasing tensions in this fashion.

I had understood, from my conversations with Mr. Adzhubei as well as my earlier talks with Mr. Gromyko, that both sides recognized the desirability of doing nothing which would increase the difficulties of peaceful negotiation. As you have stated in your letter, in politics just as in physics every action causes counteraction, so that every danger or pressure you place upon us is in effect adding to the dangers or pressures which the increased prospects of conflict signify for you. Moreover, the prospects for alleviating the other concerns which you have expressed and which I fully understand—a future excess of German nationalism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for example—are certain to be increased rather than diminished by each new increase in tension and pressure. I am certain that these concerns could be satisfactorily met if an understanding could be achieved—but further pressures on the West in Berlin only increase the pressure within France and the Federal Republic of Germany to build a greater military force, to secure an independent nuclear capacity and to adopt a more rigid attitude on any accommodation.

Another way to improve the prospects of an advance in these discussions would be to instruct our two representatives in Moscow to concentrate on concrete matters and avoid further generalized and repetitive statements of position. For example, Mr. Adzhubei, during our very interesting conversation of last January 30 here at the White House,[5] suggested there might be some variation in the possibilities of an International Commission supervising access with East German participation. If further details on this possibility and other variations are forthcoming, they might be further explored by Ambassador Thompson and Foreign Minister Gromyko. This is the sort of fresh and concrete subject matter to which their time should be devoted.

I have written frankly of these matters in the hope that you will respond in kind. I can assure you that I will continue to hold in the utmost secrecy any message or proposal sent through this channel, for I have always regarded it as a private and confidential means of communication, without all of the pressures which public communications bring to any question of this kind.

I realize that such an exchange, if successful, would represent a considerable departure from normal diplomacy. But, surely we both recognize that new situations require new methods of procedure. And I feel very strongly that we must make every effort and explore every possibility to avoid the development of a major crisis over Berlin, replete with all the dangers of war. To avoid such a development is, I know, your basic desire as well as mine; and I am convinced, as I believe you are, that if we can either find some modus vivendi in regard to Berlin or a more solid long-range agreement, this will open up the possibility of agreements on many other questions, including those mentioned in your communications through my brother—including the question of German frontiers, respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, prohibition of nuclear weapons for both parts of Germany, and the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw powers.

I was particularly glad to read in your letter that you share our hopes for peace. It was in that spirit that I was pleased to talk again with your son-in-law, Mr. Adzhubei, and stress to him the importance of avoiding any threats to the peace in this area. I enjoyed meeting with him on this occasion, and I was very pleased to see your lovely daughter. I hope she enjoyed her visit, and that there will be an opportunity for similar visits in the years to come.

Sincerely,[6]

[1] Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. The source text bears no drafting information, but on February 12 Bohlen had sent a “first draft” of this letter, which was the same in substance but 3 pages longer. (Ibid.)

[2] Document 240.

[3] Document 272.

[4] See Document 277.

[5] According to a page attached to the source text, the rest of this paragraph was a redraft by Sorensen on February 15.

[6] Printed from an unsigned copy.

297. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, February 17, 1962, 11 a.m.

1553. Paris for Embassy and Stoessel. From Clay. Reference: Paris 3894 Dept, 419 Bonn, 239 Berlin; and Paris 3901 Dept, 421 Bonn, 240 Berlin.[2]

Now that there is a temporary relaxation of Soviet actions in the air corridors I believe that we should completely re-examine our position with respect to the actions that we will take to protect our rights. The safety of the air corridors has provided the relief valve for West Berlin, and while only a few of its people ever use the air corridor its existence gave to them assurance of a secure way to move from West Berlin to West Germany. In point of fact, it is equally a relief valve for the Americans living in Berlin. Therefore, threats to the air routes can have a most serious effect on morale in Berlin. I agree that the flights in the pre-empted altitude zones during the last several days did prove our determination to keep flying. However, I cannot see this as a victory nor do I believe that it has left us in a good tactical position. While we have proved that we will continue to fly unarmed aircraft without passengers, the Soviet actions have also established their right to use any portions of the corridors at will and without filing flight plans.

It would seem to me that if the pre-emption effort continues the flying of unarmed aircraft without passengers becomes a rather futile exercise and eventually would look ridiculous. It is almost certain that Soviets will resume their actions possibly to pre-empt greater altitude ranges for longer periods of time, thus making civilian transport more difficult.

At present our plans call for the use of armed aircraft only if one of our planes is damaged or forced down. I submit that a continuation of Soviet activities will jeopardize the free use of our airways if carried on over a continued period, whether or not one of our planes is ever forced down. Thus, I would urgently recommend that we re-examine our contingency position with a view to stronger measures if and when the Soviet pattern is repeated or increased. I am very much of the view that a strong position now is far less dangerous than to permit gradual build-up of the pressures to so engage national prides and prestiges as to make retreat impossible. To my mind, these measures should include not only the use of armed escort but also periodic flights of armed aircraft in the corridors.

I cannot agree that meeting any additional Soviet requirement such as the filing of border crossing times to be an issue which we should accept. While this kind of reasoning seems logical in as far as a single event is concerned, it has led over the last twelve years to the constant erosion of our position which makes our government's job so difficult today. The procedures and agreements with respect to the air corridors have been in effect since 1945 and for us to permit any single Soviet change in these procedures would simply be an open invitation to further changes. From the day we arrived in Berlin the right to freely use our air corridors has been the basic and most important right which has been stressed time and time again by our government. Any retreat in the air corridors would, in my opinion, be a mortal blow.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-1762. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:30 a.m. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.

[2] Telegram 3894 from Paris, February 15, reported that Norstad intended to include commercial airplanes with military crews but without passengers in the air corridor traffic if the Soviets again placed restrictions on the use of the corridors. (Ibid., 962.72/2-1562) Telegram 3901 from Paris, February 16, reported that Ambassador Steel questioned the advisability of flying commercial aircraft with military crews, since this might give the Soviets a pretext to leave BASC. (Ibid., 862.72/2-1662)

298. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, February 17, 1962, 2 p.m.

1935. Kissinger and I had valuable talk with Chancellor February 16.[2] Conversation lasted over two hours and became progressively more cordial as it proceeded. It was ended by us because we were already half an hour late for luncheon engagement with Mende.

Kissinger began conversation by telling Chancellor that he understood latter was concerned about vulnerability of the United States retaliatory force. He was only part-time consultant to US Government, under no obligation to defend American policies, and Chancellor should therefore understand that everything presented to him in endorsement of these policies reflected Kissinger's personal views.

Kissinger began by saying that American strategic planning was based on premise that even after a Soviet first strike US would have more weapons and delivery vehicles remaining than Soviet Union.

Chancellor interrupted somewhat impatiently and said he had already heard this in Washington and it did not mean a great deal to him then or now. Kissinger then went over some of figures contained in our military budget with respect to our strategic forces. He explained concept of a mixed force. He also explained nature and significance of hardening of bases and role of Polaris forces. He explained why combination of these factors would permit significant percentage of US retaliatory force to survive. He gave some indication of kind of forces which would survive and damage these could inflict on the Soviet Union.

Chancellor grew progressively more interested and cordial as exposition progressed. He explained that he had never understood degree of thought that went into our planning. He stressed repeatedly how enormously reassuring this exposition was.

Kissinger then turned to question of whether United States planning involved making United States and Soviet Union a sanctuary and causing burden of conflict to fall on western Europe and satellites. He explained in percentage terms degree of overlap between SACEUR and SAC targeting. SACEUR had targets in the USSR and SAC had targets within the satellite areas. He suggested that it was extremely important in any future planning to leave no doubt about availability of total force for retaliation. United States recognized that a political requirement might conceivably exist for a NATO force but it did not think that there was a military requirement. United States concern about multiplication of national forces was not designed to keep Europe in a second class status. Rather it reflected conviction that national forces were bound to be ineffective compared to the kind of forces Kissinger has just described. Solution was not a fragmentation of NATO but welding together of Atlantic Community following course Chancellor has so wisely chosen in relations of European nations among each other.

Chancellor agreed enthusiastically. He said in defense of French national effort that United States had not adapted NATO as rapidly to new conditions as had been desirable. In particular, Norstad's proposal for MRBM forces had been before American Government for two years without being acted upon.

Kissinger stressed that objections to Norstad's proposal in Washington concerned not principle but particular technical conclusions Norstad drew from it. United States was in principle prepared to proceed with creation of a multilaterally controlled, multinational NATO force if it seemed to our NATO partners to be desirable. Particular nature of that force was still open for discussion, but he thought that Strauss at discussion yesterday[3] saw matters in a very similar light to that of many of our people.

Chancellor again indicated that he was very pleased. He then mentioned that impressed as he was he would like to raise a number of points. He said it was in his nature to be mistrustful and Kissinger should therefore forgive him. He said that he still had some concern about what would happen if the President were assassinated or if there were some other interruption in communication. Kissinger stressed that he could not conceive any failure of communication of this kind. We were, however, prepared to consider any proposal that would reduce this concern.

Chancellor then turned to quadripartite planning. He said that he had read the papers of Ambassadorial group and found them both boring and superficial. In particular, he was concerned about the process of clearing proposals through all of NATO. Kissinger asked him to be more specific. Chancellor referred to the idea of economic countermeasures, specifically his proposal for a naval blockade, as well as to military contingency planning. Chancellor stressed that he disagreed with intelligence estimate about Soviet conventional strength in eastern Europe. His own estimate was that rather than 26 divisions, Soviet Union had closer to 80 divisions in this area, including Russian border regions. He therefore thought that conventional action was bound to lead to disaster or to humiliation or to nuclear war. This is why he had proposed a blockade, an important stage along way to ultimate confrontation. He added that American conventional forces were far less well equipped than Soviet conventional forces. This made a conventional action particularly foolhardy.

Kissinger replied that after his conversation with German Defense Minister last May he had looked into the question of equipment of conventional forces and our best military judgment was quite different from what Chancellor had just stated. In any case our conventional forces were being substantially modernized. Kissinger also pointed out that Chancellor had neglected to mention one possible outcome of a conventional conflict in central Europe, and one that was most likely: That if the United States committed substantial forces to a conventional action, risk of general war would become too great for Soviet Union and it would agree to a negotiated settlement. This was particularly true in view of the relation of strategic forces that Kissinger had outlined earlier. Kissinger added that concept of a conventional build-up was designed to prevent Soviet Union from obtaining hostage such as Hamburg or Munich and holding it while nuclear retaliation was taking place.

Chancellor said that this concept put a different complexion on things. He still wondered, however, whether it would not be better to begin with a sea blockade, a field which utilized a source of western strength, rather than with ground action. Kissinger replied he wanted to be quite frank and perhaps somewhat undiplomatic. It was possible to construe this proposal of Chancellor's as an attempt by Federal Republic to shift burden and risk of any countermeasures to other members of the Alliance. It might indicate that Federal Republic was unprepared to fight for Berlin if ground action or a nuclear war might result.

The Chancellor denied this vehemently. He said that the Federal Republic was prepared to accept any burden and run any risk. However, one should not engage in a conventional action without being prepared for a nuclear war. And consequences of nuclear war were incalculable. Therefore every other measure should be tried before resorting to a nuclear war. If a blockade failed, however, the Federal Republic would support both conventional ground action and whatever results might flow from it.

Chancellor then turned somewhat philosophical. He spoke of historic accomplishment of United States in helping its defeated enemies to regain self-respect. As good friend of United States he had to add, however, that he was deeply worried by the decline of prestige of United States. It was noticeable in Europe, in Latin America and in Asia. In many parts of world, America seemed to lack an ideology in the name of which to fight Communism. Kissinger said that Americans were a pragmatic people whose values were more likely to be expressed in deeds than in words. However, he had never seen a greater unanimity among Americans that future of freedom depended on cohesion of west. Speaking as a friend and admirer of the Chancellor, he wanted to say that an historic opportunity now existed to weld Europe and the United States together by concrete measures. Chancellor asked whether Kissinger's observations were held at highest level of State Department as well. Kissinger emphatically confirmed this.

Kissinger also stressed that choice before us was very similar to that faced by the Chancellor himself in 1949. We had chance of affirming a general theoretical goal or else we could take specific steps together with our European friends to create a framework for common action whenever this was possible. It was Kissinger's opinion that wiser course was one charted by Chancellor himself with respect to European integration, namely, to work on specific measures for common action rather than to use up energies in theoretical dispute. This was spirit which animated our proposals within NATO.

Chancellor indicated his enthusiastic support for this approach. On two occasions when Kissinger and I sought to leave he asked us to stay in order to give him another opportunity to express his gratitude for what had been said and his strong concurrence with it. He said he was relieved to see that strength existed to defend freedom and that main task was to see to it that there would be no human failings. Upon leaving, Kissinger said that he wanted the Chancellor to understand that when we spoke of our power and our dedication to Atlantic Community these were not simply idle phrases. Chancellor replied, “Thank God for this!” On this note the meeting broke up.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5612/2-1862. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:53 a.m. on February 18.

[2] Kissinger visited Germany February 15-17. A summary of his conversations with various officials, dated February 21, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Henry Kissinger.

[3] The record of this conversation is included in the February 21 summary; see footnote 2 above.

299. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, February 19, 1962, 5 p.m.

1944. CINCEUR personal for Gen Norstad. Paris for Emb, USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Reference: Moscow's 2229 and Berlin's 1553.[2] Resumption by Soviets of preemption of air space in corridors and general tenor of their govt's reply to our protest[3] indicates that we may be moving rapidly toward a climax in problem of air access to Berlin. Soviets are in my estimation now building up a fully documented public case that existing procedures in BASC are no longer able to assure flight safety. Consequently they could argue that BASC should be dismantled and entire procedure for controlling flights to and from Berlin be turned over to the “sovereign German Democratic Republic."

I regard the Soviet actions in preempting space, denying guarantees of flight safety in south corridor and buzzing of Allied planes as most serious problem we have faced up to this time in maintaining access to Berlin. Their actions in past ten days are bringing about a massive erosion of Western position. In my view positive action must be taken now to demonstrate effectively that we will not accept interference in air corridors or the creation of any risk for our flights by unilateral Soviet action. If we do not demonstrate this effectively the Soviets can, as General Clay points out, at any time prescribe a more restricted air space and for longer periods of time. As long as current situation prevails both Soviet and Allied actions tend to become matters of prestige thus making it extremely difficult to change. The current situation also serves to sharpen residual differences between us and British on many issues such as practice of giving information concerning border crossing time which may now be in process of becoming a fixed govt position.

To meet this situation I propose that we should anticipate a good deal of our contingency planning and take further measures to show our determination to maintain free access. Sending of civil planes through preempted space without passengers and with military crews has served its purpose. We should now, in my view, send regularly scheduled civil flights with passengers, either with or without military crews, into Berlin at preempted altitudes. Removal of civilian flights with passengers from space preempted by Soviets to approved altitudes, which we have already done for four flights, is simply an act of self-denial which serves their purpose. Finally we should be prepared to provide fighter cover for our civilian flights to Berlin in order to insure flight safety. We should then tell Soviets again in formal govt reply that Allied Powers must reserve right to take all appropriate measures to assure safety of their aircraft unless the Soviet Union can assure us that they will abide by established procedures in air corridor.

Our determination to take these measures could be demonstrated in two ways. First, we could orbit fighter aircraft at entrance of corridors, leaving Soviets in doubt whether our planes would actually enter it, but demonstrating that we are prepared to do so. If necessary we could either escort our planes in corridors or provide fighter cover, although as I understand problem, effectiveness of such an operation would entail lifting 10,000 foot level and modifying our rules of engagement.

Secondly, we should move immediately to active countermeasures outside of Berlin area. We are unfortunately limited in effective air countermeasures by narrow confines of Berlin and corridors. In counteraction outside Berlin area we could:

a) Begin fighter “investigation” air escort of bloc flights transiting Western Europe, or at any rate FRG, France and UK or over North Sea. This should definitely include Czech, Polish, Bulgarian and Hungarian, as well as Aeroflot flights to Paris and London.

b) If USSR continues harassment of our planes in corridor by fighters, we should thereafter begin precisely correlated fighter tactics on bloc flights.

Critical question is whether such action will escalate affair to our disadvantage. As things stand, however, it is mainly our caution which seems to be feeding Soviet escalation. Essence of our reaction is to stay within bounds of accepted practice, whereas USSR is introducing major departure and may be on way to capitalizing on it. I believe foregoing proposals would lead to reversing process. As soon as possible we must demonstrate to Soviets that their excesses affecting normal travel to Berlin are reciprocally creating likelihood of their own air isolation particularly from Africa and Latin America with incalculable accompanying damage to their prestige.

In view of Brit and French positions, tripartite agreement cannot be reached in Bonn on these recommendations. In any event, I consider that divergent tripartite positions already evident require high level representations to UK and France before situation becomes more difficult through further Soviet actions.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-1962. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:08 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, USAFE, and USCINCEUR.

[2] Telegram 1553 is printed as Document 297. Telegram 2229 transmitted the February 17 Soviet reply; see Document 294.

[3] See Document 294.

300. Memorandum of Conversation[1]

Washington, February 19, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

Germany

Ambassador Grewe

Dr. Schnippenkoetter

United States

The President

Secretary Rusk

Mr. Hillenbrand

Ambassador Grewe said he had just returned from twelve days in Bonn and had had the opportunity to see the Chancellor prior to his departure for Washington. The Chancellor had told him to express his gratitude for the information given him by Dr. Kissinger during their recent talk.[2] The President commented that our reports also indicated that they had a good conversation, but that he was concerned that we did not seem to be able to get our position across clearly. The Chancellor had expressed certain concern about matters which we thought had previously been completely clarified, and there always seemed to be a necessity to provide reassurances. We had been trying to make the points stressed by Kissinger since last June. Referring to the Chancellor's remarks about the decline of US prestige, the President said he could not understand what the basis of this observation was. We were carrying the major burden of the struggle against the Communists by providing economic assistance on a major scale throughout the world, and we were making every effort to strengthen both our nuclear and conventional military capacity. Yet there was this constant need to reassure the Germans.

Ambassador Grewe observed that he sympathized with the President's point but there were special circumstances. The President again asked why it was so hard to obtain understanding of our position. The Secretary observed that Dr. Kissinger had gone to Germany without any special instructions. He had covered matters which we took for granted, and yet the Chancellor had found his remarks reassuring as if they contained new information. Ambassador Grewe said a source of misunderstanding was that the Chancellor was inclined too much to listen to narrow advice from the military, who did not think in terms of the political implications of US strategy within the framework of Berlin contingency plans.

The President stated that the situation which might develop over Berlin deserved serious thought. We wanted to convince the Soviets, in the event of a major confrontation, that the US was prepared to go all out and that this deserved a last thought on their part. No one expected to fight a conventional war in Europe, which we could not do without being overwhelmed. While the naval blockade favored by the Chancellor had a role to play in the context of Allied contingency plans, by itself it would not suffice and would certainly cause the Soviets to react with military force elsewhere. The President again expressed concern that it seemed necessary to reiterate repeatedly clarifications of US policy and of our strategic position which we thought had been fully explained during the November visit of the Chancellor. We were accordingly concerned that our effort to communicate with the Chancellor in the past had not seemed to make the desired impression.

Ambassador Grewe said that the basic agreement reached during the November meetings with the Chancellor in Washington still existed.[3] We had come much closer together in our military concepts than at the time of the August crisis. Mr. Nitze's explanation of the four-stage approach was close to German thinking.

The President said we were aware that German estimates of Soviet conventional strength and availabilities in Europe were greater than ours. We have stated that, if we face a major defeat in Europe, then nuclear weapons will be used, but we must exhaust the full battery of other possibilities before pressing the button. The Secretary said he hoped one point at least had been cleared up. Although NATO plans at the time of the Adenauer visit contemplated a fallback to the Weser-Rhine Line, we were talking in terms of a conventional force which would permit a forward strategy. Ambassador Grewe again referred to the fact that the Chancellor was old-fashioned in his thinking and was influenced too much by the views of the generals. The President observed that 30 divisions was not too much to expect of Europe and the Western countries could afford to raise them. The US took this question quite seriously. We felt our survival was tied up with that of Western Europe. We should all start with this common premise and not have to restate it and to reassure the Chancellor all the time. We will go as far as any and farther than most in the defense of West Berlin. The Ambassador said he believed that as a result of the Kissinger conversation, the Chancellor was now convinced of the military superiority of the US over the Soviet Union.

The President then referred to the Chancellor's somewhat derogatory remarks about the product of the Ambassadorial Group in Washington, and asked what Grewe's view was regarding the discussions which had been held in this forum. Ambassador Grewe said he did not feel such remarks should be taken too seriously; the Chancellor generally tended to be disparaging about such activities. The President observed that the Soviets certainly had not given us much reason for hope. He believed that, with the present stalemate in discussions with the Soviets, we were moving into a difficult spring and summer during which Khrushchev might feel impelled to move ahead with his signature of a separate peace treaty. If such a treaty brought with it the consequences which the Soviets had threatened, a confrontation between the Soviets and Western Powers would result. The Secretary asked what the German view was as to the next steps to be taken. Ambassador Grewe said his Government felt that the Thompson-Gromyko talks had come close to an impasse, but should be extended as long as possible. His Government did not feel, however, that the substantive scope of talks with the Soviets should be expanded at the present time since they were apparently not prepared to negotiate seriously but merely wanted one-sided Western concessions which they could pocket for the future.

After reiterating his belief that the Soviets might feel impelled to move ahead with their signature of a separate peace treaty in the spring or summer, the President said that the conversations with the Soviets had been useful in demonstrating their intransigence so far on two critical points: their insistence on the presence of Soviet troops in West Berlin if Western troops were to remain, and their insistence on the termination of the Allied presence in Berlin after a temporary period. Before a confrontation on this issue we wanted to be sure that we had covered the entire range of possibilities with the Soviets and had confirmed their intransigence in other areas as well. Then we could move into a crisis with the assurance that we had done all we reasonably could do, and would thus have greater certainty of the support of our public opinions and of other countries. The President said he did not have particular points in mind about “the range of possibilities”, but he thought all of us should be thinking about them.

Ambassador Grewe said he was not so sure that the Soviets would move ahead with their signature of a separate peace treaty. They had taken the position that such a peace treaty would have serious consequences, and these consequences would inevitably lead to a crisis. Bonn was not certain that Khrushchev wanted this. The developments since August 13, particularly the US military build-up, had convinced Khrushchev that a dangerous situation was developing. The President observed that the military build-up had done this more than de Gaulle's refusal to negotiate, but he felt we must still look forward to a difficult spring and summer for the reasons he had stated.

In the exchange which followed, the President reiterated his point about the desirability of making sure that we had exhausted all reasonable possibilities with the Soviets before moving into the stage of crisis, while the German Ambassador reaffirmed the German view that talks with the Soviets should continue to be restricted to the narrow front so far observed by Thompson in his talks with Gromyko.

In response to the President's query as to whether there was much pressure in the Federal Republic in the direction of bilateral talks with the Soviets, Ambassador Grewe said that such pressure did not exist on any significant scale. No major segment of German public opinion supported a bilateral initiative.

Referring to a talk which Mr. McCloy recently had with the Chancellor,[4] the President wondered whether the Bonn view was that West Berlin was essentially a tripartite problem. Grewe said this was true only in a formal sense. The Federal Republic obviously had a great substantive interest in Berlin but felt that the basic principle of over-all Four-Power responsibility had to be maintained. The President said he understood this, but that the maintenance of Western rights in Berlin was not essentially a legal problem. It was the threat of force which deterred the Soviets. Ambassador Grewe said the Germans accepted this, and had indicated that they stood together with the three Western Powers in the common cause and were not seeking an escape clause.

The President again returned to the Chancellor's emphasis on the role of a naval blockade which had been reported by Dr. Kissinger, and repeated his point that while this obviously had a role to play in Allied contingency planning along with economic countermeasures, it was important that Khrushchev not get the wrong idea that this was all the Allies would do. What was important was the impression given the Soviets.

After the President had once again mentioned the need to explore all reasonable possibilities, Ambassador Grewe said he agreed with the need to explore, but his Government had difficulty in extending the field of exploration to so-called “broader questions”. It knew perfectly well that this meant “European security”, and discussions of this subject would not improve the Western position. Before the Geneva talks start in mid-March, his Government felt the need for a common reassessment of the present situation. It considered it inevitable, if the Soviet Foreign Minister and the Secretary were in Geneva at the same time, that the subject of Berlin would arise. The President observed that this would be true even if Khrushchev went to Geneva and the Secretary were there. He agreed that there should be a complete exchange of views before the Geneva meetings using the mechanism of the Ambassadorial Group.

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2-1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved by the White House on March 5 and in S on February 23. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2283, February 19. (Ibid., 611.62A/2-1962) Memoranda of the President's conversations with Grewe on Adenauer's meeting with de Gaulle, German vested assets, and German purchase of U.N. bonds are in the Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, France, and Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149.

[2] See Document 298.

[3] See Documents 216-219.

[4] Not further identified.

301. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, February 19, 1962, 7 p.m.

1951. Because of change in his schedule, Chancellor asked to see me today instead of February 20. Purpose of visit appeared to convey his assurance that FedRep had no desire to become involved in direct talks with Soviets. Chancellor said he had had talks with Mende and other FDP leaders in this sense, pointing out to them his view that Soviets were unlikely to make any concessions to Germans which they were unwilling to make to three Western powers.

In response to my query whether he thought Soviets really desired direct talks, he said he doubted they were greatly interested, and again expressed view Soviets had no concessions to make to Germans. When I speculated that one Soviet gambit might be offer to improve lot of East Germans in response to more forthcoming attitude on part of FedRep, he said this would be spectacular development, but felt it would be difficult for Soviets to come up with.

In response to my query whether he had any thoughts re present course of Thompson-Gromyko talks, Adenauer was somewhat reserved. He remarked that de Gaulle had told him at Baden-Baden[2] that talks merely proved he (de Gaulle) had been right, and there was some slight implication that Chancellor was now inclined to agree. He went on to say, however, that it was important in further conversations to make Soviets aware West was not afraid, and at same time to convey as great a sense of Western unity as was possible.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/2-1962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 4:55 p.m.

[2] de Gaulle and Adenauer met at Baden-Baden on February 15.

302. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, February 20, 1962, 1 p.m.

2236. Eyes only Secretary. At Nepalese reception last night Gromyko initiated discussion of our Berlin talks. Both of us repeated standard arguments but following differences in emphasis may be of interest. Gromyko reproached me for insisting upon prior discussion of access and listed all of the points in which Soviets are interested. He pointed out he had discussed access and that if access agreement was reached and accepted by GDR such agreement would be carried out. It was only necessary to respect GDR sovereignty and Soviets would never conclude an agreement which did not do so. I said we were not attempting to demonstrate disrespect for GDR sovereignty but we were not prepared to reach an agreement which tended to perpetuate division of Germany. I said it was not clear what they meant by respect for GDR sovereignty and asked if this meant that in exercise of its sovereignty GDR would have possibility of changing traffic rules, arbitrarily closing highway under pretext road repairs, etc. As usual Gromyko ducked clear answer but stated GDR would carry out any agreement. When Gromyko emphasized that Soviets did not want a single brick of West Berlin I observed that this did not seem to be true of his friend Ulbricht and said Ulbricht had indicated that either agreement or peace treaty would enable East Germany to exert pressure on West Berlin. Gromyko asked me to be specific and I cited Ulbricht's statements regarding use of Templehof and RIAS. Gromyko said he was familiar with Mr. Ulbricht's statements and did not think any of them justified conclusion I had drawn. Gromyko said that if we were not prepared to respect GDR sovereignty then outlook was very gloomy. He made no reference to timing of continuation our talks nor in any way indicated desire to bring matters to a head. On contrary his concern appeared to be how we could keep talks going in view of current impasse.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-2062. Confidential; Eyes Only. Received at 10:06 a.m.

303. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, February 20, 1962, 5 p.m.

1962. Paris for Stoessel, info copies for Embassy, USRO and McGuire. Paris' 3901 to Dept.[2] At request British Ambassador (who had left Bonn for brief holiday) we met Feb 19 with British and French, to consider British Embassy recommendation that before Norstad institutes new measures in response to Soviet action re air corridors Allied Missions in Bonn and Berlin if possible be given opportunity to comment. British proposed tripartite recommendation to Live Oak, referring specifically to introduction last week of civilian aircraft, flying at prohibited altitudes and carrying no passengers, and expressed opinion that this Live Oak action of questionable wisdom, in view likely adverse effect on morale of both Berlin population and air travelers.

I informed British Embassy this morning that I could not agree to transmission of tripartite recommendations, on grounds that Norstad's ability to take action in accordance with existing Live Oak plans, particularly at this time when quick responses are so important, should not be undermined by requesting him to submit proposed action to Allied Missions in Germany for comment. I informed British that, while they are of course free to take this up at governmental level, presumably in Ambassadorial Group Washington, I would not be party to such recommendation from here, since I believed it would make effective Allied operations re air corridor even more difficult than they already are.

Our views also conveyed to French Embassy who, at yesterday's meeting, did not appear to have strong views either way re making above recommendation to Norstad.

Against background of what we already know of Ambassador Steel's opposition to introduction of Cloud Caper, together with other divergencies between US and British thinking on current air corridor problems, I cannot help suspecting that this gambit by Steel is aimed at providing additional British veto over Live Oak operations.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-2062. Secret; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:44 p.m. Also sent to Paris and repeated to London and Berlin.

[2] See footnote 1, Document 297.

304. Memorandum of Conference With President Kennedy[1]

Washington, February 21, 1962, 9:30 a.m.

Bi-Partisan Congressional Leaders—Off The Record

[Here follows a list of participants, which included the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Vice President, and 20 other Senators and Congressmen.]

The President opened the meeting with an outline of the briefers and the items he wanted them to cover. He indicated that Secretary Rusk would cover Berlin, including the Gromyko/Thompson talks, and the buzzing of our planes in the corridors. Secretary McNamara, who was just back from Hawaii, would discuss Viet-Nam and Laos, assisted by Mr. Harriman and General Lemnitzer.

Mr. Rusk indicated that he would discuss Berlin in three stages. The first stage was mid-summer, which was a period of the Soviets making threats against us, and the other allies. After eight weeks, the Soviets finally faced the fact that this was not going to get them what they wanted in Berlin.

The second stage began when the President made his July 25, 1961 speech, and with the support given by the Congress, we changed the atmosphere. There was no war, and the Soviets lifted their deadline on the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany. Gromyko came here to visit and both the President and Secretary Rusk talked to him. Out of this period came a general feeling of agreement that the Soviets and the Western powers must talk.

The third stage of these developments was highlighted by the discussions between Thompson and Gromyko. Secretary Rusk reported that, as a result of this series of talks, there is still no significant progress. He said that the Soviets are staying with their same position that World War II must be liquidated and West Berlin must become a de-militarized and neutralized city, with access to it to be settled with the East Germans. This is a position which the West cannot accept. All the West is agreed on the fundamental position on Berlin, which is clearly known (Secretary Rusk reiterated our position).

Secretary Rusk reported that these talks have been useful. We firmly established with the Soviets that the U.S. is not going to give up, and that the Soviets cannot share in West Berlin as long as they are going to be the grabbers of East Berlin. We have also made clear that no three-to-five year agreement on Berlin would be an acceptable compromise, because at the end of that time the whole matter would be wide open again and we would have the same problems all over. In the talks, we have also made it clear that there are no gimmicks or gadgets, but that this is a straight-forward searching for substantive agreement. The Soviets have made it clear that they have absorbed East Berlin, and having done so, East Berlin is not negotiable nor to be discussed. They have set about trying to discuss with us the future of West Berlin without the unification of East and West Germany.

Turning next to the problem of the air corridors, Secretary Rusk made it clear that the air access to West Berlin was the most sensitive of the various means of access because so far it is the only “uncensored” method of access.

The Secretary then summarized the actions of the past few days, including the Soviet techniques for preempting the corridors. The Secretary made clear that we do not accept their reserving of an entire corridor up to 7500 feet because that would be the first step toward eventual taking over of one whole corridor, and perhaps the prelude to a more complete interruption of our access. He explained briefly the types of missions we had flown to keep the corridors open.

The President said that they had already set a ceiling of 10,000 feet, and Secretary Rusk agreed, but said that we had never admitted that we were limited to a 10,000 foot ceiling, and that our actions had been designed to make sure that we did not give up any part of the corridors below 10,000 so that we would finally be confined to an altitude of 7500 to 10,000 feet. The U.S. rejected these demands and we put our planes through daily. The Soviets have been flying very close, as close as two meters to our aircraft, trying to get our pilots to land, but our pilots have shown great skill and nerve and have not given in. Their latest gambit is to file flight plans in accordance with the rules. In a sense, it is a legal way of preempting the air space, and we are not now sure of their purpose in this.

In summary on the Berlin problem, we are not convinced that the Soviets themselves are sure of what course of action they are going to follow. There are indications that they are talking it over and thinking it over among themselves. We haven't had any indication from the Soviet Union in the past four weeks of whether they intend now to press forward with their peace treaty or, on the other hand, choose the course of sitting down and having some serious talks. We just don't know. They are convinced now, we believe, that what they want cannot be had. We don't know whether their alternative to this is seeking a modus vivendi with no crisis, or whether they want to push this thing on to a crisis. We expect Thompson to have some more talks, seeking to clarify some of these things, but right now we cannot report that we are moving toward an agreement. None of their movements or actions indicate that they are getting ready for an intensification or a military action of any kind over Berlin. There are instruments of harassment in their hand which they can use against us, but we don't intend to sit idly by and watch them. We expect to react sharply and immediately so that they have no false conception of our position in the matter. After more talks with Gromyko, we may know whether there is any chance of a settlement of this matter. We are going to keep the way open for settlement while making the West position utterly clear. The West is convinced that the best way of preventing a war is to make it absolutely plain that we won't be pushed.

The President then said there would be time for questions later. Meanwhile, Secretary McNamara would go ahead with his part of the briefing.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Secretary Rusk then added a comment on the Berlin matter. There have been stories emanating from across the Atlantic about allied disunity, and Secretary Rusk pointed out that we have been acting with complete unity on the Berlin issue. We are sitting down daily with the four who are involved in Berlin and more than once a week with our NATO friends, and the only point of difference is that General de Gaulle has a question about what kind of negotiations we should enter into with the Soviets. He added that the negotiating problems with the Russians were not because of the rigidity of the allies. Some have said that the Germans have been so rigid that we have no basis of discussions with the Russians. The problem at this time is the rigidity of the Russians. The allies pose no problem.

Senator Russell[2] asked that if the planes which have been harassing in the corridors were Russian or planes with East German markings. Secretary Rusk confirmed that they were Russian fighters. Senator Russell then made the comment that the Russians have been insisting that we observe the sovereignty of the East Germans all the time, including the checkpoint, and that this intervention by Russian fighters was highly inconsistent. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

[2] Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, February 23, 1962, 11 a.m.

1995. Eyes only for the President and the Secretary. Re Deptels 2282 and 2283.[2] When I called on Chancellor late yesterday I found him perturbed by Grewe's report of conversation with the President.[3]

Chancellor said, however, that first he wished to clarify press confusion about his remarks to CDU Parliamentary group on Feb 21 re Foreign Ministers Conference. What he had said, he contended, was that if, after one or two more sessions, Thompson-Gromyko talks were still on dead center, four Western Foreign Ministers should perhaps meet to assess situation; he had not said anything about possibility of East-West Foreign Ministers Conference, as press had reported. Indeed, he added, he was of opinion there might well be “pause” in East-West talks if Soviets continued merely to reassert their maximum positions. He asked specifically that I clarify this matter for the President and the Secretary, and explain that his purpose in all this was to make another effort to bring French more into line with US-UK-FedRep thinking. He added that he had not discussed this idea with de Gaulle at Baden-Baden since such blunt approach would have been unproductive, but would write him in this sense if it transpired that Foreign Ministers meeting might be useful.

I then took opportunity to read from reftels our views on discussions with Soviets. Chancellor said he agreed in general with our assessment, and went on to say that while he was grateful for expression of US confidence in FedRep, he had no thought of opening bilateral talks with Soviets at this stage. He reiterated his view that Soviets could not be expected to make concessions to Germans which they were not prepared to make to Western Allies.

Adenauer then read to me extract from Grewe's telegram quoting the President's remarks re apparent necessity to reiterate clarification of US policy and strategic position to him, and referring to press reports of German doubts thereon. There was obvious misunderstanding, he said, exclaiming “The President is being unfair to me”. Referring to Kissinger briefing, he said it was not correct that he had been given this information before; most complete briefing on military strategy which he had had heretofore had been in Washington, and that was in general terms, whereas Kissinger had been much more specific, had dealt with concrete facts, and was thus much more informative and reassuring. I reminded him of press reports from Bonn of German doubts, some general, some attributed to Strauss and even to him, and said I thought point was these problems should be taken up with us if they existed, since the President had regard for his views, but Chancellor seemed to find it incredible that we could doubt his fundamental confidence in US policy generally and his particular trust in the President's leadership. He admitted his worries about Western Alliance as whole, and said he was most concerned re Western unity. This brought him back to Grewe's report re the President's comments on naval blockade. I quoted the President's comments from Deptel 2283, to which he replied this might well be so, but his position was simply that naval blockade should precede military moves foreseen in current contingency plans. He went on to say he was aware of problem of agreement on economic embargo and naval blockade in NATO, and spoke bitterly of British and Canadian resistance in these fields.

Chancellor did say he was again optimistic re European integration. He seemed confident agreement could soon be consummated on political unity, and said once European integration was accomplished fact West could face Soviets with far greater confidence. He came close to saying this would be time to take up solution of German question with Moscow.

At this point conversation turned again to stalemate in discussions with Soviets. Chancellor had not seen report on Soviet reaction to German memo,[4] but he read to me telegram from Kroll which in general did not differ from Washington assessment, but which did attribute to Ambassador Thompson an opinion that talks with Soviets could not succeed unless West adopted more flexible attitude, and implied that Thompson favored less rigid attitude on part of FedRep toward Soviet Zone regime. I replied that if this was meant to suggest that Thompson was advocating concessions beyond those agreed by four Western Allies in concert, then I must question Kroll's accuracy or his veracity. Adenauer said he accepted this, and commented that in fact it had just come to his attention that in his press conference on leaving Bonn Kroll was alleged to have made remarks favoring greater degree of recognition of DDR; he was looking into this, and if it proved to be true, Kroll would be out of Moscow “in no time at all”.

Chancellor then dwelt at length on iniquities of Ulbricht and his regime, describing how much worse conditions were in East Germany than in Poland and other satellites, and explaining how impossible this situation made it for FedRep to try to deal with East German Communist authorities. He went on to say that were Soviets to get rid of Ulbricht and ease conditions for East Germans, this would of course create entirely new situation, and indicated that in this case he would welcome bilateral talks with Moscow.

Conversation, which lasted about hour and half, was frank and cordial exchange, and ended with brief review of Iranian Prime Minister's visit, with which Adenauer is pleased, and other local events.

In spite of Chancellor's protestations, I believe the President's remarks to Grewe have served to make him appreciate just how far he seems to have gone in private conversations in voicing doubts re US policies. I would guess that he will behave most correctly for a while, although I do not mean to imply that he is corrigible or that his worries can be laid to rest unless some solution can be found for Berlin and German question, or at least until FedRep is firmly anchored in Western Community.

I was struck anew in this conversation by fact that Chancellor is aging more rapidly, with emergent quality of frailty. I was not surprised therefore when Osterheld, Chancellor's aide who was present during conversation, commented on my way out that his doctor was most anxious to get him away for a holiday, and meanwhile was trying to protect him, even refusing consent for him to meet Iranian Prime Minister at airport yesterday despite sunny, mild weather. He went on to say Adenauer is finding it difficult to run coalition government, and wondered aloud how much longer he could hold out, saying test would be whether Chancellor could regain his strength during rest at Cadenabbia beginning March 18.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/2-2362. Secret; Priority.

[2] Telegram 2282, February 19, transmitted an extensive summary of points Dowling might raise with the Chancellor. (Ibid., 611.62A/2-1962) Regarding telegram 2283, see the source note, Document 300.

[3] See Document 300.

[4] For text of the February 21 German memorandum, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Band 8, pp. 162-171.

306. Editorial Note

As part of an around-the-world tour Attorney General Kennedy visited Berlin February 22-24, 1962, Bonn February 24-25, and Paris February 27. In Berlin Kennedy made several addresses and met with Mayor Brandt and other city officials. The texts of his addresses were transmitted as enclosures to despatches 389 and 396 from Berlin, February 27 and March 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-KE/2-2762 and 033.1100-KE/3-162)

In a letter to President Kennedy on February 23, Brandt thanked him for sending his brother to Berlin, and wrote that the Attorney General had stated once more that “the American position in West Berlin will be fully maintained, the close relationship between Berlin and Western Germany will be maintained, no interference of the traffic from and to Berlin will be tolerated, agreements about Berlin will not take place without the knowledge and consent of the population concerned, and that the United States will not forget the people in East Berlin and in the Soviet-occupied Zone.” (Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany)

For three other accounts of the visit to Berlin, see Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pages 401-402; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, pages 599-600; and Begegnungen und Einsichten, pages 93-94. Extensive documentation on the Attorney General's tour is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2044-2048, and Central Files 033.1100-KE.

307. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State[1]

Berlin, February 28, 1962, 6 p.m.

1625. Bonn for Ambassador. From Clay for Rusk. Ref Deptel 1099 Berlin, 2340 Bonn.[2] I had not intended to make any further comment on the air corridors as I have already placed my views on record. However, we did not refuse to give further information to Soviet controller until the Secretary of State personally approved a policy not to give information which had not been required in the past. To yield now after refusing to do so is just another step in the long series of concessions which have placed us in our present position. For years, we have done this in the interest of Allied unity, never obtainable except at the lowest common denominator. Perhaps I am influenced because these are the air corridors which have carried as many as 1200 flights in a day for us. These are the air corridors where for years we flew armed aircraft at will, something we have not done in so long that we even think ourselves that to do so now is provocative; a corridor in which again because of Allied unity we have accepted in fact if not in principle a 10,000 foot ceiling. Of course this is a minor concession. However, is there anyone who really believes that the Soviets will not move further in attempting to control the corridors and that even a minor concession now will not lead to further demands? They will claim to have established their right to know when we enter GDR territory if we give our flight time over the last beacon prior to entering this territory, and we may be sure it will be so publicized. Moreover it is a concession which we would make without anything in return. Allied unity is desirable, but not always at the lowest common denominator.

Lightner

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-2862. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:09 p.m. Repeated to Bonn.

[2] Telegram 1099 to Berlin, February 23, reported that the British had declined a U.S. request to bring certain air corridor practices into line with U.S. practices, and had in turn asked the United States to change its practices. (Ibid., 862.72/2-2862)

308. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, February 28, 1962, 5 p.m.

2075. Paris for Emb, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. Deptel 2356 to Bonn, Moscow's 2290 and Embtel 1889 to Dept.[2] Sov actions affecting access can assume many permutations, most predictable element of which is that they rarely take form we anticipate. Unless access authority is established, Allied traffic can eventually only be checked either by GDR or USSR. As Emb understands it, Allies could presumably postulate response to two “possibilities” raised by French on extant agreed guidelines and contingency plans. Generally speaking, first action would hardly be exceptionable as final outcome so long as Allies are concerned not about pretensions but about consequences of USSR-GDR separate “peace treaty.” Second action would be unacceptable under current contingency plans which provide that we would accept East Germans at checkpoints if they introduced no procedural changes. Certainly in latter and presumably in first case we would continue to hold Sovs responsible.

German touchiness about “reverse agent” role for Sovs, as explained in Emb's reftel, does not seem to derive from logical examination of alternatives, since principal alternative would be for GDR to check Allied traffic, but rather appears to reflect concern that comfortable accommodation on Allied access would leave German civil traffic out in cold. Today's Frankfurter Allgemeine carries Am Ende story from Berlin about Allied proposal for access authority which typifies German anxieties. Story cites “political circles” and Senat reps as objecting to idea of such authority since Sovs could “sabotage it."

There is no evidence known [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] here that German intelligence has received any reports that USSR is on verge of declaring itself GDR agent re Allied access. Indeed it is characteristic of this topic that German FonOff floated it in press, and French are now raising rumor quadripartitely without pretext it derives from intelligence data. In fact, French here attribute rumor to German newspaper report, and FonOff rep in quadripartite committee meeting today expressed surprise that matter was raised at all in Wash and professed ignorance of source of rumor. Emb nevertheless suspects possible French/German coordination on this, although their working level reps may be unaware of it. Aim of exercise may be to ascertain either (1) what US/UK would do in such contingency, or (2) whether US/UK have received any private assurances (beyond Gromyko proposal) from USSR that Sovs would act as agents. In latter connection Wolf of FonOff Sov Referat on Feb 24 told Emb off FonOff was interested to have learned from courtesy copies of correspondence that Khrushchev in Dec letter to Macmillan[3] anticipated Gromyko's offer to let Sov personnel control Allied access and that Macmillan had replied that fact of access was of more importance than formalities. Wolf commented privately this seemed to indicate Brit would go pretty far.

Fact that French subject is basically only hypothetical construct does not mean that USSR could not at any moment make move on Autobahn controls. Shifting field is essence of Sov tactics, and they have now let surface access alone for some months.

Emb is inclined to speculate, however, that as long as Thompson-Gromyko talks are continuing and still open-ended, it seems likely USSR will refrain from introducing radical procedural changes on access based on political reinterpretations or new principles without some sort of warning. In view of present Sov actions in corridors, it seems more likely that any immediate Sov harassments on Autobahn would be of practical and technical nature, such as closing lanes for repairs, slowdown of clearance procedures, etc., with avoidance of clear political issues in favor of technical ones.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/2-2862. Secret. Received at 8:34 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 1889 from Bonn, February 14, reported that an AP correspondent had inquired if the Embassy knew about a German Foreign Ministry release that indicated the Soviets were planning to become agents for the GDR in checking Allied Autobahn traffic. (Ibid., 862.181/2-1462) Telegram 2356 to Bonn, February 26, reported that the French had also raised this question at a meeting of the Quadripartite Contingency Planning Group. The French suggested that the Soviets might put the GDR stamp on Allied documents in place of their own or permit GDR officials to stamp Allied documents at the same time that Soviet officials did. (Ibid.) In telegram 2290 from Moscow, February 27, Thompson speculated that, having met a firm Western response on the question of air corridors, the Soviets might turn to land access where they might believe they could now involve the GDR. (Ibid., 862.72/2-2762)

[3] See footnote 3, Document 243.

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, March 1, 1962, 6:01 p.m.

1998. Paris pass Finletter—eyes only. Eyes only for Ambassadors and Lightner.

Verbatim text.

1. Although your exchanges with Gromyko seem to have reached stage of formalistic ritual we believe that you should request further meeting with him both to put our further comments on record and to link discussions with possible talks at Geneva.

2. You already have text of memorandum, as amended to take account of British and German comments, to be handed Gromyko.[2]

3. If prior to your next session arrangements have been completed for convening of Foreign Ministers in Geneva in connection 18 power disarmament talks and you make no progress with Gromyko, you should towards end of conversation indicate that you will shortly be going to Geneva to assist Secretary in forthcoming discussions. Secretary is looking forward to opportunity which presence in Geneva will provide to meet privately with Gromyko in effort to see whether some way towards mutually acceptable accommodation on Berlin cannot be found. Although present series of talks in Moscow has given little cause for optimism, perhaps break during which both sides can reflect on arguments presented may be a good thing. In meantime it will be, of course, incumbent on both sides to avoid any unilateral acts which would only further exacerbate situation.

4. If Geneva situation is still unclear when you see Gromyko, you should instead say that US Government is hopeful that Soviet Foreign Minister will be in Geneva for opening of disarmament talks and that, under such circumstances, Secretary would look forward to opportunity to discuss with him other subjects of mutual concern such as Berlin. You might then pick up line in balance of preceding paragraph. In event that Gromyko says he is not going to Geneva and will not therefore be seeing Secretary, you should say that your government will no doubt wish to give consideration to other ways of resuming contact and that you suppose Soviets will be doing same.

5. In view of recent air corridor harassments, you should begin by observing that Soviet attempts to alter established procedures in Berlin air corridors threatened to create a highly dangerous situation. You might refer in this connection to protests submitted by three powers to Soviet Foreign Ministry on February 15,[3] making particular reference to passage stating that attempt to force changes in established procedures is incompatible with Soviet Foreign Minister's apparent agreement in talks with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk that both sides should refrain from “actions which might aggravate international tensions” and with explicit commitment to this effect in joint statement of September 20, 1961 on principles for disarmament negotiations.[4] To degree necessary you may draw on factual contents of note plus subsequent reporting telegrams from Berlin and Live Oak, but it would not be purpose of present meeting to engage in prolonged debate on situation in air corridors. Discussion this subject might be terminated by comment that highly volatile situation in air corridors underlines essential correctness of Western emphasis on access problem as requiring primary attention. This is area of activity where both sides might most quickly find themselves in escalating situation involving grave risks.

6. Apart from foregoing and necessary refutation in memorandum of certain points made by Gromyko during your last session, meeting should be directed primarily towards emphasizing desirability that progress be made in direction suggested by President to Adzhubei, i.e., that since final solution of Berlin problem seemed impossible, both sides should seek to find accommodation which would prevent tensions from mounting.

7. With reference to Gromyko's claim that US Government apparently does not have any intention of discussing seriously matters under question, you should observe that we are indeed very serious about these matters. “Discussing seriously” in Soviet definition apparently means accepting their formulation of the problem and their proposal for a solution. For various reasons, including those stated in memorandum handed Soviet Foreign Minister during your third meeting,[5] US proceeds from assumption that discussions between Great Powers must start with admission by both sides that neither one can expect other simply to accept either its formulation of problem or proposed solution. Serious discussion means finding some ground which is consistent with professed intentions and basic interests of both sides, and, if that is not possible, at least finding some modus vivendi which will avert grave risks of war inherent in dispute.

8. Exchanges so far between Soviet Foreign Minister and American Ambassador have created impression that no basis for systematic negotiation yet exists. We find it difficult to believe that Soviet Government is so unaware of US position, or so unwilling to take it into account, that it can expect us to accept claims and proposals which American leaders have repeatedly stated are clearly unacceptable. Point has now apparently been reached where Soviets seem unwilling to follow up earlier indications that some procedural formula might be found within which possibility of an arrangement on Berlin could be further explored, and that this formula envisaged that basic arrangement must be between Soviet Union and Western Powers and not between latter and “GDR”. Does this mean that Soviets have given up idea of finding an accommodation on Berlin? We trust this is not the case, and therefore once again suggest that most practicable way to begin would be to try to find some solution to access question. Soviet Foreign Minister has criticized US concentration on access. We have stressed this problem precisely because it seems to us that possibility of conflict between USSR and US is likely to arise over misunderstanding regarding access. Soviets have said they do not like idea of International Access Authority which we believe most useful approach to problem and practicable way of avoiding confrontation over it. We would, of course, be glad to discuss any variations in Access Authority proposal which Soviets have in mind. Incidents of kind we have had recently in air corridors would be avoided under International Access Authority proposal. We would appreciate having specific ideas from Soviets as to how they think confrontation over access might be avoided which go beyond generalities about “respect for GDR sovereignty”.

9. You might take up Gromyko's words as quoted in your 2100[6] regarding Soviet intention never to sign any document which would back occupation rights or favor retention of occupation regime in West Berlin, noting that this is not what we are proposing Soviets should do. As pointed out in our earlier memorandum, our rights in Berlin do not derive from Soviets and we are not asking that they sign their name to a document containing a term which seems to have acquired unpleasant associations for them. What we are asking is that they accept fact of Western presence in Berlin and draw appropriate conclusions from that fact without engaging in debate over differing legal views. They, on their side, are asking us to proceed on basis of what they call “facts” of the situation where these facts are to their liking.

10. In this connection, you might observe, we have come to reluctant conclusion that Soviets have not addressed themselves directly to a number of important points made by American Ambassador or in US memorandum handed him at meeting before last. We hope that Soviet Foreign Minister will carefully reexamine this document.

11. You might conclude opening remarks by handing Gromyko memorandum which, you may point out, is intended to deal with a number of points made by Soviets in documents they have given us.

12. In unlikely event that Gromyko unveils any new element of flexibility in Soviet position, you should endeavor to draw him out to extent possible, and at appropriate point, indicate that you will report his statement back to your Government where it will be promptly considered.

13. During course of discussion you may, as appropriate, draw on memorandum or previous instructions in commenting on Gromyko's arguments which, we assume, will follow their stereotyped course. End verbatim text.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-162. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand; cleared by Rusk (in draft), Guthrie, Bohlen, and the White House; and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] A draft of this memorandum was transmitted to Moscow on February 23 in telegram 1950, and amended in telegram 1976 to Moscow, February 27. (Ibid., 611.61/2-2362 and 762.0221/2-2762, respectively)

[3] See Document 294.

[4] For text of this statement (U.N. doc. A/4879), September 20, 1961, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 1091-1094.

[5] See Document 278.

[6] Document 278.

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union[1]

Washington, March 1, 1962, 6:48 p.m.

2001. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.

1. You will be receiving agreed tripartite instructions in separate cable,[2] and should now request early meeting with Gromyko. This message contains my supplementary instructions.

2. I continue to be in some doubt about present Soviet intentions and tactics, and have found disturbing their willingness to agitate air access situation—area which they must know to be delicate and highly volatile. At same time they have so far shown disinclination to go beyond limited point of threat and harassment thus reducing risk of escalation. I must assume that Soviets are at least partially motivated by desire to pressure us in present discussions by underlining fragility of existing access arrangements and their capacity to harass us at will. Presumably action has also been related to campaign for mid-March summit meeting in Geneva. It is clear that we must not permit Soviets to obtain impression they can soften our negotiating position by threats and actions against Berlin access. At same time we have had certain objectives in your discussions with Gromyko at least some of which, to extent they remain pertinent, we still hope to pursue.

3. In light of current situation our objectives now seem to be:

a. to warn Soviet authorities of serious implications of harassments in air corridors;

b. to avoid break-off of discussions before Secretary has opportunity to see Gromyko at Geneva (on assumption Soviets will eventually accept idea of meeting at Foreign Ministers' level);

c. to continue to probe for any flexibility in Soviet position, notably in regard to variations in Access Authority proposal and willingness to treat issue of legal status sub silentio;

d. to try to turn their thinking to kind of arrangement President suggested to Adzhubei, which would meet immediate problems we face in Berlin without purporting to settle issue for all time and which would open way for progress on other issues.

4. It seems evident that French intransigence will continue, and we have now reached point where we must realistically conclude that, within current framework of discussions with Soviets, it will be impossible to meet French prerequisite for their participation in negotiations. This dilemma is one to which we are now giving consideration; it obviously presents serious difficulties if we think of any subsequent negotiations with Soviets in terms of conventional Four-Power meetings of the past.

5. Another pertinent factor at this point is need to maintain maximum public support for our position. We consider it likely that Soviets will eventually publish various documents they have handed you in course of talks, and we are prepared to do same with documents you have given Gromyko. In considering problem of creating public understanding our position, we have concluded that all Berlin solution does not have appeal of International Access Authority proposal in terms of inherent plausibility and appeal to world opinion. We are accordingly planning to launch campaign of public statements and publicity through available media about virtue and necessity of International Access Authority. This publicity campaign would take into consideration desirability of not destroying any vague possibility that Soviets would be willing to consider some modification of Access Authority. It would also be directed to possibility that, if Soviets will have nothing to do with Access Authority, they might decide, in face of growing Western demand for improvement in status quo, their interests would be best served by reciprocal abandonment of Free City and Access Authority proposals.

6. You will have noted general reference in para 5 of basic instructions to point made by President to Adzhubei. We have not fully informed other countries of details President's discussion as contained in Deptel 1780 (memcon dated January 31, 1962, pouched Moscow).[3] If, in your judgment, however, occasion seems propitious to probe on question posed by Adzhubei on access, you may note that on personal basis Adzhubei did seem to imply there might be some Soviet interest in having question of access supervised by International Commission. You would be willing to explore this matter further if Soviets wish to develop their thinking on subject.

7. With respect to point contained memorandum handed Gromyko on February 1[4] and in para 8 of new basic instructions, if you deem it useful, you may amplify our meaning by observing that what we are asking Soviets is that they pursue course they have projected, namely access issue. We do not want to get into legalistic discussion with them as to differing views of both sides on status. We want merely to deal pragmatically with factual problems arising out of announced Soviet intentions.

8. For reasons given para 15 Deptel 1616[5] we are somewhat reluctant at this time to have you raise question of all-Berlin confederation as suggested your 2186.[6]

9. In view of approach your next meeting outlined in basic instructions, and above, do not believe you should use contingency instructions contained Deptel 1768.[7]

10. The President is concerned that these clear restatements of our position should not be read as an indication that the US is uninterested in a reasonable Berlin settlement. Unless you perceive overwhelming objections, you should add that our insistence upon the discussion of access has been based upon our conviction that this is the issue without which no other can be usefully worked out. The Soviet Government's position so far has raised in our mind a serious question whether that Government is itself seeking any agreement, but if the Soviet Government is in fact interested, we would be glad now to pursue informal bilateral conversations on wider subjects, subject always to the need for a strong and clear settlement on access and preservation of basic rights in West Berlin. While we cannot say that the position taken by the Soviet Government in Thompson-Gromyko talks has been encouraging, either on narrow or on wide questions, we ourselves are still determined to leave no method of discussion untried in seeking a sensible accommodation of the rights and interests of both sides. In making the point of this paragraph, you should emphasize its importance and the high authority from which it directly proceeds.

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-162. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Hillenbrand and the final paragraph in the White House; cleared by Rusk (in draft), Bohlen, and the White House; and initialed and approved by Kohler.

[2] Document 309.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 277.

[4] See Document 278.

[5] Document 260.

[6] Document 288.

[7] Document 275.

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin[1]

Washington, March 3, 1962, 7:16 p.m.

1128. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Question has been raised here regarding US policy, if, as a result of disturbances in West Berlin, West Berliners should become involved in incidents at wall or just inside East Berlin. Particular concern has been expressed lest Allied soldiers find themselves battling West Berliners in order to prevent crowd from assaulting wall (for example, in connection with May 1 rally normally held near Brandenburg Gate).

Department has pointed out that US and its allies in Berlin, in coordination with West Berlin authorities, have taken steps to guard against crowds getting out of hand and precipitating incidents along sector/zonal or sector/sector border. Department has noted in particular: (1) West Berlin policy instructions dated October 12, 1961, which provide for prevention incidents and control of crowds, (2) instructions to US forces for their role in supporting West Berlin police, contained in annex to Berlin Command Internal Security Directive, and (3) instructions issued on December 6, 1961 to US military forces in Berlin concerning actions along sector/sector and sector/zonal border (similar instructions were subsequently issued by British and French).[2]

In unlikely event that allied forces and West Berlin police were not able to control a crowd and this led to incidents along border or just inside East Berlin, we believe USCINCEUR's implementing instructions issued as a result of BQD-EG-2,[3] as well as December 6, 1961 instructions, should apply. Together, these provide: (1) Allied forces should not go into East Berlin, (2) They should, however, return fire in certain specified circumstances, (3) They should prevent incursions by Soviet or GDR personnel into West Berlin, and (4) They should not furnish arms or ammunition to individuals or groups in East Berlin, although an exception might be made for food and medical supplies.

If situation became sufficiently grave, three Commandants would presumably agree to appointment single allied commander. He would be responsible for dealing with situation within scope of his guidance. If he required further guidance, he would request it from General Norstad.

Request your comments, including indication whether you believe guidance you now have is adequate. If you desire further authority in order to deal with any incidents at wall or just inside East Berlin, please make specific recommendations.[4]

Rusk

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-362. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland; cleared by Hillenbrand, Davis, G/PM, SOV, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense (ISA); and initialed and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Moscow.

[2] None of the instructions listed has been found.

[3] Not found.

[4] On March 4 Clay cabled: “In view of Department's 1128 to Berlin, I see no useful purpose that I serve in Berlin and hence request soonest possible action on my letter.” (Telegram 1655 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-462) His letter is printed as Document 276.

312. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the President's Special Representative in Berlin (Clay)[1]

Washington, March 4, 1962.

DEAR LUCIUS: This is the letter I spoke about on the phone today.[2] Incidentally, I shudder to think we might have to rely on such technically fragile communications as that “green” phone if something really important comes up.

I have not taken up your letter of January 30,[3] the receipt of which I acknowledged to you by phone, for several reasons.

First, we have been involved in a touchy air corridor situation, in which you played a most important and helpful role.

Second, I was aware that a nuclear test decision was in the offing (the nature of which was known only to about five people) and the possibility of a sudden increase in tension made it especially important for you to be where you are. Mr. K. has just today replied—and you will have the text by the time you get this letter.[4]

Third, was the Attorney General's visit.

Fourth, the Central Committee is meeting in Moscow on March 5 and it is entirely possible that some far-reaching decisions may be taken. Against the background of Ulbricht's visit to Moscow,[5] this could be a period of increased pressures on Berlin. Mr. K's reply about the Geneva meeting and the possibility of a somewhat later “summit” seems to indicate (for what it's worth) that no red-hot crisis is in the making for the immediate future. But we can't be sure.

Meanwhile I have asked my colleagues to work out with the Pentagon better answers about the command situation in Berlin. One of our difficulties has been that our policy directives are translated, through the several echelons, into increasingly detailed directives and we have had some difficulty in knowing what comes out at the other end. I do think we must find some way to establish policy guidance which will at least be helpful to a commander who faces a situation not covered by instructions and without an opportunity to check with the higher chain of command. The contingency you mentioned to me (of a massacre of fleeing people) is a case in point. We consider that this contingency is covered by the political guidance if properly implemented by the military instructions.

Two comments about our Allies. The one is that we must go to considerable length to assure their solidarity, else the western position could crumble in a crisis under the most calamitous circumstances. At the present time, given some special problems of personalities in various capitals, this is not easy. In general, however, I am encouraged by the degree of unity we have achieved about Berlin.

The matter of a single allied commander in Berlin is a bit complicated. My own impression is that we could probably get one appointed in advance only if we tied his hands to London and Paris. In fact, under crisis conditions, the U.S. Commandant would have to be the “take charge” man. I have resisted the pleadings of London and Paris that, even under present arrangements, the Commandants must act in unison—which would give each a veto on all three. We'll continue to give this thought and see whether anything can be done to clarify.

With specific reference to our telegram 1128,[6] this had been prepared as a summary of the present status of our contingency planning on Berlin on which we hoped you would comment. Specific recommendations from you would be most helpful in guiding further efforts in this field.

Your presence there is symbolic but goes far beyond that role. Your ability to monitor the “feel” of the situation in Berlin and advise us on what our policy or directives look like at the other end of the line is of enormous help in a tight situation like that one. The President and I both are aware of the anomalies in your position outside of somewhat complex military and civilian channels worked out among three allies over a period of years.

Let me urge you to “sweat it out” for a time longer, giving us your views as to how we ought to improve the arrangements and as to specific problems which the other side might throw at us. I can assure you that your views count for a great deal back here and the President is grateful for them.

We may have some clearer indications during the course of this month as to what is ahead. But I do hope you can continue to help us during what will certainly be a tense period.

Cordially,

Dean Rusk[7]

[1] Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. Secret; Personal. Drafted by Rusk and approved by Kohler.

[2] Rusk telephoned Clay at 3:15 p.m. and reviewed the points made in this letter. A memorandum for the record of this conversation is ibid.

[3] Document 276.

[4] For text of Khrushchev's March 3 letter (U.N. doc. ENDC/8, March 19, 1962), see Department of State Bulletin, March 26, 1962, pp. 494-497.

[5] Ulbricht visited Moscow February 26-28.

[6] Document 311.

[7] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

313. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, March 5, 1962, 4 p.m.

2118. SHAPE for Norstad and US Element Live Oak. Deptel 2358.[2] In preliminary quadripartite discussions, Embassy has assessed corridor situation along following lines:

Apparent aim of Sov tactics since Feb 8 has been to introduce new procedures and flight practices designed to hamper and ultimately to deny Western use of the corridors. No single technique has been exhausted and abandoned, but rather several are being tried. USSR apparently plans to achieve interruption of air services to Berlin essentially by process of intruding Soviet flights into corridors. Governing characteristic of past practice for 16 years has been for Western powers to utilize corridors almost exclusively through system of BASC notifications based upon supposition and fact that Communists adjust their flights to Western convenience. Present moves seem to aim at providing completely new frame of reference which will a) replace prevailing Soviet accommodation by Allied adjustments to Soviet flights; b) complicate flight schedules in corridors and landing patterns in Berlin control zone; and c) change present character and role of BASC by altering conditions for which its present capability and functions are adequate.

If acquiesced in, Soviet practices obviously can be intensified to point of seriously affecting flights and landings and takeoffs in Berlin.

Major political aim of exercise is to degrade Western capability of air access, with effect of inducing popular nervousness as to safety of air link and of frightening civil airlines. Additional but perhaps even more visible goal is to establish flight regimen over East Germany which will establish or fortify GDR “sovereignty”. By establishing new unilateral criteria for flights, and withholding agreement to Western flights which do not conform to criteria, USSR is also creating prerequisite situation which could later be used as pretext for quitting BASC, or reducing Soviet function there to that of observers. This trend of action, therefore, points to ultimate intention to transfer control of Allied flights to the “GDR”. Other isolated demands converge toward same end, such as potential request for communication with GDR radio, and Stromov's three requirements, including variation that USG should furnish Mansbach beacon time. It is this appreciation which has led Embassy to emphasize importance of withholding passage time over Mansbach (Embtel 2009).[3]

Soviet tactics so far have been gradualist, as evidenced by primarily technical instead of political approach, staying below 7,500 feet so as to avoid interference with routine traffic, efforts to conform to BASC proprieties by filing flight plans, stopping fighter harassments just short of what might have provoked equal response, and offering compromises on procedural demands. Low-key procedure reflects realization of dangers in introducing major change and probably is designed to reduce Allied reaction. Although moves give impression of experimentation, they are more than probe, since flights are continuing, and Soviets have introduced changes in BASC procedure which could remain as residuals even should flights stop. Considered as probe, however, they have revealed certain limits of Western reaction.

Serious recent development is scheduling of Soviet flights through Berlin control zone. Although it would be difficult for USSR physically to “saturate” corridors to unusability for Western military flights, this could be achieved with lesser effort for civil flights. Control zone could also be blocked even easier, particularly if USSR gives imprecise flight data and declines to adjust to local traffic control patterns.

Soviet moves face Western powers with two general sets of alternatives, either to make determined effort to stop Soviet flights in corridors and control zone, or to adjust to flights.

Possibility of effective Western adjustment to Soviet flights depends largely on level of Soviet activity. Adjustment can take two forms, first of which is present ad hoc scheduling of flight patterns and altitudes not in conflict with Soviet flights, thus recognizing sort of Soviet primacy in air. In long run it would be unworkable. Even if method could be maintained without yielding to Stromov's three demands, it would require more accurate exchange of and adherence to flight data than is now customary in BASC. Outcome would probably be increasingly anarchical flight conditions with progressively greater dependence on radar and visual observations to ensure flight separations.

Trend of second type of adjustment would be through increased correlation of Eastern and Western flight information toward more effective integration of procedures than is possible through BASC and present rival ATC systems at Tempelhof and Schoenefeld. End result could be single unified ATC for all Berlin flights, which Communists would insist should be located at Schoenefeld.

Since both variants of second alternative are politically unacceptable, we conclude that means must be found to halt Soviet flights in their present form. We are now reviewing data and hope to be able to make specific recommendations in near future.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/3-562. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to SHAPE, USAFE, Berlin, Moscow, London, and Paris.

[2] Telegram 2358, February 26, asked for an analysis of Soviet actions and demands in BASC including a description of Allied procedures and an assessment of the effect of Soviet actions. (Ibid., 962.72/2-2462)

[3] Dated February 24. (Ibid.)

314. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State[1]

Moscow, March 6, 1962, 4 p.m.

2350. Eyes only for Secretary. At meeting with Gromyko this morning I read opening statement composed from points 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of my instructions,Deptel 1998.[2] However, in opening paragraph, in addition referring to September 20 joint statement regarding need refrain from actions aggravating international tensions, I added we are surprised Soviets have attempted to disrupt existing arrangements in air corridors just at time when we are discussing possibility of new arrangements. “This is certainly not calculated to inspire confidence in any such new arrangements.” I softened somewhat section in point 8 of instructions on Soviet intentions, stating it “now appears to be in doubt” whether procedural formula can be found.

I then presented memorandum[3] which was read by interpreter.

Gromyko responded first on air corridors. He insisted that the tensions in the air corridors, which “lie in the air space of the GDR,” have not been created by Soviets, but by Western side. He said Soviet actions are not in contradiction to existing understandings and that they correspond to the established practice. It was vain for Western powers to claim these were unexpected as if they fell down from the skies. It is clear, he continued, from your statement that Western side holds rather different views on this. “But we deny to Western powers the right of arbiters in that question and cannot agree that only one side—the Western side—will establish the truth.” He added Soviet position is laid down in their note (February 17) and Soviet Govt will continue act in accordance with this position. Warned that if attempts are made aggravate situation, Soviet side will duly reply to them.

Gromyko then turned to my remarks that both sides should refrain from actions likely aggravate tension. He claimed in Central Europe, and Berlin in particular, tension has arisen. This fact, he claimed, only underlines necessity resolve present danger situation involving existence abnormal occupation regime. He continued that Soviet proposals were designed precisely to normalize this problem in the interest of reducing tension in Germany, Europe, and whole world.

Gromyko expressed hope that agreement between us will be reached on all matters related to conclusion German peace treaty. Again warned that if this is not done Soviet Union and other states will sign peace treaty with GDR. “This is absolutely inevitable.” Gromyko said it would be a good thing if Western powers would appropriately evaluate fact Soviet Union has not yet signed peace treaty. This is being done in order facilitate agreement. However, position USG and statements made today, he continued, indicate that the Soviet position is not properly understood. Gromyko then repeated that Soviet Govt will never agree to any arrangement which will perpetuate maintenance occupation regime West Berlin or the abnormal situation in Europe characterized by absence peace treaty. He emphasized a peace treaty would not be merely slip of paper with signatures, but would be an action by which appropriate questions would be solved.

Gromyko then stated Soviet position West Berlin already quite clear. Free city proposal in Soviet view would violate interest of neither side. That is, if these interests are understood correctly, namely the interest of reducing tension and strengthening peace. Sometimes, however, people speak of interest only in a very narrow way. He complained dossiers of Western powers appear to be full of unfounded suspicions which would be better eliminated.

Gromyko restated earlier point that Soviet position specifically includes possibility of reaching agreement on access which would respect GDR sovereignty together with resolution of a number of other questions which he had mentioned many times. Also said some Western civil and military leaders continue to use strong words against Soviet Govt, others contributing to exacerbation tensions.

He then characterized US memorandum in general as attempt to balance discussions held to date in such a way as to support US positions. This did not facilitate agreement, but rather constructed a trench dividing our positions. Added he would not again repeat Soviet positions on all-Berlin solution, plebiscite proposal, or IAA. Concluded that it is clear we have different approaches to negotiations on this question and expressed difficulty in reconciling assertions in memorandum with statement US seriously seeking agreement. He explained the above were his reactions on basis of having listened to hasty translation of memorandum, implying that this might not exhaust Soviet reaction to the memorandum.

I responded by first taking up Gromyko's references to air corridors. I stated surprise at his contention situation results from Western actions, pointing out that Soviets had suddenly changed procedures which had existed 16 years and in such a way as to disturb our access. I noted his reference to Soviet February 17 note and stated we had found this response unsatisfactory. I explained I did not intend to take this up in detail today but added I had no doubt my government would pursue the matter further. I pointed out that the air corridors were established to provide free access to West Berlin and that recent Soviet actions clearly seemed designed to interfere with this free access. I warned that we take a most serious view of such actions.

I emphasized our desire avoid legalistic discussion while dealing pragmatically with factual problems which would arise from announced Soviet intentions. I reiterated our conviction that resolution problems in question is impossible without satisfactory agreement on access. I stated it is my understanding you would expect to have discussions with Gromyko on Berlin in Geneva and, further, that you would be prepared to discuss wider subjects on an informal and bilateral basis. I emphasized that discussion such problems would remain subject to the need for a strong and clear settlement on access and preservation rights in West Berlin. I pointed out that this does not represent any change in our position on the question of access as the key problem which must be taken up first but explained that the President personally is determined to leave no method of discussion untried in seeking a sensible accommodation of rights and interests both sides.

Regarding Gromyko's remarks about necessity respect GDR sovereignty, I complained of their vagueness and fact we have never clearly been able understand what this involves. I pointed out that whenever we seem to reach point of achieving some agreement, Gromyko returns to question GDR sovereignty in such a way as to negate what seemed to have been an agreement.

I then expressed concern over Gromyko's statement they would never agree to any accord which would result in perpetuation occupation regime or “abnormal situation, i.e., absence peace treaty.” This position, I stated, is the most serious and discouraging statement from Soviet side if it refers to questions of fact. I pointed out we have emphasized we were not asking for any formal Soviet action connected with occupation regime, but if any agreement between us would be impossible if after it the occupation regime in fact continued to exist, then we would seem to have really reached an impasse. I concluded that Western powers have made it abundantly clear that their presence in Berlin will not be given up until the German question is finally resolved.

Gromyko did not pursue this last point but returned briefly to question air corridors, stating he would not repeat himself with restatement Soviet position. It was well known and they intended to act in conformity with it. As to my one-sided assertions that the Soviet Union had taken new action violating agreed four-power regulations, they have studied agreements existing since WW II and their actions do not conflict in any way with the conditions existing there. He repeated, “we do not agree that the only arbiters in this situation shall be the Western powers."

Regarding my comments on GDR sovereignty, Gromyko recalled that we often refer to Soviet use of the phrase concerning necessity respect GDR sovereignty. He stated that is not only a phrase, it was an important condition. He claimed that Soviet proposals were in complete accord with “international practice baptised by years of international usage.” He repeated that any agreement on air, land, or water access must be in accord with respect for GDR sovereignty. “To underestimate this would be a big mistake which we hope Western powers will avoid.” He reiterated that Soviet Govt believes it is possible to reconcile agreement for “unrestricted access” with GDR sovereignty.

Gromyko was obviously preoccupied and pressed for time and I therefore did not probe further. I anticipate no further meeting before Geneva although way is open for him to comment further on our memorandum if he so desires.

Thompson

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/3-662. Confidential; Priority; Eyes Only.

[2] Document 309.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 309.

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, March 7, 1962, 3 p.m.

2131. SHAPE for Norstad. Berlin's 1650 to Dept.[2] In current situation and in light developments over past several months, I agree with Berlin reftel that we should reconsider basic question of accepting East Germans in place of Soviets on surface access checkpoints. We are now in a situation featured by Soviet harassment of unrestricted Western air access to Berlin, by severe limitations on Allied circulation in East Berlin, and by rumors that the Communists may impose passport and visa controls on West Germans traveling to East Germany and West Berlin.

The implications of Soviet actions re air access as seen from here are contained in Embtel 2118.[3] If Soviet actions develop and become public knowledge they will have very adverse psychological effects even if we maintain air link to Berlin. However, were we to submit while under pressure in the air corridors to what would publicly appear as East German control of Allied ground access, I submit that the adverse public reaction would be extremely serious and greatly undermine confidence in our willingness or capability to maintain our commitment to sustain Berlin's viability. In such a situation, moving to the garrison airlift to supply Allied troops and applying economic countermeasures might be preferred course of action to submitting quietly to East German checking of Allied access. If German access to Berlin should simultaneously be interfered with in an unacceptable fashion causing the invocation of IZT countermeasures, we would naturally be rapidly approaching another Berlin blockade. We should then have to choose between implementing QBAL and seeking to reopen ground access by military probes.

I can conceive of situation developing in such manner that it would be politically unacceptable to accept East Germans at checkpoints for this would represent accepting another whittling away process on access which would make sustaining West Berlin's viability extremely difficult. At that point, it might well be better to move rapidly with firm determination toward full crisis over Berlin at an early stage, rather than see climate for viability siphoned away by lack of response to Communist actions.

I understand that we decided originally in our contingency planning to accept East Germans at checkpoints provided they instituted no changes in procedures on assumption access would be turned over to them upon signature separate peace treaty. We agreed further to accept them at checkpoints if they appeared without warning again provided they instituted no procedural changes. This course was accepted on grounds that we could not use serious military measures or explain their use to public opinion on issue of who stamps documents. My fear, however, is that if we accepted East German control at the checkpoints while suffering Soviet efforts to impair air access, we might lose that confidence which is necessary to our purpose and find soon that in any case we would have to probe Soviet and East German intentions on the ground through appropriate military measures.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/3-762. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, and SHAPE.

[2] Dated March 3. (Ibid., 862.181/3-362)

[3] Document 313.

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State[1]

Bonn, March 7, 1962, 9 p.m.

2137. General Clay and I had long talk with Chancellor prior to luncheon which he gave for former yesterday. Adenauer opened conversation by thanking General Clay for visit and then turned to problem of lack of Western unity, which still disturbs him. He expressed uneasiness that France would not be represented at Geneva Disarmament Conference, where he expected talks on Berlin and German question would take place between US and Soviets as well as UK and USSR. He then read from paper before him, which he subsequently identified as telegram from German Ambassador London, reporting that British had in mind broadening Berlin talks to include discussion of Oder-Neisse Line and “respect for GDR sovereignty”, with idea that Soviet concession on access might be bought by more forthcoming Western attitude on these two points. General Clay commented that quadripartite consultations would seem to be in order before these items were raised with Soviets, and Adenauer asked if we had seen any report similar to his regarding British intentions. Receiving negative answer, he mentioned Home's speech of February 24[2] which contrasted with firmness of Attorney General's Berlin speech,[3] and was obviously pleased and reassured to hear from General Clay that the President had personally approved the latter. General Clay and I expressed confidence that US would want to consult FedRep prior to talking with Soviets on points he had mentioned.

Chancellor then raised subject of Berlin morale, asking if General Clay could confirm that situation was again calm, with West Berliners having regained their confidence. General Clay concurred with Chancellor's assessment, pointing out Berlin spirit was good and economy again showing growth, and mentioned favorable impact of Attorney General's visit. Adenauer agreed, and expressed gratitude for reassurance which Berliners had derived from General Clay's presence in city.

In conclusion, Chancellor reverted to his arguments favoring naval blockade, and again assured us that this was not intended as substitute for military measures in contingency planning, but rather as step on road to eventual confrontation if this should prove necessary.

Dowling

[1] Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-762. Secret; Limit Distribution.

[2] For extracts from Home's speech to the Young Conservatives' Conference on February 24, see The Times, February 26, 1962.

[3] See Document 306.

317. Letter From the Assistant Chief of the Mission at Berlin (Lightner) to the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan)[1]

Berlin, March 8, 1962.

DEAR GEORGE: Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of February 9[2] to Tommy Thompson, expressing your misgivings over the Berlin Mission's views on the Berlin problem. I have not seen the airgram that led you to write that letter but your summary of the basic assumption behind this airgram sounds closer to the views of some Berliners than to the views of the U.S. Mission or of responsible city leaders. However, the Mission's thinking is so far apart from yours that it seems hardly necessary to point out wherein the assumptions you ascribe to us are inaccurate. We do not, for example, oppose discussions of the Berlin problem and we do not look with unconcern on the developments that might follow if it proved impossible to reach agreement on some kind of modus vivendi on Berlin. At the same time—and this is a basic difference between us—we believe it would be most harmful to United States interests to want a modus vivendi so desperately that we might be led to make concessions to the Soviets that would have the effect of selling out this part of the free world. We also believe that free Berlin can only be preserved if we counter firmly every act of aggression or local harassment even on minor matters.

It is not localitis that supports these judgments. The Mission reports on local attitudes and opinions and worries from time to time about Berlin morale and confidence, which are important to the present and future viability of this city, but this has never led us to regard the Berliners as our political counselors on Soviet policy. Nor are we conscious of any insidious sentimentality toward the Berliners. The Berliners can, perhaps, be forgiven for believing that they live at the hub of the universe, but the Mission is well aware that Berlin is a mere pawn in the game and that what we are really talking about is United States policy towards the Soviet Union and towards the Ulbricht regime, as it pertains to Berlin and to Germany. We also know that there is no simple formula to help chart the right course in the days and weeks ahead. The Western Allies must be alert and flexible and ready for any opportunity for any settlement that might avert the catastrophe of an atomic war. And we must not be bound by preconceived ideas or blind to changes within the Communist orbit.

Conditions are not static within the orbit, but we see no sign that Soviet goals have changed. Khrushchev may be an improvement over Stalin, but the assumption that his continuance in power should be an objective of Western policy is unproven, despite Yugoslav efforts to sell that idea. I hope United States policy is not based on any such assumption. Even if it were accepted, what constructive ideas could we propose to the Soviets on Berlin that have not been proposed many times before? Short of abandoning Berlin and ultimately all of Germany, what have we not done that we still could do to further peace with honor on the continent of Europe?

You dismiss our endorsement of firmness and strength in this local situation as a “passive and negative attitude”, but I ask you, what more would you have us relinquish? In the post war years, we have gradually reduced our access routes to one autobahn, one railway line, and the three air corridors; our freedom of movement within the city has been reduced to Western Berlin itself as a result of unilateral action by the Communists in erecting the Wall. We have on record, as you know, a long series of proposals, for a Berlin-Germany settlement. They have not been acceptable to the other side because they would have preserved Berlin's freedom.

You imply that a weak Ulbricht regime in East Germany is dangerous for us as it prevents the Russians from “happily and passively” accepting the situation. You imply that our objective should be to strengthen the Ulbricht regime in order to stabilize East Germany; and that the best contribution we could make in that direction would be to meet the Communist demands regarding West Berlin. In short, your thesis seems to be that we can have peace only if the Soviets are made happy and content; that the existence of free Berlin makes them unhappy in central Europe; and hence we should give the Soviets what they want in order to preserve the peace.

What historical or psychological experience leads you to believe that further accommodation to the present regime in the Soviet Union would help pave the way to peace? When indeed have concessions to totalitarianism ever succeeded? If Khrushchev's totalitarianism is of a different kind, what evidence do we have aside from the whispered advices of the Russians and the satellites, that this is so? I have uneasy memories of the years before World War II when the responsible statesmen threw Czechoslovakia and Austria on the sacrificial altar in a vain effort to feed the insatiable appetites of Nazi Germany to win “peace in our time”.

As a long time admirer and friend of yours, I find this a most difficult letter to write, but you have attacked the integrity and judgment of the United States Mission in Berlin. You have furthermore refrained from suggesting any alternative course of action except, by inference, a policy that, if adopted by our Government, would lead us to the infinitely greater danger of total capitulation to the Communist system. We cannot permit the threat of a thermo-nuclear war to blind us to the dangers of sacrificing freedom and security through erosion and weakness. Within this century we have seen the catastrophe caused in part by appeasement and conciliation of a totalitarian regime, and that lesson is just as valid in the thermo-nuclear age.

Sincerely yours,

E. Allan Lightner, Jr.[3]

[1] Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany. Confidential; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Rusk, Bundy, Dowling, and Thompson.

[2] Document 286.

[3] Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Index

Access (see also Access harassment; Contingency planning; German Democratic Republic access control):

air access (see also air access crisis under Access harassment; airlift under Contingency planning; U.N. guarantee/observer proposals), 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95]-291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 142]-395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150]-411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 578 [Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 209]-579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 209]

British position, 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243]

civilian vs. military traffic, 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 46], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217]-600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 217], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 218]-605 [Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 218]

corridor proposals (see also international supervision below), 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40], 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 188], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243], 713 [Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 248], 723 [Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 251]

detailed description of rights, 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165]

free city proposals and, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168]-467 [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 46], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 188], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217]-600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 217], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 280]

international supervision (see also corridor proposals above):

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 790 [Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 280]

Soviet position, 713 [Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 248], 723 [Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 251], 774 [Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 275]-775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276], 784 [Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278]-786 [Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 278], 821 [Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 296]

U.S. position, 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165], 722 [Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 251]-723 [Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 251], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257], 741 [Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260]-742 [Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 260], 753 [Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 264], 768 [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274]-770 [Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 274], 786 [Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 278]-787 [Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 278], 798 [Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 284], 851 [Pg. 851 is part of Doc. 310]

Soviet position, 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 142]-395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150]-410 [Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 150], 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170], 578 [Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 209]-579 [Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 209], 713 [Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 248], 723 [Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 251]

Soviet provocation accusations, 640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228]

Soviet separate treaty and, 421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 152]

stabilization of existing procedures, 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12]

tripartite reinforced division, 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42]

U.S. troop movements, 640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232], 755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265]-756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266], 776 [Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 276]

British position, 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 261]-747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 262], 755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265]-756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266]

worker control, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95]-283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256]

Access harassment (see also Access; Berlin Wall; Contingency planning; German Democratic Republic access control), 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 204]-556 [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 204]

air access, 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 204]

contingency planning, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95]-291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132]-380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 135]-385 [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 185], 811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290], 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]-824 [Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298]

air access crisis, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281], 811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]-812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291], 821 [Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 296]

British position, 802n [Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286], 816 [Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294], 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 303]

Congressional meetings, 838 [Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 304]

French position, 816 [Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294]-818 [Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 295]

German Democratic Republic access control and, 828 [Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 299], 862 [Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315]-863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 315]

Soviet objectives, 814 [Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293]-815 [Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 293], 818 [Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 295]-819 [Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296], 828 [Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 299], 856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]-858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 313]

U.S. Ambassadorial probe discussions, 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 309]-848 [Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 309], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 310], 859 [Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314]-861 [Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 314]

Western responses, 796 [Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 283]-797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284], 800 [Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285]-802 [Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291]-814 [Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293], 816 [Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294]-818 [Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 295], 828 [Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 299]-829 [Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 299], 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 303], 843 [Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307]-844 [Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]

Clay reports, 510 [Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 181]-511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 181]

French position, 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6]-16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 524 [Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 186]-525 [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]-539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193], 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197]-545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198], 547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]-548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 199], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 201]-555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 204], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205], 565 [Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 208]-566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 208], 581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211]-584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212], 776 [Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 276]

Berlin Wall and, 565 [Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 208], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212]-584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212]

contingency planning, 498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178]-502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179], 508 [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180]-509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205]-558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 220]

negotiation proposals and, 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 189]-536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 191], 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 554 [Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 213]-586 [Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 213]

U.S.-Soviet discussions, 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 192]-539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193], 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]-543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198]-547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199], 564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95]

negotiation proposals and, 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 189]-536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 191], 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]

possibility of, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6]-16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 32], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 805 [Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 287]

refugees and, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95]

Soviet blockade, possible, 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57]

Soviet position, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 32], 721 [Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 251]-722 [Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 251], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 264]

Soviet separate treaty and, 65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23]

U.S.-Soviet discussions, 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 192]-539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193]

Watson incident (Dec. 23, 1961), 704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

West Berliners, 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 115]-343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 115]

Western responses (see also air access crisis above; criterion for action under Contingency planning: force, use of), 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]-438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 159], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 167], 467 [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]-468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170], 704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245], 727 [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254]-728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 777 [Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 276]

Acheson, Dean, 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 21], 60 [Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 21], 138 [Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49]-140 [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 49], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82]-230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89]-246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 89]

contingency planning, 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 40], 156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 49]-159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64], 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 89]-259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90]

airlift, 123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 154 [Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 49]-155 [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 49], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52]

economic countermeasures, 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 49]-147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 49], 154 [Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 49], 196 [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67]

emergency planning, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64]-190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 64], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 77]

force, use of, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14]-38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49]-153 [Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 49], 155 [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 49]-156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 49], 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 89]-256 [Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 89]

military planning, 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 184]

nuclear weapons, 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 42]-120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 42], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 49]-142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 49], 156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 49], 158 [Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 49]-159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52]

ICJ appeal, 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 40], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40]

preparedness demonstration measures, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 40]-116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 42]-123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 49]-148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 49]

propaganda, 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 49]-148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 49], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91]

negotiation proposals, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 49]-151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49], 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]-229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89]-259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 91], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 174]-492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]

Achilles, Theodore C., 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103]

Adenauer, Konrad, 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17]-51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 758 [Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 267]-759 [Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268], 842 [Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306]

Berlin Wall, 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 121]-355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 121], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216]-592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]

contingency planning, 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17]-48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 595n [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 216], 596n [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 824 [Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298]-827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 298], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]-831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305]-841 [Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 305] de Gaulle meeting, 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 225]-639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]-660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 235]

German Democratic Republic, recognition of, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]-630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221]

Kennedy, correspondence with, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 389 [Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]-391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 139], 493 [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176]-497 [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188], 636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225]-638 [Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 225], 641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229]-642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 229], 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]-660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 235]

Kennedy talks, 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]

legal rights, 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17]-50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 218]

negotiation proposals, 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216]-594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 216], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 241]-693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 241], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289], 834 [Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305], 864 [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316]

U.N. headquarters/activities relocation proposal, 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218]-609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218]

U.S. visits, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9], 45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17]-51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205]-559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 206], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 216]-618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]-634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224]

Adzhubei, Alexei I., 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 162]-445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 162], 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 230], 681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]-682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 240], 689 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 240], 780 [Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 277]-784 [Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289], 821 [Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 296]-822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297], 851 [Pg. 851 is part of Doc. 310]

Air access crisis. See under Access harassment.

Akalovsky, Alexander, 87n [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32], 96n [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33], 468n [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170], 780n [Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 277]

All-Berlin proposal, 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25]-70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25]

British position, 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96]-296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 188]

Soviet position, 722 [Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 251], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 252], 753 [Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 264], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 278]

U.S. position, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 88]-244 [Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 88], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 89], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]-702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244], 723 [Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 251]-726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253], 768 [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274]-769 [Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 274]

Alphand, Herve, 13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6]-16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]-368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 295]-819 [Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296]

negotiation proposals, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]-368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228]-641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]-811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Alsop, Joseph, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 38], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 108], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 221]

Amory, Robert, 199 [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 69]

Amrehn, Franz, 332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110]-333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]

Anderson, Adm. George W., 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]

Anderson, Robert B., 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9]

Andronikov (USSR), 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 100], 807 [Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288]

Armitage, John A., 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 26]

Ausland, John C., 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 853n [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]

Austria, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]

Bahr, Egon, 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]

Ball, George W., 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]-502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 789 [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 279]

negotiation proposals, 497 [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177]-498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 239], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273]-775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]

Behrendt (GDR), 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1]

Beigel, Edgar J., 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]

Beitz (FRG), 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5]

Belgium, 178 [Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 59], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]

Berlin (see also Access; Access harassment; All-Berlin proposal; Berlin Wall; Contingency planning; Free city proposals; German Democratic Republic access control; negotiation proposals; West Berlin):

confederation proposal, 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 252]-726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 260]

Kennedy-Adenauer correspondence, 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 389 [Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]-391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 139], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188], 636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225]-638 [Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 225], 641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229]-642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 229], 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]-660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 235]

Kennedy-Khrushchev (Pen Pal) correspondence, 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 162]-455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 162], 502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179]-508 [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 209]-580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210], 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224]-636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 230]-646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 230], 681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]-691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 240], 819 [Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296]-822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]

legal rights, 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 18], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 40]-114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 259]

British position, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 243], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]-703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 260]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17]-50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 217], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 218]

Soviet position, 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 32], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 278]-786 [Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 278]

U.S. position, 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 26], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32]-89 [Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 32], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 218]-605 [Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 218], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 260]-744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 260]

NATO guarantee, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 17]-49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17]

Soviet policies toward, 6 [Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4]-7 [Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4], 56 [Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 20]-57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27]-77 [Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 28]

British position, 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 816n [Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294]

French position, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 30], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234]-651 [Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 234]

Khrushchev letter (Feb. 17, 1961), 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43]

tripartite discussions, 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]-810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5]-10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10]

U.S. position, 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 44]-130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 44], 138 [Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49]-140 [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 49], 173 [Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 57], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57], 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 71], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 86]-238 [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 86], 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87]-242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89]-246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 89], 515 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 183]-516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 246]-706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 246], 805 [Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 287]-807 [Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288]

U.S.-Soviet discussions, 387 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 137]

U.S.-British discussions, 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]-44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15]

U.S.-French discussions, 80 [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 30]-86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 100]-316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101]

U.S.-German Federal Republic discussions, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5]-11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 513 [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182]-514 [Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188]-532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]-672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

U.S.-Soviet discussions, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24]-69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 202 [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70]-207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71], 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 85]

U.S. policy toward, 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25]-70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25], 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29]-79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 29], 514 [Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183]-516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 271], 793 [Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 282]-795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 282], 865 [Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317]-867 [Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 317]

Clay appointment, 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 127], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133], 391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 139], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 233], 854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]-856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

communication to Soviet Union, 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7]-20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8]

Congressional meetings, 837 [Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304]-839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 304]

Kennan criticisms, 435 [Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]-437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 246]-708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 246], 728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 802 [Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286]-804 [Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 286], 865 [Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317]

quadripartite discussions, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79]

State Department papers, 33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12]-34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12], 207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71]-210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72]

U.S.-French discussions, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5]-9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9], 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10]

U.S. position, 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 86]-237 [Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 86], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 89]

Berlin Airlift (1949), 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 31], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 36]

Berlin Steering Group, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90]-260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 90], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]-334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118]-349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144]

Berlin Wall, 325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 104]

British position, 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113]

contingency planning, 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 148]-405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 443n [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 161]

economic aid to Berlin and, 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 258]-734 [Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 258]family visits, 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237]-672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

free city proposals and, 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 106]

Friedrichstrasse crisis and, 565 [Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 208], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212]-584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212]

German Democratic Republic political situation and, 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 105]-328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 106], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188], 581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211]

negotiation proposals and, 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 108], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 115], 344 [Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 248]-712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 248]

possibility of, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1]-3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11]

preparedness demonstration measures and, 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118]-348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118]

refugees and, 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11], 341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115]-342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 115], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 168], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216]-592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 259], 753 [Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 264]

Soviet/German Democratic Republic motivations, 341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115]-343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 115], 364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125]-365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 125], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 168]-465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 168], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216]-592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216]

Soviet position, 581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216], 721 [Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 251], 753 [Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 264]

U.N. appeal and, 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 121]

U.S.-French discussions, 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]-368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126]

U.S. position, 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 170], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 259]

Western Ally restrictions, 364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125]-366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]

Western responses:

Allied "patrols" increase, 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]

Commandant crossing, 365 [Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 125], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128]-371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129]

Commandant protest, 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 105]-329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]-334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111]

cultural diplomatic measures, 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107], 330n [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 114], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 115], 358 [Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 121], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123], 789 [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 279]

economic countermeasures, 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 115], 358 [Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 121], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]

force, use of, 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128], 726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253]-727 [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 761 [Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 270]

French position, 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]-338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]

Germany, Federal Republic of, military buildup, 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 121]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 105]-328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 106], 329n [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107], 332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110]-334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]-339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 345 [Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 117]-346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 117], 358 [Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 121], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 130], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133]-381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221], 670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237]

Germany, Federal Republic of, public opinion, 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111], 339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]-341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115], 349n [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 119]

JCS position, 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128]-371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129]

Johnson visit to Berlin, 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 119], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 121]-358 [Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 121]

Leipzig Fair boycott. See cultural diplomatic measures above.negotiation proposals, 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221], 670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237]

propaganda, 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111]

publicity, 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118]

quadripartite discussions, 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107]-330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]-339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]-362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]

Soviet Union protest note, 327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 105], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115]

three-power status proposal, 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 117], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 120]

travel ban, 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107], 330n [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 108], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]-339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 115], 358 [Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 121], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]

tripartite statement, 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118]-348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]

U.N. appeal, 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 121]

U.S. position, 510 [Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 181], 776 [Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 276]-777 [Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 276]

West Berlin garrison reinforcements, 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 344 [Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 117]-348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 119]-353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 120], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 121]-358 [Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 121]

Bernau, Phyllis D., 760n [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269]

Bohlen, Charles E., 16n [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 388n [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 138], 415n [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 709n [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248], 714n [Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 249], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 259], 741n [Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260], 768n [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274], 772n [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 275], 819n [Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296], 846n [Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 310]n

Adenauer visits to U.S., 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

Berlin Wall, 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 168]-465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 168]

German Democratic Republic, recognition of, 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273]

German unification, 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15]

negotiation proposals, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 168]-465 [Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 168], 695n [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 242], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243]-698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243]

Soviet forces in West Berlin, 724n [Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 251]

Soviet political situation, 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]-42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]-42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Bolshakov, Georgi N., 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 567n [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 209], 573n [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 209], 780 [Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 277]

Bolz-Zorin agreement, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 152], 422 [Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 152], 793 [Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 282]

Border issues (see also German peace treaty; German unification):

British position, 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 174], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218]-611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 218], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 221]-624 [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 221], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234], 864 [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316]

Soviet position, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 26], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 32]-92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87], 460 [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 170], 807 [Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288]

U.S. position, 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 32], 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42], 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 49]-151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49], 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 218], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 221], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]

Bovey, John A., 318n [Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102]

Bowles, Chester, 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3]-6 [Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4], 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]-118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156]-433 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 156], 435 [Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158], 439 [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 160]-441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 201], 553 [Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 203]-554 [Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204]

Brandin, Robert M., 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 789n [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 279]

Brandt, Willy, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95]-282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 98], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]-671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256], 843 [Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307]

Berlin Wall, 326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 105]-327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 105], 345 [Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 117]-346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 117], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 120], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 121]-357 [Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 121], 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237]-672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Kennedy, correspondence with, 345 [Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 117]-346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 117], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 120]-353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 120]

U.S. visit, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9], 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10]-30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]-672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Brentano, Heinrich von, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5]-11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23]-65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23], 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95], 493 [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176]

all-Berlin proposal, 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96]-296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96]

contingency planning, 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17]-49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17], 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95]-288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97]-303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153]-426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153]

German Democratic Republic access control, 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152]

German peace treaty, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5]-10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11]-33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95]-289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 95]

German unification, 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96]

inter-German relations, 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 152]-422 [Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 152]

negotiation proposals, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96]-296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98]-305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153]-426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153]

West Berlin plebiscite proposals, 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 98]-308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95]-309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]-427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 153]

Brook, Sir Norman, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]

Brown, L. Dean, 366n [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]

Bruce, David K.E., 43 [Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15]-44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 59 [Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57], 460n [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165], 514 [Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183]-516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 102n [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]

Bundy, McGeorge, 33n [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 209n [Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 219n [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 77], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77]-222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77], 227n [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 93], 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 636n [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 259], 741 [Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260]n

access harassment, 544n [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 220], 704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281], 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292]-814 [Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

all-Berlin proposal, 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 188]

Berlin Wall, 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 108], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]-334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111]

contingency planning, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22], 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]-165 [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]-177 [Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 58], 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 271]

air access, 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 135]-385 [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]

economic countermeasures, 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66]-193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 68]-198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 68], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76]

emergency planning, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64]-190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 64], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66]-194 [Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 68], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 80]-226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 80]force, use of, 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]-163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 53], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 68], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 90], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 140], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143]-398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 154], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173]-489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 173], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 184]

naval countermeasures, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76]-217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76]

German Democratic Republic access control, 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 91]-263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91]

German peace treaty, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 37]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on German and Berlin, 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55], 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]-230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83]inter-German relations, 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188]-530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188]

negotiation proposals, 177 [Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 58], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76]-218 [Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 76], 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]-331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 108], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 588 [Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]-589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 215], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 239], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]-702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]

Foreign Ministers meeting proposals, 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 91]-262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 91], 430 [Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 155]-431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156]

Western agenda, 379n [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]-431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156], 460 [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165]-461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165]

propaganda, 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90]-260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 90], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 102n [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34]

U.S.-German Federal Republic discussions, 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188]

Vienna summit aide-memoire reply, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 38]-109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 91]-264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]

Burdett, William C., 36n [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41n [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]

Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 44]-130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 44], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52]

Cabell, Gen. Charles P., 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143]

Caccia, Sir Harold, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 102n [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]-362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152]

Canada, 179 [Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 59], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157]

Carstens, Karl, 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217]-600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 217], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 217]-603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Cash, Frank E., Jr., 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 26], 119n [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 42], 184 [Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 62]-185 [Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 62], 281n [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 337n [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 439n [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 160], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 497n [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177], 661n [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]

Chayes, Abram J., 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 242]-695 [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 242]

China, People's Republic of, 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83]

Clarke, Bruce, 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 119], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128]

Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 726n [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253], 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 262]

access harassment, 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]-438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 159], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 167], 467 [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 510 [Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 181]-511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 181]

air access crisis, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281], 811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]-812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]-534 [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 189], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195]-544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 202], 584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212]-586 [Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 213]

appointment as Special Representative in Berlin, 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 127], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 233], 854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]-856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

Berlin visit, 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 119], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 121]

Berlin Wall, 443n [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 161], 498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178]-502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179], 761 [Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 270], 776 [Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 276]-777 [Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 276]

contingency planning, 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172], 510 [Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 181]-511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 181], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 213]-587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214], 854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]

negotiation proposals, 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 213]-586 [Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 213], 864 [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316]

reports, 509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181]-513 [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182], 775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]-779 [Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 276]

Cleveland, Harlan, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 393n [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141]

Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade), 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92]

Congo crisis, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 70]

Congress, U.S. (see also emergency planning under Contingency planning), 123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 49], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 64], 837 [Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304]-839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 304]

Contingency planning (see also German Democratic Republic access control):

air access, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95]-291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132]-380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 135]-385 [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 185], 811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290], 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]-824 [Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298]

airlift, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 53], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 55], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97]-302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97]

British position, 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14], 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97]

French position, 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 31]-86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97]

U.S. position, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 42]-123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 154 [Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 49]-155 [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 49], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83]-231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84], 257 [Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 89], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 102], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129]-373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 129]

Berlin Wall and, 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 148]-405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 443n [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 161]

British position, 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6], 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 21], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 49]

British/French participation, 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 43], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 100]-313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 100], 323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 102]

criterion for action, 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 21], 83 [Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 30], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 374 [Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 130]-375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 130]

U.S. position, 60 [Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 21], 83 [Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 30], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49]-153 [Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 49], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57], 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 152], 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]-485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234]

diplomatic measures, 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 36], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95]

economic countermeasures, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 53], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 93], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 95], 317 [Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 101], 522 [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 185]

British position, 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95]-288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95]

French position, 86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95]-288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95]-288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133], 826 [Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 298]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, discussions, 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64], 199 [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 69]-200 [Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 69], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 74], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112]

NATO participation, 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151], 826 [Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 298]

NSC discussions, 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66]-193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 68]-198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 68], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 80]

U.S. position, 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 36], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 49]-147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 49], 154 [Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 49], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95]-288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102], 522 [Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 185], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 205]

emergency planning, 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55], 184 [Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 62]-185 [Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 62], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66]-197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 68], 209 [Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]-212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77]

military budget increase, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64]-190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 64], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 196 [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67]-197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 68], 209 [Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]-210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 80]-226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 80], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 140]

National Emergency declaration, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64]-191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 68], 209 [Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]-210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 77]-220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 77], 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95]

failure possibilities, 156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 49]-159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51]

force, use of (see also preparedness demonstration measures below):

air access, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22], 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 185]

Allied contributions, 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 68], 200 [Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 69]-201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 69], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75]-216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 80], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 89]-256 [Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 89], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 221]-629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]

British position, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95]-284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95]

French position, 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95]-284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95]-286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 95]

British position, 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34], 540 [Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 193]

criterion for action, 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49]-153 [Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 49], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234]

economic effects of, 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77], 518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 200]

force levels, 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 22]

French position, 13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94]-274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178]-502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179], 508 [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180]-509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181], 540 [Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 193], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205]-558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205]

general war (see also nuclear weapons below), 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22], 83 [Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 30], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 171]-483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 171], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 69], 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95]-286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 95]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92]

land probe, 155 [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 49]-156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 49], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57], 200 [Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 69]-201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 69]

British position, 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 42]

U.S. position, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 31], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 36], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 42]-122 [Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 42], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 43], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 49]-141 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 49], 155 [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 49]-156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 49], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

military planning (see also preparedness demonstration measures below; U.S. forces in Europe, expansion of below), 61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22]-63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 22], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 31], 136 [Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]-138 [Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 63], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72]-211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173]-489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 173]

British position, 653 [Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 234]

command, 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97]-301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 510 [Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 181]-511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 181], 777 [Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 276]-778 [Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 276], 818 [Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 295], 854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]-856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

French position, 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97]-301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97], 513n [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182], 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97]-301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300]-832 [Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 300]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, discussions, 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 55], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64], 200 [Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 69], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 112]-336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112]

NATO participation, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98], 317 [Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 101], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]-413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]-493 [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176]

negotiation proposals and, 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152], 653 [Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 234]

NSAMs, 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]-163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 53], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 68], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205]-560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

nuclear weapons, 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 49]-146 [Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 49], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]-322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 185], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185]

Western Defense Ministers meeting, 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 90], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92]-266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92]

Western Foreign Ministers meeting discussions, 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97]-303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]-413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]

NATO role, 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 144]

negotiation proposals and, 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143]-397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234]

nuclear weapons (see also general war above):alternatives to, 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12], 371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129]-372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129]

British position, 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 42], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97]-301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97]

communication to Soviet Union, 140 [Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 49]-141 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 49], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 363 [Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 124], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172], 521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 185], 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188]

control of, 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 49], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 53], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 56], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 18], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188]-528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188], 595n [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 216], 596n [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217]

JCS position, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22], 135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]-136 [Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]

negotiation proposals and, 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234]

planning, 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 49]-146 [Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 49], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]-322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-521 [Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 185], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185]

possibility of, 158 [Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 49]-159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94]-274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 102], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234]

U.S.-Soviet discussions, 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 70]-204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 70], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 84]-235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 85]

U.S. position, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14], 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 17], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 26], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 29], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 42]-121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 42], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 49]-142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 49], 156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 49], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 56]-172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 56], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 95]-287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183]

public opinion, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94]-274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94]

Soviet capabilities, 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 144], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 236], 809 [Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 289], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300]

Soviet response, 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-234 [Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 84]

special forces, 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 22]

U.N. appeal and, 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

U.S.-British discussions, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14]

U.S. forces in Europe, expansion of (see also military planning above), 138n [Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 53]-164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 53], 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 77], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 140], 398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144]-399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 144], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 154]-429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 205]

U.S. position, 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17]-47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 17], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 213]-587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214]

worldwide theater, 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 102]-321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]

French position, 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6]-15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6], 83 [Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 30], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178]-502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179], 508 [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180]-509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205]-558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 220]

German Democratic Republic, possible uprising in, 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 231]-648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232], 777 [Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 276], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]-854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17]-49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]-55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 22], 65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23], 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 43], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]

force, use of, 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 69], 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95]-286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 95], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97], 513n [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182], 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10], 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]

ICJ appeal:

British position, 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 54]

French position, 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 54]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]-133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46]

U.S. position, 113 [Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 40], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40]-117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 125 [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 43]-126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 249 [Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 89]-250 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 89], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 42]-124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42], 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 53]-165 [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 55]-169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 55], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64]-191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]-230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83]

JCS discussion, 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]-364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125]

Kissinger-Adenauer talks, 824 [Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298]-827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 298], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]-831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305]-841 [Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 305]

NATO information, 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17], 65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77]

NATO participation (see also preparedness demonstration measures below), 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14], 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 36], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]-177 [Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 58]

economic countermeasures, 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151], 826 [Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 298]

force, use of, 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 144]

military planning, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98], 317 [Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 101], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]-413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]-493 [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176]

NATO positions, 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157]-435 [Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

preparedness demonstration measures, 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95]-285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113]

propaganda, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 99]

U.S.-British discussions, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 40]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 53 [Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 18]-54 [Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18]

naval countermeasures, 145 [Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 49], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 53], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 129], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151], 424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153]-425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 205], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 300]

Allied participation, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76]-217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]

British position, 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153], 491 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 174], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188], 826 [Pg. 826 is part of Doc. 298]-827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 298], 841 [Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 305], 864 [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316]

neutral countries confidential meetings, 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 35]-104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 36]

Norstad meeting, 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166]

phases of, 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64]-189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 68]

preparedness demonstration measures (see also military planning under force, use of above), 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 40]-116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 42]-121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 42], 309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99]

Berlin Wall and, 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118]-348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118]

British position, 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98]

French position, 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]

NATO participation, 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95]-285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113]

negotiation proposals and, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94]-276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96]-294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]

U.S. position, 142 [Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 49]-148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 49], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 53]-164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 53], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 95]-287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 144]

publicity, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51]-160 [Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 53], 309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99], 779 [Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 276]

stockpiling, 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10], 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34], 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 40], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]

tripartite discussions, 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43]-128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 43]

tripartite participation, 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14], 518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184]-519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 184]

U.N. appeal (see also ICJ appeal above; Negotiation proposals), 125 [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 43]-126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46], 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 89]-259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]

Berlin Wall and, 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118], 356 [Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 121]

force, use of and, 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

Uniting for Peace resolution, 702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14]-40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34]-101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17]-48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17]-49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]-55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]-834 [Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301]

U.S. position, 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9], 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12]

worldwide countermeasures, 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6], 61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 22], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185]

Couve de Murville, Maurice, 65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23], 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 98]-308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98]

contingency planning, 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95]-288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]

force, use of, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94]-274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95]-284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97]-302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97]-301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]

German Democratic Republic access control, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 95]-290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95]

negotiation proposals, 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94]-273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96]-298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96], 368n [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 651 [Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 234]-652 [Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 234], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234]

Ambassadorial probe/consultations, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 236]-664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 236], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 238]-675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 238], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 238]

Foreign Ministers meeting proposals, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94]-272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 94], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]-414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229]

Rusk-Gromyko discussion (New York), 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 152]-417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 152]

timing, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98]

West Berlin morale and, 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 234]-655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234]

Western agenda, 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 152]-418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]-270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94]

quadripartite meetings, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95]-309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]-427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 153], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234]-659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]-678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

tripartite meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]-280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149]

Cuba, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 24], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 27]

Currien, Giles, 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]

Czechoslovakia. See Border issues.

Davis, Richard H., 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6], 16n [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42], 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 853n [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]

Day, Arthur R., 329n [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107], 424n [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 167], 467n [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 587n [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214], 727n [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254]

de Carbonnel, Charles, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]

de Gaulle, Charles, 80 [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 30]-86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 100], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 221]-624 [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 221]

Adenauer, meeting with, 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 225]-639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]-660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 235]

contingency planning, 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 31]-86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 54], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57]

German unification, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24], 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 84], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 209]

Kennedy, correspondence with, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 131]-378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 131], 493n [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176], 525n [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187], 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 250], 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 263]-751 [Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264]

negotiation proposals, 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 100]-316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 131]-378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 131], 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 171]-482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 171], 525 [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187]-526 [Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 187], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 200]-550 [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 200], 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216]-594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 216], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 221]-622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 221], 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 239]-681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243], 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-717 [Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 250], 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 263]-750 [Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 263]

speech (Oct. 2, 1961), 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 171]

Dean, Sir Patrick, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14]

Decker, Maj. Gen. C.L., 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]

Defense, U.S. Department of, 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64]-189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82], 508n [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180], 853n [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]

Dillon, C. Douglas, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273]

contingency planning, 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77]-222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77]

Disarmament (see also European security arrangements), 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 73 [Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 26]-75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27], 496 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 176], 507 [Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 179]

nuclear testing, 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 717 [Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 250]-718 [Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 250]

Soviet position, 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 162]-447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 162]

Statement of Principles, 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 162]-447 [Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 162]

summit meeting proposal, 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]-811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

Dixon, Sir Pierson, 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32], 794 [Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 282]-795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 282]

Dowling, Walter C., 7n [Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4], 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 78n [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29], 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65]-192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66], 513 [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182]-514 [Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183], 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269], 842 [Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306], 864 [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

air access crisis, 796 [Pg. 796 is part of Doc. 283]-797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284], 828 [Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 299]-829 [Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 299], 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 303], 856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]-858 [Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 313], 862 [Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315]-863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 315]

Berlin Wall, 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 106], 341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115]

contingency planning, 104 [Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 36]-105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 36], 824 [Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298]-827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 298], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305]-841 [Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 305]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 534n [Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 189], 547n [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199], 552n [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 202]

German Democratic Republic access control, 844 [Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]-886 [Pg. 886 is part of Index], 862 [Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315]-863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 315]

Kennedy-Adenauer correspondence, 497n [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177], 641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229]-642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 229], 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]-660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 235]

negotiation proposals, 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 35], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 241]-693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 241], 834 [Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305], 864 [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316]

Soviet memorandum (Dec. 27, 1961), 756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266]-757 [Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 266]

Dulles, Allen W., 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166]

Dulles, John Foster, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 17], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 18], 59 [Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21]-60 [Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 21]

Ebert (E. Berlin Mayor), 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]

Eckhardt, Felix von, 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218]

Eddleman, Gen. Clyde, 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75]

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118]

Ellis, Frank B., 196 [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67]

Erhard, Ludwig, 732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258]-735 [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 258]

Etzdorf, Hasso von, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5]

European integration, 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57], 841 [Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 305]

European security arrangements:

British position, 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]

French position, 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 171]

German arms limitations, 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 170]-472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 170], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 170]

Germany, Federal Republic of, arms limitations:

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]-626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 221]

Soviet position, 56 [Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 20], 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 164], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 170], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183]

U.S. position, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219]-617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]-621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 221], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]-626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 221]

Germany, Federal Republic of, neutralization, 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234]-659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 218]-614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]-629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 300]

Germany, foreign forces in, reduction, 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 24], 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170]-474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 170], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 218]-614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 221]-629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]

negotiation proposals and, 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 86], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 89]-253 [Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 89]

Rapacki Plan, 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 170]

Soviet position, 56 [Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 20], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 24], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164]-457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 164], 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 164], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 170]-474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 170], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183]

U.S. position, 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 86], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 164], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168], 496 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 176], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 218], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219]-617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]-621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 221], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]-626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 221], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 221]-629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]

Fanfani, Amintore, 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 162]

Farrell, Adm., 123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42]-124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42]

Fessenden, Russell H., 159n [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 431n [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156], 439n [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 160], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 492n [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]

Festing, Sir Francis, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97]-300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]

Finland, 554 [Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204], 651 [Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 234]

Finletter, Thomas K., 178 [Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 59]-179 [Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 59], 383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 433n [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 156], 435 [Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]

contingency planning, 79n [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 29], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157]-435 [Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]

Fleiderer (FRG), 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 188]

Ford Foundation, 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 258]

Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 132n [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46], 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]-265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]-268 [Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 93], 316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101]-318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149], 698n [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 744 [Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 260]

Fowler, Henry H., 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 64], 200 [Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 69], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 112]

France (see also Contingency planning; France, French, tripartite, quadripartite, and Western subheadings under other subjects):

nuclear weapons, 718 [Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 250]-719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 250], 749 [Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 263]-750 [Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 263]

Free city proposals (see also U.N. guarantee/observer proposals), 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]-42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15]

access and, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168]-467 [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]

Berlin Wall and, 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 106]

four-power forces proposals, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 170]-473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170], 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 170], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 170], 575 [Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 209]-576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 209]

French position, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94]

German peace treaty and, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 209]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]-118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41]

Mansfield speech, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]-118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41]

Soviet position, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 70], 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 162], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 170], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 209], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 209]-573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 209], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 234], 689 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 240], 723 [Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 251]-724 [Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 251]

Khrushchev letter to Adenauer (Feb. 17, 1961), 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25]

U.N. headquarters/activities relocation proposal, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153], 451 [Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 162], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218]-609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218], 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237]

U.S.-British discussions, 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15]-44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15]

U.S. position, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 7], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 108 [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 38], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]-732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258], 742 [Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 260], 769 [Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 274], 787 [Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 278]

Western version, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 152], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153]

Freeman, Orville L., 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]

Freshman, C. Arnold, 732n [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258], 789n [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 279]

Friedrichstrasse crisis. See under Access harassment.

Froment-Meurice, 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]

Frontier issues. See Border issues.

Gaitskell, Hugh, 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57]

Gavin, James M., 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 100], 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 171]-484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172], 525 [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187]-526 [Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 187], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 200]-550 [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 200]

German Democratic Republic access control (see also Access harassment; Contingency planning; German peace treaty: Soviet separate treaty), 3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2]-4 [Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3]

agency principle, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 59 [Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21]-61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 95]

air access crisis and, 828 [Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 299], 862 [Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315]-863 [Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 315]

British position, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 49], 230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94]

civilian vs. military traffic and, 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57]

document stamping, 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 49], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82]-230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 91]-263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92]

French position, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 30], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 95]

German Democratic Republic, recognition of, and, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 94]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152]-421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 152]

inter-German relations and, 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 217]-602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 217], 605 [Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 218]-606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]

international access supervision and, 774 [Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 275]-775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]

negotiation proposals and, 846 [Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309]

peel-off procedure, 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 21]-59 [Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 36], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 95]

refugees, 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94]

Soviet intentions, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152]

Soviet position, 723 [Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 251], 738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 259]-739 [Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 259], 753 [Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 264]-754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 264], 773 [Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 275]-775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]

Soviet reverse agency proposal, 844 [Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]-886 [Pg. 886 is part of Index]

U.N. guarantee/observer proposals and, 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]-607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218]

U.S.-German Democratic Republic discussion proposals, 230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83]

U.S. position, 83 [Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 30], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 49]-153 [Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 49], 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 102], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 167], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172]-486 [Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 172], 754 [Pg. 754 is part of Doc. 264]

German Democratic Republic (see also European security arrangements; German Democratic Republic subheadings under subjects; Inter-German relations):

economic situation, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10]-28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]

political situation, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65]-192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66], 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 218]

contingency planning, 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 231]-648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232], 777 [Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 276], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]-854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 218]-613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 218], 842 [Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306]

refugees and, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1]-3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10]-27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10], 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103]

refugees (see also Berlin Wall), 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27], 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94]

access harassment and, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95]

Berlin Wall and, 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11], 341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115]-342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 115], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 168], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216]-592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 259], 753 [Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 264]

British position, 102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34]

German Democratic Republic political situation and, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1]-3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10]-27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10], 191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103]

Germany, Federal Republic of, policy toward, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95]

Soviet position, 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87]

Steinstucken enclave, 442 [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 161]-443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 161], 511 [Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 181], 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 204], 776 [Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 276]

U.S. position, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95], 364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125], 442 [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 161]-443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 161]

Soviet Union, relations with (see also German Democratic Republic access control; German peace treaty), 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10]

U.S. policy toward, 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72]

Western recognition, 60 [Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 21], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168], 515 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 183], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]-607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]

British position, 57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]-58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 21], 60 [Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 21], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 94], 655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 243]

French position, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 171]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 174], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]-607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]-630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273]

Soviet position, 457 [Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 164]-458 [Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 164], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 234], 685 [Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 240], 721 [Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 251], 739 [Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 259]

German peace treaty (see also Border issues; Negotiation proposals):

British position, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94]

free city proposals and, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 209]

French position, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 30]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11]

negotiation proposals and, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94]

parallel treaties proposal, 244 [Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 88], 402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]-403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162]-449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 162]

Soviet position, 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]-20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 26], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32]-88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 32]-92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32], 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 70], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162]-449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 162], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 170]-471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 170], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 209], 571 [Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 209]-572 [Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 209], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 240]

Soviet separate treaty (see also German Democratic Republic access control):

British position, 43 [Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15], 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34]-102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34]

French position, 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 100]-315 [Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 100]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11]-33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17]-51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95]-289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 95]

interim agreement and, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 244 [Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 88]

negotiation proposals and, 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 100]-315 [Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 100], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152]

Soviet intentions, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24]-68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 24], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32]-95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 32], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 70], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 70]-207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71], 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 84], 859 [Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314]-860 [Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 314]

British position, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14]

French position, 13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6]-14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6], 65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5]-10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152]-421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 152], 832 [Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 300]-833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 300]

U.S. position, 4 [Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 7 [Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4], 30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]-31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 26], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 29], 122 [Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 42], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 70], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87], 363 [Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 124], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152], 494 [Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 176]-495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 176]

U.S. position, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24]-67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 26]-73 [Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 26], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 32], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 84], 798 [Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 284]

U.S. response, 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17]-51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 256 [Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 89]-259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90]

U.S. position, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 7], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 32], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 37], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 86]

German unification (see also Border issues; European security arrangements; Germany, division of; Inter-German relations):

all-German talks proposals, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32], 363 [Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 124]

British position, 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94]

confederation, 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 252]

French position, 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24], 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 84], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 209], 749 [Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 263]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 174], 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 218]-612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 218], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221]

inter-German relations and, 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 218]-612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 218]

negotiation proposals and, 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 174], 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188]

neutralization, 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 749 [Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 263]

plebiscite proposals, 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96]-295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96]

self-determination. See plebiscite proposals above.

Soviet policy, 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6], 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]

Soviet position, 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]-19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32], 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 84], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 209], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 252]

Soviet-Germany, Federal Republic of, relations and, 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 219]

U.S. position, 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 26], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 29], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 38], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 179], 515 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 183], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188]

Western orientation, 207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71]-208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 71]

Germany, division of (see also Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic: Western recognition; German unification):

French position, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 152]

Soviet position, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 459 [Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 164]-460 [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165], 570 [Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 209]

U.S. position, 7 [Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 7], 20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57], 244 [Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 88], 736 [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 259]-737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 259]

Western acceptance, 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162]

Germany, Federal Republic of (see also Access; Berlin; European security arrangements; Germany, Federal Republic of, quadripartite, and Western subheadings under other subjects; Inter-German relations):

British forces in, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 40]

economic situation, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]

Khrushchev letter (Feb. 17, 1961) reply, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43]

Kroll-Khrushchev meeting, 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]-581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 215]-591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221], 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 224], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243]

military buildup (see also European security arrangements), 30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 32], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 70], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 121], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 209]

NATO participation, 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]

neutralization. See under European security arrangements.

Poland, relations with (see also Border issues), 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5]-11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5]

political situation, 30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]-31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 34], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219]

Soviet memorandum (Dec. 27, 1961), 709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 258], 756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266]-757 [Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 266]

tripartite troops reinforcement, 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 95]

United States, relations with, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9]-25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10]

Adenauer visits, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9], 45 [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17]-51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205]-559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205]

balance of payments, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]-29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77]-222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77]

Brandt visit, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9], 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10]-30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

U.S. forces in (see also European security arrangements), 23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]-29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10], 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269]

West Berlin, relations with, 4 [Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 218], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218], 739 [Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 259]-740 [Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 259]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 188], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 217]-599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 218], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]-670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237]

incorporation proposal, 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 145]-401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 491 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 174]-492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 217]-598 [Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217], 669 [Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 237]-670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]-732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258]

Soviet position, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 209], 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]-581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 252]

Gilpatric, Roswell L., 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173], 513n [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184]

Glenn, Edmund S., 80n [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 30], 84n [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 31]

Gray, Maj. Gen. David, 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 64], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 69]

Greece, 179 [Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 59], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102]

Greenhill, Denis, 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]

Grewe, Wilhelm C., 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3]-6 [Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4], 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9]-22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188]-532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 217]-603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

Berlin Wall, 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]-339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133]-381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133]

Clay appointment, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133]

contingency planning, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]-55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 130]-375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 130], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188]-528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]-834 [Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300]-832 [Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 300]

free city proposals, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]-118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41]

German Democratic Republic access control, 601 [Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 217]-602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 217]

German Democratic Republic political situation, 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]

inter-German relations, 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188]-530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 217]-602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 217]

negotiation proposals, 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 130]-376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 130], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133]-382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133]

neutralism, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133]-383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134]

Soviet separate treaty, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 832 [Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 300]-833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 300]

Vienna summit aide-memoire reply, 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]-133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Gromyko, Andrei Andreivich (see also Rusk-Gromyko discussion (New York) and U.S. Ambassadorial probe under Negotiation proposals), 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 40]

air access, 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 142]-395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]-543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195], 564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207]

German Democratic Republic, recognition of, 721 [Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 251]

negotiation proposals, 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 142]-395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143], 720 [Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 251]-726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253]

Vienna summit meeting, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32]

Washington visit, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168], 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]-480 [Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 170]

Gruson, Sydney, 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133]

Guthrie, John C., 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 26], 385n [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136], 409n [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150], 768n [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274], 772n [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 275], 846n [Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309]

Hammarskjold, Dag, 203 [Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 70], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237]

Hare, Raymond A., 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]

Harriman, W. Averell, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9], 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10], 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57]

Hatcher, Andrew T., 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41]

Hayter, Sir William, 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 49]

Heath, Sir Edward, 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256]-731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]

Heusinger, Gen. Adolf, 617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 219]

Hillenbrand, Martin J., 5n [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3], 16n [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 33n [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 51n [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 64n [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 26], 125n [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 43], 132n [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46], 159n [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 180n [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 60], 182n [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61], 269n [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 291n [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299n [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 371n [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129], 374n [Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 130], 431n [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156], 439n [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 160], 456n [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 167], 467n [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 497n [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177], 508n [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180], 536n [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 191], 544n [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 545n [Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198], 551n [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 201], 553n [Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 203], 596n [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603n [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 636n [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225], 650n [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 668n [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237], 709n [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248], 727n [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 259], 741n [Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260], 768n [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274], 772n [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 275], 789n [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 279], 793n [Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 282], 830n [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300], 846n [Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309], 850n [Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 310], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]n

Adenauer visits to U.S., 620

air access crisis, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281]

contingency planning, 57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]-61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22], 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 69], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173]

Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 544n [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on German and Berlin, 168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55]-169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 55]

negotiation proposals, 123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273]

Vienna summit meeting, 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 35], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 40]

Hodges, Luther H., 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111], 789 [Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 279]

Holloway, Jerome K., Jr., 361n [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123], 371n [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129], 405n [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 817n [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 295]

Home, Lord Frederick Douglas, 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 152]-422 [Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 152], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153], 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235], 756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266]

border issues, 655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243]

contingency planning, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 40], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95]-288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]

airlift, 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97]

force, use of, 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95]-284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97]-302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97]-301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]

preparedness demonstration measures, 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98]

German Democratic Republic access control, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152]

German Democratic Republic recognition, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234]

negotiation proposals, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14], 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15]-43 [Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96]-298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98], 653 [Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 234], 655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234]

Ambassadorial probe/consultations, 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 236]-664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 236], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 238], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 238]-676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 238], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

Foreign Ministers meeting proposals, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94]-271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94]-280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96]-295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 152], 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 234], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243]

Rusk-Gromyko discussion (New York), 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]-304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 98], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 152]

U.S.-British discussions, 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]

U.S. ambassadorial probe, 698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244]

Western agenda, 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96]-297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 152], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]

Soviet separate treaty, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94]

U.N. discussion, possible, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 94]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]-102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34]

Vienna summit aide-memoire reply, 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]-99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 34], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]-117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94]

quadripartite meetings, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95]-309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]-427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 153], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234]-659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]-678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

tripartite meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]-280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149]

Hood, Viscount Samuel, 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 21], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]

Humphrey, Hubert H., 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41], 563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 206]

Il'ichev, I. I., 709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248]

Imhof, Johannes V., 808n [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]

Indonesia, 397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143]

Inter-German relations (see also German unification):

discussion proposals, 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 70], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95]-291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96]

German Democratic Republic access control and, 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 217]-602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 217], 605 [Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 218]-606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]

German Democratic Republic, recognition of and, 43 [Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]

German unification and, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32], 363 [Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 124], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 218]-612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 218]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 152]-422 [Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 152], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 174], 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188]-530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188], 556 [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 204], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 217]-602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 217], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]

Germany, Federal Republic of-Soviet bilateral talks proposals, 795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 282], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]

mixed German Committee proposals, 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 86], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 89]-253 [Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 89], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 152]-422 [Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 152]

Soviet position, 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 70]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin (ICG), 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 42]-124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42], 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 53]-165 [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 55]-169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 55], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64]-191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 199 [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 69]-202 [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 74], 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]-230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 112]-337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

Interim agreement proposals (see also Negotiation proposals), 7 [Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4], 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10], 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 49], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 49]-158 [Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 49], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 88]-245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 89], 665 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 236]

Soviet position, 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 24], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32]-93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 32]-98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]

Soviet separate treaty and, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 244 [Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 88]

International Court of Justice (ICJ). See ICJ appeal under Contingency planning.

Interzonal trade agreement, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1]-3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 735 [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 258]

Italy, 178 [Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 59], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 162], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]

Japan, 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 32]

Jessup-Malik agreement (1949), 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 234]

Johnson, Lyndon B., 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9], 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 55], 199 [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 69], 214n [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 74], 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]

Berlin Wall, 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118], 351 [Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 119], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 121]-358 [Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 121]

contingency planning, 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64]-191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67]-196 [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67], 199 [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 69]-201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 69], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164]

Johnson, U. Alexis, 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 44]-130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 44], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128]-371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]n

contingency planning, 61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22]-63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 22], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]-136 [Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48], 155 [Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 49]-156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 49], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]-364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 154]

Jorden, William, 806 [Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 287]

Kaysen, Carl, 330n [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273], 768n [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274], 772n [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 275]

Kefauver, Estes, 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41]

Kennan, George F., 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 108], 387 [Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 137], 435 [Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]-437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 246]-708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 246], 728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255], 802 [Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286]-804 [Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 286], 865 [Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317]

Kennedy, John F. (see also Vienna summit meeting (U.S.-Soviet Union)), 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5]-11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11], 49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17]-50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72], 514 [Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218]

access, 605 [Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 218], 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 262]

Adenauer, correspondence with, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 389 [Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139]-391 [Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 139], 493 [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176]-497 [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188], 636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225]-638 [Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 225], 641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229]-642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 229], 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]-660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 235]

Adenauer, talks with, 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17]-51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18], 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205]-559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 216]-595 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 216], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218]-609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218], 614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219]-618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]-632 [Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222]

Adzhubei interviews, 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 230], 681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]-682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 240], 689 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 240], 780 [Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 277]-784 [Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278], 821 [Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 296]-822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]

air access crisis, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281], 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292]-814 [Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293]

Berlin visit proposal, 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 13]

Berlin Wall, 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110], 345 [Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 117]-349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118]-349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 120]-353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 120], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133]-381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]

border issues, 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 221]-624 [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 221]

Brandt, correspondence with, 345 [Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 117]-346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 117], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 120]-353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 120]

Brandt visit to U.S., 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10]-30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

Clay appointment, 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 233]

Clay reports, 509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181]

Congressional leaders, correspondence with, 837 [Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304]-839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 304]

Congressional meetings, 837 [Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304]-839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 304]

contingency planning, 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 271]

airlift, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

criterion for action, 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]-485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172]

economic countermeasures, 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66]-193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133]

emergency planning, 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67]-196 [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75]-216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 80]-226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 80], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 140]

force, use of, 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75]-216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 221]-629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]

military planning, 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 31], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 63], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72]-211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92]-266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]-413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 154]-429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 173]-489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 173], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 184]

NSAM No. 109, 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205]-560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

nuclear weapons, 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184], 595n [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 216], 596n [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217]

U.S. forces in Europe, expansion of, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 77], 398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144]-399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 144]

German Democratic Republic political situation, 639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 231]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17]-48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17]

naval countermeasures, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 300]

stockpiling, 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34]

U.N. appeal, 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34]-101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]-834 [Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301]

de Gaulle, correspondence with, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 131]-378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 131], 493n [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176], 525n [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187], 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 250], 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 263]-751 [Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264]

European security arrangements, 496 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 176], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 221]

Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]-265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 201], 553 [Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 203], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 220]

German Democratic Republic access control, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 30], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172]-486 [Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 172]

German Democratic Republic, recognition of, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]-630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221]

German peace treaty, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5]-10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 32]-92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 32], 494 [Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 176]-495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 176]

German unification, 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188]

Germany, Federal Republic of:

arms limitations, 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219]-617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]-621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 221], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]-626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 221]

mark revaluation, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]-29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10]

Soviet Union, relations with, 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 219]-616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219]

inter-German relations, 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188]-530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]

Khrushchev, correspondence with (Pen Pal), 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 162]-455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 162], 502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179]-508 [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 209]-580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210], 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224]-636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 230]-646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 230], 681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]-691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 240], 819 [Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296]-822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]

Macmillan, correspondence with, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 632 [Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222]-634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 225]

negotiation proposals, 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15], 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 131]-378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 131], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]-402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172], 587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216]-593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243], 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-717 [Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 250], 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 263]-750 [Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 263]

Ambassadorial probe/consultations, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 239]-681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244]-704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133], 588 [Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]

Gromyko visit to Washington, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168], 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]-480 [Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 170]

Macmillan discussions, 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]-704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

Rusk-Gromyko discussion (New York), 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

summit meeting proposals, 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52]-162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]

timing, 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 122]

U.S. Ambassadorial probe, 402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]-403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244], 759 [Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268]-760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273]

Western agenda, 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 122], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 460 [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165], 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216]-594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 216]

Norstad, correspondence with, 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185]

press conference (June 28, 1961), 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51]

Southeast Asia, 130n [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 44], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72]-212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73]

Adzhubei interviews, 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 230], 681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]-682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 240], 689 [Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 240], 780 [Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 277]-784 [Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278], 821 [Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 296]-822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]

air access crisis, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281], 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292]-814 [Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293]

Berlin visit proposal, 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 13]

Berlin Wall, 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110], 345 [Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 117]-349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118]-349 [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 120]-353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 120], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133]-381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]

border issues, 27 [Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 221]-624 [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 221]

Brandt, correspondence with, 345 [Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 117]-346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 117], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 120]-353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 120]

Brandt visit to U.S., 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10]-30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

Clay appointment, 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205], 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 233]

Clay reports, 509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181]

Congressional leaders, correspondence with, 837 [Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304]-839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 304]

Congressional meetings, 837 [Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304]-839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 304]

contingency planning, 24 [Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 9], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 762 [Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 271]

airlift, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

criterion for action, 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]-485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172]

economic countermeasures, 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66]-193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133]

emergency planning, 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67]-196 [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75]-216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 80]-226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 80], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 140]

force, use of, 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75]-216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 221]-629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]

military planning, 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 31], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 63], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72]-211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92]-266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151]-413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 154]-429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155], 488 [Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 173]-489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 173], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 184]

NSAM No. 109, 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205]-560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

nuclear weapons, 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]-518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184], 595n [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 216], 596n [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217]

U.S. forces in Europe, expansion of, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 77], 398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144]-399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 144]

German Democratic Republic political situation, 639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 231]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17]-48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17]

naval countermeasures, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300], 833 [Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 300]

stockpiling, 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34]

U.N. appeal, 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34]-101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]-834 [Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301]

de Gaulle, correspondence with, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 131]-378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 131], 493n [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176], 525n [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187], 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 250], 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 263]-751 [Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264]

European security arrangements, 496 [Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 176], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 221]

Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]-265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 551 [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 201], 553 [Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 203], 619 [Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 220]

German Democratic Republic access control, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 30], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172]-486 [Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 172]

German Democratic Republic, recognition of, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]-630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221]

German peace treaty, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5]-10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 32]-92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 32], 494 [Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 176]-495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 176]

German unification, 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188]

Germany, Federal Republic of:

arms limitations, 616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219]-617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]-621 [Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 221], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]-626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 221]

mark revaluation, 21 [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]-29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10]

Soviet Union, relations with, 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 219]-616 [Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 219]

inter-German relations, 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188]-530 [Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 188], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]

Khrushchev, correspondence with (Pen Pal), 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 162]-455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 162], 502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179]-508 [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 209]-580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210], 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224]-636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 230]-646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 230], 681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]-691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 240], 819 [Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296]-822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]

Macmillan, correspondence with, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 632 [Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222]-634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 225]

negotiation proposals, 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15], 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 131]-378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 131], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]-402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172], 587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216]-593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243], 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-717 [Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 250], 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 263]-750 [Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 263]

Ambassadorial probe/consultations, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 239]-681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244]-704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133], 588 [Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]

Gromyko visit to Washington, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168], 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]-480 [Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 170]

Macmillan discussions, 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]-704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

Rusk-Gromyko discussion (New York), 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]

summit meeting proposals, 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52]-162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]

timing, 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 122]

U.S. Ambassadorial probe, 402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]-403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244], 759 [Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268]-760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273]

Western agenda, 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 122], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 460 [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165], 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216]-594 [Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 216]

Norstad, correspondence with, 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185]

press conference (June 28, 1961), 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51]

Southeast Asia, 130n [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 44], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72]-212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73]

speech (July 25, 1961), 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 233 [Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 84]-235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 85], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 94]-276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 114], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 162]

speech (U.N., Sept. 25, 1961), 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161]-442 [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 161], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162], 493 [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176]

U.N. guarantee/observer proposals, 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82]

U.S.-British discussions, 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]-44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15]

U.S.-French discussions, 80 [Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 30]-86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5]-11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188]-532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, relations, 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77]

Vienna summit aide-memoire, 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]-102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 38], 165n [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54]

West Berlin plebiscite proposals, 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 34], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 91], 309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]-415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152]

Kennedy, Robert F., 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 209], 763 [Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 272], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289], 842 [Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306]-843 [Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307]

Berlin Wall, 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]-334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118]

contingency planning, 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 90], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]

Kharlamov, Mikhail A., 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]-402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 444–445 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 162]

Khrushchev, Nikita S. (see also Soviet subheadings under other subjects; Vienna summit meeting (U.S.-Soviet Union)), 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24]-69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 24], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96], 759 [Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]-811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

Adenauer, letter to (Feb. 17, 1961), 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9]-23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25]

Fanfani talks, 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96], 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 162]

free city proposals, 449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 162]-450 [Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 162]

German peace treaty, 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]-20 [Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32]-88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 32]-92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32], 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162]-449 [Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 162]

Soviet separate treaty, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32]-95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 32]

interim agreement, 92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 32]-93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 32]-98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]

Kennedy, correspondence with (Pen Pal), 444 [Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 162]-455 [Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 162], 502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179]-508 [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180], 567 [Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 209]-580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210], 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224]-636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 230]-646 [Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 230], 681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]-691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 240], 736 [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 259]-766 [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 272], 819 [Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296]-822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]

Kroll meeting, 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]-581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 215]-591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221], 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 224], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243]

McCloy discussions, 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 85]

negotiation proposals, 56 [Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 20], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]-402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]

Pen Pal correspondence. See Kennedy, correspondence with above.

political situation, 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]-42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 27]

speech (Dec. 9, 1961), 665 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 236], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 238], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 241]

speech (Jan. 6, 1961), 4 [Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3]

statement (Jan. 18, 1962), 763 [Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 272]-766 [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 272]

Killick, John E., 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]

Kissinger, Henry A., 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 13], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 38], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 588 [Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]-589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 215], 824 [Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298]-827 [Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 298], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]-831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305]-841 [Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 305]

Klein, David, 508n [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180], 648n [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232]

Klein, Gunther, 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]

Kohler, Foy D., 8n [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 16n [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 21n [Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9], 25n [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 64n [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 71n [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 26], 111n [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 125n [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 43], 159n [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51], 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 329n [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107], 361n [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123], 380n [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 388n [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 138], 405n [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 411n [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 415n [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 424n [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 431n [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156], 439n [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 160], 463n [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 167], 467n [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 492n [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 497n [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177], 508n [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180], 527n [Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 188], 536n [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 191], 539n [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193], 544n [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 545n [Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198], 551n [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 201], 553n [Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 203], 562n [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206], 640n [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 694n [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 242], 736n [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 259], 741n [Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260], 768n [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274], 772n [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 275], 811n [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290], 846n [Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309], 850n [Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 310], 853n [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]

access, 134 [Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 46], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95]-291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 217]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

air access crisis, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291]-813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 295]-819 [Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296]

Berlin Wall, 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]-334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113]-339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]-368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126]

contingency planning, 57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 42], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43]-128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 43], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 519 [Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 184]

force, use of, 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 42], 135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173], 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 52 [Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 18], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 43], 135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]

ICJ appeal, 113 [Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 40], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40]-117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 125 [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 43]-126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45]-132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]

preparedness demonstration measures, 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 122 [Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 42]-123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42]

departmental measures, 320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 102]

free city proposals, 118n [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 535 [Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 190], 544n [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 554 [Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204]-555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 204]

German Democratic Republic access control, 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82]

German Democratic Republic, recognition of, 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273]

Germany, Federal Republic of:

arms limitations, 625 [Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 221]

Berlin, relations with, 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217]

U.S. forces in, 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 55]

negotiation proposals, 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15], 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 126], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-406 [Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 149], 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170], 695n [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 242], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]

Soviet separate treaty, 43 [Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]

U.S. policy toward Berlin, 793 [Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 282]-795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 282]

Vienna summit meeting, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 35], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 40]-113 [Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 40], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45]-132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Kozlov, Frol R., 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 142]

Krapf, Franz, 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Kroll, Hans, 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23]-66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 280], 841 [Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 305]

Khrushchev meeting, 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]-581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 215]-591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221], 635 [Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 224], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243]

Kusterer (FRG), 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Kuznetzov, V.V., 555 [Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 204]

Laloy, Jean, 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43]-127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43], 641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 550 [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 200], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Lampson, Edward T., 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]

Langer, Wolfram, 732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258], 734 [Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 258]

Laos, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 27]

Latin America, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11]

Lebel, Claude, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 84 [Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 31], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 295]

Ledwidge, W.B.J., 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Legere, Col. Lawrence J., 223n [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 112]-337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212]-584 [Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212], 726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253]-727 [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254], 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 262]

Lehmann, Glenn A., 159n [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51]

Lejins, Nora, 8n [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 45n [Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 590n [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 216], 603n [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 614n [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219], 620n [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 215 [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 154], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]

Lemmer, Ernst, 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]

Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 194n [Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 362n [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 127], 544n [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197]

air access crisis, 800 [Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291]-813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292]

Berlin Wall, 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 119], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128]-371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129]

contingency planning, 138n [Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184]

Lightner, Edwin A., Jr., 1 [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1]-3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2], 75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27]-76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 27], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161]-443 [Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 161], 865 [Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317]-867 [Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 317]

access harassment, 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]-438 [Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 159]

air access crisis, 814 [Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293]-816 [Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294], 822 [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]-824 [Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 297 and Doc. 298], 843 [Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307]-844 [Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308]

Berlin Wall, 326 [Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 105]-327 [Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 105], 332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110]-333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111], 339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]-346 [Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 117], 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 524 [Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 186]-525 [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 192]-539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 202], 564n [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207], 565 [Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 208]-566 [Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 208], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 213]

Lippmann, Walter, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 38], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 219]

Lucet, Charles, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Luxembourg, 179 [Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 59]

Lyon, Cecil B., 312n [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 100]

Macmillan, Harold, 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14], 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 21], 60 [Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 21], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34], 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 243], 758 [Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 267]

Kennedy, correspondence with, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79]-224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 632 [Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222]-634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 225]

negotiation proposals, 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15], 44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]-704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]-44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 34]-102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34]

Mali, 397n [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143]

Mansfield, Mike, 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10], 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]-118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 162]

Matthews, H. Freeman, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]

Mautner, Karl F., 167n [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 55], 214n [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 74]

McBride, Robert H., 12n [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]

McCloy, John J., 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 40], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 85], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 258]

McDermott, Edward A., 184 [Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 62]-185 [Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 62]

McGhee, George C., 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6], 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 40], 123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 236n [Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 86], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 91], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 242]-695n [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 242]

McNamara, Robert, 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 55], 215n [Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 75], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77]-222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273], 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218]

Berlin Wall, 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111]-334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111], 344 [Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118]-348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118], 355 [Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 121]

Clay appointment, 369 [Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 127], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205]

contingency planning, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 118]-348 [Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 118], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]-364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125], 379n [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

federal emergency planning, 189 [Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 64], 196 [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67], 209 [Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72]-210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72], 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 77]-220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 77]

force, use of, 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151], 518 [Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 184]

military planning, 61 [Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22]-63 [Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 22], 138n [Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72]-211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143], 412 [Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 151], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 154]-429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173]-489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 173]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 544n [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197], 547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]

Menshikov, Mikhail A., 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3], 13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40], 202 [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70]-207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150]-411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

speech (Dec. 11, 1961), 665 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 236], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 238], 676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 238], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 241]

Vienna summit meeting, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 70]-206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 70]

Millar, Sir Frederick Hoyer, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14]-41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 43 [Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15], 102n [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34]

Moffett, James D., 111n [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]

Murphy, Robert D., 349n [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118]

Murrow, Edward R., 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 77]-220 [Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 77], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 99], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102]-323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 102], 339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]-341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143]

National Intelligence Estimates:

NIE 11-7-61, 56 [Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 20]-57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]

SNIE 2-2-62, 196n [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67]

National Security Council, 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39]-111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 160 [Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]-162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77]-222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77]

Action Memoranda:

NSAM No. 58, 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]-165 [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64]

NSAM No. 59, 197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 68]-199 [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 69], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 74]

NSAM No. 62, 225 [Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 80]-226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 80]

NSAM No. 92, 398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144]-399 [Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 144]

NSAM No. 94, 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 148]

NSAM No. 107, 508n [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180]

NSAM No. 109, 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185]

NSAM No. 117, 639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226]

NSAM No. 128, 813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292]-814 [Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293]

contingency planning, 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]-165 [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54], 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66]-197 [Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 68], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 77]-221 [Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 77]

documents:

NSC 5803, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 22]

meetings:

June 13, 1961, 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]

June 29, 1961, 160 [Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]-162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53]

July 13, 1961, 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66]-196 [Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 67]

July 19, 1961, 219 [Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 77]-222 [Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 77]

Negotiation proposals (see also Contingency planning; German peace treaty; Interim agreement proposals; U.N. guarantee/observer proposals; Vienna summit meeting (U.S.-Soviet Union); specific topics):

Adenauer-de Gaulle meeting, 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 225]-639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235]-660 [Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 235]

Adenauer-Khrushchev meeting proposals, 759 [Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268]

air access and, 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149]

airlift and, 101 [Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 34], 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]

Ambassadorial probe/consultations (see also U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussion proposals below), 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96]

British position, 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 236]-665 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 236], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 238], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 238], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

French position, 663 [Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 236]-665 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 236], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 238]-675 [Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 238], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 238]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 665 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 236]-666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 236], 676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 238]-678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

NATO statement, 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 238], 676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 238]-681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240], 710 [Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 248]

U.S.-French discussions, 679 [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 239]-681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]

U.S. position, 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 236], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 238]-676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 238], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

Berlin Wall and, 331 [Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 108], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 115], 344 [Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116], 711 [Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 248]-712 [Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 248]

British position, 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 34], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 113], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189], 653 [Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 234]-655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234]

British-Soviet talks proposals, 794 [Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 282]-795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 282]

Commission on Central European problems proposals, 238 [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 86]-239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 86]

European security proposals, 239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 86], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 89]-253 [Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 89]

Foreign Ministers meeting proposals, 238 [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 86]-239 [Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 86], 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 89]-249 [Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 89], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 89], 257 [Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 89], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 91]-262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 91], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 102], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 152], 430 [Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 155]-431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243]

British position, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 94]-279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96]-295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]-414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 152], 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 234], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]

French position, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94]-272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 94], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 126]-368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94]-272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151]

Soviet position, 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 170]

timing, 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]-229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82], 238 [Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 86], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 91], 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]-266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94]-279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96]-295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98]-305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98]

four-nation non-aggression agreement, 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82]-229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82]

French opposition, 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 100]-316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]-362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]-367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 126], 651 [Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 234]-652 [Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 234], 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 234]-655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234]

Congressional meetings, 839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 304]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 374 [Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 130]-375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 130], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 241]-693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 241]

Kennedy-Adenauer discussions, 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216]-595 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 216], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 241]-693 [Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 241]

Kennedy-de Gaulle correspondence, 368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 131]-378 [Pg. 378 is part of Doc. 131], 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-717 [Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 250], 748 [Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 263]-750 [Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 263]

U.S. position, 481 [Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 171]-484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172], 640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228]-641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244], 793 [Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 282]-794 [Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 282], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 310]-851 [Pg. 851 is part of Doc. 310]

French position, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94]-273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96]-298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152]

Friedrichstrasse crisis and, 533 [Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 189]-536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 191], 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 554 [Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204], 585 [Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 213]-586 [Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 213]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243]-698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244]-704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96], 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 130], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 133]-382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133], 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188], 588 [Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]-589 [Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 215], 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 221], 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 234]

Germany, Federal Republic of-Soviet bilateral talks proposals, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 282], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289], 834 [Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305]

German peace treaty and, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94]

German unification and, 485 [Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 172], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 174], 529 [Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 188]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin discussions, 123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42]

Khrushchev statement (Jan. 18, 1962), 763 [Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 272]-766 [Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 272]

military planning and, 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152], 653 [Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 234]

NATO positions, 383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 188]-532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 94], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95]

NSC discussions, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 53]

peace conference, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96]

planning, 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 86]-241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87], 245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89]-259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90]

preparedness demonstration measures and, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94]-276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96]-294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96], 305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]

propaganda and, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133]

protracted talks proposals, 236 [Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 86]-241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87]

public opinion, 367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 126], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 131]

publicity, 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 94], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]-362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 130], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149]

U.S. position, 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96], 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 100], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]-362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 139], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152]

quadripartite discussions, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23]

reciprocal declarations proposal (Solution C), 150 [Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 49]-151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 49], 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 86]-241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 89], 257 [Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 89], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92]

refugees, 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82]

Rusk-Gromyko discussion (New York), 388 [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 138], 431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156]-433 [Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 156], 439 [Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 160]-441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164]-461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165]

British position, 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]-304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 98], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 152]

French position, 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149], 413 [Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 151]-414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 152]-417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 152], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 152]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98]-305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98]

tripartite discussions, 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149]

U.S. position, 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98]-306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 98], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 494 [Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 176], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 234], 670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237]-671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237]

Western agenda, 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]-431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156]

Soviet agenda, 460 [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165]-461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 168]-467 [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169], 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 170]-477 [Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 170], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 221], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 234]

Soviet intentions, 56 [Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 20]-57 [Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 26]-72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 26]

Soviet position, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 84], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 170]-475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 170]

Soviet separate treaty and, 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 100]-315 [Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 100], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152]

summit meeting proposals (see also Vienna summit meeting (U.S.- Soviet Union)), 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52]-162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 794 [Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 282]

Thompson-Gromyko talks. See U.S. Ambassadorial probe below. timing, 246 [Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 89]-247 [Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 89], 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94]-271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 122]

British position, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94]-271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96], 418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152]

trade agreements, 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82]

tripartite discussions, 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]-811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

U.N. discussion, possible, 174 [Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 57]-175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57], 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82], 258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 89]-259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96]-293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96], 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 102]

British position, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 94]

U.S. Ambassadorial probe, 388 [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 138]-389 [Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 142]-395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143], 846 [Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309]

British position, 699 [Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 243], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]-703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 280]-791 [Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 280]

French position, 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 497 [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177]-498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178], 525 [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187]-526 [Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 187]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 832 [Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 300], 834 [Pg. 834 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305]-841 [Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 305]

planning/instructions for, 709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248]-715 [Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 249], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]-732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258], 736 [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 259]-745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 260], 758 [Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 267]-760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269], 768 [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274]-775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 280]-791 [Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 280], 807 [Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288], 846 [Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309]-852 [Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 310]

Thompson-Gromyko meeting reports, 720 [Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 251]-726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253], 751 [Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264]-755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265], 784 [Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278]-788 [Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 278], 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284]-800 [Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285], 835 [Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 302], 859 [Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314]-862 [Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315]

U.S.-British discussions, 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256]-731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]

U.S. position, 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96], 402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]-403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 242], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 246]-708 [Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 246], 729 [Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 255], 802 [Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286]-804 [Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 286]

U.S.-British discussions, 40 [Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 14], 42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15]-44 [Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 15], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]-704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245]

U.S.-French discussions, 81 [Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 30], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 200]-550 [Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 200]

U.S.-German Federal Republic discussions, 402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]

U.S. position, 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11], 34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 73 [Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 26]-74 [Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 29], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 38], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 49], 148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 49]-151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49], 162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57], 177 [Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 58], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76]-218 [Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 76], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 84], 435 [Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158]-437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216]-593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216]

U.S. public statement proposal, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141]

U.S. "quiet" approach, 250 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 89], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 91], 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]

U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussion proposals (see also Rusk- Gromyko discussion (New York) and U.S. Ambassadorial probe above):

British position, 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207]

French position, 497 [Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177]-498 [Pg. 498 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178]

Geneva discussion proposal, 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 309], 864 [Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316]

Gromyko visit to Washington, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 168], 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]-480 [Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 170]

Soviet position, 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]-402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 162], 475 [Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 170]

U.S. position, 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 122], 430 [Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 155], 495 [Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 176], 556 [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 204], 587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214]-588 [Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215], 680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 239], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 242]-695 [Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 242], 794 [Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 282]-795 [Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 282]

use of force and, 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96], 396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143]-397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]-662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 236]

Vienna summit aide-memoire reply and, 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 34]

West Berlin morale and, 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 234]-655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234]

Western agenda (see also Western Foreign Ministers meetings; specific issues and proposals), 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96]

Adenauer visit to U.S., 528 [Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 188], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205]-559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-563 [Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 206], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 216]-618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]-634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224]

British position, 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96]-297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]

French position, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 417 [Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 152]-418 [Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 152], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 152]-424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 295 [Pg. 295 is part of Doc. 96]-296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 130]-376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 130], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 152], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153]-426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 174]-492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 556 [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 204], 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin discussion, 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82]

Norstad meeting, 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166]

Rusk-Gromyko discussion (New York), 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 152], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 152], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 152]-426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155]-431 [Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156]

U.S. position, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 102]-320 [Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 102], 360 [Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 122], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 130], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153], 460 [Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165]-461 [Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234]-657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 234]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings and, 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216], 840 [Pg. 840 is part of Doc. 305]

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 152]

Netherlands, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9], 178 [Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 59], 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157]

Neutral countries, 364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125], 397n [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143], 452 [Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 162]-453 [Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162]

Neutralism, 380 [Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 133], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133]-383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134]

Newsom, Edwin Earl, 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111]

Nitze, Paul H., 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 55], 202n [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70], 202 [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70]-207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71], 492n [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 551n [Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 201], 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

contingency planning, 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64]-190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 64], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166]

airlift, 200 [Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 69], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129]-373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 129]

force, use of, 122 [Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 42]-123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64], 200 [Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 69]-201 [Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 69], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]-322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-396 [Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 143], 398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 173]

Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 544n [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197]

German Democratic Republic access control, 229 [Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 82]-230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83]

negotiation proposals, 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]

Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205]

Adenauer visit to U.S., 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205]-559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205]

air access crisis, 800 [Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285]-802 [Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286], 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291]-813 [Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292]

Berlin Wall, 344 [Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128]

contingency planning, 124 [Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 42], 456 [Pg. 456 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]-561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 205]

force, use of, 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 42]-122 [Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 42], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]-561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 205]

military planning, 136 [Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]-138 [Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205]-560 [Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 205]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]-548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 199], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205]-558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205]

Kennedy, correspondence with, 520 [Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 185]-523 [Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 185]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see also Allied contributions under Contingency planning: force, use of; NATO subheadings under other subjects):

Berlin guarantee, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 17]-49 [Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]

missile force proposal, 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]-177 [Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 58]

negotiation proposals, 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 94], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 673 [Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 238]-681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]

nuclear weapons, 72 [Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 26], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 29], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 219], 718 [Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 250]-719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 250], 749 [Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 263]-750 [Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 263]

Vienna summit aide-memoire reply, 178 [Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 59]-182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61]

Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact proposal, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170]

Norway, 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189]

Oder-Neisse line. See Border issues.

Ormsby Gore, Sir David, 102n [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]-811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

negotiation proposals, 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]-697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]-702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256], 794n [Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 282], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]-811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

Osterheld (FRG), 842 [Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306]

Owen, Henry, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 37], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 91], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147]

Paris treaties (1954), 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10], 376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 130], 515 [Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 183]

Parsons, J. Graham, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]

Pelen, Pierre, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]

Pen Pal correspondence. See Kennedy-Khrushchev (Pen Pal) correspondence under Berlin.

Percival, J. Graham, 672n [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Perkins, Milo, 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72]

Poland (see also Border issues), 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5]-11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 218]

Propaganda, 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11], 147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 49]-148 [Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 49], 164 [Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 53], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 80], 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 89]-248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 89]

Berlin Wall and, 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 111]

French position, 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 98]

Friedrichstrasse crisis and, 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 199]

NATO participation, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 99]

negotiation proposals and, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133]

U.S. position, 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90]-260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 90], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102]-323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 102]

Radio Free Europe (RFE), 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11]

Ramsbotham, Peter E., 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]

Rapacki Plan, 242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87], 474 [Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 170]

Rau (GDR), 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1]

Reynaud, Paul, 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 162]

Ritter (FRG), 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98]

Roberts, Sir Frank, 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 280]-791 [Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 280], 794 [Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 282]

Rostow, Walt W., 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 130n [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 44], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 148], 805 [Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 287]

Rumbold, Sir Anthony, 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]

Rusk, Dean (see also Rusk-Gromyko discussion (New York) under Negotiation proposals), 50 [Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23]-65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 72], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94], 760 [Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269], 768n [Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 274], 772n [Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 275], 775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]

access, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217]-600 [Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 217], 640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228]

air access, 385 [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]-386 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 136], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150]-411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]

access harassment, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95]-283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 167]

air access crisis, 792 [Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 281], 811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]-812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291], 838 [Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 304], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 309]-848 [Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 309], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of Doc. 310]

Western responses, 463 [Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 167], 467 [Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169]-468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170], 727 [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254]-728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217]-614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]-632 [Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222]

all-Berlin proposals, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]-702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]

Berlin Wall, 329 [Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 107]-330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108], 332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110], 337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]-339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]-362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]-368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 761 [Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 270]

border issues, 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218]-610 [Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 218], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 221]-623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 221], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243]

Clay appointment as Special Representative, 649 [Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 233], 854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]-856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

Congressional meetings, 837 [Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304]-839 [Pg. 839 is part of Doc. 304]

contingency planning, 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43]-128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 43], 159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51]-160 [Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]-364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 132], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]

airlift, 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129]-373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 129]

economic countermeasures, 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66]-193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 67], 279 [Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 94], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95]-288 [Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 95]

emergency planning, 193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 66]-194 [Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67], 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95]

force, use of, 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47], 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95]-286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 95], 662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 236]

land probe, 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97]

military planning, 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97]-303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 97]-301 [Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 97], 322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]-398 [Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144], 492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]-493 [Pg. 493 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 184], 854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]-856 [Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313]

nuclear weapons, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 94], 286 [Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 95]-287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95], 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 97], 319 [Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 102], 371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129]-372 [Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 173]

German Democratic Republic political situation, 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 231]-648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]-854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]-55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19], 65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23], 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46]-135 [Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]

ICJ appeal, 125 [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 43], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 54]

naval countermeasures, 373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 129], 424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153]-425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153]

preparedness demonstration measures, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94]-276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 284 [Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 95]-287 [Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 95]

U.N. appeal, 133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]

disarmament, 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]-811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

European Ambassadors meeting, 318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102]-323 [Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 102]

Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin, 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]-265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 535 [Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 190]-536 [Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 191], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193]-541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194], 544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197]-547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199], 554 [Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207]

German Democratic Republic:

access control, 3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2]-4 [Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 95]-290 [Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 95], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 217]-603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 605 [Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 218]-606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]

political situation, 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 612 [Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 218], 647 [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 231]-648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232], 853 [Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 311]-854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312]

inter-German relations, 601 [Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 217]-602 [Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 217], 605 [Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 218]-606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 244]

Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on German and Berlin, 167 [Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 55]-168 [Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 55]

Kennedy-Adenauer correspondence, 636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225]-638 [Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 225]

Kennedy-de Gaulle correspondence, 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-719 [Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 250]

Kennedy-Khrushchev (Pen Pal) correspondence, 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224]

Khrushchev letter (Feb. 17, 1961), 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-13 [Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 6], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43]

negotiation proposals, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40], 283 [Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 95], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234]

Adenauer-de Gaulle meeting, 637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 225]-639 [Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226]

Ambassadorial probe/consultations, 664 [Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 236], 666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 674 [Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 238]-676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 238], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

declaration proposal (Solution C), 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82]

Foreign Ministers meeting proposals, 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]-265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94]-278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 94], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96]-294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96], 419 [Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 152]

French position, 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 100]-316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]-367 [Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 126], 484n [Pg. 484 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172]

Germany, Federal Republic of-Soviet bilateral talks proposals, 810 [Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 289]

Gromyko visit to Washington, 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

Kennedy-de Gaulle correspondence, 716 [Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 250]-717 [Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 250]

preparedness demonstration measures and, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 94]-276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94]

publicity, 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96], 313 [Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 100], 362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]

Soviet agenda, 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 234]

timing, 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]-228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]-265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94]-271 [Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 94], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94]-278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 94], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96]-294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98]-305 [Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 98], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 122]

tripartite discussions, 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]-811 [Pg. 811 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290]

U.N. discussion, possible, 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96]-293 [Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 96], 298 [Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 96]

U.S.-British discussions, 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]-697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]-703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244]

U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussion proposals, 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207], 587 [Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214]-588 [Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215]

U.S. Ambassadorial probe, 388 [Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 138]-389 [Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139], 402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244], 709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248]-715 [Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 249], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256]-731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257], 736 [Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 259]-745 [Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 260], 759 [Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268], 767 [Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 273], 846 [Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309]-852 [Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 310]

use of force and, 414 [Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 151], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]-662 [Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 236]

Western agenda, 280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96], 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 122], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 130]-376 [Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 130], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 152], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 152]-425 [Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 153], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 168], 640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228]-641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229], 656 [Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 234]-657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 234]

propaganda, 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93]

refugees, 282 [Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 95], 324 [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103]-325 [Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 104]

Southeast Asia, 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73]

Soviet policies toward Berlin, 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 44], 192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 65 and Doc. 66], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 71], 805 [Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 287]

Soviet political situation, 728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255]-729 [Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 255]

Soviet separate treaty, 14 [Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 94], 420 [Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 152]

U.N. guarantee/observer proposals, 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]-228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]-607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218]

U.N. headquarters/activities relocation proposal, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 218], 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237]

U.S.-British discussions, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 38 [Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14]-39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]-564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]-697 [Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]-703 [Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 244], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256]-731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]

U.S.-French discussions, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6]-16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 100]-316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126]-368 [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126]

U.S.-Germany, Federal Republic of, discussions, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 513 [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]-672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]-831 [Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 300]

U.S. policy toward Berlin, 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7]-18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71]-209 [Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 79], 793 [Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 282]

U.S.-Soviet discussions, 385 [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]-386 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 136], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150]-411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198]-547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]

U.S. troop movements, 640 [Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228], 648 [Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232], 755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265]-756 [Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266]

Vienna summit aide-memoire reply, 108 [Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 38]-109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 40]-117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 125 [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 43]-127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45]-133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46], 160 [Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]-161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 165 [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54]-166 [Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 54], 180 [Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 60]-183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 61]

Vienna summit meeting, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 35]

West Berlin:

Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 217]-598 [Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217], 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 218], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]-670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237], 732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258]-733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 258]

morale, 374 [Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 130]-375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 130], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 258]-735 [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 258]

plebiscite proposals, 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 98]-308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99]-311 [Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 99]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]

quadripartite meetings, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95]-309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]-427 [Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 153], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234]-659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]-678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

tripartite meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]-280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149]

Western summit meeting proposals, 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91]

Russell, Adm. J.S., 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76]

Russell, John, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]

Salinger, Pierre, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]-402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]

Samuel, Ian, 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]

Schelling, Thomas C., 170 [Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 56]-172 [Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 56]

Scherpenberg, Hilger van, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 11 [Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5]

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 173 [Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 57]-176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58]

Schnez, Maj. Gen., 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

Schnippenkoetter, Swidbert, 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221], 830 [Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 300]

Schorr, Daniel, 670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237]

Schroeder, Gerhard, 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 234], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 234], 665 [Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 236]-666 [Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 236], 676 [Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 238]-678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217]-603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]-613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221], 622 [Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 221]-623 [Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 221]-624 [Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 221]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234]-659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]-678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

Semenov (USSR), 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

Seydoux, Francois, 328 [Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 106]

Shuckburgh, Sir Evelyn, 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 40], 127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]-698 [Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 243], 701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244]

contingency planning, 116 [Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 40], 122 [Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 42], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 43], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 43]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96], 299 [Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 97], 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151], 415 [Pg. 415 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]

Smirnov, Andrei A., 10 [Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216], 631 [Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 221]

Smirnovsky, Mikhail N., 385 [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]-386 [Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 136], 409 [Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150]

Smith, Gerard C., 248 [Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 89]

Sokolov, Oleg M., 385 [Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]

Solovyev, Col. A. I., 525n [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 192]-539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193], 727n [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254]

Sorensen, Theodore C., 102n [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34], 165 [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54]-166 [Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 54], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 76], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147]

Southeast Asia, 129 [Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 44]-130 [Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 44], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72]-212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73]

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 48 [Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17]

Soviet Union (see also Free city proposals; Negotiation proposals; Soviet subheadings under other subjects):

China, People's Republic of, relations with, 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29]

economic situation, 86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

German Democratic Republic, relations with, 26 [Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 10]

political situation, 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]-42 [Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15], 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 27]-77 [Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 28], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 246]-706 [Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 246]

space program, 76 [Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 27], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 98]

United States, relations with, 123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 123]

Spaak, Paul-Henri, 446 [Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 162], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 170], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 216]

Steel, Christopher, 822n [Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297], 836 [Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 303]

Steeves, John M., 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15]

Stevenson, Adlai E., 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 39 [Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 57], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141]

Stikker, Dirk U., 178 [Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 59]-179 [Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 59], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 199]

Stockwell (Deputy SACEUR), 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 261], 755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265]

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 16n [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7], 557n [Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 205], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 261], 755 [Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265]

Stoph, Adolph, 2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1]

Strauss, Franz Josef, 265 [Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 92], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 218], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 218]-614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 221]-629 [Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 221]

Adenauer visits to U.S., 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205]-559 [Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 205], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 217], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 218], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

Sukarno, 397 [Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 143]

Sukhodrev (USSR), 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32], 96 [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33], 468 [Pg. 468 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170]

Sullivan, Charles A., 169 [Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 55]

Sulzberger, Cyrus L., 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]-402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147]

Summit meeting proposals. See Negotiation proposals; Vienna summit meeting (U.S.-Soviet Union).

Sweden, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]

Sweeney, Joseph, 562n [Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 206]

Swihart, James W., 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14]

Switzerland, 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]

Taylor, Maxwell D., 223 [Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79], 583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212], 747 [Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 262]

contingency planning, 190 [Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 64], 211 [Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 72], 230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83]-231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84], 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92], 392 [Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 140], 462 [Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 166], 647n [Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 231]

military planning, 186 [Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 63], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 64], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 154]-429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155], 487 [Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 173], 489 [Pg. 489 is part of Doc. 173]

Thompson, Llewellyn E. (see also U.S. Ambassadorial probe and Ambassadorial probe/consultations under Negotiation proposals), 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]-19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32], 122 [Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 42]-123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 145]-401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 634 [Pg. 634 includes portions of Doc. 222, Doc. 223, and Doc. 224]-636 [Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225]

all-Berlin proposal, 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 88]

confederation proposal, 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 252]-726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253]

Friedrichstrasse crisis, 541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]-543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195], 564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207], 581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211]-583 [Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212]

German peace treaty, 30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]-33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24]-68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 24]

negotiation proposals, 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 123 [Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 42], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 88]-245 [Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 142]-395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143], 556 [Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 204], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 246]

Soviet policies toward Berlin, 6 [Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4]-7 [Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 4], 77 [Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 28], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 49], 241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87]-242 [Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 87]

U.S. policy toward Berlin, 69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25]-70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25], 77 [Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 28]-78 [Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29]

U.S.-Soviet discussions, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 24]-69 [Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25], 231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84]-235 [Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 85]

Thomson, John A., 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 58 [Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 21], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]

Thurston, Raymond L., 337n [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113]

Topping, John L., 187n [Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 64], 199n [Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 69]

Trivers, Howard, 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 261], 761 [Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 270]

Tubby, Roger, 118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 41], 159n [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 49, Doc. 50, and Doc. 51]

Turkey, 179 [Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 59], 182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61]-183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 61], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 102]-322 [Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 102], 434 [Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 157]

Tyler, William R., 131n [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45], 324n [Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 103], 641 [Pg. 641 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229], 679n [Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 239], 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243], 701n [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289]

U-2 incident, 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 24], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32], 292 [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96]

Ulbricht, Walter, 1 [Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1]-2 [Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1], 292n [Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 96]

U.N. guarantee/observer proposals:

British position, 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34]

corridor proposals, 117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218]

German Democratic Republic access control and, 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]-607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 218]-607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218]

Soviet position, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 32], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 33]-98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 451 [Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 162], 576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 209]

U.S. position, 151 [Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 49], 158 [Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 49], 227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82]-228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 86]-241 [Pg. 241 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 96]

West Berlin plebiscite, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141]

Underdeveloped countries, Germany, Federal Republic of, aid to, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 9], 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]-29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10]

United Kingdom (see also Contingency planning; British, United Kingdom, tripartite, quadripartite, and Western subheadings under other subjects), 28 [Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10]

United Nations (see also U.N. guarantee/observer proposals):

headquarters/activities relocation proposal, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 153]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218]-609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218], 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237]

Soviet position, 451 [Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 162], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 183]

Kennedy speech (Sept. 25, 1961), 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161]-442 [Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 161], 454 [Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162]

U.S. change of administration, 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3]-6 [Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4], 22 [Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 9]

U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 90], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91]

U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussions. See Negotiation proposals; Vienna summit meeting (U.S.-Soviet Union).

Vienna summit meeting (U.S.-Soviet Union), 31 [Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 11]-32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11], 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25]-79 [Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 29], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 32]-98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34], 103 [Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 35], 109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39]-111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]

Soviet aide-memoire, 96 [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33]

Western reply, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 38]-109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39], 125 [Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 43]-127 [Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 43], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45], 165 [Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54]-166 [Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 54], 178 [Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 59]-183 [Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 61], 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73]-213 [Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 73]

French position, 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45], 178 [Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 59]-179 [Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 59], 181n [Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 60]

NSC discussions, 160 [Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]-161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 194 [Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67]

U.S.-British discussions, 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]-102 [Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 34], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]-117 [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]

U.S.-German Federal Republic discussions, 132 [Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 46]-133 [Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 46]

Soviet position, 205 [Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 70]-206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 70]

Vigderman, Alfred G., 117n [Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41]

Vine, Richard D., 730n [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256]

Von Brentano, Heinrich. See Brentano, Heinrich von.

Watson, Maj. Gen. Albert, II, 525n [Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 192]-539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 205], 704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245], 746 [Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 261]

Weber, Heinz, 8 [Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5], 46 [Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95], 590 [Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 216], 603 [Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218], 614 [Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 221]

West Berlin:

economic situation, 671 [Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 237]

Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with:

British position, 696 [Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 243]

economic aid, 732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258]-733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 258]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 531 [Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 188], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 217]-599 [Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 217], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 218], 668 [Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 237]-670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237]

harassment, 4 [Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3]

incorporation proposal, 400 [Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 145]-401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146], 491 [Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 174]-492 [Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 217]-598 [Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217], 669 [Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 237]-670 [Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 237], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]-732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258]

political activities, 272 [Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 94]

Soviet position, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 568 [Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 209], 580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210]-581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 252]

U.S. position, 604 [Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 218], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 218], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]-732 [Pg. 732 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258], 739 [Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 259]-740 [Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 259]

Kennedy visit, 35 [Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 13]

morale, 373 [Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 129], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 133], 499 [Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 178], 510 [Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 181]-512 [Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 181], 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189], 775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]-776 [Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 276]

Berlin Wall and, 333 [Pg. 333 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111], 339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]-341 [Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115], 349n [Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 118], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 119]

French position, 654 [Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 234]-655 [Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 234]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 374 [Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 130]-375 [Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 130], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243], 733 [Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 258]-735 [Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 258]

neutralization. See Free city proposals.

plebiscite proposals:

British position, 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 34], 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 98]

French position, 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 98]-308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 98]-308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98], 598 [Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217]

Soviet position, 788 [Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 278]

U.S. position, 70 [Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 34], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 52], 228 [Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 82], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 92], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 98]-307 [Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 98], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 141], 788 [Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 278], 807 [Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288]

Soviet forces in:

British position, 100 [Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 34], 700 [Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 243]

Soviet position, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 170]-473 [Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170], 479 [Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 170], 575 [Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 209]-576 [Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 209], 686 [Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 240]

U.S. position, 476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 170], 506 [Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 179], 607 [Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 218], 798 [Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 284]

Western covert activities, 32 [Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 11], 252 [Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 89]

Soviet position, 206 [Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 70], 578 [Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 209], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 240]-688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 240], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 256]-731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]

Western forces in:

French position, 85 [Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 31]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 29 [Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10]-30 [Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11]

Soviet position, 5 [Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 32], 682 [Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 240]-685 [Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 240], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 240]-688 [Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 240], 799 [Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 284]-800 [Pg. 800 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285]

U.S. position, 43 [Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 24], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 259]-738 [Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 259], 752 [Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 264]-753 [Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 264], 798 [Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 284]

Western European Union (WEU), 278 [Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 94], 285 [Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 95], 626 [Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 221]

Western Foreign Ministers meetings, 64 [Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 23]-65 [Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23], 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]-309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99]

British position, 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96]

French position, 296 [Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 96]

Germany, Federal Republic of, participation, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]-270 [Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 94]

Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 593 [Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216]

publicity, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 98]-311 [Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 99]

quadripartite meetings, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 95]-309 [Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99], 411 [Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151]-424 [Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153], 650 [Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 234]-659 [Pg. 659 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235], 661 [Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 236]-667 [Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 236], 672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238]-678 [Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 238]

tripartite meetings, 269 [Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 94]-280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 94], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of Doc. 149]-408 [Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149]

U.S. position, 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 297 [Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 96]

U.S. preparations, 261 [Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 91]-264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92]

Western Four-Power Working Group. See Four-Power Working Group on Germany Including Berlin.

Western summit meeting proposals, 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 91]-263 [Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 91], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93], 483 [Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 171]

Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 812 [Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291]

Williams, G. Mennen, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14]

Wilson, Donald E., 260 [Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 90], 339 [Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114]

Winckler, Jean-Claude, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 6], 15 [Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 6], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 45], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 126], 368n [Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 126], 808 [Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 289], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 295]

Wolf (FRG), 845 [Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 308]

Wright, J.O., 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40]

Zorin-Bolz agreement. See Bolz-Zorin agreement.

Zulueta, Philip de, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 14], 41 [Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15], 98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34]